WorldWideScience

Sample records for sabotage nonradiological sabotage

  1. Sabotage in Capital Budgeting

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Brunner, Markus; Ostermaier, Andreas

    2018-01-01

    for honesty inhibits sabotage. Moreover, honesty suppresses negative reciprocity and thus reduces sabotage not only directly but also indirectly. Our findings warn firms to consider the sabotage of investments as a hidden cost of control in budgeting. They show that honesty has a spill-over effect...

  2. Reactor safeguards against insider sabotage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bennett, H.A.

    1982-03-01

    A conceptual safeguards system is structured to show how both reactor operations and physical protection resources could be integrated to prevent release of radioactive material caused by insider sabotage. Operational recovery capabilities are addressed from the viewpoint of both detection of and response to disabled components. Physical protection capabilities for preventing insider sabotage through the application of work rules are analyzed. Recommendations for further development of safeguards system structures, operational recovery, and sabotage prevention are suggested

  3. A consequence index approach to identifying radiological sabotage targets

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Altman, W.D.; Hockert, J.W.

    1988-01-01

    One of the threats to concern to facilities using significant quantities of radioactive material is radiological sabotage. Both the Department of Energy (DOE) and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission have issued guidance to facilities for radiological sabotage protection. At those facilities where the inventories of radioactive materials change frequently, there is an operational need for a technically defensible method of determining whether or not the inventory of radioactive material at a given facility poses a potential radiological sabotage risk. In order to determine quickly whether a building is a potential radiological sabotage target, Lawrence Livermore National Loaboratory (LLNL) has developed a radiological sabotage consequence index that provides a conservative estimate of the maximum potential off-site consequences of a radiological sabotage attempt involving the facility. This radiological sabotage consequence index can be used by safeguards and security staff to rapidly determine whether a change in building operations poses a potential radiological sabotage risk. In those cases where such a potential risk is identified, a more detailed radiological sabotage vulnerability analysis can be performed

  4. ICPP radiological and toxicological sabotage analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kubiak, V.R.; Mortensen, F.G.

    1995-01-01

    In June of 1993, the Department of Energy (DOE) issued Notice 5630.3A, open-quotes Protection of Departmental Facilities Against Radiological and Toxicological Sabotage,close quotes which states that all significant radiological and toxicological hazards at Department facilities must be examined for potential sabotage. This analysis has been completed at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). The ICPP radiological and toxicological hazards include spent government and commercial fuels, Special Nuclear Materials (SNM), high-level liquid wastes, high-level solid wastes, and process and decontamination chemicals. The analysis effort included identification and assessment of quantities of hazardous materials present at the facility; identification and ranking of hazardous material targets; development of worst case scenarios detailing possible sabotage actions and hazard releases; performance of vulnerability assessments using table top and computer methodologies on credible threat targets; evaluation of potential risks to the public, workers, and the environment; evaluation of sabotage risk reduction options; and selection of cost effective prevention and mitigation options

  5. Sabotage at Nuclear Power Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Purvis, James W.

    1999-07-21

    Recently there has been a noted worldwide increase in violent actions including attempted sabotage at nuclear power plants. Several organizations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, have guidelines, recommendations, and formal threat- and risk-assessment processes for the protection of nuclear assets. Other examples are the former Defense Special Weapons Agency, which used a risk-assessment model to evaluate force-protection security requirements for terrorist incidents at DOD military bases. The US DOE uses a graded approach to protect its assets based on risk and vulnerability assessments. The Federal Aviation Administration and Federal Bureau of Investigation conduct joint threat and vulnerability assessments on high-risk US airports. Several private companies under contract to government agencies use formal risk-assessment models and methods to identify security requirements. The purpose of this paper is to survey these methods and present an overview of all potential types of sabotage at nuclear power plants. The paper discusses emerging threats and current methods of choice for sabotage--especially vehicle bombs and chemical attacks. Potential consequences of sabotage acts, including economic and political; not just those that may result in unacceptable radiological exposure to the public, are also discussed. Applicability of risk-assessment methods and mitigation techniques are also presented.

  6. Sabotage at Nuclear Power Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Purvis, James W.

    1999-01-01

    Recently there has been a noted worldwide increase in violent actions including attempted sabotage at nuclear power plants. Several organizations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, have guidelines, recommendations, and formal threat- and risk-assessment processes for the protection of nuclear assets. Other examples are the former Defense Special Weapons Agency, which used a risk-assessment model to evaluate force-protection security requirements for terrorist incidents at DOD military bases. The US DOE uses a graded approach to protect its assets based on risk and vulnerability assessments. The Federal Aviation Administration and Federal Bureau of Investigation conduct joint threat and vulnerability assessments on high-risk US airports. Several private companies under contract to government agencies use formal risk-assessment models and methods to identify security requirements. The purpose of this paper is to survey these methods and present an overview of all potential types of sabotage at nuclear power plants. The paper discusses emerging threats and current methods of choice for sabotage--especially vehicle bombs and chemical attacks. Potential consequences of sabotage acts, including economic and political; not just those that may result in unacceptable radiological exposure to the public, are also discussed. Applicability of risk-assessment methods and mitigation techniques are also presented

  7. Physical protection nuclear facilities against sabotage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hagemann, A.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: INFCIRC 225 Rev. 4 has introduced the Design Basis Threat, DBT, as a key element of the states physical protection system. The DBT is a definition which determines the level of physical protection of nuclear material during use, storage, transport and of nuclear facilities. It the basis for physical protection concepts and for the design of measures the operator or licensee has to provide. By this means it is also a definition of the responsibility for the physical protection which the operator accepts with the license. The new chapter designated to the physical protection against sabotage which has resulted also in the amendment of the title in INFCIRC 225 demonstrates the grown international concern about the potential consequences of sabotage. More than the physical protection against unauthorized removal the physical protection against sabotage has interfaces with the nuclear safety field. The basis of protection against sabotage therefore is much more based on the facility design-the safety design of the facility. Using the DBT the competent authority is in the position to determine the level of protection against sabotage and the remaining risk which has to be accepted. This risk of course depends on the real threat which is not known in advance. The acceptance of the remaining risk depends on both the assessment of the threat, its credibility and the potential consequences. There has been no serious act of sabotage in the past nor an attempt of. Despite of this the Harnun attack of the Japanese underground and some other recent terrorist activities could have given reasons to reconsider what threat might be credible. The German physical protection system has been developed since the increasing terrorist activities in the 1970s. From the beginning the protection against sabotage played an important role in the German system of physical protection. The requirements for the physical protection against unauthorized removal and against sabotage were

  8. Reactor sabotage vulnerability and vital-equipment identification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boudreau, J.M.; Haarman, R.A.

    1982-01-01

    Two ongoing programs at Los Alamos, the Vital Area Analysis Program and the Reactor Sabotage Vulnerability Program, are discussed. The Laboratory has been providing the Nuclear Regulatory Commission with technical support in identifying the vital areas at nuclear power plants through the use of sabotage fault trees. This procedure is being expanded to provide support for the Reactor Sabotage Vulnerability Assessment Program. A re-examination of some of the original system modeling assumptions, including a survey of the applicable research, is underway. A description of the survey work and the computerized data bases being used is provided. This program is expected to result in refinements in the existing procedures

  9. Ranking of sabotage/tampering avoidance technology alternatives

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Andrews, W.B.; Tabatabai, A.S.; Powers, T.B.; Daling, P.M.; Fecht, B.A.; Gore, B.F.; Overcast, T.D.; Rankin, W.R.; Schreiber, R.E.; Tawil, J.J.

    1986-01-01

    Pacific Northwest Laboratory conducted a study to evaluate alternatives to the design and operation of nuclear power plants, emphasizing a reduction of their vulnerability to sabotage. Estimates of core melt accident frequency during normal operations and from sabotage/tampering events were used to rank the alternatives. Core melt frequency for normal operations was estimated using sensitivity analysis of results of probabilistic risk assessments. Core melt frequency for sabotage/tampering was estimated by developing a model based on probabilistic risk analyses, historic data, engineering judgment, and safeguards analyses of plant locations where core melt events could be initiated. Results indicate the most effective alternatives focus on large areas of the plant, increase safety system redundancy, and reduce reliance on single locations for mitigation of transients. Less effective options focus on specific areas of the plant, reduce reliance on some plant areas for safe shutdown, and focus on less vulnerable targets.

  10. Ranking of sabotage/tampering avoidance technology alternatives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Andrews, W.B.; Tabatabai, A.S.; Powers, T.B.

    1986-01-01

    Pacific Northwest Laboratory conducted a study to evaluate alternatives to the design and operation of nuclear power plants, emphasizing a reduction of their vulnerability to sabotage. Estimates of core melt accident frequency during normal operations and from sabotage/tampering events were used to rank the alternatives. Core melt frequency for normal operations was estimated using sensitivity analysis of results of probabilistic risk assessments. Core melt frequency for sabotage/tampering was estimated by developing a model based on probabilistic risk analyses, historic data, engineering judgment, and safeguards analyses of plant locations where core melt events could be initiated. Results indicate the most effective alternatives focus on large areas of the plant, increase safety system redundancy, and reduce reliance on single locations for mitigation of transients. Less effective options focus on specific areas of the plant, reduce reliance on some plant areas for safe shutdown, and focus on less vulnerable targets

  11. Radiological/toxicological sabotage assessments at the Savannah River Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, H.D.; Pascal, M.D.; Richardson, D.L.

    1995-01-01

    This paper describes the methods being employed by Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC) to perform graded assessments of radiological and toxicological sabotage vulnerability at Savannah River Site (SRS) facilities. These assessments are conducted to ensure that effective measures are in place to prevent, mitigate, and respond to a potential sabotage event which may cause an airborne release of radiological/toxicological material, causing an adverse effect on the health and safety of employees, the public, and the environment. Department of Energy (DOE) Notice 5630.3A, open-quotes Protection of Departmental Facilities Against Radiological and Toxicological Sabotage,close quotes and the associated April 1993 DOE-Headquarters guidance provide the requirements and outline an eight-step process for hazardous material evaluation. The process requires the integration of information from a variety of disciplines, including safety, safeguards and security, and emergency preparedness. This paper summarizes WSRC's approach towards implementation of the DOE requirements, and explains the inter-relationships between the Radiological and Toxicological Assessments developed using this process, and facility Hazard Assessment Reports (HAs), Safety Analysis Reports (SARs), and Facility Vulnerability Assessments (VAs)

  12. "Set Up to Fail": Institutional Racism and the Sabotage of School Improvement

    Science.gov (United States)

    Taylor, Dianne L.; Clark, Menthia P.

    2009-01-01

    Data from two previous studies are reanalyzed using the lens of institutional racism to examine district decisions that undermined, or sabotaged, improvement efforts at schools attended by students of color. Opportunities to rectify the sabotage were available but not pursued. A model portrays the interaction between decision-maker intent,…

  13. SPTH3: subroutine for finding shortest sabotage paths

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hulme, B.L.; Holdridge, D.B.

    1977-07-01

    This document explains how to construct a sabotage graph which models any fixed-site facility and how to use the subroutine SPTH3 to find shortest paths in the graph. The shortest sabotage paths represent physical routes through the site which would allow an adversary to take advantage of the greatest weaknesses in the system of barriers and alarms. The subroutine SPTH3 is a tool with which safeguards designers and analysts can study the relative effects of design changes on the adversary routing problem. In addition to showing how to use SPTH3, this report discusses the methods used to find shortest paths and several implementation details which cause SPTH3 to be extremely efficient

  14. A Study on Developing a Framework for Sabotage Protection of Nuclear Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Kilyoo; Jung, WooSik

    2007-01-01

    A methodology related to physical protection of nuclear facilities against sabotage is preparing by IAEA. However, the framework of IAEA is somewhat superficial and it seems not to reflect the risk concept since IAEA prefers a proven technology. In this paper, a framework for sabotage protection of nuclear facilities using risk assessment is described

  15. A standardized approach for determining radiological sabotage targets

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gardner, B.H.; Snell, M.K.

    1993-01-01

    The US Department of Energy has required radiological sabotage vulnerability assessments to be conducted for years. However, the exact methodology to be used in this type of analysis still remains somewhat elusive. Therefore, there is tremendous variation in the methodologies and assumptions used to determine release levels and doses potentially affecting the health and safety of the public. In some cases, there are three orders of magnitude difference in results for dispersal of similar materials under similar meteorological conditions. To address this issue, the authors have developed an approach to standardizing radiological sabotage target analysis that starts by addressing basic assumptions and then directs the user to some recommended computerized analytical tools. Results from different dispersal codes are also compared in this analysis

  16. The DOE policy for protection against radiological and toxicological sabotage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hassell, C. Jr.; Callahan, S.; Myers, D.

    1995-01-01

    In response to a Department of Energy Office of Security Evaluations study on radiological and toxicological sabotage, the Under Secretary of Energy has directed that all departmental elements initiate analyses to determine the extent of radiological and toxicological sabotage threats within the department. To accomplish this, a plan was adopted whereby radioactive and other hazardous materials at DOE sites would be assessed by an interdisciplinary team as to quantities, ranked according to their hazards, subjected to a vulnerability assessment, and appropriate upgrades selected and monitored. This paper is a discussion of those efforts

  17. Sabotage Operations of the Prewar Anti-Facist League - Poland

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Szubanski, Rajmund

    1960-01-01

    The following article is a translation and deals with sabotage operations of the prewar Anti-Fascist League that was connected to the Communist Party, the International Seaman's and Dockers' Unions...

  18. Summary report of workshop on sabotage protection in nuclear power plant design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-02-01

    During the Summer of 1976, Sandia Laboratories hosted a workshop on Sabotage Protection in Nuclear Power Plant Design in which 11 consultants from the nuclear power industry participated. Each consultant is highly qualified and experienced in nuclear power plant design. The objective of the workshop was to identify practicable design measures which could be employed in future nuclear power plants to provide increased protection against sabotage. The report summarizes the conclusions and recommendations of the workshop

  19. Discussion of sabotage vulnerabilities: consequences of airborne releases

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lu, M.S.; Epel, L.G.

    1985-01-01

    A simplified mathematical model has been developed to provide conservative estimates of radioactive and/or chemical dispersal consequences. The model is useful in assessing physical security protection needs and determining classification levels for information on DOE facilities. Sabotage scenarios for dispersals were developed based on public information, such as safety analysis reports and environmental impact statements for facilities of interest. The dispersal mechanisms considered included criticality incidents, explosive methods, pyrotechnics, lofting, etc. The technical knowledge required by a malevolent group intent upon causing dispersal includes the attack objective information, (target, source-consequences correlation and propagation characteristics) as well attack capability information (physical security, disperal know-how and engineered safety and protection features). Physical protection measures, which could protect materials via deterrence, detection, delay and apprehension, were suggested, along with classification techniques which could protect against dispersal by denying access to information critical to the success of sabotage. 9 refs., 6 figs

  20. Protecting facilities against terrorism and sabotage. Is Jamaica prepared to deal with this potential threat?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Powell, E.D.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: Jamaica, a developing Caribbean country, is presently experiencing an economic recession. This has lead to the government having considerable difficulty in acquiring much needed financing, even financing that is necessary to protect the county's resources and facilities from terrorist and sabotage. Essential national facilities include our international airports, embassies and High Commission, hospitals, utility plants - electricity, water and telecommunications, oil-refineries, government ministries, parliamentary houses and educational facilities. These facilities are vulnerable to terrorist attacks and sabotages. Terrorist acts and acts of sabotage can come from internal as well as external sources, they can be commandeered from the air, land or sea. They can be politically, socio-economically or otherwise motivated. As a third world developing nation, Jamaica does not have the capability or the resources necessary to secure all its assets, the government must prioritize on such resource allocation. With its high level of debt servicing, dealing with recurrent and capital expenditure and addressing other social issues, some important issues will be placed on the back burner, dealing with terrorism and sabotage will fall in the category. One contributing factor is the fact that to date the incidents of terrorism and sabotage have been few to non-existent. This has encouraged the government to become somewhat complacent, subscribing to the belief that acts of terrorism and sabotage will never happen. This practice can be detrimental to the country, as one cannot underestimate the threat of terrorism and sabotage. With the steady increase in drug related incidents and with the deportation agreement the government has with some first world countries such as the USA and England, this threat is very realistic. Drug 'Lords'/'Dons' are known to promote terrorism and sabotage as revenge mechanism against governments for unfavorable decision handed down by the

  1. The Faustian bargain-hazards of theft and sabotage: Nuclear proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1975-01-01

    It is argued that the fissionable material in nuclear reactors, fuel reprocessing plants, waste storage facilities and that contained in the shipments of radioactive waste are vulnerable to sabotage and theft. (R.L.)

  2. Getting even for customer mistreatment: the role of moral identity in the relationship between customer interpersonal injustice and employee sabotage.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Skarlicki, Daniel P; van Jaarsveld, Danielle D; Walker, David D

    2008-11-01

    Research on the "dark side" of organizational behavior has determined that employee sabotage is most often a reaction by disgruntled employees to perceived mistreatment. To date, however, most studies on employee retaliation have focused on intra-organizational sources of (in)justice. Results from this field study of customer service representatives (N = 358) showed that interpersonal injustice from customers relates positively to customer-directed sabotage over and above intra-organizational sources of fairness. Moreover, the association between unjust treatment and sabotage was moderated by 2 dimensions of moral identity (symbolization and internalization) in the form of a 3-way interaction. The relationship between injustice and sabotage was more pronounced for employees high (vs. low) in symbolization, but this moderation effect was weaker among employees who were high (vs. low) in internalization. Last, employee sabotage was negatively related to job performance ratings.

  3. Projected Source Terms for Potential Sabotage Events Related to Spent Fuel Shipments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Luna, R.E.; Neuhauser, K.S.; Vigil, M.G.

    1999-01-01

    Two major studies, one sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy and the other by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, were conducted in the late 1970s and early 1980s to provide information and source terms for an optimally successful act of sabotage on spent fuel casks typical of those available for use. This report applies the results of those studies and additional analysis to derive potential source terms for certain classes of sabotage events on spent fuel casks and spent fuel typical of those which could be shipped in the early decades of the 21st century. In addition to updating the cask and spent fuel characteristics used in the analysis, two release mechanisms not included in the earlier works were identified and evaluated. As would be expected, inclusion of these additional release mechanisms resulted in a somewhat higher total release from the postulated sabotage events. Although health effects from estimated releases were addressed in the earlier study conducted for U.S. Department of Energy, they have not been addressed in this report. The results from this report maybe used to estimate health effects

  4. Protection of new and innovative NPPs against sabotage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Guerpinar, Aybars

    2005-01-01

    The design of a nuclear installation requires the consideration of a multitude of aspects that also includes safety and protection against sabotage. Nuclear safety is a very important aspect of new reactor designs and new approaches to safety is a topic that has attracted international attention in recent years. The results of many IAEA Engineering Safety Reviews to nuclear installations have demonstrated that the way nuclear safety is considered in relation to external events has not been fully satisfactory for a majority of these. The main reasons for this involve the following: importing of different methods and criteria depending on the discipline involved related to the hazard in question (methods and criteria used in hydrology versus seismology for example), incorporation of design against external events too late in the process of design of the installation and appending the considerations for external events in assessment tools (both deterministic and probabilistic) as a separate item. By their nature, sabotage events may affect nuclear facilities as extreme loads not very differently from accidental external events and therefore face similar problems in the process of integration with the design of the installation at an early stage. (author)

  5. Plague and Paideia: Sabotage in Devising Theatre with Young People

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wessels, Anne

    2012-01-01

    This ethnography, completed by the classroom teacher in a publicly funded secondary school in Mississauga, Canada, explores issues of conflict and sabotage that affected a devising project with suburban young people. The processes of devising generated ethnographic data that included a play script and videotaped rehearsals and performances. As…

  6. Large fire scenarios in relation to sabotage of nuclear installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Contri, P.; Guerpinar, A.; ); Schneider, U.

    2005-01-01

    The analyses of sabotage scenarios carried out in recent years identified two major damaging mechanisms associated with such scenarios, namely: the mechanical interaction of solid bodies or pressure waves with the installations and the fire-related effects from burning substances. While the former effect may be addressed by available analytical tools developed for accidental scenarios, the latter deserves a new, specific engineering effort. In fact, all nuclear facilities are designed in relation to accidental fires; even so, they need to be assessed in relation to sabotage induced fire scenarios due to the special characteristics of such scenarios, not addressed by the current engineering practice for the design of nuclear installations. Conventional fire hazard analysis is based on the hypothesis of the presence of combustible materials in the buildings and limited number of contemporaneous sources of fire. In addition, conventional fire safety assessment relies upon the presence of mitigation measures and fire related operational procedures. In a sabotage event the validity of all these assumptions need to be checked and if the assumptions cannot be supported, then the analysis should be revised and other alternatives of protection should be developed. Also the implementation of emergency planning should be reviewed to take account of this concern. This paper collects state-of-the-art experience from some Countries, which represents the background information for the development of new IAEA documents in this field. The paper reviews how the current design practice for nuclear installations can cope with large fire scenarios caused by malevolent actions and provides recommendations to designers and operators on how to address these issues in a reasonable framework. (authors)

  7. Spent fuel sabotage test program, characterization of aerosol dispersal : interim final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gregson, Michael Warren; Brockmann, John E.; Loiseau, Olivier; Klennert, Lindsay A.; Nolte, Oliver; Molecke, Martin Alan; Autrusson, Bruno A.; Koch, Wolfgang; Pretzsch, Gunter Guido; Brucher, Wenzel; Steyskal, Michele D.

    2008-01-01

    This multinational, multi-phase spent fuel sabotage test program is quantifying the aerosol particles produced when the products of a high energy density device (HEDD) interact with and explosively particulate test rodlets that contain pellets of either surrogate materials or actual spent fuel. This program provides source-term data that are relevant to plausible sabotage scenarios in relation to spent fuel transport and storage casks and associated risk assessments. We present details and significant results obtained from this program from 2001 through 2007. Measured aerosol results include: respirable fractions produced; amounts, nuclide content, and produced particle size distributions and morphology; measurements of volatile fission product species enhanced sorption--enrichment factors onto respirable particles; and, status on determination of the spent fuel ratio, SFR, needed for scaling studies. Emphasis is provided on recent Phase 3 tests using depleted uranium oxide pellets plus non-radioactive fission product dopants in surrogate spent fuel test rodlets, plus the latest surrogate cerium oxide results and aerosol laboratory supporting calibration work. The DUO 2 , CeO 2 , plus fission product dopant aerosol particle results are compared with available historical data. We also provide a status review on continuing preparations for the final Phase 4 in this program, tests using individual short rodlets containing actual spent fuel from U.S. PWR reactors, with both high- and lower-burnup fuel. The source-term data, aerosol results, and program design have been tailored to support and guide follow-on computer modeling of aerosol dispersal hazards and radiological consequence assessments. This spent fuel sabotage, aerosol test program was performed primarily at Sandia National Laboratories, with support provided by both the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This program has significant input from, and is cooperatively supported and

  8. Spent fuel sabotage aerosol ratio program : FY 2004 test and data summary.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Brucher, Wenzel (Gesellschaft fur Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit, Germany); Koch, Wolfgang (Fraunhofer Institut fur Toxikologie und Experimentelle Medizin, Germany); Pretzsch, Gunter Guido (Gesellschaft fur Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit, Germany); Loiseau, Olivier (Institut de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire, France); Mo, Tin (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC); Billone, Michael C. (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, IL); Autrusson, Bruno A. (Institut de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire, France); Young, F. I. (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC); Coats, Richard Lee; Burtseva, Tatiana (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, IL); Luna, Robert Earl; Dickey, Roy R.; Sorenson, Ken Bryce; Nolte, Oliver (Fraunhofer Institut fur Toxikologie und Experimentelle Medizin, Germany); Thompson, Nancy Slater (U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, DC); Hibbs, Russell S. (U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, DC); Gregson, Michael Warren; Lange, Florentin (Gesellschaft fur Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit, Germany); Molecke, Martin Alan; Tsai, Han-Chung (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, IL)

    2005-07-01

    This multinational, multi-phase spent fuel sabotage test program is quantifying the aerosol particles produced when the products of a high energy density device (HEDD) interact with and explosively particulate test rodlets that contain pellets of either surrogate materials or actual spent fuel. This program has been underway for several years. This program provides data that are relevant to some sabotage scenarios in relation to spent fuel transport and storage casks, and associated risk assessments. The program also provides significant technical and political benefits in international cooperation. We are quantifying the Spent Fuel Ratio (SFR), the ratio of the aerosol particles released from HEDD-impacted actual spent fuel to the aerosol particles produced from surrogate materials, measured under closely matched test conditions, in a contained test chamber. In addition, we are measuring the amounts, nuclide content, size distribution of the released aerosol materials, and enhanced sorption of volatile fission product nuclides onto specific aerosol particle size fractions. These data are the input for follow-on modeling studies to quantify respirable hazards, associated radiological risk assessments, vulnerability assessments, and potential cask physical protection design modifications. This document includes an updated description of the test program and test components for all work and plans made, or revised, during FY 2004. It also serves as a program status report as of the end of FY 2004. All available test results, observations, and aerosol analyses plus interpretations--primarily for surrogate material Phase 2 tests, series 2/5A through 2/9B, using cerium oxide sintered ceramic pellets are included. Advanced plans and progress are described for upcoming tests with unirradiated, depleted uranium oxide and actual spent fuel test rodlets. This spent fuel sabotage--aerosol test program is coordinated with the international Working Group for Sabotage Concerns of

  9. Spent fuel sabotage aerosol ratio program : FY 2004 test and data summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brucher, Wenzel; Koch, Wolfgang; Pretzsch, Gunter Guido; Loiseau, Olivier; Mo, Tin; Billone, Michael C.; Autrusson, Bruno A.; Young, F. I.; Coats, Richard Lee; Burtseva, Tatiana; Luna, Robert Earl; Dickey, Roy R.; Sorenson, Ken Bryce; Nolte, Oliver; Thompson, Nancy Slater; Hibbs, Russell S.; Gregson, Michael Warren; Lange, Florentin; Molecke, Martin Alan; Tsai, Han-Chung

    2005-01-01

    This multinational, multi-phase spent fuel sabotage test program is quantifying the aerosol particles produced when the products of a high energy density device (HEDD) interact with and explosively particulate test rodlets that contain pellets of either surrogate materials or actual spent fuel. This program has been underway for several years. This program provides data that are relevant to some sabotage scenarios in relation to spent fuel transport and storage casks, and associated risk assessments. The program also provides significant technical and political benefits in international cooperation. We are quantifying the Spent Fuel Ratio (SFR), the ratio of the aerosol particles released from HEDD-impacted actual spent fuel to the aerosol particles produced from surrogate materials, measured under closely matched test conditions, in a contained test chamber. In addition, we are measuring the amounts, nuclide content, size distribution of the released aerosol materials, and enhanced sorption of volatile fission product nuclides onto specific aerosol particle size fractions. These data are the input for follow-on modeling studies to quantify respirable hazards, associated radiological risk assessments, vulnerability assessments, and potential cask physical protection design modifications. This document includes an updated description of the test program and test components for all work and plans made, or revised, during FY 2004. It also serves as a program status report as of the end of FY 2004. All available test results, observations, and aerosol analyses plus interpretations--primarily for surrogate material Phase 2 tests, series 2/5A through 2/9B, using cerium oxide sintered ceramic pellets are included. Advanced plans and progress are described for upcoming tests with unirradiated, depleted uranium oxide and actual spent fuel test rodlets. This spent fuel sabotage--aerosol test program is coordinated with the international Working Group for Sabotage Concerns of

  10. Spent fuel sabotage test program, characterization of aerosol dispersal : interim final report.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gregson, Michael Warren; Brockmann, John E.; Loiseau, Olivier (Institut de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire, France); Klennert, Lindsay A.; Nolte, Oliver (Fraunhofer Institut fur Toxikologie und Experimentelle Medizin, Germany); Molecke, Martin Alan; Autrusson, Bruno A. (Institut de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire, France); Koch, Wolfgang (Fraunhofer Institut fur Toxikologie und Experimentelle Medizin, Germany); Pretzsch, Gunter Guido (Gesellschaft fur Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit, Germany); Brucher, Wenzel (Gesellschaft fur Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit, Germany); Steyskal, Michele D.

    2008-03-01

    This multinational, multi-phase spent fuel sabotage test program is quantifying the aerosol particles produced when the products of a high energy density device (HEDD) interact with and explosively particulate test rodlets that contain pellets of either surrogate materials or actual spent fuel. This program provides source-term data that are relevant to plausible sabotage scenarios in relation to spent fuel transport and storage casks and associated risk assessments. We present details and significant results obtained from this program from 2001 through 2007. Measured aerosol results include: respirable fractions produced; amounts, nuclide content, and produced particle size distributions and morphology; measurements of volatile fission product species enhanced sorption--enrichment factors onto respirable particles; and, status on determination of the spent fuel ratio, SFR, needed for scaling studies. Emphasis is provided on recent Phase 3 tests using depleted uranium oxide pellets plus non-radioactive fission product dopants in surrogate spent fuel test rodlets, plus the latest surrogate cerium oxide results and aerosol laboratory supporting calibration work. The DUO{sub 2}, CeO{sub 2}, plus fission product dopant aerosol particle results are compared with available historical data. We also provide a status review on continuing preparations for the final Phase 4 in this program, tests using individual short rodlets containing actual spent fuel from U.S. PWR reactors, with both high- and lower-burnup fuel. The source-term data, aerosol results, and program design have been tailored to support and guide follow-on computer modeling of aerosol dispersal hazards and radiological consequence assessments. This spent fuel sabotage, aerosol test program was performed primarily at Sandia National Laboratories, with support provided by both the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This program has significant input from, and is cooperatively

  11. Conceptual Framework for Physical Protection Against Sabotage Considering Plant-specific Radiological Consequences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Joung Hoon; Yu, Dong Han

    2010-01-01

    According to the Generation IV (Gen IV) Technology Roadmap, Gen IV nuclear energy systems (NESs) should highlight proliferation resistance and physical protection (PR and PP) as one of the four goals along with sustainability, safety and reliability, and economics. Especially, physical protection (PP) is the typical important characteristic of an NES that impedes the theft of materials suitable for nuclear explosives or radiation dispersal devices (RDD) and the sabotage of facilities and transportation by subnation entities and other non-Host State adversaries. These two subjects have been studied separately. Proliferation is commonly considered as an international concern and the past work on the PR assessments can be found. On the other hands, PP is regarded as a State security concern, much of which is classified and facility-dependent. Recently, more concern has been focused on the PP design and regulation because of rapid environment changes including radiological consequences by internal sabotage and nuclear terrorism by RDDs. The current PP Regulation has been applied intensively to the existing nuclear facilities and could be a possible guidance for the future GEN-IV NESs. This paper first reviews the IAEA guide document, INFCIRC/225, which was accepted as the standard international guideline in the physical protection area. It has been updated several times up to now, and is undergoing another revision. The paper introduces current substantial changes in the document regarding PP including the national nuclear security and sabotage in the nuclear facilities. Then, it presents a conceptual framework for physical protection against sabotage considering plant-specific radiological consequence after malicious acts within certain vital areas. The framework combines the newly developed method of vital area identification, the current PSA level 2 works, and physical protection concepts. This would help to improve a design concept of new physical protection

  12. Conceptual Framework for Physical Protection Against Sabotage Considering Plant-specific Radiological Consequences

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Joung Hoon; Yu, Dong Han [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2010-10-15

    According to the Generation IV (Gen IV) Technology Roadmap, Gen IV nuclear energy systems (NESs) should highlight proliferation resistance and physical protection (PR and PP) as one of the four goals along with sustainability, safety and reliability, and economics. Especially, physical protection (PP) is the typical important characteristic of an NES that impedes the theft of materials suitable for nuclear explosives or radiation dispersal devices (RDD) and the sabotage of facilities and transportation by subnation entities and other non-Host State adversaries. These two subjects have been studied separately. Proliferation is commonly considered as an international concern and the past work on the PR assessments can be found. On the other hands, PP is regarded as a State security concern, much of which is classified and facility-dependent. Recently, more concern has been focused on the PP design and regulation because of rapid environment changes including radiological consequences by internal sabotage and nuclear terrorism by RDDs. The current PP Regulation has been applied intensively to the existing nuclear facilities and could be a possible guidance for the future GEN-IV NESs. This paper first reviews the IAEA guide document, INFCIRC/225, which was accepted as the standard international guideline in the physical protection area. It has been updated several times up to now, and is undergoing another revision. The paper introduces current substantial changes in the document regarding PP including the national nuclear security and sabotage in the nuclear facilities. Then, it presents a conceptual framework for physical protection against sabotage considering plant-specific radiological consequence after malicious acts within certain vital areas. The framework combines the newly developed method of vital area identification, the current PSA level 2 works, and physical protection concepts. This would help to improve a design concept of new physical protection

  13. Are you being sabotaged by your coworkers?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ferrara-Love, R

    1998-10-01

    Men and women are both guilty of sabotaging coworkers, but men and women do it differently and for different reasons. Men tend to do it more overtly and for more work-related reasons. However, women are more covert; their reasons are motivated more by jealousy of another's success or their own insecurity. Once women are betrayed by another, they take it more personally than their male counterparts. Men confront the betrayer and move on; that is business. Women do not confront the betrayer and see betrayal in the workplace as being let down by their friends. Women need to treat business relationships and situations as business, not as friendships.

  14. A Study on Establishment of Unacceptable Radiological Consequence (URC) for Physical Protection against Sabotage

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jung, Myungtak; Koh, Moonsung; Lee, Youngwook; Jo, Kwang Ho [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-05-15

    The international community has recommended that a graded approach should be applied to the establishment of the domestic regime for physical protection in accordance with fundamental principle H of the amended Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and INFCIRC/225/rev.5. In Korea, Currently, the graded approach to unauthorized removal of nuclear material is divided into three categories (Category Ι, Category ΙΙ, Category ΙΙΙ) based on the IAEA INFCIRC/225/rev.5. Moreover, depending on the categorization of nuclear material, physical protection measures against unauthorized removal are also clearly categorized. But in the case of physical protection against sabotage, the graded approach to the physical protection measures is not applied since Unacceptable Radiological Consequence (URC) for identifying sabotage target and level is not determined. URC can be established based on either dose limit or design limit. The report by Sandia National Lab. in USA specifies that core damage is used for URC. Calculation of an exact dose is based on various assumptions and processes and subsequently increases uncertainty. Therefore, using design limit for decreasing uncertainty is more effective than using dose limit. In order to apply the graded approach to physical protection against sabotage, we have taken into Fundamental principle H : Physical protection requirements should be based on a graded approach, taking into account the current evaluation of the threat, the relative attractiveness, the nature of the material and potential consequences associated with the unauthorized removal of nuclear material and with the sabotage against nuclear material of nuclear facilities consideration legal and institutional standards on domestic and international radiological consequences and intended to provide a reference for the URC establishment by the State. The study on various standards led to the conclusion that each value has advantages and

  15. Semiochemical sabotage: behavioral chemicals for protection of western conifers from bark beetles

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nancy. E. Gillette; A. Steve Munson

    2009-01-01

    The discovery and elucidation of volatile behavioral chemicals used by bark beetles to locate hosts and mates has revealed a rich potential for humans to sabotage beetle host-finding and reproduction. Here, we present a description of currently available semiochemical methods for use in monitoring and controlling bark beetle pests in western conifer forests. Delivery...

  16. Pathfinding in graph-theoretic sabotage models. I. Simultaneous attack by several teams

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hulme, B.L.

    1976-07-01

    Graph models are developed for fixed-site safeguards systems. The problem of finding optimal routes for several sabotage teams is cast as a problem of finding shortest paths in a graph. The motivation, rationale, and interpretation of the mathematical models are discussed in detail, and an algorithm for efficiently solving the associated path problem is described

  17. Reducing the threat of nuclear theft and sabotage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bunn, Matthew; Bunn, George

    2001-01-01

    The appalling events of September II, 2001 make clear that the threat of well-organized global terrorist groups bent on causing mass destruction is not hypothetical but real. There is evidence that Osama bin Laden's Al Quaida organization is seeking weapons of mass destruction, and has attempted to purchase stolen nuclear material from the former Soviet Union for use in nuclear explosives. Ensuring that the technologies and materials of weapons of mass destruction - especially weapons-usable nuclear materials, do not fall into the hands of terrorist groups or hostile states must therefore be a central element of the coming global battle to prevent mass-destruction terrorism. At the same time, nuclear facilities and radioactive materials - along with a wide range of other especially hazardous facilities and materials - must be protected from mass-consequence sabotage. Limited access to fissile materials, the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons, is the principal technical barrier to nuclear proliferation in the world today. The international community has an overwhelming interest in seeing that all such material is secure and accounted for. These events highlight the urgent need to: Dramatically expand international cooperation to upgrade security and accounting for weapons- usable nuclear material, in the former Soviet Union and worldwide, with the goal of ensuring that all such material is protected to stringent standards within a few years; Ensure that all nuclear facilities and materials (and other particularly hazardous facilities) are secure from mass-consequence sabotage; Strengthen national and international standards for security of nuclear materials and facilities; Greatly expand international efforts to interdict nuclear smuggling, including the difficult but essential task of strengthening efforts to share intelligence in this critical area; Reduce the number of sites where significant quantities of weapons-usable nuclear material exist, and the size

  18. Spent fuel sabotage aerosol test program :FY 2005-06 testing and aerosol data summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gregson, Michael Warren; Brockmann, John E.; Nolte, O.; Loiseau, O.; Koch, W.; Molecke, Martin Alan; Autrusson, Bruno; Pretzsch, Gunter Guido; Billone, M. C.; Lucero, Daniel A.; Burtseva, T.; Brucher, W; Steyskal, Michele D.

    2006-01-01

    This multinational, multi-phase spent fuel sabotage test program is quantifying the aerosol particles produced when the products of a high energy density device (HEDD) interact with and explosively particulate test rodlets that contain pellets of either surrogate materials or actual spent fuel. This program has been underway for several years. This program provides source-term data that are relevant to some sabotage scenarios in relation to spent fuel transport and storage casks, and associated risk assessments. This document focuses on an updated description of the test program and test components for all work and plans made, or revised, primarily during FY 2005 and about the first two-thirds of FY 2006. It also serves as a program status report as of the end of May 2006. We provide details on the significant findings on aerosol results and observations from the recently completed Phase 2 surrogate material tests using cerium oxide ceramic pellets in test rodlets plus non-radioactive fission product dopants. Results include: respirable fractions produced; amounts, nuclide content, and produced particle size distributions and morphology; status on determination of the spent fuel ratio, SFR (the ratio of respirable particles from real spent fuel/respirables from surrogate spent fuel, measured under closely matched test conditions, in a contained test chamber); and, measurements of enhanced volatile fission product species sorption onto respirable particles. We discuss progress and results for the first three, recently performed Phase 3 tests using depleted uranium oxide, DUO 2 , test rodlets. We will also review the status of preparations and the final Phase 4 tests in this program, using short rodlets containing actual spent fuel from U.S. PWR reactors, with both high- and lower-burnup fuel. These data plus testing results and design are tailored to support and guide, follow-on computer modeling of aerosol dispersal hazards and radiological consequence assessments

  19. Radiological source terms resulting from sabotage to transportation casks: Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miller, N.E.; Fentiman, A.W.; Kuhlman, M.R.; Ebersole, H.N.; Trott, B.D.; Orban, J.E.

    1986-11-01

    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) promulgated a rule, 10 CFR 73.37, which established requirements for safeguarding shipments of spent fuel to reduce the risk from acts of sabotage of highly radioactive materials. After the rule became effective, experimental programs conducted by Battelle for the NRC and by Sandia for the DOE showed the consequences of an attack using explosives on a shipment of PWR spent fuel were significantly less than had been indicated by earlier analytical studies. As a result, NRC is considering modifying the safeguards requirements. In support of NRC's efforts to modify the rule, Battelle has conducted additional experimental studies to evaluate the consequences of attacks on shipments of high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) spent fuel, nonpower reactor (NPR) spent fuel, and vitrified high-level waste (HLW). Model casks containing surrogates of the spent fuels or high-level waste were penetrated by the jet from a precision shaped charge. Air samples collected after each test were used to estimate the quantities of respirable material released after the cask was penetrated. Results of the tests were scaled by specially developed scaling factors to estimate the releases that may occur from attacks on full-sized shipments of the materials. It was concluded that the sabotage of shipments of HTGR spent fuel, NPR spent fuel, or vitrified HLW should have no greater consequences than those predicted for shipments of PWR spent fuel

  20. Initiation of depleted uranium oxide and spent fuel testing for the spent fuel sabotage aerosol ratio programme

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Molecke, M.A.; Gregson, M.W.; Sorenson, K.B.

    2004-01-01

    We provide a detailed overview of an on-going, multinational test programme that is developing aerosol data for some spent fuel sabotage scenarios on spent fuel transport and storage casks. Experiments are being performed to quantify the aerosolised materials plus volatilised fission products generated from actual spent fuel and surrogate material test rods, due to impact by a high-energy/density device. The programme participants in the United States plus Germany, France and the United Kingdom, part of the international Working Group for Sabotage Concerns of Transport and Storage Casks (WGSTSC) have strongly supported and coordinated this research programme. Sandia National Laboratories has the lead role for conducting this research programme; test programme support is provided by both the US Department of Energy and the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. We provide a summary of the overall, multiphase test design and a description of all explosive containment and aerosol collection test components used. We focus on the recently initiated tests on 'surrogate' spent fuel, unirradiated depleted uranium oxide and forthcoming actual spent fuel tests. We briefly summarise similar results from completed surrogate tests that used non-radioactive, sintered cerium oxide ceramic pellets in test rods. (author)

  1. Initiation of depleted uranium oxide and spent fuel testing for the spent fuel sabotage aerosol ratio program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Molecke, M.A.; Gregson, M.W.; Sorenson, K.B. [Sandia National Labs. (United States); Billone, M.C.; Tsai, H. [Argonne National Lab. (United States); Koch, W.; Nolte, O. [Fraunhofer Inst. fuer Toxikologie und Experimentelle Medizin (Germany); Pretzsch, G.; Lange, F. [Gesellschaft fuer Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (Germany); Autrusson, B.; Loiseau, O. [Inst. de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire (France); Thompson, N.S.; Hibbs, R.S. [U.S. Dept. of Energy (United States); Young, F.I.; Mo, T. [U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (United States)

    2004-07-01

    We provide a detailed overview of an ongoing, multinational test program that is developing aerosol data for some spent fuel sabotage scenarios on spent fuel transport and storage casks. Experiments are being performed to quantify the aerosolized materials plus volatilized fission products generated from actual spent fuel and surrogate material test rods, due to impact by a high energy density device, HEDD. The program participants in the U.S. plus Germany, France, and the U.K., part of the international Working Group for Sabotage Concerns of Transport and Storage Casks, WGSTSC have strongly supported and coordinated this research program. Sandia National Laboratories, SNL, has the lead role for conducting this research program; test program support is provided by both the U.S. Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission. WGSTSC partners need this research to better understand potential radiological impacts from sabotage of nuclear material shipments and storage casks, and to support subsequent risk assessments, modeling, and preventative measures. We provide a summary of the overall, multi-phase test design and a description of all explosive containment and aerosol collection test components used. We focus on the recently initiated tests on ''surrogate'' spent fuel, unirradiated depleted uranium oxide, and forthcoming actual spent fuel tests. The depleted uranium oxide test rodlets were prepared by the Institut de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire, in France. These surrogate test rodlets closely match the diameter of the test rodlets of actual spent fuel from the H.B. Robinson reactor (high burnup PWR fuel) and the Surry reactor (lower, medium burnup PWR fuel), generated from U.S. reactors. The characterization of the spent fuels and fabrication into short, pressurized rodlets has been performed by Argonne National Laboratory, for testing at SNL. The ratio of the aerosol and respirable particles released from HEDD-impacted spent

  2. Conflict of interest between a nematode and a trematode in an amphipod host: Test of the "sabotage" hypothesis

    Science.gov (United States)

    Thomas, Frédéric; Fauchier, Jerome; Lafferty, Kevin D.

    2002-01-01

    Microphallus papillorobustus is a manipulative trematode that induces strong behavioural alterations in the gamaridean amphipod Gammarus insensibilis, making the amphipod more vulnerable to predation by aquatic birds (definitive hosts). Conversely, the sympatric nematodeGammarinema gammari uses Gammarus insensibilis as a habitat and a source of nutrition. We investigated the conflict of interest between these two parasite species by studying the consequences of mixed infection on amphipod behaviour associated with the trematode. In the field, some amphipods infected by the trematode did not display the altered behaviour. These normal amphipods also had more nematodes, suggesting that the nematode overpowered the manipulation of the trematode, a strategy that would prolong the nematode's life. We hypothesize that sabotage of the trematode by the nematode would be an adaptive strategy for the nematode consistent with recent speculation about co-operation and conflict in manipulative parasites. A behavioural test conducted in the laboratory from naturally infected amphipods yielded the same result. However, exposing amphipods to nematodes did not negate or decrease the manipulation exerted by the trematode. Similarly, experimental elimination of nematodes from amphipods did not permit trematodes to manipulate behaviour. These experimental data do not support the hypothesis that the negative association between nematodes and manipulation by the trematode is a result of the "sabotage" hypothesis.

  3. Risk and resilience in the Nigerian oil sector: The economic effects of pipeline sabotage and theft

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yeeles, Adam; Akporiaye, Alero

    2016-01-01

    Political unrest in the Niger Delta has long been viewed as a hurdle for extracting maximum value from Nigeria's oil resources. Recently, investors and policymakers have laid blame for sector under-performance on pipeline sabotage and theft, and sounded the alarm for an impending ‘oil crisis’. However, our understanding of the economic effects of social action against oil companies is incomplete. Rigorous analysis has not heretofore been offered as evidence for such dire futures. Despite the obvious risk of pipeline interdiction, price dynamics and aggregate production respond minimally to pipeline interdiction. Based on quantitative analysis of the relationship among price, production and pipeline interdiction from multiple data sources covering different time intervals (monthly data from 2005 to 2014 and annual data from 1999 to 2013), we find no evidence of significant effects of pipeline interdiction on production and a weak relationship between pipeline interdiction and Bonny light crude prices. Reported losses in product are substantial, but there is no evidence of statistically significant impacts on price or production in the aggregate. Explanations for this counterintuitive result are cast in terms of sector resilience. The implications of this finding for producer risk and the likelihood of an impending ‘oil crisis’ are discussed. - Highlights: • We examine the impact of pipeline sabotage and theft on the Nigerian oil economy. • Econometric analysis of production, price and pipeline interdiction over different time intervals. • Aggregate price and production are impacted minimally by pipeline interdiction. • Oil sector business risk is high, but production is resilient to interruptions from social and political unrest.

  4. The land of black gold, corruption, poverty and sabotage: Overcoming the Niger Delta’s problems through the establishment of a Nigerian Non-Renewable Revenue Special Fund (NNRSF

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Adrian Gonzalez

    2016-12-01

    Full Text Available Through statistics published by the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC, the paper explores why oilfield sabotage from 2009 to 2015 remains a problem in the Niger Delta, despite the 2009 amnesty programme. It explains why some of these incidents are a direct result of the failure to implement socio-economic development in successive state agencies due to corruption, a consequence of the natural resource curse. The article then explores why and how a Nigerian Non-Renewable Revenue Special Fund overseen by the United Nations Development Programme should be established which would not only manage a portion of oil revenue funds from the Niger Delta but also initiate valid social and economic projects in order to help reduce the prevalence of sabotage and instability in the region.

  5. FRAUD/SABOTAGE Killing Nuclear-Reactors!!! ``Super"alloys GENERIC ENDEMIC Wigner's-Disease IN-stability!!!

    Science.gov (United States)

    Asphahani, Aziz; Siegel, Sidney; Siegel, Edward

    2010-03-01

    Siegel [[J.Mag.Mag.Mtls.7,312(78); PSS(a)11,45(72); Semis.& Insuls.5(79)] (at: ORNL, ANS, Westin``KL"ouse, PSEG, IAEA, ABB) warning of old/new nuclear-reactors/spent-fuel-casks/refineries/ jet/missile/rocket-engines austenitic/FCC Ni/Fe-based (so MIS- called)``super"alloys(182/82;Hastelloy-X; 600;304/304L-SSs; 690 !!!) GENERIC ENDEMIC EXTANT detrimental(synonyms): Wigner's- diseas(WD)[J.Appl.Phys.17,857(46)]; Ostwald-ripening; spinodal- decomposition; overageing-embrittlement; thermomechanical- INstability: Mayo[Google: ``If Leaks Could Kill"; at flickr.com search on ``Giant-Magnotoresistance"; find: [SiegelPolitics(79)]; Hoffman[animatedsoftware.com],...what DOE/NRC MISlabels as ``butt-welds" ``stress-corrosion cracking" endpoint's ROOT-CAUSE ULTIMATE-ORIGIN is WD overageing-embrit- tlement caused brittle-fracture cracking from early/ongoing AEC/DOE-n``u''tional-la``v''atories sabotage!!!

  6. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL), Pre-NRC through December 31, 1985

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-02-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, tampering/vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage, non-radiological sabotage, and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  7. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL): Pre-NRC through December 31, 1986

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, tampering/vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage, nonradiological sabotage and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  8. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL). Pre-NRC through December 31, 1984. Revision 10

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-05-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, tampering/vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage, non-radiological sabotage and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions in derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  9. Safeguards summary event list (SSEL): Pre-NRC through December 31, 1987

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, tampering/vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage, nonradiological sabotage, alcohol and drugs, and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  10. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL). Pre-NRC-June 30, 1985. Revision 11

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-01-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSRL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, tampering/vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage, non-radiological sabotage and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels. 12 figs

  11. Use of fault and decision tree analyses to protect against industrial sabotage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fullwood, R.R.; Erdmann, R.C.

