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Sample records for safeguarding nuclear reprocessing

  1. Simulation of nuclear fuel reprocessing for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Canty, M.J.; Dayem, H.A.; Kern, E.A.; Spannagel, G.

    1983-11-01

    For safeguarding the chemical process area of future reprocessing plants the near-real-time material accountancy (NRTMA) method might be applied. Experimental data are not yet available for testing the capability of the NRTMA method but can be simulated using a digital computer. This report describes the mathematical modeling of the Pu-bearing components of reprocessing plants and presents first results obtained by simulation models. (orig.) [de

  2. Analytical chemistry needs for nuclear safeguards in nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.

    1977-01-01

    A fuel reprocessing plant designed to process 1500 tons of light water reactor fuel per year will recover 15 tons of Pu during that time, or approximately 40 to 50 kg of Pu per day. Conventional nuclear safeguards accountability has relied on batch accounting at the head and tail ends of the reprocessing plant with semi-annual plant cleanout to determine in-process holdup. An alternative proposed safeguards system relies on dynamic material accounting whereby in-line NDA and conventional analytical techniques provide indications on a daily basis of SNM transfers into the system and information of Pu holdup within the system. Some of the analytical requirements and problems for dynamic materials accounting in a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant are described. Some suggestions for further development will be proposed

  3. EURATOM safeguards. Safeguards verifications in reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heppleston, M.

    1999-01-01

    This paper provides a brief historical view of the legal basis for EURATOM. The specific application of safeguards to large scale reprocessing plants, from the theoretical model to the practical application of inspection is considered. The challenge to adequately safeguard major commercial reprocessing facilities has led to many novel approaches being developed. These lessons will also benefit other safeguard projects as a result. Good cooperation between the operator and regulator is essential for the satisfactory installation of adequate safeguard controls. The use of modern data processing technology combined with other diverse monitoring techniques has shown that a major industrial scale reprocessing plant can be controlled under international safeguards to provide a high level of assurance [ru

  4. The Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation Safeguards and Separations Reprocessing Plant Toolkit

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McCaskey, Alex [ORNL; Billings, Jay Jay [ORNL; de Almeida, Valmor F [ORNL

    2011-08-01

    This report details the progress made in the development of the Reprocessing Plant Toolkit (RPTk) for the DOE Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NEAMS) program. RPTk is an ongoing development effort intended to provide users with an extensible, integrated, and scalable software framework for the modeling and simulation of spent nuclear fuel reprocessing plants by enabling the insertion and coupling of user-developed physicochemical modules of variable fidelity. The NEAMS Safeguards and Separations IPSC (SafeSeps) and the Enabling Computational Technologies (ECT) supporting program element have partnered to release an initial version of the RPTk with a focus on software usability and utility. RPTk implements a data flow architecture that is the source of the system's extensibility and scalability. Data flows through physicochemical modules sequentially, with each module importing data, evolving it, and exporting the updated data to the next downstream module. This is accomplished through various architectural abstractions designed to give RPTk true plug-and-play capabilities. A simple application of this architecture, as well as RPTk data flow and evolution, is demonstrated in Section 6 with an application consisting of two coupled physicochemical modules. The remaining sections describe this ongoing work in full, from system vision and design inception to full implementation. Section 3 describes the relevant software development processes used by the RPTk development team. These processes allow the team to manage system complexity and ensure stakeholder satisfaction. This section also details the work done on the RPTk ``black box'' and ``white box'' models, with a special focus on the separation of concerns between the RPTk user interface and application runtime. Section 4 and 5 discuss that application runtime component in more detail, and describe the dependencies, behavior, and rigorous testing of its constituent components.

  5. Integrated international safeguards concepts for fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Gutmacher, R.G.; Markin, J.T.; Shipley, J.P.; Whitty, W.J.; Camp, A.L.; Cameron, C.P.; Bleck, M.E.; Ellwein, L.B.

    1981-12-01

    This report is the fourth in a series of efforts by the Los Alamos National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, to identify problems and propose solutions for international safeguarding of light-water reactor spent-fuel reprocessing plants. Problem areas for international safeguards were identified in a previous Problem Statement (LA-7551-MS/SAND79-0108). Accounting concepts that could be verified internationally were presented in a subsequent study (LA-8042). Concepts for containment/surveillance were presented, conceptual designs were developed, and the effectiveness of these designs was evaluated in a companion study (SAND80-0160). The report discusses the coordination of nuclear materials accounting and containment/surveillance concepts in an effort to define an effective integrated safeguards system. The Allied-General Nuclear Services fuels reprocessing plant at Barnwell, South Carolina, was used as the reference facility

  6. Nuclear safeguards policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1982-01-01

    Claims have been made that Australia's nuclear safeguards policy, announced in 1977, has changed. However, examination of the texts of nuclear safeguards agreements negotiated by Australia shows that the policy has been implemented and adhered to. The purpose of these agreements is to obtain assurance that uranium exported is used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The questions of reprocessing, transfer to third countries and the application of IAEA safeguards are discussed

  7. Safeguards implementation in UP3 reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laurent, J.P.; Regnier, J.; Talbourdet, Y.; De Jong, P.

    1991-01-01

    The implementation of safeguards in a large size reprocessing plant is a challenge, considering the high throughput of nuclear material and the sophisticated automation of such facilities. In the case of UP3, a pragmatic and realistic approach has been devised and is applied through an efficient cooperation between the safeguards organizations, the french national authorities and the operator. In essence, they consist in verification of every significant inputs and outputs, in timely analysis by NDA (e.g. solutions of dissolution through an on site k-edge equipment), in monitoring selected parts of the inprocess inventory and in specific containment/surveillance systems for the spent fuel storage ponds and the PuO2 storage. (author)

  8. Nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Estrampres, J.

    2010-01-01

    Close cooperation with the Ministry of Industry with representation from the UNESA Safeguards Group, has meant that, after almost two years of intense meetings and negotiations, Spain has a specific plant to plant agreement for the application of Safeguards under this new method. This is an agreement which aims to be a benchmark for all other EU countries, as the IAEA tends to apply a generic agreement that, in many cases, majority interferes in the nuclear power plants own processes. (Author).

  9. International safeguards for reprocessing plants. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kratzer, M.; Scheinman, L.; Sievering, N.; Wonder, E.; Lipman, D.; Immerman, W.; Elliott, J.M.; Crane, F.

    1981-04-01

    Proliferation risks inherent in reprocessing show the need to employ technically effective safeguards which can detect, with a high degree of assurance and on a timely basis, the diversion of significant quantities of fissionable material. A balance must be struck between what is technically feasible and effective and what is institutionally acceptable. Purpose of this report is to examine the several technical approaches to safeguards in light of their prospective acceptability. This study defines the economic, political and institutional nature of the safeguards problem; surveys generically alternative technical approaches to international safeguards including their effectiveness and relative development; characterizes the institutional implications and uncertainties associated with the acceptance and implementation of each technical alternative; and integrates these assessments into a set of overall judgments on feasible directions for reprocessing plant safeguards systems.

  10. International safeguards for reprocessing plants. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kratzer, M.; Scheinman, L.; Sievering, N.; Wonder, E.; Lipman, D.; Immerman, W.; Elliott, J.M.; Crane, F.

    1981-04-01

    Proliferation risks inherent in reprocessing show the need to employ technically effective safeguards which can detect, with a high degree of assurance and on a timely basis, the diversion of significant quantities of fissionable material. A balance must be struck between what is technically feasible and effective and what is institutionally acceptable. Purpose of this report is to examine the several technical approaches to safeguards in light of their prospective acceptability. This study defines the economic, political and institutional nature of the safeguards problem; surveys generically alternative technical approaches to international safeguards including their effectiveness and relative development; characterizes the institutional implications and uncertainties associated with the acceptance and implementation of each technical alternative; and integrates these assessments into a set of overall judgments on feasible directions for reprocessing plant safeguards systems

  11. Safeguarding a future industrial reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-11-01

    This paper is submitted to Working Group 5, Sub-Group B for information. It is being submitted to Working Group 4 for discussion at their meeting in January 1979 and shows that by a combination of accountancy, surveillance and containment a reliable safeguards system can be designed for the reprocessing of fuels of the BWR and PWR type. Its arguments can, in general terms, be applied to plants for reprocessing LMFBR fuels, with due allowance for future advances which should improve our overall knowledge of the reliability of safeguards systems. In the reprocessing of fast reactor (LMFBR) fuels, as compared with LWR fuels, the main differences are the higher plutonium concentration and lower heavy metal throughput in the early stages of the reprocessing operations. At later stages in the process (after plutonium/uranium separation) the plants could be similar and have similar safeguarding problems. Plants for reprocessing LMFBR on a commercial scale will not be in operation for a number of years. In these plants greater attention may have to be paid to safeguards at the early stages, especially to waste/raffinate streams, than in the PWR/BWR reprocessing plant. The actual balance between containment, surveillance and accountancy adopted will depend on the status of the technology of safeguards and reprocessing. It can be anticipated that improvements to measurement systems will be made which may allow greater reliance on actual measurement. Treatment and recycle of solid wastes will advance and could therefore lead to improvements in accountancy in, for example, the ''head-end''

  12. Nuclear safeguards technology 1986

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    This publication presents the results of the sixth in a series of international symposia on nuclear material safeguards. Development efforts related to safeguards for reprocessing plants constituted over twenty per cent of the programme. Other papers present results of over four years of field testing of near real time material accountancy at a plant in Japan, and results for a lesser period of time at a plant in Scotland. Papers reporting work on destructive and non-destructive measurement procedures or equipment constituted another thirty per cent of the programme, more if measurements in reprocessing and poster presentations are included. In honour of the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory, two sessions were devoted to a review of destructive analytical measurement procedures. Some subjects received only minor attention during the Symposium. The statistical theory of random sampling, safeguards for uranium enrichment plants, material accountancy systems and several other topics appear only incidentally in the programme, but primarily because there are few remaining problems, not because there is little remaining interest

  13. Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simpson, Michael F.; Law, Jack D.

    2010-01-01

    This is a submission for the Encyclopedia of Sustainable Technology on the subject of Reprocessing Spent Nuclear Fuel. Nuclear reprocessing is the chemical treatment of spent fuel involving separation of its various constituents. Principally, it is used to recover useful actinides from the spent fuel. Radioactive waste that cannot be re-used is separated into streams for consolidation into waste forms. The first known application of nuclear reprocessing was within the Manhattan Project to recover material for nuclear weapons. Currently, reprocessing has a peaceful application in the nuclear fuel cycle. A variety of chemical methods have been proposed and demonstrated for reprocessing of nuclear fuel. The two most widely investigated and implemented methods are generally referred to as aqueous reprocessing and pyroprocessing. Each of these technologies is described in detail in Section 3 with numerous references to published articles. Reprocessing of nuclear fuel as part of a fuel cycle can be used both to recover fissionable actinides and to stabilize radioactive fission products into durable waste forms. It can also be used as part of a breeder reactor fuel cycle that could result in a 14-fold or higher increase in energy utilization per unit of natural uranium. Reprocessing can also impact the need for geologic repositories for spent fuel. The volume of waste that needs to be sent to such a repository can be reduced by first subjecting the spent fuel to reprocessing. The extent to which volume reduction can occur is currently under study by the United States Department of Energy via research at various national laboratories and universities. Reprocessing can also separate fissile and non-fissile radioactive elements for transmutation.

  14. Safeguards for reprocessing and enrichment plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    Agency safeguards are entering a new phase with the coming under active safeguards for the first time of reprocessing plants in several regions of the world. This is taking place at a time when not only the safeguards aspect itself is coming under international scrutiny, but also at a time when the necessity of reprocessing plants is being called into question. Attracting less attention at the moment, but potentially of equal significance, are the enrichment plants that soon will be coming under Agency safeguards. It is not unreasonable in view of the present controversies to ask what is the significance of these reprocessing and enrichment plants, what are the problems concerning safeguards that appear to have given rise to the controversies, and how these problems are to be solved. The question of significance is an easy one to answer. The output of these plants is material which some people consider can be used directly for military purposes, whereas the output from other plants, for instance, reactors, would require long and extensive processing before it could be used for military purposes. Like most short answers, this one is an over-simplification which requires some elaboration to make it strictly accurate. For example, the material output of a power reactor is in the form of irradiate assemblies containing plutonium which is potentially of military use if the irradiation had been within a certain range. However, to utilize this plutonium under clandestine conditions, the highly radioactive material would have to be secretly transported to a reprocessing plant and there would have to be simultaneous falsification of the reactor material accounts and the plant records. Such falsification would be difficult to conceal. The total time required to obtain usable plutonium would be many months. Diversion of material from a uranium fabrication plant making fuel for power reactors would be easier physically but strategically it would be of little value. The

  15. Aggregated systems model for nuclear safeguards decisions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-03-01

    This report summarizes a general analytical tool designed to assist nuclear safeguards decision-makers. The approach is based on decision analysis--a quantitative procedure for evaluating complex decision alternatives with uncertain outcomes. The report describes the general analytical approach in the context of safeguards decisions at a hypothetical nuclear fuel reprocessing plant

  16. Development of safeguards approach for the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, S.J.; Abedin-Zadeh, R.; Pearsall, C.; Chesnay, B.; Creusot, C.; Ehinger, M.; Kuhn, E.; Robson, N.; Higuchi, H.; Takeda, S.; Fujimaki, K.; Ai, H.; Uehara, S.; Amano, H.; Hoshi, K.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP), which is currently undergoing construction and commissioning by the Japan Nuclear Fuels Limited (JNFL), is scheduled to begin active operations in 2005. The planned operating capacity is 800 tonnes of spent fuel per year containing approximately 8 tonnes of plutonium. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Japan safeguards authorities are working with JNFL to develop a Safeguards Approach that is both effective and efficient. In order to accomplish this goal, a number of advanced concepts are being introduced and many currently applied safeguards measures are being enhanced. These new and improved techniques and procedures will provide for more sensitive and reliable verification of nuclear material and facility operations while reducing the required inspection effort. The Safeguards Approach incorporates systematic Design Information Examination and Verification (DIE/DIV) during all phases of construction, commissioning and operation. It incorporates installed, unattended radiation and solution measurement and monitoring systems along with a number of inspector attended measurement systems. While many of the measurement systems will be independent-inspector controlled, others will require authentication of a split signal from operator controlled systems. The independent and/or authenticated data from these systems will be transmitted over a network to a central inspector center for evaluation. Near-Real-Time-Accountancy (NRTA) will be used for short period sequential analysis of the operator and inspector data which, when combined with Solution Monitoring data, will provide higher assurance in the verification of nuclear material for timeliness and of the operational status of the facility. Samples will be taken using a facility installed, but IAEA authenticated, automatic sampling system and will then be transferred to a jointly used IAEA-JSGO On-Site Laboratory (OSL). This paper provides an

  17. How safe are nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sullivan, E.

    1979-01-01

    Reports of weaknesses in IAEA safeguards have alarmed the US and since September 1977, US officials have refused to certify that the IAEA can adequately safeguard nuclear material the US exports. For political reasons, the IAEA safeguards system cannot perform an actual policing role or physically protect strategic material. The IAEA can only send out inspectors to verify bookkeeping and install cameras to sound the alarm should a diversion occur. Based on these IAEA reports and on interviews with scientists and US officials, the following serious problems hampering the Agency's safeguards effort can be identified: no foolproof safeguards for commercial reprocessing plants, uranium enrichment facilities, or fast breeder reactors; equipment failure and unreliable instruments; faulty accounting methods; too few well-trained inspectors; restrictions on where inspectors can go; commercial conflicts. Programs by the US, Canada, West Germany, Japan, and developing nations devised to better safeguards are briefly discussed. Some experts question whether international safeguards can be improved quickly enough to successfully deter nuclear weapons proliferation, given the rapid spread of nuclear technology to the third world

  18. Safeguards and nuclear forensics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gangotra, Suresh

    2016-01-01

    Nuclear Safeguards is the detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons, or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by early detection. Safeguards implementation involves nuclear material accounting and containment and surveillance measures. The safeguards are implemented in nuclear facilities by the states, or agencies and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The measures for the safeguards include nuclear material Accounting (NUMAC) and Containment and surveillance systems. In recent times, there have been advances in safeguards like Near Real Time Monitoring (NRTM), Dynamic Nuclear Material Accounting (DNMA), Safeguards-by-Design (SBD), satellite imagery, information from open sources, remote monitoring etc

  19. Containment/surveillance concepts for international safeguards in reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bleck, M.E.; Cameron, C.P.; Camp, A.L.

    1980-01-01

    This paper examines the potential role of advanced containment/surveillance instrumentation systems for international safeguards in reprocessing plants. Several conceptual systems for the surveillance of containment boundary penetrations in a reference reprocessing plant are described and evaluated. The results of the evaluation aid in understanding the potential capabilities and limitations of containment/surveillance as an international safeguards concept in this type of facility

  20. Fully integrated safeguards and security for reprocessing plant monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Duran, Felicia Angelica; Ward, Rebecca; Cipiti, Benjamin B.; Middleton, Bobby D.

    2011-01-01

    Nuclear fuel reprocessing plants contain a wealth of plant monitoring data including material measurements, process monitoring, administrative procedures, and physical protection elements. Future facilities are moving in the direction of highly-integrated plant monitoring systems that make efficient use of the plant data to improve monitoring and reduce costs. The Separations and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM) is an analysis tool that is used for modeling advanced monitoring systems and to determine system response under diversion scenarios. This report both describes the architecture for such a future monitoring system and present results under various diversion scenarios. Improvements made in the past year include the development of statistical tests for detecting material loss, the integration of material balance alarms to improve physical protection, and the integration of administrative procedures. The SSPM has been used to demonstrate how advanced instrumentation (as developed in the Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies campaign) can benefit the overall safeguards system as well as how all instrumentation is tied into the physical protection system. This concept has the potential to greatly improve the probability of detection for both abrupt and protracted diversion of nuclear material.

  1. Safeguards on nuclear waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Crawford, D.W.

    1995-01-01

    Safeguards and security policies within the Department of Energy (DOE) have been implemented in a graded fashion for the protection, control and accountability of nuclear materials. This graded philosophy has meant that safeguards on low-equity nuclear materials, typically considered of low diversion attractiveness such as waste, has been relegated to minimal controls. This philosophy has been and remains today an acceptable approach for the planning and implementation of safeguards on this material. Nuclear waste protection policy and guidance have been issued due to a lack of clear policy and guidance on the identification and implementation of safeguards controls on waste. However, there are issues related to safe-guarding waste that need to be clarified. These issues primarily stem from increased budgetary and resource pressures to remove materials from safeguards. Finally, there may be an unclear understanding, as to the scope and content of vulnerability assessments required prior to terminating safeguards on waste and other discardable materials and where the authority should lie within the Department for making decisions regarding safeguards termination. This paper examines these issues and the technical basis for Departmental policy for terminating safeguards on waste

  2. Report of the LASCAR forum: Large scale reprocessing plant safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-01-01

    This report has been prepared to provide information on the studies which were carried out from 1988 to 1992 under the auspices of the multinational forum known as Large Scale Reprocessing Plant Safeguards (LASCAR) on safeguards for four large scale reprocessing plants operated or planned to be operated in the 1990s. The report summarizes all of the essential results of these studies. The participants in LASCAR were from France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Commission of the European Communities - Euratom, and the International Atomic Energy Agency

  3. Safeguards on nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cisar, V.; Keselica, M.; Bezak, S.

    2001-01-01

    The article describes the implementation of IAEA safeguards for nuclear materials in the Czech and Slovak Republics, the establishment and development of the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) at the levels of the state regulatory body and of the operator, particularly at the Dukovany nuclear power plant. A brief overview of the historical development is given. Attention is concentrated on the basic concepts and legal regulation accepted by the Czech and Slovak Republics in accordance with the new approach to create a complete legislative package in the area of nuclear energy uses. The basic intention is to demonstrate the functions of the entire system, including safeguards information processing and technical support of the system. Perspectives of the Integrated Safeguards System are highlighted. The possible ways for approximation of the two national systems to the Safeguards System within the EU (EURATOM) are outlined, and the necessary regulatory and operators' roles in this process are described. (author)

  4. Psychology of nuclear safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Parker, L [Manchester Univ. (UK)

    1978-08-17

    it is argued that it is unreasonable to expect the Non-Proliferation Treaty to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons, which it was designed to do. However it is considered that although prevention cannot be guaranteed it is possible to deter such diversions. The question of publicity is examined since any safeguards system is judged exclusively on what is seen to be their failures and safeguard authorities will be tempted to conceal any diversion.

  5. Safeguarding of large scale reprocessing and MOX plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Howsley, R.; Burrows, B.; Longevialle, H. de; Kuroi, H.; Izumi, A.

    1997-01-01

    In May 97, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the final measures of the ''93+2'' safeguards strengthening programme, thus improving the international non-proliferation regime by enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards verification. These enhancements are not however, a revolution in current practices, but rather an important step in the continuous evolution of the safeguards system. The principles embodied in 93+2, for broader access to information and increased physical access already apply, in a pragmatic way, to large scale reprocessing and MOX fabrication plants. In these plants, qualitative measures and process monitoring play an important role in addition to accountancy and material balance evaluations in attaining the safeguard's goals. This paper will reflect on the safeguards approaches adopted for these large bulk handling facilities and draw analogies, conclusions and lessons for the forthcoming implementation of the 93+2 Programme. (author)

  6. The project 'nuclear safeguards'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gupta, D.

    1976-01-01

    A survey is given on the elaboration and implementation of a nuclear safeguards system which takes into account the economic needs of an expanding nuclear industry as well as the international monitoring commitments of the FRG under the Euratom and Non-Proliferation treaties. (RW) [de

  7. Reprocessing of nuclear fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hatfield, G.W.

    1960-11-01

    One of the persistent ideas concerning nuclear power is that the fuel costs are negligible. This, of course, is incorrect and, in fact, one of the major problems in the development of economic nuclear power is to get the cost of the fuel cycles down to an acceptable level. The irradiated fuel removed from the nuclear power reactors must be returned as fresh fuel into the system. Aside from the problems of handling and shipping involved in the reprocessing cycles, the two major steps are the chemical separation and the refabrication. The chemical separation covers the processing of the spent fuel to separate and recover the unburned fuel as well as the new fuel produced in the reactor. This includes the decontamination of these materials from other radioactive fission products formed in the reactor. Refabrication involves the working and sheathing of recycled fuel into the shapes and forms required by reactor design and the economics of the fabrication problem determines to a large extent the quality of the material required from the chemical treatment. At present there appear to be enough separating facilities in the United States and the United Kingdom to handle the recycling of fuel from power reactors for the next few years. However, we understand the costs of recycling fuel in these facilities will be high or low depend ing on whether or not the capital costs of the plant are included in the processing cost. Also, the present plants may not be well adapted to carry out the chemical processing of the very wide variety of power reactor fuel elements which are being considered and will continue to be considered over the years to come. (author)

  8. Process information systems in nuclear reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jaeschke, A.; Keller, H.; Orth, H.

    1987-01-01

    On a production management level, a process information system in a nuclear reprocessing plant (NRP) has to fulfill conventional operating functions and functions for nuclear material surveillance (safeguards). Based on today's state of the art of on-line process control technology, the progress in hardware and software technology allows to introduce more process-specific intelligence into process information systems. Exemplified by an expert-system-aided laboratory management system as component of a NRP process information system, the paper demonstrates that these technologies can be applied already. (DG) [de

  9. Australian nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kerin, J.C.

    1988-01-01

    The Australian Government considers that allegations made by the West German magazine - Der Spiegel in its January and February 1988 editions, flow from a lack of understanding of the complexities of international trade in nuclear materials, confusion between internal and international flag swaps and failure to comprehend the equivalence principle used in nuclear materials accounting. The Ministerial statement briefly outlines these issues and concludes that there is no evidence that any material subject to Australia's bilateral safeguards agreement has been diverted from peaceful uses or that Australia's safeguard requirements have been breached

  10. Reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kidd, S.

    2008-01-01

    The closed fuel cycle is the most sustainable approach for nuclear energy, as it reduces recourse to natural uranium resources and optimises waste management. The advantages and disadvantages of used nuclear fuel reprocessing have been debated since the dawn of the nuclear era. There is a range of issues involved, notably the sound management of wastes, the conservation of resources, economics, hazards of radioactive materials and potential proliferation of nuclear weapons. In recent years, the reprocessing advocates win, demonstrated by the apparent change in position of the USA under the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) program. A great deal of reprocessing has been going on since the fourties, originally for military purposes, to recover plutonium for weapons. So far, some 80000 tonnes of used fuel from commercial power reactors has been reprocessed. The article indicates the reprocessing activities and plants in the United Kigdom, France, India, Russia and USA. The aspect of plutonium that raises the ire of nuclear opponents is its alleged proliferation risk. Opponents of the use of MOX fuels state that such fuels represent a proliferation risk because the plutonium in the fuel is said to be 'weapon-use-able'. The reprocessing of used fuel should not give rise to any particular public concern and offers a number of potential benefits in terms of optimising both the use of natural resources and waste management.

  11. Nuclear safeguards project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mache, H.R.

    1978-10-01

    The present report describes the major activities carried out in 1977 in the framework of the Nuclear Safeguards Project by the institutes of the Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe, Kernforschungsanlage Juelich, the European Institute of Transuranium Elements and some industrial firms. (orig.) 891 HP 892 AP [de

  12. Coordinated safeguards for materials management in a fuel reprocessing plant. Volume I

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Cobb, D.D.; Dayem, H.A.; Dietz, R.J.; Kern, E.A.; Schelonka, E.P.; Shipley, J.P.; Smith, D.B.; Augustson, R.H.; Barnes, J.W.

    1977-09-01

    A materials management system is described for safeguarding special nuclear materials in a fuel-reprocessing plant. Recently developed nondestructive-analysis techniques and process-monitoring devices are combined with conventional chemical analyses and process-control instrumentation for improved materials accounting data. Unit-process accounting based on dynamic material balances permits localization of diversion in time and space, and the application of advanced statistical methods supported by decision-analysis theory ensures optimum use of accounting information for detecting diversion. This coordinated safeguards system provides maximum effectiveness consistent with modest cost and minimum process interference. Modeling and simulation techniques are used to evaluate the sensitivity of the system to single and multiple thefts and to compare various safeguards options. The study identifies design criteria that would improve the safeguardability of future plants

  13. Report on the NGS3 Working Group on Safeguards by Design For Aqueous Reprocessing Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Johnson, Shirley J.; Ehinger, Michael; Schanfein, Mark

    2011-02-01

    The objective of the Working Group on SBD for Aqueous Reprocessing Facilities was to provide recommendations, for facility operators and designers, which would aid in the coordination and integration of nuclear material accountancy and the safeguards requirements of all concerned parties - operators, state/regional authorities, and the IAEA. The recommendations, which are to be provided to the IAEA, are intended to assist in optimizing facility design and operating parameters to ensure the safeguardability of the facility while minimizing impact on the operations. The one day Working Group session addressed a wide range of design and operating topics.

  14. Methodology and preliminary models for analyzing nuclear-safeguards decisions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Judd, B.R.; Weissenberger, S.

    1978-11-01

    This report describes a general analytical tool designed with Lawrence Livermore Laboratory to assist the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in making nuclear safeguards decisions. The approach is based on decision analysis - a quantitative procedure for making decisions under uncertain conditions. The report: describes illustrative models that quantify the probability and consequences of diverted special nuclear material and the costs of safeguarding the material; demonstrates a methodology for using this information to set safeguards regulations (safeguards criteria); and summarizes insights gained in a very preliminary assessment of a hypothetical reprocessing plant

  15. Safeguards for special nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, R.L.

    1979-12-01

    Safeguards, accountability, and nuclear materials are defined. The accuracy of measuring nuclear materials is discussed. The use of computers in nuclear materials accounting is described. Measures taken to physically protect nuclear materials are described

  16. Noble gas atmospheric monitoring for international safeguards at reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nakhleh, C.W.; Poths, J.; Stanbro, W.D.; Perry, R.T. Jr.; Wilson, W.B.; Fearey, B.L.

    1997-01-01

    The use of environmental sampling is a major component of the improvements of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards being carried out under Program 93+2. Nonradioactive noble gas isotopic measurements in the effluent stream of large reprocessing facilities may provide useful confirmatory information on the burnup and reactor type of the spent fuel undergoing reprocessing. The authors have taken and analyzed stack samples at an operating facility. The data show clear fission signals. The authors are currently applying a maximum-likelihood estimation procedure to determine the fuel burnup from these data. They anticipate that the general features involved in the table noble gas problem--selection of appropriate signals, measurement of those signals under realistic conditions, and inverse calculation of parameters of interest from the environmental data--will be present in all environmental sampling problems. These methods should therefore be widely applicable

  17. Materials management in an internationally safeguarded fuels reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Baker, A.L.; Cobb, D.D.

    1980-04-01

    The following appendices are included: aqueous reprocessing and conversion technology, reference facilities, process design and operating features relevant to materials accounting, operator's safeguards system structure, design principles of dynamic materials accounting systems, modeling and simulation approach, optimization of measurement control, aspects of international verification problem, security and reliability of materials measurement and accounting system, estimation of in-process inventory in solvent-extraction contactors, conventional measurement techniques, near-real-time measurement techniques, isotopic correlation techniques, instrumentation available to IAEA inspectors, and integration of materials accounting and containment and surveillance

  18. Materials management in an internationally safeguarded fuels reprocessing plant

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Baker, A.L.; Cobb, D.D.

    1980-04-01

    The following appendices are included: aqueous reprocessing and conversion technology, reference facilities, process design and operating features relevant to materials accounting, operator's safeguards system structure, design principles of dynamic materials accounting systems, modeling and simulation approach, optimization of measurement control, aspects of international verification problem, security and reliability of materials measurement and accounting system, estimation of in-process inventory in solvent-extraction contactors, conventional measurement techniques, near-real-time measurement techniques, isotopic correlation techniques, instrumentation available to IAEA inspectors, and integration of materials accounting and containment and surveillance. (DLC)

  19. Reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schmitt, D.

    1985-01-01

    How should the decision in favour of reprocessing and against alternative waste management concepts be judged from an economic standpoint. Reprocessing is not imperative neither for resource-economic reasons nor for nuclear energy strategy reasons. On the contrary, the development of an ultimate storage concept representing a real alternative promising to close, within a short period of time, the nuclear fuel cycle at low cost. At least, this is the result of an extensive economic efficiency study recently submitted by the Energy Economics Institute which investigated all waste management concepts relevant for the Federal Republic of Germany in the long run, i.e. direct ultimate storage of spent fuel elements (''Other waste disposal technologies'' - AE) as well as reprocessing of spent fuel elements where re-usable plutonium and uranium are recovered and radioactive waste goes to ultimate storage (''Integrated disposal'' - IE). Despite such fairly evident results, the government of the Federal Republic of Germany has favoured the construction of a reprocessing plant. From an economic point of view there is no final answer to the question whether or not the argumentation is sufficient to justify the decision to construct a reprocessing plant. This is true for both the question of technical feasibility and issues of overriding significance of a political nature. (orig./HSCH) [de

  20. Nuclear safeguards research and development

    Science.gov (United States)

    Henry, C. N.

    1981-11-01

    The status of a nuclear safeguard research and development program is presented. Topics include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards, training courses, technology transfer, analytical chemistry methods for fissionable materials safeguards, the Department of Energy Computer Security Technical Center, and operational security.

  1. Methodology and preliminary models for analyzing nuclear safeguards decisions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-11-01

    This report describes a general analytical tool designed to assist the NRC in making nuclear safeguards decisions. The approach is based on decision analysis--a quantitative procedure for making decisions under uncertain conditions. The report: describes illustrative models that quantify the probability and consequences of diverted special nuclear material and the costs of safeguarding the material, demonstrates a methodology for using this information to set safeguards regulations (safeguards criteria), and summarizes insights gained in a very preliminary assessment of a hypothetical reprocessing plant

  2. Problem statement: international safeguards for a light-water reactor fuels reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shipley, J.P.; Hakkila, E.A.; Dietz, R.J.; Cameron, C.P.; Bleck, M.E.; Darby, J.L.

    1979-03-01

    This report considers the problem of developing international safeguards for a light-water reactor (LWR) fuel reprocessing/conversion facility that combines the Purex process with conversion of plutonium nitrate to the oxide by means of plutonium (III) oxalate precipitation and calcination. Current international safeguards systems are based on the complementary concepts of materials accounting and containment and surveillance, which are designed to detect covert, national diversion of nuclear material. This report discusses the possible diversion threats and some types of countermeasures, and it represents the first stage in providing integrated international safeguards system concepts that make optimum use of available resources. The development of design methodology to address this problem will constitute a significant portion of the subsequent effort. Additionally, future technology development requirements are identified. 8 figures, 1 table

  3. Role of near-real-time accounting in international safeguards for reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Dietz, R.J.; Shipley, J.P.

    1979-01-01

    The effectiveness of conventional nuclear materials accounting systems, both national and international, is constrained by the fundamental process features of high-throughput nuclear facilities and the economic limits of effective nuclear materials management consistent with production goals. Conventional accounting, complemented by near-real-time accounting, may meet projected IAEA performance goals for detecting diversion in medium- and high-throughput reprocessing facilities projected for the late 1900's. The design of materials accounting systems for international safeguards in reprocessing plants is discussed, paying particular attention to the question of international verification. Specific problems in measurement techniques, data evaluation, and systems structure are identified, and the current status of research and development efforts is reviewed

  4. Materials management in an internationally safeguarded fuels reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Cobb, D.D.; Dayem, H.A.; Dietz, R.J.; Kern, E.A.; Markin, J.T.; Shipley, J.P.; Barnes, J.W.; Scheinman, L.

    1980-04-01

    The first volume of this report summarizes the results and conclusions for this study of conventional and advanced nuclear materials accounting systems applicable for both large (1500 MTHM/y) and small (210 MTHM/y) spent-fuel reprocessing facilities subject to international verification

  5. Nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    White, D.

    1981-01-01

    A simple friction device for cutting nuclear fuel wrappers comprising a thin metal disc clamped between two large diameter clamping plates. A stream of gas ejected from a nozzle is used as coolant. The device may be maintained remotely. (author)

  6. Use of fuel reprocessing plant instrumentation for international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ayers, A.L.

    1977-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency has a program for developing instrumentation to be used by safeguards inspectors at reprocessing facilities. These instruments have generally been individual pieces of equipment for improving the accuracy of existing measurement instrumentation or equipment to perform nondestructive assay on a selected basis. It is proposed that greater use be made of redundant plant instrumentation and data recovery systems that could augment plant instrumentation to verify the validity of plant measurements. Use of these methods for verfication must be proven as part of an operating plant before they can be relied upon for safeguards surveillance. Inspectors must be qualified in plant operations, or have ready access to those so qualified, if the integrity of the operation is to be properly assessed. There is an immediate need for the development and in-plant proof testing of an integrated gamma, passive neutron, and active neutron measurement system for drum quantities of radioactive trash. The primary safeguards effort should be limited to plutonium and highly enriched uranium

  7. Meeting the safeguards challenges of a commercial reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, S.J.; Chesnay, B.; Pearsall, C.; Takeda, S.; Tomikawa, H.; Fujimaki, K.; Iwamoto, T.

    2004-01-01

    Never before has the IAEA taken on such a large challenge as implementing a safeguards system at a commercial reprocessing plant. The challenges lay in a wide range of areas. This paper will present an overview of how specific challenges are being met in: Providing an initial and continuing design verification approach that maintains continuity of knowledge for the life-time of the plant; Providing a robust safeguards approach, including added assurance measures to confirm the operational conditions of the facility; Providing verification systems with the highest sensitivity and reliability, while also being cost efficient; Providing timely and accurate analytical laboratory results; Providing sufficient authentication to joint-use, unattended verification systems to assure that independent conclusions can be reached; Providing a comprehensive integrated software system that allows for remote inspector data handling and evaluation and thus reducing inspection effort. A primary prerequisite to developing and implementing a safeguards approach of this magnitude is the transparent and interactive cooperation of the State and the operator. The JNFL Project has been a model example of this cooperation. This cooperation has been in the areas of system security, operational modifications, schedule adjustments, technical development and financial support. (author)

  8. Euratom experience in safeguarding reprocessing and thermal reactor mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities within the European Community

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-11-01

    The legal basis and instruments for the application of safeguards in the European Community are described. Euratom safeguards apply throughout the fuel cycle starting at the ore stage. Euratom has had experience in the application of safeguards to small and medium size reprocessing and MOX fabrication plants. In reprocessing plants accountancy, containment and surveillance methods are applied and the plant is divided into three material balance areas. Similar procedures are applied at fabrication plants. Euratom inspectors apply their main verification activities at strategic points but have the right of access at any time to all places which contain nuclear material. Under the Euratom-IAEA Agreements 'Joint Teams' of Euratom and IAEA inspectors will operate together to minimise the burden on operators and to avoid duplication of effort while enabling both organisations to achieve their safeguards objectives

  9. International nuclear material safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Syed Azmi Syed Ali

    1985-01-01

    History can be a very dull subject if it relates to events which have long since lost their relevance. The factors which led to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), however, are as important and relevant today as they were when the Agency was first created. Without understanding these factors it is impossible to realise how important the Agency is in the present world or to understand some of the controversies surrounding its future. Central to these controversies is the question of how best to promote the international transfer of nuclear technology without contributing further to the problem of proliferating nuclear explosives or explosive capabilities. One effective means is to subject nuclear materials (see accompanying article in box), which forms the basic link between the manufacture of nuclear explosives and nuclear power generation, to international safeguards. This was realized very early in the development of nuclear power and was given greater emphasis following the deployment of the first two atomic bombs towards the end of World War II. (author)

  10. Nuclear recycling: costs, savings, and safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Spinrad, B.I.

    1985-01-01

    This chapter discusses the economics, physical and chemical processes, and safety of nuclear fuel recycling. The spent fuel must be chemically reprocessed in order to recover uranium and plutonium. Topics considered include indifference costs, recycling in light water reactors (LWRs), plutonium in fast reactors, the choice between recycling and storage, safeguards, and weapons proliferation. It is shown that the economics of recycling nuclear fuel involves the actual costs and savings of the recycling operation in terms of money spent, made, and saved, and the impact of the recycling on the future cost of uranium

  11. Lessons Learned in International Safeguards - Implementation of Safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ehinger, Michael H.; Johnson, Shirley

    2010-01-01

    The focus of this report is lessons learned at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP). However, the subject of lessons learned for application of international safeguards at reprocessing plants includes a cumulative history of inspections starting at the West Valley (New York, U.S.A.) reprocessing plant in 1969 and proceeding through all of the efforts over the years. The RRP is the latest and most challenging application the International Atomic Energy Agency has faced. In many ways the challenges have remained the same, timely inspection and evaluation with limited inspector resources, with the continuing realization that planning and preparations can never start early enough in the life cycle of a facility. Lessons learned over the years have involved the challenges of using ongoing advances in technology and dealing with facilities with increased throughput and continuous operation. This report will begin with a review of historical developments and lessons learned. This will provide a basis for a discussion of the experiences and lessons learned from the implementation of international safeguards at RRP.

  12. Nuclear safeguards: a perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Walske, C.

    1975-01-01

    Safeguards, both international and domestic, are discussed from the industrial viewpoint. Anti-criminal measures are considered in more detail. Areas of anti-criminal safeguards which need improvement are pointed out; they include communications, recovery force, and accounting

  13. Nuclear safeguards technology handbook

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1977-12-01

    The purpose of this handbook is to present to United States industrial organizations the Department of Energy's (DOE) Safeguards Technology Program. The roles and missions for safeguards in the U.S. government and application of the DOE technology program to industry safeguards planning are discussed. A guide to sources and products is included. (LK)

  14. Nuclear safeguards technology handbook

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-12-01

    The purpose of this handbook is to present to United States industrial organizations the Department of Energy's (DOE) Safeguards Technology Program. The roles and missions for safeguards in the U.S. government and application of the DOE technology program to industry safeguards planning are discussed. A guide to sources and products is included

  15. Designing and Operating for Safeguards: Lessons Learned From the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, Shirley J.; Ehinger, Michael

    2010-01-01

    This paper will address the lessons learned during the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP) which are relevant to the issue of 'safeguards by design'. However, those lessons are a result of a cumulative history of international safeguards experiences starting with the West Valley reprocessing plant in 1969, continuing with the Barnwell plant, and then with the implementation of international safeguards at WAK in Germany and TRP in Japan. The design and implementation of safeguards at RRP in Japan is the latest and most challenging that the IAEA has faced. This paper will discuss the work leading up to the development of a safeguards approach, the design and operating features that were introduced to improve or aid in implementing the safeguards approach, and the resulting recommendations for future facilities. It will provide an overview of how 'safeguardability' was introduced into RRP.

  16. Nuclear Safeguards Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Findlay, T.

    2015-01-01

    The paper will consider safeguards culture both at the IAEA and among member states. It will do so through the lens of organizational culture theory and taking into account developments in safeguards since the Iraq case of the early 1990s. The study will seek to identify the current characteristics of safeguards culture and how it has evolved since the 93+2 programme was initiated, as well as considering the roles of the most important purveyors of such culture, including member states and their national safeguards authorities, the General Conference and Board of Governors, the Director General, the Secretariat as a whole, the Safeguards Department and the inspectorate. The question of what might be an optimal safeguards culture at the Agency and among member states will be investigated, along with the issue of how such a culture might be engendered or encouraged. (author)

  17. Nuclear fuel reprocessing expansion strategies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gallagher, J.M.

    1975-01-01

    A description is given of an effort to apply the techniques of operations research and energy system modeling to the problem of determination of cost-effective strategies for capacity expansion of the domestic nuclear fuel reprocessing industry for the 1975 to 2000 time period. The research also determines cost disadvantages associated with alternative strategies that may be attractive for political, social, or ecological reasons. The sensitivity of results to changes in cost assumptions was investigated at some length. Reactor fuel types covered by the analysis include the Light Water Reactor (LWR), High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (HTGR), and the Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR)

  18. Survey of economics of spent nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Valvoda, Z.

    1976-01-01

    Literature data are surveyed on the economic problems of reprocessing spent fuel from light-water reactors in the period 1970 to 1975 and on the capacity of some reprocessing plants, such as NFS, Windscale, Marcoule, etc. The sharp increase in capital and production costs is analyzed and the future trend is estimated. The question is discussed of the use of plutonium and the cost thereof. The economic advantageousness previously considered to be the primary factor is no longer decisive due to new circumstances. The main objective today is to safeguard uninterrupted operation of nuclear power plants and the separation of radioactive wastes from the fuel cycle and the safe disposal thereof. (Oy)

  19. Nuclear safeguards implementations in Taiwan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hou, R-H.; Chang, C-K.; Lin, C-R.; Gone, J-K.; Chen, W-L.; Yao, D.

    2006-01-01

    Full text: Now with six Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) units in operation, two Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) units under construction, and other peaceful applications of nuclear and radiation technology expanding in great pace, the Atomic Energy Council (AEC) has been focused on reactor safety regulation, radiation protection, radioactive waste administration, environmental monitoring and R and D for technology development and other civilian nuclear applications. Despite Taiwan's departure from the United Nations and therefore its family member International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1971, Taiwan remains its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). To date, Taiwan is still part of the international nuclear safeguards system and accepts IAEA's inspections in accordance with its regulations on nuclear safeguards. In 1998, Taiwan further agreed, through exchange of letters between the AEC and IAEA, to implementation of the measures provided for in the model Protocol Additional to its safeguards agreement. In this paper, we will introduce Taiwan's nuclear safeguards history and describe some highlights of safeguards implementation in recent years, such as complementary accesses, transparency visits, remote monitoring inspections, unannounced inspections, facility attachment termination for the decommissioned facilities, and annual safeguards implementation meeting with IAEA

  20. Introduction to nuclear material safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuroi, Hideo

    1986-01-01

    This article is aimed at outlining the nuclear material safeguards. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in 1957 and safeguards inspection was started in 1962. It is stressed that any damage resulting from nuclear proliferation would be triggered by a human intentional act. Various measures have been taken by international societies and nations, of which the safeguards are the only means which relay mainly on technical procedures. There are two modes of diversing nuclear materials to military purposes. One would be done by national intension while the other by indivisulas or expert groups, i.e., sub-national intention. IAEA is responsible for the prevention of diversification by nations, for which the international safeguards are being used. Measures against the latter mode of diversification are called nuclear protection, for which each nation is responsible. The aim of the safeguards under the Nonproliferation Treaty is to detect the diversification of a significant amount of nuclear materials from non-military purposes to production of nuclear explosion devices such as atomic weapons or to unidentified uses. Major technical methods used for the safeguards include various destructive and non-destructive tests as well as containment and monitoring techniques. System techniques are to be employed for automatic containment and monitoring procedures. Appropriate nuclear protection system techniques should also be developed. (Nogami, K.)

  1. Nuclear safeguards - a new profession

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thorne, L.

    1984-01-01

    Early moves to restrict the proliferation of nuclear weapons are described together with the application of vigorous scientific techniques to the political framework of international treaties. Technical criteria for safeguards and verification methods are discussed. (U.K.)

  2. Development of solution monitoring software for enhanced safeguards at a large scale reprocessing facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Van Handenhove, Carl; Breban, Domnica; Creusot, Christophe [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Dransart, Pascal; Dechamp, Luc [Joint Research Centre, European Commission, Ispra, Varese, (Italy); Jarde, Eric [Euriware, Equeurdreville (France)

    2011-12-15

    The implementation of an effective and efficient IAEA safeguards approach at large scale reprocessing facilities with large throughput and continuous flow of nuclear material requires the introduction of enhanced safeguards measures to provide added assurance about the absence of diversion of nuclear material and confirmation that the facility is operated as declared. One of the enhanced safeguards measures, a Solution Monitoring and Measurement System (SMMS), comprising data collection instruments, data transmission equipment and an advanced Solution Monitoring Software (SMS), is being implemented at a large scale reprocessing plant in Japan. SMS is designed as a tool to enable automatic calculations of volumes, densities and flow-rates in selected process vessels, including most of the vessels of the main nuclear material stream. This software also includes automatic features to support the inspectorate in verifying inventories and inventory changes. The software also enables one to analyze the flows of nuclear material within the process and of specified 'cycles' of operation, and, in order to provide assurance that the facility is being operated as declared to compare these with those expected (reference signatures). The configuration and parameterization work (especially the analytical and comparative work) for the implementation and configuration of the SMS has been carried out jointly between the IAEA, Euriware-France (the software developer) and the Joint Research Centre (JRC)-Ispra. This paper describes the main features of the SMS, including the principles underlying the automatic analysis functionalities. It then focuses on the collaborative work performed by the JRC-Ispra, Euriware and the IAEA for the parameterization of the software (vessels and cycles of operation), including the current status and the future challenges.

  3. Designing and Operating for Safeguards: Lessons Learned From the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Johnson, Shirley J.; Ehinger, Michael

    2010-08-07

    This paper will address the lessons learned during the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP) which are relevant to the issue of ‘safeguards by design’. However, those lessons are a result of a cumulative history of international safeguards experiences starting with the West Valley reprocessing plant in 1969, continuing with the Barnwell plant, and then with the implementation of international safeguards at WAK in Germany and TRP in Japan. The design and implementation of safeguards at RRP in Japan is the latest and most challenging that the IAEA has faced. This paper will discuss the work leading up to the development of a safeguards approach, the design and operating features that were introduced to improve or aid in implementing the safeguards approach, and the resulting recommendations for future facilities. It will provide an overview of how ‘safeguardability’ was introduced into RRP.

  4. Nuclear fuel reprocessing in the UK

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Allardice, R.; Harris, D.; Mills, A.

    1983-01-01

    Nuclear fuel reprocessing has been carried out on an industrial scale in the United Kingdom since 1952. Two large reprocessing plants have been constructed and operated at Windscale, Cumbria and two smaller specialized plants have been constructed and operated at Dounreay, Northern Scotland. At the present time, the second of the two Windscale plants is operating, and Government permission has been given for a third reprocessing plant to be built on that site. At Dounreay, one of the plants is operating in its original form, whilst the second is now operating in a modified form, reprocessing fuel from the prototype fast reactor. This chapter describes the development of nuclear fuel reprocessing in the UK, commencing with the research carried out in Canada immediately after the Second World War. A general explanation of the techniques of nuclear fuel reprocessing and of the equipment used is given. This is followed by a detailed description of the plants and processes installed and operated in the UK

  5. Authentication of reprocessing plant safeguards data through correlation analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Burr, T.L.; Wangen, L.E.; Mullen, M.F.

    1995-04-01

    This report investigates the feasibility and benefits of two new approaches to the analysis of safeguards data from reprocessing plants. Both approaches involve some level of plant modeling. All models involve some form of mass balance, either applied in the usual way that leads to material balances for individual process vessels at discrete times or applied by accounting for pipe flow rates that leads to material balances for individual process vessels at continuous times. In the first case, material balances are computed after each tank-to-tank transfer. In the second case, material balances can be computed at any desired time. The two approaches can be described as follows. The first approach considers the application of a new multivariate sequential test. The test statistic is a scalar, but the monitored residual is a vector. The second approach considers the application of recent nonlinear time series methods for the purpose of empirically building a model for the expected magnitude of a material balance or other scalar variable. Although the report restricts attention to monitoring scalar time series, the methodology can be extended to vector time series

  6. Importance of nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Allday, C.

    1977-01-01

    The following topics are discussed: world energy requirements; energy conservation and the economics of recycle environmental considerations and the timescale of reprocessing; and problems associated with reprocessing. The conclusion is reached that reprocessing is essential to the conservation of the world's energy resources and is an environmentally, and probably an economically, more acceptable option to the ''throw away'' alternative

  7. Electrochemical reprocessing of nuclear fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brambilla, G.; Sartorelli, A.

    1980-01-01

    A method is described for the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel which is particularly suitable for use with fuel from fast reactors and has the advantage of being a dry process in which there is no danger of radiation damage to a solvent medium as in a wet process. It comprises the steps of dissolving the fuel in a salt melt under such conditions that uranium and plutonium therein are converted to sulphate form. The plutonium sulphate may then be thermally decomposed to PuO 2 and removed. The salt melt is then subjected to electrolysis conditions to achieve cathodic deposition of UO 2 (and possibly PuO 2 ). The salt melt can then be recycled or conditioned for final disposal. (author)

  8. Commercial Nuclear Reprocessing in the United States

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sherrill, Charles Leland [Brigham Young Univ., Provo, UT (United States); Balatsky, Galya Ivanovna [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2015-09-09

    The short presentation outline: Reprocessing Overview; Events leading up to Carter’s Policy; Results of the decision; Policy since Nuclear Nonproliferation Act. Conclusions reached: Reprocessing ban has become an easy and visible fix to the public concern about proliferation, but has not completely stopped proliferation; and, Reprocessing needs to become detached from political considerations, so technical research can continue, regardless of the policy decisions we decide to take.

  9. Transport and reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lenail, B.

    1981-01-01

    This contribution deals with transport and packaging of oxide fuel from and to the Cogema reprocessing plant at La Hague (France). After a general discussion of nuclear fuel and the fuel cycle, the main aspects of transport and reprocessing of oxide fuel are analysed. (Auth.)

  10. International safeguards and nuclear terrorism

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moglewer, S.

    1987-01-01

    This report provides a critical review of the effectiveness of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards against potential acts of nuclear terrorism. The author argues that IAEA safeguards should be made applicable to deterring diversions of nuclear materials from civil to weapons purposes by subnational groups as well as by nations. Both technical and institutional factors are considered, and suggestions for organizational restructuring and further technical development are made. Awareness of the necessity for effective preventive measures is emphasized, and possible directions for further effort are suggested

  11. Statistical aspects of nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tietjen, G.L.

    1977-01-01

    A nuclear fuel reprocessing cycle is used to illustrate problems encountered by a statistician when trying to reconcile total amounts of an element at different stages in the recovery cycle. Calculation of errors are discussed along with problems of biases, holdup, and simulation

  12. The use of artificial intelligence for safeguarding fuel reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wachter, J.W.; Forgy, C.L.

    1987-01-01

    Recorded process data from the ''Minirun'' campaigns conducted at the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP) in Barnwell, South Carolina during 1980 to 1981 have been utilized to study the suitability of computer-based Artificial Intelligence (AI) methods for process monitoring for safeguards purposes. The techniques of knowledge engineering were used to formulate the decision-making software which operates on the process data customarily used for process operations. The OPS5 AI language was used to construct an Expert System for this purpose. Such systems are able to form reasoned conclusions from incomplete, inaccurate or otherwise ''fuzzy'' data, and to explain the reasoning that led to them. The programs were tested using minirun data taken during simulated diversions ranging in size from 1 to 20 L of solution that had been monitored previously using conventional procedural techniques. 13 refs., 3 figs

  13. The use of artificial intelligence for safeguard fuel reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wachter, J.W.; Forgy, C.L.

    1987-01-01

    Recorded process data from minirun campaigns conducted at the Barnwell Nuclear Fuels Plant have been utilized to study the suitability of computer-based artificial intelligence (AI) methods for process monitoring for safeguards purposes. The techniques of knowledge engineering were used to formulate the decision-making software. The computer software accepted as input process data customarily used for process operations that had previously been recorded on magnetic tape during the 1980 miniruns. The OPS5 AI language was used to construct an expert system for simulated monitoring of the process. Such expert systems facilitate the employment of the heuristic reasoning used by human observers to form reasoned conclusions from incomplete, inaccurate, or otherwise fuzzy data

  14. Design aspects of water usage in the Windscale nuclear fuel reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wharton, J.; Bullock, M.J.

    1982-01-01

    The safeguard requirements of a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant place unique constraints on a designer which, in turn, affect the scope for the exercise of water economy. These constraints are examined within the context of the British Nuclear Fuels Limited reprocessing plants at Windscale and indicate the scope for water conservation. The plants and their design principles are described with particular reference to water services and usage. Progressive design development is discussed to illustrate the increasing importance of water economy. (author)

  15. Storage and Reprocessing of Spent Nuclear Fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Karpius, Peter Joseph [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2017-02-02

    Addressing the problem of waste, especially high-level waste (HLW), is a requirement of the nuclear fuel cycle that cannot be ignored. We explore the two options employed currently, long-term storage and reprocessing.

  16. Solution Monitoring Evaluated by Proliferation Risk Assessment and Fuzzy Optimization Analysis for Safeguards in a Reprocessing Process

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mitsutoshi Suzuki

    2013-01-01

    Full Text Available Solution monitoring (SM has been used in a nuclear reprocessing plant as an additional measure to provide assurance that the plant is operated as declared. The inline volume and density monitoring equipment with dip tubes is important for safety and safeguards purposes and is a typical example of safeguards by design (SBD. Recently safety, safeguards, and security by design (3SBD are proposed to promote an efficient and effective generation of nuclear energy. In 3SBD, proliferation risk assessment has the potential to consider likelihood of the incidence and proliferation risk in safeguards. In this study, risk assessment methodologies for safeguards and security are discussed and several mathematical methods are presented to investigate risk notion applied to intentional acts of facility misuse in an uncertainty environment. Proliferation risk analysis with the Markov model, deterrence effect with the game model, and SBD with fuzzy optimization are shown in feasibility studies to investigate the potential application of the risk and uncertainty analyses in safeguards. It is demonstrated that the SM is an effective measurement system using risk-informed and cost-effective SBD, even though there are inherent difficulties related to the possibility of operator’s falsification.

  17. International safeguards in large scale nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gupta, D.; Heil, J.

    1977-01-01

    The trend in the energy sector in most of the industrialized areas of the world shows rather clearly, that the rate of installation of nuclear plants will be very high and that the largest possible units of nuclear material handling and storage facilities will be built. Various experiments and analyses of measurement methods relevant to safeguards, in typical nuclear facilities like a fuel reprocessing or a fabrication plant, have shown that the associated measurement errors as obtained under normal operating conditions are such that they are mainly dominated by systematic errors and that such systematic errors may lie in the range of percentages of the measured amount so that a material balance in such a plant could not normally be closed with high accuracy. The simplest way of going around the problem would be to increase the frequency of striking a material balance over a given period of time. This could however lead to an anormous increase in the technical and financial burden for the operator of a facility. The present paper analyses this problem in some detail for some facilities and shows that with a properly developed information system in such plants and a combination of containment, surveillance and accountancy measures, safeguards statements for relatively low significant amounts can be made with the attainable range of measurement accuracies

  18. Remotex and servomanipulator needs in nuclear fuel reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garin, J.

    1981-01-01

    Work on the conceptual design of a pilot-scale plant for reprocessing breeder reactor fuels is being performed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The plant design will meet all current federal regulations for repocessing plants and will serve as prototype for future production plants. A unique future of the concept is the incorporation of totally remote operation and maintenance of the process equipment within a large barn-like hot cell. This approach, caled Remotex, utilizes servomanipulators coupled with television viewing to extend man's capabilities into the hostile cell environment. The Remotex concept provides significant improvements for fuel reprocessing plants and other nuclear facilities in the areas of safeguarding nuclear materials, reducing radiation exposure, improving plant availability, recovering from unplanned events, and plant decommissioning

  19. Process monitoring for reprocessing plant safeguards: a summary review

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kerr, H.T.; Ehinger, M.H.; Wachter, J.W.; Hebble, T.L.

