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Sample records for safeguarded fuels reprocessing

  1. Integrated international safeguards concepts for fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Gutmacher, R.G.; Markin, J.T.; Shipley, J.P.; Whitty, W.J.; Camp, A.L.; Cameron, C.P.; Bleck, M.E.; Ellwein, L.B.

    1981-12-01

    This report is the fourth in a series of efforts by the Los Alamos National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, to identify problems and propose solutions for international safeguarding of light-water reactor spent-fuel reprocessing plants. Problem areas for international safeguards were identified in a previous Problem Statement (LA-7551-MS/SAND79-0108). Accounting concepts that could be verified internationally were presented in a subsequent study (LA-8042). Concepts for containment/surveillance were presented, conceptual designs were developed, and the effectiveness of these designs was evaluated in a companion study (SAND80-0160). The report discusses the coordination of nuclear materials accounting and containment/surveillance concepts in an effort to define an effective integrated safeguards system. The Allied-General Nuclear Services fuels reprocessing plant at Barnwell, South Carolina, was used as the reference facility

  2. Analytical chemistry needs for nuclear safeguards in nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.

    1977-01-01

    A fuel reprocessing plant designed to process 1500 tons of light water reactor fuel per year will recover 15 tons of Pu during that time, or approximately 40 to 50 kg of Pu per day. Conventional nuclear safeguards accountability has relied on batch accounting at the head and tail ends of the reprocessing plant with semi-annual plant cleanout to determine in-process holdup. An alternative proposed safeguards system relies on dynamic material accounting whereby in-line NDA and conventional analytical techniques provide indications on a daily basis of SNM transfers into the system and information of Pu holdup within the system. Some of the analytical requirements and problems for dynamic materials accounting in a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant are described. Some suggestions for further development will be proposed

  3. Safeguarding a future industrial reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-11-01

    This paper is submitted to Working Group 5, Sub-Group B for information. It is being submitted to Working Group 4 for discussion at their meeting in January 1979 and shows that by a combination of accountancy, surveillance and containment a reliable safeguards system can be designed for the reprocessing of fuels of the BWR and PWR type. Its arguments can, in general terms, be applied to plants for reprocessing LMFBR fuels, with due allowance for future advances which should improve our overall knowledge of the reliability of safeguards systems. In the reprocessing of fast reactor (LMFBR) fuels, as compared with LWR fuels, the main differences are the higher plutonium concentration and lower heavy metal throughput in the early stages of the reprocessing operations. At later stages in the process (after plutonium/uranium separation) the plants could be similar and have similar safeguarding problems. Plants for reprocessing LMFBR on a commercial scale will not be in operation for a number of years. In these plants greater attention may have to be paid to safeguards at the early stages, especially to waste/raffinate streams, than in the PWR/BWR reprocessing plant. The actual balance between containment, surveillance and accountancy adopted will depend on the status of the technology of safeguards and reprocessing. It can be anticipated that improvements to measurement systems will be made which may allow greater reliance on actual measurement. Treatment and recycle of solid wastes will advance and could therefore lead to improvements in accountancy in, for example, the ''head-end''

  4. Simulation of nuclear fuel reprocessing for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Canty, M.J.; Dayem, H.A.; Kern, E.A.; Spannagel, G.

    1983-11-01

    For safeguarding the chemical process area of future reprocessing plants the near-real-time material accountancy (NRTMA) method might be applied. Experimental data are not yet available for testing the capability of the NRTMA method but can be simulated using a digital computer. This report describes the mathematical modeling of the Pu-bearing components of reprocessing plants and presents first results obtained by simulation models. (orig.) [de

  5. EURATOM safeguards. Safeguards verifications in reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heppleston, M.

    1999-01-01

    This paper provides a brief historical view of the legal basis for EURATOM. The specific application of safeguards to large scale reprocessing plants, from the theoretical model to the practical application of inspection is considered. The challenge to adequately safeguard major commercial reprocessing facilities has led to many novel approaches being developed. These lessons will also benefit other safeguard projects as a result. Good cooperation between the operator and regulator is essential for the satisfactory installation of adequate safeguard controls. The use of modern data processing technology combined with other diverse monitoring techniques has shown that a major industrial scale reprocessing plant can be controlled under international safeguards to provide a high level of assurance [ru

  6. Preliminary concepts: coordinated safeguards for materials management in a thorium--uranium fuel reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Barnes, J.W.; Dayem, H.A.; Dietz, R.J.; Shipley, J.P.

    1978-10-01

    This report addresses preliminary concepts for coordinated safeguards materials management in a typical generic thorium--uranium-fueled light-water reactor (LWR) fuels reprocessing plant. The reference facility is designed to recover thorium and uranium from first-generation (denatured 235 U) startup fuels, first-recycle and equilibrium (denatured 233 U) thorium--uranium LWR fuels, and to recover the plutonium generated in the 238 U denaturant as well. 12 figures, 3 tables

  7. Coordinated safeguards for materials management in a fuel reprocessing plant. Volume I

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Cobb, D.D.; Dayem, H.A.; Dietz, R.J.; Kern, E.A.; Schelonka, E.P.; Shipley, J.P.; Smith, D.B.; Augustson, R.H.; Barnes, J.W.

    1977-09-01

    A materials management system is described for safeguarding special nuclear materials in a fuel-reprocessing plant. Recently developed nondestructive-analysis techniques and process-monitoring devices are combined with conventional chemical analyses and process-control instrumentation for improved materials accounting data. Unit-process accounting based on dynamic material balances permits localization of diversion in time and space, and the application of advanced statistical methods supported by decision-analysis theory ensures optimum use of accounting information for detecting diversion. This coordinated safeguards system provides maximum effectiveness consistent with modest cost and minimum process interference. Modeling and simulation techniques are used to evaluate the sensitivity of the system to single and multiple thefts and to compare various safeguards options. The study identifies design criteria that would improve the safeguardability of future plants

  8. Problem statement: international safeguards for a light-water reactor fuels reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shipley, J.P.; Hakkila, E.A.; Dietz, R.J.; Cameron, C.P.; Bleck, M.E.; Darby, J.L.

    1979-03-01

    This report considers the problem of developing international safeguards for a light-water reactor (LWR) fuel reprocessing/conversion facility that combines the Purex process with conversion of plutonium nitrate to the oxide by means of plutonium (III) oxalate precipitation and calcination. Current international safeguards systems are based on the complementary concepts of materials accounting and containment and surveillance, which are designed to detect covert, national diversion of nuclear material. This report discusses the possible diversion threats and some types of countermeasures, and it represents the first stage in providing integrated international safeguards system concepts that make optimum use of available resources. The development of design methodology to address this problem will constitute a significant portion of the subsequent effort. Additionally, future technology development requirements are identified. 8 figures, 1 table

  9. Euratom experience in safeguarding reprocessing and thermal reactor mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities within the European Community

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-11-01

    The legal basis and instruments for the application of safeguards in the European Community are described. Euratom safeguards apply throughout the fuel cycle starting at the ore stage. Euratom has had experience in the application of safeguards to small and medium size reprocessing and MOX fabrication plants. In reprocessing plants accountancy, containment and surveillance methods are applied and the plant is divided into three material balance areas. Similar procedures are applied at fabrication plants. Euratom inspectors apply their main verification activities at strategic points but have the right of access at any time to all places which contain nuclear material. Under the Euratom-IAEA Agreements 'Joint Teams' of Euratom and IAEA inspectors will operate together to minimise the burden on operators and to avoid duplication of effort while enabling both organisations to achieve their safeguards objectives

  10. Safeguards approach for irradiated fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harms, N.L.; Roberts, F.P.

    1987-03-01

    IAEA verification of irradiated fuel has become more complicated because of the introduction of variations in what was once presumed to be a straightforward flow of fuel from reactors to reprocessing plants, with subsequent dissolution. These variations include fuel element disassembly and reassembly, rod consolidation, double-tiering of fuel assemblies in reactor pools, long term wet and dry storage, and use of fuel element containers. This paper reviews future patterns for the transfer and storage of irradiated LWR fuel and discusses appropriate safeguards approaches for at-reactor storage, reprocessing plant headend, independent wet storage, and independent dry storage facilities

  11. Safeguards for reprocessing and enrichment plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    Agency safeguards are entering a new phase with the coming under active safeguards for the first time of reprocessing plants in several regions of the world. This is taking place at a time when not only the safeguards aspect itself is coming under international scrutiny, but also at a time when the necessity of reprocessing plants is being called into question. Attracting less attention at the moment, but potentially of equal significance, are the enrichment plants that soon will be coming under Agency safeguards. It is not unreasonable in view of the present controversies to ask what is the significance of these reprocessing and enrichment plants, what are the problems concerning safeguards that appear to have given rise to the controversies, and how these problems are to be solved. The question of significance is an easy one to answer. The output of these plants is material which some people consider can be used directly for military purposes, whereas the output from other plants, for instance, reactors, would require long and extensive processing before it could be used for military purposes. Like most short answers, this one is an over-simplification which requires some elaboration to make it strictly accurate. For example, the material output of a power reactor is in the form of irradiate assemblies containing plutonium which is potentially of military use if the irradiation had been within a certain range. However, to utilize this plutonium under clandestine conditions, the highly radioactive material would have to be secretly transported to a reprocessing plant and there would have to be simultaneous falsification of the reactor material accounts and the plant records. Such falsification would be difficult to conceal. The total time required to obtain usable plutonium would be many months. Diversion of material from a uranium fabrication plant making fuel for power reactors would be easier physically but strategically it would be of little value. The

  12. Spent fuel reprocessing options

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-08-01

    The objective of this publication is to provide an update on the latest developments in nuclear reprocessing technologies in the light of new developments on the global nuclear scene. The background information on spent fuel reprocessing is provided in Section One. Substantial global growth of nuclear electricity generation is expected to occur during this century, in response to environmental issues and to assure the sustainability of the electrical energy supply in both industrial and less-developed countries. This growth carries with it an increasing responsibility to ensure that nuclear fuel cycle technologies are used only for peaceful purposes. In Section Two, an overview of the options for spent fuel reprocessing and their level of development are provided. A number of options exist for the treatment of spent fuel. Some, including those that avoid separation of a pure plutonium stream, are at an advanced level of technological maturity. These could be deployed in the next generation of industrial-scale reprocessing plants, while others (such as dry methods) are at a pilot scale, laboratory scale or conceptual stage of development. In Section Three, research and development in support of advanced reprocessing options is described. Next-generation spent fuel reprocessing plants are likely to be based on aqueous extraction processes that can be designed to a country specific set of spent fuel partitioning criteria for recycling of fissile materials to advanced light water reactors or fast spectrum reactors. The physical design of these plants must incorporate effective means for materials accountancy, safeguards and physical protection. Section four deals with issues and challenges related to spent fuel reprocessing. The spent fuel reprocessing options assessment of economics, proliferation resistance, and environmental impact are discussed. The importance of public acceptance for a reprocessing strategy is discussed. A review of modelling tools to support the

  13. Safeguards implementation in UP3 reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laurent, J.P.; Regnier, J.; Talbourdet, Y.; De Jong, P.

    1991-01-01

    The implementation of safeguards in a large size reprocessing plant is a challenge, considering the high throughput of nuclear material and the sophisticated automation of such facilities. In the case of UP3, a pragmatic and realistic approach has been devised and is applied through an efficient cooperation between the safeguards organizations, the french national authorities and the operator. In essence, they consist in verification of every significant inputs and outputs, in timely analysis by NDA (e.g. solutions of dissolution through an on site k-edge equipment), in monitoring selected parts of the inprocess inventory and in specific containment/surveillance systems for the spent fuel storage ponds and the PuO2 storage. (author)

  14. International safeguards for reprocessing plants. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kratzer, M.; Scheinman, L.; Sievering, N.; Wonder, E.; Lipman, D.; Immerman, W.; Elliott, J.M.; Crane, F.

    1981-04-01

    Proliferation risks inherent in reprocessing show the need to employ technically effective safeguards which can detect, with a high degree of assurance and on a timely basis, the diversion of significant quantities of fissionable material. A balance must be struck between what is technically feasible and effective and what is institutionally acceptable. Purpose of this report is to examine the several technical approaches to safeguards in light of their prospective acceptability. This study defines the economic, political and institutional nature of the safeguards problem; surveys generically alternative technical approaches to international safeguards including their effectiveness and relative development; characterizes the institutional implications and uncertainties associated with the acceptance and implementation of each technical alternative; and integrates these assessments into a set of overall judgments on feasible directions for reprocessing plant safeguards systems

  15. International safeguards for reprocessing plants. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kratzer, M.; Scheinman, L.; Sievering, N.; Wonder, E.; Lipman, D.; Immerman, W.; Elliott, J.M.; Crane, F.

    1981-04-01

    Proliferation risks inherent in reprocessing show the need to employ technically effective safeguards which can detect, with a high degree of assurance and on a timely basis, the diversion of significant quantities of fissionable material. A balance must be struck between what is technically feasible and effective and what is institutionally acceptable. Purpose of this report is to examine the several technical approaches to safeguards in light of their prospective acceptability. This study defines the economic, political and institutional nature of the safeguards problem; surveys generically alternative technical approaches to international safeguards including their effectiveness and relative development; characterizes the institutional implications and uncertainties associated with the acceptance and implementation of each technical alternative; and integrates these assessments into a set of overall judgments on feasible directions for reprocessing plant safeguards systems.

  16. Light water reactor fuel reprocessing and recycling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-07-01

    This document was originally intended to provide the basis for an environmental impact statement to assist ERDA in making decisions with respect to possible LWR fuel reprocessing and recycling programs. Since the Administration has recently made a decision to indefinitely defer reprocessing, this environmental impact statement is no longer needed. Nevertheless, this document is issued as a report to assist the public in its consideration of nuclear power issues. The statement compares the various alternatives for the LWR fuel cycle. Costs and environmental effects are compared. Safeguards for plutonium from sabotage and theft are analyzed

  17. Use of fuel reprocessing plant instrumentation for international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ayers, A.L.

    1977-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency has a program for developing instrumentation to be used by safeguards inspectors at reprocessing facilities. These instruments have generally been individual pieces of equipment for improving the accuracy of existing measurement instrumentation or equipment to perform nondestructive assay on a selected basis. It is proposed that greater use be made of redundant plant instrumentation and data recovery systems that could augment plant instrumentation to verify the validity of plant measurements. Use of these methods for verfication must be proven as part of an operating plant before they can be relied upon for safeguards surveillance. Inspectors must be qualified in plant operations, or have ready access to those so qualified, if the integrity of the operation is to be properly assessed. There is an immediate need for the development and in-plant proof testing of an integrated gamma, passive neutron, and active neutron measurement system for drum quantities of radioactive trash. The primary safeguards effort should be limited to plutonium and highly enriched uranium

  18. The regulations concerning the reprocessing business of spent fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    The regulations are defined under provisions concerning the reprocessing business in the law for the regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors. The basic concepts and terms are explained, such as: exposure dose; accumulative dose; controlled area; safeguarded area; inspected surrounding area; employee; radioactive waste and marine discharging facilities. Any person who gets permission for design of reprocessing facilities and method of the construction shall file an application, listing name and address of the person and the works or the place of enterprise where reprocessing facilities are to be set up, design of such facilities and method of the construction, in and out-put chart of nuclear fuel materials in reprocessing course, etc. Records shall be made and kept for particularly periods in each works or enterprise on inspection of reprocessing facilities, control of dose, operation, maintenance, accident of reprocessing facilities and weather. Detailed prescriptions are settled on entrance limitation to controlled area, exposure dose, inspection and check, regular independent examination and operation of reprocessing facilities, transportation in the works or the enterprise, storage, disposal, safeguard and measures in dangerous situations, etc. Reports shall be filed on exposure dose of employees and other specified matters in the forms attached and in the case otherwise defined. (Okada, K.)

  19. Materials management in an internationally safeguarded fuels reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Baker, A.L.; Cobb, D.D.

    1980-04-01

    The following appendices are included: aqueous reprocessing and conversion technology, reference facilities, process design and operating features relevant to materials accounting, operator's safeguards system structure, design principles of dynamic materials accounting systems, modeling and simulation approach, optimization of measurement control, aspects of international verification problem, security and reliability of materials measurement and accounting system, estimation of in-process inventory in solvent-extraction contactors, conventional measurement techniques, near-real-time measurement techniques, isotopic correlation techniques, instrumentation available to IAEA inspectors, and integration of materials accounting and containment and surveillance

  20. Materials management in an internationally safeguarded fuels reprocessing plant

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Baker, A.L.; Cobb, D.D.

    1980-04-01

    The following appendices are included: aqueous reprocessing and conversion technology, reference facilities, process design and operating features relevant to materials accounting, operator's safeguards system structure, design principles of dynamic materials accounting systems, modeling and simulation approach, optimization of measurement control, aspects of international verification problem, security and reliability of materials measurement and accounting system, estimation of in-process inventory in solvent-extraction contactors, conventional measurement techniques, near-real-time measurement techniques, isotopic correlation techniques, instrumentation available to IAEA inspectors, and integration of materials accounting and containment and surveillance. (DLC)

  1. Safeguards operations in the integral fast reactor fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goff, K.M.; Benedict, R.W.; Brumbach, S.B.; Dickerman, C.E.; Tompot, R.W.

    1994-01-01

    Argonne National Laboratory is currently demonstrating the fuel cycle for the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR), an advanced reactor concept that takes advantage of the properties of metallic fuel and liquid metal cooling to offer significant improvements in reactor safety, operation, fuel-cycle economics, environmental protection, and safeguards. The IFR fuel cycle employs a pyrometallurgical process using molten salts and liquid metals to recover actinides from spent fuel. The safeguards aspects of the fuel cycle demonstration must be approved by the United States Department of Energy, but a further goal of the program is to develop a safeguards system that could gain acceptance from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and International Atomic Energy Agency. This fuel cycle is described with emphasis on aspects that differ from aqueous reprocessing and on its improved safeguardability due to decreased attractiveness and diversion potential of all process streams, including the fuel product

  2. Operations monitoring concept. Consolidated Fuel Reprocessing Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kerr, H.T.

    1985-01-01

    Operations monitoring is a safeguards concept which could be applied in future fuel cycle facilities to significantly enhance the effectiveness of an integrated safeguards system. In general, a variety of operations monitoring techniques could be developed for both international and domestic safeguards application. The goal of this presentation is to describe specific examples of operations monitoring techniques as may be applied in a fuel reprocessing facility. The operations monitoring concept involves monitoring certain in-plant equipment, personnel, and materials to detect conditions indicative of the diversion of nuclear material. An operations monitoring subsystem should be designed to monitor operations only to the extent necessary to achieve specified safeguards objectives; there is no intent to monitor all operations in the facility. The objectives of the operations monitoring subsystem include: verification of reported data; detection of undeclared uses of equipment; and alerting the inspector to potential diversion activities. 1 fig

  3. Noble gas atmospheric monitoring for international safeguards at reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nakhleh, C.W.; Poths, J.; Stanbro, W.D.; Perry, R.T. Jr.; Wilson, W.B.; Fearey, B.L.

    1997-01-01

    The use of environmental sampling is a major component of the improvements of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards being carried out under Program 93+2. Nonradioactive noble gas isotopic measurements in the effluent stream of large reprocessing facilities may provide useful confirmatory information on the burnup and reactor type of the spent fuel undergoing reprocessing. The authors have taken and analyzed stack samples at an operating facility. The data show clear fission signals. The authors are currently applying a maximum-likelihood estimation procedure to determine the fuel burnup from these data. They anticipate that the general features involved in the table noble gas problem--selection of appropriate signals, measurement of those signals under realistic conditions, and inverse calculation of parameters of interest from the environmental data--will be present in all environmental sampling problems. These methods should therefore be widely applicable

  4. Containment/surveillance concepts for international safeguards in reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bleck, M.E.; Cameron, C.P.; Camp, A.L.

    1980-01-01

    This paper examines the potential role of advanced containment/surveillance instrumentation systems for international safeguards in reprocessing plants. Several conceptual systems for the surveillance of containment boundary penetrations in a reference reprocessing plant are described and evaluated. The results of the evaluation aid in understanding the potential capabilities and limitations of containment/surveillance as an international safeguards concept in this type of facility

  5. Safeguarding the Plutonium Fuel Cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, S.J.; Lockwood, D.

    2013-01-01

    In developing a Safeguards Approach for a plutonium process facility, two general diversion and misuse scenarios must be addressed: 1) Unreported batches of undeclared nuclear material being processed through the plant and bypassing the accountancy measurement points, and 2) The operator removing plutonium at a rate that cannot be detected with confidence due to measurement uncertainties. This paper will look at the implementation of international safeguards at plutonium fuel cycle facilities in light of past lessons learned and current safeguards approaches. It will then discuss technical areas which are currently being addressed as future tools to improve on the efficiency of safeguards implementation, while maintaining its effectiveness. The discussion of new improvements will include: safeguards by design (SBD), process monitoring (PM), measurement and monitoring equipment, and data management. The paper is illustrated with the implementation of international safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant in Japan and its accountancy structure is detailed. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  6. Safeguards aspects for future fuel management alternatives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richter, B.; Stein, G.; Gerstler, R.

    1987-01-01

    In the future, more flexible fuel management strategies will be realized in light-water reactor power stations. The incentives for this development are based on considerations related to safe and economic plant operation, e.g. improved fuel strategies can save fuel resources and waste management efforts. A further important aspect of the nuclear fuel cycle deals with recycling strategies. At the back-end of the fuel cycle, the direct final disposal of spent fuel will have to be assessed as an alternative to recycling strategies. These major development fields will also have consequences for international safeguards. In particular, reactor fuel strategies may involve higher burn-up, conditioning of spent fuel directly in the power plant, gadolinium-poisoned fuel and different levels of enrichment. These strategies will have an impact on inspection activities, especially on the applicability of NDA techniques. The inspection frequency could also be affected in recycling strategies using MOX fuel. There may be problems with NDA methods if reprocessed feed is used in enrichment plants. On the other hand, the direct final disposal of spent fuel will raise safeguards problems regarding design verification, long-term safeguarding and the very feasibility of inaccessible nuclear material

  7. International safeguards for a light-water reactor fuels reprocessing plant: containment and surveillance concepts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cameron, C.P.; Bleck, M.E.

    1980-12-01

    Concepts for containment/surveillance for reprocessing plants are described, conceptual designs are developed, and their effectiveness is evaluated. A technical approach to design of containment/surveillance systems is presented, and design considerations are discussed. This is the second in a series of reports. The first described the basis for the study of international safeguards for reprocessing plants. In this second report, only containment/surveillance is discussed. The third report will discuss the integration of concepts for containment/surveillance and material accountancy

  8. Materials management in an internationally safeguarded fuels reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Cobb, D.D.; Dayem, H.A.; Dietz, R.J.; Kern, E.A.; Markin, J.T.; Shipley, J.P.; Barnes, J.W.; Scheinman, L.

    1980-04-01

    The first volume of this report summarizes the results and conclusions for this study of conventional and advanced nuclear materials accounting systems applicable for both large (1500 MTHM/y) and small (210 MTHM/y) spent-fuel reprocessing facilities subject to international verification

  9. Design considerations for an integrated safeguards system for fuel-reprocessng plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cartan, F.O.

    1982-05-01

    This report presents design ideas for safeguards systems in nuclear fuels reprocessing plants. The report summarizes general safeguards requirements and describes a safeguards system concept being developed and tested at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. The report gives some general concepts intended for design consideration and a checklist of specific problems that should be considered. The report is intended as an aid for the safeguards system designer and as a source of useful information

  10. Survey of economics of spent nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Valvoda, Z.

    1976-01-01

    Literature data are surveyed on the economic problems of reprocessing spent fuel from light-water reactors in the period 1970 to 1975 and on the capacity of some reprocessing plants, such as NFS, Windscale, Marcoule, etc. The sharp increase in capital and production costs is analyzed and the future trend is estimated. The question is discussed of the use of plutonium and the cost thereof. The economic advantageousness previously considered to be the primary factor is no longer decisive due to new circumstances. The main objective today is to safeguard uninterrupted operation of nuclear power plants and the separation of radioactive wastes from the fuel cycle and the safe disposal thereof. (Oy)

  11. On-Line Monitoring for Control and Safeguarding of Radiochemical Streams at Spent Fuel Reprocessing Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bryan, Samuel A.; Levitskaia, Tatiana G.; Billing, Justin M.; Casella, Amanda J.; Johnsen, Amanda M.; Peterson, James M.

    2009-01-01

    Advanced techniques enabling enhanced safeguarding of the spent fuel reprocessing plants are urgently needed. Our approach is based on prerequisite that real time monitoring of the solvent extraction flowsheets provides unique capability to quickly detect unwanted manipulations with fissile isotopes present in the radiochemical streams during reprocessing activities. The methods used to monitor these processes must be robust and must be able to withstand harsh radiation and chemical environments. A new on-line monitoring system satisfying these requirements and featuring Raman spectroscopy combined with a Coriolis and conductivity probes, has been recently developed by our research team. It provides immediate chemical data and flow parameters of high-level radioactive waste streams with high brine content generated during retrieval activities from Hanford nuclear waste storage tanks. The nature of the radiochemical streams at the spent fuel reprocessing plant calls for additional spectroscopic information, which can be gained by the utilization of UV-vis-NIR capabilities. Raman and UV-vis-NIR spectroscopies are analytical techniques that have extensively been extensively applied for measuring the various organic and inorganic compounds including actinides. The corresponding spectrometers used under the laboratory conditions are easily convertible to the process-friendly configurations allowing remote measurements under the flow conditions. A fiber optic Raman probe allows monitoring of the high concentration species encountered in both aqueous and organic phases within the UREX suite of flowsheets, including metal oxide ions, such as uranyl, components of the organic solvent, inorganic oxo-anions, and water. The actinides and lanthanides are monitored remotely by UV-vis-NIR spectroscopy in aqueous and organic phases. In this report, we will present our recent results on spectroscopic measurements of simulant flowsheet solutions and commercial fuels available at

  12. Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simpson, Michael F.; Law, Jack D.

    2010-01-01

    This is a submission for the Encyclopedia of Sustainable Technology on the subject of Reprocessing Spent Nuclear Fuel. Nuclear reprocessing is the chemical treatment of spent fuel involving separation of its various constituents. Principally, it is used to recover useful actinides from the spent fuel. Radioactive waste that cannot be re-used is separated into streams for consolidation into waste forms. The first known application of nuclear reprocessing was within the Manhattan Project to recover material for nuclear weapons. Currently, reprocessing has a peaceful application in the nuclear fuel cycle. A variety of chemical methods have been proposed and demonstrated for reprocessing of nuclear fuel. The two most widely investigated and implemented methods are generally referred to as aqueous reprocessing and pyroprocessing. Each of these technologies is described in detail in Section 3 with numerous references to published articles. Reprocessing of nuclear fuel as part of a fuel cycle can be used both to recover fissionable actinides and to stabilize radioactive fission products into durable waste forms. It can also be used as part of a breeder reactor fuel cycle that could result in a 14-fold or higher increase in energy utilization per unit of natural uranium. Reprocessing can also impact the need for geologic repositories for spent fuel. The volume of waste that needs to be sent to such a repository can be reduced by first subjecting the spent fuel to reprocessing. The extent to which volume reduction can occur is currently under study by the United States Department of Energy via research at various national laboratories and universities. Reprocessing can also separate fissile and non-fissile radioactive elements for transmutation.

  13. Design aspects of water usage in the Windscale nuclear fuel reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wharton, J.; Bullock, M.J.

    1982-01-01

    The safeguard requirements of a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant place unique constraints on a designer which, in turn, affect the scope for the exercise of water economy. These constraints are examined within the context of the British Nuclear Fuels Limited reprocessing plants at Windscale and indicate the scope for water conservation. The plants and their design principles are described with particular reference to water services and usage. Progressive design development is discussed to illustrate the increasing importance of water economy. (author)

  14. Remotex and servomanipulator needs in nuclear fuel reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garin, J.

    1981-01-01

    Work on the conceptual design of a pilot-scale plant for reprocessing breeder reactor fuels is being performed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The plant design will meet all current federal regulations for repocessing plants and will serve as prototype for future production plants. A unique future of the concept is the incorporation of totally remote operation and maintenance of the process equipment within a large barn-like hot cell. This approach, caled Remotex, utilizes servomanipulators coupled with television viewing to extend man's capabilities into the hostile cell environment. The Remotex concept provides significant improvements for fuel reprocessing plants and other nuclear facilities in the areas of safeguarding nuclear materials, reducing radiation exposure, improving plant availability, recovering from unplanned events, and plant decommissioning

  15. Report of the LASCAR forum: Large scale reprocessing plant safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-01-01

    This report has been prepared to provide information on the studies which were carried out from 1988 to 1992 under the auspices of the multinational forum known as Large Scale Reprocessing Plant Safeguards (LASCAR) on safeguards for four large scale reprocessing plants operated or planned to be operated in the 1990s. The report summarizes all of the essential results of these studies. The participants in LASCAR were from France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Commission of the European Communities - Euratom, and the International Atomic Energy Agency

  16. Development of safeguards approach for the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, S.J.; Abedin-Zadeh, R.; Pearsall, C.; Chesnay, B.; Creusot, C.; Ehinger, M.; Kuhn, E.; Robson, N.; Higuchi, H.; Takeda, S.; Fujimaki, K.; Ai, H.; Uehara, S.; Amano, H.; Hoshi, K.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP), which is currently undergoing construction and commissioning by the Japan Nuclear Fuels Limited (JNFL), is scheduled to begin active operations in 2005. The planned operating capacity is 800 tonnes of spent fuel per year containing approximately 8 tonnes of plutonium. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Japan safeguards authorities are working with JNFL to develop a Safeguards Approach that is both effective and efficient. In order to accomplish this goal, a number of advanced concepts are being introduced and many currently applied safeguards measures are being enhanced. These new and improved techniques and procedures will provide for more sensitive and reliable verification of nuclear material and facility operations while reducing the required inspection effort. The Safeguards Approach incorporates systematic Design Information Examination and Verification (DIE/DIV) during all phases of construction, commissioning and operation. It incorporates installed, unattended radiation and solution measurement and monitoring systems along with a number of inspector attended measurement systems. While many of the measurement systems will be independent-inspector controlled, others will require authentication of a split signal from operator controlled systems. The independent and/or authenticated data from these systems will be transmitted over a network to a central inspector center for evaluation. Near-Real-Time-Accountancy (NRTA) will be used for short period sequential analysis of the operator and inspector data which, when combined with Solution Monitoring data, will provide higher assurance in the verification of nuclear material for timeliness and of the operational status of the facility. Samples will be taken using a facility installed, but IAEA authenticated, automatic sampling system and will then be transferred to a jointly used IAEA-JSGO On-Site Laboratory (OSL). This paper provides an

  17. Application of curium measurements for safeguarding at reprocessing plants. Study 1: High-level liquid waste and Study 2: Spent fuel assemblies and leached hulls

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rinard, P.M.; Menlove, H.O.

    1996-03-01

    In large-scale reprocessing plants for spent fuel assemblies, the quantity of plutonium in the waste streams each year is large enough to be important for nuclear safeguards. The wastes are drums of leached hulls and cylinders of vitrified high-level liquid waste. The plutonium amounts in these wastes cannot be measured directly by a nondestructive assay (NDA) technique because the gamma rays emitted by plutonium are obscured by gamma rays from fission products, and the neutrons from spontaneous fissions are obscured by those from curium. The most practical NDA signal from the waste is the neutron emission from curium. A diversion of waste for its plutonium would also take a detectable amount of curium, so if the amount of curium in a waste stream is reduced, it can be inferred that there is also a reduced amount of plutonium. This report studies the feasibility of tracking the curium through a reprocessing plant with neutron measurements at key locations: spent fuel assemblies prior to shearing, the accountability tank after dissolution, drums of leached hulls after dissolution, and canisters of vitrified high-level waste after separation. Existing pertinent measurement techniques are reviewed, improvements are suggested, and new measurements are proposed. The authors integrate these curium measurements into a safeguards system

  18. Lessons Learned in International Safeguards - Implementation of Safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ehinger, Michael H.; Johnson, Shirley

    2010-01-01

    The focus of this report is lessons learned at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP). However, the subject of lessons learned for application of international safeguards at reprocessing plants includes a cumulative history of inspections starting at the West Valley (New York, U.S.A.) reprocessing plant in 1969 and proceeding through all of the efforts over the years. The RRP is the latest and most challenging application the International Atomic Energy Agency has faced. In many ways the challenges have remained the same, timely inspection and evaluation with limited inspector resources, with the continuing realization that planning and preparations can never start early enough in the life cycle of a facility. Lessons learned over the years have involved the challenges of using ongoing advances in technology and dealing with facilities with increased throughput and continuous operation. This report will begin with a review of historical developments and lessons learned. This will provide a basis for a discussion of the experiences and lessons learned from the implementation of international safeguards at RRP.

  19. Engineered safeguards system activities at Sandia Laboratories for back-end fuel cycle facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sellers, T.A.; Fienning, W.C.; Winblad, A.E.

    1978-01-01

    Sandia Laboratories have been developing concepts for safeguards systems to protect facilities in the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle against potential threats of sabotage and theft of special nuclear material (SNM). Conceptual designs for Engineered Safeguards Systems (ESSs) have been developed for a Fuel Reprocessing Facility (including chemical separations, plutonium conversion, and waste solidification), a Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility, and a Plutonium Transport Vehicle. Performance criteria for the various elements of these systems and a candidate systematic design approach have been defined. In addition, a conceptual layout for a large-scale Fuel-Cycle Plutonium Storage Facility has been completed. Work is continuing to develop safeguards systems for spent fuel facilities, light-water reactors, alternative fuel cycles, and improved transportation systems. Additional emphasis will be placed on the problems associated with national diversion of special nuclear material. The impact on safeguards element performance criteria for surveillance and containment to protect against national diversion in various alternative fuel cycle complexes is also being investigated

  20. Nonproliferation and safeguards aspects of the DUPIC fuel cycle concept

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Persiani, P K [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States)

    1997-07-01

    The purpose of the study is to comment on the proliferation characteristic profiles of some of the proposed fuel cycle alternatives to help ensure that nonproliferation concerns are introduced into the early stages of a fuel cycle concept development program, and to perhaps aid in the more effective implementation of the international nonproliferation regime initiative and safeguards systems. Alternative recycle concepts proposed by several countries involve the recycle of spent fuel without the separation of plutonium from uranium and fission products. The concepts are alternatives to either the direct long-term storage deposition of or the purex reprocessing of the spent fuels. The alternate fuel cycle concepts reviewed include: the dry-recycle processes such as the direct use of reconfigured PWR spent fuel assemblies into CANDU reactors(DUPIC); low-decontamination, single-cycle co-extraction of fast reactor fuels in a wet-purex type of reprocessing; and on a limited scale the thorium-uranium fuel cycle. The nonproliferation advantages usually associated with the above non-separation processes are: the highly radioactive spent fuel presents a barrier to the physical diversion of the nuclear material; avoid the need to dissolve and chemically separate the plutonium from the uranium and fission products; and that the spent fuel isotopic quality of the plutonium vector is further degraded. Although the radiation levels and the need for reprocessing may be perceived as barriers to the terrorist or the subnational level of safeguards, the international level of nonproliferation concerns is addressed primarily by material accountancy and verification activities. On the international level of nonproliferation concerns, the non-separation fuel cycle concepts involved have to be evaluated on the bases of the impact the processes may have on nuclear materials accountancy. (author).

  1. Fuel reprocessing plant - no solution for the economy of the region

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Elvers, G.

    1986-01-01

    Both for the construction and operation stage, the direct and indirect impact of the fuel reprocessing plant on employment on the whole will be negative. It is not altogether certain either that there will be no adverse effects for the areas of tourism. The top organization of German trade unions (DGB) holds that a different structure-political concept from the one represented by the large-scale project of the fuel reprocessing plant would be more appropriate for the region. Employment in the steel and construction industries must be safeguarded by corresponding programmes, and new employment must be created in small- and medium-size companies. (DG) [de

  2. Safeguarding of spent fuel conditioning and disposal in geological repositories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Forsstroem, H.; Richter, B.

    1997-01-01

    Disposal of spent nuclear fuel in geological formations, without reprocessing, is being considered in a number of States. Before disposal the fuel will be encapsulated in a tight and corrosion resistant container. The method chosen for disposal and the design of the repository will be determined by the geological conditions and the very strict requirements on long-term safety. From a safeguards perspective spent fuel disposal is a new issue. As the spent fuel still contains important amounts of material under safeguards and as it can not be considered practicably irrecoverable in the repository, the IAEA has been advised not to terminate safeguards, even after closure of the repository. This raises a number of new issues where there could be a potential conflict of interests between safety and safeguards demands, in particular in connection with the safety principle that burdens on future generations should be avoided. In this paper some of these issues are discussed based on the experience gained in Germany and Sweden about the design and future operation of encapsulation and disposal facilities. The most important issues are connected to the required level of safeguards for a closed repository, the differences in time scales for waste management and safeguards, the need for verification of the fissile content in the containers and the possibility of retrieving the fuel disposed of. (author)

  3. HTGR fuel reprocessing technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brooks, L.H.; Heath, C.A.; Shefcik, J.J.

    1976-01-01

    The following aspects of HTGR reprocessing technology are discussed: characteristics of HTGR fuels, criteria for a fuel reprocessing flowsheet; selection of a reference reprocessing flowsheet, and waste treatment

  4. Designing and Operating for Safeguards: Lessons Learned From the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, Shirley J.; Ehinger, Michael

    2010-01-01

    This paper will address the lessons learned during the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP) which are relevant to the issue of 'safeguards by design'. However, those lessons are a result of a cumulative history of international safeguards experiences starting with the West Valley reprocessing plant in 1969, continuing with the Barnwell plant, and then with the implementation of international safeguards at WAK in Germany and TRP in Japan. The design and implementation of safeguards at RRP in Japan is the latest and most challenging that the IAEA has faced. This paper will discuss the work leading up to the development of a safeguards approach, the design and operating features that were introduced to improve or aid in implementing the safeguards approach, and the resulting recommendations for future facilities. It will provide an overview of how 'safeguardability' was introduced into RRP.

  5. Safeguarding of large scale reprocessing and MOX plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Howsley, R.; Burrows, B.; Longevialle, H. de; Kuroi, H.; Izumi, A.

    1997-01-01

    In May 97, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the final measures of the ''93+2'' safeguards strengthening programme, thus improving the international non-proliferation regime by enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards verification. These enhancements are not however, a revolution in current practices, but rather an important step in the continuous evolution of the safeguards system. The principles embodied in 93+2, for broader access to information and increased physical access already apply, in a pragmatic way, to large scale reprocessing and MOX fabrication plants. In these plants, qualitative measures and process monitoring play an important role in addition to accountancy and material balance evaluations in attaining the safeguard's goals. This paper will reflect on the safeguards approaches adopted for these large bulk handling facilities and draw analogies, conclusions and lessons for the forthcoming implementation of the 93+2 Programme. (author)

  6. Workshop on instrumentation and analyses for a nuclear fuel reprocessing hot pilot plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Babcock, S.M.; Feldman, M.J.; Wymer, R.G.; Hoffman, D.

    1980-05-01

    In order to assist in the study of instrumentation and analytical needs for reprocessing plants, a workshop addressing these needs was held at Oak Ridge National Laboratory from May 5 to 7, 1980. The purpose of the workshop was to incorporate the knowledge of chemistry and of advanced measurement techniques held by the nuclear and radiochemical community into ideas for improved and new plant designs for both process control and inventory and safeguards measurements. The workshop was athended by experts in nuclear and radiochemistry, in fuel recycle plant design, and in instrumentation and analysis. ORNL was a particularly appropriate place to hold the workshop since the Consolidated Fuel Reprocessing Program (CFRP) is centered there. Requirements for safeguarding the special nuclear materials involved in reprocessing, and for their timely measurement within the process, within the reprocessing facility, and at the facility boundaries are being studied. Because these requirements are becoming more numerous and stringent, attention is also being paid to the analytical requirements for these special nuclear materials and to methods for measuring the physical parameters of the systems containing them. In order to provide a focus for the consideration of the workshop participants, the Hot Experimental Facility (HEF) being designed conceptually by the CFRP was used as a basis for consideration and discussions

  7. Status and trends in spent fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-09-01

    The management of spent fuel arising from nuclear power production is a crucial issue for the sustainable development of nuclear energy. The IAEA has issued several publications in the past that provide technical information on the global status and trends in spent fuel reprocessing and associated topics, and one reason for this present publication is to provide an update of this information which has mostly focused on the conventional technology applied in the industry. However, the scope of this publication has been significantly expanded in an attempt to make it more comprehensive and by including a section on emerging technologies applicable to future innovative nuclear systems, as are being addressed in such international initiatives as INPRO, Gen IV and MICANET. In an effort to be informative, this publication attempts to provide a state-of-the-art review of these technologies, and to identify major issues associated with reprocessing as an option for spent fuel management. It does not, however, provide any detailed information on some of the related issues such as safety or safeguards, which are addressed in other relevant publications. This report provides an overview of the status of reprocessing technology and its future prospects in terms of various criteria in Section 2. Section 3 provides a review of emerging technologies which have been attracting the interest of Member States, especially in the international initiatives for future development of innovative nuclear systems. A historical review of IAEA activities associated with spent fuel reprocessing, traceable back to the mid-1970s, is provided in Section 4, and conclusions in Section 5. A list of references is provided at the end the main text for readers interested in further information on the related topics. Annex I summarizes the current status of reprocessing facilities around the world, including the civil operational statistics of Purex-based plants, progress with decommissioning and

  8. MOX fuel reprocessing and recycling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Guillet, J.L.

    1990-01-01

    This paper is devoted to the reprocessing of MOX fuel in UP2-800 plant at La Hague, and to the MOX successive reprocessing and recycling. 1. MOX fuel reprocessing. In a first step, the necessary modifications in UP2-800 to reprocess MOX fuel are set out. Early in the UP2-800 project, actions have been taken to reprocess MOX fuel without penalty. They consist in measures regarding: Dissolution; Radiological shieldings; Nuclear instrumentation; Criticality. 2. Mox successive reprocessing and recycling. The plutonium recycling in the LWR is now a reality and, as said before, the MOX fuel reprocessing is possible in UP2-800 plant at La Hague. The following actions in this field consist in verifying the MOX successive reprocessing and recycling possibilities. After irradiation, the fissile plutonium content of irradiated MOX fuel is decreased and, in this case, the re-use of plutonium in the LWR need an important increase of initial Pu enrichment inconsistent with the Safety reactor constraints. Cogema opted for reprocessing irradiated MOX fuel in dilution with the standard UO2 fuel in appropriate proportions (1 MOX for 4 UO2 fuel for instance) in order to save a fissile plutonium content compatible with MOX successive recycling (at least 3 recyclings) in LWR. (author). 2 figs

  9. Designing and Operating for Safeguards: Lessons Learned From the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Johnson, Shirley J.; Ehinger, Michael

    2010-08-07

    This paper will address the lessons learned during the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP) which are relevant to the issue of ‘safeguards by design’. However, those lessons are a result of a cumulative history of international safeguards experiences starting with the West Valley reprocessing plant in 1969, continuing with the Barnwell plant, and then with the implementation of international safeguards at WAK in Germany and TRP in Japan. The design and implementation of safeguards at RRP in Japan is the latest and most challenging that the IAEA has faced. This paper will discuss the work leading up to the development of a safeguards approach, the design and operating features that were introduced to improve or aid in implementing the safeguards approach, and the resulting recommendations for future facilities. It will provide an overview of how ‘safeguardability’ was introduced into RRP.

  10. Technical aspects of fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Groenier, W.S.

    1982-02-01

    The purpose of this paper is to present a brief description of fuel reprocessing and some present developments which show the reliability of nuclear energy as a long-term supply. The following topics are discussed: technical reasons for reprocessing; economic reasons for reprocessing; past experience; justification for advanced reprocessing R and D; technical aspects of current reprocessing development. The present developments are mainly directed at the reprocessing of breeder reactor fuels but there are also many applications to light-water reactor fuel reprocessing. These new developments involve totally remote operation, and maintenance. To demonstrate this advanced reprocessing concept, pilot-scale demonstration facilities are planned with commercial application occurring sometime after the year 2000

  11. Research and development of safeguards measures for the large scale reprocessing plant

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kikuchi, Masahiro; Sato, Yuji; Yokota, Yasuhiro; Masuda, Shoichiro; Kobayashi, Isao; Uchikoshi, Seiji; Tsutaki, Yasuhiro; Nidaira, Kazuo [Nuclear Material Control Center, Tokyo (Japan)

    1994-12-31

    The Government of Japan agreed on the safeguards concepts of commercial size reprocessing plant under the bilateral agreement for cooperation between the Japan and the United States. In addition, the LASCAR, that is the forum of large scale reprocessing plant safeguards, could obtain the fruitful results in the spring of 1992. The research and development of safeguards measures for the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant should be progressed with every regard to the concepts described in both documents. Basically, the material accountancy and monitoring system should be established, based on the NRTA and other measures in order to obtain the timeliness goal for plutonium, and the un-attended mode inspection approach based on the integrated containment/surveillance system coupled with radiation monitoring in order to reduce the inspection efforts. NMCC has been studying on the following measures for a large scale reprocessing plant safeguards (1) A radiation gate monitor and integrated surveillance system (2) A near real time Shipper and Receiver Difference monitoring (3) A near real time material accountancy system operated for the bulk handling area (4) A volume measurement technique in a large scale input accountancy vessel (5) An in-process inventory estimation technique applied to the process equipment such as the pulse column and evaporator (6) Solution transfer monitoring approach applied to buffer tanks in the chemical process (7) A timely analysis technique such as a hybrid K edge densitometer operated in the on-site laboratory (J.P.N.).

  12. Issues for Conceptual Design of AFCF and CFTC LWR Spent Fuel Separations Influencing Next-Generation Aqueous Fuel Reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    D. Hebditch; R. Henry; M. Goff; K. Pasamehmetoglu; D. Ostby

    2007-01-01

    In 2007, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) published the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) strategic plan, which aims to meet US and international energy, safeguards, fuel supply and environmental needs by harnessing national laboratory R and D, deployment by industry and use of international partnerships. Initially, two industry-led commercial scale facilities, an advanced burner reactor (ABR) and a consolidated fuel treatment center (CFTC), and one developmental facility, an advanced fuel cycle facility (AFCF) are proposed. The national laboratories will lead the AFCF to provide an internationally recognized R and D center of excellence for developing transmutation fuels and targets and advancing fuel cycle reprocessing technology using aqueous and pyrochemical methods. The design drivers for AFCF and the CFTC LWR spent fuel separations are expected to impact on and partly reflect those for industry, which is engaging with DOE in studies for CFTC and ABR through the recent GNEP funding opportunity announcement (FOA). The paper summarizes the state-of-the-art of aqueous reprocessing, gives an assessment of engineering drivers for U.S. aqueous processing facilities, examines historic plant capital costs and provides conclusions with a view to influencing design of next-generation fuel reprocessing plants

  13. Fully integrated safeguards and security for reprocessing plant monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Duran, Felicia Angelica; Ward, Rebecca; Cipiti, Benjamin B.; Middleton, Bobby D.

    2011-01-01

    Nuclear fuel reprocessing plants contain a wealth of plant monitoring data including material measurements, process monitoring, administrative procedures, and physical protection elements. Future facilities are moving in the direction of highly-integrated plant monitoring systems that make efficient use of the plant data to improve monitoring and reduce costs. The Separations and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM) is an analysis tool that is used for modeling advanced monitoring systems and to determine system response under diversion scenarios. This report both describes the architecture for such a future monitoring system and present results under various diversion scenarios. Improvements made in the past year include the development of statistical tests for detecting material loss, the integration of material balance alarms to improve physical protection, and the integration of administrative procedures. The SSPM has been used to demonstrate how advanced instrumentation (as developed in the Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies campaign) can benefit the overall safeguards system as well as how all instrumentation is tied into the physical protection system. This concept has the potential to greatly improve the probability of detection for both abrupt and protracted diversion of nuclear material.

  14. Consolidated Fuel Reprocessing Program. Operating experience with pulsed-column holdup estimators

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ehinger, M.H.

    1986-01-01

    Methods for estimating pulsed-column holdup are being investigated as part of the Safeguards Assessment task of the Consolidated Fuel Reprocessing Program (CFRP) at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The CFRP was a major sponsor of test runs at the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel plant (BNFP) in 1980 and 1981. During these tests, considerable measurement data were collected for pulsed columns in the plutonium purification portion of the plant. These data have been used to evaluate and compare three available methods of holdup estimation

  15. Comparison for thorium fuel cycle facilities of two different capacities for implementation of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gangotra, Suresh; Grover, R.B.; Ramakumar, K.L.

    2013-01-01

    Highlights: • Facilities for implementation of safeguards for thorium fuel cycle have been compared. • Two concepts have been compared. • In one concept, the facilities are designed in hub and spoke concept. • In second concept the facilities are designed as self-contained concept. • The comparison is done on a number of factors, which affect safeguardability and proliferation resistance. -- Abstract: Thorium based nuclear fuel cycle has many attractive features, its inherent proliferation resistance being one of them. This is due to the presence of high energy gamma emitting daughter products of U 232 associated with U 233 . This high energy gamma radiation also poses challenges in nuclear material accounting. A typical thorium fuel cycle facility has a number of plants including a fuel fabrication plant for initial and equilibrium core, a reprocessed U 233 fuel fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, a fuel assembly/disassembly plant and associated waste handling and management plants. A thorium fuel cycle facility can be set up to serve reactors at a site. Alternatively, one can follow a hub and spoke approach with a large thorium fuel cycle facility acting as a hub, catering to the requirements of reactors at several sites as spokes. These two concepts have their respective merits and shortcomings in terms of engineering and economics. The present paper is aimed at comparing the merits and challenges for implementation of safeguards on the two concepts viz. a large fuel cycle hub catering to reactors at several sites versus a small fuel cycle facility dedicated to reactors at a single site

  16. Comparison for thorium fuel cycle facilities of two different capacities for implementation of safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gangotra, Suresh, E-mail: sgangotra@yahoo.co.in; Grover, R.B.; Ramakumar, K.L.

    2013-09-15

    Highlights: • Facilities for implementation of safeguards for thorium fuel cycle have been compared. • Two concepts have been compared. • In one concept, the facilities are designed in hub and spoke concept. • In second concept the facilities are designed as self-contained concept. • The comparison is done on a number of factors, which affect safeguardability and proliferation resistance. -- Abstract: Thorium based nuclear fuel cycle has many attractive features, its inherent proliferation resistance being one of them. This is due to the presence of high energy gamma emitting daughter products of U{sup 232} associated with U{sup 233}. This high energy gamma radiation also poses challenges in nuclear material accounting. A typical thorium fuel cycle facility has a number of plants including a fuel fabrication plant for initial and equilibrium core, a reprocessed U{sup 233} fuel fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, a fuel assembly/disassembly plant and associated waste handling and management plants. A thorium fuel cycle facility can be set up to serve reactors at a site. Alternatively, one can follow a hub and spoke approach with a large thorium fuel cycle facility acting as a hub, catering to the requirements of reactors at several sites as spokes. These two concepts have their respective merits and shortcomings in terms of engineering and economics. The present paper is aimed at comparing the merits and challenges for implementation of safeguards on the two concepts viz. a large fuel cycle hub catering to reactors at several sites versus a small fuel cycle facility dedicated to reactors at a single site.

  17. Fuel reprocessing/fabrication interface

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Benistan, G.; Blanchon, T.; Galimberti, M.; Mignot, E.

    1987-01-01

    EDF has conducted a major research, development and experimental programme concerning the recycling of plutonium and reprocessed uranium in pressurized water reactors, in collaboration with its major partners in the nuclear fuel cycle industry. Studies already conducted have demonstrated the technical and economic advantages of this recycling, as also its feasibility with due observance of the safety and reliability criteria constantly applied throughout the industrial development of the nuclear power sector in France. Data feedback from actual experience will make it possible to control the specific technical characteristics of MOX and reprocessed uranium fuels to a higher degree, as also management, viewed from the economic standpoint, of irradiated fuels and materials recovered from reprocessing. The next step will be to examine the reprocessing of MOX for reprocessed uranium fuels, either for secondary recycling in the PWR units, or, looking further ahead, in the fast breeders or later generation PWR units, after a storage period of a few years

  18. Trends in fuel reprocessing safety research

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tsujino, Takeshi

    1981-01-01

    With the operation of a fuel reprocessing plant in the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC) and the plan for a second fuel reprocessing plant, the research on fuel reprocessing safety, along with the reprocessing technology itself, has become increasingly important. As compared with the case of LWR power plants, the safety research in this field still lags behind. In the safety of fuel reprocessing, there are the aspects of keeping radiation exposure as low as possible in both personnel and local people, the high reliability of the plant operation and the securing of public safety in accidents. Safety research is then required to establish the safety standards and to raise the rate of plant operation associated with safety. The following matters are described: basic ideas for the safety design, safety features in fuel reprocessing, safety guideline and standards, and safety research for fuel reprocessing. (J.P.N.)

  19. Economic feasibility study of regional centers for nuclear fuel reprocessing in the developing countries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bakeshloo, A.A.

    1977-01-01

    The fuel cycle costs for the following three different economic alternatives were studied: (1) Reprocessing in an industrialized country (such as the U.S.); (2) Reprocessing in the individual developing country; (3) Reprocessing in a regional center. The nuclear fuel cycle cost for the ''Throw-away'' fuel cycle was evaluated. Among the six regions which were considered in this study, region one (South America including Mexico) was selected for the economic analysis of the nuclear fuel cycle for the above three alternatives. For evaluation of the cases where the fuel is reprocessed in a regional center or in an individual developing country, a unit reprocessing cost equation was developed. An economic evaluation was developed to estimate the least expensive method for transporting radioactive nuclear material by either leased or purchased shipping casks. The necessary equations were also developed for estimating plutonium transportation and the safeguard costs. On the basis of nuclear material and services requirements and unit costs for each component, the levelized nuclear fuel cycle costs for each alternative were estimated. Finally, by a comparison of cost, among these three alternatives plus the ''Throw-away'' case,it was found that it is not at all economical to build individual reprocessing plants inside the developing countries in region one. However, it also was found that the economic advantage of a regional center with respect to the first alternative is less than a 4% difference between their total fuel cycle costs. It is concluded that there is no great economic advantage in any developing countries to seek to process their fuel in one of the advanced countries. Construction of regional reprocessing centers is an economically viable concept

  20. Present status of fuel reprocessing plant in PNC

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koyama, Kenji

    1981-01-01

    In the fuel reprocessing plant of the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation, its hot test has now been completed. For starting its full-scale operation duly, the data are being collected on the operation performance and safety. The construction was started in June, 1971, and completed in October, 1974. In July, 1977, spent fuel was accepted in the plant, and the hot test was started. In September, the same year, the first fuel shearing was made. So far, a total of about 31 t U from both BWR and PWR plants has been processed, thus the hot test was entirely completed. The following matters are described: hot test and its results, research on Pu and U mixed extraction, utilization of product plutonium, development of safeguard technology, and repair work on the acid recovery evaporation tank. (J.P.N.)

  1. Reprocessing of MTR fuel at Dounreay

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hough, N.

    1997-01-01

    UKAEA at Dounreay has been reprocessing MTR fuel for over 30 years. During that time considerable experience has been gained in the reprocessing of traditional HEU alloy fuel and more recently with dispersed fuel. Latterly a reprocessing route for silicide fuel has been demonstrated. Reprocessing of the fuel results in a recycled uranium product of either high or low enrichment and a liquid waste stream which is suitable for conditioning in a stable form for disposal. A plant to provide this conditioning, the Dounreay Cementation Plant is currently undergoing active commissioning. This paper details the plant at Dounreay involved in the reprocessing of MTR fuel and the treatment and conditioning of the liquid stream. (author)

  2. The European experience in safeguarding nuclear fuel recycle processes and Pu stores

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Synetos, Sotiris

    2013-01-01

    Civil nuclear programs in the European Union member states have from their onset included fuel recycling as an option. The EURATOM Treaty gives to the European Commission the obligation to apply safeguards controls to all civil Nuclear Material in the European Union, and to facilitate the implementation of IAEA safeguards. The European Commission (EURATOM) has thus gained years of experience in safeguarding reprocessing plants, Pu storages, and MOX fuel fabrication plants and is currently participating in the development of approaches and measures for safeguarding long term repositories. The aim of this paper is to present the regulator's views and experience on safeguarding nuclear fuel recycle processes and Pu stores, which is based on the following principles: -) Early involvement of the control organizations in the design of the safeguards measures to be developed for a plant (currently referred to as Safeguards by Design); -) Early definition of a safeguards strategy including key measurement points; -) The design and development of plant specific Safeguards equipment, including an on site laboratory for sample analysis; -) The development by the operator of an appropriate Nuclear Material accountancy system to facilitate their declaration obligations; -) The introduction of an inspection regime allowing comprehensive controls under the restrictions imposed by financial and Human Resources limitations; -) Optimization of the inspection effort by using unattended measuring stations, containment and surveillance systems and secure remote transmission of data to the regulator's headquarters. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (authors)

  3. Safeguards activities in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Osabe, Takeshi

    1998-01-01

    Current Japanese State System for Accountancy and Control (SSAC) has been developing and fully satisfies requirements of both IAEA Safeguards and bilateral partners. However, the public attention on the national and international safeguards activities were increased and the safeguards authorities were required to promote the objective assessment of safeguards implementation to avoid mistrust in safeguards activities which directly influence the public acceptance of nuclear energy in itself. Additionally, since Japan has promoted to complete nuclear fuel cycle including spent fuel reprocessing, enrichment and mixed oxide fuel fabrication this would require further assurance of Japanese non-proliferation commitment. Japan supports the introduction of strengthened safeguards. In this context it is particularly important to strengthen the relationship between national and the IAEA safeguards to contribute actively to the IAEA safeguards in development and utilization of new technologies towards more effective and efficient IAEA safeguards

  4. Nondestructive measurement of spent fuel assemblies at the Tokai Reprocessing and Storage Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Phillips, J.R.; Bosler, G.E.; Halbig, J.K.; Lee, D.M.

    1979-12-01

    Nondestructive verification of irradiated fuel assemblies is an integral part of any safeguards system for a reprocessing facility. Available techniques are discussed with respect to the level of verification provided by each. A combination of high-resolution gamma spectrometry, neutron detectors, and gross gamma activity profile monitors provide a maximum amount of information in a minimum amount of time

  5. Safeguardability assessment on pilot-scale advanced spent fuel conditioning facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, S.Y.; Li, T.K.; Pickett, S.E.; Miller, M.C.; Ko, W.I.; Kim, H.D.