    1975-01-01

    Fault tree and decision tree analyses provide systematic bases for evaluation of safety systems and procedures. Heuristically, this paper shows applications of these methods for industrial sabotage analysis at a reprocessing plant. Fault trees constructed by ''leak path'' analysis for completeness through path inventory. The escape fault tree is readily developed by this method and using the reciprocal character of the trees, the attack fault tree is constructed. After construction, the events on the fault tree are corrected for their nonreciprocal character. The fault trees are algebraically solved and the protection that is afforded is ranked by the number of barriers that must be penetrated. No attempt is made to assess the barrier penetration probabilities or penetration time duration. Event trees are useful for dynamic plant protection analysis through their time-sequencing character. To illustrate their usefulness, a simple attack scenario is devised and event-tree analyzed. Two saboteur success paths and 21 failure paths are found. This example clearly shows the event tree usefulness for concisely presenting the time sequencing of key decision points. However, event trees have the disadvantage of being scenario dependent, therefore requiring a separate event tree for each scenario

  12. FRAUD/SABOTAGE Killing Nuclear-Reactors Need Modeling!!!: "Super"alloys GENERIC ENDEMIC Wigner's-Disease/.../IN-stability: Ethics? SHMETHICS!!!

    Science.gov (United States)

    Asphahani, Aziz; Siegel, Sidney; Siegel, Edward

    2010-03-01

    Carbides solid-state chemistry domination of old/new nuclear- reactors/spent-fuel-casks/refineries/jet/missile/rocket-engines in austenitic/FCC Ni/Fe-based(so miscalled)``super"alloys(182/82; Hastelloy-X,600,304/304L-SSs,...,690!!!) GENERIC ENDEMIC EXTANT detrimental(synonyms): Wigner's-diseas(WD)[J.Appl.Phys.17,857 (1946)]/Ostwald-ripening/spinodal-decomposition/overageing- embrittlement/thermal-leading-to-mechanical(TLTM)-INstability: Mayo[Google:``If Leaks Could Kill"; at flickr.com search on ``Giant-Magnotoresistance"; find: Siegel[J.Mag.Mag.Mtls.7,312 (1978)]Politics(1979)]-Hoffman[animatedsoftware.com], what DOE/NRC MISlabels as ``butt-welds" ``stress-corrosion cracking" endpoint's ROOT-CAUSE ULTIMATE-ORIGIN is WD overageing-embritt- lement caused brittle-fracture cracking from early/ongoing AEC/ DOE-n"u"tional-la"v"atories sabotage!!!

  13. Safeguards summary event list (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Because of public interest, also included are events reported involving byproduct material which is exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, tampering/vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage, nonradiological sabotage, alcohol and drugs, and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  14. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL). January 1, 1990--December 31, 1994, Volume 2, Revision 3

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List provides brief summaries of hundreds of safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Events are described under the categories: Bomb-related, Intrusion, Missing/Allegedly Stolen, Transportation-related, Tampering/Vandalism, Arson, Firearms-related, Radiological Sabotage, Non-radiological Sabotage, and Miscellaneous. Because of the public interest, the Miscellaneous category also includes events reported involving source material, byproduct material, and natural uranium, which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Information in the event descriptions was obtained from official NRC sources

  15. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fadden, M.; Yardumian, J.

    1993-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List provides brief summaries of hundreds of safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Events are described under the categories: Bomb-related, Intrusion, Missing/Allegedly Stolen, Transportation-related, Tampering/Vandalism, Arson, Firearms-related, Radiological Sabotage, Non-radiological Sabotage, and Miscellaneous. Because of the public interest, the Miscellaneous category also includes events reported involving source material, byproduct material, and natural uranium, which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Information in the event descriptions was obtained from official NRC sources

  16. Pseudomonas aeruginosa sabotages the generation of host proresolving lipid mediators

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Flitter, Becca A.; Hvorecny, Kelli L.; Ono, Emiko; Eddens, Taylor; Yang, Jun; Kwak, Daniel H.; Bahl, Christopher D.; Hampton, Thomas H.; Morisseau, Christophe; Hammock, Bruce D.; Liu, Xinyu; Lee, Janet S.; Kolls, Jay K.; Levy, Bruce D.; Madden, Dean R.; Bomberger, Jennifer M.

    2016-12-15

    Recurrent Pseudomonas aeruginosa infections coupled with robust, damaging neutrophilic inflammation characterize the chronic lung disease cystic fibrosis (CF). The proresolving lipid mediator, 15-epi lipoxin A4 (15-epi LXA4), plays a critical role in limiting neutrophil activation and tissue inflammation, thus promoting the return to tissue homeostasis. Here, we show that a secreted P. aeruginosa epoxide hydrolase, cystic fibrosis transmembrane conductance regulator inhibitory factor (Cif), can disrupt 15-epi LXA4 transcellular biosynthesis and function. In the airway, 15-epi LXA4 production is stimulated by the epithelial-derived eicosanoid 14,15-epoxyeicosatrienoic acid (14,15-EET). Cif sabotages the production of 15-epi LXA4 by rapidly hydrolyzing 14,15-EET into its cognate diol, eliminating a proresolving signal that potently suppresses IL-8–driven neutrophil transepithelial migration in vitro. Retrospective analyses of samples from patients with CF supported the translational relevance of these preclinical findings. Elevated levels of Cif in bronchoalveolar lavage fluid were correlated with lower levels of 15-epi LXA4, increased IL-8 concentrations, and impaired lung function. Together, these findings provide structural, biochemical, and immunological evidence that the bacterial epoxide hydrolase Cif disrupts resolution pathways during bacterial lung infections. The data also suggest that Cif contributes to sustained pulmonary inflammation and associated loss of lung function in patients with CF.

  17. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL), January 1, 1990--December 31, 1991

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yardumian, J.; Fadden, M.

    1992-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL), Vol. 2, provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) which occurred and were reported from January 1, 1990 through December 31, 1991. Because of public interest, the Miscellaneous category includes a few events which involve either source material, byproduct material, or natural uranium which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, tampering/vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage, nonradiological sabotage, and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  18. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Because of public interest, the Miscellaneous category includes a few events which involve either source material, byproduct material, or natural uranium which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, tampering/vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage, nonradiological sabotage, pre-1990 alcohol and drugs (involving reactor operators, security force members, or management persons), and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  19. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL), pre-NRC through December 31, 1989

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Because of public interest, the Miscellaneous category includes a few events which involve either source material, byproduct material, or natural uranium which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, tampering/vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage, nonradiological sabotage, alcohol and drugs (involving reactor operators, security force members, or management persons), and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  20. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL), pre-NRC through December 31, 1989

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL), Vol. 1, provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) which occurred and were reported from pre-NRC through December 31, 1989. Because of public interest, the Miscellaneous category includes a few events which involve either source material, byproduct material, or natural uranium which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, tampering/vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage, nonradiological sabotage, and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  1. Nuclear theft and sabotage. Priorities for reducing new threats

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bunn, Matthew; Bunn, George

    2001-01-01

    The appalling attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States make clear that the threat of large, well-organized global terrorist groups bent on causing mass destruction is not hypothetical but real. The attackers achieved horrifying destruction with box-cutters. The results could have been even more horrific if the attackers would have had access to, and used, weapons of mass destruction. Ensuring that technologies and materials for weapons of mass destruction - especially weapons-usable nuclear materials, whose acquisition is the most difficult part of making a nuclear bomb - do not fall into the hands of terrorist groups or hostile States must be a central element of the coming global effort to prevent catastrophic terrorism. At the same time, nuclear facilities and materials - along with a wide range of other especially hazardous facilities and materials must be protected from mass-consequence sabotage. Securing these materials and facilities must be a top priority on the international agenda - pursued at every opportunity, at every level of authority, until the job is done. At the same time, the threats against which we must defend have to be fundamentally reconsidered. On 11 September, the threat revealed itself to be bigger, smarter, better organized, and more deadly than the threats most of the world's security systems were designed to defend against. We must ensure that our defensive response is every bit as intelligent and capable as the September attackers. And we may have to rethink some of the approaches to nuclear energy that the world has been pursuing or contemplating. Every reasonable effort must be made to ensure that nuclear materials and facilities are effectively secured. In the past, many scenarios with enormously high consequences were dismissed as too unlikely to contribute much to overall risk - but now many of these probability estimates will have to be revised. A far-reaching new effort is needed to strengthen security for nuclear

  2. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL), January 1, 1990--December 31, 1996, Vol. 2, Rev. 5

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL), Vol. 2, Rev. 5, provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) which occurred and were reported from January 1, 1990, through December 31, 1996. Because of public interest, the Miscellaneous category includes a few events which involve either source material, byproduct material, or natural uranium which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of Bomb-related, Intrusion, Missing and/or Allegedly Stolen, Transportation-related, Tampering/Vandalism, Arson, Firearms, Radiological Sabotage, Nonradiological Sabotage, and Miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels.

  3. Safeguards summary event list (SSEL), January 1, 1990--December 31, 1995

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL), Vol. 2, Rev. 4, provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) which occurred and were reported from January 1, 1990, rough December 31, 1995. Because of public interest, the Miscellaneous category includes a few events which involve either source material, byproduct material, or natural uranium which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of Bomb-related, Intrusion, Missing and/or Allegedly Stolen, Transportation-related, Tampering/Vandalism, Arson, Firearms, Radiological Sabotage, Nonradiological Sabotage, and Miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  4. Safeguards summary event list (SSEL), January 1, 1990--December 31, 1995

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1996-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL), Vol. 2, Rev. 4, provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) which occurred and were reported from January 1, 1990, rough December 31, 1995. Because of public interest, the Miscellaneous category includes a few events which involve either source material, byproduct material, or natural uranium which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of Bomb-related, Intrusion, Missing and/or Allegedly Stolen, Transportation-related, Tampering/Vandalism, Arson, Firearms, Radiological Sabotage, Nonradiological Sabotage, and Miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels.

  5. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL), January 1, 1990--December 31, 1996, Vol. 2, Rev. 5

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL), Vol. 2, Rev. 5, provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) which occurred and were reported from January 1, 1990, through December 31, 1996. Because of public interest, the Miscellaneous category includes a few events which involve either source material, byproduct material, or natural uranium which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of Bomb-related, Intrusion, Missing and/or Allegedly Stolen, Transportation-related, Tampering/Vandalism, Arson, Firearms, Radiological Sabotage, Nonradiological Sabotage, and Miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  6. Safeguards and security by design (SSBD) for the domestic threat. Theft and sabotage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DeMuth, Scott; Mullen, Mark; Pan, Paul

    2011-01-01

    In recent years, the Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept has received significant interest with respect to international (IAEA) safeguards objectives. However, less attention has been focused on the equally important topic of domestic (or national) Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD), which addresses domestic requirements for material control and accounting (MC and A) and for physical protection, such as those of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in the United States. While international safeguards are concerned with detecting State diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses to nuclear explosives purposes, domestic material control and accounting (MC and A) and physical protection are focused on non-State theft and sabotage. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has described the Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' This same concept is equally applicable to SSBD for domestic requirements. The United States Department of Energy (DOE) has initiated a project through its Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), and more specifically its Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program, to develop a domestic SSBD discipline and methodology in parallel with similar efforts for international safeguards sponsored by the DOE Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the IAEA. This paper identifies the key domestic safeguards and security requirements (i.e., MC and A and physical protection) and explains how and why Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) is important and beneficial for the design of future US nuclear energy systems. (author)

  7. Safeguards and security by design (SSBD) for the domestic threat - theft and sabotage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Demuth, Scott F.; Mullen, Mark

    2011-01-01

    Safeguards by Design (SBD) is receiving significant interest with respect to international safeguards objectives. However, less attention has been focused on the equally important topic of domestic Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD), which addresses requirements such as those of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in the United States. While international safeguards are concerned with detecting State diversion of nuclear material from peaceful to nuclear explosives purposes, domestic Material Protection, Control and Accounting measures (MPC and A) are focused on non-State theft and sabotage. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has described the Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' This same concept is equally applicable to SSBD for domestic requirements. The United States Department of Energy (DOE) has initiated a project through its Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) and more specifically its Fuel Cycle Research and Development (FCRD) program, to develop a domestic SSBD discipline and methodology in parallel with similar efforts sponsored by the DOE Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the IAEA for international safeguards. This activity includes the participation of industry (through DOE-sponsored contracts) and DOE National Laboratories. This paper will identify the key domestic safeguards and security requirements (i.e. MC and A and physical protection) and explain how and why Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) is important and beneficial for the design of future US nuclear energy systems.

  8. FRAUD/SABOTAGE Killing Nuclear-Reactors Need Modeling!!!: ``Super'' alloys GENERIC ENDEMIC Wigner's-Disease/.../IN-stability: Ethics? SHMETHICS!!!

    Science.gov (United States)

    O'Grady, Joseph; Bument, Arlden; Siegel, Edward

    2011-03-01

    Carbides solid-state chemistry domination of old/new nuclear-reactors/spent-fuel-casks/refineries/jet/missile/rocket-engines is austenitic/FCC Ni/Fe-based (so miscalled)"super"alloys(182/82;Hastelloy-X,600,304/304L-SSs,...690!!!) GENERIC ENDEMIC EXTANT detrimental(synonyms): Wigner's-disease(WD) [J.Appl.Phys.17,857 (46)]/Ostwald-ripening/spinodal-decomposition/overageing-embrittlement/thermal-leading-to-mechanical(TLTM)-INstability: Mayo[Google: fLeaksCouldKill > ; - Siegel [ J . Mag . Mag . Mtls . 7 , 312 (78) = atflickr . comsearchonGiant - Magnotoresistance [Fert" [PRL(1988)]-"Gruenberg"[PRL(1989)] 2007-Nobel]necessitating NRC inspections on 40+25=65 Westin"KL"ouse PWRs(12/2006)]-Lai [Met.Trans.AIME, 9A,827(78)]-Sabol-Stickler[Phys.Stat.Sol.(70)]-Ashpahani[ Intl.Conf. Hydrogen in Metals, Paris(1977]-Russell [Prog.Mtls.Sci.(1983)]-Pollard [last UCS rept.(9/1995)]-Lofaro [BNL/DOE/NRC Repts.]-Pringle [ Nuclear-Power:From Physics to Politics(1979)]-Hoffman [animatedsoftware.com], what DOE/NRC MISlabels as "butt-welds" "stress-corrosion cracking" endpoint's ROOT-CAUSE ULTIMATE-ORIGIN is WD overageing-embrittlement caused brittle-fracture cracking from early/ongoing AEC/DOE-n"u"tional-la"v"atories sabotage!!!

  9. Extending the multifoci perspective: The role of supervisor justice and moral identity in the relationship between customer justice and customer-directed sabotage.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Skarlicki, Daniel P; van Jaarsveld, Danielle D; Shao, Ruodan; Song, Young Ho; Wang, Mo

    2016-01-01

    The multifoci perspective of justice proposes that individuals tend to target their (in)justice reactions toward the perceived source of the mistreatment. Empirical support for target-specific reactions, however, has been mixed. To explore theoretically relevant reasons for these discrepant results and address unanswered questions in the multifoci justice literature, the present research examines how different justice sources might interactively predict target-specific reactions, and whether these effects occur as a function of moral identity. Results from a sample of North American frontline service employees (N = 314, Study 1) showed that among employees with lower levels of moral identity, low supervisor justice exacerbated the association between low customer justice and customer-directed sabotage, whereas this exacerbation effect was not observed among employees with higher levels of moral identity. This 3-way interaction effect was replicated in a sample of South Korean employees (N = 265, Study 2). (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved).

  10. Open literature review of threats including sabotage and theft of fissile material transport in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cochran, John Russell; Furaus, James Phillip; Marincel, Michelle K.

    2005-01-01

    This report is a review of open literature concerning threats including sabotage and theft related to fissile material transport in Japan. It is intended to aid Japanese officials in the development of a design basis threat. This threat includes the external threats of the terrorist, criminal, and extremist, and the insider threats of the disgruntled employee, the employee forced into cooperation via coercion, the psychotic employee, and the criminal employee. Examination of the external terrorist threat considers Japanese demographics, known terrorist groups in Japan, and the international relations of Japan. Demographically, Japan has a relatively homogenous population, both ethnically and religiously. Japan is a relatively peaceful nation, but its history illustrates that it is not immune to terrorism. It has a history of domestic terrorism and the open literature points to the Red Army, Aum Shinrikyo, Chukaku-Ha, and Seikijuku. Japan supports the United States in its war on terrorism and in Iraq, which may make Japan a target for both international and domestic terrorists. Crime appears to remain low in Japan; however sources note that the foreign crime rate is increasing as the number of foreign nationals in the country increases. Antinuclear groups' recent foci have been nuclear reprocessing technology, transportation of MOX fuel, and possible related nuclear proliferation issues. The insider threat is first defined by the threat of the disgruntled employee. This threat can be determined by studying the history of Japan's employment system, where Keiretsu have provided company stability and lifetime employment. Recent economic difficulties and an increase of corporate crime, due to sole reliability on the honor code, have begun to erode employee loyalty

  11. Technical resolution of Generic Safety Issue A-29

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-09-01

    This report summarizes key technical findings related to Generic Safety Issue A-29, ''Nuclear Power Plant Design for Reduction of Vulnerability to Industrial Sabotage.'' The findings in this report deal with (1) a historical review of reported sabotage-related events at nuclear facilities, (2) NRC physical security requirements, (3) industry measures to prevent/mitigate sabotage, (4) design and procedural approaches that could be used to deter sabotage, (5) current NRC and industry initiatives aimed at personnel screening and selection, and (6) design considerations applicable to Advanced Light Water Reactors (ALWRs). The results reveal that insider sabotage at operating nuclear plants has not been a significant problem in the United States to date and that there are no singular design modifications or procedures that by themselves would completely eliminate or mitigate the threat of insider sabotage. Rather, it will take a combination of systematic and focused improvements in the three areas of reliable personnel, effective design features, and plant procedures developed to provide a strategy to deal with prevention of insider sabotage and to be able to mitigate adverse actions. 24 refs., 2 figs., 5 tabs

  12. A systematic method for identifying vital areas at complex nuclear facilities.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Beck, David Franklin; Hockert, John

    2005-05-01

    Identifying the areas to be protected is an important part of the development of measures for physical protection against sabotage at complex nuclear facilities. In June 1999, the International Atomic Energy Agency published INFCIRC/225/Rev.4, 'The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities.' This guidance recommends that 'Safety specialists, in close cooperation with physical protection specialists, should evaluate the consequences of malevolent acts, considered in the context of the State's design basis threat, to identify nuclear material, or the minimum complement of equipment, systems or devices to be protected against sabotage.' This report presents a structured, transparent approach for identifying the areas that contain this minimum complement of equipment, systems, and devices to be protected against sabotage that is applicable to complex nuclear facilities. The method builds upon safety analyses to develop sabotage fault trees that reflect sabotage scenarios that could cause unacceptable radiological consequences. The sabotage actions represented in the fault trees are linked to the areas from which they can be accomplished. The fault tree is then transformed (by negation) into its dual, the protection location tree, which reflects the sabotage actions that must be prevented in order to prevent unacceptable radiological consequences. The minimum path sets of this fault tree dual yield, through the area linkage, sets of areas, each of which contains nuclear material, or a minimum complement of equipment, systems or devices that, if protected, will prevent sabotage. This method also provides guidance for the selection of the minimum path set that permits optimization of the trade-offs among physical protection effectiveness, safety impact, cost and operational impact.

  13. Inequality, trust and growth : An experimental study

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Sadrieh, A.; Verbon, H.A.A.

    2002-01-01

    In a three player dynamic public goods experiment, social output today determines production possibilities tomorrow.In each period, players choose to sabotage, to co-operate, or to play best response.Sabotage harms social output and growth.Mutual co-operation maximises both.The property rights to

  14. An Efficient Vital Area Identification Method

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jung, Woo Sik

    2017-01-01

    A new Vital Area Identification (VAI) method was developed in this study for minimizing the burden of VAI procedure. It was accomplished by performing simplification of sabotage event trees or Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) event trees at the very first stage of VAI procedure. Target sets and prevention sets are calculated from the sabotage fault tree. The rooms in the shortest (most economical) prevention set are selected and protected as vital areas. All physical protection is emphasized to protect these vital areas. All rooms in the protected area, the sabotage of which could lead to core damage, should be incorporated into sabotage fault tree. So, sabotage fault tree development is a very difficult task that requires high engineering costs. IAEA published INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 in 2011 which includes principal international guidelines for the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear installations. A new efficient VAI method was developed and demonstrated in this study. Since this method drastically reduces VAI problem size, it provides very quick and economical VAI procedure. A consistent and integrated VAI procedure had been developed by taking advantage of PSA results, and more efficient VAI method was further developed in this study by inserting PSA event tree simplification at the initial stage of VAI procedure.

  15. Elementary survey of nuclear safeguards problems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tobias, M.L.

    1975-01-01

    The discussion presented on nuclear safeguards is confined primarily to the subject of safeguards for fixed sites. The legal and quasi-legal requirements are briefly outlined. Preventive measures against theft, terrorism, sabotage, or irrational acts by employees and against sabotage by armed gangs are the aspects emphasized. Some of the cost aspects are indicated

  16. Fault tree analysis for vital area identification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Varnado, G.B.; Ortiz, N.R.

    1978-01-01

    The use of fault tree analysis techniques to systematically identify (1) the sabotage events which can lead to release of significant quantities of radioactive materials, (2) the areas of the nuclear power plant in which the sabotage events can be accomplished, and (3) the areas of the plant which must be protected to assure that release does not occur are discussed

  17. MAIT application to the analysis of commercial power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldman, L.A.; McDaniel, T.L.; Chapman, L.D.; Stack, D.

    1981-01-01

    This paper discusses a study which was conducted for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to determine the applicability of the Matrix Analysis of the Insider Threat (MAIT) code to the analysis of sabotage vulnerabilities of commercial power reactors. The sabotage of concern was the initiation of a release of radioactivity in excess of 10 CFR 100 guidelines. 5 refs

  18. The SAVI vulnerability assessment model

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Winblad, A.E.

    1987-01-01

    The assessment model ''Systematic Analysis of Vulnerability to Intrusion'' (SAVI) presented in this report is a PC-based path analysis model. It can provide estimates of protection system effectiveness (or vulnerability) against a spectrum of outsider threats including collusion with an insider adversary. It calculates one measure of system effectiveness, the probability of interruption P(I), for all potential adversary paths. SAVI can perform both theft and sabotage vulnerability analyses. For theft, the analysis is based on the assumption that adversaries should be interrupted either before they can accomplish removal of the target material from its normal location or removal from the site boundary. For sabotage, the analysis is based on the assumption that adversaries should be interrupted before completion of their sabotage task

  19. The U.S. Navy and the Cuban Missile Crisis

    Science.gov (United States)

    1990-05-22

    telephone industries . However, the CIA 10 underestimated the hatred for Batista, even among the influential Cuban middle class, although Washington...for collective defense should Castro attempt to export his revolucion . Only days later, Kennedy slapped a trade embargo on Cuba, forbidding all exchange...and bribing foreign industrial firms to sabotage their Cuban 30 exports. Far from inspiring revolt, however, these sabotage activities actually had

  20. Identification and monitoring of non-radiological carcinogens

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chuaqui, C A; Petkau, A; Greenstock, C L; Brown, C P [Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., Pinawa, MB (Canada). Whiteshell Labs.

    1995-09-01

    This study examines the feasibility of identifying and monitoring occupational exposures to non-radiological carcinogens in the workplace at Canadian nuclear establishments (Whiteshell Laboratories, Pickering Nuclear Generating Station, Cameco Limited and Canadian General Electric Company Limited). Recent epidemiological studies recommended that potential confounding factors of a non-radiological nature be identified and analyzed, particularly non-radiological carcinogens that may be present in the workplace at nuclear facilities. The feasibility of identifying and measuring occupational exposures to non-radiological carcinogens in Canadian nuclear facilities is examined. Also, the report describes the problem of chemical carcinogens and the mechanisms involved in chemical carcinogenesis; the epidemiology related to the problem, followed by a description of the analytical aspects of detection, monitoring and analysis of carcinogens, as well as a discussion on the regulatory aspects and the regulations in place; and the findings, recommendations and concluding remarks of this study. Several problem areas became apparent as the study proceeded. For example, the classification of a chemical as a human carcinogen is a difficult problem, as is its adequate monitoring and analysis. This situation reflects, in turn, the regulatory aspects in the workplace. A list of chemical carcinogens used industrially at the four Canadian nuclear facilities has been identified. The list includes arsenic, asbestos, benzene, cadmium, beryllium, nickel, polychlorinated biphenyls, lead and trichloroethylene. Several recommendations are made in relation to the need for practical and efficient monitoring methods for chemical carcinogens, the definition of radiation and chemical dose equivalencies, and the classification of human chemical carcinogens, as well as their disposal. (author). 122 refs., 8 tabs., 6 figs.

  1. Identification and monitoring of non-radiological carcinogens

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chuaqui, C.A.; Petkau, A.; Greenstock, C.L.; Brown, C.P.

    1995-09-01

    This study examines the feasibility of identifying and monitoring occupational exposures to non-radiological carcinogens in the workplace at Canadian nuclear establishments (Whiteshell Laboratories, Pickering Nuclear Generating Station, Cameco Limited and Canadian General Electric Company Limited). Recent epidemiological studies recommended that potential confounding factors of a non-radiological nature be identified and analyzed, particularly non-radiological carcinogens that may be present in the workplace at nuclear facilities. The feasibility of identifying and measuring occupational exposures to non-radiological carcinogens in Canadian nuclear facilities is examined. Also, the report describes the problem of chemical carcinogens and the mechanisms involved in chemical carcinogenesis; the epidemiology related to the problem, followed by a description of the analytical aspects of detection, monitoring and analysis of carcinogens, as well as a discussion on the regulatory aspects and the regulations in place; and the findings, recommendations and concluding remarks of this study. Several problem areas became apparent as the study proceeded. For example, the classification of a chemical as a human carcinogen is a difficult problem, as is its adequate monitoring and analysis. This situation reflects, in turn, the regulatory aspects in the workplace. A list of chemical carcinogens used industrially at the four Canadian nuclear facilities has been identified. The list includes arsenic, asbestos, benzene, cadmium, beryllium, nickel, polychlorinated biphenyls, lead and trichloroethylene. Several recommendations are made in relation to the need for practical and efficient monitoring methods for chemical carcinogens, the definition of radiation and chemical dose equivalencies, and the classification of human chemical carcinogens, as well as their disposal. (author). 122 refs., 8 tabs., 6 figs

  2. The Big Con: China's Historical Sabotage

    Science.gov (United States)

    Terrence Cheng

    2009-01-01

    On June 4, 1989, the Chinese military, under orders from the highest levels of government, violently crushed peaceful civilian demonstrations in Beijing, most symbolically in and around Tiananmen Square. In the end, the Chinese government claimed that the death toll was approximately 200, but the Chinese Red Cross reported 2,000 to 3,000 deaths.…

  3. Fluff-thieving birds sabotage seed dispersal.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rohwer, Vanya G; Pauw, Anton; Martin, Paul R

    2017-01-01

    Characterizing many species interactions as mutualisms can be misleading because some members of the interaction derive greater fitness benefits at the expense of other members. We provide detailed natural history data on a suspected bird-plant mutualism in South Africa where many species of birds use fluffy Eriocephalus seed material to construct their nests, potentially dispersing seeds for the plant. We focus on a common bird, Prinia maculosa , which invests heavily in gathering Eriocephalus material. Prinias spent 5 of their median 6-day nest construction period adding seed material to their nests and frequently travelled outside their territory boundary to gather Eriocephalus material. Yet, prinias gathered primarily Eriocephalus fluff and actively avoided gathering seeds. The average prinia nest contained only 6.6 seeds, but contained fluff from 579 seeds. These data suggest that prinias provide limited dispersal benefits to Eriocephalus plants. By contrast, the large amounts of Eriocephalus fluff in prinia nests, and the effort that prinias invest in gathering it, suggest that prinias benefit from constructing their nests with Eriocephalus material. We end by outlining hypotheses for possible fitness benefits that Eriocephalus material could provide prinias and other birds.

  4. Fluff-thieving birds sabotage seed dispersal

    OpenAIRE

    Rohwer, Vanya G.; Pauw, Anton; Martin, Paul R.

    2017-01-01

    Characterizing many species interactions as mutualisms can be misleading because some members of the interaction derive greater fitness benefits at the expense of other members. We provide detailed natural history data on a suspected bird?plant mutualism in South Africa where many species of birds use fluffy Eriocephalus seed material to construct their nests, potentially dispersing seeds for the plant. We focus on a common bird, Prinia maculosa, which invests heavily in gathering Eriocephalu...

  5. Fluff-thieving birds sabotage seed dispersal

    Science.gov (United States)

    2017-01-01

    Characterizing many species interactions as mutualisms can be misleading because some members of the interaction derive greater fitness benefits at the expense of other members. We provide detailed natural history data on a suspected bird–plant mutualism in South Africa where many species of birds use fluffy Eriocephalus seed material to construct their nests, potentially dispersing seeds for the plant. We focus on a common bird, Prinia maculosa, which invests heavily in gathering Eriocephalus material. Prinias spent 5 of their median 6-day nest construction period adding seed material to their nests and frequently travelled outside their territory boundary to gather Eriocephalus material. Yet, prinias gathered primarily Eriocephalus fluff and actively avoided gathering seeds. The average prinia nest contained only 6.6 seeds, but contained fluff from 579 seeds. These data suggest that prinias provide limited dispersal benefits to Eriocephalus plants. By contrast, the large amounts of Eriocephalus fluff in prinia nests, and the effort that prinias invest in gathering it, suggest that prinias benefit from constructing their nests with Eriocephalus material. We end by outlining hypotheses for possible fitness benefits that Eriocephalus material could provide prinias and other birds. PMID:28280552

  6. System dynamics simulation framework for the evaluation of physical protection system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Chan Soo; Chung, Chang Hyun; Kwak, Sang Man; Kim, Sok Chul

    2004-01-01

    The events of September 11th, 2001 demonstrated the need for special considerations for the security of nuclear facilities against sabotage. Sabotage can be defined as any deliberate act directed against a nuclear facility or nuclear material in use, storage, or transport which could directly or indirectly endanger the environment or the health and safety of personnel or the public by exposure to radiation or the release of radioactive substances. Sabotage protection aims to protect and mitigate unacceptable radiological consequences. Conventional physical protection concept has focused of how to protect against or prevent intrusion of adversaries based of the Design Basis Threat (DBT) and has given only rare consideration to extreme malevolent envets such as the September 11th attack. Human induced external events were mostly screened out due to their low probabilities of occurrence. However, in this time, several countries have begun to define new design requirements for proliferation resistance and physical protection of new facilities against malevolent event such as those of September 11th, 2001

  7. Physical protection of shipments of irradiated reactor fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kasun, D.J.

    1979-05-01

    During May 1979 the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission approved for issuance in effective form new interim regulations for strengthening the protection of spent fuel shipments against sabotage and diversion. The new regulations will likely continue in force until the completion of an ongoing research program concerning the response of spent fuel to certain forms of sabotage. At that time the regulations may be rescinded, modified, or made permanent, as appropriate. This report discusses the new regulations and provides a basis on which licensees can develop an acceptable interim program for the protection of spent fuel shipments

  8. Designing a Physical Security System for Risk Reduction in a Hypothetical Nuclear Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Saleh, A.A.; Abd Elaziz, M.

    2017-01-01

    Physical security in a nuclear facility means detection, prevention and response to threat, the ft, sabotage, unauthorized access and illegal transfer involving radioactive and nuclear material. This paper proposes a physical security system designing concepts to reduce the risk associated with variant threats to a nuclear facility. This paper presents a study of the unauthorized removal and sabotage in a hypothetical nuclear facility considering deter, delay and response layers. More over, the study involves performing any required upgrading to the security system by investigating the nuclear facility layout and considering all physical security layers design to enhance the weakness for risk reduction

  9. Assessment of the safety of spent fuel transportation in urban environs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sandoval, R.P.; Weber, J.P.; Levine, H.S.

    1983-06-01

    The results of a program to provide an experimental data base for estimating the radiological consequences from a hypothetical sabotage attack on a light-water-reactor spent fuel shipping cask in a densely populated area are presented. The results of subscale and full-scale experiments in conjunction with an analytical modeling study are described. The experimental data were used as input to a reactor-safety consequence model to predict radiological health consequences resulting from a hypothetical sabotage attack on a spent-fuel shipping cask in the Manhattan borough of New York City. The results of these calculations are presented

  10. Physical protection of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1975-01-01

    Full text: An Advisory Group met to consider the up-dating and extension of the Recommendations for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, produced in 1972. Twenty-seven experts from 11 countries and EURATOM were present. Growing concern has been expressed in many countries that nuclear material may one day be used for acts of sabotage or terrorism. Serious attention is therefore being given to the need for States to develop national systems for the physical protection of nuclear materials during use, storage and transport throughout the nuclear fuel cycle which should minimize risks of sabotage or theft. The revised Recommendations formulated by the Advisory Group include new definitions of the objectives of national systems of physical protection and proposals for minimizing possibilities of unauthorized removal and sabotage to nuclear facilities. The Recommendations also describe administrative or organizational steps to be taken for this purpose and the essential technical requirements of physical protection for various types and locations of nuclear material, e.g., the setting up of protected areas, the use of physical barriers and alarms, the need for security survey, and the need of advance arrangements between the States concerned in case of international transportation, among others. (author)

  11. 10 CFR 709.2 - Definitions.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... or communications security programs. Counterintelligence evaluation or CI evaluation means the... questions relating to espionage, sabotage, terrorism, unauthorized disclosure of classified information...

  12. Safety and security in transportation of radioactive material- the perception of risk

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ericsson, A.M.; Jaernry, C. [AMC Konsult AB, Bromma (Sweden)

    2004-07-01

    Since the event of September 11, 2001, the way most people look at transportation risk has changed. There is now a lot more focusing on the security concerns related to the transportation of radioactive material. Most people are now more concerned about the risk of terrorist actions or sabotage than of accidents. This is probably due to the fact that the safety record for transportation of radioactive material has so far been very good and that most people experience terrorism and sabotage more scaring and less controllable than general accidents. This paper will compare the safety and the security regulations and discuss synergies and contradictions between the sets of regulations.

  13. Fires: what plant locations should we really protect

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Berry, D.L.

    1980-01-01

    A fire protection analysis technique was developed from earlier work involving the protection of nuclear power plants against acts of sabotage. Characteristics unique to fire phenomena were used to modify the sabotage analysis methodology. These characteristics include the effects of fuel loads, ventilation rates, heat loss areas, barrier ratings, and plant locations. The new fire analysis technique was applied to an example nuclear power plant having 85 different plant areas. It was found that some safety and nonsafety areas were both highly vulnerable to fire spread and important to overall safety, while other areas were found to be of marginal importance to fire safety

  14. Nuclear and radiological Security: Introduction.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Miller, James Christopher [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2016-02-24

    Nuclear security includes the prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer, or other malicious acts involving nuclear or other radioactive substances or their associated facilities. The presentation begins by discussing the concept and its importance, then moves on to consider threats--insider threat, sabotage, diversion of materials--with considerable emphasis on the former. The intrusion at Pelindaba, South Africa, is described as a case study. The distinction between nuclear security and security of radiological and portable sources is clarified, and the international legal framework is touched upon. The paper concludes by discussing the responsibilities of the various entities involved in nuclear security.

  15. Nuclear and radiological Security: Introduction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miller, James Christopher

    2016-01-01

    Nuclear security includes the prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer, or other malicious acts involving nuclear or other radioactive substances or their associated facilities. The presentation begins by discussing the concept and its importance, then moves on to consider threats--insider threat, sabotage, diversion of materials--with considerable emphasis on the former. The intrusion at Pelindaba, South Africa, is described as a case study. The distinction between nuclear security and security of radiological and portable sources is clarified, and the international legal framework is touched upon. The paper concludes by discussing the responsibilities of the various entities involved in nuclear security.

  16. Safety and security in transportation of radioactive material- the perception of risk

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ericsson, A.M.; Jaernry, C.

    2004-01-01

    Since the event of September 11, 2001, the way most people look at transportation risk has changed. There is now a lot more focusing on the security concerns related to the transportation of radioactive material. Most people are now more concerned about the risk of terrorist actions or sabotage than of accidents. This is probably due to the fact that the safety record for transportation of radioactive material has so far been very good and that most people experience terrorism and sabotage more scaring and less controllable than general accidents. This paper will compare the safety and the security regulations and discuss synergies and contradictions between the sets of regulations

  17. Green and mean

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nikiforuk, A.

    1998-01-01

    Industrial terrorists are committing acts of sabotage against Canadian companies involved in petroleum and natural gas drilling, mining, logging, industrial-style farming and animal testing. The petroleum industry in Alberta has recently been the target of such industrial sabotage. The acts of vandalism have included shot-up signs, smashed car windows, ripped truck tires on isolated well roads, broken machinery, holes drilled in pipes and even entire wells cemented over and embedded with shotgun shells. Recently, the scale of the vandalism surpassed anything previously experienced in North America when bullets were fired at a gas plant in Grande Prairie County, narrowly missing the operators, and a home-made bomb blew a hole in a gas pipeline. Such assaults against the resource industry (oil, gas, forestry and fisheries) are increasing nationwide. Much of the vandalism goes unreported because companies do not like to admit that they have been targeted. Other incidents of eco-terrorism have included the sabotage and bombing of forestry equipment across the country. These acts of sabotage have shown just how vulnerable the resource industry is. Most attacks share a common profile. They are aimed at machinery, not at people and they are usually the work of urban protesters rather than angry locals. The Grande Prairie incidents do not fit the pattern because the saboteurs endangered lives by using explosives. One of the problems that may be contributing to the terror campaign in the Grande Prairie region is the flaring of unwanted gas from wells, which exposes hundreds of families in the area to as many as 250 chemicals, some of them toxic. For the moment, oil and gas companies are putting their faith in increased vigilance and security, but industry insiders hope that the province will step in before someone dies from a terrorist act

  18. Security in the transport of radioactive material: Implementing guide. Spanish edition; La seguridad fisica en el transporte de materiales radiactivos. Guia de aplicacion

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2013-07-01

    This guide provides States with guidance in implementing, maintaining or enhancing a nuclear security regime to protect radioactive material (including nuclear material) in transport against theft, sabotage or other malicious acts that could, if successful, have unacceptable radiological consequences. From a security point of view, a threshold is defined for determining which packages or types of radioactive material need to be protected beyond prudent management practice. Minimizing the likelihood of theft or sabotage of radioactive material in transport is accomplished by a combination of measures to deter, detect, delay and respond to such acts. These measures are complemented by other measures to recover stolen material and to mitigate possible consequences, in order to further reduce the risks.

  19. Security in the transport of radioactive material: Implementing guide. Spanish edition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    This guide provides States with guidance in implementing, maintaining or enhancing a nuclear security regime to protect radioactive material (including nuclear material) in transport against theft, sabotage or other malicious acts that could, if successful, have unacceptable radiological consequences. From a security point of view, a threshold is defined for determining which packages or types of radioactive material need to be protected beyond prudent management practice. Minimizing the likelihood of theft or sabotage of radioactive material in transport is accomplished by a combination of measures to deter, detect, delay and respond to such acts. These measures are complemented by other measures to recover stolen material and to mitigate possible consequences, in order to further reduce the risks

  20. Security in the Transport of Radioactive Material. Implementing Guide (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This guide provides States with guidance in implementing, maintaining or enhancing a nuclear security regime to protect radioactive material (including nuclear material) in transport against theft, sabotage or other malicious acts that could, if successful, have unacceptable radiological consequences. From a security point of view, a threshold is defined for determining which packages or types of radioactive material need to be protected beyond prudent management practice. Minimizing the likelihood of theft or sabotage of radioactive material in transport is accomplished by a combination of measures to deter, detect, delay and respond to such acts. These measures are complemented by other measures to recover stolen material and to mitigate possible consequences, in order to further reduce the risks.

  1. Security in the Transport of Radioactive Material. Implementing Guide (Chinese Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This guide provides States with guidance in implementing, maintaining or enhancing a nuclear security regime to protect radioactive material (including nuclear material) in transport against theft, sabotage or other malicious acts that could, if successful, have unacceptable radiological consequences. From a security point of view, a threshold is defined for determining which packages or types of radioactive material need to be protected beyond prudent management practice. Minimizing the likelihood of theft or sabotage of radioactive material in transport is accomplished by a combination of measures to deter, detect, delay and respond to such acts. These measures are complemented by other measures to recover stolen material and to mitigate possible consequences, in order to further reduce the risks.

  2. Guidance and considerations for implementation of INFCIRC/225/Rev.3, the physical protection of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-09-01

    The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, INFCIRC/225/Rev.3, provides recommendations for the physical protection of nuclear material against theft in use, storage and transport, whether national or international and whether peaceful or military, and contains provisions relating to the sabotage of nuclear material or facilities. The recommendations contained in INFCIRC/225/Rev.3 detail the elements that should be included in a State's system of physical protection. It also recognizes the adverse health and safety consequences arising from the theft of nuclear material and the sabotage of nuclear material or facilities. Most industrial and developing countries use these recommendations to some extent in the establishment and operation of their physical protection systems. Although INFCIRC/225/Rev.3 provides recommendations for protecting materials and facilities from theft or sabotage, it does not provide in-depth details for these recommendations. In June 1996, the IAEA convened a consultants meeting to consider this matter. This report is the result of continuing discussions and drafts over a period of nine months. The intent of this guidance is to provide a broader basis for relevant State organizations to prescribe appropriate requirements for the use of nuclear materials which are compatible with accepted international practice

  3. Evaluation of the non-radiological environmental problems relating to the WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baca, T.E.

    1983-02-01

    The major non-radiological environmental problems addressed are: air pollution, water pollution and sanitary waste, solid waste, domestic drinking water, occupational health and safety and toxic chemicals

  4. Le reti di spionaggio e sabotaggio nazifasciste nell’Italia occupata dagli Alleati (1943-1945

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Nicola Tonietto

    2016-12-01

    Full Text Available The aim of this work is to describe German and Republican Fascists secret services espionage and sabotage networks, their missions and their agents who were sent to the South-Central Italy, between 1943 and 1945, with the goal of obstructing the Allied advance. The two German secret services, namely Abwehr and Sicherheitsdienst, recruited Italian agents (who belonged to the Milizia, the Black Brigades or Borghese’s Decima Mas to take part in espionage and sabotage operations beyond the Allied lines. Even the fascists themselves, through the newborn SID or other groups like Prince Pignatelli’s or Pucci-Del Massa Office, tried to plan espionage networks but also to prepare the ground for the survival of the fascism after the end of the war.

  5. Added Sugar: Don't Get Sabotaged by Sweeteners

    Science.gov (United States)

    ... preserve foods, such as jams and jellies Fuels fermentation, which enables bread to rise Serves as a ... whole-grain crackers and low-fat, low-calorie yogurt instead of candy, pastries and cookies. By limiting ...

  6. Information Operations and Asymmetric Warfare...Are We Ready?

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Patterson, LaWarren

    2002-01-01

    .... These in turn raise passions and compel people to rethink their own closely held beliefs, prejudices and hatreds, and in some cases morphing into actions such as espionage, sabotage or terrorism...

  7. Research Article Special Issue

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    pc

    2017-10-17

    Oct 17, 2017 ... develop software systematically with lowering cost, time and resource. .... instance, risks are scattered between increments which makes it easier to ..... Socio-technical congruence sabotaged by a hidden onshore outsourcing.

  8. 77 FR 55698 - National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From the Pulp and Paper Industry

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-09-11

    ... third parties,' such as strikes, sabotage, operator intoxication or insanity, and a variety of other... could lead to standards that are significantly less stringent than levels that are achieved by a well...

  9. Treatability studies in support of the nonradiological wastewater treatment project

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Begovich, J.M.; Brown, C.H. Jr.; Villiers-Fisher, J.F.; Fowler, V.L.

    1986-07-01

    The Nonradiological Wastewater Treatment Project (NRWTP) will treat nonradiological wastewaters generated at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to pollutant levels acceptable under restrictions imposed by the effluent limits of best available technology (BAT) regulations of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), according to the goals established by the Clean Water Act. A three-phase treatability study was conducted to resolve many of the uncertainties facing the NRWTP. The first phase consisted of batch simulation of the proposed NRWTP flowsheet in the laboratory. The Phase I results revealed no major problems with the proposed flowsheet. Phase II consisted of more-detailed parametric studies of the flowsheet processes at a bench-scale level in the laboratory. The Phase II results were used to guide the planning and design of the Phase III study, which consisted of flowsheet simulation on a continuous basis using a mini-pilot plant (MPP) facility. This facility is contained within two connected semitrailer vans and an analytical trailer.

  10. Nonradiological groundwater quality at low-level radioactive waste disposal sites

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goode, D.J.

    1986-04-01

    The NRC is investigating appropriate regulatory options for disposal of low-level radioactive waste containing nonradiological hazardous constituents, as defined by EPA regulations. Standard EPA/RCRA procedures to determine hazardous organics, metals, indicator parameters, and general water quality are applied to samples from groundwater monitoring wells at two commercial low-level radioactive waste disposal sites. At the Sheffield, IL site (nonoperating), several typical organic solvents are identified in elevated concentrations in onsite wells and in an offsite area exhibiting elevated tritium concentrations. At the Barnwell, SC site (operating), only very low concentrations of three organics are found in wells adjacent to disposal units. Hydrocarbons associated with petroleum products are detected at both sites. Hazardous constituents associated with previosuly identified major LLW mixed waste streams, toluene, xylene, chromium, and lead, are at or below detection limits or at background levels in all samples. Review of previously collected data also supports the conclusion that organic solvents are the primary nonradiological contaminants associated with LLW disposal

  11. 20 CFR 404.465 - Conviction for subversive activities; effect on monthly benefits and entitlement to hospital...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... a pardon of the offense by the President of the United States, such penalty is not applied in... espionage and censorship), chapter 105 (relating to sabotage), or chapter 115 (relating to treason, sedition...

  12. Transportation of radionuclides in urban environs: draft environmental assessment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Finley, N.C.; Aldrich, D.C.; Daniel, S.L.; Ericson, D.M.; Henning-Sachs, C.; Kaestner, P.C.; Ortiz, N.R.; Sheldon, D.D.; Taylor, J.M.

    1980-07-01

    This report assesses the environmental consequences of the transportation of radioactive materials in densely populated urban areas, including estimates of the radiological, nonradiological, and social impacts arising from this process. The chapters of the report and the appendices which follow detail the methodology and results for each of four causative event categories: incident free transport, vehicular accidents, human errors or deviations from accepted quality assurance practices, and sabotage or malevolent acts. The numerical results are expressed in terms of the expected radiological and economic impacts from each. Following these discussions, alternatives to the current transport practice are considered. Then, the detailed analysis is extended from a limited area of New York city to other urban areas. The appendices contain the data bases and specific models used to evaluate these impacts, as well as discussions of chemical toxicity and the social impacts of radioactive material transport in urban areas. The latter are evaluated for each causative event category in terms of psychological, sociological, political, legal, and organizational impacts. The report is followed by an extensive bibliography covering the many fields of study which were required in performing the analysis.

  13. Ethnic and Communal Clashes in Nigeria: The Case of the Sagamu ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    gold

    2012-07-26

    Jul 26, 2012 ... paper brings out the central importance of culture in the inter-relationship between two ethnic ... Key Words: Nigeria, Ethnic, Conflict, Hausa, Yoruba .... elements to sabotage the administration of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo-led.

  14. Transportation security personnel training manual

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-11-01

    Objective of this manual is to train security personnel to protect special nuclear materials and nuclear facilities against theft and sabotage as required by 10 CFR Part 73. This volume contains the introduction and rationale

  15. 48 CFR 1852.223-75 - Major breach of safety or security.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... compromise of classified information, illegal technology transfer, workplace violence resulting in criminal... that results in compromise of classified information, illegal technology transfer, workplace violence resulting in criminal conviction, sabotage, compromise or denial of information technology services...

  16. Comparison of the distribution of non-radiological and radiological fatal risk in Ontario industries (addendum)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Davis, C.K.; Forbes, W.F.; Hayward, L.M.

    1986-09-01

    Occupational limits for exposure to ionizing radiation, in force in Canada, are based on recommendations of international bodies, particularly the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). To determine whether the ICRP assertions concerning the similarity of the distributions of occupational risk at the higher risk levels (from non-radiation and from radiation work) to Canada a study of the high end of the distributions of non-radiological risk of occupational fatalities in the province of Ontario was performed. For the present study total doses from exposure to sources of ionizing radiation for Ontario workers were converted to relative risk rates to allow direct comparison with the non-radiological results. In addition, absolute values for the radiological risk rates (RRR) were derived. The radiological risk estimates are based on workers who work both from nuclear reactions and from X-rays. The conclusion is made that the radiological and non-radiological risk rate (NRRR) distributions are similar in shape, but the RRR are approximately 1 to 27 percent of the NRRR, depending on the industry concerned

  17. STECH, 3(3), S/NO 12, SEPTEMBER, 2014

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    DR Nneka

    2014-09-12

    Sep 12, 2014 ... spillage on physical and chemical properties of the soils. Soil samples ... the result from the t-test analysis showed t value of 4.863, indicating ... corrosion of pipes, over pressure, malfunctioning of equipments, sabotage and.

