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Sample records for remaining sites verification

  1. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 128-B-3 Burn Pit Site, Waste Site Reclassification Form 2006-058

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    L. M. Dittmer

    2006-11-17

    The 128-B-3 waste site is a former burn and disposal site for the 100-B/C Area, located adjacent to the Columbia River. The 128-B-3 waste site has been remediated to meet the remedial action objectives specified in the Remaining Sites ROD. The results of verification sampling demonstrated that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results of sampling at upland areas of the site also showed that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River.

  2. Remaining Sites Verification Package for 100-F-38 Stained Soil Site. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2004-093

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, R.A.

    2006-01-01

    The 100-F-38 Stained Soil site was an area of yellow stained soil that was discovered while excavating a trench for the placement of electrical conduit. The 100-F-38 Stained Soil site meets the remedial action objectives specified in the Remaining Sites ROD. The results of verification sampling show demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations support future unrestricted land uses that can be represented by a rural-residential scenario. The results also show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils and the contaminant concentrations remaining in the soil are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  3. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 128-F-2, 100-F Burning Pit Waste Site, Waste Site Reclassification Form 2008-031

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    J. M. Capron

    2008-12-01

    The 128-F-2 waste site consisted of multiple burn and debris filled pits located directly east of the 107-F Retention Basin and approximately 30.5 m east of the northeast corner of the 100-F Area perimeter road that runs along the riverbank. The burn pits were used for incinerating nonradioactive, combustible materials from 1945 to 1965. In accordance with this evaluation, the verification sampling results support a reclassification of this site to Interim Closed Out. The current site conditions achieve the remedial action objectives and the corresponding remedial action goals established in the Remaining Sites ROD. The results of verification sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River.

  4. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 128-F-2, 100-F Burning Pit Waste Site. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2008-031

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Capron, J.M.

    2008-01-01

    The 128-F-2 waste site consisted of multiple burn and debris filled pits located directly east of the 107-F Retention Basin and approximately 30.5 m east of the northeast corner of the 100-F Area perimeter road that runs along the riverbank. The burn pits were used for incinerating nonradioactive, combustible materials from 1945 to 1965. In accordance with this evaluation, the verification sampling results support a reclassification of this site to Interim Closed Out. The current site conditions achieve the remedial action objectives and the corresponding remedial action goals established in the Remaining Sites ROD. The results of verification sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  5. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 100-F-31, 144-F Sanitary Sewer System, Waste Site Reclassification Form 2006-033

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    L. M. Dittmer

    2006-08-24

    The 100-F-31 waste site is a former septic system that supported the inhalation laboratories, also referred to as the 144-F Particle Exposure Laboratory (132-F-2 waste site), which housed animals exposed to particulate material. The 100-F-31 waste site has been remediated to achieve the remedial action objectives specified in the Remaining Sites ROD. The results of verification sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River.

  6. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 600-233 Waste Site, Vertical Pipe Near 100-B Electrical Laydown Area. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2005-041

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, R.A.

    2005-01-01

    The 600-233 waste site consisted of three small-diameter pipelines within the 600-232 waste site, including previously unknown diesel fuel supply lines discovered during site remediation. The 600-233 waste site has been remediated to achieve the remedial action objectives specified in the Remaining Sites ROD. The results of verification sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  7. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 100-F-33, 146-F Aquatic Biology Fish Ponds, Waste Site Reclassification Form 2006-021

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    L. M. Dittmer

    2006-08-25

    The 100-F-33, 146-F Aquatice Biology Fish Ponds waste site was an area with six small rectangular ponds and one large circular pond used to conduct tests on fish using various mixtures of river and reactor effluent water. The current site conditions achieve the remedial action objectives specified in the Remaining Sites ROD. The results of verification and applicable confirmatory sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River.

  8. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 100-F-26:9, 1607-F2 Sanitary Sewer Pipelines. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2008-029

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Capron, J.M.

    2008-01-01

    The 100-F-26:9 underground pipeline subsite consists of the sanitary sewers servicing the 105-F, 108-F, 184-F, 185-F, and 190-F buildings, and the 1700-F administration and service buildings (1704-F, 1707-F, 1707-FA, 1713-F, 1717-F, 1719-F, and 1722-F). In accordance with this evaluation, the confirmatory and verification sampling results support a reclassification of this site to Interim Closed Out. The current site conditions achieve the remedial action objectives and the corresponding remedial action goals established in the Remaining Sites ROD. The results of verification sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  9. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 100-C-9:2 Sanitary Sewer Pipelines, Waste Site Reclassification Form 2004-013

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    L. M. Dittmer

    2007-07-11

    The 100-C-9:2 sanitary sewer pipelines include the feeder pipelines associated with the 1607-B8, the 1607-B9, the 1607-B10 and the 1607-B11 septic systems. Contaminated soil and piping from the feeder lines to the septic systems were removed and disposed of. The remaining soil in the excavations has been shown to meet the remedial action objectives specified in the Remaining Sites ROD. The results of verification sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River.

  10. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 100-D-2 Lead Sheeting Waste Site. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2007-030

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dittmer, L.M.

    2008-01-01

    The 100-D-2 Lead Sheeting waste site was located approximately 50 m southwest of the 185-D Building and approximately 16 m north of the east/west oriented road. The site consisted of a lead sheet covering a concrete pad. In accordance with this evaluation, the verification sampling results support a reclassification of this site to Interim Closed Out. The results of verification sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  11. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 100-F-33, 146-F Aquatic Biology Fish Ponds. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2006-021

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dittmer, L.M.

    2006-01-01

    The 100-F-33, 146-F Aquatice Biology Fish Ponds waste site was an area with six small rectangular ponds and one large circular pond used to conduct tests on fish using various mixtures of river and reactor effluent water. The current site conditions achieve the remedial action objectives specified in the Remaining Sites ROD. The results of verification and applicable confirmatory sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  12. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 100-C-9:2 Sanitary Sewer Pipelines. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2004-013

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dittmer, L.M.

    2007-01-01

    The 100-C-9:2 sanitary sewer pipelines include the feeder pipelines associated with the 1607-B8, the 1607-B9, the 1607-B10 and the 1607-B11 septic systems. Contaminated soil and piping from the feeder lines to the septic systems were removed and disposed of. The remaining soil in the excavations has been shown to meet the remedial action objectives specified in the Remaining Sites ROD. The results of verification sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  13. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 1607-F3 Sanitary Sewer System, Waste Site Reclassification Form 2006-047

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    L. M. Dittmer

    2007-04-26

    The 1607-F3 waste site is the former location of the sanitary sewer system that supported the 182-F Pump Station, the 183-F Water Treatment Plant, and the 151-F Substation. The sanitary sewer system included a septic tank, drain field, and associated pipeline, all in use between 1944 and 1965. In accordance with this evaluation, the verification sampling results support a reclassification of this site to Interim Closed Out. The results of verification sampling demonstrated that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also showed that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River.

  14. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 1607-F7, 141-M Building Septic Tank. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2006-040

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dittmer, L.M.

    2006-01-01

    The 1607-F7, 141-M Building Septic Tank waste site was a septic tank and drain field that received sanitary sewage from the former 141-M Building. Remedial action was performed in August and November 2005. The results of verification sampling demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations support future unrestricted land uses that can be represented by a rural-residential scenario. These results also show that residual concentrations support unrestricted future use of shallow zone soil and that contaminant levels remaining in the soil are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  15. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 1607-B2 Septic System and 100-B-14:2 Sanitary Sewer System, Waste Site Reclassification Form 2006-055

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    L. M. Dittmer

    2007-03-21

    The 1607-B2 waste site is a former septic system associated with various 100-B facilities, including the 105-B, 108-B, 115-B/C, and 185/190-B buildings. The site was evaluated based on confirmatory results for feeder lines within the 100-B-14:2 subsite and determined to require remediation. The 1607-B2 waste site has been remediated to achieve the remedial action objectives specified in the Remaining Sites ROD. The results of verification sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River.

  16. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 120-F-1 Glass Dump Waste Site. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2008-028

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Capron, J.M.

    2008-01-01

    The 120-F-1 waste site consisted of two dumping areas located 660 m southeast of the 105-F Reactor containing laboratory equipment and bottles, demolition debris, light bulbs and tubes, small batteries, small drums, and pesticide contaminated soil. It is probable that 108-F was the source of the debris but the material may have come from other locations within the 100-F Area. In accordance with this evaluation, the verification sampling results support a reclassification of this site to Interim Closed Out. The results of verification sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  17. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 600-243 Petroleum-Contaminated Soil Bioremediation Pad. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2007-033

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Capron, J.M.

    2008-01-01

    The 600-243 waste site consisted of a bioremediation pad for petroleum-contaminated soils resulting from the 1100 Area Underground Storage Tank (UST) upgrades in 1994. In accordance with this evaluation, the verification sampling results support a reclassification of this site to Interim Closed Out. The results of verification sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  18. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 1607-F4 Sanitary Sewer System. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2004-131

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dittmer, L.M.

    2007-01-01

    The 1607-F4 waste site is the former location of the sanitary sewer system that serviced the former 115-F Gas Recirculation Building. The system included a septic tank, drain field, and associated pipeline that were in use from 1944 to 1965. The 1607-F4 waste site received unknown amounts of sanitary sewage from the 115-F Gas Recirculation Building and may have potentially contained hazardous and radioactive contamination. In accordance with this evaluation, the verification sampling results support a reclassification of this site to Interim Closed Out. The results of verification sampling demonstrated that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also showed that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  19. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 100-F-36, 108-F Biological Laboratory, and for the 116-F-15, 108-F Radiation Crib. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2007-002 and 2007-003

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dittmer, L.M.

    2007-01-01

    The 116-F-15 waste site is the former location of the 108-F Radiation Crib that was located in the first floor of the 108-F Biological Laboratory. In accordance with this evaluation, the verification sampling results support a reclassification of this site to Interim Closed Out. The current site conditions achieve the remedial action objectives and the corresponding remedial action goals established in the Remaining Sites ROD. The results of verification sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  20. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 116-C-3, 105-C Chemical Waste Tanks. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2008-002

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dittmer, L.M.

    2008-01-01

    The 116-C-3 waste site consisted of two underground storage tanks designed to receive mixed waste from the 105-C Reactor Metals Examination Facility chemical dejacketing process. Confirmatory evaluation and subsequent characterization of the site determined that the southern tank contained approximately 34,000 L (9,000 gal) of dejacketing wastes, and that the northern tank was unused. In accordance with this evaluation, the verification sampling and modeling results support a reclassification of this site to Interim Closed Out. The results of verification sampling demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also show that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  1. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 100-F-26:13, 108-F Drain Pipelines. Attchment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2005-011

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dittmer, L.M.

    2008-01-01

    The 100-F-26:13 waste site is the network of process sewer pipelines that received effluent from the 108-F Biological Laboratory and discharged it to the 188-F Ash Disposal Area (126-F-1 waste site). The pipelines included one 0.15-m (6-in.)-, two 0.2-m (8-in.)-, and one 0.31-m (12-in.)-diameter vitrified clay pipe segments encased in concrete. In accordance with this evaluation, the verification sampling results support a reclassification of this site to Interim Closed Out. The results of verification sampling demonstrated that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also showed that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  2. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 1607-B2 Septic System and 100-B-14:2 Sanitary Sewer System. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2006-055 and 2004-006

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dittmer, L.M.

    2007-01-01

    The 1607-B2 waste site is a former septic system associated with various 100-B facilities, including the 105-B, 108-B, 115-B/C, and 185/190-B buildings. The site was evaluated based on confirmatory results for feeder lines within the 100-B-14:2 subsite and determined to require remediation. The 1607-B2 waste site has been remediated to achieve the remedial action objectives specified in the Remaining Sites ROD. The results of verification sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  3. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 126-B-3, 184-B Coal Pit Dumping Area, Waste Site Reclassification Form 2005-028

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    L. M. Dittmer

    2006-08-07

    The 126-B-3 waste site is the former coal storage pit for the 184-B Powerhouse. During demolition operations in the 1970s, the site was used for disposal of demolition debris from 100-B/C Area facilities. The site has been remediated by removing debris and contaminated soils. The results of verification sampling demonstrated that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also showed that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River.

  4. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 126-F-2, 183-F Clearwells, Waste Site Reclassification Form 2006-017

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    R. A. Carlson

    2006-05-04

    The 126-F-2 site is the clearwell facility formerly used as part of the reactor cooling water treatment at the 183-F facility. During demolition operations in the 1970s, potentially contaminated debris was disposed in the eastern clearwell structure. The site has been remediated by removing all debris in the clearwell structure to the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility. The results of radiological surveys and visual inspection of the remediated clearwell structure show neither residual contamination nor the potential for contaminant migration beyond the clearwell boundaries. The results of verification sampling at the remediation waste staging area demonstrated that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also showed that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River.

  5. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 126-F-2, 183-F Clearwells, Waste Site Reclassification Form 2006-017

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, R.A.

    2006-01-01

    The 126-F-2 site is the clearwell facility formerly used as part of the reactor cooling water treatment at the 183-F facility. During demolition operations in the 1970s, potentially contaminated debris was disposed in the eastern clearwell structure. The site has been remediated by removing all debris in the clearwell structure to the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility. The results of radiological surveys and visual inspection of the remediated clearwell structure show neither residual contamination nor the potential for contaminant migration beyond the clearwell boundaries. The results of verification sampling at the remediation waste staging area demonstrated that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also showed that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  6. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 100-B-21:2 Subsite (100-B/C Discovery Pipeline DS-100BC-002). Attachment Waste Site Reclassification Form 2008-003

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Capron, J.M.

    2008-01-01

    The 100-B-21:2 waste site consists of the immediate area of the DS-100BC-02 pipeline. In accordance with this evaluation, the confirmatory and verification sampling results support a reclassification of this site to Interim Closed Out. The results of verification sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  7. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 100-B-18, 184-B Powerhouse Debris Pile. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2007-020

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dittmer, L.M.

    2007-01-01

    The 100-B-18 Powerhouse Debris Pile contained miscellaneous demolition waste from the decommissioning activities of the 184-B Powerhouse. The debris covered an area roughly 15 m by 30 m and included materials such as concrete blocks, mixed aggregate/concrete slabs, stone rubble, asphalt rubble, traces of tar/coal, broken fluorescent lights, brick chimney remnants, and rubber hoses. In accordance with this evaluation, the verification sampling results support a reclassification of this site to Interim Closed Out. The results of verification sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  8. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 126-B-3, 184-B Coal Pit Dumping Area. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2005-028

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dittmer, L.M.

    2006-01-01

    The 126-B-3 waste site is the former coal storage pit for the 184-B Powerhouse. During demolition operations in the 1970s, the site was used for disposal of demolition debris from 100-B/C Area facilities. The site has been remediated by removing debris and contaminated soils. The results of verification sampling demonstrated that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also showed that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  9. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 128-B-2, 100-B Burn Pit No.2 Waste Site. Attchment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2005-038

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, R.A.

    2005-01-01

    The 128-B-2 waste site was a burn pit historically used for the disposal of combustible and noncombustible wastes, including paint and solvents, office waste, concrete debris, and metallic debris. This site has been remediated by removing approximately 5,627 bank cubic meters of debris, ash, and contaminated soil to the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility. The results of verification sampling demonstrated that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also showed that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  10. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 100-F-26:12, 1.8-m (72-in.) Main Process Sewer Pipeline. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2007-034

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Capron, J.M.

    2008-01-01

    The 100-F-26:12 waste site was an approximately 308-m-long, 1.8-m-diameter east-west-trending reinforced concrete pipe that joined the North Process Sewer Pipelines (100-F-26:1) and the South Process Pipelines (100-F-26:4) with the 1.8-m reactor cooling water effluent pipeline (100-F-19). In accordance with this evaluation, the verification sampling results support a reclassification of this site to Interim Closed Out. The results of verification sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  11. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 120-B-1, 105-B Battery Acid Sump. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2006-057

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dittmer, L.M.

    2006-01-01

    The 120-B-1 waste site, located in the 100-BC-1 Operable Unit of the Hanford Site, consisted of a concrete battery acid sump that was used from 1944 to 1969 to neutralize the spent sulfuric acid from lead cell batteries of emergency power packs and the emergency lighting system. The battery acid sump was associated with the 105-B Reactor Building and was located adjacent to the building's northwest corner. The results of verification sampling demonstrated that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also showed that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  12. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 600-111, P-11 Critical Mass Laboratory Crib, and UPR-600-16, Fire and Contamination Spread Waste Sites. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2004-065 and 2008-045

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Capron, J.M.

    2008-01-01

    The UPR-600-16, Fire and Contamination Spread waste site is an unplanned release that occurred on December 4, 1951, when plutonium contamination was spread by a fire that ignited inside the 120 Experimental Building. The 120 Experimental Building was a laboratory building that was constructed in 1949 and used for plutonium criticality studies as part of the P-11 Project. In November 1951, a criticality occurred in the 120 Experimental Building that resulted in extensive plutonium contamination inside the building. The confirmatory evaluation supports a reclassification of this site to Interim Closed Out. The current site conditions achieve the remedial action objectives and the corresponding remedial action goals established in the Remaining Sites ROD. The results of the extensive radiological survey of the surface soil and the confirmatory and verification sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  13. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 600-111, P-11 Critical Mass Laboratory Crib, and UPR-600-16, Fire and Contamination Spread Waste Sites. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2004-065

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Capron, J.M.

    2008-01-01

    The 600-111, P-11 Critical Mass Laboratory Crib waste site, also referred to as the P-11 Facility, included the 120 Experimental Building, the 123 Control Building, and the P-11 Crib. The facility was constructed in 1949 and was used as a laboratory for plutonium criticality studies. In accordance with this evaluation, the confirmatory and verification sampling results support a reclassification of this site to Interim Closed Out. The results of confirmatory and verification sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  14. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 100-F-26:10, 1607-F3 Sanitary Sewer Pipelines (182-F, 183-F, and 151-F Sanitary Sewer Lines), Waste Site Reclassification Form 2007-028

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    L. M. Dittmer

    2007-12-03

    The 100-F-26:10 waste site includes sanitary sewer lines that serviced the former 182-F, 183-F, and 151-F Buildings. In accordance with this evaluation, the verification sampling results support a reclassification of this site to Interim Closed Out. The results of verification sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River.

  15. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 100-B-26 Spillway. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2006-052

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dittmer, L.M.

    2006-01-01

    The 100-B-26 Spillway waste site is a spillway that served as an emergency discharge point for the 132-C-2 outfall in the event that the 100-B-15 river effluent pipelines were blocked, damaged, or undergoing maintenance. The selected action involved demonstrating through confirmatory sampling that cleanup goals have been met and proposing a reclassification of this site to No Action. The results of the confirmatory sampling demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations remaining in the soil beneath the riprap are more protective of groundwater and the Columbia River than the risk they would pose if the site was remediated

  16. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 100-F-26:15 Miscellaneous Pipelines Associated with the 132-F-6, 1608-F Waste Water Pumping Station. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2007-031

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dittmer, L.M.

    2008-01-01

    The 100-F-26:15 waste site consisted of the remnant portions of underground process effluent and floor drain pipelines that originated at the 105-F Reactor. In accordance with this evaluation, the verification sampling results support a reclassification of this site to Interim Closed Out. The results of verification sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  17. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 100-B-24 Spillway. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2006-051

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dittmer, L.M.

    2006-01-01

    The 100-B-24 Spillway is a spillway that was designed to serve as an emergency discharge point for the 116-B-7 outfall in the event that the 100-B-15 river effluent pipelines were blocked, damaged, or undergoing maintenance. The site meets the remedial action objectives specified in the Remaining Sites ROD. The results of confirmatory sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  18. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 126-B-2, 183-B Clearwells

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dittmer, L.M.

    2007-01-01

    The 126-B-2, 183-B Clearwells were built as part of the 183-B Water Treatment Facility and are composed of 2 covered concrete reservoirs. The bulk of the water stored in the clearwells was used as process water to cool the 105-B Reactor and as a source of potable water. Residual conditions were determined to meet the remedial action objectives specified in the Remaining Sites ROD through an evaluation of the available process knowledge. The results of the evaluation do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also indicate that residual concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River.

  19. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 100-F-26:10, 1607-F3 Sanitary Sewer Pipelines (182-F, 183-F, and 151-F Sanitary Sewer Lines). Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2007-028

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dittmer, L.M.

    2007-01-01

    The 100-F-26:10 waste site includes sanitary sewer lines that serviced the former 182-F, 183-F, and 151-F Buildings. In accordance with this evaluation, the verification sampling results support a reclassification of this site to Interim Closed Out. The results of verification sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  20. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 100-D-9 Boiler Fuel Oil Tank Site. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2006-030

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dittmer, L.M.

    2006-01-01

    The 100-D-9 site is the former location of an underground storage tank used for holding fuel for the 184-DA Boiler House. Results of soil-gas samples taken from six soil-gas probes in a rectangle around the site the tank had been removed from concluded that there were no volatile organic compounds at detectable levels in the area. The 100-D-9 Boiler Fuel Oil Tank Site meets the remedial action objectives specified in the Remaining Sites ROD. The results demonstrated that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  1. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 1607-F1 Sanitary Sewer System (124-F-1) and the 100-F-26:8 (1607-F1) Sanitary Sewer Pipelines Waste Sites. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Forms 2004-130 and 2005-004

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dittmer, L.M.

    2008-01-01

    The 100-F-26:8 waste site consisted of the underground pipelines that conveyed sanitary waste water from the 1701-F Gatehouse, 1709-F Fire Station, and the 1720-F Administrative Office to the 1607-F1 septic tank. The site has been remediated and presently exists as an open excavation. In accordance with this evaluation, the verification sampling results support a reclassification of this site to Interim Closed Out. The results of verification sampling demonstrated that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also showed that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  2. Remaining Sites Verification Package for 132-DR-1, 1608-DR Effluent Pumping Station. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2005-035

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, R.A.

    2005-01-01

    Radiological characterization, decommissioning and demolition of the 132-DR-1 site, 1608-DR Effluent Pumping Station was performed in 1987. The current site conditions achieve the remedial action objectives and the corresponding remedial action goals established in the Remaining Sites ROD. Residual concentrations support future land uses that can be represented by a rural-residential scenario and pose no threat to groundwater or the Columbia River based on RESRAD modeling

  3. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 1607-B1 Septic System. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2007-015

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dittmer, L.M.

    2007-01-01

    The 1607-B1 Septic System includes a septic tank, drain field, and associated connecting pipelines and influent sanitary sewer lines. This septic system serviced the former 1701-B Badgehouse, 1720-B Patrol Building/Change Room, and the 1709-B Fire Headquarters. The 1607-B1 waste site received unknown amounts of nonhazardous, nonradioactive sanitary sewage from these facilities during its operational history from 1944 to approximately 1970. In accordance with this evaluation, the confirmatory sampling results support a reclassification of this site to No Action. The current site conditions achieve the remedial action objectives and the corresponding remedial action goals established in the Remaining Sites ROD. The results of confirmatory sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  4. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 1607-F5 Sanitary Sewer System (124-F-5). Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2006-043

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dittmer, L.M.

    2006-01-01

    The 1607-F5 waste site is a former septic tank, tile field, and associated pipeline located within the 100-FR-1 Operable Unit that received sewage from the former 181-F Pumphouse. Lead, gamma-chlordane, and heptachlor epoxide were identified within or around the septic system at concentrations exceeding the direct exposure cleanup criteria. Multiple metal and pesticide constituents were also identified as exceeding the groundwater and river protection cleanup criteria. The results of verification sampling demonstrated that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also showed that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  5. Cleanup Verification Package for the 300-18 Waste Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Capron, J.M.

    2005-01-01

    This cleanup verification package documents completion of remedial action for the 300-18 waste site. This site was identified as containing radiologically contaminated soil, metal shavings, nuts, bolts, and concrete

  6. Cleanup Verification Package for the 300 VTS Waste Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Clark, S.W.; Mitchell, T.H.

    2006-01-01

    This cleanup verification package documents completion of remedial action for the 300 Area Vitrification Test Site, also known as the 300 VTS site. The site was used by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory as a field demonstration site for in situ vitrification of soils containing simulated waste

  7. Cleanup Verification Package for the 300 VTS Waste Site

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    S. W. Clark and T. H. Mitchell

    2006-03-13

    This cleanup verification package documents completion of remedial action for the 300 Area Vitrification Test Site, also known as the 300 VTS site. The site was used by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory as a field demonstration site for in situ vitrification of soils containing simulated waste.

  8. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 100-B-20, 1716-B Maintenance Garage Underground Tank, Waste Site Reclassification Form 2006-019

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    L. M. Dittmer

    2006-09-27

    The 100-B-20 waste site, located in the 100-BC-1 Operable Unit of the Hanford Site, consisted of an underground oil tank that once serviced the 1716-B Maintenance Garage. The selected action for the 100-B-20 waste site involved removal of the oil tanks and their contents and demonstrating through confirmatory sampling that all cleanup goals have been met. In accordance with this evaluation, a reclassification status of interim closed out has been determined. The results demonstrate that the site will support future unrestricted land uses that can be represented by a rural-residential scenario. These results also show that residual concentrations support unrestricted future use of shallow zone soil and that contaminant levels remaining in the soil are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River.

  9. Independent verification in operations at nuclear power plants: Summaries of site visits

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Donderi, D.C.; Smiley, A.; Ostry, D.J.; Moray, N.P.

    1995-09-01

    A critical review of approaches to independent verification in operations used in nuclear power plant quality assurance programs in other countries was conducted and are detailed in volume 1. This paper is a compilation of the visits to nuclear power plant sites to study independent verification in operations at sites in Canada, USA, Japan, United Kingdom, France and Germany. 3 tabs., 22 figs

  10. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 116-F-16, PNL Outfall and the 100-F-43, PNL Outfall Spillway. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2006-039 and 2006-096

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dittmer, L.M.

    2006-01-01

    The 116-F-16 waste site is the former Pacific National Laboratories (PNL) Outfall, used to discharge waste effluents from the 100-F Experimental Animal Farm. The results of verification sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  11. Cleanup Verification Package for the 600-47 Waste Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cutlip, M.J.

    2005-01-01

    This cleanup verification package documents completion of interim remedial action for the 600-47 waste site. This site consisted of several areas of surface debris and contamination near the banks of the Columbia River across from Johnson Island. Contaminated material identified in field surveys included four areas of soil, wood, nuts, bolts, and other metal debris

  12. Cleanup Verification Package for the 600-259 Waste Site

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    J. M. Capron

    2006-02-09

    This cleanup verification package documents completion of remedial action for the 600-259 waste site. The site was the former site of the Special Waste Form Lysimeter, consisting of commercial reactor isotope waste forms in contact with soils within engineered caissons, and was used by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to collect data regarding leaching behavior for target analytes. A Grout Waste Test Facility also operated at the site, designed to test leaching rates of grout-solidified low-level radioactive waste.

  13. Cleanup Verification Package for the 600-259 Waste Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Capron, J.M.

    2006-01-01

    This cleanup verification package documents completion of remedial action for the 600-259 waste site. The site was the former site of the Special Waste Form Lysimeter, consisting of commercial reactor isotope waste forms in contact with soils within engineered caissons, and was used by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to collect data regarding leaching behavior for target analytes. A Grout Waste Test Facility also operated at the site, designed to test leaching rates of grout-solidified low-level radioactive waste

  14. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 100-B-1 Surface Chemical and Solid Waste Dumping Area,. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2006-003

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, R.A.

    2006-01-01

    The 100-B-1 waste site was a dumping site that was divided into two areas. One area was used as a laydown area for construction materials, and the other area was used as a chemical dumping area. The 100-B-1 Surface Chemical and Solid Waste Dumping Area site meets the remedial action objectives specified in the Remaining Sites ROD. The results demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations support future unrestricted land uses that can be represented by a rural-residential scenario. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  15. On site PWR fuel inspection measurements for operational and design verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-01-01

    The on-site inspection of irradiated Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) fuel and Non-Fuel Bearing Components (NFBC) is typically limited to visual inspections during refuelings using underwater TV cameras and is intended primarily to confirm whether the components will continue in operation. These inspections do not normally provide data for design verification nor information to benefit future fuel designs. Japanese PWR utilities and Nuclear Fuel Industries Ltd. designed, built, and performed demonstration tests of on-site inspection equipment that confirms operational readiness of PWR fuel and NFBC and also gathers data for design verification of these components. 4 figs, 3 tabs

  16. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 100-B-20, 1716-B Maintenance Garage Underground Tank. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2006-019

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dittmer, L.M.

    2006-01-01

    The 100-B-20 waste site, located in the 100-BC-1 Operable Unit of the Hanford Site, consisted of an underground oil tank that once serviced the 1716-B Maintenance Garage. The selected action for the 100-B-20 waste site involved removal of the oil tanks and their contents and demonstrating through confirmatory sampling that all cleanup goals have been met. In accordance with this evaluation, a reclassification status of interim closed out has been determined. The results demonstrate that the site will support future unrestricted land uses that can be represented by a rural-residential scenario. These results also show that residual concentrations support unrestricted future use of shallow zone soil and that contaminant levels remaining in the soil are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  17. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 100-F-52, 146-FR Radioecology and Aquatic Biology Laboratory Soil, Waste Site Reclassification Form 2008-022

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    J. M. Capron

    2008-06-27

    The 100-F-52 waste site consisted of the soil under and around the former 146-FR Radioecology and Aquatic Biology Laboratory. The laboratory was used for studies of the effects of pre-reactor and post-reactor process water on fish eggs, young fish, and other small river creatures of interest. In accordance with this evaluation, the confirmatory sampling results support a reclassification of this site to No Action. The current site conditions achieve the remedial action objectives and the corresponding remedial action goals established in the Remaining Sites ROD. The results of confirmatory sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River.

  18. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 100-F-46, 119-F Stack Sampling French Drain. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2008-021

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Capron, J.M.

    2008-01-01

    The 100-F-46 french drain consisted of a 1.5 to 3 m long, vertically buried, gravel-filled pipe that was approximately 1 m in diameter. Also included in this waste site was a 5 cm cast-iron pipeline that drained condensate from the 119-F Stack Sampling Building into the 100-F-46 french drain. In accordance with this evaluation, the confirmatory sampling results support a reclassification of this site to No Action. The current site conditions achieve the remedial action objectives and the corresponding remedial action goals established in the Remaining Sites ROD. The results of confirmatory sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  19. Experience in verification regimes. United States On-Site Inspection Agency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reppert, J.

    1998-01-01

    Experiences are described of the United States On-site Inspection Agency in verification regimes all over the world where it has been applied in the last 30 years. The challenge for the future is to extend the benefits of the applied tools to all states in all regions to enhance stability and to create conditions for peace at lower levels of armaments than currently exist. The USA need to engage states currently caught in cycles of violence and arms escalation. They must examine technologies which together with on-site aspects of verification or transparency regimes can provide a comprehensive picture at affordable costs. They foresee a growth in combined training with new states entering for the first time into regime that include arms control and transparency measure

  20. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 116-F-8, 1904-F Outfall Structure and the 100-F-42, 1904-F Spillway. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2006-038 and 2006-045

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dittmer, L.M.

    2006-01-01

    The 116-F-8 waste site is the former 1904-F Outfall Structure used to discharge reactor cooling water effluent from the 107-F Retention Basin to the Columbia River. The results of verification sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  1. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 1607-D4 Septic System. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2005-036

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, R.A.

    2006-01-01

    The 1607-D4 Septic System was a septic tank and tile field that received sanitary sewage from the 115-D/DR Gas Recirculation Facility. This septic system operated from 1944 to 1968. Decommissioning took place in 1985 and 1986 when all above-grade features were demolished and the tank backfilled. The results of verification sampling demonstrated that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also showed that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  2. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 116-F-16, PNL Outfall and the 100-F-43, PNL Outfall Spillway. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2006-039 and 2006-046

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dittmer, L.M.

    2006-01-01

    The 100-F-43 waste site is the portion of the former discharge spillway for the PNL Outfall formerly existing above the ordinary high water mark of the Columbia River. The spillway consisted of a concrete flume used to discharge waste effluents from the 100-F Experimental Animal Farm. The results of verification sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  3. Evaluation factors for verification and validation of low-level waste disposal site models

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moran, M.S.; Mezga, L.J.