    2006-01-01

    Full text: In South Korea, approximately 6,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel from commercial reactor operation has been accumulated with the expectation of more than 30,000 metric tons, three times the present storage capacity, by the end of 2040. To resolve these challenges in spent fuel management, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has been developing a dry reprocessing technology called Advanced Spent Fuel Conditioning Process (ACP). This is an electrometallurgical treatment technique to convert oxide-type spent fuel into a metallic form, and the electrolytic reduction (ER) technology developed recently is known as a more efficient concept for spent fuel conditioning. The goal of the ACP study is to recover more than 99% of the actinide elements into a metallic form with minimizing the volume and heat load of spent fuel. The significant reduction of the volume and heat load of spent fuel is expected to lighten the burden of final disposal in terms of disposal size, safety, and economics. In the framework of R and D collaboration for the ACP safeguards, a joint study on the safeguardability of the ACP technology has been performed by the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and KAERI. The purpose of this study is to address the safeguardability of the ACP technology, through analysis of material flow and development of a proper safeguards system that meet IAEA's comprehensive safeguards objective. The sub-processes and material flow of the pilot-scale ACP facility were analyzed, and subsequently the relevant material balance area (MBA) and key measurement point (KMP) were designed for material accounting. The uncertainties in material accounting were also estimated with international target values, and design requirements for the material accounting systems were derived

  6. Consolidated fuel reprocessing program

    Science.gov (United States)

    1985-04-01

    A survey of electrochemical methods applications in fuel reprocessing was completed. A dummy fuel assembly shroud was cut using the remotely operated laser disassembly equipment. Operations and engineering efforts have continued to correct equipment operating, software, and procedural problems experienced during the previous uranium compaigns. Fuel cycle options were examined for the liquid metal reactor fuel cycle. In high temperature gas cooled reactor spent fuel studies, preconceptual designs were completed for the concrete storage cask and open field drywell storage concept. These and other tasks operating under the consolidated fuel reprocessing program are examined.

  7. Reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kidd, S.

    2008-01-01

    The closed fuel cycle is the most sustainable approach for nuclear energy, as it reduces recourse to natural uranium resources and optimises waste management. The advantages and disadvantages of used nuclear fuel reprocessing have been debated since the dawn of the nuclear era. There is a range of issues involved, notably the sound management of wastes, the conservation of resources, economics, hazards of radioactive materials and potential proliferation of nuclear weapons. In recent years, the reprocessing advocates win, demonstrated by the apparent change in position of the USA under the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) program. A great deal of reprocessing has been going on since the fourties, originally for military purposes, to recover plutonium for weapons. So far, some 80000 tonnes of used fuel from commercial power reactors has been reprocessed. The article indicates the reprocessing activities and plants in the United Kigdom, France, India, Russia and USA. The aspect of plutonium that raises the ire of nuclear opponents is its alleged proliferation risk. Opponents of the use of MOX fuels state that such fuels represent a proliferation risk because the plutonium in the fuel is said to be 'weapon-use-able'. The reprocessing of used fuel should not give rise to any particular public concern and offers a number of potential benefits in terms of optimising both the use of natural resources and waste management.

  8. Fuel cycle of nuclear power plants and safeguards system of nuclear weapon nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Malek, Z.

    1980-10-01

    The international safeguard system of nuclear weapon nonproliferation and the IAEA safeguard system are briefly described. In Czechoslovakia, a decree was issued in 1977 governing the accounting for and control of nuclear materials. The contents of the decree are presented. Described are computer processing of accounting data, technical criteria for the safeguard system application, containment and inspection in the IAEA safeguard system. The method is shown of the control of and accounting for nuclear materials in nuclear power plants and in fuel manufacturing, reprocessing and enrichment plants. Nondestructive and destructive methods of nuclear materials analysis are discussed. Nondestructive methods used include gamma spectrometry, neutron techniques, X-ray fluores--cence techniques. (J.P.)

  9. Safeguard sleuths

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lowry, D.

    1989-01-01

    A report of the conference of the European Safeguards Research and Development Association, which tries to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to military uses is given. Some of the problems encountered by safeguards inspectors are mentioned, such as being able to follow the material through the maze of piping in a reprocessing plant, the linguistic difficulties if the inspector does not speak the operator's language, the difference between precision and accuracy and the necessity of human inspection, containment and surveillance systems. Unexplained outages at a reprocessing plant are always treated as suspicious, as are power failures which prevent normal surveillance. The UK practice of allocating civil fuel temporarily to military use at Harwell also makes safeguard policing more difficult. (UK)

  10. IAEA symposium on international safeguards. Extended synopses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-10-01

    The most important subjects treated in 188 papers presented by the participants from member state and IAEA Safeguards Inspectors at the Symposium were as follows: implementation of IAEA safeguards; national support programs to the IAEA safeguards; experiences in application of safeguard monitoring devices; improved methods for verification of plutonium; highly enriched uranium; surveillance of spent fuel storage facilities, reprocessing plants, fuel fabrication plants; excess weapon grade plutonium and other fissile materials

  11. The reprocessing of irradiated MTR fuel and the nuclear material accountancy - Dounreay, UKAEA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Barrett, T.R.; Harrison, R. [UKAEA, Nuclear Materials Control Dep., Dounreay (United Kingdom)

    1997-07-01

    The reprocessing of irradiated HEU MTR fuel is a sensible part of a safeguards regime. It brings together fuel otherwise scattered around the world into a concerted accountancy and protection arrangement. From a nuclear material accountants view the overall accountancy performance has been excellent. While investigations have been required for a few individual MUFs or trends, very little effort has required to be expended by the Nuclear Materials Control Department. That is a definition of a 'good plant'; it operates, measures and records input and output streams, and then the accountancy falls into place. As identified in this paper, the accountancy of the nuclear material processed in the plant is well founded and sound. The accountancy results over several decades confirm the adequacy of the safeguards arrangements at Dounreay. The processing makes good commercial sense and meets the current philosophy of recycling valuable resource materials. The risk of operating the full fuel cycle are less than those of extended storage of irradiated fuel at disparate diverse locations. The reprocessing at Dounreay accords with all of these philosophies. The assessed risk is at a very low level, well within published UK HSE 'tolerability of risk' regulatory guidelines. The impact of the operations are similarly low within the guidelines, for the operators and for the general public. (author)

  12. The reprocessing of irradiated MTR fuel and the nuclear material accountancy - Dounreay, UKAEA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barrett, T.R.; Harrison, R.

    1997-01-01

    The reprocessing of irradiated HEU MTR fuel is a sensible part of a safeguards regime. It brings together fuel otherwise scattered around the world into a concerted accountancy and protection arrangement. From a nuclear material accountants view the overall accountancy performance has been excellent. While investigations have been required for a few individual MUFs or trends, very little effort has required to be expended by the Nuclear Materials Control Department. That is a definition of a 'good plant'; it operates, measures and records input and output streams, and then the accountancy falls into place. As identified in this paper, the accountancy of the nuclear material processed in the plant is well founded and sound. The accountancy results over several decades confirm the adequacy of the safeguards arrangements at Dounreay. The processing makes good commercial sense and meets the current philosophy of recycling valuable resource materials. The risk of operating the full fuel cycle are less than those of extended storage of irradiated fuel at disparate diverse locations. The reprocessing at Dounreay accords with all of these philosophies. The assessed risk is at a very low level, well within published UK HSE 'tolerability of risk' regulatory guidelines. The impact of the operations are similarly low within the guidelines, for the operators and for the general public. (author)

  13. IAEA symposium on international safeguards. Extended synopses

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-10-01

    The most important subjects treated in 188 papers presented by the participants from member state and IAEA Safeguards Inspectors at the Symposium were as follows: implementation of IAEA safeguards; national support programs to the IAEA safeguards; experiences in application of safeguard monitoring devices; improved methods for verification of plutonium; highly enriched uranium; surveillance of spent fuel storage facilities, reprocessing plants, fuel fabrication plants; excess weapon grade plutonium and other fissile materials Refs, figs, tabs

  14. An Approach to Safeguards by Design (SBD) for Fuel Cycle Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sankaran Nair, P.; Gangotra, S.; Karanam, R.

    2015-01-01

    Implementation of safeguards in bulk handling facilities such as fuel fabrication facilities and reprocessing facilities are a challenging task. This is attributed to the nuclear material present in the facility in the form of powder, pellet, green pellet, solution and gaseous. Additionally material hold up, material unaccounted for (MUF) and the operations carried out round the clock add to the difficulties in implementing safeguards. In facilities already designed or commissioned or operational, implementation of safeguards measures are relatively difficult. The authors have studied a number of measures which can be adopted at the design stage itself. Safeguard By Design (SBD) measures can help in more effective implementation of safeguards, reduction of cost and reduction in radiological dose to the installation personnel. The SBD measures in the power reactors are comparatively easier to implement than in the fuel fabrication plants, since reactors are item counting facilities while the fuel fabrication plants are bulk handling type of facilities and involves much rigorous nuclear material accounting methodology. The safeguards measures include technical measures like dynamic nuclear material accounting, near real time monitoring, remote monitoring, use of automation, facility imagery, Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tagging, reduction of MUF in bulk handling facilities etc. These measures have been studied in the context of bulk handling facilities and presented in this paper. Incorporation of these measures at the design stage (SBD) is expected to improve the efficiency of safeguardability in such bulk handling and item counting facilities and proliferation resistance of nuclear material handled in such facilities. (author)

  15. Noble gas atmospheric monitoring at reprocessing facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nakhleh, C.W.; Perry, R.T. Jr.; Poths, J.; Stanbro, W.D.; Wilson, W.B.; Fearey, B.L.

    1997-01-01

    The discovery in Iraq after the Gulf War of the existence of a large clandestine nuclear-weapon program has led to an across-the-board international effort, dubbed Programme 93+2, to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. One particularly significant potential change is the introduction of environmental monitoring (EM) techniques as an adjunct to traditional safeguards methods. Monitoring of stable noble gas (Kr, Xe) isotopic abundances at reprocessing plant stacks appears to be able to yield information on the burnup and type of the fuel being processed. To estimate the size of these signals, model calculations of the production of stable Kr, Xe nuclides in reactor fuel and the subsequent dilution of these nuclides in the plant stack are carried out for two case studies: reprocessing of PWR fuel with a burnup of 35 GWd/tU, and reprocessing of CAND fuel with a burnup of 1 GWd/tU. For each case, a maximum-likelihood analysis is used to determine the fuel burnup and type from the isotopic data

  16. Simulation of facility operations and materials accounting for a combined reprocessing/MOX fuel fabrication facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coulter, C.A.; Whiteson, R.; Zardecki, A.

    1991-01-01

    We are developing a computer model of facility operations and nuclear materials accounting for a facility that reprocesses spent fuel and fabricates mixed oxide (MOX) fuel rods and assemblies from the recovered uranium and plutonium. The model will be used to determine the effectiveness of various materials measurement strategies for the facility and, ultimately, of other facility safeguards functions as well. This portion of the facility consists of a spent fuel storage pond, fuel shear, dissolver, clarifier, three solvent-extraction stages with uranium-plutonium separation after the first stage, and product concentrators. In this facility area mixed oxide is formed into pellets, the pellets are loaded into fuel rods, and the fuel rods are fabricated into fuel assemblies. These two facility sections are connected by a MOX conversion line in which the uranium and plutonium solutions from reprocessing are converted to mixed oxide. The model of the intermediate MOX conversion line used in the model is based on a design provided by Mike Ehinger of Oak Ridge National Laboratory (private communication). An initial version of the simulation model has been developed for the entire MOX conversion and fuel fabrication sections of the reprocessing/MOX fuel fabrication facility, and this model has been used to obtain inventory difference variance estimates for those sections of the facility. A significant fraction of the data files for the fuel reprocessing section have been developed, but these data files are not yet complete enough to permit simulation of reprocessing operations in the facility. Accordingly, the discussion in the following sections is restricted to the MOX conversion and fuel fabrication lines. 3 tabs

  17. The use of curium neutrons to verify plutonium in spent fuel and reprocessing wastes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miura, N.

    1994-05-01

    For safeguards verification of spent fuel, leached hulls, and reprocessing wastes, it is necessary to determine the plutonium content in these items. We have evaluated the use of passive neutron multiplicity counting to determine the plutonium content directly and also to measure the 240 Pu/ 244 Cm ratio for the indirect verification of the plutonium. Neutron multiplicity counting of the singles, doubles, and triples neutrons has been evaluated for measuring 240 Pu, 244 Cm, and 252 Cf. We have proposed a method to establish the plutonium to curium ratio using the hybrid k-edge densitometer x-ray fluorescence instrument plus a neutron coincidence counter for the reprocessing dissolver solution. This report presents the concepts, experimental results, and error estimates for typical spent fuel applications

  18. Nuclear fuel reprocessing in the UK

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Allardice, R.; Harris, D.; Mills, A.

    1983-01-01

    Nuclear fuel reprocessing has been carried out on an industrial scale in the United Kingdom since 1952. Two large reprocessing plants have been constructed and operated at Windscale, Cumbria and two smaller specialized plants have been constructed and operated at Dounreay, Northern Scotland. At the present time, the second of the two Windscale plants is operating, and Government permission has been given for a third reprocessing plant to be built on that site. At Dounreay, one of the plants is operating in its original form, whilst the second is now operating in a modified form, reprocessing fuel from the prototype fast reactor. This chapter describes the development of nuclear fuel reprocessing in the UK, commencing with the research carried out in Canada immediately after the Second World War. A general explanation of the techniques of nuclear fuel reprocessing and of the equipment used is given. This is followed by a detailed description of the plants and processes installed and operated in the UK

  19. Nuclear fuel reprocessing in the UK

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Allardice, R.H.; Harris, D.W.; Mills, A.

    1983-01-01

    Nuclear fuel reprocessing has been carried out on an industrial scale in the United Kingdom since 1952. Two large reprocessing plants have been constructed and operated at Windscale, Cumbria and two smaller specialized plants have been constructed and operated at Dounreay, Northern Scotland. At the present time, the second of the two Windscale plants is operating, and Government permission has been given for a third reprocessing plant to be built on that site. At Dounreay, one of the plants is operating in its original form, whilst the second is now operating in a modified form, reprocessing fuel from the prototype fast reactor. This chapter describes the development of nuclear fuel reprocessing in the UK, commencing with the research carried out in Canada immediately after the Second World War. A general explanation of the techniques of nuclear fuel reprocessing and of the equipment used is given. This is followed by a detailed description of the plants and processes installed and operated in the UK. (author)

  20. Fast reactor fuel reprocessing. An Indian perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Natarajan, R.; Raj, Baldev

    2005-01-01

    The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) envisioned the introduction of Plutonium fuelled fast reactors as the intermediate stage, between Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors and Thorium-Uranium-233 based reactors for the Indian Nuclear Power Programme. This necessitated the closing of the fast reactor fuel cycle with Plutonium rich fuel. Aiming to develop a Fast Reactor Fuel Reprocessing (FRFR) technology with low out of pile inventory, the DAE, with over four decades of operating experience in Thermal Reactor Fuel Reprocessing (TRFR), had set up at the India Gandhi Center for Atomic Research (IGCAR), Kalpakkam, R and D facilities for fast reactor fuel reprocessing. After two decades of R and D in all the facets, a Pilot Plant for demonstrating FRFR had been set up for reprocessing the FBTR (Fast Breeder Test Reactor) spent mixed carbide fuel. Recently in this plant, mixed carbide fuel with 100 GWd/t burnup fuel with short cooling period had been successfully reprocessed for the first time in the world. All the challenging problems encountered had been successfully overcome. This experience helped in fine tuning the designs of various equipments and processes for the future plants which are under construction and design, namely, the DFRP (Demonstration Fast reactor fuel Reprocessing Plant) and the FRP (Fast reactor fuel Reprocessing Plant). In this paper, a comprehensive review of the experiences in reprocessing the fast reactor fuel of different burnup is presented. Also a brief account of the various developmental activities and strategies for the DFRP and FRP are given. (author)

  1. Development of an international safeguards approach to the final disposal of spent fuel in geological repositories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Murphey, W.M.; Moran, B.W.; Fattah, A.

    1996-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is currently pursuing development of an international safeguards approach for the final disposal of spent fuel in geological repositories through consultants meetings and through the Program for Development of Safeguards for Final Disposal of Spent Fuel in Geological Repositories (SAGOR). The consultants meetings provide policy guidance to IAEA; SAGOR recommends effective approaches that can be efficiently implemented by IAEA. The SAGOR program, which is a collaboration of eight Member State Support Programs (MSSPs), was initiated in July 1994 and has identified 15 activities in each of three areas (i.e. conditioning facilities, active repositories, and closed repositories) that must be performed to ensure an efficient, yet effective safeguards approach. Two consultants meetings have been held: the first in May 1991 and the last in November 1995. For nuclear materials emplaced in a geological repository, the safeguards objectives were defined to be (1) to detect the diversion of spent fuel, whether concealed or unconcealed, from the repository and (2) to detect undeclared activities of safeguards concern (e.g., tunneling, underground reprocessing, or substitution in containers)

  2. ERDA activities related to reprocessing and plutonium recycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Spurgeon, D.R.

    1977-01-01

    ERDA has redirected its program in support of the LWR fuel cycle from one emphasizing the commercialization of existing fuel cycle technology to a broader based assessment of alternative fuel cycle concepts with the emphasis on safeguardability and avoidance of proliferation risks. As part of this program, ERDA will evaluate a number of possible technical and institutional options to reduce proliferation risks. ERDA will continue its current program of LWR fuel reprocessing R and D with added emphasis on improved safeguards capability as well as the applicability of conventional reprocessing technology to large multinational plants. These activities and supporting design studies will provide the basis for a decision regarding the design of an optimized system for the management of spent LWR fuel. Such a system would provide a model for the development of future domestic and foreign facilities and programs. A recently completed ERDA study of the benefits of LWR reprocessing and recycle would also be expected to be factored into such a decision. The study concluded that based on currently available data, recycle of uranium and plutonium in LWR's is attractive from the standpoint of economics and resource utilization relative to the discarding of spent fuel. The LWR reprocessing/recycle picture today is clouded by several unresolved policy issues. These include the need for adequate spent fuel storage capacity for both domestic and foreign reactors; the possibility of foreign reprocessing of U.S. produced fuel; the possibility of the disposal of foreign fuel in the U.S.; the possible need to dispose of wastes generated by multinational reprocessing plants; and finally, determination of the optimum balance between recycling recovered plutonium and saving it for the breeder

  3. Fuel reprocessing and waste management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Philippone, R.L.; Kaiser, R.A.

    1989-01-01

    Because of different economic, social and political factors, there has been a tendency to compartmentalize the commercial nuclear power industry into separate power and fuel cycle operations to a greater degree in some countries compared to other countries. The purpose of this paper is to describe how actions in one part of the industry can affect the other parts and recommend an overall systems engineering approach which incorporates more cooperation and coordination between individual parts of the fuel cycle. Descriptions are given of the fuel cycle segments and examples are presented of how a systems engineering approach has benefitted the fuel cycle. Descriptions of fuel reprocessing methods and the waste forms generated are given. Illustrations are presented describing how reprocessing options affect waste management operations and how waste management decisions affect reprocessing

  4. Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant-1: a stepping stone in Indian PHWR spent fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pradhan, Sanjay; Dubey, K.; Qureshi, F.T.; Lokeswar, S.P.

    2017-01-01

    India has low reserves of uranium and high reserves of thorium. In order to optimize resource utilization India has adopted a closed fuel cycle to ensure long-term energy security. The optimum resource utilization is feasible only by adopting reprocessing, conditioning and recycle options. It is very much imperative to view spent fuel as a vital resource material and not a waste to be disposed off. Thus, spent nuclear fuel reprocessing forms an integral part of the Indian Nuclear Energy Programme. Aqueous reprocessing based on PUREX technology is in use for more than 50 years and has reached a matured status

  5. Indian experience in fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Prasad, A.N.; Kumar, S.V.

    1977-01-01

    Plant scale experience in fuel reprocessing in India was started with the successful design, execution and commissioning of the Trombay plant in 1964 to reprocess aluminium clad metallic uranium fuel from the 40 MWt research reactor. The plant has helped in generating expertise and trained manpower for future reprocessing plants. With the Trombay experience, a larger plant of capacity 100 tonnes U/year to reprocess spent oxide fuels from the Tarapur (BWR) and Rajasthan (PHWR) power reactors has been built at Tarapur which is undergoing precommissioning trial runs. Some of the details of this plant are dealt with in this paper. In view of the highly corrosive chemical attack the equipment and piping are subjected to in a fuel reprocessing plant, some of them require replacement during their service if the plant life has to be extended. This calls for extensive decontamination for bringing the radiation levels low enough to establish direct accesss to such equipment. For making modifications in the plant to extend its life and also to enable expansion of capacity, the Trombay plant has been successfully decontaminated and partially decommissioned. Some aspects of thi decontamination campaign are presented in this paper

  6. Reprocessing of LEU silicide fuel at Dounreay

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cartwright, P.

    1996-01-01

    UKAEA have recently reprocessed two LEU silicide fuel elements in their MTR fuel reprocessing plant at Dounreay. The reprocessing was undertaken to demonstrate UKAEA's commitment to the world-wide research reactor communities future needs. Reprocessing of LEU silicide fuel is seen as a waste treatment process, resulting in the production of a liquid feed suitable for conditioning in a stable form of disposal. The uranium product from the reprocessing can be used as a blending feed with the HEU to produce LEU for use in the MTR cycle. (author)

  7. Monitoring, controlling and safeguarding radiochemical streams at spent fuel reprocessing facilities with optical and gamma-ray spectroscopic methods

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schwantes, J.M.; Bryan, S.A.; Orton, C.R.; Levitskaia, T.G.; Fraga, C.G.

    2013-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has established international safeguards standards for fissionable material at spent fuel reprocessing plants to ensure that significant quantities of weapons-usable nuclear material are not diverted from these facilities. For large throughput nuclear facilities, it is difficult to satisfy the IAEA safeguards accountancy goal for detection of abrupt diversion. Currently, methods to verify material control and accountancy (MCA) at these facilities require time-consuming and resource intensive destructive assay (DA). Leveraging new on-line non-destructive assay (NDA) process monitoring techniques in conjunction with the traditional and highly precise DA methods may provide an additional measure to nuclear material accountancy which would potentially result in a more timely, cost-effective and resource efficient means for safeguards verification at such facilities. By monitoring process control measurements (e.g. flowrates, temperatures, or concentrations of reagents, products or wastes), abnormal plant operations can be detected. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing on-line NDA process monitoring technologies based upon gamma-ray and optical spectroscopic measurements to potentially reduce the time and resource burden associated with current techniques. The Multi-Isotope Process (MIP) Monitor uses gamma spectroscopy and multivariate analysis to identify off-normal conditions in process streams. The spectroscopic monitor continuously measures chemical compositions of the process streams including actinide metal ions (U, Pu, Np), selected fission products, and major stable flowsheet reagents using UV-Vis, Near IR and Raman spectroscopy. Multi-variate analysis is also applied to the optical measurements in order to quantify concentrations of analytes of interest within a complex array of radiochemical streams. This paper will provide an overview of these methods and reports on-going efforts to develop

  8. Turning point of U.S. government decision in US-Japan nuclear fuel reprocessing negotiation in 1977

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Izumi, Yoshinori

    2010-01-01

    U.S. President Carter's Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy, announced in April 1977, which terminated federal funding for reprocessing, was a shock to the Atomic Energy Authority of the Japanese Government that had promoted the construction of Tokai Reprocessing Plant (TRP). After that, it became necessary to negotiate the 'Joint Determination for the Effective Safeguardability of TRP' subject to the 1968 Agreement for cooperation between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning civil use of Atomic Energy. Negotiations for the 'Joint Determination for the Effective Safguardability of TRP' were conducted in the U.S.-Japan Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Negotiation and Joint Field Work meetings from April to September 1977. Both governments agreed to the TRP operation's terms and conditions including 'Joint Determination for the Effective Safeguardability of TRP' in the third negotiation. In spite of the hard position on reprocessing stated in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy enacted by President Carter, these negotiations concluded accepting the operation of TRP with condition. In this paper, I will explore the reasons for the abovementioned political decision by the U.S. government based on its disclosure documents. (author)

  9. Surveillance system using the CCTV at the fuel transfer pond in the Tokai reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hayakawa, T.; Fukuhara, J.; Ochiai, K.; Ohnishi, T.; Ogata, Y.; Okamoto, H.

    1991-01-01

    The Fuel Transfer Pond (FTP) in the Tokai Reprocessing Plant (TRP) is a strategic point for safeguards. Spent fuels, therefore, in the FTP have been surveyed by the surveillance system using the underwater CCTV. This system was developed through the improvement of devices composed of cameras and VCRs and the provision of tamper resistance function as one of the JASPAS (Japan Support Program for Agency Safeguards) program. The purpose of this program is to realize the continuous surveillance of the slanted tunnel through which the spent fuel on the conveyor is moved from the FTP to the Mechanical Processing Cell (MPC). This paper reports that, when this surveillance system is applied to an inspection device, the following requirements are needed: To have the ability of continuous and unattended surveillance of the spent fuel on the conveyor path from the FTP to the MPC; To have the tamper resistance function for continuous and unattended surveillance of the spent fuel

  10. Safeguards and an internationalized nuclear fuel cycle for East Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Olsen, John

    2005-01-01

    Concerns about nuclear proliferation by means of illicit enrichment of uranium or reprocessing of plutonium suggest limiting those technologies to a few, large facilities. In turn, countries that renounce acquiring those capabilities would be guaranteed fuel cycle services. Interdependence might lead to an Internationalized Nuclear Fuel Cycle (IFC), which could be formalized in voluntary regional compacts to share management of certain facilities. An IFC could add managerial oversight to strengthen the nonproliferation culture in the region and offer cost and efficiency benefits to participating countries, as well. An East Asian IFC would present opportunities to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of international safeguards by consolidating inspection requirements into relatively few facilities. This may be an opportune time to consider an IFC before the growing national industries each invest in separate facilities. An East Asian IFC regime could minimize international safeguards burdens, strengthen regional non-proliferation cooperation, and help manage future energy costs. (author)

  11. Demonstration and development of safeguards techniques in the PNC reprocessing plant. Part of a coordinated programme on the use of installed instrumentation in fuel reprocessing facilities for safeguards purposes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kurihara, H.

    1979-04-01

    A hull-monitoring system in the Head-End facility and systems for surveillance and containment in the spent fuel receiving and storage facility at Tokai Reprocessing Plant are described. Operating experience on them is analyzed

  12. Fast reactor fuel reprocessing in the UK

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Allardice, R.H.; Williams, J.; Buck, C.

    1977-01-01

    Enriched uranium metal fuel irradiated in the Dounreay Fast Reactor has been reprocessed and refabricated in plants specifically designed for the purpose in the U.K. since 1961. Efficient and reliable fuel recycle is essential to the development of a plutonium based fast reactor system and the importance of establishing at an early stage fast reactor fuel reprocessing has been reinforced by current world difficulties in reprocessing high burn-up thermal reactor oxide fuel. In consequence, the U.K. has decided to reprocess irradiated fuel from the 250 MW(E) Prototype Fast Reactor as an integral part of the fast reactor development programme. Flowsheet and equipment development work for the small scale fully active demonstration plant have been carried out over the past 5 years and the plant will be commissioned and ready for active operation during 1977. In parallel, a comprehensive waste management system has been developed and installed. Based on this development work and the information which will arise from active operation of the plant a parallel development programme has been initiated to provide the basis for the design of a large scale fast reactor fuel reprocessing plant to come into operation in the late 1980s to support the projected U.K. fast reactor installation programme. The paper identifies the important differences between fast reactor and thermal reactor fuel reprocessing technologies and describes some of the development work carried out in these areas for the small scale P.F.R. fuel reprocessing operation. In addition, the development programme in aid of the design of a larger scale fast reactor fuel reprocessing plant is outlined and the current design philosophy is discussed

  13. Fast breeder reactor fuel reprocessing in France

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bourgeois, M.; Le Bouhellec, J.; Eymery, R.; Viala, M.

    1984-08-01

    Simultaneous with the effort on fast breeder reactors launched several years ago in France, equivalent investigations have been conducted on the fuel cycle, and in particular on reprocessing, which is an indispensable operation for this reactor. The Rapsodie experimental reactor was associated with the La Hague reprocessing plant AT1 (1 kg/day), which has reprocessed about one ton of fuel. The fuel from the Phenix demonstration reactor is reprocessed partly at the La Hague UP2 plant and partly at the Marcoule pilot facility, undergoing transformation to reprocess all the fuel (TOR project, 5 t/y). The fuel from the Creys Malville prototype power plant will be reprocessed in a specific plant, which is in the design stage. The preliminary project, named MAR 600 (50 t/y), will mobilize a growing share of the CEA's R and D resources, as the engineering needs of the UP3 ''light water'' plant begins to decline. Nearly 20 tonnes of heavy metals irradiated in fast breeder reactors have been processed in France, 17 of which came from Phenix. The plutonium recovered during this reprocessing allowed the power plant cycle to be closed. This power plant now contains approximately 140 fuel asemblies made up with recycled plutonium, that is, more than 75% of the fuel assemblies in the Phenix core

  14. The use of artificial intelligence for safeguard fuel reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wachter, J.W.; Forgy, C.L.

    1987-01-01

    Recorded process data from minirun campaigns conducted at the Barnwell Nuclear Fuels Plant have been utilized to study the suitability of computer-based artificial intelligence (AI) methods for process monitoring for safeguards purposes. The techniques of knowledge engineering were used to formulate the decision-making software. The computer software accepted as input process data customarily used for process operations that had previously been recorded on magnetic tape during the 1980 miniruns. The OPS5 AI language was used to construct an expert system for simulated monitoring of the process. Such expert systems facilitate the employment of the heuristic reasoning used by human observers to form reasoned conclusions from incomplete, inaccurate, or otherwise fuzzy data

  15. Corrosion control in nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Steele, D.F.

    1986-01-01

    This article looks in detail at tribology-related hazards of corrosion in irradiated fuel reprocessing plants and tries to identify and minimize problems which could contribute to disaster. First, the corrosion process is explained. Then the corrosion aspects at each of four stages in reprocessing are examined, with particular reference to oxide fuel reprocessing. The four stages are fuel receipt and storage, fuel breakdown and dissolution, solvent extraction and product concentration and waste management. Results from laboratory and plant corrosion trails are used at the plant design stage to prevent corrosion problems arising. Operational procedures which minimize corrosion if it cannot be prevented at the design stage, are used. (UK)

  16. Transport and reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lenail, B.

    1981-01-01

    This contribution deals with transport and packaging of oxide fuel from and to the Cogema reprocessing plant at La Hague (France). After a general discussion of nuclear fuel and the fuel cycle, the main aspects of transport and reprocessing of oxide fuel are analysed. (Auth.)

  17. Development of a computerized nuclear materials control and accounting system for a fuel reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Crawford, J.M.; Ehinger, M.H.; Joseph, C.; Madeen, M.L.

    1979-07-01

    A computerized nuclear materials control and accounting system (CNMCAS) for a fuel reprocessing plant is being developed by Allied-General Nuclear Services at the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant. Development work includes on-line demonstration of near real-time measurement, measurement control, accounting, and processing monitoring/process surveillance activities during test process runs using natural uranium. A technique for estimating in-process inventory is also being developed. This paper describes development work performed and planned, plus significant design features required to integrate CNMCAS into an advanced safeguards system

  18. Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant-2, Tarapur: a benchmark in Indian PHWR spent fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pradhan, Sanjay; Dubey, K.; Qureshi, F.T.; Lokeswar, S.P.

    2017-01-01

    Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant-2 (PREFRE-2) is latest operating spent nuclear fuel reprocessing plant in India. This plant has improved design based on latest technology and feedback provided by the earlier plants. The design of PREFRE-2 plant is in five cycles of solvent extraction using TBP as extractant. The plant is commissioned in year 2011 after regulatory clearances

  19. Reprocessing in breeder fuel cycles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Burch, W.D.; Groenier, W.S.

    1982-01-01

    Over the past decade, the United States has developed plans and carried out programs directed toward the demonstration of breeder fuel reprocessing in connection with the first breeder demonstration reactor. A renewed commitment to moving forward with the construction of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor (CRBR) has been made, with startup anticipated near the end of this decade. While plans for the CRBR and its associated fuel cycle are still being firmed up, the basic research and development programs required to carry out the demonstrations have continued. This paper updates the status of the reprocessing plans and programs. Policies call for breeder recycle to begin in the early to mid-1990's. Contents of this paper are: (1) evolving plans for breeder reprocessing (demonstration reprocessing plant, reprocessing head-end colocated at an existing facility); (2) relationship to LWR reprocessing; (3) integrated equipment test (IET) facility and related hardware development activities (mechanical considerations in shearing and dissolving, remote operations and maintenance demonstration phase of IET, integrated process demonstration phase of IET, separate component development activities); and (4) supporting process R and D

  20. Handbook on process and chemistry on nuclear fuel reprocessing

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Suzuki, Atsuyuki [Tokyo Univ., Tokyo (Japan); Asakura, Toshihide; Adachi, Takeo [Japan Atomic Energy Research Inst., Tokai, Ibaraki (Japan). Tokai Research Establishment; and others

    2001-12-01

    'Wet-type' nuclear fuel reprocessing technology, based on PUREX technology, has wide applicability as the principal reprocessing technology of the first generation, and relating technologies, waste management for example, are highly developed, too. It is quite important to establish a database summarizing fundamental information about the process and the chemistry of 'wet-type' reprocessing, because it contributes to establish and develop fuel reprocessing process and nuclear fuel cycle treating high burn-up UO{sub 2} fuel and spent MOX fuel, and to utilize 'wet-type' reprocessing technology much widely. This handbook summarizes the fundamental data on process and chemistry, which was collected and examined by 'Editing Committee of Handbook on Process and Chemistry of Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing', from FY 1993 until FY 2000. (author)

  1. Handbook on process and chemistry on nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suzuki, Atsuyuki; Asakura, Toshihide; Adachi, Takeo

    2001-12-01

    'Wet-type' nuclear fuel reprocessing technology, based on PUREX technology, has wide applicability as the principal reprocessing technology of the first generation, and relating technologies, waste management for example, are highly developed, too. It is quite important to establish a database summarizing fundamental information about the process and the chemistry of 'wet-type' reprocessing, because it contributes to establish and develop fuel reprocessing process and nuclear fuel cycle treating high burn-up UO 2 fuel and spent MOX fuel, and to utilize 'wet-type' reprocessing technology much widely. This handbook summarizes the fundamental data on process and chemistry, which was collected and examined by 'Editing Committee of Handbook on Process and Chemistry of Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing', from FY 1993 until FY 2000. (author)

  2. Assessment of proliferation resistances of aqueous reprocessing techniques using the TOPS methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Åberg Lindell, M.; Grape, S.; Håkansson, A.; Jacobsson Svärd, S.

    2013-01-01

    Highlights: • Proliferation resistances of three possible LFR fuel cycles are assessed. • The TOPS methodology has been chosen for the PR assessment. • Reactor operation, reprocessing and fuel fabrication are examined. • Purex, Ganex, and a combination of Purex, Diamex and Sanex, are compared. • The safeguards analysis speaks in favor of Ganex as opposed to the Purex process. - Abstract: The aim of this study is to assess and compare the proliferation resistances (PR) of three possible Generation IV lead-cooled fast reactor fuel cycles, involving the reprocessing techniques Purex, Ganex and a combination of Purex, Diamex and Sanex, respectively. The examined fuel cycle stages are reactor operation, reprocessing and fuel fabrication. The TOPS methodology has been chosen for the PR assessment, and the only threat studied is the case where a technically advanced state diverts nuclear material covertly. According to the TOPS methodology, the facilities have been divided into segments, here roughly representing the different forms of nuclear material occurring in each examined fuel cycle stage. For each segment, various proliferation barriers have been assessed. The results make it possible to pinpoint where the facilities can be improved. The results show that the proliferation resistance of a fuel cycle involving recycling of minor actinides is higher than for the traditional Purex reprocessing cycle. Furthermore, for the purpose of nuclear safeguards, group actinide extraction should be preferred over reprocessing options where pure plutonium streams occur. This is due to the fact that a solution containing minor actinides is less attractive to a proliferator than a pure Pu solution. Thus, the safeguards analysis speaks in favor of Ganex as opposed to the Purex process

  3. Base case industrial reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-11-01

    This paper briefly describes an industrial scale plant for reprocessing thermal oxide fuel. This description was used as a base case by the Group for their later assessments and for comparing actual national plans for reprocessing plants. The plant described uses the Purex process and assumes an annual throughput of 1000 t/U. The maintenance, safety and safeguards philosophy is described. An indication of the construction schedule and capital and operating costs is also given

  4. Handbook on process and chemistry on nuclear fuel reprocessing

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Suzuki, Atsuyuki (ed.) [Tokyo Univ., Tokyo (Japan); Asakura, Toshihide; Adachi, Takeo (eds.) [Japan Atomic Energy Research Inst., Tokai, Ibaraki (Japan). Tokai Research Establishment] [and others

    2001-12-01

    'Wet-type' nuclear fuel reprocessing technology, based on PUREX technology, has wide applicability as the principal reprocessing technology of the first generation, and relating technologies, waste management for example, are highly developed, too. It is quite important to establish a database summarizing fundamental information about the process and the chemistry of 'wet-type' reprocessing, because it contributes to establish and develop fuel reprocessing process and nuclear fuel cycle treating high burn-up UO{sub 2} fuel and spent MOX fuel, and to utilize 'wet-type' reprocessing technology much widely. This handbook summarizes the fundamental data on process and chemistry, which was collected and examined by 'Editing Committee of Handbook on Process and Chemistry of Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing', from FY 1993 until FY 2000. (author)

  5. Reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schmitt, D.

    1985-01-01

    How should the decision in favour of reprocessing and against alternative waste management concepts be judged from an economic standpoint. Reprocessing is not imperative neither for resource-economic reasons nor for nuclear energy strategy reasons. On the contrary, the development of an ultimate storage concept representing a real alternative promising to close, within a short period of time, the nuclear fuel cycle at low cost. At least, this is the result of an extensive economic efficiency study recently submitted by the Energy Economics Institute which investigated all waste management concepts relevant for the Federal Republic of Germany in the long run, i.e. direct ultimate storage of spent fuel elements (''Other waste disposal technologies'' - AE) as well as reprocessing of spent fuel elements where re-usable plutonium and uranium are recovered and radioactive waste goes to ultimate storage (''Integrated disposal'' - IE). Despite such fairly evident results, the government of the Federal Republic of Germany has favoured the construction of a reprocessing plant. From an economic point of view there is no final answer to the question whether or not the argumentation is sufficient to justify the decision to construct a reprocessing plant. This is true for both the question of technical feasibility and issues of overriding significance of a political nature. (orig./HSCH) [de

  6. Development of a computerized nuclear materials control and accounting system for a fuel reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Crawford, J.M.; Ehinger, M.H.; Joseph, C.; Madeen, M.L.

    1979-01-01

    A computerized nuclear materials control and accounting system (CNMCAS) for a fuel reprocessing plant is being developed by Allied-General Nuclear Services at the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant. Development work includes on-line demonstration of near real-time measurement, measurement control, accounting, and processing monitoring/process surveillance activities during test process runs using natural uranium. A technique for estimating in-process inventory is also being developed. This paper describes development work performed and planned, plus significant design features required to integrate CNMCAS into an advanced safeguards system. 2 refs

  7. Example of material accounting and verification of reprocessing input

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koch, L.; Schoof, S.

    1981-01-01

    An example is described in this paper of material accounting at the reprocessing input point. Knowledge of the fuel history and chemical analyses of the spent fuel permitted concepts to be tested which have been developed for the determination of the input by the operator and for its verification by nuclear material safeguards with the intention of detecting a protracted as well as an abrupt diversion. Accuracies obtained for a material balance of a PWR fuel reprocessing campaign are given. 6 refs

  8. Fast-reactor fuel reprocessing in the United Kingdom

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Allardice, R.H.; Buck, C.; Williams, J.

    1977-01-01

    Enriched uranium metal fuel irradiated in the Dounreay Fast Reactor has been reprocessed and refabricated in plants specifically designed for the purpose in the United Kingdom since 1961. Efficient and reliable fuel recycle is essential to the development of a plutonium-based fast-reactor system, and the importance of establishing at an early stage fast-reactor fuel reprocessing has been reinforced by current world difficulties in reprocessing high-burnup thermal-reactor oxide fuel. The United Kingdom therefore decided to reprocess irradiated fuel from the 250MW(e) Prototype Fast Reactor (PFR) as an integral part of the fast reactor development programme. Flowsheet and equipment development work for the small-scale fully active demonstration plant has been carried out since 1972, and the plant will be commissioned and ready for active operation during 1977. In parallel, a comprehensive waste-management system has been developed and installed. Based on this development work and the information which will arise from active operation of the plant, a parallel development programme has been initiated to provide the basis for the design of a large-scale fast-reactor fuel-reprocessing plant to come into operation in the late 1980s to support the projected UK fast-reactor installation programme. The paper identifies the important differences between fast-reactor and thermal-reactor fuel-reprocessing technologies and describes some of the development work carried out in these areas for the small-scale PFR fuel-reprocessing operation. In addition, the development programme in aid of the design of a larger scale fast-reactor fuel-reprocessing plant is outlined and the current design philosophy discussed. (author)

  9. Implications for advanced safeguards derived from PR and PP case study results

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boyer, Brian D.

    2009-01-01

    The proliferation resistance and physical protection (PR and PP) working group produced a case study on the Example Sodium Fast Reactor (ESFR). The ESFR is a hypothetical nuclear energy system consisting of four sodium-cooled fast reactors of medium size collocated with an on-site dry fuel storage facility and a spent fuel reprocessing facility using pyroprocessing technology. This study revealed how safeguards would be applied at such site consisting of integrated multiple fuel cycle facilities and the implications of what safeguards technology and safeguards concepts would need to be adapted and developed to safeguard successfully this Generation IV nuclear energy system concept. The major safeguards concepts driving our safeguards analysis are timeliness goals and material quantity goals. Because the fresh transuranic (TRU) fuel to be produced in the ESFR fuel fabrication facility contains plutonium, the ESFR will be reprocessing, using in the reactor, and storing material on site that will have IAEA defined 'direct-use material' in it with stringent timeliness goals and material quantity goals that drive the safeguards implementation. Specifically, the TRU fresh fuel, pyroprocessing in process material, LWR spent fuel sent to the ESFR, and TRU spent fuel will contain plutonium. This material will need to be verified at interim intervals four times per year because the irradiated direct-use material, as defined previously, has three-month timeliness goals and 8 kg material quantity goals for plutonium. The TRU in-process material is, of course, irradiated direct-use material as defined by the IAEA. Keeping the plutonium and uranium together with TRu products should provide a radiation barrier. this radiation barrier slows down the ability to reprocess the fuel. Furthermore, the reprocessing technique, if it has some intrinsic proliferation resistance, will need major modifications to be able to separate plutonium from the uranium and TRU mixture. The ESFR design

  10. EURATOM safeguards efforts in the development of spent fuel verification methods by non-destructive assay

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Matloch, L.; Vaccaro, S.; Couland, M.; De Baere, P.; Schwalbach, P. [Euratom, Communaute europeenne de l' energie atomique - CEEA (European Commission (EC))

    2015-07-01

    The back end of the nuclear fuel cycle continues to develop. The European Commission, particularly the Nuclear Safeguards Directorate of the Directorate General for Energy, implements Euratom safeguards and needs to adapt to this situation. The verification methods for spent nuclear fuel, which EURATOM inspectors can use, require continuous improvement. Whereas the Euratom on-site laboratories provide accurate verification results for fuel undergoing reprocessing, the situation is different for spent fuel which is destined for final storage. In particular, new needs arise from the increasing number of cask loadings for interim dry storage and the advanced plans for the construction of encapsulation plants and geological repositories. Various scenarios present verification challenges. In this context, EURATOM Safeguards, often in cooperation with other stakeholders, is committed to further improvement of NDA methods for spent fuel verification. In this effort EURATOM plays various roles, ranging from definition of inspection needs to direct participation in development of measurement systems, including support of research in the framework of international agreements and via the EC Support Program to the IAEA. This paper presents recent progress in selected NDA methods. These methods have been conceived to satisfy different spent fuel verification needs, ranging from attribute testing to pin-level partial defect verification. (authors)

  11. SAFEGUARDS ENVELOPE: PREVIOUS WORK AND EXAMPLES

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Metcalf, Richard; Bevill, Aaron; Charlton, William; Bean, Robert

    2008-01-01

    The future expansion of nuclear power will require not just electricity production but fuel cycle facilities such as fuel fabrication and reprocessing plants. As large reprocessing facilities are built in various states, they must be built and operated in a manner to minimize the risk of nuclear proliferation. Process monitoring has returned to the spotlight as an added measure that can increase confidence in the safeguards of special nuclear material (SNM). Process monitoring can be demonstrated to lengthen the allowable inventory period by reducing accountancy requirements, and to reduce the false positive indications. The next logical step is the creation of a Safeguards Envelope, a set of operational parameters and models to maximize anomaly detection and inventory period by process monitoring while minimizing operator impact and false positive rates. A brief example of a rudimentary Safeguards Envelope is presented, and shown to detect synthetic diversions overlaying a measured processing plant data set. This demonstration Safeguards Envelope is shown to increase the confidence that no SNM has been diverted with minimal operator impact, even though it is based on an information sparse environment. While the foundation on which a full Safeguards Envelope can be built has been presented in historical demonstrations of process monitoring, several requirements remain yet unfulfilled. Future work will require reprocessing plant transient models, inclusion of 'non-traditional' operating data, and exploration of new methods of identifying subtle events in transient processes

  12. Nuclear safeguards considerations for pebble bed reactors (PBRs)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moses, David L.

    2012-01-01

    Recent reports by the Department of Energy National Laboratories have discussed safeguards considerations for low enriched uranium (LEU)-fueled pebble bed reactors (PBRs) and the need for bulk accountancy of the plutonium in “used fuel.” These reports fail to account for the degree of plutonium dilution in the graphitized-carbon pebbles that is sufficient to meet the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) “provisional” guidelines for termination of safeguards on “measured discards.” The thrust of this finding is not to terminate safeguards but to limit the need for specific accountancy of plutonium in stored used fuel. While the residual uranium in the used fuel is not sufficiently diluted to meet the IAEA provisional guidelines for termination of safeguards, the estimated quantities of the uranium minor isotopes 232 U and 236 U in the used fuel at the target burnup of ∼90 Gigawatt-days per metric ton (GWD/MT) exceed standard specification limits for reprocessed uranium and will require extensive blending with either natural uranium or uranium enrichment tails to dilute the 236 U content to fall within specification. Hence, the PBR used fuel is less desirable for commercial reprocessing and reuse than that from light water reactors. Also the PBR specific activity of a reprocessed uranium isotopic mixture and its A 2 values for effective dose limits if released in a dispersible form during a transportation accident are more limiting than the equivalent values for light-water-reactor used fuel at 55 GWD/MT without accounting for the presence of the principal carry-over fission product (technetium, 99 Tc) and plutonium contamination. Thus, the potentially recoverable uranium from PBR used fuel carries reactivity penalties and radiological penalties likely greater than those for reprocessed uranium from light water reactors. These factors impact the economics of reprocessing, but a more significant consideration is that reprocessing technologies for

  13. Fast reactor fuel reprocessing development in the United States: an overview

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Groenier, W.S.; Burch, W.D.

    1979-01-01

    As a result of the reduced nuclear power demand and the growing concerns over the potential proliferation of sensitive nuclear materials, there has not been a necessity to make immediate decisions regarding near-term reprocessing and breeder reactor commercialization. Programs which formed the basic thrust of nuclear development in the early 1970's have already been adjusted: increased emphasis on problems of radioactive waste management; increased attention to nonproliferation objectives and subsequent reorientation of the overall fuel cycle and breeder programs; increased emphasis on a once-through light-water reactor technology; increased concern for a more detailed knowledge of the uranium resource base; reorientation of the uranium enrichment programs; and exploration of alternative fuel cycles (such as thorium) to minimize the use of plutonium. Nevertheless, major strategic decisions still loom over breeder commercialization, the breeder's requisite demand for reprocessing, and the future role of more proliferation-resistant nuclear technologies. The current program in the United States is organized to provide the necessary technology for the reprocessing of breeder fuels on a timetable that is consistent with the reactor development and demonstration program. Also addressed in this paper are the present day concerns of environmental protection, safety, nuclear material safeguards, and proliferation resistance. It is structured on the well-known Purex processing method but includes new efforts aimed at advanced and alternative fuels. At the present time, the program consists mainly of a generic effort that is planned to progress through an integrated equipment engineering demonstration to an eventual pilot-plant operation. Each of these facilities is viewed as a test bed for advanced and alternative processing steps to address the many significant technical and political issues. 16 figures

  14. Nuclear fuel cycle: (5) reprocessing of irradiated fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Williams, J.A.

    1977-09-01

    The evolution of the reprocessing of irradiated fuel and the recovery of plutonium from it is traced out, starting by following the Manhatten project up to the present time. A brief description of the plant and processes used for reprocessing is given, while the Purex process, which is used in all plants today, is given special attention. Some of the important safety problems of reprocessing plants are considered, together with the solutions which have been adopted. Some examples of the more important safety aspects are the control of activity, criticality control, and the environmental impact. The related topic of irradiated fuel transport is briefly discussed.

  15. Remote maintenance in nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Herndon, J.N.

    1985-01-01

    Remote maintenance techniques applied in large-scale nuclear fuel reprocessing plants are reviewed with particular attention to the three major maintenance philosophy groupings: contact, remote crane canyon, and remote/contact. Examples are given, and the relative success of each type is discussed. Probable future directions for large-scale reprocessing plant maintenance are described along with advanced manipulation systems for application in the plants. The remote maintenance development program within the Consolidated Fuel Reprocessing Program at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory is also described. 19 refs., 19 figs

  16. Spent fuel management: reprocessing or storage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lima Soares, M.L. de; Oliveira Lopes, M.J. de

    1986-01-01

    A review of the spent fuel management concepts generally adopted in several countries is presented, including an analysis of the brazilian situation. The alternatives are the reprocessing, the interim storage and the final disposal in a repository after appropriate conditioning. The commercial operating reprocessing facilities in the Western World are located in France and in the United Kingdom. In the USA the anti-reprocessing policy from 1977 changed in 1981, when the government supported the resumption of commercial reprocessing and designated the private sector as responsible for providing these services. Small scale facilities are operating in India, Italy, Japan and West Germany. Pilot plants for LWR fuel are being planned by Spain, Pakistan and Argentina. (Author) [pt

  17. Spent fuel management: reprocessing or storage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lima Soares, M.L. de; Oliveira Lopes, M.J. de.

    1986-01-01

    A review of the spent fuel management concepts generally adopted in several countries is presented, including an analysis of the brazilian situation. The alternatives are the reprocessing, the interim storage and the final disposal in a repository after appropriate conditioning. The commercial operating reprocessing facilities in the Western World are located in France and in the United Kingdom. In the USA the anti-reprocessing policy from 1977 changed in 1981, when the Government supported the resumption of commercial reprocessing and designated the private sector as responsible for providing these services. Small scale facilities are operating in India, Italy, Japan and West Germany. Pilot plant for LWR fuel are being planned by Spain, Pakistan and Argentina. (Author) [pt

  18. Aggregated systems model for nuclear safeguards decisions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-03-01

    This report summarizes a general analytical tool designed to assist nuclear safeguards decision-makers. The approach is based on decision analysis--a quantitative procedure for evaluating complex decision alternatives with uncertain outcomes. The report describes the general analytical approach in the context of safeguards decisions at a hypothetical nuclear fuel reprocessing plant

  19. Symposium on international safeguards: Addressing verification challenges. Book of extended synopses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    A safeguards symposium has traditionally been organized by the Safeguards Department approximately every four years. The 2006 symposium addresses challenges to IAEA safeguards that have emerged or grown more serious since 2001. The increase in size and flexibility of uranium enrichment plants, for instance, and the spread of enrichment technology to a wider circle of States, pose challenges to traditional safeguards approaches. The procurement and supply networks discovered in 2004, dealing in sensitive nuclear technology and information, have serious implications for the future effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. The symposium will provide an opportunity for the IAEA and Member States to discuss options for dealing constructively with trade in sensitive nuclear technology. Reflecting developments since 2001, the 2006 symposium will focus on current challenges to the safeguards system, improving collection and analysis of safeguards information (analysis, processing tools, satellite imagery), advances in safeguards techniques and technology (future technology, neutron techniques, spent fuel verification, reprocessing, environmental sampling, containment and surveillance), further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches (safeguards approaches, integrated safeguards, R/SSAC, destructive analysis, non-destructive analysis, enrichment, reprocessing, spent fuel transfer) and future challenges. This publication contains 183 extended synopses, each of them was indexed separately

  20. Symposium on international safeguards: Addressing verification challenges. Book of extended synopses

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2006-07-01

    A safeguards symposium has traditionally been organized by the Safeguards Department approximately every four years. The 2006 symposium addresses challenges to IAEA safeguards that have emerged or grown more serious since 2001. The increase in size and flexibility of uranium enrichment plants, for instance, and the spread of enrichment technology to a wider circle of States, pose challenges to traditional safeguards approaches. The procurement and supply networks discovered in 2004, dealing in sensitive nuclear technology and information, have serious implications for the future effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. The symposium will provide an opportunity for the IAEA and Member States to discuss options for dealing constructively with trade in sensitive nuclear technology. Reflecting developments since 2001, the 2006 symposium will focus on current challenges to the safeguards system, improving collection and analysis of safeguards information (analysis, processing tools, satellite imagery), advances in safeguards techniques and technology (future technology, neutron techniques, spent fuel verification, reprocessing, environmental sampling, containment and surveillance), further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches (safeguards approaches, integrated safeguards, R/SSAC, destructive analysis, non-destructive analysis, enrichment, reprocessing, spent fuel transfer) and future challenges. This publication contains 183 extended synopses, each of them was indexed separately.

  1. Reprocessing of spent fuel and public acceptance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Imai, Ryukichi

    1977-01-01

    The public acceptance has to be considered regarding whole atomic power rather than the reprocessing of nuclear fuel separately, and the problems concerned are as follows; the release of radioactive materials in the normal and abnormal operations of reprocessing plants, the disposal of wastes with high level radioactivity, the transportation of high level radioactive material, the relation to the economic activity near nuclear plants, the environmental effect of 85 Kr. and 3 H, etc., and the physical protection for reprocessing facility itself, the special handling of the materials of very high radioactivity level such as fission products and plutonium, the radiation exposure of operators, and the demonstration of reprocessing techniques of commercial base, etc., as a part of the nuclear fuel cycle, and the relation between atomic power and other technologies in energy supply, the evalution of atomic power as the symbol of huge scale science, and the energy problem within the confrontation of economic development and the preservation of environment and resources regarding whole nuclear energy. The situations of fuel reprocessing in USA, UK, France, Germany and Japan are explained from the viewpoint of the history. The general background for the needs of nuclear energy in Japan, the image of nuclear energy and fuel reprocessing entertained by the general public, and the special feature of reprocessing techniques are described. (Nakai, Y.)

  2. Study of the application of near-real-time materials accountancy to safeguards for reprocessing facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ikawa, Koji; Ihara, Hitoshi; Nishimura, Hideo; Hirata, Mitsuho; Sakuragi, Hirotaka; Ido, Masaru.

    1983-09-01

    This report describes the results of TASTEX task F, the basic purpose of which was to investigate the feasibility of applying the basic concepts of near-real-time materials accountancy to small or medium-sized spent fuel reprocessing facilities, using the PNC-Tokai facility as a model. The background of Task-F and the proposed IAEA requirements on reprocessing plant safeguards are briefly shown. A model of near-real-time materials accountancy based on weekly material balances covering the entire process MBA is outlined, and the effectiveness of this model is evaluated based on simulation and analysis procedures developed for the study. The results show that the proposed materials accountancy model should provide sufficient information to satisfy IAEA guidelines for detection goals. Field testing of the model began in 1980, and the preliminary evaluation of this field test data shows that weekly in-process physical inventories are possible without affecting process operations. This report also describes studies related to IAEA verification procedures, and identifies necessary further work. (author)

  3. Analysis of UREX+1a and Pyroprocessing Technologies from Safeguards Aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Musembi, Mutava Victor; Jeong, Seung Young; Kwon, Eun Ha

    2013-01-01

    Various advanced and more easily safeguard-able reprocessing technologies have been proposed and are currently at different stages of development. This paper briefly analyses two proposed next generation reprocessing technologies, i. e. UREX+1a and pyroprocessing. It goes on to suggest various measures that can be taken to safeguard these technologies against nuclear proliferation. Due to the significant proliferation risks associated with PUREX, more proliferation resistant technologies are required in spent fuel reprocessing. UREX+1a and pyroprocessing can be suitable replacements since Pu is not separated from other TRUs after reprocessing. Implementations of technology specific safeguard measures can help enhance the proliferation resistance of these technologies. Since there is no technology which is foolproof, a MUF uncertainty estimation/quantification technology needs to be developed. These uncertainty estimates can then be used in a safeguards probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) system to quantify the risks associated with a particular reprocessing technology. To further safeguard these technologies, additional safeguard measures are needed for defense in depth. This may include implementation of multiple, independent, and redundant layers of defense such that no single layer, no matter how robust, is solely relied upon. Quantification of safeguard uncertainties related to UREX+1a and pyroprocessing can be used to benchmark these technologies against PUREX and between themselves for policy making

  4. Analysis of UREX+1a and Pyroprocessing Technologies from Safeguards Aspects

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Musembi, Mutava Victor [Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Jeong, Seung Young [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Kwon, Eun Ha [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2013-10-15

    Various advanced and more easily safeguard-able reprocessing technologies have been proposed and are currently at different stages of development. This paper briefly analyses two proposed next generation reprocessing technologies, i. e. UREX+1a and pyroprocessing. It goes on to suggest various measures that can be taken to safeguard these technologies against nuclear proliferation. Due to the significant proliferation risks associated with PUREX, more proliferation resistant technologies are required in spent fuel reprocessing. UREX+1a and pyroprocessing can be suitable replacements since Pu is not separated from other TRUs after reprocessing. Implementations of technology specific safeguard measures can help enhance the proliferation resistance of these technologies. Since there is no technology which is foolproof, a MUF uncertainty estimation/quantification technology needs to be developed. These uncertainty estimates can then be used in a safeguards probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) system to quantify the risks associated with a particular reprocessing technology. To further safeguard these technologies, additional safeguard measures are needed for defense in depth. This may include implementation of multiple, independent, and redundant layers of defense such that no single layer, no matter how robust, is solely relied upon. Quantification of safeguard uncertainties related to UREX+1a and pyroprocessing can be used to benchmark these technologies against PUREX and between themselves for policy making.

  5. The use of artificial intelligence for safeguarding fuel reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wachter, J.W.; Forgy, C.L.