    1986-10-01

    Process monitoring is a term typically associated with a detailed look at plant operating data to determine plant status. Process monitoring has been generally associated with operational control of plant processes. Recently, process monitoring has been given new attention for a possible role in international safeguards. International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) Task C.59 has the goal to identify specific roles for process monitoring in international safeguards. As the preliminary effort associated with this task, a review of previous efforts in process monitoring for safeguards was conducted. Previous efforts mentioned concepts and a few specific applications. None were comprehensive in addressing all aspects of a process monitoring application for safeguards. This report summarizes the basic elements that must be developed in a comprehensive process monitoring application for safeguards. It then summarizes the significant efforts that have been documented in the literature with respect to the basic elements that were addressed

  20. Acoustic techniques in nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Olinger, C.T.; Sinha, D.N.

    1995-01-01

    Acoustic techniques can be employed to address many questions relevant to current nuclear technology needs. These include establishing and monitoring intrinsic tags and seals, locating holdup in areas where conventional radiation-based measurements have limited capability, process monitoring, monitoring containers for corrosion or changes in pressure, and facility design verification. These acoustics applications are in their infancy with respect to safeguards and nuclear material management, but proof-of-principle has been demonstrated in many of the areas listed

  1. Remote maintenance in nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Herndon, J.N.

    1985-01-01

    Remote maintenance techniques applied in large-scale nuclear fuel reprocessing plants are reviewed with particular attention to the three major maintenance philosophy groupings: contact, remote crane canyon, and remote/contact. Examples are given, and the relative success of each type is discussed. Probable future directions for large-scale reprocessing plant maintenance are described along with advanced manipulation systems for application in the plants. The remote maintenance development program within the Consolidated Fuel Reprocessing Program at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory is also described. 19 refs., 19 figs

  2. Nuclear safeguards and export controls

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueller, H.

    1994-01-01

    Precisely from the perspective of the two most important nonnuclear weapons states, Japan and Germany, the safeguards and arms control agendas have not been finally dealt with. Because of their central position in the nonproliferation regime as nuclear suppliers and states with large nuclear energy industries, both countries are compelled to take a leading role in pursuing future reforms. In the dialogue with the nonaligned, this leadership position is helped by their nonnuclear status. In fact, Japan and Germany have some interests in common with the nonaligned states, such as the expansion of safeguards in the nuclear weapons states. To be sure, both Japan and Germany will pursue such interests with due regard to the interests of their friends and allies. For Japan, maintaining a close relationship with the United States is as important as shaping viable relations with China. Initiatives and controversies on nuclear policy must be weighed against this interest. By the same token, Germany must take into account the dense network of relations with its allies and with Russia, in addition to the German-French friendship. This will always set limits to Germany's readiness to confront the nuclear weapons states on nuclear issues. This, however, does not mean that both countries must shut up when the P 5 speak. The nuclear weapons register and the extension of the ''erga omnes'' rule in export controls, for example, should not be relegated to the dustbin of history, just because some friendly nuclear powers don't like these ideas. (orig.)

  3. Safeguarding aspects of large-scale commercial reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-03-01

    The paper points out that several solutions to the problems of safeguarding large-scale plants have been put forward: (1) Increased measurement accuracy. This does not remove the problem of timely detection. (2) Continuous in-process measurement. As yet unproven and likely to be costly. (3) More extensive use of containment and surveillance. The latter appears to be feasible but requires the incorporation of safeguards into plant design and sufficient redundancy to protect the operators interests. The advantages of altering the emphasis of safeguards philosophy from quantitative goals to the analysis of diversion strategies should be considered

  4. Nuclear fuel reprocessing in the UK

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Allardice, R.H.; Harris, D.W.; Mills, A.

    1983-01-01

    Nuclear fuel reprocessing has been carried out on an industrial scale in the United Kingdom since 1952. Two large reprocessing plants have been constructed and operated at Windscale, Cumbria and two smaller specialized plants have been constructed and operated at Dounreay, Northern Scotland. At the present time, the second of the two Windscale plants is operating, and Government permission has been given for a third reprocessing plant to be built on that site. At Dounreay, one of the plants is operating in its original form, whilst the second is now operating in a modified form, reprocessing fuel from the prototype fast reactor. This chapter describes the development of nuclear fuel reprocessing in the UK, commencing with the research carried out in Canada immediately after the Second World War. A general explanation of the techniques of nuclear fuel reprocessing and of the equipment used is given. This is followed by a detailed description of the plants and processes installed and operated in the UK. (author)

  5. Nuclear fuel reprocessing is challenged

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1994-01-01

    This article is a brief discussion of litigation to determine if the Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) in the United Kingdom will be allowed to operate. Litigants (including Greenpeace) contend that the government's December approval of discharge permits for the plant was unlawful without a public hearing. A description of the THORP process is also provided in this article

  6. Reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gal, I.

    1964-12-01

    This volume contains the following reports: Experimental facility for testing and development of pulsed columns and auxiliary devices; Chemical-technology study of the modified 'Purex' process; Chemical and radiometric control analyses; Chromatographic separation of rare earth elements on paper treated by di-n butylphosphate; Preliminary study of some organic nitrogen extracts significant in fuel reprocessing

  7. Inventory estimation for nuclear fuel reprocessing systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beyerlein, A.L.; Geldard, J.F.

    1987-01-01

    The accuracy of nuclear material accounting methods for nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities is limited by nuclear material inventory variations in the solvent extraction contactors, which affect the separation and purification of uranium and plutonium. Since in-line methods for measuring contactor inventory are not available, simple inventory estimation models are being developed for mixer-settler contactors operating at steady state with a view toward improving the accuracy of nuclear material accounting methods for reprocessing facilities. The authors investigated the following items: (1) improvements in the utility of the inventory estimation models, (2) extension of improvements to inventory estimation for transient nonsteady-state conditions during, for example, process upset or throughput variations, and (3) development of simple inventory estimation models for reprocessing systems using pulsed columns

  8. On-Line Monitoring for Control and Safeguarding of Radiochemical Streams at Spent Fuel Reprocessing Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bryan, Samuel A.; Levitskaia, Tatiana G.; Billing, Justin M.; Casella, Amanda J.; Johnsen, Amanda M.; Peterson, James M.

    2009-01-01

    Advanced techniques enabling enhanced safeguarding of the spent fuel reprocessing plants are urgently needed. Our approach is based on prerequisite that real time monitoring of the solvent extraction flowsheets provides unique capability to quickly detect unwanted manipulations with fissile isotopes present in the radiochemical streams during reprocessing activities. The methods used to monitor these processes must be robust and must be able to withstand harsh radiation and chemical environments. A new on-line monitoring system satisfying these requirements and featuring Raman spectroscopy combined with a Coriolis and conductivity probes, has been recently developed by our research team. It provides immediate chemical data and flow parameters of high-level radioactive waste streams with high brine content generated during retrieval activities from Hanford nuclear waste storage tanks. The nature of the radiochemical streams at the spent fuel reprocessing plant calls for additional spectroscopic information, which can be gained by the utilization of UV-vis-NIR capabilities. Raman and UV-vis-NIR spectroscopies are analytical techniques that have extensively been extensively applied for measuring the various organic and inorganic compounds including actinides. The corresponding spectrometers used under the laboratory conditions are easily convertible to the process-friendly configurations allowing remote measurements under the flow conditions. A fiber optic Raman probe allows monitoring of the high concentration species encountered in both aqueous and organic phases within the UREX suite of flowsheets, including metal oxide ions, such as uranyl, components of the organic solvent, inorganic oxo-anions, and water. The actinides and lanthanides are monitored remotely by UV-vis-NIR spectroscopy in aqueous and organic phases. In this report, we will present our recent results on spectroscopic measurements of simulant flowsheet solutions and commercial fuels available at

  9. Fuel cycle of nuclear power plants and safeguards system of nuclear weapon nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Malek, Z.

    1980-10-01

    The international safeguard system of nuclear weapon nonproliferation and the IAEA safeguard system are briefly described. In Czechoslovakia, a decree was issued in 1977 governing the accounting for and control of nuclear materials. The contents of the decree are presented. Described are computer processing of accounting data, technical criteria for the safeguard system application, containment and inspection in the IAEA safeguard system. The method is shown of the control of and accounting for nuclear materials in nuclear power plants and in fuel manufacturing, reprocessing and enrichment plants. Nondestructive and destructive methods of nuclear materials analysis are discussed. Nondestructive methods used include gamma spectrometry, neutron techniques, X-ray fluores--cence techniques. (J.P.)

  10. Design and Implementation of Equipment for Enhanced Safeguards of a Plutonium Storage in a Reprocessing Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richir, P.; Dechamp, L.; Buchet, P.; Dransart, P.; Dzbikowicz, Z.; Peerani, P.; ); Pierssens, L.; Persson, L.; Ancius, D.; Synetos, S.; ); Edmonds, N.; Homer, A.; Benn, K.-A.; Polkey, A.

    2015-01-01

    The Nuclear Security unit (NUSEC) of the Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU, JRC) was entrusted by DG ENER to design and implement equipment in order to achieve enhanced safeguards of a plutonium dioxide storage located on the MAGNOX reprocessing plant in Sellafield (UK). Enhanced safeguards must lead to a win-win situation for all parties involved. In this case the DG ENER inspectorate will save inspection time, manpower and future financial resources and the operator will have the right to access its storage without the need for inspector presence. To reach this goal, while at the same time taking into account current budget constraints, NUSEC developed applications that use equipment commonly used in the safety and security fields but so far have not been used in safeguards. For instance, two laser scanners are used to detect entry/exit events into and out of the store and to provide the necessary information to an algorithm in order to categorize objects/people passing the scanners, e.g., a Fork Lift Truck, a trolley used to bring in PuO 2 containers, a system used for the dispatch of cans, people, etc. An RFID reader is used to identify equipment duly authorized to access the store. All PuO 2 containers arriving from the production line must be weighed, identified and measured using gamma and neutron detectors before they can be transferred to the store. For this purpose an Unattended Combined Measurement System (UCMS) was designed and manufactured by the JRC in order to do all verification activities using a single instrument. This paper describes the design features of the equipment and its implementation with the support of the Sellafield Ltd. in the framework of the MAGNOX store project. (author)

  11. DESIGN INFORMATION VERIFICATION FOR NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Robert S. Bean; Richard R. M. Metcalf; Phillip C. Durst

    2009-07-01

    A critical aspect of international safeguards activities performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the verification that facility design and construction (including upgrades and modifications) do not create opportunities for nuclear proliferation. These Design Information Verification activities require that IAEA inspectors compare current and past information about the facility to verify the operator’s declaration of proper use. The actual practice of DIV presents challenges to the inspectors due to the large amount of data generated, concerns about sensitive or proprietary data, the overall complexity of the facility, and the effort required to extract just the safeguards relevant information. Planned and anticipated facilities will (especially in the case of reprocessing plants) be ever larger and increasingly complex, thus exacerbating the challenges. This paper reports the results of a workshop held at the Idaho National Laboratory in March 2009, which considered technologies and methods to address these challenges. The use of 3D Laser Range Finding, Outdoor Visualization System, Gamma-LIDAR, and virtual facility modeling, as well as methods to handle the facility data issues (quantity, sensitivity, and accessibility and portability for the inspector) were presented. The workshop attendees drew conclusions about the use of these techniques with respect to successfully employing them in an operating environment, using a Fuel Conditioning Facility walk-through as a baseline for discussion.

  12. Research and development of safeguards measures for the large scale reprocessing plant

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kikuchi, Masahiro; Sato, Yuji; Yokota, Yasuhiro; Masuda, Shoichiro; Kobayashi, Isao; Uchikoshi, Seiji; Tsutaki, Yasuhiro; Nidaira, Kazuo [Nuclear Material Control Center, Tokyo (Japan)

    1994-12-31

    The Government of Japan agreed on the safeguards concepts of commercial size reprocessing plant under the bilateral agreement for cooperation between the Japan and the United States. In addition, the LASCAR, that is the forum of large scale reprocessing plant safeguards, could obtain the fruitful results in the spring of 1992. The research and development of safeguards measures for the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant should be progressed with every regard to the concepts described in both documents. Basically, the material accountancy and monitoring system should be established, based on the NRTA and other measures in order to obtain the timeliness goal for plutonium, and the un-attended mode inspection approach based on the integrated containment/surveillance system coupled with radiation monitoring in order to reduce the inspection efforts. NMCC has been studying on the following measures for a large scale reprocessing plant safeguards (1) A radiation gate monitor and integrated surveillance system (2) A near real time Shipper and Receiver Difference monitoring (3) A near real time material accountancy system operated for the bulk handling area (4) A volume measurement technique in a large scale input accountancy vessel (5) An in-process inventory estimation technique applied to the process equipment such as the pulse column and evaporator (6) Solution transfer monitoring approach applied to buffer tanks in the chemical process (7) A timely analysis technique such as a hybrid K edge densitometer operated in the on-site laboratory (J.P.N.).

  13. Gaseous isotope correlation technique for safeguards at reprocessing facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ohkubo, Michiaki.

    1988-03-01

    The isotope correlation technique based on gaseous stable fission products can be used as a means of verifying the input measurement to fuel reprocessing plants. This paper reviews the theoretical background of the gaseous fission product isotope correlation technique. The correlations considered are those between burnup and various isotopic ratios of Kr and Xe nuclides. The feasibility of gaseous ICT application to Pu input accountancy of reprocessing facilities is also discussed. The technique offers the possibility of in situ measurement verification by the inspector. (author). 16 refs, 7 figs

  14. Video image processing for nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodriguez, C.A.; Howell, J.A.; Menlove, H.O.; Brislawn, C.M.; Bradley, J.N.; Chare, P.; Gorten, J.

    1995-01-01

    The field of nuclear safeguards has received increasing amounts of public attention since the events of the Iraq-UN conflict over Kuwait, the dismantlement of the former Soviet Union, and more recently, the North Korean resistance to nuclear facility inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The role of nuclear safeguards in these and other events relating to the world's nuclear material inventory is to assure safekeeping of these materials and to verify the inventory and use of nuclear materials as reported by states that have signed the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty throughout the world. Nuclear safeguards are measures prescribed by domestic and international regulatory bodies such as DOE, NRC, IAEA, and EURATOM and implemented by the nuclear facility or the regulatory body. These measures include destructive and non destructive analysis of product materials/process by-products for materials control and accountancy purposes, physical protection for domestic safeguards, and containment and surveillance for international safeguards

  15. Summary of nuclear fuel reprocessing activities around the world

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mellinger, P.J.; Harmon, K.M.; Lakey, L.T.

    1984-11-01

    This review of international practices for nuclear fuel reprocessing was prepared to provide a nontechnical summary of the current status of nuclear fuel reprocessing activities around the world. The sources of information are widely varied

  16. Problems of nuclear fuel reprocessing in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tanaka, Naojiro

    1974-01-01

    The reprocessing capacity of the plant No. 1 of Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation, which is scheduled to start operation in fiscal year 1975, will be insufficient after fiscal year 1978 for the estimated demand for reprocessing based on Japanese nuclear energy development program. Taking into consideration the results examined by JAIF's study team to Europe and the U.S., it is necessary that Japan builds 2nd reprocessing plant. But there will be a gap from 1978 to 1984 during which Japan must rely on overseas reprocessing services. The establishment of a reprocessing system is a task of national scale, and there are many problems to be solved before it can be done. These include the problems of site and environment, the problem of treatment and disposal of radioactive wastes, the raising of huge required funds and so on. Therefore, even if a private enterprise is allowed to undertake the task, it will be impossible to achieve the aim without the cooperation and assistance of the government. (Wakatsuki, Y.)

  17. International safeguards for a light-water reactor fuels reprocessing plant: containment and surveillance concepts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cameron, C.P.; Bleck, M.E.

    1980-12-01

    Concepts for containment/surveillance for reprocessing plants are described, conceptual designs are developed, and their effectiveness is evaluated. A technical approach to design of containment/surveillance systems is presented, and design considerations are discussed. This is the second in a series of reports. The first described the basis for the study of international safeguards for reprocessing plants. In this second report, only containment/surveillance is discussed. The third report will discuss the integration of concepts for containment/surveillance and material accountancy

  18. Nuclear safeguards in challenging times [Experts on nuclear safeguards and verification assess the global picture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, W.S.; Hillerman, J.

    2007-01-01

    Meeting at the IAEA's International Safeguards Symposium in October 2006, more than 500 experts from 60-plus countries and organizations addressed current and future challenges related to safeguards concepts, approaches, technologies, and experience. Sessions addressed five main issues driving developments: Current challenges to the safeguards system; Further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches; Improving the collection and analysis of safeguards information; Advances in safeguards techniques and technology; and Future challenges. Every four to five years, the IAEA brings together safeguards experts from all over the world at international symposia. In October 2001, they met in the shadow of 9/11 and the symposium included a special session on the prevention of nuclear terrorism

  19. Preliminary concepts: coordinated safeguards for materials management in a thorium--uranium fuel reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Barnes, J.W.; Dayem, H.A.; Dietz, R.J.; Shipley, J.P.

    1978-10-01

    This report addresses preliminary concepts for coordinated safeguards materials management in a typical generic thorium--uranium-fueled light-water reactor (LWR) fuels reprocessing plant. The reference facility is designed to recover thorium and uranium from first-generation (denatured 235 U) startup fuels, first-recycle and equilibrium (denatured 233 U) thorium--uranium LWR fuels, and to recover the plutonium generated in the 238 U denaturant as well. 12 figures, 3 tables

  20. Radioactive Semivolatiles in Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jubin, R. T. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Strachan, D. M. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Ilas, G. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Spencer, B. B. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Soelberg, N. R. [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

    2014-09-01

    In nuclear fuel reprocessing, various radioactive elements enter the gas phase from the unit operations found in the reprocessing facility. In previous reports, the pathways and required removal were discussed for four radionuclides known to be volatile, 14C, 3H, 129I, and 85Kr. Other, less volatile isotopes can also report to the off-gas streams in a reprocessing facility. These were reported to be isotopes of Cs, Cd, Ru, Sb, Tc, and Te. In this report, an effort is made to determine which, if any, of 24 semivolatile radionuclides could be released from a reprocessing plant and, if so, what would be the likely quantities released. As part of this study of semivolatile elements, the amount of each generated during fission is included as part of the assessment for the need to control their emission. Also included in this study is the assessment of the cooling time (time out of reactor) before the fuel is processed. This aspect is important for the short-lived isotopes shown in the list, especially for cooling times approaching 10 y. The approach taken in this study was to determine if semivolatile radionuclides need to be included in a list of gas-phase radionuclides that might need to be removed to meet Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations. A list of possible elements was developed through a literature search and through knowledge and literature on the chemical processes in typical aqueous processing of nuclear fuels. A long list of possible radionuclides present in irradiated fuel was generated and then trimmed by considering isotope half-life and calculating the dose from each to a maximum exposed individual with the US EPA airborne radiological dispersion and risk assessment code CAP88 (Rosnick 1992) to yield a short list of elements that actually need to be considered for control because they require high decontamination factors to meet a reasonable fraction of the regulated release. Each of these elements is

  1. Upgrading nuclear safeguards in Kazakhstan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hunt, Maribeth; Murakami, Kenji

    2005-01-01

    When the Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991, Kazakhstan inherited 1,410 nuclear warheads. Within three years, by 1994, Kazakhstan had formally acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and transferred its last nuclear warhead to Russia in April 1995. Its NPT safeguards agreement with the IAEA came into force in 1994 and all facilities are under safeguards. In February 2004 Kazakhstan signed the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement, though this not yet in force. Kazakhstan played a key role during the Soviet era as a supplier and processor of uranium. The BN-350 fast reactor at Aktau (formerly Shevchenko), on the shore of the Caspian Sea, successfully produced up to 135 MWe of electricity and 80,000 m3/day of potable water over some 27 years until it was closed down in mid-1999. The IAEA being involved in upgrading the nuclear material accountancy and control systems of all Member States requested, Japan and Sweden to conduct independent evaluations at the Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee (KAEC), and specifically at the Ulba Metallurgical Plant (UMP) and identified areas that could be improved with respect to nuclear material accountancy and control. In June 2003 the Agency, with four Member States and the European Union, undertook a programme to upgrade the nuclear accountancy and control systems within Kazakhstan with special emphasis on the UMP in Ust-Kamenogorsk in northeast Kazakhstan. The current IAEA programme is focused on upgrading hardware and software systems and the training of personnel in Kazakhstan. Due to the complexity of the facility, special emphasis is on training personnel and upgrading systems at the UMP. At the UMP the focus is on reducing the uncertainty in the hold-up (material which cannot be cleaned out) in the process lines, better determining the amount of nuclear material that is released from the facility as waste or retained at the facility as waste, increasing the ability of the facility to more

  2. Nuclear material safeguards surveillance and accountancy by isotope correlation techniques

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persiani, P.J.; Goleb, J.A.; Kroc, T.K.

    1981-11-01

    The purpose of this study is to investigate the applicability of isotope correlation techniques (ICT) to the Light Water Reactor (LWR) and the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR) fuel cycles for nuclear material accountancy and safeguards surveillance. The isotopic measurement of the inventory input to the reprocessing phase of the fuel cycle is the primary direct determination that an anomaly may exist in the fuel management of nuclear material. The nuclear materials accountancy gap which exists between the fabrication plant output and the input to the reprocessing plant can be minimized by using ICT at the dissolver stage of the reprocessing plant. The ICT allows a level of verification of the fabricator's fuel content specifications, the irradiation history, the fuel and blanket assemblies management and scheduling within the reactor, and the subsequent spent fuel assembly flows to the reprocessing plant. The investigation indicates that there exist relationships between isotopic concentration which have predictable, functional behavior over a range of burnup. Several cross-correlations serve to establish the initial core assembly-averaged composition. The selection of the more effective functionals will depend not only on the level of reliability of ICT for verification, but also on the capability, accuracy and difficulty of developing measurement methods. The propagation of measurement errors on the correlation functions and respective sensitivities to isotopic compositional changes have been examined and found to be consistent with current measurement methods

  3. Reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Couture, J.; Rougeau, J.-P.

    1987-01-01

    The course of development of a comprehensive nuclear power industry has its own pace which implies the timely progressive and consistent mastery of each industrial step. In the nuclear fuel it is not surprising that the back-end services have lastly reached the industrial stage. In France, we have now fully completed the industrial demonstration of the closed fuel cycle. Our experience covers all necessary steps : transportation of spent fuel, storage, reprocessing, waste conditioning, recovered uranium recycling, plutonium recycling in thermal MOX fuels, plutonium-based fuel for FBR. While FBR development is a long term target, recycling of fissile materials in present LWR reactors appears to be a source of noticable savings. In the meantime rational management of waste material is the key for increased safety and better environment protection. Reprocessing activity is certainly the major achievement of the back-end strategy. The proven efficiency of this technique as it is implemented at La Hague facility gives the full assurance of a smooth operation of the under completion UP3 unit. The base-load management system which applies during the first ten years of its operation will make possible a noticable reduction of the commercial price for reprocessing services by the end of the century. Industrial maturity being confirmed, economic maturity is now the outstanding merit of the reprocessing and recycling strategy. It is a permanent challenge, to which the response is definitely positive in the sense of reducing the nuclear KWh production cost. (author)

  4. Nuclear safety in fuel-reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hennies, H.H.; Koerting, K.

    1976-01-01

    The danger potential of nuclear power and fuel reprocessing plants in normal operation is compared. It becomes obvious that there are no basic differences. The analysis of possible accidents - blow-up of an evaporator for highly active wastes, zircaloy burning, cooling failure in self-heating process solutions, burning of a charged solvent, criticality accidents - shows that they are kept under control by the plant layout. (HP) [de

  5. Safeguards and an internationalized nuclear fuel cycle for East Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Olsen, John

    2005-01-01

    Concerns about nuclear proliferation by means of illicit enrichment of uranium or reprocessing of plutonium suggest limiting those technologies to a few, large facilities. In turn, countries that renounce acquiring those capabilities would be guaranteed fuel cycle services. Interdependence might lead to an Internationalized Nuclear Fuel Cycle (IFC), which could be formalized in voluntary regional compacts to share management of certain facilities. An IFC could add managerial oversight to strengthen the nonproliferation culture in the region and offer cost and efficiency benefits to participating countries, as well. An East Asian IFC would present opportunities to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of international safeguards by consolidating inspection requirements into relatively few facilities. This may be an opportune time to consider an IFC before the growing national industries each invest in separate facilities. An East Asian IFC regime could minimize international safeguards burdens, strengthen regional non-proliferation cooperation, and help manage future energy costs. (author)

  6. Assessment of nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1975-09-01

    The status of technology and the regulatory situation are summarized; the level of Federal support believed to be necessary to ensure that the nuclear option plays its role in the National Energy Plan is estimated. The assessment is based on a review of the open literature (no proprietary information), preliminary economic calculations, and experience of the Du Pont staff in the design, construction, and operation of nuclear facilities at Hanford and Savannah River. Because of the limited time available for the review, the conclusions and recommendations are preliminary, but they should provide an appropriate point of departure for planning purposes. A summary of recommendations and conclusions is provided at the beginning of the report, a current status of the applicable technology is given in Appendix B, and a glossary of terms is provided at the end of the report

  7. Device for reprocessing nuclear fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hatano, Mamoru.

    1981-01-01

    Purpose: To readily discharge a nuclear fuel by burning the nuclear fuel as it is without a pulverizing step and removing the graphite and other coated fuel particles. Constitution: An oxygen supply pipe is connected to the lower portion of a discharge chamber having an inlet for the fuel, and an exhaust pipe is connected to the upper portion of the chamber. The fuel mounted on a metallic gripping member made of metallic material is inserted from the inlet, the gripping member is connected through a conductor to a voltage supply unit, oxygen is then supplied through the oxygen supply tube to the discharge chamber, the voltage supply unit is subsequently operated, and discharge takes place among the fuels. Thus, high heat is generated by the discharge, the graphite carbon of the fuel is burnt, silicon carbide is destroyed and decomposed, the isolated nuclear fuel particles are discharged from the exhaust port, and the combustion gas and small embers are exhausted from the exhaust tube. Accordingly, radioactive dusts are not so much generated as when using a mechanical pulverizing means, and prescribed objective can be achieved. (Yoshino, Y.)

  8. Safeguarding and Protecting the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bjornard, Trond; Garcia, Humberto; Desmond, William; Demuth, Scott

    2010-01-01

    International safeguards as applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are a vital cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime - they protect against the peaceful nuclear fuel cycle becoming the undetected vehicle for nuclear weapons proliferation by States. Likewise, domestic safeguards and nuclear security are essential to combating theft, sabotage, and nuclear terrorism by non-State actors. While current approaches to safeguarding and protecting the nuclear fuel cycle have been very successful, there is significant, active interest to further improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards and security, particularly in light of the anticipated growth of nuclear energy and the increase in the global threat environment. This article will address two recent developments called Safeguards-by-Design and Security-by-Design, which are receiving increasing broad international attention and support. Expected benefits include facilities that are inherently more economical to effectively safeguard and protect. However, the technical measures of safeguards and security alone are not enough - they must continue to be broadly supported by dynamic and adaptive nonproliferation and security regimes. To this end, at the level of the global fuel cycle architecture, 'nonproliferation and security by design' remains a worthy objective that is also the subject of very active, international focus.

  9. Guarantying and testing the nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Turcu, Ilie

    2002-01-01

    Apparently, the nuclear power will ensure an important share of the world energy demand at least for the next decades because there is no viable alternative in the fan of energy sources neither one complying with the environment preservation requirements. The nuclear energy future depends not only on technical and economical aspects but also on preventing any danger of nuclear safeguards nature. The main international legal instrument which provides concrete commitments for nations in this field is the Nuclear Safeguard Convention. It provides guarantees and testings of the nuclear safeguards over the entire service life of the nuclear power plants. In the two general conferences (of 1999 and 2002) the status and measures adopted in the field of nuclear safeguards by the states adhering to the convention were discussed and reviewed, as well as the issues of financial resources, licensing and the adequate measures in emergency cases. The nuclear safeguards is a major issue among the criteria of integration in UE. Essential for maintaining and endorsing the provisions of nuclear safeguards in Romania are specific research and development activities aiming at integrating the equipment and structures, solving the operation problems of nuclear facilities, studying the behavior of installations in transient regimes, investigating the reliability and probabilistic assessing of nuclear safeguards, examining the phenomenology and simulating severe accidents or human factor behavior. Of major importance appears to be the international cooperation aiming that a permanent exchange of information and experience, dissemination of the best results, solutions and practices. The paper presents the status and trends at the world level, as well as in Romania, underlining the main issues of the strategy in this field and stressing the financial and human resources implied the implementing the nuclear safeguards provisions

  10. Elementary survey of nuclear safeguards problems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tobias, M.L.

    1975-01-01

    The discussion presented on nuclear safeguards is confined primarily to the subject of safeguards for fixed sites. The legal and quasi-legal requirements are briefly outlined. Preventive measures against theft, terrorism, sabotage, or irrational acts by employees and against sabotage by armed gangs are the aspects emphasized. Some of the cost aspects are indicated

  11. Nuclear fuel reprocessing: A time for decision

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    O'Donnell, A.J.; Sandbery, R.O.

    1983-01-01

    Availability of adequate supplies of energy at an affordable cost is essential to continued growth of the world's economics. The tie between economic growth and electricity usage is particularly strong and the pervasive wordwide trend toward increasing electrification shows no signs of abating. Very few viable alternatives are available for supplying the projected increase in baseload electric generating capacity in the next several decades, and most industrialized nations have chosen nuclear power to play a major role. Sustained growth of nuclear power can only be achieved, however, by reprocessing spent fuel to recover and utilize the residual uranium and plutonium energy values

  12. Handbook of nuclear data for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lammer, M.; Schwerer, O.

    1991-06-01

    This handbook contains nuclear data needed by safeguards users for their work. It was initiated by an IAEA working group, and the contents were defined by the relies to a questionnaire sent to safeguards specialists. This is a preliminary edition of the handbook for distribution to safeguards and nuclear data experts for review. The present edition of the handbook contains the following basic nuclear data: actinides: nuclear decay data, thermal neutron cross sections and resonance integrals, prompt neutron data, delayed neutron data; fission products: nuclear decay data, thermal neutron capture cross sections and resonance integrals; fission product yields. Also included are appendices that summarize the data requested by safeguards users, and that present a number of questions to them and to data experts on the data contained in this preliminary issue and about additional data for possible inclusion in future editions and updates of the handbook

  13. Termination of international safeguards on nuclear material discards: An IAEA update

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Larrimore, J.A.

    1995-01-01

    The IAEA adopted a policy for termination of international safeguards on measured discards in mid-1994. The policy addresses a broad range of termination of safeguards on nuclear material in waste with a focus on conditioned waste arising from reprocessing. The safeguards relevant aspects of waste handling up to the point of termination must be approved, and a determination made that the waste type, form of conditioning and nuclear material concentration satisfy specific criteria. In addition, the State where the terminated waste will be stored is requested to notify the IAEA of future movement or processing of the waste. Cases of international transfers of conditioned waste are also addressed

  14. Legal problems of nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rossnagel, A.

    1987-01-01

    The contributions in this book are intended to exemplify the legal situation in connection with the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel from the point of view of constitutional law, administrative law, and international law. Outline solutions are presented with regard to ensuring health, personal freedom, democratic rights and other rights, and are discussed. The author Rossnagel investigates whether the principle of essential matter can guarantee a parliamentary prerogative concerning this field of large-scale technology. The author Schmidt shows that there is no legal obligation of commitment to a reprocessing technology that would exclude research for or application of a less hazardous technology. The contribution by Baumann explains the problems presented by a technology not yet developed to maturity with regard to the outline approval of the technological concept, which is a prerequisite of any partial licence to be issued. The final contribution by Guendling investigates the duties under international law, as for instance transfrontier information, consultation, and legal protection, and how these duties can be better put into practice in order to comply the seriousness of the hazards involved in nuclear fuel reprocessing. (orig./HP) [de

  15. Method of reprocessing spent nuclear fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kamiyama, Hiroaki; Inoue, Tadashi; Miyashiro, Hajime.

    1987-01-01

    Purpose: To facilitate the storage management for the wastes resulting from reprocessing by chemically separating transuranium elements such as actionoid elements together with uranium and plutonium. Method: Spent fuels from a nuclear reactor are separated into two groups, that is, a mixture of uranium, plutonium and transuranium elements and cesium, strontium and other nuclear fission products. Virgin uranium is mixed to adjust the mixture of uranium, plutonium and transuranium elements in the first group, which is used as the fuels for the nuclear reactor. After separating to recover useful metals such as cesium and strontium are separated from short half-decay nuclear fission products of the second group, other nuclear fission products are stored and managed. This enables to shorten the storage period and safety storage and management for the wastes. (Takahashi, M.)

  16. Key Nuclear Verification Priorities: Safeguards and Beyond

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.

    2010-01-01

    In addressing nuclear verification priorities, we should look beyond the current safeguards system. Non-proliferation, which the safeguards system underpins, is not an end in itself, but an essential condition for achieving and maintaining nuclear disarmament. Effective safeguards are essential for advancing disarmament, and safeguards issues, approaches and techniques are directly relevant to the development of future verification missions. The extent to which safeguards challenges are successfully addressed - or otherwise - will impact not only on confidence in the safeguards system, but on the effectiveness of, and confidence in, disarmament verification. To identify the key nuclear verification priorities, we need to consider the objectives of verification, and the challenges to achieving these. The strategic objective of IAEA safeguards might be expressed as: To support the global nuclear non-proliferation regime by: - Providing credible assurance that states are honouring their safeguards commitments - thereby removing a potential motivation to proliferate; and - Early detection of misuse of nuclear material and technology - thereby deterring proliferation by the risk of early detection, enabling timely intervention by the international community. Or to summarise - confidence-building, detection capability, and deterrence. These will also be essential objectives for future verification missions. The challenges to achieving these involve a mix of political, technical and institutional dimensions. Confidence is largely a political matter, reflecting the qualitative judgment of governments. Clearly assessments of detection capability and deterrence have a major impact on confidence. Detection capability is largely thought of as 'technical', but also involves issues of legal authority, as well as institutional issues. Deterrence has both political and institutional aspects - including judgments on risk of detection and risk of enforcement action being taken. The

  17. Key Nuclear Verification Priorities - Safeguards and Beyond

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.

    2010-01-01

    In addressing nuclear verification priorities, we should look beyond the current safeguards system. Non-proliferation, which the safeguards system underpins, is not an end in itself, but an essential condition for achieving and maintaining nuclear disarmament. Effective safeguards are essential for advancing disarmament, and safeguards issues, approaches and techniques are directly relevant to the development of future verification missions. The extent to which safeguards challenges are successfully addressed - or otherwise - will impact not only on confidence in the safeguards system, but on the effectiveness of, and confidence in, disarmament verification. To identify the key nuclear verification priorities, we need to consider the objectives of verification, and the challenges to achieving these. The strategic objective of IAEA safeguards might be expressed as: To support the global nuclear non-proliferation regime by: - Providing credible assurance that states are honouring their safeguards commitments - thereby removing a potential motivation to proliferate; and - Early detection of misuse of nuclear material and technology - thereby deterring proliferation by the risk of early detection, enabling timely intervention by the international community. Or to summarise - confidence-building, detection capability, and deterrence. These will also be essential objectives for future verification missions. The challenges to achieving these involve a mix of political, technical and institutional dimensions. Confidence is largely a political matter, reflecting the qualitative judgment of governments. Clearly assessments of detection capability and deterrence have a major impact on confidence. Detection capability is largely thought of as 'technical', but also involves issues of legal authority, as well as institutional issues. Deterrence has both political and institutional aspects - including judgments on risk of detection and risk of enforcement action being taken. The

  18. IAEA safeguards in new nuclear facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Catton, A. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Durbin, K. [United States Department of Energy, Washington, D.C. (United States); Hamilton, A. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Martikka, E. [STUK, Helsinki (Finland); Poirier, S.; Sprinkle, J. K.; Stevens, R. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Whitlock, J. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Chalk River, ON (Canada)

    2014-07-01

    The inclusion of international safeguards early in the design of nuclear facilities offers an opportunity to reduce project risk. It also has the potential to minimize the impact of safeguards activities on facility operations. Safeguards by design (SBD) encourages stakeholders to become familiar with the requirements of their safeguards agreements and to decide when and how they will fulfil those requirements. As one example, modular reactors are at a design stage where SBD can have a useful impact. Modular reactors might be turnkey projects where the operator takes ownership after commissioning. This comes with a legal obligation to comply with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards requirements. Some of the newcomer countries entering the reactor market have little experience with IAEA safeguards and the associated non-proliferation obligations. To reduce delays or cost increments, one can embed safeguards considerations in the bid and design phases of the project, along with the safety and security considerations. SBD does not introduce any new requirements - it is a process whereby facility designers facilitate the implementation of the existing safeguards requirements. In short, safeguards experts share their expertise with the designers and vice versa. Once all parties understand the fundamentals of all of the operational constraints, they are better able to decide how best to address them. This presentation will provide an overview of SBD activities. (author)

  19. History and current status of nuclear fuel reprocessing technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Funasaka, Hideyuki; Nagai, Toshihisa; Washiya, Tadahiro

    2008-01-01

    History and present state of fast breeder reactor was reviewed in series. As a history and current status of nuclear fuel reprocessing technology, this ninth lecture presented the progress of the FBR fuel reprocessing technology and advanced reprocessing processes. FBR fuel reprocessing technology had been developed to construct the reprocessing equipment test facilities (RETF) based on PUREX process technologies. With economics, reduction of environmental burdens and proliferation resistance taken into consideration, advanced aqueous method for nuclear fuel cycle activities has been promoted as the government's basic policy. Innovative technologies on mechanical disassembly, continuous rotary dissolver, crystallizer, solvent extraction and actinides recovery have been mainly studied. (T. Tanaka)

  20. Nuclear fuel cycle: reprocessing. A bibliography

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, L.B.

    1982-12-01

    This bibliography contains information on the reprocessing portion of the nuclear fuel cycle included in the Department of Energy's Energy Data Base from January 1981 through November 1982. The abstracts are grouped by subject category. Entries in the subject index also facilitate access by subject. Within each category the arrangement is by report number for reports, followed by nonreports in reverse chronological order. These citations are to research reports, journal articles, books, patents, theses, and conference papers from worldwide sources. Five indexes, each preceded by a brief description, are provided: Corporate Author, Personal Author, Subject, Contract Number, and Report Number

  1. To reprocess to recycle. The nuclear safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    After a summary of fundamental notions of radioactivity and nuclear safety, the first part of this work is devoted to the organisation in France to provide the nuclear facilities safety. The second part related to the fuel cycle describes the big steps of this cycle and particularly the stakes and objectives of the reprocessing -recycling as well as the valorization of reusable matters such plutonium and uranium. The risks identification, means to control them, in conception, realisation and operation are described in the third, fourth and fifth parts. In this last part the managements of accidental situations is treated. The sixth and last part is devoted to the environment protection, treats the control of waste release of reprocessing -recycling facilities, of these waste management that is to say every disposition made by Cogema to limit the impact of its installations on environment. In this last part are also described the safety of nuclear and radioactive matters transport, and the definitive breakdown of installations. (N.C.)

  2. Risk analysis of nuclear safeguards regulations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Altman, W.D.; Judd, B.R.

    1982-06-01

    The Aggregated Systems Model (ASM), a probabilisitic risk analysis tool for nuclear safeguards, was applied to determine benefits and costs of proposed amendments to NRC regulations governing nuclear material control and accounting systems. The objective of the amendments was to improve the ability to detect insiders attempting to steal large quantities of special nuclear material (SNM). Insider threats range from likely events with minor consequences to unlikely events with catastrophic consequences. Moreover, establishing safeguards regulations is complicated by uncertainties in threats, safeguards performance, and consequences, and by the subjective judgments and difficult trade-offs between risks and safeguards costs. The ASM systematically incorporates these factors in a comprehensive, analytical framework. The ASM was used to evaluate the effectiveness of current safeguards and to quantify the risk of SNM theft. Various modifications designed to meet the objectives of the proposed amendments to reduce that risk were analyzed. Safeguards effectiveness was judged in terms of the probability of detecting and preventing theft, the expected time to detection, and the expected quantity of SNM diverted in a year. Data were gathered in tours and interviews at NRC-licensed facilities. The assessment at each facility was begun by carefully selecting scenarios representing the range of potential insider threats. A team of analysts and facility managers assigned probabilities for detection and prevention events in each scenario. Using the ASM we computed the measures of system effectiveness and identified cost-effective safeguards modifications that met the objectives of the proposed amendments

  3. Some reflections on nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Campbell, Ross.

    1981-01-01

    The author doubts whether, in view of the 1976 policy of requiring adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or equivalent IAEA safeguards, Canada still needs the 1974 policy of bilateral safeguards on technology as well as material. The opinion is expressed that bilateral safeguards create difficulties for the IAEA, and are resented by some potential customers. Much better, if it were achievable, would be a code agreed by a convention of vendors and customers alike, to include sanctions against transgressors. The author expresses confidence in the IAEA, but perceives a need for more men and money. Also needed are better instruments to account for materials

  4. Integrating virtual reality applications in nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barletta, Michael; Crete, Jean-Maurice; Pickett, Susan

    2011-01-01

    Virtual reality (VR) tools have already been developed and deployed in the nuclear industry, including in nuclear power plant construction, project management, equipment and system design, and training. Recognized as powerful tools for, inter alia, integration of data, simulation of activities, design of facilities, validation of concepts and mission planning, their application in nuclear safeguards is still very limited. However, VR tools may eventually offer transformative potential for evolving the future safeguards system to be more fully information-driven. The paper focuses especially on applications in the area of training that have been underway in the Department of Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It also outlines future applications envisioned for safeguards information and knowledge management, and information-analytic collaboration. The paper identifies some technical and programmatic pre-requisites for realizing the integrative potential of VR technologies. If developed with an orientation to integrating applications through compatible platforms, software, and models, virtual reality tools offer the long-term potential of becoming a real 'game changer,' enabling a qualitative leap in the efficiency and effectiveness of nuclear safeguards. The IAEA invites Member States, industry, and academia to make proposals as to how such integrating potential in the use of virtual reality technology for nuclear safeguards could be realized. (author)

  5. The European experience in safeguarding nuclear fuel recycle processes and Pu stores

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Synetos, Sotiris

    2013-01-01

    Civil nuclear programs in the European Union member states have from their onset included fuel recycling as an option. The EURATOM Treaty gives to the European Commission the obligation to apply safeguards controls to all civil Nuclear Material in the European Union, and to facilitate the implementation of IAEA safeguards. The European Commission (EURATOM) has thus gained years of experience in safeguarding reprocessing plants, Pu storages, and MOX fuel fabrication plants and is currently participating in the development of approaches and measures for safeguarding long term repositories. The aim of this paper is to present the regulator's views and experience on safeguarding nuclear fuel recycle processes and Pu stores, which is based on the following principles: -) Early involvement of the control organizations in the design of the safeguards measures to be developed for a plant (currently referred to as Safeguards by Design); -) Early definition of a safeguards strategy including key measurement points; -) The design and development of plant specific Safeguards equipment, including an on site laboratory for sample analysis; -) The development by the operator of an appropriate Nuclear Material accountancy system to facilitate their declaration obligations; -) The introduction of an inspection regime allowing comprehensive controls under the restrictions imposed by financial and Human Resources limitations; -) Optimization of the inspection effort by using unattended measuring stations, containment and surveillance systems and secure remote transmission of data to the regulator's headquarters. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (authors)

  6. Workshop on instrumentation and analyses for a nuclear fuel reprocessing hot pilot plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Babcock, S.M.; Feldman, M.J.; Wymer, R.G.; Hoffman, D.

    1980-05-01

    In order to assist in the study of instrumentation and analytical needs for reprocessing plants, a workshop addressing these needs was held at Oak Ridge National Laboratory from May 5 to 7, 1980. The purpose of the workshop was to incorporate the knowledge of chemistry and of advanced measurement techniques held by the nuclear and radiochemical community into ideas for improved and new plant designs for both process control and inventory and safeguards measurements. The workshop was athended by experts in nuclear and radiochemistry, in fuel recycle plant design, and in instrumentation and analysis. ORNL was a particularly appropriate place to hold the workshop since the Consolidated Fuel Reprocessing Program (CFRP) is centered there. Requirements for safeguarding the special nuclear materials involved in reprocessing, and for their timely measurement within the process, within the reprocessing facility, and at the facility boundaries are being studied. Because these requirements are becoming more numerous and stringent, attention is also being paid to the analytical requirements for these special nuclear materials and to methods for measuring the physical parameters of the systems containing them. In order to provide a focus for the consideration of the workshop participants, the Hot Experimental Facility (HEF) being designed conceptually by the CFRP was used as a basis for consideration and discussions

  7. Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stanchi, L.

    1991-01-01

    The book contains contributed papers from various authors on the following subjects: Safeguards systems and implementation, Measurement techniques: general, Measurement techniques: destructive analysis, Measurement techniques: non-destructive assay, Containment and surveillance, Spent fuel strategies, Material accounting and data evaluation

  8. Nuclear material inventory estimation in a nuclear fuel reprocessing facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bennett, J.E.; Beyerlein, A.L.

    1981-01-01

    A new approach in the application of modern system identification and estimation techniques is proposed to help nuclear reprocessing facilities meet the nuclear accountability requirement proposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The proposed identification and estimation method considers the material inventory in a portion of the chemical separations area of a reprocessing facility. The method addresses the nonlinear aspects of the problem, the time delay through the separation facility, and the lack of measurement access. The method utilizes only input-output measured data and knowledge of the uncertainties associated with the process and measured data. 14 refs

  9. Nuclear fuel reprocessing and high level waste disposal: informational hearings. Volume V. Reprocessing. Part 2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    None

    1977-03-08

    Testimony was presented by a four member panel on the commercial future of reprocessing. Testimony was given on the status of nuclear fuel reprocessing in the United States. The supplemental testimony and materials submitted for the record are included in this report. (LK)

  10. Nuclear fuel re-processing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sasaki, Yuko; Honda, Takashi; Shoji, Saburo; Kobayashi, Shiro; Furuya, Yasumasa

    1989-01-01

    In a nuclear fuel re-processing plant, high Si series stainless steels not always have sufficient corrosion resistance in a solution containing only nitric acid at medium or high concentration. Further, a method of blowing NOx gases may possibly promote the corrosion of equipment constituent materials remarkably. In view of the above, the corrosion promoting effect of nuclear fission products is suppressed without depositing corrosive metal ions as metals in the nitric acid solution. That is, a reducing atmosphere is formed by generating NOx by electrolytic reduction thereby preventing increase in the surface potential of stainless steels. Further, an anode is disposed in the nitric acid solution containing oxidative metal ions to establish an electrical conduction and separate them by way of partition membranes and a constant potential or constant current is applied while maintaining an ionic state so as not to deposit metals. Thus, equipments of re-processing facility can be protected from corrosion with no particular treatment for wastes as radioactive materials. (K.M.)

  11. A Comparative Study on Safeguards Implementation under Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements and the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jeon, Jihye; Kim, Ki-Hyun; Lee, Young Wook [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    A Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA) requires several conditions, so-called obligations, on the items under the agreement such as: 1) peaceful use, 2) retransfer consent, 3) consent prior to reprocessing or enrichment and 4) safeguards and security. These obligations of the NCAs are imposed by the supplier country. The Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its member states require similar activities. However, there is a significant gap in nuclear material accountancy between safeguards implementation under the NCA and CSA. The difference of those two frameworks is compared herein, focusing on the unique features of the NCA safeguards and its implications are presented. In this study, the NCAs between the ROK and Canada, Australia and US were analyzed since each of them is one of the ROK’s major nuclear trading partners. The safeguards implementation under the NCA is usually specified in an Administrative Arrangement (AA) under the Agreement. The ROK has two AAs in force with Canada and Australia among 29 countries with NCA. Recently, the AA with Canada was revised in December 2015, with those concepts mentioned above. The AA with the US is currently under discussion. Cooperation in nuclear energy between two countries could be further enhanced through reliable implementation of the NCA undertakings. Taking into account the unique features of the NCA, we need to establish effective strategy for fulfilling the obligation under the Agreement.

  12. Monitoring, controlling and safeguarding radiochemical streams at spent fuel reprocessing facilities with optical and gamma-ray spectroscopic methods

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schwantes, J.M.; Bryan, S.A.; Orton, C.R.; Levitskaia, T.G.; Fraga, C.G.

    2013-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has established international safeguards standards for fissionable material at spent fuel reprocessing plants to ensure that significant quantities of weapons-usable nuclear material are not diverted from these facilities. For large throughput nuclear facilities, it is difficult to satisfy the IAEA safeguards accountancy goal for detection of abrupt diversion. Currently, methods to verify material control and accountancy (MCA) at these facilities require time-consuming and resource intensive destructive assay (DA). Leveraging new on-line non-destructive assay (NDA) process monitoring techniques in conjunction with the traditional and highly precise DA methods may provide an additional measure to nuclear material accountancy which would potentially result in a more timely, cost-effective and resource efficient means for safeguards verification at such facilities. By monitoring process control measurements (e.g. flowrates, temperatures, or concentrations of reagents, products or wastes), abnormal plant operations can be detected. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing on-line NDA process monitoring technologies based upon gamma-ray and optical spectroscopic measurements to potentially reduce the time and resource burden associated with current techniques. The Multi-Isotope Process (MIP) Monitor uses gamma spectroscopy and multivariate analysis to identify off-normal conditions in process streams. The spectroscopic monitor continuously measures chemical compositions of the process streams including actinide metal ions (U, Pu, Np), selected fission products, and major stable flowsheet reagents using UV-Vis, Near IR and Raman spectroscopy. Multi-variate analysis is also applied to the optical measurements in order to quantify concentrations of analytes of interest within a complex array of radiochemical streams. This paper will provide an overview of these methods and reports on-going efforts to develop

  13. Steel construction in the nuclear reprocessing industry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jordan, G.W.

    1990-01-01

    Over the past decade British Nuclear Fuels plc (BNFL) has pursued a large capital expenditure programme at Sellafield in Cumbria. This has used large quantities of structural steelwork. For example, Thorp plant for reprocessing spend AGR and LWR fuels, due for completion in 1992, has 20,000 tonnes. The design of these plants has been entrusted to BNFL Engineering based at Risley near Warrington, England. These safety-related structures are designed, as required by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, to withstand the effects of environmental hazards such as extremes of earthquake, wind, temperature, ice, snow, flooding, and lightning strikes. In some cases they may be subjected to impact loading from possible mishandling of lifted loads such as fuel transportation flasks. Design criteria for these structures have been developed by BNFL Engineering. Some examples are mentioned. (author)

  14. Redefining interrelationship between nuclear safety, nuclear security and safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Irie, Kazutomo

    2012-01-01

    Since the beginning of this century, the so-called 3Ss (Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Security and Safeguards) have become major regulatory areas for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In order to rationalize the allocation of regulatory resources, interrelationship of the 3Ss should be investigated. From the viewpoint of the number of the parties concerned in regulation, nuclear security is peculiar with having “aggressors” as the third party. From the viewpoint of final goal of regulation, nuclear security in general and safeguards share the goal of preventing non-peaceful uses of nuclear energy, though the goal of anti-sabotage within nuclear security is rather similar to nuclear safety. As often recognized, safeguards are representative of various policy tools for nuclear non-proliferation. Strictly speaking, it is not safeguards as a policy tool but nuclear non-proliferation as a policy purpose that should be parallel to other policy purposes (nuclear safety and nuclear security). That suggests “SSN” which stands for Safety, Security and Non-proliferation is a better abbreviation rather than 3Ss. Safeguards as a policy tool should be enumerated along with nuclear safety regulation, nuclear security measures and trade controls on nuclear-related items. Trade controls have been playing an important role for nuclear non-proliferation. These policy tools can be called “SSST” in which Trade controls are also emphasized along with Safety regulation, Security measures and Safeguards. (author)

  15. International safeguards in large-scale nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gupta, D.; Heil, J.

    1977-01-01

    The trend in the energy sector in most of the world's industrialized areas shows rather clearly that the rate of installing nuclear plants will be very high and that the largest possible units of nuclear material handling and storage facilities will be built. Various experiments and analyses of measurement methods relevant to safeguards in typical nuclear facilities such as a fuel reprocessing or a fabrication plant have shown that the associated measurement errors as obtained under normal operating conditions are such that they are mainly dominated by systematic errors, which may lie in the range of percentages of the measured amount so that a material balance in such a plant could not normally be closed with any higher accuracy. For example, in a reprocessing plant with a throughput of 1500t U/a and a corresponding throughput of 15t Pu/a, a systematic error of 1% would cause a measurement uncertainty of around 70kg Pu in case a material balance is struck twice a year. Such a large amount may be considered to be unacceptable from the point of view of international safeguards since it arises out of a single plant. The simplest way of getting around the problem would be to strike a material balance more frequently over a given period. This could, however, lead to an enormous increase in the technical and financial burden for the operator of a facility. This paper analyses this problem in some detail for some facilities and shows that, for example, with a properly developed information system in such plants and a combination of containment, surveillance and accountancy measures, a safeguards system can be built up for such facilities. (author)

  16. Interrelationship between nuclear safety, safeguards and nuclear security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Irie, Kazutomo

    2007-01-01

    As preventive activities against danger within nuclear systems, three major areas exist; nuclear safety, safeguards and nuclear security. Considering the purpose of these activities, to prevent non-peaceful use is common in nuclear security in general and safeguards. At the same time, measures against sabotage, one of the subcategory in nuclear security, is similar to nuclear safety in aiming at preventing nuclear accidents. When taking into account the insider issues in nuclear security, the distinction between measures against sabotage and nuclear safety becomes ambiguous. Similarly, the distinction between measures against theft, another subcategory in nuclear security, and safeguards also becomes vague. These distinctions are influenced by psychological conditions of members in nuclear systems. Members who have the intention to make nuclear systems dangerous to human society shall be the 'enemy' to nuclear systems and thus be the target for nuclear security. (author)

  17. Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carchon, R.

    1998-01-01

    Safeguards activities at the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre SCK/CEN answer internal needs, support the Belgian authorities, and support the IAEA. The main objectives of activities concerning safeguards are: (1) to contribute to a prevention of the proliferation of nuclear materials by maintaining an up-to-date expertise in the field of safeguards and providing advice and guidance as well as scientific and technical support to the Belgian authorities and nuclear industry; (2) to improve the qualification and quantification of nuclear materials via nondestructive assay. The main achievements for 1997 are described

  18. Fundamentals of materials accounting for nuclear safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pillay, K.K.S. (comp.)