    1982-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to identify general evaluation factors to be used to verify and validate LLW disposal site performance models in order to assess their site-specific applicability and to determine their accuracy and sensitivity. It is intended that the information contained in this paper be employed by model users involved with LLW site performance model verification and validation. It should not be construed as providing protocols, but rather as providing a framework for the preparation of specific protocols or procedures. A brief description of each evaluation factor is provided. The factors have been categorized according to recommended use during either the model verification or the model validation process. The general responsibilities of the developer and user are provided. In many cases it is difficult to separate the responsibilities of the developer and user, but the user is ultimately accountable for both verification and validation processes. 4 refs

  4. Independent Verification Final Summary Report for the David Witherspoon, Inc. 1630 Site Knoxville, Tennessee

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    P.C. Weaver

    2009-04-29

    The primary objective of the independent verification was to determine if BJC performed the appropriate actions to meet the specified “hot spot” cleanup criteria of 500 picocuries per gram (pCi/g) uranium-238 (U-238) in surface soil. Specific tasks performed by the independent verification team (IVT) to satisfy this objective included: 1) performing radiological walkover surveys, and 2) collecting soil samples for independent analyses. The independent verification (IV) efforts were designed to evaluate radioactive contaminants (specifically U-238) in the exposed surfaces below one foot of the original site grade, given that the top one foot layer of soil on the site was removed in its entirety.

  5. Independent Verification Final Summary Report for the David Witherspoon, Inc. 1630 Site Knoxville, Tennessee

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Weaver, P.C.

    2009-01-01

    The primary objective of the independent verification was to determine if BJC performed the appropriate actions to meet the specified 'hot spot' cleanup criteria of 500 picocuries per gram (pCi/g) uranium-238 (U-238) in surface soil. Specific tasks performed by the independent verification team (IVT) to satisfy this objective included: (1) performing radiological walkover surveys, and (2) collecting soil samples for independent analyses. The independent verification (IV) efforts were designed to evaluate radioactive contaminants (specifically U-238) in the exposed surfaces below one foot of the original site grade, given that the top one foot layer of soil on the site was removed in its entirety.

  6. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 100-F-44:2, Discovery Pipeline Near 108-F Building. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2007-006

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Capron, J.M.

    2008-01-01

    The 100-F-44:2 waste site is a steel pipeline that was discovered in a junction box during confirmatory sampling of the 100-F-26:4 pipeline from December 2004 through January 2005. The 100-F-44:2 pipeline feeds into the 100-F-26:4 subsite vitrified clay pipe (VCP) process sewer pipeline from the 108-F Biology Laboratory at the junction box. In accordance with this evaluation, the confirmatory sampling results support a reclassification of this site to No Action. The current site conditions achieve the remedial action objectives and the corresponding remedial action goals established in the Remaining Sites ROD. The results of confirmatory sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  7. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 100-F-52, 146-FR Radioecology and Aquatic Biology Laboratory Soil. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2008-022

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Capron, J.M.

    2008-01-01

    The 100-F-52 waste site consisted of the soil under and around the former 146-FR Radioecology and Aquatic Biology Laboratory. The laboratory was used for studies of the effects of pre-reactor and post-reactor process water on fish eggs, young fish, and other small river creatures of interest. In accordance with this evaluation, the confirmatory sampling results support a reclassification of this site to No Action. The current site conditions achieve the remedial action objectives and the corresponding remedial action goals established in the Remaining Sites ROD. The results of confirmatory sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  8. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 116-F-8, 1904-F Outfall Structure and the 100-F-42, 1904-F Spillway. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2006-038 and 2006-045

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dittmer, L.M.

    2006-01-01

    The 100-F-42 waste site is the portion of the former emergency overflow spillway for the 1904-F Outfall Structure formerly existing above the ordinary high water mark of the Columbia River. The spillway consisted of a concrete flume designed to discharge effluent from the 107-F Retention Basin in the event that flows could not be completely discharged via the river outfall pipelines. The results of verification sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  9. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 100-F-36, 108-F Biological Laboratory, and for the 116-F-15, 108-F Radiation Crib. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2007-002

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dittmer, L.M.

    2007-01-01

    The 100-F-36 waste site is the location of the former 108-F Biological Laboratory. The building was closed in 1973, decontaminated, decommissioned, and eventually demolished in 1999. In accordance with this evaluation, the confirmatory sampling results support a reclassification of this site to No Action. The current site conditions achieve the remedial action objectives and the corresponding remedial action goals established in the Remaining Sites ROD. The results of confirmatory sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  10. Mammalian remains from an Indian site on Curaçao

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Hooijer, D.A.

    1963-01-01

    The animal remains (mostly of shells, fish, and turtles) collected by Mr. H. R. VAN HEEKEREN and Mr. C. J. DU RY at the Indian site Sint Jan II, Curaçao, in March, 1960, include a few specimens of mammals. As was the case with the Indian site Santa Cruz, on Aruba (HOOIJER, 1960), several forms are

  11. FMCT verification: Case studies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hui Zhang

    2001-01-01

    for states that have traditionally had 'less transparency' in their military sectors. As case studies, first we investigate how to applied verification measures including remote sensing, off-site environmental sampling and on-site inspections to monitor the shutdown status of plutonium production facilities, and what measures could be taken to prevent the disclosure of sensitive information at the site. We find the most effective verification measure to monitor the status of the reprocessing plant would be on-site environmental sampling. Some countries may worry that sample analysis could disclose sensitive information about their past plutonium production activities. However, we find that sample analysis at the reprocessing site need not reveal such information. Sampling would not reveal such information as long as inspectors are not able to measure total quantities of Cs-137 and Sr-90 from HLW produced at former military plutonium production facilities. Secondly, we consider verification measures for shutdown gaseous diffusion uranium-enrichment plants (GDPs). The GDPs could be monitored effectively by satellite imagery, as one telltale operational signature of the GDP would be the water-vapor plume coming from the cooling tower, which should be easy to detect with satellite images. Furthermore, the hot roof of the enrichment building could be detectable using satellite thermal-infrared images. Finally, some on-site verification measures should be allowed, such as visual observation, surveillance and tamper-indicating seals. Finally, FMCT verification regime would have to be designed to detect undeclared fissile material production activities and facilities. These verification measures could include something like special or challenge inspections or complementary access. There would need to be provisions to prevent the abuse of such inspections, especially at sensitive and non-proscribed military and nuclear activities. In particular, to protect sensitive

  12. Decontamination and management of human remains following incidents of hazardous chemical release.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hauschild, Veronique D; Watson, Annetta; Bock, Robert

    2012-01-01

    To provide specific guidance and resources for systematic and orderly decontamination of human remains resulting from a chemical terrorist attack or accidental chemical release. A detailed review and health-based decision criteria protocol is summarized. Protocol basis and logic are derived from analyses of compound-specific toxicological data and chemical/physical characteristics. Guidance is suitable for civilian or military settings where human remains potentially contaminated with hazardous chemicals may be present, such as sites of transportation accidents, terrorist operations, or medical examiner processing points. Guidance is developed from data-characterizing controlled experiments with laboratory animals, fabrics, and materiel. Logic and specific procedures for decontamination and management of remains, protection of mortuary affairs personnel, and decision criteria to determine when remains are sufficiently decontaminated are presented. Established procedures as well as existing materiel and available equipment for decontamination and verification provide reasonable means to mitigate chemical hazards from chemically exposed remains. Unique scenarios such as those involving supralethal concentrations of certain liquid chemical warfare agents may prove difficult to decontaminate but can be resolved in a timely manner by application of the characterized systematic approaches. Decision criteria and protocols to "clear" decontaminated remains for transport and processing are also provided. Once appropriate decontamination and verification have been accomplished, normal procedures for management of remains and release can be followed.

  13. The first Neanderthal remains from an open-air Middle Palaeolithic site in the Levant.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Been, Ella; Hovers, Erella; Ekshtain, Ravid; Malinski-Buller, Ariel; Agha, Nuha; Barash, Alon; Mayer, Daniella E Bar-Yosef; Benazzi, Stefano; Hublin, Jean-Jacques; Levin, Lihi; Greenbaum, Noam; Mitki, Netta; Oxilia, Gregorio; Porat, Naomi; Roskin, Joel; Soudack, Michalle; Yeshurun, Reuven; Shahack-Gross, Ruth; Nir, Nadav; Stahlschmidt, Mareike C; Rak, Yoel; Barzilai, Omry

    2017-06-07

    The late Middle Palaeolithic (MP) settlement patterns in the Levant included the repeated use of caves and open landscape sites. The fossil record shows that two types of hominins occupied the region during this period-Neandertals and Homo sapiens. Until recently, diagnostic fossil remains were found only at cave sites. Because the two populations in this region left similar material cultural remains, it was impossible to attribute any open-air site to either species. In this study, we present newly discovered fossil remains from intact archaeological layers of the open-air site 'Ein Qashish, in northern Israel. The hominin remains represent three individuals: EQH1, a nondiagnostic skull fragment; EQH2, an upper right third molar (RM 3 ); and EQH3, lower limb bones of a young Neandertal male. EQH2 and EQH3 constitute the first diagnostic anatomical remains of Neandertals at an open-air site in the Levant. The optically stimulated luminescence ages suggest that Neandertals repeatedly visited 'Ein Qashish between 70 and 60 ka. The discovery of Neandertals at open-air sites during the late MP reinforces the view that Neandertals were a resilient population in the Levant shortly before Upper Palaeolithic Homo sapiens populated the region.

  14. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 1607-B2 Septic System and 100-B-14:2 Sanitary Sewer System, Waste Site Reclassification Form 2004-006

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    L. M. Dittmer

    2007-03-21

    The 100-B-14:2 subsite encompasses the former sanitary sewer feeder lines associated with the 1607-B2 and 1607-B7 septic systems. Feeder lines associated with the 185/190-B building have also been identified as the 100-B-14:8 subsite, and feeder lines associated with the 1607-B7 septic system have also been identified as the 100-B-14:9 subsite. These two subsites have been administratively cancelled to resolve the redundancy. The results of verification sampling show that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also demonstrate that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River.

  15. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 331 Life Sciences Laboratory Drain Field Septic System. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2008-020

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Capron, J.M.

    2008-01-01

    The 331 Life Sciences Laboratory Drain Field (LSLDF) septic system waste site consists of a diversion chamber, two septic tanks, a distribution box, and a drain field. This septic system was designed to receive sanitary waste water, from animal studies conducted in the 331-A and 331-B Buildings, for discharge into the soil column. However, field observations and testing suggest the 331 LSLDF septic system did not receive any discharges. In accordance with this evaluation, the confirmatory sampling results support a reclassification of the 331 LSLDF waste site to No Action. This site does not have a deep zone or other condition that would warrant an institutional control in accordance with the 300-FF-2 ROD under the industrial land use scenario

  16. Packaged low-level waste verification system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tuite, K.T.; Winberg, M.; Flores, A.Y.; Killian, E.W.; McIsaac, C.V.

    1996-01-01

    Currently, states and low-level radioactive waste (LLW) disposal site operators have no method of independently verifying the radionuclide content of packaged LLW that arrive at disposal sites for disposal. At this time, disposal sites rely on LLW generator shipping manifests and accompanying records to insure that LLW received meets the waste acceptance criteria. An independent verification system would provide a method of checking generator LLW characterization methods and help ensure that LLW disposed of at disposal facilities meets requirements. The Mobile Low-Level Waste Verification System (MLLWVS) provides the equipment, software, and methods to enable the independent verification of LLW shipping records to insure that disposal site waste acceptance criteria are being met. The MLLWVS system was developed under a cost share subcontract between WMG, Inc., and Lockheed Martin Idaho Technologies through the Department of Energy's National Low-Level Waste Management Program at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL)

  17. Results of the radiological verification survey of the partial remediation at 90 Avenue C, Lodi, New Jersey (LJ079V)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Foley, R.D.; Johnson, C.A.

    1994-02-01

    The property at 90 Avenue C, Lodi, New Jersey is one of the vicinity properties of the former Maywood Chemical Works, Maywood, New Jersey designated for remedial action by the US Department of Energy (DOE). In July 1991, Bechtel National, Inc. performed a partial remedial action on this property. At the request of DOE, a team from Oak Ridge National Laboratory conducted an independent radiological verification survey in July, 1991 at this site. The purpose of the verification survey was to ensure the effectiveness of remedial actions performed within FUSRAP and to confirm the site's compliance with DOE guidelines. The radiological survey included surface gamma scans indoors and outdoors, ground-level beta-gamma measurements, and systematic and biased soil and material sampling. Results of the verification survey demonstrated that all radiological measurements on the portions of the property that had been remediated were within DOE guidelines. However, there still remains a portion of the property to be remediated that is not covered by this verification survey

  18. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 100-B-22:1 Pipelines and Associated Soils. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2005-042

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dittmer, L.M.

    2006-01-01

    The 100-B-22:1 pipelines and associated soils were part of the 100-B Area water treatment facilities. The 100-B-22:1 waste site is limited to those pipelines that interconnected the 185-B Filter House, the 126-B-2 Clearwells, the 185-B Deaeration Plant, and the 190-B Process Pumphouse. None of the 100-B-22:1 pipelines carried environmentally significant contamination. In accordance with the historical information and field observations of this evaluation, the results support a reclassification of this site to No Action required to meet future rural-residential uses and be protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  19. Impact of the frequency of online verifications on the patient set-up accuracy and set-up margins

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rudat, Volker; Hammoud, Mohamed; Pillay, Yogin; Alaradi, Abdul Aziz; Mohamed, Adel; Altuwaijri, Saleh

    2011-01-01

    The purpose of the study was to evaluate the patient set-up error of different anatomical sites, to estimate the effect of different frequencies of online verifications on the patient set-up accuracy, and to calculate margins to accommodate for the patient set-up error (ICRU set-up margin, SM). Alignment data of 148 patients treated with inversed planned intensity modulated radiotherapy (IMRT) or three-dimensional conformal radiotherapy (3D-CRT) of the head and neck (n = 31), chest (n = 72), abdomen (n = 15), and pelvis (n = 30) were evaluated. The patient set-up accuracy was assessed using orthogonal megavoltage electronic portal images of 2328 fractions of 173 planning target volumes (PTV). In 25 patients, two PTVs were analyzed where the PTVs were located in different anatomical sites and treated in two different radiotherapy courses. The patient set-up error and the corresponding SM were retrospectively determined assuming no online verification, online verification once a week and online verification every other day. The SM could be effectively reduced with increasing frequency of online verifications. However, a significant frequency of relevant set-up errors remained even after online verification every other day. For example, residual set-up errors larger than 5 mm were observed on average in 18% to 27% of all fractions of patients treated in the chest, abdomen and pelvis, and in 10% of fractions of patients treated in the head and neck after online verification every other day. In patients where high set-up accuracy is desired, daily online verification is highly recommended

  20. Packaged low-level waste verification system

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tuite, K.; Winberg, M.R.; McIsaac, C.V. [Idaho National Engineering Lab., Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

    1995-12-31

    The Department of Energy through the National Low-Level Waste Management Program and WMG Inc. have entered into a joint development effort to design, build, and demonstrate the Packaged Low-Level Waste Verification System. Currently, states and low-level radioactive waste disposal site operators have no method to independently verify the radionuclide content of packaged low-level waste that arrives at disposal sites for disposition. At this time, the disposal site relies on the low-level waste generator shipping manifests and accompanying records to ensure that low-level waste received meets the site`s waste acceptance criteria. The subject invention provides the equipment, software, and methods to enable the independent verification of low-level waste shipping records to ensure that the site`s waste acceptance criteria are being met. The objective of the prototype system is to demonstrate a mobile system capable of independently verifying the content of packaged low-level waste.

  1. Impact of the frequency of online verifications on the patient set-up accuracy and set-up margins

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mohamed Adel

    2011-08-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Purpose The purpose of the study was to evaluate the patient set-up error of different anatomical sites, to estimate the effect of different frequencies of online verifications on the patient set-up accuracy, and to calculate margins to accommodate for the patient set-up error (ICRU set-up margin, SM. Methods and materials Alignment data of 148 patients treated with inversed planned intensity modulated radiotherapy (IMRT or three-dimensional conformal radiotherapy (3D-CRT of the head and neck (n = 31, chest (n = 72, abdomen (n = 15, and pelvis (n = 30 were evaluated. The patient set-up accuracy was assessed using orthogonal megavoltage electronic portal images of 2328 fractions of 173 planning target volumes (PTV. In 25 patients, two PTVs were analyzed where the PTVs were located in different anatomical sites and treated in two different radiotherapy courses. The patient set-up error and the corresponding SM were retrospectively determined assuming no online verification, online verification once a week and online verification every other day. Results The SM could be effectively reduced with increasing frequency of online verifications. However, a significant frequency of relevant set-up errors remained even after online verification every other day. For example, residual set-up errors larger than 5 mm were observed on average in 18% to 27% of all fractions of patients treated in the chest, abdomen and pelvis, and in 10% of fractions of patients treated in the head and neck after online verification every other day. Conclusion In patients where high set-up accuracy is desired, daily online verification is highly recommended.

  2. New Neanderthal remains from Mani peninsula, Southern Greece: the Kalamakia Middle Paleolithic cave site.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Harvati, Katerina; Darlas, Andreas; Bailey, Shara E; Rein, Thomas R; El Zaatari, Sireen; Fiorenza, Luca; Kullmer, Ottmar; Psathi, Eleni

    2013-06-01

    The Kalamakia cave, a Middle Paleolithic site on the western coast of the Mani peninsula, Greece, was excavated in 1993-2006 by an interdisciplinary team from the Ephoreia of Paleoanthropology and Speleology (Greek Ministry of Culture) and the Muséum national d'Histoire naturelle (Paris). The site is dated to between ca. 100,000 and >39,000 years BP (Before Present) and has yielded Mousterian lithics, a rich fauna, and human remains from several layers. The latter include 10 isolated teeth, a cranial fragment and three postcranial elements. The remains represent at least eight individuals, two of them subadults, and show both carnivore and anthropogenic modifications. They can be identified as Neanderthal on the basis of diagnostic morphology on most specimens. A diet similar to that of Neanderthals from mixed habitat is suggested by our analysis of dental wear (occlusal fingerprint analysis) and microwear (occlusal texture microwear analysis), in agreement with the faunal and palynological analyses of the site. These new fossils significantly expand the Neanderthal sample known from Greece. Together with the human specimens from Lakonis and Apidima, the Kalamakia human remains add to the growing evidence of a strong Neanderthal presence in the Mani region during the Late Pleistocene. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  3. Final Report Independent Verification Survey of the High Flux Beam Reactor, Building 802 Fan House Brookhaven National Laboratory Upton, New York

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Harpeneau, Evan M. [Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education, Oak Ridge, TN (United States). Independent Environmental Assessment and Verification Program

    2011-06-24

    On May 9, 2011, ORISE conducted verification survey activities including scans, sampling, and the collection of smears of the remaining soils and off-gas pipe associated with the 802 Fan House within the HFBR (High Flux Beam Reactor) Complex at BNL. ORISE is of the opinion, based on independent scan and sample results obtained during verification activities at the HFBR 802 Fan House, that the FSS (final status survey) unit meets the applicable site cleanup objectives established for as left radiological conditions.

  4. Results of the radiological and beryllium verification survey at the Peek Street Site, Schenectady, New York (SY001V)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Foley, R.D.; Johnson, C.A.; Carrier, R.F.; Allred, J.F.

    1994-10-01

    At the request of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), a team from Oak Ridge National Laboratory conducted an independent verification radiological and non-radioactive beryllium survey at the Peek Street site, located at 425 Peek Street, Schenectady, New York. The purpose of the survey, conducted during 1993 and continuing through January 1994, was to confirm the success of the remedial actions performed to remove any beryllium concentrations or radioactive materials in excess of the identified guidelines. The verification survey included surface gamma scans and gamma readings at one meter indoors and outdoors, alpha and beta scans inside the structure, and the collection of soil, dust and debris samples and smears for radionuclide and beryllium analyses. Results of the survey demonstrated that all radiological and beryllium measurements on the property were within applicable DOE guidelines. Based on all data collected, the industrial property at 425 Peek Street and the adjacent state-owned bike path in Schenectady, New York, conforms to all applicable radiological and non-radioactive beryllium guidelines established for this site by DOE and approved by the State of New York

  5. Remaining Sites Verification Package for 132-D-3, 1608-D Effluent Pumping Station. Attchment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2005-033

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, R.A.

    2006-01-01

    Decommissioning and demolition of the 132-D-3 site, 1608-D Effluent Pumping Station was performed in 1986. Decommissioning included removal of equipment, water, and sludge for disposal as radioactive waste. The at- and below-grade structure was demolished to at least 1 m below grade and the resulting rubble buried in situ. The area was backfilled to grade with at least 1 m of clean fill and contoured to the surrounding terrain. Residual concentrations support future land uses that can be represented by a rural-residential scenario and pose no threat to groundwater or the Columbia River based on RESRAD modeling

  6. Verification Survey of Uranium Mine Remediation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ron, Stager

    2009-01-01

    The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) contracted an independent verification of an intensive gamma radiation survey conducted by a mining company to demonstrate that remediation of disturbed areas was complete. This site was the first of the recent mines being decommissioned in Canada and experience gained here may be applied to other mines being decommissioned in the future. The review included examination of the site-specific basis for clean-up criteria and ALARA as required by CNSC guidance. A paper review of the company report was conducted to determine if protocols were followed and that the summarized results could be independently reproduced. An independent verification survey was conducted on parts of the site and comparisons were made between gamma radiation measurements from the verification survey and the original company survey. Some aspects of data collection using rate meters linked to GPS data loggers are discussed as are aspects for data management and analyses methods required for the large amount of data collected during these surveys. Recommendations were made for implementation of future surveys and reporting the data from those surveys in order to ensure that remediation was complete. (authors)

  7. Fish and other faunal remains from a Late Iron Age site on the Letaba River, Kruger National Park

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ina Plug

    1991-09-01

    Full Text Available Fish remains from Late Iron Age sites in the Transvaal are relatively scarce. It seems as if the people did not utilize the riverine resources extensively. Therefore the unique assemblage of large numbers of fish bones on a Late Iron Age site, provides some insight into the fish population of a section of the Letaba River a few hundred years ago. The presence of other faunal remains provides some information on prehistoric utilization of the environment in general. Hunting strategies and aspects of herding can also be deduced from the faunal remains.

  8. Verification of chemistry reference ranges using a simple method in sub-Saharan Africa

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Irith De Baetselier

    2016-10-01

    Full Text Available Background: Chemistry safety assessments are interpreted by using chemistry reference ranges (CRRs. Verification of CRRs is time consuming and often requires a statistical background. Objectives: We report on an easy and cost-saving method to verify CRRs. Methods: Using a former method introduced by Sigma Diagnostics, three study sites in sub- Saharan Africa, Bondo, Kenya, and Pretoria and Bloemfontein, South Africa, verified the CRRs for hepatic and renal biochemistry assays performed during a clinical trial of HIV antiretroviral pre-exposure prophylaxis. The aspartate aminotransferase/alanine aminotransferase, creatinine and phosphorus results from 10 clinically-healthy participants at the screening visit were used. In the event the CRRs did not pass the verification, new CRRs had to be calculated based on 40 clinically-healthy participants. Results: Within a few weeks, the study sites accomplished verification of the CRRs without additional costs. The aspartate aminotransferase reference ranges for the Bondo, Kenya site and the alanine aminotransferase reference ranges for the Pretoria, South Africa site required adjustment. The phosphorus CRR passed verification and the creatinine CRR required adjustment at every site. The newly-established CRR intervals were narrower than the CRRs used previously at these study sites due to decreases in the upper limits of the reference ranges. As a result, more toxicities were detected. Conclusion: To ensure the safety of clinical trial participants, verification of CRRs should be standard practice in clinical trials conducted in settings where the CRR has not been validated for the local population. This verification method is simple, inexpensive, and can be performed by any medical laboratory.

  9. Verification of chemistry reference ranges using a simple method in sub-Saharan Africa.

    Science.gov (United States)

    De Baetselier, Irith; Taylor, Douglas; Mandala, Justin; Nanda, Kavita; Van Campenhout, Christel; Agingu, Walter; Madurai, Lorna; Barsch, Eva-Maria; Deese, Jennifer; Van Damme, Lut; Crucitti, Tania

    2016-01-01

    Chemistry safety assessments are interpreted by using chemistry reference ranges (CRRs). Verification of CRRs is time consuming and often requires a statistical background. We report on an easy and cost-saving method to verify CRRs. Using a former method introduced by Sigma Diagnostics, three study sites in sub-Saharan Africa, Bondo, Kenya, and Pretoria and Bloemfontein, South Africa, verified the CRRs for hepatic and renal biochemistry assays performed during a clinical trial of HIV antiretroviral pre-exposure prophylaxis. The aspartate aminotransferase/alanine aminotransferase, creatinine and phosphorus results from 10 clinically-healthy participants at the screening visit were used. In the event the CRRs did not pass the verification, new CRRs had to be calculated based on 40 clinically-healthy participants. Within a few weeks, the study sites accomplished verification of the CRRs without additional costs. The aspartate aminotransferase reference ranges for the Bondo, Kenya site and the alanine aminotransferase reference ranges for the Pretoria, South Africa site required adjustment. The phosphorus CRR passed verification and the creatinine CRR required adjustment at every site. The newly-established CRR intervals were narrower than the CRRs used previously at these study sites due to decreases in the upper limits of the reference ranges. As a result, more toxicities were detected. To ensure the safety of clinical trial participants, verification of CRRs should be standard practice in clinical trials conducted in settings where the CRR has not been validated for the local population. This verification method is simple, inexpensive, and can be performed by any medical laboratory.

  10. Analysis of long-term impacts of TRU waste remaining at generator/storage sites for No Action Alternative 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Buck, J.W.; Bagaasen, L.M.; Bergeron, M.P.; Streile, G.P.

    1997-09-01

    This report is a supplement to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Disposal-Phase Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS-II). Described herein are the underlying information, data, and assumptions used to estimate the long-term human-health impacts from exposure to radionuclides and hazardous chemicals in transuranic (TRU) waste remaining at major generator/storage sites after loss of institutional control under No Action Alternative 2. Under No Action Alternative 2, TRU wastes would not be emplaced at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) but would remain at generator/storage sites in surface or near-surface storage. Waste generated at smaller sites would be consolidated at the major generator/storage sites. Current TRU waste management practices would continue, but newly generated waste would be treated to meet the WIPP waste acceptance criteria. For this alternative, institutional control was assumed to be lost 100 years after the end of the waste generation period, with exposure to radionuclides and hazardous chemicals in the TRU waste possible from direct intrusion and release to the surrounding environment. The potential human-health impacts from exposure to radionuclides and hazardous chemicals in TRU waste were analyzed for two different types of scenarios. Both analyses estimated site-specific, human-health impacts at seven major generator/storage sites: the Hanford Site (Hanford), Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS), and Savannah River Site (SRS). The analysis focused on these seven sites because 99 % of the estimated TRU waste volume and inventory would remain there under the assumptions of No Action Alternative 2

  11. The joint verification experiments as a global non-proliferation exercise

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shaner, J.W.

    1998-01-01

    This conference commemorates the 10th anniversary of the second of two Joint Verification Experiments conducted by the Soviet Union and the US. These two experiments, one at the Nevada test site in the US, and the second here at the Semipalatinsk test site were designed to test the verification of a nuclear testing treaty limiting the size underground explosions to 150 kilotons. By building trust and technical respect between the weapons scientists of the two most powerful adversaries, the Joint Verification Experiment (JVE) had the unanticipated result of initiating a suite of cooperative projects and programs aimed at reducing the Cold War threats and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

  12. Grafting on nuclear tracks using the active sites that remain after the etching process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mazzei, R.; Bermudez, G. Garcia; Chappa, V.C.; Grosso, M.F. del; Fernandez, A.

    2006-01-01

    Poly(propylene) foils were irradiated with Ag ions and then chemically etched to produce samples with structured surfaces. After the etching procedure the active sites that remain on the latent track were used to graft acrylic acid. Nuclear tracks before grafting were visualised using a transmission electron microscope. The grafting yields were determined by weight measurements as a function of ion fluence, etching and grafting time, and were also analysed using Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy. Both measurements suggest that the acrylic acid was grafted on etched tracks using the active sites produced by the swift heavy ion beam

  13. Grafting on nuclear tracks using the active sites that remain after the etching process

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mazzei, R. [Unidad de Aplicaciones Tecnologicas y Agropecuarias, CNEA, 1429 Buenos Aires (Argentina) and Universidad Tecnologica Nacional, Buenos Aires (Argentina)]. E-mail: mazzei@cae.cnea.gov.ar; Bermudez, G. Garcia [U. A. de Fisica, Tandar, CNEA, 1429 Buenos Aires (Argentina); Escuela de Ciencia y Tecnologia, UNSAM, 1653 Buenos Aires (Argentina); Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (Argentina); Chappa, V.C. [U. A. de Fisica, Tandar, CNEA, 1429 Buenos Aires (Argentina); Grosso, M.F. del [U. A. de Fisica, Tandar, CNEA, 1429 Buenos Aires (Argentina); U. A. de Materiales, CNEA, 1429 Buenos Aires (Argentina); Fernandez, A. [Universidad Tecnologica Nacional, Buenos Aires (Argentina)

    2006-09-15

    Poly(propylene) foils were irradiated with Ag ions and then chemically etched to produce samples with structured surfaces. After the etching procedure the active sites that remain on the latent track were used to graft acrylic acid. Nuclear tracks before grafting were visualised using a transmission electron microscope. The grafting yields were determined by weight measurements as a function of ion fluence, etching and grafting time, and were also analysed using Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy. Both measurements suggest that the acrylic acid was grafted on etched tracks using the active sites produced by the swift heavy ion beam.

  14. Fate of nuclear waste site remains unclear

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anderson, E.V.

    1980-01-01

    The only commercial nuclear fuel reprocessing plant in the U.S., located in West Valley, N.Y., has been shut down since 1972, and no efforts have yet been made to clean up the site. The site contains a spent-fuel pool, high level liquid waste storage tanks, and two radioactive waste burial grounds. Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., has been leasing the site from the New York State Energy RandD Authority. Federal litigation may ensue, prompted by NRC and DOE, if the company refuses to decontaminate the area when its lease expires at the end of 1980. DOE has developed a plan to solidify the liquid wastes at the facility but needs additional legislation and funding to implement the scheme

  15. Transparencies used in describing the CTBT verification regime and its four monitoring technologies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Basham, P.

    1999-01-01

    This presentation includes description of the CTBT verification regime and its four monitoring technologies, (namely, seismic monitoring, hydro acoustic monitoring, infrasound monitoring and radionuclides monitoring) CTBT global verification system, sequence of steps needed for installing an international monitoring system station which includes: site survey, site preparation and construction, equipment procurement and installation, final tests and certification

  16. A Roadmap for the Implementation of Continued Process Verification.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Boyer, Marcus; Gampfer, Joerg; Zamamiri, Abdel; Payne, Robin

    2016-01-01

    In 2014, the members of the BioPhorum Operations Group (BPOG) produced a 100-page continued process verification case study, entitled "Continued Process Verification: An Industry Position Paper with Example Protocol". This case study captures the thought processes involved in creating a continued process verification plan for a new product in response to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's guidance on the subject introduced in 2011. In so doing, it provided the specific example of a plan developed for a new molecular antibody product based on the "A MAb Case Study" that preceded it in 2009.This document provides a roadmap that draws on the content of the continued process verification case study to provide a step-by-step guide in a more accessible form, with reference to a process map of the product life cycle. It could be used as a basis for continued process verification implementation in a number of different scenarios: For a single product and process;For a single site;To assist in the sharing of data monitoring responsibilities among sites;To assist in establishing data monitoring agreements between a customer company and a contract manufacturing organization. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration issued guidance on the management of manufacturing processes designed to improve quality and control of drug products. This involved increased focus on regular monitoring of manufacturing processes, reporting of the results, and the taking of opportunities to improve. The guidance and practice associated with it is known as continued process verification This paper summarizes good practice in responding to continued process verification guidance, gathered from subject matter experts in the biopharmaceutical industry. © PDA, Inc. 2016.