    1987-01-01

    Recorded process data from the ''Minirun'' campaigns conducted at the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP) in Barnwell, South Carolina during 1980 to 1981 have been utilized to study the suitability of computer-based Artificial Intelligence (AI) methods for process monitoring for safeguards purposes. The techniques of knowledge engineering were used to formulate the decision-making software which operates on the process data customarily used for process operations. The OPS5 AI language was used to construct an Expert System for this purpose. Such systems are able to form reasoned conclusions from incomplete, inaccurate or otherwise ''fuzzy'' data, and to explain the reasoning that led to them. The programs were tested using minirun data taken during simulated diversions ranging in size from 1 to 20 L of solution that had been monitored previously using conventional procedural techniques. 13 refs., 3 figs

  6. History and current status of nuclear fuel reprocessing technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Funasaka, Hideyuki; Nagai, Toshihisa; Washiya, Tadahiro

    2008-01-01

    History and present state of fast breeder reactor was reviewed in series. As a history and current status of nuclear fuel reprocessing technology, this ninth lecture presented the progress of the FBR fuel reprocessing technology and advanced reprocessing processes. FBR fuel reprocessing technology had been developed to construct the reprocessing equipment test facilities (RETF) based on PUREX process technologies. With economics, reduction of environmental burdens and proliferation resistance taken into consideration, advanced aqueous method for nuclear fuel cycle activities has been promoted as the government's basic policy. Innovative technologies on mechanical disassembly, continuous rotary dissolver, crystallizer, solvent extraction and actinides recovery have been mainly studied. (T. Tanaka)

  7. Spent fuel reprocessing past experience and future prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Megy, J.

    1983-09-01

    A large experience has been gathered from the early fifties till now in the field of spent fuel reprocessing. As the main efforts in the world have been made for developping the reactors and the fuel fabrication industry to feed them, the spent fuel reprocessing activities came later and have not yet reached the industrial maturity existing to day for plants such as PWRs. But in the principal nuclear countries spent fuel reprocessing is to day considered as a necessity with two simultaneous targets: 1. Recovering the valuable materials, uranium and plutonium. 2. Conditionning the radioactive wastes to ensure safe definitive storage. The paper reviews the main steps: 1. Reprocessing for thermal reactor fuels: large plants are already operating or in construction, but in parallel a large effort of R and D is still under way for improvements. 2. The development of fast breeder plants implies associated fuel reprocessing facilities: pilot plants have demonstrated the closing of the cycle. The main difficulties encountered will be examined and particularly the importance of taking into account the problems of effluents processing and wastes storage [fr

  8. Fuel reprocessing at a loss to prove its justification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Traube, K.

    1986-01-01

    Commercial utilization of nuclear energy is possible with or without fuel reprocessing of spent fuel elements. Demands on terminal storage are about equal in both cases. There is no reason - excluding the military one - to decide in favour of fuel reprocessing instead of direct terminal storage, for neither does fuel reprocessing offer advantages in regard of the safety of nuclear waste disposal, nor is it necessary to produce plutonium for the breeder reactor. Fuel reprocessing is analyzed considering those changed aspects with a view to scarcer uranium resources, juridical motives, and what is termed the development deficit. (DG) [de

  9. Fuel cycle based safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    De Montmollin, J.M.; Higinbotham, W.A.; Gupta, D.

    1985-07-01

    In NPT safeguards the same model approach and absolute-quantity inspection goals are applied at present to all similar facilities, irrespective of the State's fuel cycle. There is a continuing interest and activity on the part of the IAEA in new NPT safeguards approaches that more directly address a State's nuclear activities as a whole. This fuel cycle based safeguards system is expected to a) provide a statement of findings for the entire State rather than only for individual facilities; b) allocate inspection efforts so as to reflect more realistically the different categories of nuclear materials in the different parts of the fuel cycle and c) provide more timely and better coordinated information on the inputs, outputs and inventories of nuclear materials in a State. (orig./RF) [de

  10. Current Status of Spent Fast Reactor Fuel Reprocessing and Waste Treatment in Various Countries: United States of America

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    Due to the previous strategic US decision on treating SNF as waste and not pursuing the reprocessing option, development work for the FR fuel cycle was only performed in a few laboratories, although interest is now increasing again. ORNL together with ANL have been influential in promoting the wider use of centrifugal contactors (favoured due to the high fissile content and decay power of FR fuel materials), associated remote handling systems and hardware prototypes for most unit operations in the reprocessing conceptual designs in the context of their development of the Consolidated Fuel Reprocessing Program. There is limited experience with reprocessing tests on the Fast Flux Text Facility (FFTF) MOX fuel. ORNL has undertaken small tests on laboratory scale dissolution and solvent extraction of MOX fuel irradiated to 220 GW/t HM burnup at around 2 kg batch scale [180-186]. The initiative called the breeder reprocessing engineering test (BRET) was started in the 1980s with a focus on the developmental activity of the US DOE to demonstrate breeder fuel reprocessing technology while closing the fuel cycle for the FFTF. The process was supposed to be installed at the existing Fuels and Materials Examination Facility (FMEF) at the Hanford Site, Richland, Washington. The major objectives of BRET were to: - Develop and demonstrate reprocessing technology and systems for breeder fuel; - Close the fuel cycle for the FFTF; - Provide an integrated test of breeder reactor fuel cycle technology - reprocessing, safeguards and waste management. The quest for pyrochemical alternatives to aqueous reprocessing has been under way in the USA since the late 1950s. Approaches examined at various levels of development and for a variety of fuels include alloy melting, FP volatilization and adsorption, fluoride and chloride volatility methods, redox solvent extractions between liquid salt and metal phases, precipitation and fractional crystallization, and electrowinning and electro

  11. Meeting the safeguards challenges of a commercial reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, S.J.; Chesnay, B.; Pearsall, C.; Takeda, S.; Tomikawa, H.; Fujimaki, K.; Iwamoto, T.

    2004-01-01

    Never before has the IAEA taken on such a large challenge as implementing a safeguards system at a commercial reprocessing plant. The challenges lay in a wide range of areas. This paper will present an overview of how specific challenges are being met in: Providing an initial and continuing design verification approach that maintains continuity of knowledge for the life-time of the plant; Providing a robust safeguards approach, including added assurance measures to confirm the operational conditions of the facility; Providing verification systems with the highest sensitivity and reliability, while also being cost efficient; Providing timely and accurate analytical laboratory results; Providing sufficient authentication to joint-use, unattended verification systems to assure that independent conclusions can be reached; Providing a comprehensive integrated software system that allows for remote inspector data handling and evaluation and thus reducing inspection effort. A primary prerequisite to developing and implementing a safeguards approach of this magnitude is the transparent and interactive cooperation of the State and the operator. The JNFL Project has been a model example of this cooperation. This cooperation has been in the areas of system security, operational modifications, schedule adjustments, technical development and financial support. (author)

  12. Analysis and study of spent fuel reprocessing technology from birth to present

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Takahashi, Keizo

    2006-01-01

    As for the nuclear fuel reprocessing of the spent fuel, although there was argument of pros and cons, it was decided to start Rokkasho reprocessing project further at the Japan Atomic Energy Commission of ''Long-Term Program for Research, Development and Utilization of Nuclear Energy'' in year 2004. The operation of Tokai Reprocessing is going steadily to reprocess spent fuel more than 1,100 tons. In this paper, history, present status and future of reprocessing technology is discussed focusing from military Pu production, Magnox fuel reprocessing to oxide fuel reprocessing. Amount of reprocessed fuel are estimated based on fuel type. Then, history of reprocessing, US, UK, France, Germany, Russian, Belgian and Japan is presented and compared on technology, national character, development organization, environmental protection, and high active waste vitrification. Technical requirements are increased from Pu production fuel, Magnox fuel and oxide fuel mainly because of higher burnup. Reprocessing technology is synthetic of engineering and accumulation of operational experience. The lessons learned from the operational experience of the world will be helpful for establishment of nuclear fuel reprocessing technology in Japan. (author)

  13. Direction of reprocessing technology development based on 30 years operation of Tokai reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nomura, S; Tanaka, T.; Ohshima, H.

    2006-01-01

    Full text: Full text: Recent global interest focuses the possibility of recycling of spent fuel with advanced fast reactor fuel cycle system. Goal of closed fuel cycle is to achieve the maximum use of uranium resources and minimum disposal of waste by multi recycle of TRU as a competitive nuclear energy system. The future reprocessing and fuel fabrication system should be synchronized completely with the advanced reactor system and waste treatment and disposal back-end system to complete closed fuel cycle. To realize such system, current reprocessing system should be changed to handle Pu-U-Minor Actinide with more reductions in the cost and less waste volume, as well as an inherent proliferation resistance. For the successful industrialization of advanced reprocessing technology, it is necessary to combine three key elements of R and D efforts, engineering base demonstration and experiences of plant operation. Tokai Reprocessing Facilities licensed a maximum capacity of 0.7tHM/day began a hot operation in 1977 and reprocessed l,100tHM U02 spent fuel and 20tHM ATR-MOX with a continuous technological improvements under IAEA full scope safeguards. With 30 years experience, candidate of key technologies proposed for realizing the next advanced reprocessing are as follows: 1) Simplified co-extraction process of Pu-Np-U by using multistage centrifugal extractors in stead of pulsed columns; 2) Corrosion free components in acid condition by using corrosion resistant refractory alloys and ceramics; 3) Co-conversion technology to MA containing MOX powder by micro-wave heating method for a short process for MA containing MOX pellets fabrication; 4) Advanced verification of high level radioactive liquid waste combining separation technology of TRU and LLFP elements; 5) Advanced chemical analysis and monitoring system for TRU elements in a plant. These advanced reprocessing technologies will be applied mainly to reprocess the LWR spent fuel accumulated past and future

  14. Export control guide: Spent nuclear fuel reprocessing and preparation of plutonium metal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-10-01

    The international Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, also referred to as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), states in Article III, paragraph 2(b) that open-quotes Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide . . . equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.close quotes This guide was prepared to assist export control officials in the interpretation, understanding, and implementation of export laws and controls relating to the international Trigger List for irradiated nuclear fuel reprocessing equipment, components, and materials. The guide also contains information related to the production of plutonium metal. Reprocessing and its place in the nuclear fuel cycle are described briefly; the standard procedure to prepare metallic plutonium is discussed; steps used to prepare Trigger List controls are cited; descriptions of controlled items are given; and special materials of construction are noted. This is followed by a comprehensive description of especially designed or prepared equipment, materials, and components of reprocessing and plutonium metal processes and includes photographs and/or pictorial representations. The nomenclature of the Trigger List has been retained in the numbered sections of this document for clarity

  15. Reprocessing RTR fuel in the La Hague plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thomasson, J.; Drain, F.; David, A.

    2001-01-01

    Starting in 2006, research reactors operators will be fully responsible for the back-end management of their spent fuel. It appears that the only solution for this management is treatment-conditioning, which could be done at the La Hague reprocessing complex in France. The fissile material can be separated in the reprocessing plants and the final waste can be encapsulated in a matrix adapted to its potential hazards. RTR reprocessing at La Hague would require some modifications, since the plant had been primarily designed to reprocess fuel from light water reactors. Many provisions have been taken at the plant design stage, however, and the modifications would be feasible even during active operations, as was done from 1993 to 1995 when a new liquid waste management was implemented, and when one of the two vitrification facilities was improved. To achieve RTR back-end management, COGEMA and its partners are also conducting R and D to define a new generation of LEU fuel with performance characteristics approximating those of HEU fuel. This new-generation fuel would be easier to reprocess. (author)

  16. Reprocessing RTR fuel in the La Hague plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Thomasson, J. [Cogema, F-78140 Velizy (France); Drain, F.; David, A. [SGN, F-78182 Saint Quentin en Yvelines (France)

    2001-07-01

    Starting in 2006, research reactors operators will be fully responsible for the back-end management of their spent fuel. It appears that the only solution for this management is treatment-conditioning, which could be done at the La Hague reprocessing complex in France. The fissile material can be separated in the reprocessing plants and the final waste can be encapsulated in a matrix adapted to its potential hazards. RTR reprocessing at La Hague would require some modifications, since the plant had been primarily designed to reprocess fuel from light water reactors. Many provisions have been taken at the plant design stage, however, and the modifications would be feasible even during active operations, as was done from 1993 to 1995 when a new liquid waste management was implemented, and when one of the two vitrification facilities was improved. To achieve RTR back-end management, COGEMA and its partners are also conducting R and D to define a new generation of LEU fuel with performance characteristics approximating those of HEU fuel. This new-generation fuel would be easier to reprocess. (author)

  17. Reprocessing RTR fuel in the La Hague plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Thomasson, J. [Cogema, 78 - Velizy Villacoublay (France); Drain, F.; David, A. [SGN, 78 - Saint Quentin en Yveline (France)

    2001-07-01

    Starting in 2006, research reactors operators will be fully responsible for their research and testing reactors spent fuel back-end management. It appears that the only solution for this management is treatment-conditioning, which could be done at the La Hague reprocessing complex in France. The fissile material can be separated in the reprocessing plants and the final waste can be encapsulated in a matrix adapted to its potential hazards. RTR reprocessing at La Hague would require some modifications, since the plant had been primarily designed to reprocess fuel from light water reactors. Many provisions have been taken at the plant design stage, however, and the modifications would be feasible even during active operations, as was done from 1993 to 1995 when a new liquid waste management was implemented, and when one of the two vitrification facilities was improved. To achieve RTR back-end management, COGEMA and its partners are also conducting R and D to define a new generation of LEU fuel with performance characteristics approximating those of HEU fuel. This new-generation fuel would be easier to reprocess. (author)

  18. Reprocessing of research reactor fuel the Dounreay option

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cartwright, P.

    1997-08-01

    Reprocessing is a proven process for the treatment of spent U/Al Research Reactor fuel. At Dounreay 12679 elements have been reprocessed during the past 30 years. For reactors converting to LEU fuel the uranium recovered in reprocessing can be blended down to less than 20% U{sub 235}, enrichment and be fabricated into new elements. For reactors already converted to LEU it is technically possible to reprocess spent silicide fuel to reduce the U{sub 235} burden and present to a repository only stable conditioned waste. The main waste stream from reprocessing which contains the Fission products is collected in underground storage tanks where it is kept for a period of at least five years before being converted to a stable solid form for return to the country of origin for subsequent storage/disposal. Discharges to the environment from reprocessing are low and are limited to the radioactive gases contained in the spent fuel and a low level liquid waste steam. Both of these discharges are independently monitored, and controlled within strict discharge limits set by the UK Government`s Scottish Office. Transportation of spent fuel to Dounreay has been undertaken using many routes from mainland Europe and has utilised over the past few years both chartered and scheduled vessel services. Several different transport containers have been handled and are currently licensed in the UK. This paper provides a short history of MTR reprocessing at Dounreay, and provides information to show reprocessing can satisfy the needs of MTR operators, showing that reprocessing is a valuable asset in non-proliferation terms, offers a complete solution and is environmentally acceptable.

  19. Statement on the Consolidated Fuel Reprocessing Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Trauger, D.B.

    1984-01-01

    Oak Ridge National Laboratory has chosen the following objectives for future reprocessing plant design: reduced radiation exposure to workers; minimal environmental impact; improved plant operation and maintenance; improved accountability; no plutonium diversion; and reduced overall capital and operating cost. These objectives lead to a plant with totally remote operation. The Breeder Reactor Engineering Test (BRET) has been designed to perform a key role in demonstrating advanced reprocessing technology. It has been scheduled to be available to reprocess spent fuel from the Fast Flux Test Facility. The principal features of the Consolidated Fuel Reprocessing Program and of the BRET facility are appropriate for all reactor types

  20. Plutonium, proliferation, and the price of reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gilinsky, V.

    1978-01-01

    France and Britain disagree with the US on whether deferring fuel reprocessing that provides plutonium for export can help contain proliferation. The US has veto power over reprocessing of US-supplied fuels for non-EURATOM countries, but exceptions will be made for movement within the EURATOM community. Political issues will be influenced by the magnitude of the financial investments, however, and commercial considerations have until recently dominated and complicated international safeguards. The author notes that US policy was reversed by the gradual acknowledgment that the same international inspection of plutonium stockpiles would not work as it had for low-enriched fuel and that economic interests must have a lower priority to avoiding proliferation. He cites the combination of sudden policy shifts, failure to prove that present reactors are best, and long-term distrust of US economic motives as failing to persuade either the French or British, who feel the best safeguard is provided by their high-security reprocessing facilities. Still to be resolved are the conditions under which plutonium must be returned to its owners, a problem that must determine safe international transport and storage and international management. Technical fixes, such as the CIVEX process, cannot contribute to the solution for several decades, while reprocessing is no longer considered a first step in waste disposal and would be more expensive and complicated than present waste disposal procedures. The author concedes merit in President Carter's requirement of separating ''the legitimate and necessary use of uranium'' and nuclear fuels that are also explosives

  1. Overview of HTGR fuel recycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Notz, K.J.

    1976-01-01

    An overview of HTGR fuel recycle is presented, with emphasis placed on reprocessing and fuel kernel refabrication. Overall recycle operations include (1) shipment and storage, (2) reprocessing, (3) refabrication, (4) waste handling, and (5) accountability and safeguards

  2. Used mixed oxide fuel reprocessing at RT-1 plant

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kolupaev, D.; Logunov, M.; Mashkin, A.; Bugrov, K.; Korchenkin, K. [FSUE PA ' Mayak' , 30, Lenins str, Ozersk, 460065 (Russian Federation); Shadrin, A.; Dvoeglazov, K. [ITCP ' PRORYV' , 2/8 Malaya Krasmoselskay str, Moscow, 107140 (Russian Federation)

    2016-07-01

    Reprocessing of the mixed uranium-plutonium spent nuclear fuel of the BN-600 reactor was performed at the RT-1 plant twice, in 2012 and 2014. In total, 8 fuel assemblies with a burn-up from 73 to 89 GW day/t and the cooling time from 17 to 21 years were reprocessed. The reprocessing included the stages of dissolution, clarification, extraction separation of U and Pu with purification from the fission products, refining of uranium and plutonium at the relevant refining cycles. Dissolution of the fuel composition of MOX used nuclear fuel (UNF) in nitric acid solutions in the presence of fluoride ion has occurred with the full transfer of actinides into solution. Due to the high content of Pu extraction separation of U and Pu was carried out on a nuclear-safe equipment designed for the reprocessing of highly enriched U spent nuclear fuel and Pu refining. Technological processes of extraction, separation and refining of actinides proceeded without deviations from the normal mode. The output flow of the extraction outlets in their compositions corresponded to the regulatory norms and remained at the level of the compositions of the streams resulting from the reprocessing of fuel types typical for the RT-1 plant. No increased losses of Pu into waste have been registered during the reprocessing of BN-600 MOX UNF an compare with VVER-440 uranium UNF reprocessing. (authors)

  3. Equipment specifications for an electrochemical fuel reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hemphill, Kevin P.

    2010-01-01

    Electrochemical reprocessing is a technique used to chemically separate and dissolve the components of spent nuclear fuel, in order to produce new metal fuel. There are several different variations to electrochemical reprocessing. These variations are accounted for by both the production of different types of spent nuclear fuel, as well as different states and organizations doing research in the field. For this electrochemical reprocessing plant, the spent fuel will be in the metallurgical form, a product of fast breeder reactors, which are used in many nuclear power plants. The equipment line for this process is divided into two main categories, the fuel refining equipment and the fuel fabrication equipment. The fuel refining equipment is responsible for separating out the plutonium and uranium together, while getting rid of the minor transuranic elements and fission products. The fuel fabrication equipment will then convert this plutonium and uranium mixture into readily usable metal fuel.

  4. Review of thorium fuel reprocessing experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brooksbank, R.E.; McDuffee, W.T.; Rainey, R.H.

    1978-01-01

    The review reveals that experience in the reprocessing of irradiated thorium materials is limited. Plants that have processed thorium-based fuels were not optimized for the operations. Previous demonstrations of several viable flowsheets provide a sound technological base for the development of optimum reprocessing methods and facilities. In addition to the resource benefit by using thorium, recent nonproliferation thrusts have rejuvenated an interest in thorium reprocessing. Extensive radiation is generated as the result of 232 U-contamination produced in the 233 U, resulting in the remote operation and fabrication operations and increased fuel cycle costs. Development of the denatured thorium flowsheet, which is currently of interest because of nonproliferation concerns, represents a difficult technological challenge

  5. Some developments in safeguards techniques

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beets, C.

    1977-01-01

    The fundamental principles of safeguards and the research and development of safeguards techniques are described. Safeguard accountancy based upon the partition of the fuel cycle into suitable material balance areas will be further improved. Implementation of international safeguards in the European fuel fabrication and reprocessing facilities is described. The effectiveness of a material accounting system depends on the quality of the quantitative data. The allocation of the tasks in the framework of an integrated safeguards is concerned with R and D work only and has no bearing on the allocation of the implementation costs. Bulk measurements, sampling and destructive or non-destructive analysis of samples are described for the determination of batch data. Testing of the safeguards techniques as a keystone in relation to plant instrumentation programmes are still being developed throughout the world. In addition to accountancy and control, it also includes an effective physical security program. The system of international safeguards that prevailed in the sixties has been re-modelled to comply with the new requirements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and with the growth of nuclear energy

  6. Fuel reprocessing experience in India: Technological and economic considerations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Prasad, A.N.; Kumar, S.V.

    1983-01-01

    The approach to the reprocessing of irradiated fuel from power reactors in India is conditioned by the non-availability of highly enriched uranium with the consequent need for plutonium for the fast-reactor programme. With this in view, the fuel reprocessing programme in India is developing in stages matching the nuclear power programme. The first plant was set up in Trombay to reprocess the metallic uranium fuel from the research reactor CIRUS. The experience gained in the construction and operation of this plant, and in its subsequent decommissioning and reconstruction, has not only provided the know-how for the design of subsequent plants but has indicated the fruitful areas of research and development for efficient utilization of limited resources. The Trombay plant also handled successfully, on a pilot scale, the reprocessing of irradiated thorium fuel to separate uranium-233. The second plant at Tarapur has been built for reprocessing spent fuels from the power reactors at Tarapur (BWR) and Rajasthan (PHWR). The third plant, at present under design, will reprocess the spent fuels from the power reactors (PHWR) and the Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR) located at Kalpakkam. Through the above approach experience has been acquired which will be useful in the design and construction of even larger plants which will become necessary in the future as the nuclear power programme grows. The strategies considered for the sizing and siting of reprocessing plants extend from the idea of small plants, located at nuclear power station sites, to a large-size central plant, located at an independent site, serving many stations. The paper discusses briefly the experience in reprocessing uranium and thorium fuels and also in decommissioning. An attempt is made to outline the technological and economic aspects which are relevant under different circumstances and which influence the size and siting of the fuel reprocessing plants and the expected lead times for construction

  7. Legal questions concerning the termination of spent fuel element reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    John, Michele

    2005-01-01

    The thesis on legal aspects of the terminated spent fuel reprocessing in Germany is based on the legislation, jurisdiction and literature until January 2004. The five chapters cover the following topics: description of the problem; reprocessing of spent fuel elements in foreign countries - practical and legal aspects; operators' responsibilities according to the atomic law with respect to the reprocessing of Geman spent fuel elements in foreign countries; compatibility of the prohibition of Geman spent fuel element reprocessing in foreign countries with international law, European law and German constitutional law; results of the evaluation

  8. Handbook on process and chemistry of nuclear fuel reprocessing version 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-10-01

    Aqueous nuclear fuel reprocessing technology, based on PUREX technology, has wide applicability as the principal reprocessing technology of the first generation, and relating technologies, waste management for example, are highly developed, too. It is quite important to establish a database summarizing fundamental information about the process and the chemistry of aqueous reprocessing, because it contributes to establish and develop fuel reprocessing technology and nuclear fuel cycle treating high burn-up UO 2 fuel and spent MOX fuel, and to utilize aqueous reprocessing technology much widely. This handbook is the second edition of the first report, which summarizes the fundamental data on process and chemistry, which was collected and examined by 'Editing Committee of Handbook on Process and Chemistry of Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing' from FY 1993 until FY 2000. (author)

  9. Role of near-real-time accounting in international safeguards for reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Dietz, R.J.; Shipley, J.P.

    1979-01-01

    The effectiveness of conventional nuclear materials accounting systems, both national and international, is constrained by the fundamental process features of high-throughput nuclear facilities and the economic limits of effective nuclear materials management consistent with production goals. Conventional accounting, complemented by near-real-time accounting, may meet projected IAEA performance goals for detecting diversion in medium- and high-throughput reprocessing facilities projected for the late 1900's. The design of materials accounting systems for international safeguards in reprocessing plants is discussed, paying particular attention to the question of international verification. Specific problems in measurement techniques, data evaluation, and systems structure are identified, and the current status of research and development efforts is reviewed

  10. Reprocessing flowsheet and material balance for MEU spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Abraham, L.

    1978-10-01

    In response to nonproliferation concerns, the high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) Fuel Recycle Development Program is investigating the processing requirements for a denatured medium-enriched uranium--thorium (MEU/Th) fuel cycle. Prior work emphasized the processing requirements for a high-enriched uranium--thorium (HEU/Th) fuel cycle. This report presents reprocessing flowsheets for an HTGR/MEU fuel recycle base case. Material balance data have been calculated for reprocessing of spent MEU and recycle fuels in the HTGR Recycle Reference Facility (HRRF). Flowsheet and mass flow effects in MEU-cycle reprocessing are discussed in comparison with prior HEU-cycle flowsheets

  11. Safeguards approach for conditioning facility for spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Younkin, J.M.; Barham, M.; Moran, B.W.

    1999-01-01

    A safeguards approach has been developed for conditioning facilities associated with the final disposal of spent fuel in geologic repositories. The proposed approach is based on a generic conditioning facility incorporating common features of conditioning facility designs currently proposed. The generic facility includes a hot cell for consolidation of spent fuel pins and repackaging of spent fuel items such as assemblies and cans of pins. The consolidation process introduces safeguards concerns which have not previously been addressed in traditional safeguards approaches. In developing the safeguards approach, diversion of spent fuel was assessed in terms of potential target items, operational activities performed on the items, containment of the items, and concealment activities performed on the items. The combination of these factors defines the potential diversion pathways. Diversion pathways were identified for spent fuel pellets, pins, assemblies, canisters, and casks. Diversion activities provide for opportunities of detection along the diversion paths. Potential detection methods were identified at several levels of diversion activities. Detection methods can be implemented through safeguards measures. Safeguards measures were proposed for each of the primary safeguards techniques of design information verification (DIV), containment and surveillance (C/S), and material accountancy. Potential safeguards approaches were developed by selection of appropriate combinations of safeguards measures. For all candidate safeguards approaches, DIV is a fundamental component. Variations in the approaches are mainly in the degree of C/S measures and in the types and numbers of material accountancy verification measures. The candidate safeguards approaches were evaluated toward the goal of determining a model safeguards approach. This model approach is based on the integrated application of selected safeguards measures to use International Atomic Energy Agency resources

  12. Wastes from fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eschrich, H.

    1976-01-01

    Handling, treatment, and interim storage of radioactive waste, problems confronted with during the reprocessing of spent fuel elements from LWR's according to the Purex-type process, are dealt with in detail. (HR/LN) [de

  13. Implications for Advanced Safeguards Derived from PR and PP Case Study Results

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Boyer, Brian D. [Los Alamos National Laboratory, Nuclear Nonproliferation Division, N-4, Safeguards and Security Group, P. O. Box 1663, N-4, Mail Stop E541, Los Alamos, New Mexico 87545 (United States)

    2009-06-15

    The proliferation resistance and physical protection (PR and PP) working group produced a case study on the Example Sodium Fast Reactor (ESFR). The ESFR is a hypothetical nuclear energy system consisting of four sodium-cooled fast reactors of medium size collocated with an on-site dry fuel storage facility and a spent fuel reprocessing facility using pyro-processing technology. This study revealed how safeguards would be applied at such site consisting of integrated multiple fuel cycle facilities and the implications of what safeguards technology and safeguards concepts would need to be adapted and developed to safeguard successfully this Generation IV nuclear energy system concept. The major safeguards concepts driving our safeguards analysis are timeliness goals and material quantity goals. Because the fresh transuranic (TRU) fuel to be produced in the ESFR fuel fabrication facility contains plutonium, the ESFR will be reprocessing, using in the reactor, and storing material on site that will have IAEA defined 'direct use material' in it with stringent timeliness goals and material quantity goals that drive the safeguards implementation. Specifically, the TRU fresh fuel, pyro-processing in process material, LWR spent fuel sent to the ESFR, and TRU spent fuel will contain plutonium. This material will need to be verified at interim intervals four times per year because the irradiated direct use material, as defined previously, has three-month timeliness goals and 8 kg material quantity goals for plutonium. The TRU in-process material is, of course, irradiated direct-use material because of keeping the plutonium and uranium together with TRU products that should provide a radiation barrier that slows down the ability to reprocess the fuel and by the process if it intrinsically will take major modification to be able to separate plutonium from the uranium and TRU mixture. This is an issue that the ESFR design must answer to state it has valuable

  14. Consolidated fuel reprocessing program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuban, D.P.; Noakes, M.W.; Bradley, E.C.

    1987-01-01

    The Advanced Servomanipulator (ASM) System consists of three major components: the ASM slave, the dual arm master controller or master, and the control system. The ASM is a remotely maintainable force-reflecting servomanipulator developed at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) as part of the Consolidated Fuel Reprocessing Program of (CFRP). This new manipulator addresses requirements of advanced nuclear fuel reprocessing with emphasis on force reflection, remote maintainability, and reliability. It uses an all-gear force transmission system. The master arms were designed as a kinematic replica of ASM and use cable force transmission. Special digital control algorithms were developed to improve the system performance. The system is presently operational and undergoing evaluation. Preliminary testing has been completed and is reported. The system is now undergoing commercialization by transferring the technology to the private sector

  15. Capability of minor nuclide confinement in fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fujine, Sachio; Uchiyama, Gunzo; Mineo, Hideaki; Kihara, Takehiro; Asakura, Toshihide

    1999-01-01

    Experiment with spent fuels has started with the small scale reprocessing facility in NUCEF-BECKY αγ cell. Primary purpose of the experiment is to study the capability of long-lived nuclide confinement both in the PUREX flow sheet applied to the large scale reprocessing plant and also in the PARC (Partitioning Conundrum key process) flow sheet which is our proposal as a simplified reprocessing of one cycle extraction system. Our interests in the experiment are the behaviors of minor long-lived nuclides and the behaviors of the heterogeneous substances, such as sedimentation in the dissolver, organic cruds in the extraction banks. The significance of those behaviors will be assessed from the standpoint of the process safety of reprocessing for high burn-up fuels and MOX fuels. (author)

  16. Concept for fuel-cycle based safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    deMontmollin, J.M.; Higinbotham, W.A.; Gupta, D.

    1985-01-01

    Although the guidelines for NPT safeguards specify that the State's fuel cycle and degree of international independence are to be taken into account, the same model approach and absolute-quantity inspection goals are applied to all similar facilities, irrespective of the State's fuel cycle, and the findings are reported in those terms. A concept whereby safeguards might more effectively and efficiently accomplish the purposes of NPT safeguards is explored. The principal features are: (1) division of the fuel cycle into three zones, each containing material having a different degree of significance for safeguards; (2) closing a verified material balance around each zone, supplementing the present MBA balances for more sensitive facilities and replacing them for others; (3) maintenance by the IAEA of a current book inventory for each facility by means of immediate, abbreviated reporting of interfacility transfers; (4) near real-time analysis of material flow patterns through the fuel cycle; and (5) a periodic statement of the findings for the entire State that takes the form that there is assurance that all nuclear materials under safeguards are accounted for to some stated degree of uncertainty

  17. Radioactive Semivolatiles in Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jubin, R. T. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Strachan, D. M. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Ilas, G. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Spencer, B. B. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Soelberg, N. R. [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

    2014-09-01

    In nuclear fuel reprocessing, various radioactive elements enter the gas phase from the unit operations found in the reprocessing facility. In previous reports, the pathways and required removal were discussed for four radionuclides known to be volatile, 14C, 3H, 129I, and 85Kr. Other, less volatile isotopes can also report to the off-gas streams in a reprocessing facility. These were reported to be isotopes of Cs, Cd, Ru, Sb, Tc, and Te. In this report, an effort is made to determine which, if any, of 24 semivolatile radionuclides could be released from a reprocessing plant and, if so, what would be the likely quantities released. As part of this study of semivolatile elements, the amount of each generated during fission is included as part of the assessment for the need to control their emission. Also included in this study is the assessment of the cooling time (time out of reactor) before the fuel is processed. This aspect is important for the short-lived isotopes shown in the list, especially for cooling times approaching 10 y. The approach taken in this study was to determine if semivolatile radionuclides need to be included in a list of gas-phase radionuclides that might need to be removed to meet Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations. A list of possible elements was developed through a literature search and through knowledge and literature on the chemical processes in typical aqueous processing of nuclear fuels. A long list of possible radionuclides present in irradiated fuel was generated and then trimmed by considering isotope half-life and calculating the dose from each to a maximum exposed individual with the US EPA airborne radiological dispersion and risk assessment code CAP88 (Rosnick 1992) to yield a short list of elements that actually need to be considered for control because they require high decontamination factors to meet a reasonable fraction of the regulated release. Each of these elements is

  18. Handbook on process and chemistry of nuclear fuel reprocessing. 3rd edition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-03-01

    The fundamental data on spent nuclear fuel reprocessing and related chemistry was collected and summarized as a new edition of 'Handbook on Process and Chemistry of Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing'. The purpose of this handbook is contribution to development of the fuel reprocessing and fuel cycle technology for uranium fuel and mixed oxide fuel utilization. Contents in this book was discussed and reviewed by specialists of science and technology on fuel reprocessing in Japan. (author)

  19. Preliminary concepts: safeguards for spent light-water reactor fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cobb, D.D.; Dayem, H.A.; Dietz, R.J.

    1979-06-01

    The technology available for safeguarding spent nuclear fuels from light-water power reactors is reviewed, and preliminary concepts for a spent-fuel safeguards system are presented. Essential elements of a spent-fuel safeguards system are infrequent on-site inspections, containment and surveillance systems to assure the integrity of stored fuel between inspections, and nondestructive measurements of the fuel assemblies. Key safeguards research and development activities necessary to implement such a system are identified. These activities include the development of tamper-indicating fuel-assembly identification systems and the design and development of nondestructive spent-fuel measurement systems

  20. Noble Gas Measurement and Analysis Technique for Monitoring Reprocessing Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    William S. Charlton

    1999-01-01

    An environmental monitoring technique using analysis of stable noble gas isotopic ratios on-stack at a reprocessing facility was developed. This technique integrates existing technologies to strengthen safeguards at reprocessing facilities. The isotopic ratios are measured using a mass spectrometry system and are compared to a database of calculated isotopic ratios using a Bayesian data analysis method to determine specific fuel parameters (e.g., burnup, fuel type, fuel age, etc.). These inferred parameters can be used by investigators to verify operator declarations. A user-friendly software application (named NOVA) was developed for the application of this technique. NOVA included a Visual Basic user interface coupling a Bayesian data analysis procedure to a reactor physics database (calculated using the Monteburns 3.01 code system). The integrated system (mass spectrometry, reactor modeling, and data analysis) was validated using on-stack measurements during the reprocessing of target fuel from a U.S. production reactor and gas samples from the processing of EBR-II fast breeder reactor driver fuel. These measurements led to an inferred burnup that matched the declared burnup with sufficient accuracy and consistency for most safeguards applications. The NOVA code was also tested using numerous light water reactor measurements from the literature. NOVA was capable of accurately determining spent fuel type, burnup, and fuel age for these experimental results. Work should continue to demonstrate the robustness of this system for production, power, and research reactor fuels

  1. Spent fuel reprocessing system availability definition by process simulation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Holder, N.; Haldy, B.B.; Jonzen, M.

    1978-05-01

    To examine nuclear fuel reprocessing plant operating parameters such as maintainability, reliability, availability, equipment redundancy, and surge storage requirements and their effect on plant throughput, a computer simulation model of integrated HTGR fuel reprocessing plant operations is being developed at General Atomic Company (GA). The simulation methodology and the status of the computer programming completed on reprocessing head end systems is reported

  2. Research and development of FBR fuel reprocessing in PNC

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hoshino, T.

    1976-05-01

    The research program of the PNC for FBR fuel reprocessing in Japan is discussed. The general characteristics of FBR fuel reprocessing are pointed out and a comparison with LWR fuel is made. The R and D program is based on reprocessing using the aqueous Purex process. So far, some preliminary steps of the research program have been carried out, these include solvent extraction test, off-gas treatment test, voloxidation process study, solidification test of high-level liquid waste, and study of the dissolution behaviour of irradiated mixed oxide fuel. By the end of the 1980s, a pilot plant for FBR fuel reprocessing will be completed. For the design of the pilot plant, further research will be carried out in the following fields: head-end techniques; voloxidation process; dissolution and extraction techniques; waste treatment techniques. A time schedule for the different steps of the program is included

  3. Summary of nuclear fuel reprocessing activities around the world

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mellinger, P.J.; Harmon, K.M.; Lakey, L.T.

    1984-11-01

    This review of international practices for nuclear fuel reprocessing was prepared to provide a nontechnical summary of the current status of nuclear fuel reprocessing activities around the world. The sources of information are widely varied

  4. Special safeguards study. Scopes of work

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1975-06-01

    The Special Safeguards Study (SSS) will be conducted by a combination of (1) contacts with other agencies, (2) NRC staff studies and analysis and (3) contracted studies in specific areas. Most of the study effort will be carried out by contractual support activities. These activities will be devoted to providing technical information, primarily qualitative because of the short term of the study, to enable the staff to determine the most cost-effective sets of measures for plutonium recycle and high-enriched uranium fuel cycle safeguards. The scope of work for these activities is given. The scope of work describes tasks that range from confirming the Commission's safeguards objective to defining specific protection systems for the following siting arrangements: dispersed sites, collocated fuel cycle plants, and mixed parks where reactors, reprocessing plants and fuel fabrication plants are collocated. (U.S.)

  5. The regulations concerning the reprocessing business of spent fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1981-01-01

    This rule is stipulated under the provisions of reprocessing business in the law concerning regulation of nuclear raw materials, nuclear fuel materials and nuclear reactors and to execute them. Basic terms are defined, such as exposure radiation dose, cumulative dose, control area, security area, surrounding monitoring area, worker, radioactive waste and facility for discharging into the sea. The application for the designation for reprocessing business under the law shall include the maximum reprocessing capacities per day and per year of each kind of spent fuel, to be reprocessed and the location, structure and equipment of reprocessing facilities as specified in the regulation. Records shall be made in each works or enterprise on the inspection, operation and maintenance of reprocessing facilities, radiation control, accidents and weather, and kept for particular periods respectively. Reprocessing enterprisers shall set up control area, security area and surrounding monitoring area to restrict entrance, etc. Specified measures shall be taken by these enterprisers concerning the exposure radiation doses of workers. Reprocessing facilities shall be inspected and examined more than once a day. The regular self-inspection and operation of reprocessing facilities, the transport and storage of nuclear fuel materials, the disposal of radioactive wastes in works or enterprises where reprocessing facilities are located, and security rules are defined in detail, respectively. (Okada, K.)

  6. PYRO, a system for modeling fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ackerman, J.P.

    1989-01-01

    Compact, on-site fuel reprocessing and waste management for the Integral Fast Reactor are based on the pyrochemical reprocessing of metal fuel. In that process, uranium and plutonium in spent fuel are separated from fission products in an electrorefiner using liquid cadmium and molten salt solvents. Quantitative estimates of the distribution of the chemical elements among the metal and salt phases are essential for development of both individual pyrochemical process steps and the complete process. This paper describes the PYRO system of programs used to generate reliable mass flows and compositions

  7. International and institutional aspects of reprocessing and plutonium management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-09-01

    Various institutional alternatives applicable to reprocessing, plutonium management and recycle are considered, not as a definitive analysis but rather as a basis for identifying the institutional approaches and measures which the Working Group might wish to examine more thoroughly. Seven alternatives arrangements for reprocessing are presented. These range from suspending the operation of existing reprocessing plants through placing national facilities under safeguards to limiting reprocessing to a few large facilities subject to plutonium management, multinational or international control. Finally, the comprehensive alternative of an International Nuclear Fuel Authority with worldwide responsibility for reprocessing and plutonium management is considered. Plutonium management alternatives to complement the reprocessing options, are then outlined. These include national discretion on the separation and disposition of plutonium under safeguards, an agreed Code of Practice for plutonium management at national facilities and the international storage of plutonium. The advantages and disadvantages of the alternative are discussed tentatively. It is recognised that the alternatives are presented in a simplified form and that their elements can be combined or separated in many ways. Although strengthening the institutions relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is imperative and can contribute to non-proliferation, such arrangements might open other proliferation risks through the spread of sensitive materials, facilities and technology. While there are risks with any fuel cycle, where plutonium in quantity is separated these risks are of a high order. Although these can be mitigated, they will have to be set against the energy and economic case for reprocessing and alternatives other than plutonium considered

  8. Gaseous isotope correlation technique for safeguards at reprocessing facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ohkubo, Michiaki.

    1988-03-01

    The isotope correlation technique based on gaseous stable fission products can be used as a means of verifying the input measurement to fuel reprocessing plants. This paper reviews the theoretical background of the gaseous fission product isotope correlation technique. The correlations considered are those between burnup and various isotopic ratios of Kr and Xe nuclides. The feasibility of gaseous ICT application to Pu input accountancy of reprocessing facilities is also discussed. The technique offers the possibility of in situ measurement verification by the inspector. (author). 16 refs, 7 figs

  9. A Monte Carlo Based Spent Fuel Analysis Safeguards Strategy Assessment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fensin, Michael L.; Tobin, Stephen J.; Swinhoe, Martyn T.; Menlove, Howard O.; Sandoval, Nathan P. [Los Alamos National Laboratory, E540, Los Alamos, NM 87545 (United States)

    2009-06-15

    Safeguarding nuclear material involves the detection of diversions of significant quantities of nuclear materials, and the deterrence of such diversions by the risk of early detection. There are a variety of motivations for quantifying plutonium in spent fuel assemblies by means of nondestructive assay (NDA) including the following: strengthening the capabilities of the International Atomic Energy Agencies ability to safeguards nuclear facilities, shipper/receiver difference, input accountability at reprocessing facilities and burnup credit at repositories. Many NDA techniques exist for measuring signatures from spent fuel; however, no single NDA technique can, in isolation, quantify elemental plutonium and other actinides of interest in spent fuel. A study has been undertaken to determine the best integrated combination of cost effective techniques for characterizing Pu mass in spent fuel for nuclear safeguards. A standardized assessment process was developed to compare the effective merits and faults of 12 different detection techniques in order to integrate a few techniques and to down-select among the techniques in preparation for experiments. The process involves generating a basis burnup/enrichment/cooling time dependent spent fuel assembly library, determining and identifying limiting diversion scenarios, developing detector models and quantifying the capability of each NDA technique. Because hundreds of input and output files must be managed in the couplings of data transitions for the different facets of the assessment process, a graphical user interface (GUI) was development that automates the process. This GUI allows users to visually create diversion scenarios with varied replacement materials, and generate a MCNPX fixed source detector assessment input file. The end result of the assembly library assessment is to select a set of common source terms and diversion scenarios for quantifying the capability of each of the 12 NDA techniques. We present here

  10. A Monte Carlo based spent fuel analysis safeguards strategy assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fensin, Michael L.; Tobin, Stephen J.; Swinhoe, Martyn T.; Menlove, Howard O.; Sandoval, Nathan P.

    2009-01-01

    Safeguarding nuclear material involves the detection of diversions of significant quantities of nuclear materials, and the deterrence of such diversions by the risk of early detection. There are a variety of motivations for quantifying plutonium in spent fuel assemblies by means of nondestructive assay (NDA) including the following: strengthening the capabilities of the International Atomic Energy Agencies ability to safeguards nuclear facilities, shipper/receiver difference, input accountability at reprocessing facilities and burnup credit at repositories. Many NDA techniques exist for measuring signatures from spent fuel; however, no single NDA technique can, in isolation, quantify elemental plutonium and other actinides of interest in spent fuel. A study has been undertaken to determine the best integrated combination of cost effective techniques for quantifying plutonium mass in spent fuel for nuclear safeguards. A standardized assessment process was developed to compare the effective merits and faults of 12 different detection techniques in order to integrate a few techniques and to down-select among the techniques in preparation for experiments. The process involves generating a basis burnup/enrichment/cooling time dependent spent fuel assembly library, creating diversion scenarios, developing detector models and quantifying the capability of each NDA technique. Because hundreds of input and output files must be managed in the couplings of data transitions for the different facets of the assessment process, a graphical user interface (GUI) was development that automates the process. This GUI allows users to visually create diversion scenarios with varied replacement materials, and generate a MCNPX fixed source detector assessment input file. The end result of the assembly library assessment is to select a set of common source terms and diversion scenarios for quantifying the capability of each of the 12 NDA techniques. We present here the generalized

  11. Open problems in reprocessing of a molten salt reactor fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lelek, Vladimir; Vocka, Radim

    2000-01-01

    The study of fuel cycle in a molten salt reactor (MSR) needs deeper understanding of chemical methods used for reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel and preparation of MSR fuel, as well as of the methods employed for reprocessing of MSR fuel itself. Assuming that all the reprocessing is done on the basis of electrorefining, we formulate some open questions that should be answered before a flow sheet diagram of the reactor is designed. Most of the questions concern phenomena taking place in the vicinity of an electrode, which influence the efficiency of the reprocessing and sensibility of element separation. Answer to these questions would be an important step forward in reactor set out. (Authors)

  12. Reprocessing and fuel fabrication systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Field, F.R.; Tooper, F.E.

    1978-01-01

    The study of alternative fuel cycles was initiated to identify a fuel cycle with inherent technical resistance to proliferation; however, other key features such as resource use, cost, and development status are major elements in a sound fuel cycle strategy if there is no significant difference in proliferation resistance. Special fuel reprocessing techniques such as coprocessing or spiking provide limited resistance to diversion. The nuclear fuel cycle system that will be most effective may be more dependent on the institutional agreements that can be implemented to supplement the technical controls of fuel cycle materials

  13. Preliminary considerations on developing IAEA technical safeguards for LMFBR power systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persiani, P.J.

    1980-09-01

    Nuclear fuel cycles safeguards should be considered in the dynamic context of a world deployment of various reactor types and varying availability of fuel-cycle services. There will be a close interaction between thermal-reactor cycles and the future deployment of fast breeders. The quantitites of plutonium and the reprocessing, conversion, fabrication, and storage methods of the fuel for the fast breeders will have a significant impact on safeguards techniques. The approach to the fast breeder fuel cycle safeguards follows the general safeguards system approach proposed by the IAEA. Objective of IAEA safeguards is the detection of diversion of nuclear material and deterrence of such diversion. To achieve independent verification of material balance accountancy requires the capability to monitor inventory status and verify material flows and quantities of all nuclear materials subject to safeguards. Containment and surveillance measures are applied to monitor key measurement points, maintain integrity of material balance, and complement material accountancy. The safeguards study attempts to develop a generic reference IAEA Safeguards System and explores various system options using containment/surveillance and material accountancy instrumentation and integrated systems designs

  14. Characteristics of radioactive waste streams generated in HTGR fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lin, K.H.

    1976-01-01

    Results are presented of a study concerned with identification and characterization of radioactive waste streams from an HTGR fuel reprocessing plant. Approximate quantities of individual waste streams as well as pertinent characteristics of selected streams have been estimated. Most of the waste streams are unique to HTGR fuel reprocessing. However, waste streams from the solvent extraction system and from the plant facilities do not differ greatly from the corresponding LWR fuel reprocessing wastes

  15. Some problems relating to application of safeguards in the future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tolchenkov, D.L.

    1983-01-01

    By the end of this century there will have been a considerable increase in the amount of nuclear material and the number of facilities subject to IAEA safeguards. The IAEA will therefore be faced with problems due to the increased volume of safeguards activity, the application of safeguards to new types of facility and to large facilities, the optimization of the existing IAEA safeguards system and so on. The authors analyse the potential growth in the IAEA's safeguards activities up to the year 2000 and consider how to optimize methods for the application of safeguards, taking into account a number of factors relating to a State's nuclear activity, the application of full-scope IAEA safeguards etc. On the basis of a hypothetical model of the nuclear fuel cycle that allows for the factors considered as part of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), the authors assess the possible risk of diversion as a function of a full-scope safeguards effort. They also examine possible conceptual approaches to safeguarding large-scale facilities such as fuel reprocessing and uranium enrichment plants. (author)

  16. International safeguards concerns of Spent Fuel Disposal Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1988-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to stimulate discussions on the subjects of safeguarding large quantities of plutonium contained in spent fuels to be disposed of in geologic respositories. All the spent fuel disposal scenarios examined here pose a variety of safeguards problems, none of which are adequately addressed by the international safeguards community. The spent fuels from once-through fuel cycles in underground repositories would become an increasingly attractive target for diversion because of their plutonium content and decreasing radioactivity. Current design of the first geologic repository in the US will have the capacity to accommodate wastes equivalent to 70,000 Mt of uranium from commercial and defense fuel cycles. Of this, approximately 62,000 Mt uranium equivalent will be commerical spent fuel, containing over 500 Mt of plutonium. International safeguards commitments may require us to address the safeguards issues of disposing of such large quanities of plutonium in a geologic repository, which has the potential to become a plutonium mine in the future. This paper highlights several issues that should be addressed in the near term by US industries and the DOE before geologic repositories for spent fuels become a reality

  17. Cost and availability of gadolinium for nuclear fuel reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Klepper, O.H.

    1985-06-01

    Gadolinium is currently planned for use as a soluble neutron poison in nuclear fuel reprocessing plants to prevent criticality of solutions of spent fuel. Gadolinium is relatively rare and expensive. The present study was undertaken therefore to estimate whether this material is likely to be available in quantities sufficient for fuel reprocessing and at reasonable prices. It was found that gadolinium, one of 16 rare earth elements, appears in the marketplace as a by-product and that its present supply is a function of the production rate of other more prevalent rare earths. The potential demand for gadolinium in a fuel reprocessing facility serving a future fast reactor industry amounts to only a small fraction of the supply. At the present rate of consumption, domestic supplies of rare earths containing gadolinium are adequate to meet national needs (including fuel reprocessing) for over 100 years. With access to foreign sources, US demands can be met well beyond the 21st century. It is concluded therefore that the supply of gadolinium will quite likely be more than adequate for reprocessing spent fuel for the early generation of fast reactors. The current price of 99.99% pure gadolinium oxide lies in the range $50/lb to $65/lb (1984 dollars). By the year 2020, in time for reprocessing spent fuel from an early generation of large fast reactors, the corresponding values are expected to lie in the $60/lb to $75/lb (1984 dollars) price range. This increase is modest and its economic impact on nuclear fuel reprocessing would be minor. The economic potential for recovering gadolinium from the wastes of nuclear fuel reprocessing plants (which use gadolinium neutron poison) was also investigated. The cost of recycled gadolinium was estimated at over twelve times the cost of fresh gadolinium, and thus recycle using current recovery technology is not economical. 15 refs., 4 figs., 11 tabs

  18. Methodology for estimating reprocessing costs for nuclear fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carter, W.L.; Rainey, R.H.

    1980-02-01

    A technological and economic evaluation of reprocessing requirements for alternate fuel cycles requires a common assessment method and a common basis to which various cycles can be related. A methodology is described for the assessment of alternate fuel cycles utilizing a side-by-side comparison of functional flow diagrams of major areas of the reprocessing plant with corresponding diagrams of the well-developed Purex process as installed in the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP). The BNFP treats 1500 metric tons of uranium per year (MTU/yr). Complexity and capacity factors are determined for adjusting the estimated facility and equipment costs of BNFP to determine the corresponding costs for the alternate fuel cycle. Costs of capacities other than the reference 1500 MT of heavy metal per year are estimated by the use of scaling factors. Unit costs of reprocessed fuel are calculated using a discounted cash flow analysis for three economic bases to show the effect of low-risk, typical, and high-risk financing methods

  19. Consolidated fuel reprocessing program. Developments for the future in reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Burch, W.D.

    1982-01-01

    The future reprocessing developments focus on three major areas: (1) the retention of gaseous fission products to reduce off-site doses to very low values; (2) the initial steps of breakdown, shearing, and dissolution of breeder fuels; and (3) advanced facility and equipment concepts, which are expected to lead to a reliable, cost-effective, totally remotely operated and maintained plant. Work in the first area - removal of fission gases (the most important of which is 85 Kr) - is largely completed through tracer and bench-scale engineering equipment. Efforts are now mainly devoted to breeder fuels and advanced remote concepts. A facility, the Integrated Equipment Test Facility, which will be used to carry out much of this work, is nearing completion in Oak Ridge. In it a large, simulated, remote reprocessing cell will house a disassembly-shear machine for either breeder or LWR fuels, a rotary continuous dissolver, a solvent extraction cycle utilizing a new generation of centrifugal contactors, and related equipment

  20. Critical experiment needs and plans of the consolidated fuel reprocessing program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Primm, R.T.

    1984-01-01

    An integral part of the United States Department of Energy (DOE) plan for the development of breeder reactors is the development of the capability for fuel reprocessing. The Consolidated Fuel Reprocessing Program (CFRP) was established by the DOE to identify and conduct research and development activities in this area. The DOE is currently proposing that a capability to reprocess fast reactor fuel be established in the Fuels and Materials Examination Facility at the Hanford Engineering Development Laboratory. This capability would include conversion of plutonium nitrate to plutonium oxide. The reprocessing line is designated the Breeder Reprocessing Engineering Test (BRET). Criticality safety remains an important critetion in the design of the BRET. The different steps in the reprocessing are reviewed and areas where additional critical experiments are needed have been indentified as also areas where revision or clarification of existing criticality safety standards are desirable

  1. Technology development of fast reactor fuel reprocessing technology in India

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Natarajan, R.; Raj, Baldev

    2009-01-01

    India is committed to the large scale induction of fast breeder reactors beginning with the construction of 500 MWe Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor, PFBR. Closed fuel cycle is a prerequisite for the success of the fast reactors to reduce the external dependence of the fuel. In the Indian context, spent fuel reprocessing, with as low as possible out of pile fissile inventory, is another important requirement for increasing the share in power generation through nuclear route as early as possible. The development of this complex technology is being carried out in four phases, the first phase being the developmental phase, in which major R and D issues are addressed, while the second phase is the design, construction and operation of a pilot plant, called CORAL (COmpact Reprocessing facility for Advanced fuels in Lead shielded cell. The third phase is the construction and operation of Demonstration of Fast Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant (DFRP) which will provide experience in fast reactor fuel reprocessing with high availability factors and plant throughput. The design, construction and operation of the commercial plant (FRP) for reprocessing of PFBR fuel is the fourth phase, which will provide the requisite confidence for the large scale induction of fast reactors

  2. Safeguarding and Protecting the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bjornard, Trond; Garcia, Humberto; Desmond, William; Demuth, Scott

    2010-01-01

    International safeguards as applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are a vital cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime - they protect against the peaceful nuclear fuel cycle becoming the undetected vehicle for nuclear weapons proliferation by States. Likewise, domestic safeguards and nuclear security are essential to combating theft, sabotage, and nuclear terrorism by non-State actors. While current approaches to safeguarding and protecting the nuclear fuel cycle have been very successful, there is significant, active interest to further improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards and security, particularly in light of the anticipated growth of nuclear energy and the increase in the global threat environment. This article will address two recent developments called Safeguards-by-Design and Security-by-Design, which are receiving increasing broad international attention and support. Expected benefits include facilities that are inherently more economical to effectively safeguard and protect. However, the technical measures of safeguards and security alone are not enough - they must continue to be broadly supported by dynamic and adaptive nonproliferation and security regimes. To this end, at the level of the global fuel cycle architecture, 'nonproliferation and security by design' remains a worthy objective that is also the subject of very active, international focus.

  3. Reprocessing of ''fast'' fuel in France

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sauteron, J.; Bourgeois, M.; Le Bouhellec, J.; Miquel, P.

    1976-05-01

    The results of laboratory studies as well as pilot testing (AT-I La Hague, Marcoule, Fontenay-aux-Roses) in reprocessing of fast breeder reactor fuels are described. The paper covers all steps: head end, aqueous and fluoride volatility processes, and waste treatment. In conclusion, it is demonstrated why it is still too early to define a strategy of industrial reprocessing for this reactor type

  4. Report on the NGS3 Working Group on Safeguards by Design For Aqueous Reprocessing Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Johnson, Shirley J.; Ehinger, Michael; Schanfein, Mark

    2011-02-01

    The objective of the Working Group on SBD for Aqueous Reprocessing Facilities was to provide recommendations, for facility operators and designers, which would aid in the coordination and integration of nuclear material accountancy and the safeguards requirements of all concerned parties - operators, state/regional authorities, and the IAEA. The recommendations, which are to be provided to the IAEA, are intended to assist in optimizing facility design and operating parameters to ensure the safeguardability of the facility while minimizing impact on the operations. The one day Working Group session addressed a wide range of design and operating topics.

  5. Development of a real-time detection strategy for process monitoring during nuclear fuel reprocessing using the UREX+3a method

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goddard, Braden; Charlton, William S.; McDeavitt, Sean M.

    2010-01-01

    Research highlights: → HPGe detectors are suitable for UREX+3a real-time spectroscopy. → HPGe N-type detectors may be suitable for a reprocessing facility. → Gamma ray self-shielding does not occur for pipe diameters less than 2 in. - Abstract: Reprocessing nuclear fuel is becoming more viable in the United States due to the anticipated increase in construction of nuclear power plants, the growing stockpile of existing used nuclear fuel, and a public desire to reduce the amount of this fuel. A new reprocessing facility will likely have state of the art controls and monitoring methods to safeguard special nuclear materials, as well as to provide real-time monitoring for process control. The focus of this research was to create a proof of concept to enable the development of a detection strategy that uses well established gamma and neutron measurement methods to characterize samples from the Uranium Extraction Plus 3a (UREX+3a) reprocessing method using a variety of detector types and measurement times. A facility that implemented real-time gamma detection equipment could improve product quality control and provide additional benefits, such as waste volume reduction. In addition to the spectral analyses, it was determined by Monte Carlo N Particle (MCNP) simulations that there is no noticeable self-shielding for internal pipe diameters less than 5.08 cm, indicating that no self-shielding correction factors are needed. Further, it was determined that High Purity Germanium (HPGe) N-type detectors have the high gamma ray energy resolution and neutron damage resistance that would be required in a reprocessing facility. Finally, the gamma ray spectra for the measured samples were simulated using MCNP and then the model was extended to predict the responses from an actual reprocessing scenario from UREX+3a applied to fuel that had a decay time of 3 years. The 3-year decayed fuel was more representative of commercially reprocessed fuel than the acquired UREX+3a

  6. Reprocessing ability of high density fuels for research and test reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gay, A.; Belieres, M.

    1997-01-01

    The development of a new high density fuel is becoming a key issue for Research Reactors operators. Such a new fuel should be a Low Enrichment Uranium (LEU) fuel with a high density, to improve present in core performances. It must be compatible with the reprocessing in an industrial plant to provide a steady back-end solution. Within the framework of a work group CEA/CERCA/COGEMA on new fuel development for Research Reactors, COGEMA has performed an evaluation of the reprocessing ability of some fuel dispersants selected as good candidates. The results will allow US to classify these fuel dispersants from a reprocessing ability point of view. (author)

  7. Environmental assessment for Breeder Reprocessing Engineering Test (BRET): Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lerch, R.E.