  18. Nuclear security from cradle to grave

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Raja Adnan, Raja Abdul Aziz

    2016-01-01

    On 8 May 2016, the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) finally entered into force, almost eleven years after its adoption. The world will be a more secure place as a result of the commitments that States party to the Amendment have made. The Amendment establishes legally binding commitments for countries to protect nuclear facilities as well as nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport. Under the Amendment, countries are required to establish appropriate physical protection regimes for nuclear material. They also take on new obligations to share information on sabotage, including on credible threats of sabotage. The entry into force of the Amendment demonstrates the international community’s resolve to act together to strengthen nuclear security globally. It also helps reduce the risk of an attack involving nuclear material, which could have catastrophic consequences.

  19. A separate effect study of the influence of metallic fission products on CsI radioactive release from nuclear fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Di Lemma, F.G., E-mail: fidelma.dilemma@gmail.com [European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC), Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU), Postfach 2340, 76125 Karlsruhe (Germany); Department of Radiation Science and Technology, Faculty of Applied Sciences, Delft University of Technology, Delft, 2629 JB (Netherlands); Colle, J.Y., E-mail: jean-yves.colle@ec.europa.eu [European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC), Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU), Postfach 2340, 76125 Karlsruhe (Germany); Beneš, O. [European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC), Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU), Postfach 2340, 76125 Karlsruhe (Germany); Konings, R.J.M. [European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC), Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU), Postfach 2340, 76125 Karlsruhe (Germany); Department of Radiation Science and Technology, Faculty of Applied Sciences, Delft University of Technology, Delft, 2629 JB (Netherlands)

    2015-10-15

    The chemistry of cesium and iodine is of main importance to quantify the radioactive release in case of a nuclear reactor accident, or sabotage involving irradiated nuclear materials. We studied the interaction of CsI with different metallic fission products such as Mo and Ru. These elements can be released from nuclear fuel when exposed to oxidising conditions, as in the case of contact of overheated nuclear fuel with air (e.g. in a spent fuel cask sabotage, uncovering of a spent fuel pond, or air ingress accidents). Experiments were performed by vaporizing mixtures of the compounds in air, and analysing the produced aerosols in view of a possible gas–gas and gas–aerosol reactions between the compounds. These results were compared with the gaseous species predicted by thermochemical equilibrium calculations and experimental equilibrium vaporization tests using Knudsen Effusion Mass Spectrometry.

  20. Evaluation of physical-protection elements for interior applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scott, S.H.

    1983-01-01

    Considerable emphasis has been given in recent years to the threat of sabotage by an insider at nuclear facilities. This threat is inherently different from the outsider threat of theft or sabotage because of the insiders' unique knowledge and access to vital material and equipment. Thus, special safeguards elements are needed in order to counter the insider threat. In addition, insider physical protection system elements must be compatible with the operations, safety, and maintenance programs at the facility. To help identify elements which meet these needs, field evaluations were performed on an interior access control system, piping sensors, interior video motion detectors, and valve monitoring devices. These elements were tested in a realistic operating environment and both technical and operational evaluation data were obtained. Safeguards element descriptions and the results of the operational tests and evaluations are outlined

  1. Interrelationship between nuclear safety, safeguards and nuclear security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Irie, Kazutomo

    2007-01-01

    As preventive activities against danger within nuclear systems, three major areas exist; nuclear safety, safeguards and nuclear security. Considering the purpose of these activities, to prevent non-peaceful use is common in nuclear security in general and safeguards. At the same time, measures against sabotage, one of the subcategory in nuclear security, is similar to nuclear safety in aiming at preventing nuclear accidents. When taking into account the insider issues in nuclear security, the distinction between measures against sabotage and nuclear safety becomes ambiguous. Similarly, the distinction between measures against theft, another subcategory in nuclear security, and safeguards also becomes vague. These distinctions are influenced by psychological conditions of members in nuclear systems. Members who have the intention to make nuclear systems dangerous to human society shall be the 'enemy' to nuclear systems and thus be the target for nuclear security. (author)

  2. 75 FR 9958 - Carolina Power & Light Company, Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; Exemption

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-03-04

    ... and Qualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan, and Cyber Security Plan referred to collectively... licensee), now doing business as Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc. (PEC), is the holder of Renewed Facility..., against radiological sabotage by designing and implementing comprehensive site security programs. The...

  3. Complex VLSI Feature Comparison for Commercial Microelectronics Verification

    Science.gov (United States)

    2014-03-27

    corruption , tampering and counterfeiting due to these technologies’ extremely sensitive purposes. Adversarial intervention in the IC design and...counterfeiting in its motive: whereas counterfeiting is usually motivated by greed , tampering is an act of espionage or sabotage [26]. Finally, poor

  4. We Will Find A Way: Understanding the Legacy of Canadian Special Operations Forces

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-02-01

    planners briefed him on the Commando raiding program and, more importantly, the work of Brigadier Colin Gubbins’ SOE and their Norwegian sabotage... Drury , Assistant Military Attaché, Canadian 53. Legation, Washington to the Directorate of Military Operations & Intelligence, NDHQ, Washington, 7

  5. Computer Security for the Computer Systems Manager.

    Science.gov (United States)

    1982-12-01

    power sources essential to system availabilit y. Environsental degradation can cause system collapse or simply make the arer uncomforable work in...attack (civil disobedience, military as- sault, arson, locting, sabotage, vanlilism) * fire • smoke, dust, and dirt intrusion * bursting water pipes

  6. Pathway analysis and exposure assessment: MEPAS modeling for nonradiological chemical contaminants at the Hanford Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blanton, M.L.; Dirkes, R.; Buck, J.; Cooper, A.; Castieton, K.; Glantz, C.

    1995-01-01

    A Chemical Pathway Analysis and Exposure Assessment was performed by the Surface Environmental Surveillance Project (SESP). The SESP monitors air, surface water, sediment, agricultural products, vegetation, soil, and wildlife in order to assess onsite of offsite environmental impacts and offsite human health risk at the Hanford Site. The objectives of this study are (1) determine if a nonradiological chemical monitoring program is warranted for the Hanford Site, (2) ensure that the selection of surveillance parameters such as media, sampling location, and analytes are chosen in a manner that is scientifically sound and cost-efficient, and (3) identify specific nonradiological chemicals of concern (COC) for the Hanford Site. The basis for identification of COC for the Hanford Site was an extensive literature review. The model was also used to predict COC concentrations required onsite to achieve an offsite cancer incidence of 1 E-6 and a hazard quotient of 1.0. This study indicated that nonradiological chemical contamination occurring onsite does not pose a significant offsite human health risk. The highest cancer incidence to the offsite maximally exposed individual from COC was from arsenic (1.76E-1 0); the highest hazard quotient was chromium VI (1.48E-04)

  7. Asymmetrical sabotage tactics, nuclear facilities/materials, and vulnerability analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ballard, J.D.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: The emerging paradigm of a global community wherein post-modern political violence is a fact of life that must be dealt with by safety and security planners is discussed. This paradigm shift in the philosophy of terrorism is documented by analysis of the emerging pattern of asymmetrical tactics being employed by terrorists. Such philosophical developments in violent political movements suggest a shift in the risks that security and safety personnel must account for in their planning for physical protection of fixed site nuclear source facilities like power generation stations and the eventual storage and transportation of the by-products of these facilities like spent nuclear fuel and other high level wastes. This paper presents a framework for identifying these new political realities and related threat profiles, suggests ways in which security planners and administrators can design physical protection practices to meet these emerging threats, and argues for global adoption of standards for the protection of nuclear facilities that could be used as a source site from which terrorists could inflict a mass contamination event and for standards related to the protection of the waste materials that can be used in the production of radiological weapons of mass victimization. (author)

  8. Protection of nuclear facilities against outer aggressions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aussourd, P.; Candes, P.; Le Quinio, R.

    1976-01-01

    The various types of outer aggressions envisaged in safety analysis for nuclear facilities are reviewed. These outer aggressions are classified as natural and non-natural phenomena, the latter depending on the human activities in the vicinity of nuclear sites. The principal natural phenomena able to constitute aggressions are atmospheric phenomena (strong winds, snow storms, hail, frosting mists), hydrologie phenomena such as tides, surges, flood, low waters, and geologic phenomena such as earthquakes. Artificial phenomena are concerned with aircraft crashes, projectiles, fire, possible ruptures of dams, and intentional human aggressions. The protection against intentional human aggressions is of two sorts: first, the possibility of access to the installations mostly sensitive to sabotage are to be prevented or reduced, secondly redundant circuits and functions must be separated for preventing their simultaneous destruction in the case when sabotage actors have reach the core of the facility [fr

  9. Design basis threat analysis and implementation of the physical protection system at Nuclear Facility of BATAN Yogyakarta

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Syarip

    2005-01-01

    An analysis to determine the design basis threat (DBT) and its follow-up through the implementation of physical protection system at the nuclear facility of BATAN Yogyakarta has been done. Methodology used for the analysis is based on the IAEA guidance for the development and maintenance of a DBT. Based on the analysis results, it can be concluded that the threat motivation is influenced by political situation (related to the government policy), criminal, sabotage and theft. The characteristics of threats are: not so well organized, terror, theft of materials information, involving insider (collusion), and intimidation to workers. Potential threat could from guests/students who take a practical job or laboratory exercise. Therefore, it is necessary to be anticipated the possibility and its impact of turmoil/demonstrators such as destruction of: lighting, road, fence, sabotage on the electric and communication lines, surrounding the Yogyakarta nuclear facility

  10. Resource industries and security issues in northern Alberta

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Flanagan, T. [Calgary Univ., AB (Canada). Dept. of Political Science

    2009-06-15

    Public concern over global warming has led to many political attacks on the oil industry, particularly Alberta's tar sand industry. This document focused on security issues in northern Alberta and reviewed past incidences of security threats. The likelihood of sabotage to wells, pipelines, buildings, and other industry facilities was assessed. Five potential sources of opposition were identified, notably individual saboteurs, eco-terrorists, mainstream environmentalists, First Nations, and the Metis people. All except the Metis have at various times used some combination of litigation, blockades, boycotts, sabotage, and violence against economic development projects. This report stated that although such incidents will likely continue in the future, it is unlikely that extra-legal obstruction will become widespread unless these various groups cooperate with each other. Since these groups have different social characteristics and conflicting political interests, it is unlikely that such cooperation will occur. 34 refs.

  11. Assessment of the environmental impacts produced by the transport of radioactive materials through urban areas

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DuCharme, A.R.; Taylor, J.M.; Tierney, M.S.; Finley, B.H.

    1977-01-01

    Sandia Laboratories is performing an environmental assessment for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to ascertain the impacts produced by the transportation of radioactive materials near and through a large, densely populated area. Radiological, nonradiological and economic environmental impacts due to the transportation of all radioactive materials are considered, excepting those related to weapons, weapon components, or shipments on military vehicles. Although New York City is being studied initially to execute the methodology as a function of a real, complex urban environment, the assessment model developed is general in its basic content and is suitable for application to any urban area. Radiological consequences are being computed for cases involving ''normal'' and accident conditions. In the ''normal'' case, nothing unusual takes place, but small radiation doses are still received by nearby people. In the accident case, dispersion of possibly released material away from the accident site is considered. In addition, impacts due to deviations from quality assurance practices, as a result of human error, are being calculated using the assessment model in a special manner. Certain aspects of sabotage and diversion are also being investigated for an urban setting. Radiological consequences are being quantified in terms of human health effects and decontamination costs

  12. Process waste treatment system upgrades: Clarifier startup at the nonradiological wastewater treatment plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lucero, A.J.; McTaggart, D.R.; Van Essen, D.C.; Kent, T.E.; West, G.D.; Taylor, P.A.

    1998-07-01

    The Waste Management Operations Division at Oak Ridge National Laboratory recently modified the design of a reactor/clarifier at the Nonradiological Wastewater Treatment Plant, which is now referred to as the Process Waste Treatment Complex--Building 3608, to replace the sludge-blanket softener/clarifier at the Process Waste Treatment Plant, now referred to as the Process Waste Treatment Complex-Building 3544 (PWTC-3544). This work was conducted because periodic hydraulic overloads caused poor water-softening performance in the PWTC-3544 softener, which was detrimental to the performance and operating costs of downstream ion-exchange operations. Over a 2-month time frame, the modified reactor/clarifier was tested with nonradiological wastewater and then with radioactive wastewater to optimize softening performance. Based on performance to date, the new system has operated more effectively than the former one, with reduced employee radiological exposure, less downtime, lower costs, and improved effluent quality

  13. 29 CFR 801.14 - Exemption for employers providing security services.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... industry, generally, administrative employees may have access to customer accounts, schedules, information... securities, precious commodities or instruments, or proprietary information. (b)(1) Section 7(e) permits the...” which would be of vital importance during periods of war or civil emergency, or whose sabotage would...

  14. New Realities: Energy Security in the 2010s and Implications for the U.S. Military

    Science.gov (United States)

    2014-01-01

    sabotage, that have been responsible for the disruption of energy production and/or exports, including the imposition of sanctions, the seizure of...nuclear nonproliferation . Likewise, there may be a correlation between the U.S. nuclear industry’s struggle and the future of nuclear expertise

  15. The character of harms: operational challenges in control

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Sparrow, Malcolm K

    2008-01-01

    ... approach which he terms "the sabotage of harms." The book explores the institutional arrangements and decision-frameworks necessary to support this emerging operational model. Written for reflective practitioners charged with risk-control responsibilities across the public, private, and non-governmental sectors, The Character ...

  16. Characterisation of Aerosols from Simulated Radiological Dispersion Events

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Di Lemma, F.G.

    2015-01-01

    The research described in this thesis aims at improving the evaluation of the radiaoctive aerosol release from different Radiological Dispersion Events (RDE's), such as accidents and sabotage involving radioactive and nuclear materials. These studies help in a better assessment of the source term as

  17. The Emotional Experience of School Change: Resistance, Loss, and Grief.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Marshak, David

    1996-01-01

    Ignoring the emotional experience of school change may unintentionally sabotage rational planning. Reinventing schools means attending to educators' emotional experience, particularly their expectations, sense of loss, and resulting grief. School norms must be transformed so that teachers and administrators can have meaningful conversations about…

  18. ACUTE TOXICITY OF QUA IBOE LIGHT CRUDE OIL ON A FRESH ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    DJFLEX

    The process of Crude oil exploration and exploitation is known to result in wide ranging negative ... sabotage, corrosion of equipment malfunctioning, ... oceanographic conditions, seasonal and tide induced ... generally do more mechanical damage to inter-tidal life .... negligible and could be attributable to the behavioural.

  19. Theory of mind-based action in high-functioning children from the autistic spectrum [IF 2.1

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Begeer, S.; Rieffe, C.J.; Meerum Terwogt, M.; Stockmann, L.

    2003-01-01

    In this study we investigated whether task interest facilitated the application of Theory of Mind capacities in high-functioning children from the autism spectrum. Children were invited to carry out two simple tasks. Sabotage of both tasks by a third party resulted in the experimenter appearing to

  20. A Preliminary Model of Insider Theft of Intellectual Property

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-06-01

    insider IT sabotage [Moore 2008] [Cappelli 2006]. The primary personality model used in CWB research is the Five Factor Model ( FFM ). The FFM includes... FFM dimensions and CWBs, Salgado found 44 studies conducted between 1990 and 1999 that examine the relationship between the FFM dimensions and deviant

  1. 40 CFR 80.156 - Liability for violations of the interim detergent program controls and prohibitions.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... gasoline or detergent carrier caused the violation. (4) Volumetric additive reconciliation. Where a violation of the volumetric additive reconciliation requirements established by § 80.155(b) has occurred... violation of law (other than these regulations), or an act of sabotage or vandalism, whether or not such...

  2. Nurturing RP-US Bilateral Security Relation

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-03-24

    and sabotaging U.S. commercial airliners flying trans-Pacific routes from U.S West Coast cities. The plan hatched by Ramzi Yousef, the convicted...and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations. The agreement therefore, must provide for provisions that would cater not only for the status of the American

  3. Insider Threat Case Studies at Radiological and Nuclear Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pope, Noah Gale [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Hobbs, Christopher [Centre for Science and Security Studies, London (United Kingdom)

    2015-04-13

    Seven case studies are presented. The cases include thefts of various materials and sabotage. For each case there is an overview of the incident, a timeline, a profile of the perpetrator, and a discussion of the security system failures which allowed the incident to take place.

  4. The US regulatory framework

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    MacDonald, C.E.

    1984-01-01

    The chapter discusses the following: a brief account is given of the regulations covering the transportation of radioactive materials in the USA; departmental responsibilities; design of casks; packaging; approval of routes for transport of spent fuel; physical protection against theft or sabotage; inspection; safety standards. (U.K.)

  5. Insider Threat Case Studies at Radiological and Nuclear Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pope, Noah Gale; Hobbs, Christopher

    2015-01-01

    Seven case studies are presented. The cases include thefts of various materials and sabotage. For each case there is an overview of the incident, a timeline, a profile of the perpetrator, and a discussion of the security system failures which allowed the incident to take place.

  6. Relational aggression and marital quality: A five-year longitudinal study.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Coyne, Sarah M; Nelson, David A; Carroll, Jason S; Smith, Nathan J; Yang, Chongming; Holmgren, Hailey G; Johnson, Chad

    2017-04-01

    Relational aggression occurs in many different contexts, including in romantic relationships. The current study examined associations between two subtypes of relational aggression (love withdrawal and social sabotage) and marital quality over a 5-year time period. Participants consisted of 311 married couples who completed a number of questionnaires on relational aggression and relationship quality once a year over a 5-year period. Results revealed that relational aggression was highly stable over time and that women used more relational aggression than men. Men's use of social sabotage and love withdrawal were bidirectionally related to both partners' perceptions of poor marital quality over time. Conversely, only women's use of love withdrawal was related to her own perceptions of poor marital quality over time. Collectively, these results suggest that relational aggression by men may be less common, though particularly toxic in a marital relationship. Couples are encouraged to find healthier ways of coping with problems in relationships. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved).

  7. Identification of Vital Areas at Nuclear Facilities. Technical Guidance (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    nuclear installations against sabotage are contained in IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5). After the attacks of 11 September 2001, the perception of the potential terrorist threat to nuclear installations changed significantly, and the IAEA initiated an effort to develop a series of guidance publications on the security of nuclear and radioactive material and facilities. This publication presents a structured approach to identifying the areas that contain equipment, systems, and components to be protected against sabotage. It specifically provides detailed guidance with regard to the identification of vital areas, that is, the areas to be protected in high consequence facilities. However, the process described is applicable to the identification of areas that should be protected at any nuclear facility. The method builds upon safety analyses to develop sabotage logic models for sabotage scenarios that could cause unacceptable radiological consequences. The sabotage actions represented in the logic models are linked to the areas from which they can be accomplished. The logic models are then analysed to determine areas that should be protected to prevent these unacceptable radiological consequences

  8. Identification of Vital Areas at Nuclear Facilities. Technical Guidance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    nuclear installations against sabotage are contained in IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5). After the attacks of 11 September 2001, the perception of the potential terrorist threat to nuclear installations changed significantly, and the IAEA initiated an effort to develop a series of guidance publications on the security of nuclear and radioactive material and facilities. This publication presents a structured approach to identifying the areas that contain equipment, systems, and components to be protected against sabotage. It specifically provides detailed guidance with regard to the identification of vital areas, that is, the areas to be protected in high consequence facilities. However, the process described is applicable to the identification of areas that should be protected at any nuclear facility. The method builds upon safety analyses to develop sabotage logic models for sabotage scenarios that could cause unacceptable radiological consequences. The sabotage actions represented in the logic models are linked to the areas from which they can be accomplished. The logic models are then analysed to determine areas that should be protected to prevent these unacceptable radiological consequences.

  9. Socio-economic and other non-radiological impacts of the near surface disposal of radioactive waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-09-01

    The objective of this report is to introduce, in a generic sense, the elements that could comprise a socio-economic and non-radiological environmental impact assessment. The various social, economic and environmental impacts that could be associated with surface and near surface disposal are discussed through factors that could apply at the local, regional or national level. Impact management is also discussed. The report also introduces concepts to help Member States develop their own approaches to undertaking impact assessment and management. The report is intended to complement IAEA documents on the technology and safety aspects of the near surface disposal of radioactive waste. The scope of this report includes a discussion of a range of social, economic and nonradiological environmental impacts relevant to surface and near surface disposal and illustrations of some impact management measures

  10. Examining the Relationship of Business Operations and the Information Security Culture in the United States

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wynn, Cynthia L.

    2017-01-01

    An increase in information technology has caused and increased in threats towards information security. Threats are malware, viruses, sabotage from employees, and hacking into computer systems. Organizations have to find new ways to combat vulnerabilities and threats of internal and external threats to protect their information security and…

  11. Deterrence Theory in the Contemporary Operating Environment

    Science.gov (United States)

    2015-06-12

    Doo Hwan’s life in a bombing incident in Rangoon, Burma ( Myanmar ); and a mid-air sabotage bombing of a South Korean Boeing 707 passenger plane in......timeline. Humanitarian Cooperation Planning Division, Ministry of Unification, Seoul. “Explanations on the Results of the 20th Inter-Korean Ministerial

  12. Regulatory challenges for the licensing of future nuclear plants: A public interest perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lyman, Edwin S.

    2001-01-01

    Regulatory challenges concerned with licensing of advanced NPPs must ensure that economic imperatives do not have adverse impacts on safety, risk of radiological sabotage, waste management and disposal, non-proliferation, full opportunity for public participation. This presentation explains the mentioned issues using pebble bed reactor as an example

  13. 77 FR 75739 - National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Chemical Manufacturing Area Sources

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-12-21

    ... `uncontrollable acts of third parties,' such as strikes, sabotage, operator intoxication or insanity, and a... accounting for malfunctions could lead to standards that are significantly less stringent than levels that...) to eliminate redundancy. 40 CFR 63.11494(c)(1)(vii) We are adding a new paragraph that lists lead...

  14. Safeguards system effectiveness modeling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bennett, H.A.; Boozer, D.D.; Chapman, L.D.; Daniel, S.L.; Engi, D.; Hulme, B.L.; Varnado, G.B.

    1976-01-01

    A general methodology for the comparative evaluation of physical protection system effectiveness at nuclear facilities is presently under development. The approach is applicable to problems of sabotage or theft at fuel cycle facilities. The overall methodology and the primary analytic techniques used to assess system effectiveness are briefly outlined

  15. Gazprom joins scramble for West-Africa

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ten Hoedt, R.

    2008-01-01

    Gazprom has announced that it wants to become involved in gas production in West-Africa. A normal business decision for a company that wants to be a global player, say some analysts. Others are worried that the Russian move is intended to sabotage Europe's strategy to diversify its supplies

  16. 1994 Environmental monitoring drinking water and nonradiological effluent programs annual report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Andersen, B.D.; Brock, T.A.; Meachum, T.R.

    1995-10-01

    EG ampersand G Idaho, Inc., initiated monitoring programs for drinking water in 1988 and for nonradiological parameters and pollutants in liquid effluents in 1985. These programs were initiated for the facilities operated by EG ampersand G Idaho for the US Department of Energy at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. On October 1, 1994, Lockheed Idaho Technologies Company (LITCO) replaced EG ampersand G Idaho as the prime contractor at the INEL and assumed responsibility for these programs. Section I discusses the general site characteristics, the analytical laboratories, and sampling methodology general to both programs. Section 2, the Drinking Water Program, tracks the bacteriological, chemical, and radiological parameters required by State and Federal regulations. This section describes the drinking water monitoring activities conducted at 17 LITCO-operated production wells and 11 distribution systems. It also contains all of the drinking water parameters detected and the regulatory limits exceeded during calendar year 1994. In addition, groundwater quality is discussed as it relates to contaminants identified at the wellhead for LITCO production wells. Section 3 discusses the nonradiological liquid effluent monitoring results for 27 liquid effluent streams. These streams are presented with emphasis on calendar year 1994 activities. All parameter measurements and concentrations were below the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act toxic characteristics limits

  17. Social support for healthy behaviors: Scale psychometrics and prediction of weight loss among women in a behavioral program

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kiernan, Michaela; Moore, Susan D.; Schoffman, Danielle E.; Lee, Katherine; King, Abby C.; Taylor, C. Barr; Kiernan, Nancy Ellen; Perri, Michael G.

    2015-01-01

    Social support could be a powerful weight-loss treatment moderator or mediator but is rarely assessed. We assessed the psychometric properties, initial levels, and predictive validity of a measure of perceived social support and sabotage from friends and family for healthy eating and physical activity (eight subscales). Overweight/obese women randomized to one of two 6-month, group-based behavioral weight-loss programs (N=267; mean BMI 32.1±3.5; 66.3% White) completed subscales at baseline, and weight loss was assessed at 6 months. Internal consistency, discriminant validity, and content validity were excellent for support subscales and adequate for sabotage subscales; qualitative responses revealed novel deliberate instances not reflected in current sabotage items. Most women (>75%) “never” or “rarely” experienced support from friends or family. Using non-parametric classification methods, we identified two subscales—support from friends for healthy eating and support from family for physical activity—that predicted three clinically meaningful subgroups who ranged in likelihood of losing ≥5% of initial weight at 6 months. Women who “never” experienced family support were least likely to lose weight (45.7% lost weight) whereas women who experienced both frequent friend and family support were more likely to lose weight (71.6% lost weight). Paradoxically, women who “never” experienced friend support were most likely to lose weight (80.0% lost weight), perhaps because the group-based programs provided support lacking from friendships. Psychometrics for support subscales were excellent; initial support was rare; and the differential roles of friend versus family support could inform future targeted weight-loss interventions to subgroups at risk. PMID:21996661

  18. 10 CFR 72.184 - Safeguards contingency plan.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards contingency plan. 72.184 Section 72.184 Energy... Protection § 72.184 Safeguards contingency plan. (a) The requirements of the licensee's safeguards contingency plan for responding to threats and radiological sabotage must be as defined in appendix C to part...

  19. Women as Entrepreneurs.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bianchi, Antoinette

    1989-01-01

    An Afro-American woman discusses her experiences as an entrepreneur, describing the inspiration provided by her parents; the vision which enabled her to create a multi-million dollar business; the loss of her company through industrial sabotage; and her comeback as head of a seminar, speaking, and consulting firm. (JDD)

  20. Why Are Faculty Development Workshops a Waste of Time?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Berk, Ronald A.

    2010-01-01

    This article discusses how to design and execute a faculty development workshop. The author first describes the characteristics of the faculty development event that can sabotage or facilitate attendance. They relate to: (a) format and frequency; (b) venues; (c) technical support; and (d) competing activities. Then, the author presents ten…

  1. 28 CFR 12.40 - Public examination.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Public examination. 12.40 Section 12.40... ESPIONAGE, COUNTERESPIONAGE, OR SABOTAGE MATTERS UNDER THE ACT OF AUGUST 1, 1956 § 12.40 Public examination. Registration statements shall be available for public examination at the offices of the Registration Unit...

  2. 77 FR 48433 - New Source Performance Standards Review for Nitric Acid Plants

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-08-14

    ... third parties,' such as strikes, sabotage, operator intoxication or insanity, and a variety of other... could lead to standards that are significantly less stringent than levels that are achieved by a well... operating hours during that day. The proposed method could hypothetically lead to a day with only a few...

  3. The Two and a Half Learning Model: A Consequence of Academic Dishonesty

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sahin, Mehmet

    2016-01-01

    Academic dishonesty has been regarded as a problem but not a visible and declared one in every type of educational setting from elementary school to graduate level all over the world. Dishonesty or misconduct in the academic realm covers plagiarism, fabrication, deception, cheating, bribery, sabotage, professorial misconduct and impersonation.…

  4. SA silent on talk of a second nuclear station

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Waddacor, M.

    1983-01-01

    Local nuclear energy officials have either denied or will not comment on recent European reports suggesting South Africa plans to construct a second nuclear power station. The probability of South Africa building a second nuclear power plant is discussed. The recent sabotage at the Koeberg-1 reactor is also mentioned

  5. Gazprom joins scramble for West-Africa

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ten Hoedt, R.

    2008-03-15

    Gazprom has announced that it wants to become involved in gas production in West-Africa. A normal business decision for a company that wants to be a global player, say some analysts. Others are worried that the Russian move is intended to sabotage Europe's strategy to diversify its supplies.

  6. A Review on Sabotage against Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Choi, Sungyeol; Lim, Jihwan [UNIST, Ulsan (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    This report assesses the risk of routine transportation including cask response to an impact or fire accidents. In addition, we have still found the non-negligible difference among the studies for scenarios, approaches, and data. In order to evaluate attack cases on the same basis and reflect more realistic situations, at this moment, it is worthwhile to thoroughly review and analyze the existing studies and to suggest further development directions. In Section 2, we compare scenarios of terror attacks against spent fuel storage and transportation. Section 3 compares target scenarios, capabilities, and limitations of assessment methods. In addition, we collect and compare modeling data used for previous studies to analyze gaps and uncertainties in the existing studies. According to the long term management strategy for spent fuels in Korea, they will be transported from the spent fuel pools in each nuclear power plant to the central interim storage facility. The government should not be the only ones contributing to this dialogue. This dialogue that needs to happen should work both ways, with the government presenting their information and statistics and the public relaying their concerns for the government to review.

  7. The Enemies of Excellence 7 Reasons Why We Sabotage Success

    CERN Document Server

    Salciccioli, Greg

    2011-01-01

    A handbook that addresses the moral failures and corruption of political and corporate officials, this reference suggests that, regardless of how morally strong a leader, all face seven core risks, but by identifying and learning to recognize each risk, leaders can stop creating misery for themselves and the people who rely on them emotionally and financially and deliver the sustainable success people count on them for. Following the story of "Rob," this story begins with the demise of a fallen hero-revisiting the choices Rob made as he first took a leadership role and began growing in stature

  8. A Review on Sabotage against Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, Sungyeol; Lim, Jihwan

    2016-01-01

    This report assesses the risk of routine transportation including cask response to an impact or fire accidents. In addition, we have still found the non-negligible difference among the studies for scenarios, approaches, and data. In order to evaluate attack cases on the same basis and reflect more realistic situations, at this moment, it is worthwhile to thoroughly review and analyze the existing studies and to suggest further development directions. In Section 2, we compare scenarios of terror attacks against spent fuel storage and transportation. Section 3 compares target scenarios, capabilities, and limitations of assessment methods. In addition, we collect and compare modeling data used for previous studies to analyze gaps and uncertainties in the existing studies. According to the long term management strategy for spent fuels in Korea, they will be transported from the spent fuel pools in each nuclear power plant to the central interim storage facility. The government should not be the only ones contributing to this dialogue. This dialogue that needs to happen should work both ways, with the government presenting their information and statistics and the public relaying their concerns for the government to review

  9. A Risk Mitigation Model: Lessons Learned From Actual Insider Sabotage

    Science.gov (United States)

    2006-11-07

    performance Responsibilities removed from projects Suspension of Internet access Death in family ; Divorce Financial Disagreement re: salary/compensation...Infrastructure by Information Technology Insiders, ” Monterrey , CA.: Defense Personnel Security Research and Education Center. Shaw, E.D. (2004). “The

  10. The Ideology of Free Culture and the Grammar of Sabotage

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pasquinelli, Matteo

    2010-01-01

    Bringing post-Operaismo into network culture, this text tries to introduce the notion of surplus in a contemporary media debate dominated by a simple symmetry between immaterial and material domain, between digital economy and bioeconomy. Therefore a new asymmetry is first shaped through Serres' conceptual figure of the parasite and Bataille's…

  11. Creating Optimal Learning Environments through Invitational Education: An Alternative to Control Oriented School Reform

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fretz, Joan R.

    2015-01-01

    Understanding what motivates people to put forth effort, persevere in the face of obstacles, and choose their behaviors is key to creating an optimal learning environment--the type of school that policy makers desire, but are unknowingly sabotaging (Dweck, 2000). Many motivation and self-concept theories provide important insight with regard to…

  12. All hands on deck : an interactive perspective on complex common-pool resource management based on case studies in the coastal waters of the Isle of Wight (UK), Connemara (Ireland) and the Dutch Wadden Sea

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Steins, N.A.

    1999-01-01

    In 1996, the new fish cages of an Irish salmon farm were sabotaged and juvenile salmon with a value of IR£ 250,000 were released, nearly putting the farm out of business. This deed was an act of protest against the growth of the salmon farming industry. The loss of fishing grounds,

  13. Safeguards system effectiveness modeling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bennett, H.A.; Boozer, D.D.; Chapman, L.D.; Daniel, S.L.; Engi, D.; Hulme, B.L.; Varnado, G.B.

    1976-01-01

    A general methodology for the comparative evaluation of physical protection system effectiveness at nuclear facilities is presently under development. The approach is applicable to problems of sabotage or theft at fuel cycle facilities. In this paper, the overall methodology and the primary analytic techniques used to assess system effectiveness are briefly outlined

  14. Safeguards system effectiveness modeling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boozer, D.D.; Hulme, B.L.; Daniel, S.L.; Varnado, G.B.; Bennett, H.A.; Chapman, L.D.; Engi, D.

    1976-09-01

    A general methodology for the comparative evaluation of physical protection system effectiveness at nuclear facilities is presently under development. The approach is applicable to problems of sabotage or theft at fuel cycle facilities. In this paper, the overall methodology and the primary analytic techniques used to assess system effectiveness are briefly outlined

  15. The theory-practice gap: impact of professional-bureaucratic work conflict on newly-qualified nurses.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Maben, Jill; Latter, Sue; Clark, Jill Macleod

    2006-08-01

    This paper reports the findings from a naturalistic enquiry undertaken in the United Kingdom into the extent to which the ideals and values of the preregistration nursing course are adopted by individual newly educated Registered Nurses. Research in several countries provides consistent evidence of the existence of a theory-practice gap in nursing. Clear disparities have been demonstrated between the best practice ideals and values that are taught and those actually encountered in everyday practice. Nurse education 'Project 2000' reforms in the United Kingdom were designed, in part, to address this issue. Few studies to date have examined the impact of these reforms on newly qualified Registered Nurses' ability to translate theory into practice. A longitudinal study was carried out in three educational institutions in the United Kingdom from 1997 to 2000. Final year nursing students (n = 72) in three colleges of nursing completed questionnaires to elicit views on their ideals and values for practice. In-depth interviews with a purposive subsample of 26 participants (at 4-6 and 11-15 months postqualification) indicated the extent to which these ideals and values were adopted in practice. Interviews were tape-recorded, transcribed, and data were analysed using constant comparison and negative case analysis. Although new nurses emerged from their programmes with a strong set of nursing values, a number of professional and organizational factors effectively sabotaged implementation. Professional sabotage includes obeying covert rules, lack of support and poor nursing role models. Organizational sabotage includes structural and organizational constraints such as time pressures, role constraints, staff shortages and work overload. The disparity between nursing as taught and as practised may have profound implications for the future of the profession both in the United Kingdom and internationally, in terms of morale, job satisfaction and retention. Measures to improve

  16. History of malware

    OpenAIRE

    Milošević, Nikola

    2013-01-01

    In past three decades almost everything has changed in the field of malware and malware analysis. From malware created as proof of some security concept and malware created for financial gain to malware created to sabotage infrastructure. In this work we will focus on history and evolution of malware and describe most important malwares.

  17. Physical protection of shipments of irradiated reactor fuel; Interim guidance. Regulatory report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-06-01

    During May, 1979, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission approved for issuance in effective form new interim regulations for strengthening the protection of spent fuel shipments against sabotage and diversion. The new regulations were issued without benefit of public comment, but comments from the public were solicited after the effective date. Based upon the public comments received, the interim regulations were amended and reissued in effective form as a final interim rule in May, 1980. The present document supersedes a previously issued interim guidance document, NUREG-0561 (June, 1979) which accompanied the original rule. This report has been revised to conform to the new interim regulations on the physical protection of shipments of irradiated reactor fuel which are likely to remain in effect until the completion of an ongoing research program concerning the response of spent fuel to certain forms of sabotage, at which time the regulations may be rescinded, modified or made permanent, as appropriate. This report discusses the amended regulations and provides a basis on which licensees can develop an acceptable interim program for the protection of spent fuel shipments

  18. PSA based vulnerability and protectability analysis for NPPs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gopika, V.; Sanyasi Rao, V.V.S.; Ghosh, A.K.; Kushwaha, H.S.

    2012-01-01

    Highlights: ► The paper describes the generation of location sets and protection sets. ► Vulnerability and protectability used to rank location sets and protection sets. ► Ranking helps in adequacy of protection measures employed in various locations. ► The procedure for PSA based vital area identification is demonstrated. ► This method has found practical applicability for Indian NPP. -- Abstract: Identification of vital areas in a facility involves assessing the facility and the locations, whose sabotage can result in undesirable (radiological) consequences. Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) technique can find the component failures leading to core damage (a surrogate for radiological consequence) in a systematic manner, which can be extended to identification of vital areas. This paper describes the procedure for the generation of location sets (set of locations whose sabotage can lead to possible core damage) and protection sets (set of locations that must be protected to prevent possible core damage). In addition, measures such as vulnerability and protectability have been introduced, which can be used to rank location sets and protection sets.

  19. Idaho National Engineering Laboratory nonradiological waste management information for 1994 and record to date

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    French, D.L.; Lisee, D.J.; Taylor, K.A.

    1995-08-01

    This document provides detailed data and graphics on airborne and liquid effluent releases, fuel oil and coal consumption, water usage, and hazardous and mixed waste generated for calendar year 1994. This report summarizes industrial waste data records compiled since 1971 for the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL). The data presented are from the INEL Nonradiological Waste Management Information System

  20. Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Nonradiological Waste Management Information for 1993 and record to date

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sims, A.M.; Taylor, K.A.

    1994-08-01

    This document provides detailed data and graphics on airborne and liquid effluent releases, fuel oil and coal consumption, water usage, and hazardous and mixed waste generated for calendar year 1993. This report summarizes industrial waste data records compiled since 1971 for the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL). The data presented are from the INEL Nonradiological Waste Management Information System

  1. Leveraging Conflict for Social Justice: How "Leadable" Moments Can Transform School Culture

    Science.gov (United States)

    Aleman, Enrique, Jr.

    2009-01-01

    It is not a question of whether conflict within a school will occur, but rather when it will manifest and by whom. Often times, conflict occurring between key stakeholders such as teachers, parents, and students is looked upon as tainting school culture or sabotaging change strategies. However, conflict may also serve as a catalyst for larger…

  2. Critical Role of Positive Incentives for Reducing Insider Threat

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-10-01

    connectedness at work [Sulea 2012]  perceived organizational support [Bordia 2008, Sulea 2012, Shoss 2013]  organizational citizenship behavior [Ariani...difficult to generalize these findings to the digital age wherein different machinations of theft and sabotage have evolved. Pre- digital age...research gap. Because the digital age engendered workplace surveillance, performance monitoring, etc. that employees sometimes maladapted to (loneliness

  3. Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    violence, gang -related activities) rather than on perceptions of potential security threats. To account for possible emerging internal threats, we...terrorism, school violence, sexual crimes, stalking , cyber crimes, domestic violence, arson, sabotage, communicated threats, and 38 Department of...focus on the common indicators leading up to a wide range of destructive events, such as terrorism, school violence, sexual crimes, stalking , cyber

  4. Model to predict the radiological consequences of transportation of radioactive material through an urban environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Taylor, J.M.; Daniel, S.L.; DuCharme, A.R.; Finley, N.N.

    1977-01-01

    A model has been developed which predicts the radiological consequences of the transportation of radioactive material in and around urban environments. This discussion of the model includes discussion of the following general topics: health effects from radiation exposure, urban area characterization, computation of dose resulting from normal transportation, computation of dose resulting from vehicular accidents or sabotage, and preliminary results and conclusions

  5. EDRP public local inquiry, UKAEA/BNFL precognition on: Risk targets and EDRP design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brown, M.L.

    1986-06-01

    A full description is presented of the extent to which risk is controlled by the targets to be implemented in the proposed EDRP design, including a discussion of a particular accident sequence. Risk expressions and the usefulness of risk criteria are reviewed. Details are given of the accident consequence modelling as used by the UKAEA. Terrorist attack and sabotage are briefly discussed. (UK)

  6. Legal constraints imposed on security force personnel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cadwell, J.J.

    1983-01-01

    It is argued that the penalty for most mistakes made by security is the payment of money by the utility. The security personnel has only to act reasonably and not in a negligent manner. Preventing of sabotage is more important than obtaining a conviction, so it is better to search and not get a conviction than it is not to search

  7. Legal constraints imposed on security force personnel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cadwell, J.J.

    1983-01-01

    It is argued that the penalty for most mistakes made by security is the payment of money by the utility. The security personnel has only to act reasonably and not in a negligent manner. Preventing of sabotage is more important than obtaining a conviction, so it is better to search and not get a conviction than it is not to search. (DLC)

  8. Review of the German Reactor Safety Study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bayer, A.

    1980-01-01

    The accident risks in German nuclear power plants are reviewed. Parameters influencing the extent and consequences of an accident are differentiated. Risks of normal operation, war, and sabotage have not been considered. Measures taken by the operating shaft in the course of an accident are taken into account. The knowledge thus gained can be applied in the planning of emergency measures. (DG) [de

  9. Protection of facilities against sabotage general approaches and studies in France

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Venot, R.; Loiseau, O.; Cheval, K.

    2004-01-01

    In addition to the measures taken in the frame of the nuclear safety demonstration, the French nuclear facilities are subjected to a specific verification approach concerning the risk resulting from a malevolent action that may cause a release of radioactive materials in the environment. This approach aims at determining the protection level for facilities, based on predefined threats and the provisions to be set, if necessary, to ensure a satisfactory protection. The approach presented in this paper basically consists of a sensitivity analysis followed by a vulnerability analysis. In the French national control system also shortly described in the paper, the competent authority asks the operator to present a demonstration based on the approach and IRSN is charged with the technical assessment of the dossier. Because these analyses are generally based on specific tools, particularly in the case of vulnerability assessment, IRSN has raised a program to collect a set of methods and data on this subject, presented in the second part of this paper. It must be pointed out that no quantitative results or detailed examples will be given in the paper due to the sensitivity of the subject and the confidentiality measures applying. (orig.)

  10. Systems Thinking Safety Analysis: Nuclear Security Assessment of Physical Protection System in Nuclear Power Plants

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Tae Ho Woo

    2013-01-01

    Full Text Available The dynamical assessment has been performed in the aspect of the nuclear power plants (NPPs security. The physical protection system (PPS is constructed by the cyber security evaluation tool (CSET for the nuclear security assessment. The systems thinking algorithm is used for the quantifications by the Vensim software package. There is a period of 60 years which is the life time of NPPs' operation. The maximum possibility happens as 3.59 in the 30th year. The minimum value is done as 1.26 in the 55th year. The difference is about 2.85 times. The results of the case with time delay have shown that the maximum possibility of terror or sabotage incident happens as 447.42 in the 58th year and the minimum value happens as 89.77 in the 51st year. The difference is about 4.98 times. Hence, if the sabotage happens, the worst case is that the intruder can attack the target of the nuclear material in about one and a half hours. The general NPPs are modeled in the study and controlled by the systematic procedures.

  11. Methodology for proliferation resistance and physical protection of Generation IV nuclear energy systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bari, R.; Peterson, P.; Nishimura, R.; Roglans-Ribas, J.

    2005-01-01

    Enhanced proliferation resistance and physical protection (PR and PP) is one of the technology goals for advanced nuclear concepts. Under the auspices of the Generation IV International Forum an international experts group has been chartered to develop an evaluation methodology for PR and PP. This methodology will permit an objective PR and PP comparison between alternative nuclear systems and support design optimization to enhance robustness against proliferation, theft and sabotage. The assessment framework consists of identifying the threats to be considered, defining the PR and PP measures required to evaluate the resistance of a nuclear system to proliferation, theft or sabotage, and establishing quantitative methods to evaluate the proposed measures. The defined PR and PP measures are based on the design of the system (e.g., materials, processes, facilities), and institutional measures (e.g., safeguards, access control). The assessment methodology uses analysis of pathways' with respect to specific threats to determine the PR and PP measures. Analysis requires definition of the threats (i.e. objective, capability, strategy), decomposition of the system into its relevant elements (e.g., reactor core, fuel recycle facility, fuel storage), and identification of targets. (author)

  12. Physical Protection Study of the Radio metallurgy Installation Using SAVIComputer Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pinitoyo, Andreas

    2000-01-01

    Based on IAEA Recommendation on INFCIR/225/Rev.3 (The Physical Protectionof Nuclear Material), a nuclear installation shall have physical protectionsystem for protection or being secure on sabotage activities in theinstallation and thieve of nuclear materials. The recommendation states therequirements for physical protection of nuclear materials usage, transit andstorage. Radio metallurgy Installation of the Fuel Element and ReprocessingDevelopment Center (BATAN) at Serpong is a nuclear installation for researchon post irradiation of high radioactive spent fuel element, its processingand storage. The installation has risk on threat of a sabotage, which isdominant than thieve. The RMI building was designed and constructed ofphysical protection components and have been integrated with the BATAN Safetyand Security System and the Security Guards functions to be PhysicalProtection System for the RMI. By using the SAVI Computer Program with inputdata from the existing standards, assumptions for detection possibility,delay and response, that will result the probability of interruptions of theworst adversary paths PI = 0.1. These mean that the physical protectionsystems of the RMI shall be upgraded and improved in order to be reliable orbetter if the most of paths to the target PI = 1.0. (author)

  13. Non-radiological contaminants from uranium mining and milling at Ranger, Jabiru, Northern Territory, Australia.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Noller, B N

    1991-10-01

    Protection from the hazards from radioactivity is of prime importance in the management of uranium mine and mill wastes. Such wastes also contain non-radiological contaminants (heavy metals, acids and neutralising agents) which give rise to potential long-term health and environmental hazards and short-term hazards to the aquatic ecosystem, e.g. as a result of release of waste water. This study seeks to identify non-radiological contaminants (elements) transferred to waste water at the Ranger uranium mine/mill complex at Jabiru, which are likely to hazardous to the aquatic environment.The two principal sources of contaminants are: (i) ore and waste rock mobilised from mining; and (ii) process reagents used in the milling and mineral extraction process. These substances may or may not already be present in the natural environment but may lead to deleterious effects on the aquatic environment if increased above threshold levels.Rhenium, derived from the ore body, was found to be significantly enriched in waste water from Ranger, indicating its suitability as an indicator element for water originating from the mining and milling process, but only uranium, likewise derived from the ore, and magnesium, manganese and sulfur (as sulfate) from the milling process were found to be significant environmental contaminants.

  14. Building and Maintaining Healthy Organizations: The Key to Future Success

    Science.gov (United States)

    2000-10-01

    If fights break out, if there are industrial accidents, if there is sabotage, if absenteeism increases, the organization is at the point of pushing...coordinators for eldercare; flexible work hours; telecommuting ; and four-day work weeks. Marriott Corporation and Cargill Inc., invite spouses 62 or... telecommuting options or remote work sites. Virtual offices can reduce real estate costs; the requisite supporting hardware/software packages usually cost

  15. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-02-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  16. JPRS Report, Soviet Union, Foreign Military Review, No. 3, March 1988

    Science.gov (United States)

    1988-09-02

    command and control. Special-purpose troops are intended to conduct recon- naissance and sabotage operations and to carry out psychological ...operations and other disruptive activities. They include a separate airborne brigade, separate com- mando brigades and psychological warfare subunits...partic- ipated in the production and testing of French Atar -9C and Larzac engines. Belgian armor industry was born around 20 years ago. In the mid

  17. Understanding The Resistance to Health Information Systems

    OpenAIRE

    David Ackah; Angelito E Alvarado; Heru Santoso Wahito Nugroho; Sanglar Polnok; Wiwin Martiningsih

    2017-01-01

    User resistance is users’ opposition to system implementation. Resistance often occurs as a result of a mismatch between management goals and employee preferences. There are two types of resistance to health iformation system namely active resistance and passive resistance. The manifestation of active resistance are being critical,  blaming/accusing, blocking, fault finding, sabotaging, undermining, ridiculing, intimidating/threatening, starting rumors, appealing to fear, manipulating arguing...

  18. Details of Nazis' A-Bomb program surface

    CERN Multimedia

    Glanz, J

    2002-01-01

    Werner Heisenberg, leader of the Nazi atomic bomb program, revealed the projects existence to Niels Bohr in a meeting in Copenhagen in 1941. But contrary to several historical accounts of the meeting, Heisenberg never expressed moral qualms about building a bomb for Hitler nor hinted that he might be willing to sabotage the project, according to secret documents cited in a London newspaper yesterday (2 pages).

  19. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, vandalism, arson, firearms, sabotage and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  20. Stuxnet. First strike in the cyber war?; Stuxnet. Erstschlag im Cyberkrieg?

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Weinberger, Sharon [Alicia Patterson Foundation, Washington, DC (United States)

    2011-10-15

    In June 2010, the computer virus Stuxnet was discovered in Iran. This virus was more complex than any previously known malicious programs. In special test laboratories it could be shown that this virus had been developed by experts in order to sabotage industrial production processes. Since Stuxnet can be installed on a USB flash drive, it does not require an internet access for infection.

  1. Civil implications of commercial nuclear power

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilkinson, P.; Gallie, N.