  17. Disarmament Verification - the OPCW Experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lodding, J.

    2010-01-01

    The Chemical Weapons Convention is the only multilateral treaty that bans completely an entire category of weapons of mass destruction under international verification arrangements. Possessor States, i.e. those that have chemical weapons stockpiles at the time of becoming party to the CWC, commit to destroying these. All States undertake never to acquire chemical weapons and not to help other States acquire such weapons. The CWC foresees time-bound chemical disarmament. The deadlines for destruction for early entrants to the CWC are provided in the treaty. For late entrants, the Conference of States Parties intervenes to set destruction deadlines. One of the unique features of the CWC is thus the regime for verifying destruction of chemical weapons. But how can you design a system for verification at military sites, while protecting military restricted information? What degree of assurance is considered sufficient in such circumstances? How do you divide the verification costs? How do you deal with production capability and initial declarations of existing stockpiles? The founders of the CWC had to address these and other challenges in designing the treaty. Further refinement of the verification system has followed since the treaty opened for signature in 1993 and since inspection work was initiated following entry-into-force of the treaty in 1997. Most of this work concerns destruction at the two large possessor States, Russia and the United States. Perhaps some of the lessons learned from the OPCW experience may be instructive in a future verification regime for nuclear weapons. (author)

  18. Verification of Chemical Weapons Destruction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lodding, J.

    2010-01-01

    The Chemical Weapons Convention is the only multilateral treaty that bans completely an entire category of weapons of mass destruction under international verification arrangements. Possessor States, i.e. those that have chemical weapons stockpiles at the time of becoming party to the CWC, commit to destroying these. All States undertake never to acquire chemical weapons and not to help other States acquire such weapons. The CWC foresees time-bound chemical disarmament. The deadlines for destruction for early entrants to the CWC are provided in the treaty. For late entrants, the Conference of States Parties intervenes to set destruction deadlines. One of the unique features of the CWC is thus the regime for verifying destruction of chemical weapons. But how can you design a system for verification at military sites, while protecting military restricted information? What degree of assurance is considered sufficient in such circumstances? How do you divide the verification costs? How do you deal with production capability and initial declarations of existing stockpiles? The founders of the CWC had to address these and other challenges in designing the treaty. Further refinement of the verification system has followed since the treaty opened for signature in 1993 and since inspection work was initiated following entry-into-force of the treaty in 1997. Most of this work concerns destruction at the two large possessor States, Russia and the United States. Perhaps some of the lessons learned from the OPCW experience may be instructive in a future verification regime for nuclear weapons. (author)

  19. Verification test for three WindCube WLS7 LiDARs at the Høvsøre test site

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Gottschall, Julia; Courtney, Michael

    The report describes the procedure of testing ground-based WindCube lidars (manufactured by the French company Leosphere) at the Høvsøre test site in comparison to reference sensors mounted at a meteorological mast. Results are presented for three tested units – in detail for unit WLS7-0062, and ......-0062, and in a summary for units WLS7-0064 and WLS7-0066. The verification test covers the evaluation of measured mean wind speeds, wind directions and wind speed standard deviations. The data analysis is basically performed in terms of different kinds of regression analyses.......The report describes the procedure of testing ground-based WindCube lidars (manufactured by the French company Leosphere) at the Høvsøre test site in comparison to reference sensors mounted at a meteorological mast. Results are presented for three tested units – in detail for unit WLS7...

  20. Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project Design Verification and Validation Process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    OLGUIN, L.J.

    2000-01-01

    This document provides a description of design verification and validation activities implemented by the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project. During the execution of early design verification, a management assessment (Bergman, 1999) and external assessments on configuration management (Augustenburg, 1999) and testing (Loscoe, 2000) were conducted and identified potential uncertainties in the verification process. This led the SNF Chief Engineer to implement corrective actions to improve process and design products. This included Design Verification Reports (DVRs) for each subproject, validation assessments for testing, and verification of the safety function of systems and components identified in the Safety Equipment List to ensure that the design outputs were compliant with the SNF Technical Requirements. Although some activities are still in progress, the results of the DVR and associated validation assessments indicate that Project requirements for design verification are being effectively implemented. These results have been documented in subproject-specific technical documents (Table 2). Identified punch-list items are being dispositioned by the Project. As these remaining items are closed, the technical reports (Table 2) will be revised and reissued to document the results of this work

  1. Carnivoran remains from the Malapa hominin site, South Africa.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Brian F Kuhn

    Full Text Available Recent discoveries at the new hominin-bearing deposits of Malapa, South Africa, have yielded a rich faunal assemblage associated with the newly described hominin taxon Australopithecus sediba. Dating of this deposit using U-Pb and palaeomagnetic methods has provided an age of 1.977 Ma, being one of the most accurately dated, time constrained deposits in the Plio-Pleistocene of southern Africa. To date, 81 carnivoran specimens have been identified at this site including members of the families Canidae, Viverridae, Herpestidae, Hyaenidae and Felidae. Of note is the presence of the extinct taxon Dinofelis cf. D. barlowi that may represent the last appearance date for this species. Extant large carnivores are represented by specimens of leopard (Panthera pardus and brown hyaena (Parahyaena brunnea. Smaller carnivores are also represented, and include the genera Atilax and Genetta, as well as Vulpes cf. V. chama. Malapa may also represent the first appearance date for Felis nigripes (Black-footed cat. The geochronological age of Malapa and the associated hominin taxa and carnivoran remains provide a window of research into mammalian evolution during a relatively unknown period in South Africa and elsewhere. In particular, the fauna represented at Malapa has the potential to elucidate aspects of the evolution of Dinofelis and may help resolve competing hypotheses about faunal exchange between East and Southern Africa during the late Pliocene or early Pleistocene.

  2. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 100-F-44:4, Discovery Pipeline in Silica Gel Pit. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2008-030

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Capron, J.M.

    2008-01-01

    The 100-F-44:4, Discovery Pipeline in Silica Gel Pit subsite is located in the 100-FR-1 Operable Unit of the Hanford Site, near the location of the former 110-F Gas Storage Tanks structure. The 100-F-44:4 subsite is a steel pipe discovered October 17, 2004, during trenching to locate the 118-F-4 Silica Gel Pit. Based on visual inspection and confirmatory investigation sampling data, the 100-F-44:4 subsite is a piece of non-hazardous electrical conduit debris. The 100-F-44:4 subsite supports unrestricted future use of shallow zone soil and is protective of groundwater and the Columbia River. No residual contamination exists within the deep zone. Therefore, no deep zone institutional controls are required

  3. Complementary technologies for verification of excess plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Langner, D.G.; Nicholas, N.J.; Ensslin, N.; Fearey, B.L.; Mitchell, D.J.; Marlow, K.W.; Luke, S.J.; Gosnell, T.B.

    1998-01-01

    Three complementary measurement technologies have been identified as candidates for use in the verification of excess plutonium of weapons origin. These technologies: high-resolution gamma-ray spectroscopy, neutron multiplicity counting, and low-resolution gamma-ray spectroscopy, are mature, robust technologies. The high-resolution gamma-ray system, Pu-600, uses the 630--670 keV region of the emitted gamma-ray spectrum to determine the ratio of 240 Pu to 239 Pu. It is useful in verifying the presence of plutonium and the presence of weapons-grade plutonium. Neutron multiplicity counting is well suited for verifying that the plutonium is of a safeguardable quantity and is weapons-quality material, as opposed to residue or waste. In addition, multiplicity counting can independently verify the presence of plutonium by virtue of a measured neutron self-multiplication and can detect the presence of non-plutonium neutron sources. The low-resolution gamma-ray spectroscopic technique is a template method that can provide continuity of knowledge that an item that enters the a verification regime remains under the regime. In the initial verification of an item, multiple regions of the measured low-resolution spectrum form a unique, gamma-radiation-based template for the item that can be used for comparison in subsequent verifications. In this paper the authors discuss these technologies as they relate to the different attributes that could be used in a verification regime

  4. Formal Verification of Circuits and Systems

    Indian Academy of Sciences (India)

    R. Narasimhan (Krishtel eMaging) 1461 1996 Oct 15 13:05:22

    The problem of validation and verification of correctness of present day hardware and soft- ware systems has become extemely complex due to the enormous growth in the size of the designs. Today typically 50% to 70% of the design cycle time is spent in verifying correct- ness. While simulation remains a predominant form ...

  5. Cleanup Verification Package for the 618-2 Burial Ground

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    W. S. Thompson

    2006-12-28

    This cleanup verification package documents completion of remedial action for the 618-2 Burial Ground, also referred to as Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 2; Burial Ground No. 2; 318-2; and Dry Waste Burial Site No. 2. This waste site was used primarily for the disposal of contaminated equipment, materials and laboratory waste from the 300 Area Facilities.

  6. Cleanup Verification Package for the 618-2 Burial Ground

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thompson, W.S.

    2006-01-01

    This cleanup verification package documents completion of remedial action for the 618-2 Burial Ground, also referred to as Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 2; Burial Ground No. 2; 318-2; and Dry Waste Burial Site No. 2. This waste site was used primarily for the disposal of contaminated equipment, materials and laboratory waste from the 300 Area Facilities

  7. Challenges for effective WMD verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Andemicael, B.

    2006-01-01

    Effective verification is crucial to the fulfillment of the objectives of any disarmament treaty, not least as regards the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The effectiveness of the verification package depends on a number of factors, some inherent in the agreed structure and others related to the type of responses demanded by emerging challenges. The verification systems of three global agencies-the IAEA, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO, currently the Preparatory Commission), and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)-share similarities in their broad objectives of confidence-building and deterrence by assuring members that rigorous verification would deter or otherwise detect non-compliance. Yet they are up against various constraints and other issues, both internal and external to the treaty regime. These constraints pose major challenges to the effectiveness and reliability of the verification operations. In the nuclear field, the IAEA safeguards process was the first to evolve incrementally from modest Statute beginnings to a robust verification system under the global Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The nuclear non-proliferation regime is now being supplemented by a technology-intensive verification system of the nuclear test-ban treaty (CTBT), a product of over three decades of negotiation. However, there still remain fundamental gaps and loopholes in the regime as a whole, which tend to diminish the combined effectiveness of the IAEA and the CTBT verification capabilities. He three major problems are (a) the lack of universality of membership, essentially because of the absence of three nuclear weapon-capable States-India, Pakistan and Israel-from both the NPT and the CTBT, (b) the changes in US disarmament policy, especially in the nuclear field, and (c) the failure of the Conference on Disarmament to conclude a fissile material cut-off treaty. The world is

  8. The MODUS Approach to Formal Verification

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Brewka Lukasz

    2014-03-01

    Full Text Available Background: Software reliability is of great importance for the development of embedded systems that are often used in applications that have requirements for safety. Since the life cycle of embedded products is becoming shorter, productivity and quality simultaneously required and closely in the process of providing competitive products Objectives: In relation to this, MODUS (Method and supporting toolset advancing embedded systems quality project aims to provide small and medium-sized businesses ways to improve their position in the embedded market through a pragmatic and viable solution Methods/Approach: This paper will describe the MODUS project with focus on the technical methodologies that can assist formal verification and formal model checking. Results: Based on automated analysis of the characteristics of the system and by controlling the choice of the existing opensource model verification engines, model verification producing inputs to be fed into these engines. Conclusions: The MODUS approach is aligned with present market needs; the familiarity with tools, the ease of use and compatibility/interoperability remain among the most important criteria when selecting the development environment for a project

  9. A verification regime for the spatial discretization of the SN transport equations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Schunert, S.; Azmy, Y. [North Carolina State Univ., Dept. of Nuclear Engineering, 2500 Stinson Drive, Raleigh, NC 27695 (United States)

    2012-07-01

    The order-of-accuracy test in conjunction with the method of manufactured solutions is the current state of the art in computer code verification. In this work we investigate the application of a verification procedure including the order-of-accuracy test on a generic SN transport solver that implements the AHOTN spatial discretization. Different types of semantic errors, e.g. removal of a line of code or changing a single character, are introduced randomly into the previously verified S{sub N} code and the proposed verification procedure is used to identify the coding mistakes (if possible) and classify them. Itemized by error type we record the stage of the verification procedure where the error is detected and report the frequency with which the errors are correctly identified at various stages of the verification. Errors that remain undetected by the verification procedure are further scrutinized to determine the reason why the introduced coding mistake eluded the verification procedure. The result of this work is that the verification procedure based on an order-of-accuracy test finds almost all detectable coding mistakes but rarely, 1.44% of the time, and under certain circumstances can fail. (authors)

  10. Results of the independent radiological verification survey at the former Associate Aircraft Tool and Manufacturing Company site, Fairfield, Ohio (FOH001)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rice, D.E.; Murray, M.E.; Brown, K.S.

    1996-01-01

    The former Associate Aircraft Tool and Manufacturing Company site is located at 3550 Dixie Highway, Fairfield, Ohio. Associate Aircraft Tool and Manufacturing Company produced hollow uranium slugs in a machine shop at the site in 1956. The work was performed for National Lead of Ohio in a contract with the Atomic Energy Commission to augment the capacity of the Feed Materials Production Center at Fernald in the development of nuclear energy for defense-related projects. The current occupant of the building, Force Control, operates a multipurpose machine shop. At the request of the US Department of Energy (DOE), a team from Oak Ridge National Laboratory conducted an independent radiological verification survey at the former Associate Aircraft Tool and Manufacturing Company Site, Fairfield, Ohio. The survey was performed from February to May of 1995. The purpose of the survey was to verify that radioactivity from residues of 238 U was remediated to a level below acceptable DOE guidelines levels

  11. CTBT on-site inspections

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zucca, J. J.

    2014-05-01

    On-site inspection (OSI) is a critical part of the verification regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The OSI verification regime provides for international inspectors to make a suite of measurements and observations on site at the location of an event of interest. The other critical component of the verification regime is the International Monitoring System (IMS), which is a globally distributed network of monitoring stations. The IMS along with technical monitoring data from CTBT member countries, as appropriate, will be used to trigger an OSI. After the decision is made to carry out an OSI, it is important for the inspectors to deploy to the field site rapidly to be able to detect short-lived phenomena such as the aftershocks that may be observable after an underground nuclear explosion. The inspectors will be on site from weeks to months and will be working with many tens of tons of equipment. Parts of the OSI regime will be tested in a field exercise in the country of Jordan late in 2014. The build-up of the OSI regime has been proceeding steadily since the CTBT was signed in 1996 and is on track to becoming a deterrent to someone considering conducting a nuclear explosion in violation of the Treaty.

  12. Results of the independent radiological verification survey at 4400 Piehl Road, Ottawa Lake, Michigan (BTO002)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Murray, M.E.; Brown, K.S.

    1996-04-01

    At the request of the US Department of Energy (DOE), a team from Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) conducted an independent radiological verification survey at Ottawa Lake, Michigan. The survey was performed in November and December of 1994. The purpose of the survey was to verify that the site was remediated to levels below the DOE guidelines for FUSRAP sites. Results of the independent radiological verification survey at Ottawa Lake, Michigan confirm that the residual uranium contamination at the site is below DOE FUSRAP guidelines for unrestricted use.

  13. Advanced verification topics

    CERN Document Server

    Bhattacharya, Bishnupriya; Hall, Gary; Heaton, Nick; Kashai, Yaron; Khan Neyaz; Kirshenbaum, Zeev; Shneydor, Efrat

    2011-01-01

    The Accellera Universal Verification Methodology (UVM) standard is architected to scale, but verification is growing and in more than just the digital design dimension. It is growing in the SoC dimension to include low-power and mixed-signal and the system integration dimension to include multi-language support and acceleration. These items and others all contribute to the quality of the SOC so the Metric-Driven Verification (MDV) methodology is needed to unify it all into a coherent verification plan. This book is for verification engineers and managers familiar with the UVM and the benefits it brings to digital verification but who also need to tackle specialized tasks. It is also written for the SoC project manager that is tasked with building an efficient worldwide team. While the task continues to become more complex, Advanced Verification Topics describes methodologies outside of the Accellera UVM standard, but that build on it, to provide a way for SoC teams to stay productive and profitable.

  14. Material integrity verification radar

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koppenjan, S.K.

    1999-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has the need for verification of 'as-built' spent fuel-dry storage containers and other concrete structures. The IAEA has tasked the Special Technologies Laboratory (STL) to fabricate, test, and deploy a stepped-frequency Material Integrity Verification Radar (MIVR) system to nondestructively verify the internal construction of these containers. The MIVR system is based on previously deployed high-frequency, ground penetrating radar (GPR) systems that have been developed by STL for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Whereas GPR technology utilizes microwave radio frequency energy to create subsurface images, MTVR is a variation for which the medium is concrete instead of soil. The purpose is to nondestructively verify the placement of concrete-reinforcing materials, pipes, inner liners, and other attributes of the internal construction. The MIVR system underwent an initial field test on CANDU reactor spent fuel storage canisters at Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), Chalk River Laboratories, Ontario, Canada, in October 1995. A second field test at the Embalse Nuclear Power Plant in Embalse, Argentina, was completed in May 1996. The DOE GPR also was demonstrated at the site. Data collection and analysis were performed for the Argentine National Board of Nuclear Regulation (ENREN). IAEA and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the Control and Accounting of Nuclear Material (ABACC) personnel were present as observers during the test. Reinforcing materials were evident in the color, two-dimensional images produced by the MIVR system. A continuous pattern of reinforcing bars was evident and accurate estimates on the spacing, depth, and size were made. The potential uses for safeguard applications were jointly discussed. The MIVR system, as successfully demonstrated in the two field tests, can be used as a design verification tool for IAEA safeguards. A deployment of MIVR for Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ

  15. U-Th/ESR combined dating of faunal remains from the Mousterian open site of Beauvais (France)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Michel, V.; Masaoudi, H.; Falgueres, Ch.; Yokoyama, Y.; Locht, J.L.; Antoine, P.

    1999-01-01

    Faunal remains from the Beauvais open site 'La Justice' (Oise) are the subject of an U-Th dating (disequilibrium of the uranium chain) and an ESR dating (electronic spin resonance). This study was performed in order to identify the chronological situation of the Middle Paleolithic levels of this site located in the north of France, supposedly aged stage 4 after stratigraphic correlations. U-Th ages of bones and dentine are between 20 and 200 ka and are scattered; however, the combined ESR/U-Th ages of rhinoceros dental enamels are homogeneous and indicate that the archaeological levels were deposited between 60 to 40 ka. This period corresponds to the end of the oxygen isotopic stage 4 to the beginning of stage 3. (authors) stage 3. (authors)

  16. Remaining Sites Verification Package for the 182-F Reservoir Waste Site. Attachment to Waste Site Reclassification Form 2005-025

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, R.A.

    2005-01-01

    The 182-F Reservoir was a rectangular-shaped concrete basin consisting of two sections divided by a concrete wall. The reservoir provided reserve water from the Columbia River for reactor cooling water and raw water for the 100 Area and had a storage capacity of 94.6 million liters (25 million gallons). The 182-F Reservoir was later used as a landfill for decontaminated rubble from buildings that were decommissioned in the 100-F Area. The results of the 182-F Reservoir evaluation showed that residual contaminant concentrations do not preclude any future uses and allow for unrestricted use of shallow zone soils. The results also showed that residual contaminant concentrations are protective of groundwater and the Columbia River

  17. Data storage accounting and verification at LHC experiments

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Huang, C. H. [Fermilab; Lanciotti, E. [CERN; Magini, N. [CERN; Ratnikova, N. [Moscow, ITEP; Sanchez-Hernandez, A. [CINVESTAV, IPN; Serfon, C. [Munich U.; Wildish, T. [Princeton U.; Zhang, X. [Beijing, Inst. High Energy Phys.

    2012-01-01

    All major experiments at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) need to measure real storage usage at the Grid sites. This information is equally important for resource management, planning, and operations. To verify the consistency of central catalogs, experiments are asking sites to provide a full list of the files they have on storage, including size, checksum, and other file attributes. Such storage dumps, provided at regular intervals, give a realistic view of the storage resource usage by the experiments. Regular monitoring of the space usage and data verification serve as additional internal checks of the system integrity and performance. Both the importance and the complexity of these tasks increase with the constant growth of the total data volumes during the active data taking period at the LHC. The use of common solutions helps to reduce the maintenance costs, both at the large Tier1 facilities supporting multiple virtual organizations and at the small sites that often lack manpower. We discuss requirements and solutions to the common tasks of data storage accounting and verification, and present experiment-specific strategies and implementations used within the LHC experiments according to their computing models.

  18. Design of verification platform for wireless vision sensor networks

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ye, Juanjuan; Shang, Fei; Yu, Chuang

    2017-08-01

    At present, the majority of research for wireless vision sensor networks (WVSNs) still remains in the software simulation stage, and the verification platforms of WVSNs that available for use are very few. This situation seriously restricts the transformation from theory research of WVSNs to practical application. Therefore, it is necessary to study the construction of verification platform of WVSNs. This paper combines wireless transceiver module, visual information acquisition module and power acquisition module, designs a high-performance wireless vision sensor node whose core is ARM11 microprocessor and selects AODV as the routing protocol to set up a verification platform called AdvanWorks for WVSNs. Experiments show that the AdvanWorks can successfully achieve functions of image acquisition, coding, wireless transmission, and obtain the effective distance parameters between nodes, which lays a good foundation for the follow-up application of WVSNs.

  19. VAMOS: The verification and monitoring options study: Current research options for in-situ monitoring and verification of contaminant remediation and containment within the vadose zone

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Betsill, J.D.; Gruebel, R.D.

    1995-09-01

    The Verification and Monitoring Options Study Project (VAMOS) was established to identify high-priority options for future vadose-zone environmental research in the areas of in-situ remediation monitoring, post-closure monitoring, and containment emplacement and verification monitoring. VAMOS examined projected needs not currently being met with applied technology in order to develop viable monitoring and verification research options. The study emphasized a compatible systems approach to reinforce the need for utilizing compatible components to provide user friendly site monitoring systems. To identify the needs and research options related to vadose-zone environmental monitoring and verification, a literature search and expert panel forums were conducted. The search included present drivers for environmental monitoring technology, technology applications, and research efforts. The forums included scientific, academic, industry, and regulatory environmental professionals as well as end users of environmental technology. The experts evaluated current and future monitoring and verification needs, methods for meeting these needs, and viable research options and directions. A variety of high-priority technology development, user facility, and technology guidance research options were developed and presented as an outcome of the literature search and expert panel forums

  20. Verification of EPA's " Preliminary remediation goals for radionuclides" (PRG) electronic calculator

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Stagich, B. H. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States). Savannah River National Lab. (SRNL)

    2017-03-29

    The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) requested an external, independent verification study of their “Preliminary Remediation Goals for Radionuclides” (PRG) electronic calculator. The calculator provides information on establishing PRGs for radionuclides at Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) sites with radioactive contamination (Verification Study Charge, Background). These risk-based PRGs set concentration limits using carcinogenic toxicity values under specific exposure conditions (PRG User’s Guide, Section 1). The purpose of this verification study is to ascertain that the computer codes has no inherit numerical problems with obtaining solutions as well as to ensure that the equations are programmed correctly.

  1. A foetal tile from an archaeological site: anthropological investigation of human remains recovered in a medieval cemetery in Northern Italy.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Licata, Marta; Rossetti, Chiara; Tosi, Adelaide; Badino, Paola

    2018-06-01

    The recovery of foetal remains is very sporadic in archaeology, especially due the scarce degree of bone mineralisation. This paper presents the singular archaeological discovery of a foetal tile preserving the bone remains, object of our anthropological examination. The foetal tile was discovered during an archaeological excavation in a medieval site (Northern Italy). The tile was analysed by CT scan and later, human remains were anthropologically examined. The archaeological investigation revealed a special ritual destined to foetuses while forensic anthropological analysis allowed estimating the gestational age near to 21-24 weeks.

  2. Radiochemical verification and validation in the environmental data collection process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rosano-Reece, D.; Bottrell, D.; Bath, R.J.

    1994-01-01

    A credible and cost effective environmental data collection process should produce analytical data which meets regulatory and program specific requirements. Analytical data, which support the sampling and analysis activities at hazardous waste sites, undergo verification and independent validation before the data are submitted to regulators. Understanding the difference between verification and validation and their respective roles in the sampling and analysis process is critical to the effectiveness of a program. Verification is deciding whether the measurement data obtained are what was requested. The verification process determines whether all the requirements were met. Validation is more complicated than verification. It attempts to assess the impacts on data use, especially when requirements are not met. Validation becomes part of the decision-making process. Radiochemical data consists of a sample result with an associated error. Therefore, radiochemical validation is different and more quantitative than is currently possible for the validation of hazardous chemical data. Radiochemical data include both results and uncertainty that can be statistically compared to identify significance of differences in a more technically defensible manner. Radiochemical validation makes decisions about analyte identification, detection, and uncertainty for a batch of data. The process focuses on the variability of the data in the context of the decision to be made. The objectives of this paper are to present radiochemical verification and validation for environmental data and to distinguish the differences between the two operations

  3. Combining Space Geodesy, Seismology, and Geochemistry for Monitoring Verification and Accounting of CO2 in Sequestration Sites

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Swart, Peter K. [Univ. of Miami, Key Biscayne, FL (United States); Dixon, Tim [Univ. of South Florida, Tampa, FL (United States)

    2014-09-30

    A series of surface geophysical and geochemical techniques are tested in order to demonstrate and validate low cost approaches for Monitoring, Verification and Accounting (MVA) of the integrity of deep reservoirs for CO2 storage. These techniques are (i) surface deformation by GPS; ii) surface deformation by InSAR; iii) passive source seismology via broad band seismometers; and iv) soil gas monitoring with a cavity ring down spectrometer for measurement of CO2 concentration and carbon isotope ratio. The techniques were tested at an active EOR (Enhanced Oil Recovery) site in Texas. Each approach has demonstrated utility. Assuming Carbon Capture, Utilization and Storage (CCUS) activities become operational in the future, these techniques can be used to augment more expensive down-hole techniques.

  4. Verification of criticality safety in on-site spent fuel storage systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rasmussen, R.W.

    1989-01-01

    On February 15, 1984, Duke Power Company received approval for a two-region, burnup credit, spent fuel storage rack design at both Units 1 and 2 of the McGuire Nuclear Station. Duke also hopes to obtain approval by January of 1990 for a dry spent fuel storage system at the Oconee Nuclear Station, which will incorporate the use of burnup credit in the criticality analysis governing the design of the individual storage units. While experiences in burnup verification for criticality safety for their dry storage system at Oconee are in the future, the methods proposed for burnup verification will be similar to those currently used at the McGuire Nuclear Station in the two-region storage racks installed in both pools. In conclusion, the primary benefit of the McGuire rerack effort has obviously been the amount of storage expansion it provided. A total increase of about 2,000 storage cells was realized, 1,000 of which were the result of pursuing the two-region rather than the conventional poison rack design. Less impacting, but equally as important, however, has been the experience gained during the planning, installation, and operation of these storage racks. This experience should prove useful for future rerack efforts likely to occur at Duke's Catawba Nuclear Station as well as for the current dry storage effort underway for the Oconee Nuclear Station

  5. Multilateral disarmament verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persbo, A.

    2013-01-01

    Non-governmental organisations, such as VERTIC (Verification Research, Training and Information Centre), can play an important role in the promotion of multilateral verification. Parties involved in negotiating nuclear arms accords are for the most part keen that such agreements include suitable and robust provisions for monitoring and verification. Generally progress in multilateral arms control verification is often painstakingly slow, but from time to time 'windows of opportunity' - that is, moments where ideas, technical feasibility and political interests are aligned at both domestic and international levels - may occur and we have to be ready, so the preparatory work is very important. In the context of nuclear disarmament, verification (whether bilateral or multilateral) entails an array of challenges, hurdles and potential pitfalls relating to national security, health, safety and even non-proliferation, so preparatory work is complex and time-greedy. A UK-Norway Initiative was established in order to investigate the role that a non-nuclear-weapon state such as Norway could potentially play in the field of nuclear arms control verification. (A.C.)

  6. IAEA verification of materials accounting in commercial reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gutmacher, R.G.; Hakkila, E.A.

    1987-01-01

    The reprocessing plants currently under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards have design capacities up to 210 tonnes of heavy metal per year. All of the plants use conventional materials accounting for safeguards. However, several larger commercial reprocessing plants are being designed with capacities of 350 to 1200 tonnes of heavy metal per year. It is likely that many of these plants, as well as some of the existing smaller ones, will adopt near-real-time materials accounting. The major effect of the combination of larger plants and near-real-time accounting on IAEA safeguards will be the demand for greater timeliness of verification. Continuous inspector presence may be required, as well as more on-site measurements by the inspector. In this paper, the authors review what needs to be verified, as well as current inspector activities in the process area. The bulk of the paper describes rapid, easy-to-use measurement techniques and instruments that may be applied to on-site verification measurements

  7. US monitoring and verification technology: on-site inspection experience and future challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gullickson, R.L.; Carlson, D.; Ingraham, J.; Laird, B.

    2013-01-01

    The United States has a long and successful history of cooperation with treaty partners in monitoring and verification. For strategic arms reduction treaties, our collaboration has resulted in the development and application of systems with limited complexity and intrusiveness. As we progress beyond New START (NST) along the 'road to zero', the reduced number of nuclear weapons is likely to require increased confidence in monitoring and verification techniques. This may place increased demands on the technology to verify the presence of a nuclear weapon and even confirm the presence of a certain type. Simultaneously, this technology must include the ability to protect each treaty partner's sensitive nuclear weapons information. Mutual development of this technology by treaty partners offers the best approach for acceptance in treaty negotiations. This same approach of mutual cooperation and development is essential for developing nuclear test monitoring technology in support of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Our ability to detect low yield and evasive testing will be enhanced through mutually developed techniques and experiments using laboratory laser experiments and high explosives tests in a variety of locations and geologies. (authors)

  8. FEFTRA {sup TM} verification. Update 2013

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Loefman, J. [VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, Espoo (Finland); Meszaros, F. [The Relief Lab., Harskut, (Hungary)

    2013-12-15

    FEFTRA is a finite element program package developed at VTT for the analyses of groundwater flow in Posiva's site evaluation programme that seeks a final repository for spent nuclear fuel in Finland. The code is capable of modelling steady-state or transient groundwater flow, solute transport and heat transfer as coupled or separate phenomena. Being a typical research tool used only by its developers, the FEFTRA code lacked long of a competent testing system and precise documentation of the verification of the code. In 2006 a project was launched, in which the objective was to reorganise all the material related to the existing verification cases and place them into the FEFTRA program path under the version-control system. The work also included development of a new testing system, which automatically calculates the selected cases, checks the new results against the old approved results and constructs a summary of the test run. All the existing cases were gathered together, checked and added into the new testing system. The documentation of each case was rewritten with the LATEX document preparation system and added into the testing system in a way that the whole test documentation (this report) could easily be generated in a postscript or pdf-format. The current report is the updated version of the verification report published in 2007. At the moment the report includes mainly the cases related to the testing of the primary result quantities (i.e. hydraulic head, pressure, salinity concentration, temperature). The selected cases, however, represent typical hydrological applications, in which the program package has been and will be employed in the Posiva's site evaluation programme, i.e. the simulations of groundwater flow, solute transport and heat transfer as separate or coupled phenomena. The comparison of the FEFTRA results to the analytical, semianalytical and/or other numerical solutions proves the capability of FEFTRA to simulate such problems

  9. Cleanup Verification Package for the 100-F-20, Pacific Northwest Laboratory Parallel Pits

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Appel, M.J.

    2007-01-01

    This cleanup verification package documents completion of remedial action for the 100-F-20, Pacific Northwest Laboratory Parallel Pits waste site. This waste site consisted of two earthen trenches thought to have received both radioactive and nonradioactive material related to the 100-F Experimental Animal Farm

  10. Verification of operating software for cooperative monitoring applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tolk, K.M.; Rembold, R.K.