    1989-03-01

    This Environmental Assessment (EA) is for the proposed installation and operation of an integrated breeder fuel reprocessing test system in the shielded cells of the Fuels and Materials Examination Facility (FMEF) at Hanford and the associated modifications to the FMEF to accommodate BRET. These modifications would begin in FY-1986 subject to Congressional authorization. Hot operations would be scheduled to start in the early 1990's. The system, called the Breeder Reprocessing Engineering Test (BRET), is being designed to provide a test capability for developing the demonstrating fuel reprocessing, remote maintenance, and safeguards technologies for breeder reactor fuels. This EA describes (1) the action being proposed, (2) the existing environment which would be affected, (3) the potential environmental impacts from normal operations and severe accidents from the proposed action, (4) potential conflicts with federal, state, regional, and/or local plans for the area, and (5) environmental implications of alternatives considered to the proposed action. 41 refs., 10 figs., 31 tabs

  8. Safeguards and nonproliferation aspects of a dry fuel recycling technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1993-01-01

    Los Alamos National Laboratory undertook an independent assessment of the proliferation potentials and safeguardability of a dry fuel recycling technology, whereby spent pressurized-water reactor (PWR) fuels are used to fuel canadian deuterium uranium (CANDU) reactors. Objectives of this study included (1) the evaluation of presently available technologies that may be useful to safeguard technology options for dry fuel recycling (2) and identification of near-term and long-term research needs to develop process-specific safeguards requirements. The primary conclusion of this assessment is that like all other fuel cycle alternatives proposed in the past, the dry fuel recycle entails prolfferation risks and that there are no absolute technical fixes to eliminate such risks. This study further concludes that the proliferation risks of dry fuel recycling options are relatively minimal and presently known safeguards systems and technologies can be modified and/or adapted to meet the requirements of safeguarding such fuel recycle facilities

  9. Fuel reprocessing and environmental problem

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ichikawa, Ryushi

    1977-01-01

    The radioactive nuclides which are released from the reprocessing plants of nuclear fuel are 137 Cs, 106 Ru, 95 Zr and 3 H in waste water and 85 Kr in the atmosphere. This release affects the environment for example, the reprocessing plant of the Nuclear Fuel Service Co in the USA releases about 2 x 10 5 Ci/y of 85 Kr, which is evaluated as about 0.025 mr/y as external exposure dose. The radioactivity in milk around this plant was measured as less than 10 pCi/lit of 129sup(I. The radioactive concentration in the sea, especially in fish and shellfish, was measured near the reprocessing plant of Windscale in UK. The radioactive release rate from this plants more than 10)5sup( Ci/y as the total amount of )137sup(Cs, )3sup(H, )106sup(Ru, )95sup(Zr, )95sup(Nb, )90sup(Sr, )144sup(Ce, etc., and the radioactivity in seaweeds near Windscale is about 400 pCi/g as the maximum value, and the mayonnaise which was made of this seaweeds contained about 1 pCi/g of )106sup(Ru, which is estimated as about 7 mr/y for the digestive organ if 100 g is eaten every day. On the other hand, the experimental result is presented for the reprocessing plant of La Hague in France, in which the radioactive release rate from this plant is about 10)4sup( Ci/y, and the radioactivity in sea water and shellfish is about 4 pCi/l of )106sup(Ru and about 400 pCi/kg of )137 Cs, respectively, near this plant. The philosophy of ALAP (as low as practicable) is also applied to reprocessing plants. (Nakai, Y.)

  10. French experience and prospects in the reprocessing of fast breeder reactor fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Megy, J.

    1983-06-01

    Experience acquired in France in the field of reprocessing spent fuels from fast breeder reactors is recalled. Emphasis is put on characteristics and quantities of spent fuels reprocessed in La Hague and Marcoule facilities. Then reprocessing developments with the realisation of the new pilot plant TOR at Marcoule, new equipments and study of industrial reprocessing units are reviewed [fr

  11. Reprocessing free nuclear fuel production via fusion fission hybrids

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kotschenreuther, Mike, E-mail: mtk@mail.utexas.edu [Intitute for Fusion Studies, University of Texas at Austin (United States); Valanju, Prashant; Mahajan, Swadesh [Intitute for Fusion Studies, University of Texas at Austin (United States)

    2012-05-15

    Fusion fission hybrids, driven by a copious source of fusion neutrons can open qualitatively 'new' cycles for transmuting nuclear fertile material into fissile fuel. A totally reprocessing-free (ReFree) Th{sup 232}-U{sup 233} conversion fuel cycle is presented. Virgin fertile fuel rods are exposed to neutrons in the hybrid, and burned in a traditional light water reactor, without ever violating the integrity of the fuel rods. Throughout this cycle (during breeding in the hybrid, transport, as well as burning of the fissile fuel in a water reactor) the fissile fuel remains a part of a bulky, countable, ThO{sub 2} matrix in cladding, protected by the radiation field of all fission products. This highly proliferation-resistant mode of fuel production, as distinct from a reprocessing dominated path via fast breeder reactors (FBR), can bring great acceptability to the enterprise of nuclear fuel production, and insure that scarcity of naturally available U{sup 235} fuel does not throttle expansion of nuclear energy. It also provides a reprocessing free path to energy security for many countries. Ideas and innovations responsible for the creation of a high intensity neutron source are also presented.

  12. Reprocessing free nuclear fuel production via fusion fission hybrids

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kotschenreuther, Mike; Valanju, Prashant; Mahajan, Swadesh

    2012-01-01

    Fusion fission hybrids, driven by a copious source of fusion neutrons can open qualitatively “new” cycles for transmuting nuclear fertile material into fissile fuel. A totally reprocessing-free (ReFree) Th 232 –U 233 conversion fuel cycle is presented. Virgin fertile fuel rods are exposed to neutrons in the hybrid, and burned in a traditional light water reactor, without ever violating the integrity of the fuel rods. Throughout this cycle (during breeding in the hybrid, transport, as well as burning of the fissile fuel in a water reactor) the fissile fuel remains a part of a bulky, countable, ThO 2 matrix in cladding, protected by the radiation field of all fission products. This highly proliferation-resistant mode of fuel production, as distinct from a reprocessing dominated path via fast breeder reactors (FBR), can bring great acceptability to the enterprise of nuclear fuel production, and insure that scarcity of naturally available U 235 fuel does not throttle expansion of nuclear energy. It also provides a reprocessing free path to energy security for many countries. Ideas and innovations responsible for the creation of a high intensity neutron source are also presented.

  13. Status of power reactor fuel reprocessing in India

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kansra, V.P.

    1999-01-01

    Spent fuel reprocessing in India started with the commissioning of the Trombay Plutonium Plant in 1964. This plant was intended for processing spent fuel from the 40 MWth research reactor CIRUS and recovering plutonium required for the research and development activities of the Indian Atomic Energy programme. India's nuclear energy programme aims at the recycle of plutonium in view of the limited national resources of natural uranium and abundant quantities of thorium. This is based on the approach which aims at separating the plutonium from the power reactor spent fuel, use it in the fast reactors to breed 233 U and utilise the 233 U generated to sustain a virtually endless source of power through thorium utilisation. The separated plutonium is also being utilised to fabricate MOX fuel for use in thermal reactors. Spent fuel treatment and extracting plutonium from it makes economic sense and a necessity for the Indian nuclear power programme. This paper describes the status and trends in the Indian programme for the reprocessing of power reactor fuels. The extraction of plutonium can also be seen as a far more positive approach to long-term waste management. The closed cycle approach visualised and pursued by the pioneers in the field is now steadily moving India towards the goal of a sustainable source of power through nuclear energy. The experience in building, operating and refurbishing the reprocessing facilities for uranium and thorium has resulted in acquiring the technological capability for designing, constructing, operating and maintaining reprocessing plants to match India's growing nuclear power programme. (author)

  14. Feasibility study for adapting ITREC plant to reprocessing LMFBR fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moccia, A.; Rolandi, G.

    1976-05-01

    The report evaluates the feasibility of adapting ITREC plant to the reprocessing LMFBR fuels, with the double purpose of: 1) recovering valuable Pu contained in these fuels and recycling it to the fabrication plant; 2) trying, on a pilot scale, the chemical process technology to be applied in a future industrial plant for reprocessing the fuel elements discharged from fast breeder power reactors

  15. Fuel reprocessing and waste management in the UK

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heafield, W.; Griffin, N.L.

    1994-01-01

    The currently preferred route for the management of irradiated fuel in the UK is reprocessing. This paper, therefore, concentrates on outlining the policies, practices and achievement of British Nuclear Fuels plc (BNFL) associated with the management of its irradiated fuel facilities at Sellafield. The paper covers reprocessing and how the safe management of each of the major waste categories is achieved. BNFL's overall waste management policy is to develop, in close consultation with the regulatory authorities, a strategy to minimize effluent discharges and provide a safe, cost effective method of treating and preparing for disposal all wastes arising on the site

  16. Historical fuel reprocessing and HLW management in Idaho

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Knecht, D.A.; Staiger, M.D.; Christian, J.D.

    1997-01-01

    This article review some of the key decision points in the historical development of spent fuel reprocessing and waste management practices at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant that have helped ICPP to successfully accomplish its mission safely and with minimal impact on the environment. Topics include ICPP reprocessing development; batch aluminum-uranium dissolution; continuous aluminum uranium dissolution; batch zirconium dissolution; batch stainless steel dissolution; semicontinuous zirconium dissolution with soluble poison; electrolytic dissolution of stainless steel-clad fuel; graphite-based rover fuel processing; fluorinel fuel processing; ICPP waste management consideration and design decisions; calcination technology development; ICPP calcination demonstration and hot operations; NWCF design, construction, and operation; HLW immobilization technology development. 80 refs., 4 figs

  17. Application of electrochemical techniques in fuel reprocessing- an overview

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rao, M K; Bajpai, D D; Singh, R K [Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant, Tarapur (India)

    1994-06-01

    The operating experience and development work over the past several years have considerably improved the wet chemical fuel reprocessing PUREX process and have brought the reprocessing to a stage where it is ready to adopt the introduction of electrochemical technology. Electrochemical processes offer advantages like simplification of reprocessing operation, improved performance of the plant and reduction in waste volume. At Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing plant, Tarapur, work on development and application of electrochemical processes has been carried out in stages. To achieve plant scale application of these developments, a new electrochemical cycle is being added to PUREX process at PREFRE. This paper describes the electrochemical and membrane cell development activities carried out at PREFRE and their current status. (author). 5 refs., 4 tabs.

  18. The economics of reprocessing versus direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bunn, M.; Holdren, J.P.; Fetter, S.; Zwaan, B. van der

    2007-01-01

    The economics of reprocessing versus direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel are assessed. The break-even uranium price at which reprocessing spent nuclear fuel from existing light water reactors (LWRs) and recycling the resulting plutonium and uranium in LWRs would become economic is estimated for a wide range of reprocessing prices and other fuel cycle costs and parameters. The contribution of each fuel cycle option to the cost of electricity is also estimated. A similar analysis is performed for the breakeven uranium price at which deploying fast neutron reactors (FRs) would become competitive compared with a once-through fuel cycle in LWRs, for a range of differences in capital cost between LWRs and FRs. Available information about reprocessing prices and various other fuel cycle costs and input parameters are reviewed, as well as the quantities of uranium likely to be recoverable worldwide at a range of different possible future prices. It is concluded that the once-through fuel cycle is likely to remain significantly cheaper than reprocessing and recycling in either LWRs or FRs for at least the next 50 years. Finally, there is a discussion of how scarce and expensive repository space would have to become before separation and transmutation would be economically attractive. (author)

  19. Recent advances in safeguards operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Agu, B.; Iwamoto, H.

    1983-01-01

    The facilities and nuclear materials under IAEA safeguards have steadily increased in the past few years with consequent increases in the manpower and effort required for the implementation of effective international safeguards. To meet this challenge, various techniques and instruments have been developed with the assistance, support and cooperation of the Member States. Improved NDA equipment now permits accurate verification of plutonium and HEU bearing items; and optical and TV surveillance systems have improved remarkably. Experience in safeguarding nuclear facilities now includes fast-reactor fuel reprocessing and enrichment plants, even though the Hexapartite Safeguards Project is yet to define an agreed approach for safeguarding enrichment plants. The establishment of field offices now enables the IAEA to adequately implement safeguards at important facilities and also with more effective use of manpower. Closer cooperation with Member States via liaison or similar committees makes for effective safeguards implementation and the speedy solution of attendant problems. The technical support programmes from the Member States continue to provide the basis of the recent advances in safeguards techniques and instrumentation. (author)

  20. Nuclear fuel reprocessing and high level waste disposal: informational hearings. Volume V. Reprocessing. Part 2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    None

    1977-03-08

    Testimony was presented by a four member panel on the commercial future of reprocessing. Testimony was given on the status of nuclear fuel reprocessing in the United States. The supplemental testimony and materials submitted for the record are included in this report. (LK)

  1. Benefit analysis of reprocessing and recycling light water reactor fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1976-12-01

    The macro-economic impact of reprocessing and recycling fuel for nuclear power reactors is examined, and the impact of reprocessing on the conservation of natural uranium resources is assessed. The LWR fuel recycle is compared with a throwaway cycle, and it is concluded that fuel recycle is favorable on the basis of economics, as well as being highly desirable from the standpoint of utilization of uranium resources

  2. The regulations concerning the reprocessing business of spent fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    The office ordinance is established under the provisions related to reprocessing businesses of the law concerning regulation of nuclear raw materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors, to enforce the provisions. The basic terms are defined, such as exposure radiation dose; accumulated dose; controlled area; maintenance area; surrounding watch area; employee; radioactive waste; the facilities for discharge to sea. An application for the designation of reprocessing businesses shall be filed, listing the following matters: the maximum daily and yearly reprocessing capacities for each kind of spent fuel; the location and general structure of reprocessing facilities; the structures of buildings; the structure and equipments of main reprocessing facilities, the storage facilities for products and the disposal facilities for radioactive wastes; the equipments of measuring and control system facilities and radiation control facilities, etc. Records shall be made on the inspection of reprocessing facilities, radiation control, operation, maintenance, the accidents of reprocessing facilities and weather, and kept for the period from one to ten years, respectively. Any person engaging in reprocessing businesses shall set up control, maintenance and surrounding watch areas, and take specified measures to restrict the entrance of persons. The measures to be taken against exposure radiation dose, the inspection, regular independent examination and operation of reprocessing facilities and other related matters are stipulated in detail. (Okada, K.)

  3. A study of safeguards approach for the area of plutonium evaporator in a large scale reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sakai, Hirotada; Ikawa, Koji

    1994-01-01

    A preliminary study on a safeguards approach for the chemical processing area in a large scale reprocessing plant has been carried out. In this approach, plutonium inventory at the plutonium evaporator will not be taken, but containment and surveillance (C/S) measures will be applied to ensure the integrity of an area specifically defined to include the plutonium evaporator. The plutonium evaporator area consists of the evaporator itself and two accounting points, i.e., one before the plutonium evaporator and the other after the plutonium evaporator. For newly defined accounting points, two alternative measurement methods, i.e., accounting vessels with high accuracy and flow meters, were examined. Conditions to provide the integrity of the plutonium evaporator area were also examined as well as other technical aspects associated with this approach. The results showed that an appropriate combination of NRTA and C/S measures would be essential to realize a cost effective safeguards approach to be applied for a large scale reprocessing plant. (author)

  4. Operation of Nuclear Fuel Based on Reprocessed Uranium for VVER-type Reactors in Competitive Nuclear Fuel Cycles

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Troyanov, V.; Molchanov, V.; Tuzov, A. [TVEL Corporation, 49 Kashirskoe shosse, Moscow 115409 (Russian Federation); Semchenkov, Yu.; Lizorkin, M. [RRC ' Kurchatov Institute' (Russian Federation); Vasilchenko, I.; Lushin, V. [OKB ' Gidropress' (Russian Federation)

    2009-06-15

    Current nuclear fuel cycle of Russian nuclear power involves reprocessed low-enriched uranium in nuclear fuel production for some NPP units with VVER-type LWR. This paper discusses design and performance characteristics of commercial nuclear fuel based on natural and reprocessed uranium. It presents the review of results of commercial operation of nuclear fuel based on reprocessed uranium on Russian NPPs-unit No.2 of Kola NPP and unit No.2 of Kalinin NPP. The results of calculation and experimental validation of safe fuel operation including necessary isotope composition conformed to regulation requirements and results of pilot fuel operation are also considered. Meeting the customer requirements the possibility of high burn-up achieving was demonstrated. In addition the paper compares the characteristics of nuclear fuel cycles with maximum length based on reprocessed and natural uranium considering relevant 5% enrichment limitation and necessity of {sup 236}U compensation. The expedience of uranium-235 enrichment increasing over 5% is discussed with the aim to implement longer fuel cycles. (authors)

  5. Non-proliferation and safeguards aspects of alternative fuel cycle concepts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persiani, P.J.

    1997-01-01

    Timely visibility on the development, evaluation and optimization of fuel cycle concepts with respect to nonproliferation characteristics should be emphasized in the early stage of planning a civilian nuclear power program, by fuel cycle developers, reviewers and decision makers. Fuel cycle technologies have inherently differing levels of nonproliferation characteristic profiles. Institutional and/or multi-national arrangements have been effective in reducing the nonproliferation concerns. The implementation of international safeguards further reduces these concerns by the timely detection of a possible physical diversion of SNM from fuel cycle facilities. Fuel cycles are safeguardable, but the nonproliferation characteristics of fuel cycle concepts differ significantly with consequent impacts on the international level of technical safeguards measures. The paper comments on characteristics of some of the fuel cycle concepts for the purpose of exploring the need to develop advanced nonproliferation and safeguards measures. (author)

  6. Nuclear recycling: costs, savings, and safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Spinrad, B.I.

    1985-01-01

    This chapter discusses the economics, physical and chemical processes, and safety of nuclear fuel recycling. The spent fuel must be chemically reprocessed in order to recover uranium and plutonium. Topics considered include indifference costs, recycling in light water reactors (LWRs), plutonium in fast reactors, the choice between recycling and storage, safeguards, and weapons proliferation. It is shown that the economics of recycling nuclear fuel involves the actual costs and savings of the recycling operation in terms of money spent, made, and saved, and the impact of the recycling on the future cost of uranium

  7. Safety aspects of LWR fuel reprocessing and mixed oxide fuel fabrication plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, M.; Leichsenring, C.H.; Herrmann, G.W.; Schueller, W.; Hagenberg, W.; Stoll, W.

    1977-01-01

    The paper is focused on the safety and the control of the consequences of credible accidents in LWR fuel reprocessing plants and in mixed oxide fuel fabrication plants. Each of these plants serve for many power reactor (about 50.000 Mwel) thus the contribution to the overall risk of nuclear energy is correspondingly low. Because of basic functional differences between reprocessing plants, fuel fabrication plants and nuclear power reactors, the structure and safety systems of these plants are different in many respects. The most important differences that influence safety systems are: (1) Both fuel reprocessing and fabrication plants do not have the high system pressure that is associated with power reactors. (2) A considerable amount of the radioactivity of the fuel, which is in the form of short-lived radionuclides has decayed. Therefore, fuel reprocessing plants and mixed oxide fuel fabrication plants are designed with multiple confinement barriers for control of radioactive materials, but do not require the high-pressure containment systems that are used in LWR plants. The consequences of accidents which may lead to the dispersion of radioactive materials such as chemical explosions, nuclear excursions, fires and failure of cooling systems are considered. A reasonable high reliability of the multiple confinement approach can be assured by design. In fuel reprocessing plants, forced cooling is necessary only in systems where fission products are accumulated. However, the control of radioactive materials can be maintained during normal operation and during the above mentioned accidents, if the dissolver off-gas and vessel off-gas treatment systems provide for effective removal of radioactive iodine, radioactive particulates, nitrogen oxides, tritium and krypton 85. In addition, the following incidents in the dissolver off-gas system itself must be controlled: failures of iodine filters, hydrogen explosion in O 2 - and NOsub(x)-reduction component, decomposition of

  8. Investigation of novel spent fuel verification system for safeguard application

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Haneol; Yim, Man-Sung [KAIST, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    Radioactive waste, especially spent fuel, is generated from the operation of nuclear power plants. The final stage of radioactive waste management is disposal which isolates radioactive waste from the accessible environment and allows it to decay. The safety, security, and safeguard of a spent fuel repository have to be evaluated before its operation. Many researchers have evaluated the safety of a repository. These researchers calculated dose to public after the repository is closed depending on their scenario. Because most spent fuel repositories are non-retrievable, research on security or safeguards of spent fuel repositories have to be performed. Design based security or safeguard have to be developed for future repository designs. This study summarizes the requirements of future spent fuel repositories especially safeguards, and suggests a novel system which meets the safeguard requirements. Applying safeguards to a spent fuel repository is becoming increasingly important. The future requirements for a spent fuel repository are suggested by several expert groups, such as ASTOR in IAEA. The requirements emphasizes surveillance and verification. The surveillance and verification of spent fuel is currently accomplished by using the Cerenkov radiation detector while spent fuel is being stored in a fuel pool. This research investigated an advanced spent fuel verification system using a system which converts spent fuel radiation into electricity. The system generates electricity while it is conveyed from a transportation cask to a disposal cask. The electricity conversion system was verified in a lab scale experiment using an 8.51GBq Cs-137 gamma source.

  9. Investigation of novel spent fuel verification system for safeguard application

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Haneol; Yim, Man-Sung

    2016-01-01

    Radioactive waste, especially spent fuel, is generated from the operation of nuclear power plants. The final stage of radioactive waste management is disposal which isolates radioactive waste from the accessible environment and allows it to decay. The safety, security, and safeguard of a spent fuel repository have to be evaluated before its operation. Many researchers have evaluated the safety of a repository. These researchers calculated dose to public after the repository is closed depending on their scenario. Because most spent fuel repositories are non-retrievable, research on security or safeguards of spent fuel repositories have to be performed. Design based security or safeguard have to be developed for future repository designs. This study summarizes the requirements of future spent fuel repositories especially safeguards, and suggests a novel system which meets the safeguard requirements. Applying safeguards to a spent fuel repository is becoming increasingly important. The future requirements for a spent fuel repository are suggested by several expert groups, such as ASTOR in IAEA. The requirements emphasizes surveillance and verification. The surveillance and verification of spent fuel is currently accomplished by using the Cerenkov radiation detector while spent fuel is being stored in a fuel pool. This research investigated an advanced spent fuel verification system using a system which converts spent fuel radiation into electricity. The system generates electricity while it is conveyed from a transportation cask to a disposal cask. The electricity conversion system was verified in a lab scale experiment using an 8.51GBq Cs-137 gamma source

  10. Safeguardability of advanced spent fuel conditioning process

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Li, T. K. (Tien K.); Lee, S. Y. (Sang Yoon); Burr, Tom; Russo, P. A. (Phyllis A.); Menlove, Howard O.; Kim, H. D.; Ko, W. I. (Won Il); Park, S. W.; Park, H. S.

    2004-01-01

    The Advanced Spent Fuel Conditioning Process (ACP) is an electro-metallurgical treatment technique to convert oxide-type spent nuclear fuel into a metallic form. The Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has been developing this technology since 1977 for the purpose of spent fuel management and is planning to perform a lab-scale demonstration in 2006. By using of this technology, a significant reduction of the volume and heat load of spent fuel is expected, which would lighten the burden of final disposal in terms of disposal size, safety and economics. In the framework of collaboration agreement to develop the safeguards system for the ACP, a joint study on the safeguardability of the ACP technology has been performed by the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and the KAERI since 2002. In this study, the safeguardability of the ACP technology was examined for the pilot-scale facility. The process and material flows were conceptually designed, and the uncertainties in material accounting were estimated with international target values.

  11. Pyro-electrochemical reprocessing of irradiated MOX fast reactor fuel, testing of the reprocessing process with direct MOX fuel production

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kormilitzyn, M.V.; Vavilov, S.K.; Bychkov, A.V.; Skiba, O.V.; Chistyakov, V.M.; Tselichshev, I.V

    2000-07-01

    One of the advanced technologies for fast reactor fuel recycle is pyro-electrochemical molten salt technology. In 1998 we began to study the next phase of the irradiated oxide fuel reprocessing new process MOX {yields} MOX. This process involves the following steps: - Dissolution of irradiated fuel in molten alkaline metal chlorides, - Purification of melt from fission products that are co-deposited with uranium and plutonium oxides, - Electrochemical co-deposition of uranium and plutonium oxides under the controlled cathode potential, - Production of granulated MOX (crushing,salt separation and sizing), and - Purification of melt from fission products by phosphate precipitation. In 1998 a series of experiments were prepared and carried out in order to validate this process. It was shown that the proposed reprocessing flowsheet of irradiated MOX fuel verified the feasibility of its decontamination from most of its fission products (rare earths, cesium) and minor-actinides (americium, curium)

  12. Pyro-electrochemical reprocessing of irradiated MOX fast reactor fuel, testing of the reprocessing process with direct MOX fuel production

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kormilitzyn, M.V.; Vavilov, S.K.; Bychkov, A.V.; Skiba, O.V.; Chistyakov, V.M.; Tselichshev, I.V.

    2000-01-01

    One of the advanced technologies for fast reactor fuel recycle is pyro-electrochemical molten salt technology. In 1998 we began to study the next phase of the irradiated oxide fuel reprocessing new process MOX → MOX. This process involves the following steps: - Dissolution of irradiated fuel in molten alkaline metal chlorides, - Purification of melt from fission products that are co-deposited with uranium and plutonium oxides, - Electrochemical co-deposition of uranium and plutonium oxides under the controlled cathode potential, - Production of granulated MOX (crushing,salt separation and sizing), and - Purification of melt from fission products by phosphate precipitation. In 1998 a series of experiments were prepared and carried out in order to validate this process. It was shown that the proposed reprocessing flowsheet of irradiated MOX fuel verified the feasibility of its decontamination from most of its fission products (rare earths, cesium) and minor-actinides (americium, curium)

  13. An overview on dry reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ouyang Yinggen

    2002-01-01

    Although spent nuclear fuels have been reprocessed successfully for many years by the well-know Purex process based on solvent extraction, other reprocessing method which do not depend upon the use of organic solvents and aqueous media appear to have important potential advantage. There are two main non-aqueous methods for the reprocessing of spent fuel: fluoride-volatility process and pyro-electrochemical process. The presence of a poser in the process is that PuF 6 is obviously thermodynamically stable only in the presence of a large excess of fluorine. Pyro-electrochemical process is suited to processing metallic, oxide and carbide fuels. First, the fuel is dissolved in fresh salts, then, electrodes are introduced into the bath, U and Pu are deposited on the cathode, third, separation and refinement U and Pu are deposited on the cathode. There is a couple of contradictions in the process that are not in harmonious proportion in the fields on the nuclear fuel is dissolved the ability in the molten salt and corrosiveness of the molten salt for equipment used in the process

  14. Consolidated fuel reprocessing. Program progress report, April 1-June 30, 1980

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1980-09-01

    This progress report is compiled from major contributions from three programs: (1) the Advanced Fuel Recycle Program at ORNL; (2) the Converter Fuel Reprocessing Program at Savannah River Laboratory; and (3) the reprocessing components of the HTGR Fuel Recycle Program, primarily at General Atomic and ORNL. The coverage is generally overview in nature; experimental details and data are limited.

  15. Alternative fuels, fuel cycles, and reactors: are they useful. are they necessary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Spinrad, B.I.

    1985-01-01

    This chapter discusses reactors, fuel cycles, and fuel production concepts other than those considered conventional in the nuclear community. An attempt is made to look for improvements with the aim of providing cheaper and more durable energy systems, and to contribute toward a solution of the threat of weapons material diversion and weapons proliferation problems. Topics considered include breeding, alternate breeder cycles, alternative reprocessing schemes, symbiotic reactor systems, an interim strategy, and other sources of nuclear fuel. It is determined that the reprocessing of spent fuel is an important safeguard measure in itself

  16. Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Fast Reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Durst, Philip C.; Therios, Ike; Bean, Robert; Dougan, A.; Boyer, Brian; Wallace, Rick L.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Kovacic, Don N.; Tolk, K.

    2007-01-01

    This third report in the series reviews possible safeguards approaches for new fast reactors in general, and the ABR in particular. Fast-neutron spectrum reactors have been used since the early 1960s on an experimental and developmental level, generally with fertile blanket fuels to 'breed' nuclear fuel such as plutonium. Whether the reactor is designed to breed plutonium, or transmute and 'burn' actinides depends mainly on the design of the reactor neutron reflector and the whether the blanket fuel is 'fertile' or suitable for transmutation. However, the safeguards issues are very similar, since they pertain mainly to the receipt, shipment and storage of fresh and spent plutonium and actinide-bearing 'TRU'-fuel. For these reasons, the design of existing fast reactors and details concerning how they have been safeguarded were studied in developing advanced safeguards approaches for the new fast reactors. In this regard, the design of the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II 'EBR-II' at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) was of interest, because it was designed as a collocated fast reactor with a pyrometallurgical reprocessing and fuel fabrication line--a design option being considered for the ABR. Similarly, the design of the Fast Flux Facility (FFTF) on the Hanford Site was studied, because it was a successful prototype fast reactor that ran for two decades to evaluate fuels and the design for commercial-scale fast reactors

  17. Legal problems of nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rossnagel, A.

    1987-01-01

    The contributions in this book are intended to exemplify the legal situation in connection with the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel from the point of view of constitutional law, administrative law, and international law. Outline solutions are presented with regard to ensuring health, personal freedom, democratic rights and other rights, and are discussed. The author Rossnagel investigates whether the principle of essential matter can guarantee a parliamentary prerogative concerning this field of large-scale technology. The author Schmidt shows that there is no legal obligation of commitment to a reprocessing technology that would exclude research for or application of a less hazardous technology. The contribution by Baumann explains the problems presented by a technology not yet developed to maturity with regard to the outline approval of the technological concept, which is a prerequisite of any partial licence to be issued. The final contribution by Guendling investigates the duties under international law, as for instance transfrontier information, consultation, and legal protection, and how these duties can be better put into practice in order to comply the seriousness of the hazards involved in nuclear fuel reprocessing. (orig./HP) [de

  18. Development of solution monitoring software for enhanced safeguards at a large scale reprocessing facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Van Handenhove, Carl; Breban, Domnica; Creusot, Christophe [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Dransart, Pascal; Dechamp, Luc [Joint Research Centre, European Commission, Ispra, Varese, (Italy); Jarde, Eric [Euriware, Equeurdreville (France)

    2011-12-15

    The implementation of an effective and efficient IAEA safeguards approach at large scale reprocessing facilities with large throughput and continuous flow of nuclear material requires the introduction of enhanced safeguards measures to provide added assurance about the absence of diversion of nuclear material and confirmation that the facility is operated as declared. One of the enhanced safeguards measures, a Solution Monitoring and Measurement System (SMMS), comprising data collection instruments, data transmission equipment and an advanced Solution Monitoring Software (SMS), is being implemented at a large scale reprocessing plant in Japan. SMS is designed as a tool to enable automatic calculations of volumes, densities and flow-rates in selected process vessels, including most of the vessels of the main nuclear material stream. This software also includes automatic features to support the inspectorate in verifying inventories and inventory changes. The software also enables one to analyze the flows of nuclear material within the process and of specified 'cycles' of operation, and, in order to provide assurance that the facility is being operated as declared to compare these with those expected (reference signatures). The configuration and parameterization work (especially the analytical and comparative work) for the implementation and configuration of the SMS has been carried out jointly between the IAEA, Euriware-France (the software developer) and the Joint Research Centre (JRC)-Ispra. This paper describes the main features of the SMS, including the principles underlying the automatic analysis functionalities. It then focuses on the collaborative work performed by the JRC-Ispra, Euriware and the IAEA for the parameterization of the software (vessels and cycles of operation), including the current status and the future challenges.

  19. R and D on fast reactor fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Subba Rao, R.V.; Vijaya Kumar, V.; Natarajan, R.

    2012-01-01

    Development of Fast Reactor Fuel Reprocessing technology, with low out of pile inventory, is carried out at the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR). Based on the successful R and D programme which addressed specific issues of fast reactor fuels, a pilot plant called CORAL was set up. This plant is operational since 2003 and several reprocessing campaigns with spent FBTR fuels of varying burnups have been carried out. Based on the valuable operating experience of CORAL, the design of demonstration fast reactor fuel reprocessing plant (DFRP) and the commercial reprocessing plant, FRP have been taken up. Concurrently R and D efforts are continuing for improving the process and equipment performance apart from reducing the waste volumes and the radiation exposures to the operating personnel. Some important R and D efforts are highlighted in the paper. Reducing the dissolution time is one of the vital area of investigation especially for the high plutonium bearing MOX fuels which are known to dissolve slowly. To address this as well as criticality issues, continuous dissolvers are being developed. Solvent extraction based process is employed for getting highly pure nuclear grade uranium and plutonium. In view of the lower cooling time the fission product activity in the spent fuel is higher, formulation of process flowsheet with reduced number of solvent extraction cycles to improve the decontamination of ruthenium and zirconium without the formation of second organic phase due to plutonium loading, is under investigation. Retention of plutonium in lean organic is another issue to be addressed as otherwise it would lead to further deterioration of the solvent on storage. Several reagents to effectively wash the lean solvent have been investigated and flowsheets have been formulated to recover the retained plutonium with minimum secondary wastes. Partitioning of uranium and plutonium is an important step and methods reported in the literature have inherent

  20. Reprocessing of nuclear fuels: economical, ecological and technical aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kueffer, K.

    1994-01-01

    The report deals with the questions on reprocessing and final storage of spent fuel elements from the point of view of the Swiss. The contractual obligations were discussed, of the present situation of reprocessing and their assessment. 1 fig

  1. Inspection activities of other strategic points (OSPs) at Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kaifuki, Yukinobu; Ebata, Takashi; Nakano, Sadayuki; Fujimaki, Kazunori

    2008-01-01

    At Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP), Active Test (AT) using actual spent fuels for the final confirmation of the equipment and the system has been performed since March 31, 2006 toward the commercial operation. The safeguards inspection during AT is required in the same manner as commercial operation condition because plutonium is handled. In RRP automated verification systems are established by using unattended verification systems including a number of process monitoring systems along with main plutonium handling process from the spent fuel storage until the MOX product storages. Even under the modernized safeguards, inspection activities at Other Strategic Points (OSPs) are required to confirm plant status in accordance with requirements of the IAEA safeguards criteria. This paper presents procedures and inspection activities at OSPs which has been implemented in RRP since start of AT. (author)

  2. International safeguards for spent fuel storage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kratzer, M.; Wonder, E.; Immerman, W.; Crane, F.

    1981-08-01

    This report analyzes the nonproliferation effectiveness and political and economic acceptability of prospective improvements in international safeguard techniques for LWR spent fuel storage. Although the applicability of item accounting considerably eases the safeguarding of stored spent fuel, the problem of verification is potentially serious. A number of simple gamma and neutron nondestructive assay techniques were found to offer considerable improvements, of a qualitative rather than quantitative nature, in verification-related data and information, and possess the major advantage of intruding very little on facility operations. A number of improved seals and monitors appear feasible as well, but improvements in the timeliness of detection will not occur unless the frequency of inspection is increased or a remote monitoring capability is established. Limitations on IAEA Safeguards resources and on the integration of results from material accounting and containment and surveillance remain problems

  3. Evaluation of subcritical hybrid systems loaded with reprocessed fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Velasquez, Carlos E.; Barros, Graiciany de P.; Pereira, Claubia; Veloso, Maria Auxiliadora F.; Costa, Antonella L.

    2015-01-01

    Highlights: • Accelerator driven systems (ADS) and fusion–fission systems are investigated for transmutation and fuel regeneration. • The calculations were performed using Monteburns code. • The results indicate the most suitable system for achieve transmutation. - Abstract: Two subcritical hybrid systems containing spent fuel reprocessed by Ganex technique and spiked with thorium were submitted to neutron irradiation of two different sources: ADS (Accelerator-driven subcritical) and Fusion. The aim is to investigate the nuclear fuel evolution using reprocessed fuel and the neutronic parameters under neutron irradiation. The source multiplication factor and fuel depletion for both systems were analysed during 10 years. The simulations were performed using MONTEBURNS code (MCNP/ORIGEN). The results indicate the main differences when irradiating the fuel with different neutron sources as well as the most suitable system for achieving transmutation

  4. Material control and accounting at a CANDU reactor: the instrumented safeguards scheme

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stirling, A.J.; Payne, E.

    1985-01-01

    While CANDU reactors differ from LWRs quite markedly in the way they operate, the principles of materials accounting and safeguards are equally applicable. Indeed, since CANDU fuel is not reprocessed, the relatively simple procedure of item accounting is sufficient for CANDUs. However, on-power refueling means that automatic item counting is needed to independently confirm operator records. Surveillance and sealing techniques for spent fuel are needed for a practical system. The equipment developed has allowed the IAEA to apply safeguards at reasonable cost and with minimal interference to the utility operating the station

  5. Reprocessing technology for present water reactor fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McMurray, P.R.

    1977-01-01

    The basic Purex solvent extraction technology developed and applied in the U.S. in the 1950's provides a well-demonstrated and efficient process for recovering uranium and plutonium for fuel recycle and separating the wastes for further treatment and packaging. The technologies for confinement of radioactive effluents have been developed but have had limited utilization in the processing of commercial light water reactor fuels. Technologies for solidification and packaging of radioactive wastes have not yet been demonstrated but significant experience has been gained in laboratory and engineering scale experiments with simulated commercial reprocessing wastes and intermediate level wastes. Commercial scale experience with combined operations of all the required processes and equipment are needed to demonstrate reliable reprocessing centers

  6. Evironmental assessment factors relating to reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-05-01

    This document is in two parts. Part I presents the criteria and evaluation factors, based primarily on US experience, which may be used to carry out an environmental assessment of spent fuel reprocessing. The concept of As Low as is Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) is introduced in limiting radiation exposure. The factors influencing both occupational and general public radiation exposure are reviewed. Part II provides information on occupational and general public radiation exposure in relation to reprocessing taken from various sources including UNSCEAR and GESMO. Some information is provided in relation to potential accidents at reprocessing or MOX fuel refabrication plants. The magnitude of the services, energy, land use and non-radiological effluents for the reference design of reprocessing plant are also presented

  7. Advanced fuel cycle on the basis of pyroelectrochemical process for irradiated fuel reprocessing and vibropacking technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mayorshin, A.A.; Skiba, O.V.; Tsykanov, V.A.; Golovanov, V.N.; Bychkov, A.V.; Kisly, V.A.; Bobrov, D.A.

    2000-01-01

    For advanced nuclear fuel cycle in SSC RIAR there is developed the pyroelectrochemical process to reprocess irradiated fuel and produce granulated oxide fuel UO 2 , PuO 2 or (U,Pu)O 2 from chloride melts. The basic technological stage is the extraction of oxides as a crystal product with the methods either of the electrolysis (UO 2 and UO 2 -PuO 2 ) or of the precipitating crystalIization (PuO 2 ). After treating the granulated fuel is ready for direct use to manufacture vibropacking fuel pins. Electrochemical model for (U,Pu)O 2 coprecipitation is described. There are new processes being developed: electroprecipitation of mixed oxides - (U,Np)O 2 , (U,Pu,Np)O 2 , (U,Am)O 2 and (U,Pu,Am)O 2 . Pyroelectrochemical production of mixed actinide oxides is used both for reprocessing spent fuel and for producing actinide fuel. Both the efficiency of pyroelectrochemical methods application for reprocessing nuclear fuel and of vibropac technology for plutonium recovery are estimated. (author)

  8. EdF speaks about economic advantages of fuel reprocessing as compared with interim storage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1997-01-01

    The French company Electricite de France (EdF) will prefer nuclear fuel reprocessing and plutonium recycling to spent fuel storage also in the years after 2000. This option is economically advantageous if the proportional cost of reprocessing does not exceed 1900 FRF/kg heavy metal. Economic analysis shows that this is feasible. EdF will soon have to reprocess annually about 1000 Mt spent fuel to supply enough plutonium for MOX fuel fabrication to feed as many as 28 PWR units and the Superphenix reactor. Spent fuel reprocessing is seen as promising as long as the efficiency of the MOX fuel approaches that of natural uranium based fuel. The French national industrial, political and legal context of EdF operations is also considered. (P.A.)

  9. Solution Monitoring Evaluated by Proliferation Risk Assessment and Fuzzy Optimization Analysis for Safeguards in a Reprocessing Process

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mitsutoshi Suzuki

    2013-01-01

    Full Text Available Solution monitoring (SM has been used in a nuclear reprocessing plant as an additional measure to provide assurance that the plant is operated as declared. The inline volume and density monitoring equipment with dip tubes is important for safety and safeguards purposes and is a typical example of safeguards by design (SBD. Recently safety, safeguards, and security by design (3SBD are proposed to promote an efficient and effective generation of nuclear energy. In 3SBD, proliferation risk assessment has the potential to consider likelihood of the incidence and proliferation risk in safeguards. In this study, risk assessment methodologies for safeguards and security are discussed and several mathematical methods are presented to investigate risk notion applied to intentional acts of facility misuse in an uncertainty environment. Proliferation risk analysis with the Markov model, deterrence effect with the game model, and SBD with fuzzy optimization are shown in feasibility studies to investigate the potential application of the risk and uncertainty analyses in safeguards. It is demonstrated that the SM is an effective measurement system using risk-informed and cost-effective SBD, even though there are inherent difficulties related to the possibility of operator’s falsification.

  10. Predicting the behaviour or neptunium during nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Drake, V.A.

    1988-01-01

    Behaviour of Np and its distribution over reprocessing flowsheet is studied due to the necessity of improvement of reprocessing methods of wastes formed during purex-process. Valency states of Np in solutions of reprocessing cycles, Np distribution in organic and acid phases, Np(5) oxidation by nitric acid at the stage of extraction, effect of U and Pu presence on Np behaviour, are considered. Calculation and experimental data are compared; the possibility of Np behaviour forecasting in the process of nuclear fuel reprocessing, provided initial data vay, is shown. 7 refs.; 4 figs.; 1 tab

  11. The main chemical safety problems in main process of nuclear fuel reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Song Fengli; Zhao Shangui; Liu Xinhua; Zhang Chunlong; Lu Dan; Liu Yuntao; Yang Xiaowei; Wang Shijun

    2014-01-01

    There are many chemical reactions in the aqueous process of nuclear fuel reprocessing. The reaction conditions and the products are different so that the chemical safety problems are different. In the paper the chemical reactions in the aqueous process of nuclear fuel reprocessing are described and the main chemical safety problems are analyzed. The reference is offered to the design and accident analysis of the nuclear fuel reprocessing plant. (authors)

  12. Potential safety-related incidents with possible applicability to a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Perkins, W.C.; Durant, W.S.; Dexter, A.H.

    1980-12-01

    The occurrence of certain potential events in nuclear fuel reprocessing plants could lead to significant consequences involving risk to operating personnel or to the general public. This document is a compilation of such potential initiating events in nuclear fuel reprocessing plants. Possible general incidents and incidents specific to key operations in fuel reprocessing are considered, including possible causes, consequences, and safety features designed to prevent, detect, or mitigate such incidents

  13. Safeguarding nuclear energy in the Pacific: the role of Australia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Indyk, M.

    1980-01-01

    Measures necessary for the establishment of an effective safeguards regime are outlined. These include the establishment of multinational institutions to control and limit the number of sensitive facilities, the establishment of regional spent fuel storage sites and regional plutonium banks to be placed under international control, the establishment of international uranium banks to provide fuel assurances to cooperating countries and the cooperation between suppliers and consumers in improving safeguard techniques. The possibility of a Pacific regional non-proliferation initiative and the role Australia is likely to play in such an initiative are considered. From the public record, the Australian Government would appear to be a deeply committed supporter of international measures to control reprocessing, to store spent fuel and plutonium, to strengthen safeguards and to provide fuel assurances to consumers. However, the Government's actions are not as consistent. It is concluded that Australia will be willing to support non-proliferation efforts as long as they do not unduly jeopardise uranium exports

  14. Reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gal, I.

    1964-12-01

    This volume contains the following reports: Experimental facility for testing and development of pulsed columns and auxiliary devices; Chemical-technology study of the modified 'Purex' process; Chemical and radiometric control analyses; Chromatographic separation of rare earth elements on paper treated by di-n butylphosphate; Preliminary study of some organic nitrogen extracts significant in fuel reprocessing

  15. Status and trends in spent fuel reprocessing. Proceedings of an advisory group meeting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-08-01

    Spent fuel management has always been an important part of the nuclear fuel cycle and is still one of the most important activities in all countries exploiting the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Continuous attention is being given by the IAEA to the collection, analysis and exchange of information on spent fuel management. Its role in this area is to provide a forum for exchanging information and to coordinate and encourage closer co-operation among Member States in certain research and developing activities that are of common interest. As part of spent fuel management, reprocessing activities have been reviewed from time to time on a low profile level under the terminology 'spent fuel treatment'. However, spent fuel treatment covers, in broad terms, spent fuel storage (short, interim and long term), fuel rod consolidation, reprocessing and, in case the once-through cycle is selected, conditioning of the spent fuel for disposal. Hence the reprocessing activities under the heading 'spent fuel treatment' were somewhat misleading. Several meetings on spent fuel treatment have been organized during the fast decade: an Advisory Group meeting (AGM) in 1992, a Technical Committee meeting in 1995 and recently an Advisory Group meeting from 7 to 10 September 1998. The objectives of the meetings were to review the status and trends of spent fuel reprocessing, to discuss the environmental impact and safety aspects of reprocessing facilities and to define the most important issues in this field. Notwithstanding the fact that the Summary of the report does not include aspects of military reprocessing, some of the national presentations do refer to some relevant aspects (e.g. experience, fissile stockpiles)

  16. The integral fast reactor fuels reprocessing laboratory at Argonne National Laboratory, Illinois

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wolson, R.D.; Tomczuk, Z.; Fischer, D.F.; Slawecki, M.A.; Miller, W.E.

    1986-09-01

    The processing of Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) metal fuel utilizes pyrochemical fuel reprocessing steps. These steps include separation of the fission products from uranium and plutonium by electrorefining in a fused salt, subsequent concentration of uranium and plutonium for reuse, removal, concentration, and packaging of the waste material. Approximately two years ago a facility became operational at Argonne National Laboratory-Illinois to establish the chemical feasibility of proposed reprocessing and consolidation processes. Sensitivity of the pyroprocessing melts to air oxidation necessitated operation in atmosphere-controlled enclosures. The Integral Fast Reactor Fuels Reprocessing Laboratory is described

  17. Process data in safeguards at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ehinger, M.H.

    1988-01-01

    The desire to improve timeliness and sensitivity of material control and accounting capabilities is the basis for evaluation and upgrade of regulatory requirements throughout the nuclear industry. Improvements invariably require better measurement capabilities and more frequent measurements. Operating plants typically include a broad range of measurements and equipment devoted to process control. How can these measurements be used to benefit safeguards? A part of the Consolidated Fuel Reprocessing Program at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory has focused on the use of process data for safeguards. This report discusses recent safeguards demonstrations and current activities in a test facility at Oak Ridge

  18. Comments on fuel cycle concepts and impacts on nonproliferation and safeguards concerns

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persiani, P.J.

    1997-01-01

    Fuel cycle technologies have inherently differing levels of proliferation risk profiles. Institutional and/or multi-national arrangements have been effective in reducing the proliferation risk concerns. The implementation of international safeguards further reduces the proliferation risk concerns by the timely detection of a possible physical diversion of SNM from fuel cycle facilities. Fuel cycles are safeguardable, but the proliferation risk characteristics of fuel cycles concepts differ significantly with consequent impacts on the international level of technical safeguards measures. The paper comments on proliferation characteristics of some of the fuel cycle concepts for the purpose of exploring development of advanced nonproliferation and safeguards measures

  19. The use of the hybrid K-edge densitometer for routine analysis of safeguards verification samples of reprocessing input liquor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ottmar, H.; Eberle, H.

    1991-01-01

    Following successful tests of a hybrid K-edge instrument at TUI Karlsruhe and the routine use of a K-edge densitometer for safeguards verification at the same laboratory, the Euratom Safeguards Directorate of the Commission of the European Communities decided to install the first such instrument into a large industrial reprocessing plant for the routine verification of samples taken from the input accountancy tanks. This paper reports on the installation, calibration, sample handling procedure and the performance of this instrument after one year of routine operation

  20. Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Fast Reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Durst, Philip C.; Therios, Ike; Bean, Robert; Dougan, A.; Boyer, Brian; Wallace, Rick L.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Kovacic, Don N.; Tolk, K.

    2007-12-15

    This third report in the series reviews possible safeguards approaches for new fast reactors in general, and the ABR in particular. Fast-neutron spectrum reactors have been used since the early 1960s on an experimental and developmental level, generally with fertile blanket fuels to “breed” nuclear fuel such as plutonium. Whether the reactor is designed to breed plutonium, or transmute and “burn” actinides depends mainly on the design of the reactor neutron reflector and the whether the blanket fuel is “fertile” or suitable for transmutation. However, the safeguards issues are very similar, since they pertain mainly to the receipt, shipment and storage of fresh and spent plutonium and actinide-bearing “TRU”-fuel. For these reasons, the design of existing fast reactors and details concerning how they have been safeguarded were studied in developing advanced safeguards approaches for the new fast reactors. In this regard, the design of the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II “EBR-II” at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) was of interest, because it was designed as a collocated fast reactor with a pyrometallurgical reprocessing and fuel fabrication line – a design option being considered for the ABR. Similarly, the design of the Fast Flux Facility (FFTF) on the Hanford Site was studied, because it was a successful prototype fast reactor that ran for two decades to evaluate fuels and the design for commercial-scale fast reactors.

  1. Cost analysis of the US spent nuclear fuel reprocessing facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Schneider, E.A.; Deinert, M.R. [Department of Mechanical Engineering, University of Texas, Austin TX (United States); Cady, K.B. [Department of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics, Cornell University, Ithaca NY (United States)

    2009-09-15

    The US Department of Energy is actively seeking ways in which to delay or obviate the need for additional nuclear waste repositories beyond Yucca Mountain. All of the realistic approaches require the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. However, the US currently lacks the infrastructure to do this and the costs of building and operating the required facilities are poorly established. Recent studies have also suggested that there is a financial advantage to delaying the deployment of such facilities. We consider a system of government owned reprocessing plants, each with a 40 year service life, that would reprocess spent nuclear fuel generated between 2010 and 2100. Using published data for the component costs, and a social discount rate appropriate for intergenerational analyses, we establish the unit cost for reprocessing and show that it increases slightly if deployment of infrastructure is delayed by a decade. The analysis indicates that achieving higher spent fuel discharge burnup is the most important pathway to reducing the overall cost of reprocessing. The analysis also suggests that a nuclear power production fee would be a way for the US government to recover the costs in a manner that is relatively insensitive to discount and nuclear power growth rates. (author)

  2. The Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation Safeguards and Separations Reprocessing Plant Toolkit

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McCaskey, Alex [ORNL; Billings, Jay Jay [ORNL; de Almeida, Valmor F [ORNL

    2011-08-01

    This report details the progress made in the development of the Reprocessing Plant Toolkit (RPTk) for the DOE Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NEAMS) program. RPTk is an ongoing development effort intended to provide users with an extensible, integrated, and scalable software framework for the modeling and simulation of spent nuclear fuel reprocessing plants by enabling the insertion and coupling of user-developed physicochemical modules of variable fidelity. The NEAMS Safeguards and Separations IPSC (SafeSeps) and the Enabling Computational Technologies (ECT) supporting program element have partnered to release an initial version of the RPTk with a focus on software usability and utility. RPTk implements a data flow architecture that is the source of the system's extensibility and scalability. Data flows through physicochemical modules sequentially, with each module importing data, evolving it, and exporting the updated data to the next downstream module. This is accomplished through various architectural abstractions designed to give RPTk true plug-and-play capabilities. A simple application of this architecture, as well as RPTk data flow and evolution, is demonstrated in Section 6 with an application consisting of two coupled physicochemical modules. The remaining sections describe this ongoing work in full, from system vision and design inception to full implementation. Section 3 describes the relevant software development processes used by the RPTk development team. These processes allow the team to manage system complexity and ensure stakeholder satisfaction. This section also details the work done on the RPTk ``black box'' and ``white box'' models, with a special focus on the separation of concerns between the RPTk user interface and application runtime. Section 4 and 5 discuss that application runtime component in more detail, and describe the dependencies, behavior, and rigorous testing of its constituent components.

  3. Problems of nuclear fuel reprocessing in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tanaka, Naojiro

    1974-01-01

    The reprocessing capacity of the plant No. 1 of Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation, which is scheduled to start operation in fiscal year 1975, will be insufficient after fiscal year 1978 for the estimated demand for reprocessing based on Japanese nuclear energy development program. Taking into consideration the results examined by JAIF's study team to Europe and the U.S., it is necessary that Japan builds 2nd reprocessing plant. But there will be a gap from 1978 to 1984 during which Japan must rely on overseas reprocessing services. The establishment of a reprocessing system is a task of national scale, and there are many problems to be solved before it can be done. These include the problems of site and environment, the problem of treatment and disposal of radioactive wastes, the raising of huge required funds and so on. Therefore, even if a private enterprise is allowed to undertake the task, it will be impossible to achieve the aim without the cooperation and assistance of the government. (Wakatsuki, Y.)

  4. Safety aspects in fuel reprocessing and radioactive waste management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Agarwal, K.

    2018-01-01

    Nuclear energy is used for generation of electricity and for production of a wide range of radionuclides for use in research and development, healthcare and industry. Nuclear industry uses nuclear fission as source of energy so a large amount of energy is available from very small amount of fuel. As India has adopted c losed fuel cycle , spent nuclear fuel from nuclear reactor is considered as a material of resource and reprocessed to recovery valuable fuel elements. Main incentive of reprocessing is to use the uranium resources effectively by recovering/recycling Pu and U present in the spent fuel. This finally leads to a very small percentage of residual material present in spent nuclear fuel requiring their management as radioactive waste. Another special feature of the Indian Atomic Energy Program is the attention paid from the very beginning to the safe management of radioactive waste

  5. Designing a safeguards approach for the transfer and storage of used fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Benjamin, Robert; Truong, Q.S. Bob; Keeffe, Richard; Whiting, Neville; Green, Brian

    2001-01-01

    Full text: To provide needed space in the bays for continued CANDU reactor discharges, used fuel must be moved from the bays to dry storage facilities, which are built on site. Over the next decades, used fuel in the bays in Canada will be loaded into containers or transfer flasks and moved to the dry storage facilities. The IAEA currently verifies the transfer of used fuel to dry storage at the Point Lepreau and Gentilly and Pickering CANDU reactor stations. When the Bruce Used Fuel Dry Storage Facility starts operating in 2002 followed by the Darlington Used Fuel Dry Storage Facility in 2007-2009 increased Agency safeguards resources will be required. Safeguarding these new facilities and the flow of fuel to them would place additional demand on IAEA resources if the current approach, which relies heavily upon inspectors being present at the facility, were used. In a continuous search for more efficient approaches, the IAEA, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, and the facility operators are working together to develop a safeguards scheme that depends less upon inspectors and more upon instruments, operator activity and remote monitoring. This paper describes the current approach to safeguarding used fuel in transit and in storage at the Pickering site and how that approach might be applied to the Bruce site. Alternative approaches are also discussed and their application to existing and future used fuel dry storage facilities is considered. Safeguards approaches under existing Safeguards Criteria are compared with approaches that might be possible under a safeguards regime strengthened by the Additional Protocol, and with approaches optimised under Integrated Safeguards. The technologies being considered to safeguard used fuel include position tracking using Global Positioning System (GPS), Geospatial Information System (GIS), radio frequency techniques, electronic seals, operator activity and remote surveillance and monitoring. (author)

  6. Needs of Advanced Safeguards Technologies for Future Nuclear Fuel Cycle (FNFC) Facilities and a Trial Application of SBD Concept to Facility Design of a Hypothetical FNFC Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seya, M.; Hajima, R.; Nishimori, N.; Hayakawa, T.; Kikuzawa, N.; Shizuma, T.; Fujiwara, M.

    2010-01-01

    Some of future nuclear fuel cycle (FNFC) facilities are supposed to have the characteristic features of very large throughput of plutonium, low decontamination reprocessing (no purification process; existence of certain amount of fission products (FP) in all process material), full minor actinides (MA) recycle, and treatment of MOX with FP and MA in fuel fabrication. In addition, the following international safeguards requirements have to be taken into account for safeguards approaches of the FNFC facilities. -Application of integrated safeguards (IS) approach; -Remote (unattended) verification; - 'Safeguards by Design' (SBD) concept. These features and requirements compel us to develop advanced technologies, which are not emerged yet. In order to realize the SBD, facility designers have to know important parts of design information on advanced safeguards systems before starting the facility design. The SBD concept requires not only early start of R and D of advanced safeguards technologies (before starting preliminary design of the facility) but also interaction steps between researchers working on safeguards systems and nuclear facility designers. The interaction steps are follows. Step-1; researchers show images of advanced safeguards systems to facility designers based on their research. Step-2; facility designers take important design information on safeguards systems into process systems of demonstration (or test) facility. Step-3; demonstration and improvement of both systems based on the conceptual design. Step-4; Construction of a FNFC facility with the advanced safeguards systems We present a trial application of the SBD concept to a hypothetical FNFC facility with an advanced hybrid K-edge densitometer and a Pu NDA system for spent nuclear fuel assembly using laser Compton scattering (LCS) X-rays and γ-rays and other advanced safeguards systems. (author)

  7. Reprocessing of AHWR spent-fuel: Challenges and strategies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kant, S.

    2005-01-01

    Reprocessing of advanced heavy water reactor (AHWR) spent-fuel involves separation of Th, 233 U and Pu, from the fission products and from one another. A proper combination of Purex and Thorex processes is required. The technology development for a reprocessing facility is extremely complex owing to high fissile content, high levels of irradiation, presence high of levels of 232 U, difficulty in thoria dissolution, presence of thorium as the major constituent, problems due to third phase formation with Th, etc. It demands for development of suitable dissolution, solvent extraction, criticality control, U-Pu partitioning, and other equipments and/or techniques. Process modelling, simulation and optimisation are crucial in predicting behaviour of equipments/cycles, and in arriving at safe and optimum flowsheet. A significant success in this field has been achieved. This paper describes the reprocessing aspects pertaining to AHWR spent-fuel, indicating the major technological challenges, strategies to be followed and development requirements. A schematic flowsheet is proposed for Th- 233 U-Pu separation. (author)

  8. Pilot and pilot-commercial plants for reprocessing spent fuels of FBR type reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shaldaev, V.S.; Sokolova, I.D.

    1988-01-01

    A review of modern state of investigations on the FBR mixed oxide uranium-plutonium fuel reprocessing abroad is given. Great Britain and France occupy the leading place in this field, operating pilot plants of 5 tons a year capacity. Technology of spent fuel reprocessing and specific features of certain stages of the technological process are considered. Projects of pilot and pilot-commercial plants of Great Britain, France, Japan, USA are described. Economic problems of the FBR fuel reprocessing are touched upon

  9. Storage and Reprocessing of Spent Nuclear Fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Karpius, Peter Joseph [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2017-02-02

    Addressing the problem of waste, especially high-level waste (HLW), is a requirement of the nuclear fuel cycle that cannot be ignored. We explore the two options employed currently, long-term storage and reprocessing.