    1985-01-01

    The following aspects are discussed; spent fuel transport by rail, routes and possible accidents; reactors, possible accidents and effects of radioactive releases to the environment; possible effects of sabotage and terrorist attacks; possible hazards from fuel reprocessing plants; radioactive wastes, inventories and possible effects of escape to environment; biological radiation effects; civil war effects and democratic freedoms; the miners' strike and its implications. (U.K.)

  2. Effect of ethical leadership and climate on effectiveness

    OpenAIRE

    Amos S. Engelbrecht; Janneke Wolmarans; Bright Mahembe

    2017-01-01

    Orientation: The increasing prevalence of theft, sabotage and other deviant behaviours in the workplace has disastrous effects for organisations, such as lowered effectiveness, escalated costs and the organisation’s declining reputation. Research purpose: The purpose of the research was to design and investigate the relationships among perceived leader effectiveness, ethical climate and ethical leadership. A further objective of the investigation was to validate a conceptual model clarify...

  3. The Chinese Communist Party: A Strategic Center of Gravity Analysis

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-03-08

    Rebellion Revolution Collapse Population Segment: unemployed harassment , slow-downs, sabotage, quitting, sit-ins, wild-cat strikes strikes...rules can be high: demotion, fines, physical and verbal harassment , journalists and editors being fired and put under arrest, whole newspapers have even...2011). 195 Ibid. 196 Ibid. 197 ―Younger generation of workers more willing to strike to protect rights – new Maplecroft Labour Standards Report

  4. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL), Pre-NRC through December 31, 1983. Rev. 9

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-06-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing/allegedly stolen, transportation, tampering/vandalism, arson, firearms-related, radiological sabotage and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  5. Disparity in Democracies: A Comparative Case Study of Mali and Niger

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-12-01

    thought he was. In the spirit of cooperation, Ousmane issued an emotional appeal to the "every patriot,.. .all the Niger political class...even voted on.127 In 1993-1994, eleven Islamic organizations thwarted a government condom distribution campaign aimed at both contraception and AIDS...GR-EN.pdf (accessed October 18, 2010). 123 Radio France Internationale, "Islamic groups attempt to sabotage contraceptive campaign," November 18

  6. Nuclear power investment and generating costs from a utility point of view

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Roth, B.F.

    1975-01-01

    Nuclear power stations presently in operation in the Federal Republic of Germany have electricity generating costs between 3.5 Pf/kWh and 4.5 Pf/kWh. The higher electricity generating costs are due mainly to the increased expenditure required for the protection of plants against airplane crashes, earthquakes and sabotage, and to the higher costs of the entire fuel cycle. (orig./RW) [de

  7. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL). Pre-NRC through June 30, 1981

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    MacMurdy, P.; Davidson, J.; Lin, H.

    1981-09-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, vandalism, arson, firearms, sabotage and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  8. Rock siting of nuclear power plants from a reactor safety standpoint. Status report October 1974

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1975-01-01

    The aim of this study is to clearify the advantages and disadvantages of an underground nuclear power plant from a reactor safety point of view, compared to a plant above ground. Principles for the technical design of a rock sited BWR nuclear power plant is presented. Also questions of sabotage and closing down the plant at the end of the operational period are treated. (K.K.)

  9. Work and Risk: Perceptions of Nuclear-Power Personnel. a Study in Grounded Theory.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fields, Claire Dewitt

    1992-01-01

    The utility industry has devoted time and money to assure personnel within nuclear power plants are informed about occupational risks. Radiation-protection training programs are designed to present information to employees about occupational radiation and protective procedures. Work -related concerns are known to create stress, affect the morale of the workforce, influence collective bargaining, and increase compensation claims. This study was designed to determine perceptions of risk among employees of nuclear power plants and identify variables that influence these perceptions. Four power plants were included in the study, one in Canada and three in the United States. Data were generated through participant observations and interviews of 350 participants during a period of 3 weeks at each plant. Data were gathered and analyzed following procedures advanced by Grounded Theory, a naturalistic methodology used in this study. Training content, information, and communication materials were additional sources of data. Findings indicated employees believed health and safety risks existed within the work environment. Perceptions of risk were influenced by training quality, the work environment, nuclear myths and images of the general public, and fears of family members. Among the three groups of workers, administration personnel, security personnel, and radiation workers, the latter identified a larger number of risks. Workers perceived radiation risks, shift work, and steam pipe ruptures as high-level concerns. Experiencing stress, making mistakes, and fear of sabotage were concerns shared among all employee groups at various levels of concern. Strategies developed by employees were used to control risk. Strategies included teamwork, humor, monitoring, avoidance, reframing, and activism. When risks were perceived as uncontrollable, the employee left the plant. A coping strategy of transferring concerns about radiological risks to nonradiological risks were uncovered in

  10. Improving radiation awareness and feeling of personal security of non-radiological medical staff by implementing a traffic light system in computed tomography

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Heilmaier, C.; Mayor, A.; Zuber, N.; Weishaupt, D. [Stadtspital Triemli, Zurich (Switzerland). Dept. of Radiology; Fodor, P. [Stadtspital Triemli, Zurich (Switzerland). Dept. of Anesthesiology and Intensive Care Medicine

    2016-03-15

    Non-radiological medical professionals often need to remain in the scanning room during computed tomography (CT) examinations to supervise patients in critical condition. Independent of protective devices, their position significantly influences the radiation dose they receive. The purpose of this study was to assess if a traffic light system indicating areas of different radiation exposure improves non-radiological medical staff's radiation awareness and feeling of personal security. Phantom measurements were performed to define areas of different dose rates and colored stickers were applied on the floor according to a traffic light system: green = lowest, orange = intermediate, and red = highest possible radiation exposure. Non-radiological medical professionals with different years of working experience evaluated the system using a structured questionnaire. Kruskal-Wallis and Spearman's correlation test were applied for statistical analysis. Fifty-six subjects (30 physicians, 26 nursing staff) took part in this prospective study. Overall rating of the system was very good, and almost all professionals tried to stand in the green stickers during the scan. The system significantly increased radiation awareness and feeling of personal protection particularly in staff with ? 5 years of working experience (p < 0.05). The majority of non-radiological medical professionals stated that staying in the green stickers and patient care would be compatible. Knowledge of radiation protection was poor in all groups, especially among entry-level employees (p < 0.05). A traffic light system in the CT scanning room indicating areas with lowest, in-termediate, and highest possible radiation exposure is much appreciated. It increases radiation awareness, improves the sense of personal radiation protection, and may support endeavors to lower occupational radiation exposure, although the best radiation protection always is to re-main outside the CT room during the scan.

  11. Improving radiation awareness and feeling of personal security of non-radiological medical staff by implementing a traffic light system in computed tomography

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heilmaier, C.; Mayor, A.; Zuber, N.; Weishaupt, D.; Fodor, P.

    2016-01-01

    Non-radiological medical professionals often need to remain in the scanning room during computed tomography (CT) examinations to supervise patients in critical condition. Independent of protective devices, their position significantly influences the radiation dose they receive. The purpose of this study was to assess if a traffic light system indicating areas of different radiation exposure improves non-radiological medical staff's radiation awareness and feeling of personal security. Phantom measurements were performed to define areas of different dose rates and colored stickers were applied on the floor according to a traffic light system: green = lowest, orange = intermediate, and red = highest possible radiation exposure. Non-radiological medical professionals with different years of working experience evaluated the system using a structured questionnaire. Kruskal-Wallis and Spearman's correlation test were applied for statistical analysis. Fifty-six subjects (30 physicians, 26 nursing staff) took part in this prospective study. Overall rating of the system was very good, and almost all professionals tried to stand in the green stickers during the scan. The system significantly increased radiation awareness and feeling of personal protection particularly in staff with ? 5 years of working experience (p < 0.05). The majority of non-radiological medical professionals stated that staying in the green stickers and patient care would be compatible. Knowledge of radiation protection was poor in all groups, especially among entry-level employees (p < 0.05). A traffic light system in the CT scanning room indicating areas with lowest, in-termediate, and highest possible radiation exposure is much appreciated. It increases radiation awareness, improves the sense of personal radiation protection, and may support endeavors to lower occupational radiation exposure, although the best radiation protection always is to re-main outside the CT room during the scan.

  12. Non-radiological air quality modeling for the high-level waste tank closure environmental impact statement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hunter, C.H.

    2000-01-01

    Dispersion modeling of potential non-radiological air emissions associated with the proposed closure of high-level waste (HLW) tanks at the Savannah River Site has been completed, as requested (TtNUS, 1999). Estimated maximum ground-level concentrations of applicable regulated air pollutants at the site boundary and at the distance to the co-located onsite worker (640 meters) are summarized. In all cases, the calculated concentrations were much less than regulatory standards

  13. Physical protection solutions for security problems at nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Darby, J.L.; Jacobs, J.

    1980-09-01

    Under Department of Energy sponsorship, Sandia National Laboratories has developed a broad technological base of components and integrated systems to address security concerns at facilities of importance, including nuclear reactors. The primary security concern at a light water reactor is radiological sabotage, a deliberate set of actions at a plant which could expose the public to a significant amount of radiation (on the order of 10 CFR 100 limits)

  14. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-03-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, tampering/vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  15. Essays on the Economics of Organizations, Productivity and Labor

    OpenAIRE

    Cowgill, Bradford Lee

    2015-01-01

    This dissertation is about how firms use incentives and information in internal personnel and management practices, in particular relating to hiring and innovation. In the first chapter, I study competition between workers inside of firms. Why do firms use incentives that encourage anti-social behavior among employees? Rank-based promotion schemes are among the most widespread forms competition and incentives, despite encouraging influence-peddling, sabotage and anti-social behavior. I study ...

  16. The fundamental principles of the physical protection, the group of six point of view

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Claeys, M.; Carnas, L.; Robeyns, G.; Rommevaux, G.; Venot, R.; Hagemann, A.; Fontaneda Gonzalez, A.; Gimenez Gonzalez, S.; Isaksson, S.G.; Wager, K.; Price, C.

    2001-01-01

    This paper presents the joint experience of the Group of Six in the field of physical protection against the theft or unauthorized removal of nuclear material and against the sabotage of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, which emerged from the joint discussion. Several fundamental principles stem from this experience. Of course the particular terms and conditions of the implementation of these principles are specific to each country. (authors)

  17. A Transparent Framework for guiding Radiological and Non-Radiological Contaminated Land Risk Assessments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Alex; Mathers, Dan

    2003-01-01

    A framework is presented that may be used as a transparent guidance to both radiological and non-radiological risk assessments. This framework has been developed by BNFL, with external consultation, to provide a systematic approach for identifying key system drivers and to guide associated research packages in light of data deficiencies and sources of model uncertainty. The process presented represents an advance on existing working practices yet combines regulator philosophy to produce a robust, comprehensive, cost-effective and transparent work package. It aims at lending added confidence to risk models thereby adding value to the decision process

  18. Assessment of the response of spent fuel transports to malevolent acts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sandoval, R.P.

    1983-01-01

    This paper describes the results of a program conducted at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) for the US Department of Energy to provide an experimental data base for more accurately assessing the radiological consequences from a hypothetical sabotage attack on a spent fuel shipping cask. The primary objectives of the program were limited to: (1) evaluating the effectiveness of selected high explosive devices (HED) in breaching full-size spent fuel casks, (2) quantifying and characterizing relevant aerosol properties of the released fuel, and (3) using the resulting experimental data to evaluate the radiological health consequences resulting from a hypothetical sabotage attack on a spent fuel shipping cask in a densely populated area. Subscale and full-scale experiments in conjunction with an analytical modeling study were performed to meet the programmatic objectives. The data from this program indicate that the Urban Studies greatly overestimated the impact of malevolent acts directed at spent fuel casks in urban environs. From that standpoint this work could be the basis of additional regulatory revisions of the NRC physical protection requirements. In a larger sense this work can also be the basis of more credible worst case analyses since it defines the actual result of an event which is well beyond any expectations of cask failures in accident environments. 5 references

  19. Speaking Too Soon: The Sabotage of Bail Reform in New South Wales

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Julia Quilter

    2014-10-01

    Full Text Available Within just over one month of coming into operation in May 2014, the new Bail Act 2013 (NSW, a product of long-term law reform consideration, was reviewed and then amended after talk-back radio ‘shock jock’ and tabloid newspaper outcry over three cases. This article examines the media triggers, the main arguments of the review conducted by former New South Wales (NSW Attorney General John Hatzistergos, and the amendments, with our analysis of the judicial interpretation of the Act thus far providing relevant background. We argue that the amendments are premature, unnecessary, create complexity and confusion, and, quite possibly, will have unintended consequences: in short, they are a mess. The whole process of reversal is an example of law and order politics driven by the shock jocks and tabloid media, the views of which, are based on fundamental misconceptions of the purpose of bail and its place in the criminal process, resulting in a conflation of accusation, guilt and punishment. Other consequences of the review and amendments process recognised in this article include the denigration of judicial expertise and lack of concern with evidence and process; the disproportionate influence of the shock jocks, tabloids and Police Association of NSW on policy formation; the practice of using retired politicians to produce ‘quick fix’ reviews; and the political failure to understand and defend fundamental legal principles that benefit us all and are central to the maintenance of a democratic society and the rule of law. The article concludes with some discussion of ways in which media and political debate might be conducted to produce more balanced outcomes.

  20. 76 FR 43937 - Criminal Penalties for Unauthorized Introduction of Weapons and Sabotage

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-07-22

    ..., assault, assault with a deadly weapon). However, the variability of State law and consistency of State..., ``Category 1 and 2 Radioactive Materials,'' to 10 CFR Part 73, ``Physical Protection of Plants and Materials...

  1. Impact of the increase in broadband access on South African national security and the average citizen

    CSIR Research Space (South Africa)

    Jansen van Vuuren, JC

    2010-04-01

    Full Text Available distributed denial of service (DDOS) attack, flooding Web sites or Internet Service Providers. DDOS attacks are often launched from numerous computers that have been hacked to obey commands of the perpetrator. Network Sabotage: Modification... sector. Cyber attacks with political connotation were seen in Estonia, Georgia and South Korea in the last few years. South Korea, a country with advanced IT developments experienced a distributed denial of service (DDOS) attack in July 2009...

  2. Consultant tells how to reduce nuclear risk

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smock, R.

    1983-01-01

    John Garrick of Pickard, Lowe, and Garrick, an Irvine, CA, consulting firm, thinks nuclear plant risks can be measured and managed through creative use of probabilistic risk assessments (PRA). PRAs can be used to quantify the likelihood of an accident from all causes except sabotage or war, says Garrick. Although that use has been criticized, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is moving toward formal use of PRAs in its internal analyses. 7 figures, 1 table

  3. Civilian protection and Britain's commercial nuclear installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1981-01-01

    The subject is treated as follows: initial conclusions (major nuclear attack on military installations; nuclear attack including civil nuclear targets; conventional attack on civil nuclear installations); nature of nuclear weapons explosions and power reactor releases (general; dose effects and biologically significant isotopes; nuclear weapon effects; effect of reactors and other fuel-cycle installations in a thermonuclear area; implications of reactor releases due to conventional attack, sabotage, civil disorder or major accident). (U.K.)

  4. Evacuation of Hospitals during Disaster, Establishment of a Field Hospital, and Communication

    OpenAIRE

    Tekin, Erdal; Bayramoglu, Atif; Uzkeser, Mustafa; Cakir, Zeynep

    2017-01-01

    The buildings, working personnel, and patients and their relatives may directly or indirectly be affected by the disasters. Here we will discuss evacuation, establishing a field hospital, communication, the role of the media in disasters, and defending against sabotage. The affected individuals should be evacuated and transferred to secure zones safely and rapidly. How the decision for evacuation should be made and how the evacuation triage should be performed are important issues. Field hosp...

  5. Final Generic Environmental Impact Statement. Handling and storage of spent light water power reactor fuel. Volume 2. Appendices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-08-01

    This volume contains the following appendices: LWR fuel cycle, handling and storage of spent fuel, termination case considerations (use of coal-fired power plants to replace nuclear plants), increasing fuel storage capacity, spent fuel transshipment, spent fuel generation and storage data, characteristics of nuclear fuel, away-from-reactor storage concept, spent fuel storage requirements for higher projected nuclear generating capacity, and physical protection requirements and hypothetical sabotage events in a spent fuel storage facility

  6. Application of systems analysis techniques to vulnerability studies of complex installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bott, T.F.

    1986-01-01

    Application of reliability and risk analysis methods (particularly fault trees) to failure analysis of systems in hostile manmade environments is discussed. Methods for constructing, analyzing, and interpreting the fault trees, graphs, and diagrams are described. The application of fault-trees, directed graphs, and functional diagrams to problems in sabotage, survivability, and information protection is discussed in general terms. Special problems encountered in this type of analysis are discussed, and future research directions are considered

  7. Office of Strategic Services Training during World War II

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-06-01

    States: centralized intelligence, “fifth column” activities, psycho- logical or “ political warfare,” and the kind of sabotage, com- mando raids and...ship of Lt. Col. Serge Obolen- sky, a former Russian prince and New York socialite who had fought the Germans in World War I, the Bolsheviks in...and conflicting political agendas. Some veter- ans grumbled about undue emphasis on “cloak and dagger creepiness” instead of practical training that

  8. Lost Unconventional Warfare Lessons from the Yugoslav Front

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-12-06

    James D. Kiras, Special Operations and Strategy: From World War II to the War on Terror (NY: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2006), 93. 74 Walter...77 James D. Kiras, Special Operations and Strategy: From World War II to the War on Terror (NY: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2006), 94...79 Nigel West, Secret War: The Story of SOE, Britain’s Wartime Sabotage Organization (UK: Hodder & Stoughton Ltd., 1992), 189. 80

  9. Career Concerns in Teams

    OpenAIRE

    Auriol, Emmanuelle; Friebel, Guido; Pechlivanos, Lambros

    2002-01-01

    We investigate how changes in the commitment power of a principal affect cooperation among agents who work in a team. When the principal and her agents are symmetrically uncertain about the agents' innate abilities, workers have career concerns. Then, unless the principal can commit herself to long-term wage contracts, an implicit sabotage incentive emerges. Agents become reluctant to help their teammates. Anticipating this risk, and in order to induce the desired level of cooperation, the pr...

  10. Música medieval al més enllà

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Toldrà i Vilardell, Albert

    2007-12-01

    Full Text Available According to the Middle Ages anthropomorphic and anachronical conception, in the other world -in heaven and in hell- they play, listen and dance different musics, vochal and instrumental, mystical hymns or torture shapes. There is too a defined and giving legitimation liturgycal and musical collaboration between heaven and earth’s church, which devils try to sabotage. And different heavenly and hellish attitudes, from pleasure to absolut condemnation, towards human musicians and musics.

    No disponible

  11. Developing a Vital Area Identification in Nuclear Power Plants Using PSA Results

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Kilyoo; Jung, Woosik; Yang, Juneon

    2008-01-01

    After 9/11, a physical protection and vital area identification (VAI) became important. In the well known VAI methodology, fault trees (FTs) to mitigate the initiating events caused by sabotage or terror should be prepared for the VAI. The KAERI VAI method is to develop FTs by using Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) and Risk Informed In-service Inspection (RI-ISI) results. In this paper, how to develop a VAI model by using PSA and RI-ISI results is described

  12. SNAP: a tool for nuclear physical protection system modeling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Engi, D.; Grant, F.H. III.

    1979-10-01

    Nuclear safeguards systems are concerned, in part, with the physical protection of nuclear materials. The function of a physical protection system is to define the facility against adversary activities which could lead to theft of nuclear material or sabotage resulting in a radiological release. The Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) provides a convenient and standard analysis methodology for the evaluation of physical protection system analysis. This paper describes a detailed application of SNAP to a hypothetical nuclear facility

  13. The IAEA Nuclear Security Programme Combating Nuclear Terrorism

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    Discusses the four threats of nuclear terrorism,which are theft of a nuclear weapon, theft of material to make an improvised nuclear explosive device,theft of other radioactive material for an Radiological dispersal device and sabotage of a facility or transport. The IAEA Nuclear Security programme combating Nuclear Terrorism therefore adopts a comprehensive approach. The programme addresses the need to cover nuclear and other radioactive materials, nuclear facilities and transports, non-nuclear, medical and industrial applications of sources

  14. Safety assessment of automated vehicle functions by simulation-based fault injection

    OpenAIRE

    Juez, Garazi; Amparan, Estibaliz; Lattarulo, Ray; Rastelli, Joshue Perez; Ruiz, Alejandra; Espinoza, Huascar

    2017-01-01

    As automated driving vehicles become more sophisticated and pervasive, it is increasingly important to assure its safety even in the presence of faults. This paper presents a simulation-based fault injection approach (Sabotage) aimed at assessing the safety of automated vehicle functions. In particular, we focus on a case study to forecast fault effects during the model-based design of a lateral control function. The goal is to determine the acceptable fault detection interval for pe...

  15. Definitive closure of nuclear power plants. Aspects concerning physical safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodriguez, C.; Puntarulo, L.; Canibano, J.

    1988-01-01

    This paper analyzes the various safety requirements that must be fulfilled by nuclear power plants for their operation without restrictions, such as safeguards, nuclear safety and physical protection. Physical protection, the subject most extensively dealt by the authors, is defined as safety measures aimed at providing protection against deliberate hostile deeds, such as robberies or non-authorized transport of radioactive materials or sabotage in nuclear facilities, performed either by individuals or by groups of individuals. (Author)

  16. ORNL necessary and sufficient standards for environment, safety, and health. Final report of the Identification Team for other industrial, radiological, and non-radiological hazard facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-07-01

    This Necessary and Sufficient (N and S) set of standards is for Other Industrial, Radiological, and Non-Radiological Hazard Facilities at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). These facility classifications are based on a laboratory-wide approach to classify facilities by hazard category. An analysis of the hazards associated with the facilities at ORNL was conducted in 1993. To identify standards appropriate for these Other Industrial, Radiological, and Non-Radiological Hazard Facilities, the activities conducted in these facilities were assessed, and the hazards associated with the activities were identified. A preliminary hazards list was distributed to all ORNL organizations. The hazards identified in prior hazard analyses are contained in the list, and a category of other was provided in each general hazard area. A workshop to assist organizations in properly completing the list was held. Completed hazard screening lists were compiled for each ORNL division, and a master list was compiled for all Other Industrial, Radiological Hazard, and Non-Radiological facilities and activities. The master list was compared against the results of prior hazard analyses by research and development and environment, safety, and health personnel to ensure completeness. This list, which served as a basis for identifying applicable environment, safety, and health standards, appears in Appendix A.

  17. ORNL necessary and sufficient standards for environment, safety, and health. Final report of the Identification Team for other industrial, radiological, and non-radiological hazard facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-07-01

    This Necessary and Sufficient (N and S) set of standards is for Other Industrial, Radiological, and Non-Radiological Hazard Facilities at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). These facility classifications are based on a laboratory-wide approach to classify facilities by hazard category. An analysis of the hazards associated with the facilities at ORNL was conducted in 1993. To identify standards appropriate for these Other Industrial, Radiological, and Non-Radiological Hazard Facilities, the activities conducted in these facilities were assessed, and the hazards associated with the activities were identified. A preliminary hazards list was distributed to all ORNL organizations. The hazards identified in prior hazard analyses are contained in the list, and a category of other was provided in each general hazard area. A workshop to assist organizations in properly completing the list was held. Completed hazard screening lists were compiled for each ORNL division, and a master list was compiled for all Other Industrial, Radiological Hazard, and Non-Radiological facilities and activities. The master list was compared against the results of prior hazard analyses by research and development and environment, safety, and health personnel to ensure completeness. This list, which served as a basis for identifying applicable environment, safety, and health standards, appears in Appendix A

  18. Geopolitical hotspots : Iraq

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, J.

    2004-01-01

    The government of Iraq fell one month after the United States and its allies launched an invasion on the country in March, 2003. The problems that ensued included looting, sabotage and alienation of the occupying powers from the Iraqi people. The author states that despite these problems, progress has been made in Iraq in terms of an Iraqi governing council which will hand back power to Iraqis by the end of June 2004. The goal is to have an election of a constitutional assembly by the end of January 2005. Progress has also been made in terms of restoring pre-invasion oil production capacity, despite sabotage to pipelines and oilfields. The Iraqi Oil Ministry claimed to have raised oil production to 2.5 million barrels per day (mbpd) by mid-March 2004, and exports to the Turkish port of Ceyhan were restored. The future of Iraq's oil production remains uncertain. Although a transitional government could contract foreign companies to boost production from existing oilfields for the short-term, the author emphasized that a permanent government must be elected by the people of Iraq before any long-term contracts for new oilfield development can be negotiated. The government elected by the people of Iraq should determine the structure of its own oil industry and any future relationships with foreign oil companies. tabs., figs

  19. Geopolitical hotspots : Iraq

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, J. [Centre for Global Energy Studies, London (United Kingdom)

    2004-07-01

    The government of Iraq fell one month after the United States and its allies launched an invasion on the country in March, 2003. The problems that ensued included looting, sabotage and alienation of the occupying powers from the Iraqi people. The author states that despite these problems, progress has been made in Iraq in terms of an Iraqi governing council which will hand back power to Iraqis by the end of June 2004. The goal is to have an election of a constitutional assembly by the end of January 2005. Progress has also been made in terms of restoring pre-invasion oil production capacity, despite sabotage to pipelines and oilfields. The Iraqi Oil Ministry claimed to have raised oil production to 2.5 million barrels per day (mbpd) by mid-March 2004, and exports to the Turkish port of Ceyhan were restored. The future of Iraq's oil production remains uncertain. Although a transitional government could contract foreign companies to boost production from existing oilfields for the short-term, the author emphasized that a permanent government must be elected by the people of Iraq before any long-term contracts for new oilfield development can be negotiated. The government elected by the people of Iraq should determine the structure of its own oil industry and any future relationships with foreign oil companies. tabs., figs.

  20. EU-CIS joint study project 2. Intervention criteria in CIS, risk assessments and non-radiological factors in decision-making

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hedemann Jensen, P. [Risoe National Lab., Roskilde (Denmark); Demin, V.F. [Russian Reserch Centre `Kurchatov Inst.`, Moscow (Russian Federation); Konstantinov, Y.O. [Research Inst. of Radiation Hygiene, St. Petersburg (Russian Federation); Likhtarev, I.A. [Ukrainian Scientific Centre for Radiation Medicine, Kiev (Ukraine); Rolevich, I.V. [Chernobyl State Commiettee, Minsk (Belarus); Schneider, T. [Centre d`etudes sur l`Evaluation de la Protection dans le domaine Nucleaire, CEPN, Paris (France)

    1996-05-01

    An extensive radiation risk estimation methodology has recently been developed in Russia and used for estimates of risk in exposed populations in the republics of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. Results based on demographic data for the three republics are presented and compared with risk estimates from the EU risk model ASQRAD. The intervention criteria in the CIS republics have been evolving since the Chernobyl accident. The development of criteria in each of the three republics has been analysed and the CIS-Criteria have been compared to international guidance on intervention. After a nuclear or radiological emergency both radiological and non-radiological protection factors will influence the level of protective actions being introduced. The role of non-radiological protection factors in the overall optimization of health protection is addressed. It is argued that optimization of the overall health protection is not a question of developing radiation radiation protection philosophy to fully include socio-psychological factors. It is rather a question of including these factors - in parallel with the radiological protection factors - in cooperation between radiation protection experts and psychological specialists under the responsibility of the decision maker. (au) 19 tabs., 10 ills., 45 refs.

  1. EU-CIS joint study project 2. Intervention criteria in CIS, risk assessments and non-radiological factors in decision-making

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hedemann Jensen, P.; Demin, V.F.; Konstantinov, Y.O.; Likhtarev, I.A.; Rolevich, I.V.; Schneider, T.

    1996-05-01

    An extensive radiation risk estimation methodology has recently been developed in Russia and used for estimates of risk in exposed populations in the republics of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. Results based on demographic data for the three republics are presented and compared with risk estimates from the EU risk model ASQRAD. The intervention criteria in the CIS republics have been evolving since the Chernobyl accident. The development of criteria in each of the three republics has been analysed and the CIS-Criteria have been compared to international guidance on intervention. After a nuclear or radiological emergency both radiological and non-radiological protection factors will influence the level of protective actions being introduced. The role of non-radiological protection factors in the overall optimization of health protection is addressed. It is argued that optimization of the overall health protection is not a question of developing radiation radiation protection philosophy to fully include socio-psychological factors. It is rather a question of including these factors - in parallel with the radiological protection factors - in cooperation between radiation protection experts and psychological specialists under the responsibility of the decision maker. (au) 19 tabs., 10 ills., 45 refs

  2. Believing Your Eyes: Strengthening the Reliability of Tags and Seals

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Brim, Cornelia P.; Denlinger, Laura S.

    2013-07-01

    NNSA’s Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) is working together with scientific experts at the DOE national laboratories to develop the tools needed to safeguard and secure nuclear material from diversion, theft, and sabotage--tasks critical to support future arms control treaties that may involve the new challenge of monitoring nuclear weapons dismantlement. Use of optically stimulated luminescent material is one method to enhance the security and robustness of existing tamper indicating devices such as tags and seals.

  3. Nuclear energy technology transfer: the security barriers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rinne, R.L.

    1975-08-01

    The problems presented by security considerations to the transfer of nuclear energy technology are examined. In the case of fusion, the national security barrier associated with the laser and E-beam approaches is discussed; for fission, the international security requirements, due to the possibility of the theft or diversion of special nuclear materials or sabotage of nuclear facilities, are highlighted. The paper outlines the nuclear fuel cycle and terrorist threat, examples of security barriers, and the current approaches to transferring technology. (auth)

  4. Nuclear power in rock. Principal report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-06-01

    In September 1975 the Swedish Government directed the Swedish State Power Board to study the question of rock-siting nuclear power plants. The study accounted for in this report aims at clarifying the advantages and disadvantages of siting a nuclear power plant in rock, compared to siting on ground level, considering reactor safety, war protection and sabotage. The need for nuclear power production during war situations and the closing down of nuclear power plants after terminated operation are also dealt with. (author)

  5. From Sticks and Stones to Zeros and Ones: The Development of Computer Network Operations as an Element of Warfare. A Study of the Palestinian-Israeli Cyberconflict and What the United States Can Learn from the Interfada

    Science.gov (United States)

    2005-09-01

    Israeli teens who sabotaged a website of Hezbollah, the militantly anti-Israel guerrilla movement in Lebanon, with a defacement which placed an Israeli...ftp with out a password. FUCK HIZZBALLA!!! Sincerely digibrain & haboshanik (we are the domain masters).” • Hackers of Israel Unite: Hackers of...other defacement. 2. b1n4ry c0d3 defaced only one site on December 3, 2000. This defacement was the only one to refer to the WFD as the “World’s Fuck

  6. The degree of horizontal violence in RNs practicing in New York State.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sellers, Kathleen F; Millenbach, Linda; Ward, Kathy; Scribani, Melissa

    2012-10-01

    This study examined the degree of horizontal violence (HV) among RNs practicing in New York State (NYS). The objective was to determine the knowledge of HV and the degree of being a victim among practicing RNs. A descriptive survey using Briles' Sabotage Savvy Questionnaire, measuring occurrences of HV and nurses' knowledge of HV, was conducted among 2659 RNs in NYS hospitals. Findings demonstrate a significantly greater (P leadership, and individual interventions to address HV helps create a culture of safety.

  7. Additional improvements needed in physical security at nuclear powerplants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-01-01

    Since the middle 1970's, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and powerplant operators have taken measures to reduce the vulnerability of powerplants to attempted acts of sabotage. GAO's evaluation disclosed that further improvements can be made by screening nuclear plant employees to reduce the number of potential saboteurs and strengthening the physical security systems to ensure their compatibility with other plant safety systems. The Commission has taken two initiatives addressing these improvements. Therefore, GAO is not making recommendations at this time

  8. Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3. Annual operating report for 1976, volume 1: nonradiological environmental surveillance report; II: summary of operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    The non-radiological environmental surveillance program including thermal and chemical effluents, water quality, fish populations, benthos, fish impingement, gas-bubble disease, and plankton, fish larvae and fish egg entrainment is described. Information is also presented concerning operations, personnel radiation exposures, and fuel examinations

  9. Sabotaging the benefits of our own human capital: Work unit characteristics and sleep.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Barnes, Christopher M; Jiang, Kaifeng; Lepak, David P

    2016-02-01

    The strategic human capital literature indicates the importance of human capital to work unit performance. However, we argue that human capital only aids performance when it is translated into actions beneficial to the unit. We examine a set of common human capital leveraging characteristics (including the use of extended shifts, night shifts, shift flexibility, norms for work as a priority over sleep, and norms for constant connectivity) as factors that enhance the effect of human capital on human capital utilization. We also draw from the 2-process model of sleep regulation to examine how these characteristics undermine employee sleep, and thus weaken the link between human capital and work unit performance efficiency. Overall, we propose that human capital leveraging strategies initially enhance the effect of human capital on work unit performance, but over time weaken the effect of human capital on work unit performance efficiency. Thus, strategies intended to enhance the beneficial effect of human capital on work unit performance can end up doing the opposite. (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved).

  10. Early Safety Assessment of Automotive Systems Using Sabotage Simulation-Based Fault Injection Framework

    OpenAIRE

    Juez, Garazi; Amparan, Estíbaliz; Lattarulo, Ray; Ruíz, Alejandra; Perez, Joshue; Espinoza, Huascar

    2017-01-01

    As road vehicles increase their autonomy and the driver reduces his role in the control loop, novel challenges on dependability assessment arise. Model-based design combined with a simulation-based fault injection technique and a virtual vehicle poses as a promising solution for an early safety assessment of automotive systems. To start with, the design, where no safety was considered, is stimulated with a set of fault injection simulations (fault forecasting). By doing so, safety strategies ...

  11. Leadership Handbook for the Armor Officer. Volume 1. Thoughts on Leadership

    Science.gov (United States)

    1986-01-01

    34 Shakespeare "King Henry the VIII" (1612) 2-14 1 -4.. *4 * 4l& MISSION-TYPE ORDERS General Bruce C. Clarke, United States Army In Wbrld War II, those who... Hamlet IN ANY POSSIBLE nuclear war, as in past wars with conventional weapons, loss of sleep by soldiers--especially those in key staff and command...and sabotage. Several hamlets comprise Son My. These include Ta Cung, My 11hi, Co Lucy, and My Lai. These hamlets were assaulted by A/3-1 Infantry, B/4

  12. Sandia Laboratories plutonium protection system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bernard, E.A.; Miyoshi, D.S.; Gutierrez, F.D.

    1977-01-01

    Sandia Laboratories is developing an improved plutonium protection system (PPS) to demonstrate new concepts for enhancing special nuclear materials safeguards. PPS concepts include separation of functions, real-time item accountability and improved means for control of materials, activities and personnel access. Physical barriers and a secure communications network are designed into the system to offer greater protection against sabotage, diversion and theft attempts. Prototype systems are being constructed at Hanford, Washington and Albuquerque, New Mexico and will be subjected to a comprehensive testing and evaluation program

  13. International conference in Stockholm to address protection of nuclear material and radioactive sources from illicit trafficking

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    The Conference will look at approaches for enhancing security of material in general as well as protecting facilities against terrorism and sabotage. More specifically it will address measures for interception and response to illicit trafficking and discuss the practices and measures currently being used to minimize the possibilities of the unauthorized removal and movement of nuclear materials and critical equipment. It will also consider the importance of closer co-operation with law enforcement authorities and intelligence agencies and the necessity of applying new technologies to this effort

  14. Advanced physical protection systems for nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jones, O.E.

    1976-01-01

    Because of the increasing incidence of terrorism, there is growing concern that nuclear materials and facilities need improved physical protection against theft, diversion, or sabotage. Physical protection systems for facilities or transportation which have balanced effectiveness include information systems, access denial systems, adequate and timely response, recovery capability, and use denial methods for despoiling special nuclear materials (SNM). The role of these elements in reducing societal risk is described; however, it is noted that, similar to nuclear war, the absolute risks of nuclear theft and sabotage are basically unquantifiable. Sandia Laboratories has a major US Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) role in developing advanced physical protection systems for improving the security of both SNM and facilities. These activities are surveyed in this paper. A computer simulation model is being developed to assess the cost-effectiveness of alternative physical protection systems under various levels of threat. Improved physical protection equipment such as perimeter and interior alarms, secure portals, and fixed and remotely activated barriers is being developed and tested. In addition, complete prototype protection systems are being developed for representative nuclear facilities. An example is shown for a plutonium storage vault. The ERDA safe-secure transportation system for highway shipments of all significant quantities of government-owned SNM is described. Adversary simulation as a tool for testing and evaluating physical protection systems is discussed. Finally, a list of measures is given for assessing overall physical protection system performance. (author)

  15. Conflict between civil liberties and nuclear energy safeguards: an analysis of current and prospective Federal regulation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    O'Brien, J.N.

    1977-01-01

    The high regard that the U.S. has traditionally placed on individual rights and liberties makes it imperative that nuclear-safeguards measures currently in use or suggested by evaluated in terms of their social costs. A nuclear-safeguards strategy that minimizes civil-liberties impacts as a social cost and allows adequate protection against the threats of nuclear theft and sabotage in the rapidly developing nuclear energy industry must be arrived at. This study explores the possible civil-liberties impacts and the effectiveness of nuclear-safeguards measures which may be or are being used. Case law and statutory law are extensively analyzed to classify the type of civil-liberties impacts that particular nuclear-safeguards measures may impose. Literature addressing the effectiveness of safeguards measures is examined in various contexts often completely outside of the ''security'' disciplines. A comparison of both the civil liberties impact and effectiveness of each nuclear safeguards measure reveals a cost/benefit factor from which conclusions may be drawn. The real issue is whether or not a nuclear safeguards system will interfere with historic respect governmental institutions have given rights and liberties guaranteed in the U.S. It is concluded that physical access controls present only minor civil liberties costs while providing substantial protection against theft and sabotage. Recommendations are made in the form of suggested statutes, regulations, and regulatory guides. Certain inter-agency relationships and methods for establishing those relationships are also suggested

  16. Advanced physical protection systems for nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jones, O.E.

    1975-10-01

    Because of the increasing incidence of terrorism, there is growing concern that nuclear materials and facilities need improved physical protection against theft, diversion, or sabotage. Physical protection systems for facilities or transportation which have balanced effectiveness include information systems, access denial systems, adequate and timely response, recovery capability, and use denial methods for despoiling special nuclear materials (SNM). The role of these elements in reducing societal risk is described; however, it is noted that, similar to nuclear war, the absolute risks of nuclear theft and sabotage are basically unquantifiable. Sandia Laboratories has a major Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) role in developing advanced physical protection systems for improving the security of both SNM and facilities. These activities are surveyed. A computer simulation model is being developed to assess the cost-effectiveness of alternative physical protection systems under various levels of threat. Improved physical protection equipment such as perimeter and interior alarms, secure portals, and fixed and remotely-activated barriers is being developed and tested. In addition, complete prototype protection systems are being developed for representative nuclear facilities. An example is shown for a plutonium storage vault. The ERDA safe-secure transportation system for highway shipments of all significant quantities of government-owned SNM is described. Adversary simulation as a tool for testing and evaluating physical protection systems is discussed. A list of measures is given for assessing overall physical protection system performance. (auth)

  17. Increasing the effectiveness of the physical protection system on a nuclear facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vaz, Antonio C.A.; Conti, Thadeu N., E-mail: acavaz@ipen.br, E-mail: tnconti@ipen.br [Instituto de Pesquisas Energéticas e Nucleares (IPEN/CNEN-SP), São Paulo, SP (Brazil)

    2017-07-01

    The malicious use of radioactive material could be devastating, particularly in the case of a nuclear explosive device, it could be unpredictably disruptive resulting in the dispersal of radioactive material, like it was in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant disaster. Physical Protection System (PPS) plays an important role in ensuring that individuals, organizations and institutions remain vigilant and that sustained measures are taken to prevent and combat the threat of sabotage or of using radioactive material for malicious acts. PPS is an integrated system of people, equipment and procedures used to protect nuclear facilities and radioactive sources against threat, theft or sabotage. In the operator's perspective, this paper study factors influencing the performance of a PPS in a nuclear facility suggesting ways to increase the system effectiveness. The human factor, the physical and the psychological work environment has a large impact on how personnel perform their work and comply with nuclear security requirements. Apathy and corporatism are two human behaviors that collaborate negatively and make decrease the effectiveness of any PPS. Job satisfaction reduces the probability that personnel will become less reliable and/or obstructive in extreme cases an insider threat. Managers must recognize individual and group needs and the relationship among personnel so that they may motivate personnel by creating a supportive working environment that reduces workplace stress. An effective PPS can result in a significant increase in the effectiveness of the security of radioactive material and associated facilities. (author)

  18. Major Cyber threat on Nuclear Facility and Key Entry Points of Malicious Codes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Shin, Ickhyun; Kwon, Kookheui [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2013-05-15

    Cyber security incident explicitly shows that the domestic intra net system which is not connected to the Internet can be compromised by the USB based mal ware which was developed by the state-sponsored group. It also tells that the actor for cyber-attack has been changed from script kiddies to state's governments and the target has been changed to nation's main infrastructures such as electricity, transportation and etc. Since the cyber sabotage on nuclear facility has been proven to be possible and can be replicated again with same method, the cyber security on nuclear facility must be strengthened. In this paper, it is explained why the malicious code is the one of the biggest cyber threat in nuclear facility's digital I and C(Instrumentation and Controls) system by analyzing recent cyber attacks and well-known malicious codes. And a feasible cyber attack scenario on nuclear facility's digital I and C system is suggested along with some security measures for prevention of malicious code. As experienced from the cyber sabotage on Iranian nuclear facility in 2010, cyber attack on nuclear facility can be replicated by infecting the computer network with malicious codes. One of the cyber attack scenario on nuclear digital I and C computer network with using malicious code was suggested to help security manager establishing cyber security plan for prevention of malicious code. And some security measures on prevention of malicious code are also provided for reference.

  19. Major Cyber threat on Nuclear Facility and Key Entry Points of Malicious Codes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shin, Ickhyun; Kwon, Kookheui

    2013-01-01

    Cyber security incident explicitly shows that the domestic intra net system which is not connected to the Internet can be compromised by the USB based mal ware which was developed by the state-sponsored group. It also tells that the actor for cyber-attack has been changed from script kiddies to state's governments and the target has been changed to nation's main infrastructures such as electricity, transportation and etc. Since the cyber sabotage on nuclear facility has been proven to be possible and can be replicated again with same method, the cyber security on nuclear facility must be strengthened. In this paper, it is explained why the malicious code is the one of the biggest cyber threat in nuclear facility's digital I and C(Instrumentation and Controls) system by analyzing recent cyber attacks and well-known malicious codes. And a feasible cyber attack scenario on nuclear facility's digital I and C system is suggested along with some security measures for prevention of malicious code. As experienced from the cyber sabotage on Iranian nuclear facility in 2010, cyber attack on nuclear facility can be replicated by infecting the computer network with malicious codes. One of the cyber attack scenario on nuclear digital I and C computer network with using malicious code was suggested to help security manager establishing cyber security plan for prevention of malicious code. And some security measures on prevention of malicious code are also provided for reference

  20. Increasing the effectiveness of the physical protection system on a nuclear facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vaz, Antonio C.A.; Conti, Thadeu N.

    2017-01-01

    The malicious use of radioactive material could be devastating, particularly in the case of a nuclear explosive device, it could be unpredictably disruptive resulting in the dispersal of radioactive material, like it was in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant disaster. Physical Protection System (PPS) plays an important role in ensuring that individuals, organizations and institutions remain vigilant and that sustained measures are taken to prevent and combat the threat of sabotage or of using radioactive material for malicious acts. PPS is an integrated system of people, equipment and procedures used to protect nuclear facilities and radioactive sources against threat, theft or sabotage. In the operator's perspective, this paper study factors influencing the performance of a PPS in a nuclear facility suggesting ways to increase the system effectiveness. The human factor, the physical and the psychological work environment has a large impact on how personnel perform their work and comply with nuclear security requirements. Apathy and corporatism are two human behaviors that collaborate negatively and make decrease the effectiveness of any PPS. Job satisfaction reduces the probability that personnel will become less reliable and/or obstructive in extreme cases an insider threat. Managers must recognize individual and group needs and the relationship among personnel so that they may motivate personnel by creating a supportive working environment that reduces workplace stress. An effective PPS can result in a significant increase in the effectiveness of the security of radioactive material and associated facilities. (author)

  1. Safety, security and safeguard

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zakariya, Nasiru Imam; Kahn, M.T.E.

    2015-01-01

    Highlights: • The 3S interface in the design of PPS is hereby proposed. • The 3S synergy enhances the reduction in vulnerability and terrorism. • Highlighted were concept of detection, delay and response. - Abstract: A physical protection system (PPS) integrates people, procedures, and equipment for the protection of assets or facilities against theft, sabotage and terrorist attacks. Therefore, this paper proposes the use of a systematic and measurable approach to the design of PPS and its emphases on the concept of detection, delay and response. The proposed performance based PPS has the capability of defeating adversaries thereby achieving its targets. Therefore, timely detection of intrusion – based on the use of sensors, signal lines and alarm systems – is a major principle in the proposed system. Also the need for deterrence such as barriers in form of guards, access control, close circuit television (CCTV), strong policy and procedures, then the security culture amongst the facility workers was appropriately discussed. Since nuclear power is considered the only source that can provide large scale electricity with comparatively minimal impact on the environment, the paper also considered base guidelines for the application of PPS in any nuclear and radioactive facilities, followed with the necessity to incorporate inherent safety, security and safeguard (3S) synergy innovation in the physical protection system design and other characteristics that will enhance to reduce the vulnerability of nuclear facilities and materials to theft sabotage and terrorist attacks

  2. Criteria and application methodology of physical protection of nuclear materials within the national and regional boundaries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodriguez, C.E.; Cesario, R.H.; Giustina, D.H.; Canibano, J.

    1998-01-01

    Full text: The physical protection against robbery, diversion of nuclear materials and sabotage of nuclear installations by individuals or groups, has been for long time the reason of national and international concern. Even though, the obligation to create and implement an effective physical protection system for nuclear materials and installations in the territory of a given State, fall entirely on the State's Government, whether this obligation is fulfilled or not, and if it does, in what measure or up to what extent, it also concerns the rest of the States. Therefore, physical protection has become the reason for a regional co-operation. It is evident the need of co-operation in those cases where the physical protection efficiency within the territory of a given State depends also on the appropriate measures other States are taken, specially when dealing with materials been transported through national borders. The above mentioned constitute an important framework for the regional co-operation for the physical protection of nuclear materials. For that reason, the Nuclear Regulatory Authority established criteria and conditions aimed at mitigate diversions, robberies and sabotage to nuclear installations. As a working philosophy, it was established a simplify physical protection model of application in Argentina who, through the ARCAL No. 23 project, will be extrapolated to the whole Latin-American region, concluding that the application of the appropriated physical protection systems at regional level will lead to the strengthening of it at national level. (author) [es

  3. Establishing 'design basis threat' in Norway

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maerli, M.B.; Naadland, E.; Reistad, O.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: INFCIRC 225 (Rev. 4) assumes that a state's physical protection system should be based on the state's evaluation of the threat, and that this should be reflected in the relevant legislation. Other factors should also be considered, including the state's emergency response capabilities and the existing and relevant measures of the state's system of accounting for and control of nuclear material. A design basis threat developed from an evaluation by the state of the threat of unauthorized removal of nuclear material and of sabotage of nuclear material and nuclear facilities is an essential element of a state's system of physical protection. The state should continuously review the threat, and evaluate the implications of any changes in that threat for the required levels and the methods of physical protection. As part of a national design basis threat assessment, this paper evaluates the risk of nuclear or radiological terrorism and sabotage in Norway. Possible scenarios are presented and plausible consequences are discussed with a view to characterize the risks. The need for more stringent regulatory requirements will be discussed, together with the (positive) impact of improved systems and procedures of physical protection on nuclear emergency planning. Special emphasis is placed on discussing the design basis threat for different scenarios in order to systemize regulatory efforts to update the current legislation, requirement for operators' contingency planning, response efforts and the need for emergency exercises. (author)

  4. Vulnerability Analysis Considerations for the Transportation of Special Nuclear Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nicholson, Lary G.; Purvis, James W.

    1999-01-01

    The vulnerability analysis methodology developed for fixed nuclear material sites has proven to be extremely effective in assessing associated transportation issues. The basic methods and techniques used are directly applicable to conducting a transportation vulnerability analysis. The purpose of this paper is to illustrate that the same physical protection elements (detection, delay, and response) are present, although the response force plays a dominant role in preventing the theft or sabotage of material. Transportation systems are continuously exposed to the general public whereas the fixed site location by its very nature restricts general public access

  5. Insider safeguards effectiveness model (ISEM). User's guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boozer, D.D.; Engi, D.

    1977-11-01

    A comprehensive presentation of the ISEM computer program is provided. ISEM was designed to evaluate the effectiveness of a fixed-site facility safeguards system in coping with the theft, sabotage, or dispersal of radiological material by a single person who has authorized access to the facility. This insider may be aided by a group of insiders who covertly degrade sensor systems. Each ISEM run evaluates safeguards system performance for a particular scenario specified by the user. The dispatching of guards following alarms and their interaction with the insider are explicitly treated by the model

  6. Security culture: One for all, and all for one

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gaspar, Milos

    2016-01-01

    Preventing the theft of nuclear material and attacks and sabotage against nuclear installations is a challenge that governments, nuclear regulators and operators around the world are increasingly facing. “Terrorism is a real threat that exists around the world and also in Indonesia. And it can affect nuclear security,” said Khairul Khairul, a senior nuclear security officer at Indonesia’s National Nuclear Energy Agency (BATAN), which operates three research reactors. “We need to strengthen the notion of nuclear security in our entire workforce by developing a strong nuclear security culture.”