    1989-04-01

    Materials accounting is essential to providing the necessary assurance for verifying the effectiveness of a safeguards system. The use of measurements, analyses, records, and reports to maintain knowledge of the quantities of nuclear material present in a defined area of a facility and the use of physical inventories and materials balances to verify the presence of special nuclear materials are collectively known as materials accounting for nuclear safeguards. This manual, prepared as part of the resource materials for the Safeguards Technology Training Program of the US Department of Energy, addresses fundamental aspects of materials accounting, enriching and complementing them with the first-hand experiences of authors from varied disciplines. The topics range from highly technical subjects to site-specific system designs and policy discussions. This collection of papers is prepared by more than 25 professionals from the nuclear safeguards field. Representing research institutions, industries, and regulatory agencies, the authors create a unique resource for the annual course titled ''Materials Accounting for Nuclear Safeguards,'' which is offered at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

  19. Handbook on process and chemistry on nuclear fuel reprocessing

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Suzuki, Atsuyuki [Tokyo Univ., Tokyo (Japan); Asakura, Toshihide; Adachi, Takeo [Japan Atomic Energy Research Inst., Tokai, Ibaraki (Japan). Tokai Research Establishment; and others

    2001-12-01

    'Wet-type' nuclear fuel reprocessing technology, based on PUREX technology, has wide applicability as the principal reprocessing technology of the first generation, and relating technologies, waste management for example, are highly developed, too. It is quite important to establish a database summarizing fundamental information about the process and the chemistry of 'wet-type' reprocessing, because it contributes to establish and develop fuel reprocessing process and nuclear fuel cycle treating high burn-up UO{sub 2} fuel and spent MOX fuel, and to utilize 'wet-type' reprocessing technology much widely. This handbook summarizes the fundamental data on process and chemistry, which was collected and examined by 'Editing Committee of Handbook on Process and Chemistry of Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing', from FY 1993 until FY 2000. (author)

  20. Handbook on process and chemistry on nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suzuki, Atsuyuki; Asakura, Toshihide; Adachi, Takeo

    2001-12-01

    'Wet-type' nuclear fuel reprocessing technology, based on PUREX technology, has wide applicability as the principal reprocessing technology of the first generation, and relating technologies, waste management for example, are highly developed, too. It is quite important to establish a database summarizing fundamental information about the process and the chemistry of 'wet-type' reprocessing, because it contributes to establish and develop fuel reprocessing process and nuclear fuel cycle treating high burn-up UO 2 fuel and spent MOX fuel, and to utilize 'wet-type' reprocessing technology much widely. This handbook summarizes the fundamental data on process and chemistry, which was collected and examined by 'Editing Committee of Handbook on Process and Chemistry of Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing', from FY 1993 until FY 2000. (author)

  1. Handbook on process and chemistry on nuclear fuel reprocessing

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Suzuki, Atsuyuki (ed.) [Tokyo Univ., Tokyo (Japan); Asakura, Toshihide; Adachi, Takeo (eds.) [Japan Atomic Energy Research Inst., Tokai, Ibaraki (Japan). Tokai Research Establishment] [and others

    2001-12-01

    'Wet-type' nuclear fuel reprocessing technology, based on PUREX technology, has wide applicability as the principal reprocessing technology of the first generation, and relating technologies, waste management for example, are highly developed, too. It is quite important to establish a database summarizing fundamental information about the process and the chemistry of 'wet-type' reprocessing, because it contributes to establish and develop fuel reprocessing process and nuclear fuel cycle treating high burn-up UO{sub 2} fuel and spent MOX fuel, and to utilize 'wet-type' reprocessing technology much widely. This handbook summarizes the fundamental data on process and chemistry, which was collected and examined by 'Editing Committee of Handbook on Process and Chemistry of Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing', from FY 1993 until FY 2000. (author)

  2. International safeguards: Accounting for nuclear materials

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fishbone, L.G.

    1988-09-28

    Nuclear safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are one element of the non-proliferation regime'', the collection of measures whose aim is to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already possess them. Safeguards verifications provide evidence that nuclear materials in peaceful use for nuclear-power production are properly accounted for. Though carried out in cooperation with nuclear facility operators, the verifications can provide assurance because they are designed with the capability to detect diversion, should it occur. Traditional safeguards verification measures conducted by inspectors of the IAEA include book auditing; counting and identifying containers of nuclear material; measuring nuclear material; photographic and video surveillance; and sealing. Novel approaches to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in safeguards verifications are under investigation as the number and complexity of nuclear facilities grow. These include the zone approach, which entails carrying out verifications for groups of facilities collectively, and randomization approach, which entails carrying out entire inspection visits some fraction of the time on a random basis. Both approaches show promise in particular situations, but, like traditional measures, must be tested to ensure their practical utility. These approaches are covered on this report. 15 refs., 16 figs., 3 tabs.

  3. International safeguards: Accounting for nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fishbone, L.G.

    1988-01-01

    Nuclear safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are one element of the ''non-proliferation regime'', the collection of measures whose aim is to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already possess them. Safeguards verifications provide evidence that nuclear materials in peaceful use for nuclear-power production are properly accounted for. Though carried out in cooperation with nuclear facility operators, the verifications can provide assurance because they are designed with the capability to detect diversion, should it occur. Traditional safeguards verification measures conducted by inspectors of the IAEA include book auditing; counting and identifying containers of nuclear material; measuring nuclear material; photographic and video surveillance; and sealing. Novel approaches to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in safeguards verifications are under investigation as the number and complexity of nuclear facilities grow. These include the zone approach, which entails carrying out verifications for groups of facilities collectively, and randomization approach, which entails carrying out entire inspection visits some fraction of the time on a random basis. Both approaches show promise in particular situations, but, like traditional measures, must be tested to ensure their practical utility. These approaches are covered on this report. 15 refs., 16 figs., 3 tabs

  4. India and the nuclear safeguards controversy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Poulose, T.T.

    1979-01-01

    A brief account of the origin and development of the safeguards system to prevent diversion of nuclear material from its peaceful uses to production of nuclear explosives is given. India is firmly opposed to the discriminatory characteristics of the system. The IAEA safeguards apply to those nations (most of them developing nations) seeking Agency aid and not to the nuclear weapons powers and other advanced nuclear powers who do not need Agency aid. Even though the Tarapur Agreement does not provide for full scope safeguards, U.S.A., particularly after 1974 Pokharan explosion, is pressurisinq India to accept them by delaying the supply of enriched uranium for the Tarapur Power Plant. As is assumed by the Americans, India is not indifferent to the problem of proliferation. On the other hand, it has renounced nuclear weapons as an instrument of national policy and is committed to non-proliferation. India has all along since independence advocated universal and non-discriminating full scope safeguards system applicable to all nations, both nuclear and non-nuclear powers and to all nuclear facilities. (M.G.B.)

  5. Deactivating a major nuclear fuels reprocessing facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    LeBaron, G.J.

    1997-01-01

    This paper describes three key processes used in deactivating the Plutonium Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Facility, a large, complex nuclear reprocessing facility, 15 months ahead of schedule and $77 million under budget. The organization was reengineered to refine its business processes and more effectively organize around the deactivation work scope. Multi-disciplined work teams were formed to be self-sufficient and empowered to make decisions and perform work. A number of benefits were realized by reengineering. A comprehensive process to develop end points which clearly identified specific results and the post-project facility configuration was developed so all areas of a facility were addressed. Clear and specific end points allowed teams to focus on completing deactivation activities and helped ensure there were no unfulfilled end-of-project expectations. The RCRA regulations require closure of permitted facilities within 180 days after cessation of operations which may essentially necessitate decommissioning. A more cost effective approach was adopted which significantly reduced risk to human health and the environment by taking the facility to a passive, safe, inexpensive-to-maintain surveillance and maintenance condition (deactivation) prior to disposition. PUREX thus became the first large reprocessing facility with active TSD [treatment, storage, and disposal] units to be deactivated under the RCRA regulations

  6. Safeguards Strategy in Physical Protection System for Nuclear Installation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ade lndra B; Kasturi; Tatang Eryadi

    2004-01-01

    Safeguards strategy is directed at efforts of eliminating theft of nuclear materials and sabotage of nuclear installation. For achieving the above objective, it is necessary to set up safeguards strategy in physical protection of nuclear materials and installation. The safeguards strategy starts from anticipated security condition, list of thefts, planning referred to as safeguards planning. Safeguards planning are implemented in safeguards implementation, followed up then by evaluation. Results of evaluation are equipped with results of safeguards survey already developed. Safeguards' planning is made from these results and serve as guidelines for next safeguards implementation and is repeated to form a safeguard cycle. One safeguard cycle is made on a periodical basis, at least annually. (author)

  7. Nuclear Safeguards Considerations For The Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Phillip Casey Durst; David Beddingfield; Brian Boyer; Robert Bean; Michael Collins; Michael Ehinger; David Hanks; David L. Moses; Lee Refalo

    2009-10-01

    High temperature reactors (HTRs) have been considered since the 1940s, and have been constructed and demonstrated in the United Kingdom (Dragon), United States (Peach Bottom and Fort Saint Vrain), Japan (HTTR), Germany (AVR and THTR-300), and have been the subject of conceptual studies in Russia (VGM). The attraction to these reactors is that they can use a variety of reactor fuels, including abundant thorium, which upon reprocessing of the spent fuel can produce fissile U-233. Hence, they could extend the stocks of available uranium, provided the fuel is reprocessed. Another attractive attribute is that HTRs typically operate at a much higher temperature than conventional light water reactors (LWRs), because of the use of pyrolytic carbon and silicon carbide coated (TRISO) fuel particles embedded in ceramic graphite. Rather than simply discharge most of the unused heat from the working fluid in the power plant to the environment, engineers have been designing reactors for 40 years to recover this heat and make it available for district heating or chemical conversion plants. Demonstrating high-temperature nuclear energy conversion was the purpose behind Fort Saint Vrain in the United States, THTR-300 in Germany, HTTR in Japan, and HTR-10 and HTR-PM, being built in China. This resulted in nuclear reactors at least 30% or more thermodynamically efficient than conventional LWRs, especially if the waste heat can be effectively utilized in chemical processing plants. A modern variant of high temperature reactors is the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR). Originally developed in the United States and Germany, it is now being redesigned and marketed by the Republic of South Africa and China. The team examined historical high temperature and high temperature gas reactors (HTR and HTGR) and reviewed safeguards considerations for this reactor. The following is a preliminary report on this topic prepared under the ASA-100 Advanced Safeguards Project in support of the NNSA Next

  8. Nuclear export controls and nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sevini, F.

    2013-01-01

    The export control of dual use goods has developed since the early seventies to counter nuclear proliferation. The paper provides an overview of dual-use export control issues also in relation with the Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, which requires States to provide declarations of the export of the controlled items listed in its Annex II, derived from the Nuclear Suppliers Group Trigger list. Recommendations for improvement are proposed. On the EU level, the paper summarises the framework set by the European Council Regulation 428/2009, requiring Member States to impose control on exports, brokering and transit of dual use goods. The Regulation includes the so-called 'EU dual-use control list' integrating the lists of dual-use items defined by the international regimes and requires also the control on intangible technology transfers as foreseen by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540. ESARDA has recently launched a new sub-Working Group on export control, which raised large interest and may evolve to a full-fledged working group. Export control may provide an opportunity of technical collaboration between ESARDA and INMM. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (author)

  9. Economic feasibility study of regional centers for nuclear fuel reprocessing in the developing countries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bakeshloo, A.A.

    1977-01-01

    The fuel cycle costs for the following three different economic alternatives were studied: (1) Reprocessing in an industrialized country (such as the U.S.); (2) Reprocessing in the individual developing country; (3) Reprocessing in a regional center. The nuclear fuel cycle cost for the ''Throw-away'' fuel cycle was evaluated. Among the six regions which were considered in this study, region one (South America including Mexico) was selected for the economic analysis of the nuclear fuel cycle for the above three alternatives. For evaluation of the cases where the fuel is reprocessed in a regional center or in an individual developing country, a unit reprocessing cost equation was developed. An economic evaluation was developed to estimate the least expensive method for transporting radioactive nuclear material by either leased or purchased shipping casks. The necessary equations were also developed for estimating plutonium transportation and the safeguard costs. On the basis of nuclear material and services requirements and unit costs for each component, the levelized nuclear fuel cycle costs for each alternative were estimated. Finally, by a comparison of cost, among these three alternatives plus the ''Throw-away'' case,it was found that it is not at all economical to build individual reprocessing plants inside the developing countries in region one. However, it also was found that the economic advantage of a regional center with respect to the first alternative is less than a 4% difference between their total fuel cycle costs. It is concluded that there is no great economic advantage in any developing countries to seek to process their fuel in one of the advanced countries. Construction of regional reprocessing centers is an economically viable concept

  10. Development of a computerized nuclear materials control and accounting system for a fuel reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Crawford, J.M.; Ehinger, M.H.; Joseph, C.; Madeen, M.L.

    1979-07-01

    A computerized nuclear materials control and accounting system (CNMCAS) for a fuel reprocessing plant is being developed by Allied-General Nuclear Services at the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant. Development work includes on-line demonstration of near real-time measurement, measurement control, accounting, and processing monitoring/process surveillance activities during test process runs using natural uranium. A technique for estimating in-process inventory is also being developed. This paper describes development work performed and planned, plus significant design features required to integrate CNMCAS into an advanced safeguards system

  11. Development of a computerized nuclear materials control and accounting system for a fuel reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Crawford, J.M.; Ehinger, M.H.; Joseph, C.; Madeen, M.L.

    1979-01-01

    A computerized nuclear materials control and accounting system (CNMCAS) for a fuel reprocessing plant is being developed by Allied-General Nuclear Services at the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant. Development work includes on-line demonstration of near real-time measurement, measurement control, accounting, and processing monitoring/process surveillance activities during test process runs using natural uranium. A technique for estimating in-process inventory is also being developed. This paper describes development work performed and planned, plus significant design features required to integrate CNMCAS into an advanced safeguards system. 2 refs

  12. Review of the nuclear safeguards problem

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Poch, L.A.; Wolsko, T.D.

    1979-10-01

    The issues surrounding nuclear safeguards are proliferation and terrorism. Protecting the nuclear fuel cycle against nuclear materials diversion has been the function of the NPT and the IAEA. However, because all nations have not signed the NPT and IAEA safeguarding inspections are not foolproof, the fuel cycle itself has been looked to as a possible way to alleviate concerns over proliferation. A civilian nuclear industry is not needed to produce weapon material, since research reactors can provide the necessary weapon-grade uranium or plutonium much cheaper and easier than commercial power reactors. Thus, altering the nuclear fuel cycle does not necessarily reduce the possibility of proliferation of nuclear weapons. Only strict enforcement of the NPT and of the safeguard guidelines of the IAEA can achieve nonproliferation. Changing the fuel cycle does not present terrorists from stealing highly radioactive material to be used for weapons or from sabotaging nuclear facilities. Policing a nuclear facility by using guards, alarms, barriers, and searching and screening of employees is the only way to protect against terrorism, but these actions raise questions regarding civil liberties

  13. The importance of nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Allday, C.

    1977-01-01

    The subject is discussed under the following main headings: introduction; world energy requirement; energy conservation and the economics of recycle; environmental considerations and the timescale of reprocessing; and problems associated with reprocessing. It is concluded that reprocessing is essential to the conservation of the world's energy resources and is an environmentally and probably an economically more acceptable option to the 'throw away' alternative. The associated problems of proliferation and terrorism, although of the utmost importance, can and will be solved. (U.K.)

  14. Safeguards for a nuclear weapon convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, D.

    1999-01-01

    An NDT presupposes a fundamental commitment by all parties to its final objective and hence requires a high and sustained level of confidence amongst all states concerned. The appropriate format for an Nuclear Disarmament Treaty (NDT) would probably be a multilateral treaty open to all states. The treaty must necessarily include the five nuclear weapon states and a procedure would have to be found for securing the ratification of the threshold states without conferring upon them the status of nuclear weapon states. While the IAEA may well be able to carry out the safeguards tasks required by an NDT it would probably be necessary to establish a new international organization to verify the elimination of all nuclear weapons. The experience of UNSCOM and the IAEA in Iraq, and of the IAEA in the DPRK, have shown how difficult the verification of international obligations is in the absence of a commitment to disarm, while the experience of the INF and START treaties, and of the IAEA in South Africa have shown how much simpler it is when the parties concerned are fully committed to the process. Verifying and safeguarding an NDT would be largely an extrapolation of activities already carried out by the nuclear weapon states under the INF and START treaties and by the IAEA in the routine application of safeguards as well as in its less routine work in Iraq, South Africa and the DPRK. Both the verification and safeguarding tasks would be made very much easier if it were possible to bring down to a few hundred the number of nuclear warheads remaining in the hands of any avowed nuclear weapon state, and to conclude a cutoff convention. Experience is needed to show whether the additional safeguards authority accorded to the IAEA by 'programme 93+2' will enable it to effectively safeguard the facilities that would be decommissioned as a result of an NDT and those that would remain in operation to satisfy civilian needs. Subject to this rider and on condition that the IAEA

  15. Status of ANSI standards on decommissioning of nuclear reprocessing facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Graham, H.B.

    1975-01-01

    A definition of decommissioning is given, and the preparation of ANSI Standard, ''General Design Criteria for Nuclear Reprocessing Facilities'' (N101.3) is discussed. A Eurochemic report, entitled ''The Shutdown of Reprocessing Facilities--Results of Preliminary Studies on the Installations Belonging to Eurochemic,'' was used in the preparation of this standard. (U.S.)

  16. Predicting the behaviour or neptunium during nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Drake, V.A.

    1988-01-01

    Behaviour of Np and its distribution over reprocessing flowsheet is studied due to the necessity of improvement of reprocessing methods of wastes formed during purex-process. Valency states of Np in solutions of reprocessing cycles, Np distribution in organic and acid phases, Np(5) oxidation by nitric acid at the stage of extraction, effect of U and Pu presence on Np behaviour, are considered. Calculation and experimental data are compared; the possibility of Np behaviour forecasting in the process of nuclear fuel reprocessing, provided initial data vay, is shown. 7 refs.; 4 figs.; 1 tab

  17. Safeguards and nuclear safety: a personal perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Manning Muntzing, L.

    1982-01-01

    The IAEA's twenty-fifth anniversary provides an occasion for taking stock, for reviewing what the Agency has accomplished, for appraising its present status and for setting out the imperatives that should guide the activities in the near future. In the spirit of this occasion, the author offers his personal perspective on two fundamental aspects of the Agency's work: safeguards and nuclear safety

  18. Mass-spectrometric measurements for nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carter, J.A.; Smith, D.H.; Walker, R.L.

    1982-01-01

    The need of an on-site inspection device to provide isotopic ratio measurements led to the development of a quadrupole mass spectrometer mounted in a van. This mobile laboratory has the ability, through the use of the resin bead technique, to acquire, prepare, and analyze samples of interest to nuclear safeguards. Precision of the measurements is about 1 to 2%

  19. Gamma scanning equipment for nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    De Grandi, G.; Stanchi, L.

    1975-01-01

    Many reasons justify the use of gamma techniques in the field of nuclear safeguards. The paper describes electronic equipment for gamma-scanning of non-irradiated fuel elements. The control of the operation is completely digital and driven by a minicomputer and gives more accurate results in respect of an analog chain which has been successfully used in fuel element manufacturing plants

  20. Measurements Matter in Nuclear Safeguards & Security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aregbe, Y.; Jakopic, R.; Richter, S.; Schillebeeckx, P.; Hult, M.

    2015-01-01

    The deliverable of any laboratory is a measurement result with stated uncertainty and traceability (ISO/IEC 17025: 2005). Measurement results, particularly in safeguards, have to be accurate, comparable and traceable to a stated reference, preferably to the SI. Results provided by operator-, safeguards- or network laboratories have to be in compliance with specific quality goals for nuclear material and environmental sample analysis. Metrological quality control tools are prerequisites to build up confidence in measurement results that have to be translated into meaningful safeguards conclusions or to demonstrate conformity of findings with declared processes. The European Commission—Joint Research Centre (EC–JRC) has dedicated facilities, laboratories and projects to provide certified nuclear reference materials (CRM), to develop reference methods and to organize inter-laboratory comparisons (ILC) in compliance with ISO Guide 34, ISO17025 and ISO17043, including respective training. Recent examples are: – cooperation with the JAEA to investigate on the application of Neutron Resonance Densitometry (NRD) to quantify the amount of special nuclear material in particlelike debris of melted fuel as formed in the nuclear accident in Fukushima – training in metrology and gamma-ray spectrometry for EURATOM safeguards inspectors – development of uranium reference particle standards under a new EC support task to the IAEA. Currently, the JRC puts major efforts in producing CRMs and conformity assessment tools for “age-dating” of uranium and plutonium samples. They are needed for method validation in determining the date of the last chemical separation of uranium or plutonium from their daughter nuclides. These type of CRMs are not only needed in nuclear safeguards and forensics, but could support in the future a possible new type of “verification mechanism” as part of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), since measurements and measurement standards

  1. Reprocessing of nuclear fuels - status report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schueller, W.

    1976-01-01

    The paper gives a survey on reprocessing plants at present under construction, in operation, and planned, as well as on the most important process steps such as receipt, storage, conversion, the extraction process, purification of the end products, gaseous waste treatment and waste treatment, and repair and maintenance of reprocessing plants. An outline on operational experience with WAK follows. (HR/LN) [de

  2. Study of the application of near-real-time materials accountancy to safeguards for reprocessing facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ikawa, Koji; Ihara, Hitoshi; Nishimura, Hideo; Hirata, Mitsuho; Sakuragi, Hirotaka; Ido, Masaru.

    1983-09-01

    This report describes the results of TASTEX task F, the basic purpose of which was to investigate the feasibility of applying the basic concepts of near-real-time materials accountancy to small or medium-sized spent fuel reprocessing facilities, using the PNC-Tokai facility as a model. The background of Task-F and the proposed IAEA requirements on reprocessing plant safeguards are briefly shown. A model of near-real-time materials accountancy based on weekly material balances covering the entire process MBA is outlined, and the effectiveness of this model is evaluated based on simulation and analysis procedures developed for the study. The results show that the proposed materials accountancy model should provide sufficient information to satisfy IAEA guidelines for detection goals. Field testing of the model began in 1980, and the preliminary evaluation of this field test data shows that weekly in-process physical inventories are possible without affecting process operations. This report also describes studies related to IAEA verification procedures, and identifies necessary further work. (author)

  3. Nuclear safeguards - a system in transition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.

    1999-01-01

    'Classical' safeguards have a strong emphasis on nuclear materials accountancy, and are primarily concerned with verifying nuclear activities as declared by the State - what has been termed the correctness of States' declarations. Following the Gulf War, failure to adequately address the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities - the issue of the completeness of States' declarations - has been recognised as a major shortcoming in the classical safeguards system, and major changes are in progress to strengthen the IAEA's capabilities in this regard. Agreement has been reached on a Model Protocol substantially extending the IAEA's authority, and there has been good progress in developing the new approaches and technologies required to ensure this authority is used effectively. IAEA safeguards are undergoing a major transition, towards greater emphasis on information collection and analysis, diversity of verification methods, incorporation of more qualitative judgments, and improved efficiency. These changes present major challenges to the IAEA and to the international community, but the end result will be a more effective safeguards system

  4. Corrosion control in nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Steele, D.F.

    1986-01-01

    This article looks in detail at tribology-related hazards of corrosion in irradiated fuel reprocessing plants and tries to identify and minimize problems which could contribute to disaster. First, the corrosion process is explained. Then the corrosion aspects at each of four stages in reprocessing are examined, with particular reference to oxide fuel reprocessing. The four stages are fuel receipt and storage, fuel breakdown and dissolution, solvent extraction and product concentration and waste management. Results from laboratory and plant corrosion trails are used at the plant design stage to prevent corrosion problems arising. Operational procedures which minimize corrosion if it cannot be prevented at the design stage, are used. (UK)

  5. Nuclear proliferation and safeguards. Summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-03-01

    This comprehensive analysis of the technological, economic, and political factors affecting the potential spread of nuclear weapons proved useful in the congressional debate which culminated in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. The report was subsequently published commercially and has been a frequently cited reference in the literature on proliferation and nuclear power. Despite developments since 1977, the information in the OTA report is still useful to those wishing to obtain an indepth understanding of the issues. Included is an analysis of why a nation might want nuclear weapons development program and the various sources of nuclear material are discussed. The control of proliferation is considered as well as its relation to the nuclear industry

  6. Analytical methodology for nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ramakumar, K.L.

    2011-01-01

    This paper attempts to briefly describe the analytical methodologies available and also highlight some of the challenges, expectations from nuclear material accounting and control (NUMAC) point of view

  7. Institutionalizing Safeguards By Design for Nuclear Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Morgan, James B.; Kovacic, Donald N.; Whitaker, J. Michael

    2008-01-01

    Safeguards for nuclear facilities can be significantly improved by developing and implementing methodologies for integrating proliferation resistance into the design of new facilities. This paper proposes a method to systematically analyze a facility's processes, systems, equipment, structures and management controls to ensure that all relevant proliferation scenarios that could potentially result in unacceptable consequences have been identified, evaluated and mitigated. This approach could be institutionalized into a country's regulatory structure similar to the way facilities are licensed to operate safely and are monitored through inspections and incident reporting to ensure compliance with domestic and international safeguards. Furthermore, taking credit for existing systems and equipment that have been analyzed and approved to assure a facility's reliable and safe operations will reduce the overall cost of implementing intrinsic and extrinsic proliferation-resistant features. The ultimate goal is to integrate safety, reliability, security and safeguards operations into the design of new facilities to effectively and efficiently prevent diversion, theft and misuse of nuclear material and sensitive technologies at both the facility and state level. To facilitate this approach at the facility level, this paper discusses an integrated proliferation resistance analysis (IPRA) process. If effectively implemented, this integrated approach will also facilitate the application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards

  8. Redefining interrelationship between nuclear safety, nuclear security and safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Irie, Kazutomo

    2011-01-01

    Since the beginning of this century, the so-called 3Ss (Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Security and Safeguards) have become major regulatory areas for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The importance of the 3Ss is now emphasized to countries which are newly introducing nuclear power generation. However, as role models for those newcomers, existing nuclear power countries are also required to strengthen their regulatory infrastructure for the 3Ss. In order to rationalize the allocation of regulatory resources, interrelationship of the 3Ss should be investigated. From the viewpoint of the number of the parties concerned in regulation, nuclear security is peculiar with having 'aggressors' as the third party. From the viewpoint of final goal of regulation, nuclear security in general and safeguards share the goal of preventing non-peaceful uses of nuclear energy, though the goal of anti-sabotage within nuclear security is rather similar to nuclear safety. As often recognized, safeguards are representative of various policy tools for nuclear non-proliferation. Strictly speaking, it is not safeguards as a policy tool but nuclear non-proliferation as a policy purpose that should be parallel to other policy purposes (nuclear safety and nuclear security). That suggests 'SSN' which stands for Safety, Security and Non-proliferation is a better abbreviation rather than 3Ss. Safeguards as a policy tool should be enumerated along with nuclear safety regulation, nuclear security measures and trade controls on nuclear-related items. Trade controls have been playing an important role for nuclear non-proliferation. These policy tools can be called 'SSST' in which Trade controls are also emphasized along with Safety regulation, Security measures and Safeguards. Recently, it becomes quite difficult to clearly demarcate these policy tools. As nuclear security concept is expanding, the denotation of nuclear security measures is also expanding. Nuclear security measures are more and more

  9. Paths to a nuclear world with reliable safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zebroski, E.L.

    1978-01-01

    The effectiveness of safeguards in the nuclear industry in reducing proliferation is surveyed. Several basic topics relative to proliferation which are discussed are: (1) ''the recognition that 'proliferation' encompasses at least four different issues which may require distinct approaches and policies;'' (2) ''in the context of the regulatory process by which the perceived risks to society are managed;'' (3) ''in the context of the realistic options and objectives for an attainable world nuclear structure;'' and (4) ''in the perception of the public and of decision-makers of the attainable reduction in risks - and at what costs - and the recognition of the extent to which some costs have already been accrued.'' Options open to the world are: (1) a structured nuclear world, (2) an unstructured nuclear world, or (3) a benign energy world. Current US policy of denial of nuclear energy by indefinite delay is seen as indirectly pointing the US toward option 1 or 3, as the basic cause of American economic decline, and as a root cause of many international tensions resulting from the US decline. Certain alternate approaches to a breeder-type reactor program or to fuel reprocessing which should contribute to a more proliferation-resistant nuclear program are briefly discussed

  10. Non cooperative games applied to nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goutal, P.

    1997-01-01

    This study presents the utilization of the non cooperative games in the nuclear safeguards. In order to dissuade from possible diversions of nuclear materials, an inspector has to realize a certain number of inspections in a nuclear installation. The inspector has to minimize the detection time of a diversion and the diverter has to maximize this time. A software, JADIS, is realized to obtain optimum inspection strategy for a great number of periods. Another game is studied: the infiltration game. An infiltration agent has to brake into the installation without being headed off. (A.L.B.)

  11. International safeguards and international nuclear trade

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Felten, P.

    1991-01-01

    A particular feature of nuclear trade is the need to ensure a good equilibrium between technology transfer and the requirements linked to non proliferation of nuclear weapons. The recent dramatic changes that occurred on the international scene have particularly underlined the difficulty to reach this equilibrium, reminding us the fragility of the existing order and the responsibility of the nuclear community in the field of non-proliferation. Consequently, there is a need for an international thorough review of the actual non proliferation tools developed until now. This review could lead to reconsider some of the dogmas upon which the present safeguard system is based

  12. Probabilistic assessment of nuclear safety and safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Higson, D.J.

    1987-01-01

    Nuclear reactor accidents and diversions of materials from the nuclear fuel cycle are perceived by many people as particularly serious threats to society. Probabilistic assessment is a rational approach to the evaluation of both threats, and may provide a basis for decisions on appropriate actions to control them. Probabilistic method have become standard tools used in the analysis of safety, but there are disagreements on the criteria to be applied when assessing the results of analysis. Probabilistic analysis and assessment of the effectiveness of nuclear material safeguards are still at an early stage of development. (author)

  13. Mass spectrometric analysis for nuclear safeguards

    OpenAIRE

    BOULYGA S.; KONEGGER-KAPPEL S.; RICHTER Stephan; SANGELY L.

    2014-01-01

    Mass spectrometry is currently being implemented in a wide spectrum of research and industrial areas, such as material sciences, cosmo- and geochemistry, biology and medicine, to name just a few. Research and development in nuclear safeguards is closely related to the general field of “Peace Research”; representing a specific application area for analytical sciences in general and for mass spectrometry in particular. According to Albert Einstein “peace cannot be kept by force. It only can be ...

  14. Nuclear Safeguards and Electricity (Finance) Act 1978

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    This Act of 30 June 1978 gives effect to the Agreement concluded on 6 September 1976 between the United Kingdom, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in the territory of the United Kingdom in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear Weapons. It also deals with the financial support provided by the State for the generating station at Drax. (NEA) [fr

  15. Coping with plastic scintillators in nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fehlau, P.E.; Brunson, G.S.

    1983-01-01

    Plastic scintillators offer several advantages for nuclear safeguards research and technology to those who design, assemble, encapsulate, and calibrate detectors from raw materials that are commercially available. These large, inexpensive detectors have good spatial uniformity and good high-energy gamma-ray response. Uniform light collection is obtained with a light pipe attached to a polished scintillator wrapped with aluminum foil. Best low-energy response is obtained by applying a variance analyzer to select the low energy bias level

  16. Safeguards activities in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Osabe, Takeshi

    1998-01-01

    Current Japanese State System for Accountancy and Control (SSAC) has been developing and fully satisfies requirements of both IAEA Safeguards and bilateral partners. However, the public attention on the national and international safeguards activities were increased and the safeguards authorities were required to promote the objective assessment of safeguards implementation to avoid mistrust in safeguards activities which directly influence the public acceptance of nuclear energy in itself. Additionally, since Japan has promoted to complete nuclear fuel cycle including spent fuel reprocessing, enrichment and mixed oxide fuel fabrication this would require further assurance of Japanese non-proliferation commitment. Japan supports the introduction of strengthened safeguards. In this context it is particularly important to strengthen the relationship between national and the IAEA safeguards to contribute actively to the IAEA safeguards in development and utilization of new technologies towards more effective and efficient IAEA safeguards

  17. The use of the hybrid K-edge densitometer for routine analysis of safeguards verification samples of reprocessing input liquor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ottmar, H.; Eberle, H.

    1991-01-01

    Following successful tests of a hybrid K-edge instrument at TUI Karlsruhe and the routine use of a K-edge densitometer for safeguards verification at the same laboratory, the Euratom Safeguards Directorate of the Commission of the European Communities decided to install the first such instrument into a large industrial reprocessing plant for the routine verification of samples taken from the input accountancy tanks. This paper reports on the installation, calibration, sample handling procedure and the performance of this instrument after one year of routine operation

  18. Multivariate diagnostics and anomaly detection for nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Burr, T.

    1994-01-01

    For process control and other reasons, new and future nuclear reprocessing plants are expected to be increasingly more automated than older plants. As a consequence of this automation, the quantity of data potentially available for safeguards may be much greater in future reprocessing plants than in current plants. The authors first review recent literature that applies multivariate Shewhart and multivariate cumulative sum (Cusum) tests to detect anomalous data. These tests are used to evaluate residuals obtained from a simulated three-tank problem in which five variables (volume, density, and concentrations of uranium, plutonium, and nitric acid) in each tank are modeled and measured. They then present results from several simulations involving transfers between the tanks and between the tanks and the environment. Residuals from a no-fault problem in which the measurements and model predictions are both correct are used to develop Cusum test parameters which are then used to test for faults for several simulated anomalous situations, such as an unknown leak or diversion of material from one of the tanks. The leak can be detected by comparing measurements, which estimate the true state of the tank system, with the model predictions, which estimate the state of the tank system as it ''should'' be. The no-fault simulation compares false alarm behavior for the various tests, whereas the anomalous problems allow one to compare the power of the various tests to detect faults under possible diversion scenarios. For comparison with the multivariate tests, univariate tests are also applied to the residuals

  19. Nuclear safeguards: power tool for ensuring nuclear safety and security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ramakumar, K.L.

    2016-01-01

    The quantitative measurement of fissile nuclear materials through independent measurements is one of the cornerstones of the Nuclear Material Accounting and Control (NUMAC) edifice. The verification of the accountancy also represents one of the key elements of international nuclear materials Safeguards. The very basis of NUMAC is to ensure safeguarding nuclear material and to state with confidence, “no significant amount of nuclear material has been withdrawn from its intended civilian use.” Thus, materials accounting systems are designed to account for or keep track of the amounts and locations of sensitive nuclear materials by periodic measurements. The purpose of this activity is to detect missing items (gross defects). A variety of C/S techniques are used, primarily optical surveillance and sealing. These measures serve to back up nuclear material accountancy by providing means by which access to nuclear material can be monitored. Unattended monitoring is a special mode of application of NDA or C/S techniques, or a combination of these, that operates for extended periods of time. The complexity and diversity of facilities containing safeguarded nuclear material require a correspondingly diverse set of verification techniques and equipment. The equipment and techniques used in safeguards are briefly described in this talk

  20. Tamper and radiation resistant instrumentation for safeguarding special nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Parsons, B.B.; Wells, J.L.

    1977-01-01

    A tamper-resistant liquid level/accountability instrumentation system for safeguards use has been developed and tested. The tests demonstrate the accuracy of liquid level measurement using TDR (Time Domain Reflectometry) techniques and the accuracy of differential pressure and temperature measurements utilizing a custom designed liquid level sensor probe. The calibrated liquid level, differential pressure, and temperature data provide sufficient information to accurately determine volume, density, and specific gravity. Test solutions used include ordinary tap water, diluted nitric acid in varying concentrations, and diluted uranium trioxide also in varying concentrations. System operations and preliminary test results conducted at the General Electric Midwest Fuel Recovery Plant and the National Bureau of Standards, respectively, suggest that the system will provide the safeguards inspector with an additional tool for real-time independent verification of normal operations and special nuclear materials accountancy data for chemical reprocessing plants. This paper discusses the system design concepts, including a brief description of the tamper and radiation resistant features, the preliminary test results, and the significance of the work

  1. Bar codes for nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keswani, A.N.; Bieber, A.M. Jr.

    1983-01-01

    Bar codes similar to those used in supermarkets can be used to reduce the effort and cost of collecting nuclear materials accountability data. A wide range of equipment is now commercially available for printing and reading bar-coded information. Several examples of each of the major types of commercially available equipment are given, and considerations are discussed both for planning systems using bar codes and for choosing suitable bar code equipment

  2. Bar codes for nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keswani, A.N.; Bieber, A.M.

    1983-01-01

    Bar codes similar to those used in supermarkets can be used to reduce the effort and cost of collecting nuclear materials accountability data. A wide range of equipment is now commercially available for printing and reading bar-coded information. Several examples of each of the major types of commercially-available equipment are given, and considerations are discussed both for planning systems using bar codes and for choosing suitable bar code equipment

  3. Industrial experience of irradiated nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Delange, M.

    1981-01-01

    At the moment and during the next following years, France and La Hague plant particularly, own the greatest amount of industrial experience in the field of reprocessing, since this experience is referred to three types of reactors, either broadly spread all through the world (GCR and LWR) or ready to be greatly developed in the next future (FBR). Then, the description of processes and technologies used now in France, and the examination of the results obtained, on the production or on the security points of view, are a good approach of the actual industrial experience in the field of spent fuel reprocessing. (author)

  4. Working conditions in nuclear reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-12-01

    In the context of the project, the working conditions of workers in reprocessing plants and associated plant of the fuel circuit were thoroughly examined. The project design and course of the project are a good example of a precautionary technical assessment necessary for social policy reasons, which is in the public interest and is required by the Trade Unions. By working conditions, one means the whole set of scientific/technical, medical, legal, economic and political conditions for the permanent employment of workers in reprocessing plants including the associated parts of the fuel circuit. (orig./HP) [de

  5. The structure of nuclear safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coulter, C.A.

    1989-01-01

    Safeguards systems for facilities that handle special nuclear material combine procedural, protective, and materials accounting elements to prevent and/or detect sabotage and diversion or theft of material. Because most of the discussion in this course is devoted to materials accounting topics only, this chapter provides a brief introduction to some of the procedural and protective elements of safeguards systems, placing the materials accounting system in its proper context. The chapter begins by reviewing certain pertinent DOE definitions and then surveys some protection requirements and technology - protective personnel, personnel identification systems, barriers, detectors, and communication systems. Considered next are the procedures of personnel selection and monitoring, definition and division of job functions, and operation. The chapter then describes the way the procedural, protective, and materials accounting elements can be combined, becoming a total safeguards system. Although such a system necessarily requires elements of procedure, protection, and materials accounting, only the materials accounting gives positive assurance that nuclear material is not diverted or stolen

  6. Framework for Integrating Safety, Operations, Security, and Safeguards in the Design and Operation of Nuclear Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Darby, John L. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Horak, Karl Emanuel [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); LaChance, Jeffrey L. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Tolk, Keith Michael [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Whitehead, Donnie Wayne [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2007-10-01

    The US is currently on the brink of a nuclear renaissance that will result in near-term construction of new nuclear power plants. In addition, the Department of Energy’s (DOE) ambitious new Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) program includes facilities for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel and reactors for transmuting safeguards material. The use of nuclear power and material has inherent safety, security, and safeguards (SSS) concerns that can impact the operation of the facilities. Recent concern over terrorist attacks and nuclear proliferation led to an increased emphasis on security and safeguard issues as well as the more traditional safety emphasis. To meet both domestic and international requirements, nuclear facilities include specific SSS measures that are identified and evaluated through the use of detailed analysis techniques. In the past, these individual assessments have not been integrated, which led to inefficient and costly design and operational requirements. This report provides a framework for a new paradigm where safety, operations, security, and safeguards (SOSS) are integrated into the design and operation of a new facility to decrease cost and increase effectiveness. Although the focus of this framework is on new nuclear facilities, most of the concepts could be applied to any new, high-risk facility.

  7. Effluent monitoring for nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stanchi, L.

    1977-01-01

    A microprocessor-based instrument operates a continuous surveillance on effluents from a nuclear facility. It receives and evaluates pulses from two NaI detectors and a set of single-channel analyzers. It has self-diagnosing capability so that it takes actions not only when it recognizes excessive radioactivity but also when it ascertains some abnormal behavior. Power failure procedure and automatic restart are provided. Operative constants such as alarm thresholds, times, and number of successive measurements are permanently stored in a read/write battery operated C-MOS memory. The program allows automatic succession of phases in a peculiar way and has a feature for loading an auxiliary program into RAMs

  8. Effluent monitoring for nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stanchi, L.

    1976-01-01

    A microprocessor-based instrument operates a continuous surveillance on effluents from a nuclear facility. It receives and evaluates pulses from two NaI detectors and a set of single-channel analyzers. It has self-diagnosing capability so that it takes actions not only when it recognizes excessive radioactivity but also when it ascertains some abnormal behavior. Power failure procedure and automatic restart are provided. Operative constants such as alarm thresholds, times, and number of successive measurements are permanently stored in a read/write battery operated C-MOS memory. The program allows automatic succession of phases in a peculiar way and has a feature for loading an auxiliary program into RAMs

  9. Export control guide: Spent nuclear fuel reprocessing and preparation of plutonium metal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-10-01

    The international Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, also referred to as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), states in Article III, paragraph 2(b) that open-quotes Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide . . . equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.close quotes This guide was prepared to assist export control officials in the interpretation, understanding, and implementation of export laws and controls relating to the international Trigger List for irradiated nuclear fuel reprocessing equipment, components, and materials. The guide also contains information related to the production of plutonium metal. Reprocessing and its place in the nuclear fuel cycle are described briefly; the standard procedure to prepare metallic plutonium is discussed; steps used to prepare Trigger List controls are cited; descriptions of controlled items are given; and special materials of construction are noted. This is followed by a comprehensive description of especially designed or prepared equipment, materials, and components of reprocessing and plutonium metal processes and includes photographs and/or pictorial representations. The nomenclature of the Trigger List has been retained in the numbered sections of this document for clarity

  10. Cost analysis of the US spent nuclear fuel reprocessing facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Schneider, E.A.; Deinert, M.R. [Department of Mechanical Engineering, University of Texas, Austin TX (United States); Cady, K.B. [Department of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics, Cornell University, Ithaca NY (United States)

    2009-09-15

    The US Department of Energy is actively seeking ways in which to delay or obviate the need for additional nuclear waste repositories beyond Yucca Mountain. All of the realistic approaches require the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. However, the US currently lacks the infrastructure to do this and the costs of building and operating the required facilities are poorly established. Recent studies have also suggested that there is a financial advantage to delaying the deployment of such facilities. We consider a system of government owned reprocessing plants, each with a 40 year service life, that would reprocess spent nuclear fuel generated between 2010 and 2100. Using published data for the component costs, and a social discount rate appropriate for intergenerational analyses, we establish the unit cost for reprocessing and show that it increases slightly if deployment of infrastructure is delayed by a decade. The analysis indicates that achieving higher spent fuel discharge burnup is the most important pathway to reducing the overall cost of reprocessing. The analysis also suggests that a nuclear power production fee would be a way for the US government to recover the costs in a manner that is relatively insensitive to discount and nuclear power growth rates. (author)

  11. Nuclear fission and nuclear safeguards: Common technologies and challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keepin, G.R.

    1989-01-01

    Nuclear fission and nuclear safeguards have much in common, including the basic physical phenomena and technologies involved as well as the commitments and challenges posed by expanding nuclear programs in many countries around the world. The unique characteristics of the fission process -- such as prompt and delayed neutron and gamma ray emission -- not only provide the means of sustaining and controlling the fission chain reaction, but also provide unique ''signatures'' that are essential to quantitative measurement and effective safeguarding of key nuclear materials (notably 239 Pu and 235 U) against theft, loss, or diversion. In this paper, we trace briefly the historical emergence of safeguards as an essential component of the expansion of the nuclear enterprise worldwide. We then survey the major categories of passive and active nondestructive assay techniques that are currently in use or under development for rapid, accurate measurement and verification of safe-guarded nuclear materials in the many forms in which they occur throughout the nuclear fuel cycle. 23 refs., 14 figs

  12. Cost and availability of gadolinium for nuclear fuel reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Klepper, O.H.

    1985-06-01

    Gadolinium is currently planned for use as a soluble neutron poison in nuclear fuel reprocessing plants to prevent criticality of solutions of spent fuel. Gadolinium is relatively rare and expensive. The present study was undertaken therefore to estimate whether this material is likely to be available in quantities sufficient for fuel reprocessing and at reasonable prices. It was found that gadolinium, one of 16 rare earth elements, appears in the marketplace as a by-product and that its present supply is a function of the production rate of other more prevalent rare earths. The potential demand for gadolinium in a fuel reprocessing facility serving a future fast reactor industry amounts to only a small fraction of the supply. At the present rate of consumption, domestic supplies of rare earths containing gadolinium are adequate to meet national needs (including fuel reprocessing) for over 100 years. With access to foreign sources, US demands can be met well beyond the 21st century. It is concluded therefore that the supply of gadolinium will quite likely be more than adequate for reprocessing spent fuel for the early generation of fast reactors. The current price of 99.99% pure gadolinium oxide lies in the range $50/lb to $65/lb (1984 dollars). By the year 2020, in time for reprocessing spent fuel from an early generation of large fast reactors, the corresponding values are expected to lie in the $60/lb to $75/lb (1984 dollars) price range. This increase is modest and its economic impact on nuclear fuel reprocessing would be minor. The economic potential for recovering gadolinium from the wastes of nuclear fuel reprocessing plants (which use gadolinium neutron poison) was also investigated. The cost of recycled gadolinium was estimated at over twelve times the cost of fresh gadolinium, and thus recycle using current recovery technology is not economical. 15 refs., 4 figs., 11 tabs

  13. Inspection methods for safeguards systems at nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Minichino, C.; Richard, E.W.

    1981-01-01

    A project team at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has been developing inspection procedures and training materials for the NRC inspectors of safeguards systems at licensed nuclear facilities. This paper describes (1) procedures developed for inspecting for compliance with the Code of Federal Regulations, (2) training materials for safeguards inspectors on technical topics related to safeguards systems, such as computer surety, alarm systems, sampling techniques, and power supplies, and (3) an inspector-oriented methodology for evaluating the overall effectiveness of safeguards systems

  14. The reprocessing of irradiated MTR fuel and the nuclear material accountancy - Dounreay, UKAEA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Barrett, T.R.; Harrison, R. [UKAEA, Nuclear Materials Control Dep., Dounreay (United Kingdom)

    1997-07-01

    The reprocessing of irradiated HEU MTR fuel is a sensible part of a safeguards regime. It brings together fuel otherwise scattered around the world into a concerted accountancy and protection arrangement. From a nuclear material accountants view the overall accountancy performance has been excellent. While investigations have been required for a few individual MUFs or trends, very little effort has required to be expended by the Nuclear Materials Control Department. That is a definition of a 'good plant'; it operates, measures and records input and output streams, and then the accountancy falls into place. As identified in this paper, the accountancy of the nuclear material processed in the plant is well founded and sound. The accountancy results over several decades confirm the adequacy of the safeguards arrangements at Dounreay. The processing makes good commercial sense and meets the current philosophy of recycling valuable resource materials. The risk of operating the full fuel cycle are less than those of extended storage of irradiated fuel at disparate diverse locations. The reprocessing at Dounreay accords with all of these philosophies. The assessed risk is at a very low level, well within published UK HSE 'tolerability of risk' regulatory guidelines. The impact of the operations are similarly low within the guidelines, for the operators and for the general public. (author)

  15. The reprocessing of irradiated MTR fuel and the nuclear material accountancy - Dounreay, UKAEA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barrett, T.R.; Harrison, R.

    1997-01-01

    The reprocessing of irradiated HEU MTR fuel is a sensible part of a safeguards regime. It brings together fuel otherwise scattered around the world into a concerted accountancy and protection arrangement. From a nuclear material accountants view the overall accountancy performance has been excellent. While investigations have been required for a few individual MUFs or trends, very little effort has required to be expended by the Nuclear Materials Control Department. That is a definition of a 'good plant'; it operates, measures and records input and output streams, and then the accountancy falls into place. As identified in this paper, the accountancy of the nuclear material processed in the plant is well founded and sound. The accountancy results over several decades confirm the adequacy of the safeguards arrangements at Dounreay. The processing makes good commercial sense and meets the current philosophy of recycling valuable resource materials. The risk of operating the full fuel cycle are less than those of extended storage of irradiated fuel at disparate diverse locations. The reprocessing at Dounreay accords with all of these philosophies. The assessed risk is at a very low level, well within published UK HSE 'tolerability of risk' regulatory guidelines. The impact of the operations are similarly low within the guidelines, for the operators and for the general public. (author)

  16. International Nuclear Safeguards Inspection Support Tool (INSIST)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    St. Pierre, D.E.; Steinmaus, K.L.; Moon, B.D.

    1994-07-01

    DOE is committed to providing technologies to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to meet escalating monitoring and inspection requirements associated with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). One example of technology provided to the IAEA is the information management and remote monitoring capabilities being customized for the IAEA by the International Safeguards Division of the Office of Non-Proliferation and National Security. The ongoing Safeguards Information Management Systems (SIMS) program is an interlaboratory effort providing the IAEA with a range of information management capabilities designed to enhance the effectiveness of their nuclear inspection activities. The initial commitment involved the customization of computer capabilities to provide IAEA with the basic capability to geographically organize, store, and retrieve the large quantity of information involved in their nuclear on site inspection activities in Iraq. This initial system, the International Nuclear Safeguards Inspection Support Tool (INSIST), was developed by DOE's Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL). To date, two INSIST workstations have been deployed at the IAEA. The first has been used to support the IAEA Action Team in the inspection of Iraqi nuclear facilities since August 1993. A second, and similar, workstation has been deployed to support environmental monitoring under the IAEA 93+2 Programme. Both INSIST workstations geographically integrate analog (video) and digital data to provide an easy to use and effective tool for storing retrieving and displaying multimedia site and facility information including world-wide maps, satellite and aerial imagery, on site photography, live inspection videos, and treaty and inspection textual information. The interactive, UNIX-based workstations have a variety of peripheral devices for information input and output. INSIST software includes commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) modules and application-specific code developed at PNL

  17. SGNucDat. Safeguards nuclear data for windows. Summary documentation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lemmel, H.D.; Schwerer, O.

    1996-01-01

    SGNucDat is a PC code displaying recommended values of nuclear data that are required for nuclear materials analyses by IAEA safeguards. Diskette and report available from the IAEA Nuclear Data Section, costfree upon request. (author)

  18. Simulations of Atmospheric Krypton-85 to Assess the Detectability of Clandestine Nuclear Reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ross, O.; Ahlswede, J.; Annewandter, R.; Kalinowski, M.B.; Rast, S.; Schluenzen, K.H.

    2010-01-01

    The results of this study were achieved in the project 'Simulation of Atmospheric Noble Gas Concentrations to Assess Sampling Procedures for the Detection of Clandestine Nuclear Reprocessing' (IAEA GER 1643) in the joint programme of IAEA and Federal Government of Germany. In the first year of the project the detectability of additional krypton-85 sources was investigated using atmospheric transport modelling. Krypton-85 is released into the air during reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel rods. Therefore the krypton-85 signature can possibly be used for the detection of undeclared plutonium separation. First, the global krypton-85 background produced by known reprocessing facilities from 1971 until 2006 was simulated with the atmospheric general circulation model ECHAM5 using annual emission data. The model results were evaluated by extensive comparison with measurements performed by the German Federal Office for Radiation Protection. Of particular interest for an assessment of the detectability of unknown sources is the background variability. The variability of concentrations is very high over central Europe, where the large reprocessing plants La Hague and Sellafield are located, and it is very low on the Southern Hemisphere, where no nuclear reprocessing takes place. The analysis of concentration time series on various time scales allows partly a distinction between fluctuations caused by the variability of the sources from variations due to atmospheric dynamics. Furthermore the detection sensitivity to a set of arbitrarily specified source locations is analysed with a Lagrangian particle dispersion model. This, in combination with the location specific background variability, is giving first benchmarks on the capability of using krypton-85 for IAEA Safeguards based on the Additional Protocols foreseeing environmental sampling. (author)

  19. Application of curium measurements for safeguarding at reprocessing plants. Study 1: High-level liquid waste and Study 2: Spent fuel assemblies and leached hulls

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rinard, P.M.; Menlove, H.O.

    1996-03-01

    In large-scale reprocessing plants for spent fuel assemblies, the quantity of plutonium in the waste streams each year is large enough to be important for nuclear safeguards. The wastes are drums of leached hulls and cylinders of vitrified high-level liquid waste. The plutonium amounts in these wastes cannot be measured directly by a nondestructive assay (NDA) technique because the gamma rays emitted by plutonium are obscured by gamma rays from fission products, and the neutrons from spontaneous fissions are obscured by those from curium. The most practical NDA signal from the waste is the neutron emission from curium. A diversion of waste for its plutonium would also take a detectable amount of curium, so if the amount of curium in a waste stream is reduced, it can be inferred that there is also a reduced amount of plutonium. This report studies the feasibility of tracking the curium through a reprocessing plant with neutron measurements at key locations: spent fuel assemblies prior to shearing, the accountability tank after dissolution, drums of leached hulls after dissolution, and canisters of vitrified high-level waste after separation. Existing pertinent measurement techniques are reviewed, improvements are suggested, and new measurements are proposed. The authors integrate these curium measurements into a safeguards system

  20. Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence for Safeguards Applications

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ludewigt, Bernhard A; Quiter, Brian J; Ambers, Scott D

    2011-02-04

    In nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF) measurements, resonances are excited by an external photon beam leading to the emission of {gamma} rays with specific energies that are characteristic of the emitting isotope. The promise of NRF as a non-destructive analysis technique (NDA) in safeguards applications lies in its potential to directly quantify a specific isotope in an assay target without the need for unfolding the combined responses of several fissile isotopes as often required by other NDA methods. The use of NRF for detection of sensitive nuclear materials and other contraband has been researched in the past. In the safeguards applications considered here one has to go beyond mere detection and precisely quantify the isotopic content, a challenge that is discussed throughout this report. Basic NRF measurement methods, instrumentation, and the analytical calculation of NRF signal strengths are described in Section 2. Well understood modeling and simulation tools are needed for assessing the potential of NRF for safeguards and for designing measurement systems. All our simulations were performed with the radiation transport code MCNPX, a code that is widely used in the safeguards community. Our initial studies showed that MCNPX grossly underestimated the elastically scattered background at backwards angles due to an incorrect treatment of Rayleigh scattering. While new, corrected calculations based on ENDF form factors showed much better agreement with experimental data for the elastic scattering of photons on an uranium target, the elastic backscatter is still not rigorously treated. Photonuclear scattering processes (nuclear Thomson, Delbruck and Giant Dipole Resonance scattering), which are expected to play an important role at higher energies, are not yet included. These missing elastic scattering contributions were studied and their importance evaluated evaluated against data found in the literature as discussed in Section 3. A transmission experiment

  1. Turning point of U.S. government decision in US-Japan nuclear fuel reprocessing negotiation in 1977

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Izumi, Yoshinori

    2010-01-01

    U.S. President Carter's Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy, announced in April 1977, which terminated federal funding for reprocessing, was a shock to the Atomic Energy Authority of the Japanese Government that had promoted the construction of Tokai Reprocessing Plant (TRP). After that, it became necessary to negotiate the 'Joint Determination for the Effective Safeguardability of TRP' subject to the 1968 Agreement for cooperation between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning civil use of Atomic Energy. Negotiations for the 'Joint Determination for the Effective Safguardability of TRP' were conducted in the U.S.-Japan Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Negotiation and Joint Field Work meetings from April to September 1977. Both governments agreed to the TRP operation's terms and conditions including 'Joint Determination for the Effective Safeguardability of TRP' in the third negotiation. In spite of the hard position on reprocessing stated in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy enacted by President Carter, these negotiations concluded accepting the operation of TRP with condition. In this paper, I will explore the reasons for the abovementioned political decision by the U.S. government based on its disclosure documents. (author)

  2. Canada and international safeguards. Verifying nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-01-01

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970 and now has about 140 signatory nations. By creating legal barriers against proliferation and by promoting an international non-proliferation ethic, the NPT has promoted international peace and security. A key ingredient has been the confidence generated through verification by IAEA safeguards. By the end of 1988 IAEA safeguards agreements had been concluded with about 100 countries, including Canada. Over 500 nuclear facilities worldwide are under safeguards or contain safeguarded nuclear material. The existence of this credible and effective safeguards system makes international trade in nuclear equipment and materials possible, monitoring the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries as well as between industrial countries. Canada is committed to non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards. Canadian non-proliferation policy is among the strictest in the world, even though opportunities have been lost to sell Canadian technology abroad as a result

  3. Nuclear Security and Nuclear Safeguards; Differences, Commonalities and Synergies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jorant, C.