  10. Status of nuclear fuel reprocessing, spent fuel storage, and high-level waste disposal. Nuclear Fuel Cycle Committee, California Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission. Draft report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1978-01-01

    An analysis of the current status of technologies and issues in the major portions of the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle is presented. The discussion on nuclear fuel reprocessing covers the reprocessing requirement, reprocessing technology assessment, technology for operation of reprocessing plants, and approval of reprocessing plants. The chapter devoted to spent fuel storage covers the spent fuel storge problem, the legislative response, options for maintaining full core discharge capacity, prospective availability of alterntive storage options, and the outlook for California. The existence of a demonstrated, developed high-level waste disposal technology is reviewed. Recommendations for Federal programs on high-level waste disposal are made

  11. Zone approaches to international safeguards of a nuclear fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.

    1986-01-01

    At present the IAEA designs its safeguards approach with regard to each type of nuclear facility so that the safeguards activities and effort are essentially the same for a given type and size of nuclear facility wherever it may be located. Conclusions regarding a State are derived by combining the results of safeguards verifications for the individual facilities within it. The authors have examined safeguards approaches for a State nuclear fuel cycle that take into account the existence of all of the nuclear facilities in the State. They have focused on the fresh-fuel zone of an advanced nuclear fuel cycle, the several facilities of which use or process low-enriched uranium. The intention is to develop an approach which will make it possible to compare the technical effectiveness and the inspection effort for the facility-oriented approach, for the zone approach and for some reasonable intermediate safeguards approaches

  12. The refurbishment of the D1206 fuel reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bailey, G.

    1988-01-01

    The term decommissioning can be applied not only to reactors but to any nuclear plant, laboratory, building or part of a building that may have been associated with radioactive material and needs to be restored to clean conditions. In this case the decommissioning and reconstruction of the Dounreay Fast Reactor fuel reprocessing plant, so that plutonium oxide could be reprocessed as well as enriched uranium fuel, is described. The work included improving containment and shielding, building a new head-end treatment cave for the more complex and larger fuel elements, improving the ventilation and constructing a new dissolver. In this paper the breakdown cave and dissolver cell are described and compared and the work done explained. (U.K.)

  13. Electrochemical Methods for Reprocessing Defective Fuel Elements and for Decontaminating Equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mikheykin, S. V.; Rybakov, K. A.; Simonov, V. P.

    2002-01-01

    Reprocessing of fuel elements receives much consideration in nuclear engineering. Chemical and electrochemical methods are used for the purpose. For difficultly soluble materials based on zirconium alloys chemical methods are not suitable. Chemical reprocessing of defective or irradiated fuel elements requires special methods for their decladding because the dissolution of the clad material in nitric acid is either impossible (stainless steel, Zr alloys) or quite slow (aluminium). Fuel elements are cut in air-tight glove-boxes equipped with a dust collector and a feeder for crushed material. Chemical treatment is not free from limitations. For this reason we started a study of the feasibility of electrochemical methods for reprocessing defective and irradiated fuel elements. A simplified electrochemical technology developed makes it possible to recover expensive materials which were earlier wasted or required multi-step treatment. The method and an electrochemical cell are suitable for essentially complete dissolution of any fuel elements, specifically those made of materials which are difficultly soluble by chemical methods

  14. Inventory estimation for nuclear fuel reprocessing systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beyerlein, A.L.; Geldard, J.F.

    1987-01-01

    The accuracy of nuclear material accounting methods for nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities is limited by nuclear material inventory variations in the solvent extraction contactors, which affect the separation and purification of uranium and plutonium. Since in-line methods for measuring contactor inventory are not available, simple inventory estimation models are being developed for mixer-settler contactors operating at steady state with a view toward improving the accuracy of nuclear material accounting methods for reprocessing facilities. The authors investigated the following items: (1) improvements in the utility of the inventory estimation models, (2) extension of improvements to inventory estimation for transient nonsteady-state conditions during, for example, process upset or throughput variations, and (3) development of simple inventory estimation models for reprocessing systems using pulsed columns

  15. Informing the public on technical effectiveness of international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hunt, H.M.

    1994-01-01

    In recent years, public interest regarding IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards effectiveness has partially shifted to detection of undeclared nuclear facilities. Nevertheless, important segments of the public remain vitally interested in whether international safeguards would be able to reliably and definitively detect diversion of bomb quantities of plutonium or highly enriched uranium from open-quotes bulk handlingclose quotes facilities. There now exists a sizable body of unclassified technical reports, based on experimental results over many years, written by various experts, describing actual capabilities and limitations of safeguards techniques and systems, which collectively lead to definitive evaluations of technical safeguards effectiveness. For a large-scale operation of spent fuel reprocessing, plutonium fuel fabrication, or gas centrifuge uranium enrichment, an undisputable conclusion is that international safeguards systems would be unable to reliably and definitively detect the diversion in a one-year period of a significant quantity of plutonium or enriched uranium; moreover, diversion of many significant quantities per year (from such an operation) would have negligible probability of definitive detection if conducted in accordance with particle diversion scenarios. To properly inform the public and government agencies, reports on technical effectiveness of international safeguards should incorporate these basic conclusions

  16. Nuclear fuel reprocessing expansion strategies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gallagher, J.M.

    1975-01-01

    A description is given of an effort to apply the techniques of operations research and energy system modeling to the problem of determination of cost-effective strategies for capacity expansion of the domestic nuclear fuel reprocessing industry for the 1975 to 2000 time period. The research also determines cost disadvantages associated with alternative strategies that may be attractive for political, social, or ecological reasons. The sensitivity of results to changes in cost assumptions was investigated at some length. Reactor fuel types covered by the analysis include the Light Water Reactor (LWR), High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (HTGR), and the Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR)

  17. Task 5c: measurement and instrumentation under subsystem design of the LLL safeguard material control program. [For fuel reprocessing plant

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1976-12-31

    A product survey was conducted of all security products currently available on the market. Documentation is presented of the survey and a printout of the data is included. A general description is given of new but recommended instrumentation and security devices for application to fuel reprocessing plants. Security systems and hardware recommended for development, assembly, and testing are discussed briefly. (DLC)

  18. Technology development of nuclear material safeguards for DUPIC fuel cycle

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hong, Jong Sook; Kim, Ho Dong; Kang, Hee Young; Lee, Young Gil; Byeon, Kee Ho; Park, Young Soo; Cha, Hong Ryul; Park, Ho Joon; Lee, Byung Doo; Chung, Sang Tae; Choi, Hyung Rae; Park, Hyun Soo

    1997-07-01

    During the second phase of research and development program conducted from 1993 to 1996, nuclear material safeguards studies system were performed on the technology development of DUPIC safeguards system such as nuclear material measurement in bulk form and product form, DUPIC fuel reactivity measurement, near-real-time accountancy, and containment and surveillance system for effective and efficient implementation of domestic and international safeguards obligation. By securing in advance a optimized safeguards system with domestically developed hardware and software, it will contribute not only to the effective implementation of DUPIC safeguards, but also to enhance the international confidence build-up in peaceful use of spent fuel material. (author). 27 refs., 13 tabs., 89 figs.

  19. Summary of safeguards interactions between Los Alamos and Chinese scientists

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eccleston, G.W.

    1994-01-01

    Los Alamos has been collaborating since 1984 with scientists from the Chinese Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE) to develop nuclear measurement instrumentation and safeguards systems technologies that will help China support implementation of the nonproliferation treaty (NPT). To date, four Chinese scientists have visited Los Alamos, for periods of six months to two years, where they have studied nondestructive assay instrumentation and learned about safeguards systems and inspection techniques that are used by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. Part of this collaboration involves invitations from the CIAE to US personnel to visit China and interact with a larger number of Institute staff and to provide a series of presentations on safeguards to a wider audience. Typically, CIAE scientists, Beijing Institute of Nuclear Engineering (BINE) staff, and officials from the Government Safeguards Office attend the lectures. The BINE has an important role in developing the civilian nuclear power fuel cycle. BINE is designing a reprocessing plant for spent nuclear fuel from Chinese nuclear Power reactors. China signed the nonproliferation treaty in 1992 and is significantly expanding its safeguards expertise and activities. This paper describes the following: DOE support for US and Chinese interactions on safeguards; Chinese safeguards; impacts of US-China safeguards interactions; and possible future safeguards interactions

  20. Fuel reprocessing data validation using the isotope correlation technique

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persiani, P.J.; Bucher, R.G.; Pond, R.B.; Cornella, R.J.

    1990-01-01

    The Isotope Correlation Technique (ICT), in conjunction with the gravimetric (Pu/U ratio) method for mass determination, provides an independent verification of the input accountancy at the dissolver or accountancy stage of the reprocessing plant. The Isotope Correlation Technique has been applied to many classes of domestic and international reactor systems (light-water, heavy-water, and graphite reactors) operating in a variety of modes (power, research, and production reactors), and for a variety of reprocessing fuel cycle management strategies. Analysis of reprocessing operations data based on isotopic correlations derived for assemblies in a PWR environment and fuel management scheme, yielded differences between the measurement-derived and ICT-derived plutonium mass determinations of (- 0.02 ± 0.23)% for the measured U-235 and (+ 0.50 ± 0.31)% for the measured Pu-239, for a core campaign. The ICT analyses has been implemented for the plutonium isotopics in a depleted uranium assembly in a heavy-water, enriched uranium system and for the uranium isotopes in the fuel assemblies in light-water, highly-enriched systems

  1. Reprocessing technology of liquid metal cooled fast breeder reactor fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baetsle, L.H.; Broothaerts, J.; Heylen, P.R.; Eschrich, H.; Geel, J. van

    1974-11-01

    All the important aspects of LMFBR fuel reprocessing are critically reviewed in this report. Storage and transportation techniques using sodium, inert gas, lead, molten salts and organic coolants are comparatively discussed in connection with cooling time and de-activation techniques. Decladding and fuel disaggregation of UO 2 -PuO 2 fuel are reviewed according to the present state of R and D in the main nuclear powers. Strong emphasis is put on on voloxidation, mechanical pulverization and molten salt disaggregation in connection with volatilization of gaseous fission products. Release of fission gases and the resulting off-gas treatment are discussed in connection with cooling time, burn up and dissagregation techniques. The review is limited to tritium, iodine xenon-krypton and radioactive airborne particulates. Dissolution, solvent extraction and plutonium purification problems specifically connected to LMFBR fuel are reviewed with emphasis on the differences between LWR and fast fuel reprocessing. Finally the categories of wastes produced by reprocessing are analysed according to their origin in the plant and their alpha emitters content. The suitable waste treatment techniques are discussed in connection with the nature of the wastes and the ultimate disposal technique. (author)

  2. Electrochemical reprocessing of nuclear fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brambilla, G.; Sartorelli, A.

    1980-01-01

    A method is described for the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel which is particularly suitable for use with fuel from fast reactors and has the advantage of being a dry process in which there is no danger of radiation damage to a solvent medium as in a wet process. It comprises the steps of dissolving the fuel in a salt melt under such conditions that uranium and plutonium therein are converted to sulphate form. The plutonium sulphate may then be thermally decomposed to PuO 2 and removed. The salt melt is then subjected to electrolysis conditions to achieve cathodic deposition of UO 2 (and possibly PuO 2 ). The salt melt can then be recycled or conditioned for final disposal. (author)

  3. Air conditioning facilities in a fuel reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kawasaki, Michitaka; Oka, Tsutomu

    1987-01-01

    Reprocessing plants are the facilities for separating the plutonium produced by nuclear reaction and unconsumed remaining uranium from fission products in the spent fuel taken out of nuclear reactors and recovering them. The fuel reprocessing procedure is outlined. In order to ensure safety in handling radioactive substances, triple confinement using vessels, concrete cells and buildings is carried out in addition to the prevention of criticality and radiation shielding, and stainless steel linings and drip trays are installed as occasion demands. The ventilation system in a reprocessing plant is roughly divided into three systems, that is, tower and tank ventilation system to deal with offgas, cell ventilation system for the cells in which main towers and tanks are installed, and building ventilation system. Air pressure becomes higher from tower and tank system to building system. In a reprocessing plant, the areas in a building are classified according to dose rate. The building ventilation system deals with green and amber areas, and the cell ventilation system deals with red area. These three ventilation systems are explained. Radiation monitors are installed to monitor the radiation dose rate and air contamination in working places. The maintenance and checkup of ventilation systems are important. (Kako, I.)

  4. Spent fuel reprocessing system security engineering capability maturity model

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liu Yachun; Zou Shuliang; Yang Xiaohua; Ouyang Zigen; Dai Jianyong

    2011-01-01

    In the field of nuclear safety, traditional work places extra emphasis on risk assessment related to technical skills, production operations, accident consequences through deterministic or probabilistic analysis, and on the basis of which risk management and control are implemented. However, high quality of product does not necessarily mean good safety quality, which implies a predictable degree of uniformity and dependability suited to the specific security needs. In this paper, we make use of the system security engineering - capability maturity model (SSE-CMM) in the field of spent fuel reprocessing, establish a spent fuel reprocessing systems security engineering capability maturity model (SFR-SSE-CMM). The base practices in the model are collected from the materials of the practice of the nuclear safety engineering, which represent the best security implementation activities, reflect the regular and basic work of the implementation of the security engineering in the spent fuel reprocessing plant, the general practices reveal the management, measurement and institutional characteristics of all process activities. The basic principles that should be followed in the course of implementation of safety engineering activities are indicated from 'what' and 'how' aspects. The model provides a standardized framework and evaluation system for the safety engineering of the spent fuel reprocessing system. As a supplement to traditional methods, this new assessment technique with property of repeatability and predictability with respect to cost, procedure and quality control, can make or improve the activities of security engineering to become a serial of mature, measurable and standard activities. (author)

  5. Fuel cycles for the 80's

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    Papers presented at the American Nuclear Society's topical meeting on the fuel cycle are summarized. Present progress and goals in the areas of fuel fabrication, fuel reprocessing, spent fuel storage, accountability, and safeguards are reported. Present governmental policies which affect the fuel cycle are also discussed. Individual presentations are processed for inclusion in the Energy Data Base

  6. Reprocessing on the whole fuel cycle operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Megy, J.

    1983-11-01

    Spent fuel reprocessing, in France, is become an industrial reality which takes an importance place in several fields: place surely essential in the fuel cycle from the energetic material economy and waste management point of view; place priority in the CEA (Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique) research and development programs; place in the industry where it is an important activity sector with the realizations in progress [fr

  7. Safeguards Licensing Aspects of a Future Gen IV Test Facility - a Case Study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lindell, M. Aberg; Grape, S.; Hakansson, A.; Svaerd, S. Jacobsson

    2010-01-01

    The scope of this study covers safeguards licensing aspects of a possible future Gen IV demonstration facility. As a basis for the investigation, the facility was assumed to be located in Sweden, comprising a lead-cooled fast reactor and a reprocessing plant with fuel fabrication. The aim has been to identify safeguards requirements that may be set by the IAEA and the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, and also to suggest how the safeguards system could be implemented in practice. The changed usage and handling of nuclear fuel, as compared to that of today, has been examined in order to determine how today's safeguards measures can be modified and extended to meet the needs of the demonstration facility. This work is part of GENIUS, the Swedish Gen IV research and development programme, which emphasizes lead-cooled fast reactors. (author)

  8. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY08

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Robert Bean; Richard Metcalf; Aaron Bevill

    2008-09-01

    The Safeguards Envelope Project met its milestones by creating a rudimentary safeguards envelope, proving the value of the approach on a small scale, and determining the most appropriate path forward. The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant’s large cache of reprocessing process monitoring data, dubbed UBER Data, was recovered and used in the analysis. A probabilistic Z test was used on a Markov Monte Carlo simulation of expected diversion data when compared with normal operating data. The data regarding a fully transient event in a tank was used to create a simple requirement, representative of a safeguards envelope, whose impact was a decrease in operating efficiency by 1.3% but an increase in material balance period of 26%. This approach is operator, state, and international safeguards friendly and should be applied to future reprocessing plants. Future requirements include tank-to-tank correlations in reprocessing facilities, detailed operations impact studies, simulation inclusion, automated optimization, advanced statistics analysis, and multi-attribute utility analysis.

  9. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY08

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bean, Robert; Metcalf, Richard; Bevill, Aaron

    2008-01-01

    The Safeguards Envelope Project met its milestones by creating a rudimentary safeguards envelope, proving the value of the approach on a small scale, and determining the most appropriate path forward. The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant's large cache of reprocessing process monitoring data, dubbed UBER Data, was recovered and used in the analysis. A probabilistic Z test was used on a Markov Monte Carlo simulation of expected diversion data when compared with normal operating data. The data regarding a fully transient event in a tank was used to create a simple requirement, representative of a safeguards envelope, whose impact was a decrease in operating efficiency by 1.3% but an increase in material balance period of 26%. This approach is operator, state, and international safeguards friendly and should be applied to future reprocessing plants. Future requirements include tank-to-tank correlations in reprocessing facilities, detailed operations impact studies, simulation inclusion, automated optimization, advanced statistics analysis, and multi-attribute utility analysis

  10. Fuel fabrication and reprocessing at UKAEA Dounreay

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anderson, B.

    1994-01-01

    The Dounreay fuel plants, which are the most flexible anywhere in the world, will continue to carry out work for foreign commercial customers. A number of German companies are important customers of UKAEA and examples of the wide variety of the work currently being carried out for them in the Dounreay plants is given (reprocessing and fabrication of fuel elements from and for research reactors). (orig./HP) [de

  11. The French R and D programme for fast reactor fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Auchapt, P.; Bourgeois, M.; Calame-Longjean, A.; Miquel, P.; Sauteron, J.

    1979-01-01

    The process employed is the Purex process adapted to the specific case of fast breeder reactor fuels. The results achieved have demonstrated that the aqueous method can be applied to these fuels: nearly ten years of operation in the ATl workshop which reprocesses RAPSODIE fuels, and the good results obtained at the Marcoule pilot facility on large batches of fuel attest to this achievement. The CEA effort continues principally on extrapolation to industrial scale, thanks mainly to experiments conducted on industrial prototypes and to the launching of the TOR project, which will, as of 1984, allow reprocessing of FBR fuels on a significant scale, and which will provide extensive additional resources for R and D activities

  12. The present status of IAEA safeguards on nuclear fuel cycle facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-02-01

    This paper examines the present approach of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to safeguarding various types of facilities in the nuclear fuel cycle, in the hope that it will serve as useful background material for several of the various working groups of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE). The objectives and criteria of safeguards as well as the specific safeguards techniques which are utilized by the Agency, are addressed. In Part I, a general overview of safeguards as well as a discussion of procedures applicable to most if not all IAEA safeguarded facilities are included. Part II is broken down into specific facility types and focusses on the particular safeguards measures applied to them. Safeguards have reached different degrees of development for different types of facilities, in part because the Agency's experience in safeguarding certain types is considerably greater than for other types. Thus the Agency safeguards described herein are not static, but are continuously evolving. This evolution results not only from the fact that larger and more complex facilities have been coming under safeguards. Changes are also continually being introduced based on practical experience and research and development aimed at improving safeguards efficiency, reducing intrusiveness into plant operations, minimizing operator and inspector radiation exposure, and reducing subjective evaluations in determining the effectiveness of safeguards. To these ends, the technical support programmes of various countries are playing an important role. It is emphasized that this paper is not intended to evaluate the effectiveness of Agency safeguards or to highlight problem areas. It is simply aimed at providing a picture of what safeguards are or are planned to be at various stages of the fuel cycle

  13. Design study on advanced nuclear fuel recycling system by pyrometallurgical reprocessing technology

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kasai, Yoshimitsu; Kakehi, Isao; Moro, Satoshi; Tobe, Kenji; Kawamura, Fumio; Higashi, Tatsuhiro; Yonezawa, Shigeaki [Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Inst., Oarai, Ibaraki (Japan). Oarai Engineering Center; Yoshiuji, Takahiro

    1998-12-01

    The Japan Nuclear Fuel Cycle Development Institute is conducting research and development on the nuclear fuel recycling system, which will improve the economy, safety, and environmental impact of the nuclear fuel recycling system in the age of the FBR. The System Engineering Division in the O-arai Engineering Center has conducted a design study on an advanced nuclear fuel recycling system for FBRs by using pyrometallurgical reprocessing technology. The system is an economical and compact module-type system, and can be used for reprocessing oxide fuel and also new types of fuel (metal fuel and nitride fuel). This report describes the concept of this system and results of the design study. (author)

  14. Design study on advanced nuclear fuel recycling system by pyrometallurgical reprocessing technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kasai, Yoshimitsu; Kakehi, Isao; Moro, Satoshi; Tobe, Kenji; Kawamura, Fumio; Higashi, Tatsuhiro; Yonezawa, Shigeaki; Yoshiuji, Takahiro

    1998-01-01

    The Japan Nuclear Fuel Cycle Development Institute is conducting research and development on the nuclear fuel recycling system, which will improve the economy, safety, and environmental impact of the nuclear fuel recycling system in the age of the FBR. The System Engineering Division in the O-arai Engineering Center has conducted a design study on an advanced nuclear fuel recycling system for FBRs by using pyrometallurgical reprocessing technology. The system is an economical and compact module-type system, and can be used for reprocessing oxide fuel and also new types of fuel (metal fuel and nitride fuel). This report describes the concept of this system and results of the design study. (author)

  15. The regulations concerning the reprocessing business of spent fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    In compliance with ''The law for the regulations of nuclear source material, nuclear fuel material and reactors'' these regulations prescribe concerning reprocessing facilities: The procedures to apply for the approval of the design and method of construction and the approval of the change thereof; as well as the procedure to apply for the inspection of the facilities, and details of the inspection (in sections 2-6). After that, the regulations require the enterpriser of reprocessing business to keep necessary records and take necessary measures for safety concerning the facilities, operation of reprocessing equipments, and transportation, storage on disposal of used fuel, materials separated therefrom or materials contaminated by either of them (in sections 8-16). Further, the regulations prescribe the procedure to apply for the approval of the safety rule required to the enterpriser of reprocessing business by above mentioned law and specifies items which should be included into the rule (section 17). Moreover, the regulations require the enterpriser to submit reports of each use of the internationally controllled material and specifies the items which should be included into these reports (section 19). (Matsushima, A.)

  16. An improved characterization method for international accountancy measurements of fresh and irradiated mixed oxide (MOX) fuel: helping achieve continual monitoring and safeguards through the fuel cycle

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Evans, Louise G [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Croft, Stephen [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Swinhoe, Martyn T [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Tobin, S. J. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Menlove, H. O. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Schear, M. A. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Worrall, Andrew [U.K. NNL

    2011-01-13

    Nuclear fuel accountancy measurements are conducted at several points through the nuclear fuel cycle to ensure continuity of knowledge (CofK) of special nuclear material (SNM). Non-destructive assay (NDA) measurements are performed on fresh fuel (prior to irradiation in a reactor) and spent nuclear fuel (SNF) post-irradiation. We have developed a fuel assembly characterization system, based on the novel concept of 'neutron fingerprinting' with multiplicity signatures to ensure detailed CofK of nuclear fuel through the entire fuel cycle. The neutron fingerprint in this case is determined by the measurement of the various correlated neutron signatures, specific to fuel isotopic composition, and therefore offers greater sensitivity to variations in fissile content among fuel assemblies than other techniques such as gross neutron counting. This neutron fingerprint could be measured at the point of fuel dispatch (e.g. from a fuel fabrication plant prior to irradiation, or from a reactor site post-irradiation), monitored during transportation of the fuel assembly, and measured at a subsequent receiving site (e.g. at the reactor site prior to irradiation, or reprocessing facility post-irradiation); this would confirm that no unexpected changes to the fuel composition or amount have taken place during transportation and/ or reactor operations. Changes may indicate an attempt to divert material for example. Here, we present the current state of the practice of fuel measurements for both fresh mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and SNF (both MOX and uranium dioxide). This is presented in the framework of international safeguards perspectives from the US and UK. We also postulate as to how the neutron fingerprinting concept could lead to improved fuel characterization (both fresh MOX and SNF) resulting in: (a) assured CofK of fuel across the nuclear fuel cycle, (b) improved detection of SNM diversion, and (c) greater confidence in safeguards of SNF transportation.

  17. Industrial experience of irradiated nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Delange, M.

    1981-01-01

    At the moment and during the next following years, France and La Hague plant particularly, own the greatest amount of industrial experience in the field of reprocessing, since this experience is referred to three types of reactors, either broadly spread all through the world (GCR and LWR) or ready to be greatly developed in the next future (FBR). Then, the description of processes and technologies used now in France, and the examination of the results obtained, on the production or on the security points of view, are a good approach of the actual industrial experience in the field of spent fuel reprocessing. (author)

  18. Some alternatives to the mixed oxide fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Deonigi, D.E.; Eschbach, E.A.; Goldsmith, S.; Pankaskie, P.J.; Rohrmann, C.A.; Widrig, R.D.

    1977-02-01

    While on initial examination each of the six fuel cycle concepts (tandem cycle, extended burnup, fuel rejuvenation, coprocessing, partial reprocessing, and thorium) described in the report may have some potential for improving safeguards, none of the six appears to have any other major or compelling advantages over the mixed oxide (MOX) fuel cycle. Compared to the MOX cycle, all but coprocessing appear to have major disadvantages, including severe cost penalties. Three of the concepts-tandem, extended burnup, and rejuvenation--share the basic problems of the throwaway cycle (GESMO Alternative 6): without reprocessing, high-level waste volumes and costs are substantially increased, and overall uranium utilization decreases for three reasons. First, the parasitic fission products left in the fuel absorb neutrons in later irradiation steps reducing the overall neutronic efficiencies of these cycles. Second, discarded fuel still has sufficient fissile values to warrant recycle. Third, perhaps most important, the plutonium needed for breeder start-up will not be available; without the breeder, uranium utilization would drop by about a factor of sixty. Two of the concepts--coprocessing and partial reprocessing--involve variations of the basic MOX fuel cycle's chemical reprocessing step to make plutonium diversion potentially more difficult. These concepts could be used with the MOX fuel cycle or in conjunction with the tandem, extended burnup and rejuvenation concepts to eliminate some of the problems with those cycles. But in so doing, the basic impetus for those cycles--elimination of reprocessing for safeguards purposes--no longer exists. Of all the concepts considered, only coprocessing--and particularly the ''master blend'' version--appears to have sufficient promise to warrant a more detailed study. The master blend concept could possibly make plutonium diversion more difficult with minimal impact on the reprocessing and MOX fuel fabrication operations

  19. Safeguards-by-Design: Guidance for Independent Spent Fuel Dry Storage Installations (ISFSI)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Trond Bjornard; Philip C. Durst

    2012-05-01

    This document summarizes the requirements and best practices for implementing international nuclear safeguards at independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs), also known as Away-from- Reactor (AFR) storage facilities. These installations may provide wet or dry storage of spent fuel, although the safeguards guidance herein focuses on dry storage facilities. In principle, the safeguards guidance applies to both wet and dry storage. The reason for focusing on dry independent spent fuel storage installations is that this is one of the fastest growing nuclear installations worldwide. Independent spent fuel storage installations are typically outside of the safeguards nuclear material balance area (MBA) of the reactor. They may be located on the reactor site, but are generally considered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the State Regulator/SSAC to be a separate facility. The need for this guidance is becoming increasingly urgent as more and more nuclear power plants move their spent fuel from resident spent fuel ponds to independent spent fuel storage installations. The safeguards requirements and best practices described herein are also relevant to the design and construction of regional independent spent fuel storage installations that nuclear power plant operators are starting to consider in the absence of a national long-term geological spent fuel repository. The following document has been prepared in support of two of the three foundational pillars for implementing Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). These are: i) defining the relevant safeguards requirements, and ii) defining the best practices for meeting the requirements. This document was prepared with the design of the latest independent dry spent fuel storage installations in mind and was prepared specifically as an aid for designers of commercial nuclear facilities to help them understand the relevant international requirements that follow from a country’s safeguards agreement with

  20. Prospect of spent fuel reprocessing and back-end cycling in China in 1990's

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ke Youzhi; Wang Rengtao

    1987-01-01

    According to the CHinese Program of nuclear energy in 1990's, the amount of spent fuel by the year 2000 is estimated in this paper. Reprocessing is considered as an important link in the back-end fuel cycle. A pilot plant is scheduled for hot start up in 1996. The main goal of the study is LWR spent fuel reprocessing. We will use the experience gained from reprocessing of production reactor fuel and last research results. The advanced foreign technigue and experience will be introduced. The study emphasizes on the test of technology, equipments, instrumentation and automation, development of remote maintenance and decontamination. China will start to demonstrate the way for fuel cycle. (author)

  1. Partitioning and transmutation - Technical feasibility, proliferation resistance and safeguardability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schenkel, R.; Glatz, J.-P.; Magill, J.; Mayer, K.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The advantages of partitioning and transmutation (P and T) of minor actinides and selected fission products are largely discussed and described in literature. The advantages of separation of the long-lived alpha-emitters for the long-term storage of highly radioactive waste have been highlighted. After separation, these nuclides shall be transmuted by means of a dedicated reactor or accelerator driven system into shorter-lived fission products that are less hazardous. This, however, requires the development and implementation of a P and T fuel cycle, involving chemical separation of the minor actinides and the fabrication of MA containing fuels or targets. Concepts for P and T fuel cycles have been developed and technical issues are being addressed in various research programs. With the recognition of the proliferation potential associated with the minor actinides by the IAEA, also the proliferation and safeguards aspects need to be addressed. It is important to raise these points at an early stage of process development, in order to identify potential problems and to develop appropriate solutions. The oxide fuels used worldwide in thermal reactor systems for energy production are reprocessed by aqueous techniques. Therefore these systems, primarily the PUREX process, are fully developed and implemented commercially. Furthermore, the safeguards approach is fully implemented in existing facilities, covering uranium and plutonium. Pyroprocess systems have largely been associated with fast reactors and metallic fuels and their development has therefore only reached the pilot-scale stage and the feasibility of minor actinide (MA) separation still needs to be demonstrated. Hydrometallurgical and pyrochemical reprocessing should however not be considered as competing but rather as complementary technologies. For instance in a so-called double strata concept (foreseen for instance in the Japanese OMEGA project), the PUREX process (first stratum) would be

  2. Administrative and managerial controls for the operation of nuclear fuel reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1979-01-01

    Guidelines are provided for the administrative and managerial controls necessary for the safe and efficient operation of nuclear fuel reprocessing plants. Topics covered include: administrative organization; review and audit; facility administrative policies and procedures; and tests and inspections. Recognizing that administrative practices vary among organizations operating nuclear fuel reprocessing plants, the standard incorporates flexibility that provides for compliance by any organization

  3. Radioactive characteristics of spent fuels and reprocessing products in thorium fueled alternative cycles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maeda, Mitsuru

    1978-09-01

    In order to provide one fundamental material for the evaluation of Th cycle, compositions of the spent fuels were calculated with the ORIGEN code on following fuel cycles: (1) PWR fueled with Th- enriched U, (2) PWR fueled with Th-denatured U, (3) CANDU fueled with Th-enriched U and (4) HTGR fueled with Th-enriched U. Using these data, product specifications on radioactivity for their reprocessing were calculated, based on a criterion that radioactivities due to foreign elements do not exceed those inherent in nuclear fuel elements, due to 232 U in bred U or 228 Th in recovered Th, respectively. Conclusions are as the following: (1) Because of very high contents of 232 U and 228 Th in the Th cycle fuels from water moderated reactors, especially from PWR, required decontamination factors for their reprocessing will be smaller by a factor of 10 3 to 10 4 , compared with those from U-Pu fueled LWR cycle. (2) These less stringent product specifications on the radioactivity of bred U and recovered Th will justify introduction of some low decontaminating process, with additional advantage of increased proliferation resistance. (3) Decontamination factors required for HTGR fuel will be 10 to 30 times higher than for the other fuels, because of less 232 U and 228 Th generation, and higher burn-up in the fuel. (author)

  4. Development of a Reliable Fuel Depletion Methodology for the HTR-10 Spent Fuel Analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chung, Kiwhan [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Beddingfield, David H. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Geist, William H. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Lee, Sang-Yoon [unaffiliated

    2012-07-03

    A technical working group formed in 2007 between NNSA and CAEA to develop a reliable fuel depletion method for HTR-10 based on MCNPX and to analyze the isotopic inventory and radiation source terms of the HTR-10 spent fuel. Conclusions of this presentation are: (1) Established a fuel depletion methodology and demonstrated its safeguards application; (2) Proliferation resistant at high discharge burnup ({approx}80 GWD/MtHM) - Unfavorable isotopics, high number of pebbles needed, harder to reprocess pebbles; (3) SF should remain under safeguards comparable to that of LWR; and (4) Diversion scenarios not considered, but can be performed.

  5. THE ECONOMICS OF REPROCESSING vs. DIRECT DISPOSAL OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bunn, Matthew; Fetter, Steve; Holdren, John P.; Zwaan, Bob van der

    2003-01-01

    This report assesses the economics of reprocessing versus direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The breakeven uranium price at which reprocessing spent nuclear fuel from existing light-water reactors (LWRs) and recycling the resulting plutonium and uranium in LWRs would become economic is assessed, using central estimates of the costs of different elements of the nuclear fuel cycle (and other fuel cycle input parameters), for a wide range of range of potential reprocessing prices. Sensitivity analysis is performed, showing that the conclusions reached are robust across a wide range of input parameters. The contribution of direct disposal or reprocessing and recycling to electricity cost is also assessed. The choice of particular central estimates and ranges for the input parameters of the fuel cycle model is justified through a review of the relevant literature. The impact of different fuel cycle approaches on the volume needed for geologic repositories is briefly discussed, as are the issues surrounding the possibility of performing separations and transmutation on spent nuclear fuel to reduce the need for additional repositories. A similar analysis is then performed of the breakeven uranium price at which deploying fast neutron breeder reactors would become competitive compared with a once-through fuel cycle in LWRs, for a range of possible differences in capital cost between LWRs and fast neutron reactors. Sensitivity analysis is again provided, as are an analysis of the contribution to electricity cost, and a justification of the choices of central estimates and ranges for the input parameters. The equations used in the economic model are derived and explained in an appendix. Another appendix assesses the quantities of uranium likely to be recoverable worldwide in the future at a range of different possible future prices

  6. Spent nuclear fuel reprocessing and international law. Germany's obligations under international law in matters of spent fuel reprocessing and the relevant contracts concluded with France and the United Kingdom

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heintschel v Heinegg, W.

    1999-01-01

    The review presented is an excerpt from an expert opinion written by the author in December last year, in response to changes in nuclear energy policy announced by the new German government. The reprocessing of spent nuclear fuels from German power reactors in the reprocessing facilities of France (La Hague) and the UK (Sellafield) is not only based on contracts concluded by the German electric utilities and the French COGEMA or the British BNFL, but has been agreed as well by an exchange of diplomatic notes between the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the German ambassador in Paris, the German Foreign Ministry and the French ambassador as well as the British ambassador in Bonn. The article therefore first examines from the angle of international law the legal obligations binding the states involved, and Germany in particular, in matters of spent fuel reprocessing contracts. The next question arising in this context and discussed by the article is that of whether and how much indemnification can be demanded by the reprocessing companies, or their governments, resp., if Germany should discontinue spent fuel reprocessing and thus might be made liable for breach of the bilateral agreements. (orig/CB) [de

  7. Simplified probabilistic risk assessment in fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Solbrig, C.W.

    1993-01-01

    An evaluation was made to determine if a backup mass tracking computer would significantly reduce the probability of criticality in the fuel reprocessing of the Integral Fast Reactor. Often tradeoff studies, such as this, must be made that would greatly benefit from a Probably Risk Assessment (PRA). The major benefits of a complete PRA can often be accrued with a Simplified Probabilistic Risk Assessment (SPRA). An SPRA was performed by selecting a representative fuel reprocessing operation (moving a piece of fuel) for analysis. It showed that the benefit of adding parallel computers was small compared to the benefit which could be obtained by adding parallelism to two computer input steps and two of the weighing operations. The probability of an incorrect material moves with the basic process is estimated to be 4 out of 100 moves. The actual values of the probability numbers are considered accurate to within an order of magnitude. The most useful result of developing the fault trees accrue from the ability to determine where significant improvements in the process can be made. By including the above mentioned parallelism, the error move rate can be reduced to 1 out of 1000

  8. Fuel reprocessing: Citizens' questions and experts' answers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-10-01

    In connection with the intention of DWK to erect a fuel reprocessing plant in the Oberpfalz, citizens have asked a great number of questions which are of interest to the general public. They have been collected, grouped into subject categories and answered by experts. (orig./HSCH) [de

  9. Nuclear material safeguards surveillance and accountancy by isotope correlation techniques

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persiani, P.J.; Goleb, J.A.; Kroc, T.K.

    1981-11-01

    The purpose of this study is to investigate the applicability of isotope correlation techniques (ICT) to the Light Water Reactor (LWR) and the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR) fuel cycles for nuclear material accountancy and safeguards surveillance. The isotopic measurement of the inventory input to the reprocessing phase of the fuel cycle is the primary direct determination that an anomaly may exist in the fuel management of nuclear material. The nuclear materials accountancy gap which exists between the fabrication plant output and the input to the reprocessing plant can be minimized by using ICT at the dissolver stage of the reprocessing plant. The ICT allows a level of verification of the fabricator's fuel content specifications, the irradiation history, the fuel and blanket assemblies management and scheduling within the reactor, and the subsequent spent fuel assembly flows to the reprocessing plant. The investigation indicates that there exist relationships between isotopic concentration which have predictable, functional behavior over a range of burnup. Several cross-correlations serve to establish the initial core assembly-averaged composition. The selection of the more effective functionals will depend not only on the level of reliability of ICT for verification, but also on the capability, accuracy and difficulty of developing measurement methods. The propagation of measurement errors on the correlation functions and respective sensitivities to isotopic compositional changes have been examined and found to be consistent with current measurement methods

  10. Remote maintenance in TOR fast reactor fuel reprocessing facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eymery, R.; Constant, M.; Malterre, G.

    1986-11-01

    The TOR facility which is undergoing commissioning tests has a capacity of 5 T. HM/year which is enough for reprocessing all the Phenix fuel, with an excess capacity which is to be used for other fast reactors fuels. It is the result of enlargement and renovation of the old Marcoule pilot facility. A good load factor is expected through the use of equipment with increased reliability and easy maintenance. TOR will also be used to test new equipment developed for the large breeder fuel reprocessing plant presently in the design stage. The latter objective is specifically important for the parts of the plant involving mechanical equipment which are located in a new building: TOR 1. High reliability and flexibility will be obtained in this building thanks to the attention given to the integrated remote handling system [fr

  11. Status of reprocessing technology in the HTGR fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kaiser, G.; Merz, E.; Zimmer, E.

    1977-01-01

    For more than ten years extensive R and D work has been carried out in the Federal Republic of Germany in order to develop the technology necessary for closing the fuel cycle of high-temperature gas-cooled reactors. The efforts are concentrated primarily on fuel elements having either highly enriched 235 U or recycled 233 U as the fissile and thorium as the fertile material embedded in a graphite matrix. They include the development of processes and equipment for reprocessing and remote preparation of coated microspheres from the recovered uranium. The paper reviews the issues and problems associated with the requirements to deal with high burn-up fuel from HTGR's of different design and composition. It is anticipated that a grind-burn-leach head-end treatment and a modified THOREX-type chemical processing are the optimum choice for the flowsheet. An overview of the present status achieved in construction of a small reprocessing facility, called JUPITER, is presented. It includes a discussion of problems which have already been solved and which have still to be solved like the treatment of feed/breed particle systems and for minimizing environmental impacts envisaged with a HTGR fuel cycle technology. Also discussed is the present status of remote fuel kernel fabrication and coating technology. Additional activities include the design of a mock-up prototype burning head-end facility, called VENUS, with a throughput equivalent to about 6000 MW installed electrical power, as well as a preliminary study for the utilisation of the Karlsruhe LWR prototype reprocessing plant (WAK) to handle HTGR fuel after remodelling of the installations. The paper concludes with an outlook of projects for the future

  12. Safeguards System for the Advanced Spent Fuel Conditioning Process Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Ho-dong; Lee, T.H.; Yoon, J.S.; Park, S.W; Lee, S.Y.; Li, T.K.; Menlove, H.; Miller, M.C.; Tolba, A.; Zarucki, R.; Shawky, S.; Kamya, S.

    2007-01-01

    The advanced spent fuel conditioning process (ACP) which is a part of a pyro-processing has been under development at Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) since 1997 to tackle the problem of an accumulation of spent fuel. The concept is to convert spent oxide fuel into a metallic form in a high temperature molten salt in order to reduce the heat energy, volume, and radioactivity of a spent fuel. Since the inactive tests of the ACP have been successfully implemented to confirm the validity of the electrolytic reduction technology, a lab-scale hot test will be undertaken in a couple of years to validate the concept. For this purpose, the KAERI has built the ACP Facility (ACPF) at the basement of the Irradiated Material Examination Facility (IMEF) of KAERI, which already has a reserved hot-cell area. Through the bilateral arrangement between US Department of Energy (DOE) and Korean Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) for safeguards R and D, the KAERI has developed elements of safeguards system for the ACPF in cooperation with the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The reference safeguards design conditions and equipment were established for the ACPF. The ACPF safeguards system has many unique design specifications because of the particular characteristics of the pyro-process materials and the restrictions during a facility operation. For the material accounting system, a set of remote operation and maintenance concepts has been introduced for a non-destructive assay (NDA) system. The IAEA has proposed a safeguards approach to the ACPF for the different operational phases. Safeguards measures at the ACPF will be implemented during all operational phases which include a 'Cold Test', a 'Hot Test' and at the end of a 'Hot test'. Optimization of the IAEA's inspection efforts was addressed by designing an effective safeguards approach that relies on, inter alia, remote monitoring using cameras, installed NDA instrumentation, gate monitors and seals

  13. Reprocessing techniques of LWR spent fuel for reutilization in hybrid systems and IV generation reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Aruquipa, Wilmer; Velasquez, Carlos E.; Pereira, Claubia; Veloso, Maria Auxiliadora F.; Costa, Antonella L. [Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG), Belo Horizonte, MG (Brazil). Departamento de Engenharia Nuclear; Barros, Graiciany de P. [Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear (CNEN), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil)

    2017-07-01

    Since the era of nuclear technology begins, nuclear reactors have been produced spent fuel. This spent fuel contains material that could be recycle and reprocessed by different processes. All these processes aim to reduce the contribution to the final repository through the re-utilization of the nuclear material. Therefore, some new reprocessing options with non-proliferation characteristics have been proposed and the goal is to compare the different techniques used to maximize the effectiveness of the spent fuel utilization and to reduce the volume and long-term radiotoxicity of high-level waste by irradiation with neutron with high energy such as the ones created in hybrid reactors. In order to compare different recovery methods, the cross sections of fuels are calculated with de MCNP code, the first set consists of thorium-232 spiked with the reprocessed material and the second set in depleted uranium that containing 4.5% of U-235 spiked with the reprocessed material; These sets in turn are compared with the cross section of the UO{sub 2} in order to evaluate the efficiency of the reprocessed fuel as nuclear fuel. (author)

  14. Spent fuel management in France: Reprocessing, conditioning, recycling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Giraud, J.P.; Montalembert, J.A. de

    1994-01-01

    The French energy policy has been based for 20 years on the development of nuclear power. The some 75% share of nuclear in the total electricity generation, representing an annual production of 317 TWh requires full fuel cycle control from the head-end to the waste management. This paper presents the RCR concept (Reprocessing, Conditioning, Recycling) with its industrial implementation. The long lasting experience acquired in reprocessing and MOX fuel fabrication leads to a comprehensive industrial organization with minimized impact on the environment and waste generation. Each 900 MWe PWR loaded with MOX fuel avoids piling up 2,500 m 3 per year of mine tailings. By the year 2000, less than 500 m 3 of high-level and long-lived waste will be annually produced at La Hague for the French program. The fuel cycle facilities and the associated MOX loading programs are ramping-up according to schedule. Thus, the RCR concept is a reality as well as a policy adopted in several countries. Last but not least, RCR represents a strong commitment to non-proliferation as it is the way to fully control and master the plutonium inventory

  15. Roles of programmable logic controllers in fuel reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mishra, Hrishikesh; Balakrishnan, V.P.; Pandya, G.J.

    1999-01-01

    Fuel charging facility is another application of Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) in fuel reprocessing plants, that involves automatic operation of fuel cask dolly, charging motor, pneumatic doors, clutches, clamps, stepper motors and rod pushers in a pre-determined sequence. Block diagram of ACF system is given for underlining the scope of control and interlocks requirements involved for automation of the fuel charging system has been provided for the purpose at KARP Plant, Kalpakkam

  16. Reprocessing of irradiated fuel: pros and cons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lebedev, O.G.; Novikov, V.M.

    1991-01-01

    The acceptable-safety nuclear reactors (APWR, LMFBR, MSBR, MSCR) can be provided by the enrichment industry and by plutonium reserves. But steady accumulation of spent fuel will inevitably make to return to the problems of fuel recycle. PUREX-processing increases a danger of radionuclides spreading due to the presence of large buffer tanks. Using of compact fluoride - volatility process will sharply reduce a nuclide leakage likewise permit to reprocess a fuel with a burnup as high as possible. Success of a powerful robots development give an opportunity to design a fluoride-volatility plant twice cheaper than PUREX. (author)

  17. A comprehensive fuel nuclide analysis at the reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Arenz, H.J.; Koch, L.

    1983-01-01

    The composition of spent fuel can be determined by various methods. They rely partially on different information. Therefore the synopsis of the results of all methods permits a detection of systematic errors and their explanation. Methods for determining the masses of fuel nuclides at the reprocessing input point range from pure calculations (shipper data) to mere experimental determinations (volumetric analysis). In between, a mix of ''fresh'' experimental results and ''historical'' data is used to establish a material balance. Deviations in the results obtained by the individual methods can be attributed to the information source, which is unique for the method in question. The methodology of the approach consists of three steps: by paired comparison of the operator analysis (usually volumetric or gravimetric) with remeasurements the error components are determined on a batch-by-batch basis. Using the isotope correlation technique the operator data as well as the remeasurements are checked on an inter-batch basis for outliers, precision and bias. Systematic errors can be uncovered by inter-lab comparison of remeasurements and confirmed by using historical information. Experience collected during the reprocessing of LWR fuel at two reprocessing plants prove the flexibility and effectiveness of this approach. An example is presented to demonstrate its capability in detecting outliers and determining systematic errors. (author)

  18. Reprocessing in the thorium fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Merz, E.

    1984-01-01

    An overview of the authors personal view is presented on open questions in regard to still required research and development work for the thorium fuel cycle before its application in a technical-industrial scale may be tackled. For a better understanding, all stations of the back-end of the thorium fuel cycle are briefly illustrated and their special features discussed. They include storage and transportation measures, all steps of reprocessing, as well as the entire radioactive waste treatment. Knowledge gaps are, as far as they are obvious, identified and proposals put forward for additional worthwile investigations. (orig.) [de

  19. Tokai Advanced Safeguards Technology Exercise (TASTEX). An experience in international co-operation on safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fukuda, G.; Koizumi, T.; Higuchi, K.

    1983-01-01

    TASTEX stands for Tokai Advanced Safeguards Technology Exercise, and was the joint programme of Japan, the United States of America, France and the International Atomic Energy Agency for developing, testing and evaluating advanced safeguards technology to be used in reprocessing facilities. The TASTEX programme, which started early in 1978 and successfully ended in May 1981, consisted of thirteen safeguards-technology-related tasks, from Task A to M. They were classified into four groups from the viewpoints of their usefulness and effectiveness: (1) Tasks technically feasible for international safeguards application in the near future: Tasks E, G, H and part of Task A (underwater CCTV and monitoring cameras); (2) Tasks which can be used in the future if research and development are continued: Tasks F, I, J, C and the other part of Task A (exclusive of the themes shown in (1)); (3) Tasks which may be used in future at the Tokai Reprocessing Facility if research and development are continued: Tasks K and L; and (4) Tasks which are difficult to be used at the Tokai Reprocessing Facility: Tasks B, D and M. The tasks classified under Group (1) are being developed further as part of the JASPAS (Japan Support Programme for Agency's Safeguards) project. (author)

  20. Nuclear fuel re-processing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sasaki, Yuko; Honda, Takashi; Shoji, Saburo; Kobayashi, Shiro; Furuya, Yasumasa

    1989-01-01

    In a nuclear fuel re-processing plant, high Si series stainless steels not always have sufficient corrosion resistance in a solution containing only nitric acid at medium or high concentration. Further, a method of blowing NOx gases may possibly promote the corrosion of equipment constituent materials remarkably. In view of the above, the corrosion promoting effect of nuclear fission products is suppressed without depositing corrosive metal ions as metals in the nitric acid solution. That is, a reducing atmosphere is formed by generating NOx by electrolytic reduction thereby preventing increase in the surface potential of stainless steels. Further, an anode is disposed in the nitric acid solution containing oxidative metal ions to establish an electrical conduction and separate them by way of partition membranes and a constant potential or constant current is applied while maintaining an ionic state so as not to deposit metals. Thus, equipments of re-processing facility can be protected from corrosion with no particular treatment for wastes as radioactive materials. (K.M.)

  1. Surveillance instrumentation for spent-fuel safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McKenzie, J.M.; Holmes, J.P.; Gillman, L.K.; Schmitz, J.A.; McDaniel, P.J.

    1978-01-01

    The movement, in a facility, of spent reactor fuel may be tracked using simple instrumentation together with a real time unfolding algorithm. Experimental measurements, from multiple radiation monitors and crane weight and position monitors, were obtained during spent fuel movements at the G.E. Morris Spent-Fuel Storage Facility. These data and a preliminary version of an unfolding algorithm were used to estimate the position of the centroid and the magnitude of the spent fuel radiation source. Spatial location was estimated to +-1.5 m and source magnitude to +-10% of their true values. Application of this surveillance instrumentation to spent-fuel safeguards is discussed

  2. Nuclear safety in fuel-reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hennies, H.H.; Koerting, K.

    1976-01-01

    The danger potential of nuclear power and fuel reprocessing plants in normal operation is compared. It becomes obvious that there are no basic differences. The analysis of possible accidents - blow-up of an evaporator for highly active wastes, zircaloy burning, cooling failure in self-heating process solutions, burning of a charged solvent, criticality accidents - shows that they are kept under control by the plant layout. (HP) [de

  3. Spent fuel handling and storage facility for an LWR fuel reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baker, W.H.; King, F.D.

    1979-01-01

    The facility will have the capability to handle spent fuel assemblies containing 10 MTHM/day, with 30% if the fuel received in legal weight truck (LWT) casks and the remaining fuel received in rail casks. The storage capacity will be about 30% of the annual throughput of the reprocessing plant. This size will provide space for a working inventory of about 50 days plant throughput and empty storage space to receive any fuel that might be in transit of the reprocessing plant should have an outage. Spent LWR fuel assemblies outside the confines of the shipping cask will be handled and stored underwater. To permit drainage, each water pool will be designed so that it can be isolated from the remaining pools. Pool water quality will be controlled by a filter-deionizer system. Radioactivity in the water will be maintained at less than or equal to 2 x 10 -4 Ci/m 3 ; conductivity will be maintained at 1 to 2 μmho/cm. The temperature of the pool water will be maintained at less than or equal to 40 0 C to retard algae growth and reduce evaporation. Decay heat will be transferred to the environment via a heat exchanger-cooling tower system

  4. Reprocessing of nuclear fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hatfield, G.W.

    1960-11-01

    One of the persistent ideas concerning nuclear power is that the fuel costs are negligible. This, of course, is incorrect and, in fact, one of the major problems in the development of economic nuclear power is to get the cost of the fuel cycles down to an acceptable level. The irradiated fuel removed from the nuclear power reactors must be returned as fresh fuel into the system. Aside from the problems of handling and shipping involved in the reprocessing cycles, the two major steps are the chemical separation and the refabrication. The chemical separation covers the processing of the spent fuel to separate and recover the unburned fuel as well as the new fuel produced in the reactor. This includes the decontamination of these materials from other radioactive fission products formed in the reactor. Refabrication involves the working and sheathing of recycled fuel into the shapes and forms required by reactor design and the economics of the fabrication problem determines to a large extent the quality of the material required from the chemical treatment. At present there appear to be enough separating facilities in the United States and the United Kingdom to handle the recycling of fuel from power reactors for the next few years. However, we understand the costs of recycling fuel in these facilities will be high or low depend ing on whether or not the capital costs of the plant are included in the processing cost. Also, the present plants may not be well adapted to carry out the chemical processing of the very wide variety of power reactor fuel elements which are being considered and will continue to be considered over the years to come. (author)

  5. Nuclear safeguards policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1982-01-01

    Claims have been made that Australia's nuclear safeguards policy, announced in 1977, has changed. However, examination of the texts of nuclear safeguards agreements negotiated by Australia shows that the policy has been implemented and adhered to. The purpose of these agreements is to obtain assurance that uranium exported is used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The questions of reprocessing, transfer to third countries and the application of IAEA safeguards are discussed

  6. Policy in France regarding the back-end of the fuel cycle reprocessing/recycling route

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gloaguen, A.; Lenail, B.

    1991-01-01

    The decision taken in early 1970s to base the French power policy on the use of pressurized water reactors also included the strategy for the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle based on reprocessing, waste conditioning for the final disposal in the most suitable form in terms of safety and plutonium recycling to fast breeder reactors. Twenty years have elapsed, and substantial development and investment have been made. New evidences have emerged especially regarding breeder development, and the initial choice has been proved to be sound. EDF and COGEMA, the French utility and fuel cycle companies, respectively, are working together in order to take the best advantage of past efforts. The good behavior of MOX fuel in EDF reactors and the excellent start of the UP3 reprocessing plant of La Hague, which was completed and commissioned in August, 1990, made EDF and COGEMA extremely confident for future decision. The French choice made in favor of fuel reprocessing the history of fuel reprocessing in France, the policy concerning the back end of nuclear fuel cycle of EDF, and the present consideration and circumstances on this matter are reported. (K.I.)

  7. The transport of irradiated fuel. An activity closely related to reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lenail, B.; Curtis, H.W.

    1987-01-01

    With a proven reprocessing capacity of 400 tonnes of uranium per year and the rapid expansion of this capacity, the need to feed the reprocessing plants at La Hague has become vital to ensure continuous and economic reprocessing. The programming of transports by the reprocessor and transporter to ensure a constant supply of fuel for reprocessing has therefore become increasingly important. These transports use the public roads and the railway system and the reprocessor and transporter must cooperate in maintaining the highest possible standards of safety. Safety must take priority over all other factors, including the economics of the operation

  8. Zone approaches to international safeguards of a nuclear fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.

    1986-01-01

    At present the IAEA designs its safeguards approach with regard to each type of nuclear facility so that the safeguards activities and effort are essentially the same for a given type and size of nuclear facility wherever it may be located. Conclusions regarding a state are derived by combining the results of safeguards verifications for the individual facilities within it. We have examined safeguards approaches for a state nuclear fuel cycle that take into account the existence of all of the nuclear facilities in the state. We have focussed on the fresh-fuel zone of an advanced nuclear fuel cycle, the several facilities of which use or process low-enriched uranium. At one extreme, flows and inventories would be verified at each material balance area. At the other extreme, the flows into and out of the zone and the inventory of the whole zone would be verified. The intention is to develop an approach which will make it possible to compare the technical effectiveness and the inspection effort for the facility-oriented approach, for the zone approach and for some reasonable intermediate safeguards approaches. Technical effectiveness, in these cases, means an estimate of the assurance that all nuclear material has been accounted for

  9. Development of some operations in technological flowsheet for spent VVER fuel reprocessing at a pilot plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lazarev, L.N.; Galkin, B.Ya; Lyubtsev, R.I.; Romanovskii, V.N.; Velikhov, E.P.

    1981-01-01

    The fuel reprocessing pilot plants for high active materials would permit the study and development or particular processing steps and flowsheet variations; in some cases, these experimental installations realize on a small scale practically all technological chains of large reprocessing plants. Such a fuel reprocessing pilot plant with capacity of 3 kg U/d has been built at V. G. Khlopin Radium Institute. The pilot plant is installed in the hot cell of radiochemical compartment, and is composed of the equipments for fuel element cutting and dissolving, the preparation of feed solution (clarification, correction), extraction reprocessing and the production of uranium, plutonium and neptunium concentrates, the complex processing of liquid and solid wastes and a special unit for gas purification and analysis. In the last few years, a series of experiments have been carried out on the reprocessing of spent VVER fuel. (J.P.N.)

  10. Krypton-85 health risk assessment for a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mellinger, P.J.; Brackenbush, L.W.; Tanner, J.E.; Gilbert, E.S.

    1984-08-01

    The risks involved in the routine release of 85 Kr from nuclear fuel reprocessing operations to the environment were compared to those resulting from the capture and storage of 85 Kr. Instead of releasing the 85 Kr to the environment when fuel is reprocessed, it can be captured, immobilized and stored. Two alternative methods of capturing 85 Kr (cryogenic distillation and fluorocarbon absorption) and one method of immobilizing the captured gas (ion implantation/sputtering) were theoretically incorporated into a representative fuel reprocessing plant, the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant, even though there are no known plans to start up this facility. Given the uncertainties in the models used to generate lifetime risk numbers (0.02 to 0.027 radiation induced fatal cancers expected in the occupational workforce and 0.017 fatal cancers in the general population), the differences in total risks for the three situations, (i.e., no-capture and two-capture alternatives) cannot be considered meaningful. It is possible that no risks would occur from any of the three situations. There is certainly no reason to conclude that risks from 85 Kr routinely released to the environment are greater than those that would result from the other two situations considered. Present regulations mandate recovery and disposal of 85 Kr from the off gases of a facility reprocessing spent fuel from commercial sources. Because of the lack of a clear-cut indication that recovery woud be beneficial, it does not seem prudent to burden the facilities with a requirement for 85 Kr recovery, at least until operating experience demonstrates the incentive. The probable high aging of the early fuel to be processed and the higher dose resulting from the release of the unregulated 3 H and 14 C also encourage delaying implementation of the 85 Kr recovery in the early plants

  11. Authentication of reprocessing plant safeguards data through correlation analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Burr, T.L.; Wangen, L.E.; Mullen, M.F.