  7. Consequences of dispersal of a radioactive source

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chester, R.O.; Chester, C.V.

    1978-01-01

    The purpose of this study is to examine the question of whether the risk and consequences of theft or sabotage of facilities or vehicles containing small quantities of SNM, source, and by-product materials are such that licensees should be required to adopt further measures to safeguard them. In the course of the study an assessment will be made of the potential consequences of malevolent use of the referenced materials. To provide, these will be compared with the corresponding characteristics of non-nuclear materials such as chemical or biological agents

  8. Employees Misbehaviour: Formes, Causes and What Management Should do to Handle With

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Edit LUKÁCS

    2009-01-01

    Full Text Available In many organizations there are employees who sabotage processes, stealcompany property, harass others, cheat the management or mislead customers.These misbehaviours of the employees are pervasive and costly. In the sametime, they are warning that employees` needs are not met. Sometimes managersavoid to facing the unacceptable behaviours of the employee due to certainpsychological reasons. The approach of problem-employees is a challenge forthe managers. While most of them may be tempted to dismiss these employeesresearches have indicated that the best alternative is to learn how to behave withthat person.

  9. Nuclear power in the developing countries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Perera, J.

    1984-01-01

    The subject is covered in chapters, entitled: the general energy situation (including nuclear power); the nuclear fuel cycle; the history of nuclear power in the third world; economic considerations; environmental considerations (including general environmental effects of power generation; radiation; normal fuel cycle operation; nuclear waste management; accidents; sabotage; health and safety regulations); political considerations (nuclear weapons proliferation; technology transfer; energy independence and national prestige); the suppliers (mainly USA, France, West Germany, Canada, UK, USSR); Sub-Saharan Africa; the Arab World and Israel; Central Asia; South and East Asia; Latin America; conclusions. (U.K.)

  10. Directed polymers versus directed percolation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Halpin-Healy, Timothy

    1998-10-01

    Universality plays a central role within the rubric of modern statistical mechanics, wherein an insightful continuum formulation rises above irrelevant microscopic details, capturing essential scaling behaviors. Nevertheless, occasions do arise where the lattice or another discrete aspect can constitute a formidable legacy. Directed polymers in random media, along with its close sibling, directed percolation, provide an intriguing case in point. Indeed, the deep blood relation between these two models may have sabotaged past efforts to fully characterize the Kardar-Parisi-Zhang universality class, to which the directed polymer belongs.

  11. Light water reactor fuel reprocessing and recycling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-07-01

    This document was originally intended to provide the basis for an environmental impact statement to assist ERDA in making decisions with respect to possible LWR fuel reprocessing and recycling programs. Since the Administration has recently made a decision to indefinitely defer reprocessing, this environmental impact statement is no longer needed. Nevertheless, this document is issued as a report to assist the public in its consideration of nuclear power issues. The statement compares the various alternatives for the LWR fuel cycle. Costs and environmental effects are compared. Safeguards for plutonium from sabotage and theft are analyzed

  12. Technical aspects of nuclear nonproliferation: safeguards. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Energy Research and Production of the Committee on Science and Technology, US House of Representatives, Ninety-Seventh Congress, Second Session, August 3-4, 1982

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1982-01-01

    Ten witnesses from federal agencies, national laboratories, the nuclear industry, and the American Nuclear Society participated in a two-day hearing on research and development on domestic safeguards against theft and sabotage and international research and development on safeguards against the diversion of nuclear materials for weapons use. Speaking as individuals and in panels, the witnesses described the purpose and nature of current research programs and the coordination of these activities on the domestic and international levels to avoid duplication. Additional materials for the record follow the statements and responses of the witnesses

  13. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL). Pre-NRC trhough December 31, 1978

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-12-01

    Nine categories of events involving NRC licensed material or licensees are included. As additional information is obtained on an event, it will be incorporated in future editions. The list contains incidents as well as less significant events. The nine categories are: bomb-related (divided into two sections: (a) those events in which a bomb or explosive material was located or an explosion occurred at or in the vicinity of a licensed facility, (b) a complete chronological list), intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation-related, vandalism, arson, firearms-related, sabotage, and miscellaneous

  14. Safeguards and physical protection - The Belarus experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krevsun, E.

    1999-01-01

    Taking into account the new initiatives of the IAEA Belarus indented to continue activity on improving the Material Protection, Control and Accounting system in various directions. The significant ones are: electronic transmission of information to the IAEA, measurement standards of nuclear materials, upgraded Wiegard cards with photographs of their holders, preventive measures (threat, evaluation of safety for objects, sabotage from the staff etc.). The Belarus experience testifies that there is a unique way for increasing nuclear and radiation safety: cooperation and exchange of experience on a global scale

  15. Nuclear materials control and accountability criteria for upgrades measures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Erkkila, B.H.; Hatcher, C.R.

    1998-01-01

    As a result of major political and societal changes in the past several years, methods of nuclear material control may no longer be as effective as in the past in Russia, the Newly Independent States (NIS), and the Baltic States (BS). The objective of the Department of Energy (DOE) Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Program (MPC and A) is to reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation by collaborating with Russia, NIS, and BS governments to promote western-style MPC and A. This cooperation will improve the MPC and A on all weapons useable nuclear materials and will establish a sustainable infrastructure to provide future support and maintenance for these technology-based improvements. Nuclear materials of proliferation concern include materials of the types and quantities that can be most easily and directly used in a nuclear weapon. Sabotage of nuclear material is an event of great concern and potentially disastrous consequences to both the US and the host country. However, sabotage is currently beyond the scope of program direction and cannot be used to justify US-funded MPC and A upgrades. Judicious MPC and A upgrades designed to protect against insider and outsider theft scenarios would also provide addition, although not comprehensive, protection against saboteurs. This paper provides some suggestions to establish consistency in prioritizing system-enhancement efforts at nuclear material facilities. The suggestions in this paper are consistent with DOE policy and directions and should be used as a supplement to any policy directives issued by NN-40, DOE Russia/NIS Task Force

  16. Physical security in multinational nuclear-fuel-cycle operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Willrich, M.

    1977-01-01

    Whether or not multinationalization will reduce or increase risks of theft or sabotage will depend on the form and location of the enterprise, the precise nature of the physical security arrangements applied to the enterprise, and the future course of crime and terrorism in the nuclear age. If nuclear operations are multinationalized, the host government is likely to insist on physical security measures that are at least as stringent as those for a national or private enterprise subject to its jurisdiction. At the same time, the other participants will want to be sure the host government, as well as criminal groups, do not steal nuclear material from the facility. If designed to be reasonably effective, the physical security arrangements at a multinational nuclear enterprise seem likely to reduce the risk that any participating government will seek to divert material from the facility for use in a nuclear weapons program. Hence, multinationalization and physical security will both contribute to reducing the risks of nuclear weapons proliferation to additional governments. If economic considerations dominate the timing, scale and location of fuel-cycle facilities, the worldwide nuclear power industry is likely to develop along lines where the problems of physical security will be manageable. If, however, nuclear nationalism prevails, and numerous small-scale facilities become widely dispersed, the problem of security against theft and sabotage may prove to be unmanageable. It is ironic, although true, that in attempting to strengthen its security by pursuing self-sufficiency in nuclear power, a nation may be reducing its internal security against criminal terrorists

  17. Compatibility of safety and security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jalouneix, J.

    2013-01-01

    Nuclear safety means the achievement of proper operating conditions, prevention of accidents or mitigation of accident consequences, resulting in protection of workers, the public and the environment from undue radiation hazards while nuclear security means the prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material. Nuclear safety and nuclear security present large similarities in their aim as in their methods and are mutually complementary in the field of protection with regard to the risk of sabotage. However they show specific attributes in certain areas which leads to differences in their implementation. For instance security culture must integrate deterrence and confidentiality while safety culture implies transparency and open dialogue. Two important design principles apply identically for safety and security: the graded approach and the defense in depth. There are also strong similarities in operating provisions: -) a same need to check the availability of the equipment, -) a same need to treat the experience feedback, or -) a same need to update the basic rules. There are also strong similarities in emergency management, for instance the elaboration of emergency plans and the performance of periodic exercises. Activities related to safety of security of an installation must be managed by a quality management system. For all types of nuclear activities and facilities, a well shared safety culture and security culture is the guarantee of a safe and secure operation. The slides of the presentation have been added at the end of the paper

  18. Nuclear materials control and accountability criteria for upgrades measures

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Erkkila, B.H.; Hatcher, C.R.

    1998-11-01

    As a result of major political and societal changes in the past several years, methods of nuclear material control may no longer be as effective as in the past in Russia, the Newly Independent States (NIS), and the Baltic States (BS). The objective of the Department of Energy (DOE) Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Program (MPC and A) is to reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation by collaborating with Russia, NIS, and BS governments to promote western-style MPC and A. This cooperation will improve the MPC and A on all weapons useable nuclear materials and will establish a sustainable infrastructure to provide future support and maintenance for these technology-based improvements. Nuclear materials of proliferation concern include materials of the types and quantities that can be most easily and directly used in a nuclear weapon. Sabotage of nuclear material is an event of great concern and potentially disastrous consequences to both the US and the host country. However, sabotage is currently beyond the scope of program direction and cannot be used to justify US-funded MPC and A upgrades. Judicious MPC and A upgrades designed to protect against insider and outsider theft scenarios would also provide addition, although not comprehensive, protection against saboteurs. This paper provides some suggestions to establish consistency in prioritizing system-enhancement efforts at nuclear material facilities. The suggestions in this paper are consistent with DOE policy and directions and should be used as a supplement to any policy directives issued by NN-40, DOE Russia/NIS Task Force.

  19. Questions for the nuclear installations inspectorate

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Conroy, C.; Flood, M.; MacRory, R.; Patterson, W.C.

    1976-01-01

    The responsibilities of the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate are considered, and the responsibilities of other bodies for (a) reprocessing and enrichment, and (b) security. Questions for the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate are then set out under the following heads: general (on such topics as vandalism, sabotage, threats, security, reactor incidents); magnox reactors; corrosion; advanced gas-cooled reactor; steam generating heavy water reactor; fast breeder reactor; reproces-sing and waste. Most of the questions are concerned with technical problems that have been reported or might possibly arise during construction or operation, affecting the safety of the reactor or process. (U.K.)

  20. Safeguards summary event list (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Davidson, J.J.; MacMurdy, P.H.

    1980-12-01

    The List contains nine categories of events involving NRC licensed material or licensees. It is deliberately broad in scope for two main reasons. First, the list is designed to serve as a reference document. It is as complete and accurate as possible. Second, the list is intended to provide as broad a perspective of the nature of licensee-related events as possible. The nine categories of events are as follows: bomb-related events; intrusion events; missing and/or allegedly stolen events; transportation-related events; vandalism events; arson events; firearms-related events; sabotage events; and miscellaneous events

  1. Training organizational supervisors to detect and prevent cyber insider threats: two approaches

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Dee H. Andrews

    2013-05-01

    Full Text Available Cyber insider threat is intentional theft from, or sabotage of, a cyber system by someone within the organization. This article explores the use of advanced cognitive and instructional principles to accelerate learning in organizational supervisors to mitigate the cyber threat. It examines the potential advantage of using serious games to engage supervisors. It also posits two systematic instructional approaches for this training challenge – optimal path modelling and a competency-based approach. The paper concludes by discussing challenges of evaluating training for seldom occurring real world phenomena, like detecting a cyber-insider threat.

  2. Safeguards at NRC licensed facilities: Are we doing enough

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Asselstine, J.K.

    1986-01-01

    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is pursuing a number of initiatives in the safeguards area. The Commission is conducting a reassessment of its safeguards design basis threat statements to consider the possible implications of an explosive-laden vehicle for U.S. nuclear safeguards and to examine the comparability of safeguards features at NRC-licensed and DOE facilities. The Commission is also completing action on measures to protect against the sabotage threat from an insider at NRC-licensed facilities, and is examining the potential safety implications of safeguards measures. Finally, the NRC has developed measures to reduce the theft potential for high-enriched uranium

  3. Danish cadres in the Comintern

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Larsen, Chris Holmsted

    caught the attention of the Comintern. A further category consisted of scientists. One example was a case file on the physicist Niels Bohr, who also was part of the British team of physicists working on the Manhattan Project. As for the communists, we were positively surprised by the fact, that the files......, and halfway expected disappointment, was that the collected material did not include much information on the secret and illegal work of the Comintern, or more specifically the OMS. For example the prewar acts of bombing and sabotage, committed by the so called Wollweber Network, in Denmark, and Danish...

  4. Bahamianness as an Exclusive Good: Attempting to Change the Constitution, 2002

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Stephen B. Aranha

    2016-10-01

    This paper seeks to analyse the amendments proposed in 2002, which marked the first attempt at constitutional reform since Bahamian independence, as well as the process that ultimately led to defeat at the polls. The focus will be on the amendments addressing gender inequality. Questions include: how would the 2002 proposal have changed the levels of unequal access to citizenship compared to the 1973 Constitution, and how do they compare to the 2014 proposals? And, to what extent were there procedural flaws present in 2002, and to what extent did a distractionary discourse sabotage the declared goal of gender equality?

  5. Automated personal identification: a new technique for controlling access to nuclear materials and facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eccles, D.R.

    1975-01-01

    Special nuclear materials must be protected against the threat of diversion or theft, and nuclear facilities against the threat of industrial sabotage. Implicit in this protection is the means of controlling access to protected areas, material access areas, and vital areas. With the advent of automated personal identification technology, the processes of access control can be automated to yield both higher security and reduced costs. This paper first surveys the conventional methods of access control; next, automated personal identification concepts are presented and various systems approaches are highlighted; finally, Calspan's FINGERSCAN /sub TM/ system for identity verification is described

  6. Complementarities Between Nuclear Security, Safeguards and State System of Accounting for and Control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jalouneix, J.

    2010-01-01

    Nuclear security deals with prevention against theft and diversion of nuclear materials and sabotage against nuclear materials or installations. It is based on provisions of physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities complemented by: - Provisions for accounting for and control to prevent and, where appropriate, detect loss, theft or diversion of nuclear materials; - The nuclear safety provisions to protect nuclear materials and facilities against sabotage. Safeguards are based on the statements and accounting controls in the facilities. The respective aim of EURATOM and IAEA controls is to verify afterwards the respect for the declared use of materials or political commitments undertaken by States under the non-proliferation purpose. However, EURATOM and IAEA controls are not exercised at all facilities (including those working for defence purposes) or in respect of all nuclear materials subject to the French national control. In addition, these international safeguards do not deal with physical protection of nuclear materials which is the sole responsibility of the State. The state control, implemented in France, is positioned upstream to the international controls. It aims to prevent, deter and detect the loss, theft or diversion of nuclear materials in installations or during transport. It places the responsibility of a possible diversion at the operator level. It is made of different components that complement each other and form a coherent whole. This includes: - physical protection; - accounting for and control; - inspections. The physical protection system has to protect nuclear materials against a malicious act. Malicious act means a theft or diversion of nuclear material or an act of sabotage affecting nuclear materials or facilities which could lead to radiological releases into the environment. The accounting for and control system of nuclear materials has to allow the continuous and accurate knowledge of the quantity, quality and location

  7. Site environmental report for Calendar Year 1994 on radiological and nonradiological parameters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    Battelle Memorial Institute's nuclear research facilities are currently being maintained in a surveillance and maintenance (S ampersand M) mode with continual decontamination and decommissioning (D ampersand D) activities being conducted under Department of Energy (DOE) Contract W-7405-ENG-92. These activities are referred to under the Contract as the Battelle Columbus Laboratories Decommissioning Project (BCLDP). Operations referenced in this report are performed in support of S ampersand M and D ampersand D activities. Battelle's King Avenue facility is not considered in this report to the extent that the West Jefferson facility is. The source term at the King Avenue site is a small fraction of the source term at the West Jefferson site. Off site levels of radionuclides that could be attributed to the west Jefferson and King Avenue nuclear operations wereindistinguishable from background levels at specific locations where air, water, and direct radiation measurements were performed. Environmental monitoring continued to demonstrate compliance by Battelle with federal, state and local regulations. Routine, nonradiological activities performed include monitoring liquid effluents and monitoring the ground water system for the West Jefferson North site. Samples of various environmental media including air, water, grass, fish, field and garden crops, sediment and soil were collected from the region surrounding the two sites and analyzed

  8. World Health Organization on nuclear power

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1977-01-01

    A report published by the World Health Organization in cooperation with, and at the instigation of, the Belgian authorities, is summarised. The report was prepared by an international multidisciplinary working group, and concentrated on the somatic and genetic risks from ionising radiation, the environmental effects of nuclear power from the mining of uranium to the disposal of waste and the probability and consequences of accidents, sabotage and theft of nuclear materials. In general positive to nuclear power, the report nevertheless recommends for RESEARCH AND EVALUATION IN SEVERAL SECTORS: The duties of the authorities in providing full and open information on the consequences of the exploitation of nuclear power are emphasised. (JIW)

  9. Summary report on transportation of nuclear fuel materials in Japan : transportation infrastructure, threats identified in open literature, and physical protection regulations.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cochran, John Russell; Ouchi, Yuichiro (Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Japan); Furaus, James Phillip; Marincel, Michelle K.

    2008-03-01

    This report summarizes the results of three detailed studies of the physical protection systems for the protection of nuclear materials transport in Japan, with an emphasis on the transportation of mixed oxide fuel materials1. The Japanese infrastructure for transporting nuclear fuel materials is addressed in the first section. The second section of this report presents a summary of baseline data from the open literature on the threats of sabotage and theft during the transport of nuclear fuel materials in Japan. The third section summarizes a review of current International Atomic Energy Agency, Japanese and United States guidelines and regulations concerning the physical protection for the transportation of nuclear fuel materials.

  10. Fault tree analysis for vital area identification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Varnado, G.B.; Ortiz, N.R.

    1978-01-01

    This paper discusses the use of fault tree analysis to identify those areas of nuclear fuel cycle facilities which must be protected to prevent acts of sabotage that could lead to sifnificant release of radioactive material. By proper manipulation of the fault trees for a plant, an analyst can identify vital areas in a manner consistent with regulatory definitions. This paper discusses the general procedures used in the analysis of any nuclear facility. In addition, a structured, generic approach to the development of the fault trees for nuclear power reactors is presented along with selected results of the application of the generic approach to several plants

  11. Energy. Health, environment, and safety hazards. Final report from the Energy Commission. Energi. Haelso- miljoe- och saekerhetsrisker. Slutbetaenkande av energikommissionen

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1978-01-01

    The Swedish Energy Commission in its main report (''Energy'', SOU 1978:17) presented its considerations and put forward its proposals for a Swedish Energy policy for the next decade. This report contains complementary information on health hazards, risks of major accidents and sabotage, and problems of waste management. The presentation takes the form of a comparison of such risks in relation to different sources of energy. The Commission is not unanimous in its estimates of the relative hazards of different energysystems. The Commission recommends the initiation of a large number of studies concerning the possible ways the increase the safety and reduce the adverse effects of energy production.

  12. Physical protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Myre, W.C.; DeMontmollin, J.M.

    1989-01-01

    Serious concern about physical protection of nuclear facilities began around 1972. R and D was initiated at Sandia National Laboratories which had developed techniques to protect weapons for many years. Special vehicles, convoy procedures, and a communications system previously developed for weapons shipments were improved and extended for shipments of other sensitive materials. Barriers, perimeter alarms, portal and internal control systems were developed, tested, and published in handbooks and presented at symposia. Training programs were initiated for U.S. and foreign personnel. Containment and surveillance techniques were developed for the IAEA. Presently emphasis is on computer security, active barriers, and techniques to prevent theft or sabotage by ''insiders''

  13. Health

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Donckt, van der.

    1976-01-01

    The article is a critical review of the work group VI ''health'' in the ''sages report'', the criteria of total body dosis for radionuclides as strontium 90 and iodine 131 are discussed. It emphasizes the lack of adequate solution for the effluents as carbon-14, tritium and iodine 129 as well as for the high radioactivity waste management: the toxicity of plutonium and its cancerous properties are recalled. The risks of accidents in the nuclear facilities and their effect on the population in the proximity of the power plant and the contamination from cooling media are considered as well as sabotage risks. (A.F.)

  14. History of physical security R and D

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Myre, W.C.; De Montmollin, J.M.

    1987-01-01

    Serious concern about physical protection of nuclear facilities began around 1972. R and D was initiated at Sandia National Laboratory which had developed techniques to protect weapons for many years. Special vehicles, convoy procedures, and a communications system previously developed for weapons shipments were improved and extended for shipments of other sensitive materials. Barriers, perimeter alarms, portal and internal control systems were developed, tested, and published in handbooks and presented at symposia. Training programs were initiated for U.S. and foreign personnel. Containment and surveillance techniques were developed for the IAEA. Presently emphasis is on computer security, active barriers, and techniques to prevent theft or sabotage by ''insiders''

  15. Administration in an operating plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Staebler, K.

    1977-01-01

    The importance of strict administrative procedures in the daily work is being demonstrated by commenting on events that occured in the operation of German nuclear power plants. The procedure for working in an area of the plant (pressurized medium, high-radioactive level, explosive of flammable mediums), where special measures for safe working have to be taken, is discussed in detail. The administrative problems during refuelling time are further on mentioned, especially the problems connected with administering more than 1,000 people with respect to health protection and sabotage protection. Some general comments on the influences from external causes (authorities, courts, etc.) are given. (orig./ORU) [de

  16. H.R. 3532: This act may be cited as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999. Introduced in the House of Representatives, One Hundred Fifth Congress, Second Session, March 24, 1998

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    This bill authorizes appropriations for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for fiscal year 1999. It is divided into the following sections: Section 1. Short title; Section 102. Allocation of amounts authorized; Section 103. Retention of funds; Section 104. Transfer of certain funds; Section 105. Limitation; Section 106. License fee exemption; Section 107. NRC user fees and actual charges. Section 201. Office location; Section 202. Period of a combined license; Section 203. Gift acceptance authority; Section 204. Carrying of firearms by licensee employees; Section 205. Sabotage of production, utilization or waste storage facilities under construction; Section 206. Unauthorized introduction of dangerous weapons; and Section 207. Continuation of Commissioner service

  17. Establishing an Information Security System related to Physical Protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jang, Sung Soon; Yoo, Ho Sik

    2009-01-01

    A physical protection system (PPS) integrates people, procedures and equipment for the protection of assets or facilities against theft, sabotage or other malevolent attacks. In the physical protection field, it is important the maintain confidentiality of PPS related information, such as the alarm system layout, detailed maps of buildings, and guard schedules. In this abstract, we suggest establishing a methodology for an information security system. The first step in this methodology is to determine the information to protect and possible adversaries. Next, system designers should draw all possible paths to the information and arrange appropriate protection elements. Finally he/she should analyze and upgrade their information security system

  18. Dataset of anomalies and malicious acts in a cyber-physical subsystem.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Laso, Pedro Merino; Brosset, David; Puentes, John

    2017-10-01

    This article presents a dataset produced to investigate how data and information quality estimations enable to detect aNomalies and malicious acts in cyber-physical systems. Data were acquired making use of a cyber-physical subsystem consisting of liquid containers for fuel or water, along with its automated control and data acquisition infrastructure. Described data consist of temporal series representing five operational scenarios - Normal, aNomalies, breakdown, sabotages, and cyber-attacks - corresponding to 15 different real situations. The dataset is publicly available in the .zip file published with the article, to investigate and compare faulty operation detection and characterization methods for cyber-physical systems.

  19. Guns, guards, gates and geeks: Romania strengthens computer security at nuclear installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gil, Laura

    2016-01-01

    A cyberattack could swipe all the information stored on your computer or even prevent it from working. That’s bad enough. But a cyberattack on a nuclear power plant could lead to sabotage or theft of nuclear material. Computer security, concerned with the protection of digital data and the defence of systems and networks against malicious acts, is a critical component of nuclear security. “The advance of computers and their use in all aspects of nuclear operations has changed the security paradigm,” said Donald Dudenhoeffer, Information Technology Security Officer at the IAEA. “Information and computer security must be considered as components in the overall nuclear security plan.”

  20. Non-radiological factors and decision making on the radiological protection of the environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simcock, A.

    2002-01-01

    'Non-radiological factors' can cover both physical and non-physical issues. As far as physical issues are concerned, the appropriate course is not to forget that radioactive substances have to be considered in the same way as other substances in respect of their non-radioactive properties. 'Damage to amenities' and 'interference with legitimate uses of the sea' are long-standing descriptions of the non-physical aspects of marine pollution and degradation. A framework for a taxonomy of the interests involved in such aspects is suggested, using the three dimensions of the degree of linkage to the marine environment, the nature of the interaction with the marine environment, and the economic nature of the interest concerned. Questions of remoteness also arise. A multi-dimensional analysis of the risks to the interests concerned is suggested. The dimension of 'public response' is particularly significant for the non-physical aspects of marine pollution and degradation. This dimension is complex, being influenced by 'fright factors' and subject to media amplification. These influences can include special local economic circumstances and past experiences. Finally, the process for integrating physical and non-physical factors is examined. Early consideration is recommended of how to achieve a transparent presentation of the issues and the way in which decisions are to be taken. (author)

  1. Training programs for the systems approach to nuclear security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ellis, D.

    2005-01-01

    Full text: In support of United States Government (USG) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear security programs, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has advocated and practiced a risk-based, systematic approach to nuclear security. The risk equation has been developed and implemented as the basis for a performance-based methodology for the design and evaluation of physical protection systems against a design basis threat (DBT) for theft and sabotage of nuclear and/or radiological materials. Integrated systems must include technology, people, and the man-machine interface. A critical aspect of the human element is training on the systems-approach for all the stakeholders in nuclear security. Current training courses and workshops have been very beneficial but are still rather limited in scope. SNL has developed two primary international classes - the international training course on the physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials, and the design basis threat methodology workshop. SNL is also completing the development of three new courses that will be offered and presented in the near term. They are vital area identification methodology focused on nuclear power plants to aid in their protection against radiological sabotage, insider threat analysis methodology and protection schemes, and security foundations for competent authority and facility operator stakeholders who are not security professionals. In the long term, we envision a comprehensive nuclear security curriculum that spans policy and technology, regulators and operators, introductory and expert levels, classroom and laboratory/field, and local and offsite training options. This training curriculum will be developed in concert with a nuclear security series of guidance documents that is expected to be forthcoming from the IAEA. It is important to note that while appropriate implementation of systems based on such training and documentation can improve the risk reduction, such a

  2. Measures to prevent, intercept and respond to illicit uses of nuclear material and radioactive sources. Proceedings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    As nuclear programmes have evolved, the quantities of nuclear material in use or storage, and the number of facilities operating or shut down has increased. In particular, the dismantling of nuclear weapons has resulted in greatly increased stockpiles of weapons usable plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Concern over the security of these and related materials has been further raised by the continued occurrence of cases of illicit trafficking. The risks are theft, leading to trafficking and possible illicit use, and sabotage which could lead to the creation of radiological hazards. The challenge is threefold: prevention, detection and interception, and response. Prevention starts with effective national systems for accountancy, control and protection. Detection and interception involves effective measures to combat illicit trafficking, and response requires planning for the consequences of theft and sabotage. Responsibilities in these fields are national, but nuclear security also has a powerful international dimension. The consequences of failures in national measures reach beyond national boundaries. The effectiveness of national nuclear security can be enhanced through international measures: through agreed international norms, standards and guides, through training and advice, through information exchange and the sharing of experience, and through developing common understandings and perceptions. The Stockholm Conference contributed by focusing on the threats, including terrorist, to nuclear and other radioactive materials; on how to assess them and on how to develop the appropriate security measures. National measures to protect nuclear material and facilities and the continuing development of international standards and obligations were described. The conference discussed the patterns and trends in the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials and national and international measures to combat such trafficking. Finally, it considered

  3. Measures to prevent, intercept and respond to illicit uses of nuclear material and radioactive sources. Proceedings

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2002-08-01

    As nuclear programmes have evolved, the quantities of nuclear material in use or storage, and the number of facilities operating or shut down has increased. In particular, the dismantling of nuclear weapons has resulted in greatly increased stockpiles of weapons usable plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Concern over the security of these and related materials has been further raised by the continued occurrence of cases of illicit trafficking. The risks are theft, leading to trafficking and possible illicit use, and sabotage which could lead to the creation of radiological hazards. The challenge is threefold: prevention, detection and interception, and response. Prevention starts with effective national systems for accountancy, control and protection. Detection and interception involves effective measures to combat illicit trafficking, and response requires planning for the consequences of theft and sabotage. Responsibilities in these fields are national, but nuclear security also has a powerful international dimension. The consequences of failures in national measures reach beyond national boundaries. The effectiveness of national nuclear security can be enhanced through international measures: through agreed international norms, standards and guides, through training and advice, through information exchange and the sharing of experience, and through developing common understandings and perceptions. The Stockholm Conference contributed by focusing on the threats, including terrorist, to nuclear and other radioactive materials; on how to assess them and on how to develop the appropriate security measures. National measures to protect nuclear material and facilities and the continuing development of international standards and obligations were described. The conference discussed the patterns and trends in the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials and national and international measures to combat such trafficking. Finally, it considered

  4. Security-by-design handbook.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Snell, Mark Kamerer; Jaeger, Calvin Dell; Scharmer, Carol; Jordan, Sabina Erteza; Tanuma, Koji [Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Tokai-mura, Ibaraki, Japan; Ochiai, Kazuya [Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Tokai-mura, Ibaraki, Japan; Iida, Toru [Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Tokai-mura, Ibaraki, Japan

    2013-01-01

    This document is a draft SecuritybyDesign (SeBD) handbook produced to support the Work Plan of the Nuclear Security Summit to share best practices for nuclear security in new facility design. The Work Plan calls on States to %E2%80%9Cencourage nuclear operators and architect/engineering firms to take into account and incorporate, where appropriate, effective measures of physical protection and security culture into the planning, construction, and operation of civilian nuclear facilities and provide technical assistance, upon request, to other States in doing so.%E2%80%9D The materials for this document were generated primarily as part of a bilateral project to produce a SeBD handbook as a collaboration between the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) Nuclear Nonproliferation Science and Technology Center and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), which represented the US Department Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) under a Project Action Sheet PASPP04. Input was also derived based on tours of the Savannah River Site (SRS) and Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited (JNFL) Rokkasho Mixed Oxide Fuel fabrication facilities and associated project lessonslearned. For the purposes of the handbook, SeBD will be described as the systemlevel incorporation of the physical protection system (PPS) into a new nuclear power plant or nuclear facility resulting in a PPS design that minimizes the risk of malicious acts leading to nuclear material theft; nuclear material sabotage; and facility sabotage as much as possible through features inherent in (or intrinsic to) the design of the facility. A fourelement strategy is presented to achieve a robust, durable, and responsive security system.

  5. By Dynamite, Sabotage, Revolution, and the Pen: Violence in Caribbean Anarchist Fiction, 1890s-1920s

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Kirwin R. Shaffer

    2009-07-01

    Full Text Available From the 1890s to the 1920s, anarchist groups and movements emerged in Puerto Rico and Cuba. They promoted the traditional anarchist agenda against governments, militarism, capitalism, and organized religion. While research on anarchists has often focused on their activities in strikes, uprisings, educational experiments, and other counter-cultural activities, this article illustrates how Caribbean-based anarchists used their fiction to promote the anarchist agenda. A central theme in much of the fiction (plays, poetry, novels, and short stories revolved around violence leveled against society especially by governments. Just as interesting is how this fiction described—even praised—anarchist violence against authority. Thus, even while Caribbean anarchists only rarely resorted to physical violence, anarchist fiction often condemned authoritarian violence while celebrating the violence of revolution, the strike, bombings, and assassination to promote the anarchist cause of universal freedom.

  6. Understanding The Resistance to Health Information Systems

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    David Ackah

    2017-07-01

    Full Text Available User resistance is users’ opposition to system implementation. Resistance often occurs as a result of a mismatch between management goals and employee preferences. There are two types of resistance to health iformation system namely active resistance and passive resistance. The manifestation of active resistance are being critical,  blaming/accusing, blocking, fault finding, sabotaging, undermining, ridiculing, intimidating/threatening, starting rumors, appealing to fear, manipulating arguing, using facts selectively, distorting facts and  raising objections. The manifestation of passive resistance are agreeing verbally but not following through, failing to implement change, procrastinating/dragging feet, feigning ignorance, withholding information, suggestions, help or support, and standing by and allowing the change to fail.

  7. Game theoretic analysis of physical protection system design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Canion, B.; Schneider, E.; Bickel, E.; Hadlock, C.; Morton, D.

    2013-01-01

    The physical protection system (PPS) of a fictional small modular reactor (SMR) facility have been modeled as a platform for a game theoretic approach to security decision analysis. To demonstrate the game theoretic approach, a rational adversary with complete knowledge of the facility has been modeled attempting a sabotage attack. The adversary adjusts his decisions in response to investments made by the defender to enhance the security measures. This can lead to a conservative physical protection system design. Since defender upgrades were limited by a budget, cost benefit analysis may be conducted upon security upgrades. One approach to cost benefit analysis is the efficient frontier, which depicts the reduction in expected consequence per incremental increase in the security budget

  8. Fixed-site physical protection system modeling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chapman, L.D.

    1975-01-01

    An evaluation of a fixed-site safeguard security system must consider the interrelationships of barriers, alarms, on-site and off-site guards, and their effectiveness against a forcible adversary attack whose intention is to create an act of sabotage or theft. A computer model has been developed at Sandia Laboratories for the evaluation of alternative fixed-site security systems. Trade-offs involving on-site and off-site response forces and response times, perimeter alarm systems, barrier configurations, and varying levels of threat can be analyzed. The computer model provides a framework for performing inexpensive experiments on fixed-site security systems for testing alternative decisions, and for determining the relative cost effectiveness associated with these decision policies

  9. Safeguards at NRC licensed facilities: Are we doing enough

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Asselstine, J.K.

    1986-01-01

    Safeguards at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) facilities are discussed in this paper. The NRC is pursuing a number of initiatives in the safeguards area. The Commission is conducting a reassessment of its safeguards design basis threat statements to consider the possible implications of an explosive-laden vehicle for U.S. nuclear safeguards and to examine the comparability of safeguards features at NRC-licensed and DOE facilities. The Commission is also completing action on measures to protect against the sabotage threat from an insider at NRC-licensed facilities, and is examining the potential safety implications of safeguards measures. Finally, the NRC has developed measures to reduce the theft potential for high-enriched uranium

  10. Accomplishments and future suggestions of 2012 seoul nuclear security summit

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Jae San

    2012-01-01

    The second Seoul Nuclear Security Summit was held in Seoul, March 26∼27, 2012. It was a very big political event for nuclear security. National and International organization leaders had a time to discuss in depth issues about nuclear security; nuclear terrorism, illicit trafficking of nuclear /radiological materials, sabotages for nuclear facilities, etc. Why did many national leaders still take part in the second nuclear security summit compared to Washington summit and what is the importance of nuclear security? This paper will be the answer from those questions and handle the background, outcomes and future tasks of nuclear security summit. And suggestions for the next summits were considered in the conclusion part

  11. Leadership: social identity and guiding from within.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kerfoot, Karlene M

    2007-01-01

    An important field in leadership research is that of the social identity of the group and what that means for leadership. In health care, there are many different types of social identities that vary by hospital, geography, and profession. Leaders often sabotage their effectiveness when they do not consider the social values of the group. The work of leaders is to help move units and organizations to a higher level of performance. Identifying the social identity of the group is the first step. The most successful have expertise in assessing the social identity of groups and developing a commonality of a shared vision that represents the best work of the group and of the leader.

  12. Safeguards Strategy in Physical Protection System for Nuclear Installation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ade lndra B; Kasturi; Tatang Eryadi

    2004-01-01

    Safeguards strategy is directed at efforts of eliminating theft of nuclear materials and sabotage of nuclear installation. For achieving the above objective, it is necessary to set up safeguards strategy in physical protection of nuclear materials and installation. The safeguards strategy starts from anticipated security condition, list of thefts, planning referred to as safeguards planning. Safeguards planning are implemented in safeguards implementation, followed up then by evaluation. Results of evaluation are equipped with results of safeguards survey already developed. Safeguards' planning is made from these results and serve as guidelines for next safeguards implementation and is repeated to form a safeguard cycle. One safeguard cycle is made on a periodical basis, at least annually. (author)

  13. Treaties against nuclear terrorism. The global legal framework can make a difference

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, L.D.

    2002-01-01

    Two international treaties, one being drafted and the other already on the books, specifically address nuclear terrorism. The first Treaty known as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was adopted in 1980 under auspices of the IAEA. The second Treaty for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism is being drafted as part of the UN global campaign against terrorism. Both could require that specific measures be taken worldwide to protect and secure nuclear facilities from terrorist attack and sabotage. But neither one does. Efforts to include such requirements, before the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, have not borne fruit. Now, in the wake of lessons learned, is the time to revive and support them

  14. Accomplishments and future suggestions of 2012 seoul nuclear security summit

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Jae San [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2012-10-15

    The second Seoul Nuclear Security Summit was held in Seoul, March 26{approx}27, 2012. It was a very big political event for nuclear security. National and International organization leaders had a time to discuss in depth issues about nuclear security; nuclear terrorism, illicit trafficking of nuclear /radiological materials, sabotages for nuclear facilities, etc. Why did many national leaders still take part in the second nuclear security summit compared to Washington summit and what is the importance of nuclear security? This paper will be the answer from those questions and handle the background, outcomes and future tasks of nuclear security summit. And suggestions for the next summits were considered in the conclusion part.

  15. Nuclear power reactors: reactor safety and military and civil defence

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hvinden, T.

    1976-01-01

    The formation of fission products and plutonium in reactors is briefly described, followed by a short general discussion of reactor safety. The interaction of reactor safety and radioactive release considerations with military and civil defence is thereafter discussed. Reactors and other nuclear plants are factors which must be taken into account in the defence of the district around the site, and as potential targets of both conventional and guerilla attacks and sabotage, requiring special defence. The radiological hazards arising from serious damage to a power reactor by conventional weapons are briefly discussed, and the benefits of underground siting evaluated. Finally the author discusses the significance of the IAEA safeguards work as a preventive factor. (JIW)

  16. Nuclear safety shall face the challenge given by terrorism

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang Mengzhuo

    2003-01-01

    A nuclear power plant is a large economic department that has an important bearing on the national economy and the people's livelihood as well as the science and technology progress, and it can lead to grave radioactive pollution for environment after being destroyed, thus it must be an important objective that terrorism hatches a raid. To combat and forestall terrorism well are new requirements to nuclear safety raised by the international and national situation progress. On the bases of internal and external whole relations, the severe damage to NPPs and the theory of grave radioactive pollution to environment can be caused by sabotage are discussed, and then put forward the proposals about the graded protective measures. (author)

  17. SAPE Database Building for a Security System Test Bed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jo, Kwangho; Kim, Woojin

    2013-01-01

    Physical protection to prevent radiological sabotage and the unauthorized removal of nuclear material is one of the important activities. Physical protection system (PPS) of nuclear facilities needs the effectiveness analysis. This effectiveness analysis of PPS is evaluated by the probability of blocking the attack at the most vulnerable path. Systematic Analysis of Physical Protection Effectiveness (SAPE) is one of a computer code developed for the vulnerable path analysis. SAPE is able to analyze based on the data of the experimental results that can be obtained through the Test Bed. In order to utilize the SAPE code, we conducted some field tests on several sensors and acquired data. This paper aims at describing the way of DB (database) establishment

  18. A comprehensive inventory of radiological and nonradiological contaminants in waste buried or projected to be buried in the subsurface disposal area of the INEL RWMC during the years 1984-2003, Volume 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-05-01

    This is the second volume of this comprehensive report of the inventory of radiological and nonradiological contaminants in waste buried or projected to be buried in the subsurface disposal area of the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. Appendix B contains a complete printout of contaminant inventory and other information from the CIDRA Database and is presented in volumes 2 and 3 of the report

  19. Simulation of personnel control systems with the Insider Safeguards Effectiveness Model (ISEM)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boozer, D.D.; Engi, D.

    1977-04-01

    Nuclear safeguards systems are being designed to prevent theft or sabotage of radioactive material by persons employed in nuclear facilities. As incidents of terrorism have increased, the need for more advanced safeguards systems has been recognized. Dynamic simulation models have been found useful in determining relative safeguards system effectiveness. A simulation model which treats certain aspects of the insider problem is the Insider Safeguards Effectiveness Model (ISEM). This report describes the model, discusses its role in analysis and design of safeguards systems, and explains the use of the model in conjunction with other models used for safeguards system design. Effectiveness results and sensitivities to safeguard system parameter variations are reported, and a comprehensive example of ISEM use for a hypothetical facility is given

  20. Licensee safeguards contingency plans

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1978-01-01

    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is amending its regulations to require that licensees authorized to operate a nuclear reactor (other than certain research and test reactors), and those authorized to possess strategic quantities of plutonium, uranium-233, or uranium-235 develop and implement acceptable plans for responding to threats, thefts, and industrial sabotage of licensed nuclear materials and facilities. The plans will provide a structured, orderly, and timely response to safeguards contingencies and will be an important segment of NRC's contingency planning programs. Licensee safeguards contingency plans will result in organizing licensee's safeguards resources in such a way that, in the unlikely event of a safeguards contingency, the responding participants will be identified, their several responsibilities specified, and their responses coordinated

  1. Groundwater issues relating to an Alaskan methanol spill

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Robertson, S.B.

    1992-01-01

    This paper reports on a Dec. 1989 methanol spill which resulted from sabotage to three railroad tank cars. Samples taken from nearby drinking-water wells and groundwater-monitoring wells were below the analytical detection limit. Monitoring well data demonstrated that groundwater flow was not toward local residential wells. Dilution by snow and subsequent freezing in the soil limited the downward spread of the methanol, an advantage not found in milder, more temperate conditions. Contaminated material was removed and processed to reclaim the methanol. Volatilization and biodegradation should remove any remaining methanol. Cleanup options were limited by the possible hazardous waste classification of the contaminated soil. The regulatory status of spilled methanol waste should be re-evaluated, especially if use of methanol as a motor fuel increases

  2. IAEA to hold special session on nuclear terrorism

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    Experts from around the world are meeting at the IAEA this week for an international symposium on nuclear safeguards, verification, and security. A special session on 2 November focuses on the issue of combating nuclear terrorism. The Special Session, which will bring together experts on nuclear terrorism from around the world, will deal with the following issues: The Psychology of terrorism; Intelligence, police and border protection; Guarding nuclear reactors and material from terrorists and thieves; The threat of nuclear terrorism: Nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; The threat of nuclear terrorism: Intentional dispersal of radioactive material - Sabotage of fixed installations or transport systems; The Legal Framework: Treaties and Conventions, Laws; Regulations and Codes of Practice; IAEA Nuclear Security and Safety Programmes

  3. Simulation of personnel control systems with the Insider Safeguards Effectiveness Model (ISEM)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Boozer, D.D.; Engi, D.

    1977-04-01

    Nuclear safeguards systems are being designed to prevent theft or sabotage of radioactive material by persons employed in nuclear facilities. As incidents of terrorism have increased, the need for more advanced safeguards systems has been recognized. Dynamic simulation models have been found useful in determining relative safeguards system effectiveness. A simulation model which treats certain aspects of the insider problem is the Insider Safeguards Effectiveness Model (ISEM). This report describes the model, discusses its role in analysis and design of safeguards systems, and explains the use of the model in conjunction with other models used for safeguards system design. Effectiveness results and sensitivities to safeguard system parameter variations are reported, and a comprehensive example of ISEM use for a hypothetical facility is given.

  4. Good is not good enough: the culture of low expectations and the leader's challenge.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kerfoot, Karlene M

    2010-01-01

    There are many examples of health care organizations that have morphed from the culture of low expectation to the culture of excellence. Ethically, to not drive to excellence means that we are settling from knowingly allowing harm to happen on our watch. The leader's obligation is to create that sonic boom that Black and Gregersen (2008) describe to break up the old mind maps, to create the movement, and to finish the cultural change in spite of change fatigue and other factors that could sabotage the process. Only then can the effective leader sleep well at night knowing that the infrastructure is being created that will provide a culture of excellence and safety for patients and their families. And it is being created on his/her watch.

  5. Nuclear power: Siting and safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Openshaw, S.

    1986-01-01

    By 2030, half, or even two-thirds, of all electricity may be generated by nuclear power. Major reactor accidents are still expected to be rare occurrences, but nuclear safety is largely a matter of faith. Terrorist attacks, sabotage, and human error could cause a significant accident. Reactor siting can offer an additional, design-independent margin of safety. Remote geographical sites for new plants would minimize health risks, protect the industry from negative changes in public opinion concerning nuclear energy, and improve long-term public acceptance of nuclear power. U.K. siting practices usually do not consider the contribution to safety that could be obtained from remote sites. This book discusses the present trends of siting policies of nuclear power and their design-independent margin of safety

  6. Destruction of nuclear energy facilities in war: the problem and the implications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ramberg, B.

    1980-01-01

    This book examines current practices, policies, and regulations concerning nuclear energy in the light of potential sabotage. Dr. Ramberg explains clearly, for both the lay reader and the technical community, the vulnerabilities of different sorts of nuclear facilities. In a case-by-case analysis of countries using or building nuclear power plants, he outlines the strategic hazards of these facilities. The safety of thousands could depend on such volatile factors as the psychological sensitivity of national leaders and the direction of the wind. A combination of engineering changes, use of alternative forms of energy to limit nuclear proliferation, and changes in international law could lessen these risks. Finally, Dr. Ramberg suggests specific national and international guidelines for monitoring nuclear exports

  7. The physical protection of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-12-01

    A Technical Committee on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material met in April-May 1989 to advise on the need to update the recommendations contained in document INFCIRC/225/Rev.1 and on any changes considered to be necessary. The Technical Committee indicated a number of such changes, reflecting mainly: the international consensus established in respect of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; the experience gained since 1977; and a wish to give equal treatment to protection against the theft of nuclear material and protection against the sabotage of nuclear facilities. The recommendations presented in this IAEA document reflect a broad consensus among Member States on the requirements which should be met by systems for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. 1 tab

  8. Implementing an Information Security Program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Glantz, Clifford S.; Lenaeus, Joseph D.; Landine, Guy P.; O' Neil, Lori Ross; Leitch, Rosalyn; Johnson, Christopher; Lewis, John G.; Rodger, Robert M.

    2017-11-01

    The threats to information security have dramatically increased with the proliferation of information systems and the internet. Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives (CBRNe) facilities need to address these threats in order to protect themselves from the loss of intellectual property, theft of valuable or hazardous materials, and sabotage. Project 19 of the European Union CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative is designed to help CBRN security managers, information technology/cybersecurity managers, and other decision-makers deal with these threats through the application of cost-effective information security programs. Project 19 has developed three guidance documents that are publically available to cover information security best practices, planning for an information security management system, and implementing security controls for information security.

  9. Approach for Establishing a National Nuclear Forensics System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Jaekwang; Hyung, Sangcheol

    2014-01-01

    The increasing number could give rise to posing a potential threat to national infrastructure which is very vulnerable to radiological sabotage with the materials. International community has been emphasizing the importance of nuclear forensics through the Nuclear Security Summit process as a countermeasure against nuclear terrorism. Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism(GICNT) and nuclear forensics International Technology Working Group(ITWG) suggest the establishment of national nuclear forensics system which has a law enforcement for forensic management and maintenance of nuclear forensics database including nuclear material and other radioactive materials. We suggest the legal and institutional system through this paper in an effort to set up a multi expert group and the nuclear forensics DB which can contribute to effective Core capabilities

  10. Approach for Establishing a National Nuclear Forensics System

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Jaekwang; Hyung, Sangcheol [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-05-15

    The increasing number could give rise to posing a potential threat to national infrastructure which is very vulnerable to radiological sabotage with the materials. International community has been emphasizing the importance of nuclear forensics through the Nuclear Security Summit process as a countermeasure against nuclear terrorism. Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism(GICNT) and nuclear forensics International Technology Working Group(ITWG) suggest the establishment of national nuclear forensics system which has a law enforcement for forensic management and maintenance of nuclear forensics database including nuclear material and other radioactive materials. We suggest the legal and institutional system through this paper in an effort to set up a multi expert group and the nuclear forensics DB which can contribute to effective Core capabilities.

  11. Intermediate storage facility for vitrified high level waste from the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-04-01

    An intermediate storage facility for vitrified high level waste is described. The design was made specifically for Swedish conditions but can due to modular design be applied also for other conditions. Most of the plant is located underground with a rock cover of about 30 m in order to provide protection against external forces such as acts of war and sabotage. The storage area consists of four caverns each with 150 pits. Each pit can take 10 waste cylinders of 0.4 m diameter and 1.5 m length containing 150 liters of glass. The capacity can be increased by adding additional caverns. Cooling is obtained by forced air convection. Reception areas, auxiliary systems and operation of the plant are also described

  12. Reprocessing decision: a study in policymaking under uncertainty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heising, C.D.