    2015-01-01

    Reference to the three S's in the nuclear world is recurring and much has been said about the need to build on synergies to reinforce safeguards, safety and security. In practice, the 3S's communities are seldom interconnected even though some interaction can be observed between safety and security and security and safeguards. Ensuring a better understanding between those three sectors about their scope, requirements, implementation methods and tools would stimulate cooperation. The second Nuclear Security Summit and particularly the industry related event stressed the synergies between safety and security. The first IAEAs Security Conference organized in July 2013 did not address specifically nuclear safeguards and security relations. Last Security Summit took place in The Hague in March 2014 and this type of issue was not really raised either. The safeguards Symposium provides a timely opportunity to tackle possible enhanced cooperation between safeguards and security communities and assess the prospect for addressing such issue at the next and allegedly last security summit in 2016. This presentation will analyze the differences and commonalities between those two sectors, in particular with regards to the objectives and actors, the organization and technicalities, or to the conceptual approaches (DBT and APA/SLC, attractiveness/accessibility). It will then assess the possible synergies or cooperation between both communities. It will discuss the merits of a global and comprehensive involvement of the different actors, (State, industry and international bodies including the NGOs) and of exchanges on good practices to contribute to a common understanding and references while allowing for an adaptable and national approach. Indeed the need to reassure the stakeholders, including the general public, that security, as well as safeguards are addressed in a consistent manner worldwide is of utmost importance for building future nuclear energy programmes on a

  4. Nuclear Safeguards Infrastructure Development and Integration with Safety and Security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kovacic, Donald N.; Raffo-Caiado, Ana Claudia; McClelland-Kerr, John; Van sickle, Matthew; Bissani, Mo

    2009-01-01

    Faced with increasing global energy demands, many developing countries are considering building their first nuclear power plant. As a country embarks upon or expands its nuclear power program, it should consider how it will address the 19 issues laid out in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) document Milestones in Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power. One of those issues specifically addresses the international nonproliferation treaties and commitments and the implementation of safeguards to prevent diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons. Given the many legislative, economic, financial, environmental, operational, and other considerations preoccupying their planners, it is often difficult for countries to focus on developing the core strengths needed for effective safeguards implementation. Typically, these countries either have no nuclear experience or it is limited to the operation of research reactors used for radioisotope development and scientific research. As a result, their capacity to apply safeguards and manage fuel operations for a nuclear power program is limited. This paper argues that to address the safeguards issue effectively, a holistic approach must be taken to integrate safeguards with the other IAEA issues including safety and security - sometimes referred to as the '3S' concept. Taking a holistic approach means that a country must consider safeguards within the context of its entire nuclear power program, including operations best practices, safety, and security as well as integration with its larger nonproliferation commitments. The Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration's International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP) has been involved in bilateral technical cooperation programs for over 20 years to promote nonproliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. INSEP is currently spearheading efforts to promote the development of

  5. Nuclear engineering questions: power, reprocessing, waste, decontamination, fusion

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Walton, R.D. Jr.

    1979-01-01

    This volume contains papers presented at the chemical engineering symposium on nuclear questions. Specific questions addressed by the speakers included: nuclear power - why and how; commercial reprocessing - permanent death or resurrection; long-term management of commercial high-level wastes; long-term management of defense high-level waste; decontamination and decommissioning of nuclear facilities, engineering aspects of laser fusion I; and engineering aspects of laser fusion II. Individual papers have been input to the Energy Data Base previously

  6. Safeguard sleuths

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lowry, D.

    1989-01-01

    A report of the conference of the European Safeguards Research and Development Association, which tries to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to military uses is given. Some of the problems encountered by safeguards inspectors are mentioned, such as being able to follow the material through the maze of piping in a reprocessing plant, the linguistic difficulties if the inspector does not speak the operator's language, the difference between precision and accuracy and the necessity of human inspection, containment and surveillance systems. Unexplained outages at a reprocessing plant are always treated as suspicious, as are power failures which prevent normal surveillance. The UK practice of allocating civil fuel temporarily to military use at Harwell also makes safeguard policing more difficult. (UK)

  7. Safeguards for nuclear material transparency monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    MacArthur, D.A.; Wolford, J.K.

    1999-01-01

    The US and the Russian Federation are currently engaged in negotiating or implementing several nuclear arms and nuclear material control agreements. These involve placing nuclear material in specially designed containers within controlled facilities. Some of the agreements require the removal of nuclear components from stockpile weapons. These components are placed in steel containers that are then sealed and tagged. Current strategies for monitoring the agreements involve taking neutron and gamma radiation measurements of components in their containers to monitor the presence, mass, and composition of plutonium or highly enriched uranium, as well as other attributes that indicate the use of the material in a weapon. If accurate enough to be useful, these measurements will yield data containing information about the design of the weapon being monitored. In each case, the design data are considered sensitive by one or both parties to the agreement. To prevent the disclosure of this information in a bilateral or trilateral inspection scenario, so-called information barriers have evolved. These barriers combine hardware, software, and procedural safeguards to contain the sensitive data within a protected volume, presenting to the inspector only the processed results needed for verification. Interlocks and volatile memory guard against disclosure in case of failure. Implementing these safeguards requires innovation in radiation measurement instruments and data security. Demonstrating their reliability requires independent testing to uncover any flaws in design. This study discusses the general problem and gives a proposed solution for a high resolution gamma ray detection system. It uses historical examples to illustrate the evolution of other successful systems

  8. Nuclear safeguards control in nuclear power stations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boedege, R.; Braatz, U.; Heger, H.

    1976-01-01

    The execution of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has initiated a third phase in the efforts taken to ensure peace by limiting the number of atomic powers. In this phase it is important, above all, to turn into workable systems the conditions imposed upon technology by the different provisions of the Verification Agreement of the NPT. This is achieved mainly by elaborating annexes to the Agreement specifically geared to certain model plants, typical representatives selected for LWR power stations being the plants at Garigliano, Italy (BWR), and Stade, Federal Republic of Germany (PWR). The surveillance measures taken to prevent any diversion of special nuclear material for purposes of nuclear weapons manufacture must be effective in achieving their specific objective and must not impede the circumspect management of operations of the plants concerned. A VDEW working party has studied the technical details of the planned surveillance measures in nuclear power stations in the Federal Republic of Germany and now presents a concept of material balancing by units which meets the conditions imposed by the inspection authority and could also be accepted by the operators of nuclear power stations. The concept provides for uninterrupted control of the material balance areas of the nuclear power stations concerned, allows continuous control of the whole nuclear fuel cycle, is based exclusively on existing methods and facilities, and can be implemented at low cost. (orig.) [de

  9. Identification of uranium signatures in swipe samples on verification of nuclear activities for nuclear safeguards purposes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pestana, Rafael Cardoso Baptistini

    2013-01-01

    The use of environmental sampling for safeguards purposes, has been applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency–IAEA since 1996 and are routinely used as a complementary measure to strengthen the traditional nuclear safeguards procedures. The aim is verify if the states signatory to the safeguards agreements are not diverging their peaceful nuclear activities for undeclared nuclear activities. This work describes a new protocol of collect and analysis of the swipe samples for identification of nuclear signatures that may be related to the nuclear activities developed in the inspected facility. This work was used as a case of study a real uranium conversion plant of the nuclear fuel cycle of IPEN. The strategy proposed uses different analytical techniques, such as alpha radiation meter, SEM-EDX and ICP-MS to identify signatures of uranium adhered to the swipe samples. In the swipe samples analysis, it was possible to identify particles of UO 2 F 2 and UF4 through the morphological comparison and semi-quantitative analyses performed by SEM-EDX technique. In this work, methods were used that as a result has the average isotopic composition of the sample, in which the enrichment ranged from 1.453 ± 0.023 to 18.24 % ± 0.15 % in the 235 U isotope. Through these externally collections, a non-intrusive sampling, it was possible to identify enriched material handling activities with enrichment of 1.453 % ± 0.023 % to 6.331 ± 0.055 % in the isotope 235 U, as well as the use of reprocessed material, through the identification of the 236 U isotope. The uncertainties obtained for the n( 235 U)/n( 238 U) ratio varied from 0.40% to 0.86 % for the internal swipe samples. (author)

  10. General criteria for the project of nuclear fuel reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    Recommendations are presented establishing the general criteria for the project of nuclear fuel reprocessing plants to be licensed according to the legislation in effect. They apply to all the plant's systems, components and structures which are important to operation safety and to the public's health and safety. (F.E.) [pt

  11. Zone approaches to international safeguards of a nuclear fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.

    1986-01-01

    At present the IAEA designs its safeguards approach with regard to each type of nuclear facility so that the safeguards activities and effort are essentially the same for a given type and size of nuclear facility wherever it may be located. Conclusions regarding a State are derived by combining the results of safeguards verifications for the individual facilities within it. The authors have examined safeguards approaches for a State nuclear fuel cycle that take into account the existence of all of the nuclear facilities in the State. They have focused on the fresh-fuel zone of an advanced nuclear fuel cycle, the several facilities of which use or process low-enriched uranium. The intention is to develop an approach which will make it possible to compare the technical effectiveness and the inspection effort for the facility-oriented approach, for the zone approach and for some reasonable intermediate safeguards approaches

  12. Pyroelectrochemical process for reprocessing irradiated nuclear fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brambilla, G.; Sartorelli, A.

    1982-01-01

    A pyroelectrochemical process for reprocessing irradiated fast reactor mixed oxide or carbide fuels is described. The fuel is dissolved in a bath of molten alkali metal sulfates. The Pu(SO 4 ) 2 formed in the bath is thermally decomposed, leaving crystalline PuO 2 on the bottom of the reaction vessel. Electrodes are then introduced into the bath, and UO 2 is deposited on the cathode. Alternatively, both UO 2 and PuO 2 may be electrodeposited. The molten salts, after decontamination by precipitating the fission products dissolved in the bath by introducing basic agents such as oxides, carbonates, or hydroxides, may be recycled. Since it is not possible to remove cesium from the molten salt bath, periodic disposal and partial renewal with fresh salts is necessary. The melted salts that contain the fission products are conditioned for disposal by embedding them in a metallic matrix

  13. Nuclear materials management handbook. Safeguards, physical protection of nuclear material. 1995 ed.

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    Now, very safe and stable supply of electric power has become to be obtained by nuclear energy, and Japan has steadily promoted nuclear power as the basic energy that contributes to overcome the unstable structure of energy supply in Japan highly depending on foreign countries, as shown in the long term plan of the research, development and utilization of nuclear power. Great progress was observed in nuclear fuel recycling in Japan such as the attainment of initial criticality of the prototype FBR 'Monju' and the start of construction of the commercial fuel reprocessing plant in Rokkasho. Recently the recognition of the importance of nuclear substance management has heightened, and the measures for maintaining and strengthening the reliability of nuclear nonproliferation system are investigated. It is important that Japan strictly observes the nuclear nonproliferation system based on the NPT which was extended infinitely. In this handbook, the outline of the measures for nuclear nonproliferation and safeguard and the protection of nuclear substances, the treaties and agreements and the national laws related to these are described. (K.I.)

  14. A technical analysis of the IAEA nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yoon, J. W.

    1998-01-01

    In the post-Cold War era, the threats of horizontal nuclear proliferation emerge as the forefront security issue while the nuclear arms races among existing nuclear weapon states reduce to a remarkable extent. In this context, there arises lots of research attention to the IAEA nuclear safeguards which have been viewed as the core of international monitoring on the clandestine nuclear activities of potential proliferators. However, previous attention tended to highlight the political aspects of the IAEA nuclear safeguards, centering on the possibilities and limitations of the IAEA's inspection authority. In contrast, this paper purports to focus on the technical aspects of the IAEA nuclear safeguards, so it can show the intrinsic problems of those safeguards in stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This paper mainly deals with the technical objectives and options of the IAEA nuclear safeguards, the technical indices of clandestine nuclear activities, and some measures to improve the efficacy of the IAEA nuclear safeguards. Hopefully, this paper is expected to lead us to approach the issue of the North Korean nuclear transparency from the technical perspective as well as the political one

  15. Safeguards Guidance Document for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities: International Nuclear Safeguards Requirements and Practices For Uranium Enrichment Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Robert Bean; Casey Durst

    2009-10-01

    This report is the second in a series of guidelines on international safeguards requirements and practices, prepared expressly for the designers of nuclear facilities. The first document in this series is the description of generic international nuclear safeguards requirements pertaining to all types of facilities. These requirements should be understood and considered at the earliest stages of facility design as part of a new process called “Safeguards-by-Design.” This will help eliminate the costly retrofit of facilities that has occurred in the past to accommodate nuclear safeguards verification activities. The following summarizes the requirements for international nuclear safeguards implementation at enrichment plants, prepared under the Safeguards by Design project, and funded by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of NA-243. The purpose of this is to provide designers of nuclear facilities around the world with a simplified set of design requirements and the most common practices for meeting them. The foundation for these requirements is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Relevant safeguards requirements are also cited from the Safeguards Criteria for inspecting enrichment plants, found in the IAEA Safeguards Manual, Part SMC-8. IAEA definitions and terms are based on the IAEA Safeguards Glossary, published in 2002. The most current specification for safeguards measurement accuracy is found in the IAEA document STR-327, “International Target Values 2000 for Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding Nuclear Materials,” published in 2001. For this guide to be easier for the designer to use, the requirements have been restated in plainer language per expert interpretation using the source documents noted. The safeguards agreement is fundamentally a

  16. Nuclear facility safeguards systems modeling using discrete event simulation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Engi, D.

    1977-01-01

    The threat of theft or dispersal of special nuclear material at a nuclear facility is treated by studying the temporal relationships between adversaries having authorized access to the facility (insiders) and safeguards system events by using a GASP IV discrete event simulation. The safeguards system events--detection, assessment, delay, communications, and neutralization--are modeled for the general insider adversary strategy which includes degradation of the safeguards system elements followed by an attempt to steal or disperse special nuclear material. The performance measure used in the analysis is the estimated probability of safeguards system success in countering the adversary based upon a predetermined set of adversary actions. An exemplary problem which includes generated results is presented for a hypothetical nuclear facility. The results illustrate representative information that could be utilized by safeguards decision-makers

  17. Mass Spectrometric Analysis for Nuclear Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boulyga, S.

    2013-01-01

    The release of man-made radionuclides into the environment results in contamination that carries specific isotopic signatures according to the release scenarios and the previous usage of materials and facilities. In order to trace the origin of such contamination and/or to assess the potential impact on the public and environmental health, it is necessary to determine the isotopic composition and activity concentrations of radionuclides in environmental samples in an accurate and timely fashion. Mass spectrometric techniques, such as thermal ionization mass spectrometry (TIMS), secondary ion mass spectrometry (SIMS), and inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) belong to the most powerful methods for analysis of nuclear and related samples in nuclear safeguards, forensics, and environmental monitoring. This presentation will address the potential of mass spectrometric analysis of actinides at ultra-trace concentration levels, isotopic analysis of micro-samples, age determination of nuclear materials as well as identification and quantification of elemental and isotopic signatures of nuclear samples in general. (author)

  18. Safeguards Guidance for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities – International Safeguards Requirements for Uranium Enrichment Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Philip Casey Durst; Scott DeMuth; Brent McGinnis; Michael Whitaker; James Morgan

    2010-04-01

    For the past two years, the United States National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of International Regimes and Agreements (NA-243), has sponsored the Safeguards-by-Design Project, through which it is hoped new nuclear facilities will be designed and constructed worldwide more amenable to nuclear safeguards. In the course of this project it was recognized that commercial designer/builders of nuclear facilities are not always aware of, or understand, the relevant domestic and international safeguards requirements, especially the latter as implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To help commercial designer/builders better understand these requirements, a report was prepared by the Safeguards-by-Design Project Team that articulated and interpreted the international nuclear safeguards requirements for the initial case of uranium enrichment plants. The following paper summarizes the subject report, the specific requirements, where they originate, and the implications for design and construction. It also briefly summarizes the established best design and operating practices that designer/builder/operators have implemented for currently meeting these requirements. In preparing the subject report, it is recognized that the best practices are continually evolving as the designer/builder/operators and IAEA consider even more effective and efficient means for meeting the safeguards requirements and objectives.

  19. Ventilating system for reprocessing of nuclear fuel rods

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Szulinski, M.J.

    1981-01-01

    In a nuclear facility such as a reprocessing plant for nuclear fuel rods, the central air cleaner discharging ventilating gas to the atmosphere must meet preselected standards not only as to the momentary concentration of radioactive components, but also as to total quantity per year. In order to comply more satisfactorily with such standards, reprocessing steps are conducted by remote control in a plurality of separate compartments. The air flow for each compartment is regulated so that the air inventory for each compartment has a slow turnover rate of more than a day but less than a year, which slow rate is conveniently designated as quasihermetic sealing. The air inventory in each such compartment is recirculated through a specialized processing unit adapted to cool and/or filter and/or otherwise process the gas. Stale air is withdrawn from such recirculating inventory and fresh air is injected (eg., By the less than perfect sealing of a compartment) into such recirculating inventory so that the air turnover rate is more than a day but less than a year. The amount of air directed through the manifold and duct system from the reprocessing units to the central air cleaner is less than in reprocessing plants of conventional design

  20. The international framework for safeguarding peaceful nuclear energy programs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mazer, B.M.

    1980-01-01

    International law, in response to the need for safeguard assurances, has provided a framework which can be utilized by supplier and recipient states. Multilateral treaties have created the International Atomic Energy Agency which can serve a vital role in the establishment and supervision of safeguard agreements for nuclear energy programs. The Non-Proliferation Treaty has created definite obligations on nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear weapon states to alleviate some possibilities of proliferation and has rejuvenated the function of the IAEA in providing safeguards, especially to non-nuclear-weapon states which are parties to the Non-Proliferation treaty. States which are not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty may receive nuclear energy co-operation subject to IAEA safeguards. States like Canada, have insisted through the bilateral nuclear energy co-operation agreements that either individual or joint agreement be reached with the IAEA for the application of safeguards. Trilateral treaties among Canada, the recipient state and the IAEA have been employed and can provide the necessary assurances against the diversion of peaceful nuclear energy programs to military or non-peaceful uses. The advent of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and its guidlines has definitely advanced the cause of ensuring peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The ultimate objective should be the creation of an international structure incorporating the application of the most comprehensive safeguards which will be applied universally to all nuclear energy programs

  1. Safeguards against use of nuclear material for weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, B.; Rometsch, R.

    1975-01-01

    The history of safeguards is traced from the first session of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in 1946, through the various stages of the IAEA safeguard system for nuclear materials and to the initiation of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1968. The role of the IAEA under the treaty is discussed. The structure and content of safeguards agreements in connection with the treaty were laid down and the objective of safeguards clearly defined. The methods of verification by the IAEA of the facility operator's material accountancy through inspection and statistical analysis and evaluation of 'material unaccounted for' are explained. The extent to which the IAEA may make use of the State's system of accounting and control of nuclear materials is considered. Reference is also made to the question of protection against theft and sabotage. Finally the scope of safeguards work for the next 15 years is forecast. (U.K.)

  2. The nuclear safeguards data flow for the item facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wang Hongjun; Chen Desheng

    1994-04-01

    The constitution of nuclear safeguards data flow for the item facilities is introduced and the main contents are the data flow of nuclear safeguards. If the data flow moves positively, i.e. from source data →supporting documents→accounting records→accounting reports, the systems of records and reports will be constituted. If the data flow moves negatively, the way to trace inspection of nuclear material accounting quality will be constituted

  3. Plasma Mass Filters For Nuclear Waste Reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fetterman, Abraham J.; Fisch, Nathaniel J.

    2011-01-01

    Practical disposal of nuclear waste requires high-throughput separation techniques. The most dangerous part of nuclear waste is the fission product, which contains the most active and mobile radioisotopes and produces most of the heat. We suggest that the fission products could be separated as a group from nuclear waste using plasma mass filters. Plasmabased processes are well suited to separating nuclear waste, because mass rather than chemical properties are used for separation. A single plasma stage can replace several stages of chemical separation, producing separate streams of bulk elements, fission products, and actinoids. The plasma mass filters may have lower cost and produce less auxiliary waste than chemical processing plants. Three rotating plasma configurations are considered that act as mass filters: the plasma centrifuge, the Ohkawa filter, and the asymmetric centrifugal trap.

  4. Safeguards-by-Design: Early Integration of Physical Protection and Safeguardability into Design of Nuclear Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    T. Bjornard; R. Bean; S. DeMuth; P. Durst; M. Ehinger; M. Golay; D. Hebditch; J. Hockert; J. Morgan

    2009-09-01

    The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities has the potential to minimize proliferation and security risks as the use of nuclear energy expands worldwide. This paper defines a generic SBD process and its incorporation from early design phases into existing design / construction processes and develops a framework that can guide its institutionalization. SBD could be a basis for a new international norm and standard process for nuclear facility design. This work is part of the U.S. DOE’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), and is jointly sponsored by the Offices of Non-proliferation and Nuclear Energy.

  5. Survey of nuclear safeguards in the European Community

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gmelin, W.

    1992-01-01

    The control of the peaceful use of nuclear energy comprises activities related to nuclear safety, to the protection of persons and of the environment, to physical protection of the nuclear materials against theft or terrorism and to nuclear safeguards. Nuclear safeguards means the set of measures performed by the IAEA in the context of non-proliferation safeguards and, in the framework of the Euratom Treaty, those measures enabling the European Commission to satisfy itself that the nuclear material is not diverted from its intended and declared uses (particularly to unlawful non-peaceful applications) and that the obligations arising from International Agreements are complied with. This contribution to the International Conference on Peaceful Application of Nuclear Energy at Liege briefly reviews the history of nuclear safeguards in Europe since the early 1960ies. It also notes the practical aspects for, constraints and impacts to the nuclear operators imposed on them by the European law such as inspections, accountancy, reporting and describes the trend of the future development of the safeguards operation. The paper finally addresses non-proliferation issues and, notably, the relations between the IAEA and Euratom which in an exemplary way resulted in effective international safeguards and high non-proliferation credentials of the European Community. (author)

  6. Applying new safeguards technology to existing nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, C.E.; Wagner, E.P.

    1979-01-01

    The application and operation of safeguards instrumentation in a facility containing special nuclear material is most successful when the installation is designed for the operation of the specific facility. Experience at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory demonstrates that installation designs must consider both Safeguards and Production requirements of specific facilities. Equipment selection and installation design influenced by the training and experience of production operations and safeguards personnel at a specific facility help assure successful installation, reliable operation, and minimal operator training. This minimizes impacts on existing plant production activities while maximizing utility of the safeguards information obtained

  7. Applying new safeguards technology to existing nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harris, W.J.; Wagner, E.P.

    1979-01-01

    The application and operation of safeguards instrumentation in a facility containing special nuclear material is most successful when the installation is desinged for the operation of the specific facility. Experience at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory demonstrates that installation designs must consider both safeguards and production requirements of specific facilities. Equipment selection and installation design influenced by the training and experience of production operations and safeguards personnel at a specific facility help assure successful installation, reliable operation, and minimal operator training. This minimizes impacts on existing plant production activities while maximizing utility of the safeguards information obtained

  8. A study of safeguards approach for the area of plutonium evaporator in a large scale reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sakai, Hirotada; Ikawa, Koji

    1994-01-01

    A preliminary study on a safeguards approach for the chemical processing area in a large scale reprocessing plant has been carried out. In this approach, plutonium inventory at the plutonium evaporator will not be taken, but containment and surveillance (C/S) measures will be applied to ensure the integrity of an area specifically defined to include the plutonium evaporator. The plutonium evaporator area consists of the evaporator itself and two accounting points, i.e., one before the plutonium evaporator and the other after the plutonium evaporator. For newly defined accounting points, two alternative measurement methods, i.e., accounting vessels with high accuracy and flow meters, were examined. Conditions to provide the integrity of the plutonium evaporator area were also examined as well as other technical aspects associated with this approach. The results showed that an appropriate combination of NRTA and C/S measures would be essential to realize a cost effective safeguards approach to be applied for a large scale reprocessing plant. (author)

  9. Advancement of safeguards inspection technology for CANDU nuclear power plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Jae Sung; Park, W S; Cha, H R; Ham, Y S; Lee, Y G; Kim, K P; Hong, Y D

    1999-04-01

    The objectives of this project are to develop both inspection technology and safeguards instruments, related to CANDU safeguards inspection, through international cooperation, so that those outcomes are to be applied in field inspections of national safeguards. Furthermore, those could contribute to the improvement of verification correctness of IAEA inspections. Considering the level of national inspection technology, it looked not possible to perform national inspections without the joint use of containment and surveillance equipment conjunction with the IAEA. In this connection, basic studies for the successful implementation of national inspections was performed, optimal structure of safeguards inspection was attained, and advancement of safeguards inspection technology was forwarded. The successful implementation of this project contributed to both the improvement of inspection technology on CANDU reactors and the implementation of national inspection to be performed according to the legal framework. In addition, it would be an opportunity to improve the ability of negotiating in equal shares in relation to the IAEA on the occasion of discussing or negotiating the safeguards issues concerned. Now that the national safeguards technology for CANDU reactors was developed, the safeguards criteria, procedure and instruments as to the other item facilities and fabrication facilities should be developed for the perfection of national inspections. It would be desirable that the recommendations proposed and concreted in this study, so as to both cope with the strengthened international safeguards and detect the undeclared nuclear activities, could be applied to national safeguards scheme. (author)

  10. Safeguarding nuclear energy in the Pacific: the role of Australia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Indyk, M.

    1980-01-01

    Measures necessary for the establishment of an effective safeguards regime are outlined. These include the establishment of multinational institutions to control and limit the number of sensitive facilities, the establishment of regional spent fuel storage sites and regional plutonium banks to be placed under international control, the establishment of international uranium banks to provide fuel assurances to cooperating countries and the cooperation between suppliers and consumers in improving safeguard techniques. The possibility of a Pacific regional non-proliferation initiative and the role Australia is likely to play in such an initiative are considered. From the public record, the Australian Government would appear to be a deeply committed supporter of international measures to control reprocessing, to store spent fuel and plutonium, to strengthen safeguards and to provide fuel assurances to consumers. However, the Government's actions are not as consistent. It is concluded that Australia will be willing to support non-proliferation efforts as long as they do not unduly jeopardise uranium exports

  11. Nuclear energy without waste reprocessing in West Germany?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ebert, K.

    1989-01-01

    The decision to discontinue construction of the Wackersdorf waste reprocessing plant has been an item of public interest for only a short period; even supporters of nuclear power seemed to have been just relieved that this controversial project was off the agenda, and done with. So only little was to be heard from experts about the facts, background, and consequences of this decision. The author of the article in hand is head of the Hot Chemistry Institute of the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Centre and therefore has been a leading scientist in the development of reprocessing technology. He presents from his point of view the facts and reasons leading to the decision, and explains the possible consequences for the F.R.G. (orig./RB) [de

  12. Nuclear facility safeguards as specified by the Czechoslovak administrative law

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Elias, J.; Svab, J.

    1978-01-01

    A study is presented of the legal aspects of nuclear safeguards for the operation of nuclear power facilities evaluating the development of the legal arrangement over the past five years, i.e., encoding nuclear safeguards for nuclear facilities in the new building regulations (Act No. 50/1976 Coll. of Laws on Urban Planning and Building Regulations and implementing provisions). It also discusses the juridical position of State surveillance over the nuclear safety of nuclear facilities and its relation to surveillance carried out by specialized bodies of the State work safety inspection and to surveillance carried out by hygiene inspection bodies. (J.S.)

  13. Safeguards Issues at Nuclear Reactors and Enrichment Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Boyer, Brian D [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-08-15

    The Agency's safeguards technical objective is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.

  14. Development of Measurement Techniques For Strengthening Nuclear Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Badawy, I.

    2007-01-01

    The strategy of nuclear safeguards is based on the accounting and control of nuclear materials, nuclear technologies and activities in a State in order to attain its ''Legal'' goals of the application of atomic energy. The present paper investigates the development in the measurement techniques used in the verification and control of NMs for the purpose of strengthening safeguards. Its focus is to review the recent nuclear measurement techniques used for the identification and verification of nuclear materials.The different levels of verification and the accuracy of these techniques are discussed. The implementation of stregthened safeguards; and nuclear materials verification and control in the world are mentioned. Also, the recently proposed measures to enhance the ability to detect undeclared nuclear materials, nuclear activities and facilities that would need advanced measurement techniques are indicated.

  15. Nuclear safeguards considerations for pebble bed reactors (PBRs)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moses, David L.

    2012-01-01

    Recent reports by the Department of Energy National Laboratories have discussed safeguards considerations for low enriched uranium (LEU)-fueled pebble bed reactors (PBRs) and the need for bulk accountancy of the plutonium in “used fuel.” These reports fail to account for the degree of plutonium dilution in the graphitized-carbon pebbles that is sufficient to meet the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) “provisional” guidelines for termination of safeguards on “measured discards.” The thrust of this finding is not to terminate safeguards but to limit the need for specific accountancy of plutonium in stored used fuel. While the residual uranium in the used fuel is not sufficiently diluted to meet the IAEA provisional guidelines for termination of safeguards, the estimated quantities of the uranium minor isotopes 232 U and 236 U in the used fuel at the target burnup of ∼90 Gigawatt-days per metric ton (GWD/MT) exceed standard specification limits for reprocessed uranium and will require extensive blending with either natural uranium or uranium enrichment tails to dilute the 236 U content to fall within specification. Hence, the PBR used fuel is less desirable for commercial reprocessing and reuse than that from light water reactors. Also the PBR specific activity of a reprocessed uranium isotopic mixture and its A 2 values for effective dose limits if released in a dispersible form during a transportation accident are more limiting than the equivalent values for light-water-reactor used fuel at 55 GWD/MT without accounting for the presence of the principal carry-over fission product (technetium, 99 Tc) and plutonium contamination. Thus, the potentially recoverable uranium from PBR used fuel carries reactivity penalties and radiological penalties likely greater than those for reprocessed uranium from light water reactors. These factors impact the economics of reprocessing, but a more significant consideration is that reprocessing technologies for

  16. Development of nuclear materials accounting for international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Markin, J.T.; Augustson, R.H.; Eccleston, G.W.; Hakkila, E.A.

    1991-01-01

    This paper reports that nuclear materials accountancy was introduced as a primary safeguards measure in international safeguards at the inception of the EURATOM safeguards directorate in 1959 and in IAEA safeguards in 1961 with the issuance of INFCIRC 26. As measurement technology evolved and safeguarded facilities increased in both number and size, measurement methodology requirements increased as reflected in INFCIRC 66 (Rev 2.) in 1968 and later in INFCIRC 153 in 1972. Early measurements relied heavily on chemical analysis, but in the 1960s the measurements evolved more and more toward nondestructive assay. Future nuclear materials accountancy systems will increase in complexity, driven by larger and more complex facilities; more stringent health, safety, and environmental considerations; and unattended automation in facility operations

  17. Technology development of nuclear material safeguards for DUPIC fuel cycle

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hong, Jong Sook; Kim, Ho Dong; Kang, Hee Young; Lee, Young Gil; Byeon, Kee Ho; Park, Young Soo; Cha, Hong Ryul; Park, Ho Joon; Lee, Byung Doo; Chung, Sang Tae; Choi, Hyung Rae; Park, Hyun Soo

    1997-07-01

    During the second phase of research and development program conducted from 1993 to 1996, nuclear material safeguards studies system were performed on the technology development of DUPIC safeguards system such as nuclear material measurement in bulk form and product form, DUPIC fuel reactivity measurement, near-real-time accountancy, and containment and surveillance system for effective and efficient implementation of domestic and international safeguards obligation. By securing in advance a optimized safeguards system with domestically developed hardware and software, it will contribute not only to the effective implementation of DUPIC safeguards, but also to enhance the international confidence build-up in peaceful use of spent fuel material. (author). 27 refs., 13 tabs., 89 figs.

  18. Reprocessing free nuclear fuel production via fusion fission hybrids

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kotschenreuther, Mike, E-mail: mtk@mail.utexas.edu [Intitute for Fusion Studies, University of Texas at Austin (United States); Valanju, Prashant; Mahajan, Swadesh [Intitute for Fusion Studies, University of Texas at Austin (United States)

    2012-05-15

    Fusion fission hybrids, driven by a copious source of fusion neutrons can open qualitatively 'new' cycles for transmuting nuclear fertile material into fissile fuel. A totally reprocessing-free (ReFree) Th{sup 232}-U{sup 233} conversion fuel cycle is presented. Virgin fertile fuel rods are exposed to neutrons in the hybrid, and burned in a traditional light water reactor, without ever violating the integrity of the fuel rods. Throughout this cycle (during breeding in the hybrid, transport, as well as burning of the fissile fuel in a water reactor) the fissile fuel remains a part of a bulky, countable, ThO{sub 2} matrix in cladding, protected by the radiation field of all fission products. This highly proliferation-resistant mode of fuel production, as distinct from a reprocessing dominated path via fast breeder reactors (FBR), can bring great acceptability to the enterprise of nuclear fuel production, and insure that scarcity of naturally available U{sup 235} fuel does not throttle expansion of nuclear energy. It also provides a reprocessing free path to energy security for many countries. Ideas and innovations responsible for the creation of a high intensity neutron source are also presented.

  19. Reprocessing free nuclear fuel production via fusion fission hybrids

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kotschenreuther, Mike; Valanju, Prashant; Mahajan, Swadesh

    2012-01-01

    Fusion fission hybrids, driven by a copious source of fusion neutrons can open qualitatively “new” cycles for transmuting nuclear fertile material into fissile fuel. A totally reprocessing-free (ReFree) Th 232 –U 233 conversion fuel cycle is presented. Virgin fertile fuel rods are exposed to neutrons in the hybrid, and burned in a traditional light water reactor, without ever violating the integrity of the fuel rods. Throughout this cycle (during breeding in the hybrid, transport, as well as burning of the fissile fuel in a water reactor) the fissile fuel remains a part of a bulky, countable, ThO 2 matrix in cladding, protected by the radiation field of all fission products. This highly proliferation-resistant mode of fuel production, as distinct from a reprocessing dominated path via fast breeder reactors (FBR), can bring great acceptability to the enterprise of nuclear fuel production, and insure that scarcity of naturally available U 235 fuel does not throttle expansion of nuclear energy. It also provides a reprocessing free path to energy security for many countries. Ideas and innovations responsible for the creation of a high intensity neutron source are also presented.

  20. Achievements and questions in the accountability of nuclear materials and their verification for safeguards purposes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Deron, S.

    1990-01-01

    A very accurate accountability of nuclear materials is required throughout the industrial nuclear fuel cycle for technical reasons and safety purposes but also for commercial, physical protection and safeguards objectives. The present note intends to illustrate with a few samples the performance presently achieved and the major questions which the analysts are facing in these areas. The examples taken concern the accountability of feed and product materials at LWR nuclear fuel fabrication plants and spent fuel reprocessing plants. They were selected because they constitute major components of the flow and inventory of the nuclear fuel materials at key measurement points in nuclear industry. The factors limiting the quality of the assays and accountability of these industrial materials and some observations regarding the need and use of reference materials and quality control programmes in support of accurate accounting are presented. 7 refs

  1. Target values for nuclear material safeguards measurements - motivation or burden to operators?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Weh, R.; Kuhn, K.D.

    1989-01-01

    The analytical determination of material streams and inventories plays an important part in those nuclear facilities called bulk-handling facilities in safeguards terminology. Reprocessing plants and mixed-oxide fabrication facilities are typical examples. With respect to their safeguards, the relevant regulations attach fundamental importance to material accountancy. The balance itself is examined by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors and within the boundaries of the European Communities by Euratom inspectors as well, with regard to formal correctness. The analytical methods of accountancy in, for example, reprocessing plants, make high demands on the qualifications of the analyst. A conscientious analyst will, of course, try to fulfill his task as well and effectively as possible. These target values will become a burden, however, when they have been drawn up for purely scientific interest and the operator has been urged to achieve them on the pretext of improving safeguards. There are basically two reasons for which the authors have misgivings in this respect. First, the measurement system, which the material balance is based on, has to conform to the latest international regulations. This could easily lead to a permanent obligation of updating for the plants concerned. Second, the goal quantities set by the IAEA will induce an attempt to adjust measurement techniques and chemical analysis to goals totally unsuitable for large-scale plants

  2. Handbook on process and chemistry of nuclear fuel reprocessing. 3rd edition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-03-01

    The fundamental data on spent nuclear fuel reprocessing and related chemistry was collected and summarized as a new edition of 'Handbook on Process and Chemistry of Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing'. The purpose of this handbook is contribution to development of the fuel reprocessing and fuel cycle technology for uranium fuel and mixed oxide fuel utilization. Contents in this book was discussed and reviewed by specialists of science and technology on fuel reprocessing in Japan. (author)

  3. Nuclear safeguards and security: we can do better.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Johnston, R. G. (Roger G.); Warner, Jon S.; Garcia, A. R. E. (Anthony R. E.); Martinez, R. K. (Ronald K.); Lopez, L. N. (Leon N.); Pacheco, A. N. (Adam N.); Trujillo, S. J. (Sonia J.); Herrera, A. M. (Alicia M.); Bitzer, E. G. (Edward G.), III

    2005-01-01

    There are a number of practical ways to significantly improve nuclear safeguards and security. These include recognizing and minimizing the insider threat; using adversarial vulnerability assessments to find vulnerabilities and countermeasures; fully appreciating the disparate nature of domestic and international nuclear safeguards; improving tamper detection and tamper-indicating seals; not confusing the inventory and security functions; and recognizing the limitations of GPS tracking, contact memory buttons, and RFID tags. The efficacy of nuclear safeguards depends critically on employing sophisticated security strategies and effective monitoring hardware. The Vulnerability Assessment Team (VAT) at Los Alamos National Laboratory has extensively researched issues associated with nuclear safeguards, especially in the areas of tamper/intrusion detection, transport security, and vulnerability assessments. This paper discusses some of our findings, recommendations, and warnings.

  4. Annual report of the nuclear safeguards project 1978

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mache, H.R.

    1980-05-01

    The present report describes the major activities carried out in 1978 in the framework of the Nuclear Safeguards Project by the institutes of the Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe, Kernforschungsanlage Juelich, the European Institute of Transuranium Elements and some industrial firms. (orig.) [de

  5. Annual report of the Nuclear Safeguards Project 1980

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mache, H.R.

    1981-10-01

    The present report describes the major activities carried out in 1980 in the framework of the Nuclear Safeguards Project by the Institutes of the Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe and the European Institute of Transuranium Elements. (orig.) [de

  6. Annual report of the Nuclear Safeguards Project l976

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-07-01

    The present report describes the major activities carried out in 1976 in the framework of the Nuclear Safeguards Project by the institutes of the Gesellschaft fuer Kernforschung Karlsruhe, the European Institute of Transuranium Elements and some industrial firms. (orig.) [de

  7. Mine... electricity... reprocessing... Nuclear energy, how and why? Second edition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grisez, F.

    2003-01-01

    This book makes a short and consistent synthesis of nuclear power: how electricity can be generated by braking up atoms and what is the advantage of this mean with respect to the use of fossil fuels or renewable energy sources. Beside the text, this book contains transparency-like illustrations which give a general overview of the civil nuclear domain. Content: 1 - introduction; 2 - radioactivity and nuclear safety: natural and artificial atoms, radioactivity, exposure, nuclear safety; 3 - nuclear fuel cycle: uranium mines and yellow cake, uranium conversion, uranium enrichment, fuel fabrication, nuclear power plants, reprocessing, recycling and conditioning, wastes, statuses, needs, companies and industrial capacities, R and D; 4 - energy consumption; 5 - what energy sources for even more electricity: available energies, environmental impact and accidents, costs of electricity, energy reserves, summary, opinions and conclusions. (J.S.)

  8. IAEA safeguards and detection of undeclared nuclear activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harry, R.J.S.

    1996-03-01

    Verfication of State declarations is an essential feature of IAEA safeguards. The issue of completeness of the declaration of all nuclear material, nuclear activities and nuclear facilities arises only in full scope safeguards, like those pursuant to NPT. Concentrating on the accountability aspect of nuclear material, the NPT safeguards system has achieved a high level of objective and quantified performance. Some of the basic ideas of the drafters of INFCIRC/153 (corrected) have been stalled. Non-proliferation concerns demand also for a detection probability for undeclared nuclear activities. Following the example of the Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC), advanced detection techniques are proposed, which go beyond the classical nuclear material accountability approach. Recent proposals for additional measures to strengthen IAEA safeguards conform to rules of NPT and related safeguards. Some proposals have been agreed generally, others can only be implemented on a voluntary basis between the State and the IAEA. The implementation will require additional resources and support for the IAEA. Great care is required to maintain the existing capability of the IAEA for a technically sound, independent, objective, and internationally acceptable judgement with available resources, and at the same time to change emphasis on certain elements of the existing safeguards system. (orig.)

  9. IAEA safeguards and detection of undeclared nuclear activities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Harry, R.J.S.

    1996-03-01

    Verfication of State declarations is an essential feature of IAEA safeguards. The issue of completeness of the declaration of all nuclear material, nuclear activities and nuclear facilities arises only in full scope safeguards, like those pursuant to NPT. Concentrating on the accountability aspect of nuclear material, the NPT safeguards system has achieved a high level of objective and quantified performance. Some of the basic ideas of the drafters of INFCIRC/153 (corrected) have been stalled. Non-proliferation concerns demand also for a detection probability for undeclared nuclear activities. Following the example of the Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC), advanced detection techniques are proposed, which go beyond the classical nuclear material accountability approach. Recent proposals for additional measures to strengthen IAEA safeguards conform to rules of NPT and related safeguards. Some proposals have been agreed generally, others can only be implemented on a voluntary basis between the State and the IAEA. The implementation will require additional resources and support for the IAEA. Great care is required to maintain the existing capability of the IAEA for a technically sound, independent, objective, and internationally acceptable judgement with available resources, and at the same time to change emphasis on certain elements of the existing safeguards system. (orig.).

  10. Role of materials accounting in integrated safeguards systems for reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Gutmacher, R.G.; Markin, J.T.; Shipley, J.P.; Whitty, W.J.

    1981-01-01

    Integration of materials accounting and containment/surveillance techniques for international safeguards requires careful examination and definition of suitable inspector activities for verification of operator's materials accounting data. The inspector's verification procedures are designed to protect against data falsification and/or the use of measurement uncertainties to conceal missing material. Materials accounting activities are developed to provide an effective international safeguards system when combined with containment/surveillance activities described in a companion paper

  11. Advanced safeguards research and development plan with an emphasis on its impact on nuclear power-plant design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tobin, S.J.; Demuth, S.F.; Miller, M.C.; Swinhoe, M.T.; Thomas, K.E.

    2007-01-01

    One tool for reducing the concern of nuclear proliferation is enhanced safeguards. Present safeguards have evolved over the past 40 years, and future safeguards will grow from this strong base to implement new technologies for improving our ability to quantify nuclear material. This paper will give an overview of the advanced technology research and development plan for safeguarding. One of the research facilities planned by the Department of Energy is the Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility (AFCF), to develop a novel nuclear fuel recycling program. Since the Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility will receive and reprocess spent fuel and will fabricate fast-reactor fuel, a wide breadth of safeguards technologies is involved. A fundamental concept in safeguards is material control and accounting (MCA). 4 topics concerning MCA and requiring further research have been identified: 1) measuring spent fuel, 2) measuring the plutonium content in the electro-refiner with pyro-processing, 3) measuring plutonium in the presence of other actinides, and 4) measuring neptunium and americium in the presence of other actinides. As for the long-term research and development plan for the AFCF, it will include improving MCA techniques as well as introducing new techniques that are not related to MCA, for example, enhanced containment and surveillance, or enhanced process monitoring. The top priority will stay quantifying the plutonium as accurately as possible and to reach this purpose 4 relevant technologies have been identified: 1) the microcalorimeter, 2) the passive neutron-albedo reactivity, 3) list-mode data acquisition, and 4) a liquid-scintillator multiplicity counter. Incorporating safeguards into the initial design of AFCF (safeguards by design) is a central concept. As the technology research and development plan for the Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility is examined, particular attention will be given to safeguards technologies that may affect the physical design of nuclear power plants

  12. Pyrolytic electrochemical process for the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brambilla, G.; Sartorelli, A.

    1980-01-01

    The reprocessing is aimed at synthetic UO 2 -PuO 2 mixed oxides, UC-PuC mixed carbides and at oxides and carbides of U, Pu and Th from fast nuclear reactors. The nuclear fuel is dissolved in a salt melting bath. The conversion of the Pu(SO 4 ) 2 is done thermally and that of UO 2 is done electrolytically. The molten salts are returned to the input of the process and the fission products and the molten salts are conditioned. (DG) [de

  13. An overview on dry reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ouyang Yinggen

    2002-01-01

    Although spent nuclear fuels have been reprocessed successfully for many years by the well-know Purex process based on solvent extraction, other reprocessing method which do not depend upon the use of organic solvents and aqueous media appear to have important potential advantage. There are two main non-aqueous methods for the reprocessing of spent fuel: fluoride-volatility process and pyro-electrochemical process. The presence of a poser in the process is that PuF 6 is obviously thermodynamically stable only in the presence of a large excess of fluorine. Pyro-electrochemical process is suited to processing metallic, oxide and carbide fuels. First, the fuel is dissolved in fresh salts, then, electrodes are introduced into the bath, U and Pu are deposited on the cathode, third, separation and refinement U and Pu are deposited on the cathode. There is a couple of contradictions in the process that are not in harmonious proportion in the fields on the nuclear fuel is dissolved the ability in the molten salt and corrosiveness of the molten salt for equipment used in the process

  14. Holdup-related issues in safeguarding of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1988-03-01

    Residual inventories of special nuclear materials (SNM) remaining in processing facilities (holdup) are recognized as an insidious problem for both safety and safeguards. This paper identifies some of the issues that are of concern to the safeguards community at-large that are related to holdup of SNM in large-scale process equipment. These issues range from basic technologies of SNM production to changing regulatory requirements to meet the needs of safeguarding nuclear materials. Although there are no magic formulas to resolve these issues, there are several initiatives that could be taken in areas of facility design, plant operation, personnel training, SNM monitoring, and regulatory guidelines to minimize the problems of holdup and thereby improve both safety and safeguards at nuclear material processing plants. 8 refs

  15. Nuclear safeguards in Brazil and Argentina: 25 years of ABACC

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kassenova, Togzhan

    2017-11-01

    As possessors of advanced nuclear technology, Brazil and Argentina bear special responsibility for helping the international community and neighbors in their region feel confident that their nuclear programs are peaceful, secure, and safe. Over the past 25 years, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) has played an indispensable role in strengthening such confidence by implementing nuclear safeguards in the two countries. Today, ABACC carries out safeguards inspections at a total of 76 nuclear facilities in Brazil and Argentina. This article describes how Brazil and Argentina view trends in the global nonproliferation regime and international nuclear safeguards, and explains how these trends relate to unique challenges and opportunities facing Brazil, Argentina, and ABACC.

  16. Nuclear safeguards research and development program. Status report, January--April 1977

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sapir, J.L. (comp.)

    1977-06-01

    The status of the Nuclear Safeguards Research and Development program pursued by LASL Safeguards Groups Q-1, Q-2, Q-3, and Q-4 is presented . Topics covered include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards, perimeter safeguards and surveillance, concepts and subsystems development (e.g., DYMAC program), integrated safeguards systems, training courses, and technology transfer.

  17. Nuclear safeguards research and development program. Status report, January--April 1977

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sapir, J.L.

    1977-06-01

    The status of the Nuclear Safeguards Research and Development program pursued by LASL Safeguards Groups Q-1, Q-2, Q-3, and Q-4 is presented . Topics covered include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards, perimeter safeguards and surveillance, concepts and subsystems development (e.g., DYMAC program), integrated safeguards systems, training courses, and technology transfer

  18. Implementation of integrated safeguards at Nuclear Fuel Plant Pitesti, Romania

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Olaru, Vasilica; Ivana, Tiberiu; Epure, Gheorghe

    2010-01-01

    The nuclear activity in ROMANIA was for many years under Traditional Safeguards (TS) and has developed in good conditions this type of nuclear safeguards. Now, the opportunity exists to improve the performance and quality of the safeguards activity and increase the accountancy and control of nuclear material by passing to Integrated Safeguards (IS). The legal framework is the Law 100/2000 for ratification of the Protocol between Romania and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Romania Government and IAEA related to safeguards as part of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons published in the Official Gazette no. 3/31 January 1970, and the Additional Protocol content published in the Official Gazette no. 295/ 29.06.2000. The first discussion about Integrated Safeguards (IS) between Nuclear Fuel Plant (NFP) representatives and IAEA inspectors was in June 2005. In Feb. 2007 an IAEA mission visited NFP and established the main steps for implementing the IS. There were visited the storages, technological flow, and was reviewed the disposal times for different nuclear materials, the applied chemical analysis, measuring methods, weighting method and elaborating procedure of the documents and lists. At that time the IAEA and NFP representatives established the main points for starting the IS at NFP: performing the Short Notice Random Inspections (SNRI); communication of the days established for SNRI for each year; communication of the estimated deliveries and shipments for first quarter and then for the rest of the year: daily mail box declaration (DD) with respect to the deposit time for several nuclear materials i.e. advance notification (AN) for each nuclear material transfer (shipments and receipts), others. At 01 June 2007 Romania has passed officially to Integrated Safeguards and NFP (WRMD) has taken all measures to implement this objective. (authors)

  19. Methodology for estimating reprocessing costs for nuclear fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carter, W.L.; Rainey, R.H.

    1980-02-01

    A technological and economic evaluation of reprocessing requirements for alternate fuel cycles requires a common assessment method and a common basis to which various cycles can be related. A methodology is described for the assessment of alternate fuel cycles utilizing a side-by-side comparison of functional flow diagrams of major areas of the reprocessing plant with corresponding diagrams of the well-developed Purex process as installed in the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP). The BNFP treats 1500 metric tons of uranium per year (MTU/yr). Complexity and capacity factors are determined for adjusting the estimated facility and equipment costs of BNFP to determine the corresponding costs for the alternate fuel cycle. Costs of capacities other than the reference 1500 MT of heavy metal per year are estimated by the use of scaling factors. Unit costs of reprocessed fuel are calculated using a discounted cash flow analysis for three economic bases to show the effect of low-risk, typical, and high-risk financing methods

  20. Radioactive Iodine and Krypton Control for Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Facilities

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Nick R. Soelberg

    2013-01-01

    Full Text Available The removal of volatile radionuclides generated during used nuclear fuel reprocessing in the US is almost certain to be necessary for the licensing of a reprocessing facility in the US. Various control technologies have been developed, tested, or used over the past 50 years for control of volatile radionuclide emissions from used fuel reprocessing plants. The US DOE has sponsored, since 2009, an Off-gas Sigma Team to perform research and development focused on the most pressing volatile radionuclide control and immobilization problems. In this paper, we focus on the control requirements and methodologies for 85Kr and 129I. Numerous candidate technologies have been studied and developed at laboratory and pilot-plant scales in an effort to meet the need for high iodine control efficiency and to advance alternatives to cryogenic separations for krypton control. Several of these show promising results. Iodine decontamination factors as high as 105, iodine loading capacities, and other adsorption parameters including adsorption rates have been demonstrated under some conditions for both silver zeolite (AgZ and Ag-functionalized aerogel. Sorbents, including an engineered form of AgZ and selected metal organic framework materials (MOFs, have been successfully demonstrated to capture Kr and Xe without the need for separations at cryogenic temperatures.

  1. Nuclear safeguards surveys as performed by the Albuquerque operations office

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jewell, D.

    1987-01-01

    The nuclear safeguards survey program as administered by the Albuquerque Operations Office (AL) is comprehensive in scope and evaluates the facility's safeguards program for an entire appraisal period. The survey program focuses on both the integrated and graded safeguards concepts and includes both compliance and performance evaluations. The program utilizes independent measurement support to verify facility inventory values and measurement system capabilities. The AL survey program is oriented towards facility development and management as opposed to development and management by numerous detailed departmental directives

  2. The main chemical safety problems in main process of nuclear fuel reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Song Fengli; Zhao Shangui; Liu Xinhua; Zhang Chunlong; Lu Dan; Liu Yuntao; Yang Xiaowei; Wang Shijun

    2014-01-01

    There are many chemical reactions in the aqueous process of nuclear fuel reprocessing. The reaction conditions and the products are different so that the chemical safety problems are different. In the paper the chemical reactions in the aqueous process of nuclear fuel reprocessing are described and the main chemical safety problems are analyzed. The reference is offered to the design and accident analysis of the nuclear fuel reprocessing plant. (authors)

  3. Zone approaches to international safeguards of a nuclear fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.

    1986-01-01

    At present the IAEA designs its safeguards approach with regard to each type of nuclear facility so that the safeguards activities and effort are essentially the same for a given type and size of nuclear facility wherever it may be located. Conclusions regarding a state are derived by combining the results of safeguards verifications for the individual facilities within it. We have examined safeguards approaches for a state nuclear fuel cycle that take into account the existence of all of the nuclear facilities in the state. We have focussed on the fresh-fuel zone of an advanced nuclear fuel cycle, the several facilities of which use or process low-enriched uranium. At one extreme, flows and inventories would be verified at each material balance area. At the other extreme, the flows into and out of the zone and the inventory of the whole zone would be verified. The intention is to develop an approach which will make it possible to compare the technical effectiveness and the inspection effort for the facility-oriented approach, for the zone approach and for some reasonable intermediate safeguards approaches. Technical effectiveness, in these cases, means an estimate of the assurance that all nuclear material has been accounted for

  4. Analysis of nuclear proliferation resistance reprocessing and recycling technologies

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Patricia Paviet-Hartmann; Gary Cerefice; Marcela Stacey; Steven Bakhtiar

    2011-05-01

    The PUREX process has been progressively and continuously improved during the past three decades, and these improvements account for successful commercialization of reprocessing in a few countries. The renewed interest in nuclear energy and the international growth of nuclear electricity generation do not equate – and should not be equated -with increasing proliferation risks. Indeed, the nuclear renaissance presents a unique opportunity to enhance the culture of non-proliferation. With the recent revival of interest in nuclear technology, technical methods for prevention of nuclear proliferation are being revisited. Robust strategies to develop new advanced separation technologies are emerging worldwide for sustainability and advancement of nuclear energy with enhanced proliferation resistance. On the other hand, at this moment, there are no proliferation resistance advanced technologies. . Until now proliferation resistance as it applies to reprocessing has been focused on not separating a pure stream of weapons-usable plutonium. France, as an example, has proposed a variant of the PUREX process, the COEX TM process, which does not result on a pure plutonium product stream. A further step is to implement a process based on group extraction of actinides and fission products associated with a homogeneous recycling strategy (UNEX process in the US, GANEX process in France). Such scheme will most likely not be deployable on an industrial scale before 2030 or so because it requires intensive R&D and robust flowsheets. Finally, future generation recycling schemes will handle the used nuclear fuel in fast neutron reactors. This means that the plutonium throughput of the recycling process may increase. The need is obvious for advanced aqueous recycling technologies that are intrinsically more proliferation resistant than the commercial PUREX process. In this paper, we review the actual PUREX process along with the advanced recycling technologies that will enhance

  5. Analysis of nuclear proliferation resistance reprocessing and recycling technologies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Paviet-Hartmann, Patricia; Cerefice, Gary; Stacey, Marcela; Bakhtiar, Steven

    2011-01-01

    The PUREX process has been progressively and continuously improved during the past three decades, and these improvements account for successful commercialization of reprocessing in a few countries. The renewed interest in nuclear energy and the international growth of nuclear electricity generation do not equate - and should not be equated - with increasing proliferation risks. Indeed, the nuclear renaissance presents a unique opportunity to enhance the culture of non-proliferation. With the recent revival of interest in nuclear technology, technical methods for prevention of nuclear proliferation are being revisited. Robust strategies to develop new advanced separation technologies are emerging worldwide for sustainability and advancement of nuclear energy with enhanced proliferation resistance. On the other hand, at this moment, there are no proliferation resistance advanced technologies. Until now proliferation resistance as it applies to reprocessing has been focused on not separating a pure stream of weapons-usable plutonium. France, as an example, has proposed a variant of the PUREX process, the COEX TM process, which does not result on a pure plutonium product stream. A further step is to implement a process based on group extraction of actinides and fission products associated with a homogeneous recycling strategy (UNEX process in the US, GANEX process in France). Such scheme will most likely not be deployable on an industrial scale before 2030 or so because it requires intensive R and D and robust flowsheets. Finally, future generation recycling schemes will handle the used nuclear fuel in fast neutron reactors. This means that the plutonium throughput of the recycling process may increase. The need is obvious for advanced aqueous recycling technologies that are intrinsically more proliferation resistant than the commercial PUREX process. In this paper, we review the actual PUREX process along with the advanced recycling technologies that will enhance

  6. In-line analytical instrumentation in nuclear fuel reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rao, V.K.; Bhargava, V.K.; Marathe, S.G.

    1979-01-01

    In nuclear fuel reprocessing plants where uranium and plutonium are separated from highly radioactive fission products, continuous monitoring of these constituents is helpful in many ways. Apart from quick detection of possible process malfunctions, in-line monitoring protects operating personnel from radiation hazards, reduces the cost of laboratory analysis and increases the overall efficiency of the process. A review of a proqramme of work on the design, fabrication and testing of some in-line instruments viz. gamma absorptiometer for uranium, neutron monitor for plutonium, acidity monitor for scrub nitric acid etc., their feasibility studies in the laboratory as well as in the pilot plant is presented. (auth.)

  7. Behavior of Nb fission product during nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gue, J.P.

    1977-02-01

    Investigations on niobium fission product behavior in nitric acid and tributyl phosphate media have been carried out in order to explain the difficulties encountered in separating this element from fissile materials during spent nuclear fuel reprocessing. The studies have shown that in nitric acid solution, pentavalent niobium has a colloidal hydroxide form. The so-obtained sols were characterized by light scattering, electronic microscopy, electrophoresis and ultracentrifugation methods. In heterogeneous extracting media containing tributyl phosphate and dibutyl phosphoric acid the niobium hydroxide sols could be flocculated by low dibutyl phosphoric acid concentration or extracted into the organic phase containing an excess of dibutyl phosphoric acid [fr

  8. Destructive and nondestructive methods for controlling nuclear materials for the purpose of safeguards in the CSSR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krivanek, M.; Krtil, J.; Moravec, J.; Pacak, P.; Sus, F.