    1997-01-01

    Monitoring agencies often use computer based equipment to control instruments and to collect data at sites that are being monitored under international safeguards or other cooperative monitoring agreements. In order for this data to be used as an independent verification of data supplied by the host at the facility, the software used must be trusted by the monitoring agency. The monitoring party must be sure that the software has not be altered to give results that could lead to erroneous conclusions about nuclear materials inventories or other operating conditions at the site. The host might also want to verify that the software being used is the software that has been previously inspected in order to be assured that only data that is allowed under the agreement is being collected. A description of a method to provide this verification using keyed has functions and how the proposed method overcomes possible vulnerabilities in methods currently in use such as loading the software from trusted disks is presented. The use of public key data authentication for this purpose is also discussed

  11. Embedded software verification and debugging

    CERN Document Server

    Winterholer, Markus

    2017-01-01

    This book provides comprehensive coverage of verification and debugging techniques for embedded software, which is frequently used in safety critical applications (e.g., automotive), where failures are unacceptable. Since the verification of complex systems needs to encompass the verification of both hardware and embedded software modules, this book focuses on verification and debugging approaches for embedded software with hardware dependencies. Coverage includes the entire flow of design, verification and debugging of embedded software and all key approaches to debugging, dynamic, static, and hybrid verification. This book discusses the current, industrial embedded software verification flow, as well as emerging trends with focus on formal and hybrid verification and debugging approaches. Includes in a single source the entire flow of design, verification and debugging of embedded software; Addresses the main techniques that are currently being used in the industry for assuring the quality of embedded softw...

  12. Software verification for nuclear industry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilburn, N.P.

    1985-08-01

    Why verification of software products throughout the software life cycle is necessary is considered. Concepts of verification, software verification planning, and some verification methodologies for products generated throughout the software life cycle are then discussed

  13. The design of verification regimes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gallagher, N.W.

    1991-01-01

    Verification of a nuclear agreement requires more than knowledge of relevant technologies and institutional arrangements. It also demands thorough understanding of the nature of verification and the politics of verification design. Arms control efforts have been stymied in the past because key players agreed to verification in principle, only to disagree radically over verification in practice. In this chapter, it is shown that the success and stability of arms control endeavors can be undermined by verification designs which promote unilateral rather than cooperative approaches to security, and which may reduce, rather than enhance, the security of both sides. Drawing on logical analysis and practical lessons from previous superpower verification experience, this chapter summarizes the logic and politics of verification and suggests implications for South Asia. The discussion begins by determining what properties all forms of verification have in common, regardless of the participants or the substance and form of their agreement. Viewing verification as the political process of making decisions regarding the occurrence of cooperation points to four critical components: (1) determination of principles, (2) information gathering, (3) analysis and (4) projection. It is shown that verification arrangements differ primarily in regards to how effectively and by whom these four stages are carried out

  14. Improved verification methods for safeguards verifications at enrichment plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lebrun, A.; Kane, S. C.; Bourva, L.; Poirier, S.; Loghin, N. E.; Langlands, D.

    2009-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has initiated a coordinated research and development programme to improve its verification methods and equipment applicable to enrichment plants. The programme entails several individual projects to meet the objectives of the IAEA Safeguards Model Approach for Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants updated in 2006. Upgrades of verification methods to confirm the absence of HEU (highly enriched uranium) production have been initiated and, in particular, the Cascade Header Enrichment Monitor (CHEM) has been redesigned to reduce its weight and incorporate an electrically cooled germanium detector. Such detectors are also introduced to improve the attended verification of UF 6 cylinders for the verification of the material balance. Data sharing of authenticated operator weighing systems such as accountancy scales and process load cells is also investigated as a cost efficient and an effective safeguards measure combined with unannounced inspections, surveillance and non-destructive assay (NDA) measurement. (authors)

  15. Improved verification methods for safeguards verifications at enrichment plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lebrun, A.; Kane, S. C.; Bourva, L.; Poirier, S.; Loghin, N. E.; Langlands, D. [Department of Safeguards, International Atomic Energy Agency, Wagramer Strasse 5, A1400 Vienna (Austria)

    2009-07-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has initiated a coordinated research and development programme to improve its verification methods and equipment applicable to enrichment plants. The programme entails several individual projects to meet the objectives of the IAEA Safeguards Model Approach for Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants updated in 2006. Upgrades of verification methods to confirm the absence of HEU (highly enriched uranium) production have been initiated and, in particular, the Cascade Header Enrichment Monitor (CHEM) has been redesigned to reduce its weight and incorporate an electrically cooled germanium detector. Such detectors are also introduced to improve the attended verification of UF{sub 6} cylinders for the verification of the material balance. Data sharing of authenticated operator weighing systems such as accountancy scales and process load cells is also investigated as a cost efficient and an effective safeguards measure combined with unannounced inspections, surveillance and non-destructive assay (NDA) measurement. (authors)

  16. Verification and the safeguards legacy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Perricos, Demetrius

    2001-01-01

    of Iraq was a case of late detection of undeclared activities, the case of DPRK was a case of prompt detection of discrepancies in the initial declaration through implementation of modem detection techniques, such as environmental sampling, and access to information. Access to the Security Council became important in view of the protracted process of non-compliance. The Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC 540) agreed in 1997 incorporates the results of the efforts to strengthen the safeguards system and as such provides the possibility for more transparency by the States and more access to locations by the inspectors on the basis of information. It does not provide the broad and intrusive access rights as in the case of Iraq, since such rights are unprecedented and the result of a cease-fire arrangement involving the Security Council. But the expectations are that the broad implementation of the Additional Protocol will result in an effective and efficient safeguards verification system for the future. The on-site verification systems on a national, regional or multinational basis that have been put into operation in the past or are being discussed by States for the implementation of disarmament and non-proliferation conventions related to weapons of mass destruction whether nuclear, chemical or biological, have benefited and will benefit in the future from the guiding experience - both from the strengths and weaknesses -of the IAEA verification system. This is hopefully a legacy for the future of verification

  17. The US National Resources Defense Council/Soviet Academy of Sciences Nuclear Test Ban Verification Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cochran, T.B.

    1989-01-01

    The first week in September 1987 was an extraordinary one for arms control verification. As part of the co-operative Test Ban Verification Project of the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and the Soviet Academy of Sciences, fourteen American scientists from the Scripps Institution of Oceanography (at the University of California- San Diego), University of Nevada-Reno and the University of Colorado went to the region of the Soviet's principal nuclear test site near Semipalatinsk. Together with their Soviet counterparts from the Institute of Physics of the Earth (IPE) in Moscow, they fired off three large chemical explosions. The purpose of these explosions was to demonstrate the sensitivity of the three seismic stations surrounding the test site, to study the efficiency with which high-frequency seismic waves propagate in the region, and to study differences between chemical explosions, nuclear explosions and earthquakes in order more firmly to establish procedures for verification of a nuclear test ban. This paper presents a review of the results of these experiments, an update on the status of the joint project, and a review of the significance of high frequency seismic data to test ban verification

  18. Physics Verification Overview

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Doebling, Scott William [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2017-09-12

    The purpose of the verification project is to establish, through rigorous convergence analysis, that each ASC computational physics code correctly implements a set of physics models and algorithms (code verification); Evaluate and analyze the uncertainties of code outputs associated with the choice of temporal and spatial discretization (solution or calculation verification); and Develop and maintain the capability to expand and update these analyses on demand. This presentation describes project milestones.

  19. Synergies across verification regimes: Nuclear safeguards and chemical weapons convention compliance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kadner, Steven P.; Turpen, Elizabeth

    2001-01-01

    In the implementation of all arms control agreements, accurate verification is essential. In setting a course for verifying compliance with a given treaty - whether the NPT or the CWC, one must make a technical comparison of existing information-gathering capabilities against the constraints in an agreement. Then it must be decided whether this level of verifiability is good enough. Generally, the policy standard of 'effective verification' includes the ability to detect significant violations, with high confidence, in sufficient time to respond effectively with policy adjustments or other responses, as needed. It is at this juncture where verification approaches have traditionally diverged. Nuclear safeguards requirements have taken one path while chemical verification methods have pursued another. However, recent technological advances have brought a number of changes affecting verification, and lately their pace has been accelerating. First, all verification regimes have more and better information as a result of new kinds of sensors, imagery, and other technologies. Second, the verification provisions in agreements have also advanced, to include on-site inspections, portal monitoring, data exchanges, and a variety of transparency, confidence-building, and other cooperative measures, Together these developments translate into a technological overlap of certain institutional verification measures such as the NPT's safeguards requirements and the IAEA and the CWC's verification visions and the OPCW. Hence, a priority of international treaty-implementing organizations is exploring the development of a synergistic and coordinated approach to WMD policy making that takes into account existing inter-linkages between nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons issues. Specific areas of coordination include harmonizing information systems and information exchanges and the shared application of scientific mechanisms, as well as collaboration on technological developments

  20. SHIELD verification and validation report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boman, C.

    1992-02-01

    This document outlines the verification and validation effort for the SHIELD, SHLDED, GEDIT, GENPRT, FIPROD, FPCALC, and PROCES modules of the SHIELD system code. Along with its predecessors, SHIELD has been in use at the Savannah River Site (SRS) for more than ten years. During this time the code has been extensively tested and a variety of validation documents have been issued. The primary function of this report is to specify the features and capabilities for which SHIELD is to be considered validated, and to reference the documents that establish the validation

  1. Cleanup Verification Package for the 116-K-2 Effluent Trench

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Capron, J.M.

    2006-01-01

    This cleanup verification package documents completion of remedial action for the 116-K-2 effluent trench, also referred to as the 116-K-2 mile-long trench and the 116-K-2 site. During its period of operation, the 116-K-2 site was used to dispose of cooling water effluent from the 105-KE and 105-KW Reactors by percolation into the soil. This site also received mixed liquid wastes from the 105-KW and 105-KE fuel storage basins, reactor floor drains, and miscellaneous decontamination activities

  2. Cleanup Verification Package for the 118-F-3, Minor Construction Burial Ground

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Appel, M.J.

    2007-01-01

    This cleanup verification package documents completion of remedial action for the 118-F-3, Minor Construction Burial Ground waste site. This site was an open field covered with cobbles, with no vegetation growing on the surface. The site received irradiated reactor parts that were removed during conversion of the 105-F Reactor from the Liquid 3X to the Ball 3X Project safety systems and received mostly vertical safety rod thimbles and step plugs

  3. Hypervelocity Wind Tunnel No. 9 Mach 7 Thermal Structural Facility Verification and Calibration

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Lafferty, John

    1996-01-01

    This report summarizes the verification and calibration of the new Mach 7 Thermal Structural Facility located at the White Oak, Maryland, site of the Dahlgren Division, Naval Surface Warfare Center...

  4. SU-E-T-49: A Multi-Institutional Study of Independent Dose Verification for IMRT

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baba, H; Tachibana, H; Kamima, T; Takahashi, R; Kawai, D; Sugawara, Y; Yamamoto, T; Sato, A; Yamashita, M

    2015-01-01

    Purpose: AAPM TG114 does not cover the independent verification for IMRT. We conducted a study of independent dose verification for IMRT in seven institutes to show the feasibility. Methods: 384 IMRT plans in the sites of prostate and head and neck (HN) were collected from the institutes, where the planning was performed using Eclipse and Pinnacle3 with the two techniques of step and shoot (S&S) and sliding window (SW). All of the institutes used a same independent dose verification software program (Simple MU Analysis: SMU, Triangle Product, Ishikawa, JP), which is Clarkson-based and CT images were used to compute radiological path length. An ion-chamber measurement in a water-equivalent slab phantom was performed to compare the doses computed using the TPS and an independent dose verification program. Additionally, the agreement in dose computed in patient CT images between using the TPS and using the SMU was assessed. The dose of the composite beams in the plan was evaluated. Results: The agreement between the measurement and the SMU were −2.3±1.9 % and −5.6±3.6 % for prostate and HN sites, respectively. The agreement between the TPSs and the SMU were −2.1±1.9 % and −3.0±3.7 for prostate and HN sites, respectively. There was a negative systematic difference with similar standard deviation and the difference was larger in the HN site. The S&S technique showed a statistically significant difference between the SW. Because the Clarkson-based method in the independent program underestimated (cannot consider) the dose under the MLC. Conclusion: The accuracy would be improved when the Clarkson-based algorithm should be modified for IMRT and the tolerance level would be within 5%

  5. Radiological verification survey results at 14 Peck Ave., Pequannock, New Jersey (PJ001V)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodriguez, R.E.; Johnson, C.A.

    1995-05-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) conducted remedial action during 1993 at the Pompton Plains Railroad Spur and eight vicinity properties in the Wayne and Pequannock Townships in New Jersey as part of the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP). These properties are in the vicinity of the DOE-owned Wayne Interim Storage Site (WISS), formerly the W. R. Grace facility. The property at 14 Peck Ave., Pequannock, New Jersey is one of these vicinity properties. At the request of DOE, a team from Oak Ridge National Laboratory conducted an independent radiological verification survey at this property. The purpose of the survey, conducted between September and December 1993, was to confirm the success of the remedial actions performed to remove any radioactive materials in excess of the identified guidelines. The verification survey included surface gamma scans and gamma readings at 1 meter, beta-gamma scans, and the collection of soil and debris samples for radionuclide analysis. Results of the survey demonstrated that all radiological measurements on the property at 14 Peck Ave. were within applicable DOE guidelines. Based on the results of the remedial action data and confirmed by the verification survey data, the portions of the site that had been remediated during this action successfully meet the DOE remedial action objectives

  6. Radiological verification survey results at 3 Peck Ave., Pequannock, New Jersey (PJ002V)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodriguez, R.E.; Johnson, C.A.

    1995-05-01

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) conducted remedial action during 1993 at the Pompton Plains Railroad Spur and eight vicinity properties in the Wayne and Pequannock Townships in New Jersey as part of the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP). These properties are in the vicinity of the DOE-owned Wayne Interim Storage Site (WISS), formerly the W.R. Grace facility. The property at 3 Peck Ave., Pequannock, New Jersey is one of these vicinity properties. At the request of DOE, a team from Oak Ridge National Laboratory conducted an independent radiological verification survey at this property. The purpose of the survey, conducted between September and December 1993, was to confirm the success of the remedial actions performed to remove any radioactive materials in excess of the identified guidelines. The verification survey included surface gamma scans and gamma readings at 1 meter, beta-gamma scans, and the collection of soil and debris samples for radionuclide analysis. Results of the survey demonstrated that all radiological measurements on the property at 3 Peck Ave. were within applicable DOE guidelines. Based on the results of the remedial action data and confirmed by the verification survey data, the portions of the site that had been remediated during this action successfully meet the DOE remedial action objectives

  7. Radiological verification survey results at 15 Peck Ave., Pequannock, New Jersey (PJ005V)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodriguez, R.E.; Johnson, C.A.

    1995-05-01

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) conducted remedial action during 1993 at the Pompton Plains Railroad Spur and eight vicinity properties in the Wayne and Pequannock Townships in New Jersey as part of the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP). These properties are in the vicinity of the DOE-owned Wayne Interim Storage Site (WISS), formerly the W.R. Grace facility. The property at 15 Peck Ave., Pequannock, New Jersey is one of these vicinity properties. At the request of DOE, a team from Oak Ridge National Laboratory conducted an independent radiological verification survey at this property. The purpose of the survey, conducted between September and December 1993, was to confirm the success of the remedial actions performed to remove any radioactive materials in excess of the identified guidelines. The verification survey included surface gamma scans and gamma readings at 1 meter, beta-gamma scans, and the collection of soil and debris samples for radionuclide analysis. Results of the survey demonstrated that all radiological measurements on the property at 15 Peck Ave. were within applicable DOE guidelines. Based on the results of the remedial action data and confirmed by the verification survey data, the portions of the site that had been remediated during this action successfully meet the DOE remedial action objectives

  8. Radiological verification survey results at 17 Peck Ave., Pequannock, New Jersey (PJ006V)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodriguez, R.E.; Johnson, C.A.

    1995-05-01

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) conducted remedial action during 1993 at the Pompton Plains Railroad Spur and eight vicinity properties in the Wayne and Pequannock Townships in New Jersey as part of the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP). These properties are in the vicinity of the DOE-owned Wayne Interim Storage Site (WISS), formerly the W.R. Grace facility. The property at 17 Peck Ave., Pequannock, New Jersey is one of these vicinity properties. At the request of DOE, a team from Oak Ridge National Laboratory conducted an independent radiological verification survey at this property. The purpose of the survey, conducted between September and December 1993, was to confirm the success of the remedial actions performed to remove any radioactive materials in excess of the identified guidelines. The verification survey included surface gamma scans and gamma readings at 1 meter, beta-gamma scans, and the collection of soil and debris samples for radionuclide analysis. Results of the survey demonstrated that all radiological measurements on the property at 17 Peck Ave. were within applicable DOE guidelines. Based on the results of the remedial action data and confirmed by the verification survey data, the portions of the site that had been remediated during this action successfully meet the DOE remedial action objectives

  9. Radiological verification survey results at 7 Peck Ave., Pequannock, New Jersey (PJ003V)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodriguez, R.E.; Johnson, C.A.

    1995-05-01

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) conducted remedial action during 1993 at the Pompton Plains Railroad Spur and eight vicinity properties in the Wayne and Pequannock Townships in New Jersey as part of the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP). These properties are in the vicinity of the DOE-owned Wayne Interim Storage Site (WISS), formerly the W.R. Grace facility. The property at 7 Peck Ave., Pequannock, New Jersey is one of these vicinity properties. At the request of DOE, a team from Oak Ridge National Laboratory conducted an independent radiological verification survey at this property. The purpose of the survey, conducted between September and December 1993, was to confirm the success of the remedial actions performed to remove any radioactive materials in excess of the identified guidelines. The verification survey included surface gamma scans and gamma readings at 1 meter, beta-gamma scans, and the collection of soil samples for radionuclide analysis. Results of the survey demonstrated that all radiological measurements on the property at 7 Peck Ave. were within applicable DOE guidelines. Based on the results of the remedial action data and confirmed by the verification survey data, the portions of the site that had been remediated during this action successfully meet the DOE remedial action objectives

  10. Radiological verification survey results as 13 Peck Ave., Pequannock, New Jersey (PJ004V)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodriguez, R.E.; Johnson, C.A.

    1995-05-01

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) conducted remedial action during 1993 at the Pompton Plains Railroad Spur and eight vicinity properties in the Wayne and Pequannock Townships in New Jersey as part of the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP). These properties are in the vicinity of the DOE-owned Wayne Interim Storage Site (WISS), formerly the W.R. Grace facility. The property at 13 Peck Ave., Pequannock, New Jersey is one of these vicinity properties. At the request of DOE, a team from Oak Ridge National Laboratory conducted an independent radiological verification survey at this property. The purpose of the survey, conducted between September and December 1993, was to confirm the success of the remedial actions performed to remove any radioactive materials in excess of the identified guidelines. The verification survey included surface gamma scans and gamma readings at 1 meter, beta-gamma scans, and the collection of soil and debris samples for radionuclide analysis. Results of the survey demonstrated that all radiological measurements on the property at 13 Peck Ave. were within applicable DOE guidelines. Based on the results of the remedial action data and confirmed by the verification survey data, the portions of the site that had been remediated during this action successfully meet the DOE remedial action objectives

  11. Organics Verification Study for Sinclair and Dyes Inlets, Washington

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kohn, Nancy P.; Brandenberger, Jill M.; Niewolny, Laurie A.; Johnston, Robert K.

    2006-09-28

    Sinclair and Dyes Inlets near Bremerton, Washington, are on the State of Washington 1998 303(d) list of impaired waters because of fecal coliform contamination in marine water, metals in sediment and fish tissue, and organics in sediment and fish tissue. Because significant cleanup and source control activities have been conducted in the inlets since the data supporting the 1998 303(d) listings were collected, two verification studies were performed to address the 303(d) segments that were listed for metal and organic contaminants in marine sediment. The Metals Verification Study (MVS) was conducted in 2003; the final report, Metals Verification Study for Sinclair and Dyes Inlets, Washington, was published in March 2004 (Kohn et al. 2004). This report describes the Organics Verification Study that was conducted in 2005. The study approach was similar to the MVS in that many surface sediment samples were screened for the major classes of organic contaminants, and then the screening results and other available data were used to select a subset of samples for quantitative chemical analysis. Because the MVS was designed to obtain representative data on concentrations of contaminants in surface sediment throughout Sinclair Inlet, Dyes Inlet, Port Orchard Passage, and Rich Passage, aliquots of the 160 MVS sediment samples were used in the analysis for the Organics Verification Study. However, unlike metals screening methods, organics screening methods are not specific to individual organic compounds, and are not available for some target organics. Therefore, only the quantitative analytical results were used in the organics verification evaluation. The results of the Organics Verification Study showed that sediment quality outside of Sinclair Inlet is unlikely to be impaired because of organic contaminants. Similar to the results for metals, in Sinclair Inlet, the distribution of residual organic contaminants is generally limited to nearshore areas already within the

  12. Inspector measurement verification activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    George, R.S.; Crouch, R.

    e most difficult and complex activity facing a safeguards inspector involves the verification of measurements and the performance of the measurement system. Remeasurement is the key to measurement verification activities. Remeasurerements using the facility's measurement system provide the bulk of the data needed for determining the performance of the measurement system. Remeasurements by reference laboratories are also important for evaluation of the measurement system and determination of systematic errors. The use of these measurement verification activities in conjunction with accepted inventory verification practices provides a better basis for accepting or rejecting an inventory. (U.S.)

  13. Verification and disarmament

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Blix, H. [IAEA, Vienna (Austria)

    1998-07-01

    The main features are described of the IAEA safeguards verification system that non-nuclear weapon states parties of the NPT are obliged to accept. Verification activities/problems in Iraq and North Korea are discussed.

  14. Verification and disarmament

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blix, H.

    1998-01-01

    The main features are described of the IAEA safeguards verification system that non-nuclear weapon states parties of the NPT are obliged to accept. Verification activities/problems in Iraq and North Korea are discussed

  15. Remote sensing and geoinformation technologies in support of nuclear non-proliferation and arms control verification regimes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Niemeyer, Irmgard [Forschungszentrum Juelich GmbH, Institut fuer Energie- und Klimaforschung, IEK-6: Nukleare Entsorgung und Reaktorsicherheit (Germany)

    2013-07-01

    A number of international agreements and export control regimes have been concluded in order to reduce the risk and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In order to provide confidence that Member States are complying with the agreed commitments, most of the treaties and agreements include verification provisions. Different types of verification measures exist, e.g. cooperative measures; national technical means; technical monitoring or measurement devices placed at or near sites; on-site inspections; intelligence information; open-source information, such as commercial internet data and satellite imagery. The study reviews the technical progress in the field of satellite imaging sensors and explores the recent advances in satellite imagery processing and geoinformation technologies as to the extraction of significant observables and signatures. Moreover, it discusses how satellite data and geoinformation technologies could be used complementary for confirming information gathered from other systems or sources. The study also aims at presenting the legal and political aspects and the cost benefits of using imagery from both national and commercial satellites in the verification procedure. The study concludes that satellite imagery and geoinformation technologies are expected to enhance the verification efficiency and effectiveness.

  16. Vinča-Belo Brdo, a late neolithic site in Serbia consideration of the macro-botanical remains as indicators of dietary habits

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Filipović Dragana

    2012-01-01

    Full Text Available The analysis of macro-botanical remains from the late Neolithic site of Vinča-Belo Brdo has provided first information on the range of crops and wild plants present at the site, and revealed their potential role as foodstuffs. The abundance and distribution of certain plant taxa across different archaeological deposits suggests to what extent they were used within the settlement. The analyzed plant remains also offer insight into the types of food consumed by Vinča residents and serve as a basis for inferring the seasonality and method of food provision/production and activities related to plant use. [Projekat Ministarstva nauke Republike Srbije, br. 177012: Society, spiritual and material culture and communications in prehistory and early history of the Balkans

  17. Cleanup Verification Package for the 100-K-55:1 and 100-K-56:1 Pipelines and the 116-KW-4 and 116-KE-5 Heat Recovery Stations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Capron, J.M.

    2005-01-01

    This cleanup verification package documents completion of remedial action for the 100-K-55:1 and 100-K-56:1 reactor cooling effluent underground pipelines and for the 116-KW-4 and 116-KE-5 heat recovery stations. The 100-K-55 and 100-K-56 sites consisted of those process effluent pipelines that serviced the 105-KW and 105-KE Reactors. This cleanup verification package documents completion of remedial action for the 100-K-55: 1 and 100-K-56: 1 reactor cooling effluent underground pipelines, referred to herein as the 100-K-55:1 and 100-K-56:l sites, as well as for the 116-KW-4 and 116-KE-5 heat recovery stations, referred to herein as the 116-KW-4 and 116-KE-5 sites. The 116-KW-4 and 116-KE-5 heat recovery stations were co-located and remediated with the 100-K-55:1 and 100-K-56:1 pipelines, respectively. These sites are located in the 100-KR-2 Operable Unit in the 100-K Area of the Hanford Site in southeastern Washington State. The 100-K-55 and 100-K-56 sites consisted of those process effluent pipelines that serviced the 105-KW and 105-KE Reactors, respectively. Both of these sites have been administratively divided into subunits based on the current extent of remediation. Portions of the pipelines remaining within the reactor security fencing and in proximity to active utility features have been delineated as the 100-K-55:2 and 100-K-56:2 pipelines, with the portions of the pipelines excluded from these boundaries identified as the 100-K-55:1 and 100-K-56:1 pipelines. This cleanup verification package addresses only the 100-K-55:1 and 100-K-56:I subunits; the 100-K-55:2 and 100-K-56:2 subunits will be addressed within a separate cleanup verification package. Site excavation and waste disposal are complete, and the exposed surfaces have been sampled and analyzed to verify attainment of the remedial action goals. Results of the sampling, laboratory analyses, and data evaluations for the 100-K-55:1, 100-K-56:1, 116-KW-4, and 116-KE-5 sites indicate that all remedial

  18. Societal Verification: Intellectual Game or International Game-Changer

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hartigan, Kelsey; Hinderstein, Corey

    2013-01-01

    Within the nuclear nonproliferation and arms control field, there is an increasing appreciation for the potential of open source information technologies to supplement existing verification and compliance regimes. While clearly not a substitute for on-site inspections or national technical means, it may be possible to better leverage information gleaned from commercial satellite imagery, international trade records and the vast amount of data being exchanged online and between publics (including social media) so as to develop a more comprehensive set of tools and practices for monitoring and verifying a state’s nuclear activities and helping judge compliance with international obligations. The next generation “toolkit” for monitoring and verifying items, facility operations and activities will likely include a more diverse set of analytical tools and technologies than are currently used internationally. To explore these and other issues, the Nuclear Threat Initiative has launched an effort that examines, in part, the role that emerging technologies and “citizen scientists” might play in future verification regimes. This paper will include an assessment of past proliferation and security “events” and whether emerging tools and technologies would have provided indicators concurrently or in advance of these actions. Such case studies will be instrumental in understanding the reliability of these technologies and practices and in thinking through the requirements of a 21st century verification regime. Keywords: Verification, social media, open-source information, arms control, disarmament.

  19. HDL to verification logic translator

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gambles, J. W.; Windley, P. J.

    1992-01-01

    The increasingly higher number of transistors possible in VLSI circuits compounds the difficulty in insuring correct designs. As the number of possible test cases required to exhaustively simulate a circuit design explodes, a better method is required to confirm the absence of design faults. Formal verification methods provide a way to prove, using logic, that a circuit structure correctly implements its specification. Before verification is accepted by VLSI design engineers, the stand alone verification tools that are in use in the research community must be integrated with the CAD tools used by the designers. One problem facing the acceptance of formal verification into circuit design methodology is that the structural circuit descriptions used by the designers are not appropriate for verification work and those required for verification lack some of the features needed for design. We offer a solution to this dilemma: an automatic translation from the designers' HDL models into definitions for the higher-ordered logic (HOL) verification system. The translated definitions become the low level basis of circuit verification which in turn increases the designer's confidence in the correctness of higher level behavioral models.

  20. Update on Monitoring Technologies for International Safeguards and Fissile Material Verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Croessmann, C. Dennis; Glidewell, Don D.; Mangan, Dennis L.; Smathers, Douglas C.

    1999-01-01

    Monitoring technologies are playing an increasingly important part in international safeguards and fissile material verification. The developments reduce the time an inspector must spend at a site while assuring continuity of knowledge. Monitoring technologies' continued development has produced new seal systems and integrated video surveillance advances under consideration for Trilateral Initiative use. This paper will present recent developments for monitoring systems at Embalse, Argentina, VNHEF, Sarov, Russian, and Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina

  1. Verification survey of the 17th Street Drainage Area, Santa Susana Field Laboratory, The Boeing Company, Ventura County, California

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    John R. Morton

    2000-01-01

    An independent (third-party) verification of contractor remedial actions of the subject site verifies that remedial actions have been effective in meeting established and site-specific guidelines and that the documentation accurately and adequately describes the radiological conditions at the site

  2. Human cultural and related remains from Me Aure Cave (site WMD007), Moindou, New Caledonia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grant-Mackie, J.A.; Sand, C.; Valentin, F.; Fitzgerald, B.M.; Richer de Forges, B.

    2013-01-01

    In 1995 a small cave near Me Aure (site WMD007) on the west coast of New Caledonia, about 120 km northwest of Noumea, was excavated and found to contain mainly owl and human midden deposits. Some of the contents have already been documented and the present paper completes the study by reporting the human-related materials, including human bone fragments, pottery sherds, bones of four rodent species, and marine mollusc and crab remains. Each of these material classes are reported separately by the authors responsible for their analysis, and the results and interpretations based on each line of evidence are compared and contrasted. The human bone and pottery data suggest a temporally constrained deposit (2750-2350 BP) that has experienced stratigraphic disturbance. This result raises doubt about the un-mixed nature of the deposit emphasized in earlier publications and it urges instead the conclusion that the Me Aure stratigraphy consists mostly of a redeposited set of horizons. If this conclusion is correct, interpretations already published relying on a fixed chronology, especially about vegetation change and avifauna depletion or early aroid introduction will need to be reconsidered. The site constitutes the first in New Caledonia for which a cave deposit has now been fully analysed. (author). 36 refs., 11 figs., 9 tabs.

  3. Technical safety requirements control level verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    STEWART, J.L.

    1999-01-01

    A Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) control level verification process was developed for the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) TSRs at the Hanford Site in Richland, WA, at the direction of the US. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL). The objective of the effort was to develop a process to ensure that the TWRS TSR controls are designated and managed at the appropriate levels as Safety Limits (SLs), Limiting Control Settings (LCSs), Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs), Administrative Controls (ACs), or Design Features. The TSR control level verification process was developed and implemented by a team of contractor personnel with the participation of Fluor Daniel Hanford, Inc. (FDH), the Project Hanford Management Contract (PHMC) integrating contractor, and RL representatives. The team was composed of individuals with the following experience base: nuclear safety analysis; licensing; nuclear industry and DOE-complex TSR preparation/review experience; tank farm operations; FDH policy and compliance; and RL-TWRS oversight. Each TSR control level designation was completed utilizing TSR control logic diagrams and TSR criteria checklists based on DOE Orders, Standards, Contractor TSR policy, and other guidance. The control logic diagrams and criteria checklists were reviewed and modified by team members during team meetings. The TSR control level verification process was used to systematically evaluate 12 LCOs, 22 AC programs, and approximately 100 program key elements identified in the TWRS TSR document. The verification of each TSR control required a team consensus. Based on the results of the process, refinements were identified and the TWRS TSRs were modified as appropriate. A final report documenting key assumptions and the control level designation for each TSR control was prepared and is maintained on file for future reference. The results of the process were used as a reference in the RL review of the final TWRS TSRs and control suite. RL

  4. A review of technology for verification of waste removal from Hanford Underground Storage Tanks (WHC Issue 30)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thunborg, S.

    1994-09-01

    Remediation of waste from Underground Storage Tanks (UST) at the Hanford Waste storage sites will require removal of all waste to a nearly clean condition. Current requirements are 99% clean. In order to meet remediation legal requirements, a means to remotely verify that the waste has been removed to sufficient level is needed. This report discusses the requirements for verification and reviews major technologies available for inclusion in a verification system. The report presents two operational scenarios for verification of residual waste volume. Thickness verification technologies reviewed are Ultrasonic Sensors, Capacitance Type Sensors, Inductive Sensors, Ground Penetrating Radar, and Magnetometers. Of these technologies Inductive (Metal Detectors) and Ground Penetrating Radar appear to be the most suitable for use as waste thickness sensors

  5. LLNL`s partnership with selected US mines, for CTBT verification: A pictorial and some reflections

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Heuze, F.E.