    1995-04-01

    This report investigates the feasibility and benefits of two new approaches to the analysis of safeguards data from reprocessing plants. Both approaches involve some level of plant modeling. All models involve some form of mass balance, either applied in the usual way that leads to material balances for individual process vessels at discrete times or applied by accounting for pipe flow rates that leads to material balances for individual process vessels at continuous times. In the first case, material balances are computed after each tank-to-tank transfer. In the second case, material balances can be computed at any desired time. The two approaches can be described as follows. The first approach considers the application of a new multivariate sequential test. The test statistic is a scalar, but the monitored residual is a vector. The second approach considers the application of recent nonlinear time series methods for the purpose of empirically building a model for the expected magnitude of a material balance or other scalar variable. Although the report restricts attention to monitoring scalar time series, the methodology can be extended to vector time series

  12. Radioactive waste management in a fuel reprocessing facility in fiscal 1982

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-01-01

    In the fuel reprocessing facility of the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation, radioactive gaseous and liquid waste are released not exceeding the respective permissible levels. Radioactive concentrated solutions are stored at the site. Radioactive solid waste are stored appropriately at the site. In fiscal 1982, the released quantities of radioactive gaseous and liquid waste were both below the permissible levels. The results of radioactive waste management in the fuel reprocessing facility in fiscal 1982 are given in the tables: the released quantities of radioactive gaseous and liquid waste, the produced quantities of radioactive solid waste, and the stored quantities of radioactive concentrated solutions and of radioactive solid waste as of the end of fiscal 1982. (Mori, K.)

  13. Evaluation of methods for seismic analysis of nuclear fuel reprocessing plants, part 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tokarz, F.J.; Murray, R.C.; Arthur, D.F.; Feng, W.W.; Wight, L.H.; Zaslawsky, M.

    1975-01-01

    Currently, no guidelines exist for choosing methods of structural analysis to evaluate the seismic hazard of nuclear fuel reprocessing plants. This study examines available methods and their applicability to fuel reprocessing plant structures. The results of this study should provide a basis for establishing guidelines recommending methods of seismic analysis for evaluating future fuel reprocessing plants. The approach taken is: (1) to identify critical plant structures and place them in four categories (structures at or near grade; deeply embedded structures; fully buried structures; equipment/vessels/attachments/piping), (2) to select a representative structure in each of the first three categories and perform static and dynamic analysis on each, and (3) to evaluate and recommend method(s) of analysis for structures within each category. The Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant is selected as representative of future commercial reprocessing plants. The effect of site characteristics on the structural response is also examined. The response spectra method of analysis combined with the finite element model for each category is recommended. For structures founded near or at grade, the lumped mass model could also be used. If a time history response is required, a time-history analysis is necessary. (U.S.)

  14. Japan-IAEA Workshops on Advanced Safeguards for Future Nuclear Fuel Cycles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hoffheins, B.; Hori, M.; Suzuki, M.; Kuno, Y.; Kimura, N.; Naito, K.; Hosoya, M.; Khlebnikov, N.; Whichello, J.; Zendel, M.

    2010-01-01

    Beginning in 2007, the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Department of Safeguards initiated a workshop series focused on advanced safeguards technologies for the future nuclear fuel cycle (NFC). The goals for these workshops were to address safeguards challenges, to share implementation experiences, to discuss fuel cycle plans and promising research and development, and to address other issues associated with safeguarding new fuel cycle facilities. Concurrently, the workshops also served to promote dialog and problem solving, and to foster closer collaborations for facility design and planning. These workshops have sought participation from IAEA Member States' support programmes (MSSP), the nuclear industry, R and D organizations, state systems of accounting and control (SSAC), regulators and inspectorates to ensure that all possible stakeholder views can be shared in an open process. Workshop presentations have covered, inter alia, national fuel cycle programs and plans, research progress in proliferation resistance (PR) and safeguardability, approaches for nuclear measurement accountancy of large material throughputs and difficult to access material, new and novel radiation detectors with increased sensitivity and automation, and lessons learned from recent development and operation of safeguards systems for complex facilities and the experiences of integrated safeguards (IS) in Japan. Although the title of the workshops presumes an emphasis on technology, participants recognized that early planning and organization, coupled with close cooperation among stakeholders, that is, through the application of 'Safeguards by Design' (SBD) processes that include nuclear safety and security coordination, 'Remote Inspections' and 'Joint-Use of Equipment (JUE)' would be required to enable more successful implementations of safeguards at future NFC facilities. The needs to cultivate the future workforce, effectively preserve

  15. 2. JAPAN-IAEA workshop on advanced safeguards technology for the future nuclear fuel cycle. Abstracts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    This international workshop addressed issues and technologies associated with safeguarding the future nuclear fuel cycle. The workshop discussed issues of interest to the safeguards community, facility operators and State Systems of accounting and control of nuclear materials. Topic areas covered were as follows: Current Status and Future Prospects of Developing Safeguards Technologies for Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities, Technology and Instrumentation Needs, Advanced Safeguards Technologies, Guidelines on Developing Instrumentation to Lead the Way for Implementing Future Safeguards, and Experiences and Lessons learned. This workshop was of interest to individuals and organizations concerned with future nuclear fuel cycle technical developments and safeguards technologies. This includes representatives from the nuclear industry, R and D organizations, safeguards inspectorates, State systems of accountancy and control, and Member States Support Programmes

  16. A review of reprocessing, partitioning, and transmutation of spent nuclear fuel and the implications for Canada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jackson, D.P.

    2006-01-01

    The current status of the reprocessing, partitioning, and transmutation of used nuclear fuel are reviewed in the context of assessing the possible application of these technologies to used CANDU fuel. The status of commercial reprocessing is briefly surveyed and recent progress in world R and D programs on the transmutation of FP's and actinides using Accelerator Driven Systems is summarized. The implications of reprocessing for Canada are explored from the point of view of a long strategy for managing used CANDU fuel in terms of the costs of initiating reprocessing domestically at some time in the future including public and occupational radiation doses, and the wastes generated. (author)

  17. Safety aspects of solvent nitration in HTGR fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilbourn, R.G.

    1977-06-01

    Reprocessing of HTGR fuels requires evaporative concentration of uranium and thorium nitrate solutions. The results of a bench-scale test program conducted to assess the safety aspects of planned concentrator operations are reported

  18. International arrangements for nuclear-fuel-cycle facilities: the politics of the problem

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Epstein, W.

    1977-01-01

    Thirty years after the Three-Power Declaration on November 5, 1945, promising effective safeguards on the information exchange on atomic energy, many nations are selling and transferring nuclear materials, equipment, and technology without these ''effective enforceable safeguards.'' Even though there is no actual commercial need to reprocess spent fuel into Pu, France and West Germany are planning to sell reprocessing plants to non-NPT countries. The erosion of faith in and the weakening of the NPT are pointed out. The Canadian decision not to resume nuclear aid to India is commended. The question of how effective and enforceable the international (IAEA/NPT) safeguards are, is addressed. The weaknesses of the London Suppliers' Club position on safeguards are pointed out. Multinational fuel cycle centers would not much help to contain the risks of nuclear proliferation. Additional measures needed for really effective safeguards are listed. The unilateral embargo of nuclear exports by U.S. is proposed. Political measures to discourage nations from acquiring nuclear weapons are also listed. Only a combination of political, psychological, and technical measures can produce an effective nonproliferation regime

  19. Can a safeguards accountancy system really detect an unauthorized removal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ehinger, M.H.; Ellis, J.H.

    1981-11-01

    Theoretical investigations and system studies indicate safeguards material balance data from reprocessing plants can be used to detect unauthorized removals. Plant systems have been modeled and simulated data used to demonstrate the techniques. But how sensitive are the techniques when used with actual plant data. What is the effect of safeguards applications on plant operability. Can safeguards be acceptable to plant operators, and are there any benefits to be derived. The Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP) has been devoted to answering these and other questions over the past several years. A computerized system of near-real-time accounting and in-process inventory has been implemented and demonstrated during actual plant test runs. Measured inventories and hourly material balance closures have been made to assess safeguards in an operating plant application. The tests have culminated in actual removals of material from the operating plant to investigate the response and measure the sensitivity of the safeguards and data evaluation system

  20. Interim dry fuel storage for magnox reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bradley, N [National Nuclear Corporation, Risley, Warrington (United Kingdom); Ealing, C [GEC Energy Systems Ltd, Whetstone, Leicester (United Kingdom)

    1985-07-01

    In the UK the practice of short term buffer storage in water ponds prior to chemical reprocessing had already been established on the early gas cooled reactors in Calder Hall. Thus the choice of water pond buffer storage for MGR power plants logically followed the national policy decision to reprocess. The majority of the buffer storage period would take place at the reprocessing plant with only a nominal of 100 days targeted at the station. Since Magnox clad fuel is not suitable for long term pond storage, alternative methods of storage on future stations was considered desirable. In addition to safeguards considerations the economic aspects of the fuel cycle has influenced the conclusion that today the purchase of a MGR power plant with dry spent fuel storage and without commitment to reprocess would be a rational decision for a country initiating a nuclear programme. Dry storage requirements are discussed and two designs of dry storage facilities presented together with a fuel preparation facility.

  1. Interim dry fuel storage for magnox reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bradley, N.; Ealing, C.

    1985-01-01

    In the UK the practice of short term buffer storage in water ponds prior to chemical reprocessing had already been established on the early gas cooled reactors in Calder Hall. Thus the choice of water pond buffer storage for MGR power plants logically followed the national policy decision to reprocess. The majority of the buffer storage period would take place at the reprocessing plant with only a nominal of 100 days targeted at the station. Since Magnox clad fuel is not suitable for long term pond storage, alternative methods of storage on future stations was considered desirable. In addition to safeguards considerations the economic aspects of the fuel cycle has influenced the conclusion that today the purchase of a MGR power plant with dry spent fuel storage and without commitment to reprocess would be a rational decision for a country initiating a nuclear programme. Dry storage requirements are discussed and two designs of dry storage facilities presented together with a fuel preparation facility

  2. Separations and safeguards model integration.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cipiti, Benjamin B.; Zinaman, Owen

    2010-09-01

    Research and development of advanced reprocessing plant designs can greatly benefit from the development of a reprocessing plant model capable of transient solvent extraction chemistry. This type of model can be used to optimize the operations of a plant as well as the designs for safeguards, security, and safety. Previous work has integrated a transient solvent extraction simulation module, based on the Solvent Extraction Process Having Interaction Solutes (SEPHIS) code developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, with the Separations and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM) developed at Sandia National Laboratory, as a first step toward creating a more versatile design and evaluation tool. The goal of this work was to strengthen the integration by linking more variables between the two codes. The results from this integrated model show expected operational performance through plant transients. Additionally, ORIGEN source term files were integrated into the SSPM to provide concentrations, radioactivity, neutron emission rate, and thermal power data for various spent fuels. This data was used to generate measurement blocks that can determine the radioactivity, neutron emission rate, or thermal power of any stream or vessel in the plant model. This work examined how the code could be expanded to integrate other separation steps and benchmark the results to other data. Recommendations for future work will be presented.

  3. On permission of reprocessing project change at the Reprocessing Works of the Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. (Reply)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    The Nuclear Safety Commission replied as follows to the Prime Minister on July 14, 1997 on permission of reprocessing project change at the Reprocessing Works of the Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. inquired on Dec. 26, 1996. Contents of the inquiry consisted of change of refinery facility and its related instruments, integration of low level wasted liquid treating instrument and change of low level solid waste treating instrument, integration of high level wasted liquid storing building and high level wasted liquid glassification building, installation of used fuel transporting container maintenance instrument and its relating instruments, and so forth. As a result of careful discussion at the Commission for these items, they were admitted to be valid on her technical ability and her safety. (G.K.)

  4. A survey of methods to immobilize tritium and carbon-14 arising from a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Taylor, P.

    1991-02-01

    This report reviews the literature on methods to separate and immobilize tritium ( 3 H) and carbon-14 ( 14 C) released from U0 2 fuel in a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant. It was prepared as part of a broader review of fuel reprocessing waste management methods that might find future application in Canada. The calculated inventories of both 3 H and 14 C in used fuel are low; special measures to limit releases of these radionuclides from reprocessing plants are not currently in place, and may not be necessary in future. If required, however, several possible approaches to the concentration and immobilization of both radionuclides are available for development. Technology to control these radionuclides in reactor process streams is in general more highly developed than for reprocessing plant effluent, and some control methods may be adaptable to reprocessing applications

  5. Role of the consolidated fuel reprocessing program in the United States Breeder Reactor Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ballard, W.W.; Burch, W.D.

    1980-01-01

    While present US policy precludes the commercial reprocessing of LWR fuels and the recycle of plutonium, the policy does encompass the need to continue a program to develop the technology for reprocessing breeder fuels. Some questions have again risen this year as to the pace of the entire breeder program, including recycle, and the answers are evolving. This paper and the other companion papers which describe several aspects of the Consolidated Fuel Reprocessing Program take a longer-range perspective on the total program. Whether the program is implemented in the general time frame described is dependent on future government actions dedicated to carrying out a systematic program that would permit breeders to be commercialized early in the next century

  6. Ministerial ordinance on the establishment of a reserve fund for spent nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-01-01

    The ministerial ordinance provides for a reserve fund for spent nuclear fuel reprocessing, according to the Electricity Enterprises Act. The Government designates an electricity enterprise that must deposit a reserve fund for spent nuclear fuel reprocessing. The electricity enterprise concerned must deposit a certain sum of money as a reserve fund which is the payment left over from spent fuel reprocessing at the end of a fiscal year minus the same at the end of the preceding year less a certain sum, when the former exceeds the latter. Then, concerning the remainder of the reserve fund in the preceding year, a certain sum must be subtracted from this reserve fund. (Mori, K.)

  7. Why reprocess

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Greenwood, T.

    1977-01-01

    Prospective costs of reprocessing, waste management, and mixed oxide fuel fabrication have risen so much that the costs of U/P recycle and of spent fuel storage are nearly equal. This paper reviews the current state of the reprocessing industry, with a list of facilities all over the world, and examines the incentives and disincentives other than short-term economics that will affect the decision of states to acquire their own reprocessing facilities. Finally, it examines the possibility of avoiding a widespread commercial reprocessing industry

  8. Extending Spent Fuel Storage until Transport for Reprocessing or Disposal

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Carlsen, Brett; Chiguer, Mustapha; Grahn, Per; Sampson, Michele; Wolff, Dietmar; Bevilaqua, Arturo; Wasinger, Karl; Saegusa, Toshiari; Seelev, Igor

    2016-09-01

    Spent fuel (SF) must be stored until an end point such as reprocessing or geologic disposal is imple-mented. Selection and implementation of an end point for SF depends upon future funding, legisla-tion, licensing and other factors that cannot be predicted with certainty. Past presumptions related to the availability of an end point have often been wrong and resulted in missed opportunities for properly informing spent fuel management policies and strategies. For example, dry cask storage systems were originally conceived to free up needed space in reactor spent fuel pools and also to provide SFS of up to 20 years until reprocessing and/or deep geological disposal became available. Hundreds of dry cask storage systems are now employed throughout the world and will be relied upon well beyond the originally envisioned design life. Given present and projected rates for the use of nuclear power coupled with projections for SF repro-cessing and disposal capacities, one concludes that SF storage will be prolonged, potentially for several decades. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission has recently considered 300 years of storage to be appropriate for the characterization and prediction of ageing effects and ageing management issues associated with extending SF storage and subsequent transport. This paper encourages addressing the uncertainty associated with the duration of SF storage by de-sign – rather than by default. It suggests ways that this uncertainty may be considered in design, li-censing, policy, and strategy decisions and proposes a framework for safely extending spent fuel storage until SF can be transported for reprocessing or disposal – regardless of how long that may be. The paper however is not intended to either encourage or facilitate needlessly extending spent fuel storage durations. Its intent is to ensure a design and safety basis with sufficient margin to accommodate the full range of potential future scenarios. Although the focus is primarily on

  9. Reprocessing of spent nuclear fuels. Status and trends

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hultgren, Aa.

    1993-01-01

    The report gives a short review of the status for industrial reprocessing and recycling of Uranium/Plutonium. The following countries are covered: Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, India, Japan, Russia, USA. Different fuel cycle strategies are accounted for, and new developments outlined. 116 refs, 27 figs, 12 tabs

  10. EDRP public local inquiry, UKAEA/BNFL precognition on: PFR fuel reprocessing and radioactive waste management at Dounreay

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pugh, O.

    1986-01-01

    A description of PFR fuel reprocessing at Dounreay is given, including brief details of fuel assembly transport, dismantling, chemical separation processes and reprocessing experience. The origin of radioactive wastes from PFR reprocessing, and the types of radioactive waste are outlined. The management of radioactive waste, including storage, treatment and disposal is described. (U.K.)

  11. Isotopic safeguards data bank (ISTLIB) and control program (MISTY)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Timmerman, C.L.

    1978-09-01

    As part of the U.S. program to provide technical assistance to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) has developed a computer code and data bank to aid in the safeguards verification of spent fuel content at the head end of a reprocessing facility. A description and user instructions that uses isotopic safeguards techniques are presented for MISTY, a computer program for analyzing an isotopic data base (ISTLIB). The input, operating procedures, and output from MISTY are explained in detail. An output listing of an example computer run is provided to illustrate the program's operation. The contents of the data bank are summarized, and show the isotopic data sets that are available

  12. Back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle. A comparison of the direct disposal and reprocessing options

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Allan, C.J.; Baumgartner, P.

    1997-01-01

    Based on the need to address public concerns, the need to ensure long-term safety and an ethical concern for future generations, many countries are developing technology to dispose of nuclear fuel waste. The waste substances in used fuel can be disposed of either by directly disposing of the used fuel assemblies themselves, or by disposing of the long-lived waste from fuel reprocessing. The basic thesis of this paper is that the direct disposal of either used fuel or of the long-lived heat-generating and non-heat generating waste that arise from reprocessing is technically and economically feasible and that both options will meet the fundamental objectives of protecting human health and the environment. Decisions about whether, or when, to reprocess used fuel, or about whether to dispose of used fuel directly, are not fundamentally waste management issues. (author)

  13. Fuel reprocessing at THORP: profitability and public liabilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Berkhout, F.

    1992-01-01

    Since the economics of British Nuclear Fuels Limited's (BNFL) Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) were analysed in an earlier report, a number of domestic and international developments have affected the prospects for THORP. The present report outlines these changes, and analyses their implications for the profits and public liabilities associated with the project. Timing is of some significance because once THORP becomes radioactive (planned to occur in March 1993) the bill for decommissioning the plant will rise from a trivial sum to a very large one - Pound 900 million (1992 prices) in BNFL's own estimates. The report begins with a brief outline of reprocessing and the THORP project. It then examines the market prospects for reprocessing beyond THORP's first ten years and revises BNFL's own projections. It then considers the potential profitability of THORP in relation to various possible cost increases and finally outlines the possible implications of different THORP scenarios for the public purse. (author)

  14. Advanced safeguards research and development plan with an emphasis on its impact on nuclear power-plant design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tobin, S.J.; Demuth, S.F.; Miller, M.C.; Swinhoe, M.T.; Thomas, K.E.

    2007-01-01

    One tool for reducing the concern of nuclear proliferation is enhanced safeguards. Present safeguards have evolved over the past 40 years, and future safeguards will grow from this strong base to implement new technologies for improving our ability to quantify nuclear material. This paper will give an overview of the advanced technology research and development plan for safeguarding. One of the research facilities planned by the Department of Energy is the Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility (AFCF), to develop a novel nuclear fuel recycling program. Since the Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility will receive and reprocess spent fuel and will fabricate fast-reactor fuel, a wide breadth of safeguards technologies is involved. A fundamental concept in safeguards is material control and accounting (MCA). 4 topics concerning MCA and requiring further research have been identified: 1) measuring spent fuel, 2) measuring the plutonium content in the electro-refiner with pyro-processing, 3) measuring plutonium in the presence of other actinides, and 4) measuring neptunium and americium in the presence of other actinides. As for the long-term research and development plan for the AFCF, it will include improving MCA techniques as well as introducing new techniques that are not related to MCA, for example, enhanced containment and surveillance, or enhanced process monitoring. The top priority will stay quantifying the plutonium as accurately as possible and to reach this purpose 4 relevant technologies have been identified: 1) the microcalorimeter, 2) the passive neutron-albedo reactivity, 3) list-mode data acquisition, and 4) a liquid-scintillator multiplicity counter. Incorporating safeguards into the initial design of AFCF (safeguards by design) is a central concept. As the technology research and development plan for the Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility is examined, particular attention will be given to safeguards technologies that may affect the physical design of nuclear power plants

  15. Comparison of the waste management aspects of spent fuel disposal and reprocessing: post-disposal radiological impact

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mobbs, S.F.; Harvey, M.P.; Martin, J.S.; Mayall, A.; Jones, M.E.

    1991-01-01

    A joint project involving contractors from France, Germany and the UK was set up by the Commission of the European Communities to assess the implications of two waste management options: the direct disposal of spent fuel and reprocessing of that fuel. This report describes the calculation of the radiological impact on the public of the management and disposal of the wastes associated with these two options. Six waste streams were considered: discharge of liquid reprocessing effluents, discharge of gaseous reprocessing effluents, disposal of low-level solid wastes arising from reprocessing, disposal of intermediate-level solid wastes arising from reprocessing, disposal of vitrified high-level reprocessing wastes, and direct disposal of spent fuel. The results of the calculations are in the form of maximum annual doses and risks to individual members of the public, and collective doses to four population groups, integrated over six time periods. These results were designed for input into a computer model developed by another contractor, Yard Ltd, which combines costs and impacts in a multi-attribute hierarchy to give an overall measure of the impact of a given option

  16. Implementation and operational experience of an integrated fuel information service at the BNFL THORP facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Robson, D.N.; Ramsden, P.N.

    1995-01-01

    BNFL's THORP Plant, which started active operations early in 1994, has contracts to reprocess 7000t(U) of fuel belonging to 33 customers in 9 countries in the UK, Europe and Japan during its first 10 years of operation. Contracts are in place or being negotiated, and further business sought after, with the expectation of extending THORP's operations well beyond the initial 10 years. An integrated data management service, for the fuel storage areas of BNFL's THORP Division, is being implemented to replace several, independent, systems. This Fuel Information Service (FIS) will bring the Nuclear Materials Accountancy and Safeguards Records together with the Operating Records into one database from which all Safeguards Reports will be made. BNFL's contractual and commercial data and technical data on the stored fuel, required to support the reprocessing business, will also be brought into the common database. FIS is the first stage in a project to integrate the Materials Management systems throughout the THORP nuclear recycling business including irradiated fuel receipt and storage, reprocessing and storage of products, mixed oxide fuel manufacture and the conditioning and storage of wastes

  17. Modeling and simulation in the design and evaluation of conceptual safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cobb, D.D.; Smith, D.B.

    1977-01-01

    Recent work in modeling nuclear fuel-cycle processes and the materials measurement and accountability portion of integrated safeguards systems is summarized. Process variability, especially in the levels of in-process holdup and in scrap and waste sidestreams, impacts significantly on the design of dynamic materials accounting and control systems. In the absence of operating data from modern facilities, detailed dynamic models of process operation are required in order to evaluate systems design concepts. Numerical data are presented from the simulated operation of major portions of spent fuel reprocessing, plutonium nitrate-to-oxide conversion, and mixed-oxide fuel-fabrication processes

  18. Nuclear safeguards technology 1986

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    This publication presents the results of the sixth in a series of international symposia on nuclear material safeguards. Development efforts related to safeguards for reprocessing plants constituted over twenty per cent of the programme. Other papers present results of over four years of field testing of near real time material accountancy at a plant in Japan, and results for a lesser period of time at a plant in Scotland. Papers reporting work on destructive and non-destructive measurement procedures or equipment constituted another thirty per cent of the programme, more if measurements in reprocessing and poster presentations are included. In honour of the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory, two sessions were devoted to a review of destructive analytical measurement procedures. Some subjects received only minor attention during the Symposium. The statistical theory of random sampling, safeguards for uranium enrichment plants, material accountancy systems and several other topics appear only incidentally in the programme, but primarily because there are few remaining problems, not because there is little remaining interest

  19. Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards: Safeguards-by-Design at Enrichment Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Long, Jon D.; McGinnis, Brent R.; Morgan, James B.; Whitaker, Michael; Lockwood, Dunbar; Shipwash, Jacqueline L.

    2011-01-01

    The Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards (NGS3) was hosted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) in Washington, D.C. on 14-15 December 2010; this meeting focused on the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) concept. There were approximately 100 participants from 13 countries, comprised of safeguards policy and technical experts from government and industry. Representatives also were present from the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), the European Atomic Energy Agency (Euratom), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The primary objective of this meeting was to exchange views and provide recommendations on implementation of the SBD concept for four specific nuclear fuel cycle facility types: gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs), GEN III and GEN IV reactors, aqueous reprocessing plants, and mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities. The general and facility-specific SBD documents generated from the four working groups, which were circulated for comment among working group participants, are intended to provide a substantive contribution to the IAEA's efforts to publish SBD guidance for these specific types of nuclear facilities in the near future. The IAEA has described the SBD concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' As part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the DOE is working to establish SBD as a global norm through DOE laboratory studies, international workshops, engagement with industry and the IAEA, and setting an example through its use in new nuclear facilities in the United States. This paper describes the discussion topics and final recommendations of the Enrichment Facilities Working

  20. Safeguards for final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. Methods and technologies for the Olkiluoto site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Okko, O.

    2003-05-01

    The final disposal of the nuclear material shall introduce new safeguards concerns which have not been addressed previously in IAEA safeguards approaches for spent fuel. The encapsulation plant to be built at the site will be the final opportunity for verification of spent fuel assemblies prior to their transfer to the geological repository. Moreover, additional safety and safeguards measures are considered for the underground repository. Integrated safeguards verification systems will also concentrate on environmental monitoring to observe unannounced activities related to possible diversion schemes at the repository site. The final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in geological formation will begin in Finland within 10 years. After the geological site investigations and according to legal decision made in 2001, the final repository of the spent nuclear fuel shall be located at the Olkiluoto site in Eurajoki. The next phase of site investigations contains the construction of an underground facility, called ONKALO, for rock characterisation purposes. The excavation of the ONKALO is scheduled to start in 2004. Later on, the ONKALO may form a part of the final repository. The plans to construct the underground facility for nuclear material signify that the first safeguards measures, e.g. baseline mapping of the site area, need to take prior to the excavation phase. In order to support the development and implementation of the regulatory control of the final disposal programme, STUK established an independent expert group, LOSKA. The group should support the STUK in the development of the technical safeguards requirements, in the implementation of the safeguards and in the evaluation of the plans of the facility operator. This publication includes four background reports produced by this group. The first of these 'NDA verification of spent fuel, monitoring of disposal canisters, interaction of the safeguards and safety issues in the final disposal' describes the new

  1. Reprocessed and combined thorium fuel cycles in a PER system with a micro heterogeneous approaches

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Monteiro, Fabiana B.A.; Castro, Victor F.; Faria, Rochkhudson B. de; Pereira, Claubia; Fortini, Angela

    2015-01-01

    A micro heterogeneous approaches were used to study the behavior of reprocessed fuel spiked with thorium in a PWR fuel element considering (TRU-Th) cycle. The goal is to achieve a higher burnup using three different configurations to model the fuel element using SCALE 6.0. The reprocessed fuels were obtained using the ORIGEN 2.1 code from a spent PWR standard fuel (33,000 MWd/tHM burned), with 3.1% of initial enrichment. The spent fuel remained in the cooling pool for five years and then reprocessed using the UREX+ technique. Three configurations of micro heterogeneous approaches were analyzed, and the k inf and plutonium evolution during the burnup were evaluated. The preliminary results show that the behavior of advanced fuel based on transuranic elements spiked with thorium, and micro heterogeneous approach are satisfactory in PWRs, and the configuration that use a combination of Th and TRU (configuration 1) seems to be the most promising once has higher values for k inf during the burnup, compared with other configurations. (author)

  2. Environmental survey of the reprocessing and waste management portions of the LWR fuel cycle: a task force report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bishop, W.P.; Miraglia, F.J. Jr. (eds.)

    1976-10-01

    This Supplement deals with the reprocessing and waste management portions of the nuclear fuel cycle for uranium-fueled reactors. The scope of the report is limited to the illumination of fuel reprocessing and waste management activities, and examination of the environmental impacts caused by these activities on a per-reactor basis. The approach is to select one realistic reprocessing and waste management system and to treat it in enough depth to illuminate the issues involved, the technology available, and the relationships of these to the nuclear fuel cycle in general and its environmental impacts.

  3. Environmental survey of the reprocessing and waste management portions of the LWR fuel cycle: a task force report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bishop, W.P.; Miraglia, F.J. Jr.

    1976-10-01

    This Supplement deals with the reprocessing and waste management portions of the nuclear fuel cycle for uranium-fueled reactors. The scope of the report is limited to the illumination of fuel reprocessing and waste management activities, and examination of the environmental impacts caused by these activities on a per-reactor basis. The approach is to select one realistic reprocessing and waste management system and to treat it in enough depth to illuminate the issues involved, the technology available, and the relationships of these to the nuclear fuel cycle in general and its environmental impacts

  4. Ventilating system for reprocessing of nuclear fuel rods

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Szulinski, M.J.

    1981-01-01

    In a nuclear facility such as a reprocessing plant for nuclear fuel rods, the central air cleaner discharging ventilating gas to the atmosphere must meet preselected standards not only as to the momentary concentration of radioactive components, but also as to total quantity per year. In order to comply more satisfactorily with such standards, reprocessing steps are conducted by remote control in a plurality of separate compartments. The air flow for each compartment is regulated so that the air inventory for each compartment has a slow turnover rate of more than a day but less than a year, which slow rate is conveniently designated as quasihermetic sealing. The air inventory in each such compartment is recirculated through a specialized processing unit adapted to cool and/or filter and/or otherwise process the gas. Stale air is withdrawn from such recirculating inventory and fresh air is injected (eg., By the less than perfect sealing of a compartment) into such recirculating inventory so that the air turnover rate is more than a day but less than a year. The amount of air directed through the manifold and duct system from the reprocessing units to the central air cleaner is less than in reprocessing plants of conventional design

  5. Development of challengeable reprocessing and fuel fabrication technologies for advanced fast reactor fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nomura, S.; Aoshima, T.; Myochin, M.

    2001-01-01

    R and D in the next five years in Feasibility Study Phase-2 are focused on selected key technologies for the advanced fuel cycle. These are the reference technology of simplified aqueous extraction and fuel pellet short process based on the oxide fuel and the innovative technology of oxide-electrowinning and metal- electrorefining process and their direct particle/metal fuel fabrication methods in a hot cell. Automatic and remote handling system operation in both reprocessing and fuel manufacturing can handle MA and LLFP concurrently with Pu and U attaining the highest recovery and an accurate accountability of these materials. (author)

  6. Assess How Changes in Fuel Cycle Operation Impact Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tobin, Stephen Joseph [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States). Nuclear Engineering and Nonproliferation Division; Adigun, Babatunde John [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States). Nuclear Engineering and Nonproliferation Division; Fugate, Michael Lynn [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States). Nuclear Engineering and Nonproliferation Division; Trellue, Holly Renee [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States). Nuclear Engineering and Nonproliferation Division; Sprinkle, James K. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States). Nuclear Engineering and Nonproliferation Division

    2016-10-31

    Since the beginning of commercial nuclear power generation in the 1960s, the ability of researchers to understand and control the isotopic content of spent fuel has improved. It is therefore not surprising that both fuel assembly design and fuel assembly irradiation optimization have improved over the past 50+ years. It is anticipated that the burnup and isotopics of the spent fuel should exhibit less variation over the decades as reactor operators irradiate each assembly to the optimum amount. In contrast, older spent fuel is anticipated to vary more in burnup and resulting isotopics for a given initial enrichment. Modern fuel therefore should be more uniform in composition, and thus, measured safeguards results should be easier to interpret than results from older spent fuel. With spent fuel ponds filling up, interim and long-­term storage of spent fuel will need to be addressed. Additionally after long periods of storage, spent fuel is no longer self-­protecting and, as such, the IAEA will categorize it as more attractive; in approximately 20 years many of the assemblies from early commercial cores will no longer be considered self-­protecting. This study will assess how more recent changes in the reactor operation could impact the interpretation of safeguards measurements. The status quo for spent fuel assay in the safeguards context is that the overwhelming majority of spent fuel assemblies are not measured in a quantitative way except for those assemblies about to be loaded into a difficult or impossible to access location (dry storage or, in the future, a repository). In other words, when the assembly is still accessible to a state actor, or an insider, when it is cooling in a pool, the inspectorate does not have a measurement database that could assist them in re-­verifying the integrity of that assembly. The spent fuel safeguards regime would be strengthened if spent fuel assemblies were measured from discharge to loading into a difficult or impossible

  7. Facility safeguards at an LEU fuel fabrication facility in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuroi, H.; Osabe, T.

    1984-01-01

    A facility description of a Japanese LEU BWR-type fuel fabrication plant focusing on safeguards viewpoints is presented. Procedures and practices of MC and A plan, measurement program, inventory taking, and the report and record system are described. Procedures and practices of safeguards inspection are discussed and lessons learned from past experiences are reviewed

  8. Consolidated fuel reprocessing program. Progress report, January 1-March 31, 1981

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1981-06-01

    Progress and activities are reported on process development, laboratory R and D, engineering research, engineering systems, Integrated Equipment Test (IET) facility operations, and HTGR fuel reprocessing

  9. Radioactive wastes management in fiscal year 1983 in the fuel reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    In the nuclear fuel reprocessing plant of Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation, the releases of radioactive gaseous and liquid wastes are so managed not to exceed the respective objective release levels. Of the radioactive liquid wastes, the high level concentrated wastes are stored in tanks and the low level wastes are stored in tanks or asphalt solidified. For radioactive solid wastes, high level solid wastes are stored in casks, low level solid wastes and asphalt solids in drums etc. The releases of radioactive gaseous and liquid wastes in the fiscal year 1983 were below the objective release levels. The radioactive wastes management in the fuel reprocessing plant in fiscal year 1983 is given in tables, the released quantities, the stored quantities, etc. (Mori, K.)

  10. The reprocessing-recycling of spent nuclear fuel. Actinides separation - Application to wastes management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    After its use in the reactor, the spent fuel still contains lot of recoverable material for an energetic use (uranium, plutonium), but also fission products and minor actinides which represent the residues of nuclear reactions. The reprocessing-recycling of the spent fuel, as it is performed in France, implies the chemical separation of these materials. The development and the industrial implementation of this separation process represent a major contribution of the French science and technology. The reprocessing-recycling allows a good management of nuclear wastes and a significant saving of fissile materials. With the recent spectacular rise of uranium prices, this process will become indispensable with the development of the next generation of fast neutron reactors. This book takes stock of the present and future variants of the chemical process used for the reprocessing of spent fuels. It describes the researches in progress and presents the stakes and recent results obtained by the CEA. content: the separation of actinides, a key factor for a sustainable nuclear energy; the actinides, a discovery of the 20. century; the radionuclides in nuclear fuels; the aquo ions of actinides; some redox properties of actinides; some complexing properties of actinide cations; general considerations about treatment processes; some characteristics of nuclear fuels in relation with their reprocessing; technical goals and specific constraints of the PUREX process; front-end operations of the PUREX process; separation and purification operations of the PUREX process; elaboration of finite products in the framework of the PUREX process; management and treatment of liquid effluents; solid wastes of the PUREX process; towards a joint management of uranium and plutonium: the COEX TM process; technical options of treatment and recycling techniques; the fuels of generation IV reactors; front-end treatment processes of advanced fuels; hydrometallurgical processes for future fuel cycles

  11. Method of reprocessing spent nuclear fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kamiyama, Hiroaki; Inoue, Tadashi; Miyashiro, Hajime.

    1987-01-01

    Purpose: To facilitate the storage management for the wastes resulting from reprocessing by chemically separating transuranium elements such as actionoid elements together with uranium and plutonium. Method: Spent fuels from a nuclear reactor are separated into two groups, that is, a mixture of uranium, plutonium and transuranium elements and cesium, strontium and other nuclear fission products. Virgin uranium is mixed to adjust the mixture of uranium, plutonium and transuranium elements in the first group, which is used as the fuels for the nuclear reactor. After separating to recover useful metals such as cesium and strontium are separated from short half-decay nuclear fission products of the second group, other nuclear fission products are stored and managed. This enables to shorten the storage period and safety storage and management for the wastes. (Takahashi, M.)

  12. Safeguards and security aspects of a potential Canadian used-fuel disposal facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, R.M.; Wuschke, D.; Baumgartner, P.

    1994-09-01

    Large quantities of highly radioactive used fuel have been produced by Canadian nuclear generating stations. Conceptual design and development is under way to assess a means of disposing of this used fuel within a vault located 500 to 1000 m deep in plutonic rock in the Canadian Shield. In parallel with this work, the safeguards and physical security measures that will be required for this used fuel during transportation, packaging, and containment in a disposal vault are being studied in Canada, in several other countries that have similar requirements and by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Canadian commitments and regulations applicable to used-fuel transportation and disposal are described. The experience gained from applying safeguards and physical security measures at similar facilities is considered together with the availability of equipment that might be used in applying these measures. Possible safeguards and physical security measures are outlined and considered. These measures are based on the conceptual design studies for a reference Used-Fuel Disposal Centre and associated transportation systems undertaken by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited and Ontario Hydro. These studies show that effective and practical safeguards, which meet present IAEA objectives, can be applied to the used fuel in transportation and at a disposal facility. They also show that physical security measures can be employed that have a high probability of preventing theft or sabotage. 27 refs., 8 figs., 3 tabs., glossary, 2 appendices

  13. Safeguards and security aspects of a potential Canadian used-fuel disposal facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, R M; Wuschke, D; Baumgartner, P

    1994-09-01

    Large quantities of highly radioactive used fuel have been produced by Canadian nuclear generating stations. Conceptual design and development is under way to assess a means of disposing of this used fuel within a vault located 500 to 1000 m deep in plutonic rock in the Canadian Shield. In parallel with this work, the safeguards and physical security measures that will be required for this used fuel during transportation, packaging, and containment in a disposal vault are being studied in Canada, in several other countries that have similar requirements and by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Canadian commitments and regulations applicable to used-fuel transportation and disposal are described. The experience gained from applying safeguards and physical security measures at similar facilities is considered together with the availability of equipment that might be used in applying these measures. Possible safeguards and physical security measures are outlined and considered. These measures are based on the conceptual design studies for a reference Used-Fuel Disposal Centre and associated transportation systems undertaken by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited and Ontario Hydro. These studies show that effective and practical safeguards, which meet present IAEA objectives, can be applied to the used fuel in transportation and at a disposal facility. They also show that physical security measures can be employed that have a high probability of preventing theft or sabotage. 27 refs., 8 figs., 3 tabs., glossary, 2 appendices.

  14. Chemical engineering in fuel reprocessing. The French experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Viala, M.; Sombret, C.; Bernard, C.; Miquel, P.; Moulin, J.P.

    1992-01-01

    Reprocessing is the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle, designed to recover valuable fissile materials, especially plutonium, and to condition safely all the wastes ready for disposal. For its new commercial reprocessing plants (UP 3 and UP 2 800) COGEMA decided to include many engineering innovations as well as new processes and key-components developed by CEA. UP 3 is a complete new plant with a capacity of 800 t/y which was put in operation in August 1990. UP 2 800 is an extension of the existing UP 2 facility, designed to achieve the same annual capacity of 800 t/y, to be put in operation at the end of 1993 by the commissioning of a new head-end and highly active chemical process facilities

  15. Engineering study: Fast Flux Test Facility fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beary, M.M.; Raab, G.J.; Reynolds, W.R. Jr.; Yoder, R.A.

    1974-01-01

    Several alternatives were studied for reprocessing FFTF fuels at Hanford. Alternative I would be to decontaminate and trim the fuel at T Plant and electrolytically dissolve the fuel at Purex. Alternative II would be to decontaminate and shear leach the fuels in a new facility near Purex. Alternative III would be to decontaminate and store fuel elements indefinitely at T Plant for subsequent offsite shipment. Alternative I, 8 to 10 M$ and 13 quarter-years; for Alternative II, 24 to 28 M$ and 20 quarter-years; for Alternative III, 3 to 4 M$ and 8 quarter-years. Unless there is considerable slippage in the FFTF shipping schedule, it would not be possible to build a new facility as described in Alternative II in time without building temporary storage facilities at T Plant, as described in Alternative III

  16. Used fuel extended storage security and safeguards by design roadmap

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Durbin, Samuel G. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Lindgren, Eric Richard [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Jones, Robert [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States). Savannah River National Lab. (SRNL); Ketusky, Edward [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States). Savannah River National Lab. (SRNL); England, Jeffrey [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States). Savannah River National Lab. (SRNL); Scherer, Carolynn [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Sprinkle, James [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Miller, Michael. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Rauch, Eric [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Scaglione, John [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Dunn, T. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

    2016-05-01

    In the United States, spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is safely and securely stored in spent fuel pools and dry storage casks. The available capacity in spent fuel pools across the nuclear fleet has nearly reached a steady state value. The excess SNF continues to be loaded in dry storage casks. Fuel is expected to remain in dry storage for periods beyond the initial dry cask certification period of 20 years. Recent licensing renewals have approved an additional 40 years. This report identifies the current requirements and evaluation techniques associated with the safeguards and security of SNF dry cask storage. A set of knowledge gaps is identified in the current approaches. Finally, this roadmap identifies known knowledge gaps and provides a research path to deliver the tools and models needed to close the gaps and allow the optimization of the security and safeguards approaches for an interim spent fuel facility over the lifetime of the storage site.

  17. The fuel reprocessing plant at Wackersdorf

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Held, M.

    1986-01-01

    For a more systematic discussion about the fuel reprocessing plant at Wackersdorf, the colloquium tried to cover the most important questions put forward in the controversies: economic efficiency and energy-political needs; safety and ecological repercussions; inner safety and consequences for basic rights and the regional economic structure; majority decisions and participation of the population of the region. Elements of evaluation are the conservation of resources, health, economic efficiency, and citizens' rights of liberty. The related basic ethical questions are considered. The 18 contributions are individually recorded in the data base. (DG) [de

  18. Pyrochemical reprocessing of molten salt fast reactor fuel: focus on the reductive extraction step

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Rodrigues Davide

    2015-12-01

    Full Text Available The nuclear fuel reprocessing is a prerequisite for nuclear energy to be a clean and sustainable energy. In the case of the molten salt reactor containing a liquid fuel, pyrometallurgical way is an obvious way. The method for treatment of the liquid fuel is divided into two parts. In-situ injection of helium gas into the fuel leads to extract the gaseous fission products and a part of the noble metals. The second part of the reprocessing is performed by ‘batch’. It aims to recover the fissile material and to separate the minor actinides from fission products. The reprocessing involves several chemical steps based on redox and acido-basic properties of the various elements contained in the fuel salt. One challenge is to perform a selective extraction of actinides and lanthanides in spent liquid fuel. Extraction of actinides and lanthanides are successively performed by a reductive extraction in liquid bismuth pool containing metallic lithium as a reductive reagent. The objective of this paper is to give a description of the several steps of the reprocessing retained for the molten salt fast reactor (MSFR concept and to present the initial results obtained for the reductive extraction experiments realized in static conditions by contacting LiF-ThF4-UF4-NdF3 with a lab-made Bi-Li pool and for which extraction efficiencies of 0.7% for neodymium and 14.0% for uranium were measured. It was concluded that in static conditions, the extraction is governed by a kinetic limitation and not by the thermodynamic equilibrium.

  19. Process monitoring for reprocessing plant safeguards: a summary review

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kerr, H.T.; Ehinger, M.H.; Wachter, J.W.; Hebble, T.L.

    1986-10-01

    Process monitoring is a term typically associated with a detailed look at plant operating data to determine plant status. Process monitoring has been generally associated with operational control of plant processes. Recently, process monitoring has been given new attention for a possible role in international safeguards. International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) Task C.59 has the goal to identify specific roles for process monitoring in international safeguards. As the preliminary effort associated with this task, a review of previous efforts in process monitoring for safeguards was conducted. Previous efforts mentioned concepts and a few specific applications. None were comprehensive in addressing all aspects of a process monitoring application for safeguards. This report summarizes the basic elements that must be developed in a comprehensive process monitoring application for safeguards. It then summarizes the significant efforts that have been documented in the literature with respect to the basic elements that were addressed

  20. Development of new decladding system in the reprocessing process for FBR fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yamada, Seiya; Washiya, Tadahiro; Takeuchi, Masayuki; Koizumi, Tsutomu; Aose, Shinichi

    2005-01-01

    As a part of the feasibility study on commercialized fast reactor cycle systems, Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC) has been developing the fuel decladding technology for the dry reprocessing process (oxide electrowinning process) and aqueous reprocessing process. Particularly, in the oxide electrowinning process, the spent fuel should be reduced to powder for quick dissolution in the molten salt at electrolyzer. Therefore, JNC proposes new decladding system with innovative mechanical decladding devices. The decladding system consists of fuel crushing stage, hull separation stage and hull rinsing stage. In the fuel crushing stage, disassembled spent fuel pins are crushed and powdered by mechanical decladding device, then the following stage, the hull and the fuel powder are separated by magnetic separator. Only the fuel powder is fed to the electrolyzer. On the other side, the separated hull is melted by induction heating method, and the small amount of oxide included in the hull fragments is recovered at the hull rinsing stage. The recovered oxide fuel is fed back to the electrolyzer. In this paper, the basic performance of the element equipment that composes this new decladding system will be described. (author)

  1. NO/sub x/ emissions from Hanford nuclear fuels reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pajunen, A.L.; Dirkes, R.L.

    1978-01-01

    Operation of the existing Hanford nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities will increase the release of nitrogen oxides (NO/sub x/) to the atmosphere over present emission rates. Stack emissions from two reprocessing facilities, one waste storage facility and two coal burning power plants will contain increased concentrations of NO/sub x/. The opacity of the reprocessing facilities' emissions is predicted to periodically exceed the State and local opacity limit of twenty percent. Past measurements failed to detect differences in the ambient air NO/sub x/ concentration with and without reprocessing plant operations. Since the facilities are not presently operating, increases in the non-occupational ambient air NO/sub x/ concentration were predicted from theoretical diffusion models. Based on the calculations, the annual average ambient air NO/sub x/ concentration will increase from the present level of less than 0.004 ppM to less than 0.006 ppM at the Hanford site boundaries. The national standard for the annual mean ambient air NO 2 concentration is 0.05 ppM. Therefore, the non-occupational ambient air NO/sub x/ concentration will not be increased to significant levels by reprocessing operations in the Hanford 200 Areas

  2. German Approach to Spent Fuel Management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jussofie, A.; Graf, R.; Filbert, W.

    2010-01-01

    The management of spent fuel was based on two powerful columns until 30 June 2005, i. e. reprocessing and direct disposal. After this date any delivery of spent fuel to reprocessing plants was prohibited so that the direct disposal of unreprocessed spent fuel is the only available option in Germany today. The main steps of the current concept are: (i) Intermediate storage of spent fuel, which is the only step in practice. After the first cooling period in spent fuel storage pools it continues into cask-receiving dry storage facilities. Identification of casks, 'freezing' of inventories in terms of continuity of knowledge, monitoring the access to spent fuel, verifying nuclear material movements in terms of cask transfers and ensurance against diversion of nuclear material belong to the fundamental safeguards goals which have been achieved in the intermediate storage facilities by containment and surveillance techniques in unattended mode. (ii) Conditioning of spent fuel assemblies by separating the fuel rods from structural elements. Since the pilot conditioning facility in Gorleben has not yet come into operation, the underlying safeguards approach which focuses on safeguarding the key measurement points - the spent fuel related way in and out of the facility - has not been applied yet. (iii) Disposal in deep geological formations, but no decision has been made so far neither regarding the location of a geological repository nor regarding the safeguards approach for the disposal concept of spent fuel. The situation was complicated by a moratorium which suspended the underground exploration of the Gorleben salt dome as potential geological repository for spent fuel. The moratorium expires in October 2010. Nevertheless, considerable progress has been made in the development of disposal concepts. According to the basic, so-called POLLUX (registered) -concept spent fuel assemblies are to be conditioned after dry storage and reloaded into the POLLUX (registered) -cask

  3. Nuclear Safeguards Considerations For The Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Phillip Casey Durst; David Beddingfield; Brian Boyer; Robert Bean; Michael Collins; Michael Ehinger; David Hanks; David L. Moses; Lee Refalo

    2009-10-01

    High temperature reactors (HTRs) have been considered since the 1940s, and have been constructed and demonstrated in the United Kingdom (Dragon), United States (Peach Bottom and Fort Saint Vrain), Japan (HTTR), Germany (AVR and THTR-300), and have been the subject of conceptual studies in Russia (VGM). The attraction to these reactors is that they can use a variety of reactor fuels, including abundant thorium, which upon reprocessing of the spent fuel can produce fissile U-233. Hence, they could extend the stocks of available uranium, provided the fuel is reprocessed. Another attractive attribute is that HTRs typically operate at a much higher temperature than conventional light water reactors (LWRs), because of the use of pyrolytic carbon and silicon carbide coated (TRISO) fuel particles embedded in ceramic graphite. Rather than simply discharge most of the unused heat from the working fluid in the power plant to the environment, engineers have been designing reactors for 40 years to recover this heat and make it available for district heating or chemical conversion plants. Demonstrating high-temperature nuclear energy conversion was the purpose behind Fort Saint Vrain in the United States, THTR-300 in Germany, HTTR in Japan, and HTR-10 and HTR-PM, being built in China. This resulted in nuclear reactors at least 30% or more thermodynamically efficient than conventional LWRs, especially if the waste heat can be effectively utilized in chemical processing plants. A modern variant of high temperature reactors is the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR). Originally developed in the United States and Germany, it is now being redesigned and marketed by the Republic of South Africa and China. The team examined historical high temperature and high temperature gas reactors (HTR and HTGR) and reviewed safeguards considerations for this reactor. The following is a preliminary report on this topic prepared under the ASA-100 Advanced Safeguards Project in support of the NNSA Next

  4. Operational experiences in radiation protection in fast reactor fuel reprocessing facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meenakshisundaram, V.; Rajagopal, V.; Santhanam, R.; Baskar, S.; Madhusoodanan, U.; Chandrasekaran, S.; Balasundar, S.; Suresh, K.; Ajoy, K.C.; Dhanasekaran, A.; Akila, R.; Indira, R.

    2008-01-01

    The Compact Reprocessing facility for Advanced fuels in Lead cells (CORAL), situated at Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR), Kalpakkam is a pilot plant to reprocess the mixed carbide fuel, for the first time in the world. Reprocessing of fuel with varying burn-ups up to 155 G Wd/t, irradiated at Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR), has been successfully carried out at CORAL. Providing radiological surveillance in a fuel reprocessing facility itself is a challenging task, considering the dynamic status of the sources and the proximity of the operator with the radioactive material and it is more so in a fast reactor fuel reprocessing facility due to handling of higher burn-up fuels associated with radiation fields and elevated levels of fissile material content from the point of view of criticality hazard. A very detailed radiation protection program is in place at CORAL. This includes, among others, monitoring the release of 85 Kr and other fission products and actinides, if any, through stack on a continuous basis to comply with the regulatory limits and management of disposal of different types of radioactive wastes. Providing radiological surveillance during the operations such as fuel transport, chopping and dissolution and extraction cycle was without any major difficulty, as these were carried out in well-shielded and high integrity lead cells. Enforcement of exposure control assumes more importance during the analysis of process samples and re-conversion operations due to the presence of fission product impurities and also since the operations were done in glove boxes and fume hoods. Although the radiation fields encountered in process area were marginally higher, due to the enforcement of strict administrative controls, the annual exposure to the radiation workers was well within the regulatory limit. As the facility is being used as test bed for validation of prototype equipment, periodic inspection and maintenance of components such as centrifuge

  5. Available reprocessing and recycling services for research reactor spent nuclear fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tozser, Sandor; Marshall, Frances M.; Adelfang, Pablo; Bradley, Edward [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Budu, Madalina Elena [SOSNY Research and Development Company, Moscow (Russian Federation); Chiguer, Mustapha [AREVA, Paris La Defense (France)

    2016-03-15

    International activities in the back end of the research reactor (RR) fuel cycle have so far been dominated by the programmes of acceptance of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) by the country where it was originally enriched. In the future inventories of LEU SNF will continue to be created and the back end solution of RR SNF remains a critical issue. The IAEA, based on the experience gained during the decade of international cooperation in supporting the objectives of the HEU take-back programmes, drew up a report presenting available reprocessing and recycling services for RR SNF. This paper gives an overview of the report, which will address all aspects of reprocessing and recycling services for RR SNF.

  6. Reprocessing decision

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heising, C.D.

    1978-01-01

    The United States must decide whether to permit, delay, or prohibit the reprocessing and recycling of nuclear spent fuel. To permit reprocessing would allow recycle as early as 1985; to delay the decision for a later administration to deal with means spent fuel would mount up at nuclear reactor sites; to prohibit would eliminate recycling and mandate permanent storage. Bayesian decision analysis was used to examine reprocessing costs associated with risks and economic benefits. Three distinct categories of risk that are important in the nuclear fuel cycle are discussed. These are: health, environment, and safety risks; nuclear theft and sabotage; and nuclear weapons proliferation risks. Results are discussed from comparing nine routes to weapons-usuable mterial available to nonweapons states that desire a nuclear capability. These are: production reactor and military reporcessor; research reacotr and military reprocessor; power plant plus military reprocessor or commercial reprocessor; enrichment (centrifuge, gaseous diffusion, electromagnetic separation, or aerodynamic jet cascade); and accelerator. It was found that the commercial power reactor-commercial reprocessor route is comparatively unattractive to a nonweapons state. In summary, allowing nuclear fuel reprocessing to go forward in the United States can be expected to increase the costs to society by a maximum $360 million a year. This is approximately one-seventh of the expected benefit (reduced electricity bills) to be dderived by society from closing the fuel cycle. It appears that the permitting reprocessing now is logically preferable to delaying or prohibiting the technology, the author concludes

  7. Reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Couture, J.; Rougeau, J.-P.

    1987-01-01

    The course of development of a comprehensive nuclear power industry has its own pace which implies the timely progressive and consistent mastery of each industrial step. In the nuclear fuel it is not surprising that the back-end services have lastly reached the industrial stage. In France, we have now fully completed the industrial demonstration of the closed fuel cycle. Our experience covers all necessary steps : transportation of spent fuel, storage, reprocessing, waste conditioning, recovered uranium recycling, plutonium recycling in thermal MOX fuels, plutonium-based fuel for FBR. While FBR development is a long term target, recycling of fissile materials in present LWR reactors appears to be a source of noticable savings. In the meantime rational management of waste material is the key for increased safety and better environment protection. Reprocessing activity is certainly the major achievement of the back-end strategy. The proven efficiency of this technique as it is implemented at La Hague facility gives the full assurance of a smooth operation of the under completion UP3 unit. The base-load management system which applies during the first ten years of its operation will make possible a noticable reduction of the commercial price for reprocessing services by the end of the century. Industrial maturity being confirmed, economic maturity is now the outstanding merit of the reprocessing and recycling strategy. It is a permanent challenge, to which the response is definitely positive in the sense of reducing the nuclear KWh production cost. (author)

  8. Radiological considerations in the design of Reprocessing Uranium Plant (RUP) of Fast Reactor Fuel Cycle Facility (FRFCF), Kalpakkam

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chandrasekaran, S.; Rajagopal, V.; Jose, M.T.; Venkatraman, B.

    2012-01-01

    A Fast Reactor Fuel Cycle Facility (FRFCF) being planned at Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research, Kalpakkam is an integrated facility with head end and back end of fuel cycle plants co-located in a single place, to meet the refuelling needs of the prototype fast breeder reactor (PFBR). Reprocessed uranium oxide plant (RUP) is one such plant in FRFCF to built to meet annual requirements of UO 2 for fabrication of fuel sub-assemblies (FSAs) and radial blanket sub-assemblies (RSAs) for PFBR. RUP receives reprocessed uranium oxide powder (U 3 O 8 ) from fast reactor fuel reprocessing plant (FRP) of FRFCF. Unlike natural uranium oxide plant, RUP has to handle reprocessed uranium oxide which is likely to have residual fission products activity in addition to traces of plutonium. As the fuel used for PFBR is recycled within these plants, formation of higher actinides in the case of plutonium and formation of higher levels of 232 U in the uranium product would be a radiological problem to be reckoned with. The paper discussed the impact of handling of multi-recycled reprocessed uranium in RUP and the radiological considerations

  9. Consolidated fuel reprocessing program. Progress report, July 1-September 30, 1981

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1981-12-01

    Technical progress is reported in overview fashion in the following areas: process development, laboratory R and D, engineering research, engineering systems, integrated equipment test facility (IET) operations, and HTGR fuel reprocessing

  10. Reprocessing: experience and future outlooks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rapin, M.

    1981-01-01

    It is shown that reprocessing is the best way to cope with irradiated fuels since it provides an optimized waste conditioning for long term storage, the possibility to recycle fissile material and the reduction of Pu diversion risk. The reprocessing constraints are discussed from political, technical, safety, public acceptance, and economical points of view. The French reprocessing programme (thermal reactor fuel fast breeder fuels) is presented together with a short review of the reprocessing experience and outlooks out of France [fr

  11. Safeguards Considerations for the Design of a Future Fast Neutron Sodium Cooled Reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cazalet, J.; Raymond, P.; Masson, M.; Saturnin, A.

    2015-01-01

    Incorporating safeguards at an early stage of a reactor design is a way to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards measures minimizing the possibilities of misuse of the plant or nuclear material diversion. It also reduces the impact on the construction and operation cost. At the preliminary phase, the design will integrate: confinement, containment, surveillance features and non-destructive assay equipment. Taking into account these requirements will help the operator in the approval of the plant at the design phase by national and international authorities in charge of Nuclear Material accounting and safeguards. A large amount of work has been made by the GEN IV International Forum to assess the proliferation resistance of nuclear systems. The IAEA has developed guidelines on ''Safeguards by design'' describing reference requirements for future nuclear facilities. Based on these studies, this communication details implementation of safeguards in the design of a sodium cooled fast neutron reactor (SFR) currently studied in France. Specificities are the use of MOX fuel with high concentration of plutonium and the potential capacity of breeding. A great attention should be paid to avoid diversion of nuclear material contained in fresh or irradiated fuel. Scenarios of reactor misuse are analyzed. The identification of diversion pathways and requirements for nuclear material accountancy, leads to an approach of safeguards, specific to SFR: Material Balance Areas (MBA) and some key measurement points (KMP) are characterized. Specific instrumentation assay helping in the identification and/or characterization of fuel elements and the inventory of nuclear material is described. As concerns the fuel cycle, the safeguards of the reprocessing unit will be progressively increased through the development of materials monitoring and the implementation of these measures at strategic locations of buildings, thus providing real-time information

  12. Isotope correlations for safeguards surveillance and accountancy methods

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persiani, P.J.; Kalimullah.

    1982-01-01

    Isotope correlations corroborated by experiments, coupled with measurement methods for nuclear material in the fuel cycle have the potential as a safeguards surveillance and accountancy system. The ICT allows the verification of: fabricator's uranium and plutonium content specifications, shipper/receiver differences between fabricator output and reactor input, reactor plant inventory changes, reprocessing batch specifications and shipper/receiver differences between reactor output and reprocessing plant input. The investigation indicates that there exist predictable functional relationships (i.e. correlations) between isotopic concentrations over a range of burnup. Several cross-correlations serve to establish the initial fuel assembly-averaged compositions. The selection of the more effective correlations will depend not only on the level of reliability of ICT for verification, but also on the capability, accuracy and difficulty of developing measurement methods. The propagation of measurement errors through the correlations have been examined to identify the sensitivity of the isotope correlations to measurement errors, and to establish criteria for measurement accuracy in the development and selection of measurement methods. 6 figures, 3 tables

  13. Fuel handling, reprocessing, and waste and related nuclear data aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuesters, H.; Lalovic, M.; Wiese, H.W.