    1977-01-01

    Central Control Laboratory (CCL) of the Nuclear Research Institute was charged with the control of nuclear materials in CSSR within the framework of the safeguards system. The CCL has been directed by the Department of nuclear safety and safeguards of CAEC according to a long-term plan, elaborated for controlling nuclear material in CSSR. The CCL has mainly been performing independent, rapid, accurate, and reliable analyses of nuclear materials, using destructive as well as non-destructive methods; the analyses of samples taken in MBA's in CSSR are mentioned, concerning the determinations of U, Pu, and Th contents, isotopic compositions of U and Pu, and burn up. The results of the analyses have served for the material and isotopic balances of fissile materials and the control of fuel reprocessing under laboratory conditions. The methods for sampling and sample transport as well as sample treatment before the analysis are described. The experience is given, obtained at CCL during a routine application of chemical methods for highly precise determinations of U, Pu, and Th (titration-based methods), mass-spectrometric determinations of U and Pu (isotopic composition, IDA using 233 U and 242 Pu), and burn-up determinations based on radioactive fissile products (Cs, Ru, Ce) and stable Nd isotopes. Some non-destructive methods for controlling nuclear materials (passive gamma-spectrometry) are discussed

  9. Reprocessing of spent nuclear fuels in OECD countries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    This report deals with the adequacy of projected reprocessing capacity, the short-term measures proposed in view of the lack of sufficient reprocessing capacity, the longer term measures proposed in view of the lack of sufficient reprocessing capacity, the alternatives to reprocessing and the cooperative arrangements

  10. Course modules on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bril, L.-V.; Janssens-Maenhout, G.

    2004-01-01

    Full text: One of major current concern in the nuclear field is the conservation of developed knowledge and expertise. The relevance of this subject is steadily increasing for several reasons: retirement of the generation of first industrial development of nuclear energy, only one new reactor under construction in Europe while several in Eastern and Asian countries, the public's concern on safety, radioactive waste and safeguards aspects, and some lack of interest common to many activities in engineering and physics. Moreover nuclear safeguards is nowadays characterised with an enlarged scope and no longer strictly limited to the accountancy of nuclear material; today it encompasses non proliferation of nuclear material, and deals with the control of dual use equipment and technologies, illicit trafficking and External Security. Some higher education networks, such as the European Nuclear Engineering Network (ENEN), have been established to make better use of dwindling teaching capacity, scientific equipment and research infrastructure, through co-operation amongst universities and research centres. The European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) initiated the set-up of course modules under an e-learning medium, to preserve knowledge in nuclear safeguards. These course modules should be considered as basic pedagogical documentation, which will be accessible via the Internet. Monitoring or controlling of the accesses will be ensured. The modules are structured with an increasing level of detail, in function of the audience. On one hand the course modules should be attractive to University students in nuclear, chemical or mechanical engineering, in radiochemistry, statistics, law, political science etc. at universities or specialised institutes. On the other hand the course modules aim to give professionals, working on specific safeguards or non-proliferation issues an overview and detailed technical information on the wide variety of nuclear

  11. Development of remote maintenance technology for nuclear fuel reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kawahara, Akira; Saito, Masayuki; Kawamura, Hironobu; Yamade, Atsushi; Sugiyama, Sen; Sugiyama, Sakae.

    1986-01-01

    In the plants for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel containing fission products, due to the facts that the facilities are in high radiations fields, and the surfaces of equipments are contaminated with radioactive substances, the troubles of process equipments are directly connected to the remarkable drop of the rate of operation of the facilities. Therefore, the development of various remote maintenance techniques has been carried out so far, but this time, Hitachi Ltd. got a chance to take part in the repair of spent fuel dissolving tanks in the Tokai Reprocessing Plant of Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp. and the development of several kinds of remote checkup equipment related to the repair work. Especially in the repair of the dissolving tanks, a radiation-withstanding checkup and repair apparatus which has high remote operability taking the conditions of radioactive environment and the restriction of the repaired objects in consideration was required, and a dissolving tank repairing robot composed of six kinds has been developed. The key points of the development were the selective use of high radiation-withstanding parts and materials, small size structure and the realization of full remote operability. The full remote maintenance apparatus of this kind is unique in the world, and applicable to wide fields. (Kako, I.)

  12. Dynamic analysis of nuclear safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilson, J.R.; Rasmuson, D.M.; Tingey, F.H.

    1978-01-01

    The assessment of the safeguards/adversary system poses a unique challenge as evolving technology affects the capabilities of both. The method discussed meets this challenge using a flexible analysis which can be updated by system personnel. The automatically constructed event tree provides a rapid overview analysis for initial assessment, evaluation of changes, cost/benefit study and inspection and audit

  13. THIEF: An interactive simulation of nuclear materials safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Stanbro, W. D.

    1990-01-01

    The safeguards community is facing an era in which it will be called upon to tighten protection of nuclear material. At the same time, it is probable that safeguards will face more competition for available resources from other activities such as environmental cleanup. To exist in this era, it will be necessary to understand and coordinate all aspects of the safeguards system. Because of the complexity of the interactions involved, this process puts a severe burden on designers and operators of safeguards systems. This paper presents a simulation tool developed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory to allow users to examine the interactions among safeguards elements as they apply to combating the insider threat. The tool consists of a microcomputer-based simulation in which the user takes the role of the insider trying to remove nuclear material from a facility. The safeguards system is run by the computer and consists of both physical protection and MC A computer elements. All data elements describing a scenario can be altered by the user. The program can aid in training, as well as in developing threat scenarios. 4 refs.

  14. Psychology of nuclear safeguards. [Cannot guarantee preventing diversion, only deter

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Parker, L

    1978-08-17

    There is an essential confusion in the way we look at safeguards. They cannot guarantee to prevent diversions: at best, they can deter. While successful acts of deterrence pass unnoticed, failures will be widely publicized. Therefore, we will judge safeguards systems not on a fair balance between their successes and failures, but exclusively on what we believe to be their failures. Effectively, we will be demanding an impossibly high standard of performance, and safeguards authorities will be tempted to conceal diversions rather than disappoint our expectations. Perhaps it is appropriate that safeguards are primarily psychological instruments: Parker argues that their essence is credibility, and that this does not necessarily depend on the hard reality of their performance. Brian Johnson claimed (New Scientist, vol 74, p 189) that safeguards have engendered a sense of security by linking the commitment of many states not to develop nuclear weapons, and that the Non-Proliferation Treaty has helped condition domestic political attitudes against starting up nuclear weapons programs. Perhaps the common view that safeguards are legal instruments has served the psychological purpose of supplying a language in which states with widely differing interests can explore the fundamental incompatibility between non-proliferation and the search for convenient energy sources. If this is true then it cannot be said that the NPT is a failure, merely that its success does not correspond to its apparent purposes.

  15. International training course on nuclear materials accountability for safeguards purposes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-12-01

    The two volumes of this report incorporate all lectures and presentations at the International Training Course on Nuclear Materials Accountability and Control for Safeguards Purposes, held May 27-June 6, 1980, at the Bishop's Lodge near Santa Fe, New Mexico. The course, authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a National system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both National and IAEA International safeguards objectives. Volume I, covering the first week of the course, presents the background, requirements, and general features of material accounting and control in modern safeguard systems. Volume II, covering the second week of the course, provides more detailed information on measurement methods and instruments, practical experience at power reactor and research reactor facilities, and examples of operating state systems of accountability and control

  16. International training course on nuclear materials accountability for safeguards purposes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1980-12-01

    The two volumes of this report incorporate all lectures and presentations at the International Training Course on Nuclear Materials Accountability and Control for Safeguards Purposes, held May 27-June 6, 1980, at the Bishop's Lodge near Santa Fe, New Mexico. The course, authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a National system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both National and IAEA International safeguards objectives. Volume I, covering the first week of the course, presents the background, requirements, and general features of material accounting and control in modern safeguard systems. Volume II, covering the second week of the course, provides more detailed information on measurement methods and instruments, practical experience at power reactor and research reactor facilities, and examples of operating state systems of accountability and control.

  17. Qualitative simulation for supervision of a nuclear reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leyval, L.; Ledoux, A.

    1991-01-01

    This paper deals with the first application of a supervision support system to a part of a nuclear reprocessing plant. The system is called DIAPASON; its role is to help the operators to understand the behaviour of the process, and to diagnose failures if needed. This paper is only concerned with the simulation of the behaviour of the process and the associated explanations provided by DIAPASON during the normal operation periods. The modeling, simulation techniques are presented, when applied to a nuclear process. A causal graph linking the relevant variables by Qualitative Transfer Functions models the process behaviour. The simulation consists in propagating through the entire graph the significant events detected on the input variables or on measurable disturbances of the process. As a result, the evolutions of all the other variables are obtained. The explanations that can be provided at the present time are deduced from the simulation

  18. On-line control of nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Parus, I.; Kierzek, J.; Zoltowski, T.

    1977-01-01

    The development trends in the field of chemical processes control and the present state of the development of continuous composition analysers has been described. On this background the peculiarities of on-line control methods for spent nuclear fuel reprocessing have been discussed. The measuring methods for direct and indirect determination of chemical composition and nuclear safety are reviewed in detail. The review comprises such methods as: measurement of α, γ and neutron radiation emitted both by nuclides present in technological solutions and using external sources of different radiation, X-ray fluorescence, measurements of physicochemical parameters connected with the composition (pH, density, electrical conductivity), polarography and spectrophotometry. At the end of this review some new trends in process control based on dynamic process models have been presented. (author)

  19. Fuel handling, reprocessing, and waste and related nuclear data aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuesters, H.; Lalovic, M.; Wiese, H.W.

    1979-06-01

    The essential processes in the out-of-pile nuclear fuel cycle are described, i.e. mining and milling of uranium ores, enrichment, fuel fabrication, storage, transportation, reprocessing of irradiated fuel, waste treatment and waste disposal. The aspects of radiation (mainly gammas and neutrons) and of heat production, as well as special safety considerations are outlined with respect to their potential operational impacts and long-term hazards. In this context the importance of nuclear data for the out-of-pile fuel cycle is discussed. Special weight is given to the LWR fuel cycle including recycling; the differences of LMFBR high burn-up fuel with large PuO 2 content are described. The HTR fuel cycle is discussed briefly as well as some alternative fuel cycle concepts. (orig.) [de

  20. Potential safety-related incidents with possible applicability to a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Perkins, W.C.; Durant, W.S.; Dexter, A.H.

    1980-12-01

    The occurrence of certain potential events in nuclear fuel reprocessing plants could lead to significant consequences involving risk to operating personnel or to the general public. This document is a compilation of such potential initiating events in nuclear fuel reprocessing plants. Possible general incidents and incidents specific to key operations in fuel reprocessing are considered, including possible causes, consequences, and safety features designed to prevent, detect, or mitigate such incidents

  1. Safeguards by Design - Experiences from New Nuclear Installation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Okko, O.; Honkamaa, T.; Kuusi, A.; Rautjaervi, J.

    2010-01-01

    The experiences obtained from the current construction projects at Olkiluoto clearly point out the need to introduce the safeguards requirements into facility design process at an early stage. The early Design Information is completed, in principle, before the construction. However, during the design of containment, surveillance systems, and non-destructive assay equipment and their cabling, the design requirements for safeguards systems were not available either for the new reactor unit or for the disposal plant with a geological repository. Typically, the official Design Information documents are not available early enough for efficient integration of safeguards systems into new facilities. In case of the Olkiluoto projects, this was due to understandable reasons: at the new reactor unit the design acceptance by the ordering company and by the nuclear safety authorities was a long process, ongoing simultaneously with parts of the construction; and at the geological repository the national legislation assigns the repository the status of a nuclear facility only after the initial construction and research phase of the repository when the long-term safety of the disposal concept is demonstrated. As similar factors are likely to delay the completion of the official Design Information documents with any new reactor projects until the construction is well underway and efficient integration of safeguards systems is impossible. Therefore, the proliferation resistance of new nuclear installations should be addressed in the design phase before the official Design Information documents are finished. This approach was demonstrated with the enlargement of the Olkiluoto spent fuel storage building. For this approach to work, strong national contribution is needed to facilitate the early communication and exchange of information between the IAEA and the other stakeholders to enable the design of facilities that can be efficiently safeguarded. With the renaissance of nuclear

  2. Evaluation of excess nuclear materials suitability for international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Newton, J.W.; White, W.C.; Davis, R.M.; Cherry, R.C.

    1996-01-01

    President Clinton announced in March 1995 the permanent withdrawal of 200 tons of fissile material from the US nuclear stockpile. This action was made possible by the dramatic reduction in nuclear weapons stockpile size and a desire to demonstrate the US'' commitment to nonproliferation goals. To provide further assurance of that commitment, the US is addressing placement of these materials under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. An initial step of this overall assessment was evaluation of the nuclear materials'' suitability for international safeguards. US Department of Energy (DOE) field organizations reviewed a detailed listing of all candidate materials with respect to characterization status, security classification, and acceptability for international safeguards compared to specified criteria. These criteria included form, location, environment and safety considerations, measurability, and stability. The evaluation resulted in broad categorizations of all materials with respect to preparing and placing materials under IAEA safeguards and provided essential information for decisions on the timing for offering materials as a function of materials attributes. A plan is being prepared to determine the availability of these materials for IAEA safeguards considering important factors such as costs, processes and facilities required to prepare materials, and impacts on other programs

  3. Handbook on process and chemistry of nuclear fuel reprocessing version 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-10-01

    Aqueous nuclear fuel reprocessing technology, based on PUREX technology, has wide applicability as the principal reprocessing technology of the first generation, and relating technologies, waste management for example, are highly developed, too. It is quite important to establish a database summarizing fundamental information about the process and the chemistry of aqueous reprocessing, because it contributes to establish and develop fuel reprocessing technology and nuclear fuel cycle treating high burn-up UO 2 fuel and spent MOX fuel, and to utilize aqueous reprocessing technology much widely. This handbook is the second edition of the first report, which summarizes the fundamental data on process and chemistry, which was collected and examined by 'Editing Committee of Handbook on Process and Chemistry of Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing' from FY 1993 until FY 2000. (author)

  4. Administrative and managerial controls for the operation of nuclear fuel reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1979-01-01

    Guidelines are provided for the administrative and managerial controls necessary for the safe and efficient operation of nuclear fuel reprocessing plants. Topics covered include: administrative organization; review and audit; facility administrative policies and procedures; and tests and inspections. Recognizing that administrative practices vary among organizations operating nuclear fuel reprocessing plants, the standard incorporates flexibility that provides for compliance by any organization

  5. Reprocessing of nuclear fuels: economical, ecological and technical aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kueffer, K.

    1994-01-01

    The report deals with the questions on reprocessing and final storage of spent fuel elements from the point of view of the Swiss. The contractual obligations were discussed, of the present situation of reprocessing and their assessment. 1 fig

  6. The present status of IAEA safeguards on nuclear fuel cycle facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-11-01

    The present IAEA approach to safeguarding various types of nuclear facilities is examined. The IAEA safeguards objectives, criteria and specific techniques are addressed, with reference e.g. to concepts like timely detection, quantities of safeguards significance, and conversion times. Material accountancy and containment and surveillance as basic features of IAEA safeguards verification are discussed. Safeguards measures for specific facility types are considered and corresponding levels of IAEA safeguards experience are assessed. Outlines of expected IAEA safeguard approaches to large bulk handling facilities are discussed. The evolutionary nature of safeguards based on experience and research and development is mentioned

  7. An Introduction to Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haakansson, Ane; Jonter, Thomas

    2007-06-01

    The purpose of this project was to compile a course material that covers how the nuclear safeguards system has emerged and how it works today. The produced compendium is directed to both university students and people concerned by safeguards from the industry. The primary aim of the first part of this paper is to describe the historical development of this global non-proliferation system and its central tasks. A second purpose is to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of its current design in order to answer the following question: Can we today say that we have a functioning global non-proliferation system? Does it require further strengthening, and, if so, how can this be achieved? In the second section we review the verification regime within nuclear safeguards, i. e. describe the methods and techniques that are available to reassure the world community that concluded treaties are adhered to

  8. An Introduction to Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Haakansson, Ane; Jonter, Thomas

    2007-06-15

    The purpose of this project was to compile a course material that covers how the nuclear safeguards system has emerged and how it works today. The produced compendium is directed to both university students and people concerned by safeguards from the industry. The primary aim of the first part of this paper is to describe the historical development of this global non-proliferation system and its central tasks. A second purpose is to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of its current design in order to answer the following question: Can we today say that we have a functioning global non-proliferation system? Does it require further strengthening, and, if so, how can this be achieved? In the second section we review the verification regime within nuclear safeguards, i. e. describe the methods and techniques that are available to reassure the world community that concluded treaties are adhered to

  9. International nuclear safeguards 1994: Vision for the future. V.1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    Since the last IAEA symposium on this subject, held eight years ego in 1986, the world of safeguards has experienced a number of momentous changes which have opened a new period of intensive development in safeguards. The important events were: The discoveries in Iraq during activities under United Nations Security Council resolutions, South Africa's decision to become a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the IAEA-Argentina-Brazil-ABACC Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement, the break-up of the former USSR into newly independent States, and the problems encountered in the implementation of NPT safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The consequences for international safeguards of these events were presented in papers at this symposium, with special emphasis on verification of a State's declaration as well as on detection of undeclared activities. Other fundamental changes stem from converging relationships between nuclear arms reductions and the civil use of plutonium, and the international debate on the associated issues. Furthermore, the review and extension of the NPT is due in 1995. Events have opened the possibility for ambitious new concepts for verification regimes. These matters were addressed at the symposium in the opening session and in the closing panel discussion. Refs, figs and tabs

  10. Confinement of ruthenium oxides volatilized during nuclear fuels reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maas, E.T. Jr.; Longo, J.M.

    1980-01-01

    While many materials have been suggested and employed as trapping agents for gaseous oxides of fission product ruthenium volatilized during nuclear fuels reprocessing, none that is known to form thermodynamically stable compounds with rutheniunm has been utilized. We have employed alkaline earth metal compounds for this purpose because of their ability to form stable mixed metal oxide phases with ruthenium. Results of experiments in which RuO 4 was volatilized from either a solid source (RuO 2 .xH 2 O) or from solution [Ru(NO)(NO 3 ) 3 ] in HNO 3 and passed through beds of alkaline earth metal carbonates and calcium oxide held at 600 to 750 0 C have demonstrated that compounds of formulation MRuO 3 (M = calcium, strontium, barium) are formed. Under oxidizing conditions, these materials exist as stable ceramic phases, whereas under reducing conditions, they are transformed into intimate mixtures of the alkaline earth metal oxide and nonvolatile ruthenium metal

  11. Microbial transformations of radionuclides released from nuclear fuel reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Francis, A.J.

    2007-01-01

    Microorganisms can affect the stability and mobility of the actinides U, Pu, Cm, Am, Np, and the fission products Tc, I, Cs, Sr, released from nuclear fuel reprocessing plants. Under appropriate conditions, microorganisms can alter the chemical speciation, solubility and sorption properties and thus could increase or decrease the concentrations of radionuclides in solution and the bioavailability. Dissolution or immobilization of radionuclides is brought about by direct enzymatic action or indirect non-enzymatic action of microorganisms. Although the physical, chemical, and geochemical processes affecting dissolution, precipitation, and mobilization of radionuclides have been investigated, we have only limited information on the effects of microbial processes. The mechanisms of microbial transformations of the major and minor actinides and the fission products under aerobic and anaerobic conditions in the presence of electron donors and acceptors are reviewed. (author)

  12. Advanced teleoperation in nuclear applications: consolidated fuel reprocessing program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hamel, W.R.; Feldman, M.J.; Martin, H.L.

    1984-01-01

    A new generation of integrated remote maintenance systems is being developed to meet the needs of future nuclear fuel reprocessing at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Development activities cover all aspects of an advanced teleoperated maintenance system with particular emphasis on a new force-reflecting servomanipulator concept. The new manipulator, called the advanced servomanipulator, is microprocessor controlled and is designed to achieve force-reflection performance near that of mechanical master/slave manipulators. The advanced servomanipulator uses a gear-drive transmission which permits modularization for remote maintainability (by other advanced servomanipulators) and increases reliability. Human factors analysis has been used to develop an improved man/machine interface concept based upon colographic displays and menu-driven touch screens. Initial test and evaluation of two advanced servomanipulator slave arms and several other development components have begun. 9 references, 5 figures

  13. Apparatus and method for reprocessing and separating spent nuclear fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krikorian, O.H.; Grens, J.Z.; Parrish, W.H.; Coops, M.S.

    1983-01-01

    A method and apparatus for separating and reprocessing spent nuclear fuels includes a separation vessel housing a molten metal solvent in a reaction region, a reflux region positioned above and adjacent to the reaction region, and a porous filter member defining the bottom of the separation vessel in a supporting relationship with the metal solvent. Spent fuels are added to the metal solvent. A non-oxidizing nitrogen-containing gas is introduced into the separation vessel, forming solid actinide nitrides in the metal solvent from actinide fuels, while leaving other fission products in solution. A pressure of about 1.1 to 1.2 atm is applied in the reflux region, forcing the molten metal solvent and soluble fission products out of the vessel, while leaving the solid actinide nitrides in the separation vessel. (author)

  14. Falling film evaporators: organic solvent regeneration in nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garcin, I.

    1989-01-01

    The aim of this work was to improve knowledge about working of falling film evaporators used in nuclear fuel reprocessing plants for organic solvent regeneration. The first part deals with a non evaporation film. An original film thickness measuring technique was used; infrared thermography. It gave indications on hydrodynamics and wave amplitude and pointed out thermocapillary forces to be the cause of bad wetting of the heated wall. By another way we showed that a small slit spacing on the film distributor, an enhanced surface roughness and an important liquid flow rate favour a better wetting. The second part deals with evaporation of a binary solvent mixture. Experiments in an industrial evaporator corroborated the fact that it is essential for the efficiency of the apparatus to work at high flow rates. We propose an over-simple model which can be used to estimate performances of co-current falling film evaporators of the process [fr

  15. Physical Protection of Nuclear Safeguards Technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hoskins, Richard

    2004-01-01

    IAEA's Nuclear Security Plan is established to assist Member States in implementing effective measures against nuclear terrorism. Four potential threats were identified: theft of nuclear weapon, nuclear explosive device, radiological dispersal device and an attack on radiation facility. In order to achieve effective protection of nuclear materials and facilities, the IAEA sponsored the Convention of the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials which focuses on the protection of nuclear materials 'in international transport. The IAEA also promoted INFCIRC/255 entitled the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities and published TECDOC/967 for the protection of nuclear materials and facilities against theft and sabotage and during transport. Assistance is available for the Member States through the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) and the International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ). (author)

  16. Methodology for characterizing potential adversaries of Nuclear Material Safeguards Systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kirkwood, C.W.; Pollock, S.M.

    1978-11-01

    The results are described of a study by Woodward--Clyde Consultants to assist the University of California Lawrence Livermore Laboratory in the development of methods to analyze and evaluate Nuclear Material Safeguards (NMS) Systems. The study concentrated on developing a methodology to assist experts in describing, in quantitative form, their judgments about the characteristics of potential adversaries of NMS Systems

  17. Methodology for characterizing potential adversaries of Nuclear Material Safeguards Systems

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kirkwood, C.W.; Pollock, S.M.

    1978-11-01

    The results are described of a study by Woodward--Clyde Consultants to assist the University of California Lawrence Livermore Laboratory in the development of methods to analyze and evaluate Nuclear Material Safeguards (NMS) Systems. The study concentrated on developing a methodology to assist experts in describing, in quantitative form, their judgments about the characteristics of potential adversaries of NMS Systems.

  18. Array of germanium detectors for nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moss, C.E.; Bernard, W.; Dowdy, E.J.; Garcia, C.; Lucas, M.C.; Pratt, J.C.

    1983-01-01

    Our gamma-ray spectrometer system, designed for field use, offers high efficiency and high resolution for safeguards applications. The system consists of three 40% high-purity germanium detectors and a LeCroy 3500 data-acquisition system that calculates a composite spectrum for the three detectors. The LeCroy 3500 mainframe can be operated remotely from the detector array with control exercised through moderns and the telephone system. System performance with a mixed source of 125 Sb, 154 Eu, and 155 Eu confirms the expected efficiency of 120% with an overall resolution that is between the resolution of the best detector and that of the worst

  19. Safeguards Culture

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2012-07-01

    The concepts of nuclear safety and security culture are well established; however, a common understanding of safeguards culture is not internationally recognized. Supported by the National Nuclear Security Administration, the authors prepared this report, an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture, and gauged its value to the safeguards community. The authors explored distinctions between safeguards culture, safeguards compliance, and safeguards performance, and evaluated synergies and differences between safeguards culture and safety/security culture. The report concludes with suggested next steps.

  20. Nuclear material control and accounting safeguards in the United States

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Woltermann, H.A.; Rudy, C.R.; Rakel, D.A.; DeVer, E.A.

    1982-01-01

    Material control and accounting (MC and A) of special nuclear material (SNM) must supplement physical security to protect SNM from unlawful use such as terrorist activities. This article reviews MC and A safeguards of SNM in the United States. The following topics are covered: a brief perspective and history of MC and A safeguards, current MC and A practices, measurement methods for SNM, historical MC and A performance, a description of near-real-time MC and A systems, and conclusions on the status of MC and A in the United States

  1. Improved IAEA safeguards for closed nuclear fuel cycles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-12-01

    The paper recognises the limitations of nuclear material accountancy in applying safeguards to future large scale processing plants. For those plants the following will be necessary: (i) The inclusion of safeguards requirements in design criteria. (ii) Extensive application of containment and surveillance with monitors on personnel and goods exits, pipework, tanks, etc. (iii) Continuous inspectorate measurement of input and output flows. Local IAEA laboratories to ensure timeliness. (iv) Upgrading of process control information to enable the inspectorate to monitor the in-process inventory. The inspectorates knowledge of the in-process inventory will be valuable in their assessment of any alarms given by the containment-surveillance system

  2. The role of IAEA Safeguards in connection with nuclear trade

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Imai, R.

    1977-01-01

    IAEA safeguards is one of the means to prevent proliferation of military and/or explosive utilization of nuclear material. As such; safeguards can be a potent instrument, and its characteristics are primarily technical. Other means may include; a) political incentives which make possession of nuclear weapons unnecessary and undescribable; b) an extent of trade restrictions regarding certain sensitive material, equipment and technology; and c) accompanying requirements of physical protection. Peaceful nuclear industry has an aspect which naturally calls for international exchange. The technology itself represents one of the most advanced in our times, and therefore, should be shared throughout the world. Uranium resources of economic grades are found only in a limited number of countries. Many of the components of the industry, including reactor manufacture and fuel cycle, are very capital-intensive and technology-intensive, so that it would be natural that a relatively limited number of manufacturing or processing capabilities should serve the rest of the world. It is useful to look at the existing pattern of nuclear trade, as well as to forecast the effects of increasing trade volume. Regarding technology, the problem divides itself into three in order that safeguards should be effective and non-intrusive. There is a need to decrease international shipper/receiver difference by means of containment/surveillance as well as quick and accurate reporting. Obviously, its effectiveness will be maximized if all the world's trading partners should participate in a system of coordination. Improving technical effectiveness of safeguards is very important, once nuclear material is in a country. Thirdly, in addition to nuclear material accountancy, new techniques may be employed to recognize characteristic patterns of a nations's nuclear activities, or deviation from such a pattern. Tracing nuclear trade might become important input to such an analysis

  3. French nuclear plant safeguard pump qualification testing: EPEC test loop

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Guesnon, H.

    1985-01-01

    This paper reviews the specifications to which nuclear power plant safeguard pumps must be qualified, and surveys the qualification methods and program used in France to verify operability of the pump assembly and major pump components. The EPEC test loop is described along with loop capabilities and acheivements up to now. This paper shows, through an example, the Medium Pressure Safety Injection Pump designed for service in 1300 MW nuclear power plants, and the interesting possibilities offered by qualification testing

  4. Needs of Advanced Safeguards Technologies for Future Nuclear Fuel Cycle (FNFC) Facilities and a Trial Application of SBD Concept to Facility Design of a Hypothetical FNFC Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seya, M.; Hajima, R.; Nishimori, N.; Hayakawa, T.; Kikuzawa, N.; Shizuma, T.; Fujiwara, M.

    2010-01-01

    Some of future nuclear fuel cycle (FNFC) facilities are supposed to have the characteristic features of very large throughput of plutonium, low decontamination reprocessing (no purification process; existence of certain amount of fission products (FP) in all process material), full minor actinides (MA) recycle, and treatment of MOX with FP and MA in fuel fabrication. In addition, the following international safeguards requirements have to be taken into account for safeguards approaches of the FNFC facilities. -Application of integrated safeguards (IS) approach; -Remote (unattended) verification; - 'Safeguards by Design' (SBD) concept. These features and requirements compel us to develop advanced technologies, which are not emerged yet. In order to realize the SBD, facility designers have to know important parts of design information on advanced safeguards systems before starting the facility design. The SBD concept requires not only early start of R and D of advanced safeguards technologies (before starting preliminary design of the facility) but also interaction steps between researchers working on safeguards systems and nuclear facility designers. The interaction steps are follows. Step-1; researchers show images of advanced safeguards systems to facility designers based on their research. Step-2; facility designers take important design information on safeguards systems into process systems of demonstration (or test) facility. Step-3; demonstration and improvement of both systems based on the conceptual design. Step-4; Construction of a FNFC facility with the advanced safeguards systems We present a trial application of the SBD concept to a hypothetical FNFC facility with an advanced hybrid K-edge densitometer and a Pu NDA system for spent nuclear fuel assembly using laser Compton scattering (LCS) X-rays and γ-rays and other advanced safeguards systems. (author)

  5. Design of integrated safeguards systems for nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    de Montmollin, J.M.; Walton, R.B.

    1978-06-01

    Safeguards systems that are capable of countering postulated threats to nuclear facilities must be closely integrated with plant layout and processes if they are to be effective and if potentially-severe impacts on plant operations are to be averted. This paper describes a facilities safeguards system suitable for production plant, in which the traditional elements of physical protection and periodic material-balance accounting are extended and augmented to provide close control of material flows. Discrete material items are subjected to direct, overriding physical control where appropriate. Materials in closely-coupled process streams are protected by on-line NDA and weight measurements, with rapid computation of material balances to provide immediate indication of large-scale diversion. The system provides information and actions at the safeguards/operations interface

  6. Design of integrated safeguards systems for nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    de Montmollin, J.M.; Walton, R.B.

    1976-01-01

    Safeguards systems that are capable of countering postulated threats to nuclear facilities must be closely integrated with plant layout and processes if they are to be effective and if potentially severe impacts on plant operations are to be averted. A facilities safeguards system suitable for a production plant is described in which the traditional elements of physical protection and periodic material-balance accounting are extended and augmented to provide close control of material flows. Discrete material items are subjected to direct, overriding physical control where appropriate. Materials in closely coupled process streams are protected by on-line NDA and weight measurements, with rapid computation of material balances to provide immediate indication of large-scale diversion. The system provides an information and actions at the safeguards/operations interface

  7. Nuclear material data management and integration. A safeguard perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilkey, David D.; Martin, H.R.; O'Leary, Jerry

    1999-01-01

    This paper is a discussion of the use of available data in the performance of nuclear material (NM) safeguards. The discussion considers the various sources of data and system requirements for collecting and managing that data, and is preliminary concerned with domestic safeguards requirements such as those specified by the US Department of Energy. The preferred configuration for integrated data management does not necessarily require a single computer system; however, separate computerized systems with direct inter-system connections is preferred. Use of all relevant data NM accounting, NM control, physical protection, and non-safeguards) is necessary to assure the most effective protection for the NM inventories. Where direct exchange of data is not possible, a systematic program to implement indirect exchange is essential [ru

  8. Safeguards systems concepts for nuclear material transportation. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baldonado, O.C.; Kevany, M.; Rodney, D.; Pitts, D.; Mazur, M.

    1977-09-01

    The report describes the development of system concepts for the safeguarding of special strategic nuclear materials (SNM) against malevolent adversary action during the interfacility transport of the SNM. The methodology used includes techniques for defining, classifying, and analyzing adversary action sequences; defining safeguards system components; assessing the vulnerability of various safeguards systems and their component parts to the potential adversary action sequences, and conceptualizing system design requirements. The method of analysis is based primarily on a comparison of adversary actions with safeguards measures, to estimate vulnerability. Because of the paucity of the data available for assessing vulnerability, the Delphi approach was used to generate data: values were estimated in a structured exercise by a panel of experts in the safeguards and terrorist fields. It is concluded that the probability of successful attack against a truck/escort convoy manned by well-trained, well-armed personnel is low enough to discourage all but the strongest adversaries. Secrecy of operations and careful screening of personnel are very important. No reliance should be placed on current capabilities of local law enforcement agencies. The recommendation of the study is the use of road transport in the near future and air transport at a later time when the number of shipments reaches a level to justify it, and when present safety problems are resolved

  9. Neutron resonance analysis for nuclear safeguards and security applications

    Science.gov (United States)

    Paradela, Carlos; Heyse, Jan; Kopecky, Stefan; Schillebeeckx, Peter; Harada, Hideo; Kitatani, Fumito; Koizumi, Mitsuo; Tsuchiya, Harufumi

    2017-09-01

    Neutron-induced reactions can be used to study the properties of nuclear materials of interest in the fields of nuclear safeguards and security. The elemental and isotopic composition of these materials can be determined by using the presence of resonance structures. This idea is the basis of two non-destructive analysis techniques which have been developed at the GELINA neutron time-of-flight facility at JRC-Geel: Neutron Resonance Capture Analysis (NRCA) and Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA). A combination of NRTA and NRCA has been proposed for the characterisation of particle-like debris of melted fuel formed in severe nuclear accidents. In this work, we present a quantitative validation of the NRTA technique which was used to determine the areal densities of Pu enriched reference samples used for safeguards applications. Less than 2% bias has been obtained for the fissile isotopes, with well-known total cross sections.

  10. On permission of reprocessing project change at the Reprocessing Works of the Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. (Reply)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    The Nuclear Safety Commission replied as follows to the Prime Minister on July 14, 1997 on permission of reprocessing project change at the Reprocessing Works of the Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. inquired on Dec. 26, 1996. Contents of the inquiry consisted of change of refinery facility and its related instruments, integration of low level wasted liquid treating instrument and change of low level solid waste treating instrument, integration of high level wasted liquid storing building and high level wasted liquid glassification building, installation of used fuel transporting container maintenance instrument and its relating instruments, and so forth. As a result of careful discussion at the Commission for these items, they were admitted to be valid on her technical ability and her safety. (G.K.)

  11. Nuclear Safeguards and Security Education at Russian Universities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Killinger, Mark H.; Goodey, Kent O.; Butler, Gilbert W.; Duncan, Cristen L.

    2008-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy is assisting key Russian universities in developing safeguards and security degree programs to prepare the next generation of specialists who will be responsible for protecting nuclear material from illicit use. These programs include course and laboratory work in nuclear material measurements, vulnerability analysis, exterior and interior sensors, and legal aspects of nuclear nonproliferation. Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI) has graduated nine classes of masters students, most of who are working in government agencies, research organizations, or pursuing their PhD. With DOE support, MEPhI has also established a 5 1/2-year engineering degree program in safeguards and security. This is a hands-on degree that more closely meets the needs of nuclear facilities. The first class graduated in February 2007, marking a major milestone in Russian nonproliferation education. A second engineering degree program has been established at Tomsk Polytechnic University and is designed to reach those students east of the Ural Mountains, where many nuclear facilities are located. The first class will graduate in February 2009. This paper describes current development of these education programs, new initiatives, and sustainability efforts to ensure their continued viability after DOE support ends. The paper also describes general nonproliferation education activities supported by DOE that complement the more technical safeguards and security education programs.

  12. A review of reprocessing, partitioning, and transmutation of spent nuclear fuel and the implications for Canada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jackson, D.P.

    2006-01-01

    The current status of the reprocessing, partitioning, and transmutation of used nuclear fuel are reviewed in the context of assessing the possible application of these technologies to used CANDU fuel. The status of commercial reprocessing is briefly surveyed and recent progress in world R and D programs on the transmutation of FP's and actinides using Accelerator Driven Systems is summarized. The implications of reprocessing for Canada are explored from the point of view of a long strategy for managing used CANDU fuel in terms of the costs of initiating reprocessing domestically at some time in the future including public and occupational radiation doses, and the wastes generated. (author)

  13. Remote repair robots for dissolvers in nuclear fuel reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sugiyama, Sen; Hirose, Yasuo; Kawamura, Hironobu; Minato, Akira; Ozaki, Norihiko.

    1984-01-01

    In nuclear facilities, for the purpose of the reduction of radiation exposure of workers, the shortening of working time and the improvement of capacity ratio of the facilities, the technical development of various devices for remote maintenance and inspection has been advanced so far. This time, an occasion came to inspect and repair the pinhole defects occurred in spent fuel dissolving tanks in the reprocessing plant of Tokai Establishment, Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp. However, since the radiation environmental condition and the restricting condition due to the object of repair were extremely severe, it was impossible to cope with them using conventional robot techniques. Consequently, a repair robot withstanding high level radiation has been developed anew, which can work by totally remote operation in the space of about 270 mm inside diameter and about 6 m length. The repair robot comprises a periscope reflecting mirror system, a combined underwater and atmospheric use television, a grinder, a welder, a liquid penetrant tester and an ultrasonic flaw detector. The key points of the development were the parts withstanding high level radiation and the selection of materials, to make the mechanism small size and the realization of totally remote operation. (Kako, I.)

  14. The proceedings of China-Japan workshop on nuclear waste management and reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    China-Japan workshop on Nuclear Waste Management and Reprocessing held by sponsors, Nuclear Chemical Engineering Association, Chinese nuclear Society and Division of nuclear Fuel Cycle and Environment, Atomic Energy Society of Japan and by co-sponsor, Nuclear and Radiochemistry Association, Chinese Nuclear Society, on April 5-7, 2000, in Beijing, China. The proceedings is published. It collected 34 articles. The contents include nuclear fuel reprocessing, radioactive waste processing and radioactive waste disposal, partitioning and transmutation, radionuclide migration, sorption and diffusion and actinide chemistry

  15. Technetium-99 and strontium-90: Abundance determination at ultratrace sensitivity by AMS as signatures of undeclared nuclear reprocessing activity

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McAninch, J.E.; Proctor, I.D.

    1995-03-01

    The purpose of this White Paper is to examine the use of the ultratrace technique Accelerator Mass Spectrometry (AMS) to lower detection limits for 99 Tc and 90 Sr, and to examine the utility of these isotopes as signatures of a convert reprocessing facility. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has committed to improving the effectiveness of the IAEA Safeguards System. This is in some degree a result of the discovery in 1991 of an undeclared Iraqi EMIS program. Recommendations from the March 1993 Consultants Group Meeting have resulted in several studies and follow on field trials to identify environmental signatures from covert nuclear fuel reprocessing activity. In particular, the April, 1993 reports of the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) identified the long-lived radioisotopes Technetium-99 and strontium-90 as two reliable signatures of fuel reprocessing activity. This report also suggested pathways in the chemical processing of irradiated fuel where these elements would be volatilized and potentially released in amounts detectable with ultratrace sensitivity techniques. Based on measured 99 Tc background levels compiled from a variety of sources, it is estimated that AMS can provide 10% measurements of environmental levels of 99 Tc in a few minutes using modestly sized samples: a few grams for soils, plants, or animal tissues; one to several liters for rain or seawater samples; and tens to hundreds of cubic meters for air sampling. Small sample sizes and high sample throughput result in significant increases in feasibility, cost effectiveness, and quality of data for a regional monitoring program. Similar results are expected for 90 Sr

  16. Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Book of extended synopses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    The symposium covered the topics related to international safeguards, verification and nuclear materials security, namely: verification and nuclear material security; the NPT regime: progress and promises; the Additional Protocol as an important tool for the strengthening of the safeguards system; the nuclear threat and the nuclear threat initiative. Eighteen sessions dealt with the following subjects: the evolution of IAEA safeguards (including strengthened safeguards, present and future challenges; verification of correctness and completeness of initial declarations; implementation of the Additional Protocol, progress and experience; security of material; nuclear disarmament and ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq; evolution of IAEA verification in relation to nuclear disarmament); integrated safeguards; physical protection and illicit trafficking; destructive analysis for safeguards; the additional protocol; innovative safeguards approaches; IAEA verification and nuclear disarmament; environmental sampling; safeguards experience; safeguards equipment; panel discussion on development of state systems of accountancy and control; information analysis in the strengthened safeguard system; satellite imagery and remote monitoring; emerging IAEA safeguards issues; verification technology for nuclear disarmament; the IAEA and the future of nuclear verification and security

  17. Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Book of extended synopses

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2001-07-01

    The symposium covered the topics related to international safeguards, verification and nuclear materials security, namely: verification and nuclear material security; the NPT regime: progress and promises; the Additional Protocol as an important tool for the strengthening of the safeguards system; the nuclear threat and the nuclear threat initiative. Eighteen sessions dealt with the following subjects: the evolution of IAEA safeguards (including strengthened safeguards, present and future challenges; verification of correctness and completeness of initial declarations; implementation of the Additional Protocol, progress and experience; security of material; nuclear disarmament and ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq; evolution of IAEA verification in relation to nuclear disarmament); integrated safeguards; physical protection and illicit trafficking; destructive analysis for safeguards; the additional protocol; innovative safeguards approaches; IAEA verification and nuclear disarmament; environmental sampling; safeguards experience; safeguards equipment; panel discussion on development of state systems of accountancy and control; information analysis in the strengthened safeguard system; satellite imagery and remote monitoring; emerging IAEA safeguards issues; verification technology for nuclear disarmament; the IAEA and the future of nuclear verification and security.

  18. Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Book of extended synopses. Addendum

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    The symposium covered the topics related to international safeguards, verification and nuclear materials security, namely: verification and nuclear material security; the NPT regime: progress and promises; the Additional Protocol as an important tool for the strengthening of the safeguards system; the nuclear threat and the nuclear threat initiative. Eighteen sessions dealt with the following subjects: the evolution of IAEA safeguards ( including strengthened safeguards, present and future challenges; verification of correctness and completeness of initial declarations; implementation of the Additional Protocol, progress and experience; security of material; nuclear disarmament and ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq; evolution of IAEA verification in relation to nuclear disarmament); integrated safeguards; physical protection and illicit trafficking; destructive analysis for safeguards; the additional protocol; innovative safeguards approaches; IAEA verification and nuclear disarmament; environmental sampling; safeguards experience; safeguards equipment; panel discussion on development of state systems of accountancy and control; information analysis in the strengthened safeguard system; satellite imagery and remote monitoring; emerging IAEA safeguards issues; verification technology for nuclear disarmament; the IAEA and the future of nuclear verification and security

  19. Spent fuel reprocessing options

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-08-01

    The objective of this publication is to provide an update on the latest developments in nuclear reprocessing technologies in the light of new developments on the global nuclear scene. The background information on spent fuel reprocessing is provided in Section One. Substantial global growth of nuclear electricity generation is expected to occur during this century, in response to environmental issues and to assure the sustainability of the electrical energy supply in both industrial and less-developed countries. This growth carries with it an increasing responsibility to ensure that nuclear fuel cycle technologies are used only for peaceful purposes. In Section Two, an overview of the options for spent fuel reprocessing and their level of development are provided. A number of options exist for the treatment of spent fuel. Some, including those that avoid separation of a pure plutonium stream, are at an advanced level of technological maturity. These could be deployed in the next generation of industrial-scale reprocessing plants, while others (such as dry methods) are at a pilot scale, laboratory scale or conceptual stage of development. In Section Three, research and development in support of advanced reprocessing options is described. Next-generation spent fuel reprocessing plants are likely to be based on aqueous extraction processes that can be designed to a country specific set of spent fuel partitioning criteria for recycling of fissile materials to advanced light water reactors or fast spectrum reactors. The physical design of these plants must incorporate effective means for materials accountancy, safeguards and physical protection. Section four deals with issues and challenges related to spent fuel reprocessing. The spent fuel reprocessing options assessment of economics, proliferation resistance, and environmental impact are discussed. The importance of public acceptance for a reprocessing strategy is discussed. A review of modelling tools to support the

  20. The curium tagging approach for enhanced safeguards for spent fuel handling and reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Menlove, H.O.; Beddingfield, D.H.; Rinard, P.M.; Wenz, T.R.

    1999-01-01

    Because of the intense neutron emission rate from curium, it can be a useful signature to measure and track special nuclear material in spent fuel and waste. By measuring the concentration of curium as well as plutonium and uranium in spent fuel streams, the ratio of curium to plutonium, uranium or other actinides can be used for waste assay. The quantity of special nuclear material in the waste streams such as the leached hulls and vitrified high-level waste can be calculated from the ratio of the curium to the plutonium, etc. The quantity of curium can be measured from the neutron emission rate from the various waste streams in the presence of the high-level gamma-ray backgrounds from fission products. Examples of using the curium ratio technique for measuring plutonium in leached hulls and vitrified waste canisters are presented in this paper. (author)

  1. The role of IAEA safeguards in connection with nuclear trade

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Imai, R.

    1977-01-01

    IAEA safeguards are one of the means to prevent the proliferation of nuclear material for military purposes. As such safeguards can be a potent instrument, and its characteristics are primarily technical. Other means may include (a) political incentives which render possession of nuclear weapons unnecessary and undesirable; (b) extension of trade restrictions regarding certain sensitive material, equipment and technology; and (c) accompanying requirements for physical protection. Peaceful nuclear industry has certain aspects which naturally call for international exchange. The technology itself represents one of the most advanced in our times, and therefore needs to be shared throughout the world. Uranium resources of economic levels are found in only a limited number of countries. Many of the components of the industry, including reactor manufacture and fuel cycle, are vey capital-intensive and technology-intensive, so that it would be natural for a relatively limited number of manufacturing or processing capabilities to serve the rest of the world. It is useful to examine the existing pattern of nuclear trade, as well as to forecast the effects of increasing trade volume. Regarding technology, there is a need to decrease the international shipper/receiver difference by means of containment/surveillance as well as by rapid and accurate reporting. Obviously, its effectiveness will be maximized if all the world's trading partners participated in a system of co-ordination. Improving technical effectiveness of safeguards is very important once nuclear material is in a country. In addition to nuclear material accountancy, new techniques may be employed to recognize the characteristic pattern of a nation's nuclear activities, or deviation from such a pattern. Tracing nuclear trade might become an important input to such an analysis. (author)

  2. Global partnering related to nuclear materials safeguards and security - A pragmatic approach to international safeguards work

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stanford, Dennis

    2007-01-01

    This paper documents issues Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. has addressed in the performance of international work to safeguards and security work. It begins with a description of the package we put together for a sample proposal for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, for which we were ranked number one for technical approach and cost, and concludes with a discussion of approaches that we have taken to performing this work, including issues related to performing the work as part of a team. The primary focus is on communication, workforce, equipment, and coordination issues. Finally, the paper documents the rules that we use to assure the work is performed safely and successfully. (author)

  3. Alpha-contaminated waste from reprocessing of nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sumner, W.

    1982-01-01

    The anticipated alpha-waste production rates from the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing plant is discussed. The estimated alpha-waste production rate from the 1500 metric ton/year plant is about 85,000 ft 3 /year at the 10 nCi/g limit. Most of this waste is estimated to come from the separation facility, and the major waste sources were cladding, which was 27%, and low-level contact-handled general process trash, which was estimated at 32% of the total. It was estimated that 45% of the waste was combustible and 72% of the waste was compactible. These characteristics could have a significant impact on the final volumes as disposed. Changing the alpha-waste limit from 10 nCi/g to 100 nCi/g was estimated to reduce the amount of alpha waste produced by about 20%. Again, the uncertainty in this value obviously has to be substantial. One has to recognize that these estimates were just that; they were not based on any operating experience. The total plutonium losses to waste, including the high-level waste, was estimated to be 1.5%. The cladding waste was estimated to be contaminated with alpha emitters to the extent of 10 4 to 10 5 nCi/g

  4. Thermochemical properties of media for pyrometallurgical nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hosoya, Yuji; Terai, Takayuki

    1998-01-01

    Molten chloride/cadmium system is considered to be applied to a solvent in pyrochemical reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. In this work, phase diagrams for molten chloride systems were constructed, using NdCl 3 as an imitative substance in place of UCl 3 or PuCl 3 . Hastelloy-X (Ni/Cr21/Fe18/Mo9/W) was examined as a structural material for the corrosion-resistance against molten chloride baths containing NdCl 3 . The process of corrosion was thermochemically discussed and the form of the corrosion was illustrated. Rutherford backscattering spectroscopy was successfully applied to determine the elemental distribution profile of specimens tested on the compatibility with molten chloride mixture at elevated temperature. Ferritic steel was also examined as another candidate material for the compatibility with molten cadmium covered with LiCl-KCl eutectic salt. Variation of near-surface composition was observed by comparing the results of Rutherford backscattering spectroscopy obtained before and after the dipping. (author)

  5. Status of radioiodine control for nuclear fuel reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Burger, L.L.; Scheele, R.D.

    1983-07-01

    This report summarizes the status of radioiodine control in a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant with respect to capture, fixation, and disposal. Where possible, we refer the reader to a number of survey documents which have been published in the last four years. We provide updates where necessary. Also discussed are factors which must be considered in developing criteria for iodine control. For capture from gas streams, silver mordenite and a silver nitrate impregnated silica (AC-6120) are considered state-of-the-art and are recommended. Three aqueous scrubbing processes have been demonstrated: Caustic scrubbing is simple but probably will not give an adequate iodine retention by itself. Mercurex (mercuric nitrate-nitric acid scrubbing) has a number of disadvantages including the use of toxic mercury. Iodox (hyperazeotropic nitric acid scrubbing) is effective but employs a very corrosive and hazardous material. Other technologies have been tested but require extensive development. The waste forms recommended for long-term storage or disposal are silver iodide, the iodates of barium, strontium, or calcium, and silver loaded sorbents, all fixed in cement. Copper iodide in bitumen (asphalt) is a possibility but requires testing. The selection of a specific form will be influenced by the capture process used

  6. Hydrothermal synthesis for fabrication and reprocessing of MOX nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ohta, Suguru; Yamamura, Tomoo; Shirasaki, Kenji; Satoh, Isamu; Shikama, Tatsuo

    2011-01-01

    To improve the nuclear proliferation resistance and to minimize use of chemicals, a new reprocessing and fabrication process of 'mixed oxide' (MOX) fuel was proposed and studied by using simulated spent fuel solutions. The process is consisting of the two steps, i.e. the removal of fission product (FP) from dissolved spent fuel by using carbonate solutions (Step-1), and hydrothermal synthesis of uranium dioxides (Step-2). In Step-1, rare earth (the precipitation ratio: 90%) and alkaline earth (10-50% for Sr) as FP were removed based on their low solubility of hydroxides and carbonate salts, with uranium kept dissolved for the certain carbonate solutions of weak base (Type 2) or mixtures of relatively strong base and weak base (Type 3). In Step-2, the features of uranium dioxides UO 2+x particles, i.e. stoichiometry (x=0.05-0.2), size (0.2-3 μm) and shape (cubic, spherical, rectangular parallelpiped, etc.), were controlled, and the cesium was removed down to 40 ppm by an addition of organic additives. The decontamination factors (DF) for cesium exceeds 10 5 , whereas the total DF of all the simulated FP were as low as the order of 10 which requires future studies for removal of alkaline earth, Re and Tc etc. (author)

  7. Current Status of Helium-3 Alternative Technologies for Nuclear Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Henzlova, Daniela; Kouzes, R.; McElroy, R.; Peerani, P.; Baird, K.; Bakel, A.; Borella, M.; Bourne, M.; Bourva, L.; Cave, F.; Chandra, R.; Chernikova, D.; Croft, S.; Dermody, G.; Dougan, A.; Ely, J.; Fanchini, E.; Finocchiaro, P.; Gavron, Victor; Kureta, M.; Ianakiev, Kiril Dimitrov; Ishiyama, K.; Lee, T.; Martin, Ch.; McKinny, K.; Menlove, Howard Olsen; Orton, Ch.; Pappalardo, A.; Pedersen, B.; Plenteda, R.; Pozzi, S.; Schear, M.; Seya, M.; Siciliano, E.; Stave, S.; Sun, L.; Swinhoe, Martyn Thomas; Tagziria, H.; Takamine, J.; Weber, A.-L.; Yamaguchi, T.; Zhu, H.

    2015-01-01

    International safeguards inspectorates (e.g., International Atomic Energy Agency, or Euratom) rely heavily on neutron assay techniques, and in particular, on coincidence counters for the verification of declared nuclear materials under safeguards and for monitoring purposes. While 3 He was readily available, the reliability, safety, ease of use, gamma-ray insensitivity, and high intrinsic thermal neutron detection efficiency of 3 He-based detectors obviated the need for alternative detector technologies. However, the recent decline of the 3 He gas supply has triggered international efforts to develop and field neutron detectors that make use of alternative materials. In response to this global effort, the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and Euratom launched a joint effort aimed at bringing together international experts, technology users and developers in the field of nuclear safeguards to discuss and evaluate the proposed 3 He alternative materials and technologies. The effort involved a series of two workshops focused on detailed overviews and viability assessments of various 3 He alternative technologies for use in nuclear safeguards applications. The key objective was to provide a platform for collaborative discussions and technical presentations organized in a compact, workshop-like format to stimulate interactions among the participants. The meetings culminated in a benchmark exercise providing a unique opportunity for the first inter-comparison of several available alternative technologies. This report provides an overview of the alternative technology efforts presented during the two workshops along with a summary of the benchmarking activities and results. The workshop recommendations and key consensus observations are discussed in the report, and used to outline a proposed path forward and future needs foreseeable in the area of 3 He-alternative technologies.

  8. [Safeguards for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jones, O.E.

    1975-01-01

    Testimony is given on the subject of safeguards for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities, particularly during transportation. The ERDA nation-wide safe-secure transportation system and the Safe-Secure Trailer are described. The nationwide ERDA voice communication system is also described. Development of hardware and systems is discussed. The use of adversary simulation for evaluating protection systems is mentioned

  9. Current Status of Helium-3 Alternative Technologies for Nuclear Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Henzlova, Daniela [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Kouzes, R. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); McElroy, R. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Peerani, P. [European Commission, Ispra (Italy). Joint Research Centre; Aspinall, M. [Hybrid Instruments Ltd., Birmingham (United Kingdom); Baird, K. [Intl Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Vienna (Austria); Bakel, A. [National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Washington, DC (United States); Borella, M. [SCK.CEN, Mol (Belgium); Bourne, M. [Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (United States); Bourva, L. [Canberra Ltd., Oxford (United Kingdom); Cave, F. [Hybrid Instruments Ltd., Birmingham (United Kingdom); Chandra, R. [Arktis Radiation Detectors Ltd., Zurich (Sweden); Chernikova, D. [Chalmers Univ. of Technology (Sweden); Croft, S. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Dermody, G. [Symetrica Inc., Maynard, MA (United States); Dougan, A. [National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Washington, DC (United States); Ely, J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Fanchini, E. [Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare (INFN), Milano (Italy); Finocchiaro, P. [Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare (INFN), Milano (Italy); Gavron, Victor [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Kureta, M. [Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), Tokai (Japan); Ianakiev, Kiril Dimitrov [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Ishiyama, K. [Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), Tokai (Japan); Lee, T. [Intl Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Vienna (Austria); Martin, Ch. [Symetrica Inc., Maynard, MA (United States); McKinny, K. [GE Reuter-Stokes, Twinsburg, OH (United States); Menlove, Howard Olsen [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Orton, Ch. [National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Washington, DC (United States); Pappalardo, A. [Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare (INFN), Milano (Italy); Pedersen, B. [European Commission, Ispra (Italy). Joint Research Centre; Peranteau, D. [National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Washington, DC (United States); Plenteda, R. [Intl Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Vienna (Austria); Pozzi, S. [Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (United States); Schear, M. [Symetrica Inc., Maynard, MA (United States); Seya, M. [Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), Tokai (Japan); Siciliano, E. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Stave, S. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Sun, L. [Proportional Technologies Inc., Houston, TX (United States); Swinhoe, Martyn Thomas [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Tagziria, H. [European Commission, Ispra (Italy). Joint Research Centre; Vaccaro, S. [DG Energy (Luxembourg); Takamine, J. [Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), Tokai (Japan); Weber, A. -L. [Inst. for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN), Fontenay-aux-Roses (France); Yamaguchi, T. [Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), Tokai (Japan); Zhu, H. [National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Washington, DC (United States)

    2015-12-01

    International safeguards inspectorates (e.g., International Atomic Energy Agency {IAEA}, or Euratom) rely heavily on neutron assay techniques, and in particular, on coincidence counters for the verification of declared nuclear materials under safeguards and for monitoring purposes. While 3He was readily available, the reliability, safety, ease of use, gamma-ray insensitivity, and high intrinsic thermal neutron detection efficiency of 3He-based detectors obviated the need for alternative detector technologies. However, the recent decline of the 3He gas supply has triggered international efforts to develop and field neutron detectors that make use of alternative materials. In response to this global effort, the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and Euratom launched a joint effort aimed at bringing together international experts, technology users and developers in the field of nuclear safeguards to discuss and evaluate the proposed 3He alternative materials and technologies. The effort involved a series of two workshops focused on detailed overviews and viability assessments of various 3He alternative technologies for use in nuclear safeguards applications. The key objective was to provide a platform for collaborative discussions and technical presentations organized in a compact, workshop-like format to stimulate interactions among the participants. The meetings culminated in a benchmark exercise providing a unique opportunity for the first inter-comparison of several available alternative technologies. This report provides an overview of the alternative technology efforts presented during the two workshops along with a summary of the benchmarking activities and results. The workshop recommendations and key consensus observations are discussed in the report, and used to outline a proposed path forward and future needs foreseeable in the area of 3

  10. A quadrupole mass spectrometer system for nuclear safeguards applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Evans, P.J.