    1996-01-01

    The verification of an upcoming Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) will involve seismic monitoring and will provide for on-site inspections which may include drilling. Because of the fact that mining operations can send out strong seismic signals, many mining districts in the US and abroad may come under special scrutiny. The seismic signals can be generated by the use of large quantities of conventional explosives, by the collapse of underground workings, or by sudden energy release in the ground such as in rock bursts and coal bumps. These mining activities may be the cause of false alarms, but may also offer opportunities for evasive nuclear testing. So in preparing for future verification of a CTBT it becomes important to address the mining-related questions. For the United States, these are questions to be answered with respect to foreign mines. But there is a good amount of commonality in mining methods worldwide. Studies conducted at US mine sites can provide good analogs of activities that may be carried out for overseas CTBT verification, save for the expected logistical impediments.

  6. Advances in the Processing of VHR Optical Imagery in Support of Safeguards Verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Niemeyer, I.; Listner, C.; Canty, M.

    2015-01-01

    Under the Additional Protocol of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) complementing the safeguards agreements between States and the International Atomic Energy Agency, commercial satellite imagery, preferably acquired by very high-resolution (VHR) satellite sensors, is an important source of safeguards-relevant information. Satellite imagery can assist in the evaluation of site declarations, design information verification, the detection of undeclared nuclear facilities, and the preparation of inspections or other visits. With the IAEA's Geospatial Exploitation System (GES), satellite imagery and other geospatial information such as site plans of nuclear facilities are available for a broad range of inspectors, analysts and country officers. The demand for spatial information and new tools to analyze this data is growing, together with the rising number of nuclear facilities under safeguards worldwide. Automated computer-driven processing of satellite imagery could therefore add a big value in the safeguards verification process. These could be, for example, satellite imagery pre-processing algorithms specially developed for new sensors, tools for pixel or object-based image analysis, or geoprocessing tools that generate additional safeguards-relevant information. In the last decade procedures for automated (pre-) processing of satellite imagery have considerably evolved. This paper aims at testing some pixel-based and object-based procedures for automated change detection and classification in support of safeguards verification. Taking different nuclear sites as examples, these methods will be evaluated and compared with regard to their suitability to (semi-) automatically extract safeguards-relevant information. (author)

  7. DOE handbook: Integrated safety management systems (ISMS) verification. Team leader's handbook

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-06-01

    The primary purpose of this handbook is to provide guidance to the ISMS verification Team Leader and the verification team in conducting ISMS verifications. The handbook describes methods and approaches for the review of the ISMS documentation (Phase I) and ISMS implementation (Phase II) and provides information useful to the Team Leader in preparing the review plan, selecting and training the team, coordinating the conduct of the verification, and documenting the results. The process and techniques described are based on the results of several pilot ISMS verifications that have been conducted across the DOE complex. A secondary purpose of this handbook is to provide information useful in developing DOE personnel to conduct these reviews. Specifically, this handbook describes methods and approaches to: (1) Develop the scope of the Phase 1 and Phase 2 review processes to be consistent with the history, hazards, and complexity of the site, facility, or activity; (2) Develop procedures for the conduct of the Phase 1 review, validating that the ISMS documentation satisfies the DEAR clause as amplified in DOE Policies 450.4, 450.5, 450.6 and associated guidance and that DOE can effectively execute responsibilities as described in the Functions, Responsibilities, and Authorities Manual (FRAM); (3) Develop procedures for the conduct of the Phase 2 review, validating that the description approved by the Approval Authority, following or concurrent with the Phase 1 review, has been implemented; and (4) Describe a methodology by which the DOE ISMS verification teams will be advised, trained, and/or mentored to conduct subsequent ISMS verifications. The handbook provides proven methods and approaches for verifying that commitments related to the DEAR, the FRAM, and associated amplifying guidance are in place and implemented in nuclear and high risk facilities. This handbook also contains useful guidance to line managers when preparing for a review of ISMS for radiological

  8. Field test for treatment verification of an in-situ enhanced bioremediation study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Taur, C.K.; Chang, S.C.

    1995-01-01

    Due to a leakage from a 12-inch pressurized diesel steel pipe four years ago, an area of approximately 30,000 square meters was contaminated. A pilot study applying the technology of in-situ enhanced bioremediation was conducted. In the study, a field test kit and on-site monitoring equipment were applied for site characterization and treatment verification. Physically, the enhanced bioremediation study consisted of an air extraction and air supply system, and a nutrition supply network. Certain consistent sampling methodology was employed. Progress was verified by daily monitoring and monthly verification. The objective of this study was to evaluate the capabilities of indigenous microorganisms to biodegrade the petroleum hydrocarbons with provision of oxygen and nutrients. Nine extraction wells and eight air sparging wells were installed. The air sparging wells injected the air into geoformation and the extraction wells provided the underground air circulation. The soil samples were obtained monthly for treatment verification by a Minuteman drilling machine with 2.5-foot-long hollow-stem augers. The samples were analyzed on site for TPH-diesel concentration by a field test kit manufactured by HNU-Hanby, Houston, Texas. The analytical results from the field test kit were compared with the results from an environmental laboratory. The TVPH concentrations of the air extracted from the vadose zone by a vacuum blower and the extraction wells were routinely monitored by a Foxboro FID and Cosmos XP-311A combustible air detector. The daily monitoring of TVPH concentrations provided the reliable data for assessing the remedial progress

  9. The carnivore remains from the Sima de los Huesos Middle Pleistocene site (Sierra de Atapuerca, Spain).

    Science.gov (United States)

    García, N; Arsuaga, J L; Torres, T

    1997-01-01

    Remains of carnivores from the Sima de los Huesos site representing at least 158 adult individuals of a primitive (i.e., not very speleoid) form of Ursus deningeri Von Reichenau 1906, have been recovered through the 1995 field season. These new finds extend our knowledge of this group in the Sierra de Atapuerca Middle Pleistocene. Material previously classified as Cuoninae indet, is now assigned to Canis lupus and a third metatarsal assigned in 1987 to Panthera of gombaszoegensis, is in our opinion only attributable to Panthera sp. The family Mustelidae is added to the faunal list and includes Martes sp. and a smaller species. The presence of Panthera leo cf. fossilis, Lynx pardina spelaea and Felis silvestris, is confirmed. The presence of a not very speloid Ursus deningeri, together with the rest of the carnivore assemblage, points to a not very late Middle Pleistocene age, i.e., oxygen isotope stage 7 or older. Relative frequencies of skeletal elements for the bear and fox samples are without major biases. The age structure of the bear sample, based on dental wear stages, does not follow the typical hibernation mortality profile and resembles a catastrophic profile. The site was not a natal or refuge den. The hypothesis that the site was a natural trap is the most plausible. If the Sima de los Huesos functioned as a natural trap (without an egress out), the human accumulation cannot be attributed to carnivore: activities and must be explained differently.

  10. Likelihood-ratio-based biometric verification

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Bazen, A.M.; Veldhuis, Raymond N.J.

    2002-01-01

    This paper presents results on optimal similarity measures for biometric verification based on fixed-length feature vectors. First, we show that the verification of a single user is equivalent to the detection problem, which implies that for single-user verification the likelihood ratio is optimal.

  11. Likelihood Ratio-Based Biometric Verification

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Bazen, A.M.; Veldhuis, Raymond N.J.

    The paper presents results on optimal similarity measures for biometric verification based on fixed-length feature vectors. First, we show that the verification of a single user is equivalent to the detection problem, which implies that, for single-user verification, the likelihood ratio is optimal.

  12. Scalable Techniques for Formal Verification

    CERN Document Server

    Ray, Sandip

    2010-01-01

    This book presents state-of-the-art approaches to formal verification techniques to seamlessly integrate different formal verification methods within a single logical foundation. It should benefit researchers and practitioners looking to get a broad overview of the spectrum of formal verification techniques, as well as approaches to combining such techniques within a single framework. Coverage includes a range of case studies showing how such combination is fruitful in developing a scalable verification methodology for industrial designs. This book outlines both theoretical and practical issue

  13. Cleanup Verification Package for the 118-F-1 Burial Ground

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    E. J. Farris and H. M. Sulloway

    2008-01-10

    This cleanup verification package documents completion of remedial action for the 118-F-1 Burial Ground on the Hanford Site. This burial ground is a combination of two locations formerly called Minor Construction Burial Ground No. 2 and Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 2. This waste site received radioactive equipment and other miscellaneous waste from 105-F Reactor operations, including dummy elements and irradiated process tubing; gun barrel tips, steel sleeves, and metal chips removed from the reactor; filter boxes containing reactor graphite chips; and miscellaneous construction solid waste.

  14. EURATOM safeguards efforts in the development of spent fuel verification methods by non-destructive assay

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Matloch, L.; Vaccaro, S.; Couland, M.; De Baere, P.; Schwalbach, P. [Euratom, Communaute europeenne de l' energie atomique - CEEA (European Commission (EC))

    2015-07-01

    The back end of the nuclear fuel cycle continues to develop. The European Commission, particularly the Nuclear Safeguards Directorate of the Directorate General for Energy, implements Euratom safeguards and needs to adapt to this situation. The verification methods for spent nuclear fuel, which EURATOM inspectors can use, require continuous improvement. Whereas the Euratom on-site laboratories provide accurate verification results for fuel undergoing reprocessing, the situation is different for spent fuel which is destined for final storage. In particular, new needs arise from the increasing number of cask loadings for interim dry storage and the advanced plans for the construction of encapsulation plants and geological repositories. Various scenarios present verification challenges. In this context, EURATOM Safeguards, often in cooperation with other stakeholders, is committed to further improvement of NDA methods for spent fuel verification. In this effort EURATOM plays various roles, ranging from definition of inspection needs to direct participation in development of measurement systems, including support of research in the framework of international agreements and via the EC Support Program to the IAEA. This paper presents recent progress in selected NDA methods. These methods have been conceived to satisfy different spent fuel verification needs, ranging from attribute testing to pin-level partial defect verification. (authors)

  15. Can self-verification strivings fully transcend the self-other barrier? Seeking verification of ingroup identities.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gómez, Angel; Seyle, D Conor; Huici, Carmen; Swann, William B

    2009-12-01

    Recent research has demonstrated self-verification strivings in groups, such that people strive to verify collective identities, which are personal self-views (e.g., "sensitive") associated with group membership (e.g., "women"). Such demonstrations stop short of showing that the desire for self-verification can fully transcend the self-other barrier, as in people working to verify ingroup identities (e.g., "Americans are loud") even when such identities are not self-descriptive ("I am quiet and unassuming"). Five studies focus on such ingroup verification strivings. Results indicate that people prefer to interact with individuals who verify their ingroup identities over those who enhance these identities (Experiments 1-5). Strivings for ingroup identity verification were independent of the extent to which the identities were self-descriptive but were stronger among participants who were highly invested in their ingroup identities, as reflected in high certainty of these identities (Experiments 1-4) and high identification with the group (Experiments 1-5). In addition, whereas past demonstrations of self-verification strivings have been limited to efforts to verify the content of identities (Experiments 1 to 3), the findings also show that they strive to verify the valence of their identities (i.e., the extent to which the identities are valued; Experiments 4 and 5). Self-verification strivings, rather than self-enhancement strivings, appeared to motivate participants' strivings for ingroup identity verification. Links to collective self-verification strivings and social identity theory are discussed.

  16. Subsurface barrier verification technologies, informal report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heiser, J.H.

    1994-06-01

    One of the more promising remediation options available to the DOE waste management community is subsurface barriers. Some of the uses of subsurface barriers include surrounding and/or containing buried waste, as secondary confinement of underground storage tanks, to direct or contain subsurface contaminant plumes and to restrict remediation methods, such as vacuum extraction, to a limited area. To be most effective the barriers should be continuous and depending on use, have few or no breaches. A breach may be formed through numerous pathways including: discontinuous grout application, from joints between panels and from cracking due to grout curing or wet-dry cycling. The ability to verify barrier integrity is valuable to the DOE, EPA, and commercial sector and will be required to gain full public acceptance of subsurface barriers as either primary or secondary confinement at waste sites. It is recognized that no suitable method exists for the verification of an emplaced barrier's integrity. The large size and deep placement of subsurface barriers makes detection of leaks challenging. This becomes magnified if the permissible leakage from the site is low. Detection of small cracks (fractions of an inch) at depths of 100 feet or more has not been possible using existing surface geophysical techniques. Compounding the problem of locating flaws in a barrier is the fact that no placement technology can guarantee the completeness or integrity of the emplaced barrier. This report summarizes several commonly used or promising technologies that have been or may be applied to in-situ barrier continuity verification

  17. Cleanup Verification Package for the 618-8 Burial Ground

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Appel, M.J.

    2006-01-01

    This cleanup verification package documents completion of remedial action for the 618-8 Burial Ground, also referred to as the Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 8, 318-8, and the Early Solid Waste Burial Ground. During its period of operation, the 618-8 site is speculated to have been used to bury uranium-contaminated waste derived from fuel manufacturing, and construction debris from the remodeling of the 313 Building

  18. Cleanup Verification Package for the 618-3 Burial Ground

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Appel, M.J.

    2006-01-01

    This cleanup verification package documents completion of remedial action for the 618-3 Solid Waste Burial Ground, also referred to as Burial Ground Number 3 and the Dry Waste Burial Ground Number 3. During its period of operation, the 618-3 site was used to dispose of uranium-contaminated construction debris from the 311 Building and construction/demolition debris from remodeling of the 313, 303-J and 303-K Buildings

  19. Utterance Verification for Text-Dependent Speaker Recognition

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kinnunen, Tomi; Sahidullah, Md; Kukanov, Ivan

    2016-01-01

    Text-dependent automatic speaker verification naturally calls for the simultaneous verification of speaker identity and spoken content. These two tasks can be achieved with automatic speaker verification (ASV) and utterance verification (UV) technologies. While both have been addressed previously...

  20. Technical safety requirements control level verification; TOPICAL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    STEWART, J.L.

    1999-01-01

    A Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) control level verification process was developed for the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) TSRs at the Hanford Site in Richland, WA, at the direction of the US. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL). The objective of the effort was to develop a process to ensure that the TWRS TSR controls are designated and managed at the appropriate levels as Safety Limits (SLs), Limiting Control Settings (LCSs), Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs), Administrative Controls (ACs), or Design Features. The TSR control level verification process was developed and implemented by a team of contractor personnel with the participation of Fluor Daniel Hanford, Inc. (FDH), the Project Hanford Management Contract (PHMC) integrating contractor, and RL representatives. The team was composed of individuals with the following experience base: nuclear safety analysis; licensing; nuclear industry and DOE-complex TSR preparation/review experience; tank farm operations; FDH policy and compliance; and RL-TWRS oversight. Each TSR control level designation was completed utilizing TSR control logic diagrams and TSR criteria checklists based on DOE Orders, Standards, Contractor TSR policy, and other guidance. The control logic diagrams and criteria checklists were reviewed and modified by team members during team meetings. The TSR control level verification process was used to systematically evaluate 12 LCOs, 22 AC programs, and approximately 100 program key elements identified in the TWRS TSR document. The verification of each TSR control required a team consensus. Based on the results of the process, refinements were identified and the TWRS TSRs were modified as appropriate. A final report documenting key assumptions and the control level designation for each TSR control was prepared and is maintained on file for future reference. The results of the process were used as a reference in the RL review of the final TWRS TSRs and control suite. RL

  1. Cleanup Verification Package for the 118-B-6, 108-B Solid Waste Burial Ground

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Proctor, M.L.

    2006-01-01

    This cleanup verification package documents completion of remedial action for the 118-B-6, 108-B Solid Waste Burial Ground. The 118-B-6 site consisted of 2 concrete pipes buried vertically in the ground and capped by a concrete pad with steel lids. The site was used for the disposal of wastes from the 'metal line' of the P-10 Tritium Separation Project.

  2. Verification survey report of the south waste tank farm training/test tower and hazardous waste storage lockers at the West Valley demonstration project, West Valley, New York

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Weaver, Phyllis C.

    2012-01-01

    A team from ORAU's Independent Environmental Assessment and Verification Program performed verification survey activities on the South Test Tower and four Hazardous Waste Storage Lockers. Scan data collected by ORAU determined that both the alpha and alpha-plus-beta activity was representative of radiological background conditions. The count rate distribution showed no outliers that would be indicative of alpha or alpha-plus-beta count rates in excess of background. It is the opinion of ORAU that independent verification data collected support the site's conclusions that the South Tower and Lockers sufficiently meet the site criteria for release to recycle and reuse

  3. Complex-Wide Waste Flow Analysis V1.0 verification and validation report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hsu, K.M.; Lundeen, A.S.; Oswald, K.B.; Shropshire, D.E.; Robinson, J.M.; West, W.H.

    1997-01-01

    The complex-wide waste flow analysis model (CWWFA) was developed to assist the Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM) Office of Science and Technology (EM-50) to evaluate waste management scenarios with emphasis on identifying and prioritizing technology development opportunities to reduce waste flows and public risk. In addition, the model was intended to support the needs of the Complex-Wide Environmental Integration (EMI) team supporting the DOE's Accelerating Cleanup: 2006 Plan. CWWFA represents an integrated environmental modeling system that covers the life cycle of waste management activities including waste generation, interim process storage, retrieval, characterization and sorting, waste preparation and processing, packaging, final interim storage, transport, and disposal at a final repository. The CWWFA shows waste flows through actual site-specific and facility-specific conditions. The system requirements for CWWFA are documented in the Technical Requirements Document (TRD). The TRD is intended to be a living document that will be modified over the course of the execution of CWWFA development. Thus, it is anticipated that CWWFA will continue to evolve as new requirements are identified (i.e., transportation, small sites, new streams, etc.). This report provides a documented basis for system verification of CWWFA requirements. System verification is accomplished through formal testing and evaluation to ensure that all performance requirements as specified in the TRD have been satisfied. A Requirement Verification Matrix (RVM) was used to map the technical requirements to the test procedures. The RVM is attached as Appendix A. Since February of 1997, substantial progress has been made toward development of the CWWFA to meet the system requirements. This system verification activity provides a baseline on system compliance to requirements and also an opportunity to reevaluate what requirements need to be satisfied in FY-98

  4. A Practitioners Perspective on Verification

    Science.gov (United States)

    Steenburgh, R. A.

    2017-12-01

    NOAAs Space Weather Prediction Center offers a wide range of products and services to meet the needs of an equally wide range of customers. A robust verification program is essential to the informed use of model guidance and other tools by both forecasters and end users alike. In this talk, we present current SWPC practices and results, and examine emerging requirements and potential approaches to satisfy them. We explore the varying verification needs of forecasters and end users, as well as the role of subjective and objective verification. Finally, we describe a vehicle used in the meteorological community to unify approaches to model verification and facilitate intercomparison.

  5. Cleanup Verification Package for the 118-F-6 Burial Ground

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sulloway, H.M.

    2008-01-01

    This cleanup verification package documents completion of remedial action for the 118-F-6 Burial Ground located in the 100-FR-2 Operable Unit of the 100-F Area on the Hanford Site. The trenches received waste from the 100-F Experimental Animal Farm, including animal manure, animal carcasses, laboratory waste, plastic, cardboard, metal, and concrete debris as well as a railroad tank car

  6. Cleanup Verification Package for the 118-F-2 Burial Ground

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Capron, J.M.; Anselm, K.A.

    2008-01-01

    This cleanup verification package documents completion of remedial action, sampling activities, and compliance with cleanup criteria for the 118-F-2 Burial Ground. This burial ground, formerly called Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 1, was the original solid waste disposal site for the 100-F Area. Eight trenches contained miscellaneous solid waste from the 105-F Reactor and one trench contained solid waste from the biology facilities

  7. Design, Implementation, and Verification of the Reliable Multicast Protocol. Thesis

    Science.gov (United States)

    Montgomery, Todd L.

    1995-01-01

    This document describes the Reliable Multicast Protocol (RMP) design, first implementation, and formal verification. RMP provides a totally ordered, reliable, atomic multicast service on top of an unreliable multicast datagram service. RMP is fully and symmetrically distributed so that no site bears an undue portion of the communications load. RMP provides a wide range of guarantees, from unreliable delivery to totally ordered delivery, to K-resilient, majority resilient, and totally resilient atomic delivery. These guarantees are selectable on a per message basis. RMP provides many communication options, including virtual synchrony, a publisher/subscriber model of message delivery, a client/server model of delivery, mutually exclusive handlers for messages, and mutually exclusive locks. It has been commonly believed that total ordering of messages can only be achieved at great performance expense. RMP discounts this. The first implementation of RMP has been shown to provide high throughput performance on Local Area Networks (LAN). For two or more destinations a single LAN, RMP provides higher throughput than any other protocol that does not use multicast or broadcast technology. The design, implementation, and verification activities of RMP have occurred concurrently. This has allowed the verification to maintain a high fidelity between design model, implementation model, and the verification model. The restrictions of implementation have influenced the design earlier than in normal sequential approaches. The protocol as a whole has matured smoother by the inclusion of several different perspectives into the product development.

  8. Closure report for housekeeping category, Corrective Action Unit 348, Nevada Test Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    This Closure Report summarizes the corrective actions which were completed at twelve Corrective Action Sites within Corrective Action Unit 348 at the Nevada Test Site. Current site descriptions, observations and identification of wastes removed are included on FFACO Corrective Action Site housekeeping closure verification forms

  9. Closure report for housekeeping category, Corrective Action Unit 347, Nevada Test Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    This Closure Report summarizes the corrective actions which were completed at the Corrective Action Sites within Corrective Action Unit 347 at the Nevada Test Site. Current site descriptions, observations and identification of wastes removed are included on FFACO Corrective Action Site housekeeping closure verification forms

  10. Radiological verification survey results at 898 Black Oak Ridge Rd., Wayne, New Jersey (WJ004V)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodriguez, R.E.; Johnson, C.A.

    1995-05-01

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) conducted remedial action during 1993 at the Pompton Plains Railroad Spur and eight vicinity properties in the Wayne and Pequannock Townships in New Jersey as part of the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP). These properties are in the vicinity of the DOE-owned Wayne Interim Storage Site (WISS), formerly the W.R. Grace facility. The property at 898 Black Oak Ridge Road, Wayne, New Jersey is one of these vicinity properties. At the request of DOE, a team from Oak Ridge National Laboratory conducted an independent radiological verification survey at this property. The purpose of the survey, conducted between September and December 1993, was to confirm the success of the remedial actions performed to remove any radioactive materials in excess of the identified guidelines. The verification survey included surface gamma scans and gamma readings at one meter, beta-gamma scans, and the collection of soil and debris samples for radionuclide analysis. Results of the survey demonstrated that all radiological measurements on the property at 898 Black Oak Ridge Road were within applicable DOE guidelines. Based on the results of the remedial action data and confirmed by the verification survey data, the portions of the site that had been remediated during this action successfully meet the DOE remedial action objectives

  11. Radiological verification survey results at the Pompton Plains Railroad Spur, Pequannock, New Jersey (PJ008V)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodriguez, R.E.; Johnson, C.A.

    1995-05-01

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) conducted remedial action during 1993 at the Pompton Plains railroad spur and eight vicinity properties in the Wayne and Pequannock Townships in New Jersey as part of the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP). These properties are in the vicinity of the DOE-owned Wayne Interim Storage Site (WISS), formerly the W.R. Grace facility. The property at the Pompton Plains Railroad Spur, Pequannock, New Jersey is one of these vicinity properties. At the request of DOE, a team from Oak Ridge National Laboratory conducted an independent radiological verification survey at this property. The purpose of the survey, conducted between September and December 1993, was to confirm the success of the remedial actions performed to remove any radioactive materials in excess of the identified guidelines. The verification survey included surface gamma scans and gamma readings at 1 meter, beta-gamma scans, and the collection of soil and debris samples for radionuclide analysis. Results of the survey demonstrated that all radiological measurements on the property at the Pompton Plains railroad spur were within applicable DOE guidelines. Based on the results of the remedial action data and confirmed by the verification survey data, the portions of the site that had been remediated during this action successfully meet the DOE remedial action objectives

  12. 37Ar monitoring techniques and on-site inspection system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Duan Rongliang; Chen Yinliang; Li Wei; Wang Hongxia; Hao Fanhua

    2001-01-01

    37 Ar is separated, purified and extracted from air sample with a low temperature gas-solid chromatographic purifying method, prepared into a radioactive measurement source and its radioactivity is measured with a proportional counter. Based on the monitoring result, a judgement can be made if an nuclear explosion event has happened recently in a spectabilis area. A series of element techniques that are associated the monitoring of the trace element 37 Ar have been investigated and developed. Those techniques include leaked gas sampling, 37 Ar separation and purification, 37 Ar radioactivity measurement and the on-site inspection of 37 Ar. An advanced 37 Ar monitoring method has been developed, with which 200 liters of air can be treated in 2 hours with sensitivity of 0.01 Bq/L for 37 Ar radioactivity measurement. A practical 37 Ar On-site Inspection system has been developed. This research work may provide technical and equipment support for the verification protection, verification supervision and CTBT verification

  13. Nuclear disarmament verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DeVolpi, A.

    1993-01-01

    Arms control treaties, unilateral actions, and cooperative activities -- reflecting the defusing of East-West tensions -- are causing nuclear weapons to be disarmed and dismantled worldwide. In order to provide for future reductions and to build confidence in the permanency of this disarmament, verification procedures and technologies would play an important role. This paper outlines arms-control objectives, treaty organization, and actions that could be undertaken. For the purposes of this Workshop on Verification, nuclear disarmament has been divided into five topical subareas: Converting nuclear-weapons production complexes, Eliminating and monitoring nuclear-weapons delivery systems, Disabling and destroying nuclear warheads, Demilitarizing or non-military utilization of special nuclear materials, and Inhibiting nuclear arms in non-nuclear-weapons states. This paper concludes with an overview of potential methods for verification

  14. Verification Account Management System (VAMS)

    Data.gov (United States)

    Social Security Administration — The Verification Account Management System (VAMS) is the centralized location for maintaining SSA's verification and data exchange accounts. VAMS account management...

  15. Quantum money with classical verification

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gavinsky, Dmitry [NEC Laboratories America, Princeton, NJ (United States)

    2014-12-04

    We propose and construct a quantum money scheme that allows verification through classical communication with a bank. This is the first demonstration that a secure quantum money scheme exists that does not require quantum communication for coin verification. Our scheme is secure against adaptive adversaries - this property is not directly related to the possibility of classical verification, nevertheless none of the earlier quantum money constructions is known to possess it.

  16. Quantum money with classical verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gavinsky, Dmitry

    2014-01-01

    We propose and construct a quantum money scheme that allows verification through classical communication with a bank. This is the first demonstration that a secure quantum money scheme exists that does not require quantum communication for coin verification. Our scheme is secure against adaptive adversaries - this property is not directly related to the possibility of classical verification, nevertheless none of the earlier quantum money constructions is known to possess it

  17. Lessons learned in the implementation of Integrated Safety Management at DOE Order Compliance Sites vs Necessary and Sufficient Sites

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hill, R.L.

    2000-01-01

    This paper summarizes the development and implementation of Integrated Safety Management (ISM) at an Order Compliance Site (Savannah River Site) and a Necessary and Sufficient Site (Nevada Test Site). A discussion of each core safety function of ISM is followed by an example from an Order Compliance Site and a Necessary and Sufficient Site. The Savannah River Site was the first DOE site to have a DOE Headquarters-validated and approved ISM System. The NTS is beginning the process of verification and validation. This paper defines successful strategies for integrating Environment, Safety, and Health management into work under various scenarios

  18. New foot remains from the Gran Dolina-TD6 Early Pleistocene site (Sierra de Atapuerca, Burgos, Spain).

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pablos, Adrián; Lorenzo, Carlos; Martínez, Ignacio; Bermúdez de Castro, José María; Martinón-Torres, María; Carbonell, Eudald; Arsuaga, Juan Luis

    2012-10-01

    This paper presents and describes new foot fossils from the species Homo antecessor, found in level TD6 of the site of Gran Dolina (Sierra de Atapuerca, Burgos, Spain). These new fossils consist of an almost complete left talus (ATD6-95) and the proximal three-quarters of a right fourth metatarsal (ATD6-124). The talus ATD6-95 is tentatively assigned to Hominin 10 of the TD6 sample, an adult male specimen with which the second metatarsal ATD6-70+107 (already published) is also tentatively associated. Analysis of these fossils and other postcranial remains has made possible to estimate a stature similar to those of the specimens from the Middle Pleistocene site of Sima de los Huesos (Sierra de Atapuerca, Burgos, Spain). The morphology of the TD6 metatarsals does not differ significantly from that of modern humans, Neanderthals and the specimens from Sima de los Huesos. Talus ATD6-95, however, differs from the rest of the comparative samples in being long and high, having a long and wide trochlea, and displaying a proportionally short neck. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  19. Independent Verification Survey Report for the Operable Unit-1 Landfill Miamisburg Closure Project, Miamisburg, OH

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Weaver, P.

    2008-01-01

    The objectives of the independent verification survey were to confirm that remedial actions have been effective in meeting established release criteria and that documentation accurately and adequately describes the current radiological and chemical conditions of the MCP site

  20. Particularities of Verification Processes for Distributed Informatics Applications

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ion IVAN

    2013-01-01

    Full Text Available This paper presents distributed informatics applications and characteristics of their development cycle. It defines the concept of verification and there are identified the differences from software testing. Particularities of the software testing and software verification processes are described. The verification steps and necessary conditions are presented and there are established influence factors of quality verification. Software optimality verification is analyzed and some metrics are defined for the verification process.

  1. Nuclear test ban verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chun, Kin-Yip

    1991-07-01

    This report describes verification and its rationale, the basic tasks of seismic verification, the physical basis for earthquake/explosion source discrimination and explosion yield determination, the technical problems pertaining to seismic monitoring of underground nuclear tests, the basic problem-solving strategy deployed by the forensic seismology resarch team at the University of Toronto, and the scientific significance of the team's research. The research carried out at the Univeristy of Toronto has two components: teleseismic verification using P wave recordings from the Yellowknife Seismic Array (YKA), and regional (close-in) verification using high-frequency L g and P n recordings from the Eastern Canada Telemetered Network. Major differences have been found in P was attenuation among the propagation paths connecting the YKA listening post with seven active nuclear explosion testing areas in the world. Significant revisions have been made to previously published P wave attenuation results, leading to more interpretable nuclear explosion source functions. (11 refs., 12 figs.)

  2. TH-B-204-03: TG-199: Implanted Markers for Radiation Treatment Verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wang, Z.