    1979-06-01

    The essential processes in the out-of-pile nuclear fuel cycle are described, i.e. mining and milling of uranium ores, enrichment, fuel fabrication, storage, transportation, reprocessing of irradiated fuel, waste treatment and waste disposal. The aspects of radiation (mainly gammas and neutrons) and of heat production, as well as special safety considerations are outlined with respect to their potential operational impacts and long-term hazards. In this context the importance of nuclear data for the out-of-pile fuel cycle is discussed. Special weight is given to the LWR fuel cycle including recycling; the differences of LMFBR high burn-up fuel with large PuO 2 content are described. The HTR fuel cycle is discussed briefly as well as some alternative fuel cycle concepts. (orig.) [de

  14. Safeguarding aspects of large-scale commercial reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-03-01

    The paper points out that several solutions to the problems of safeguarding large-scale plants have been put forward: (1) Increased measurement accuracy. This does not remove the problem of timely detection. (2) Continuous in-process measurement. As yet unproven and likely to be costly. (3) More extensive use of containment and surveillance. The latter appears to be feasible but requires the incorporation of safeguards into plant design and sufficient redundancy to protect the operators interests. The advantages of altering the emphasis of safeguards philosophy from quantitative goals to the analysis of diversion strategies should be considered

  15. Assessment of the insertion of reprocessed fuel spiked with thorium in a PWR core

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Castro, Victor F.; Monteiro, Fabiana B.A.; Pereira, Claubia, E-mail: victorfc@fis.grad.ufmg.br, E-mail: claubia@nuclear.ufmg.br [Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG), Belo Horizonte, MG (Brazil). Departamento de Engenharia Nuclear

    2017-07-01

    Reprocessed fuel by UREX+ technique and spiked with thorium was inserted in a PWR core and neutronic parameters have been analyzed. Based on the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) of the Angra-2 reactor, the core was modeled and simulated with SCALE6.0 package. The neutronic data evaluation was carried out by the analysis of the effective and infinite multiplication factors, and the fuel evolution during the burnup. The conversion ratio (CR) was also evaluated. The results show that, when inserting reprocessed fuel spiked with thorium, the insertion of burnable poison rods is not necessary, due to the amount of absorber isotopes present in the fuel. Besides, the conversion ratio obtained was greater than the presented by standard UO{sub 2} fuel, indicating the possibility of extending the burnup. (author)

  16. Radioactive Iodine and Krypton Control for Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Facilities

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Nick R. Soelberg

    2013-01-01

    Full Text Available The removal of volatile radionuclides generated during used nuclear fuel reprocessing in the US is almost certain to be necessary for the licensing of a reprocessing facility in the US. Various control technologies have been developed, tested, or used over the past 50 years for control of volatile radionuclide emissions from used fuel reprocessing plants. The US DOE has sponsored, since 2009, an Off-gas Sigma Team to perform research and development focused on the most pressing volatile radionuclide control and immobilization problems. In this paper, we focus on the control requirements and methodologies for 85Kr and 129I. Numerous candidate technologies have been studied and developed at laboratory and pilot-plant scales in an effort to meet the need for high iodine control efficiency and to advance alternatives to cryogenic separations for krypton control. Several of these show promising results. Iodine decontamination factors as high as 105, iodine loading capacities, and other adsorption parameters including adsorption rates have been demonstrated under some conditions for both silver zeolite (AgZ and Ag-functionalized aerogel. Sorbents, including an engineered form of AgZ and selected metal organic framework materials (MOFs, have been successfully demonstrated to capture Kr and Xe without the need for separations at cryogenic temperatures.

  17. Measurement and behaviour of technetium in fast reactor fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ferguson, C.; Kyffin, T.W.

    1986-02-01

    A method is described for the spectrophotometric measurement of technetium in plant solutions from the reprocessing of fast reactor fuel. The technetium is selectively extracted using tri-iso-octylamine. After back extraction, thiocyanate is added, in the presence of tetrabutyl-ammonium hydroxide, to form the red hexa-thiocyanato anionic complex in a chloroform medium. The concentration of the technetium is then calculated from the spectrophotometric measurement of this complex. This method was applied to bulk samples, collected during a PFR fuel reprocessing campaign, to identify the main routes followed by technetium through the reprocessing plant. In order to understand the probable behaviour of technetium in the process plant streams, an investigation into the influence of plutonium IV nitrate on the extraction of Tc (VII) into 20%v/v tributyl phosphate/odourless kerosene solution from nitric acid solutions, was initiated. The results of this investigation, along with the known distribution coefficient for the extraction of the uranyl/technetium complex U0 2 (N0 3 )(Tc0 4 ).2TBP and the redox chemistry of technetium, are used to predict the probable behaviour of technetium in the process plant streams. This predicted behaviour is compared with the experimental results and reasonable agreement is obtained between experiment and theory, considering the history of the samples analysed. (author)

  18. Removal of actinides from high-level wastes generated in the reprocessing of commercial fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bond, W.D.; Leuze, R.E.

    1975-09-01

    Progress is reported on a technical feasibility study of removing the very long-lived actinides (uranium, neptunium, plutonium, americium, and curium) from high-level wastes generated in the commercial reprocessing of spent nuclear fuels. The study was directed primarily at wastes from the reprocessing of light water reactor (LWR) fuels and specifically to developing satisfactory methods for reducing the actinide content of these wastes to values that would make 1000-year-decayed waste comparable in radiological toxicity to natural uranium ore deposits. Although studies are not complete, results thus far indicate the most promising concept for actinide removal includes both improved recovery of actinides in conventional fuel reprocessing and secondary processing of the high-level wastes. Secondary processing will be necessary for the removal of americium and curium and perhaps some residual plutonium. Laboratory-scale studies of separations methods that appear most promising are reported and conceptual flowsheets are discussed. (U.S.)

  19. Critical review of analytical techniques for safeguarding the thorium-uranium fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.

    1978-10-01

    Conventional analytical methods applicable to the determination of thorium, uranium, and plutonium in feed, product, and waste streams from reprocessing thorium-based nuclear reactor fuels are reviewed. Separations methods of interest for these analyses are discussed. Recommendations concerning the applicability of various techniques to reprocessing samples are included. 15 tables, 218 references

  20. Improved measurement of aluminum in irradiated fuel reprocessed at the Savannah River Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maxwell, S.L. III.

    1991-01-01

    At the Savannah River Site (SRS), irradiated fuel from research reactor operators or their contract fuel service companies is reprocessed in the H-Canyon Separations Facility. Final processing costs are based on analytical measurements of the amount of total metal dissolved. Shipper estimates for uranium and uranium-235 and measured values at SRS have historically agreed very well. There have occasionally been significant differences between shipper estimates for aluminum and the aluminum content determined at SRS. To minimize analytical error that might contribute to poor shipper-receiver agreement for the reprocessing of off-site fuel, a new analytical method to measure aluminum was developed by SRS Analytical Laboratories at the Central Laboratory Facilities. An EDTA (ethylenediaminetetraacetic acid) titration method, subject to dissolver matrix interferences, was previously used at SRS to measure aluminum in H-Canyon dissolver during the reprocessing of offsite fuel. The new method combines rapid ion exchange technology with direct current argon plasma spectrometry to enhance the reliability of aluminum measurements for off-site fuel. The technique rapidly removes spectral interferences such as uranium and significantly lowers gamma levels due to fission products. Aluminium is separated quantitatively by using an anion exchange technique that employs oxalate complexing, small particle size resin and rapid flow rates. The new method, which has eliminated matrix interference problems with these analyses and improved the quality of aluminum measurements, has improved the overall agreement between shipper-receiver values for offsite fuel processed SRS

  1. International co-operation in the supply of nuclear fuel and fuel cycle services

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sievering, N.F. Jr.

    1977-01-01

    Recent changes in the United States' nuclear policy, in recognition of the increased proliferation risk, have raised questions of US intentions in international nuclear fuel and fuel-cycle service co-operation. This paper details those intentions in relation to the key elements of the new policy. In the past, the USA has been a world leader in peaceful nuclear co-operation with other nations and, mindful of the relationships between civilian nuclear technology and nuclear weapon proliferation, remains strongly committed to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, IAEA safeguards and other elements concerned with international nuclear affairs. Now, in implementing President Carter's nuclear initiatives, the USA will continue its leading role in nuclear fuel and fuel-cycle co-operation in two ways, (1) by increasing its enrichment capacity for providing international LWR fuel supplies and (2) by taking the lead in solving the problems of near and long-term spent fuel storage and disposal. Beyond these specific steps, the USA feels that the international community's past efforts in controlling the proliferation risks of nuclear power are necessary but inadequate for the future. Accordingly, the USA urges other similarly concerned nations to pause with present developments and to join in a programme of international co-operation and participation in a re-assessment of future plans which would include: (1) Mutual assessments of fuel cycles alternative to the current uranium/plutonium cycle for LWRs and breeders, seeking to lessen proliferation risks; (2) co-operative mechanisms for ensuring the ''front-end'' fuel supply including uranium resource exploration, adequate enrichment capacity, and institutional arrangements; (3) means of dealing with short-, medium- and long-term spent fuel storage needs by means of technical co-operation and assistance and possibly establishment of international storage or repository facilities; and (4) for reprocessing plants, and related fuel

  2. The Text of the Safeguards Agreement of 18 March 1976 between the Agency, France and Pakistan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1976-01-01

    The text of the Agreement of 18 March 1976 between the Agency, France and Pakistan for the application of safeguards with respect to a fuel reprocessing plant and to nuclear material, facilities, equipment and relevant technological information supplied by France to Pakistan for the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  3. The Text of the Safeguards Agreement of 18 March 1976 between the Agency, France and Pakistan

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1976-06-22

    The text of the Agreement of 18 March 1976 between the Agency, France and Pakistan for the application of safeguards with respect to a fuel reprocessing plant and to nuclear material, facilities, equipment and relevant technological information supplied by France to Pakistan for the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  4. Coordinated safeguards for materials management in a mixed-oxide fuel facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shipley, J.P.; Cobb, D.D.; Dietz, R.J.; Evans, M.L.; Schelonka, E.P.; Smith, D.B.; Walton, R.B.

    1977-02-01

    A coordinated safeguards system is described for safeguarding strategic quantities of special nuclear materials in mixed-oxide recycle fuel fabrication facilities. The safeguards system is compatible with industrial process requirements and combines maximum effectiveness consistent with modest cost and minimal process interference. It is based on unit process accounting using a combination of conventional and state-of-the-art NDA measurement techniques. The effectiveness of the system against single and multiple thefts is evaluated using computer modeling and simulation techniques

  5. Coordinated safeguards for materials management in a mixed-oxide fuel facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Shipley, J.P.; Cobb, D.D.; Dietz, R.J.; Evans, M.L.; Schelonka, E.P.; Smith, D.B.; Walton, R.B.

    1977-02-01

    A coordinated safeguards system is described for safeguarding strategic quantities of special nuclear materials in mixed-oxide recycle fuel fabrication facilities. The safeguards system is compatible with industrial process requirements and combines maximum effectiveness consistent with modest cost and minimal process interference. It is based on unit process accounting using a combination of conventional and state-of-the-art NDA measurement techniques. The effectiveness of the system against single and multiple thefts is evaluated using computer modeling and simulation techniques.

  6. Safeguards and security modeling for electrochemical plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cipiti, B.B.; Duran, F.A.; Mendoza, L.A.; Parks, M.J.; Dominguez, D.; Le, T.D.

    2013-01-01

    Safeguards and security design for reprocessing plants can lead to excessive costs if not incorporated early in the design process. The design for electrochemical plants is somewhat uncertain since these plants have not been built at a commercial scale in the past. The Separation and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM), developed at Sandia National Laboratories, has been used for safeguards design and evaluation for multiple reprocessing plant types. The SSPM includes the following capabilities: -) spent fuel source term library, -) mass tracking of elements 1-99 and bulk solid/liquids, -) tracking of heat load and activity, -) customisable measurement points, -) automated calculation of ID and error propagation, -) alarm conditions and statistical tests, and -) user-defined diversion scenarios. Materials accountancy and process monitoring data can provide more timely detection of material loss specifically to protect against the insider threat. While the SSPM is capable of determining detection probabilities and examining detection times for material loss scenarios, it does not model the operations or spatial effects for a plant design. The STAGE software was chosen to model the physical protection system. STAGE provides a framework to create end-to-end scalable force-on-force combat simulations. It allows for a complete 3D model of a facility to be designed along with the design of physical protection elements. This software, then, can be used to model operations and response for various material loss scenarios. The future integration of the SSPM model data with the STAGE software will provide a more complete analysis of diversion scenarios to assist plant designers

  7. Safeguards and security modeling for electrochemical plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cipiti, B.B.; Duran, F.A.; Mendoza, L.A.; Parks, M.J.; Dominguez, D.; Le, T.D. [Sandia National Laboratories, PO Box 5800 MS 0747, Albuquerque, NM 87185 (United States)

    2013-07-01

    Safeguards and security design for reprocessing plants can lead to excessive costs if not incorporated early in the design process. The design for electrochemical plants is somewhat uncertain since these plants have not been built at a commercial scale in the past. The Separation and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM), developed at Sandia National Laboratories, has been used for safeguards design and evaluation for multiple reprocessing plant types. The SSPM includes the following capabilities: -) spent fuel source term library, -) mass tracking of elements 1-99 and bulk solid/liquids, -) tracking of heat load and activity, -) customisable measurement points, -) automated calculation of ID and error propagation, -) alarm conditions and statistical tests, and -) user-defined diversion scenarios. Materials accountancy and process monitoring data can provide more timely detection of material loss specifically to protect against the insider threat. While the SSPM is capable of determining detection probabilities and examining detection times for material loss scenarios, it does not model the operations or spatial effects for a plant design. The STAGE software was chosen to model the physical protection system. STAGE provides a framework to create end-to-end scalable force-on-force combat simulations. It allows for a complete 3D model of a facility to be designed along with the design of physical protection elements. This software, then, can be used to model operations and response for various material loss scenarios. The future integration of the SSPM model data with the STAGE software will provide a more complete analysis of diversion scenarios to assist plant designers.

  8. Nuclear fuel cycle: reprocessing. A bibliography

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, L.B.

    1982-12-01

    This bibliography contains information on the reprocessing portion of the nuclear fuel cycle included in the Department of Energy's Energy Data Base from January 1981 through November 1982. The abstracts are grouped by subject category. Entries in the subject index also facilitate access by subject. Within each category the arrangement is by report number for reports, followed by nonreports in reverse chronological order. These citations are to research reports, journal articles, books, patents, theses, and conference papers from worldwide sources. Five indexes, each preceded by a brief description, are provided: Corporate Author, Personal Author, Subject, Contract Number, and Report Number

  9. Reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel; Prerada isluzenog nuklearnog goriva

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gal, I [Institute of Nuclear Sciences Boris Kidric, Laboratorija za hemiju visoke aktivnosti, Vinca, Beograd (Serbia and Montenegro)

    1964-12-15

    This volume contains the following reports: Experimental facility for testing and development of pulsed columns and auxiliary devices; Chemical-technology study of the modified 'Purex' process; Chemical and radiometric control analyses; Chromatographic separation of rare earth elements on paper treated by di-n butylphosphate; Preliminary study of some organic nitrogen extracts significant in fuel reprocessing.

  10. Cost/Benefit Prioritization for Advanced Safeguards Research and Development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DeMuth, S.F.; Adeli, R.; Thomas, K.E.

    2008-01-01

    A system level study utilizing commercially available Extend TM software, has been initiated to perform cost/benefit analyses for advanced safeguards research and development. The methodology is focused on estimating standard error in the inventory difference (SEID) for reprocessing and fuel fabrication facilities, for various proposed advanced safeguards measurement technologies. The inventory duration, and consequent number of inventories per year, is dictated by the detection of a significant quantity of special nuclear material (SNM). Detection is limited by the cumulative measurement uncertainty for the entire system. The cost of inventories is then compared with the cost of advanced instrumentation and/or process design changes. Current progress includes development of the methodology, future efforts will be focused on ascertaining estimated costs and performance. Case studies will be provided as examples of the methodology. (author)

  11. Technetium-99 and strontium-90: Abundance determination at ultratrace sensitivity by AMS as signatures of undeclared nuclear reprocessing activity

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McAninch, J.E.; Proctor, I.D.

    1995-03-01

    The purpose of this White Paper is to examine the use of the ultratrace technique Accelerator Mass Spectrometry (AMS) to lower detection limits for 99 Tc and 90 Sr, and to examine the utility of these isotopes as signatures of a convert reprocessing facility. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has committed to improving the effectiveness of the IAEA Safeguards System. This is in some degree a result of the discovery in 1991 of an undeclared Iraqi EMIS program. Recommendations from the March 1993 Consultants Group Meeting have resulted in several studies and follow on field trials to identify environmental signatures from covert nuclear fuel reprocessing activity. In particular, the April, 1993 reports of the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) identified the long-lived radioisotopes Technetium-99 and strontium-90 as two reliable signatures of fuel reprocessing activity. This report also suggested pathways in the chemical processing of irradiated fuel where these elements would be volatilized and potentially released in amounts detectable with ultratrace sensitivity techniques. Based on measured 99 Tc background levels compiled from a variety of sources, it is estimated that AMS can provide 10% measurements of environmental levels of 99 Tc in a few minutes using modestly sized samples: a few grams for soils, plants, or animal tissues; one to several liters for rain or seawater samples; and tens to hundreds of cubic meters for air sampling. Small sample sizes and high sample throughput result in significant increases in feasibility, cost effectiveness, and quality of data for a regional monitoring program. Similar results are expected for 90 Sr

  12. Nuclear fuel reprocessing deactivation plan for the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant, Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Patterson, M.W.

    1994-10-01

    The decision was announced on April 28, 1992 to cease all United States Department of Energy (DOE) reprocessing of nuclear fuels. This decision leads to the deactivation of all fuels dissolution, solvent extraction, krypton gas recovery operations, and product denitration at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). The reprocessing facilities will be converted to a safe and stable shutdown condition awaiting future alternate uses or decontamination and decommissioning (D ampersand D). This ICPP Deactivation Plan includes the scope of work, schedule, costs, and associated staffing levels necessary to achieve a safe and orderly deactivation of reprocessing activities and the Waste Calcining Facility (WCF). Deactivation activities primarily involve shutdown of operating systems and buildings, fissile and hazardous material removal, and related activities. A minimum required level of continued surveillance and maintenance is planned for each facility/process system to ensure necessary environmental, health, and safety margins are maintained and to support ongoing operations for ICPP facilities that are not being deactivated. Management of the ICPP was transferred from Westinghouse Idaho Nuclear Company, Inc. (WINCO) to Lockheed Idaho Technologies Company (LITCO) on October 1, 1994 as part of the INEL consolidated contract. This revision of the deactivation plan (formerly the Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Phaseout Plan for the ICPP) is being published during the consolidation of the INEL site-wide contract and the information presented here is current as of October 31, 1994. LITCO has adopted the existing plans for the deactivation of ICPP reprocessing facilities and the plans developed under WINCO are still being actively pursued, although the change in management may result in changes which have not yet been identified. Accordingly, the contents of this plan are subject to revision

  13. Reprocessing and waste management in the UK

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mogg, C.S.; Howarth, G.G.

    1987-01-01

    The paper concerns the progress in irradiated fuel reprocessing and waste management at the Sellafield site. Magnox fuel reprocessing is reviewed and oxide fuel reprocessing, due to commence in the early 1990s, is compared with existing practices. The article describes how magnox fuel reprocessing will be sustained by recent additions of new plant and shows how waste management downstream of reprocessing will be integrated across the Sellafield site. This article was first presented as a paper at the Waste Management '87 (1-5 March, Tucson, Arizona) conference. (author)

  14. Safety problems in fuel reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Amaury, P.; Jouannaud, C.; Niezborala, F.

    1979-01-01

    The document first situates the reprocessing in the fuel cycle as a whole. It shows that a large reprocessing plant serves a significant number of reactors (50 for a plant of 1500 tonnes per annum). It then assesses the potential risks with respect to the environment as well as with respect to the operating personnel. The amounts of radioactive matter handled are very significant and their easily dispersible physical form represents very important risks. But the low potential energy likely to bring about this dispersion and the very severe and plentiful confinement arrangements are such that the radioactive risks are very small, both with respect to the environment and the operating personnel. The problems of the interventions for maintenance or repairs are mentioned. The intervention techniques in a radioactive environment are perfected, but they represent the main causes of operating personnel irradiation. The design principle applied in the new plants take this fact into account, involving a very significant effort to improve the reliability of the equipment and ensuring the provision of devices enabling the failing components to be replaced without causing irradiation of the personnel [fr

  15. Importance of nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Allday, C.

    1977-01-01

    The following topics are discussed: world energy requirements; energy conservation and the economics of recycle environmental considerations and the timescale of reprocessing; and problems associated with reprocessing. The conclusion is reached that reprocessing is essential to the conservation of the world's energy resources and is an environmentally, and probably an economically, more acceptable option to the ''throw away'' alternative

  16. Reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel; Prerada isluzenog nuklearnog goriva

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gal, I [Institute of Nuclear Sciences Boris Kidric, Laboratorija za visoku aktivnost, Vinca, Beograd (Serbia and Montenegro)

    1963-12-15

    This report covers: chemical-technology investigation of modified purex process for reprocessing of spent fuel; implementation of the procedure for obtaining plutonium peroxide and oxalate; research in the field of uranium, plutonium, and fission products separation by inorganic ion exchangers and extraction by organic solutions; study of the fission products in the heavy water RA reactor.

  17. Handling of spent nuclear fuel and final storage of nitrified high level reprocessing waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The following stages of handling and transport of the fuel on its way to final storage are dealt with in the report. 1) The spent nuclear fuel is stored at the power station or in the central fuel storage facility awaiting reprocessing. 2) The fuel is reprocessed, i.e. uranium, plutonium and waste are separated from each other. Reprocessing does not take place in Sweden. The highlevel waste is vitrified and can be sent back to Sweden in the 1990s. 3) Vitrified waste is stored for about 30 years awaiting deposition in the final repository. 4) The waste is encapsulated in highly durable materials to prevent groundwater from coming into contact with the waste glass while the radioactivity of the waste is still high. 5) The canisters are emplaced in a final repository which is built at a depth of 500 m in rock of low permeability. 6) All tunnels and shafts are filled with a mixture of clay and sand of low permeability. A detailed analysis of possible harmful effects resulting from normal acitivties and from conceivable accidents is presented in a special section. (author)

  18. Airborne effluent control for LMFBR fuel reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yarbro, O.O.; Groenier, W.S.; Stephenson, M.J.

    1976-01-01

    A significant part of the LMFBR fuel reprocessing development program has been devoted to the development of efficient removal systems for the volatile fission products, including 131 I, krypton, tritium, 129 I, and most recently 14 C. Flowsheet studies have indicated that very significant reductions of radioactive effluents can be achieved by integrating advanced effluent control systems with new concepts of containment and ventilation; however, the feasibility of such has not yet been established, nor have the economics been examined. This paper presents a flowsheet for the application of advanced containment systems to the processing of LMFBR fuels and summarizes the status and applicability of specific fission product removal systems

  19. Assessment of the requirements for placing and maintaining Savannah River Site spent fuel storage basins under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Amacker, O.P. Jr.; Curtis, M.M.; Delegard, C.H.; Hsue, S.T.; Whitesel, R.N.

    1997-03-01

    The United States is considering the offer of irradiated research reactor spent fuel (RRSF) for international safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The offer would be to add one or more spent fuel storage basins to the list of facilities eligible for IAEA safeguards. The fuel to be safeguarded would be stored in basins on the Savannah River Site (SRS). This RRSF potentially can include returns of Material Test Reactor (MTR) VAX fuel from Argentina, Brazil, and Chile (ABC); returns from other foreign research reactors; and fuel from domestic research reactors. Basins on the SRS being considered for this fuel storage are the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuel (RBOF) and the L-Area Disassembly Basin (L-Basin). A working group of SRS, U.S. Department of Energy International Safeguards Division (NN-44), and National Laboratory personnel with experience in IAEA safeguards was convened to consider the requirements for applying the safeguards to this material. The working group projected the safeguards requirements and described alternatives

  20. HTGR fuel reprocessing pilot plant: results of the sequential equipment operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strand, J.B.; Fields, D.E.; Kergis, C.A.

    1979-05-01

    The second sequential operation of the HTGR fuel reprocessing cold-dry head-end pilot plant equipment has been successfully completed. Twenty standard LHGTR fuel elements were crushed to a size suitable for combustion in a fluid bed burner. The graphite was combusted leaving a product of fissile and fertile fuel particles. These particles were separated in a pneumatic classifier. The fissile particles were fractured and reburned in a fluid bed to remove the inner carbon coatings. The remaining products are ready for dissolution and solvent extraction fuel recovery

  1. Laser-enhanced chemical reactions and the liquid state. II. Possible applications to nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DePoorter, G.L.; Rofer-DePoorter, C.K.

    1976-01-01

    Laser photochemistry is surveyed as a possible improvement upon the Purex process for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel. Most of the components of spent nuclear fuel are photochemically active, and lasers can be used to selectively excite individual chemical species. The great variety of chemical species present and the degree of separation that must be achieved present difficulties in reprocessing. Lasers may be able to improve the necessary separations by photochemical reaction or effects on rates and equilibria of reactions

  2. Calculation of burn-up data for spent LWR-fuels with respect to the design of spent fuel reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gasteiger, R.

    1976-11-01

    The design of spent fuel reprocessing plants makes necessary a detailed knowledge of the composition of the incoming fuels as a function of burn-up. This report gives a broad review on the composition of radionuclides in fuels (fission products, actinides) and structural materials for different burn-up data. (orig.) [de

  3. Energies and media nr 30. Conditions for the nuclear sector. The fuel cycle and wastes. The usefulness of fuel reprocessing. Wastes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-10-01

    After some comments on recent events in the nuclear sector in different countries (energy policy and projects in the USA, Europe, China, India, Russia), this issue proposes some explanations on the nuclear fuel cycle and on nuclear wastes: involved processes and products from mining to reprocessing and recycling, usefulness of reprocessing (future opportunities of fast neutron reactors, present usefulness of reprocessing with the recycling of separated fissile materials), impact of reprocessing on the environment in La Hague (gas and liquid releases, release standard definition), and the destiny of wastes

  4. Safeguarding the fuel cycle: Methodologies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gruemm, H.

    1984-01-01

    The effectiveness of IAEA safeguards is characterized by the extent to which they achieve their basic purpose - credible verification that no nuclear material is diverted from peaceful uses. This effectiveness depends inter alia but significantly on manpower in terms of the number and qualifications of inspectors. Staff increases will be required to improve effectiveness further, if this is requested by Member States, as well as to take into account new facilities expected to come under safeguards in the future. However, they are difficult to achieve due to financial constraints set by the IAEA budget. As a consequence, much has been done and is being undertaken to improve utilization of available manpower, including standardization of inspection procedures; improvement of management practices and training; rationalization of planning, reporting, and evaluation of inspection activities; and development of new equipment. This article focuses on certain aspects of the verification methodology presently used and asks: are any modifications of this methodology conceivable that would lead to economies of manpower, without loss of effectiveness. It has been stated in this context that present safeguards approaches are ''facility-oriented'' and that the adoption of a ''fuel cycle-oriented approach'' might bring about the desired savings. Many studies have been devoted to this very interesting suggestion. Up to this moment, no definite answer is available and further studies will be necessary to come to a conclusion. In what follows, the essentials of the problem are explained and some possible paths to a solution are discussed

  5. Removal of spent fuel from the TVR reactor for reprocessing and proposals for the RA reactor spent fuel handling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Volkov, E.B.; Konev, V.N.; Shvedov, O.V.; Bulkin, S.Yu; Sokolov, A.V.

    2002-01-01

    The 2,5 MW heavy-water moderated and cooled research reactor TVR was located at the Moscow Institute for Theoretical and Experimental Physics site. In 1990 the final batch of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from the TVR reactor was transported for reprocessing to Production Association (PA) 'Mayak'. This transportation of the SNF was a part of TVR reactor decommissioning. The special technology and equipment was developed in order to fulfill the preparation of TVR SNF for transportation. The design of the TVR reactor and the fuel elements used are similar to the design and fuel elements of the RA reactor. Two different ways of RA spent fuel elements for transportation to reprocessing plant are considered: in aluminum barrels, and in additional cans. The experience and equipment used for the preparing TVR fuel elements for transportation can help the staff of RA reactor to find the optimal way for these technical operations. (author)

  6. Overview of safeguards aspects related to MOX fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heinonen, O.J.; Murakami, K.; Shea, T.

    2000-01-01

    Recent developments in the light of the IAEA verification requirements for MOX fuel at reactors and bulk handling facilities are discussed. Impact of the Additional Protocol and Integrated Safeguards System is briefly addressed. Agency's work undertaken with regard to the nuclear arms control and reduction is presented. (author)

  7. Methodology for evaluation of alternative technologies applied to nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Selvaduray, G.S.; Goldstein, M.K.; Anderson, R.N.

    1977-07-01

    An analytic methodology has been developed to compare the performance of various nuclear fuel reprocessing techniques for advanced fuel cycle applications including low proliferation risk systems. The need to identify and to compare those processes, which have the versatility to handle the variety of fuel types expected to be in use in the next century, is becoming increasingly imperative. This methodology allows processes in any stage of development to be compared and to assess the effect of changing external conditions on the process

  8. Spectroscopic methods of process monitoring for safeguards of used nuclear fuel separations

    Science.gov (United States)

    Warburton, Jamie Lee

    To support the demonstration of a more proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel processing plant, techniques and instrumentation to allow the real-time, online determination of special nuclear material concentrations in-process must be developed. An ideal materials accountability technique for proliferation resistance should provide nondestructive, realtime, on-line information of metal and ligand concentrations in separations streams without perturbing the process. UV-Visible spectroscopy can be adapted for this precise purpose in solvent extraction-based separations. The primary goal of this project is to understand fundamental URanium EXtraction (UREX) and Plutonium-URanium EXtraction (PUREX) reprocessing chemistry and corresponding UV-Visible spectroscopy for application in process monitoring for safeguards. By evaluating the impact of process conditions, such as acid concentration, metal concentration and flow rate, on the sensitivity of the UV-Visible detection system, the process-monitoring concept is developed from an advanced application of fundamental spectroscopy. Systematic benchtop-scale studies investigated the system relevant to UREX or PUREX type reprocessing systems, encompassing 0.01-1.26 M U and 0.01-8 M HNO3. A laboratory-scale TRansUranic Extraction (TRUEX) demonstration was performed and used both to analyze for potential online monitoring opportunities in the TRUEX process, and to provide the foundation for building and demonstrating a laboratory-scale UREX demonstration. The secondary goal of the project is to simulate a diversion scenario in UREX and successfully detect changes in metal concentration and solution chemistry in a counter current contactor system with a UV-Visible spectroscopic process monitor. UREX uses the same basic solvent extraction flowsheet as PUREX, but has a lower acid concentration throughout and adds acetohydroxamic acid (AHA) as a complexant/reductant to the feed solution to prevent the extraction of Pu. By examining

  9. Study of the chemical behaviour of technetium during irradiated fuels reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zelverte, A.

    1988-04-01

    This paper deals with the preparation of the lower oxidation states +III +IV and +V of technetium in nitric acid and its behaviour during the reprocessing of nuclear fuels (PUREX process). The first part of this work is a bibliographical study of this element in solution without any strong ligand. By chemical and electrochemical technics, pentavalent, tetravalent and trivalent technetium species, were prepared in nitric acid. The following chemical reactions are studied: - trivalent and tetravalent technetium oxidation by nitrate ion. - hydrazine and tetravalent uranium oxidation catalysed by technetium: in those reactions, we point out unequivocally the prominent part of trivalent and tetravalent technetium, - technetium behaviour towards hydroxylamine. Technetium should not cause any disturbance in the steps where hydroxylamine is employed to destroy nitrous acid and hydrazine replacement by hydroxylamine in uranium-plutonium partition could contribute to a best reprocessing of nuclear fuels [fr

  10. Optimizing near real time accountability for reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cipiti, Benjamin B.

    2010-01-01

    Near Real Time Accountability (NRTA) of actinides at high precision in reprocessing plants has been a long sought-after goal in the safeguards community. Achieving this goal is hampered by the difficulty of making precision measurements in the reprocessing environment, equipment cost, and impact to plant operations. Thus the design of future reprocessing plants requires an optimization of different approaches. The Separations and Safeguards Performance Model, developed at Sandia National Laboratories, was used to evaluate a number of NRTA strategies in a UREX+ reprocessing plant. Strategies examined include the incorporation of additional actinide measurements of internal plant vessels, more use of process monitoring data, and the option of periodic draining of inventory to key tanks. Preliminary results show that the addition of measurement technologies can increase the overall measurement uncertainty due to additional error propagation, so care must be taken when designing an advanced system. Initial results also show that relying on a combination of different NRTA techniques will likely be the best option. The model provides a platform for integrating all the data. The modeling results for the different NRTA options under various material loss conditions will be presented.

  11. Software to improve spent fuel measurements using the FDET

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Staples, P.; Beddingfield, D.; Lestone, J.; Pelowitz, D.; Sprinkle, J.; Bytchkov, V.; Starovich, Z.; Harizanov, I.; Vellejo-Luna, J.; Lavender, C.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: Vast quantities of spent fuel are available for safeguard measurements, primarily in Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) of the former Soviet Union. This spent fuel, much of which consists of long cooling time material, is going to become less unique in the world safeguards arena as reprocessing projects or permanent repositories continue to be delayed or postponed. The long cooling time of many of the spent fuel assemblies in the CIS countries being prepared for intermediate term storage promotes the possibility of increased accuracy in spent fuel assays. An important point to consider for the future that could advance safeguards measurements for re-verification and inspection measurements would be to determine what safeguards requirements should be imposed upon this 'new' class of spent fuel. Improvements in measurement capability will obviously affect the safeguards requirements. What most significantly enables this progress in spent fuel measurements is the improvement in computer processing power and software enhancements leading to user-friendly Graphical User Interfaces (GUI's). The software used for these projects significantly reduces the IAEA inspector's time both learning and operating computer and data acquisition systems. While at the same time by standardizing the spent fuel measurements it is possible to increase reproducibility and reliability of the measurement data. The inclusion of various analysis algorithms into the operating environment, which can be performed in real time upon the measurement data, can also lead to increases in safeguard reliability and improvements in efficiency to plant operations. (author)

  12. Assembly of laboratory line for nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fidler, J.; Chotivka, V.

    1979-01-01

    The dismantling of a laboratory line for spent fuel reprocessing after the termination of the research programme and the procedures for hot and semi-hot cell decontamination are described. The equipment was mostly disassembled in smaller parts which were then decontaminated by wiping them with cotton wool soaked in detergent and citric acid, varnished with two-component epoxi varnish, wrapped into multiple polyethylene foils, sealed in PVC bags and thus ready for transport. (B.S.)

  13. Safety aspects of reprocessing and plutonium fuel facilities in power reactor and nuclear fuel development corporation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sato, S.; Akutsu, H.; Nakajima, K.; Kono, K.; Muto, T.

    1977-01-01

    PNC completed the construction of the first Japanese reprocessing plant in 1974, and the startup is now under way. The plant will have a capacity of 0.7 metric tons of spent fuel per day. Various safety measures for earthquake, radiation, criticality, fire, explosion and leakage of radioactive materials are provided in the plant. 8,000 Ci of Kr-85 and 50 Ci of H-3 per day will be released from the plant to enviroment. Skin dose is conservatively estimated to be about 30 mrem per year. Liquid waste containing 0.7 Ci per day will be discharged into the sea. Whole body dose is conservatively estimated to be 10 mrem per year. R and D for removal of Kr-85 and reducing radioactivity released into the sea are being carried out. Developmental works for solidification of radioactive liquid waste are also being conducted. Safety control in plutonium handling work for both R and D and fuel fabrication has been successfully conducted without significant abnormal occurrence in these ten years. By ''zero-contamination control policy'', surface contamination and airborne contamination in operation rooms are maintained at the background level in usual operation. The intake of plutonium was found at the maximum about one-hundredths of the MPB. External exposure has been generally controlled below three-tenths rem for three months, by shielding and mechanization of process. The radioactivity concentration of exhaust air and liquid effluent disposal is ensured far below the regulation level. Nuclear material control is maintained by a computer system, and no criticality problem has occurred. The safeguard system and installation has been improved, and is sufficient to satisfy the IAEA regulation

  14. Cost probability analysis of reprocessing spent nuclear fuel in the US

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Recktenwald, G.D.; Deinert, M.R.

    2012-01-01

    The methods by which nuclear power's radioactive signature could be reduced typically require the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. However, economic assessments of the costs that are associated with doing this are subject to a high degree of uncertainty. We present a probabilistic analysis of the costs to build, operate and decommission the facilities that would be required to reprocess all US spent nuclear fuel generated over a one hundred year time frame, starting from a 2010 power production rate. The analysis suggests a total life-cycle cost of 2.11 ± 0.26 mills/kWh, with a 90% and 99% confidence that the overall cost would remain below 2.45 and 2.75 mills/kWh respectively. The most significant effects on cost come from the efficiency of the reactor fleet and the growth rate of nuclear power. The analysis shows that discounting results in life-cycle costs decreasing as recycling is delayed. However the costs to store spent fuel closely counter the effect of discounting when an intergenerational discount rate is used.

  15. An analysis of development and research on spent nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Borges Silverio, Leticia; Queiroz Lamas, Wendell de

    2011-01-01

    Nuclear energy comes back to the discussions on the world stage as an energy source that does not contribute to global warming during production process. It can be chosen as the main source of power generation in some countries or complement the energy matrix in others. In this context, there is the need to develop new technologies for the management of radioactive waste generated by the production process. Final repositories for spent fuel are not yet in commercial operation, and techniques for fuel reprocessing have been developed, because after use, the fuel still has materials that produce energy. Some countries already use reprocessing, and develop research to make it more secure and more competitive, while others prefer to adopt policies to prevent developments in this area due to the problem of nuclear proliferation. In another line of research, new reactors are being developed in order to reduce the amount of waste in energy production and some will be designed to work in closed loop, recycling the materials generated.

  16. An analysis of development and research on spent nuclear fuel reprocessing

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Borges Silverio, Leticia; Lamas, Wendell de Queiroz [University of Taubate, Postgraduate Programme in Mechanical Engineering, Rua Daniel Danelli, s/n, Jd. Morumbi, Taubate, SP 12060-440 (Brazil)

    2011-01-15

    Nuclear energy comes back to the discussions on the world stage as an energy source that does not contribute to global warming during production process. It can be chosen as the main source of power generation in some countries or complement the energy matrix in others. In this context, there is the need to develop new technologies for the management of radioactive waste generated by the production process. Final repositories for spent fuel are not yet in commercial operation, and techniques for fuel reprocessing have been developed, because after use, the fuel still has materials that produce energy. Some countries already use reprocessing, and develop research to make it more secure and more competitive, while others prefer to adopt policies to prevent developments in this area due to the problem of nuclear proliferation. In another line of research, new reactors are being developed in order to reduce the amount of waste in energy production and some will be designed to work in closed loop, recycling the materials generated. (author)

  17. Flowsheet development for HTGR fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baxter, B.; Benedict, G.E.; Zimmerman, R.D.

    1976-01-01

    Development studies to date indicate that the HTGR fuel blocks can be effectively crushed with two stages of eccentric jaw crushing, followed by a double-roll crusher, a screener and an eccentrically mounted single-roll crusher for oversize particles. Burner development results indicate successful long-term operation of both the primary and secondary fluidized-bed combustion systems can be performed with the equipment developed in this program. Aqueous separation development activities have centered on adapting known Acid-Thorex processing technology to the HTGR reprocessing task. Significant progress has been made on dissolution of burner ash, solvent extraction feed preparation, slurry transfer, solids drying and solvent extraction equipment and flowsheet requirements

  18. Behavior of silicon in nitric media. Application to uranium silicides fuels reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cheroux, L.

    2001-01-01

    Uranium silicides are used in some research reactors. Reprocessing them is a solution for their cycle end. A list of reprocessing scenarios has been set the most realistic being a nitric dissolution close to the classic spent fuel reprocessing. This uranium silicide fuel contains a lot of silicon and few things are known about polymerization of silicic acid in concentrated nitric acid. The study of this polymerization allows to point out the main parameters: acidity, temperature, silicon concentration. The presence of aluminum seems to speed up heavily the polymerization. It has been impossible to find an analytical technique smart and fast enough to characterize the first steps of silicic acid polymerization. However the action of silicic species on emulsions stabilization formed by mixing them with an organic phase containing TBP has been studied, Silicon slows down the phase separation by means of oligomeric species forming complex with TBP. The existence of these intermediate species is short and heating can avoid any stabilization. When non irradiated uranium silicide fuel is attacked by a nitric solution, aluminum and uranium are quickly dissolved whereas silicon mainly stands in solid state. That builds a gangue of hydrated silica around the uranium silicide particulates without preventing uranium dissolution. A small part of silicon passes into the solution and polymerize towards the highly poly-condensed forms, just 2% of initial silicon is still in molecular form at the end of the dissolution. A thermal treatment of the fuel element, by forming inter-metallic phases U-Al-Si, allows the whole silicon to pass into the solution and next to precipitate. The behavior of silicon in spent fuels should be between these two situations. (author)

  19. Reasons for and against reprocessing of spent fuel elements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gries, W

    1983-06-01

    In the following the reasons for and against the main methods of waste disposal are compared. The author examines the advantages and disadvantages of waste disposal by reprocessing of spent fuel assemblies or by immediate ultimate storage. To get a general idea the pros and cons are arranged and analysed according to the following subjects: - technology/science, - safety/environment, - profitability, - political aspects.

  20. Evaluation technology for burnup and generated amount of plutonium by measurement of Xenon isotopic ratio in dissolver off-gas at reprocessing facility (Joint research)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Okano, Masanori; Kuno, Takehiko; Shirouzu, Hidetomo; Yamada, Keiji; Sakai, Toshio; Takahashi, Ichiro; Charlton, William S.; Wells, Cyndi A.; Hemberger, Philip H.

    2006-12-01

    The amount of Pu in the spent fuel was evaluated from Xe isotopic ratio in off-gas in reprocessing facility, is related to burnup. Six batches of dissolver off-gas (DOG) at spent fuel dissolution process were sampled from the main stack in Tokai Reprocessing Plant (TRP) during BWR fuel (approx. 30GWD/MTU) reprocessing campaign. Xenon isotopic ratio was determined with Gas Chromatography/Mass Spectrometry. Burnup and generated amount of Pu were evaluated with Noble Gas Environmental Monitoring Application code (NOVA), developed by Los Alamos National Laboratory. Inferred burnup evaluated by Xe isotopic measurements and NOVA were in good agreement with those of the declared burnup in the range from -3.8% to 7.1%. Also, the inferred amount of Pu in spent fuel was in good agreed with those of the declared amount of Pu calculated by ORIGEN code in the range from -0.9% to 4.7%. The evaluation technique is applicable for both burnup credit to achieve efficient criticality safety control and a new measurement method for safeguards inspection. (author)

  1. Long-term proliferation and safeguards issues in future technologies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keisch, B.; Auerbach, C.; Fainberg, A.; Fiarman, S.; Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.; Lemley, J.R.; O'Brien, J.

    1986-02-01

    The purpose of the task was to assess the effect of potential new technologies, nuclear and non-nuclear, on safeguards needs and non-proliferation policies, and to explore possible solutions to some of the problems envisaged. Eight subdivisions were considered: New Enrichment Technologies; Non-Aqueous Reprocessing Technologies; Fusion; Accelerator-Driven Reactor Systems; New Reactor Types; Heavy Water and Deuterium; Long-Term Storage of Spent Fuel; and Other Future Technologies (Non-Nuclear). For each of these subdivisions, a careful review of the current world-wide effort in the field provided a means of subjectively estimating the viability and qualitative probability of fruition of promising technologies. Technologies for which safeguards and non-proliferation requirements have been thoroughly considered by others were not restudied here (e.g., the Fast Breeder Reactor). The time scale considered was 5 to 40 years for possible initial demonstration although, in some cases, a somewhat optimistic viewpoint was embraced. Conventional nuclear-material safeguards are only part of the overall non-proliferation regime. Other aspects are international agreements, export controls on sensitive technologies, classification of information, intelligence gathering, and diplomatic initiatives. The focus here is on safeguards, export controls, and classification

  2. Long-term proliferation and safeguards issues in future technologies

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Keisch, B.; Auerbach, C.; Fainberg, A.; Fiarman, S.; Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.; Lemley, J.R.; O' Brien, J.

    1986-02-01

    The purpose of the task was to assess the effect of potential new technologies, nuclear and non-nuclear, on safeguards needs and non-proliferation policies, and to explore possible solutions to some of the problems envisaged. Eight subdivisions were considered: New Enrichment Technologies; Non-Aqueous Reprocessing Technologies; Fusion; Accelerator-Driven Reactor Systems; New Reactor Types; Heavy Water and Deuterium; Long-Term Storage of Spent Fuel; and Other Future Technologies (Non-Nuclear). For each of these subdivisions, a careful review of the current world-wide effort in the field provided a means of subjectively estimating the viability and qualitative probability of fruition of promising technologies. Technologies for which safeguards and non-proliferation requirements have been thoroughly considered by others were not restudied here (e.g., the Fast Breeder Reactor). The time scale considered was 5 to 40 years for possible initial demonstration although, in some cases, a somewhat optimistic viewpoint was embraced. Conventional nuclear-material safeguards are only part of the overall non-proliferation regime. Other aspects are international agreements, export controls on sensitive technologies, classification of information, intelligence gathering, and diplomatic initiatives. The focus here is on safeguards, export controls, and classification.

  3. General criteria for the project of nuclear fuel reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    Recommendations are presented establishing the general criteria for the project of nuclear fuel reprocessing plants to be licensed according to the legislation in effect. They apply to all the plant's systems, components and structures which are important to operation safety and to the public's health and safety. (F.E.) [pt

  4. International safeguards for a modern MOX [mixed-oxide] fuel fabrication facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.; Stirpe, D.; Picard, R.R.

    1987-03-01

    Bulk-handling facilities that process plutonium for commercial fuel cycles offer considerable challenges to nuclear materials safeguards. Modern fuel fabrication facilities that handle mixed oxides of plutonium and uranium (MOX) often have large inventories of special nuclear materials in their process lines and in storage areas for feed and product materials. In addition, the remote automated processing prevalent at new MOX facilities, which is necessary to minimize radiation exposures to personnel, tends to limit access for measurements and inspections. The facility design considered in this study incorporates all these features as well as state-of-the-art measurement technologies for materials accounting. Key elements of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards for such a fuel-cycle facility have been identified in this report, and several issues of primary importance to materials accountancy and IAEA verifications have been examined. We have calculated detection sensitivities for abrupt and protracted diversions of plutonium assuming a single materials balance area for all processing areas. To help achieve optimal use of limited IAEA inspection resources, we have calculated sampling plans for attributes/variables verification. In addition, we have demonstrated the usefulness of calculating σ/sub (MUF-D)/ and detection probabilities corresponding to specified material-loss scenarios and resource allocations. The data developed and the analyses performed during this study can assist both the facility operator and the IAEA in formulating necessary safeguards approaches and verification procedures to implement international safeguards for special nuclear materials

  5. International safeguards for a modern MOX (mixed-oxide) fuel fabrication facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pillay, K.K.S.; Stirpe, D.; Picard, R.R.

    1987-03-01

    Bulk-handling facilities that process plutonium for commercial fuel cycles offer considerable challenges to nuclear materials safeguards. Modern fuel fabrication facilities that handle mixed oxides of plutonium and uranium (MOX) often have large inventories of special nuclear materials in their process lines and in storage areas for feed and product materials. In addition, the remote automated processing prevalent at new MOX facilities, which is necessary to minimize radiation exposures to personnel, tends to limit access for measurements and inspections. The facility design considered in this study incorporates all these features as well as state-of-the-art measurement technologies for materials accounting. Key elements of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards for such a fuel-cycle facility have been identified in this report, and several issues of primary importance to materials accountancy and IAEA verifications have been examined. We have calculated detection sensitivities for abrupt and protracted diversions of plutonium assuming a single materials balance area for all processing areas. To help achieve optimal use of limited IAEA inspection resources, we have calculated sampling plans for attributes/variables verification. In addition, we have demonstrated the usefulness of calculating sigma/sub (MUF-D)/ and detection probabilities corresponding to specified material-loss scenarios and resource allocations. The data developed and the analyses performed during this study can assist both the facility operator and the IAEA in formulating necessary safeguards approaches and verification procedures to implement international safeguards for special nuclear materials.

  6. Worldwide reprocessing supply and demand

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pinto, S.

    1987-01-01

    The aim of this paper is to broadly examine the current situation in the LWR fuel reprocessing services market on a worldwide basis through 2010. The main factors influencing this market (nuclear programs, fuel discharges, reprocessing capacities, buyer philosophies, etc.) are identified in the paper and the most important are highlighted and discussed in more detail. Emphasis has been placed on the situation with respect to reprocessing in those countries having a significant influence on the reprocessing market

  7. Part 5. Fuel cycle options

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lineberry, M.J.; McFarlane, H.F.; Amundson, P.I.; Goin, R.W.; Webster, D.S.

    1980-01-01

    The results of the FBR fuel cycle study that supported US contributions to the INFCE are presented. Fuel cycle technology is reviewed from both generic and historical standpoints. Technology requirements are developed within the framework of three deployment scenarios: the reference international, the secured area, and the integral cycle. Reprocessing, fabrication, waste handling, transportation, and safeguards are discussed for each deployment scenario. Fuel cycle modifications designed to increase proliferation defenses are described and assessed for effectiveness and technology feasibility. The present status of fuel cycle technology is reviewed and key issues that require resolution are identified

  8. Research on solvent extraction process for reprocessing of Th-U fuel from HTGR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bao Borong; Wang Gaodong; Qian Jun

    1992-05-01

    The unique properties of spent fuel from HTGR (high temperature gas cooled reactor) have been analysed. The single solvent extraction process using 30% TBP for separation and purification of Th-U fuel has been studied. In addition, the solvent extraction process for second uranium purification is also investigated to meet different needs of reprocessing and reproduction of Th-U spent fuel from HTGR

  9. Legal problems connected with irradiated fuel reprocessing and its waste storage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nercy, B. de.

    1981-10-01

    In view of its nature, an irradiated nuclear fuel reprocessing operation -and the contracts implementing it between the reprocessor and the customer- raises certain difficult legal problems. This paper analyses this question from the legal viewpoint, in particular as regards nuclear fuel and material ownership and products or waste arising therefrom, as well as in the context of rules of international trade and non-proliferation standards. (NEA) [fr

  10. Fast breeder reactor fuel reprocessing R and D: technological development for a commercial plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Colas, J.; Saudray, D.; Coste, J.A.; Roux, J.P.; Jouan, A.

    1987-01-01

    The technological developments undertaken by the CEA are applied to a plant project of a 50 t/y capacity, having to reprocess in particular the SUPERPHENIX 1 reactor fuel. French experience on fast breeder reactor fuel reprocessing is presented, then the 50 t/y capacity plant project and the research and development installations. The R and D programs are described, concerning: head-end operations, solvent extractions, Pu02 conversion and storage, out-of-specification Pu02 redissolution, fission products solution vitrification, conditioning of stainless steel hulls by melting, development of remote operation equipments, study of corrosion and analytical problems

  11. Environmental control aspects for fabrication, reprocessing and waste disposal of alternative LWR and LMFBR fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nolan, A.M.; Lewallen, M.A.; McNair, G.W.

    1979-11-01

    Environmental control aspects of alternative fuel cycles have been analyzed by evaluating fabrication, reprocessing, and waste disposal operations. Various indices have been used to assess potential environmental control requirements. For the fabrication and reprocessing operations, 50-year dose commitments were used. Waste disposal was evaluated by comparing projected nuclide concentrations in ground water at various time periods with maximum permissible concentrations (MPCs). Three different fabrication plants were analyzed: a fuel fabrication plant (FFP) to produce low-activity uranium and uranium-thorium fuel rods; a plutonium fuel refabrication plant (PFRFP) to produce plutonium-uranium and plutonium-thorium fuel rods; and a uranium fuel refabrication plant (UFRFP) to produce fuel rods containing the high-activity isotopes 232 U and 233 U. Each plant's dose commitments are discussed separately. Source terms for the analysis of effluents from the fuel reprocessing plant (FRP) were calculated using the fuel burnup codes LEOPARD, CINDER and ORIGEN. Effluent quantities are estimated for each fuel type. Bedded salt was chosen for the waste repository analysis. The repository site is modeled on the Waste Isolation Pilot Program site in New Mexico. Wastes assumed to be stored in the repository include high-level vitrified waste from the FRP, packaged fuel residue from the FRP, and transuranic (TRU) contaminated wastes from the FFP, PFRFP, and UFRFP. The potential environmental significance was determined by estimating the ground-water concentrations of the various nuclides over a time span of a million years. The MPC for each nuclide was used along with the estimated ground-water concentration to generate a biohazard index for the comparison among fuel compositions

  12. Revisit of analytical methods for the process and plant control analyses during reprocessing of fast reactor fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Subba Rao, R.V.

    2016-01-01

    CORAL (COmpact facility for Reprocessing of Advanced fuels in Lead cell) is an experimental facility for demonstrating the reprocessing of irradiated fast reactor fuels discharged from the Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR). The objective of the reprocessing plant is to achieve nuclear grade plutonium and uranium oxides with minimum process waste volumes. The process flow sheet for the reprocessing of spent Fast Reactor Fuel consists of Transport of spent fuel, Chopping, Dissolution, Feed conditioning, Solvent Extraction cycle, Partitioning Cycle and Re-conversion of Plutonium nitrate and uranium nitrate to respective oxides. The efficiency and performance of the plant to achieve desired objective depends on the analyses of various species in the different steps adopted during reprocessing of fuels. The analytical requirements in the plant can be broadly classified as 1. Process control Analyses (Analyses which effect the performance of the plant- PCA); 2. Plant control Analyses (Analyses which indicates efficiency of the plant-PLCA); 3. Nuclear Material Accounting samples (Analyses which has bearing on nuclear material accounting in the plant - NUMAC) and Quality control Analyses (Quality of the input bulk chemicals as well as products - QCA). The analytical methods selected are based on the duration of analyses, precision and accuracies required for each type analytical requirement classified earlier. The process and plant control analyses requires lower precision and accuracies as compared to NUMAC analyses, which requires very high precision accuracy. The time taken for analyses should be as lower as possible for process and plant control analyses as compared to NUMAC analyses. The analytical methods required for determining U and Pu in process and plant samples from FRFR will be different as compared to samples from TRFR (Thermal Reactor Fuel Reprocessing) due to higher Pu to U ratio in FRFR as compared TRFR and they should be such that they can be easily

  13. Low-decontamination approach to a proliferation-resistant fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Asquith, J.G.; Grantham, L.F.

    1978-01-01

    To prevent the diversion of nuclear material from power production to weapon production either by a nation or by clandestine groups within a nation, the nuclear fuel cycle must be proliferation-resistant and safeguarded. Potentially proliferation-resistant and safeguarded fuel cycles based on low-decontamination pyroreprocessing have been developed for the light water reactor (LWR), fast breeder reactor (FBR), and FBR-LWR combination. The major penalty for recycling fission products to the LWR is that fuel enrichment must be somewhat greater to overcome parasitic fission product absorption of neutrons. In the FBR, the major penalty is a slight reduction in breeding ratio due to the displacement of fertile material by fission products. Preliminary cost analysis indicates that these fuel cycles are economically competitive with fuel cycles using conventional reprocessing or those using virgin uranium if spent fuel storage costs are considered

  14. A safeguards approach for a closed geological repository for spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meer, K. van der; Carchon, R.

    1999-01-01

    After closure of a geological repository a diversion of fissile material can only take place by excavating spent fuel containers and bringing them to the surface. Therefore mining activities are required, either by reopening the original shaft, by creating a new shaft or by approaching the containers underground via a neighbouring mine The recovery time of the stored spent fuel plays an important role in the determination of the timeliness criterion and, therefore, the inspection frequency of the site. Obviously, this frequency can create a financial constraint due to the infinite character of the spent fuel storage in a geological repository. Anomalies for detection of a possible diversion are undeclared mining activities. The safeguards approach has to assure Continuity Of Knowledge (COK) of the fissile material. By consequence, a safeguards approach that is developed for a closed repository, is influenced by the safeguards approach applied to an open. repository and a conditioning facility. A closed repository is verified by DIV. To perform the DIV satellite monitoring could be performed for surface verification and e.g. seismic techniques could be used for verification that no undeclared mining activities underground take place. Visual inspections of the site by inspectors have to reveal concealment methods used by a potential diverter. These measures should guarantee that the disposed spent fuel remains untouched. (author)

  15. International safeguards in large-scale nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gupta, D.; Heil, J.

    1977-01-01

    The trend in the energy sector in most of the world's industrialized areas shows rather clearly that the rate of installing nuclear plants will be very high and that the largest possible units of nuclear material handling and storage facilities will be built. Various experiments and analyses of measurement methods relevant to safeguards in typical nuclear facilities such as a fuel reprocessing or a fabrication plant have shown that the associated measurement errors as obtained under normal operating conditions are such that they are mainly dominated by systematic errors, which may lie in the range of percentages of the measured amount so that a material balance in such a plant could not normally be closed with any higher accuracy. For example, in a reprocessing plant with a throughput of 1500t U/a and a corresponding throughput of 15t Pu/a, a systematic error of 1% would cause a measurement uncertainty of around 70kg Pu in case a material balance is struck twice a year. Such a large amount may be considered to be unacceptable from the point of view of international safeguards since it arises out of a single plant. The simplest way of getting around the problem would be to strike a material balance more frequently over a given period. This could, however, lead to an enormous increase in the technical and financial burden for the operator of a facility. This paper analyses this problem in some detail for some facilities and shows that, for example, with a properly developed information system in such plants and a combination of containment, surveillance and accountancy measures, a safeguards system can be built up for such facilities. (author)

  16. Experimental research subject and renovation of chemical processing facility (CPF) for advanced fast reactor fuel reprocessing technology development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koyama, Tomozo; Shinozaki, Tadahiro; Nomura, Kazunori; Koma, Yoshikazu; Miyachi, Shigehiko; Ichige, Yoshiaki; Kobayashi, Tsuguyuki; Nemoto, Shin-ichi

    2002-01-01

    In order to enhance economical efficiency, environmental impact and nuclear nonproliferation resistance, the Advanced Reprocessing Technology, such as simplification and optimization of process, and applicability evaluation of the innovative technology that was not adopted up to now, has been developed for the reprocessing of the irradiated fuel taken out from a fast reactor. Renovation of the hot cell interior equipments, establishment and updating of glove boxes, installation of various analytical equipments, etc. in the Chemical Processing Facility (CPF) was done to utilize the CPF more positivity which is the center of the experimental field, where actual fuel can be used, for research and development towards establishment of the Advanced Reprocessing Technology development. The hot trials using the irradiated fuel pins of the experimental fast reactor 'JOYO' for studies on improved aqueous reprocessing technology, MA separation technology, dry process technology, etc. are scheduled to be carried out with these new equipments. (author)

  17. Alternative fuel cycle evaluation in the Federal Republic of Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Papp, R.; Closs, K.D.