    1987-12-01

    An on-line enrichment monitor for nuclear safeguards-related surveillance of a pilot-scale gas centrifuge plant is described. This monitor utilises a quadrupole mass spectrometer to measure the isotopic composition of UF 6 in the feed and product gas streams. Details of the design and construction are given, and several difficulties are identified and discussed. Finally, the performance of this system is illustrated with typical results

  11. A review of liquor transfer systems for use in nuclear reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Singh, J.

    1982-01-01

    Liquor pumping systems for use in nuclear fuel reprocessing plants are described. Comparison of the operating characteristics and system constants are made between the air lift/Vacuum Operated Slug Lift, power fluidics and ejector pump systems. (author)

  12. Analysis on the status of the application of satellite remote sensing technology to nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tao Zhangsheng; Zhao Yingjun

    2008-01-01

    Based on the application status of satellite remote sensing technology to nuclear safeguards, advantage of satellite remote sensing technology is analyzed, main types of satellite image used in nuclear safeguards are elaborated and the main application of satellite images is regarded to detect, verify and monitor nuclear activities; verify additional protocol declaration and design information, support performing complementary access inspections; investigate alleged undeclared activities based on open source or the third party information. Application examples of satellite image in nuclear safeguards to analyze nuclear facilities by other countries, the ability of remote sensing technology in nuclear safeguards is discussed. (authors)

  13. Nuclear safeguards and security in a changing world

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Badolato, E.V.

    1986-01-01

    Two major crises of 1986 - the Chernobyl nuclear accident and international terrorism have had the effect of making what everyone does even more critically important for U.S. national security and for the security of the world. Chernobyl can be a starting point for efforts to make nuclear power systems safer and more benign. It also poses very basic questions for nuclear arms control activities. A fundamental objective of the Administration's arms control policy is to achieve substantial and equitable reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces with effective verification. However, Chernobyl served to remind the U.S. once again of the obsessive secretiveness of the Soviet Union and the difficulties of obtaining information on Soviet nuclear weapon activities. All of this points to the importance of developing improved monitoring technologies and obtaining Soviet agreement on on-site inspection. Nuclear safeguards and security developments in response to a changing world are the topic of discussion in this paper

  14. Potential development of non-destructive assay for nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Benoit, R.; Cuypers, M.; Guardini, S.

    1983-01-01

    After a brief summary on the role of non-destructive assay in safeguarding the nuclear fuel cycle, its evolution from NDA methods development to other areas is illustrated. These areas are essentially: a) the evaluation of the performances of NDA techniques in field conditions; b) introduction of full automation of measurement instrument operation, using interactive microprocessors and of measurement data handling evaluation and retrieval features; c) introduction of the adequate link and compatibility to assure NDA measurement data transfer in an integrated safeguards data evaluation scheme. In this field, the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the Commission of the European Communities (CEC) is developing and implementing a number of techniques and methodologies allowing an integrated and rational treatment of the large amount of safeguards data produced. In particular for the non-destructive assay measurements and techniques, the JRC has studied and tested methodologies for the automatic generation and validation of data of inventory verification. In order to apply these techniques successfully in field, the JRC has studied the design requirements of NDA data management and evaluation systems. This paper also discusses the functional requirements of an integrated system for NDA safeguards data evaluation

  15. Safeguard management for operation security in nuclear power plants (NPPs)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Woo, Tae-Ho; Lee, Un-Chul

    2011-01-01

    Safeguard modeling is conducted for the successful operations in the nuclear power plants (NPPs). The characteristics of the secure operation in NPPs are investigated using the network effect method which is quantified by the Monte-Carlo algorithm. Fundamentally, it is impossible to predict the exact time of a terror incident. So, the random sampling for the event frequency is a reasonable method, including the characteristics of network effect method such as the zero-sum quantification. The performance of operation with safeguard is the major concern of this study. There are three kinds of considerations as the neutronics, thermo-hydraulics, and safeguard properties which are organized as an aspect of safeguard considerations. The result, therefore, can give the stability of the operations when the power is decided. The maximum value of secure operation is 12.0 in the third month and the minimum value is 1.0 in the 18th and 54th months, in a 10 years period. Thus, the stability of the secure power operation increases 12 times higher than the lowest value according to this study. This means that the secure operation is changeable in the designed NPPs and the dynamical situation of the secure operation can be shown to the operator.

  16. Domestic safeguards in the nuclear industry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Uhrig, R.E.

    1979-01-01

    The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 brought about markedly increased security requirements at nuclear power plants. NRC established a threat level against which the security forces were expected to defend. It is asserted that an inadequate legal basis exists for the NRC requirement that nuclear plants be defended by the use of deadly force, if necessary, and that complex issues such as apprehension, retention, and pursuit of intruders are left vague. Security measures patterned after the airline industry, resolution of the deadly force issue, and definition of a creditable threat level are proposed

  17. 2. JAPAN-IAEA workshop on advanced safeguards technology for the future nuclear fuel cycle. Abstracts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    This international workshop addressed issues and technologies associated with safeguarding the future nuclear fuel cycle. The workshop discussed issues of interest to the safeguards community, facility operators and State Systems of accounting and control of nuclear materials. Topic areas covered were as follows: Current Status and Future Prospects of Developing Safeguards Technologies for Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities, Technology and Instrumentation Needs, Advanced Safeguards Technologies, Guidelines on Developing Instrumentation to Lead the Way for Implementing Future Safeguards, and Experiences and Lessons learned. This workshop was of interest to individuals and organizations concerned with future nuclear fuel cycle technical developments and safeguards technologies. This includes representatives from the nuclear industry, R and D organizations, safeguards inspectorates, State systems of accountancy and control, and Member States Support Programmes

  18. Advanced Safeguards Technology Road-map for the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miller, M.C.; Tobin, S.; Smith, L.E.; Ehinger, M.; Dougan, A.; Cipiti, B.; Bakel, A.; Bean, R.

    2008-01-01

    Strengthening the nonproliferation regime, including advanced safeguards, is a cornerstone of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). To meet these challenges, the Safeguards Campaign was formed, whose mission is to provide research and technology development for the foundation of next generation safeguards systems for implementation in U.S. GNEP facilities. The Safeguards Campaign works closely with the Nuclear Nonproliferation and International Security department (NA-24) of NNSA (National Nuclear Safety Administration) to ensure that technology developed for domestic safeguards applications are optimum with respect to international safeguards use. A major milestone of the program this year has been the development of the advanced safeguards technology road-map. This paper will broadly describe the road-map, which provides a path to next generation safeguards systems including advanced instrumentation; process monitoring; data integration, protection, and analysis; and system level evaluation and knowledge extraction for real time applications. (authors)

  19. Ministerial ordinance on the establishment of a reserve fund for spent nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-01-01

    The ministerial ordinance provides for a reserve fund for spent nuclear fuel reprocessing, according to the Electricity Enterprises Act. The Government designates an electricity enterprise that must deposit a reserve fund for spent nuclear fuel reprocessing. The electricity enterprise concerned must deposit a certain sum of money as a reserve fund which is the payment left over from spent fuel reprocessing at the end of a fiscal year minus the same at the end of the preceding year less a certain sum, when the former exceeds the latter. Then, concerning the remainder of the reserve fund in the preceding year, a certain sum must be subtracted from this reserve fund. (Mori, K.)

  20. Nuclear fuel cycle: (5) reprocessing of irradiated fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Williams, J.A.

    1977-09-01

    The evolution of the reprocessing of irradiated fuel and the recovery of plutonium from it is traced out, starting by following the Manhatten project up to the present time. A brief description of the plant and processes used for reprocessing is given, while the Purex process, which is used in all plants today, is given special attention. Some of the important safety problems of reprocessing plants are considered, together with the solutions which have been adopted. Some examples of the more important safety aspects are the control of activity, criticality control, and the environmental impact. The related topic of irradiated fuel transport is briefly discussed.

  1. Economic assessment factors relating to spent nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    This paper is in two parts. Part I discusses the factors to be applied in an economic assessment of reprocessing. It sets forth three basic cost components, namely capital costs, operating costs and the cost of capital utilization. It lists the various components of each cost area. Part II proposes a relationship between these respective cost areas, tabulates a range of costs and then develops unit costs for reprocessing operations. Finally, an addendum to the paper gives a more detailed breakdown of the capital costs of a reprocessing plant

  2. Laser-enhanced chemical reactions and the liquid state. II. Possible applications to nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DePoorter, G.L.; Rofer-DePoorter, C.K.

    1976-01-01

    Laser photochemistry is surveyed as a possible improvement upon the Purex process for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel. Most of the components of spent nuclear fuel are photochemically active, and lasers can be used to selectively excite individual chemical species. The great variety of chemical species present and the degree of separation that must be achieved present difficulties in reprocessing. Lasers may be able to improve the necessary separations by photochemical reaction or effects on rates and equilibria of reactions

  3. Safeguarding the Plutonium Fuel Cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, S.J.; Lockwood, D.

    2013-01-01

    In developing a Safeguards Approach for a plutonium process facility, two general diversion and misuse scenarios must be addressed: 1) Unreported batches of undeclared nuclear material being processed through the plant and bypassing the accountancy measurement points, and 2) The operator removing plutonium at a rate that cannot be detected with confidence due to measurement uncertainties. This paper will look at the implementation of international safeguards at plutonium fuel cycle facilities in light of past lessons learned and current safeguards approaches. It will then discuss technical areas which are currently being addressed as future tools to improve on the efficiency of safeguards implementation, while maintaining its effectiveness. The discussion of new improvements will include: safeguards by design (SBD), process monitoring (PM), measurement and monitoring equipment, and data management. The paper is illustrated with the implementation of international safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant in Japan and its accountancy structure is detailed. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  4. Human-Centred Computing for Assisting Nuclear Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Szoke, I.

    2015-01-01

    With the rapid evolution of enabling hardware and software, technologies including 3D simulation, virtual reality (VR), augmented reality (AR), advanced user interfaces (UI), and geographical information systems (GIS) are increasingly employed in many aspects of modern life. In line with this, the nuclear industry is rapidly adopting emerging technologies to improve efficiency and safety by supporting planning and optimization of maintenance and decommissioning work, as well as for knowledge management, surveillance, training and briefing field operatives, education, etc. For many years, the authors have been involved in research and development (R&D) into the application of 3D simulation, VR, and AR, for mobile, desktop, and immersive 3D systems, to provide a greater sense of presence and situation awareness, for training, briefing, and in situ work by field operators. This work has resulted in a unique software base and experience (documented in numerous reports) from evaluating the effects of the design of training programmes and briefing sessions on human performance and training efficiency when applying various emerging technologies. In addition, the authors are involved in R&D into the use of 3D simulation, advanced UIs, mobile computing, and GIS systems to support realistic visualization of the combined radiological and geographical environment, as well as acquisition, analyzes, visualization and sharing of radiological and other data, within nuclear installations and their surroundings. The toolkit developed by the authors, and the associated knowledge base, has been successfully applied to various aspects of the nuclear industry, and has great potential within the safeguards domain. It can be used to train safeguards inspectors, brief inspectors before inspections, assist inspectors in situ (data registration, analyzes, and communication), support the design and verification of safeguards systems, conserve data and experience, educate future safeguards

  5. Safeguarding nuclear weapon: Usable materials in Russia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cochran, T.

    1998-01-01

    Both the United States and Russia are retaining as strategic reserves more plutonium and HEU for potential reuse as weapons, than is legitimately needed. Both have engaged in discussions and have programs in various stages of development to dispose of excess plutonium and HEU. These fissile material disposition programs will take decades to complete. In the interim there will be, as there is now, hundreds of tons of separated weapon-usable fissile material stored in tens of thousands of transportable canisters, each containing from a few to several tons of kgs of weapon-usable fissile material. This material must be secured against theft and unauthorized use. To have high confidence that the material is secure, one must establish criteria against which the adequacy of the protective systems can be judged. For example, one finds such criteria in US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) regulations for the protection of special nuclear materials

  6. Strengthening of Organizational Infrastructure for Meeting IAEA Nuclear Safeguards Obligations: Bangladesh Perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mollah, A.S.

    2010-01-01

    Safeguards are arrangements to account for and control the use of nuclear materials. This verification is a key element in the international system which ensures that uranium in particular is used only for peaceful purposes. The only nuclear reactor in Bangladesh achieved critically on September 14, 1986. Reactor Operation and Maintenance Unit routinely carries out certain international obligations which need to undertake as signatory of different treaties, agreements and protocols in the international safeguards regime. Pursuant to the relevant articles of these agreements/protocols, the reactor and associated facilities of Bangladesh (Facility code: BDA- and BDZ-) are physically inspected by the designated IAEA safeguards inspectors. The Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission (BAEC) has recently created a new division called 'Nuclear Safeguards and Security Division' for enhancing the safeguards activities as per international obligations. This division plays a leading role in the planning, implementation, and evaluation of the BAEC's nuclear safeguards and nuclear security activities. This division is actively working with USDOE, IAEA and EU to enhance the nuclear safeguards and security activities in the following areas: - Analysis of nuclear safeguards related reports of 3 MW TRIGA Mark-II research reactor; - Upgrading of physical protection system of 3 MW TRIGA Mark-II research reactor, gamma irradiation facilities, central radioactive storage and processing facility and different radiation oncology facilities of Bangladesh under GTRI programme; - Supervision for installation of radiation monitoring system of the Chittagong port under USDOE Megaports Initiative Programmes for detection of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials; - Development of laboratory capabilities for analysis of nuclear safeguards related samples; - Planning for development of organizational infrastructure to carry out safeguards related activities under IAEA different

  7. Evironmental assessment factors relating to reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-05-01

    This document is in two parts. Part I presents the criteria and evaluation factors, based primarily on US experience, which may be used to carry out an environmental assessment of spent fuel reprocessing. The concept of As Low as is Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) is introduced in limiting radiation exposure. The factors influencing both occupational and general public radiation exposure are reviewed. Part II provides information on occupational and general public radiation exposure in relation to reprocessing taken from various sources including UNSCEAR and GESMO. Some information is provided in relation to potential accidents at reprocessing or MOX fuel refabrication plants. The magnitude of the services, energy, land use and non-radiological effluents for the reference design of reprocessing plant are also presented

  8. Handbook of nuclear data for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nichols, A.L.; Verpelli, M.; Aldama, D.L.

    2007-01-01

    A set of recommended nuclear data have been assembled that are judged to be suitable for application with respect to nuclear materials accounting techniques. These revised data supersede the tabulations to be found within IAEA report INDC(NDS)-376, December 1997. The update is based on available evaluated nuclear databases and recently published files, books and technical reports. Every effort has been made to ensure that the recommended data are credible and correct with respect to their original sources. Section A contains decay data, thermal neutron capture cross section data, resonance integrals and neutron emission yields per fission for relevant actinides and their natural decay products; Section B includes decay and thermal neutron capture cross section data for some important fission products; Section C presents fission product yield data for selected actinides. The recommended data sets can be inspected as tables in this INDC(NDS) report, or through the adoption and use of appropriate software. Users are referred to 'Interactive Chart of Nuclides' for an introduction to software that can be downloaded from the Web to undertake rapid inspections of the assembled database. The Web site is located at http://www-nds.iaea.org/sgnucdat/. (author)

  9. Human as a component of a nuclear material safeguard system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Morgan, D.E.; Schechter, R.S.

    1978-01-01

    Many human vigilance experiments are summarized and principles are extracted which should be useful in designing and evaluating a nuclear material safeguard system. A human is a poor observer and is not a dependable part of any man-machine system when required to function as an observer. There are a few techniques which improve his performance by providing feedback. A conceptual model is presented which is helpful in design and evaluation of systems. There is some slight experimental support for the model. Finally, some techniques of time study and statistical control charting will be useful as a means of detecting nuclear diversion attempts

  10. Management and disposal of used nuclear fuel and reprocessing wastes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-01-01

    The subject is dealt with in chapters, entitled: introduction (general statement of problem); policy framework (criteria for waste management policy); waste management and disposal, as practised and planned (general; initial storage; reprocessing and conditioning of reprocessing wastes; intermediate storage; transportation; packaging; disposal); international co-operation. Details of the situation in each country concerned (Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom) are included as annexes. (U.K.)

  11. Requirements for near-real-time accounting of strategic nuclear materials in nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Cobb, D.D.; Dietz, R.J.; Shipley, J.P.; Smith, D.B.

    1978-01-01

    A Purex-based nuclear fuel reprocessing plant has been studied for possible incorporation of near-real-time accounting to supplement conventional accounting procedures. Near-real-time accounting of special nuclear materials relies on in-line or at-line flow measurements and plutonium assay of product and waste streams, complemented by conventional analytical chemistry for daily instrument calibrations. In-line alpha monitors could be used for waste stream measurements of plutonium, even in the presence of high beta-gamma fluxes from fission products. X-ray absorption edge densitometry using either K- or L-absorption edges could be used for plutonium concentration measurements in main product streams. Some problem areas identified in waste stream measurements include measurements of leached hulls and of centrifuge sludge. Conventional analytical chemical methods for measuring plutonium in weapons grade material can be modified for reprocessed plutonium. Analytical techniques requiring special precautions will be reviewed

  12. European Commission and IAEA Celebrate 30 Years Co-operation on Nuclear Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    reprocessing plant in Japan and is now being installed in other facilities in Europe - Secure Sealing: During the last 30 years, the Seal and Identification Laboratory (SILab) of the JRC developed and produced ultrasonic bolt seals requested by the IAEA in order to seal underwater nuclear spent fuel assemblies. In 2011, after a training session at JRC in Ispra, Italy, a joint team of inspectors from the IAEA and EURATOM Safeguards and the European Commission's Directorate-General for Energy successfully sealed the first nuclear fuel bundles produced by the Cernavoda II reactor in Romania. Joint Research Centre (JRC): The JRC is the European Commission's in-house science service. Its mission is to provide customer-driven scientific and technical support for the conception, development, implementation and monitoring of European Union policies. The JRC serves the common interest of the Member States, while being independent of special interests, whether private or national. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): The IAEA serves as the world's foremost intergovernmental forum for scientific and technical co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear technology. Established as an autonomous organization under the United Nations (UN) in 1957, the IAEA carries out programmes to maximize the useful contribution of nuclear technology to society while verifying its peaceful use. (IAEA)

  13. Nuclear proliferation-resistance and safeguards for future nuclear fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuno, Y.; Inoue, N.; Senzaki, M.

    2009-01-01

    Corresponding to the world nuclear security concerns, future nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) should have high proliferation-resistance (PR) and physical protection (PP), while promotion of the peaceful use of the nuclear energy must not be inhibited. In order to accomplish nuclear non-proliferation from NFC, a few models of the well-PR systems should be developed so that international community can recognize them as worldwide norms. To find a good balance of 'safeguard-ability (so-called extrinsic measure or institutional barrier)' and 'impede-ability (intrinsic feature or technical barrier)' will come to be essential for NFC designers to optimize civilian nuclear technology with nuclear non-proliferation, although the advanced safeguards with high detectability can still play a dominant role for PR in the states complying with full institutional controls. Accomplishment of such goal in a good economic efficiency is a future key challenge

  14. Nuclear proliferation-resistance and safeguards for future nuclear fuel cycle

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kuno, Y.; Inoue, N.; Senzaki, M.

    2009-03-01

    Corresponding to the world nuclear security concerns, future nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) should have high proliferation-resistance (PR) and physical protection (PP), while promotion of the peaceful use of the nuclear energy must not be inhibited. In order to accomplish nuclear non-proliferation from NFC, a few models of the well-PR systems should be developed so that international community can recognize them as worldwide norms. To find a good balance of 'safeguard-ability (so-called extrinsic measure or institutional barrier)' and 'impede-ability (intrinsic feature or technical barrier)' will come to be essential for NFC designers to optimize civilian nuclear technology with nuclear non-proliferation, although the advanced safeguards with high detectability can still play a dominant role for PR in the states complying with full institutional controls. Accomplishment of such goal in a good economic efficiency is a future key challenge.

  15. NPT safeguards and the peaceful use of nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kyd, D.R.

    1993-10-01

    Origin of safeguards system and of comprehensive safeguards agreements, assurance given by IAEA safeguards, penalties and sanctions in case of breach of a safeguards agreement, recent experiences with Iraq, South Africa and DPRK as well as limits of the safeguards system are described

  16. Applications of a portable MCA in nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Halbig, J.K.; Klosterbuer, S.F.; Cameron, R.A.

    1985-01-01

    The DSD-2056-4K portable multi-channel analyzer (PMCA) is a standard tool used in both international and domestic safeguards. This tool and the built-in user programs have been field proven. For applications where the manpower to program built-in programs is not available, programs in external computers can control the PMCA. A set of general purpose setup and analysis subroutines have been written in BASIC to be used directly or as a guide in the external applications. While safeguards and the nuclear industry are just beginning to make use of the present PMCA, we are looking into ways of making it easier to write internal programs for the PMCA and into replacing its current 8-bit processor with a 16-bit processor to give it the capability to do very involved analysis such as peak fitting and detailed plutonium isotopic analysis. 8 refs., 3 figs

  17. Radiation resistant polymers and coatings for nuclear fuel reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kamachi Mudali, U.; Mallika, C.; Lawrence, Falix

    2014-01-01

    Polymer based materials are extensively used in the nuclear industry for the reprocessing of spent fuels in highly radioactive and corrosive environment. Hence, these polymer materials are susceptible to damage by ionizing radiation, resulting in the degradation in properties. Polymers containing aromatic molecules generally possess higher resistance to radiation degradation than the aliphatic polymers. For improving the radiation resistance of polymers various methods are reported in the literature. Among the aromatic polymers, polyetheretherketone (PEEK) has the radiation tolerance up to 10 Mega Grey (MGy). To explore the possibility of enhancing the radiation resistance of PEEK, a study was initiated to develop PEEK - ceramic composites and evaluate the effect of radiation on the properties of the composites. PEEK and PEEK - alumina (micron size) composites were irradiated in a gamma chamber using 60 Co source and the degradation in mechanical, structural, electrical and thermal properties, gel fraction, coefficient of friction and morphology were investigated. The degradation in the mechanical properties owing to radiation could be reduced by adding alumina filler to PEEK. Nano alumina filler was observed to be more effective in suppressing the damage caused by radiation on the polymer, when compared to micron alumina filler. For the protection of aluminium components in the manipulators and the rotors and stators of the motors of the centrifugal extractors employed in the plant from the attack by nitric acid vapour, PEEK coating based on liquid dispersion was developed, which has resistance to radiation, chemicals and wear. The effect of radiation and chemical vapour on the properties of the PEEK coating was estimated. The performance of the coating in the plant was evaluated and the coating was found to give adequate protection to the motors of centrifugal extractors against corrosion. (author)

  18. The challenges of integrating multiple safeguards systems in a large nuclear facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lavietes, A.; Liguori, C.; Pickrell, M.; Plenteda, R.; Sweet, M.

    2009-01-01

    Full-text: Implementing safeguards in a cost-effective manner in large nuclear facilities such as fuel conditioning, fuel reprocessing, and fuel fabrication plants requires the extensive use of instrumentation that is operated in unattended mode. The collected data is then periodically reviewed by the inspectors either on-site at a central location in the facility or remotely in the IAEA offices. A wide variety of instruments are deployed in large facilities, including video surveillance cameras, electronic sealing devices, non-destructive assay systems based on gamma ray and neutron detection, load cells for mass measurement, ID-readers, and other process-specific monitors. The challenge to integrate these different measurement instruments into an efficient, reliable, and secure system requires implementing standardization at various levels throughout the design process. This standardization includes the data generator behaviour and interface, networking solutions, and data security approaches. This standardization will provide a wide range of savings, including reduced training for inspectors and technicians, reduced periodic technical maintenance, reduced spare parts inventory, increased system robustness, and more predictive system behaviour. The development of standard building blocks will reduce the number of data generators required and allow implementation of simplified architectures that do not require local collection computers but rather utilize transmission of the acquired data directly to a central server via Ethernet connectivity. This approach will result in fewer system components and therefore reduced maintenance efforts and improved reliability. This paper discusses in detail the challenges and the subsequent solutions in the various areas that the IAEA Department of Safeguards has committed to pursue as the best sustainable way of maintaining the ability to implement reliable safeguards systems. (author)

  19. Nuclear safeguards research and development. Program status report, October 1980-January 1981

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Henry, C.N.

    1981-11-01

    This report presents the status of the Nuclear Safeguards Research and Development Program pursued by the Energy, Chemistry-Materials Science, and Operational Security/Safeguards Divisions of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Topics include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards systems. Also discussed are training courses, technology transfer, analytical chemistry methods for fissionable materials safeguards, the Department of Energy Computer Security Technical Center, and operational security

  20. Nuclear safeguards research and development. Program status report, October 1980-January 1981

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Henry, C.N. (comp.)

    1981-11-01

    This report presents the status of the Nuclear Safeguards Research and Development Program pursued by the Energy, Chemistry-Materials Science, and Operational Security/Safeguards Divisions of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Topics include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards systems. Also discussed are training courses, technology transfer, analytical chemistry methods for fissionable materials safeguards, the Department of Energy Computer Security Technical Center, and operational security.

  1. Strengthened International Nuclear Safeguards; burdens and Effects on Nuclear Technology Development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Badawy, I.

    2000-01-01

    The present paper deals with the recent direction of strengthening the international nuclear safeguards and the effects on the development of nuclear technology for peaceful applications. The new basic principles for strengthening the international nuclear control in the direction of undeclared nuclear activities are elaborated, and the national obligations are indicated. The burdens on the development of nuclear technology are discussed. Approaches are proposed in this work for coping with the present and future situations

  2. Simulation of atmospheric krypton-85 transport to assess the detectability of clandestine nuclear reprocessing

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ross, Jens Ole

    2010-02-02

    The radioactive noble gas krypton-85 is released into the atmosphere during reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel or irradiated breeding targets. This is a necessary step for plutonium separation. Therefore the {sup 85}Kr signature of reprocessing could possibly be used for the detection of undeclared nuclear facilities producing nuclear weaponusable material. The {sup 85}Kr content of the atmosphere has grown over the last decades as the emissions from military and civilian nuclear industry could not be compensated by the decay with a half-life of 10.76 years. In this study, the global {sup 85}Kr background distribution due to emissions of known reprocessing facilities for the period from 1971 until 2006 was simulated using the atmospheric general circulation model ECHAM5 applying the newest available annual emission data. The convective tracer transport scheme and the operator splitting for the physical calculations in the model were modified in order to guarantee physically correct results for tracer point sources, in particular non negative concentrations. An on-line routine controlling the {sup 85}Kr -budget in the model enforced exact mass conservation. The results of the simulation were evaluated by extensive comparison with measurements performed by the German Federal Office for Radiation Protection with very good agreement at most observation sites except those in the direct vicinity of {sup 85}Kr sources. Of particular interest for the {sup 85}Kr detection potential was the variability of {sup 85}Kr background concentrations which was evaluated for the first time in a global model. In addition, the interhemispheric transport as simulated by ECHAM5 was analyzed using a two-box model providing a mean exchange time of τ {sub ex} = 10.5 months. The analysis of τ{sub ex} over simulated 35 years indicates that in years with strong South Asian or African Monsoon the interhemispheric transport is faster during the monsoon season. A correlation analysis of

  3. Cost Savings of Nuclear Power with Total Fuel Reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Solbrig, Charles W.; Benedict, Robert W.

    2006-01-01

    The cost of fast reactor (FR) generated electricity with pyro-processing is estimated in this article. It compares favorably with other forms of energy and is shown to be less than that produced by light water reactors (LWR's). FR's use all the energy in natural uranium whereas LWR's utilize only 0.7% of it. Because of high radioactivity, pyro-processing is not open to weapon material diversion. This technology is ready now. Nuclear power has the same advantage as coal power in that it is not dependent upon a scarce foreign fuel and has the significant additional advantage of not contributing to global warming or air pollution. A jump start on new nuclear plants could rapidly allow electric furnaces to replace home heating oil furnaces and utilize high capacity batteries for hybrid automobiles: both would reduce US reliance on oil. If these were fast reactors fueled by reprocessed fuel, the spent fuel storage problem could also be solved. Costs are derived from assumptions on the LWR's and FR's five cost components: 1) Capital costs: LWR plants cost $106/MWe. FR's cost 25% more. Forty year amortization is used. 2) The annual O and M costs for both plants are 9% of the Capital Costs. 3) LWR fuel costs about 0.0035 $/kWh. Producing FR fuel from spent fuel by pyro-processing must be done in highly shielded hot cells which is costly. However, the five foot thick concrete walls have the advantage of prohibiting diversion. LWR spent fuel must be used as feedstock for the FR initial core load and first two reloads so this FR fuel costs more than LWR fuel. FR fuel costs much less for subsequent core reloads ( 6 /MWe. The annual cost for a 40 year licensed plant would be 2.5 % of this or less if interest is taken into account. All plants will eventually have to replace those components which become radiation damaged. FR's should be designed to replace parts rather than decommission. The LWR costs are estimated to be 2.65 cents/kWh. FR costs are 2.99 cents/kWh for the first

  4. Overview of reductants utilized in nuclear fuel reprocessing/recycling

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Patricia Paviet-Hartmann; Catherine Riddle; Keri Campbell; Edward Mausolf

    2013-10-01

    promises as a replacement for AHA. FHA undergoes hydrolysis to formic acid which is volatile, thus allowing the recycling of nitric acid. Unfortunately, FHA powder was not stable in the experiments we ran in our laboratory. In addition, AHA and FHA also decompose to hydroxylamine which may undergo an autocatalytic reaction. Other reductants are available and could be extremely useful for actinides separation. The review presents the current plutonium reductants used in used nuclear fuel reprocessing and will introduce innovative and novel reductants that could become reducers for future research on UNF separation.

  5. Selected topics in special nuclear materials safeguard system design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    King, L.L.; Thatcher, C.D.; Clarke, J.D.; Rodriguez, M.P.

    1991-01-01

    During the past two decades the improvements in circuit integration have given rise to many new applications in digital processing technology by continuously reducing the unit cost of processing power. Along with this increase in processing power a corresponding decrease in circuit volume has been achieved. Progress has been so swift that new classes of applications become feasible every 2 or 3 years. This is especially true in the application of proven new technology to special nuclear materials (SNM) safeguard systems. Several areas of application were investigated in establishing the performance requirements for the SNM safeguard system. These included the improvements in material control and accountability and surveillance by using multiple sensors to continuously monitor SNM inventory within the selected value(s); establishing a system architecture to provide capabilities needed for present and future performance requirements; and limiting operating manpower exposure to radiation. This paper describes two selected topics in the application of state-of-the-art, well-proven technology to SNM safeguard system design

  6. Cryotechnics used for activity retention in nuclear reactors and in the reprocessing of nuclear fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cavalieri, L.; Gutowski, H.; Patzelt, A.; Schroeder, E.

    The use of low temperature technology for cleaning waste gas is demonstrated by four examples from nuclear technology: 1. Treatment of the gaseous fission products and oxyhydrogen gas components (catalytic H 2 oxidation, cold drying, Kr/Xe delay by adsorption) in the primary circuit of a 1300 MWe light water reactor. 2. Cleaning of the helium cooling gas of a high temperature reactor (delay adsorption for short-lived Kr/Xe isotopes, CO/H 2 oxidation CO 2 /H 2 O adsorption and finally low temperature adsorption of Kr/Xe/N 2 and N 2 recondensation). 3. Reprocessing of heavy water moderator by separation of the tritium with low temperature rectification and 4. Cleaning of solvent waste gas of a reprocessing plant (precleaning with various stages of process for separating aerosols, oil, Kr/Xe/N 2 , H 2 , NOsub(x) and low temperature rectification of krypton). (RB) [de

  7. Design measures to facilitate implementation of safeguards at future water cooled nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The report is intended to present guidelines to the State authorities, designers and prospective purchasers of future water cooled power reactors which, if taken into account, will minimize the impact of IAEA safeguards on plant operation and ensure efficient and effective acquisition of safeguards data to the mutual benefit of the Member State, the plant operator and the IAEA. These guidelines incorporate the IAEA's experience in establishing and carrying out safeguards at currently operating nuclear power plants, the ongoing development of safeguards techniques and feedback of experience from plant operators and designers on the impact of IAEA safeguards on plant operation. The following main subjects are included: The IAEA's safeguards function for current and future nuclear power plants; summary of the political and legal foundations of the IAEA's safeguards system; the technical objective of safeguards and the supply and use of required design information; safeguards approaches for nuclear power plants; design implications of experience in safeguarding nuclear power plants and guidelines for future water cooled reactors to facilitate the implementation of safeguards

  8. Nuclear material safeguards surveillance and accountancy by isotope correlation techniques

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persiani, P.J.; Goleb, J.A.

    1981-01-01

    This paper presents the initial phase of the US study program and involves the computation of isotopic correlations for the LMFBR fuel cycle. The LWR fuel cycle phase of the study is currently in progress. The selection of the more safeguards effective functionals will depend not only on the level of reliability of isotope correlation technique (ICT) for verification, but also on the capability and difficulty of developing measurement methods. Performance characteristics of existing and proposed isotopic measurement techniques cover the general areas including assay and isotopic wet chemistry and NDA: (1) simultaneous multicomponent analysis techniques, (2) mass spectrometry, (3) x-ray fluorescence or densitometry with high flux monochromatic x-ray sources and high dispersion spectrometers, (4) passive and active neutron interrogation, (5) high level gamma-ray spectroscopy, (6) coulometry, and (7) potentiometry. The measurement capabilities and inherent limitations of these systems are to be evaluated in terms of total systems, operational mode, sample preparation requirements and consequent effect on dissolver solution representation, accuracy and precision estimates (if available), development status of the technique, and development requirements. The isotopic correlation technique shows considerable promise for use in verifying the initial isotopic composition and burnup of discharged assemblies based on the measured ratios of several key isotopes, obtained probably at the dissolver stage in reprocessing. This technique should, for example, easily be capable of indicating the exchange of a blanket assembly for a fuel assembly

  9. Optimal improvement of graphs related to nuclear safeguards problems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jacobsen, S.E.

    1977-08-01

    This report develops the methodology for optimally improving graphs related to nuclear safeguards issues. In particular, given a fixed number of dollars, the report provides a method for optimally allocating such dollars over the arcs of a weighted graph (the weights vary as a function of dollars spent on arcs) so as to improve the system effectiveness measure which is the shortest of all shortest paths to several targets. Arc weights can be either clock times or detection probabilities and the algorithm does not explicitly consider all paths to the targets

  10. Demonstration and development of safeguards techniques in the PNC reprocessing plant. Part of a coordinated programme on the use of installed instrumentation in fuel reprocessing facilities for safeguards purposes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kurihara, H.

    1979-04-01

    A hull-monitoring system in the Head-End facility and systems for surveillance and containment in the spent fuel receiving and storage facility at Tokai Reprocessing Plant are described. Operating experience on them is analyzed

  11. Automated approach to nuclear facility safeguards effectiveness evaluation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    Concern over the security of nuclear facilities has generated a need for a reliable, time efficient, and easily applied method of evaluating the effectiveness of safeguards systems. Such an evaluation technique could be used (1) by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to evaluate a licensee's proposal, (2) to assess the security status of a system, or (3) to design and/or upgrade nuclear facilities. The technique should be capable of starting with basic information, such as the facility layout and performance parameters for physical protection components, and analyzing that information so that a reliable overall facility evaluation is obtained. Responding to this expressed need, an automated approach to facility safeguards effectiveness evaluation has been developed. This procedure consists of a collection of functional modules for facility characterization, critical path generation, and path evaluation combined into a continuous stream of operations. The technique has been implemented on an interactive computer-timesharing system and makes use of computer graphics for the handling and presentation of information. Using this technique a thorough facility evaluation can be made by systematically varying parameters that characterize the physical protection components of a facility according to changes in perceived adversary attributes and strategy, environmental conditions, and site status

  12. Development of ultrahigh energy resolution gamma spectrometers for nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Drury, O.B.; Velazquez, M.; Dreyer, J.G.; Friedrich, S.

    2009-01-01

    We are developing superconducting ultrahigh resolution gamma-detectors for non-destructive analysis (NDA) of nuclear materials, and specifically for spent fuel characterization in nuclear safeguards. The detectors offer an energy resolution below 100 eV FWHM at 100 keV, and can therefore significantly increase the precision of NDA at low energies where line overlap affects the errors of the measurement when using germanium detectors. They also increase the peak-to-background ratio and thus improve the detection limits for weak gamma emissions from the fissile Pu and U isotopes at low energy in the presence of an intense Compton background from the fission products in spent fuel. Here we demonstrate high energy resolution and high peak-to-background ratio of our superconducting Gamma detectors, and discuss their relevance for measuring actinides in spent nuclear fuel. (author)

  13. Reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel; Prerada isluzenog nuklearnog goriva

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gal, I [Institute of Nuclear Sciences Boris Kidric, Laboratorija za visoku aktivnost, Vinca, Beograd (Serbia and Montenegro)

    1963-12-15

    This report covers: chemical-technology investigation of modified purex process for reprocessing of spent fuel; implementation of the procedure for obtaining plutonium peroxide and oxalate; research in the field of uranium, plutonium, and fission products separation by inorganic ion exchangers and extraction by organic solutions; study of the fission products in the heavy water RA reactor.

  14. Reprocessing of spent nuclear fuels. Status and trends

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hultgren, Aa.

    1993-01-01

    The report gives a short review of the status for industrial reprocessing and recycling of Uranium/Plutonium. The following countries are covered: Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, India, Japan, Russia, USA. Different fuel cycle strategies are accounted for, and new developments outlined. 116 refs, 27 figs, 12 tabs

  15. Implications of ICPR 60 for nuclear fuel reprocessing in france

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mathieu, P.

    1992-01-01

    The ICRP 60 publication intends to guide the regulatory agencies on the main rules and principle of protection. The text contains recommendations for practices and for emergencies. The following report intends to develop the possible consequences of the publication for the reprocessing of spent fuel as managed by COGEMA in the plants of La Hague and Marcoule. (author)

  16. Reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel; Prerada isluzenog nuklearnog goriva

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gal, I [Institute of Nuclear Sciences Boris Kidric, Laboratorija za hemiju visoke aktivnosti, Vinca, Beograd (Serbia and Montenegro)

    1964-12-15

    This volume contains the following reports: Experimental facility for testing and development of pulsed columns and auxiliary devices; Chemical-technology study of the modified 'Purex' process; Chemical and radiometric control analyses; Chromatographic separation of rare earth elements on paper treated by di-n butylphosphate; Preliminary study of some organic nitrogen extracts significant in fuel reprocessing.

  17. Nuclear accountability data at the EUREX reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ilardi, S.; Pozzi, F.

    1976-01-01

    In the present work the physical inventory's and fissile material balance's data, which have been collected during the irradiated MTR fuel reprocessing campaign at the EUREX plant in Saluggia (VC), are reported, together with the most important procedures of fissile material accountability

  18. Canada and international safeguards. Verifying nuclear non-proliferation. Verification brochure no. 5

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1990-01-01

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970 and now has about 140 signatory nations. By creating legal barriers against proliferation and by promoting an international non-proliferation ethic, the NPT has promoted international peace and security. A key ingredient has been the confidence generated through verification by IAEA safeguards. By the end of 1988 IAEA safeguards agreements had been concluded with about 100 countries, including Canada. Over 500 nuclear facilities worldwide are under safeguards or contain safeguarded nuclear material. The existence of this credible and effective safeguards system makes international trade in nuclear equipment and materials possible, monitoring the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries as well as between industrial countries. Canada is committed to non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards. Canadian non-proliferation policy is among the strictest in the world, even though opportunities have been lost to sell Canadian technology abroad as a result.

  19. Verifying compliance with nuclear non-proliferation undertakings: IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-06-01

    This report provides background information on safeguards and explains procedures for States to conclude Additional Protocols to comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA. Since the IAEA was founded in 1957, its safeguards system has been an indispensable component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and has facilitated peaceful nuclear cooperation. In recognition of this, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) makes it mandatory for all non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) party to the Treaty to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and thus allow for the application of safeguards to all their nuclear material. Under Article III of the NPT, all NNWS undertake to accept safeguards, as set forth in agreements to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the States' obligations under the NPT. In May 1997, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the Model Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements (reproduced in INFCIRC/540(Corr.)) which provided for an additional legal authority. In States that have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force, the IAEA is able to optimize the implementation of all safeguards measures available. In order to simplify certain procedures under comprehensive safeguards agreements for States with little or no nuclear material and no nuclear material in a facility, the IAEA began making available, in 1971, a 'small quantities protocol' (SQP), which held in abeyance the implementation of most of the detailed provisions of comprehensive safeguards agreements for so long as the State concerned satisfied these criteria. The safeguards system aims at detecting and deterring the diversion of nuclear material. Such material includes enriched uranium, plutonium and uranium-233, which could be used directly in nuclear weapons. It also includes natural uranium and depleted uranium, the latter of which is

  20. Verifying compliance with nuclear non-proliferation undertakings: IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-04-01

    This report provides background information on safeguards and explains procedures for States to conclude Additional Protocols to comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA. Since the IAEA was founded in 1957, its safeguards system has been an indispensable component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and has facilitated peaceful nuclear cooperation. In recognition of this, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) makes it mandatory for all non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) party to the Treaty to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and thus allow for the application of safeguards to all their nuclear material. Under Article III of the NPT, all NNWS undertake to accept safeguards, as set forth in agreements to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the States' obligations under the NPT. In May 1997, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the Model Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements (reproduced in INFCIRC/540(Corr.)) which provided for an additional legal authority. In States that have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force, the IAEA is able to optimize the implementation of all safeguards measures available. In order to simplify certain procedures under comprehensive safeguards agreements for States with little or no nuclear material and no nuclear material in a facility, the IAEA began making available, in 1971, a 'small quantities protocol' (SQP), which held in abeyance the implementation of most of the detailed provisions of comprehensive safeguards agreements for so long as the State concerned satisfied these criteria. The safeguards system aims at detecting and deterring the diversion of nuclear material. Such material includes enriched uranium, plutonium and uranium-233, which could be used directly in nuclear weapons. It also includes natural uranium and depleted uranium, the latter of which is

  1. On-Line Monitoring for Process Control and Safeguarding of Radiochemical Streams at Spent Fuel Reprocessing Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bryan, S.; Levitskaia, T.; Casella, A.

    2015-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has established international safe- guards standards for fissionable material at spent nuclear fuel reprocessing plants to ensure that significant quantities of weapons-grade nuclear material are not diverted from these facilities. Currently, methods to verify material control and accountancy (MC&A) at these facilities require time-consuming and resource-intensive destructive assay (DA). Leveraging new on-line non-destructive assay (NDA) techniques in conjunction with the traditional and highly precise DA methods may provide a more timely, cost-effective and resource-efficient means for MC&A verification at such facilities. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing on-line NDA process monitoring technologies, including a spectroscopy-based monitoring system, to potentially reduce the time and re- source burden associated with current techniques. The spectroscopic monitor continuously measures chemical compositions of the process streams including actinide metal ions (U, Pu, Np), selected fission products, and major cold flowsheet chemicals using ultra-violet and visible, near infrared and Raman spectroscopy. This paper will provide an overview of the methods and report our on-going efforts to develop and demonstrate the technologies. Our ability to identify material intentionally diverted from a liquid-liquid solvent extraction contactor system was successfully tested using on-line process monitoring as a means to detect the amount of material diverted. A chemical diversion, and detection of that diversion, from a solvent extraction scheme was demonstrated using a centrifugal contactor system operating with the PUREX flowsheet. A portion of the feed from a counter-current extraction system was diverted while a continuous extraction experiment was underway. The amount observed to be diverted by on-line spectroscopic process monitoring was in excellent agreement with values based from the known mass of

  2. Safety aspects of reprocessing and plutonium fuel facilities in power reactor and nuclear fuel development corporation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sato, S.; Akutsu, H.; Nakajima, K.; Kono, K.; Muto, T.

    1977-01-01

    PNC completed the construction of the first Japanese reprocessing plant in 1974, and the startup is now under way. The plant will have a capacity of 0.7 metric tons of spent fuel per day. Various safety measures for earthquake, radiation, criticality, fire, explosion and leakage of radioactive materials are provided in the plant. 8,000 Ci of Kr-85 and 50 Ci of H-3 per day will be released from the plant to enviroment. Skin dose is conservatively estimated to be about 30 mrem per year. Liquid waste containing 0.7 Ci per day will be discharged into the sea. Whole body dose is conservatively estimated to be 10 mrem per year. R and D for removal of Kr-85 and reducing radioactivity released into the sea are being carried out. Developmental works for solidification of radioactive liquid waste are also being conducted. Safety control in plutonium handling work for both R and D and fuel fabrication has been successfully conducted without significant abnormal occurrence in these ten years. By ''zero-contamination control policy'', surface contamination and airborne contamination in operation rooms are maintained at the background level in usual operation. The intake of plutonium was found at the maximum about one-hundredths of the MPB. External exposure has been generally controlled below three-tenths rem for three months, by shielding and mechanization of process. The radioactivity concentration of exhaust air and liquid effluent disposal is ensured far below the regulation level. Nuclear material control is maintained by a computer system, and no criticality problem has occurred. The safeguard system and installation has been improved, and is sufficient to satisfy the IAEA regulation

  3. Development of a real-time detection strategy for process monitoring during nuclear fuel reprocessing using the UREX+3a method

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goddard, Braden; Charlton, William S.; McDeavitt, Sean M.

    2010-01-01

    Research highlights: → HPGe detectors are suitable for UREX+3a real-time spectroscopy. → HPGe N-type detectors may be suitable for a reprocessing facility. → Gamma ray self-shielding does not occur for pipe diameters less than 2 in. - Abstract: Reprocessing nuclear fuel is becoming more viable in the United States due to the anticipated increase in construction of nuclear power plants, the growing stockpile of existing used nuclear fuel, and a public desire to reduce the amount of this fuel. A new reprocessing facility will likely have state of the art controls and monitoring methods to safeguard special nuclear materials, as well as to provide real-time monitoring for process control. The focus of this research was to create a proof of concept to enable the development of a detection strategy that uses well established gamma and neutron measurement methods to characterize samples from the Uranium Extraction Plus 3a (UREX+3a) reprocessing method using a variety of detector types and measurement times. A facility that implemented real-time gamma detection equipment could improve product quality control and provide additional benefits, such as waste volume reduction. In addition to the spectral analyses, it was determined by Monte Carlo N Particle (MCNP) simulations that there is no noticeable self-shielding for internal pipe diameters less than 5.08 cm, indicating that no self-shielding correction factors are needed. Further, it was determined that High Purity Germanium (HPGe) N-type detectors have the high gamma ray energy resolution and neutron damage resistance that would be required in a reprocessing facility. Finally, the gamma ray spectra for the measured samples were simulated using MCNP and then the model was extended to predict the responses from an actual reprocessing scenario from UREX+3a applied to fuel that had a decay time of 3 years. The 3-year decayed fuel was more representative of commercially reprocessed fuel than the acquired UREX+3a

  4. Systematic classification of civil society contributions to nuclear safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kalinowski, Martin B. [Universitaet Hamburg, Carl Friedrich von Weizsaecker, Centre for Science and Peace Research (ZNF) Hamburg (Germany)

    2012-06-15

    Civil Society is increasingly involved in the policy area of international arms control. Their opportunities are very limited for compliance control in the nuclear nonproliferation regime due to its particular sensitivity. The severe gaps of nuclear safeguards with respect to the capabilities to detect clandestine facilities render marginal civil society contributions highly influential and controversial. More and more data get available for the civil society that can be used to expose potential violations of the NPT. A systematic framework is presented to classify civil society contributions that allows for a systematic study. This classification uses the two parameters (a) affected safeguards stage and (b) degree of integration with the official procedures. These parameters may have the following defined values: (a) The affected safeguards stage can be i. Development and demonstration of new methodologies and technologies ii. Fact finding and data gathering iii. Sharing and publication of data and information iv. Technical analysis of data and information v. Determination of non-compliance vi. Political interpretation (b) The degree of integration can be i. Without a relation ii. Indirect connection iii. Informal interaction iv. Official contribution or mandate. A prominent example for civil society contributions is the increasing availability and capability to acquire and analyze satellite images. An emerging field is environmental sampling, analysis and related atmospheric transport simulation. These and other opportunities are put in the systematic framework to discuss their demonstrated and potential impact. In particular, possible contributions that civil society may offer for improving the detectability of unreported facilities and activities are considered with their chances and risks.

  5. Design considerations for an integrated safeguards system for fuel-reprocessng plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cartan, F.O.

    1982-05-01

    This report presents design ideas for safeguards systems in nuclear fuels reprocessing plants. The report summarizes general safeguards requirements and describes a safeguards system concept being developed and tested at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. The report gives some general concepts intended for design consideration and a checklist of specific problems that should be considered. The report is intended as an aid for the safeguards system designer and as a source of useful information

  6. Nuclear Safeguards Infrastructure Required for the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dr. Mark Schanfein; Philip Casey Durst

    2012-07-01

    The Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) is a Very High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (VHTR) to be constructed near Idaho Falls, Idaho The NGNP is intrinsically safer than current reactors and is planned for startup ca. 2021 Safety is more prominent in the minds of the Public and Governing Officials following the nuclear reactor meltdown accidents in Fukushima, Japan The authors propose that the NGNP should be designed with International (IAEA) Safeguards in mind to support export to Non-Nuclear-Weapons States There are two variants of the NGNP design; one using integral Prismatic-shaped fuel assemblies in a fixed core; and one using recirculating fuel balls (or Pebbles) The following presents the infrastructure required to safeguard the NGNP This infrastructure is required to safeguard the Prismatic and Pebble-fueled NGNP (and other HTGR/VHTR) The infrastructure is based on current Safeguards Requirements and Practices implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for similar reactors The authors of this presentation have worked for decades in the area of International Nuclear Safeguards and are recognized experts in this field Presentation for INMM conference in July 2012.

  7. Control of information as an element of nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Green, J.N.

    1982-03-01

    Control of information as an element of physical protection has a long history in the field of national security. The nuclear industry is familiar with the constraints on proprietary information; and, with an effective date of October 1, 1980 for Parts 25 and 95 in Title 10 of the code of Federal Regulations, certain activities had to cope with rules for safeguarding of classified information. In applying the rules it is important to understand the differences between national security information and restricted data, and how guidance is promulgated both by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and by the Department of Energy. More recently, with a fully effective date of January 20, 1982, the NRC published rules for the protection of unclassified safeguards information. The scope is much broader than for the classified information. For example, the rules are applicable to power reactors. In this paper the directives which provide the details for compliance with all these rules are identified, and their application is discussed. NRC inspectors will be checking for compliance with the rules. Once problems of compliance are resolved, the more difficult question of evaluating the impact of information control procedures on the effectiveness of a physical protection system can be addressed

  8. Non-destructive measurement technologies for nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gavron, A.

    1998-04-01

    There are three aspects that need to be in place in order to maintain a valid safeguards system: (1) Physical protection; guarding the access to nuclear materials using physical protection and surveillance. (2) Accounting systems; computer based accounting systems that provide the current location of nuclear materials, quantities, and the uncertainty in the assayed values. (3) Measurement systems; detectors, data acquisition systems and data analysis methods that provide accurate assays of nuclear material quantities for the accounting system. The authors expand on this third aspect, measurement systems, by discussing nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques. NDA is defined as the quantitative or qualitative determination of the kind and/or amount of nuclear material in an item without alteration or invasion of the item. This is contrasted with destructive analysis which is the process of taking small samples from the item in question, analyzing those samples by chemical analysis, destroying the original nature of the samples in the process (hence the term destructive), and applying the results to the entire item. Over the past 30 years, numerous techniques, using the atomic and nuclear properties of the actinides, have been developed for reliable, rapid, accurate, and tamper-proof NDA of nuclear materials. The authors distinguish between two types of measurements: the first involving the detection of spontaneously emitted radiation, produced by the natural radioactive decay processes; the second involving the detection of induced radiation, produced by irradiating the sample with an external radiation source

  9. Proposal of a national system to supervise nuclear installations out of international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rosa, L.P.

    1990-01-01

    It is proposed a national system to safeguard, supervise and inspect nuclear facilities in Brazil, apart from international safeguards. It discusses also the military nuclear activities and the uranium enrichment plants. The system should be controlled by Brazilian CNEN. (A.C.A.S.)

  10. Assembly of laboratory line for nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fidler, J.; Chotivka, V.

    1979-01-01

    The dismantling of a laboratory line for spent fuel reprocessing after the termination of the research programme and the procedures for hot and semi-hot cell decontamination are described. The equipment was mostly disassembled in smaller parts which were then decontaminated by wiping them with cotton wool soaked in detergent and citric acid, varnished with two-component epoxi varnish, wrapped into multiple polyethylene foils, sealed in PVC bags and thus ready for transport. (B.S.)

  11. The position of IAEA safeguards relative to nuclear material control accountancy by States

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rometsch, R.; Hough, G.

    1977-01-01

    IAEA Safeguards, which are always implemented on the basis of agreements which are concluded between one or more Governments and the IAEA, lay down the rights and obligations of the parties; and the more modern types of agreement, in particular those in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, do this in quite some detail. Several articles, for instance, regulate the working relations between the States and the IAEA inspectorate. These are based on two basic obligations - that of the State to establish and maintain a ''System of Accountancy for and Control of Nuclear Material'' and that of the IAEA to ascertain the absence of diversion of nuclear material by verifying the findings of the States' systems, inter alia through independent measurements and observations. Other articles dealing also with the working relations between States and the IAEA rule that the IAEA should take due account of the technical effectiveness of the States' systems and mention among the criteria for determining the inspection effort, the extent of functional dependence of the State's accountancy on that of the facility operator. However, quantitative relationships in this respect are left to be worked out in practice. With the help of consultants and expert advisory groups a rationale has been developed and possible practical arrangements discussed with several States concerned. The rationale for co-ordinating the work of the States' inspectorate with that of the IAEA was to use a factor by which the significant quantity used for calculating verification sampling plans would be adjusted so as to reduce to a certain extent the IAEA's independent verification work in case the States would themselves do extensive verifications in a manner transparent to the IAEA. However, in practice it proved that there are a number of points in the fuel cycle where such adaptations would have little or no effect on the inspection effort necessary to achieve the safeguards

  12. The position of IAEA safeguards relative to nuclear material control accountancy by states

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rometsch, R.; Hough, G.

    1977-01-01

    IAEA Safeguards are always implemented on the basis of agreements which are concluded between one or more Governments and the Agency. They lay down the rights and obligations of the parties; the more modern types of agreements, in particular those in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, do that in quite some details. Several articles, for instance, regulate the working relations between the States and the IAEA inspectorate. Those are based on two basic obligations: that of the State to establish and maintain a ''System of Accountancy for and Control of Nuclear Material'' and that of the Agency to ascertain the absence of diversion of nuclear material by verifying the findings of the States' system, inter alia through independent measurements and observations. Other articles dealing also with the working relations States - IAEA rule that the Agency should take due account of the technical effectiveness of the States' system and mention among the criteria for determining the inspection effort, the extent of functional dependence of the State's accountancy from that of the facility operator. However, quantitative relationships in that respect are left to be worked out in practice. With the help of consultants and expert advisory groups a rational has been developed and possible practical arrangements discussed with several States concerned. The rational for coordinating the work of the States' inspectorate with IAEA's inspectorate was to use a factor by which the significant quantity used for calculating verification sampling plans would be adjusted in order to reduce to a certain extent the Agency's independent verification work in case the States would do extensive verifications themselves in a manner transparent to IAEA. However, in practice it proved that there are quite a number of points in the fuel cycle where such adaptations would have little or no effect on the inspection effort necessary to achieve the safeguards objective

  13. Preliminary concepts: materials management in an internationally safeguarded nuclear-waste geologic repository

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ostenak, C.A.; Whitty, W.J.; Dietz, R.J.