    2016-01-01

    Implanted markers as target surrogates have been widely used for treatment verification, as they provide safe and reliable monitoring of the inter- and intra-fractional target motion. The rapid advancement of technology requires a critical review and recommendation for the usage of implanted surrogates in current field. The symposium, also reporting an update of AAPM TG 199 - Implanted Target Surrogates for Radiation Treatment Verification, will be focusing on all clinical aspects of using the implanted target surrogates for treatment verification and related issues. A wide variety of markers available in the market will be first reviewed, including radiopaque markers, MRI compatible makers, non-migrating coils, surgical clips and electromagnetic transponders etc. The pros and cons of each kind will be discussed. The clinical applications of implanted surrogates will be presented based on different anatomical sites. For the lung, we will discuss gated treatments and 2D or 3D real-time fiducial tracking techniques. For the prostate, we will be focusing on 2D-3D, 3D-3D matching and electromagnetic transponder based localization techniques. For the liver, we will review techniques when patients are under gating, shallow or free breathing condition. We will review techniques when treating challenging breast cancer as deformation may occur. Finally, we will summarize potential issues related to the usage of implanted target surrogates with TG 199 recommendations. A review of fiducial migration and fiducial derived target rotation in different disease sites will be provided. The issue of target deformation, especially near the diaphragm, and related suggestions will be also presented and discussed. Learning Objectives: Knowledge of a wide variety of markers Knowledge of their application for different disease sites Understand of issues related to these applications Z. Wang: Research funding support from Brainlab AG Q. Xu: Consultant for Accuray; Q. Xu, I am a consultant

  3. TH-B-204-03: TG-199: Implanted Markers for Radiation Treatment Verification

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wang, Z. [Duke University Medical Center (United States)

    2016-06-15

    Implanted markers as target surrogates have been widely used for treatment verification, as they provide safe and reliable monitoring of the inter- and intra-fractional target motion. The rapid advancement of technology requires a critical review and recommendation for the usage of implanted surrogates in current field. The symposium, also reporting an update of AAPM TG 199 - Implanted Target Surrogates for Radiation Treatment Verification, will be focusing on all clinical aspects of using the implanted target surrogates for treatment verification and related issues. A wide variety of markers available in the market will be first reviewed, including radiopaque markers, MRI compatible makers, non-migrating coils, surgical clips and electromagnetic transponders etc. The pros and cons of each kind will be discussed. The clinical applications of implanted surrogates will be presented based on different anatomical sites. For the lung, we will discuss gated treatments and 2D or 3D real-time fiducial tracking techniques. For the prostate, we will be focusing on 2D-3D, 3D-3D matching and electromagnetic transponder based localization techniques. For the liver, we will review techniques when patients are under gating, shallow or free breathing condition. We will review techniques when treating challenging breast cancer as deformation may occur. Finally, we will summarize potential issues related to the usage of implanted target surrogates with TG 199 recommendations. A review of fiducial migration and fiducial derived target rotation in different disease sites will be provided. The issue of target deformation, especially near the diaphragm, and related suggestions will be also presented and discussed. Learning Objectives: Knowledge of a wide variety of markers Knowledge of their application for different disease sites Understand of issues related to these applications Z. Wang: Research funding support from Brainlab AG Q. Xu: Consultant for Accuray; Q. Xu, I am a consultant

  4. Plant remains of archaeological site Casa Vieja, Callango (Ica

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    José Roque

    2013-06-01

    Full Text Available A paleoethnobotanical study was carried out at the Middle Horizon archaeological site of Casa Vieja, located in Callango within the Lower Ica Valley. A total of 23 species were identified, all determined to be of the Magnoliopyta Division, 78 % (or 18 species were Magnoliopsid and 22% (or 15 species Liliopsid. The Fabaceae are the best represented family with 6 species. Most of the analyzed samples correspond to seeds of Gossypium barbadense “cotton”. Seventy percent of the species were probably used as food; 48% for artifact-making and construction and 52% for medicinal and curative purposes.

  5. Double-Difference Tomography for Sequestration MVA [monitoring, verification, and accounting

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Westman, Erik [Virginia Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ. (Virginia Tech), Blacksburg, VA (United States)

    2012-12-31

    Analysis of synthetic data was performed to determine the most cost-effective tomographic monitoring system for a geologic carbon sequestration injection site. Double-difference tomographic inversion was performed on 125 synthetic data sets: five stages of CO2 plume growth, five seismic event regions, and five geophone arrays. Each resulting velocity model was compared quantitatively to its respective synthetic velocity model to determine an accuracy value. The results were examined to determine a relationship between cost and accuracy in monitoring, verification, and accounting applications using double-difference tomography. The geophone arrays with widely-varying geophone locations, both laterally and vertically, performed best. Additionally, double difference seismic tomography was performed using travel time data from a carbon sequestration site at the Aneth oil field in southeast Utah as part of a Department of Energy initiative on monitoring, verification, and accounting (MVA) of sequestered CO2. A total of 1,211 seismic events were recorded from a borehole array consisting of 22 geophones. Artificial velocity models were created to determine the ease with which different CO2 plume locations and sizes can be detected. Most likely because of the poor geophone arrangement, a low velocity zone in the Desert Creek reservoir can only be detected when regions of test site containing the highest ray path coverage are considered. MVA accuracy and precision may be improved through the use of a receiver array that provides more comprehensive ray path coverage.

  6. Java bytecode verification via static single assignment form

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Gal, Andreas; Probst, Christian W.; Franz, Michael

    2008-01-01

    Java Virtual Machines (JVMs) traditionally perform bytecode verification by way of an iterative data-flow analysis. Bytecode verification is necessary to ensure type safety because temporary variables in the JVM are not statically typed. We present an alternative verification mechanism that trans......Java Virtual Machines (JVMs) traditionally perform bytecode verification by way of an iterative data-flow analysis. Bytecode verification is necessary to ensure type safety because temporary variables in the JVM are not statically typed. We present an alternative verification mechanism...

  7. Progress in forming bottom barriers under waste sites

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carter, E.E.

    1997-01-01

    The paper describes an new method for the construction, verification, and maintenance of underground vaults to isolate and contain radioactive burial sites without excavation or drilling in contaminated areas. The paper begins with a discussion of previous full-scale field tests of horizontal barrier tools which utilized high pressure jetting technology. This is followed by a discussion of the TECT process, which cuts with an abrasive cable instead of high pressure jets. The new method is potentially applicable to more soil types than previous methods and can form very thick barriers. Both processes are performed from the perimeter of a site and require no penetration or disturbance of the active waste area. The paper also describes long-term verification methods to monitor barrier integrity passively

  8. Formal verification of algorithms for critical systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rushby, John M.; Von Henke, Friedrich

    1993-01-01

    We describe our experience with formal, machine-checked verification of algorithms for critical applications, concentrating on a Byzantine fault-tolerant algorithm for synchronizing the clocks in the replicated computers of a digital flight control system. First, we explain the problems encountered in unsynchronized systems and the necessity, and criticality, of fault-tolerant synchronization. We give an overview of one such algorithm, and of the arguments for its correctness. Next, we describe a verification of the algorithm that we performed using our EHDM system for formal specification and verification. We indicate the errors we found in the published analysis of the algorithm, and other benefits that we derived from the verification. Based on our experience, we derive some key requirements for a formal specification and verification system adequate to the task of verifying algorithms of the type considered. Finally, we summarize our conclusions regarding the benefits of formal verification in this domain, and the capabilities required of verification systems in order to realize those benefits.

  9. Application of virtual distances methodology to laser tracker verification with an indexed metrology platform

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Acero, R; Pueo, M; Santolaria, J; Aguilar, J J; Brau, A

    2015-01-01

    High-range measuring equipment like laser trackers need large dimension calibrated reference artifacts in their calibration and verification procedures. In this paper, a new verification procedure for portable coordinate measuring instruments based on the generation and evaluation of virtual distances with an indexed metrology platform is developed. This methodology enables the definition of an unlimited number of reference distances without materializing them in a physical gauge to be used as a reference. The generation of the virtual points and reference lengths derived is linked to the concept of the indexed metrology platform and the knowledge of the relative position and orientation of its upper and lower platforms with high accuracy. It is the measuring instrument together with the indexed metrology platform one that remains still, rotating the virtual mesh around them. As a first step, the virtual distances technique is applied to a laser tracker in this work. The experimental verification procedure of the laser tracker with virtual distances is simulated and further compared with the conventional verification procedure of the laser tracker with the indexed metrology platform. The results obtained in terms of volumetric performance of the laser tracker proved the suitability of the virtual distances methodology in calibration and verification procedures for portable coordinate measuring instruments, broadening and expanding the possibilities for the definition of reference distances in these procedures. (paper)

  10. Application of virtual distances methodology to laser tracker verification with an indexed metrology platform

    Science.gov (United States)

    Acero, R.; Santolaria, J.; Pueo, M.; Aguilar, J. J.; Brau, A.

    2015-11-01

    High-range measuring equipment like laser trackers need large dimension calibrated reference artifacts in their calibration and verification procedures. In this paper, a new verification procedure for portable coordinate measuring instruments based on the generation and evaluation of virtual distances with an indexed metrology platform is developed. This methodology enables the definition of an unlimited number of reference distances without materializing them in a physical gauge to be used as a reference. The generation of the virtual points and reference lengths derived is linked to the concept of the indexed metrology platform and the knowledge of the relative position and orientation of its upper and lower platforms with high accuracy. It is the measuring instrument together with the indexed metrology platform one that remains still, rotating the virtual mesh around them. As a first step, the virtual distances technique is applied to a laser tracker in this work. The experimental verification procedure of the laser tracker with virtual distances is simulated and further compared with the conventional verification procedure of the laser tracker with the indexed metrology platform. The results obtained in terms of volumetric performance of the laser tracker proved the suitability of the virtual distances methodology in calibration and verification procedures for portable coordinate measuring instruments, broadening and expanding the possibilities for the definition of reference distances in these procedures.

  11. MESA: Message-Based System Analysis Using Runtime Verification

    Science.gov (United States)

    Shafiei, Nastaran; Tkachuk, Oksana; Mehlitz, Peter

    2017-01-01

    In this paper, we present a novel approach and framework for run-time verication of large, safety critical messaging systems. This work was motivated by verifying the System Wide Information Management (SWIM) project of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). SWIM provides live air traffic, site and weather data streams for the whole National Airspace System (NAS), which can easily amount to several hundred messages per second. Such safety critical systems cannot be instrumented, therefore, verification and monitoring has to happen using a nonintrusive approach, by connecting to a variety of network interfaces. Due to a large number of potential properties to check, the verification framework needs to support efficient formulation of properties with a suitable Domain Specific Language (DSL). Our approach is to utilize a distributed system that is geared towards connectivity and scalability and interface it at the message queue level to a powerful verification engine. We implemented our approach in the tool called MESA: Message-Based System Analysis, which leverages the open source projects RACE (Runtime for Airspace Concept Evaluation) and TraceContract. RACE is a platform for instantiating and running highly concurrent and distributed systems and enables connectivity to SWIM and scalability. TraceContract is a runtime verication tool that allows for checking traces against properties specified in a powerful DSL. We applied our approach to verify a SWIM service against several requirements.We found errors such as duplicate and out-of-order messages.

  12. A Syntactic-Semantic Approach to Incremental Verification

    OpenAIRE

    Bianculli, Domenico; Filieri, Antonio; Ghezzi, Carlo; Mandrioli, Dino

    2013-01-01

    Software verification of evolving systems is challenging mainstream methodologies and tools. Formal verification techniques often conflict with the time constraints imposed by change management practices for evolving systems. Since changes in these systems are often local to restricted parts, an incremental verification approach could be beneficial. This paper introduces SiDECAR, a general framework for the definition of verification procedures, which are made incremental by the framework...

  13. Verification and validation benchmarks.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Oberkampf, William Louis; Trucano, Timothy Guy

    2007-02-01

    Verification and validation (V&V) are the primary means to assess the accuracy and reliability of computational simulations. V&V methods and procedures have fundamentally improved the credibility of simulations in several high-consequence fields, such as nuclear reactor safety, underground nuclear waste storage, and nuclear weapon safety. Although the terminology is not uniform across engineering disciplines, code verification deals with assessing the reliability of the software coding, and solution verification deals with assessing the numerical accuracy of the solution to a computational model. Validation addresses the physics modeling accuracy of a computational simulation by comparing the computational results with experimental data. Code verification benchmarks and validation benchmarks have been constructed for a number of years in every field of computational simulation. However, no comprehensive guidelines have been proposed for the construction and use of V&V benchmarks. For example, the field of nuclear reactor safety has not focused on code verification benchmarks, but it has placed great emphasis on developing validation benchmarks. Many of these validation benchmarks are closely related to the operations of actual reactors at near-safety-critical conditions, as opposed to being more fundamental-physics benchmarks. This paper presents recommendations for the effective design and use of code verification benchmarks based on manufactured solutions, classical analytical solutions, and highly accurate numerical solutions. In addition, this paper presents recommendations for the design and use of validation benchmarks, highlighting the careful design of building-block experiments, the estimation of experimental measurement uncertainty for both inputs and outputs to the code, validation metrics, and the role of model calibration in validation. It is argued that the understanding of predictive capability of a computational model is built on the level of

  14. Verification of Ceramic Structures

    Science.gov (United States)

    Behar-Lafenetre, Stephanie; Cornillon, Laurence; Rancurel, Michael; De Graaf, Dennis; Hartmann, Peter; Coe, Graham; Laine, Benoit

    2012-07-01

    In the framework of the “Mechanical Design and Verification Methodologies for Ceramic Structures” contract [1] awarded by ESA, Thales Alenia Space has investigated literature and practices in affiliated industries to propose a methodological guideline for verification of ceramic spacecraft and instrument structures. It has been written in order to be applicable to most types of ceramic or glass-ceramic materials - typically Cesic®, HBCesic®, Silicon Nitride, Silicon Carbide and ZERODUR®. The proposed guideline describes the activities to be performed at material level in order to cover all the specific aspects of ceramics (Weibull distribution, brittle behaviour, sub-critical crack growth). Elementary tests and their post-processing methods are described, and recommendations for optimization of the test plan are given in order to have a consistent database. The application of this method is shown on an example in a dedicated article [7]. Then the verification activities to be performed at system level are described. This includes classical verification activities based on relevant standard (ECSS Verification [4]), plus specific analytical, testing and inspection features. The analysis methodology takes into account the specific behaviour of ceramic materials, especially the statistical distribution of failures (Weibull) and the method to transfer it from elementary data to a full-scale structure. The demonstration of the efficiency of this method is described in a dedicated article [8]. The verification is completed by classical full-scale testing activities. Indications about proof testing, case of use and implementation are given and specific inspection and protection measures are described. These additional activities are necessary to ensure the required reliability. The aim of the guideline is to describe how to reach the same reliability level as for structures made of more classical materials (metals, composites).

  15. International ENEA/ISMES/ENS specialist meeting on 'On-site experimental verification of the seismic behaviour of nuclear reactor structures and components'. Proceedings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-01-01

    The seismic verification of nuclear plants is a subject of increasing interest in all the industrial countries, with respect to both the safety aspects and the impact of the seismic event on the design and the costs of a nuclear reactor. This topic is especially of great interest for a country like Italy, whose territory is unfortunately characterized by non - negligible seismicity: we remember, not too many years ago, the catastrophic earthquakes of Frioul and Irpinia, that caused thousands of dead people. The meeting aimed at establishing the state-of-the-art on on-site testing of nuclear reactors structures and components, with particular attention to experiences and research programmes concerning: methodologies of on-site tests and interpretation of the experimental data; seismic monitoring systems, recorded data, their use and interpretation; calibration and validation of numerical analyses. Six technical sessions were held, during which 23 high papers were presented and discussed, and six panel discussions were held (the importance of discussion was emphasized in the meeting). The technical contributions consisted of: an introduction paper, summarizing the seismic studies performed in Italy for PEC reactor and explaining the reasons why on-site tests had been performed on this reactor; 6 invited lectures, one for each of the countries that are more deeply involved in seismic analysis, providing the state-of-the-art on the topics of interest for the meeting; 16 contributed papers dealing with more specific technical items, related to the various countries and international organizations

  16. International ENEA/ISMES/ENS specialist meeting on 'On-site experimental verification of the seismic behaviour of nuclear reactor structures and components'. Proceedings

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1988-07-01

    The seismic verification of nuclear plants is a subject of increasing interest in all the industrial countries, with respect to both the safety aspects and the impact of the seismic event on the design and the costs of a nuclear reactor. This topic is especially of great interest for a country like Italy, whose territory is unfortunately characterized by non - negligible seismicity: we remember, not too many years ago, the catastrophic earthquakes of Frioul and Irpinia, that caused thousands of dead people. The meeting aimed at establishing the state-of-the-art on on-site testing of nuclear reactors structures and components, with particular attention to experiences and research programmes concerning: methodologies of on-site tests and interpretation of the experimental data; seismic monitoring systems, recorded data, their use and interpretation; calibration and validation of numerical analyses. Six technical sessions were held, during which 23 high papers were presented and discussed, and six panel discussions were held (the importance of discussion was emphasized in the meeting). The technical contributions consisted of: an introduction paper, summarizing the seismic studies performed in Italy for PEC reactor and explaining the reasons why on-site tests had been performed on this reactor; 6 invited lectures, one for each of the countries that are more deeply involved in seismic analysis, providing the state-of-the-art on the topics of interest for the meeting; 16 contributed papers dealing with more specific technical items, related to the various countries and international organizations.

  17. Is flow verification necessary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beetle, T.M.

    1986-01-01

    Safeguards test statistics are used in an attempt to detect diversion of special nuclear material. Under assumptions concerning possible manipulation (falsification) of safeguards accounting data, the effects on the statistics due to diversion and data manipulation are described algebraically. A comprehensive set of statistics that is capable of detecting any diversion of material is defined in terms of the algebraic properties of the effects. When the assumptions exclude collusion between persons in two material balance areas, then three sets of accounting statistics are shown to be comprehensive. Two of the sets contain widely known accountancy statistics. One of them does not require physical flow verification - comparisons of operator and inspector data for receipts and shipments. The third set contains a single statistic which does not require physical flow verification. In addition to not requiring technically difficult and expensive flow verification, this single statistic has several advantages over other comprehensive sets of statistics. This algebraic approach as an alternative to flow verification for safeguards accountancy is discussed in this paper

  18. Procedure generation and verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sheely, W.F.

    1986-01-01

    The Department of Energy has used Artificial Intelligence of ''AI'' concepts to develop two powerful new computer-based techniques to enhance safety in nuclear applications. The Procedure Generation System, and the Procedure Verification System, can be adapted to other commercial applications, such as a manufacturing plant. The Procedure Generation System can create a procedure to deal with the off-normal condition. The operator can then take correct actions on the system in minimal time. The Verification System evaluates the logic of the Procedure Generator's conclusions. This evaluation uses logic techniques totally independent of the Procedure Generator. The rapid, accurate generation and verification of corrective procedures can greatly reduce the human error, possible in a complex (stressful/high stress) situation

  19. Closure report for CAU No. 450: Historical UST release sites, Nevada Test Site. Volume 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-09-01

    This report addresses the closure of 11 historical underground storage tank release sites within various areas of the Nevada Test Site. This report contains remedial verification of the soil sample analytical results for the following: Area 11 Tweezer facility; Area 12 boiler house; Area 12 service station; Area 23 bypass yard; Area 23 service station; Area 25 power house; Area 25 tech. services building; Area 25 tech. operations building; Area 26 power house; and Area 27 boiler house

  20. Verification of Thermal Models of Internally Cooled Gas Turbine Blades

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Igor Shevchenko

    2018-01-01

    Full Text Available Numerical simulation of temperature field of cooled turbine blades is a required element of gas turbine engine design process. The verification is usually performed on the basis of results of test of full-size blade prototype on a gas-dynamic test bench. A method of calorimetric measurement in a molten metal thermostat for verification of a thermal model of cooled blade is proposed in this paper. The method allows obtaining local values of heat flux in each point of blade surface within a single experiment. The error of determination of local heat transfer coefficients using this method does not exceed 8% for blades with radial channels. An important feature of the method is that the heat load remains unchanged during the experiment and the blade outer surface temperature equals zinc melting point. The verification of thermal-hydraulic model of high-pressure turbine blade with cooling allowing asymmetrical heat removal from pressure and suction sides was carried out using the developed method. An analysis of heat transfer coefficients confirmed the high level of heat transfer in the leading edge, whose value is comparable with jet impingement heat transfer. The maximum of the heat transfer coefficients is shifted from the critical point of the leading edge to the pressure side.

  1. Flammable Gas Refined Safety Analysis Tool Software Verification and Validation Report for Resolve Version 2.5

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BRATZEL, D.R.

    2000-01-01

    The purpose of this report is to document all software verification and validation activities, results, and findings related to the development of Resolve Version 2.5 for the analysis of flammable gas accidents in Hanford Site waste tanks

  2. Results of Remediation and Verification Sampling for the 600-270 Horseshoe Landfill

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    W. S. Thompson

    2005-12-14

    This report presents the results of the 2005 remedial action and verification soil sampling conducted at the 600-270 waste site after removal of soil containing residual concentrations of dichlorodiphenyl trichloroethane and its breakdown products dichlorodiphenyl dichloroethylene and dichlorodiphenyl dichloroethane. The remediation was performed in response to post-closure surface soil sampling performed between 1998 and 2003 that indicated the presence of residual DDT contamination exceeding the Record of Decision for the 1100 Area National Priorities List site cleanup criteria of 1 mg/kg that was established for the original 1994 cleanup activities.

  3. Results of Remediation and Verification Sampling for the 600-270 Horseshoe Landfill

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thompson, W.S.

    2005-01-01

    This report presents the results of the 2005 remedial action and verification soil sampling conducted at the 600-270 waste site after removal of soil containing residual concentrations of dichlorodiphenyl trichloroethane and its breakdown products dichlorodiphenyl dichloroethylene and dichlorodiphenyl dichloroethane. The remediation was performed in response to post-closure surface soil sampling performed between 1998 and 2003 that indicated the presence of residual DDT contamination exceeding the Record of Decision for the 1100 Area National Priorities List site cleanup criteria of 1 mg/kg that was established for the original 1994 cleanup activities.

  4. A Scalable Approach for Hardware Semiformal Verification

    OpenAIRE

    Grimm, Tomas; Lettnin, Djones; Hübner, Michael

    2018-01-01

    The current verification flow of complex systems uses different engines synergistically: virtual prototyping, formal verification, simulation, emulation and FPGA prototyping. However, none is able to verify a complete architecture. Furthermore, hybrid approaches aiming at complete verification use techniques that lower the overall complexity by increasing the abstraction level. This work focuses on the verification of complex systems at the RT level to handle the hardware peculiarities. Our r...

  5. Data storage accounting and verification in LHC experiments

    CERN Document Server

    Ratnikova ,Natalia

    2012-01-01

    All major experiments at Large Hadron Collider (LHC) need to measure real storage usage at the Grid sites. This information is equally important for the resource management, planning, and operations. To verify consistency of the central catalogs, experiments are asking sites to provide full list of files they have on storage, including size, checksum, and other file attributes. Such storage dumps provided at regular intervals give a realistic view of the storage resource usage by the experiments. Regular monitoring of the space usage and data verification serve as additional internal checks of the system integrity and performance. Both the importance and the complexity of these tasks increase with the constant growth of the total data volumes during the active data taking period at the LHC. Developed common solutions help to reduce the maintenance costs both at the large Tier-1 facilities supporting multiple virtual organizations, and at the small sites that often lack manpower. We discuss requirements...

  6. Methodology and applicability of a safety and demonstration concept for a HAW final repository on clays. Safety concept and verification strategy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ruebel, Andre; Meleshyn, Artur

    2014-08-01

    The report describes the site independent frame for a safety concept and verification strategy for a final repository for heat generating wastes in clay rock. In the safety concept planning specifications and technical measures are summarized that are supposed to allow a safe inclusion of radionuclides in the host rock. The verification strategy defines the systematic procedures for the development of fundamentals and scenarios as basis for the demonstration of the safety case and to allow the prognosis of appropriateness. The report includes the boundary conditions, the safety concept for the post-closure phase and the verification strategy for the post-closure phase.

  7. Inspection and verification of waste packages for near surface disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    Extensive experience has been gained with various disposal options for low and intermediate level waste at or near surface disposal facilities. Near surface disposal is based on proven and well demonstrated technologies. To ensure the safety of near surface disposal facilities when available technologies are applied, it is necessary to control and assure the quality of the repository system's performance, which includes waste packages, engineered features and natural barriers, as well as siting, design, construction, operation, closure and institutional controls. Recognizing the importance of repository performance, the IAEA is producing a set of technical publications on quality assurance and quality control (QA/QC) for waste disposal to provide Member States with technical guidance and current information. These publications cover issues on the application of QA/QC programmes to waste disposal, long term record management, and specific QA/QC aspects of waste packaging, repository design and R and D. Waste package QA/QC is especially important because the package is the primary barrier to radionuclide release from a disposal facility. Waste packaging also involves interface issues between the waste generator and the disposal facility operator. Waste should be packaged by generators to meet waste acceptance requirements set for a repository or disposal system. However, it is essential that the disposal facility operator ensure that waste packages conform with disposal facility acceptance requirements. Demonstration of conformance with disposal facility acceptance requirements can be achieved through the systematic inspection and verification of waste packages at both the waste generator's site and at the disposal facility, based on a waste package QA/QC programme established by the waste generator and approved by the disposal operator. However, strategies, approaches and the scope of inspection and verification will be somewhat different from country to country

  8. Survey on Offline Finger Print Verification System

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Suman, R.; Kaur, R.

    2012-01-01

    The fingerprint verification, means where "verification" implies a user matching a fingerprint against a single fingerprint associated with the identity that the user claims. Biometrics can be classified into two types Behavioral (signature verification, keystroke dynamics, etc.) And Physiological

  9. In-core Instrument Subcritical Verification (INCISV) - Core Design Verification Method - 358

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Prible, M.C.; Heibel, M.D.; Conner, S.L.; Sebastiani, P.J.; Kistler, D.P.

    2010-01-01

    According to the standard on reload startup physics testing, ANSI/ANS 19.6.1, a plant must verify that the constructed core behaves sufficiently close to the designed core to confirm that the various safety analyses bound the actual behavior of the plant. A large portion of this verification must occur before the reactor operates at power. The INCISV Core Design Verification Method uses the unique characteristics of a Westinghouse Electric Company fixed in-core self powered detector design to perform core design verification after a core reload before power operation. A Vanadium self powered detector that spans the length of the active fuel region is capable of confirming the required core characteristics prior to power ascension; reactivity balance, shutdown margin, temperature coefficient and power distribution. Using a detector element that spans the length of the active fuel region inside the core provides a signal of total integrated flux. Measuring the integrated flux distributions and changes at various rodded conditions and plant temperatures, and comparing them to predicted flux levels, validates all core necessary core design characteristics. INCISV eliminates the dependence on various corrections and assumptions between the ex-core detectors and the core for traditional physics testing programs. This program also eliminates the need for special rod maneuvers which are infrequently performed by plant operators during typical core design verification testing and allows for safer startup activities. (authors)

  10. Site Closure Strategy Model for Creosote Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coll, F.R.; Gray, D.R.

    2009-01-01

    In conjunction with RCRA site corrective action at an active wood preserving facility, a risk-based site closure strategy was developed and incorporated the performance of a dense non-aqueous phase liquid (DNAPL) source recovery remedy, a monitored natural attenuation (MNA) remedy for dissolved phase groundwater, and institutional controls. Innovative creosote DNAPL source recovery has been undertaken at the Site since 1998. Pooled creosote DNAPL is present 90 feet below ground within a transmissive sand and gravel aquifer with a saturated thickness of approximately 80 feet. The creosote DNAPL source is situated on the property boundary of the site and has generated a 1/2 mile off-site dissolved phase plume, creating significant NAPL management and remedial technology verification issues. To date, over 120,000 gallons of creosote DNAPL have been recovered from the subsurface utilizing a modified circulation well technology. A mass discharge flux protocol was developed to serve as a major performance metrics for the continuation of source removal efforts and to support the application of monitored natural attenuation as an associated remedial technology for groundwater. The mass removal success has supported the MNA remedy for dissolved phase groundwater and the associated development of institutional controls. The enacted site management strategy outlines the current and future risk management activities for the Site and represents an appropriate site closure strategy for the Site. (authors)

  11. Fingerprint verification prediction model in hand dermatitis.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lee, Chew K; Chang, Choong C; Johor, Asmah; Othman, Puwira; Baba, Roshidah

    2015-07-01

    Hand dermatitis associated fingerprint changes is a significant problem and affects fingerprint verification processes. This study was done to develop a clinically useful prediction model for fingerprint verification in patients with hand dermatitis. A case-control study involving 100 patients with hand dermatitis. All patients verified their thumbprints against their identity card. Registered fingerprints were randomized into a model derivation and model validation group. Predictive model was derived using multiple logistic regression. Validation was done using the goodness-of-fit test. The fingerprint verification prediction model consists of a major criterion (fingerprint dystrophy area of ≥ 25%) and two minor criteria (long horizontal lines and long vertical lines). The presence of the major criterion predicts it will almost always fail verification, while presence of both minor criteria and presence of one minor criterion predict high and low risk of fingerprint verification failure, respectively. When none of the criteria are met, the fingerprint almost always passes the verification. The area under the receiver operating characteristic curve was 0.937, and the goodness-of-fit test showed agreement between the observed and expected number (P = 0.26). The derived fingerprint verification failure prediction model is validated and highly discriminatory in predicting risk of fingerprint verification in patients with hand dermatitis. © 2014 The International Society of Dermatology.

  12. Closure report for housekeeping category, Corrective Action Unit 349, Area 12, Nevada Test Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    This Closure Report summarizes the corrective actions which were completed at the Corrective Action Sites within Corrective Action Unit 349 Area 12 at the Nevada Test Site. Current site descriptions, observations and identification of wastes removed are included on FFACO Corrective Action Site housekeeping closure verification forms

  13. Closure report for housekeeping category, Corrective Action Unit 349, Area 12, Nevada Test Site

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-01-01

    This Closure Report summarizes the corrective actions which were completed at the Corrective Action Sites within Corrective Action Unit 349 Area 12 at the Nevada Test Site. Current site descriptions, observations and identification of wastes removed are included on FFACO Corrective Action Site housekeeping closure verification forms.

  14. A new verification film system for routine quality control of radiation fields: Kodak EC-L.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hermann, A; Bratengeier, K; Priske, A; Flentje, M

    2000-06-01

    The use of modern irradiation techniques requires better verification films for determining set-up deviations and patient movements during the course of radiation treatment. This is an investigation of the image quality and time requirement of a new verification film system compared to a conventional portal film system. For conventional verifications we used Agfa Curix HT 1000 films which were compared to the new Kodak EC-L film system. 344 Agfa Curix HT 1000 and 381 Kodak EC-L portal films of different tumor sites (prostate, rectum, head and neck) were visually judged on a light box by 2 experienced physicians. Subjective judgement of image quality, masking of films and time requirement were checked. In this investigation 68% of 175 Kodak EC-L ap/pa-films were judged "good", only 18% were classified "moderate" or "poor" 14%, but only 22% of 173 conventional ap/pa verification films (Agfa Curix HT 1000) were judged to be "good". The image quality, detail perception and time required for film inspection of the new Kodak EC-L film system was significantly improved when compared with standard portal films. They could be read more accurately and the detection of set-up deviation was facilitated.

  15. Groundwater flow code verification ''benchmarking'' activity (COVE-2A): Analysis of participants' work

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dykhuizen, R.C.; Barnard, R.W.

    1992-02-01

    The Nuclear Waste Repository Technology Department at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) is investigating the suitability of Yucca Mountain as a potential site for underground burial of nuclear wastes. One element of the investigations is to assess the potential long-term effects of groundwater flow on the integrity of a potential repository. A number of computer codes are being used to model groundwater flow through geologic media in which the potential repository would be located. These codes compute numerical solutions for problems that are usually analytically intractable. Consequently, independent confirmation of the correctness of the solution is often not possible. Code verification is a process that permits the determination of the numerical accuracy of codes by comparing the results of several numerical solutions for the same problem. The international nuclear waste research community uses benchmarking for intercomparisons that partially satisfy the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) definition of code verification. This report presents the results from the COVE-2A (Code Verification) project, which is a subset of the COVE project

  16. Cleanup Verification Package for the 126-F-1, 184-F Powerhouse Ash Pit

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Clark, S.W.; Sulloway, H.M.

    2007-01-01

    This cleanup verification package documents completion of remedial action for the 126-F-1, 184-F Powerhouse Ash Pit. This waste site received coal ash from the 100-F Area coal-fired steam plant. Leakage of process effluent from the 116-F-14 , 107-F Retention Basins flowed south into the ash pit, contaminating the northern portion

  17. Verification and validation benchmarks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oberkampf, William Louis; Trucano, Timothy Guy

    2007-01-01

    Verification and validation (V and V) are the primary means to assess the accuracy and reliability of computational simulations. V and V methods and procedures have fundamentally improved the credibility of simulations in several high-consequence fields, such as nuclear reactor safety, underground nuclear waste storage, and nuclear weapon safety. Although the terminology is not uniform across engineering disciplines, code verification deals with assessing the reliability of the software coding, and solution verification deals with assessing the numerical accuracy of the solution to a computational model. Validation addresses the physics modeling accuracy of a computational simulation by comparing the computational results with experimental data. Code verification benchmarks and validation benchmarks have been constructed for a number of years in every field of computational simulation. However, no comprehensive guidelines have been proposed for the construction and use of V and V benchmarks. For example, the field of nuclear reactor safety has not focused on code verification benchmarks, but it has placed great emphasis on developing validation benchmarks. Many of these validation benchmarks are closely related to the operations of actual reactors at near-safety-critical conditions, as opposed to being more fundamental-physics benchmarks. This paper presents recommendations for the effective design and use of code verification benchmarks based on manufactured solutions, classical analytical solutions, and highly accurate numerical solutions. In addition, this paper presents recommendations for the design and use of validation benchmarks, highlighting the careful design of building-block experiments, the estimation of experimental measurement uncertainty for both inputs and outputs to the code, validation metrics, and the role of model calibration in validation. It is argued that the understanding of predictive capability of a computational model is built on the

  18. Verification and validation benchmarks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oberkampf, William L.; Trucano, Timothy G.