    1978-01-01

    The U.S. reprocessing decision is examined in this thesis. Decision analysis is applied to develop a rational framework for the assessment of policy alternatives. Benefits and costs for each alternative are evaluated and compared in dollar terms to determine the optimal decision. A fuel cycle simulation model is constructed to assess the economic value of reprocessing light water reactor (LWR) spent fuel and recycling plutonium. In addition, a dynamic fuel substitution model is used to estimate the economic effects of the reprocessing decision's influence on the introduction date of the liquid metal fast breeder reactor (LMFBR). Risks estimated in dollar terms for comparison with the economic values include those related to health, the environment and safety, nuclear theft and sabotage, and nuclear proliferation

  13. Risk perception among nuclear power plant employees

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fields, C.D.

    1989-01-01

    Radiation protection training and general employee training within the nuclear industry are designed to reduce workers' concerns about radiation and to develop skills that will protect against unwarranted exposures. Inaccurate perceptions about radiation by workers can cause a lack of adequate concern or exaggerated fears, which in turn can result in unnecessary radiation exposure to the worker or co-workers. The purpose of the study is threefold: (a) to identify health and safety concerns among nuclear power plant employees, (b) to discover variables that influence the perception of risk among employees, and (c) to ascertain if attitudes of the family, community, and the media affect workers' perception of risk. Workers identified five areas of concern: shift work, radiation, industrial safety, stress, and sabotage

  14. Torness. Keep it green

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Flood, M.

    1979-01-01

    The subject is discussed under the following headings: Torness foolishness (concerning the steps being taken towards constructing a nuclear power station at Torness Point in East Lothian, Scotland); the case against Torness (a summary); is Torness necessary (discusses the present, planned and forecast positions of electricity supply and demand in Scotland); how much will Torness cost, and who will pay; the local impact of Torness (on employment, infrastructure, amenity and future prospects); how reliable is the Advanced Gas Cooled Reactor (the choice of the AGR type reactor and discussions on the 'Hinkley Point incident' and the 'Hunterston incident'); how safe is nuclear power (discussion on AGR programme, nuclear accidents, sabotage, war, nuclear waste, plutonium, secrecy and security); public opposition to Torness; what can be done. (U.K.)

  15. The Framing of Network Neutrality Governance

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Perry, James

    The neutrality of the internet with regard to applications (e.g. search, social networking, email, to mention only three) has been central to innovation and growth in the knowledge-economy over the past two decades. Until recently, neutrality was built into the internet's design via its core stan...... with a critical analysis of their respective operational paradigms, the paper seeks to understand who is framing the debate, how they are doing so, and to what (systemic) effect....... generative: Useful innovations in applications of the internet could take hold easily, and it was difficult – or indeed impossible - for incumbent business interests to disrupt or sabotage them. However, this neutrality is now under threat. New technologies have given incumbent businesses the ability...

  16. Mitigating Insider Sabotage and Espionage: A Review of the United States Air Force’s Current Posture

    Science.gov (United States)

    2009-03-01

    of proxy services and demilitarized zones to protect the information resources while allowing remote access for telework . In addition, the...Insider Computer Misuse Incidents. EICAR 2000 Best Paper Proceedings (pp. 105-125). Aalborg, Denmark : EICAR. Under Secretary for Management. (2006

  17. Non-radiological consequences to the aquatic biota and fisheries of the Susquehanna River from the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island Nuclear Station

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hickey, C.R. Jr.; Samworth, R.B.

    1979-11-01

    The non-radiological consequences to the aquatic biota and fishes of the Susquehanna River from the March 28, 1979 accident at Three Mile Island Nuclear Station were assessed through the post-accident period of July 1979. Thermal and chemical discharges during the period did not exceed required effluent limitations. Several million gallons of treated industrial waste effluents were released into the river which were not of unusual volumes compared with normal operation and were a very small proportion of the seasonally high river flows. The extent and relative location of the effluent plume were defined and the fisheries known to have been under its immediate influence were identified, including rough, forage, and predator/sport fishery species

  18. A CcP model of the stock market

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Shimshon Bichler

    2017-05-01

    Full Text Available Most explanations of stock market booms and busts are based on contrasting the underlying ‘fundamental’ logic of the economy with the exogenous, non-economic factors that presumably distort it. Our paper offers a radically different model, examining the stock market not from the mechanical viewpoint of a distorted economy, but from the dialectical perspective of capitalized power. The model demonstrates that (1 the valuation of equities represents capitalized power; (2 capitalized power is dialectically intertwined with systemic fear; and (3 systemic fear and capitalized power are mediated through strategic sabotage. This triangular model, we posit, can offer a basis for examining the asymptotes, or limits, of capitalized power and the ways in which these asymptotes relate to the historical and ongoing transformation of the capitalist mode of power.

  19. Goal system for comparative assessments of nuclear fuel transport under security aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Behrendt, V.; Schwieren, G.

    1983-01-01

    Due to the great hazard potential of nuclear fuel transports the possibility always exists during transportation that either a single perpetrator or a group of perpetrators will try to get possession of the nuclear fuel. One can assume that at the end of such illegal actions there will be a politically (or otherwise) motivated extortion. Thinking about security one has to face things like sabotage, attacks from inside or outside the system, robbery and/or dispersion of the transported goods. In respect to the security of nuclear transports we carried out an investigation for the German Ministry of the Interior in order to review the different levels of security of different transport systems. This paper deals with the methodological approach, especially with the goal system and the way we executed the investigation

  20. [Cigarette smuggling: a wide scope phenomenon only there to serve the interests of big tobacco manufacturers].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gauvin, Louis

    2005-01-01

    "Cigarette smuggling: a wide scope phenomenon only there to serve the interests of big tobacco manuafacturers" uses industry officials' quotes and documents to describe how tobacco manufacturers are involved in the organisation of smuggling and how manufacturers use smuggling in two ways: on one hand, to flood markets with cheap cigarettes and defeat governements' efforts to reduce tobacco consumption by adopting one of the most efficient public health measures (ie: high taxation of tobacco products) and on the other hand, by using the false threat of increased contraband to scare politicians and prevent them from adopting strong fiscal policies. The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) with a protocol on smuggling and the collaboration between international agencies is a means to counter and defeat the tobacco industry attemps at sabotaging efficient public health measures.

  1. Modified risk evaluation method

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Udell, C.J.; Tilden, J.A.; Toyooka, R.T.

    1993-08-01

    The purpose of this paper is to provide a structured and cost-oriented process to determine risks associated with nuclear material and other security interests. Financial loss is a continuing concern for US Department of Energy contractors. In this paper risk is equated with uncertainty of cost impacts to material assets or human resources. The concept provides a method for assessing the effectiveness of an integrated protection system, which includes operations, safety, emergency preparedness, and safeguards and security. The concept is suitable for application to sabotage evaluations. The protection of assets is based on risk associated with cost impacts to assets and the potential for undesirable events. This will allow managers to establish protection priorities in terms of the cost and the potential for the event, given the current level of protection

  2. Resource Geopolitics: Cold War Technologies, Global Fertilizers, and the Fate of Western Sahara.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Camprubí, Lino

    2015-07-01

    When, after years of geological and geophysical exploration, a phosphate mine was discovered at Bu-Craa in 1964, Western Sahara received renewed geopolitical attention. Several countries competing for the control of the world fertilizer market, including Morocco, Spain, France, and the United States, developed diverging strategies to gain control of the mineral. After intense negotiations revolving around the materiality of mining technologies and involving reserve estimations, sabotage, and flexing of diplomatic muscles, Morocco took over the Spanish colony in 1975. While this secured Morocco's place in the world market, it condemned the local population to exile and domination. This article explores three technological stages of the exploitation of phosphate in Western Sahara that underpin the geopolitical history. This perspective yields new visions of cold war technology and postcolonial markets.

  3. Advanced physical protection systems for facilities and transportation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jones, O.E.

    1976-01-01

    Sandia Laboratories is developing advanced physical protection safeguards in order to improve the security of special nuclear materials, facilities, and transportation. Computer models are being used to assess the cost-effectiveness of alternative systems for protecting facilities against external attack which may include internal assistance, and against internal theft or sabotage. Physical protection elements such as admittance controls, portals and detectors, perimeter and interior intrusion alarms, fixed and remotely activated barriers, and secure communications are being evaluated, adapted, and where required, developed. New facilities safeguards concepts which involve ''control loops'' between physical protection and materials control elements are being evolved jointly between Sandia Laboratories and Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. Special vehicles and digital communications equipment have been developed for the ERDA safe-secure transportation system. The current status and direction of these activities are surveyed

  4. Reactor safeguards system assessment and design. Volume I

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Varnado, G.B.; Ericson, D.M. Jr.; Daniel, S.L.; Bennett, H.A.; Hulme, B.L.

    1978-06-01

    This report describes the development and application of a methodology for evaluating the effectiveness of nuclear power reactor safeguards systems. Analytic techniques are used to identify the sabotage acts which could lead to release of radioactive material from a nuclear power plant, to determine the areas of a plant which must be protected to assure that significant release does not occur, to model the physical plant layout, and to evaluate the effectiveness of various safeguards systems. The methodology was used to identify those aspects of reactor safeguards systems which have the greatest effect on overall system performance and which, therefore, should be emphasized in the licensing process. With further refinements, the methodology can be used by the licensing reviewer to aid in assessing proposed or existing safeguards systems

  5. La participación docente en la toma de decisiones desde la visión micropolítica

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Gustavo Obando Castillo

    2008-06-01

    Full Text Available The teacher is the one who experiences close by the problematic of the schoolsystem, the one who makes decisions, modifies or sabotages the school plans, theone who transmits the vision of the school or makes it difficult, among othersaspects; all which reveal the teacher as the key for maintaining alive the educativeorganizations. For this reason, it is important that the teacher participates in theschools with consciousness taking part of the decision making process.However, in a micropolitical context, the participation can occur in a complexway and not always be open to discussion, making use of a variety of strategies(like alliances, rumors and comments so that the different groups and individualsreach their interests, those that are not necessarily aligned with the school ones orother groups’ interests.

  6. Advanced physical protection systems for facilities and transportation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jones, O.E.

    1976-01-01

    Sandia Laboratories is developing advanced physical protection safeguards in order to improve the security of special nuclear materials, facilities, and transportation. Computer models are being used to assess the cost-effectiveness of alternative systems for protecting facilities against external attack which may include internal assistance, and against internal theft or sabotage. Physical protection elements such as admittance controls, portals and detectors, perimeter and interior intrusion alarms, fixed and remotely-activated barriers, and secure communications are being evaluated, adapted, and where required, developed. New facilities safeguards concepts which involve (control loops) between physical protection and materials control elements are being evolved jointly between Sandia Laboratories and Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. Special vehicles and digital communications equipment have been developed for the ERDA safe-secure transportation system. The current status and direction of these activities are surveyed

  7. High security container

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moreau, P.J.-M.; Monsterleet, G.A.

    1979-01-01

    This invention concerns containments, vessels or tanks for containing and protecting products or installations of various kinds, to be called by the general denomination 'containers'. Such products can be, inter alia, liquids such as natural gas, ammonia, vinyle chloride and hydrocarbons. Far from just forming simple means of storage, the containers used for this must now be capable of withstanding fire, sabotage for instance rocket fire, even impacts from aircraft, earthquakes and other aggressions of the same kind. The particular object of this invention is to create a container withstanding all these various agressions. It must also be considered that this container can not only be used for storing products or materials but also for enclosing particularly dangerous or delicate installations, such as nuclear or chemical reactors [fr

  8. Physical Protection of Nuclear Safeguards Technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hoskins, Richard

    2004-01-01

    IAEA's Nuclear Security Plan is established to assist Member States in implementing effective measures against nuclear terrorism. Four potential threats were identified: theft of nuclear weapon, nuclear explosive device, radiological dispersal device and an attack on radiation facility. In order to achieve effective protection of nuclear materials and facilities, the IAEA sponsored the Convention of the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials which focuses on the protection of nuclear materials 'in international transport. The IAEA also promoted INFCIRC/255 entitled the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities and published TECDOC/967 for the protection of nuclear materials and facilities against theft and sabotage and during transport. Assistance is available for the Member States through the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) and the International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ). (author)

  9. Physical protection of nuclear installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Toepfer, K.

    1989-01-01

    This contribution investigates the possible danger and the legal basis of physical protection and explains the current, integrated system provided for, as well as the underlying possible scenarios of an assault: (1) by a violent crowd of aggressors outside the installation, (2) by a small group of aggressors outside the installation, (3) by a person allowed to enter (internal assault). The physical protection system supplements the internal safety measures to enhance protection against hypothetical and possible acts of terrorism or other criminal assault. The system covers external and internal controlled areas, access monitoring, physical protection control room and service, security checks of the personnel, and activities to disclose sabotage. Some reflections on the problem field between security controls and the constitutional state conclude this contribution. (orig./HSCH) [de

  10. A study on surveillance equipment at the exit/entry control point of nuclear facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, C. S.; Kim, D. Y.; Cha, H. L.; Kim, H. D.; Hong, J. S.

    1999-01-01

    Exit/Entry control is an essential measure at both entrances of the protected area and vital area of nuclear facility at which physical protection is required under the relevant laws and regulations. Especially, when there are heavy traffics of personnel and process equipment in those areas, automated surveillance devices have to be introduced to timely and efficiently screen out internal and external adversaries from achieving their goals of stealing of nuclear material and/or sabotage of the facility. The major portion of this study involves with integration and processing of signals from radiation detector, metal detector, and image monitor. This integrated device together with positive personal identification device which will be reinforced in near future would contribute to the establishment of total exit/entry control point of nuclear facility

  11. Safety and environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cogne, F.

    1975-01-01

    The author analyses the papers presented by C. Starr and M. Muntzing at the Paris Conference on the maturity of nuclear energy. The main problems raised in the matter of safety (safety of the plants, plutonium toxicity, the possibilities of theft or sabotage, treatment and storage of the waste) are analyzed and it is pointed out that the hazards arising from the use of nuclear power are contained within reasonable limits. The experts should take the initiative of informing the general public on these matters as the mass media circulate too much inaccurate information in this field. As concerns the environment, it is the choice of sites and the harmonizing of the rules and procedures which appear to be the most important problems for the authorities charged with safety measures [fr

  12. Protection of nuclear power plants against external disasters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cottrell, W.B.

    1975-04-01

    A bibliography and a compilation of articles on the protection of nuclear power plants from external disasters are presented. The subject matter includes tornadoes and high winds, floods and high waves, earthquakes, plane crashes, sabotage and diversion, acts of war, and other disasters. The articles included in this compilation are primarily review articles on various topics selected from Nuclear Safety. Relevant AEC regulations, rulings, and regulatory guides are also included where appropriate. The bibliography with each section includes all recent literature on each topic, each with its own key-word, author, and permured title index. In addition, a brief commentary serves as an introduction to the report as well as to place its varied contents in perspective. An overall index to all textural material is also provided. (U.S.)

  13. Safeguards Automated Facility Evaluation (SAFE) methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chapman, L.D.; Grady, L.M.; Bennett, H.A.; Sasser, D.W.; Engi, D.

    1978-01-01

    The SAFE procedure is an efficient method of evaluating the physical protection system of a nuclear facility. Since the algorithms used in SAFE for path generation and evaluation are analytical, many paths can be evaluated with a modest investment in computer time. SAFE is easy to use because the information required is well-defined and the interactive nature of this procedure lends itself to straightforward operation. The modular approach that has been taken allows other functionally equivalent modules to be substituted as they become available. The SAFE procedure has broad applications in the nuclear facility safeguards field as well as in the security field in general. Any fixed facility containing valuable materials or components to be protected from theft or sabotage could be analyzed using this same automated evaluation technique

  14. From Napoleon Conquests to the Big Brother Sabotage : Harmonization of the Dutch Historical Censuses in the Semantic Web

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Meroño-Peñuela, Albert; Ashkpour, Ashkan

    2014-01-01

    Around the turn of the 18th century, the first integral pop- ulation enumeration was held in the Netherlands during the Batavian Republic. It took over 30 years before the first official census was, by royal decree, organized and conducted in 1829, and was meant to be held from then onwards every

  15. Assessment of radiological and non-radiological hazards in the nuclear fuel cycle - The Indian experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krishnamony, S.; Gopinath, D.V.

    1996-01-01

    Design and operational aspects of nuclear fuel cycle facilities have several features that distinguish them from nuclear power plants. These are related to (i) the nature of operations which are chiefly mining, metallurgical and chemical; (ii) the nature and type of radio-active materials handled, their specific activities and inventories; and (iii) the physical and chemical processes involved and the associated containment provisions. Generally the radioactive materials are present in an already highly dispersible or mobile form, in the form of solutions, slurries and powders, often associated with a wide variety of reactive and corrosive chemicals. There are further marked differences between the front-end and back-end of the fuel cycle. Whereas the front-end is characterized by the presence of large quantities of low specific activity naturally occurring radioactive materials, the back-end is characterized by high specific activities and concentrations of fission products and actinides. Radioactive characteristics of waste arisings are also different in different phases of the nuclear fuel cycle. Potential for internal exposure in the occupational environment is another distinguishing feature as compared with the more common designs of nuclear power reactors. Potential for accidents, their phenomenology and the resulting consequences are also markedly different in fuel cycle operations. The non-radiological hazards in fuel cycle operations are also of significance, since the operations are mostly mining, metallurgical and chemical in nature. These aspects are examined and evaluated in this paper, based on the Indian experience. (author). 12 refs, 10 tabs

  16. Fixed site neutralization model programmer's manual. Volume 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Engi, D.; Chapman, L.; Judnick, W.; Blum, R.; Broegler, L.; Lenz, J.; Weinthraub, A.; Ballard, D.

    1979-12-01

    The Fixed Site Neutralization Model (FSNM) is a stochastic, time-stepped simulation of an engagement process whereby an adversary force attempts to steal or sabotage sensitive (e.g., nuclear) materials being guarded by a security force on a fixed site and a response force that is off-site. FSNM will assist regulatory bodies of the US Government in evaluating fixed site physical protection systems at various installations in a variety of scenarios. Most data input to the Fixed Site Neutralization Model are in binary form. The user's data are transformed into binary form by two supporting modules, the Data Preprocessor (DPP) and the Plex Preprocessor (PPP). Both preprocessors and the FSNM itself are written in FORTRAN. This volume of the program maintenance program contains: introduction, logic descriptions, PLEX data structure, PLEX records, dictionaries, and error conditions and comments

  17. Stuxnet and Cyber-Warfare (1/2)

    CERN Multimedia

    CERN. Geneva

    2016-01-01

    The first part of the lecture is devoted to the description of the Stuxnet worm, the first cyber-weapon whose existence has been made public, discovered in 2010 and targeting a specific industrial control system; the worm is responsible for the damaging of many centrifuges at an uranium enrichment facility, with the goal of sabotaging Iran's nuclear program. In the second part, the main features of cyber-warfare in conflict and pre-conflict activities will be discussed and compared to the conventional warfare domains, with also a general view at the international political debate on this topic. Check the http://pugwash.org web site, an organisation that seeks a world free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.   NB! All Academic Training lectures are recorded and are publicly available. There is no live webcast.

  18. Access control system for two person rule at Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yanagisawa, Sawako; Ino, Munekazu; Yamada, Noriyuki; Oota, Hiroto; Iwasaki, Mitsuaki; Kodani, Yoshiki; Iwamoto, Tomonori

    2014-01-01

    Following the amendment and enforcement of Regulation of Reprocessing Activity on March 29th 2012, two person rule has become compulsory for the specific rooms to counter and prevent the sabotage or theft of nuclear materials by the insiders at reprocessing plant in Japan. The rooms will include those which contains cooling systems for decay heat removal from spent fuels and so on, scavenging systems to prevent the hydrogen accumulation, and those which contains nuclear material. To ensure the two person rule at Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant, JNFL has recently, after comprehensive study, introduced efficient and effective access control system for the rooms mentioned above. The system is composed of bio-attestation devices, surveillance cameras and electronic locks to establish access control system. This report outlines the access control system for two person rule and introduces the operation. (author)

  19. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-09-01

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international cooperation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers [es

  20. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-09-01

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international cooperation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers [fr

  1. Windscale - power versus pollution

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bonney, S.

    1977-01-01

    Protests from British environmental groups, scientists, politicians and private citizens has forced the Government to postpone a decision on plans to create the world's largest nuclear fuel oxide reprocessing complex at Windscale, on the north-west coast of England. Subjects considered here are the vast increase in the the quantity of lethal nuclear waste stored at Windscale, the risk of explosion or plant malfunction causing radioactive fall-out, the increased radioactive discharge into the Irish Sea and into the atmosphere and the danger of terrorism or sabotage. It is stated that critics of the Windscale project have yet to be convinced that the nuclear power industry is as risk-free as its proponents maintain in public statements. To satisfy the great anxieties shared by a large number of people about the expansion plan, a full public inquiry is essential. (U.K.)

  2. BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER IN THE MEDICAL SETTING: Suggestive Behaviors, Syndromes, and Diagnoses.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sansone, Randy A; Sansone, Lori A

    2015-01-01

    Borderline personality disorder is a personality dysfunction that is characterized by disinhibition and impulsivity, which oftentimes manifest as self-regulation difficulties. Patients with this disorder have always been present in medical settings, but have been described as "difficult patients" rather than patients with borderline personality disorder. According to empirical findings, a number of behaviors and medical syndromes/diagnoses are suggestive of borderline personality disorder. Suggestive behaviors in the medical setting may include aggressive or disruptive behaviors, the intentional sabotage of medical care, and excessive healthcare utilization. Suggestive medical syndromes and diagnoses in the medical setting may include alcohol and substance misuse (including the abuse of prescription medications), multiple somatic complaints, chronic pain, obesity, sexual impulsivity, and hair pulling. While not all-inclusive or diagnostic, these behaviors and syndromes/diagnoses may invite further clinical evaluation of the patient for borderline personality disorder.

  3. Perceived risk, stigma, and potential economic impacts of a high-level nuclear waste repository in Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Slovic, P.

    1989-01-01

    This paper addresses the potential for the proposed Yucca Mountain repository to have serious adverse economic impacts on the city of Las Vegas and the State of Nevada. Adverse economic impacts may be expected to result from two related social processes. One has to do with perceptions of risk and socially amplified reactions to unfortunate events associated with the repository (major and minor accidents, discoveries of radiation releases, evidence of mismanagement, attempts to sabotage or disrupt the facility, etc.). The second process that may trigger significant adverse impacts is that of stigmatization. The conceptual underpinnings of risk perception, social amplification, and stigma are discussed in this paper and empirical data are presented to demonstrate how nuclear images associated with Las Vegas and the State of Nevada might trigger adverse effects on tourism, migration, and business development

  4. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international cooperation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers

  5. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-08-01

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international co-operation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and nuclear materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers

  6. Environmental and technological implications of a theta-pinch fusion power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coultas, T.A.; Burke, R.J.; Krakowski, R.A.

    1974-01-01

    The environmental effects of this conceptual design were evaluated and found to be little different from other electrical power plants in most regards. Exceptions include a very small release of tritium, a low-hazard isotope, and relatively large amounts of radioactive material which must be either stored on site for eventual reprocessing or permanently discarded. These radioactive materials are nonvolatile and should not pose a difficult disposal problem, although some of the material may remain radioactive for hundreds of years. Natural resources required to build and operate the reference plant are not excessive except perhaps in the case of niobium and beryllium. The accident, sabotage, etc., problems of the plant are very minimal and although accidents can be postulated which would be inconvenient and costly within the plant, the probability of sizable impact on the surroundings is so as to be incredible

  7. Perspectives on dam safety in Canada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Halliday, R.

    2004-01-01

    Canadian dam safety issues were reviewed from the perspective of a water resources engineer who is not a dam safety practitioner. Several external factors affecting dam safety were identified along with perceived problems in dam safety administration. The author claims that the main weakness in safety practices can be attributed to provincial oversights and lack of federal engagement. Some additions to the Canadian Dam Safety Guidelines were proposed to address these weaknesses. Canada has hundreds of large dams and high hazard dams whose failure would result in severe downstream consequences. The safety of dams built on boundary waters shared with the United States have gained particular attention from the International Joint Commission. This paper also examined safety criteria for concerns such as aging dams, sabotage and global climate change that may compromise the safety of a dam. 26 refs

  8. Regulations on nuclear materials control of the People's Republic of China

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-01-01

    The present 'Regulations on Nuclear Materials Control of the People's Republic of China' were promulgated by the State Council on June 15, 1987, which are enacted to ensure safe and lawful use of nuclear materials, to prevent theft, sabotage, lose, unlawful diversion and unlawful use, to protect the security of the State and the Public and to facilitate the development of nuclear undertakings. The nuclear materials controlled are: 1. Uranium-235 (materials and products); 2. Uranium-233 (material and products); 3. Plutonium-239 (materials and products); 4. tritium (materials and products); 5. lithium-6 (materials and products); 6. Other nuclear materials requiring control. The present regulations are not applicable to the control of uranium ore and its primary products. The control measures for nuclear products transferred to the armed forces shall be laid down by the national defence department

  9. Radioactive waste and transport. Chapter 6

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    A brief definition of the nature of radioactive waste is followed by a more detailed discussion of high level waste, its composition the amounts involved, storage in liquid and in solid form and the storage of non-reprocessed spent fuel. The final disposal of high level waste in deep geological structures is then described, based on the Swedish KBS study. The effectiveness of the artificial and natural barriers in preventing the radioactive substances from reaching the biosphere is discussed. American and Swedish risk analyses are briefly discussed, and practical experience presented. Low and medium level wastes are thereafter treated in a similar, though briefer manner. Transport of radioactive materials, fresh fuel, spent fuel and waste is then dealt with. Regulations for the containers and their tests are briefly presented and the risk of accidents, theft and sabotage during transport are discussed. (JIW)

  10. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-06-01

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international co-operation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and nuclear materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers [es

  11. Applying Bayesian decision theory to assess reprocessing economic and social cost-benefits

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heising, C.D.

    1978-01-01

    Bayesian decision theory, combined with conventional systems analysis techniques into the discipline called decision analysis, has been applied in this work to assess economic and social cost-benefits associated with reprocessing nuclear fuel. Particular attention in this paper is given to the models which have been developed to place numerical estimates in dollar terms on the three categories of social risks that have been identified with reprocessing. These categories include: (1) health, environment, and safety, (2) diversion of fissile material, including sabotage, terrorist acts, and subnational diversion, and (3) nuclear proliferation, defined to be a diversion at the national level to obtain weapons capability. The emphasis is placed on the third category, as proliferation risk has not been treated elsewhere in a quantitative fashion; most arguments have in the main been qualitative conjectures put forth by political scientists

  12. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-06-01

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international co-operation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and nuclear materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers

  13. A multi-objective reliable programming model for disruption in supply chain

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Emran Mohammadi

    2013-05-01

    Full Text Available One of the primary concerns on supply chain management is to handle risk components, properly. There are various reasons for having risk in supply chain such as natural disasters, unexpected incidents, etc. When a series of facilities are built and deployed, one or a number of them could probably fail at any time due to bad weather conditions, labor strikes, economic crises, sabotage or terrorist attacks and changes in ownership of the system. The objective of risk management is to reduce the effects of different domains to an acceptable level. To overcome the risk, we propose a reliable capacitated supply chain network design (RSCND model by considering random disruptions risk in both distribution centers and suppliers. The proposed study of this paper considers three objective functions and the implementation is verified using some instance.

  14. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-09-01

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international cooperation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers

  15. Intelligent Techniques for Power Systems Vulnerability Assessment

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mohamed A. El-Sharkawi

    2002-06-01

    Full Text Available With power grids considered national security matters, the reliable operation of the system is of top priority to utilities.  This concern is amplified by the utility’s deregulation, which increases the system’s openness while simultaneously decreasing the applied degree of control.  Vulnerability Assessment (VA deals with the power system’s ability to continue to provide service in case of an unforeseen catastrophic contingency.  Such contingencies may include unauthorized tripping, breaks in communication links, sabotage or intrusion by external agents, human errors, natural calamities and faults.  These contingencies could lead to a disruption of service to part or all of the system.  The service disruption is known as outage or blackout.  The paper outlines an approach by which feature extraction and boundary tracking can be implemented to achieve on line vulnerability assessment.

  16. Development of nuclear power and impacts on public safety and security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bochmann, H.P.

    1985-01-01

    The author summarizes the contribution of nuclear power to the overall power supply in the FRG, impacts of the nuclear power industry on public safety and security, and the legal instruments available to protect the public. He concludes his discussion of facts and arguments with the following statements: protection against interference or any other harmful actions of third parties aimed against nuclear installations must be devised so as to practically guarantee prevention of sabotage or any acts of terrorism. Preventive measures have to be made with an eye to what is sensible in practice, as perfectionism might have the adverse effect. The available concept of integrated protection and engineered safety, which has been set up in 1977, will be a sufficient means of reacting to near developments and information in a flexible and effective manner. (orig./HSCH) [de

  17. The implementation of nuclear security program and the improvement of physical protection in Indonesia: progress and challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khairul

    2009-01-01

    facilities. The nuclear material and its installation is potential target in the facilities so that they needed physical protection measures in prevention and protection of nuclear material and radioactive source against theft and sabotage. The implementation of physical protection of nuclear material and radioactive sources in Indonesia complied with the international instruments such as the Convention of the Physical Protection on Nuclear Material and Facilities, amended on July 2005, and INFCIRC/225/Rev. 4, (corrected), the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, June 1999. The application of nuclear energy for power program generation involve in the management of nuclear materials and other radioactive substance. According to international regulation and convention, an effective physical protection system is needed to protect nuclear materials and its facilities against theft and sabotage for both non-proliferation and radiation safety purpose. Further to implementation of the IAEA nuclear security program in the region, Indonesia received two nuclear security services, IPPAS and INSServ mission. Based on the expert mission recommendation, therefore Indonesia improved their physical protection system on nuclear material and facilities against theft and sabotage. One thing that should be considered by the Government of Indonesia is human resource development programmes. So far, some effort has developed to enhance the knowledge of the employee who deals with nuclear material and radioactive substances. It still needed to increase the awareness in particular to personal and other related agencies as well. The Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration discussed security assistance with Indonesia's National Nuclear Energy Agency, BATAN. These upgrades not only reduced the threat of theft at the three research reactors, but also provided local physical protection expertise to use during the concept, design, and operation of

  18. States agree on stronger physical protection regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    Full text: Delegates from 89 countries agreed on 8 July to fundamental changes that will substantially strengthen the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei welcomed the agreement in saying 'This new and stronger treaty is an important step towards greater nuclear security by combating, preventing, and ultimately punishing those who would engage in nuclear theft, sabotage or even terrorism. It demonstrates that there is indeed a global commitment to remedy weaknesses in our nuclear security regime.' The amended CPPNM makes it legally binding for States Parties to protect nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage as well as transport. It will also provide for expanded cooperation between and among States regarding rapid measures to locate and recover stolen or smuggled nuclear material, mitigate any radiological consequences of sabotage, and prevent and combat related offences. The original CPPNM applied only to nuclear material in international transport. Conference President Dr. Alec Baer said 'All 89 delegations demonstrated real unity of purpose. They put aside some very genuine national concerns in favour of the global interest and the result is a much improved convention that is better suited to addressing the nuclear security challenges we currently face.' The new rules will come into effect once they have been ratified by two-thirds of the 112 States Parties of the Convention, expected to take several years. 'But concrete actions are already taking place around the world. For more than 3 years, the IAEA has been implementing a systematic Nuclear Security plan, including physical protection activities designed to prevent, detect and respond to malicious acts,' said Anita Nillson, Director of the IAEA's Office of Nuclear Security. The Agency's Nuclear Security Fund, set up after the events of 9/11, has delivered $19.5 million in practical assistance to 121 countries

  19. Security Management and Safeguards Office

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bewley, Nathaniel M.

    2004-01-01

    The Security Management and Safeguards Office at NASA is here to keep the people working in a safe environment. They also are here to protect the buildings and documents from sabotage, espionage, and theft. During the summer of 2004, I worked with Richard Soppet in Physical Security. While I was working here I helped out with updating the map that we currently use at NASA Glenn Research Center, attended meetings for homeland security, worked with the security guards and the locksmith. The meetings that I attended for homeland security talked about how to protect ourselves before something happened, they told us to always be on the guard and look for anything suspicious, and the different ways that terrorist groups operate. When I was with the security guards I was taught how to check someone into the base, showed how to use a radar gun, observed a security guard make a traffic stop for training and was with them while they patrolled NASA Glenn Research Center to make sure things were running smooth and no one was in danger. When I was with the lock smith I was taught how to make keys and locks for the employees here at NASA. The lock smith also showed me that he had inventory cabinets of files that show how many keys were out to people and who currently has access to the rooms that they keys were made for. I also helped out the open house at NASA Glenn Research Center. I helped out by showing the Army Reserves, and Brook Park's SWAT team where all the main events were going to take place a week before the open house was going to begin. Then during the open house I helped out by making sure people had there IDS, checked through there bags, and handed out a map to them that showed where the different activities were going to take place. So the main job here at NASA Glenn Research Center for the Security Management and Safeguards Office is to make sure that nothing is stolen, sabotaged, and espionaged. Also most importantly make sure all the employees here at NASA are

  20. George and the big bang

    CERN Document Server

    Hawking, Lucy; Parsons, Gary

    2012-01-01

    George has problems. He has twin baby sisters at home who demand his parents’ attention. His beloved pig Freddy has been exiled to a farm, where he’s miserable. And worst of all, his best friend, Annie, has made a new friend whom she seems to like more than George. So George jumps at the chance to help Eric with his plans to run a big experiment in Switzerland that seeks to explore the earliest moment of the universe. But there is a conspiracy afoot, and a group of evildoers is planning to sabotage the experiment. Can George repair his friendship with Annie and piece together the clues before Eric’s experiment is destroyed forever? This engaging adventure features essays by Professor Stephen Hawking and other eminent physicists about the origins of the universe and ends with a twenty-page graphic novel that explains how the Big Bang happened—in reverse!

  1. Perceived risk, stigma, and potential economic impacts of a high-level nuclear waste repository in Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Slovic, P.; Layman, M.; Kraus, N.N.; Chalmers, J.; Gesel, G.; Flynn, J.

    1989-07-01

    This paper describes a program of research designed to assess the potential impacts of a high-level nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, upon tourism, retirement and job-related migration, and business development in Las Vegas and the state. Adverse economic impacts may be expected to result from two related social processes. One has to do with perceptions of risk and socially amplified reactions to ''unfortunate events'' associated with the repository (major and minor accidents, discoveries of radiation releases, evidence of mismanagement, attempts to sabotage or disrupt the facility, etc.). The second process that may trigger significant adverse impacts is that of stigmatization. The conceptual underpinnings of risk perception, social amplification, and stigmatization are discussed in this paper and empirical data are presented to demonstrate how nuclear images associated with Las Vegas and the State of Nevada might trigger adverse effects on tourism, migration, and business development

  2. Relational aggression in marriage.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Carroll, Jason S; Nelson, David A; Yorgason, Jeremy B; Harper, James M; Ashton, Ruth Hagmann; Jensen, Alexander C

    2010-01-01

    Drawing from developmental theories of relational aggression, this article reports on a study designed to identify if spouses use relationally aggressive tactics when dealing with conflict in their marriage and the association of these behaviors with marital outcomes. Using a sample of 336 married couples (672 spouses), results revealed that the majority of couples reported that relationally aggressive behaviors, such as social sabotage and love withdrawal, were a part of their marital dynamics, at least to some degree. Gender comparisons of partner reports of their spouse's behavior revealed that wives were significantly more likely to be relationally aggressive than husbands. Structural equation modeling demonstrated that relational aggression is associated with lower levels of marital quality and greater marital instability for both husbands and wives. Implications are drawn for the use of relational aggression theory in the future study of couple conflict and marital aggression. (c) 2010 Wiley-Liss, Inc.

  3. Stuxnet and Cyber-Warfare (2/2)

    CERN Multimedia

    CERN. Geneva

    2016-01-01

    The first part of the lecture is devoted to the description of the Stuxnet worm, the first cyber-weapon whose existence has been made public, discovered in 2010 and targeting a specific industrial control system; the worm is responsible for the damaging of many centrifuges at an uranium enrichment facility, with the goal of sabotaging Iran's nuclear program. In the second part, the main features of cyber-warfare in conflict and pre-conflict activities will be discussed and compared to the conventional warfare domains, with also a general view at the international political debate on this topic.   Check the http://pugwash.org web site, an organisation that seeks a world free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The lecturer invites comments via email to Gian.Piero.Siroli@cern.ch NB! All Academic Training lectures are recorded and are publicly available. There is no live webcast.

  4. Insider protection: A report card

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.

    1986-01-01

    Enhanced security measures against external threats (e.g., terrorists, criminals) have been implemented at most facilities that handle special nuclear material, classified information, or other assets critical to national security. Attention is now focusing on insider protection, and safeguards managers are attempting to provide balanced protection against insider and outsider threats. Potential insider threats include attempts by facility employees to steal special nuclear material (SNM), to cause a radiological hazard to the public, to sabotage critical facilities, or to steal property or classified information. This paper presents a report card on the status of insider protection at Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission-licensed facilities, with emphasis on SNM theft. The authors discuss the general trends in insider protection and the limitations of protection measures currently in use. They also discuss the most critical needs for improved procedures, technology, analytical tools, and education for safeguards personnel

  5. Planning and architectural safety considerations in designing nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Konsowa, Ahmed A.

    2009-01-01

    To achieve optimum safety and to avoid possible hazards in nuclear power plants, considering architectural design fundamentals and all operating precautions is mandatory. There are some planning and architectural precautions should be considered to achieve a high quality design and construction of nuclear power plant with optimum safety. This paper highlights predicted hazards like fire, terrorism, aircraft crash attacks, adversaries, intruders, and earthquakes, proposing protective actions against these hazards that vary from preventing danger to evacuating and sheltering people in-place. For instance; using safeguards program to protect against sabotage, theft, and diversion. Also, site and building well design focusing on escape pathways, emergency exits, and evacuation zones, and the safety procedures such as; evacuation exercises and sheltering processes according to different emergency classifications. In addition, this paper mentions some important codes and regulations that control nuclear power plants design, and assessment methods that evaluate probable risks. (author)

  6. Using detection and deterrence to reduce insider risk

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eggers, R.F.; Carlson, R.L.; Udell, C.J.

    1988-01-01

    This paper addresses a new concept of interaction between adversary detection and deterrence. It provides an initial evaluation of the effects of these variables on the risk of theft of special nuclear material by an insider adversary and can be extended to the sabotage threat. A steady-state risk equation is used. Exercises with this equation show that deterrence, resulting from the prospect of detection, has a greater ability to reduce the risk than the detection exercise itself. This is true for all cases except those in which the probabilty of detection is 1. Cases were developed for three different types of adversaries that can be distinguished from one another by the level of detection they are willing to tolerate before they are deterred from attempting a theft. By considering the effects of detection, deterrence, and adversary type, the ground work is laid for designing cost-effective insider threat-protection systems

  7. Vehicle access and search training manual. Report for Oct 77-sep 79

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Obermiller, J.E.; Wait, H.J.

    1979-11-01

    This Vehicle Access and Search Training Manual is intended to assist NRC-licensed organizations and their security personnel in developing vehicle access, control and search operations necessary at nuclear fuel cycle facilities and at reactor facilities. The manual is based on security requirements prescribed by The Nuclear Regulatory Commission as contained in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 73, 'Physical Protection of Plants and Materials.' As a condition of the licensing agreement, the licensee is required to maintain a physical protection system which includes a training program for security personnel. The manual includes lesson plans in (1) controlling vehicle entry and exit, (2) searching for contraband, and (3) protecting the facility from sabotage and/or theft of special nuclear materials. These training guidelines provide information and instruction for self-study, discussion and hands-on training. A job knowledge test reviews the entire training program

  8. Inherently safe technologies-chemical and nuclear

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Weinberg, A.M.

    1984-01-01

    Probabilistic risk assessments show an inverse relationship between the likelihood and the consequences of nuclear and chemical plant accidents, but the Bhopal accident has change public complacency about the safety of chemical plants to such an extent that public confidence is now at the same low level as with nuclear plants. The nuclear industry's response was to strengthen its institutions and improve its technologies, but the public may not be convinced. One solution is to develop reactors which do not depend upon the active intervention of humans of electromechanical devices to deal with emergencies, but which have physical properties that limit the possible temperature and power of a reactor. The Process Inherent Ultimately Safe and the modular High-Temperature Gas-Cooled reactors are two possibilities. the chemical industry needs to develop its own inherently safe design precepts that incorporate smallness, safe processes, and hardening against sabotage. 5 references

  9. Employment Maintenance and Intimate Partner Violence.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Borchers, Andrea; Lee, Rebecca C; Martsolf, Donna S; Maler, Jeff

    2016-05-18

    Intimate partner violence (IPV) is a major public health problem in the United States. Negative outcomes of IPV affect women's attainment and maintenance of employment. The purpose of this study was to develop a theoretical framework that described and explained the process by which women who have experienced IPV attain and maintain employment. Grounded theory methodology was used to analyze interviews of 34 women who had experienced IPV. Analysis suggested that women who had experienced IPV could attain employment; however, they had difficulty maintaining employment. Entanglement of work and IPV was experienced by all 34 participants because of the perpetrator controlling their appearance, sabotaging their work, interfering with their work, or controlling their finances. Some women described ways in which they disentangled work from IPV through a dynamic unraveling process, with periods of re-entanglement, resulting in job security and satisfaction. © 2016 The Author(s).

  10. A cognitive profile of obesity and its translation into new interventions

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Anita eJansen

    2015-11-01

    Full Text Available Change your lifestyle: decrease your energy intake and increase your energy expenditure, is what obesity experts tell people who need to lose weight. Though the advice might be correct, it appears to be extremely difficult to change one’s lifestyle. Unhealthy habits usually are ingrained and hard to change, especially for people with an ‘obese cognitive profile’. Knowledge of the cognitive mechanisms that maintain unhealthy eating habits is necessary for the development of interventions that can change behavior effectively. This paper discusses some cognitive processes that might maintain unhealthy eating habits and make healthier eating difficult, like increased food cue reactivity, weak executive skills and attention bias. An effort is also done to translate these basic scientific findings into new interventions which aim to tackle the sabotaging cognitive processes. Preliminary studies into the effectiveness of these interventions, if available, are presented.

  11. Plutonium working group report on environmental, safety and health vulnerabilities associated with the Department's plutonium storage. Volume 2, Appendix B, Part 2: Hanford site assessment team report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-09-01

    The Hanford Site Self Assessment of Plutonium Environmental Safety and Health (ES and H) Vulnerabilities was conducted in accordance with the US Department of Energy (DOE) Secretary's directive of February 1994. The implementation plans to carry out this directive are contained in the Project Plan and the Assessment Plan. For this assessment, vulnerabilities are defined as conditions or weaknesses that may lead to unnecessary or increased radiation exposure of the workers, release of radioactive materials to the environment, or radiation exposure of the public. The purpose for the Assessment is to evaluate environmental, safety and health vulnerabilities from plutonium operations and storage activities. Acts of sabotage or diversion of plutonium which obviously may have ES and H implications are excluded from this study because separate DOE programs evaluate those issues on a continuing basis. Security and safeguards activities which may have negative impacts on safety are included in the evaluation

  12. Insider protection: a report card

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.

    1986-01-01

    Enhanced security measures against external threats (e.g., terrorists, criminals) have been implemented at most facilities that handle special nuclear material, classified information, or other assets critical to national security. Attention is not focussing on insider protection, and safeguards managers are attempting to provide balanced protection against insider and outsider threats. Potential insider threats include attempts by facility employees to steal special nuclear material (SNM), to cause a radiological hazard to the public, to sabotage critical facilities, or to steal property or classified information. This paper presents a report card on the status of insider protection at Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission-licensed facilities, with emphasis on SNM theft. We discuss the general trends in insider protection and the limitations of protection measures currently in use. We also discuss the most critical needs for improved procedures, technology, analytical tools, and education for safeguards personnel

  13. Exports and economic growth in Nigeria

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Goodly Otto

    2016-09-01

    Full Text Available Nigeria is an oil dependent economy, over 90 per cent of its exports receipts in recent years flow from petroleum but this sector is currently affected by local challenges, which include insecurity, oil thefts, sabotage and an unfriendly operational environment. These challenges are generating loses for the major producers and encouraging capital flight but amidst this situation, the economy is said to be having an impressive growth. This paradox informed this research. The study was designed to see the nexus between exports and economic growth in Nigeria. Using data from the Central Bank of Nigeria spanning 1980-2011, the study with the aid of OLS regression analysis found a strong relationship between Exports and economic growth in Nigeria. Nigeria will be better served if it diversifies its export base. It must also create structures that lead to better redistribution of export incomes within the local economy.

  14. Modeling Human Behavior to Anticipate Insider Attacks

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ryan E Hohimer

    2011-01-01

    Full Text Available The insider threat ranks among the most pressing cyber-security challenges that threaten government and industry information infrastructures. To date, no systematic methods have been developed that provide a complete and effective approach to prevent data leakage, espionage, and sabotage. Current practice is forensic in nature, relegating to the analyst the bulk of the responsibility to monitor, analyze, and correlate an overwhelming amount of data. We describe a predictive modeling framework that integrates a diverse set of data sources from the cyber domain, as well as inferred psychological/motivational factors that may underlie malicious insider exploits. This comprehensive threat assessment approach provides automated support for the detection of high-risk behavioral "triggers" to help focus the analyst's attention and inform the analysis. Designed to be domain-independent, the system may be applied to many different threat and warning analysis/sense-making problems.

  15. Using Combined One-Time Password for Prevention of Phishing Attacks

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    S. Nasiri

    2017-12-01

    Full Text Available Αs technologies and communications develop, more sabotaging attacks occur including phishing attacks which jeopardize users' security and critical information like their passwords and credentials. Several solutions have been proposed for existing dangers. One of which is the use of one-time passwords. This issue has remained as a main challenge and requires more extensive research. In this research, we have focused on one-time password combinations and we also have proposed solutions based on behavioral patterns which lead to significant optimizations while tending the simplicity for users. Efficiency of the proposed method has been measured through defining scenarios, modeling and simulations based on a prevention rate index. In addition, complexity coefficient of the proposed method showing the probability of unpredictability of passwords for attackers has been calculated. Ultimately, a descriptive comparison has shown that the proposed method is superior to some of the existing methods.

  16. Wpływ incydentu na bezpieczeństwo informacji w zarządzaniu podmiotem

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Zbigniew Grzywna

    2014-06-01

    Full Text Available The beginning of the 21st century is the period of the intensive development of the Western Civilization changing from industrial epoch based on industry and resources to informative epoch where most important issues are information and knowledge. Because of the change, there are new problems and threats which have not existed before. In the industrial world, we are afraid of physical threats – fires, thefts and sabotage. In the world of information, virtual threats must be added as well. Various occurrences where rules of management are not observed can lead to critical situation or crisis and as a result can ruin a particular subject. What is more, computer-related occurrences must also be mentioned. Different occurrences and information security incidents will be taken into consideration in the article, such as serious threats which can cause crisis in organization if suitable management mechanism was not prepared.

  17. Simulation for Teaching and Assessment of Nodule Perception on Chest Radiography in Nonradiology Health Care Trainees.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Auffermann, William F; Henry, Travis S; Little, Brent P; Tigges, Stefan; Tridandapani, Srini

    2015-11-01

    Simulation has been used as an educational and assessment tool in several fields, generally involving training of physical skills. To date, simulation has found limited application in teaching and assessment of skills related to image perception and interpretation. The goal of this pilot study was to evaluate the feasibility of simulation as a tool for teaching and assessment of skills related to perception of nodules on chest radiography. This study received an exemption from the institutional review board. Subjects consisted of nonradiology health care trainees. Subjects underwent training and assessment of pulmonary nodule identification skills on chest radiographs at simulated radiology workstations. Subject performance was quantified by changes in area under the localization receiver operating characteristic curve. At the conclusion of the study, all subjects were given a questionnaire with five questions comparing learning at a simulated workstation with training using conventional materials. Statistical significance for questionnaire responses was tested using the Wilcoxon signed rank test. Subjects demonstrated statistically significant improvement in nodule identification after training at a simulated radiology workstation (change in area under the curve, 0.1079; P = .015). Subjects indicated that training on simulated radiology workstations was preferable to conventional training methods for all questions; P values for all questions were less than .01. Simulation may be a useful tool for teaching and assessment of skills related to medical image perception and interpretation. Further study is needed to determine which skills and trainee populations may be most amenable to training and assessment using simulation. Copyright © 2015 American College of Radiology. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  18. Nonradiological chemical pathway analysis and identification of chemicals of concern for environmental monitoring at the Hanford Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blanton, M.L.; Cooper, A.T.; Castleton, K.J.

    1995-11-01

    Pacific Northwest's Surface Environmental Surveillance Project (SESP) is an ongoing effort tot design, review, and conducted monitoring on and off the Hanford site. Chemicals of concern that were selected are listed. Using modeled exposure pathways, the offsite cancer incidence and hazard quotient were calculated and a retrospective pathway analysis performed to estimate what onsite concentrations would be required in the soil for each chemical of concern and other detected chemicals that would be required to obtain an estimated offsite human-health risk of 1.0E-06 cancer incidence or 1.0 hazard quotient. This analysis indicates that current nonradiological chemical contamination occurring on the site does not pose a significant offsite human-health risk; the highest cancer incidence to the offsite maximally exposed individual was from arsenic (1.76E-10); the highest hazard quotient was chromium(VI) (1.48E-04). The most sensitive pathways of exposure were surfacewater and aquatic food consumption. Combined total offsite excess cancer incidence was 2.09E-10 and estimated hazard quotient was 2.40E-04. Of the 17 identified chemicals of concern, the SESP does not currently (routinely) monitor arsenic, benzo(a)pyrene, bis(2- ethylhexyl)phthalate (BEHP), and chrysene. Only 3 of the chemicals of concern (arsenic, BEHP, chloroform) could actually occur in onsite soil at concern high enough to cause a 1.0E-06 excess cancer incidence or a 1.0 hazard index for a given offsite exposure pathway. During the retrospective analysis, 20 other chemicals were also evaluated; only vinyl chloride and thallium could reach targeted offsite risk values

  19. The 1995 attempted derailing of the French TGV (high-speed train) and a quantitative analysis of 181 rail sabotage attempts.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-03-01

    On August 26, 1995, the Saturday of the final and busiest weekend of Frances summer holiday season, terrorists attempted to derail the TGV (Train Grande Vitesse) between Lyon and Paris by planting a bomb. Fortunately, their crude triggering mec...