    1979-11-01

    Preliminary concepts of materials accountability are presented for an internationally safeguarded nuclear-waste geologic repository. A hypothetical reference repository that receives nuclear waste for emplacement in a geologic medium serves to illustrate specific safeguards concepts. Nuclear wastes received at the reference repository derive from prior fuel-cycle operations. Alternative safeguards techniques ranging from item accounting to nondestructive assay and waste characteristics that affect the necessary level of safeguards are examined. Downgrading of safeguards prior to shipment to the repository is recommended whenever possible. The point in the waste cycle where international safeguards may be terminate depends on the fissile content, feasibility of separation, and practicable recoverability of the waste: termination may not be possible if spent fuels are declared as waste

  14. Experience in safeguarding nuclear material at the Rheinsberg nuclear power station

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Winkler, R.

    1976-01-01

    The three years' experience that has been gained in application of the Safeguards Agreement shows that the carrying out of inspections at the nuclear power plant has virtually no effect on operating conditions. In future it will be possible to reduce this effect even further and still maintain the operational reliability of the station. Verification of the transfer of nuclear material and detection of possible violations have proved relatively simple. The labour requirement of each unit at the station for the performance of inspections is not more that thirty man-days. Constructive collaboration between power station staff and inspectors is of great importance in improving the safeguards procedures. (author)

  15. Nuclear proliferation-resistance and safeguards for future nuclear fuel cycle

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kuno, Y. [Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) Nuclear-Non-proliferation Science and Technology Centre (NPSTC), 2-4 Shirane Shirakata, Tokai-mura, Ibaraki, 319-1195 (Japan); University of Tokyo, Nuclear Engineering and Management, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-8656 (Japan)], E-mail: kuno.yusuke@jaea.go.jp; Inoue, N. [Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) Nuclear-Non-proliferation Science and Technology Centre (NPSTC), 2-4 Shirane Shirakata, Tokai-mura, Ibaraki, 319-1195 (Japan); University of Tokyo, Nuclear Engineering and Management, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-8656 (Japan); Senzaki, M. [Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) Nuclear-Non-proliferation Science and Technology Centre (NPSTC), 2-4 Shirane Shirakata, Tokai-mura, Ibaraki, 319-1195 (Japan)

    2009-03-15

    Corresponding to the world nuclear security concerns, future nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) should have high proliferation-resistance (PR) and physical protection (PP), while promotion of the peaceful use of the nuclear energy must not be inhibited. In order to accomplish nuclear non-proliferation from NFC, a few models of the well-PR systems should be developed so that international community can recognize them as worldwide norms. To find a good balance of 'safeguard-ability (so-called extrinsic measure or institutional barrier)' and 'impede-ability (intrinsic feature or technical barrier)' will come to be essential for NFC designers to optimize civilian nuclear technology with nuclear non-proliferation, although the advanced safeguards with high detectability can still play a dominant role for PR in the states complying with full institutional controls. Accomplishment of such goal in a good economic efficiency is a future key challenge.

  16. Tokai advanced safeguards technology exercise task T-F: study of selected capabilities needed to apply DYMAC principles to safeguarding the Tokai reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lowry, L.L.; Augustson, R.H.

    1979-10-01

    Selected technical capabilities needed to apply the DYMAC principles to safeguarding the Tokai reproprocessing plant are presented. The measurements needed to close the mass balance around the process line and the analysis methods for assessing the results were investigated. Process conditions at the Tokai plant were used when numerical values were needed to assist the analyis. A rationale is presented for the selection of instruments (x-ray fluorescence spectrometers, x-ray densitometers, and gamma-ray spectrometers) best suited to establishing plutonium concentrations and inventories in the feed tanks. The current state of the art in estimating inventory in contactors is reviewed and profitable directions for further work are recommended. A generalized performance surface has been developed that can measure the diversion sensitivity of the safeguard system when the instrument performance levels, the number of measurements made, and the false alarm probability are specified. An analysis of its application to the Tokai plant is given. Finally, a conceptual approach to the problem of IAEA safeguards verification is discussed. It appears possible that, in the process of verifying, the full power of the plant operator's safeguard system can be brought to the service of the IAEA

  17. Network modeling and analysis technique for the evaluation of nuclear safeguards systems effectiveness

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grant, F.H. III; Miner, R.J.; Engi, D.

    1978-01-01

    Nuclear safeguards systems are concerned with the physical protection and control of nuclear materials. The Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) provides a convenient and standard analysis methodology for the evaluation of safeguards system effectiveness. This is achieved through a standard set of symbols which characterize the various elements of safeguards systems and an analysis program to execute simulation models built using the SNAP symbology. The reports provided by the SNAP simulation program enable analysts to evaluate existing sites as well as alternative design possibilities. This paper describes the SNAP modeling technique and provides an example illustrating its use

  18. Network modeling and analysis technique for the evaluation of nuclear safeguards systems effectiveness

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grant, F.H. III; Miner, R.J.; Engi, D.

    1979-02-01

    Nuclear safeguards systems are concerned with the physical protection and control of nuclear materials. The Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) provides a convenient and standard analysis methodology for the evaluation of safeguards system effectiveness. This is achieved through a standard set of symbols which characterize the various elements of safeguards systems and an analysis program to execute simulation models built using the SNAP symbology. The reports provided by the SNAP simulation program enable analysts to evaluate existing sites as well as alternative design possibilities. This paper describes the SNAP modeling technique and provides an example illustrating its use

  19. An analysis of a regional nuclear safeguards organisation: the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the development of nuclear safeguards in Western Europe

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Howlett, Darryl.

    1988-08-01

    This thesis argues that the nuclear safeguards system implemented by EURATOM in Western Europe has come to fruition as a result of a complex political process. This process has involved negotiations over the exact limits on safeguards interventions into the nuclear affairs of the European Community. There are two dimensions to these negotiations. On the one hand, they involve EURATOM and its member states over the necessary limits on safeguards intervention in member states' domestic nuclear affairs. On the other, there are negotiations between EURATOM and several actors outside the region, particularly the International Atomic Energy Agency. The thesis concludes by arguing that international safeguards organisations, of which EURATOM is a regional example, have made important contributions to arms control and international security. In the process, certain kinds of precedents and procedures which have potential for broader application have been established. (author)

  20. Safeguards at the Central Institute for Nuclear Research at Rossendorf/GDR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Helming, M.; Rehak, W.; Schillert, B.

    1989-01-01

    Experience in the implementation of domestic and international safeguards at the Central Institute for Nuclear Research at Rossendorf is reported covering the following topics: overview of the main nuclear installations belonging to the Institute; structure of its material balance areas; responsibilities for the different aspects of accounting for and control of nuclear material at facility level; the various types of nuclear materials handled and their flow, accessibility and strategic significance; the assessment of IAEA safeguards effectiveness. 2 tabs., 2 figs. (author)

  1. CAD system applications to the nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Morita, Eiji; Matsumoto, Tadakuni; Shikakura, Sakae; Furuya, Kousei; Sakurai, Shin-ichi.

    1994-01-01

    Effective supporting techniques of design, operation, and maintenance of the reprocessing facility have been developed using the Intergraph CAD system. Two and three dimensional views of the process cells were utilized to rationalize the equipment layout and material handling flows, and to check the piping interference. Interferences of the remote maintenance equipment with the process equipments were also evaluated by the pictures on the CAD display. The newest virtual reality technology will help our future development of the more natural simulation for the remote maintenance operator training. (author)

  2. The present status of IAEA safeguards on nuclear fuel cycle facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-02-01

    This paper examines the present approach of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to safeguarding various types of facilities in the nuclear fuel cycle, in the hope that it will serve as useful background material for several of the various working groups of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE). The objectives and criteria of safeguards as well as the specific safeguards techniques which are utilized by the Agency, are addressed. In Part I, a general overview of safeguards as well as a discussion of procedures applicable to most if not all IAEA safeguarded facilities are included. Part II is broken down into specific facility types and focusses on the particular safeguards measures applied to them. Safeguards have reached different degrees of development for different types of facilities, in part because the Agency's experience in safeguarding certain types is considerably greater than for other types. Thus the Agency safeguards described herein are not static, but are continuously evolving. This evolution results not only from the fact that larger and more complex facilities have been coming under safeguards. Changes are also continually being introduced based on practical experience and research and development aimed at improving safeguards efficiency, reducing intrusiveness into plant operations, minimizing operator and inspector radiation exposure, and reducing subjective evaluations in determining the effectiveness of safeguards. To these ends, the technical support programmes of various countries are playing an important role. It is emphasized that this paper is not intended to evaluate the effectiveness of Agency safeguards or to highlight problem areas. It is simply aimed at providing a picture of what safeguards are or are planned to be at various stages of the fuel cycle

  3. Nuclear safeguard assessment in nuclear power plants (NPPs) using loss function with modified random numbers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Woo, Tae Ho

    2012-01-01

    Highlights: ► The safeguard is analyzed by quantification. ► Newly introduced SF is analyzed by the electrical power output. ► The relative value of SF is shown in the month level. ► The better operation could be indicated numerical values. ► There are several secure operation factors to be suggested. - Abstract: The energy production in nuclear power plants (NPPs) is investigated for the safeguard risk management using economic factors. The economic loss function is used for the life quality in the social and natural objects. For the basic event elements, the game theory is applied for the basic elements of the incidents in non-secure situations. The Safeguard Factor (SF) is introduced for the quantifications of simulation. The results are shown by the standard productivity comparisons with the designed power operations, which is obtained as the range of secure life extension in 2000 MW e is between 0.0000 and 9.1985 and the range in 600 MW e is between 0.0000 and 2.7600. So, the highest value in the range of secure power operation increases about 3.33 times higher than that of the interested power operation in this study, which means the safeguard assessment is quantified by the power rate in the life extension of the NPPs. The Nuclear Safeguard Protocol (NSP) is constructed for the safe operation successfully.

  4. Termination of Safeguards for Accountable Nuclear Materials at the Idaho National Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Holzemer, Michael; Carvo, Alan

    2012-01-01

    Termination of safeguards ends requirements of Nuclear Material Control and Accountability (MC and A) and thereby removes the safeguards basis for applying physical protection requirements for theft and diversion of nuclear material, providing termination requirements are met as described. Department of Energy (DOE) M 470.4 6 (Nuclear Material Control and Accountability [8/26/05]) stipulates: 1. Section A, Chapter I (1)( q) (1): Safeguards can be terminated on nuclear materials provided the following conditions are met: (a) 'If the material is special nuclear material (SNM) or protected as SNM, it must be attractiveness level E and have a measured value.' (b) 'The material has been determined by DOE line management to be of no programmatic value to DOE.' (c) 'The material is transferred to the control of a waste management organization where the material is accounted for and protected in accordance with waste management regulations. The material must not be collocated with other accountable nuclear materials.' Requirements for safeguards termination depend on the safeguards attractiveness levels of the material. For attractiveness level E, approval has been granted from the DOE Idaho Operations Office (DOE ID) to Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC (BEA) Safeguards and Security (S and S). In some cases, it may be necessary to dispose of nuclear materials of attractiveness level D or higher. Termination of safeguards for such materials must be approved by the Departmental Element (this is the DOE Headquarters Office of Nuclear Energy) after consultation with the Office of Security.

  5. Conflict between civil liberties and nuclear energy safeguards: an analysis of current and prospective Federal regulation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    O'Brien, J.N.

    1977-01-01

    The high regard that the U.S. has traditionally placed on individual rights and liberties makes it imperative that nuclear-safeguards measures currently in use or suggested by evaluated in terms of their social costs. A nuclear-safeguards strategy that minimizes civil-liberties impacts as a social cost and allows adequate protection against the threats of nuclear theft and sabotage in the rapidly developing nuclear energy industry must be arrived at. This study explores the possible civil-liberties impacts and the effectiveness of nuclear-safeguards measures which may be or are being used. Case law and statutory law are extensively analyzed to classify the type of civil-liberties impacts that particular nuclear-safeguards measures may impose. Literature addressing the effectiveness of safeguards measures is examined in various contexts often completely outside of the ''security'' disciplines. A comparison of both the civil liberties impact and effectiveness of each nuclear safeguards measure reveals a cost/benefit factor from which conclusions may be drawn. The real issue is whether or not a nuclear safeguards system will interfere with historic respect governmental institutions have given rights and liberties guaranteed in the U.S. It is concluded that physical access controls present only minor civil liberties costs while providing substantial protection against theft and sabotage. Recommendations are made in the form of suggested statutes, regulations, and regulatory guides. Certain inter-agency relationships and methods for establishing those relationships are also suggested

  6. European nuclear safeguards and terrorism: a personal perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jacchia, E.

    1987-01-01

    This analysis is divided into two parts that, in the authors view, deal with two fundamentally different types of terrorism: national and state sponsored. The information is drawn from his experience and recollections of data and events. In terms of potential access to nuclear and chemical materials, the most dangerous possibility is the state-sponsored terrorist group, and it poses a difficult situation. The sponsor state may or may not be a member of the NPT and may or may not have accepted IAEA safeguards. Even if it had accepted them, given the technical and political limitations on the agency's activities, it is almost impossible for the IAEA to guarantee that illegal transfers do not occur

  7. CETAMA contribution to safeguards and nuclear forensic analysis based on nuclear reference materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Roudil, D.; Rigaux, C.; Rivier, C.; Hubinois, J.C.; Aufore, L.

    2012-01-01

    Measurement quality is crucial for the safety of nuclear facilities: nuclear reference materials (CRM) and interlaboratory programs (ILC), beyond the assessment of analytical measurement quality, play an important role. In the nuclear field, the CETAMA proposes suitable scientific and technical developments, in particular the preparation and certification of CRM used either as analytical standards or as reference samples for ILCs. The growing emphasis on nuclear forensic measurements will require some re-certification of old CRMs. But the future analytical challenges of meeting nuclear fuel cycle needs and of ensuring safeguard performance improvements will also concern the future CRMs. (authors)

  8. The economics of reprocessing versus direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bunn, M.; Holdren, J.P.; Fetter, S.; Zwaan, B. van der

    2007-01-01

    The economics of reprocessing versus direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel are assessed. The break-even uranium price at which reprocessing spent nuclear fuel from existing light water reactors (LWRs) and recycling the resulting plutonium and uranium in LWRs would become economic is estimated for a wide range of reprocessing prices and other fuel cycle costs and parameters. The contribution of each fuel cycle option to the cost of electricity is also estimated. A similar analysis is performed for the breakeven uranium price at which deploying fast neutron reactors (FRs) would become competitive compared with a once-through fuel cycle in LWRs, for a range of differences in capital cost between LWRs and FRs. Available information about reprocessing prices and various other fuel cycle costs and input parameters are reviewed, as well as the quantities of uranium likely to be recoverable worldwide at a range of different possible future prices. It is concluded that the once-through fuel cycle is likely to remain significantly cheaper than reprocessing and recycling in either LWRs or FRs for at least the next 50 years. Finally, there is a discussion of how scarce and expensive repository space would have to become before separation and transmutation would be economically attractive. (author)

  9. Status of nuclear fuel reprocessing, spent fuel storage, and high-level waste disposal. Nuclear Fuel Cycle Committee, California Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission. Draft report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1978-01-01

    An analysis of the current status of technologies and issues in the major portions of the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle is presented. The discussion on nuclear fuel reprocessing covers the reprocessing requirement, reprocessing technology assessment, technology for operation of reprocessing plants, and approval of reprocessing plants. The chapter devoted to spent fuel storage covers the spent fuel storge problem, the legislative response, options for maintaining full core discharge capacity, prospective availability of alterntive storage options, and the outlook for California. The existence of a demonstrated, developed high-level waste disposal technology is reviewed. Recommendations for Federal programs on high-level waste disposal are made

  10. Development of Metallic Magnetic Calorimeters for Nuclear Safeguards Applications

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bates, Cameron Russell [Univ. of California, Berkeley, CA (United States)

    2015-03-11

    Many nuclear safeguards applications could benefit from high-resolution gamma-ray spectroscopy achievable with metallic magnetic calorimeters. This dissertation covers the development of a system for these applications based on gamma-ray detectors developed at the University of Heidelberg. It demonstrates new calorimeters of this type, which achieved an energy resolution of 45.5 eV full-width at half-maximum at 59.54 keV, roughly ten times better than current state of the art high purity germanium detectors. This is the best energy resolution achieved with a gamma-ray metallic magnetic calorimeter at this energy to date. In addition to demonstrating a new benchmark in energy resolution, an experimental system for measuring samples with metallic magnetic calorimeters was constructed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. This system achieved an energy resolution of 91.3 eV full-width at half-maximum at 59.54 keV under optimal conditions. Using this system it was possible to characterize the linearity of the response, the count-rate limitations, and the energy resolution as a function of temperature of the new calorimeter. With this characterization it was determined that it would be feasible to measure 242Pu in a mixed isotope plutonium sample. A measurement of a mixed isotope plutonium sample was performed over the course of 12 days with a single two-pixel metallic magnetic calorimeter. The relative concentration of 242Pu in comparison to other plutonium isotopes was determined by direct measurement to less than half a percent accuracy. This is comparable with the accuracy of the best-case scenario using traditional indirect methods. The ability to directly measure the relative concentration of 242Pu in a sample could enable more accurate accounting and detection of indications of undeclared activities in nuclear safeguards, a better constraint on source material in forensic samples containing plutonium, and improvements in verification in a future plutonium

  11. Towards Compact Antineutrino Detectors for Safeguarding Nuclear Reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meijer, R.J. de; Smit, F.D.; Woertche, H.J.

    2010-01-01

    In 2008 the IAEA Division of Technical Support convened a Workshop on Antineutrino Detection for Safeguards Applications. Two of the recommendations expressed that IAEA should consider antineutrino detection and monitoring in its current R and D program for safeguarding bulk-process reactors, and consider antineutrino detection and monitoring in its Safeguards by Design approaches for power and fissile inventory monitoring of new and next generation reactors. The workshop came to these recommendations after having assessed the results obtained at the San Onofre Nuclear Generator Station (SONGS) in California. A 600 litre, 10% efficiency detector, placed at 25m from the core was shown to record 300 net antineutrino events per day. The 2*2.5*2.5 m 3 footprint of the detector and the required below background operation, prevents an easy deployment at reactors. Moreover it does not provide spatial information of the fissile inventory and, because of the shape of a PBMR reactor, would not be representative for such type of reactor. A solution to this drawback is to develop more efficient detectors that are less bulky and less sensitive to cosmic and natural radiation backgrounds. Antineutrino detection in the SONGS detector is based on the capture of antineutrinos by a proton resulting in a positron and neutron. In the SONGS detector the positron and neutron are detected by secondary gamma-rays. The efficiency of the SONGS detector is largely dominated by the low efficiency for gamma detection high background sensitivity We are investigating two methods to resolve this problem, both leading to more compact detectors, which in a modular set up also will provide spatial information. One is based on detecting the positrons on their slowdown signal and the neutrons by capturing in 10 B or 6 Li, resulting in alpha-emission. The drawback for standard liquid scintillators doped with e.g. B is the low flame point of the solvent and the strong quenching of the alpha signal. Our

  12. Task 5c: measurement and instrumentation under subsystem design of the LLL safeguard material control program. [For fuel reprocessing plant

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1976-12-31

    A product survey was conducted of all security products currently available on the market. Documentation is presented of the survey and a printout of the data is included. A general description is given of new but recommended instrumentation and security devices for application to fuel reprocessing plants. Security systems and hardware recommended for development, assembly, and testing are discussed briefly. (DLC)

  13. International target values 2000 for measurement uncertainties in safeguarding nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aigner, H.; Binner, R.; Kuhn, E.

    2001-01-01

    The IAEA has prepared a revised and updated version of International Target Values (ITVs) for uncertainty components in measurements of nuclear material. The ITVs represent uncertainties to be considered in judging the reliability of analytical techniques applied to industrial nuclear and fissile material subject to safeguards verification. The tabulated values represent estimates of the 'state of the practice' which ought to be achievable under routine conditions by adequately equipped, experienced laboratories. The ITVs 2000 are intended to be used by plant operators and safeguards organizations as a reference of the quality of measurements achievable in nuclear material accountancy, and for planning purposes. The IAEA prepared a draft of a technical report presenting the proposed ITVs 2000, and in April 2000 the chairmen or officers of the panels or organizations listed below were invited to co- author the report and to submit the draft to a discussion by their panels and organizations. Euratom Safeguards Inspectorate, ESAKDA Working Group on Destructive Analysis, ESARDA Working Group on Non Destructive Analysis, Institute of Nuclear Material Management, Japanese Expert Group on ITV-2000, ISO Working Group on Analyses in Spent Fuel Reprocessing, ISO Working Group on Analyses in Uranium Fuel Fabrication, ISO Working Group on Analyses in MOX Fuel Fabrication, Agencia Brasileno-Argentina de Contabilidad y Control de Materiales Nucleares (ABACC). Comments from the above groups were received and incorporated into the final version of the document, completed in April 2001. The ITVs 2000 represent target standard uncertainties, expressing the precision achievable under stipulated conditions. These conditions typically fall in one of the two following categories: 'repeatability conditions' normally encountered during the measurements done within one inspection period; or 'reproducibility conditions' involving additional sources of measurement variability such as

  14. Determination of zirconium 93 and molybdenum 93 in reprocessing nuclear waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Puech, P.

    1998-01-01

    The aim of this work is to find new determination methods of zirconium 93 and molybdenum 93 (two long-lived radioelements) contained in reprocessing nuclear waste. 93 Zr has a very long period: 1.5 * 10 6 years. The measurement of this isotope is more performing by the ICP-MS method than by the classical radiochemical measurement methods. 93 Mo disintegrates with a radioactive period of 4000 years and can be detected by radiochemical measurement in particular by X spectrometry. But these radioelements cannot be directly measured on the reprocessing nuclear waste; they require a preliminary chemical separation (removing the radioelements able to interfere and those responsible of the radioactivity of the nuclear waste). The separation is implemented with very potentially selective techniques, using Mo and Zr specific extracting molecules: solvent extraction, emulsified liquid membrane extraction and liquid chromatography extraction (on a resin impregnated by solvent). Studies carried out in CEA/Cadarache, on a synthetic solution simulating a reprocessing nuclear waste, have allowed to show the selective properties of the L'-benzoinoxime for extracting Mo and of TBP for extracting Zr for the three studied techniques. The optimal extraction and separation conditions have been reached with a methodology including experiment plans. At last, the methods have been tested on real reprocessing nuclear waste at Cogema/La Hague. 93 Zr and 93 Mo have been measured in a dissolution solution and in a fission product solution. The obtained values are 2 * 10 6 Bq/l and 10 7 Bq/l for 93 Zr and 500 Bq/l for 93 Mo in a dissolution solution. These methods have allowed to determine too the isotopic compositions for Mo and Zr elements contained in reprocessing nuclear waste. The results are in accordance with those obtained with the Cesar code. (O.M.)

  15. Example of material accounting and verification of reprocessing input

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koch, L.; Schoof, S.

    1981-01-01

    An example is described in this paper of material accounting at the reprocessing input point. Knowledge of the fuel history and chemical analyses of the spent fuel permitted concepts to be tested which have been developed for the determination of the input by the operator and for its verification by nuclear material safeguards with the intention of detecting a protracted as well as an abrupt diversion. Accuracies obtained for a material balance of a PWR fuel reprocessing campaign are given. 6 refs

  16. Trends for minimization of radioactive waste arising from spent nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Polyakov, A.S.; Koltunov, V.S.; Marchenko, V.I.; Ilozhev, A.P.; Mukhin, I.V.

    2000-01-01

    Research and development of technologies for radioactive waste (RAW) minimization arising from spent nuclear fuel reprocessing are discussed. Novel reductants of Pu and Np ions, reagents of purification recycled extractant, possibility of the electrochemical methods are studied. The partitioning of high activity level waste are considered. Examples of microbiological methods decomposition of radioactive waste presented. (authors)

  17. Corrosion resistance of metallic materials for use in nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Legry, J.P.; Pelras, M.; Turluer, G.

    1989-01-01

    This paper reviews the corrosion resistance properties required from metallic materials to be used in the various developments of the PUREX process for nuclear fuel reprocessing. Stainless steels, zirconium or titanium base alloys are considered for the various plant components, where nitric acid is the main electrolyte with differing acid and nitrate concentrations, temperature and oxidizing species. (author)

  18. Recent advances in safeguards operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Agu, B.; Iwamoto, H.

    1983-01-01

    The facilities and nuclear materials under IAEA safeguards have steadily increased in the past few years with consequent increases in the manpower and effort required for the implementation of effective international safeguards. To meet this challenge, various techniques and instruments have been developed with the assistance, support and cooperation of the Member States. Improved NDA equipment now permits accurate verification of plutonium and HEU bearing items; and optical and TV surveillance systems have improved remarkably. Experience in safeguarding nuclear facilities now includes fast-reactor fuel reprocessing and enrichment plants, even though the Hexapartite Safeguards Project is yet to define an agreed approach for safeguarding enrichment plants. The establishment of field offices now enables the IAEA to adequately implement safeguards at important facilities and also with more effective use of manpower. Closer cooperation with Member States via liaison or similar committees makes for effective safeguards implementation and the speedy solution of attendant problems. The technical support programmes from the Member States continue to provide the basis of the recent advances in safeguards techniques and instrumentation. (author)

  19. Sludge behavior in centrifugal contactor operation for nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sakamoto, Atsushi; Sano, Yuichi; Takeuchi, Masayuki; Okamura, Nobuo; Koizumi, Kenji

    2015-01-01

    The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) has been developing the centrifugal contactor for spent fuel reprocessing. In this study, we investigated the sludge behavior in centrifugal contactors at three different scales. The operational conditions (the flow rate and rotor speed) were varied. Most insoluble particles such as sludge remained in the rotor via centrifugal force. The capture ratio of sludge in the contactor was measured as a function of particle size at various flow rates, rotor speeds, and contactor scales. The sludge adhered and accumulated inside the rotor as the operational time increased, and the operational conditions influenced the capture ratio of the sludge; a lower flow rate and higher rotor speed increased the capture ratio. The results confirmed that Stokes' law can be applied to estimate the experimental result on the behavior of the capture ratio for centrifugal contactors with different scales. (author)

  20. 129I in the environment around a nuclear reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Joshi, S.N.; Doshi, G.R.

    1988-01-01

    129 I and 131 I activities are measured in leaf samples collected within Trombay region, covering a radius of 4500 m from the reprocessing plant. The concentration of 129 I and 131 I in dried leaf samples ranged from 0.04 to 1.28 pCi/gm and 4 to 5 pCi/gm respectively. A radiochemical procedure involving distillation and solvent extractions of 129 I and then counting in a Liquid Scintillation Spectrometer is used for its final determination. The concentration of 129 I observed in leaf samples collected at the south site gate is used to calculate the dose commitment to an adult via grass-cow-milk pathway. On the basis of conservative assumption that the activity present in the grass would be equal to that in the leaf, the dose commitment to an adult through milk ingestion route will not exceed 5.5 μSv/y. (author). 2 tabs., 13 refs

  1. Cleaning and extraction apparatus in a nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nakamura, Yoshiaki.

    1983-01-01

    Purpose : To eliminate the requirement for the decomposition and cleaning of a centrifugal extractor upon re-processing of FBR type reactor fuels, by preventing solid fission products from depositing on a rotary body of the centrifugal extractor. Constitution : A cleaning and extraction apparatus comprising a combination of a centrifugal cleaner and a centrifugal extractor is used for shortening the contact time between the process liquid and the extraction solvent in FBR type reactor fuel re-processing, and variable parameters are adjusted so that the following equation can be satisfied for avoiding the deposition of solids onto the rotary body of the centrifugal extractor: lsub(e). (rsub(le) 2 + rsub(2r) 2 ) . Nsub(e) . Qsub(c)/ lsub(c) (rsub(lc) 2 + rsub(2c) 2 ) . Nsub(c) . Qsub(e) < 0.8 where Qsub(c) : flow rate to be processed in a centrifugal cleaner, lsub(c) : length of the rotary body, rsub(2c) : radius of a rotary body, rsub(le) : distance from the center to the liquid-extracting hole of the rotary body center to the liquid-extraction hole, Nsub(c) : number of revolution of the rotary body, Qsub(e) : amount of flowrate to be treated in the centrifugal extractor, lsub(e) : length of the rotary body, rsub(2e) : radius for the rotary body, rsub(le) : distance from the center of the rotary body to the liquid discharging aperture and Nsub(e) : number of rotation of the rotary body. (Ikeda, J.)

  2. Nuclear materials safeguards. Volume I. 1964--1974 (a title bibliography). Report for 1964--1974

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grooms, D.W.

    1976-03-01

    The research covers the methods of safeguarding nuclear materials through effective management, accountability, nondestructive assays, instrumentation, and automated continuous perpetual inventory systems. Studies on problem areas and recommendations for improving the management of nuclear materials are included. Due to the unavailability of Atomic Energy Commission abstracts during the time period covered by this bibliography, these citations are not included. (Contains 287 titles) See also NTIS/PS-76/0201, Nuclear Materials Safeguards. Vol. 2. 1975-March, 1976 (A bibliography with abstracts)

  3. Nuclear development and international safeguards: where do we stand and where are we going

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scheinman, L.

    1979-01-01

    Together with the political commitments reflected in the Nonproliferation Treaty, international safeguards represent a cornerstone of an effective international nuclear regime. As important as they are, safeguards cannot fully achieve the goal of maintaining access to peaceful nuclear energy without significantly increasing proliferation risks. In order to mitigate those risks, extrinsic protective measures are necessary, including the establishment of rules, norms and institutional arrangements relating to the timing, conditions, and scope of introduction of sensitive nuclear fuels and fuel cycle facilities

  4. Remote handling equipment for laboratory research of fuel reprocessing in Nuclear Research Institute at Rez

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fidler, J.; Novy, P.; Kyrs, M.

    1985-04-01

    Laboratory installations were developed for two nuclear fuel reprocessing methods, viz., the solvent extraction process and the fluoride volatility process. The apparatus for solvent extraction reprocessing consists of a pneumatically driven rod-chopper, a dissolver, mixer-settler extractors, an automatic fire extinguishing device and other components and it was tested using irradiated uranium. The technological line for the fluoride volatility process consists of a fluorimater, condensers, sorption columns with NaF pellets and a distillation column for the separation of volatile fluorides from UF 6 . The line has not yet been tested using irradiated fuel. Some features of the remote handling equipment of both installations are briefly described. (author)

  5. Improving the reliability of nuclear reprocessing by application of computers and mathematical modelling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gabowitsch, E.; Trauboth, H.

    1982-01-01

    After a brief survey of the present and expected future state of nuclear energy utilization, which should demonstrate the significance of nuclear reprocessing, safety and reliability aspects of nuclear reprocessing plants (NRP) are considered. Then, the principal possibilities of modern computer technology including computer systems architecture and application-oriented software for improving the reliability and availability are outlined. In this context, two information systems being developed at the Nuclear Research Center Karlsruhe (KfK) are briefly described. For design evaluation of certain areas of a large NRP mathematical methods and computer-aided tools developed, used or being designed by KfK are discussed. In conclusion, future research to be pursued in information processing and applied mathematics in support of reliable operation of NRP's is proposed. (Auth.)

  6. Design study on advanced nuclear fuel recycling system by pyrometallurgical reprocessing technology

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kasai, Yoshimitsu; Kakehi, Isao; Moro, Satoshi; Tobe, Kenji; Kawamura, Fumio; Higashi, Tatsuhiro; Yonezawa, Shigeaki [Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Inst., Oarai, Ibaraki (Japan). Oarai Engineering Center; Yoshiuji, Takahiro

    1998-12-01

    The Japan Nuclear Fuel Cycle Development Institute is conducting research and development on the nuclear fuel recycling system, which will improve the economy, safety, and environmental impact of the nuclear fuel recycling system in the age of the FBR. The System Engineering Division in the O-arai Engineering Center has conducted a design study on an advanced nuclear fuel recycling system for FBRs by using pyrometallurgical reprocessing technology. The system is an economical and compact module-type system, and can be used for reprocessing oxide fuel and also new types of fuel (metal fuel and nitride fuel). This report describes the concept of this system and results of the design study. (author)

  7. Design study on advanced nuclear fuel recycling system by pyrometallurgical reprocessing technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kasai, Yoshimitsu; Kakehi, Isao; Moro, Satoshi; Tobe, Kenji; Kawamura, Fumio; Higashi, Tatsuhiro; Yonezawa, Shigeaki; Yoshiuji, Takahiro

    1998-01-01

    The Japan Nuclear Fuel Cycle Development Institute is conducting research and development on the nuclear fuel recycling system, which will improve the economy, safety, and environmental impact of the nuclear fuel recycling system in the age of the FBR. The System Engineering Division in the O-arai Engineering Center has conducted a design study on an advanced nuclear fuel recycling system for FBRs by using pyrometallurgical reprocessing technology. The system is an economical and compact module-type system, and can be used for reprocessing oxide fuel and also new types of fuel (metal fuel and nitride fuel). This report describes the concept of this system and results of the design study. (author)

  8. Safeguards: Modelling of the Detection and Characterization of Nuclear Materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Enqvist, Andreas

    2010-01-01

    Nuclear safeguards is a collective term for the tools and methods needed to ensure nonproliferation and safety in connection to utilization of nuclear materials. It encompasses a variety of concepts from legislation to measurement equipment. The objective of this thesis is to present a number of research results related to nuclear materials control and accountability, especially the area of nondestructive assay. Physical aspects of nuclear materials are often the same as for materials encountered in everyday life. One special aspect though is that nuclear materials also emit radiation allowing them to be qualitatively and quantitatively measured without direct interaction with the material. For the successful assay of the material, the particle generation and detection needs to be well understood, and verified with measurements, simulations and models. Four topics of research are included in the thesis. First the generation and multiplication of neutrons and gamma rays in a fissile multiplying sample is treated. The formalism used enables investigation of the number of generated, absorbed and detected particles, offering understanding of the different processes involved. Secondly, the issue of relating the coincident detector signals, generated by both neutrons and gamma rays, to sample parameters is dealt with. Fission rate depends directly on the sample mass, while parameters such as neutron generation by alpha decay and neutron leakage multiplication are parameters that depend on the size, composition and geometry of the sample. Artificial neural networks are utilized to solve the inverse problem of finding sample characteristics from the measured rates of particle multiples. In the third part the interactions between neutrons and organic scintillation detectors are treated. The detector material consists of hydrogen and carbon, on which the neutrons scatter and transfer energy. The problem shares many characteristics with the area of neutron moderation found in

  9. Safeguards and security by design support for the next generation nuclear plant project - Progress in safeguards by design (SBD) by the United States National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bjornard, T.; Casey Durst, P.

    2013-01-01

    The Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) project was authorized by the United States Energy Policy Act of 2005 with the principal objective of designing, licensing, and building a Generation IV nuclear plant capable of producing both high-temperature process heat and electricity. The two candidate NGNP reactor concepts are pebble- and prismatic-fueled high-temperature gas reactors that will be licensed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The conceptual design phase of the project was completed in December 2010. This paper summarizes support provided to the NGNP project to facilitate consideration of international safeguards during the design phase, or safeguards by design (SBD). Additional support was provided for domestic safeguards (material control and accounting) and physical protection, or safeguards and security by design (2SBD). The main focus of this paper is on SBD and international safeguards. Included is an overview of the international safeguards guidance contained in guidance reports for SBD. These reports contain guidance and suggestions intended to be useful to the industry design teams, but they do not contain ready-made solutions. Early and frequent interaction of design stakeholders with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the NRC are essential to a successful endeavor. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (author)

  10. Assessment of ambient-temperature, high-resolution detectors for nuclear safeguards applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ruhter, W.D.; McQuaid, J.H.; Lavietes, A.

    1993-01-01

    High-resolution, gamma- and x-ray spectrometry are used routinely in nuclear safeguards verification measurements of plutonium and uranium in the field. These measurements are now performed with high-purity germanium (HPGe) detectors that require cooling liquid-nitrogen temperatures, thus limiting their utility in field and unattended safeguards measurement applications. Ambient temperature semiconductor detectors may complement HPGe detectors for certain safeguards verification applications. Their potential will be determined by criteria such as their performance, commercial availability, stage of development, and costs. We have conducted as assessment of ambient temperature detectors for safeguards measurement applications with these criteria in mind

  11. Operation of Nuclear Fuel Based on Reprocessed Uranium for VVER-type Reactors in Competitive Nuclear Fuel Cycles

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Troyanov, V.; Molchanov, V.; Tuzov, A. [TVEL Corporation, 49 Kashirskoe shosse, Moscow 115409 (Russian Federation); Semchenkov, Yu.; Lizorkin, M. [RRC ' Kurchatov Institute' (Russian Federation); Vasilchenko, I.; Lushin, V. [OKB ' Gidropress' (Russian Federation)

    2009-06-15

    Current nuclear fuel cycle of Russian nuclear power involves reprocessed low-enriched uranium in nuclear fuel production for some NPP units with VVER-type LWR. This paper discusses design and performance characteristics of commercial nuclear fuel based on natural and reprocessed uranium. It presents the review of results of commercial operation of nuclear fuel based on reprocessed uranium on Russian NPPs-unit No.2 of Kola NPP and unit No.2 of Kalinin NPP. The results of calculation and experimental validation of safe fuel operation including necessary isotope composition conformed to regulation requirements and results of pilot fuel operation are also considered. Meeting the customer requirements the possibility of high burn-up achieving was demonstrated. In addition the paper compares the characteristics of nuclear fuel cycles with maximum length based on reprocessed and natural uranium considering relevant 5% enrichment limitation and necessity of {sup 236}U compensation. The expedience of uranium-235 enrichment increasing over 5% is discussed with the aim to implement longer fuel cycles. (authors)

  12. Analyzing the reprocessing decision: plutonium recycle and nuclear proliferation. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heising, C.D.; Connolly, T.J.

    1978-11-01

    The United States decision to defer indefinitely the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel is examined in this thesis. Bayesian decision analysis is applied to develop a rational framework for the assessment of alternatives. Benefits and costs for each alternative are evaluated and compared in dollar terms to determine the optimal decision. A fuel cycle simulation model is constructed to assess the economic value of reprocessing light water reactor (LWR) spent fuel and recycling plutonium. In addition, a dynamic fuel substitution model is used to estimate the economic effects of the reprocessing decision's influence on the introduction date of the liquid metal fast breeder reactor (LMFBR). The analysis of benefits and costs is extended to include the social costs due to technological risks, such as accident risk, nuclear theft and/or sabotage, and international nuclear proliferation. These social costs are expressed in dollar terms for comparison with the conventional economic values. Results of the analysis indicate that the domestic social costs are less than the economic benefits by more than three orders of magnitude, and that the permit option dominates those of delay or prohibit. An examination of proliferation risk indicates a factor of approximately 7 between cost-benefits. Thus, on the basis of this analysis, it appears that to permit reprocessing is optimal over delaying or prohibiting the technology

  13. Nuclear energy without reprocessing: a future made possible by energy conservation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Feiveson, Harold

    1987-01-01

    The achievements of energy conservation and the promise of future progress have rendered economically unattractive for many decades the separation of plutonium from spent reactor fuel (reprocessing) and its recycle into breeder or light water reactors. Despite this, reprocessing and recycle are already underway in Europe and Japan. If unchecked, these activities, by the end of the century, will lead to an annual flow in routine commerce of tens of thousands of kilograms of separated plutonium, a circumstance which would pose a grave threat to international security. However, continued stagnation of nuclear power programs in much of the world, due significantly to greatly reduced growth rates in electricity demand, will underscore the economic folly of reprocessing and recycle and may eventually encourage their abandonment. (author)

  14. Peaceful nuclear development and the three 'S' ('Safety', 'Security' and 'Safeguards')

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Julio Gonzalez, Abel; Abel Gonzalez, Martin

    2010-01-01

    We should agree on a comprehensive solution for a commensurate international control of both nuclear and radioactive material designed to ensure that peaceful nuclear developments will not cause harm to humanity. The concept of an international security system is clouded by the confusing semantics of its parts: the English concepts 'safeguards', 'safety' and 'security', on one hand, and nuclear and radioactive materials on the other hand. The objectives should be: to ensure, through appropriate safeguards, that nuclear materials are not diverted to non-peaceful activities; to prevent, through appropriate security, the unauthorized possession or use, illegal or malicious, of nuclear and radioactive materials; and, to ensure, through appropriate safety, that the use of nuclear and radioactive material will not cause harm to people and the environment. Security must be understood as an integral part of safeguards and safety, because materials that are secure are not necessarily safeguarded or safe, and materials may not be safeguarded or safe unless they are secure. Security is a necessary but not sufficient condition for safeguards and safety; security is an important but subsidiary condition of safeguards and safety; security is necessary but not sufficient to ensure nuclear control via safeguards and safety. In conclusion an International Treaty for the Control ('safeguards', 'safety' and 'security') of the Peaceful Development of Nuclear Energy and its Byproducts is proposed. It should clearly regulate the obligations and (non-compliance) penalties of the Parties, and, based on existing agreements, should be clear, logical, rational, fundamental, methodical, systematic, universal, equitable, impartial, fair and non discriminatory. (author)

  15. Nuclear safety, security and safeguards. An application of an integrated approach

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chapman, Howard; Edwards, Jeremy; Fitzpatrick, Joshua; Grundy, Colette; Rodger, Robert; Scott, Jonathan [National Nuclear Laboratory, Warrington (United Kingdom)

    2018-01-15

    National Nuclear Laboratory has recently produced a paper regarding the integrated approach of nuclear safety, security and safeguards. The paper considered the international acknowledgement of the inter-relationships and potential benefits to be gained through improved integration of the nuclear '3S'; Safety, Security and Safeguards. It considered that combining capabilities into one synergistic team can provide improved performance and value. This approach to integration has been adopted, and benefits realised by the National Nuclear Laboratory through creation of a Safety, Security and Safeguards team. In some instances the interface is clear and established, as is the case between safety and security in the areas of Vital Area Identification. In others the interface is developing such as the utilisation of safeguards related techniques such as nuclear material accountancy and control to enhance the security of materials. This paper looks at a practical example of the progress to date in implementing Triple S by a duty holder.

  16. Evaluation of a Business Case for Safeguards by Design in Nuclear Power Reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wood, Thomas W.; Seward, Amy M.; Lewis, Valerie A.; Gitau, Ernest TN; Zentner, Michael D.

    2012-12-01

    Safeguards by Design (SbD) is a well-known paradigm for consideration and incorporation of safeguards approaches and associated design features early in the nuclear facility development process. This paradigm has been developed as part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), and has been accepted as beneficial in many discussions and papers on NGSI or specific technologies under development within NGSI. The Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security funded the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to examine the business case justification of SbD for nuclear power reactors. Ultimately, the implementation of SbD will rely on the designers of nuclear facilities. Therefore, it is important to assess the incentives which will lead designers to adopt SbD as a standard practice for nuclear facility design. This report details the extent to which designers will have compelling economic incentives to adopt SbD.

  17. NO/sub x/ emissions from Hanford nuclear fuels reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pajunen, A.L.; Dirkes, R.L.

    1978-01-01

    Operation of the existing Hanford nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities will increase the release of nitrogen oxides (NO/sub x/) to the atmosphere over present emission rates. Stack emissions from two reprocessing facilities, one waste storage facility and two coal burning power plants will contain increased concentrations of NO/sub x/. The opacity of the reprocessing facilities' emissions is predicted to periodically exceed the State and local opacity limit of twenty percent. Past measurements failed to detect differences in the ambient air NO/sub x/ concentration with and without reprocessing plant operations. Since the facilities are not presently operating, increases in the non-occupational ambient air NO/sub x/ concentration were predicted from theoretical diffusion models. Based on the calculations, the annual average ambient air NO/sub x/ concentration will increase from the present level of less than 0.004 ppM to less than 0.006 ppM at the Hanford site boundaries. The national standard for the annual mean ambient air NO 2 concentration is 0.05 ppM. Therefore, the non-occupational ambient air NO/sub x/ concentration will not be increased to significant levels by reprocessing operations in the Hanford 200 Areas

  18. Russian University Education in Nuclear Safeguards and Security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Duncan, Cristen L.; Kryuchkov, Eduard F.; Geraskin, Nikolay I.; Boiko, Vladimir I.; Silaev, Maxim E.; Demyanyuk, Dmitry G.; Killinger, Mark H.; Heinberg, Cynthia L.

    2009-01-01

    As safeguards and security (S and S) systems are installed and upgraded in nuclear facilities throughout Russia, it becomes increasingly important to develop mechanisms for educating future Russian nuclear scientists and engineers in the technologies and methodologies of physical protection (PP) and nuclear material control and accounting (MC and A). As part of the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) program to secure nuclear materials in Russia, the Education Project supports technical S and S degree programs at key Russian universities and nonproliferation education initiatives throughout the Russian Federation that are necessary to achieve the overall objective of fostering qualified and vigilant Russian S and S personnel. The Education Project supports major educational degree programs at the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI) and Tomsk Polytechnic University (TPU). The S and S Graduate Program is available only at MEPhI and is the world's first S and S degree program. Ten classes of students have graduated with a total of 79 Masters Degrees as of early 2009. At least 84% of the graduates over the ten years are still working in the S and S field. Most work at government agencies or research organizations, and some are pursuing their PhD. A 5 and 1/2 year Engineering Degree Program (EDP) in S and S is currently under development at MEPhI and TPU. The EDP is more tailored to the needs of nuclear facilities. The program's first students (14) graduated from MEPhI in February 2007. Similar-sized classes are graduating from MEPhI each February. All of the EDP graduates are working in the S and S field, many at nuclear facilities. TPU also established an EDP and graduated its first class of approximately 18 students in February 2009. For each of these degree programs, the American project team works with MEPhI and TPU to develop appropriate curriculum, identify and acquire various training aids, develop and publish textbooks, and strengthen instructor skills

  19. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear security. IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lodding, Jan; Kinley, David III

    2002-09-01

    One of the most urgent challenges facing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system for verification in order to increase the likelihood of detecting any clandestine nuclear weapons programme in breach of international obligations. The IAEA should be able to provide credible assurance not only about declared nuclear material in a State but also about the absence of undeclared material and activities. Realising the full potential of the strengthened system will require that all States bring into force their relevant safeguards agreements, as well as additional protocols thereto. Today, 45 years after the Agency's foundation, its verification mission is as relevant as ever. This is illustrated by the special challenges encountered with regard to verification in Iraq and North Korea in the past decade. Moreover, the horrifying events of 11 September 2001 demonstrated all too well the urgent need to strengthen worldwide control of nuclear and other radioactive material. The IAEA will continue to assist States in their efforts to counter the spread of nuclear weapons and to prevent, detect and respond to illegal uses of nuclear and radioactive material. Adherence by as many States as possible to the strengthened safeguards system is a crucial component in this endeavour

  20. Integrated neutron/gamma-ray portal monitors for nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fehlau, P.E.

    1994-01-01

    Radiation monitoring is one nuclear-safeguards measure used to protect against the theft of special nuclear materials (SNM) by pedestrians departing from SNM access areas. The integrated neutron/gamma-ray portal monitor is an ideal radiation monitor for the task when the SNM is plutonium. It achieves high sensitivity for detecting both bare and shielded plutonium by combining two types of radiation detector. One type is a neutron-chamber detector, comprising a large, hollow, neutron moderator that contains a single thermal-neutron proportional counter. The entrance wall of each chamber is thin to admit slow neutrons from plutonium contained in a moderating shield, while the other walls are thick to moderate fast neutrons from bare or lead-shielded plutonium so that they can be detected. The other type of detector is a plastic scintillator that is primarily for detecting gamma rays from small amounts of unshielded plutonium. The two types of detector are easily integrated by making scintillators part of the thick back wall of each neutron chamber or by inserting them into each chamber void. The authors compared the influence of the two methods of integration on detecting neutrons and gamma rays, and they examined the effectiveness of other design factors and the methods for signal detection as well

  1. Composite reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel - is a way to low waste nuclear power

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kosyakov, Valentin

    2005-01-01

    Further development of nuclear power in many respects depend on the solution of the problems connected to high level radioactive wastes (HLRW), containing highly toxic long-lived radionuclides. Long-term controlled storage of HLRW manages expensively and any advanced technology of reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel (SNF), besides recovery of the basic products, should be aimed at the reduction of this waste amount. However, the existing SNF reprocessing technology, using PUREX - process, is aimed only at extraction of uranium and plutonium, considering the remaining fraction (other transuranium elements and all fission products) as HLRW. In this work an attempt is made to give quantitative and qualitative characteristics to the isotopes and the elements which are included in the composition of HLRW after 15-years storage. Depending on the radiation properties of the isotopes included, these elements were divided into three categories: 1. The elements represented by only stable isotopes; 2. The elements represented by mostly low radioactive isotopes; 3. The elements represented by highly toxic long-lived radionuclides. As a result it appeared, that the weight percentage of the elements of the first, the second and the third categories in HLRW was: 60, 25 and 15% respectively. It means, that the amount of the real HLRW to be disposed in a deep geological repository could be reduced at least by a factor of 6, if to recover completely only 7 most dangerous elements (Sr, J, Cs, Sm, Np, Am and Cm) from the solution remaining after extraction of uranium and plutonium. Then it is meaningful to recover the elements of the first category from the remaining mix. As the main part of this fraction is represented by rare earth elements and noble metals, which can easily find many useful application. (author)

  2. The Nuclear Safeguards and Security Activities under Euratom Research and Training Programme

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Abousahl, S.; Palajova, Z.; Janssens, W.A.M.; Luetzenkirchen, K.; Goncalves, J.G.M.; Aregbe, Y.; )

    2015-01-01

    Nuclear safeguards and security are absolute priorities for the EU. At technical level, the Joint Research Centre (JRC) as the European Commission's in-house science service plays an important role in the field of nuclear research, training and education that include nuclear safety, safeguards and security. The JRC's nuclear research activities are defined in a Council Regulation on the research and training programme of the European Atomic Energy Community. The JRC works closely with EC safeguards authority, whose mission is to ensure that nuclear material within the EU is not diverted from its intended use according to Euratom treaty. Technologies, methodologies and trainings are developed according to the Euratom Safeguards inspectorate's needs. In the area of nuclear security, the JRC contributes to the development of specific expertise in the field of nuclear forensics and border security detection as well as related training efforts for first front-line responders and national experts. The JRC provides its expert support for the implementation of internal EU action plans mainly in the field of radiological and nuclear security. At an international level, the JRC cooperates with the IAEA mainly through the EC support programme on the control of nuclear materials and facilities in order to avoid proliferation or diversion. Close cooperation with IAEA nuclear security is developed through the recent signature of a dedicated practical arrangement. Key partnerships have also been developed in the field of safeguards and security with the US-DoE, Russia, Japan and China. In addition, JRC contributes significantly to the EU nuclear safeguards and security outreach activities implemented under the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation and Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace. In this paper we will highlight some of the JRC contributions to the enhancement of nuclear safeguards and security at EU and international levels. (author)

  3. Report Of The Workshop On Nuclear Facility Design Information Examination And Verification For Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Metcalf, Richard; Bean, Robert

    2009-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements nuclear safeguards and verifies countries are compliant with their international nuclear safeguards agreements. One of the key provisions in the safeguards agreement is the requirement that the country provide nuclear facility design and operating information to the IAEA relevant to safeguarding the facility, and at a very early stage. , This provides the opportunity for the IAEA to verify the safeguards-relevant features of the facility and to periodically ensure that those features have not changed. The national authorities (State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) provide the design information for all facilities within a country to the IAEA. The design information is conveyed using the IAEA's Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) and specifies: (1) Identification of the facility's general character, purpose, capacity, and location; (2) Description of the facility's layout and nuclear material form, location, and flow; (3) Description of the features relating to nuclear material accounting, containment, and surveillance; and (4) Description of existing and proposed procedures for nuclear material accounting and control, with identification of nuclear material balance areas. The DIQ is updated as required by written addendum. IAEA safeguards inspectors examine and verify this information in design information examination (DIE) and design information verification (DIV) activities to confirm that the facility has been constructed or is being operated as declared by the facility operator and national authorities, and to develop a suitable safeguards approach. Under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the National Nuclear Security Administrations (NNSA) Office of Non-Proliferation and International Security identified the need for more effective and efficient verification of design information by the IAEA for improving international safeguards in the future

  4. Nuclear material safeguards technology development in the new structure of BATAN organization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ilyas, Zurias

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The implementation of Nuclear Energy Act No. 10/97 has led to a restructuring in BATAN organization in July 1999. A new unit, Center for Nuclear Material Safeguards Technology (PTPBN), was established to be especially in charge of safeguards facilities. The main responsibility of this unit is to develop the technology of safeguards and physical protection. The function of this unit is also to analyze the operational technical aspect of the International Convention of Nuclear. The duties of Center for Nuclear Material Safeguards Technology can be seen from the various programs set up for every fiscal year. The programs for the year 2000 were: Analyses of SSAC implementation in BATAN; Development of Safeguards information system; Creation of database of physical protection technology; Physical protection simulator for Bandung reactor research; Development of detector technology for physical protection system; Identification of BATAN activities and facilities submitted to IAEA in order to be in line with the Additional Protocol to the agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation on Nuclear Weapons, which was ratified on September 29th, 1999 in Vienna, Austria; Seminar on Safeguards technology held in Jakarta in September 2000. The program of 2001 will be focusing on the continuation of the previous year's program as well as the creation of new ones, such as: Collaboration with other countries. At initial stage experts from JBC-Japan were invited to share their expertise on their safeguards information system; Development of education and training for safeguards operators by emphasizing more on the techniques of nuclear materials measurement; Seminar on Safeguards technology scheduled for December 2001 by inviting experts from IAEA and modem countries; Field survey to determine the location of radionuclide station in Indonesia in

  5. REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON NUCLEAR FACILITY DESIGN INFORMATION EXAMINATION AND VERIFICATION FOR SAFEGUARDS

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Richard Metcalf; Robert Bean

    2009-10-01

    Executive Summary The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements nuclear safeguards and verifies countries are compliant with their international nuclear safeguards agreements. One of the key provisions in the safeguards agreement is the requirement that the country provide nuclear facility design and operating information to the IAEA relevant to safeguarding the facility, and at a very early stage. , This provides the opportunity for the IAEA to verify the safeguards-relevant features of the facility and to periodically ensure that those features have not changed. The national authorities (State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) provide the design information for all facilities within a country to the IAEA. The design information is conveyed using the IAEA’s Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) and specifies: (1) Identification of the facility’s general character, purpose, capacity, and location; (2) Description of the facility’s layout and nuclear material form, location, and flow; (3) Description of the features relating to nuclear material accounting, containment, and surveillance; and (4) Description of existing and proposed procedures for nuclear material accounting and control, with identification of nuclear material balance areas. The DIQ is updated as required by written addendum. IAEA safeguards inspectors examine and verify this information in design information examination (DIE) and design information verification (DIV) activities to confirm that the facility has been constructed or is being operated as declared by the facility operator and national authorities, and to develop a suitable safeguards approach. Under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the National Nuclear Security Administrations (NNSA) Office of Non-Proliferation and International Security identified the need for more effective and efficient verification of design information by the IAEA for improving international safeguards

  6. Solvent extraction for spent nuclear fuel reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Masui, Jinichi

    1986-01-01

    The purex process provides a solvent extraction method widely used for separating uranium and plutonium from nitric acid solution containing spent fuel. The Tokai Works has adopted the purex process with TPB-n dodecane as the extraction agent and a mixer settler as the solvent extraction device. The present article outlines the solvent extraction process and discuss the features of various extraction devices. The chemical principle of the process is described and a procedure for calculating the number of steps for countercurrent equilibrium extraction is proposed. Discussion is also made on extraction processes for separating and purifying uranium and plutonium from fission products and on procedures for managing these processes. A small-sized high-performance high-reliability device is required for carrying out solvent extraction in reprocessing plants. Currently, mixer settler, pulse column and centrifugal contactor are mainly used in these plants. Here, mixer settler is comparted with pulse column with respect to their past achievements, design, radiation damage to solvent, operation halt, controllability and maintenance. Processes for co-extraction, partition, purification and solvent recycling are described. (Nogami, K.)