    2008-01-01

    Verification and validation (V and V) are the primary means to assess the accuracy and reliability of computational simulations. V and V methods and procedures have fundamentally improved the credibility of simulations in several high-consequence fields, such as nuclear reactor safety, underground nuclear waste storage, and nuclear weapon safety. Although the terminology is not uniform across engineering disciplines, code verification deals with assessing the reliability of the software coding, and solution verification deals with assessing the numerical accuracy of the solution to a computational model. Validation addresses the physics modeling accuracy of a computational simulation by comparing the computational results with experimental data. Code verification benchmarks and validation benchmarks have been constructed for a number of years in every field of computational simulation. However, no comprehensive guidelines have been proposed for the construction and use of V and V benchmarks. For example, the field of nuclear reactor safety has not focused on code verification benchmarks, but it has placed great emphasis on developing validation benchmarks. Many of these validation benchmarks are closely related to the operations of actual reactors at near-safety-critical conditions, as opposed to being more fundamental-physics benchmarks. This paper presents recommendations for the effective design and use of code verification benchmarks based on manufactured solutions, classical analytical solutions, and highly accurate numerical solutions. In addition, this paper presents recommendations for the design and use of validation benchmarks, highlighting the careful design of building-block experiments, the estimation of experimental measurement uncertainty for both inputs and outputs to the code, validation metrics, and the role of model calibration in validation. It is argued that the understanding of predictive capability of a computational model is built on the

  19. Quantitative analysis of patient-specific dosimetric IMRT verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Budgell, G J; Perrin, B A; Mott, J H L; Fairfoul, J; Mackay, R I

    2005-01-01

    Patient-specific dosimetric verification methods for IMRT treatments are variable, time-consuming and frequently qualitative, preventing evidence-based reduction in the amount of verification performed. This paper addresses some of these issues by applying a quantitative analysis parameter to the dosimetric verification procedure. Film measurements in different planes were acquired for a series of ten IMRT prostate patients, analysed using the quantitative parameter, and compared to determine the most suitable verification plane. Film and ion chamber verification results for 61 patients were analysed to determine long-term accuracy, reproducibility and stability of the planning and delivery system. The reproducibility of the measurement and analysis system was also studied. The results show that verification results are strongly dependent on the plane chosen, with the coronal plane particularly insensitive to delivery error. Unexpectedly, no correlation could be found between the levels of error in different verification planes. Longer term verification results showed consistent patterns which suggest that the amount of patient-specific verification can be safely reduced, provided proper caution is exercised: an evidence-based model for such reduction is proposed. It is concluded that dose/distance to agreement (e.g., 3%/3 mm) should be used as a criterion of acceptability. Quantitative parameters calculated for a given criterion of acceptability should be adopted in conjunction with displays that show where discrepancies occur. Planning and delivery systems which cannot meet the required standards of accuracy, reproducibility and stability to reduce verification will not be accepted by the radiotherapy community

  20. Production of plastic scintillation survey meter for clearance verification measurement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tachibana, Mitsuo; Shiraishi, Kunio; Ishigami, Tsutomu; Tomii, Hiroyuki

    2008-03-01

    In the Nuclear Science Research Institute, the decommissioning of various nuclear facilities is carried out according to the plan for meeting the midterm goal of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA). An increase in the clearance verification measurement of concrete on buildings and the radiation measurement for releasing controlled areas will be expected along with the dismantlement of nuclear facilities in the future. The radiation measurement for releasing controlled areas has been carried out in small-scale nuclear facilities including the JPDR (Japan Power Demonstration Reactor). However, the radiation measurement with an existing measuring device was difficult in effects of radiation from radioactive materials that remains in buried piping. On the other hand, there is no experience that the clearance verification measurement is executed in the JAEA. The generation of a large amount of clearance object will be expected along with the decommissioning of the nuclear facilities in the future. The plastic scintillation survey meter (hereafter, 'PL measuring device') was produced to apply to the clearance verification measurement and the radiation measurement for releasing controlled areas. The basic characteristic test and the actual test were confirmed using the PL measuring device. As a result of these tests, it was found that the evaluation value of radioactivity with the PL measuring device was accuracy equal with the existing measuring device. The PL measuring device has feature of the existing measuring device with a light weight and easy operability. The PL measuring device can correct the gamma ray too. The PL measuring device is effective to the clearance verification measurement of concrete on buildings and the radiation measurement for releasing controlled areas. (author)

  1. SU-E-T-48: A Multi-Institutional Study of Independent Dose Verification for Conventional, SRS and SBRT

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Takahashi, R; Kamima, T; Tachibana, H; Baba, H; Itano, M; Yamazaki, T; Ishibashi, S; Higuchi, Y; Shimizu, H; Yamamoto, T; Yamashita, M; Sugawara, Y; Sato, A; Nishiyama, S; Kawai, D; Miyaoka, S

    2015-01-01

    Purpose: To show the results of a multi-institutional study of the independent dose verification for conventional, Stereotactic radiosurgery and body radiotherapy (SRS and SBRT) plans based on the action level of AAPM TG-114. Methods: This study was performed at 12 institutions in Japan. To eliminate the bias of independent dose verification program (Indp), all of the institutions used the same CT-based independent dose verification software (Simple MU Analysis, Triangle Products, JP) with the Clarkson-based algorithm. Eclipse (AAA, PBC), Pinnacle 3 (Adaptive Convolve) and Xio (Superposition) were used as treatment planning system (TPS). The confidence limits (CL, Mean±2SD) for 18 sites (head, breast, lung, pelvis, etc.) were evaluated in comparison in dose between the TPS and the Indp. Results: A retrospective analysis of 6352 treatment fields was conducted. The CLs for conventional, SRS and SBRT were 1.0±3.7 %, 2.0±2.5 % and 6.2±4.4 %, respectively. In conventional plans, most of the sites showed within 5 % of TG-114 action level. However, there were the systematic difference (4.0±4.0 % and 2.5±5.8 % for breast and lung, respectively). In SRS plans, our results showed good agreement compared to the action level. In SBRT plans, the discrepancy between the Indp was variable depending on dose calculation algorithms of TPS. Conclusion: The impact of dose calculation algorithms for the TPS and the Indp affects the action level. It is effective to set the site-specific tolerances, especially for the site where inhomogeneous correction can affect dose distribution strongly

  2. SU-E-T-48: A Multi-Institutional Study of Independent Dose Verification for Conventional, SRS and SBRT

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Takahashi, R; Kamima, T [The Cancer Institute Hospital of JFCR, Koto-ku, Tokyo (Japan); Tachibana, H; Baba, H [National Cancer Center Hospital East, Kashiwa, Chiba (Japan); Itano, M; Yamazaki, T [Inagi Municipal Hospital, Inagi, Tokyo (Japan); Ishibashi, S; Higuchi, Y [Sasebo City General Hospital, Sasebo, Nagasaki (Japan); Shimizu, H [Kitasato University Medical Center, Kitamoto, Saitama (Japan); Yamamoto, T [Otemae Hospital, Chuou-ku, Osaka-city (Japan); Yamashita, M [Kobe City Medical Center General Hospital, Kobe, Hyogo (Japan); Sugawara, Y [The National Center for Global Health and Medicine, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo (Japan); Sato, A [Itabashi Central General Hospital, Itabashi-ku, Tokyo (Japan); Nishiyama, S [Kuki General Hospital, Kuki, Saitama (Japan); Kawai, D [Kanagawa Cancer Center, Yokohama, Kanagawa-prefecture (Japan); Miyaoka, S [Kamitsuga General Hospital, Kanuma, Tochigi (Japan)

    2015-06-15

    Purpose: To show the results of a multi-institutional study of the independent dose verification for conventional, Stereotactic radiosurgery and body radiotherapy (SRS and SBRT) plans based on the action level of AAPM TG-114. Methods: This study was performed at 12 institutions in Japan. To eliminate the bias of independent dose verification program (Indp), all of the institutions used the same CT-based independent dose verification software (Simple MU Analysis, Triangle Products, JP) with the Clarkson-based algorithm. Eclipse (AAA, PBC), Pinnacle{sup 3} (Adaptive Convolve) and Xio (Superposition) were used as treatment planning system (TPS). The confidence limits (CL, Mean±2SD) for 18 sites (head, breast, lung, pelvis, etc.) were evaluated in comparison in dose between the TPS and the Indp. Results: A retrospective analysis of 6352 treatment fields was conducted. The CLs for conventional, SRS and SBRT were 1.0±3.7 %, 2.0±2.5 % and 6.2±4.4 %, respectively. In conventional plans, most of the sites showed within 5 % of TG-114 action level. However, there were the systematic difference (4.0±4.0 % and 2.5±5.8 % for breast and lung, respectively). In SRS plans, our results showed good agreement compared to the action level. In SBRT plans, the discrepancy between the Indp was variable depending on dose calculation algorithms of TPS. Conclusion: The impact of dose calculation algorithms for the TPS and the Indp affects the action level. It is effective to set the site-specific tolerances, especially for the site where inhomogeneous correction can affect dose distribution strongly.

  3. Burnup verification using the FORK measurement system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ewing, R.I.

    1994-01-01

    Verification measurements may be used to help ensure nuclear criticality safety when burnup credit is applied to spent fuel transport and storage systems. The FORK measurement system, designed at Los Alamos National Laboratory for the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards program, has been used to verify reactor site records for burnup and cooling time for many years. The FORK system measures the passive neutron and gamma-ray emission from spent fuel assemblies while in the storage pool. This report deals with the application of the FORK system to burnup credit operations based on measurements performed on spent fuel assemblies at the Oconee Nuclear Station of Duke Power Company

  4. Post-silicon and runtime verification for modern processors

    CERN Document Server

    Wagner, Ilya

    2010-01-01

    The purpose of this book is to survey the state of the art and evolving directions in post-silicon and runtime verification. The authors start by giving an overview of the state of the art in verification, particularly current post-silicon methodologies in use in the industry, both for the domain of processor pipeline design and for memory subsystems. They then dive into the presentation of several new post-silicon verification solutions aimed at boosting the verification coverage of modern processors, dedicating several chapters to this topic. The presentation of runtime verification solution

  5. Cleanup Verification Package for the 118-F-7, 100-F Miscellaneous Hardware Storage Vault

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Appel, M.J.

    2006-01-01

    This cleanup verification package documents completion of remedial action for the 118-F-7, 100-F Miscellaneous Hardware Storage Vault. The site consisted of an inactive solid waste storage vault used for temporary storage of slightly contaminated reactor parts that could be recovered and reused for the 100-F Area reactor operations

  6. Cleanup Verification Package for the 118-F-7, 100-F Miscellaneous Hardware Storage Vault

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    M. J. Appel

    2006-11-02

    This cleanup verification package documents completion of remedial action for the 118-F-7, 100-F Miscellaneous Hardware Storage Vault. The site consisted of an inactive solid waste storage vault used for temporary storage of slightly contaminated reactor parts that could be recovered and reused for the 100-F Area reactor operations.

  7. Getting ready for final disposal in Finland - Independent verification of spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tarvainen, Matti; Honkamaa, Tapani; Martikka, Elina; Varjoranta, Tero; Hautamaeki, Johanna; Tiitta, Antero

    2001-01-01

    Full text: Final disposal of spent nuclear fuel has been known to be the solution for the back-end of the fuel cycle in Finland already for a long time. This has allowed the State system for accounting and control (SSAC) to prepare for the safeguards requirements in time. The Finnish SSAC includes the operator, the State authority STUK and the parties above them e.g. the Ministry for Trade and Industry. Undisputed responsibility of the safe disposal of spent fuel is on the operator. The role of the safety authority STUK. is to set up detailed requirements, to inspect the operator plans and by using different tools of a quality audit approach to verity that the requirements will be complied with in practice. Responsibility on the safeguards issues is similar with the addition of the role of the regional and the international verification organizations represented by Euratom and the IAEA, As the competent safeguards authority, STUK has decided to maintain its active role also in the future. This will be reflected in the future in the increasing cooperation between the SSAC and the IAEA in the new safeguards activities related to the Additional Protocol. The role of Euratom will remain the same concerning the implementation of conventional safeguards. Based on its SSAC role, STUK has continued carrying out safeguards inspections including independent verification measurements on spent fuel also after joining the EU and Euratom safeguards in 1995. Verification of the operator declared data is the key verification element of safeguards. This will remain to be the case also under the Integrated Safeguards (IS) in the future. It is believed that the importance of high quality measurements will rather increase than decrease when the frequency of interim inspections will decrease. Maintaining the continuity of knowledge makes sense only when the knowledge is reliable and independently verified. One of the corner stones of the high quality of the Finnish SSAC activities is

  8. SU-F-T-494: A Multi-Institutional Study of Independent Dose Verification Using Golden Beam Data

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Itano, M; Yamazaki, T [Inagi Municipal Hospital, Inagi, Tokyo (Japan); Tachibana, R; Uchida, Y [National Cancer Center Hospital East, Kashiwa, Chiba (Japan); Yamashita, M [Kobe City Medical Center General Hospital, Kobe, Hyogo (Japan); Shimizu, H [Kitasato University Medical Center, Kitamoto, Saitama (Japan); Sugawara, Y; Kotabe, K [National Center for Global Health and Medicine, Shinjuku, Tokyo (Japan); Kamima, T [Cancer Institute Hospital Japanese Foundation for Cancer Research, Koto, Tokyo (Japan); Takahashi, R [Cancer Institute Hospital of Japanese Foundation for Cancer Research, Koto, Tokyo (Japan); Ishibashi, S [Sasebo City General Hospital, Sasebo, Nagasaki (Japan); Tachibana, H [National Cancer Center, Kashiwa, Chiba (Japan)

    2016-06-15

    Purpose: In general, beam data of individual linac is measured for independent dose verification software program and the verification is performed as a secondary check. In this study, independent dose verification using golden beam data was compared to that using individual linac’s beam data. Methods: Six institutions were participated and three different beam data were prepared. The one was individual measured data (Original Beam Data, OBD) .The others were generated by all measurements from same linac model (Model-GBD) and all linac models (All-GBD). The three different beam data were registered to the independent verification software program for each institute. Subsequently, patient’s plans in eight sites (brain, head and neck, lung, esophagus, breast, abdomen, pelvis and bone) were analyzed using the verification program to compare doses calculated using the three different beam data. Results: 1116 plans were collected from six institutes. Compared to using the OBD, the results shows the variation using the Model-GBD based calculation and the All-GBD was 0.0 ± 0.3% and 0.0 ± 0.6%, respectively. The maximum variations were 1.2% and 2.3%, respectively. The plans with the variation over 1% shows the reference points were located away from the central axis with/without physical wedge. Conclusion: The confidence limit (2SD) using the Model-GBD and the All-GBD was within 0.6% and 1.2%, respectively. Thus, the use of golden beam data may be feasible for independent verification. In addition to it, the verification using golden beam data provide quality assurance of planning from the view of audit. This research is partially supported by Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development(AMED)

  9. SU-F-T-494: A Multi-Institutional Study of Independent Dose Verification Using Golden Beam Data

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Itano, M; Yamazaki, T; Tachibana, R; Uchida, Y; Yamashita, M; Shimizu, H; Sugawara, Y; Kotabe, K; Kamima, T; Takahashi, R; Ishibashi, S; Tachibana, H

    2016-01-01

    Purpose: In general, beam data of individual linac is measured for independent dose verification software program and the verification is performed as a secondary check. In this study, independent dose verification using golden beam data was compared to that using individual linac’s beam data. Methods: Six institutions were participated and three different beam data were prepared. The one was individual measured data (Original Beam Data, OBD) .The others were generated by all measurements from same linac model (Model-GBD) and all linac models (All-GBD). The three different beam data were registered to the independent verification software program for each institute. Subsequently, patient’s plans in eight sites (brain, head and neck, lung, esophagus, breast, abdomen, pelvis and bone) were analyzed using the verification program to compare doses calculated using the three different beam data. Results: 1116 plans were collected from six institutes. Compared to using the OBD, the results shows the variation using the Model-GBD based calculation and the All-GBD was 0.0 ± 0.3% and 0.0 ± 0.6%, respectively. The maximum variations were 1.2% and 2.3%, respectively. The plans with the variation over 1% shows the reference points were located away from the central axis with/without physical wedge. Conclusion: The confidence limit (2SD) using the Model-GBD and the All-GBD was within 0.6% and 1.2%, respectively. Thus, the use of golden beam data may be feasible for independent verification. In addition to it, the verification using golden beam data provide quality assurance of planning from the view of audit. This research is partially supported by Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development(AMED)

  10. Performance Verification for Safety Injection Tank with Fluidic Device

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yune, Seok Jeong; Kim, Da Yong

    2014-01-01

    In LBLOCA, the SITs of a conventional nuclear power plant deliver excessive cooling water to the reactor vessel causing the water to flow into the containment atmosphere. In an effort to make it more efficient, Fluidic Device (FD) is installed inside a SIT of Advanced Power Reactor 1400 (APR 1400). FD, a complete passive controller which doesn't require actuating power, controls injection flow rates which are susceptible to a change in the flow resistance inside a vortex chamber of FD. When SIT Emergency Core Cooling (ECC) water level is above the top of the stand pipe, the water enters the vortex chamber through both the top of the stand pipe and the control ports resulting in injection of the water at a large flow rate. When the water level drops below the top of the stand pipe, the water only enters the vortex chamber through the control ports resulting in vortex formation in the vortex chamber and a relatively small flow injection. Performance verification of SIT shall be carried out because SITs play an integral role to mitigate accidents. In this paper, the performance verification method of SIT with FD is presented. In this paper, the equations for calculation of flow resistance coefficient (K) are induced to evaluate on-site performance of APR 1400 SIT with FD. Then, the equations are applied to the performance verification of SIT with FD and good results are obtained

  11. IAEA verification of weapon-origin fissile material in the Russian Federation and the United States

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    The Secretary of Energy of the United States, Spencer Abraham, Minister of the Russian Federation on Atomic Energy, Alexander Rumyantsev, and Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei, met in Vienna on 18 September 2001 to review progress on the Trilateral Initiative. The Initiative was launched in 1996 to develop a new IAEA verification system for weapon-origin material designated by the United States and the Russian Federation as released from their defence programmes. The removal of weapon-origin fissile material from the defence programmes of the Russian Federation and the United States is in furtherance of the commitment to disarmament undertaken by the two States pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). IAEA verification under this Initiative is intended to promote international confidence that fissile material made subject by either of the two States to Agency verification remains irreversibly removed from nuclear weapon programmes

  12. Verification and benchmarking of PORFLO: an equivalent porous continuum code for repository scale analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eyler, L.L.; Budden, M.J.

    1984-11-01

    The objective of this work was to perform an assessment of prediction capabilities and features of the PORFLO code in relation to its intended use in the Basalt Waste Isolation Project. This objective was to be accomplished through a code verification and benchmarking task. Results were to be documented which either support correctness of prediction capabilities or identify areas of intended application in which the code exhibits weaknesses. A test problem set consisting of 10 problems was developed. Results of PORFLO simulations of these problems were provided for use in this work. The 10 problems were designed to test the three basic computational capabilities or categories of the code. Broken down by physical process, these are heat transfer, fluid flow, and radionuclide transport. Two verification problems were included within each of these categories. They were problems designed to test basic features of PORFLO for which analytical solutions are available for use as a known comparison basis. Hence they are referred to as verification problems. Of the remaining four problems, one repository scale problem representative of intended PORFLO use within BWIP was included in each of the three basic capabilities categories. The remaining problem was a case specifically designed to test features of decay and retardation in radionuclide transport. These four problems are referred to as benchmarking problems, because results computed with an additional computer code were used as a basis for comparison. 38 figures

  13. RESRAD-BUILD verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kamboj, S.; Yu, C.; Biwer, B. M.; Klett, T.

    2002-01-01

    The results generated by the RESRAD-BUILD code (version 3.0) were verified with hand or spreadsheet calculations using equations given in the RESRAD-BUILD manual for different pathways. For verification purposes, different radionuclides--H-3, C-14, Na-22, Al-26, Cl-36, Mn-54, Co-60, Au-195, Ra-226, Ra-228, Th-228, and U-238--were chosen to test all pathways and models. Tritium, Ra-226, and Th-228 were chosen because of the special tritium and radon models in the RESRAD-BUILD code. Other radionuclides were selected to represent a spectrum of radiation types and energies. Verification of the RESRAD-BUILD code was conducted with an initial check of all the input parameters for correctness against their original source documents. Verification of the calculations was performed external to the RESRAD-BUILD code with Microsoft Excel to verify all the major portions of the code. In some cases, RESRAD-BUILD results were compared with those of external codes, such as MCNP (Monte Carlo N-particle) and RESRAD. The verification was conducted on a step-by-step basis and used different test cases as templates. The following types of calculations were investigated: (1) source injection rate, (2) air concentration in the room, (3) air particulate deposition, (4) radon pathway model, (5) tritium model for volume source, (6) external exposure model, (7) different pathway doses, and (8) time dependence of dose. Some minor errors were identified in version 3.0; these errors have been corrected in later versions of the code. Some possible improvements in the code were also identified

  14. Verification Test Report for CFAST 3.1.6

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vincent, A.M. III

    2002-01-01

    Fire is a significant hazard in most facilities that handle radioactive materials. The severity of fire varies with room arrangement, combustible loading, ventilation and protective system response. The complexity of even simple situations can be unwieldy to solve by hand calculations. Thus, computer simulation of the fire severity has become an important tool in characterizing fire risk. The Savannah River Site (SRS), a Department of Energy facility, has been using the Consolidated Model of Fire Growth and Smoke Transport (CFAST) software to complete such deterministic evaluations to better characterize the nuclear facility fire severity. To fully utilize CFAST at SRS it is necessary to demonstrate that CFAST produces valid analytic solutions over its range of use. This report describes the primary verification exercise that is required to establish that CFAST, and its user interface program FAST, produce valid analytic solutions. This verification exercise may be used to check the fu nctionality of FAST and as a training tool to familiarize users with the software. In addition, the report consolidates the lessons learned by the SRS staff in using FAST and CFAST as fire modeling tools

  15. ECG based biometrics verification system using LabVIEW

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Sunil Kumar Singla

    2010-07-01

    Full Text Available Biometric based authentication systems provide solutions to the problems in high security which remain with conventionalsecurity systems. In a biometric verification system, human’s biological parameters (such as voice, finger print,palm print or hand geometry, face, iris etc. are used to verify the authenticity of a person. These parameters are good to beused as biometric parameters but do not provide the guarantee that the person is present and alive. As voice can be copied,finger print can be picked from glass on synthetic skin and in face recognition system due to genetic factors identical twinsor father-son may have the same facial appearance. ECG does not have these problems. It can not be recorded without theknowledge of the person and ECG of every person is unique even identical twins have different ECG. In this paper an ECGbasedbiometrics verification system which was developed using Laboratory Virtual Instruments Engineering Workbench(LabVIEW version 7.1 is discussed. Experiments were conducted on the database stored in the laboratory of 20 individualshaving 10 samples each and the results revealed a false rejection rate (FRR of 3% and false acceptance rate (FAR of 3.21%.

  16. Spent fuel verification options for final repository safeguards in Finland. A study on verification methods, their feasibility and safety aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hautamaeki, J.; Tiitta, A.

    2000-12-01

    The verification possibilities of the spent fuel assemblies from the Olkiluoto and Loviisa NPPs and the fuel rods from the research reactor of VTT are contemplated in this report. The spent fuel assemblies have to be verified at the partial defect level before the final disposal into the geologic repository. The rods from the research reactor may be verified at the gross defect level. Developing a measurement system for partial defect verification is a complicated and time-consuming task. The Passive High Energy Gamma Emission Tomography and the Fork Detector combined with Gamma Spectrometry are the most potential measurement principles to be developed for this purpose. The whole verification process has to be planned to be as slick as possible. An early start in the planning of the verification and developing the measurement devices is important in order to enable a smooth integration of the verification measurements into the conditioning and disposal process. The IAEA and Euratom have not yet concluded the safeguards criteria for the final disposal. E.g. criteria connected to the selection of the best place to perform the verification. Measurements have not yet been concluded. Options for the verification places have been considered in this report. One option for a verification measurement place is the intermediate storage. The other option is the encapsulation plant. Crucial viewpoints are such as which one offers the best practical possibilities to perform the measurements effectively and which would be the better place in the safeguards point of view. Verification measurements may be needed both in the intermediate storages and in the encapsulation plant. In this report also the integrity of the fuel assemblies after wet intermediate storage period is assessed, because the assemblies have to stand the handling operations of the verification measurements. (orig.)

  17. Paraho oil shale module. Site development plan, Task 4

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1981-10-01

    A management plan and schedule which covers all requirements for gaining access to the site and for conducting a Paraho Process demonstration program have been prepared. The oil shale available should represent a regional resource of suitable size and quality for commercial development. Discussed in this report are: proof of ownership; requirements for rights-of-way for access to the site; local zoning restrictions; water rights; site availability verification; and other legal requirements. (DMC)

  18. Cleanup Verification Package for the 118-C-1, 105-C Solid Waste Burial Ground

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    M. J. Appel and J. M. Capron

    2007-07-25

    This cleanup verification package documents completion of remedial action for the 118-C-1, 105-C Solid Waste Burial Ground. This waste site was the primary burial ground for general wastes from the operation of the 105-C Reactor and received process tubes, aluminum fuel spacers, control rods, reactor hardware, spent nuclear fuel and soft wastes.

  19. Cleanup Verification Package for the 118-C-1, 105-C Solid Waste Burial Ground

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Appel, M.J.; Capron, J.M.

    2007-01-01

    This cleanup verification package documents completion of remedial action for the 118-C-1, 105-C Solid Waste Burial Ground. This waste site was the primary burial ground for general wastes from the operation of the 105-C Reactor and received process tubes, aluminum fuel spacers, control rods, reactor hardware, spent nuclear fuel and soft wastes

  20. Verification of safety critical software

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Son, Ki Chang; Chun, Chong Son; Lee, Byeong Joo; Lee, Soon Sung; Lee, Byung Chai

    1996-01-01

    To assure quality of safety critical software, software should be developed in accordance with software development procedures and rigorous software verification and validation should be performed. Software verification is the formal act of reviewing, testing of checking, and documenting whether software components comply with the specified requirements for a particular stage of the development phase[1]. New software verification methodology was developed and was applied to the Shutdown System No. 1 and 2 (SDS1,2) for Wolsung 2,3 and 4 nuclear power plants by Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute(KAERI) and Atomic Energy of Canada Limited(AECL) in order to satisfy new regulation requirements of Atomic Energy Control Boars(AECB). Software verification methodology applied to SDS1 for Wolsung 2,3 and 4 project will be described in this paper. Some errors were found by this methodology during the software development for SDS1 and were corrected by software designer. Outputs from Wolsung 2,3 and 4 project have demonstrated that the use of this methodology results in a high quality, cost-effective product. 15 refs., 6 figs. (author)

  1. Future of monitoring and verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wagenmakers, H.

    1991-01-01

    The organized verification entrusted to IAEA for the implementation of the NPT, of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and of the Treaty of Rarotonga, reaches reasonable standards. The current dispute with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea about the conclusion of a safeguards agreement with IAEA, by its exceptional nature, underscores rather than undermines the positive judgement to be passed on IAEA's overall performance. The additional task given to the Director General of IAEA under Security Council resolution 687 (1991) regarding Iraq's nuclear-weapons-usable material is particularly challenging. For the purposes of this paper, verification is defined as the process for establishing whether the States parties are complying with an agreement. In the final stage verification may lead into consideration of how to respond to non-compliance. Monitoring is perceived as the first level in the verification system. It is one generic form of collecting information on objects, activities or events and it involves a variety of instruments ranging from communications satellites to television cameras or human inspectors. Monitoring may also be used as a confidence-building measure

  2. Measurement and Verification of Energy Savings and Performance from Advanced Lighting Controls

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    PNNL

    2016-02-21

    This document provides a framework for measurement and verification (M&V) of energy savings, performance, and user satisfaction from lighting retrofit projects involving occupancy-sensor-based, daylighting, and/or other types of automatic lighting. It was developed to provide site owners, contractors, and other involved organizations with the essential elements of a robust M&V plan for retrofit projects and to assist in developing specific project M&V plans.

  3. A new verification film system for routine quality control of radiation fields: Kodak EC-L

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hermann, A.; Bratengeier, K.; Priske, A.; Flentje, M.

    2000-01-01

    Background: The use of modern irradiation techniques requires better verification films for determining set-up deviations and patient movements during the course of radiation treatment. This is an investigation of the image quality and time requirement of a new verification film system compared to a conventional portal film system. Material and Methods: For conventional verifications we used Agfa Curix HT 1000 films which were compared to the new Kodak EC-L film system. 344 Agfa Curix HT 1000 and 381 Kodak EC-L portal films of different tumor sites (prostate, rectum, head and neck) were visually judged on a light box by 2 experienced physicians. Subjective judgement of image quality, masking of films and time requirement were checked. Results: In this investigation 68% of 175 Kodak EC-L ap/pa-films were judged 'good', only 18% were classified 'moderate' or 'poor' 14%, but only 22% of 173 conventional ap/pa verification films (Agfa Curix HT 1000) were judged to be 'good'. Conclusions: The image quality, detail perception and time required for film inspection of the new Kodak EC-L film system was significantly improved when compared with standard portal films. They could be read more accurately and the detection of set-up deviation was facilitated. (orig.) [de

  4. Concepts for inventory verification in critical facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cobb, D.D.; Sapir, J.L.; Kern, E.A.; Dietz, R.J.

    1978-12-01

    Materials measurement and inventory verification concepts for safeguarding large critical facilities are presented. Inspection strategies and methods for applying international safeguards to such facilities are proposed. The conceptual approach to routine inventory verification includes frequent visits to the facility by one inspector, and the use of seals and nondestructive assay (NDA) measurements to verify the portion of the inventory maintained in vault storage. Periodic verification of the reactor inventory is accomplished by sampling and NDA measurement of in-core fuel elements combined with measurements of integral reactivity and related reactor parameters that are sensitive to the total fissile inventory. A combination of statistical sampling and NDA verification with measurements of reactor parameters is more effective than either technique used by itself. Special procedures for assessment and verification for abnormal safeguards conditions are also considered. When the inspection strategies and inventory verification methods are combined with strict containment and surveillance methods, they provide a high degree of assurance that any clandestine attempt to divert a significant quantity of fissile material from a critical facility inventory will be detected. Field testing of specific hardware systems and procedures to determine their sensitivity, reliability, and operational acceptability is recommended. 50 figures, 21 tables

  5. Verification and Examination Management of Complex Systems

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Stian Ruud

    2014-10-01

    Full Text Available As ship systems become more complex, with an increasing number of safety-critical functions, many interconnected subsystems, tight integration to other systems, and a large amount of potential failure modes, several industry parties have identified the need for improved methods for managing the verification and examination efforts of such complex systems. Such needs are even more prominent now that the marine and offshore industries are targeting more activities and operations in the Arctic environment. In this paper, a set of requirements and a method for verification and examination management are proposed for allocating examination efforts to selected subsystems. The method is based on a definition of a verification risk function for a given system topology and given requirements. The marginal verification risks for the subsystems may then be evaluated, so that examination efforts for the subsystem can be allocated. Two cases of requirements and systems are used to demonstrate the proposed method. The method establishes a systematic relationship between the verification loss, the logic system topology, verification method performance, examination stop criterion, the required examination effort, and a proposed sequence of examinations to reach the examination stop criterion.

  6. Monitoring and verification R and D

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pilat, Joseph F.; Budlong-Sylvester, Kory W.; Fearey, Bryan L.