  20. Technical Program of The 4th World Congress on Chemical, Biological and Radiological Terrorism

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    Many countries worldwide were interested in the part that CBMTS industry played in the overall protection schemes required of all nations. It was idea to develop a baseline of information on antidotes and planned medical treatment for military and civilian medical casualties, in both peace and war. Based on actual incidents that affected their chemical, petrochemical and pharmaceutical industries during their recent war, countries highlighted a danger that every country could face in the event of military actions, sabotage and especially terrorist actions, as well as major incidents or accidents involving these industries. It is great importance of CBMTS approach at bringing together the world's very best professionals in science and medicine to explore at the outer edges of science and technology, the most important issue facing the international community. Participants put big efforts towards defining the issues, surfacing the problems across the NBC science and medical spectrum and applying the best efforts at developing solutions that would most benefit our world community

  1. Using detection and deterrence to reduce insider risk

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Eggers, R F; Carlson, R L; Udell, C J

    1988-06-01

    This paper addresses a new concept of interaction between adversary detection and deterrence. It provides an initial evaluation of the effects of these variables on the risk of theft of special nuclear material by an insider adversary and can be extended to the sabotage threat. A steady-state risk equation is used. Exercises with this equation show that deterrence, resulting from the prospect of detection, has a greater ability to reduce the risk than the detection exercise itself. This is true for all cases except those in which the probability of detection is 1. Cases were developed for three different types of adversaries that can be distinguished from one another by the level of detection they are willing to tolerate before they are deterred from attempting a theft. By considering the effects of detection, deterrence, and adversary type, the ground work is laid for designing cost-effective insider threat-protection systems. 2 refs., 6 figs.

  2. The structure of nuclear safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coulter, C.A.

    1989-01-01

    Safeguards systems for facilities that handle special nuclear material combine procedural, protective, and materials accounting elements to prevent and/or detect sabotage and diversion or theft of material. Because most of the discussion in this course is devoted to materials accounting topics only, this chapter provides a brief introduction to some of the procedural and protective elements of safeguards systems, placing the materials accounting system in its proper context. The chapter begins by reviewing certain pertinent DOE definitions and then surveys some protection requirements and technology - protective personnel, personnel identification systems, barriers, detectors, and communication systems. Considered next are the procedures of personnel selection and monitoring, definition and division of job functions, and operation. The chapter then describes the way the procedural, protective, and materials accounting elements can be combined, becoming a total safeguards system. Although such a system necessarily requires elements of procedure, protection, and materials accounting, only the materials accounting gives positive assurance that nuclear material is not diverted or stolen

  3. Iterated crowdsourcing dilemma game

    Science.gov (United States)

    Oishi, Koji; Cebrian, Manuel; Abeliuk, Andres; Masuda, Naoki

    2014-02-01

    The Internet has enabled the emergence of collective problem solving, also known as crowdsourcing, as a viable option for solving complex tasks. However, the openness of crowdsourcing presents a challenge because solutions obtained by it can be sabotaged, stolen, and manipulated at a low cost for the attacker. We extend a previously proposed crowdsourcing dilemma game to an iterated game to address this question. We enumerate pure evolutionarily stable strategies within the class of so-called reactive strategies, i.e., those depending on the last action of the opponent. Among the 4096 possible reactive strategies, we find 16 strategies each of which is stable in some parameter regions. Repeated encounters of the players can improve social welfare when the damage inflicted by an attack and the cost of attack are both small. Under the current framework, repeated interactions do not really ameliorate the crowdsourcing dilemma in a majority of the parameter space.

  4. Disordered Money Behaviors: Development of the Klontz Money Behavior Inventory

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Brad T Klontz

    2012-06-01

    Full Text Available Much of the existing literature on financial behavior focuses on basic money management tasks (e.g., balancing a checkbook. However, it can be equally important to identify problematic financial behaviors that can sabotage one’s financial health. The purpose of this study was to create an assessment tool that can be used by mental health and financial professionals to identify disordered money behaviors that may impede on progress towards one’s financial goals. This study asked 422 respondents to indicate their agreement with disordered money behaviors, including compulsive buying, pathological gambling, compulsive hoarding, workaholism, financial enabling, financial dependence, financial denial, and financial enmeshment, which were correlated with demographic characteristics and financial outcomes. The results identified eight subscales derived from 68 disordered money behavior items. All eight subscales were found to have high reliability in measuring disordered behaviors, and six were associated with negative financial health indicators (e.g. less net worth, less income, and/or more revolving credit.

  5. Forensic Evidence Identification and Modeling for Attacks against a Simulated Online Business Information System

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Manghui Tu

    2012-12-01

    Full Text Available Forensic readiness can support future forensics investigation or auditing on external/internal attacks, internal sabotage and espionage, and business frauds. To establish forensics readiness, it is essential for an organization to identify what evidences are relevant and where they can be found, to determine whether they are logged in a forensic sound way and whether all the needed evidences are available to reconstruct the events successfully.  Our goal of this research is to ensure evidence availability. First, both external and internal attacks are molded as augmented attack trees/graphs based on the system vulnerabilities. Second, modeled attacks are conducted against a honeynet simulating an online business information system, and each honeypot's hard drive is forensic sound imaged for each individual attack. Third, an evidence tree/graph will be built after forensics examination on the disk images for each attack. The evidence trees/graphs are expected to be used for automatic crime scene reconstruction and automatic attack/fraud detection in the future.

  6. Safeguards against use of nuclear material for weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, B.; Rometsch, R.

    1975-01-01

    The history of safeguards is traced from the first session of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in 1946, through the various stages of the IAEA safeguard system for nuclear materials and to the initiation of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1968. The role of the IAEA under the treaty is discussed. The structure and content of safeguards agreements in connection with the treaty were laid down and the objective of safeguards clearly defined. The methods of verification by the IAEA of the facility operator's material accountancy through inspection and statistical analysis and evaluation of 'material unaccounted for' are explained. The extent to which the IAEA may make use of the State's system of accounting and control of nuclear materials is considered. Reference is also made to the question of protection against theft and sabotage. Finally the scope of safeguards work for the next 15 years is forecast. (U.K.)

  7. Authoritarianism and Intolerance Under Autocratic and Democratic Regimes

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Kris Dunn

    2014-09-01

    Full Text Available Based on findings indicating that authoritarians express greater intolerance in situations where diversity is more apparent, Stenner (2005 proposes that democracies may sabotage their stability by allowing the unbridled expression of societal pluralism. She therefore suggests that pluralism in democracies be suppressed in order to pacify authoritarians and the threat their unbridled intolerance may pose to the stability of these countries. Based on data from the World and European Values Surveys, I examined 75,478 individuals across 75 countries to determine if authoritarians are indeed more intolerant in more democratic societies; a key assumption upon which Stenner’s suggestion rests. While authoritarianism was more strongly and negatively related to tolerance in more democratic countries, authoritarians in more democratic countries were more tolerant than were authoritarians in more autocratic countries. I argue that Stenner’s concern may be valid if we strictly consider rapid pluralization within a single generation within consolidating democracies, but for established democracies, her concern appears unwarranted.

  8. Nuclear material control in the United States

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jaeger, C.; Waddoups, I.

    1995-01-01

    The Department of Energy has defined a safeguards system to be an integrated system of physical protection, material accounting and material control subsystems designed to deter, prevent, detect, and respond to unauthorized possession, use, or sabotage of SNM. In practice, safeguards involve the development and application of techniques and procedures dealing with the establishment and continued maintenance of a system of activities. The system must also include administrative controls and surveillance to assure that the procedures and techniques of the system are effective and are being carried out. The control of nuclear material is critical to the safeguarding of nuclear materials within the United States. The U.S. Department of Energy includes as part of material control four functional performance areas. They include access controls, material surveillance, material containment and detection/assessment. This paper will address not only these areas but also the relationship between material control and other safeguards and security functions

  9. Safeguards considerations related to the decontamination and decommissioning of former nuclear weapons facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Crawford, D.

    1995-01-01

    In response to the post-Cold War environment and the changes in the U. S. Department of Energy defense mission, many former nuclear operations are being permanently shut down. These operations include facilities where nuclear materials production, processing, and weapons manufacturing have occurred in support of the nation's defense industry. Since defense-related operations have ceased, many of the classification and sensitive information concerns do not exist. However, nuclear materials found at these sites are of interest to the DOE from environmental, safety and health, and materials management perspectives. Since these facilities played a role in defense activities, the nuclear materials found at these facilities are considered special nuclear materials, primarily highly enriched uranium and/or plutonium. Consequently, these materials pose significant diversion, theft, and sabotage threats, and significant nuclear security issues exist that must be addressed. This paper focuses on the nuclear materials protection issues associated with facility decommissioning and decontamination, primarily safeguards

  10. Safeguards Automated Facility Evaluation (SAFE) methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chapman, L.D.; Grady, L.M.; Bennett, H.A.; Sasser, D.W.; Engi, D.

    1978-08-01

    An automated approach to facility safeguards effectiveness evaluation has been developed. This automated process, called Safeguards Automated Facility Evaluation (SAFE), consists of a collection of a continuous stream of operational modules for facility characterization, the selection of critical paths, and the evaluation of safeguards effectiveness along these paths. The technique has been implemented on an interactive computer time-sharing system and makes use of computer graphics for the processing and presentation of information. Using this technique, a comprehensive evaluation of a safeguards system can be provided by systematically varying the parameters that characterize the physical protection components of a facility to reflect the perceived adversary attributes and strategy, environmental conditions, and site operational conditions. The SAFE procedure has broad applications in the nuclear facility safeguards field as well as in the security field in general. Any fixed facility containing valuable materials or components to be protected from theft or sabotage could be analyzed using this same automated evaluation technique

  11. Vital area identification software VIP for the physical protection of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jung, Woo Sik; Park, Chang Kue; Yang, Joon Eon

    2004-01-01

    There are two major factors to be considered for the physical protection of nuclear power plants. They are a design basis threat (DBT) and the vital area identification (VAI). The DBT has been considered as 'the maximum credible threat.' The vital area is defined as 'an area inside a protected area containing equipment, systems or devices, or nuclear materials, the sabotage of which could directly or indirectly lead to unacceptable radiological consequences.' For the VAI of nuclear power plants, a software VIP (Vital area Identification Package based on PSA method) is being developed. The VIP is based on the current probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) techniques. The PSA method, including internal as well as external events, is known as the most complete and consistent method for identifying various accident sequences that might result in a core melt and radioactive material release to the environment. Thus, the VIP employs a fault tree analysis method in the PSA and utilizes the PSA results

  12. LANL Safeguards and Security Assurance Program. Revision 6

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    The Safeguards and Security (S and S) Assurance Program provides a continuous quality improvement approach to ensure effective, compliant S and S program implementation throughout the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Any issues identified through the various internal and external assessments are documented, tracked and closed using the Safeguards and Security Issue Management Program. The Laboratory utilizes an integrated S and S systems approach to protect US Department of Energy (DOE) interests from theft or diversion of special nuclear material (SNM), sabotage, espionage, loss or theft of classified/controlled matter or government property, and other hostile acts that may cause unacceptable impacts on national security, health and safety of employees and the public, and the environment. This document explains the basis, scope, and conduct of the S and S process to include: self-assessments, issue management, risk assessment, and root cause analysis. It also provides a discussion of S and S topical areas, roles and responsibilities, process flow charts, minimum requirements, methodology, terms, and forms

  13. Fusion power and the environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Holdren, J.P.; Fowler, T.K.; Post, R.F.

    1975-01-01

    Environmental characteristics of conceptual fusion-reactor systems based on magnetic confinement are examined quantitatively, and some comparisons with fission systems are made. Fusion, like all other energy sources, will not be completely free of environmental liabilities, but the most obvious of these--tritium leakage and activation of structural materials by neutron bombardment--are susceptible to significant reduction by ingenuity in choice of materials and design. Large fusion reactors can probably be designed so that worst-case releases of radioactivity owing to accident or sabotage would produce no prompt fatalities in the public. A world energy economy relying heavily on fusion could make heavy demands on scarce nonfuel materials, a topic deserving further attention. Fusion's potential environmental advantages are not entirely ''automatic'', converting them into practical reality will require emphasis on environmental characteristics throughout the process of reactor design and engineering. The central role of environmental impact in the long-term energy dilemma of civilization justifies the highest priority on this aspect of fusion

  14. Transportation of nuclear material in France: regulatory and technical aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Flory, D.; Renard, C.

    1995-01-01

    Legislative and regulatory documentation define responsibilities in the field of security and physical protection for transportation of nuclear material. Any transportation activity has to conform to an advance authorization regime delivered by the Ministry of Industry. Responsibility for physical protection of nuclear material rests with the carrier under control of the public authority. Penalties reinforce this administrative regime. Operational responsibility for management and control of transport operations has been entrusted by the ministry to the operational transport unit (Echelon Operationnel des Transports - EOT) of IPSN (Institute for Nuclear Protection and Safety). To guarantee en efficient protection of transport operations, the various following means are provided for: -specialized transport means; - devices for real time tracking of road vehicles; - administrative authorization and declaration procedures; -intervention capacities in case of sabotage... This set of technical means and administrative measures is completed by the existence of a body of inspectors who may control every step of the operations. (authors). 3 tabs

  15. The Gas Turbine - Modular Helium Reactor: A Promising Option for Near Term Deployment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    LaBar, Malcolm P.

    2002-01-01

    The Gas Turbine - Modular Helium Reactor (GT-MHR) is an advanced nuclear power system that offers unparalleled safety, high thermal efficiency, environmental advantages, and competitive electricity generation costs. The GT-MHR module couples a gas-cooled modular helium reactor (MHR) with a high efficiency modular Brayton cycle gas turbine (GT) energy conversion system. The reactor and power conversion systems are located in a below grade concrete silo that provides protection against sabotage. The GT-MHR safety is achieved through a combination of inherent safety characteristics and design selections that take maximum advantage of the gas-cooled reactor coated particle fuel, helium coolant and graphite moderator. The GT-MHR is projected to be economically competitive with alternative electricity generation technologies due to the high operating temperature of the gas-cooled reactor, high thermal efficiency of the Brayton cycle power conversion system, high fuel burnup (>100,000 MWd/MT), and low operation and maintenance requirements. (author)

  16. Combined evaluation. Plutonium transports in France. Problems of safety and reliability of transport container FS47; Evaluation Conjointe. Transports de plutonium en France. Problemes de surete et de securite du container de transport FS47

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Marignac, Y.; Coeytaux, X. [Wise-Paris, 75 (France); Large, J.H. [Nuclear Engineer, Large and Associates, Londres (United Kingdom)

    2004-09-15

    This report concerns the safety and the protection of plutonium dioxide transported from Cogema La Hague to the mixed oxide fuel plant of Marcoule and Cadarache. The French approach of the transport safety is based on the combining of two essential principles: the first one affirms that the performances of the FS47 container in regard of containment (norms TS-R-1 from IAEA for the accidental conditions) is conceived to resist in any situation even terrorism or sabotage. In fact, the IAEA norm follows a probabilistic study without a voluntary attack such a terrorist one. The second principle rests on the ability to prevent the treat of terrorism acts, because of a secrecy policy on the plutonium transport. It appeared that the Green peace association has succeeded several times to know exactly the hours, the trips of the plutonium transport and this simple thing raises more questions than it solves. (N.C.)

  17. Environmental impacts of the transportation of radioactive materials in urban areas

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Finley, N.C.; Taylor, J.M.; Daniel, S.L.; Ericson, D.M. Jr.

    1980-01-01

    Radioactive material transport in urban areas is investigated and the specific urban features which influence environmental impacts are addressed. These features include the geographic and demographic make-up, and vehicular population and transportation patterns in the area. Previous efforts have not identified a most important population exposure pathway or group. This assessment examines several pathways and a number of urban specific population groups to evaluate their relative significance. In addition, because different causative events contribute to the overall environmental impacts, this assessment addresses four of these: incident free transport, vehicular accidents, human errors, and sabotage or malevolent acts. Not only does radioactive material transport produce radiological and economic consequences but also it can have social impacts. The objective of this study is to examine both the quantitative environmental impacts of radioactive material transport in urban areas and the more subjective social effects of this process. The social impacts assessment was performed by Battelle Human Affairs Research Centers, Seattle, Washington and their conclusions are only summarized here

  18. DEVELOPMENT OF A METHODOLOGY TO ASSESS PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION FOR GENERATION IV SYSTEMS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nishimura, R.; Bari, R.; Peterson, P.; Roglans-Ribas, J.; Kalenchuk, D.

    2004-01-01

    Enhanced proliferation resistance and physical protection (PR and PP) is one of the technology goals for advanced nuclear concepts, such as Generation IV systems. Under the auspices of the Generation IV International Forum, the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology of the U.S. DOE, the Office of Nonproliferation Policy of the National Nuclear Security Administration, and participating organizations from six other countries are sponsoring an international working group to develop an evaluation methodology for PR and PP. This methodology will permit an objective PR and PP comparison between alternative nuclear systems (e.g., different reactor types or fuel cycles) and support design optimization to enhance robustness against proliferation, theft and sabotage. The paper summarizes the proposed assessment methodology including the assessment framework, measures used to express the PR and PP characteristics of the system, threat definition, system element and target identification, pathway identification and analysis, and estimation of the measures

  19. Effectiveness evaluation of alternative fixed-site safeguard security systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chapman, L.D.

    1976-01-01

    An evaluation of a fixed-site physical protection system must consider the interrelationships of barriers, alarms, on-site and off-site guards, and their effectiveness against a forcible adversary attack intent on creating an act of sabotage of theft. A computer model, Forcible Entry Safeguard Effectiveness Model (FESEM), was developed for the evaluation of alternative fixed-site protection systems. It was written in the GASP IV simulation language. A hypothetical fixed-state protection system is defined and relative evaluations from a cost-effectiveness point of view are presented in order to demonstrate how the model can be used. Trade-offs involving on-site and off-site response forces and response times, perimeter system alarms, barrier configurations, and varying levels of threat are analyzed. The computer model provides a framework for performing inexpensive experiments on fixed-site security systems, for testing alternative decisions, and for determining the relative cost effectiveness associated with these decision policies

  20. Engineered safeguards system activities at Sandia Laboratories for back-end fuel cycle facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sellers, T.A.; Fienning, W.C.; Winblad, A.E.

    1978-01-01

    Sandia Laboratories have been developing concepts for safeguards systems to protect facilities in the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle against potential threats of sabotage and theft of special nuclear material (SNM). Conceptual designs for Engineered Safeguards Systems (ESSs) have been developed for a Fuel Reprocessing Facility (including chemical separations, plutonium conversion, and waste solidification), a Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility, and a Plutonium Transport Vehicle. Performance criteria for the various elements of these systems and a candidate systematic design approach have been defined. In addition, a conceptual layout for a large-scale Fuel-Cycle Plutonium Storage Facility has been completed. Work is continuing to develop safeguards systems for spent fuel facilities, light-water reactors, alternative fuel cycles, and improved transportation systems. Additional emphasis will be placed on the problems associated with national diversion of special nuclear material. The impact on safeguards element performance criteria for surveillance and containment to protect against national diversion in various alternative fuel cycle complexes is also being investigated

  1. Nuclear energy: public controversies and the analysis of risks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sills, D.L.

    1984-01-01

    Energy is a social concept, the product of social, economic, and political processes that define certain raw materials as resources and thus convert them into usable energy. Like all social concepts, energy is controversial. Out of a wide range of controversies, three are selected for analysis here: (1) the relationship of nuclear power systems to nuclear weapons proliferation; (2) the risks of terrorism and sabotage associated with the operation of nuclear power facilities, including threats to civil liberties; and (3) the problems associated with the long-term management of radioactive wastes. The final section of the paper describes various modes of analyzing risks and the perception of risks. It is concluded that it may take many decades to learn whether nuclear energy is as natural a source of electrical power as wells are of drinking water, or whether nuclear energy is a horror that mankind in the 1980s or 1990s took a hard look at and then backed away. (author)

  2. New evaluation system for antisabotage physical protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Itakura, Shuichiro; Nakagome, Yoshihiro

    2008-01-01

    The discussion on an appropriate level of physical protection has not been elaborated so far because of the confidentiality of its nature, thus resulting in a lack of consensus on this issue. In view of this context, a new system for the evaluation of antisabotage physical protection systems is proposed in this paper, in which we introduce openness to a certain extent in the process of the evaluation. The proposed system is composed of the following three elements; (1) establishment of an evaluation basis threat (EBT), which should be less strong but more likely to occur than the design basis threat (DBT); (2) employment of realistic standard scenarios in the process of evaluation; (3) disclosure of results of evaluation implemented based on the above EBT and standard scenarios. It is expected that this considerably open system will foment peace of mind among citizens as well as create a deterrent effect that would minimize the occurrence of sabotage on nuclear facilities. (author)

  3. Facility Targeting, Protection and Mission Decision Making Using the VISAC Code

    Science.gov (United States)

    Morris, Robert H.; Sulfredge, C. David

    2011-01-01

    The Visual Interactive Site Analysis Code (VISAC) has been used by DTRA and several other agencies to aid in targeting facilities and to predict the associated collateral effects for the go, no go mission decision making process. VISAC integrates the three concepts of target geometric modeling, damage assessment capabilities, and an event/fault tree methodology for evaluating accident/incident consequences. It can analyze a variety of accidents/incidents at nuclear or industrial facilities, ranging from simple component sabotage to an attack with military or terrorist weapons. For nuclear facilities, VISAC predicts the facility damage, estimated downtime, amount and timing of any radionuclides released. Used in conjunction with DTRA's HPAC code, VISAC also can analyze transport and dispersion of the radionuclides, levels of contamination of the surrounding area, and the population at risk. VISAC has also been used by the NRC to aid in the development of protective measures for nuclear facilities that may be subjected to attacks by car/truck bombs.

  4. Development of computer-based analytical tool for assessing physical protection system

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mardhi, Alim, E-mail: alim-m@batan.go.id [National Nuclear Energy Agency Indonesia, (BATAN), PUSPIPTEK area, Building 80, Serpong, Tangerang Selatan, Banten (Indonesia); Chulalongkorn University, Faculty of Engineering, Nuclear Engineering Department, 254 Phayathai Road, Pathumwan, Bangkok Thailand. 10330 (Thailand); Pengvanich, Phongphaeth, E-mail: ppengvan@gmail.com [Chulalongkorn University, Faculty of Engineering, Nuclear Engineering Department, 254 Phayathai Road, Pathumwan, Bangkok Thailand. 10330 (Thailand)

    2016-01-22

    Assessment of physical protection system effectiveness is the priority for ensuring the optimum protection caused by unlawful acts against a nuclear facility, such as unauthorized removal of nuclear materials and sabotage of the facility itself. Since an assessment based on real exercise scenarios is costly and time-consuming, the computer-based analytical tool can offer the solution for approaching the likelihood threat scenario. There are several currently available tools that can be used instantly such as EASI and SAPE, however for our research purpose it is more suitable to have the tool that can be customized and enhanced further. In this work, we have developed a computer–based analytical tool by utilizing the network methodological approach for modelling the adversary paths. The inputs are multi-elements in security used for evaluate the effectiveness of the system’s detection, delay, and response. The tool has capability to analyze the most critical path and quantify the probability of effectiveness of the system as performance measure.

  5. Enersec conference series. Nuclear energy and security (NUSEC). Book of abstracts

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Steinhaeusler, F; Heissl, C [Division of Physics and Biophysics, University of Salzburg, Hellbrunnerstrasse 34, Salzburg (Austria)

    2005-07-01

    Full text: After the terror attacks in the last years, the issue of security of nuclear power plants was raised, therefore members of national regulatory agencies, international organizations, and research institutions have engaged in the assessment of the security threats to nuclear facilities and the potential risks to man and the environment in the case of a successful terror attack. The risks range from the theft of nuclear material leading to illicit trafficking, to sabotage of nuclear power plants, and attacks on spent fuel transport resulting in an uncontrolled release of radioactivity. The NUSEC conference was focused on the security-related risks in the nuclear sector and its objective was to provide an overview of the currently available terrorism risk assessment methodology and international security approaches. Papers were presented in the following sessions: security of nuclear material, security of nuclear power plants, security of the transport of nuclear material, security of nuclear waste, national approaches to nuclear security and future outlook. (nevyjel)

  6. Audit program for physical security systems at nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Minichino, C.

    1982-01-01

    Licensees of nuclear power plants conduct audits of their physical security systems to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 73, Physical Protection of Plants and Materials. Section 73.55, Requirements for physical Protection of Licensed Activities in Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiological Sabotage, requires that the security programs be reviewed at least every 12 months, that the audit be conducted by individuals independent of both security management and security supervision, and that the audit program review all aspects of the physical security system: hardware, personnel, and operational and maintenance procedures. This report contains information for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and for the licensees of nuclear power reactors who carry out these comprehensive audits. Guidance on the overall management of the audit function includes organizational structure and issues concerning the auditors who perform the review: qualifications, independence, due professional care, and standards. Guidance in the audit program includes purpose and scope of the audit, planning, techniques, post-audit procedures, reporting, and follow-up

  7. Antiservice Within the Medical Service Encounter: Lessons for Radiologists Beyond Service Recovery.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hill, Paul Armstrong; Hill, Ronald Paul

    2015-12-01

    Recent modifications in the metrics for reimbursement have reinforced the importance of radiology service-delivery experiences of patients. Evaluating current radiology practices calls for reflection on the various touch points with patients, as well as their overall satisfaction. If problems occur during encounters, service failure, or lack of satisfactory medical experiences can be transformed through service recovery, whereby patients-as-customers are given chances to voice their concerns, and health care providers across the spectrum can work together to resolve problematic issues. This paper takes a systemic view of the patient experience as embedded in the care continuum, recognizing that different beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors of members of the health care team can negatively affect or sabotage patient satisfaction. Although radiologists are only one of many roles in the care continuum, recommendations are discussed for how they can integrate service satisfaction as a pervasive communal goal among all health care team members. Copyright © 2015 American College of Radiology. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  8. Radiological Safety Analysis Computer (RSAC) Program Version 7.0 Users’ Manual

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dr. Bradley J Schrader

    2009-03-01

    The Radiological Safety Analysis Computer (RSAC) Program Version 7.0 (RSAC-7) is the newest version of the RSAC legacy code. It calculates the consequences of a release of radionuclides to the atmosphere. A user can generate a fission product inventory from either reactor operating history or a nuclear criticality event. RSAC-7 models the effects of high-efficiency particulate air filters or other cleanup systems and calculates the decay and ingrowth during transport through processes, facilities, and the environment. Doses are calculated for inhalation, air immersion, ground surface, ingestion, and cloud gamma pathways. RSAC-7 can be used as a tool to evaluate accident conditions in emergency response scenarios, radiological sabotage events and to evaluate safety basis accident consequences. This users’ manual contains the mathematical models and operating instructions for RSAC-7. Instructions, screens, and examples are provided to guide the user through the functions provided by RSAC-7. This program was designed for users who are familiar with radiological dose assessment methods.

  9. Radiological Safety Analysis Computer (RSAC) Program Version 7.2 Users’ Manual

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dr. Bradley J Schrader

    2010-10-01

    The Radiological Safety Analysis Computer (RSAC) Program Version 7.2 (RSAC-7) is the newest version of the RSAC legacy code. It calculates the consequences of a release of radionuclides to the atmosphere. A user can generate a fission product inventory from either reactor operating history or a nuclear criticality event. RSAC-7 models the effects of high-efficiency particulate air filters or other cleanup systems and calculates the decay and ingrowth during transport through processes, facilities, and the environment. Doses are calculated for inhalation, air immersion, ground surface, ingestion, and cloud gamma pathways. RSAC-7 can be used as a tool to evaluate accident conditions in emergency response scenarios, radiological sabotage events and to evaluate safety basis accident consequences. This users’ manual contains the mathematical models and operating instructions for RSAC-7. Instructions, screens, and examples are provided to guide the user through the functions provided by RSAC-7. This program was designed for users who are familiar with radiological dose assessment methods.

  10. Compulsory declaration of the loss or theft of property and of serious events: New rules and reminder

    CERN Document Server

    2014-01-01

    This notification cancels and replaces the notifications published in Bulletins Nos. 13-14/2006 and 28-29/2009 and the update of 18 November 2011.   1.     Definitions "fenced part of the CERN site" means all the different fenced areas used by the Organization, including remote buildings and underground facilities, "serious event" means any event infringing the rules designed to protect people and property (e.g. attacks, threats, acts of sabotage, vandalism).   2.   Internal declarations The loss or theft of property and serious events must be declared internally if they occur: within the fenced part of the CERN site, irrespective of the person and item concerned, outside the fenced part of the CERN site if CERN is the owner or custodian of the item concerned.   3.   Who must make the declaration? In principle, the loss or theft of property and serious events m...

  11. Development of computer-based analytical tool for assessing physical protection system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mardhi, Alim; Pengvanich, Phongphaeth

    2016-01-01

    Assessment of physical protection system effectiveness is the priority for ensuring the optimum protection caused by unlawful acts against a nuclear facility, such as unauthorized removal of nuclear materials and sabotage of the facility itself. Since an assessment based on real exercise scenarios is costly and time-consuming, the computer-based analytical tool can offer the solution for approaching the likelihood threat scenario. There are several currently available tools that can be used instantly such as EASI and SAPE, however for our research purpose it is more suitable to have the tool that can be customized and enhanced further. In this work, we have developed a computer–based analytical tool by utilizing the network methodological approach for modelling the adversary paths. The inputs are multi-elements in security used for evaluate the effectiveness of the system’s detection, delay, and response. The tool has capability to analyze the most critical path and quantify the probability of effectiveness of the system as performance measure

  12. Human nature, human culture: the case of cultural evolution.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lewens, Tim

    2017-10-06

    In recent years, far from arguing that evolutionary approaches to our own species permit us to describe the fundamental character of human nature, a prominent group of cultural evolutionary theorists has instead argued that the very idea of 'human nature' is one we should reject. It makes no sense, they argue, to speak of human nature in opposition to human culture. The very same sceptical arguments have also led some thinkers-usually from social anthropology-to dismiss the intimately related idea that we can talk of human culture in opposition to human nature. How, then, are we supposed to understand the cultural evolutionary project itself, whose proponents seem to deny the distinction between human nature and human culture, while simultaneously relying on a closely allied distinction between 'genetic' (or sometimes 'organic') evolution and 'cultural' evolution? This paper defends the cultural evolutionary project against the charge that, in refusing to endorse the concept of human nature, it has inadvertently sabotaged itself.

  13. Combined evaluation. Plutonium transports in France. Problems of safety and reliability of transport container FS47

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marignac, Y.; Coeytaux, X.; Large, J.H.

    2004-09-01

    This report concerns the safety and the protection of plutonium dioxide transported from Cogema La Hague to the mixed oxide fuel plant of Marcoule and Cadarache. The French approach of the transport safety is based on the combining of two essential principles: the first one affirms that the performances of the FS47 container in regard of containment (norms TS-R-1 from IAEA for the accidental conditions) is conceived to resist in any situation even terrorism or sabotage. In fact, the IAEA norm follows a probabilistic study without a voluntary attack such a terrorist one. The second principle rests on the ability to prevent the treat of terrorism acts, because of a secrecy policy on the plutonium transport. It appeared that the Green peace association has succeeded several times to know exactly the hours, the trips of the plutonium transport and this simple thing raises more questions than it solves. (N.C.)

  14. Insight: Exploring Hidden Roles in Collaborative Play

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Tricia Shi

    2015-06-01

    Full Text Available This paper looks into interaction modes between players in co-located, collaborative games. In particular, hidden traitor games, in which one or more players is secretly working against the group mission, has the effect of increasing paranoia and distrust between players, so this paper looks into the opposite of a hidden traitor – a hidden benefactor. Rather than sabotaging the group mission, the hidden benefactor would help the group achieve the end goal while still having a reason to stay hidden. The paper explores what games with such a role can look like and how the role changes player interactions. Finally, the paper addresses the divide between video game and board game interaction modes; hidden roles are not common within video games, but they are of growing prevalence in board games. This fact, combined with the exploration of hidden benefactors, reveals that hidden roles is a mechanic that video games should develop into in order to match board games’ complexity of player interaction modes.

  15. Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Regional Centres of Excellence Initiative

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bril, L.V.

    2013-01-01

    This series of slides presents the initiative launched in May 2010 by the European Union to develop at national and regional levels the necessary institutional capacity to fight against the CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear) risk. The origin of the risk can be: -) criminal (proliferation, theft, sabotage and illicit traffics), -) accidental (industrial catastrophes, transport accidents...) and -) natural (mainly pandemics). The initiative consists in the creation of Centres of Excellence for providing assistance and cooperation in the field of CBRN risk and the creation of experts networks for sharing best practices, reviewing laws and regulation, developing technical capacities in order to mitigate the CBRN risk. The initiative is complementary to the instrument for nuclear safety cooperation. Regional Centres of Excellence are being set up in 6 regions: South East Europe, South East Asia, North Africa, West Africa, Middle East, and Central Asia covering nearly 40 countries. A global budget of 100 million Euros will be dedicated to this initiative for the 2009-2013 period. (A.C.)

  16. Technical Program of The 4th World Congress on Chemical, Biological and Radiological Terrorism

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2007-07-01

    Many countries worldwide were interested in the part that CBMTS industry played in the overall protection schemes required of all nations. It was idea to develop a baseline of information on antidotes and planned medical treatment for military and civilian medical casualties, in both peace and war. Based on actual incidents that affected their chemical, petrochemical and pharmaceutical industries during their recent war, countries highlighted a danger that every country could face in the event of military actions, sabotage and especially terrorist actions, as well as major incidents or accidents involving these industries. It is great importance of CBMTS approach at bringing together the world's very best professionals in science and medicine to explore at the outer edges of science and technology, the most important issue facing the international community. Participants put big efforts towards defining the issues, surfacing the problems across the NBC science and medical spectrum and applying the best efforts at developing solutions that would most benefit our world community.

  17. Lesser known aspects of Ludwik Fleck's (1896-1961) heroic life during World War II.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Grzybowski, Andrzej; Ciesielska, Maria

    2016-08-01

    Professor Ludwik Fleck was a famous scientist and a prominent philosopher. Although his life and work were studied extensively, the Second World War period was a subject of some discussion and controversy. On account of his Jewish origin, he was first arrested and moved from the Lwów ghetto to the 'Laokoon' factory and then imprisoned in KL Auschwitz-Birkenau and in KL Buchenwald. Fleck produced the anti-typhus vaccine in the chemo-bacteriological laboratory in the Jewish Hospital at Kuszewicza Street and in the 'Laokoon' factory in Lwów. During his incarceration in KL Auschwitz-Birkenau, Fleck worked in the camp laboratory in Block 10 carrying out bacteriological studies for the inmates and then was assigned to work in the Wasserman station in Rajsko. From January 1944 Fleck performed routine laboratory tests in Block 50 in KL Buchenwald. Though Fleck had a privileged life in the camp, he participated in the sabotage activities organized by the camp resistance. © The Author(s) 2016.

  18. Nuclear Waste Transportation Safety Act of 1979. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, Ninety-Sixth Congress, first session on S. 535, July 18-20, 1979

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1980-01-01

    The Nuclear Waste Transportation Safety Act of 1979 provides for the safe transportation of nuclear waste and nuclear fuel. The issues evaluated during the hearing included: (1) The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 conveyed to the NRC the prior existing authority of the former Atomic Energy Commission to regulate transportation of radioactive nuclear fuel and nuclear waste. The Hazardous Material Transportation Act of 1974 consolidated within the Department of Transportation the regulatory authority for safety and transportation of all hazardous substances, including radioactive materials; should consultation and coordination between these regulating authorities continue to be used. (2) The specific areas of transportation regulation involved in this combination; (3) Should the Department of Transportation (DOT) become a separate office; (4) Is security against theft and sabotage necessary and realistically attainable; (5) Should DOT be responsible for assuring a coordinated Federal-State emergency response plan for possible nuclear related transportation emergencies; and (6) Is the Federal grant program of S. 535 necessary and adequate

  19. Radiological Safety Analysis Computer (RSAC) Program Version 7.0 Users Manual

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schrader, Bradley J.

    2009-01-01

    The Radiological Safety Analysis Computer (RSAC) Program Version 7.0 (RSAC-7) is the newest version of the RSAC legacy code. It calculates the consequences of a release of radionuclides to the atmosphere. A user can generate a fission product inventory from either reactor operating history or a nuclear criticality event. RSAC-7 models the effects of high-efficiency particulate air filters or other cleanup systems and calculates the decay and ingrowth during transport through processes, facilities, and the environment. Doses are calculated for inhalation, air immersion, ground surface, ingestion, and cloud gamma pathways. RSAC-7 can be used as a tool to evaluate accident conditions in emergency response scenarios, radiological sabotage events and to evaluate safety basis accident consequences. This users manual contains the mathematical models and operating instructions for RSAC-7. Instructions, screens, and examples are provided to guide the user through the functions provided by RSAC-7. This program was designed for users who are familiar with radiological dose assessment methods

  20. Development of computer-based analytical tool for assessing physical protection system

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mardhi, Alim; Pengvanich, Phongphaeth

    2016-01-01

    Assessment of physical protection system effectiveness is the priority for ensuring the optimum protection caused by unlawful acts against a nuclear facility, such as unauthorized removal of nuclear materials and sabotage of the facility itself. Since an assessment based on real exercise scenarios is costly and time-consuming, the computer-based analytical tool can offer the solution for approaching the likelihood threat scenario. There are several currently available tools that can be used instantly such as EASI and SAPE, however for our research purpose it is more suitable to have the tool that can be customized and enhanced further. In this work, we have developed a computer-based analytical tool by utilizing the network methodological approach for modelling the adversary paths. The inputs are multi-elements in security used for evaluate the effectiveness of the system's detection, delay, and response. The tool has capability to analyze the most critical path and quantify the probability of effectiveness of the system as performance measure.

  1. To arbitrate or not to arbitrate: that is the question

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kowch, J.R.M.

    1996-01-01

    Price arbitration under a gas sales contract was discussed. Arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism can be a costly, time consuming and often frustrating experience. However, it is a fact of life that until more creative ways of ensuring a market sensitive price over the term of a gas sales contract are developed, there will exist a need for arbitration. In arbitration, the parties submit their dispute to an impartial person or group of persons, for resolution. It is an alternative to the civil court system for resolving disputes; it is private, convenient, has less procedural rules and allows parties to choose their own judge with some expertise. However, the absence of specific rules of procedure or a means of enforcing them, could allow one party to sabotage the process. It was noted that gas deal makers take a cautious look at arbitration as a price dispute resolution mechanism. Alternatives to arbitration, and points to consider if arbitration is chosen, were described

  2. Design Basis Threat (DBT) Approach for the First NPP Security System in Indonesia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ign Djoko Irianto

    2004-01-01

    Design Basis Threat (DBT) is one of the main factors to be taken into account in the design of physical protection system of nuclear facility. In accordance with IAEA's recommendations outlined in INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected), DBT is defined as: attributes and characteristics of potential insider and/or external adversaries, who might attempt unauthorized removal of nuclear material or sabotage against the nuclear facilities. There are three types of adversary that must be considered in DBT, such as adversary who comes from the outside (external adversary), adversary who comes from the inside (internal adversary), and adversary who comes from outside and colludes with insiders. Current situation in Indonesia, where many bomb attacks occurred, requires serious attention on DBT in the physical protection design of NPP which is to be built in Indonesia. This paper is intended to describe the methodology on how to create and implement a Design Basis Threat in the design process of NPP physical protection in Indonesia. (author)

  3. Enersec conference series. Nuclear energy and security (NUSEC). Book of abstracts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Steinhaeusler, F.; Heissl, C.

    2005-01-01

    Full text: After the terror attacks in the last years, the issue of security of nuclear power plants was raised, therefore members of national regulatory agencies, international organizations, and research institutions have engaged in the assessment of the security threats to nuclear facilities and the potential risks to man and the environment in the case of a successful terror attack. The risks range from the theft of nuclear material leading to illicit trafficking, to sabotage of nuclear power plants, and attacks on spent fuel transport resulting in an uncontrolled release of radioactivity. The NUSEC conference was focused on the security-related risks in the nuclear sector and its objective was to provide an overview of the currently available terrorism risk assessment methodology and international security approaches. Papers were presented in the following sessions: security of nuclear material, security of nuclear power plants, security of the transport of nuclear material, security of nuclear waste, national approaches to nuclear security and future outlook. (nevyjel)

  4. Development of the efficient emergency preparedness system for the nuclear critical infrastructure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kostadinov, V.; Marn, J.; Petelin, S.

    2007-01-01

    plants security, reliability and availability. The basic objectives of performing a nuclear power plant vulnerability assessment are to better understand threats and vulnerabilities, determine acceptable levels of a risk, and incorporate countermeasures to reduce identified vulnerabilities. The prevention of a nuclear power plant shutdown because of the terrorist attack or sabotage will avoid loss of overall national economic activities. Initial estimates of only economic losses due to the nuclear power plant shutdown because of the terrorist attack and/or sabotage could run into millions of dollars, depending on the size and types of areas affected. First attempts of developing the new methodology for the nuclear critical infrastructure vulnerability assessment as a part of an efficient emergency preparedness system are presented. (author)

  5. Security of material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nilsson, A.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: From the early days of discovery and experimentation with nuclear science, nuclear and radioactive materials have held extraordinary potential for being of great benefit to humankind, as well as for causing significant harm. For the past forty years, the IAEA has played an important role in ensuring that nuclear technologies and materials are used only for peaceful purposes. The Agency's safeguards programme has been providing assurances that States honour their undertakings to use nuclear facilities and materials for peaceful purposes only. The potential of nuclear materials and other radioactive materials being used in subversive activities, such as theft, illicit trafficking, sabotage and threats thereof, has been recognized by the international community. The tragic events in New York have given new light to and increased concern for this potential. No target may be considered immune from terrorism. Since 1993, States have confirmed over 370 cases of illicit trafficking. Information is also available on potential attempts of and actual acts of sabotage. For any State, the first step in ensuring the security of their materials is an effective national system. Such a system must contain multiple elements, including physical protection measures, material accountability arrangements, reliable detection capabilities, and plans for rapid and effective response when material is found to be lost, stolen or otherwise not under proper control. The system must also cover illegal waste dumping and other activities that would result in the release of radioactive material into the environment. All these measures should be based on well founded legal and regulatory structures. In many cases, the responsibility for these various elements lies with different bodies, and co-operation between them is vital to the success of the national system. The Agency's programme Security of Material aims at being of service to States in their efforts to upgrade their security

  6. Genetic profiling to determine potential origins of boll weevils (Coleoptera: Curculionidae) captured in a Texas eradication zone: endemicity, immigration, or sabotage?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kim, Kyung Seok; Sappington, Thomas W; Allen, Charles T

    2008-12-01

    Thirty-seven boll weevils, Anthonomus grandis grandis Boheman (Coleoptera: Curculionidae), were captured in pheromone traps near Lubbock, TX, in the Southern High Plains/Caprock eradication zone during August-October 2006. No boll weevils had been captured in this zone or neighboring zones to the north earlier in the year, and only very low numbers had been captured in neighboring zones to the south and east. Therefore, the captures near Lubbock were unexpected. Five of the weevils captured the last week of August were preserved and genotyped at 10 microsatellite loci for comparison with a database of genotypes for 22 boll weevil populations sampled from eight U.S. states and four locations in Mexico. The Lubbock population itself is an unlikely source, suggesting that the captured weevils probably did not originate from a low-level endemic population. Populations from eastern states, Mexico, and Big Spring, TX, can be confidently excluded as potential source regions. Although the Weslaco and Kingsville, TX, areas cannot be statistically excluded, they are unlikely sources. The most likely sources are nearby areas in New Mexico, TX, or southwest Oklahoma, or from areas of eastern Texas represented by Waxahachie and El Campo populations. Together, genetic and circumstantial evidence suggest either that the trapped boll weevils are the offspring of alone mated female that immigrated from eastern Texas earlier in the summer or that weevils originally captured near Waxahachie but now long-dead were planted in the traps by a disgruntled employee of the eradication program.

  7. 1996 NRC annual report. Volume 13

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-10-01

    This 22nd annual report of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) describes accomplishments, activities, and plans made during Fiscal Year 1996 (FH 1996)--October 1, 1995, through September 30, 1996. Significant activities that occurred early in FY 1997 are also described, particularly changes in the Commission and organization of the NRC. The mission of the NRC is to ensure that civilian uses of nuclear materials in the US are carried out with adequate protection of public health and safety, the environment, and national security. These uses include the operation of nuclear power plants and fuel cycle plants and medical, industrial, and research applications. Additionally, the NRC contributes to combating the proliferation of nuclear weapons material worldwide. The NRC licenses and regulates commercial nuclear reactor operations and research reactors and other activities involving the possession and use of nuclear materials and wastes. It also protects nuclear materials used in operation and facilities from theft or sabotage. To accomplish its statutorily mandated regulatory mission, the NRC issues rules and standards, inspects facilities and operations, and issues any required enforcement actions.

  8. Stalking: A Multidimensional Framework for Assessment and Safety Planning.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Logan, T K; Walker, Robert

    2015-09-03

    Despite the high prevalence of stalking and the risk of harm it poses to victims, arrest rates, prosecutions, and convictions for stalking continue to be low in the United States. The overall goal of this article is to introduce a multidimensional framework of stalking that adds to the current literature by (1) providing a conceptual framework consistent with legal elements of many stalking statutes to facilitate assessment, communication, documentation, and safety planning for stalking several victims; (2) introducing a more systematic way of assessing course of conduct and the context of fear in stalking situations in order to increase the understanding of cumulative fear for stalking victims; (3) emphasizing the aspects of stalking harm that go beyond violence and that show how harm from stalking accumulates over time including life sabotage; and (4) discussing 12 risk factors derived from the overall multidimensional framework that can be used to describe the big picture of stalking and to facilitate safety planning for victims. Implications for future research are discussed. © The Author(s) 2015.

  9. Nuclear energy risks and benefits

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jansen, S.D.; Bailey, R.E.; Randolph, J.C.; Hartnett, J.P.; Mastanaiah, K.

    1981-09-01

    The report was prepared as part of the Ohio River Basin Energy Study (ORBES), a multidisciplinary policy research program. The study region consists of all of Kentucky, most of West Virginia, and substantial portions of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. By 1988, coal-fired electrical generating capacity in the region is expected to total over 100,000 MWe, versus about 11,000 MWe projected for nuclear-fueled capacity by that year. Thus, the ORBES emphasis was on coal-fired generation. This report attempts to fill in some of the gaps in the relative lack of emphasis on the risks and benefits of nuclear electricity production in the study region. It covers the following topics: (1) basic facts about radiation, (2) an overview of the current regulatory framework of the nuclear industry, (3) health risks associated with electricity production by LWRs, (4) the risks of nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and sabotage, (5) comparative economics and healthy risks of coal versus nuclear, and (6) the March 1979 accident at Three Mile Island

  10. Risk reduction and TQM: A corporate culture of continuous improvement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nau, D.C.

    1992-01-01

    A company supplying products and services to the nuclear industry that implements a cultural commitment to continuous improvement, in addition to providing higher quality products and services, also represents a significant reduction in operational risk to that industry. The implementation of a culture of total quality management (TQM), initiated by Sorrento Electronics (SE) in 1989, involves total commitment to the basic TQM principles: continuous improvement, people performing the work are the best sources of how to do it better, and employees must be empowered to make the improvements. What this means to the nuclear industry is a significant reduction in operational risk through: (1) products based on simpler, standardized, proven designs with established operational track records, enhancing confidence that they will perform as expected; (2) the highest confidence that products and supporting documentation are delivered with zero defects; (3) critical power plant schedules can be supported through the shortest possible equipment delivery times; (4) highly motivated employees with extremely positive attitudes, working together in cross-functional teams, virtually eliminate the possibility of deliberate product tampering or sabotage

  11. A heuristic approach for the evaluation of Physical Protection System effectiveness

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zou, Bowen; Yang, Ming; Guo, Jia; Benjamin, Emi-Reybold; Wu, Wenfei

    2017-01-01

    Highlights: • A heuristic approach is applied for the evaluation of PPS effectiveness (HAPPS). • Import 2-D engineering drawings into the analysis application, identify the information contained in the model. Use the HAPPS method as search algorithm to seek the vulnerable adversary intrusion and escape path under certain conditions. • Redesign the PPS by the evaluation results. - Abstract: Physical Protection System (PPS) is essential for each nuclear power plant to safeguard its nuclear materials and nuclear facilities from theft, robbery, illegal transport and sabotage. This paper presents a novel method (HAPPS) combined with Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption (EASI) method and heuristic approach (Ant Colony Optimization, ACO) for analyzing and evaluating the PPS effectiveness of NPPs. Import 2-D engineering drawings into the analysis application, identify the information contained in the model, and use the HAPPS method as search algorithm to seek the vulnerable adversary intrusion and escape path under certain conditions. The results of PPS effectiveness analysis will provide a detailed technical feedback for redesigning PPS.