  7. Cyber Security Evaluation of the Wireless Communication for the Mobile Safeguard Systems in Nuclear Power Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, S.; Kim, Y.S.; Ye, S.H.

    2015-01-01

    This paper introduces cyber security evaluation results and a design of the wireless communication technology to apply to safeguard systems in nuclear power plants. While wireless communication technologies can generally make mobility and efficiency on plant operation, those have seldom been installed on the nuclear I&C systems due to the negative concern of unexpected outcomes that stem from electromagnetic interference and cyber attack. New design of advanced digital safeguard and I&C systems uses computer-based systems for the safeguard and safety functions. On the other hand, those are being exposed to various types of new and existing cyber threats, vulnerabilities and risks which significantly increase the likelihood that those could be compromised. In order to employ the wireless communication technology in safeguard function, licencees assess and manage the potential for adverse effects on safeguard and safety functions so as to provide high assurance that critical functions are properly protected cyber attack. It is expected that the safeguard function, specifically on the area of real-time monitoring, logging, can be enhanced by employing the mobile safeguard devices (: smart phone, laptop, smart pad, etc). In this paper, we deal with the cyber security evaluation, which consists of threat analysis, vulnerability test, establishment of security plan, and design solutions for the wireless communication on the basis of IEEE 802.11(Wi-Fi) protocol. Proposed evaluation and design solution could be a basis for the design of wireless communication and mobile safeguard systems in nuclear power plants. (author)

  8. Reprocessing of nuclear fuels at the Savannah River Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gray, L.W.

    1986-01-01

    For more than 30 years, the Savannah River Plant (SRP) has been a major supplier of nuclear materials such as plutonium-239 and tritium-3 for nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, plutonium-238 for space exploration, and isotopes of americium, curium, and californium for use in the nuclear research community. SRP is a complete nuclear park, providing most of the processes in the nuclear fuel cycle. Key processes involve fabrication and cladding of the nuclear fuel, target, and control assemblies; rework of heavy water for use as reactor moderator; reactor loading, operation, and unloading; chemical recovery of the reactor transmutation products and spent fuels; and management of the gaseous, liquid, and solid nuclear and chemical wastes; plus a host of support operations. The site's history and the key processes from fabrication of reactor fuels and targets to finishing of virgin plutonium for use in the nuclear weapons complex are reviewed. Emphasis has been given to the chemistry of the recovery and purification of weapons grade plutonium from irradiated reactor targets

  9. Economics and resources analysis of the potential use of reprocessing options by the current Spanish nuclear reactor park

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Alvarez-Velarde, F.; Merino Rodriguez, I.; Gonzalez-Romero, E.

    2014-07-01

    Reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel serves multiple purposes, from Pu separation and recovery for MOX fuel fabrication to reduction of high level waste volume, and is nowadays being implemented in several countries like France, Japan, Russia or United Kingdom. This work is aimed at exploring the possibility (in resources and economic terms) of implementing reprocessing for MOX fabrication in Spain. (Author)

  10. Reprocessing decision

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heising, C.D.

    1978-01-01

    The United States must decide whether to permit, delay, or prohibit the reprocessing and recycling of nuclear spent fuel. To permit reprocessing would allow recycle as early as 1985; to delay the decision for a later administration to deal with means spent fuel would mount up at nuclear reactor sites; to prohibit would eliminate recycling and mandate permanent storage. Bayesian decision analysis was used to examine reprocessing costs associated with risks and economic benefits. Three distinct categories of risk that are important in the nuclear fuel cycle are discussed. These are: health, environment, and safety risks; nuclear theft and sabotage; and nuclear weapons proliferation risks. Results are discussed from comparing nine routes to weapons-usuable mterial available to nonweapons states that desire a nuclear capability. These are: production reactor and military reporcessor; research reacotr and military reprocessor; power plant plus military reprocessor or commercial reprocessor; enrichment (centrifuge, gaseous diffusion, electromagnetic separation, or aerodynamic jet cascade); and accelerator. It was found that the commercial power reactor-commercial reprocessor route is comparatively unattractive to a nonweapons state. In summary, allowing nuclear fuel reprocessing to go forward in the United States can be expected to increase the costs to society by a maximum $360 million a year. This is approximately one-seventh of the expected benefit (reduced electricity bills) to be dderived by society from closing the fuel cycle. It appears that the permitting reprocessing now is logically preferable to delaying or prohibiting the technology, the author concludes

  11. Evaluation of methods for seismic analysis of nuclear fuel reprocessing plants, part 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tokarz, F.J.; Murray, R.C.; Arthur, D.F.; Feng, W.W.; Wight, L.H.; Zaslawsky, M.

    1975-01-01

    Currently, no guidelines exist for choosing methods of structural analysis to evaluate the seismic hazard of nuclear fuel reprocessing plants. This study examines available methods and their applicability to fuel reprocessing plant structures. The results of this study should provide a basis for establishing guidelines recommending methods of seismic analysis for evaluating future fuel reprocessing plants. The approach taken is: (1) to identify critical plant structures and place them in four categories (structures at or near grade; deeply embedded structures; fully buried structures; equipment/vessels/attachments/piping), (2) to select a representative structure in each of the first three categories and perform static and dynamic analysis on each, and (3) to evaluate and recommend method(s) of analysis for structures within each category. The Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant is selected as representative of future commercial reprocessing plants. The effect of site characteristics on the structural response is also examined. The response spectra method of analysis combined with the finite element model for each category is recommended. For structures founded near or at grade, the lumped mass model could also be used. If a time history response is required, a time-history analysis is necessary. (U.S.)

  12. Nuclear fuel reprocessing deactivation plan for the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant, Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Patterson, M.W.

    1994-10-01

    The decision was announced on April 28, 1992 to cease all United States Department of Energy (DOE) reprocessing of nuclear fuels. This decision leads to the deactivation of all fuels dissolution, solvent extraction, krypton gas recovery operations, and product denitration at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). The reprocessing facilities will be converted to a safe and stable shutdown condition awaiting future alternate uses or decontamination and decommissioning (D ampersand D). This ICPP Deactivation Plan includes the scope of work, schedule, costs, and associated staffing levels necessary to achieve a safe and orderly deactivation of reprocessing activities and the Waste Calcining Facility (WCF). Deactivation activities primarily involve shutdown of operating systems and buildings, fissile and hazardous material removal, and related activities. A minimum required level of continued surveillance and maintenance is planned for each facility/process system to ensure necessary environmental, health, and safety margins are maintained and to support ongoing operations for ICPP facilities that are not being deactivated. Management of the ICPP was transferred from Westinghouse Idaho Nuclear Company, Inc. (WINCO) to Lockheed Idaho Technologies Company (LITCO) on October 1, 1994 as part of the INEL consolidated contract. This revision of the deactivation plan (formerly the Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Phaseout Plan for the ICPP) is being published during the consolidation of the INEL site-wide contract and the information presented here is current as of October 31, 1994. LITCO has adopted the existing plans for the deactivation of ICPP reprocessing facilities and the plans developed under WINCO are still being actively pursued, although the change in management may result in changes which have not yet been identified. Accordingly, the contents of this plan are subject to revision

  13. Removal of actinides from selected nuclear fuel reprocessing wastes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Navratil, J.D.; Thompson, G.H.

    1979-01-01

    The US Department of Energy awarded Oak Ridge National Laboratory a program to develop a cost-risk-benefit analysis of partitioning long-lived nuclides from waste and transmuting them to shorter lived or stable nuclides. Two subtasks of this program were investigated at Rocky Flats. In the first subtask, methods for solubilizing actinides in incinerator ash were tested. Two methods appear to be preferable: reaction with ceric ion in nitric acid or carbonate-nitrate fusion. The ceric-nitric acid system solubilizes 95% of the actinides in ash; this can be increased by 2 to 4% by pretreating ash with sodium hydroxide to solubilize silica. The carbonate-nitrate fusion method solubilizes greater than or equal to 98% of the actinides, but requires sodium hydroxide pretreatment. Two additional disadvantages are that it is a high-temperature process, and that it generates a lot of salt waste. The second subtask comprises removing actinides from salt wastes likely to be produced during reactor fuel fabrication and reprocessing. A preliminary feasibility study of solvent extraction methods has been completed. The use of a two-step solvent extraction system - tributyl phosphate (TBP) followed by extraction with a bidentate organophosphorous extractant (DHDECMP) - appears to be the most efficient for removing actinides from salt waste. The TBP step would remove most of the plutonium and > 99.99% of the uranium. The second step using DHDECMP would remove > 99.91% of the americium and the remaining plutonium (> 99.98%) and other actinides from the acidified salt waste. 8 figures, 11 tables

  14. The regulations concerning the reprocessing business of spent fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    The regulations are defined under provisions concerning the reprocessing business in the law for the regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors. The basic concepts and terms are explained, such as: exposure dose; accumulative dose; controlled area; safeguarded area; inspected surrounding area; employee; radioactive waste and marine discharging facilities. Any person who gets permission for design of reprocessing facilities and method of the construction shall file an application, listing name and address of the person and the works or the place of enterprise where reprocessing facilities are to be set up, design of such facilities and method of the construction, in and out-put chart of nuclear fuel materials in reprocessing course, etc. Records shall be made and kept for particularly periods in each works or enterprise on inspection of reprocessing facilities, control of dose, operation, maintenance, accident of reprocessing facilities and weather. Detailed prescriptions are settled on entrance limitation to controlled area, exposure dose, inspection and check, regular independent examination and operation of reprocessing facilities, transportation in the works or the enterprise, storage, disposal, safeguard and measures in dangerous situations, etc. Reports shall be filed on exposure dose of employees and other specified matters in the forms attached and in the case otherwise defined. (Okada, K.)

  15. SAFEGUARDS ENVELOPE: PREVIOUS WORK AND EXAMPLES

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Metcalf, Richard; Bevill, Aaron; Charlton, William; Bean, Robert

    2008-01-01

    The future expansion of nuclear power will require not just electricity production but fuel cycle facilities such as fuel fabrication and reprocessing plants. As large reprocessing facilities are built in various states, they must be built and operated in a manner to minimize the risk of nuclear proliferation. Process monitoring has returned to the spotlight as an added measure that can increase confidence in the safeguards of special nuclear material (SNM). Process monitoring can be demonstrated to lengthen the allowable inventory period by reducing accountancy requirements, and to reduce the false positive indications. The next logical step is the creation of a Safeguards Envelope, a set of operational parameters and models to maximize anomaly detection and inventory period by process monitoring while minimizing operator impact and false positive rates. A brief example of a rudimentary Safeguards Envelope is presented, and shown to detect synthetic diversions overlaying a measured processing plant data set. This demonstration Safeguards Envelope is shown to increase the confidence that no SNM has been diverted with minimal operator impact, even though it is based on an information sparse environment. While the foundation on which a full Safeguards Envelope can be built has been presented in historical demonstrations of process monitoring, several requirements remain yet unfulfilled. Future work will require reprocessing plant transient models, inclusion of 'non-traditional' operating data, and exploration of new methods of identifying subtle events in transient processes

  16. The effect of safeguards on the contractual relations of nuclear suppliers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    MacIsaac, J.F.D.

    1976-01-01

    Canada applies a safeguards system aimed to ensure that nuclear materials and equipment are not diverted from their peaceful uses. These control requirements have a direct influence on the conditions of export contracts concluded by Canadian suppliers of nuclear materials or equipment. In particular if the buyer does not comply with the safeguards clauses, it may not be possible for the Canadian supplier to fulfill the contract. This possibility is covered by the force majeure clauses. (N.E.A.) [fr

  17. A Priority-Based View of Future Challenges in International Nuclear Safeguards.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Matteucci, Kayla [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2017-06-01

    The international nuclear safeguards community is faced with a host of challenges in the coming years, many of which have been outlined but have not been described in terms of their urgency. Literature regarding safeguards challenges is either broad and devoid of any reference to prioritization or tailored to a specific problem and removed from the overall goals of the safeguards community. For example, developing new methods of environmental sampling, improving containment and surveillance (C/S) technologies to increase efficiency and decrease inspection time, advancing nuclear material accountancy (NMA) techniques, and planning safeguards approaches for new types of nuclear facilities are all important. They have not, however, been distinctly prioritized at a high level within the safeguards community. Based on a review of existing literature and interviews with experts on these upcoming challenges, this paper offers a high-level summary of present and future priorities in safeguards, with attention both to what is feasible and to what is most imperative. In doing so, the paper addresses the potential repercussions for failing to prioritize, with a focus on the risk of diversion of nuclear material. Within the context of shifts in the American political landscape, and keeping in mind that nonproliferation issues may take a backseat to others in the near future, a prioritized view of safeguards objectives will be vital. In the interest of expanding upon this work, the paper offers several potential conceptual models for prioritization which can be explored in greater depth upon further research.

  18. Mass media differences in ''nuclear news'' reporting: implications for public opinions and acceptable safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Williams, A.; Williams, J.

    1975-01-01

    The technical and political issues of diversion safeguards are at best confusing to the general public, who derive most of their information about nuclear science from the mass media. This investigation compared ''nuclear news'' of all kinds in three national mass media for thirty-three months of 1972-1974 to examine the quantity and quality of atom-related news they provide. Findings from The New York Times, U. S. News and World Report, and the ABC, CBS, and NBC evening news indicate grounds for low public familiarity with essential concepts of safeguards, and consequently, for consumer value conflicts and weak popular supports for safeguards-related policy

  19. Policy and technical issues for international safeguards in nuclear weapons states

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Markin, J.T.; Stanbro, W.D.

    1994-01-01

    Expansion of international safeguards into the military and commercial fuel cycles of the nuclear weapons states (NWS) -- the subject of previous proposals in international safeguards discussions and of studies in the safeguards literature -- has been given impetus by recent US government initiatives for safeguards on excess weapons materials and a verified fissile materials production cutoff. These proposals, if implemented, would have implications on the safeguards objectives, approaches, and technologies that are traditionally employed in international safeguards. This paper examines the modifications and innovations that might be required to the current international safeguards regime in meeting these proposed new roles. Although the examples given are in the context of the US materials and facilities, many of the conclusions are valid for other NWS. None of the statements in this paper represent official US position on policy for international safeguards in weapons states. Instead, the purpose is to identify policy and technical issues and to offer, where possible, options for their resolution. This paper limits consideration to the potential role of the IAEA in verifying these proposed initiatives for declared facilities, recognizing that there may also be a role for bilateral, multilateral, or regional verification regimes. Indeed, in some cases verification of weapons materials may be more appropriate for a bilateral arrangement. Because traditional IAEA safeguards may not be admissible for weapons materials, the concept of ''transparency'' is suggested as a less intrusive alternative providing some confidence that materials are as declared

  20. Assessing and Promoting the Level of Safeguards Culture in Hungarian Nuclear Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stefanka, Z.; Vincze, A.

    2015-01-01

    The Hungarian SSAC has introduced a comprehensive domestic safeguards verification system consisting of regular comprehensive SSAC verifications in the whole lifetime of the facilities. The main goals of the comprehensive verification system are: (i) to assess the facility's safeguards system compliance with the relevant national legislation and recommendations, (ii) to assess the activities of the facility aimed at maintaining and further developing its safeguards system, and, (iii) to revise validity of data and information previously provided by the facility subject to safeguards licencing procedures. The maintenance level of the system as well as the available knowledge on the possible needs for change reflect the top management's awareness of this issue and is a good indicator of the present and future effectiveness of the facility level safeguards system and the level of safeguards culture. The structure, preparation, conduction, documentation and initial experiences of the comprehensive safeguards verification system is introduced in the paper. Additionally, HAEA has just introduced a safeguards indexing method for evaluation the safeguards culture at Hungarian nuclear facilities. The main goal of indexing method and the evaluated parameters are also shown in the paper. (author)

  1. Spectroscopic methods of process monitoring for safeguards of used nuclear fuel separations

    Science.gov (United States)

    Warburton, Jamie Lee

    To support the demonstration of a more proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel processing plant, techniques and instrumentation to allow the real-time, online determination of special nuclear material concentrations in-process must be developed. An ideal materials accountability technique for proliferation resistance should provide nondestructive, realtime, on-line information of metal and ligand concentrations in separations streams without perturbing the process. UV-Visible spectroscopy can be adapted for this precise purpose in solvent extraction-based separations. The primary goal of this project is to understand fundamental URanium EXtraction (UREX) and Plutonium-URanium EXtraction (PUREX) reprocessing chemistry and corresponding UV-Visible spectroscopy for application in process monitoring for safeguards. By evaluating the impact of process conditions, such as acid concentration, metal concentration and flow rate, on the sensitivity of the UV-Visible detection system, the process-monitoring concept is developed from an advanced application of fundamental spectroscopy. Systematic benchtop-scale studies investigated the system relevant to UREX or PUREX type reprocessing systems, encompassing 0.01-1.26 M U and 0.01-8 M HNO3. A laboratory-scale TRansUranic Extraction (TRUEX) demonstration was performed and used both to analyze for potential online monitoring opportunities in the TRUEX process, and to provide the foundation for building and demonstrating a laboratory-scale UREX demonstration. The secondary goal of the project is to simulate a diversion scenario in UREX and successfully detect changes in metal concentration and solution chemistry in a counter current contactor system with a UV-Visible spectroscopic process monitor. UREX uses the same basic solvent extraction flowsheet as PUREX, but has a lower acid concentration throughout and adds acetohydroxamic acid (AHA) as a complexant/reductant to the feed solution to prevent the extraction of Pu. By examining

  2. Light water reactor fuel reprocessing and recycling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-07-01

    This document was originally intended to provide the basis for an environmental impact statement to assist ERDA in making decisions with respect to possible LWR fuel reprocessing and recycling programs. Since the Administration has recently made a decision to indefinitely defer reprocessing, this environmental impact statement is no longer needed. Nevertheless, this document is issued as a report to assist the public in its consideration of nuclear power issues. The statement compares the various alternatives for the LWR fuel cycle. Costs and environmental effects are compared. Safeguards for plutonium from sabotage and theft are analyzed

  3. The reprocessing-recycling of spent nuclear fuel. Actinides separation - Application to wastes management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    After its use in the reactor, the spent fuel still contains lot of recoverable material for an energetic use (uranium, plutonium), but also fission products and minor actinides which represent the residues of nuclear reactions. The reprocessing-recycling of the spent fuel, as it is performed in France, implies the chemical separation of these materials. The development and the industrial implementation of this separation process represent a major contribution of the French science and technology. The reprocessing-recycling allows a good management of nuclear wastes and a significant saving of fissile materials. With the recent spectacular rise of uranium prices, this process will become indispensable with the development of the next generation of fast neutron reactors. This book takes stock of the present and future variants of the chemical process used for the reprocessing of spent fuels. It describes the researches in progress and presents the stakes and recent results obtained by the CEA. content: the separation of actinides, a key factor for a sustainable nuclear energy; the actinides, a discovery of the 20. century; the radionuclides in nuclear fuels; the aquo ions of actinides; some redox properties of actinides; some complexing properties of actinide cations; general considerations about treatment processes; some characteristics of nuclear fuels in relation with their reprocessing; technical goals and specific constraints of the PUREX process; front-end operations of the PUREX process; separation and purification operations of the PUREX process; elaboration of finite products in the framework of the PUREX process; management and treatment of liquid effluents; solid wastes of the PUREX process; towards a joint management of uranium and plutonium: the COEX TM process; technical options of treatment and recycling techniques; the fuels of generation IV reactors; front-end treatment processes of advanced fuels; hydrometallurgical processes for future fuel cycles

  4. Beyond integrated safeguards: Performance-based assessments for future nuclear controls

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pilat, Joseph F.; Budlong Sylvester, Kory W.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: In the future, if the nuclear nonproliferation and arms control agendas are to advance, they will likely become increasingly seen as parallel undertakings with the objective of comprehensive cradle-to-grave controls over nuclear materials and possibly even warheads removed from defense programs along with materials in civilian use. This 'back to the future' prospect was envisioned in the Acheson-Lillienthal Report and the Baruch Plan, and more modestly in the Atoms-for-Peace Proposal. Unlike the grand plans of the early nuclear years, today's and tomorrow's undertakings will more likely consist of a series of incremental steps with the goal of expanding nuclear controls. These steps will be undertaken at a time of fundamental change in the IAEA safeguards system, and they will be influenced by those changes in profound ways. This prospective influence needs to be taken into account as the IAEA develops and implements integrated safeguards, including its efforts to establish new safeguards criteria, undertake technological and administrative improvements in safeguards, implement credible capabilities for the detection of undeclared nuclear facilities and activities and, perhaps, provide for a more intensive involvement in applying safeguards in new roles such as the verification of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. Performance-based criteria offer one promising way to address the effectiveness of integrated safeguards and to provide a common means of assessing the other key areas of a comprehensive approach to nuclear controls as these develop independently and to the extent that they are coordinated in the future. (author)

  5. Progress in safeguards by design (SBD) by the United States National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Long, J.D.

    2013-01-01

    The IAEA has described the Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept as an approach in which international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning. Often, international safeguards features are added following completion of the facility design. Earlier consideration of safeguards features has the potential to reduce the need for costly re-designs or retrofits of the facility and can result in a more efficient and effective safeguards design. The U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) initiated a project in 2008 through its Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to establish a global norm for the use of SBD. The NGSI SBD program is evolving in parallel with a similar effort at the IAEA, while taking into account the IAEA's SBD achievements and future plans. The NGSI program includes DOE laboratory studies, international workshops, engagement with industry and the IAEA, and setting an example through its planned use in new nuclear facilities in the United States. Consistent with this effort, the NGSI program has sponsored 'Lessons Learned' studies and the preparation of facility-specific SBD Guidance documents. The NGSI program also takes into account successes that the NNSA has had with implementing safeguards early into facility designs within the U.S. The purpose of this paper is the presentation of the most recent developments in SBD under NGSI within the U.S. as well as the presentation of 'Lessons Learned' integrating safeguards into new nuclear facility designs of the U.S. Nuclear Security Enterprise (NSE), namely the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) project at the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee and to discuss its relevance to international safeguards. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (author)

  6. Application of Telepresence Technologies to Nuclear Material Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wright, M.C.; Rome, J.A.

    1999-01-01

    Implementation of remote monitoring systems has become a priority area for the International Atomic Energy Agency and other international inspection regimes. For the past three years, DOE2000 has been the US Department of Energy's (DOE's) initiative to develop innovative applications to exploit the capabilities of broadband networks and media integration. The aim is to enhance scientific collaboration by merging computing and communications technologies. These Internet-based telepresence technologies could be easily extended to provide remote monitoring and control for confidence building and transparency systems at nuclear facilities around the world. One of the original DOE2000 projects, the Materials Microcharacterization Collaboratory is an interactive virtual laboratory, linking seven DOE user facilities located across the US. At these facilities, external collaborators have access to scientists, data, and instrumentation, all of which are available to varying degrees using the Internet. Remote operation of the instruments varies between passive (observational) to active (direct control), in many cases requiring no software at the remote site beyond a Web browser. Live video streams are continuously available on the Web so that participants can see what is happening at a particular location. An X.509 certificate system provides strong authentication, The hardware and software are commercially available and are easily adaptable to safeguards applications

  7. Benchmark data for a large reprocessing plant for evaluation of advanced data analysis algorithms and safeguards system design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Burr, T.L.; Coulter, C.A.; Wangen, L.E.

    1998-02-01

    This report describes the simulation and analysis of solution level and density (L,D) in all key main process tanks in a large reprocessing plant. In addition, initial provisions were made to include temperature (T) data in the analysis at a later time. FacSim, a simulation program developed at Los Alamos, was used to generate simulated process operating data for the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP) that is now under construction in Japan. Both normal facility operation and more than thirty abrupt diversion scenarios were modeled over 25-day periods of simulated operation beginning with clean startup of the facility. The simulation tracked uranium, plutonium (both +3 and +4 oxidation states), HNO 3 diluent, and tributyl phosphate from the input accountability vessel to the plutonium output accountability vessel, with the status of each process vessel and many pipes recorded at intervals of approximately four minutes. These data were used to determine solution volume and density values in each process vessel as a function of time

  8. The UK safeguards R and D support program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Patrick, B.H.; Andrew, G.; Tuley, J.N.

    1991-01-01

    The UK Safeguards R and D Programme in support of IAEA safeguards was formally initiated in 1981. Funding is provided by HM Government through the Department of Energy, responsibility for managing and carrying out the work being placed in the hands of the UK Atomic Energy Authority The programme covers safeguards in a variety of areas, including reprocessing and enrichment plants, nuclear materials in waste, authentication of facility computer systems, training courses for safeguards inspectors, containment and surveillance, destructive and non-destructive assay techniques and techniques for assessing diversion path analysis. In this paper an overview of the work is presented

  9. Identification of uranium signatures in swipe samples on verification of nuclear activities for nuclear safeguards purposes; Identificacao de assinaturas de uranio em amostras de esfregacos (swipe samples) para verificacao de atividades nucleares para fins de salvaguardas nucleares

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pestana, Rafael Cardoso Baptistini

    2013-07-01

    The use of environmental sampling for safeguards purposes, has been applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency–IAEA since 1996 and are routinely used as a complementary measure to strengthen the traditional nuclear safeguards procedures. The aim is verify if the states signatory to the safeguards agreements are not diverging their peaceful nuclear activities for undeclared nuclear activities. This work describes a new protocol of collect and analysis of the swipe samples for identification of nuclear signatures that may be related to the nuclear activities developed in the inspected facility. This work was used as a case of study a real uranium conversion plant of the nuclear fuel cycle of IPEN. The strategy proposed uses different analytical techniques, such as alpha radiation meter, SEM-EDX and ICP-MS to identify signatures of uranium adhered to the swipe samples. In the swipe samples analysis, it was possible to identify particles of UO{sub 2}F{sub 2} and UF4 through the morphological comparison and semi-quantitative analyses performed by SEM-EDX technique. In this work, methods were used that as a result has the average isotopic composition of the sample, in which the enrichment ranged from 1.453 ± 0.023 to 18.24 % ± 0.15 % in the {sup 235}U isotope. Through these externally collections, a non-intrusive sampling, it was possible to identify enriched material handling activities with enrichment of 1.453 % ± 0.023 % to 6.331 ± 0.055 % in the isotope {sup 235}U, as well as the use of reprocessed material, through the identification of the {sup 236}U isotope. The uncertainties obtained for the n({sup 235}U)/n({sup 238}U) ratio varied from 0.40% to 0.86 % for the internal swipe samples. (author)

  10. Operations monitoring concept. Consolidated Fuel Reprocessing Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kerr, H.T.

    1985-01-01

    Operations monitoring is a safeguards concept which could be applied in future fuel cycle facilities to significantly enhance the effectiveness of an integrated safeguards system. In general, a variety of operations monitoring techniques could be developed for both international and domestic safeguards application. The goal of this presentation is to describe specific examples of operations monitoring techniques as may be applied in a fuel reprocessing facility. The operations monitoring concept involves monitoring certain in-plant equipment, personnel, and materials to detect conditions indicative of the diversion of nuclear material. An operations monitoring subsystem should be designed to monitor operations only to the extent necessary to achieve specified safeguards objectives; there is no intent to monitor all operations in the facility. The objectives of the operations monitoring subsystem include: verification of reported data; detection of undeclared uses of equipment; and alerting the inspector to potential diversion activities. 1 fig

  11. Nuclear fuel cycle reprocessing and waste management technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Allardice, R.H.

    1992-01-01

    In this address, the status of global and US nuclear fuel cycles is briefly reviewed. Projections for Europe and the Pacific basin include a transition towards mixed uranium and plutonium oxide (MOX) recycle in thermal and, eventually, fast reactors. Major environmental benefits could be expected by the development of fast reactor technology. Published estimates of the principal greenhouse gas emission from nuclear operations are reviewed. The final section notes the reduction in radiation dose uptake by operators and general public which can be anticipated when fast reactor and thermal reactor fuel cycles are compared. The major reduction follows elimination of the uranium mining/milling operation

  12. A view from the nuclear fuel reprocessing industry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, R.; Hartley, G.

    1982-01-01

    Radiological protection in UK nuclear industry is discussed, with special reference to British Nuclear Fuels Ltd. The following aspects are covered: historical introduction, relevant legislation and general principles; radioactive decay processes (fission, fission products, radio-isotopes, ionising radiations, neutrons); risk assessment (historical, biological radiation effects; ICRP recommendations, dose limits); cost effectiveness of protection; plant design principles; examples of containment (shielding, ventilation and contamination control required for various types of radioactive materials, e.g. fission products, plutonium, depleted uranium; fuel rod storage ponds and decanning caves; fission products at dissolution stage; glovebox handling of Pu operations; critical assembly of fissile materials; surface contamination control; monitoring radiation levels). (U.K.)

  13. Possible toxic effects from the nuclear reprocessing at Sellafield and Cap de la Hague

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schneider, M.; Coeytaux, X.; Faid, Y.B.; Marignac, Y.; Rouy, E.; Thompson, G.; Fairlie, I.; Lowry, D.; Sumner, D.

    2001-11-01

    The principal aim of this report is to assist the Committee of Petitions of the European Parliament in its consideration of Petition 393/95 brought by Dr. W. Nachtwey. The Petition expresses concerns about radioactive discharges from nuclear reprocessing plants at Sellafield in the UK and La Hague in France, and their possible adverse health effects. Six years after the Petition was introduced, the Petitioner main concerns remain relevant. This report concludes that reprocessing discharges are a valid matter for the Committee consideration. It also concludes that, on balance, the Petitioner's concerns over radioactive discharges from Sellafield and La Hague are justified. The report presents evidence and data on: 1) radioactive discharges from the Sellafield and La Hague sites; 2) resulting nuclide concentrations in environmental media including foodstuffs; 3) radiation doses from nuclide discharges to critical groups near the sites; 4) adverse health effects near the two sites; and 5) resulting collective doses from nuclide discharges. The report also examines a number of current issues in radiobiology concerning health effects from exposure to ionising radiation, in particular genetic and in utero effects. In addition, in accordance with contract specifications, the report examines other major factors that might influence future decision-making on reprocessing. It provides information on the legal framework, the operational history of the plants and the economic case for reprocessing compared with available alternatives for spent nuclear fuel management. The report also makes policy-related recommendations that take into account current knowledge and uncertainties in risk assessment and the availability of alternatives to reprocessing in spent fuel management. (authors)

  14. Possible toxic effects from the nuclear reprocessing at Sellafield and Cap de la Hague

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Schneider, M.; Coeytaux, X.; Faid, Y.B.; Marignac, Y.; Rouy, E. [Wise, 75 - Paris (France); Thompson, G. [IRSS, Cambridge (United States); Fairlie, I.; Lowry, D.; Sumner, D

    2001-11-15

    The principal aim of this report is to assist the Committee of Petitions of the European Parliament in its consideration of Petition 393/95 brought by Dr. W. Nachtwey. The Petition expresses concerns about radioactive discharges from nuclear reprocessing plants at Sellafield in the UK and La Hague in France, and their possible adverse health effects. Six years after the Petition was introduced, the Petitioner main concerns remain relevant. This report concludes that reprocessing discharges are a valid matter for the Committee consideration. It also concludes that, on balance, the Petitioner's concerns over radioactive discharges from Sellafield and La Hague are justified. The report presents evidence and data on: 1) radioactive discharges from the Sellafield and La Hague sites; 2) resulting nuclide concentrations in environmental media including foodstuffs; 3) radiation doses from nuclide discharges to critical groups near the sites; 4) adverse health effects near the two sites; and 5) resulting collective doses from nuclide discharges. The report also examines a number of current issues in radiobiology concerning health effects from exposure to ionising radiation, in particular genetic and in utero effects. In addition, in accordance with contract specifications, the report examines other major factors that might influence future decision-making on reprocessing. It provides information on the legal framework, the operational history of the plants and the economic case for reprocessing compared with available alternatives for spent nuclear fuel management. The report also makes policy-related recommendations that take into account current knowledge and uncertainties in risk assessment and the availability of alternatives to reprocessing in spent fuel management. (authors)

  15. A numerical simulation of 129I in the atmosphere emitted from nuclear fuel reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nishizawa, Masato; Suzuki, Takashi; Nagai, Haruyasu; Togawa, Orihiko

    2010-01-01

    A global chemical transport model, MOZART-4, is applied to investigate the behavior of 129 I emitted from nuclear fuel reprocessing plants in Europe (Sellafield in the UK and La Hague in France). The result of numerical simulation for more than fifty-year period from the 1950s is validated by comparison with measurements of 129 I around the world and analyzed to clarify the characteristic of the distributions of concentration and deposition of 129 I. The modeled concentrations of 129 I in precipitation in Europe and the United States and inventories in the seawater around Japan and the Gulf of Mexico are in the same order as measurements. the emitted 129 I to the atmosphere is distributed all over the Northern Hemisphere due mainly to the prevailing westerlies and can be an important source of supply of artificial 129 I for the seawater remote from the point source such as a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant. (author)

  16. Challenges for development and provision of metrological quality control tools in nuclear safeguards, nuclear forensics and nuclear security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aregbe, Y.; Richter, S.; Jakopic, R.; Bauwens, J.; Truyens, J.; Sturm, M.; Bujak, R.; Eykens, R.; Kehoe, F.; Kuehn, H.; Hennessy, C.

    2013-01-01

    Joint advancements in quality control tools and measurement sciences of international reference and safeguards laboratories include: -) successful integration of the Modified Total Evaporation technique (MTE) as a new tool for routine thermal ionization mass spectrometry in nuclear safeguards and security, -) research and feasibility studies for the development of new materials standard, particularly for nuclear forensics (Certified Reference Materials - CRMs for age-dating), -) quality control tools to support the additional protocol and nuclear security (particle CRMs, NUSIMEP (inter-laboratory comparisons for U particle analysis), and -) scientific/technical advice, training and knowledge transfer. The European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA), the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) and the CETAMA Commission from the French Commission of Atomic Energy and Alternative Energies (CEA/CETAMA) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Technical Meetings are the platforms to exchange views on the needs and challenges for new Quality Control tools for nuclear safeguards and security. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  17. Analysis of UREX+1a and Pyroprocessing Technologies from Safeguards Aspects

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Musembi, Mutava Victor [Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Jeong, Seung Young [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Kwon, Eun Ha [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2013-10-15

    Various advanced and more easily safeguard-able reprocessing technologies have been proposed and are currently at different stages of development. This paper briefly analyses two proposed next generation reprocessing technologies, i. e. UREX+1a and pyroprocessing. It goes on to suggest various measures that can be taken to safeguard these technologies against nuclear proliferation. Due to the significant proliferation risks associated with PUREX, more proliferation resistant technologies are required in spent fuel reprocessing. UREX+1a and pyroprocessing can be suitable replacements since Pu is not separated from other TRUs after reprocessing. Implementations of technology specific safeguard measures can help enhance the proliferation resistance of these technologies. Since there is no technology which is foolproof, a MUF uncertainty estimation/quantification technology needs to be developed. These uncertainty estimates can then be used in a safeguards probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) system to quantify the risks associated with a particular reprocessing technology. To further safeguard these technologies, additional safeguard measures are needed for defense in depth. This may include implementation of multiple, independent, and redundant layers of defense such that no single layer, no matter how robust, is solely relied upon. Quantification of safeguard uncertainties related to UREX+1a and pyroprocessing can be used to benchmark these technologies against PUREX and between themselves for policy making.

  18. Analysis of UREX+1a and Pyroprocessing Technologies from Safeguards Aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Musembi, Mutava Victor; Jeong, Seung Young; Kwon, Eun Ha

    2013-01-01

    Various advanced and more easily safeguard-able reprocessing technologies have been proposed and are currently at different stages of development. This paper briefly analyses two proposed next generation reprocessing technologies, i. e. UREX+1a and pyroprocessing. It goes on to suggest various measures that can be taken to safeguard these technologies against nuclear proliferation. Due to the significant proliferation risks associated with PUREX, more proliferation resistant technologies are required in spent fuel reprocessing. UREX+1a and pyroprocessing can be suitable replacements since Pu is not separated from other TRUs after reprocessing. Implementations of technology specific safeguard measures can help enhance the proliferation resistance of these technologies. Since there is no technology which is foolproof, a MUF uncertainty estimation/quantification technology needs to be developed. These uncertainty estimates can then be used in a safeguards probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) system to quantify the risks associated with a particular reprocessing technology. To further safeguard these technologies, additional safeguard measures are needed for defense in depth. This may include implementation of multiple, independent, and redundant layers of defense such that no single layer, no matter how robust, is solely relied upon. Quantification of safeguard uncertainties related to UREX+1a and pyroprocessing can be used to benchmark these technologies against PUREX and between themselves for policy making

  19. THE ECONOMICS OF REPROCESSING vs. DIRECT DISPOSAL OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bunn, Matthew; Fetter, Steve; Holdren, John P.; Zwaan, Bob van der

    2003-01-01

    This report assesses the economics of reprocessing versus direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The breakeven uranium price at which reprocessing spent nuclear fuel from existing light-water reactors (LWRs) and recycling the resulting plutonium and uranium in LWRs would become economic is assessed, using central estimates of the costs of different elements of the nuclear fuel cycle (and other fuel cycle input parameters), for a wide range of range of potential reprocessing prices. Sensitivity analysis is performed, showing that the conclusions reached are robust across a wide range of input parameters. The contribution of direct disposal or reprocessing and recycling to electricity cost is also assessed. The choice of particular central estimates and ranges for the input parameters of the fuel cycle model is justified through a review of the relevant literature. The impact of different fuel cycle approaches on the volume needed for geologic repositories is briefly discussed, as are the issues surrounding the possibility of performing separations and transmutation on spent nuclear fuel to reduce the need for additional repositories. A similar analysis is then performed of the breakeven uranium price at which deploying fast neutron breeder reactors would become competitive compared with a once-through fuel cycle in LWRs, for a range of possible differences in capital cost between LWRs and fast neutron reactors. Sensitivity analysis is again provided, as are an analysis of the contribution to electricity cost, and a justification of the choices of central estimates and ranges for the input parameters. The equations used in the economic model are derived and explained in an appendix. Another appendix assesses the quantities of uranium likely to be recoverable worldwide in the future at a range of different possible future prices

  20. Method for recovering palladium and technetium values from nuclear fuel reprocessing waste solutions

    Science.gov (United States)

    Horwitz, E. Philip; Delphin, Walter H.

    1979-07-24

    A method for recovering palladium and technetium values from nuclear fuel reprocessing waste solutions containing these and other values by contacting the waste solution with an extractant of tricaprylmethylammonium nitrate in an inert hydrocarbon diluent which extracts the palladium and technetium values from the waste solution. The palladium and technetium values are recovered from the extractant and from any other coextracted values with a strong nitric acid strip solution.

  1. Ion chromatographic separation for analysis of radiostrontium in nuclear reprocessing solutions of high ionic strength

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lamb, J.D.; Nordmeyer, F.R.; Drake, P.A.; Elder, M.P.; Miles, R.W.

    1989-01-01

    An ion chromatography (IC)-based method was developed for Sr 2+ concentration and separation showing high recoveries of strontium. This procedure permits complete automation. One of the potential weaknesses of the IC approach to sample preconcentration, i.e. sensitivity to solutions of high acid content, common in nuclear reprocessing solution, has been overcome by a novel application of acid suppression technology. (author) 12 refs.; 8 figs.; 3 tabs

  2. Methodology for evaluation of alternative technologies applied to nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Selvaduray, G.S.; Goldstein, M.K.; Anderson, R.N.

    1977-07-01

    An analytic methodology has been developed to compare the performance of various nuclear fuel reprocessing techniques for advanced fuel cycle applications including low proliferation risk systems. The need to identify and to compare those processes, which have the versatility to handle the variety of fuel types expected to be in use in the next century, is becoming increasingly imperative. This methodology allows processes in any stage of development to be compared and to assess the effect of changing external conditions on the process

  3. The Planning of a Small Pilot Plant for Development Work on Aqueous Reprocessing of Nuclear Fuels

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sjoeborg, T U; Haeffner, E; Hultgren, Aa

    1963-10-15

    A shielded volume (42 m{sup 3}) in the hot laboratory at Kjeller, Norway, has been used for the installation of a small pilot plant intended for studies on nuclear fuel reprocessing. During the first period of operation (1963) a plutonium separation method (the Silex process) developed at AB Atomenergi will be studied. This document is a description of the project during the stage of technical planning and chemical process development.

  4. A global-scale dispersion analysis of iodine-129 from nuclear fuel reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nishizawa, Masato; Suzuki, Takashi; Nagai, Haruyasu; Togawa, Orihiko

    2010-01-01

    A three-dimensional global chemical transport model, MOZART-2, is applied to investigate the global-sale dispersion of Iodine-129 from nuclear fuel reprocessing plants. The concentration and deposition of 129 I obtained by MOZART-2 are dispersed all over the Northern Hemisphere. The emission of 129 I to the atmosphere is thus important in considering the transport of 129 I to remote sites. (author)

  5. IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    IAEA safeguards are a system of technical measures within the framework of international non-proliferation policy entrusted to the IAEA in its Statute and by other treaties. About 98% of the world's nuclear installations outside the nuclear-weapon countries are now under safeguards. This paper gives a review of IAEA activities in this field: objectives, agreements, work and development of staff of the IAEA's Department of Safeguards, instruments and techniques for direct measurement and verification of nuclear material. (author)

  6. Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Education at Texas A&M University

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gariazzo, C.; Charlton, W.

    2015-01-01

    The MS degree in Nuclear Engineering - Non-proliferation at Texas A&M University is administered by the Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute (NSSPI). The oldest and largest of its kind in the US, 45 M.S. and 15 Ph.D. students conducted technical research in relevant areas: safeguards, nuclear security, non-proliferation, and arms control. In addition to focusing on graduate education with a wide combination of internationally-recognized talent, NSSPI faculty lead research and service activities in safeguarding of nuclear materials and reducing nuclear threats. Texas A&M Nuclear Engineering students take relevant nonproliferation and safeguards courses (within the College of Engineering and the Texas A&M Bush School of Government) as well as conduct their research under competent experts. The complete educational experience here is unique because of the strong research and educational support NSSPI provides. This paper will detail these endeavors and convey contributions from NSSPI for developing next-generation safeguards experts via practical experiences and strong affiliations with real-world practitioners. The safeguards and non-proliferation education programme blends historical, legal, technical and policy aspects that is unique for a technical university such as Texas A&M. Beyond classroom lectures, NSSPI provides opportunities for students ranging from asynchronous learning modules to practical experiences. Publicly-available self-paced, online course modules in basic and advanced safeguards education have been developed by NSSPI as supplemental nuclear education for students and professionals. By leveraging NSSPI's contacts, students participate in exchange programmes with international institutions as well as partake in experiences like engaging safeguards practitioners at nuclear fuel cycle facilities around the world, conducting experiments at internationally-renowned laboratories, and representing their communities at workshops worldwide

  7. Implementation of integrated safeguards in Nuclear Fuel Plant at Pitesti, Romania

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Olaru, V.; Ivana, T.; Epure, Gh.

    2009-01-01

    The nuclear activity was conducted for many years in Romania under Traditional Safeguards (TS) and has developed in good conditions the specific nuclear safeguards. Now there is a good opportunity to improve the performance and quality of the safeguards activity and at the same time to increase the accountancy and control of nuclear materials by passing to Integrated Safeguards (IS) implementation. The legal framework is the Law 100/2000 for ratification of the Protocol between Romania and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), additional completion to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Romania Government and IAEA relating to safeguards. It is part of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons published in the Official Gazette no. 3/31 January 1970, and the Additional Protocol published in the Official Gazette no. 295/ 29.06.2000. The first discussion about Integrated Safeguards (IS) between the Nuclear Fuel Plant (FCN) representatives and IAEA inspectors has taken place in June 2005. In Feb. 2007 an IAEA mission visited FCN and established the main steps for implementing the IS. There were visited the storage and the technological flow and it was reviewed the residence times for different nuclear materials, the applied chemical analysis, metrological methods, weighting method and procedures of elaborating the implied documents and lists. At the same time the IAEA and FCN representatives established the main points for implementing the IS at FCN i.e. performing the Short Notice Random Inspections (SNRI), communicating the eligible days for SNRI for each year, communicating the estimated deliveries and shipments for the first quarter and then for the rest of the year, mail box daily declaration (DD) with respect to the residence time for several nuclear materials, advance notification (AN) for each nuclear material transfer (shipments and receipts), etc. At 01 June 2007 Romania has passed officially to Integrated Safeguards and FCN (RO

  8. International and institutional aspects of reprocessing and plutonium management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-09-01

    Various institutional alternatives applicable to reprocessing, plutonium management and recycle are considered, not as a definitive analysis but rather as a basis for identifying the institutional approaches and measures which the Working Group might wish to examine more thoroughly. Seven alternatives arrangements for reprocessing are presented. These range from suspending the operation of existing reprocessing plants through placing national facilities under safeguards to limiting reprocessing to a few large facilities subject to plutonium management, multinational or international control. Finally, the comprehensive alternative of an International Nuclear Fuel Authority with worldwide responsibility for reprocessing and plutonium management is considered. Plutonium management alternatives to complement the reprocessing options, are then outlined. These include national discretion on the separation and disposition of plutonium under safeguards, an agreed Code of Practice for plutonium management at national facilities and the international storage of plutonium. The advantages and disadvantages of the alternative are discussed tentatively. It is recognised that the alternatives are presented in a simplified form and that their elements can be combined or separated in many ways. Although strengthening the institutions relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is imperative and can contribute to non-proliferation, such arrangements might open other proliferation risks through the spread of sensitive materials, facilities and technology. While there are risks with any fuel cycle, where plutonium in quantity is separated these risks are of a high order. Although these can be mitigated, they will have to be set against the energy and economic case for reprocessing and alternatives other than plutonium considered

  9. Safeguards for final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. Methods and technologies for the Olkiluoto site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Okko, O.

    2003-05-01

    The final disposal of the nuclear material shall introduce new safeguards concerns which have not been addressed previously in IAEA safeguards approaches for spent fuel. The encapsulation plant to be built at the site will be the final opportunity for verification of spent fuel assemblies prior to their transfer to the geological repository. Moreover, additional safety and safeguards measures are considered for the underground repository. Integrated safeguards verification systems will also concentrate on environmental monitoring to observe unannounced activities related to possible diversion schemes at the repository site. The final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in geological formation will begin in Finland within 10 years. After the geological site investigations and according to legal decision made in 2001, the final repository of the spent nuclear fuel shall be located at the Olkiluoto site in Eurajoki. The next phase of site investigations contains the construction of an underground facility, called ONKALO, for rock characterisation purposes. The excavation of the ONKALO is scheduled to start in 2004. Later on, the ONKALO may form a part of the final repository. The plans to construct the underground facility for nuclear material signify that the first safeguards measures, e.g. baseline mapping of the site area, need to take prior to the excavation phase. In order to support the development and implementation of the regulatory control of the final disposal programme, STUK established an independent expert group, LOSKA. The group should support the STUK in the development of the technical safeguards requirements, in the implementation of the safeguards and in the evaluation of the plans of the facility operator. This publication includes four background reports produced by this group. The first of these 'NDA verification of spent fuel, monitoring of disposal canisters, interaction of the safeguards and safety issues in the final disposal' describes the new

  10. Dynamical nuclear safeguard investigations in nuclear materials using Analytic Pair Values

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Woo, Tae-Ho

    2011-01-01

    Highlights: → The quantification of the safeguard is performed to enhance operation safety. → Newly introduced maximum pair values with multiplications are obtained by the AHP method. → The dynamical simulations are performed based on the energy policy aspect. → The comparisons using NSP are possible. → A better operation skill is developed. - Abstract: The operation of nuclear power plants (NPPs) has been investigated from the view point of safeguard assessment. The risk of terrorist attack on NPPs is one of the critical points in the secure plant operations. The basic event of the related incidents is quantified by the random sampling using a Monte-Carlo method. The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is developed leading to the maximum pair values with multiplications which are decided by reactor characteristics. The matrix form analysis is compared with five NPP types of interest. Using a life cycle of 60 years, the range of the secure operation is between 0.020628 and 0.0212986, as relative numbers. This means the highest value in the range of secure power operation is about 1.043 times larger than the lowest one in this study. The consistency has the highest consistent values in the 24th and 54th years, as represented by C.I. (Consistency Index) and C.R. (Consistency Ratio). Finally, a nuclear safeguard protocol (NSP) is successfully constructed for the safe operation.

  11. Why reprocess

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hagen, M.

    1977-01-01

    The problem of whether to reprocess spent nuclear fuel elements has been studied already in the early days of the commercial utilization of nuclear power and has been answered positively. This also, and in particular, applies to the United States. Under the new American nuclear policy reprocessing is rejected only for reasons of non-proliferation. Although these are valid reasons, the effectiveness of a ban on reprocessing, as fas as the non-profileration of nuclear weapons is concerned, is not accepted worldwide because the necessary knowledge either already exists in many countries or can be obtained. Only if there had been a realistic chance to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, also the other industrialized countries would have seconded the policy of the United States. A country like the Federal Republic of Germany, with a substantial long-term nuclear power program based initially on light water reactors, subsequently on advanced reactor systems, cannot do without a complete nuclear fuel cycle. This reasoning is outlined in the light of economic and radioecological aspects. Extensive experience on a technical scale is available in the reprocessing sector. The technical problems associated with this activity have been solved in principle and have largely been demonstrated to function in practice. (orig.) [de

  12. Reprocessing of radioactive waste, toward recycling of nuclear rare metals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ozawa, M.

    2010-01-01

    Conclusions: Rare metals are inevitable in the leading industries and hold the national GDP. Industry-oriented, light PGM and Ln, etc, are localized and must be exhausted. They will become “strategic material”like oils by producing countries. Nuclear fission reaction will create 31 rare metals as well as energy. Now, SF should be considered as nota waste but a new artificial ore.In the flame of Adv.-ORIENT Cycle research, hydrometallurgical, soft and salt-free, separation processes are under developing. A hybrid system of CEE and IXC, in HNO3/HCl media with CH3OH, is promising in separation chemistry. Radio-toxicity of eventually vitrified HLLW is expected to be significantly decreased. To increase the reality, active tests on the separation system are planed in this year. Investigation on engineering issue, safety and costs will be the key

  13. DA and NDA measurement of nuclear materials Mayak reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dzekun, E.G.; Lelyuk, G.A.; Sazhnov, V.K.

    1999-01-01

    Methods of nuclear material (NM) analysis and their quality assurance at the laboratory of RT-1 plant of PA Mayak are reviewed as applicable to the NM control and accounting system. The impact of analysis quality on the NM control and accounting system quality is analyzed. It has been shown that major component of the inventory difference for plutonium is caused by the errors of its measurement in the initial solution. The expedience of decreasing this error from 5 % to 1-1.5 % has been substantiated. Errors of plutonium detection on the other flows of NM at the facility prove to be acceptable for the NM control and accounting system. Accuracy of uranium concentration measurements proved to be satisfactory for all NM flows [ru

  14. Nuclear-fuel-cycle costs. Consolidated Fuel-Reprocessing Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Burch, W.D.; Haire, M.J.; Rainey, R.H.

    1981-01-01

    The costs for the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle, which were developed as part of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program (NASAP), are presented. Total fuel-cycle costs are given for the pressurized-water reactor once-through and fuel-recycle systems, and for the liquid-metal fast-breeder-reactor system. These calculations show that fuel-cycle costs are a small part of the total power costs. For breeder reactors, fuel-cycle costs are about half that of the present once-through system. The total power cost of the breeder-reactor system is greater than that of light-water reactor at today's prices for uranium and enrichment

  15. Personnel exposure estimates associated with nuclear fuel reprocessing waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boone, F.W.; Rogers, B.W.

    1983-08-01

    The operation design of the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP) calls for shipment of its wastes to either a low-level waste disposal site or to a Federal repository. This study analyzes the probable radiation dose accrued to the personnel involved in handling waste packages from all identified waste streams of the BNFP from generation to reception at destination and including transportation. The shielding characteristics of the transport packages were derived by assuming packaging in existing or prototyped casks. Possible combinations of waste forms and packages for which the projected dose exceeded DOT or NRC regulations for transport of radioactive materials were rejected. Legal weight truck and legal weight rail transport modes were assumed. Potential ways for reducing overall personnel exposure are considered, concentrating on the particular streams with the largest dose contributions. The personnel exposure estimates were determined using a computer program specifically designed for this purpose. This program is described in Appendix A. 9 references, 3 figures, 19 tables

  16. Educating the next generation of nuclear safeguards and security experts at TAMU

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Charlton, William S.; Boyle, David; Chirayath, Sunil; Ford, David G.; Gariazzo, Claudio A.; Marianno, Craig; Ragusa, Kelley; Solodov, Alexander

    2011-01-01

    The Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute (NSSPI) has established a Nuclear Nonproliferation specialization for the Master of Science degree within the Nuclear Engineering Department at Texas A and M University (TAMU). Since 2004, twenty-eight students have received MS degrees in this area and over 200 (technical and policy) students have taken classes offered by NSSPI at TAMU. The model for educating safeguards and security experts is being changed at TAMU. Beyond conventional classroom lectures, NSSPI has developed alternative educational models based on practical experience, asynchronous learning portals, and virtual courses in both nuclear safeguards and nuclear security. Due to the experimental and practical past experiences of NSSPI staff and faculty, a heavy hands-on component has been implemented for TAMU nuclear engineering graduate students: hands-on education at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, visiting nuclear installations in other countries to discuss applied safeguards, and summer internships at several national laboratories. In an effort to disseminate basic nuclear education for professionals and students around the globe, NSSPI has developed a publically-available online resource that offers self-paced, independent course modules in basic safeguards and security education: the Nuclear Safeguards Education Portal. Another venture utilized by NSSPI is using a virtual TAMU campus to hold classes for students at a distance. NSSPI is building upon a successful academic program by embracing new educational means. This paper describes the current efforts NSSPI and TAMU have undertaken in strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation, safeguards and security human resource capacity domestically and internationally and the lessons learned from these efforts. (author)

  17. Radioactive effluents from nuclear power stations and nuclear fuel reprocessing plants in the European Community

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Luykx, F.; Fraser, G.

    1983-01-01

    The report covers operational nuclear power stations of capacity greater than 5C MWe and nucler fuel reprocessing plants in the European Community. Radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent discharges from these installations are given for the period 1976 to 1980, expressed both in absolute terms and normalized to net electricity production from the fuel. An assesssment is then made of exposure of members of the public consequent to the 1980 discharges. Where environmental contamination levels were detectable the results have been taken into account in the dose assessment; however, environmental contamination was in general below the limit of detection. In these circumstances the dose estimates rely entirely on theoretical models which frequently incorporate conservative assumptions; hence these estimates are likely to be greater than the doses actually received. The estimated exposures have then been compared with the dose limits set out in the Euratom Directive of 15th July, 1980. It is concluded that the exposure of members of the public always left an appreciable safety margin relative to the limits and indeed lay within the variations in exposure which result from natural background

  18. Examination of methods of proliferation control for application to nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    O'Hara, F.A.

    1980-01-01

    Potential methods are examined that could be applied to the nuclear fuel reprocessing facility as a means of more effectively controlling the proliferation threat and, at the same time, permitting the further development of nuclear power as an energy source. The proposed remedies for this problem are basically technical or economic and political in nature and include: ''technical fixes'', institutional arrangements, and international political solutions. Each of these approaches to the problem is examined, along with a consideration of their interaction and an estimation of their effectiveness, either individually or in combination. 22 refs

  19. Dynamic considerations in the development of centrifugal separators used for reprocessing nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strunk, W.D.; Singh, S.P.; Tuft, R.M.

    1988-01-01

    The development of centrifugal separators has been a key ingredient in improving the process used for reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. The separators are used to segregate uranium and plutonium from the fission products produced by a controlled nuclear reaction. The separators are small variable speed centrifuges, designed to operate in a harsh environment. Dynamic problems were detected by vibration analysis and resolved using modal analysis and trending. Problems with critical speeds, resonances in the base, balancing, weak components, precision manufacturing, and short life have been solved

  20. Design of vertical thermosiphon reboilers for operation under vacuum conditions application in nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moore, M.J.C.; Keys, M.H.; Plumb, G.R.

    1988-01-01

    Reprocessing of nuclear fuel requires concentration of uranium, plutonium and other active effluent streams at various stages for purification, storage or solidification. This is usually achieved by evaporation and in U.K. plant such processes are often carried out under reduced pressure. For high throughput streams, there are considerable advantages in using vertical thermosiphon systems for evaporation and for recovery of nitric acid. However, data for such systems at reduced pressure is limited and the development by John Brown E and C Ltd of a computer program for reliable prediction of thermosiphon performance was carried out on behalf of British Nuclear Fuels Plc using data from operating plant. (author)