    1986-01-01

    In compliance with a 1979 governmental decision, Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center managed the research and development (R and D) program ''Alternative Entsorgung,'' which had two major goals: (a) development of technical concepts for direct disposal of spent fuel and (b) comparison of the traditional back end of the nuclear fuel cycle based on fuel reprocessing with direct disposal. With respect to radiological safety, this comparison revealed that direct disposal scores better than the reprocessing path, but the difference is judged minor when compared to doses from natural radiation background. From the standpoint of cost, direct disposal proves more economical by a margin of 30% even though the reference system of direct disposal was not cost optimized. Finally, some unresolved but not unresolvable issues exist with regard to safeguarding a repository for spent fuel. In its decision in January 1985, the government of the Federal Republic of Germany stated that the results of the R and D program indicated that the legal requirement to ensure Entsorgung were better fulfilled by fuel reprocessing than by direct disposal of spent fuel

  18. High temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) graphite pebble fuel: Review of technologies for reprocessing

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mcwilliams, A. J. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States). Savannah River National Lab. (SRNL)

    2015-09-08

    This report reviews literature on reprocessing high temperature gas-cooled reactor graphite fuel components. A basic review of the various fuel components used in the pebble bed type reactors is provided along with a survey of synthesis methods for the fabrication of the fuel components. Several disposal options are considered for the graphite pebble fuel elements including the storage of intact pebbles, volume reduction by separating the graphite from fuel kernels, and complete processing of the pebbles for waste storage. Existing methods for graphite removal are presented and generally consist of mechanical separation techniques such as crushing and grinding chemical techniques through the use of acid digestion and oxidation. Potential methods for reprocessing the graphite pebbles include improvements to existing methods and novel technologies that have not previously been investigated for nuclear graphite waste applications. The best overall method will be dependent on the desired final waste form and needs to factor in the technical efficiency, political concerns, cost, and implementation.

  19. Dynamic behaviour of solvent contactors in fuel reprocessing plants- an analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Raju, R P; Siddiqui, H R [Nuclear Waste Management Group, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Mumbai (India); Murthy, K K; Kansra, V P [Fuel Reprocessing Group, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Mumbai (India)

    1994-06-01

    Fuel reprocessing plants carry out separation of useful fissile and fertile materials from spent nuclear fuels by isolating highly radioactive fission products using solvent extraction method. In the fuel reprocessing step of nuclear fuel cycle, optimisation of process parameters in the PUREX flowsheet design is of great importance particularly on account of the need to realize high degree of recovery of fissile and fertile materials and to ensure proper control on concentrations of fissile element in process streams for avoidance of criticality. In counter-current solvent contactors of PUREX flowsheet there are a variety of processes conditions which may cause plutonium accumulations that requires attention to ascertain safe Pu concentrations within the contactors. A study was carried out using the PUREX process mathematical model Solvent Extraction Program Having Interacting Solutes (SEPHIS) for pulsed solvent contactors in PREFRE-1, Tarapur and PREFRE-2, Kalpakkam flowsheets for optimising the process parameters in plutonium purification cycles. The study was extended to predict the behaviour of contactors handling plutonium bearing solutions under certain anticipated deviations in the process parameters. Modifications wherever necessary were carried out to the original SEPHIS code. This paper discusses the results obtained during this analysis. (author). 2 figs., 2 tabs.

  20. How can Korea secure uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing rights?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Roh, Seungkook; Kim, Wonjoon

    2014-01-01

    South Korea is heavily dependent on energy resources from other countries and nuclear energy accounts for 31% of Korea's electric power generation as a major energy. However, Korea has many limitations in uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing under the current Korea-U.S. nuclear agreement, although they are economically and politically important to Korea due to a significant problems in nuclear fuel storages. Therefore, in this paper, we first examine those example countries – Japan, Vietnam, and Iran – that have made nuclear agreements with the U.S. or have changed their agreements to allow the enrichment of uranium and the reprocessing of spent fuel. Then, we analyze those countries' nuclear energy policies and review their strategic repositioning in the relationship with the U.S. We find that a strong political stance for peaceful usage of nuclear energy including the legislation of nuclear laws as was the case of Japan. In addition, it is important for Korea to acquire advanced technological capability such as sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) because SFR technologies require plutonium to be used as fuel rather than uranium-235. In addition, Korea needs to leverage its position in nuclear agreement between China and the U.S. as was the case of Vietnam

  1. Available reprocessing and recycling services for research reactor spent nuclear fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tozser, Sandor Miklos; Adelfang, Pablo; Bradley, Ed [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Budu, Madalina [SOSNY Research and Development Company, Moscow (Russian Federation); Chiguer, Mustapha [AREVA, Paris (France)

    2015-05-15

    International activities in the back-end of the research reactor (RR) fuel cycle have so far been dominated by the programmes of acceptance of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) by the country where it was originally enriched. These programmes will soon have achieved their goals and the SNF take-back programmes will cease. However, the needs of the nuclear community dictate that the majority of the research reactors continue to operate using low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel in order to meet the varied mission objectives. As a result, inventories of LEU SNF will continue to be created and the back-end solution of RR SNF remains a critical issue. In view of this fact, the IAEA, based on the experience gained during the decade of international cooperation in supporting the objectives of the HEU take-back programmes, will draw up a report presenting available reprocessing and recycling services for research reactor spent nuclear fuel. This paper gives an overview of the guiding document which will address all aspects of Reprocessing and Recycling Services for RR SNF, including an overview of solutions, decision making support, service suppliers, conditions (prerequisites, options, etc.), services offered by the managerial and logistics support providers with a focus on available transport packages and applicable transport modes.

  2. Development of remote maintenance technology for nuclear fuel reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kawahara, Akira; Saito, Masayuki; Kawamura, Hironobu; Yamade, Atsushi; Sugiyama, Sen; Sugiyama, Sakae.

    1986-01-01

    In the plants for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel containing fission products, due to the facts that the facilities are in high radiations fields, and the surfaces of equipments are contaminated with radioactive substances, the troubles of process equipments are directly connected to the remarkable drop of the rate of operation of the facilities. Therefore, the development of various remote maintenance techniques has been carried out so far, but this time, Hitachi Ltd. got a chance to take part in the repair of spent fuel dissolving tanks in the Tokai Reprocessing Plant of Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp. and the development of several kinds of remote checkup equipment related to the repair work. Especially in the repair of the dissolving tanks, a radiation-withstanding checkup and repair apparatus which has high remote operability taking the conditions of radioactive environment and the restriction of the repaired objects in consideration was required, and a dissolving tank repairing robot composed of six kinds has been developed. The key points of the development were the selective use of high radiation-withstanding parts and materials, small size structure and the realization of full remote operability. The full remote maintenance apparatus of this kind is unique in the world, and applicable to wide fields. (Kako, I.)

  3. Preliminary assessment of safeguardability on the concepture design of advanced spent fuel conditioning process

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Sang Yoon; Ha, Jang Ho; Ko, Won Il; Song, Dae Yong; Kim, Ho Dong

    2003-04-01

    In this report, a preliminary study on the safeguardability of ACP (Advanced spent fuel Conditioning Process) was conducted with Los Alamos National Laboratory. The proposed ACP concept is an electrometallurgical treatment technique to convert oxide-type spent nuclear fuels into metal forms, which can achieve significant reduction of the volume and heat load of spent fuel to be stored and disposed of. For the safeguardability analysis of the ACP facility, sub-processes and their KMPs (Key Measurement Points) were defined first, and then their material flows were analyzed. Finally, the standard deviation of the Inventory Difference (ID) value of the facility was estimated with assumption by assuming international target values for the uncertainty of measurement methods and their uncertainty. From the preliminary calculation, we concluded that if the assumptions regarding measurement instruments can be achieved in a safeguards system for the ACP facility, the safeguards goals of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could be met. In the second phase of this study, further study on sensitivity analyses considering various factors such as measurement errors, facility capacities, MBA periods etc. may be needed.

  4. Preliminary assessment of safeguardability on the concepture design of advanced spent fuel conditioning process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Sang Yoon; Ha, Jang Ho; Ko, Won Il; Song, Dae Yong; Kim, Ho Dong

    2003-04-01

    In this report, a preliminary study on the safeguardability of ACP (Advanced spent fuel Conditioning Process) was conducted with Los Alamos National Laboratory. The proposed ACP concept is an electrometallurgical treatment technique to convert oxide-type spent nuclear fuels into metal forms, which can achieve significant reduction of the volume and heat load of spent fuel to be stored and disposed of. For the safeguardability analysis of the ACP facility, sub-processes and their KMPs (Key Measurement Points) were defined first, and then their material flows were analyzed. Finally, the standard deviation of the Inventory Difference (ID) value of the facility was estimated with assumption by assuming international target values for the uncertainty of measurement methods and their uncertainty. From the preliminary calculation, we concluded that if the assumptions regarding measurement instruments can be achieved in a safeguards system for the ACP facility, the safeguards goals of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could be met. In the second phase of this study, further study on sensitivity analyses considering various factors such as measurement errors, facility capacities, MBA periods etc. may be needed

  5. Nondestructive determination of residual fuel on leached hulls and dissolver sludges from LWR fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wuerz, H.; Wagner, K.; Becker, H.J.

    1990-01-01

    In reprocessing plants leached hulls and dissolver sludges represent rather important intermediate level α-waste streams. A control of the Pu content of these waste streams is desirable. The nondestructive assay method to be preferred would be passive neutron counting. However, before any decision on passive neutron monitoring becomes possible a characterization of hulls and sludges in terms of Pu content and neutron emission is necessary. For the direct determination of plutonium on hulls and in sludges, as coming from reprocessing, an active neutron measurement is required. A simple, and sufficiently sensitive active neutron method which can easily be installed uses as stationary Cf-252 neutron source. This method was used for the characterization of hulls and sludges in terms of plutonium content and total neutron emission in the WAK. Meanwhile a total of 28 batches of leached hulls and 22 batches of dissolver sludges from reprocessing of PWR fuel have been assayed. The paper describes the assay method used and gives an analysis of the error sources together with a discussion of the results and the accuracies obtained in a reprocessing plant. (orig./HP)

  6. Methods and calculations for regional, continental, and global dose assessments from a hypothetical fuel reprocessing facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schubert, J.F.; Kern, C.D.; Cooper, R.E.; Watts, J.R.

    1978-01-01

    The Savannah River Laboratory (SRL) is coordinating an interlaboratory effort to provide, test, and use state-of-the-art methods for calculating the environmental impact to an offsite population from the normal releases of radionuclides during the routine operation of a fuel-reprocessing plant. Results of this effort are the estimated doses to regional, continental, and global populations. Estimates are based upon operation of a hypothetical reprocessing plant at a site in the southeastern United States. The hypothetical plant will reprocess fuel used at a burn rate of 30 megawatts/metric ton and a burnup of 33,000 megawatt days/metric ton. All fuel will have been cooled for at least 365 days. The plant will have a 10 metric ton/day capacity and an assumed 3000 metric ton/year (82 percent online plant operation) output. Lifetime of the plant is assumed to be 40 years

  7. Decommissioning alternatives for the West Valley, New York, Fuel Reprocessing Plant

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Munson, L F; Nemec, J F; Koochi, A K

    1978-06-01

    The methodology and numerical values of NUREG-0278 were applied to four decommissioning alternatives for the West Valley Fuel Reprocessing Plant. The cost and impacts of the following four alternatives for the process building, fuel receiving and storage, waste tank farm, and auxiliary facilities were assessed: (1) layaway, (2) protective storage, (3) preparation for alternate nuclear use, and (4) dismantlement. The estimated costs are 5.7, 11, 19, and 31 million dollars, respectively. (DLC)

  8. Decommissioning alternatives for the West Valley, New York, Fuel Reprocessing Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Munson, L.F.; Nemec, J.F.; Koochi, A.K.

    1978-06-01

    The methodology and numerical values of NUREG-0278 were applied to four decommissioning alternatives for the West Valley Fuel Reprocessing Plant. The cost and impacts of the following four alternatives for the process building, fuel receiving and storage, waste tank farm, and auxiliary facilities were assessed: (1) layaway, (2) protective storage, (3) preparation for alternate nuclear use, and (4) dismantlement. The estimated costs are 5.7, 11, 19, and 31 million dollars, respectively

  9. Safeguards instrument to monitor spent reactor fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nicholson, N.; Dowdy, E.J.; Holt, D.M.; Stump, C.

    1981-01-01

    A hand-held instrument for monitoring irradiated nuclear fuel inventories located in water-filled storage ponds has been developed. This instrument provides sufficient precise qualitative and quantitative information to be useful as a confirmatory technique to International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors, and is believed to be of potential use to nuclear fuel managers and to operators of spent-fuel storage facilities, both at reactor and away-from-reactor, and to operators of nuclear fuel reprocessing plants. Because the Cerenkov radiation glow can barely be seen by the unaided eye under darkened conditions, a night vision device is incorporated to aid the operator in locating the fuel assembly to be measured. Beam splitting optics placed in front of the image intensifier and a preset aperture select a predetermined portion of the observed scene for measurement of the light intensity using a photomultiplier (PM) tube and digital readout. The PM tube gain is adjusted by use of an internal optical reference source, providing long term repeatability and instrument-to-instrument cnsistency. Interchangeable lenses accommodate various viewing and measuring conditions

  10. TASTEX: Tokai Advanced Safeguards Technology Exercise

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-01-01

    During the years 1978 to 1981 the Governments of France, Japan and the United States of America cooperated with the International Atomic Energy Agency in the TASTEX (Tokai Advanced Safeguards Technology Exercise) programme. The aim of this programme was to improve the technology for the application of international safeguards at reprocessing facilities, and the results are presented in the present report

  11. On the possibility of reprocessing of fuel elements of dispersion type with copper matrix by pyrochemical methods

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vasin, B.D.; Ivanov, V.A.; Shchetinskij, A.V.; Vavilov, S.K.; Savochkin, Yu.P.; Bychkov, A.V.; Kormilitsyn, M.V.

    2005-01-01

    A consideration is given to pyrochemical processes suitable for separation of uranium dioxide from structural materials when reprocessing cermet type fuel elements. The estimation of the possibility to apply liquid antimony and bismuth, potassium and copper chlorides melts is made. The specimens compacted of copper and uranium dioxide powders in a stainless steel can are used as simulators of fuel element sections. It is concluded that the dissolution of structural materials in molten salts at the stage of uranium dioxide concentration is the process of choice for reprocessing of dispersion type fuel elements [ru

  12. Results of Active Test of Uranium-Plutonium Co-denitration Facility at Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Numao, Teruhiko; Nakayashiki, Hiroshi; Arai, Nobuyuki; Miura, Susumu; Takahashi, Yoshiharu; Nakamura, Hironobu; Tanaka, Izumi

    2007-01-01

    In the U-Pu co-denitration facility at Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP), Active Test which composes of 5 steps was performed by using uranium-plutonium nitrate solution that was extracted from spent fuels. During Active Test, two kinds of tests were performed in parallel. One was denitration performance test in denitration ovens, and expected results were successfully obtained. The other was validation and calibration of non-destructive assay (NDA) systems, and expected performances were obtained and their effectiveness as material accountancy and safeguards system was validated. (authors)

  13. Recycling of reprocessed uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Randl, R.P.

    1987-01-01

    Since nuclear power was first exploited in the Federal Republic of Germany, the philosophy underlying the strategy of the nuclear fuel cycle has been to make optimum use of the resource potential of recovered uranium and plutonium within a closed fuel cycle. Apart from the weighty argument of reprocessing being an important step in the treatment and disposal of radioactive wastes, permitting their optimum ecological conditioning after the reprocessing step and subsequent storage underground, another argument that, no doubt, carried weight was the possibility of reducing the demand of power plants for natural uranium. In recent years, strategies of recycling have emerged for reprocessed uranium. If that energy potential, too, is to be exploited by thermal recycling, it is appropriate to choose a slightly different method of recycling from the one for plutonium. While the first generation of reprocessed uranium fuel recycled in the reactor cuts down natural uranium requirement by some 15%, the recycling of a second generation of reprocessed, once more enriched uranium fuel helps only to save a further three per cent of natural uranium. Uranium of the second generation already carries uranium-232 isotope, causing production disturbances, and uranium-236 isotope, causing disturbances of the neutron balance in the reactor, in such amounts as to make further fabrication of uranium fuel elements inexpedient, even after mixing with natural uranium feed. (orig./UA) [de

  14. Handling of spent nuclear fuel and final storage of vitrified high level reprocessing waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    A summary of the planning of transportation and plant design in the Swedish KBS project on management and disposal reprocessed radioactive waste. It describes a transportation system, a central storage facility for used fuel elements, a plant for intermediate storage and encapsulation and a final repository for the vitrified waste. Accounts are given for the reprocessing and vitrification. The safety of the entire system is discussed

  15. Standard model for safety analysis report of fuel reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-12-01

    A standard model for a safety analysis report of fuel reprocessing plants is established. This model shows the presentation format, the origin, and the details of the minimal information required by CNEN (Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear) aiming to evaluate the requests of construction permits and operation licenses made according to the legislation in force. (E.G.) [pt

  16. Implications of ICPR 60 for nuclear fuel reprocessing in france

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mathieu, P.

    1992-01-01

    The ICRP 60 publication intends to guide the regulatory agencies on the main rules and principle of protection. The text contains recommendations for practices and for emergencies. The following report intends to develop the possible consequences of the publication for the reprocessing of spent fuel as managed by COGEMA in the plants of La Hague and Marcoule. (author)

  17. Nuclear fuel reprocessing: A time for decision

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    O'Donnell, A.J.; Sandbery, R.O.

    1983-01-01

    Availability of adequate supplies of energy at an affordable cost is essential to continued growth of the world's economics. The tie between economic growth and electricity usage is particularly strong and the pervasive wordwide trend toward increasing electrification shows no signs of abating. Very few viable alternatives are available for supplying the projected increase in baseload electric generating capacity in the next several decades, and most industrialized nations have chosen nuclear power to play a major role. Sustained growth of nuclear power can only be achieved, however, by reprocessing spent fuel to recover and utilize the residual uranium and plutonium energy values

  18. Burner and dissolver off-gas treatment in HTR fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barnert-Wiemer, H.; Heidendael, M.; Kirchner, H.; Merz, E.; Schroeder, G.; Vygen, H.

    1979-01-01

    In the reprocessing of HTR fuel, essentially all of the gaseous fission products are released during the heat-end tratment, which includes burning of the graphite matrix and dissolving of the heavy metallic residues in THOREX reagent. Three facilities for off-gas cleaning are described, the status of the facility development and test results are reported. Hot tests with a continuous dissolver for HTR-type fuel (throughput 2 kg HM/d) with a closed helium purge loop have been carried out. Preliminary results of these experiments are reported

  19. The Back-End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle in Sweden. Considerations for safeguards and data handling

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fritzell, Anni (ES-konsult, Solna (Sweden))

    2011-01-15

    All nuclear facilities and activities in Sweden are under safeguards - an international monitoring system for all nuclear material. When the planned facilities for encapsulation and final disposal of spent nuclear fuel are constructed, they will also be covered by the safeguards system. The Swedish plans for final disposal is to emplace all spent fuel in a geological repository. The new facility type, the geological repository, will mean that the safeguards system is faced with new challenges, mainly since the nuclear material will be inaccessible after encapsulation and emplacement. This implies that, unlike for existing facilities, it is not possible to verify that the nuclear material is where it is declared to be or that it has the declared characteristics. This report consists of three parts, where each part investigates one aspect of safeguards for encapsulation and final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The first part, Paper 1, presents a plausible safeguards approach for the two new facilities. The paper starts with an introduction to international safeguards and to the facilities. The facility layouts and processes are comprehensively described. The main part of Paper 1 is spent describing a safeguards system that covers all diversion paths for fissile material. The diversion paths are identified in the diversion path analysis which is the basis for Paper 3. A strategy to detect diversion is presented for each diversion path. The safeguards system comprises three main measures: 1. Verification of Nuclear Material Accountancy using, for example, verifying measurements and comparisons between shipment documents and receipt documents for transports. 2. Containment and Surveillance which are methods used to maintain continuity of knowledge of the nuclear material during periods between inspections. 3. Design Information Verification which is methods to verify that nuclear facilities are designed and operated according to declarations. The second part of the

  20. The Back-End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle in Sweden. Considerations for safeguards and data handling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fritzell, Anni

    2011-01-01

    All nuclear facilities and activities in Sweden are under safeguards - an international monitoring system for all nuclear material. When the planned facilities for encapsulation and final disposal of spent nuclear fuel are constructed, they will also be covered by the safeguards system. The Swedish plans for final disposal is to emplace all spent fuel in a geological repository. The new facility type, the geological repository, will mean that the safeguards system is faced with new challenges, mainly since the nuclear material will be inaccessible after encapsulation and emplacement. This implies that, unlike for existing facilities, it is not possible to verify that the nuclear material is where it is declared to be or that it has the declared characteristics. This report consists of three parts, where each part investigates one aspect of safeguards for encapsulation and final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The first part, Paper 1, presents a plausible safeguards approach for the two new facilities. The paper starts with an introduction to international safeguards and to the facilities. The facility layouts and processes are comprehensively described. The main part of Paper 1 is spent describing a safeguards system that covers all diversion paths for fissile material. The diversion paths are identified in the diversion path analysis which is the basis for Paper 3. A strategy to detect diversion is presented for each diversion path. The safeguards system comprises three main measures: 1. Verification of Nuclear Material Accountancy using, for example, verifying measurements and comparisons between shipment documents and receipt documents for transports. 2. Containment and Surveillance which are methods used to maintain continuity of knowledge of the nuclear material during periods between inspections. 3. Design Information Verification which is methods to verify that nuclear facilities are designed and operated according to declarations. The second part of the

  1. It's safety first on N-fuel carrier ship

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1983-01-01

    The 3 000t deadweight ship to carry irradiated nuclear fuel ordered recently from Appledore Shipbuilders will be one of the most sophisticated ships built at the firm's modern and totally-enclosed north Devon yard. The ship will be used to carry irradiated nuclear fuel from Japan to be reprocessed at British Nuclear Fuels site at Sellafield and at the Cogema plant in northern France. It has been designed to conform to the most exacting requirements of Pacific Nuclear Transport and will incorporate every safeguard for the shipment of irradiated nuclear fuels

  2. Advanced hybrid process with solvent extraction and pyro-chemical process of spent fuel reprocessing for LWR to FBR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fujita, Reiko; Mizuguchi, Koji; Fuse, Kouki; Saso, Michitaka; Utsunomiya, Kazuhiro; Arie, Kazuo

    2008-01-01

    Toshiba has been proposing a new fuel cycle concept of a transition from LWR to FBR. The new fuel cycle concept has better economical process of the LWR spent fuel reprocessing than the present Purex Process and the proliferation resistance for FBR cycle of plutonium with minor actinides after 2040. Toshiba has been developing a new Advanced Hybrid Process with Solvent Extraction and Pyrochemical process of spent fuel reprocessing for LWR to FBR. The Advanced Hybrid Process combines the solvent extraction process of the LWR spent fuel in nitric acid with the recovery of high pure uranium for LWR fuel and the pyro-chemical process in molten salts of impure plutonium recovery with minor actinides for metallic FBR fuel, which is the FBR spent fuel recycle system after FBR age based on the electrorefining process in molten salts since 1988. The new Advanced Hybrid Process enables the decrease of the high-level waste and the secondary waste from the spent fuel reprocessing plants. The R and D costs in the new Advanced Hybrid Process might be reduced because of the mutual Pyro-chemical process in molten salts. This paper describes the new fuel cycle concept of a transition from LWR to FBR and the feasibility of the new Advanced Hybrid Process by fundamental experiments. (author)

  3. Estimation of gamma dose rate from hulls and shield design for the hull transport cask of Fuel Reprocessing Plant (FRP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chandrasekaran, S.; Rajagopal, V.; Jose, M.T.; Venkatraman, B.

    2012-01-01

    In Fuel Reprocessing Plant (FRP), un-dissolved clad of fuel pins known as hulls are the major sources of high level solid waste. Safe handling, transport and disposal require the estimation of radioactivity as a consequent of gamma dose rate from hulls in fast reactor fuel reprocessing plant in comparison with thermal reactor fuel. Due to long irradiation time and low cooling of spent fuel, the evolution of activation products 51 Cr, 58 Co, 54 Mn and 59 Fe present as impurities in the fuel clad are the major sources of gamma radiation. Gamma dose rate from hull container with hulls from Fuel Sub Assembly (FSA) and Radial Sub Assembly (RSA) of Fuel Reprocessing Plant (FRP) was estimated in order to design the hull transport cask. Shielding computations were done using point kernel code, IGSHIELD. This paper describes the details of source terms, estimation of dose rate and shielding design of hull transport cask in detail. (author)

  4. Operating experience in reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schueller, W.

    1983-01-01

    Since 1953, reprocessing has accumulated 180 years of operating experience in ten plants, six of them with 41 years of operation in reprocessing oxide fuel from light water reactors. After abortive, premature attempts at what is called commercial reprocessing, which had been oriented towards the market value of recoverable uranium and plutonium, non-military reprocessing technologies have proved their technical feasibility, since 1966 on a pilot scale and since 1976 on an industrial scale. Reprocessing experience obtained on uranium metal fuel with low and medium burnups can now certainly be extrapolated to oxide fuel with high burnup and from pilot plants to industrial scale plants using the same technologies. The perspectives of waste management of the nuclear power plants operated in the Federal Republic of Germany should be viewed realistically. The technical problems still to be solved are in a balanced relationship to the benefit arising to the national economy out of nuclear power generation and can be solved in time, provided there are clearcut political boundary conditions. (orig.) [de

  5. Transformative monitoring approaches for reprocessing.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cipiti, Benjamin B.

    2011-09-01

    The future of reprocessing in the United States is strongly driven by plant economics. With increasing safeguards, security, and safety requirements, future plant monitoring systems must be able to demonstrate more efficient operations while improving the current state of the art. The goal of this work was to design and examine the incorporation of advanced plant monitoring technologies into safeguards systems with attention to the burden on the operator. The technologies examined include micro-fluidic sampling for more rapid analytical measurements and spectroscopy-based techniques for on-line process monitoring. The Separations and Safeguards Performance Model was used to design the layout and test the effect of adding these technologies to reprocessing. The results here show that both technologies fill key gaps in existing materials accountability that provide detection of diversion events that may not be detected in a timely manner in existing plants. The plant architecture and results under diversion scenarios are described. As a tangent to this work, both the AMUSE and SEPHIS solvent extraction codes were examined for integration in the model to improve the reality of diversion scenarios. The AMUSE integration was found to be the most successful and provided useful results. The SEPHIS integration is still a work in progress and may provide an alternative option.

  6. Regulation on control of nuclear fuel materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ikeda, Kaname

    1976-01-01

    Some comment is made on the present laws and the future course of consolidating the regulation of nuclear fuel materials. The first part gives the definitions of the nuclear fuel materials in the laws. The second part deals with the classification and regulation in material handling. Refinement undertaking, fabrication undertaking, reprocessing undertaking, the permission of the government to use the materials, the permission of the government to use the materials under international control, the restriction of transfer and receipt, the reporting, and the safeguard measures are commented. The third part deals with the strengthening of regulation. The nuclear fuel safety deliberation special committee will be established at some opportunity of revising the ordinance. The nuclear material safeguard special committee has been established in the Atomic Energy Commission. The last part deals with the future course of legal consolidation. The safety control will be strengthened. The early investigation of waste handling is necessary, because low level solid wastes are accumulating at each establishment. The law for transporting nuclear materials must be consolidated as early as possible to correspond to foreign transportation laws. Physical protection is awaiting the conclusions of the nuclear fuel safeguard special committee. The control and information systems for the safeguard measures must be consolidated in the laws. (Iwakiri, K.)

  7. Pyroelectrochemical process for reprocessing irradiated nuclear fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brambilla, G.; Sartorelli, A.

    1982-01-01

    A pyroelectrochemical process for reprocessing irradiated fast reactor mixed oxide or carbide fuels is described. The fuel is dissolved in a bath of molten alkali metal sulfates. The Pu(SO 4 ) 2 formed in the bath is thermally decomposed, leaving crystalline PuO 2 on the bottom of the reaction vessel. Electrodes are then introduced into the bath, and UO 2 is deposited on the cathode. Alternatively, both UO 2 and PuO 2 may be electrodeposited. The molten salts, after decontamination by precipitating the fission products dissolved in the bath by introducing basic agents such as oxides, carbonates, or hydroxides, may be recycled. Since it is not possible to remove cesium from the molten salt bath, periodic disposal and partial renewal with fresh salts is necessary. The melted salts that contain the fission products are conditioned for disposal by embedding them in a metallic matrix

  8. Extraction of Uranium Using Nitrogen Dioxide and Carbon Dioxide for Spent Fuel Reprocessing

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kayo Sawada; Daisuke Hirabayashi; Youichi Enokida [EcoTopia Science Institute, Nagoya University, Nagoya, 464-8603 (Japan)

    2008-07-01

    For the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuels, a new method to extract actinides from spent fuel using highly compressed gases, nitrogen dioxide and carbon dioxide was proposed. Uranium extraction from broken pieces, whose average grain size was 5 mm, of uranium dioxide pellet with nitrogen dioxide and carbon dioxide was demonstrated in the present study. (authors)

  9. Design of an engineered safeguards system for a mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Winblad, A.E.; McKnight, R.P.; Fienning, W.C.; Fenchel, B.R.

    1977-06-01

    Several Engineered Safeguards System concepts and designs are described that provide increased protection against a wide spectrum of adversary threats. An adversary sequence diagram that outlines all possible adversary paths through the safeguards elements in a mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facility is shown. An example of a critical adversary path is given

  10. Evaluation and development plan of NRTA measurement methods for the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Li, T.K.; Hakkila, E.A.; Flosterbuer, S.F.

    1995-01-01

    Near-real-time accounting (NRTA) has been proposed as a safeguards method at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP), a large-scale commercial boiling water and pressurized water reactors spent-fuel reprocessing facility. NRTA for RRP requires material balance closures every month. To develop a more effective and practical NRTA system for RRP, we have evaluated NRTA measurement techniques and systems that might be implemented in both the main process and the co-denitration process areas at RRP to analyze the concentrations of plutonium in solutions and mixed oxide powder. Based on the comparative evaluation, including performance, reliability, design criteria, operation methods, maintenance requirements, and estimated costs for each possible measurement method, recommendations for development were formulated. This paper discusses the evaluations and reports on the recommendation of the NRTA development plan for potential implementation at RRP

  11. Some technical aspects of the nuclear material accounting and control at nuclear fuel cycle facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miller, O.A.; Babaev, N.S.; Gryazev, V.M.; Gadzhiev, G.I.; Gabeskiriya, V.Ya.

    1977-01-01

    The possibilities of nuclear material accounting and control are discussed at nuclear facilities of fuel cycle (WWER-type reactor, fuel fabrication plant, reprocessing plant and uranium enrichment facility) and zero energy fast reactor facility. It is shown that for nuclear material control the main method is the accounting with the application isotopic correlations at the reprocessing plant and enrichment facility. Possibilities and limitations of the application of destructive and non-destructive methods are discussed for nuclear material determinations at fuel facilities and their role in the accounting and safeguards systems as well as possibilities of the application of neutron method at a zero energy fast reactor facility [ru

  12. Processing large sensor data sets for safeguards : the knowledge generation system.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Thomas, Maikel A.; Smartt, Heidi Anne; Matthews, Robert F.

    2012-04-01

    Modern nuclear facilities, such as reprocessing plants, present inspectors with significant challenges due in part to the sheer amount of equipment that must be safeguarded. The Sandia-developed and patented Knowledge Generation system was designed to automatically analyze large amounts of safeguards data to identify anomalous events of interest by comparing sensor readings with those expected from a process of interest and operator declarations. This paper describes a demonstration of the Knowledge Generation system using simulated accountability tank sensor data to represent part of a reprocessing plant. The demonstration indicated that Knowledge Generation has the potential to address several problems critical to the future of safeguards. It could be extended to facilitate remote inspections and trigger random inspections. Knowledge Generation could analyze data to establish trust hierarchies, to facilitate safeguards use of operator-owned sensors.

  13. Retention of gaseous fission products in reprocessing LMFBR fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Burch, W.D.; Yarbro, O.O.; Groenier, W.S.; Stephenson, M.J.

    1976-05-01

    The report is devoted to status of the development programme at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory on methods for retaining iodine-131 and 129, Krypton-85, Tritium and Carbon-14 in reprocessing LMFBR fuels. The Iodox process, Fluorocarbon absorption process and Voloxidation process are described for retention of iodine, Krypton-85 and Tritium, respectively. Flowsheets for the different processes are given and results of experimental runs in small engineering-scale equipment are reported

  14. Consolidated fuel reprocessing programme: Analysis of various options for the breeder fuel cycle in the USA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stradley, J.G.; Burch, W.D.; Yook, H.R.

    1986-01-01

    The United States Department of Energy (DOE) has established a programme to develop innovative liquid metal reactor (LMR) designs to assist in developing future U.S. reactor strategy. The paper describes studies in progress to examine various fuel cycle strategies that relate to the reactor strategy. Three potential fuel cycle options that focus on supporting an initial 1300 MW(e) reactor station have been defined: (1) Completion and utilization of the Breeder Reprocessing Engineering Test/Secure Automated Fabrication (BRET/SAF) in the Fuels and Materials Examination Facility (FMEF) at Hanford, Washington; (2) a co-located fuel cycle facility; and (3) delayed closure of the fuel cycle for five to ten years. The BRET, designed as a development facility, has sufficient capacity to service the needs of an initial module at an LMR station. It appears feasible to increase this capacity and to utilize SAF in the FMEF to accommodate the projected output (up to 35 MtHM/year) from the 1300 MW(e) liquid-metal concepts under study. Plans developed within the United States Consolidated Management Office for an initial reactor project have envisioned that cost savings could be realized by delaying the closure of the fuel cycle as long as supplies of plutonium could be obtained relatively inexpensively. This might prove to be only five to ten years, but even that period might be long enough for the fuel cycle costs to be spread over more than one reactor rather than loaded on the initial project. This concept is being explored as is the question of the future coupling of a light water reactor reprocessing industry for plutonium supply to breeder recycle

  15. The measurement of neptunium in fast reactor fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mair, M.A.; Savage, D.J.; Kyffin, T.W.

    1986-02-01

    Analytical techniques have been developed to measure neptunium in the feed, waste and product streams of a fast reactor fuel reprocessing plant. The estimated level of one microgram per milligram of plutonium in some solutions presented severe separation and measurement problems. An initial separation stage was essential, and both ion exchange and solvent extraction using thenoyltrifluoroacetone were studied. The redox chemistry of neptunium necessary to achieve good separation is considered. Spectrophotometry measurement of the stable neptunium/arsenazo III complex was selected for the final neptunium determination with additional analysis by radiometric methods. Incomplete recovery of neptunium during the separation stages necessitated yield measurements, using either neptunium-237 as an internal standard or the short lived gamma active neptunium-239 isotope as a tracer. The distribution of neptunium between the waste and product streams is discussed, in relation to the chemistry of neptunium in the reprocessing plant. (author)

  16. Handling of spent nuclear fuel and final storage of vitrified high level reprocessing waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    The report gives a general summary of the Swedish KBS-project on management and disposal of vitrified reprocessed waste. Its final aim is to demostrate that the means of processing and managing power reactor waste in an absolutely safe way, as stipulated in the Swedish so called Conditions Act, already exist. Chapters on Storage facility for spent fuel, Intermidiate storage of reprocessed waste, Geology, Final repository, Transportation, Protection, and Siting. (L.E.)

  17. The next generation safeguards initiative

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tobey, William

    2008-01-01

    NGSI or the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative is designed to revitalize the U.S. safeguards technical base, as well as invest in human resources, and to mobilize our primary asset - the U.S. National Laboratories - as well as industry and academia to restore capabilities. While NGSI is a U.S. effort it is intended to serve as a catalyst for a much broader commitment to international safeguards in partnership with the IAEA and other countries. Initiatives over the last years include such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and initiatives of the G-8 and NSG to discourage the spread of enrichment and reprocessing. NGSI augments this agenda by providing a means to strengthen the technical and political underpinnings of IAEA safeguards. Priorities and envisioned activities under NGSI are the following. (1) Cooperation with IAEA and others to promote universal adoption of safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol including greater information sharing between member states and the IAEA, investigation of weaponization and procurement activities, and options to strengthen the state-level approach to safeguards. (2) NGSI anticipates the deployment of new types of reactors and fuel cycle facilities, as well as the need to use limited safeguards resources effectively and efficiently, especially in plants that pose the largest burden specifically complex, bulk-handling facilities. (3) NGSI will encourage a generational improvement in current safeguards technologies including improvement of precision and speed of nuclear measurements, performance of real-time process monitoring and surveillance in unattended mode, enabling in-field, pre-screening and analysis of nuclear and environmental samples, and collection, integration, analysis and archiving safeguards-relevant information from all available sources.(4) NGSI will address human capital management. Training and

  18. IAEA safeguards for geological repositories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moran, B.W.

    2005-01-01

    In September. 1988, the IAEA held its first formal meeting on the safeguards requirements for the final disposal of spent fuel and nuclear material-bearing waste. The consensus recommendation of the 43 participants from 18 countries at this Advisory Group Meeting was that safeguards should not terminate of spent fuel even after emplacement in, and closure of, a geologic repository.' As a result of this recommendation, the IAEA initiated a series of consultants' meetings and the SAGOR Programme (Programme for the Development of Safeguards for the Final Disposal of Spent Fuel in Geologic Repositories) to develop an approach that would permit IAEA safeguards to verify the non-diversion of spent fuel from a geologic repository. At the end of this process, in December 1997, a second Advisory Group Meeting, endorsed the generic safeguards approach developed by the SAGOR Programme. Using the SAGOR Programme results and consultants' meeting recommendations, the IAEA Department of Safeguards issued a safeguards policy paper stating the requirements for IAEA safeguards at geologic repositories. Following approval of the safeguards policy and the generic safeguards approach, the Geologic Repository Safeguards Experts Group was established to make recommendations on implementing the safeguards approach. This experts' group is currently making recommendations to the IAEA regarding the safeguards activities to be conducted with respect to Finland's repository programme. (author)

  19. IAEA verification of materials accounting in commercial reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gutmacher, R.G.; Hakkila, E.A.

    1987-01-01

    The reprocessing plants currently under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards have design capacities up to 210 tonnes of heavy metal per year. All of the plants use conventional materials accounting for safeguards. However, several larger commercial reprocessing plants are being designed with capacities of 350 to 1200 tonnes of heavy metal per year. It is likely that many of these plants, as well as some of the existing smaller ones, will adopt near-real-time materials accounting. The major effect of the combination of larger plants and near-real-time accounting on IAEA safeguards will be the demand for greater timeliness of verification. Continuous inspector presence may be required, as well as more on-site measurements by the inspector. In this paper, the authors review what needs to be verified, as well as current inspector activities in the process area. The bulk of the paper describes rapid, easy-to-use measurement techniques and instruments that may be applied to on-site verification measurements

  20. Reprocessing in Europe

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rossney, G [United Reprocessors G.m.b.H., Karlsruhe (F.R. Germany)

    1976-04-01

    The status of reprocessing activities within the member organizations of United Reprocessors is reviewed. The U.K. government has approved overseas deals by BNFL which will help to pay for their planned plant of 1000 te U p.a. at Windscale. In Germany KEWA has selected a site at Aschenburg as a fuel cycle centre where they plan to build a utility financed reprocessing plant of 1500 te U p.a. France has formed a new fuel cycle corporation, Cogema, which hopes to participate in the large volume of Japanese business negotiated by BNFL. United Reprocessors have agreed to pool their technology which may be available to organisations wishing to construct reprocessing plants in their own countries.

  1. Reprocessing method of ceramic nuclear fuels in low-melting nitrate molten salts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brambilla, G.; Caporali, G.; Zambianchi, M.

    1976-01-01

    Ceramic nuclear fuel is reprocessed through a method wherein the fuel is dispersed in a molten eutectic mixture of at least two alkali metal nitrates and heated to a temperature in the range between 200 and 300 0 C. That heated mixture is then subjected to the action of a gaseous stream containing nitric acid vapors, preferably in the presence of a catalyst such as sodium fluoride. Dissolved fuel can then be precipitated out of solution in crystalline form by cooling the solution to a temperature only slightly above the melting point of the bath

  2. Methodology and preliminary models for analyzing nuclear safeguards decisions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-11-01

    This report describes a general analytical tool designed to assist the NRC in making nuclear safeguards decisions. The approach is based on decision analysis--a quantitative procedure for making decisions under uncertain conditions. The report: describes illustrative models that quantify the probability and consequences of diverted special nuclear material and the costs of safeguarding the material, demonstrates a methodology for using this information to set safeguards regulations (safeguards criteria), and summarizes insights gained in a very preliminary assessment of a hypothetical reprocessing plant

  3. The reasons for and against reprocessing of spent fuel elements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gries, W.

    1983-01-01

    In the following the reasons for and against the main methods of waste disposal are compred. The author examines the advantages and disadvantages of waste disposal by reprocessing of spent fuel assemblies or by immediate ultimate storage. To get a general idea the pros and cons are arranged and analysed according to the following subjects: - technology/science, - safety/environment, - profitability, - political aspects. (orig./UA) [de

  4. Nuclear material control and accountancy in a spent fuel storage ponds

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gurle, P.; Zhabo, Dgh.

    1999-01-01

    The spent fuel storage ponds of a large reprocessing plant La Hague in France are under safeguards by means of a wide range of techniques currently used. These techniques include the nuclear material accountancy an containment/surveillance (C/S). Nondestructive assay, design information verification, and authentication of equipment provided by the operator are also implemented. Specific C/S equipment including video surveillance and unattended radiation monitoring have been developed and implemented in a spent fuel pond of La Hague. These C/S systems named EMOSS and CONSULHA with high degree of reliability and conclusiveness provide the opportunity to improve the efficiency of safeguards, particularly as related to spent fuel storage areas where the accountancy is verified by item counting [ru

  5. Remote handling equipment for laboratory research of fuel reprocessing in Nuclear Research Institute at Rez

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fidler, J.; Novy, P.; Kyrs, M.

    1985-04-01

    Laboratory installations were developed for two nuclear fuel reprocessing methods, viz., the solvent extraction process and the fluoride volatility process. The apparatus for solvent extraction reprocessing consists of a pneumatically driven rod-chopper, a dissolver, mixer-settler extractors, an automatic fire extinguishing device and other components and it was tested using irradiated uranium. The technological line for the fluoride volatility process consists of a fluorimater, condensers, sorption columns with NaF pellets and a distillation column for the separation of volatile fluorides from UF 6 . The line has not yet been tested using irradiated fuel. Some features of the remote handling equipment of both installations are briefly described. (author)

  6. Design and Implementation of Equipment for Enhanced Safeguards of a Plutonium Storage in a Reprocessing Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richir, P.; Dechamp, L.; Buchet, P.; Dransart, P.; Dzbikowicz, Z.; Peerani, P.; ); Pierssens, L.; Persson, L.; Ancius, D.; Synetos, S.; ); Edmonds, N.; Homer, A.; Benn, K.-A.; Polkey, A.

    2015-01-01

    The Nuclear Security unit (NUSEC) of the Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU, JRC) was entrusted by DG ENER to design and implement equipment in order to achieve enhanced safeguards of a plutonium dioxide storage located on the MAGNOX reprocessing plant in Sellafield (UK). Enhanced safeguards must lead to a win-win situation for all parties involved. In this case the DG ENER inspectorate will save inspection time, manpower and future financial resources and the operator will have the right to access its storage without the need for inspector presence. To reach this goal, while at the same time taking into account current budget constraints, NUSEC developed applications that use equipment commonly used in the safety and security fields but so far have not been used in safeguards. For instance, two laser scanners are used to detect entry/exit events into and out of the store and to provide the necessary information to an algorithm in order to categorize objects/people passing the scanners, e.g., a Fork Lift Truck, a trolley used to bring in PuO 2 containers, a system used for the dispatch of cans, people, etc. An RFID reader is used to identify equipment duly authorized to access the store. All PuO 2 containers arriving from the production line must be weighed, identified and measured using gamma and neutron detectors before they can be transferred to the store. For this purpose an Unattended Combined Measurement System (UCMS) was designed and manufactured by the JRC in order to do all verification activities using a single instrument. This paper describes the design features of the equipment and its implementation with the support of the Sellafield Ltd. in the framework of the MAGNOX store project. (author)

  7. Mid-Term Direction of JAEA Nuclear Fuel Cycle Engineering Laboratories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ojima, H.; Sugiyama, T.; Tanaka, K.; Takeda, S.; Nomura, S.

    2009-01-01

    1. Introduction Nuclear Fuel Cycle Engineering Laboratories (NCL) of Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) has sufficient experience and ability through its 50 year operation to establish the next generation closed cycle. It strives to become a world-class Center Of Excellence. 2. Current activity in NCL: 1) - Recycling of MOX fuel: The Tokai Reprocessing Plant has reprocessed 29 tons of MOX fuel from the ATR Fugenh as a part of 1140 tons of cumulative spent fuel reprocessed. JAEA has supported the pre-operation of the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant. An innovative MOX pellet fabrication process has been developed in the Plutonium Fuel Development Center, and a part of products obtained by the development are used as a fuel for core confirmation test for re-startup of the FBR Monjuh. Characterization of MOX containing Am and Np has been studied and a new data such as melting point and thermal conductivity were reported. In the Chemical Processing Facility, a hot lab., an advanced aqueous reprocessing technology has been tested for TRU recovery, economical improvement, etc., using irradiated MOX fuel from the FR Joyoh. 2) - Supporting Activity: JAEA has improved the effectiveness and efficiency of existing safeguards activities. The Integrated Safeguards approach for all facilities in NCL has been implemented since August, 2008, as a pioneer and a good example in the world. To reduce anxiety among local residents, NCL has explained its operation plans and exchanged information and opinions with them concerning potential risks to health and environment. Recently, stake-holder participation in the management of NCL was started from the view point of Corporate Social Responsibility. In April, 2008, the agreement was signed with Idaho National Laboratory for cooperation of personnel training in fuel cycle area. 3. Mid-Term Direction: In Japan, feasibility and direction of the transition period from the LWR era to the FBR era should be discussed for the next several years. Study

  8. Mid-Term Direction of JAEA Nuclear Fuel Cycle Engineering Laboratories

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ojima, H.; Sugiyama, T.; Tanaka, K.; Takeda, S.; Nomura, S. [Tokai-mura, Ibaraki-ken 319-1194 (Japan)

    2009-06-15

    1. Introduction Nuclear Fuel Cycle Engineering Laboratories (NCL) of Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) has sufficient experience and ability through its 50 year operation to establish the next generation closed cycle. It strives to become a world-class Center Of Excellence. 2. Current activity in NCL: 1) - Recycling of MOX fuel: The Tokai Reprocessing Plant has reprocessed 29 tons of MOX fuel from the ATR Fugenh as a part of 1140 tons of cumulative spent fuel reprocessed. JAEA has supported the pre-operation of the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant. An innovative MOX pellet fabrication process has been developed in the Plutonium Fuel Development Center, and a part of products obtained by the development are used as a fuel for core confirmation test for re-startup of the FBR Monjuh. Characterization of MOX containing Am and Np has been studied and a new data such as melting point and thermal conductivity were reported. In the Chemical Processing Facility, a hot lab., an advanced aqueous reprocessing technology has been tested for TRU recovery, economical improvement, etc., using irradiated MOX fuel from the FR Joyoh. 2) - Supporting Activity: JAEA has improved the effectiveness and efficiency of existing safeguards activities. The Integrated Safeguards approach for all facilities in NCL has been implemented since August, 2008, as a pioneer and a good example in the world. To reduce anxiety among local residents, NCL has explained its operation plans and exchanged information and opinions with them concerning potential risks to health and environment. Recently, stake-holder participation in the management of NCL was started from the view point of Corporate Social Responsibility. In April, 2008, the agreement was signed with Idaho National Laboratory for cooperation of personnel training in fuel cycle area. 3. Mid-Term Direction: In Japan, feasibility and direction of the transition period from the LWR era to the FBR era should be discussed for the next several years. Study

  9. Gas-Cooled Reactor Programs annual progress report for period ending December 31, 1973. [HTGR fuel reprocessing, fuel fabrication, fuel irradiation, core materials, and fission product distribution; GCFR fuel irradiation and steam generator modeling

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kasten, P.R.; Coobs, J.H.; Lotts, A.L.

    1976-04-01

    Progress is summarized in studies relating to HTGR fuel reprocessing, refabrication, and recycle; HTGR fuel materials development and performance testing; HTGR PCRV development; HTGR materials investigations; HTGR fuel chemistry; HTGR safety studies; and GCFR irradiation experiments and steam generator modeling.

  10. Nuclear proliferation-resistance and safeguards for future nuclear fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuno, Y.; Inoue, N.; Senzaki, M.

    2009-01-01

    Corresponding to the world nuclear security concerns, future nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) should have high proliferation-resistance (PR) and physical protection (PP), while promotion of the peaceful use of the nuclear energy must not be inhibited. In order to accomplish nuclear non-proliferation from NFC, a few models of the well-PR systems should be developed so that international community can recognize them as worldwide norms. To find a good balance of 'safeguard-ability (so-called extrinsic measure or institutional barrier)' and 'impede-ability (intrinsic feature or technical barrier)' will come to be essential for NFC designers to optimize civilian nuclear technology with nuclear non-proliferation, although the advanced safeguards with high detectability can still play a dominant role for PR in the states complying with full institutional controls. Accomplishment of such goal in a good economic efficiency is a future key challenge

  11. Nuclear proliferation-resistance and safeguards for future nuclear fuel cycle

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kuno, Y.; Inoue, N.; Senzaki, M.

    2009-03-01

    Corresponding to the world nuclear security concerns, future nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) should have high proliferation-resistance (PR) and physical protection (PP), while promotion of the peaceful use of the nuclear energy must not be inhibited. In order to accomplish nuclear non-proliferation from NFC, a few models of the well-PR systems should be developed so that international community can recognize them as worldwide norms. To find a good balance of 'safeguard-ability (so-called extrinsic measure or institutional barrier)' and 'impede-ability (intrinsic feature or technical barrier)' will come to be essential for NFC designers to optimize civilian nuclear technology with nuclear non-proliferation, although the advanced safeguards with high detectability can still play a dominant role for PR in the states complying with full institutional controls. Accomplishment of such goal in a good economic efficiency is a future key challenge.

  12. THORP and the economics of reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Berkhout, F.; Walker, W.

    1990-11-01

    This Report compares the costs of reprocessing spent fuels at the new THORP reprocessing plant at Sellafield with the alternative of storing them prior to final disposal. It finds that even when the cost of constructing THORP is treated as a sunk cost, reprocessing has no decisive economic advantage over spent fuel storage. Electric utilities in Western Europe and Japan have already largely paid for the construction of the new British and French reprocessing plants. Today, their economic judgements therefore depend on the future costs of operating and eventually decommissioning the plants, and of dealing with the resulting wastes and separated products. The costs attached to reprocessing have risen mainly due to the higher estimated costs of waste management and decommissioning, and to the costs of coping with unwanted plutonium. Most of these costs are passed directly on to utilities and thus electricity consumers under the terms of cost-plus contracts. Using cost estimates favourable to the reprocessing option, the total future undiscounted liabilities arising from the first ten years of THORP reprocessing come to Pound 2.4-3.7 billion at today's prices. This compares with the more predictable although still burdensome fuel storage, conditioning and disposal costs of Pound 3.0-3.8 billion. If disposal is not anticipated, the economic advantage shifts decisively in favour of spent fuel storage: Pound 0.9-1.3 billion against Pound 1.4-2.4 billion for reprocessing. (author)

  13. Study of the potential uses of the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP). Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1980-03-25

    The purpose of this study is to provide an evaluation of possible international and domestic uses for the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant, located in South Carolina, at the conclusion of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation. Four generic categories of use options for the Barnwell plant have been considered: storage of spent LWR fuel; reprocessing of LWR spent fuel; safeguards development and training; and non-use. Chapters are devoted to institutional options and integrated institutional-use options.

  14. Study of the potential uses of the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP). Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    The purpose of this study is to provide an evaluation of possible international and domestic uses for the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant, located in South Carolina, at the conclusion of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation. Four generic categories of use options for the Barnwell plant have been considered: storage of spent LWR fuel; reprocessing of LWR spent fuel; safeguards development and training; and non-use. Chapters are devoted to institutional options and integrated institutional-use options

  15. Concerns when designing a safeguards approach for the back-end of the Swedish nuclear fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fritzell, Anni

    2006-03-01

    In Sweden, the construction of an encapsulation plant and a geological repository for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel is planned to start within the next ten years. Due to Sweden's international agreements on non-proliferation, the Swedish safeguards regime must be extended to include these facilities. The geological repository has some unique features, which present the safeguards system with unprecedented challenges. These features include, inter alia, the long period of time that the facility will contain nuclear material and that the disposed nuclear material will be very difficult to access, implying that physical verification of its presence in the repository is not foreseen. This work presents the available techniques for creating a safeguards system for the backend of the Swedish nuclear fuel cycle. Important issues to consider in the planning and implementation of the safeguards system have been investigated, which in some cases has led to an identification of areas needing further research. The results include three proposed options for a safeguards approach, which have been evaluated on the basis of the safeguards authorities' requirements. Also, the evolution and present situation of the work carried out in connection to safeguards for geological repositories has been compiled

  16. Analysis of triso packing fraction and fissile material to DB-MHR using LWR reprocessed fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silva, Clarysson A.M. da; Pereira, Claubia; Costa, Antonella L.; Veloso, Maria Auxiliadora F.; Gual, Maritza R.

    2013-01-01

    Gas-cooled and graphite-moderated reactor is being considered the next generation of nuclear power plants because of its characteristic to operate with reprocessed fuel. The typical fuel element consists of a hexagonal block with coolant and fuel channels. The fuel pin is manufactured into compacted ceramic-coated particles (TRISO) which are used to achieve both a high burnup and a high degree of passive safety. This work uses the MCNPX 2.6.0 to simulate the active core of Deep Burn Modular Helium Reactor (DB-MHR) employing PWR (Pressurized Water Reactor) reprocessed fuel. However, before a complete study of DB-MHR fuel cycle and recharge, it is necessary to evaluate the neutronic parameters to some values of TRISO Packing Fractions (PF) and Fissile Material (FM). Each PF and FM combination would generate the best behaviour of neutronic parameters. Therefore, this study configures several PF and FM combinations considering the heterogeneity of TRISO layers and lattice. The results present the best combination of PF and FM values according with the more appropriated behaviour of the neutronic parameters during the burnup. In this way, the optimized combination can be used to future works of MHR fuel cycle and recharge. (author)

  17. Future trends of light-water reactor fuel-cycle costs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tamiya, S.; Otomo, T.; Meguro, T.

    1977-01-01

    In past cost estimates, the main fuel-cycle components were mining and milling, uranium enrichment and fuel fabrication, and the reprocessing charge deemed to be recovered by plutonium credit. Since the oil crisis, all costs of fuel-cycle components have increased as well as construction costs of power stations. Recent analysis shows that costs in the back-end of the fuel cycle are much higher than those anticipated several years ago, although their contribution to the nuclear electricity generating cost would be small. This situation has now changed but there are still many uncertainties, i.e. regulatory requirements for reprocessing plants concerning safety, safeguards, environmental protection and high-level waste management. Thus it is more difficult to estimate overall investments and, therefore, the costs of the back-end of the fuel-cycle sector. This paper reviews the future trend of nuclear fuel-cycle costs of LWRs, based on recent analysis; and those factors which affect fuel-cycle costs are discussed. To reduce the uncertainties of the cost estimates as soon as possible, international discussion is necessary on items such as the treatment and disposal of high-level radioactive wastes, siting reprocessing plants, physical protection of plutonium, and the effects of plutonium on the environment. (author)

  18. Plutonium determination by spectrophotometry of plutonium (VI): control of the nuclear fuel reprocessing plant

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Grison, J [Compagnie Generale des Matieres Nucleaires (COGEMA), Centre de la Hague, 50 - Cherbourg (France)

    1980-10-01

    The plutonium (VI) spectrophotometric determination, after AgO oxidation in 3 M nitric acid medium, is used for the running-control of the nuclear fuel reprocessing plant at La Hague. Analytical device used in glove-box or shielded-cell is briefly described. This method is fast, sensitive, unfailing and gives simple effluents. It is applied by day and night shifts, during Light Water Reactor fuel reprocessing campaign, for 0.5 mg/l up to 20 g/l plutonium solutions. Reference solution measurements have a 0.8 to 1.4 % relative standard deviation; duplicate plutonium determinations give a 0.3% relative standard deviation for sample analysis. There is a discrepancy (- 0.3% to - 0.9%) between the spectrophotometric method results and the isotopic dilution analysis.

  19. Plutonium determination by spectrophotometry of plutonium (VI): control of the nuclear fuel reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grison, J.

    1980-01-01

    The plutonium (VI) spectrophotometric determination, after AgO oxidation in 3 M nitric acid medium, is used for the running-control of the nuclear fuel reprocessing plant at La Hague. Analytical device used in glove-box or shielded-cell is briefly described. This method is fast, sensitive, unfailing and gives simple effluents. It is applied by day and night shifts, during Light Water Reactor fuel reprocessing campaign, for 0.5 mg/l up to 20 g/l plutonium solutions. Reference solution measurements have a 0.8 to 1.4 % relative standard deviation; duplicate plutonium determinations give a 0.3% relative standard deviation for sample analysis. There is a discrepancy (- 0.3% to - 0.9%) between the spectrophotometric method results and the isotopic dilution analysis [fr

  20. Advanced concepts under development in the United States Breeder-Fuel-Reprocessing Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Burch, W.D.

    1981-01-01

    Advanced concepts and techniques for the fuel reprocessing step are being developed. These concepts have been incorporated into the conceptual design of a Hot Experimental Facility (HEF), which is intended to demonstrate reprocessing of the first US breeder demonstration reactor. To achieve system reliability and reduce occupational doses, a concept of totally remote operation and maintenance (termed Remotex) has been conceived and is being developed. In this concept, maintenance and mechanical operations are accomplished with remotely operated bilateral force-reflecting electronic master/slave manipulators. Suitable transport systems, coupled with remote closed-circuit television viewing, are provided to extend man's capabilities into the hostile cell environment. New equipment concepts are being developed for the fuel dismantling and shearing step, a high-temperature dry process termed voloxidation to remove tritium, a continuous rotary dissolver, and for an improved centrifugal solvent contractor. Techniques have been developed, using engineering-scale equipment with active tracers for retention of 85 Kr, radioiodine, 14 C, and 3 H