  12. Academic Training Lectures | Stuxnet and Cyber-Warfare | 13-14 January 2016

    CERN Multimedia

    2015-01-01

    Please note that the next series of Academic Training Lectures will take place on 13 and 14 January 2016. The lectures will be given by Gian Piero Siroli (Università e INFN, Bologna (IT))   Stuxnet and Cyber-Warfare (1/2)​ on Wednesday, 13 January from 11 a.m. to 12 p.m. http://indico.cern.ch/event/438525/ Stuxnet and Cyber-Warfare (2/2) on Thursday, 14 January from 11 a.m. to 12 p.m. http://indico.cern.ch/event/438526/ at CERN, Council Chamber (503-1-001)  Description: The first part of the lecture is devoted to the description of the Stuxnet worm, the first cyber-weapon whose existence has been made public, discovered in 2010 and targeting a specific industrial control system; the worm is responsible for the damaging of many centrifuges at an uranium enrichment facility, with the goal of sabotaging Iran&...

  13. Analysis of vulnerability to intrusion - a software for aid in training, design, and implementation of physical system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tangdan

    2002-01-01

    Full text: In this paper, we discuss briefly the developed level of physical protection system (PPS) in different Chinese history stage, and the relation between PPS and society, politics, military and security. It reveals the current status of application of PPS in China, and the level of design, implementation, evaluation and products. We also discuss the developing direction and applying tendency of PPS in future China. We mainly introduce a software using the ASD to evaluate the effectiveness of the PPS at a facility. It is used for training, design, and implementation of physical system. It identifies the path which adversaries can follow to accomplish sabotage or theft. For a specific PPS and threat, the most vulnerable path can be determined. The path probability of interruption P(I) establishes of the total PPS. Especially, we introduce how to specify threat characteristics bases the situation of present Chinese society, based global and local threat development. We also introduce how to build a data base of different elements based on the level of crime at present China. (author)

  14. From lab to clinic: Extinction of cued cravings to reduce overeating.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jansen, Anita; Schyns, Ghislaine; Bongers, Peggy; van den Akker, Karolien

    2016-08-01

    Food cue reactivity is a strong motivation to eat, even in the absence of hunger. Therefore, food cue reactivity might sabotage healthy eating, induce weight gain and impede weight loss or weight maintenance. Food cue reactivity can be learned via Pavlovian appetitive conditioning: It is easily acquired but the extinction of appetitive responding seems to be more challenging. Several properties of extinction make it fragile: extinction does not erase the original learning and extinction is context-dependent. These properties threaten full extinction and increase the risk of full relapse. Extinction procedures are discussed to reduce or prevent the occurrence of rapid reacquisition, spontaneous recovery, renewal and reinstatement after extinction. A translation to food cue exposure treatment is made and suggestions are provided, such as conducting the exposure in relevant contexts, using occasional reinforcement and targeting expectancy violation instead of habituation. A new hypothesis proposed here is that the adding of inhibition training to strengthen inhibition skills that reduce instrumental responding, might be beneficial to improve food cue exposure effects. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  15. DOE assessment guide for safeguards and security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bennett, C.A.; Christorpherson, W.E.; Clark, R.J.; Martin, F.; Hodges, Jr.

    1978-04-01

    DOE operations are periodically assessed to assure that special nuclear material, restricted data, and other classified information and DOE facilities are executed toward continuing the effectiveness of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. A guide to describe the philosophy and mechanisms through which these assessments are conducted is presented. The assessment program is concerned with all contractor, field office, and Headquarters activities which are designed to assure that safeguards and security objectives are reached by contractors at DOE facilities and operations. The guide takes into account the interlocking relationship between many of the elements of an effective safeguards and security program. Personnel clearance programs are a part of protecting classified information as well as nuclear materials. Barriers that prevent or limit access may contribute to preventing theft of government property as well as protecting against sabotage. Procedures for control and surveillance need to be integrated with both information systems and procedures for mass balance accounting. Wherever possible, assessment procedures have been designed to perform integrated inspection, evaluation, and follow-up for the safeguards and security program

  16. Nuclear materials transport worldwide. Greenpeace report 2. Der weltweite Atomtransport. Greenpeace Report 2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Stellpflug, J.

    1987-01-01

    This Greenpeace report shows: nuclear materials transport is an extremely hazardous business. There is no safe protection against accidents, kidnapping, or sabotage. Any moment of a day, at any place, a nuclear transport accident may bring the world to disaster, releasing plutonium or radioactive fission products to the environment. Such an event is not less probable than the MCA at Chernobyl. The author of the book in hand follows the secret track of radioactive materials around the world, from uranium mines to the nuclear power plants, from reprocessing facilities to the waste repositories. He explores the routes of transport and the risks involved, he gives the names of transport firms and discloses incidents and carelessness, tells about damaged waste drums and plutonium that 'disappeared'. He also tells about worldwide, organised resistance to such nuclear transports, explaining the Greenpeace missions on the open sea, or the 'day X' operation at the Gorleben site, informing the reader about protests and actions for a world freed from the threat of nuclear energy.

  17. Statement at Nuclear Security Summit, 25 March 2014, The Hague, Netherlands

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Amano, Y.

    2014-01-01

    In recent years, world leaders have put the need to protect nuclear and other radioactive material from malicious acts high on the international agenda. Many of the commitments made at the first two nuclear security summits have been fulfilled. Globally, much has been achieved in the past decade. Many countries have taken effective measures to prevent theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer, or other malicious acts involving nuclear or other radioactive material. Security has been improved at many facilities containing such material. While the responsibility for nuclear security at the national level rests entirely with each State, the central role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in helping to strengthen the global nuclear security framework is widely recognized. We continue to expand the services we offer. However, too much nuclear material still goes missing. Too many facilities are still inadequately protected. Border security remains lax in too many places. And attempts are still being made to acquire nuclear or other radioactive material with malicious intent. The threat of nuclear terrorism remains real

  18. Perceived risk, stigma, and potential economic impacts of a high-level nuclear waste repository in Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Slovic, P.; Layman, M.; Kraus, N.; Flynn, J.; Chalmers, J.; Gesell, G.

    1991-01-01

    This study investigates the potential impacts of the proposed nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, upon tourism, retirement and job-related migration, and business development in Las Vegas and the state. Adverse impacts may be expected to result from perceptions of risk, stigmatization, and socially amplified reactions to 'unfortunate events' associated with the repository (major and minor accidents, discoveries of radiation releases, evidence of mismanagement, attempts to sabotage or disrupt the facility, etc.). The conceptual underpinnings of risk perception, stigmatization, and social amplification are discussed and empirical data are presented to demonstrate how nuclear images associated with Las Vegas and the State of Nevada might trigger adverse economic effects. The possibility that intense negative imagery associated with the repository may cause significant harm to Nevada's economy can no longer be ignored by serious attempts to assess the risks and impacts of this unique facility. The behavioral processes described here appear relevant as well to the social impact assessment of any proposed facility that produces, uses, transports, or disposes of hazardous materials

  19. Impaired spontaneous anthropomorphizing despite intact perception and social knowledge

    Science.gov (United States)

    Heberlein, Andrea S.; Adolphs, Ralph

    2004-01-01

    Humans spontaneously imbue the world with social meaning: we see not only emotions and intentional behaviors in humans and other animals, but also anger in the movements of thunderstorms and willful sabotage in crashing computers. Converging evidence supports a role for the amygdala, a collection of nuclei in the temporal lobe, in processing emotionally and socially relevant information. Here, we report that a patient with bilateral amygdala damage described a film of animated shapes (normally seen as full of social content) in entirely asocial, geometric terms, despite otherwise normal visual perception. Control tasks showed that the impairment did not result from a global inability to describe social stimuli or a bias in language use, nor was a similar impairment observed in eight comparison subjects with damage to orbitofrontal cortex. This finding extends the role of the amygdala to the social attributions we make even to stimuli that are not explicitly social and, in so doing, suggests that the human capacity for anthropomorphizing draws on some of the same neural systems as do basic emotional responses. PMID:15123799

  20. Review of the nuclear safeguards problem

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Poch, L.A.; Wolsko, T.D.

    1979-10-01

    The issues surrounding nuclear safeguards are proliferation and terrorism. Protecting the nuclear fuel cycle against nuclear materials diversion has been the function of the NPT and the IAEA. However, because all nations have not signed the NPT and IAEA safeguarding inspections are not foolproof, the fuel cycle itself has been looked to as a possible way to alleviate concerns over proliferation. A civilian nuclear industry is not needed to produce weapon material, since research reactors can provide the necessary weapon-grade uranium or plutonium much cheaper and easier than commercial power reactors. Thus, altering the nuclear fuel cycle does not necessarily reduce the possibility of proliferation of nuclear weapons. Only strict enforcement of the NPT and of the safeguard guidelines of the IAEA can achieve nonproliferation. Changing the fuel cycle does not present terrorists from stealing highly radioactive material to be used for weapons or from sabotaging nuclear facilities. Policing a nuclear facility by using guards, alarms, barriers, and searching and screening of employees is the only way to protect against terrorism, but these actions raise questions regarding civil liberties

  1. Options for small and medium sized reactors (SMRs) to overcome loss of economies of scale and incorporate increased proliferation resistance and energy security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuznetsov, Vladimir

    2008-01-01

    The designers of innovative small and medium sized reactors pursue new design and deployment strategies making use of certain advantages provided by smaller reactor size and capacity to achieve reduced design complexity and simplified operation and maintenance requirements, and to provide for incremental capacity increase through multi-module plant clustering. Competitiveness of SMRs depends on the incorporated strategies to overcome loss of economies of scale but equally it depends on finding appropriate market niches for such reactors. For many less developed countries, these are the features of enhanced proliferation resistance and increased robustness of barriers for sabotage protection that may ensure the progress of nuclear power. For such countries, small reactors without on-site refuelling, designed for infrequent replacement of well-contained fuel cassette(s) in a manner that impedes clandestine diversion of nuclear fuel material, may provide a solution. Based on the outputs of recent IAEA activities for innovative SMRs, the paper provides a summary of the state-of-the-art in approaches to improve SMR competitiveness and incorporate enhanced proliferation resistance and energy security. (author)

  2. Assumptions and Policy Decisions for Vital Area Identification Analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Myungsu; Bae, Yeon-Kyoung; Lee, Youngseung [KHNP CRI, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and IAEA guidance indicate that certain assumptions and policy questions should be addressed to a Vital Area Identification (VAI) process. Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power conducted a VAI based on current Design Basis Threat and engineering judgement to identify APR1400 vital areas. Some of the assumptions were inherited from Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) as a sabotage logic model was based on PSA logic tree and equipment location data. This paper illustrates some important assumptions and policy decisions for APR1400 VAI analysis. Assumptions and policy decisions could be overlooked at the beginning stage of VAI, however they should be carefully reviewed and discussed among engineers, plant operators, and regulators. Through APR1400 VAI process, some of the policy concerns and assumptions for analysis were applied based on document research and expert panel discussions. It was also found that there are more assumptions to define for further studies for other types of nuclear power plants. One of the assumptions is mission time, which was inherited from PSA.

  3. The application of PSA techniques to the vital area identification of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ha, Jae Joo; Jung, Woo Sik; Park, Chang Kue

    2005-01-01

    This paper presents a Vital Area Identification (VAI) method based on the current Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) techniques for the physical protection of nuclear power plants. A structured framework of a Top Event Prevention set Analysis (TEPA) application to the VAI of nuclear power plants is also delineated. One of the important processes for physical protection in a nuclear power plant is VIA that is a process for identifying areas containing nuclear materials, Structures, Systems or Components (SSCs) to be protected from sabotage, which could directly or indirectly lead to core damage and unacceptable radiological consequences. A software VIP (Vital area Identification Package based on the PSA method) is being developed by KAERI for the VAI of nuclear power plants. Furthermore, the KAERI fault tree solver FTREX (Fault Tree Reliability Evaluation eXpert) is specialized for the VIP to generate the candidates of the vital areas. FTREX can generate numerous MCSs for a huge fault tree with the lowest truncation limit and all possible prevention sets

  4. Anatomy of regret: a developmental view of the depressive position and a critical turn toward love and creativity in the transforming schizoid personality.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kavaler-Adler, Susan

    2004-03-01

    This article deals with critical psychic transformation in a schizoid personality disorder that evolves in an object relations psychoanalysis in which "developmental mourning" plays a central role. Within a mourning process that allows for the grieving of loss related to arrested separation-individuation development, the analysand confronts the existential grief of regret that had always unconsciously haunted her. The unconscious guilt related to the existential grief of regret had caused much dissociation of self-experience and affect states. The analysand acknowledges her own part in the destruction of primal and current relationships after the traumatic impact of her early life is understood. This allows her to repair current relationships, both within her internal and external worlds so that she can open to capacities for love and creativity. The analysand's courage to consciously grapple with her regret (loss and guilt combined) allows her to relinquish self-sabotaging character defenses such as contempt and emotional withdrawl. Consequently, a second marriage is salvaged and enriched, and the analysand's relationship with her two children is dramatically improved.

  5. The IAEA programme on research reactor safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Abou Yehia, H.

    2007-01-01

    According to the research reactor database of IAEA (RRDB), 250 reactors are operating worldwide, 248 have been shut down and 170 have been decommissioned. Among the 248 reactors that do not run, some will resume their activities, others will be dismantled and the rest do not face a clear future. The analysis of reported incidents shows that the ageing process is a major cause of failures, more than two thirds of operating reactors are over 30 years old. It also appears that the lack of adequate regulations or safety standards for research reactors is an important issue concerning reactor safety particularly when reactors are facing re-starting or upgrading or modifications. The IAEA has launched a 4-axis program: 1) to set basic safety regulations and standards for research reactors, 2) to provide IAEA members with an efficient help for the application of these safety regulations to their reactors, 3) to foster international exchange of information on research reactor safety, and 4) to provide IAEA members with a help concerning safety issues linked to malicious acts or sabotage on research reactors

  6. Evaluation of the physical protection system of the IEA-R1 research reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vaz, Antonio C.A.; Conti, Thadeu das N.

    2013-01-01

    The '09/11' in New York and the accident at the Fukushima power plant are two events that served as worldwide reference to review some aspects of the Physical Protection System (PPS) in nuclear areas. The nuclear research reactor IEA-R1 has followed this new world order and improved the protection systems that are directly related to detection (CCTV, sensors, alarms, etc), delay (turnstile, gates, barriers, etc) and response (communication systems, response force, etc), for operation against malicious act, seeking always to avoid or minimize any possibility of threat, theft and sabotage. These actions were performed to prevent and to mitigate the consequence on the environment, economy and society from damages caused by natural hazard, as well. This study evaluates the PPS of the IEA-R1 regarding the weaknesses, strengths,and impacts of the changes resulting from the system implanted. The analyses were based on methodology developed by security experts from SANDIA National Laboratories in Texas - U.S.A, allowing the evaluation of the system through probabilistic and hypothetical analysis. (author)

  7. Perceived risk, stigma, and potential economic impacts of a high-level nuclear waste repository in Nevada.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Slovic, P; Layman, M; Kraus, N; Flynn, J; Chalmers, J; Gesell, G

    1991-12-01

    This study investigates the potential impacts of the proposed nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, upon tourism, retirement and job-related migration, and business development in Las Vegas and the state. Adverse impacts may be expected to result from perceptions of risk, stigmatization, and socially amplified reactions to "unfortunate events" associated with the repository (major and minor accidents, discoveries of radiation releases, evidence of mismanagement, attempts to sabotage or disrupt the facility, etc.). The conceptual underpinnings of risk perception, stigmatization, and social amplification are discussed and empirical data are presented to demonstrate how nuclear images associated with Las Vegas and the State of Nevada might trigger adverse economic effects. The possibility that intense negative imagery associated with the repository may cause significant harm to Nevada's economy can no longer be ignored by serious attempts to assess the risks and impacts of this unique facility. The behavioral processes described here appear relevant as well to the social impact assessment of any proposed facility that produces, uses, transports, or disposes of hazardous materials.

  8. Underground collocation of nuclear power plant reactors and repository to facilitate the post-renaissance expansion of nuclear power

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Myers, Carl W [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Elkins, Ned Z [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2008-01-01

    Underground collocation of nuclear power reactors and the nuclear waste management facilities supporting those reactors, termed an underground nuclear park (UNP), appears to have several advantages compared to the conventional approach to siting reactors and waste management facilities. These advantages include the potential to lower reactor capital and operating cost, lower nuclear waste management cost, and increase margins of physical security and safety. Envirorunental impacts related to worker health, facility accidents, waste transportation, and sabotage and terrorism appear to be lower for UNPs compared to the current approach. In-place decommissioning ofUNP reactors appears to have cost, safety, envirorunental and waste disposal advantages. The UNP approach has the potential to lead to greater public acceptance for the deployment of new power reactors. Use of the UNP during the post-nuclear renaissance time frame has the potential to enable a greater expansion of U.S. nuclear power generation than might otherwise result. Technical and economic aspects of the UNP concept need more study to determine the viability of the concept.

  9. The interpersonal effects of Facebook reassurance seeking.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Clerkin, Elise M; Smith, April R; Hames, Jennifer L

    2013-11-01

    Social networking sites like Facebook represent a potentially valuable means for individuals with low self-esteem or interpersonal difficulties to connect with others; however, recent research indicates that individuals who are most in need of social benefits from Facebook may be ineffective in their communication strategies, and thereby sabotage their potential to benefit interpersonally. The current study tested whether reassurance seeking via Facebook negatively influenced self-esteem, and whether this change in self-esteem mediated the relationship between Facebook reassurance seeking and greater thwarted belongingness and perceived burdensomeness. Participants completed measures online at two time-points approximately 24 days apart. Results provided evidence that Facebook reassurance seeking predicted lower levels of self-esteem, which in turn predicted increased feelings that one does not belong and that one is a burden. Key limitations to this study include our use of a predominantly young, female, Caucasian sample, a novel reassurance seeking measure, and only evaluating two time points. These results suggest that Facebook usage has the potential for negative and far-reaching influences on one's interpersonal functioning. Published by Elsevier B.V.

  10. Target assignment for security officers to K targets (TASK)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rowland, J.R.; Shelton, K.W.; Stunkel, C.B.

    1983-02-01

    A probabilistic algorithm is developed to provide an optimal Target Assignment for Security officers to K targets (TASK) using a maximin criterion. Under the assumption of only a limited number (N) of security officers, the TASK computer model determines deployment assignments which maximize the system protection against sabotage by an adversary who may select any link in the system, including the weakest, for the point of attack. Applying the TASK model to a hypothetical nuclear facility containing a nine-level building reveals that aggregate targets covering multiple vital areas should be utilized to reduce the number of possible target assignments to a value equal to or only slightly larger than N. The increased probability that a given aggregate target is covered by one or more security officers offsets the slight decrease in interruption probability due to its occurring earlier in the adversary's path. In brief, the TASK model determines the optimal maximin deployment strategy for limited numbers of security officers and calculates a quantitative measure of the resulting system protection

  11. Design and deployment strategies for small and medium sized reactors (SMRs) to overcome loss of economies of scale and incorporate increased proliferation resistance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuznetsov, V.

    2007-01-01

    The designers of innovative small and medium sized reactors pursue new design and deployment strategies making use of certain advantages provided by smaller reactor size and capacity to achieve reduced design complexity and simplified operation and maintenance requirements, and to provide for incremental capacity increase through multi-module plant clustering. Competitiveness of SMRs (Small and Medium size Reactor) depends on the incorporated strategies to overcome loss of economies of scale but equally it depends on finding appropriate market niches for such reactors. For many less developed countries, these are the features of enhanced proliferation resistance and increased robustness of barriers for sabotage protection that may ensure the progress of nuclear power. For such countries, small reactors without on-site refuelling, designed for infrequent replacement of well-contained fuel cassette(s) in a manner that impedes clandestine diversion of nuclear fuel material, may provide a solution. Based on the outputs of recent IAEA activities for innovative SMRs, the paper provides a summary of the state-of-the-art in approaches to improve SMR competitiveness and incorporate enhanced proliferation resistance and energy security. (author)

  12. Nuclear materials transport worldwide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stellpflug, J.

    1987-01-01

    This Greenpeace report shows: nuclear materials transport is an extremely hazardous business. There is no safe protection against accidents, kidnapping, or sabotage. Any moment of a day, at any place, a nuclear transport accident may bring the world to disaster, releasing plutonium or radioactive fission products to the environment. Such an event is not less probable than the MCA at Chernobyl. The author of the book in hand follows the secret track of radioactive materials around the world, from uranium mines to the nuclear power plants, from reprocessing facilities to the waste repositories. He explores the routes of transport and the risks involved, he gives the names of transport firms and discloses incidents and carelessness, tells about damaged waste drums and plutonium that 'disappeared'. He also tells about worldwide, organised resistance to such nuclear transports, explaining the Greenpeace missions on the open sea, or the 'day X' operation at the Gorleben site, informing the reader about protests and actions for a world freed from the threat of nuclear energy. (orig./HP) [de

  13. 1996 NRC annual report. Volume 13

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    This 22nd annual report of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) describes accomplishments, activities, and plans made during Fiscal Year 1996 (FH 1996)--October 1, 1995, through September 30, 1996. Significant activities that occurred early in FY 1997 are also described, particularly changes in the Commission and organization of the NRC. The mission of the NRC is to ensure that civilian uses of nuclear materials in the US are carried out with adequate protection of public health and safety, the environment, and national security. These uses include the operation of nuclear power plants and fuel cycle plants and medical, industrial, and research applications. Additionally, the NRC contributes to combating the proliferation of nuclear weapons material worldwide. The NRC licenses and regulates commercial nuclear reactor operations and research reactors and other activities involving the possession and use of nuclear materials and wastes. It also protects nuclear materials used in operation and facilities from theft or sabotage. To accomplish its statutorily mandated regulatory mission, the NRC issues rules and standards, inspects facilities and operations, and issues any required enforcement actions

  14. IPPAS guidelines. Reference document for the IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The IAEA International Physical protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) provides advice to Member States to assist them in strengthening the effectiveness of their national physical protection system whilst recognizing the ultimate responsibility for physical protection is that of the Member State. The IPPAS is available to all countries with nuclear materials and facilities. The basic concepts, purposes and functions of physical protection are provided in INFCIR/225, 'The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities' as amended from time to time and 'the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (INFCIR/247/Rev.1). The guidance given in INFCIR/225 recognizes that implementation of these requirements vary from country to country depending on their existing constitutional, legal and administrative systems; the assessment of the threat for the potential theft of nuclear material or sabotage of nuclear facilities; the technical skills and professional and financial resources available to the competent authority; and social customs and cultural traditions. IPPAS missions are performance oriented in that they accept different approaches to the implementation of national physical protection system

  15. A Feasibility Study on Detection of Insider Threats based on Human Bio-signals

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Suh, Young A; Yim, Man-Sung [KAIST, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    The insider threat means that trusted workers in an organization might carry out harmful acts from the negligent use of classified data to potentially sabotage the workplace. Surveys and studies conducted over the last decade have consistently shown the critical nature of the insider threats problem, in both government and private sectors. The shortcomings of existing systems, such as mental self-assessment and peer review, are very subjective, biased-assessments and employed infrequently. To overcome these limitations, this study investigates the feasibility of detecting and predicting an insider threat by using human biodata, from smart wearable devices. This paper showed the feasibility of predicting and detecting insider threats using EEG, GSR and ECG signals. In the section 2.1, two research hypotheses were established to identify the significant difference on EEG, GSR and ECG signals when the subject decided bad action and is the placed in deceit situation. These hypotheses were tested using two kinds of pilot experiments in the form of input (stimulus) and output (checking response of physiological signals and reaction time)

  16. Memory attacks on device-independent quantum cryptography.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Barrett, Jonathan; Colbeck, Roger; Kent, Adrian

    2013-01-04

    Device-independent quantum cryptographic schemes aim to guarantee security to users based only on the output statistics of any components used, and without the need to verify their internal functionality. Since this would protect users against untrustworthy or incompetent manufacturers, sabotage, or device degradation, this idea has excited much interest, and many device-independent schemes have been proposed. Here we identify a critical weakness of device-independent protocols that rely on public communication between secure laboratories. Untrusted devices may record their inputs and outputs and reveal information about them via publicly discussed outputs during later runs. Reusing devices thus compromises the security of a protocol and risks leaking secret data. Possible defenses include securely destroying or isolating used devices. However, these are costly and often impractical. We propose other more practical partial defenses as well as a new protocol structure for device-independent quantum key distribution that aims to achieve composable security in the case of two parties using a small number of devices to repeatedly share keys with each other (and no other party).

  17. Countdown to a Moon launch preparing Apollo for its historic journey

    CERN Document Server

    Ward, Jonathan H

    2015-01-01

    Thousands of workers labored at Kennedy Space Center around the clock, seven days a week, for half a year to prepare a mission for the liftoff of Apollo 11. This is the story of what went on during those hectic six months. Countdown to a Moon Launch provides an in-depth look at the carefully choreographed workflow for an Apollo mission at KSC. Using the Apollo 11 mission as an example, readers will learn what went on day by day to transform partially completed stages and crates of parts into a ready-to-fly Saturn V. Firsthand accounts of launch pad accidents, near misses, suspected sabotage, and last-minute changes to hardware are told by more than 70 NASA employees and its contractors. A companion to Rocket Ranch, it includes many diagrams and photographs, some never before published, to illustrate all aspects of the process. NASA’s groundbreaking use of computers for testing and advanced management techniques are also covered in detail. This book will demystify the question of how NASA could build and lau...

  18. The Protos mandate a scientific novel

    CERN Document Server

    Kanas, Nick

    2014-01-01

    In the 25th Century, the effects of overpopulation and global warming on Earth have led to the formation of human colonies on the Moon, Mars and elsewhere in the Solar System, yet the limited number of viable places forces humanity to look to the stars. A crash program has been developed to send Protos 1, a giant multigenerational starship, to a newly discovered Earth-like planet orbiting a nearby star. The plan is for awake crewmembers to run the ship, and for people in suspended animation to be roused before planetfall to use their skills in exploration and colony formation. To fulfill the goals of the mission and ensure that the in-flight population does not deplete the limited resources, the Protos Mandate is set up to govern a tightly controlled social system for the duration of the journey, which will take several generations.  But problems threaten to sabotage the mission during its launch and transit, and what finally awaits the crewmembers shocks them in an unpredictable way.  This novel chronicl...

  19. A comparison of regional and global catastrophic hazards associated with energy technologies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heising, C.D.; Inhaber, H.

    1983-01-01

    This paper reviews some of what is known about the relative catastrophic hazards, on both a regional and global level, of energy technologies, and proposes a logical framework for their comparison. A review of the Inhaber study results is made indicating the relative position of overall nuclear power related risks. Then, concentration is placed on describing the catastrophic and global hazards of energy technologies. Regionally catastrophic hazards include sabotage and other malicious human activities, in addition to severe accidents caused inadvertantly by man, such as fires, reactor core damage events, chemical and poisonous gas releases, fuel storage fires and explosions, in addition to others. Global risks include such hazards as nuclear proliferation, CO 2 , build-up, oil shortages and possible national conflicts over dwindling energy fuels. The conclusion is drawn that consideration of both regional and global catastrophic risks must be made in making energy decisions, and that further study is necessary to better quantify and compare these risks. A simple decision analytic framework for making energy decisions inclusive of catastrophic risk is proposed

  20. Designing and constructing/installing technical security countermeasures (TSCM) into supersensitive facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Davis, D.L.

    1988-01-01

    The design and construction of supersensitive facilities and the installation of systems secure from technical surveillance and sabotage penetration involve ''TSCM'' in the broad sense of technical ''security'' countermeasures. When the technical threat was at a lower level of intensity and sophistication, it was common practice to defer TSCM to the future facility occupant. However, the New Moscow Embassy experience has proven this course of action subject to peril. Although primary concern with the embassy was audio surveillance, elsewhere there are other threats of equal or greater concern, e.g., technical implants may be used to monitor readiness status or interfere with the operation of C3I and weapons systems. Present and future technical penetration threats stretch the imagination. The Soviets have committed substantial hard scientific resources to a broad range of technical intelligence, even including applications or parapsychology. Countering these threats involves continuous TSCM precautions from initial planning to completion. Designs and construction/installation techniques must facilitate technical inspections and preclude the broadest range of known and suspected technical penetration efforts

  1. Designing and constructing/installing technical security countermeasures (TSCM) into supersensitive facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Davis, D.L.

    1988-01-01

    The design and construction of supersensitive facilities and the installation of systems secure from technical surveillance and sabotage penetration involve ''TSCM'' in the broad sense of technical ''security'' countermeasures. When the technical threat was at a lower level of intensity and sophistication, it was common practice to defer TSCM to the future facility occupant. However, the New Moscow Embassy experience has proven this course of action subject to peril. Although primary concern with the embassy was audio surveillance, elsewhere there are other threats of equal or greater concern, e.g., technical implants may be used to monitor readiness status or interfere with the operation of C3I and weapons systems. Present and future technical penetration threats stretch the imagination. The Soviets have committed substantial hard scientific resources to a broad range of technical intelligence, even including applications or parapsychology. Countering these threats involves continuous TSCM precautions from initial planning to completion. Designs and construction/installation techniques must facilitate technical inspections and preclude the broadest range of known and suspected technical penetration efforts.

  2. Training programs for the systems approach to nuclear security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ellis, Doris E.

    2005-01-01

    In support of the US Government and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Programmes, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has advocated and practiced a risk-based, systematic approach to nuclear security. The risk equation has been implemented as the basis for a performance methodology for the design and evaluation of Physical Protection Systems against a Design Basis Threat (DBT) for theft or sabotage of nuclear and/or radiological materials. Since integrated systems must include people as well as technology and the man-machine interface, a critical aspect of the human element is to train all stakeholders in nuclear security on the systems approach. Current training courses have been beneficial but are still limited in scope. SNL has developed two primary international courses and is completing development of three new courses that will be offered and presented in the near term. In the long-term, SNL envisions establishing a comprehensive nuclear security training curriculum that will be developed along with a series of forthcoming IAEA Nuclear Security Series guidance documents.

  3. Improving nuclear safety at international research reactors: The Integrated Research Reactor Safety Enhancement Program (IRRSEP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Huizenga, David; Newton, Douglas; Connery, Joyce

    2002-01-01

    Nuclear energy continues to play a major role in the world's energy economy. Research and test reactors are an important component of a nation's nuclear power infrastructure as they provide training, experiments and operating experience vital to developing and sustaining the industry. Indeed, nations with aspirations for nuclear power development usually begin their programs with a research reactor program. Research reactors also are vital to international science and technology development. It is important to keep them safe from both accident and sabotage, not only because of our obligation to prevent human and environmental consequence but also to prevent corresponding damage to science and industry. For example, an incident at a research reactor could cause a political and public backlash that would do irreparable harm to national nuclear programs. Following the accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, considerable efforts and resources were committed to improving the safety posture of the world's nuclear power plants. Unsafe operation of research reactors will have an amplifying effect throughout a country or region's entire nuclear programs due to political, economic and nuclear infrastructure consequences. (author)

  4. Potential threat to licensed nuclear activities from insiders (insider study). Technical report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mullen, S.A.; Davidson, J.J.; Jones, H.B. Jr.

    1980-07-01

    The Insider Study was undertaken by NRC staff at the request of the Commission. Its objectives were to: (1) determine the characteristics of potential insider adversaries to licensed nuclear activities; (2) examine security system vulnerabilities to insider adversaries; and (3) assess the effectiveness of techniques used to detect or prevent insider malevolence. The study analyzes insider characteristics as revealed in incidents of theft or sabotage that occurred in the nuclear industry, analogous industries, government agencies, and the military. Adversary characteristics are grouped into four categories: position-related, behavioral, resource and operational. It also analyzes (1) the five security vulnerabilities that most frequently accounted for the success of the insider crimes in the data base; (2) the 11 means by which insider crimes were most often detected; and (3) four major and six lesser methods aimed at preventing insider malevolence. In addition to case history information, the study contains data derived from non-NRC studies and from interviews with over 100 security experts in industry, government (federal and state), and law enforcement

  5. Advancement adopted for physical protection system at BARC facilities Tarapur

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jaroli, Manish; Ameta, Rohit; Patil, V.H.; Dubey, K.

    2015-01-01

    Considering the prevailing security situation and threat perception to the nuclear installations in particular, it has become essential to strengthen security system at BARC Tarapur in an effective manner to avert any attempt of sabotage and to ensure smooth functioning of security and safety of the nuclear installations. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) have provided various security guides for the physical protection system (PPS) for nuclear installations and there has been advancement in physical and personnel protection system due to evolution of new technologies. In line with this, latest technologies have been adopted in PPS for BARC facilities, Tarapur recently. This includes state of art RFID card based access control, visitor and contractor management system, electronic key management system. Digital signature based biometric visitor and contractor management system; Digital signature based leave management system; Distress alarm system (DAS); Guard tour monitoring system (GTMS); Secure network access system (SNAS) as well as multilayered access control system at plant level. This will strengthen the surveillance and monitoring of personnel and visitors at BARC facilities. (author)

  6. Evaluation of the physical protection system of the IEA-R1 research reactor

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vaz, Antonio C.A.; Conti, Thadeu das N., E-mail: acavaz@ipen.br, E-mail: tnconti@yahoo.com.br [Instituto de Pesquisas Energeticas e Nucleares (IPEN/CNEN-SP), Sao Paulo, SP (Brazil)

    2013-07-01

    The '09/11' in New York and the accident at the Fukushima power plant are two events that served as worldwide reference to review some aspects of the Physical Protection System (PPS) in nuclear areas. The nuclear research reactor IEA-R1 has followed this new world order and improved the protection systems that are directly related to detection (CCTV, sensors, alarms, etc), delay (turnstile, gates, barriers, etc) and response (communication systems, response force, etc), for operation against malicious act, seeking always to avoid or minimize any possibility of threat, theft and sabotage. These actions were performed to prevent and to mitigate the consequence on the environment, economy and society from damages caused by natural hazard, as well. This study evaluates the PPS of the IEA-R1 regarding the weaknesses, strengths,and impacts of the changes resulting from the system implanted. The analyses were based on methodology developed by security experts from SANDIA National Laboratories in Texas - U.S.A, allowing the evaluation of the system through probabilistic and hypothetical analysis. (author)

  7. Combating illegal nuclear traffic - Poland's experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smagala, G.

    1998-01-01

    International non-proliferation efforts have been taken to reduce the risk related to nuclear materials and radioactive sources. The physical security of nuclear facilities to prevent acts of sabotage or terrorism and to protect nuclear materials against loss or seizure is an essential element of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Iraq case and the end of the Cold War have influenced the development of co-operation and openness in many countries. Poland due to: - its geolocation, - a growing number of post Chernobyl contamination transports and - high risk to become a transit country in illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and radioactive sources, initiated deployment of the fixed installation instruments at the border check-points. Since the end of 1990 to now 103 such devices have been installed. Broader involvement in combating illicit nuclear trafficking of Border Guards, Customs Services, Police and Intelligence Security has been noticed. Paper presents Poland's experience in implementing national prevention measures to reduce nuclear proliferation risk and in detecting capabilities against illicit nuclear traffic. (author)

  8. Security of Radioactive Waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldammer, W.

    2003-01-01

    Measures to achieve radioactive waste security are discussed. Categorization of waste in order to implement adequate and consistent security measures based on potential consequences is made. The measures include appropriate treatment/storage/disposal of waste to minimize the potential and consequences of malicious acts; management of waste only within an authorised, regulated, legal framework; management of the security of personnel and information; measures to minimize the acquisition of radioactive waste by those with malicious intent. The specific measures are: deter unauthorized access to the waste; detect any such attempt or any loss or theft of waste; delay unauthorized access; provide timely response to counter any attempt to gain unauthorised access; measures to minimize acts of sabotage; efforts to recover any lost or stolen waste; mitigation and emergency plans in case of release of radioactivity. An approach to develop guidance, starting with the categorisation of sources and identification of dangerous sources, is presented. Dosimetric criteria for internal and external irradiation are set. Different exposure scenarios are considered. Waste categories and security categories based on the IAEA INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 are presented

  9. The NNSA global threat reduction initiative's efforts to minimize the use of highly enriched uranium for medical isotope production

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Staples, Parrish

    2010-01-01

    The mission of the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Global Threat Reduction (GTRI) is to reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials located at civilian sites worldwide. GTRI is a key organization for supporting domestic and global efforts to minimize and, to the extent possible, eliminate the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in civilian nuclear applications. GTRI implements the following activities in order to achieve its threat reduction and HEU minimization objectives: Converting domestic and international civilian research reactors and isotope production facilities from the use of HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU); Demonstrating the viability of medical isotope production technologies that do not use HEU; Removing or disposing excess nuclear and radiological materials from civilian sites worldwide; and Protecting high-priority nuclear and radiological materials worldwide from theft and sabotage. This paper provides a brief overview on the recent developments and priorities for GTRI program activities in 2010, with a particular focus on GTRI's efforts to demonstrate the viability of non-HEU based medical isotope production technologies. (author)

  10. Management of radiological and non-radiological risks in a decommissioning project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Deboodt, Pascal

    2002-01-01

    real commitment of each partner. We think that the ALARA approach is a very good way to provide an adapted language as well as such commitment. Without any doubt, this approach is mainly responsible for the good results we got. Thirdly, as far as the removal of asbestos at BR3 is concerned, it is obvious that the 'radiological approach' has brought some technical improvements to the 'non radiological' approach. Examples can be found in the use of the masks, of in the daily control for potential contamination. But, on the other end, the workers of the BR3 installation are now more aware of the potential existence of other sources of risks and of the rules, which have to be followed in such cases. Working into the nuclear field leads sometimes to a lack of awareness regarding 'industrial risks'. Some questions are still remaining as 'open questions'. Some of these have still been pointed out. How do we have to optimise such operations where more than one 'recognized' risk is involved? How did we cope up to now with such 'interactive' situations? How far do we have to optimise? What's the meaning of 'optimisation' in such cases? These are examples of questions we hope to deal with during the discussions with partners from the radiological and non-radiological fields

  11. "Eh! I Felt I Was Sabotaged!": Facilitators' Understandings of Success in a Participatory HIV and IPV Prevention Intervention in Urban South Africa

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gibbs, Andrew; Willan, Samantha; Jama-Shai, Nwabisa; Washington, Laura; Jewkes, Rachel

    2015-01-01

    Participatory approaches to behaviour change dominate HIV- and intimate partner violence prevention interventions. Research has identified multiple challenges in the delivery of these. In this article, we focus on how facilitators conceptualize successful facilitation and how these understandings may undermine dialogue and critical consciousness,…

  12. Forced swimming sabotages the morphological and synaptic maturation of newborn granule neurons and triggers a unique pro-inflammatory milieu in the hippocampus.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Llorens-Martín, María; Jurado-Arjona, Jerónimo; Bolós, Marta; Pallas-Bazarra, Noemí; Ávila, Jesús

    2016-03-01

    Recent experimental data suggest that mood disorders are related to inflammatory phenomena and have led to the "inflammatory hypothesis of depression". Given that the hippocampus is one of the most affected areas in these disorders, we used a model of acute stress (the Porsolt test) to evaluate the consequences of forced swimming on two crucial events related to the pathophysiology of major depression: the functional maturation of newborn granule neurons; and the hippocampal inflammatory milieu. Using PSD95:GFP-expressing retroviruses, we found that forced swimming selectively alters the dendritic morphology of newborn neurons and impairs their connectivity by reducing the number and volume of their postsynaptic densities. In addition, acute stress triggered a series of morphological changes in microglial cells, together with an increase in microglial CD68 expression, thus suggesting the functional and morphological activation of this cell population. Furthermore, we observed an intriguing change in the hippocampal inflammatory milieu in response to forced swimming. Importantly, the levels of several molecules affected by acute stress (such as Interleukin-6 and eotaxin) have been described to also be altered in patients with depression and other mood disorders. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  13. Ghana's Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dahlstrom, Danielle

    2013-01-01

    At the Korle Bu Teaching Hospital outside Accra, Pearl Lovelyn Lawson checks the records of the next patient to undergo radiotherapy and adjusts the dose settings of the teletherapy machine. It is business as usual at the facility that treats over fifty patients each day. But Lawson's routine now includes additional procedures to ensure that the highly radioactive cobalt-60 source located inside the machine remains secure. Nuclear security devices and systems such as double locks, motion sensors, and cameras that transmit images to a central alarm system have been installed to ensure that the source cannot be stolen, the facility sabotaged, or unauthorized access gained. At Korle Bu physical protection measures were upgraded as part of Ghana's Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP). Preventing, detecting and responding to criminal acts like the theft or illegal transfer of a radioactive source, is an international priority that could be addressed through an INSSP. As one of its key nuclear security services, the IAEA assists Member States in drafting such plans. An INSSP is developed jointly with the Member State, using a holistic approach to nuclear security capacity building. It reinforces the primary objective of a State's nuclear security regime to protect people, society, and the environment from the harmful consequences of a nuclear security event. Addressing five components - the legal and regulatory framework, prevention, detection, and sustainability - the jointly developed plan identifies the needs, responsible entities and organizations within the State, as well as the timeframe for the implementation of agreed nuclear security related activities. Ghana's INSSP, tailored to its specific needs, is based on findings and recommendations from advisory service missions carried out in Ghana, including an International Nuclear Security Advisory Service mission and an International Physical Protection Advisory Service mission. Ghana's INSSP was

  14. Risk assessment on hazards for decommissioning safety of a nuclear facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jeong, Kwan-Seong; Lee, Kune-Woo; Lim, Hyeon-Kyo

    2010-01-01

    A decommissioning plan should be followed by a qualitative and quantitative safety assessment of it. The safety assessment of a decommissioning plan is applied to identify the potential (radiological and non-radiological) hazards and risks. Radiological and non-radiological hazards arise during decommissioning activities. The non-radiological or industrial hazards to which workers are subjected during a decommissioning and dismantling process may be greater than those experienced during an operational lifetime of a facility. Workers need to be protected by eliminating or reducing the radiological and non-radiological hazards that may arise during routine decommissioning activities and as well as during accidents. The risk assessment method was developed by using risk matrix and fuzzy inference logic, on the basis of the radiological and non-radiological hazards for a decommissioning safety of a nuclear facility. Fuzzy inference of radiological and non-radiological hazards performs a mapping from radiological and non-radiological hazards to risk matrix. Defuzzification of radiological and non-radiological hazards is the conversion of risk matrix and priorities to the maximum criterion method and the mean criterion method. In the end, a composite risk assessment methodology, to rank the risk level on radiological and non-radiological hazards of the decommissioning tasks and to prioritize on the risk level of the decommissioning tasks, by simultaneously combining radiological and non-radiological hazards, was developed.

  15. Nuclear security towards the adequate answers to the new challenge of nuclear and radiological terrorism

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Puig, D.E.

    2006-01-01

    The globalization phenomenon and the process of regional integration have generated new and defiant characteristics in the criminal activation, the one that has acquired growing trans national dimension. After September 11, 2001 it should to have bigger international initiative to reinforce the safety of materials and facilities in the entire world and to apply the international recommendations for to assure that all the nuclear materials of not used bombs are registered and secure of sabotage. Thousands of radioactive sources exist in the world. Possibility that the terrorists use radioactive sources as attack instruments since its are more easily available and its are more easy too to obtain in comparison with the uranium or plutonium classified for weapons. Dirty bomb. Effects of the Radiations. The Goiania accident. 'Orphans' sources Illicit traffic of radioactive material. Security. Measures of Physical Protection. Security of the radioactive sources. Role of the IAEA and other international organisms and regional CAN-MERCOSUR. Nuclear security and Legal frame. International and national instruments against the nuclear and radiological terrorism. Study from a proposal to Pan-American level to make in front of the problem. (Author)

  16. Guilt about being born and debt concerning the gift of life.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lotterman, Andrew C

    2003-01-01

    A very powerful form of preoedipal guilt stems from a sense of having damaged the life-giving parent with one's most basic needs. A related phenomenon is the child's sense that another subjectivity has deliberately chosen to give and sustain the child's life. This experience gives rise to a compelling mixture of awe, reverence, and obligation, a sense of guilt about being born, of debt concerning the gift of life. This sense of guilt and debt are part of every child's development. Depending on how conflicts surrounding them are negotiated, the child can come to feel either an appetite for living or a crushing sense of selfishness and unworthiness. Such forms of guilt and debt may lead not only to masochism generally, but to a particularly pernicious form of negative therapeutic reaction that can sabotage psychoanalytic work. A patient may feel, for instance, that a successful psychoanalysis is a selfish indulgence and an immoral betrayal of a sacred duty to rescue his or her parents from their misery. Guilt about being born and the sense of debt concerning the gift of life are linked to various developmental, psychodynamic, interpersonal, and cultural phenomena.

  17. What is the future of peer review? Why is there fraud in science? Is plagiarism out of control? Why do scientists do bad things? Is it all a case of: "all that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing"?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Triggle, Chris R; Triggle, David J

    2007-01-01

    Peer review is an essential component of the process that is universally applied prior to the acceptance of a manuscript, grant or other scholarly work. Most of us willingly accept the responsibilities that come with being a reviewer but how comfortable are we with the process? Peer review is open to abuse but how should it be policed and can it be improved? A bad peer review process can inadvertently ruin an individual's career, but are there penalties for policing a reviewer who deliberately sabotages a manuscript or grant? Science has received an increasingly tainted name because of recent high profile cases of alleged scientific misconduct. Once considered the results of work stress or a temporary mental health problem, scientific misconduct is increasingly being reported and proved to be a repeat offence. How should scientific misconduct be handled--is it a criminal offence and subject to national or international law? Similarly plagiarism is an ever-increasing concern whether at the level of the student or a university president. Are the existing laws tough enough? These issues, with appropriate examples, are dealt with in this review.

  18. Cyber meets nuclear - Stuxnet and the cyberattacks on Iranian centrifuges

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Englert, Matthias [IANUS, TU Darmstadt (Germany)

    2013-07-01

    In 2010 the computer worm Stuxnet attacked the information hardware of the Iranian uranium enrichment program. Stuxnet spread by USB flash drives and attacked SCADA software installed on Windows systems via several zero-day exploits. SCADA configures programmable logic controllers which control in the case of the Iranian centrifuge cascades frequency converter drives to choose the frequency of centrifuge motors. Thus the attackers were able to either change the rotation frequency of the rotor and thereby the separative power of the centrifuge or even destroy the fast spinning centrifuges by stopping and restarting them. The designers of Stuxnet must have had intimate knowledge of the facility design as e.g. the cascade connection scheme was programmed into Stuxnet. Based on this information some calculations of the Iranian cascade regarding the potential to produce highly enriched uranium will be presented using cascade simulation tools. The use of such highly sophisticated computer attacks to sabotage a nuclear program shed a new light on the debate about cyber attacks and the use of information technology for kinetic attacks in general. The talk will address problems the weaponization of information technology poses for international security and will highlight some more recent developments.

  19. What is the future of peer review? Why is there fraud in science? Is plagiarism out of control? Why do scientists do bad things? Is it all a case of:“All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing?”

    Science.gov (United States)

    Triggle, Chris R; Triggle, David J

    2007-01-01

    Peer review is an essential component of the process that is universally applied prior to the acceptance of a manuscript, grant or other scholarly work. Most of us willingly accept the responsibilities that come with being a reviewer but how comfortable are we with the process? Peer review is open to abuse but how should it be policed and can it be improved? A bad peer review process can inadvertently ruin an individual’s career, but are there penalties for policing a reviewer who deliberately sabotages a manuscript or grant? Science has received an increasingly tainted name because of recent high profile cases of alleged scientific misconduct. Once considered the results of work stress or a temporary mental health problem, scientific misconduct is increasingly being reported and proved to be a repeat offence. How should scientific misconduct be handled—is it a criminal offence and subject to national or international law? Similarly plagiarism is an ever-increasing concern whether at the level of the student or a university president. Are the existing laws tough enough? These issues, with appropriate examples, are dealt with in this review. PMID:17583174

  20. EXAMINATION OF SECURITY EVENTS AS DBEs FOR MGDS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY SSCs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    J.M. Hartsell

    1998-01-01

    A portion of the safeguards and security system for the Mined Geologic Disposal System (MGDS) has been identified as QA-1 based on the classification of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) performed in accordance with QAP-2-3, ''Classification of Permanent Items'' (Reference 5.2). The classification analysis, ''Classification of the Preliminary MGDS Repository Design'' (Reference 5.9), identifies the ''Safeguards Material Control and Accountability'' system as a QA-1 SSC based on the identification of unauthorized intrusion, sabotage, theft, and diversion as potential Design Basis Events (DBEs). The purpose of this analysis is to provide justification to eliminate these events as DBEs for the MGDS based on a review of the Codes of Federal Regulation (CFRs) for geologic repositories (10 CFR 60), commercial reactor facilities (10 CFR 50), independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs) and monitored retrievable storage (MRS) installations (10 CFR 72), and other relevant guidance documents in an effort to clarify that security events should not be considered in the QA design process of important to safety SSCs for the MGDS. The MGDS is a first of a kind geologic repository and no licensing precedent has been established for this type of facility