    2011-01-01

    The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) report outlined the Administration's approach to promoting the agenda put forward by President Obama in Prague on April 5, 2009. The NPR calls for a national monitoring and verification R and D program to meet future challenges arising from the Administration's nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament agenda. Verification of a follow-on to New START could have to address warheads and possibly components along with delivery capabilities. Deeper cuts and disarmament would need to address all of these elements along with nuclear weapon testing, nuclear material and weapon production facilities, virtual capabilities from old weapon and existing energy programs and undeclared capabilities. We only know how to address some elements of these challenges today, and the requirements may be more rigorous in the context of deeper cuts as well as disarmament. Moreover, there is a critical need for multiple options to sensitive problems and to address other challenges. There will be other verification challenges in a world of deeper cuts and disarmament, some of which we are already facing. At some point, if the reductions process is progressing, uncertainties about past nuclear materials and weapons production will have to be addressed. IAEA safeguards will need to continue to evolve to meet current and future challenges, and to take advantage of new technologies and approaches. Transparency/verification of nuclear and dual-use exports will also have to be addressed, and there will be a need to make nonproliferation measures more watertight and transparent. In this context, and recognizing we will face all of these challenges even if disarmament is not achieved, this paper will explore possible agreements and arrangements; verification challenges; gaps in monitoring and verification technologies and approaches; and the R and D required to address these gaps and other monitoring and verification challenges.

  7. Housekeeping Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 463: Areas 2, 3, 9, and 25 Housekeeping Waste Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order was entered into by the State of Nevada, U.S. Department of Energy, and U.S. Department of Defense to identify sites of potential historical contamination and implement corrective actions based on public health and environmental considerations. The facilities subject to this agreement include the Nevada Test Site (NTS), parts of the Tonopah Test Range, parts of the Nellis Air Force Range, the Central Nevada Test Area, and the Project Shoal Area. Corrective Action Sites (CASs) are areas potentially requiring corrective actions and may include solid waste management units, individual disposal, or release sites. Based on geography, technical similarity, agency responsibility, or other appropriate reasons, CASs are grouped together into Corrective Action Units (CAUs) for the purposes of determining corrective actions. This report contains the Closure Verification Forms for cleanup activities that were performed at 13 CASs within CAU 463 on the NTS. The Housekeeping Closure Verification Form for each CAS provides the location, directions to the site, general description, and photographs of the site before and after cleanup activities. Housekeeping activities at these sites included removal of debris (e.g., wooden pallets, metal, glass, and trash) and other material. In addition, these forms confirm prior removal of other contaminated materials such as metal drums or buckets, transformers, lead bricks, batteries, and gas cylinders. Based on these activities, no further action is required at these CASs

  8. Geological discrete fracture network model for the Laxemar site. Site Descriptive Modelling. SDM-Site Laxemar

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    La Pointe, Paul; Fox, Aaron (Golder Associates Inc (United States)); Hermanson, Jan; Oehman, Johan (Golder Associates AB, Stockholm (Sweden))

    2008-12-15

    The Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB) is performing site characterization at two different locations, Forsmark and Laxemar, in order to locate a site for a final geologic repository for spent nuclear fuel. The program is built upon the development of Site Descriptive Models (SDMs) at specific timed data freezes. Each SDM is formed from discipline-specific reports from across the scientific spectrum. This report describes the methods, analyses, and conclusions of the modelling team in the production of the SDM-Site Laxemar geological discrete-fracture network (DFN) model. The DFN builds upon the work of other geological models, including the deformation zone and rock domain models. The geological DFN is a statistical model for stochastically simulating rock fractures and minor deformation zones at a scale of less than 1,000 m (the lower cut-off of the DZ models). The geological DFN is valid within six distinct fracture domains inside the Laxemar local model subarea: FSM{sub C}, FSM{sub E}W007, FSM{sub N}, FSM{sub N}E005, FSM{sub S}, and FSM{sub W}. The models are built using data from detailed surface outcrop maps, geophysical lineament maps, and the cored borehole record at Laxemar. The conceptual model for the SDM-Site Laxemar geological DFN model revolves around the identification of fracture domains based on relative fracture set intensities, orientation clustering, and the regional tectonic framework (including deformation zones). A single coupled fracture size/fracture intensity concept (the Base Model) based on a Pareto (power-law) distribution for fracture sizes was chosen as the recommended parameterisation. A slew of alternative size-intensity models were also carried through the fracture analyses and into the uncertainty and model verification analyses. Uncertainty is modelled by analysing the effects on fracture intensity (P32) that alternative model cases can have. Uncertainty is parameterised as a ratio between the P32 of the

  9. Geological discrete fracture network model for the Laxemar site. Site Descriptive Modelling. SDM-Site Laxemar

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    La Pointe, Paul; Fox, Aaron; Hermanson, Jan; Oehman, Johan

    2008-10-01

    The Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB) is performing site characterization at two different locations, Forsmark and Laxemar, in order to locate a site for a final geologic repository for spent nuclear fuel. The program is built upon the development of Site Descriptive Models (SDMs) at specific timed data freezes. Each SDM is formed from discipline-specific reports from across the scientific spectrum. This report describes the methods, analyses, and conclusions of the modelling team in the production of the SDM-Site Laxemar geological discrete-fracture network (DFN) model. The DFN builds upon the work of other geological models, including the deformation zone and rock domain models. The geological DFN is a statistical model for stochastically simulating rock fractures and minor deformation zones at a scale of less than 1,000 m (the lower cut-off of the DZ models). The geological DFN is valid within six distinct fracture domains inside the Laxemar local model subarea: FSM C , FSM E W007, FSM N , FSM N E005, FSM S , and FSM W . The models are built using data from detailed surface outcrop maps, geophysical lineament maps, and the cored borehole record at Laxemar. The conceptual model for the SDM-Site Laxemar geological DFN model revolves around the identification of fracture domains based on relative fracture set intensities, orientation clustering, and the regional tectonic framework (including deformation zones). A single coupled fracture size/fracture intensity concept (the Base Model) based on a Pareto (power-law) distribution for fracture sizes was chosen as the recommended parameterisation. A slew of alternative size-intensity models were also carried through the fracture analyses and into the uncertainty and model verification analyses. Uncertainty is modelled by analysing the effects on fracture intensity (P32) that alternative model cases can have. Uncertainty is parameterised as a ratio between the P32 of the alternative model and the P

  10. Results of the independent radiological verification survey at the former Bridgeport Brass Company Facility, Seymour, Connecticut (SSC001)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Foley, R.D.; Rice, D.E.; Allred, J.F.; Brown, K.S.

    1995-03-01

    At the request of the USDOE, a team from ORNL conducted an independent radiological verification survey at the former Bridgeport Brass Company Facility, Seymour, Connecticut, from September 1992 to March 1993. Purpose of the survey was to determine whether residual levels of radioactivity inside the Ruffert Building and selected adjacent areas were rmediated to levels below DOE guidelines for FUSRAP sites. The property was contaminated with radioactive residues of 238 U from uranium processing experiments conducted by Reactive Metals, Inc., from 1962 to 1964 for the Atomic Energy Commission. A previous radiological survey did not characterize the entire floor space because equipment which could not be moved at the time made it inaccessible for radiological surveys. During the remediation process, additional areas of elevated radioactivity were discovered under stationary equipment, which required additional remediation and further verification. Results of the independent radiological verification survey confirm that, with the exception of the drain system inside the building, residual uranium contamination has been remediated to levels below DOE guidelines for unrestricted release of property at FUSRAP sites inside and outside the Ruffert Building. However, certain sections of the drain system retain uranium contamination above DOE surface guideline levels. These sections of pipe are addressed in separate, referenced documentation

  11. Verification of hyperthermia treatment planning in cervix carcinoma patients using invasive thermometry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haaren Van, P.M.A.; Kok, H.P.; Zum Voerde Sive Voerding, P.J.; Oldenborg, S.; Stalpers, L.J.A.; Crezee, J.; Berg Van den, C.A.T; Leeuw De, A.A.C.

    2005-01-01

    Full text: Hyperthermia treatment planning (HTP) is a useful tool for improvement of clinical hyperthermia treatments. Aim of this study was to determine the correlation between HTP and measurements during hyperthermia treatments. We compared the calculated specific absorption rate (SAR) with clinically measured SAR-values, from ΔT-measurements, in cervix carcinoma patients. General difficulties for such clinical verifications are changes in the anatomy during the different steps and possible movement of the catheters. We used one fixed invasive catheter in the tumor additional to the usual non-invasive catheters in the vagina, bladder and rectum, for insertion of multisensor thermocouple probes. A special CT-scan with the patient in treatment position and the catheters in situ was made for the HTP. We performed these verifications in a total of 11 treatments in 7 patients. The main difficulties for accurate verification were of clinical nature: difficulties arising from the use of gynaecological tampon and the limited number of measurements in tissue. Remaining air in the vagina and sub-optimal tissue contact of the catheters resulted in bad thermal contact between thermocouples and tissue, causing measurement artefacts that are difficult to correlate with calculations. These artefacts are probably not specific for thermocouple measurements, but more general for intraluminal temperature and SAR measurements. (author)

  12. Face Verification for Mobile Personal Devices

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Tao, Q.

    2009-01-01

    In this thesis, we presented a detailed study of the face verification problem on the mobile device, covering every component of the system. The study includes face detection, registration, normalization, and verification. Furthermore, the information fusion problem is studied to verify face

  13. Gender Verification of Female Olympic Athletes.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dickinson, Barry D.; Genel, Myron; Robinowitz, Carolyn B.; Turner, Patricia L.; Woods, Gary L.

    2002-01-01

    Gender verification of female athletes has long been criticized by geneticists, endocrinologists, and others in the medical community. Recently, the International Olympic Committee's Athletic Commission called for discontinuation of mandatory laboratory-based gender verification of female athletes. This article discusses normal sexual…

  14. ESTRO ACROP guidelines for positioning, immobilisation and position verification of head and neck patients for radiation therapists

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Michelle Leech

    2017-03-01

    Full Text Available Background and purpose: Over the last decade, the management of locally advanced head and neck cancers (HNCs has seen a substantial increase in the use of chemoradiation. These guidelines have been developed to assist Radiation TherapisTs (RTTs in positioning, immobilisation and position verification for head and neck cancer patients. Materials and methods: A critical review of the literature was undertaken by the writing committee.Based on the literature review, a survey was developed to ascertain the current positioning, immobilisation and position verification methods for head and neck radiation therapy across Europe. The survey was translated into Italian, German, Greek, Portuguese, Russian, Croatian, French and Spanish.Guidelines were subsequently developed by the writing committee. Results: Results from the survey indicated that a wide variety of treatment practices and treatment verification protocols are in operation for head and neck cancer patients across Europe currently.The guidelines developed are based on the experience and expertise of the writing committee, remaining cognisant of the variations in imaging and immobilisation techniques used currently in Europe. Conclusions: These guidelines have been developed to provide RTTs with guidance on positioning, immobilisation and position verification of HNC patients. The guidelines will also provide RTTs with the means to critically reflect on their own daily clinical practice with this patient group. Keywords: Head and neck, Immobilisation, Positioning, Verification

  15. The new geospatial tools: global transparency enhancing safeguards verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pabian, Frank Vincent

    2010-01-01

    This paper focuses on the importance and potential role of the new, freely available, geospatial tools for enhancing IAEA safeguards and how, together with commercial satellite imagery, they can be used to promote 'all-source synergy'. As additional 'open sources', these new geospatial tools have heralded a new era of 'global transparency' and they can be used to substantially augment existing information-driven safeguards gathering techniques, procedures, and analyses in the remote detection of undeclared facilities, as well as support ongoing monitoring and verification of various treaty (e.g., NPT, FMCT) relevant activities and programs. As an illustration of how these new geospatial tools may be applied, an original exemplar case study provides how it is possible to derive value-added follow-up information on some recent public media reporting of a former clandestine underground plutonium production complex (now being converted to a 'Tourist Attraction' given the site's abandonment by China in the early 1980s). That open source media reporting, when combined with subsequent commentary found in various Internet-based Blogs and Wikis, led to independent verification of the reporting with additional ground truth via 'crowdsourcing' (tourist photos as found on 'social networking' venues like Google Earth's Panoramio layer and Twitter). Confirmation of the precise geospatial location of the site (along with a more complete facility characterization incorporating 3-D Modeling and visualization) was only made possible following the acquisition of higher resolution commercial satellite imagery that could be correlated with the reporting, ground photos, and an interior diagram, through original imagery analysis of the overhead imagery.

  16. Reload core safety verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Svetlik, M.; Minarcin, M.

    2003-01-01

    This paper presents a brief look at the process of reload core safety evaluation and verification in Slovak Republic. It gives an overview of experimental verification of selected nuclear parameters in the course of physics testing during reactor start-up. The comparison of IAEA recommendations and testing procedures at Slovak and European nuclear power plants of similar design is included. An introduction of two level criteria for evaluation of tests represents an effort to formulate the relation between safety evaluation and measured values (Authors)

  17. Validation of Embedded System Verification Models

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Marincic, J.; Mader, Angelika H.; Wieringa, Roelf J.

    The result of a model-based requirements verification shows that the model of a system satisfies (or not) formalised system requirements. The verification result is correct only if the model represents the system adequately. No matter what modelling technique we use, what precedes the model

  18. On Verification Modelling of Embedded Systems

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Brinksma, Hendrik; Mader, Angelika H.

    Computer-aided verification of embedded systems hinges on the availability of good verification models of the systems at hand. Such models must be much simpler than full design models or specifications to be of practical value, because of the unavoidable combinatorial complexities in the

  19. Compositional verification of real-time systems using Ecdar

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    David, Alexandre; Larsen, Kim Guldstrand; Legay, Axel

    2012-01-01

    We present a specification theory for timed systems implemented in the Ecdar tool. We illustrate the operations of the specification theory on a running example, showing the models and verification checks. To demonstrate the power of the compositional verification, we perform an in depth case study...... of a leader election protocol; Modeling it in Ecdar as Timed input/output automata Specifications and performing both monolithic and compositional verification of two interesting properties on it. We compare the execution time of the compositional to the classical verification showing a huge difference...

  20. The NRC measurement verification program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pham, T.N.; Ong, L.D.Y.

    1995-01-01

    A perspective is presented on the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approach for effectively monitoring the measurement methods and directly testing the capability and performance of licensee measurement systems. A main objective in material control and accounting (MC and A) inspection activities is to assure the accuracy and precision of the accounting system and the absence of potential process anomalies through overall accountability. The primary means of verification remains the NRC random sampling during routine safeguards inspections. This involves the independent testing of licensee measurement performance with statistical sampling plans for physical inventories, item control, and auditing. A prospective cost-effective alternative overcheck is also discussed in terms of an externally coordinated sample exchange or ''round robin'' program among participating fuel cycle facilities in order to verify the quality of measurement systems, i.e., to assure that analytical measurement results are free of bias

  1. A Model for Collaborative Runtime Verification

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Testerink, Bas; Bulling, Nils; Dastani, Mehdi

    2015-01-01

    Runtime verification concerns checking whether a system execution satisfies a given property. In this paper we propose a model for collaborative runtime verification where a network of local monitors collaborates in order to verify properties of the system. A local monitor has only a local view on

  2. Comparison of monitor units calculated by radiotherapy treatment planning system and an independent monitor unit verification software.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sellakumar, P; Arun, C; Sanjay, S S; Ramesh, S B

    2011-01-01

    In radiation therapy, the monitor units (MU) needed to deliver a treatment plan are calculated by treatment planning systems (TPS). The essential part of quality assurance is to verify the MU with independent monitor unit calculation to correct any potential errors prior to the start of treatment. In this study, we have compared the MU calculated by TPS and by independent MU verification software. The MU verification software was commissioned and tested for the data integrity to ensure that the correct beam data was considered for MU calculations. The accuracy of the calculations was tested by creating a series of test plans and comparing them with ion chamber measurements. The results show that there is good agreement between the two. The MU difference (MUdiff) between the monitor unit calculations of TPS and independent MU verification system was calculated for 623 fields from 245 patients and was analyzed by treatment site for head & neck, thorax, breast, abdomen and pelvis. The mean MUdiff of -0.838% with a standard deviation of 3.04% was observed for all 623 fields. The site specific standard deviation of MUdiff was as follows: abdomen and pelvis (<1.75%), head & neck (2.5%), thorax (2.32%) and breast (6.01%). The disparities were analyzed and different correction methods were used to reduce the disparity. © 2010 Associazione Italiana di Fisica Medica. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  3. HDM/PASCAL Verification System User's Manual

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hare, D.

    1983-01-01

    The HDM/Pascal verification system is a tool for proving the correctness of programs written in PASCAL and specified in the Hierarchical Development Methodology (HDM). This document assumes an understanding of PASCAL, HDM, program verification, and the STP system. The steps toward verification which this tool provides are parsing programs and specifications, checking the static semantics, and generating verification conditions. Some support functions are provided such as maintaining a data base, status management, and editing. The system runs under the TOPS-20 and TENEX operating systems and is written in INTERLISP. However, no knowledge is assumed of these operating systems or of INTERLISP. The system requires three executable files, HDMVCG, PARSE, and STP. Optionally, the editor EMACS should be on the system in order for the editor to work. The file HDMVCG is invoked to run the system. The files PARSE and STP are used as lower forks to perform the functions of parsing and proving.

  4. Self-verification and contextualized self-views.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chen, Serena; English, Tammy; Peng, Kaiping

    2006-07-01

    Whereas most self-verification research has focused on people's desire to verify their global self-conceptions, the present studies examined self-verification with regard to contextualized selfviews-views of the self in particular situations and relationships. It was hypothesized that individuals whose core self-conceptions include contextualized self-views should seek to verify these self-views. In Study 1, the more individuals defined the self in dialectical terms, the more their judgments were biased in favor of verifying over nonverifying feedback about a negative, situation-specific self-view. In Study 2, consistent with research on gender differences in the importance of relationships to the self-concept, women but not men showed a similar bias toward feedback about a negative, relationship-specific self-view, a pattern not seen for global self-views. Together, the results support the notion that self-verification occurs for core self-conceptions, whatever form(s) they may take. Individual differences in self-verification and the nature of selfhood and authenticity are discussed.

  5. Digital system verification a combined formal methods and simulation framework

    CERN Document Server

    Li, Lun

    2010-01-01

    Integrated circuit capacity follows Moore's law, and chips are commonly produced at the time of this writing with over 70 million gates per device. Ensuring correct functional behavior of such large designs before fabrication poses an extremely challenging problem. Formal verification validates the correctness of the implementation of a design with respect to its specification through mathematical proof techniques. Formal techniques have been emerging as commercialized EDA tools in the past decade. Simulation remains a predominantly used tool to validate a design in industry. After more than 5

  6. Verification of RESRAD-build computer code, version 3.1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    RESRAD-BUILD is a computer model for analyzing the radiological doses resulting from the remediation and occupancy of buildings contaminated with radioactive material. It is part of a family of codes that includes RESRAD, RESRAD-CHEM, RESRAD-RECYCLE, RESRAD-BASELINE, and RESRAD-ECORISK. The RESRAD-BUILD models were developed and codified by Argonne National Laboratory (ANL); version 1.5 of the code and the user's manual were publicly released in 1994. The original version of the code was written for the Microsoft DOS operating system. However, subsequent versions of the code were written for the Microsoft Windows operating system. The purpose of the present verification task (which includes validation as defined in the standard) is to provide an independent review of the latest version of RESRAD-BUILD under the guidance provided by ANSI/ANS-10.4 for verification and validation of existing computer programs. This approach consists of a posteriori V and V review which takes advantage of available program development products as well as user experience. The purpose, as specified in ANSI/ANS-10.4, is to determine whether the program produces valid responses when used to analyze problems within a specific domain of applications, and to document the level of verification. The culmination of these efforts is the production of this formal Verification Report. The first step in performing the verification of an existing program was the preparation of a Verification Review Plan. The review plan consisted of identifying: Reason(s) why a posteriori verification is to be performed; Scope and objectives for the level of verification selected; Development products to be used for the review; Availability and use of user experience; and Actions to be taken to supplement missing or unavailable development products. The purpose, scope and objectives for the level of verification selected are described in this section of the Verification Report. The development products that were used

  7. Verification Test Report for CFAST 3.1.6; TOPICAL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vincent, A.M. III

    2002-01-01

    Fire is a significant hazard in most facilities that handle radioactive materials. The severity of fire varies with room arrangement, combustible loading, ventilation and protective system response. The complexity of even simple situations can be unwieldy to solve by hand calculations. Thus, computer simulation of the fire severity has become an important tool in characterizing fire risk. The Savannah River Site (SRS), a Department of Energy facility, has been using the Consolidated Model of Fire Growth and Smoke Transport (CFAST) software to complete such deterministic evaluations to better characterize the nuclear facility fire severity. To fully utilize CFAST at SRS it is necessary to demonstrate that CFAST produces valid analytic solutions over its range of use. This report describes the primary verification exercise that is required to establish that CFAST, and its user interface program FAST, produce valid analytic solutions. This verification exercise may be used to check the fu nctionality of FAST and as a training tool to familiarize users with the software. In addition, the report consolidates the lessons learned by the SRS staff in using FAST and CFAST as fire modeling tools

  8. Guarantee of remaining life time. Integrity of mechanical components and control of ageing phenomena

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schuler, X.; Herter, K.H.; Koenig, G.

    2012-01-01

    The life time of safety relevant systems, structures and components (SSC) of Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) is determined by two main principles. First of all the required quality has to be produced during the design and fabrication process. This means that quality has to be produced and can't be improved by excessive inspections (Basis Safety - quality through production principle). The second one is assigned to the initial quality which has to be maintained during operation. This concerns safe operation during the total life time (life time management), safety against ageing phenomena (AM - ageing management) as well as proof of integrity (e.g. break preclusion or avoidance of fracture for SSC with high safety relevance). Initiated by the Fukushima Dai-ichi event in Japan in spring 2011 for German NPP's Long Term Operation (LTO) is out of question. In June 2011 legislation took decision to phase-out from nuclear by 2022. As a fact safe operation shall be guaranteed for the remaining life time. Within this technical framework the ageing management is a key element. Depending on the safety-relevance of the SSC under observation including preventive maintenance various tasks are required in particular to clarify the mechanisms which contribute systemspecifically to the damage of the components and systems and to define their controlling parameters which have to be monitored and checked. Appropriate continuous or discontinuous measures are to be considered in this connection. The approach to ensure a high standard of quality in operation for the remaining life time and the management of the technical and organizational aspects are demonstrated and explained. The basis for ageing management to be applied to NNPs is included in Nuclear Safety Standard 1403 which describes the ageing management procedures. For SSC with high safety relevance a verification analysis for rupture preclusion (proof of integrity, integrity concept) shall be performed (Nuclear Safety Standard 3206

  9. Feasibility of proton-activated implantable markers for proton range verification using PET

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cho, Jongmin; Ibbott, Geoffrey; Gillin, Michael; Gonzalez-Lepera, Carlos; Titt, Uwe; Paganetti, Harald; Kerr, Matthew; Mawlawi, Osama

    2013-11-01

    Proton beam range verification using positron emission tomography (PET) currently relies on proton activation of tissue, the products of which decay with a short half-life and necessitate an on-site PET scanner. Tissue activation is, however, negligible near the distal dose fall-off region of the proton beam range due to their high interaction energy thresholds. Therefore Monte Carlo simulation is often supplemented for comparison with measurement; however, this also may be associated with systematic and statistical uncertainties. Therefore, we sought to test the feasibility of using long-lived proton-activated external materials that are inserted or infused into the target volume for more accurate proton beam range verification that could be performed at an off-site PET scanner. We irradiated samples of ≥98% 18O-enriched water, natural Cu foils, and >97% 68Zn-enriched foils as candidate materials, along with samples of tissue-equivalent materials including 16O water, heptane (C7H16), and polycarbonate (C16H14O3)n, at four depths (ranging from 100% to 3% of center of modulation (COM) dose) along the distal fall-off of a modulated 160 MeV proton beam. Samples were irradiated either directly or after being embedded in Plastic Water® or balsa wood. We then measured the activity of the samples using PET imaging for 20 or 30 min after various delay times. Measured activities of candidate materials were up to 100 times greater than those of the tissue-equivalent materials at the four distal dose fall-off depths. The differences between candidate materials and tissue-equivalent materials became more apparent after longer delays between irradiation and PET imaging, due to the longer half-lives of the candidate materials. Furthermore, the activation of the candidate materials closely mimicked the distal dose fall-off with offsets of 1 to 2 mm. Also, signals from the foils were clearly visible compared to the background from the activated Plastic Water® and balsa wood

  10. A Verification Logic for GOAL Agents

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hindriks, K. V.

    Although there has been a growing body of literature on verification of agents programs, it has been difficult to design a verification logic for agent programs that fully characterizes such programs and to connect agent programs to agent theory. The challenge is to define an agent programming language that defines a computational framework but also allows for a logical characterization useful for verification. The agent programming language GOAL has been originally designed to connect agent programming to agent theory and we present additional results here that GOAL agents can be fully represented by a logical theory. GOAL agents can thus be said to execute the corresponding logical theory.

  11. Secure optical verification using dual phase-only correlation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liu, Wei; Liu, Shutian; Zhang, Yan; Xie, Zhenwei; Liu, Zhengjun

    2015-01-01

    We introduce a security-enhanced optical verification system using dual phase-only correlation based on a novel correlation algorithm. By employing a nonlinear encoding, the inherent locks of the verification system are obtained in real-valued random distributions, and the identity keys assigned to authorized users are designed as pure phases. The verification process is implemented in two-step correlation, so only authorized identity keys can output the discriminate auto-correlation and cross-correlation signals that satisfy the reset threshold values. Compared with the traditional phase-only-correlation-based verification systems, a higher security level against counterfeiting and collisions are obtained, which is demonstrated by cryptanalysis using known attacks, such as the known-plaintext attack and the chosen-plaintext attack. Optical experiments as well as necessary numerical simulations are carried out to support the proposed verification method. (paper)

  12. Verification of DRAGON: the NXT tracking module

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zkiek, A.; Marleau, G.

    2007-01-01

    The version of DRAGON-IST that has been verified for the calculation of the incremental cross sections associated with CANDU reactivity devices is version 3.04Bb that was released in 2001. Since then, various improvements were implemented in the code including the NXT: module that can track assemblies of clusters in 2-D and 3-D geometries. Here we will discuss the verification plan for the NXT: module of DRAGON, illustrate the verification procedure we selected and present our verification results. (author)

  13. Technical challenges for dismantlement verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Olinger, C.T.; Stanbro, W.D.; Johnston, R.G.; Nakhleh, C.W.; Dreicer, J.S.

    1997-01-01

    In preparation for future nuclear arms reduction treaties, including any potential successor treaties to START I and II, the authors have been examining possible methods for bilateral warhead dismantlement verification. Warhead dismantlement verification raises significant challenges in the political, legal, and technical arenas. This discussion will focus on the technical issues raised by warhead arms controls. Technical complications arise from several sources. These will be discussed under the headings of warhead authentication, chain-of-custody, dismantlement verification, non-nuclear component tracking, component monitoring, and irreversibility. The authors will discuss possible technical options to address these challenges as applied to a generic dismantlement and disposition process, in the process identifying limitations and vulnerabilities. They expect that these considerations will play a large role in any future arms reduction effort and, therefore, should be addressed in a timely fashion

  14. Safety Verification for Probabilistic Hybrid Systems

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Zhang, Lijun; She, Zhikun; Ratschan, Stefan

    2010-01-01

    The interplay of random phenomena and continuous real-time control deserves increased attention for instance in wireless sensing and control applications. Safety verification for such systems thus needs to consider probabilistic variations of systems with hybrid dynamics. In safety verification o...... on a number of case studies, tackled using a prototypical implementation....

  15. SSN Verification Service

    Data.gov (United States)

    Social Security Administration — The SSN Verification Service is used by Java applications to execute the GUVERF02 service using the WebSphere/CICS Interface. It accepts several input data fields...

  16. Enhanced Verification Test Suite for Physics Simulation Codes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kamm, J R; Brock, J S; Brandon, S T; Cotrell, D L; Johnson, B; Knupp, P; Rider, W; Trucano, T; Weirs, V G

    2008-10-10

    This document discusses problems with which to augment, in quantity and in quality, the existing tri-laboratory suite of verification problems used by Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). The purpose of verification analysis is demonstrate whether the numerical results of the discretization algorithms in physics and engineering simulation codes provide correct solutions of the corresponding continuum equations. The key points of this document are: (1) Verification deals with mathematical correctness of the numerical algorithms in a code, while validation deals with physical correctness of a simulation in a regime of interest. This document is about verification. (2) The current seven-problem Tri-Laboratory Verification Test Suite, which has been used for approximately five years at the DOE WP laboratories, is limited. (3) Both the methodology for and technology used in verification analysis have evolved and been improved since the original test suite was proposed. (4) The proposed test problems are in three basic areas: (a) Hydrodynamics; (b) Transport processes; and (c) Dynamic strength-of-materials. (5) For several of the proposed problems we provide a 'strong sense verification benchmark', consisting of (i) a clear mathematical statement of the problem with sufficient information to run a computer simulation, (ii) an explanation of how the code result and benchmark solution are to be evaluated, and (iii) a description of the acceptance criterion for simulation code results. (6) It is proposed that the set of verification test problems with which any particular code be evaluated include some of the problems described in this document. Analysis of the proposed verification test problems constitutes part of a necessary--but not sufficient--step that builds confidence in physics and engineering simulation codes. More complicated test cases, including physics models of

  17. Lessons Learned From Microkernel Verification — Specification is the New Bottleneck

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Thorsten Bormer

    2012-11-01

    Full Text Available Software verification tools have become a lot more powerful in recent years. Even verification of large, complex systems is feasible, as demonstrated in the L4.verified and Verisoft XT projects. Still, functional verification of large software systems is rare – for reasons beyond the large scale of verification effort needed due to the size alone. In this paper we report on lessons learned for verification of large software systems based on the experience gained in microkernel verification in the Verisoft XT project. We discuss a number of issues that impede widespread introduction of formal verification in the software life-cycle process.

  18. Advancing Disarmament Verification Tools: A Task for Europe?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Göttsche, Malte; Kütt, Moritz; Neuneck, Götz; Niemeyer, Irmgard

    2015-01-01

    A number of scientific-technical activities have been carried out to establish more robust and irreversible disarmament verification schemes. Regardless of the actual path towards deeper reductions in nuclear arsenals or their total elimination in the future, disarmament verification will require new verification procedures and techniques. This paper discusses the information that would be required as a basis for building confidence in disarmament, how it could be principally verified and the role Europe could play. Various ongoing activities are presented that could be brought together to produce a more intensified research and development environment in Europe. The paper argues that if ‘effective multilateralism’ is the main goal of the European Union’s (EU) disarmament policy, EU efforts should be combined and strengthened to create a coordinated multilateral disarmament verification capacity in the EU and other European countries. The paper concludes with several recommendations that would have a significant impact on future developments. Among other things, the paper proposes a one-year review process that should include all relevant European actors. In the long run, an EU Centre for Disarmament Verification could be envisaged to optimize verification needs, technologies and procedures.

  19. The verification of DRAGON: progress and lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marleau, G.

    2002-01-01

    The general requirements for the verification of the legacy code DRAGON are somewhat different from those used for new codes. For example, the absence of a design manual for DRAGON makes it difficult to confirm that the each part of the code performs as required since these requirements are not explicitly spelled out for most of the DRAGON modules. In fact, this conformance of the code can only be assessed, in most cases, by making sure that the contents of the DRAGON data structures, which correspond to the output generated by a module of the code, contains the adequate information. It is also possible in some cases to use the self-verification options in DRAGON to perform additional verification or to evaluate, using an independent software, the performance of specific functions in the code. Here, we will describe the global verification process that was considered in order to bring DRAGON to an industry standard tool-set (IST) status. We will also discuss some of the lessons we learned in performing this verification and present some of the modification to DRAGON that were implemented as a consequence of this verification. (author)

  20. Simulation Environment Based on the Universal Verification Methodology

    CERN Document Server

    AUTHOR|(SzGeCERN)697338

    2017-01-01

    Universal Verification Methodology (UVM) is a standardized approach of verifying integrated circuit designs, targeting a Coverage-Driven Verification (CDV). It combines automatic test generation, self-checking testbenches, and coverage metrics to indicate progress in the design verification. The flow of the CDV differs from the traditional directed-testing approach. With the CDV, a testbench developer, by setting the verification goals, starts with an structured plan. Those goals are targeted further by a developed testbench, which generates legal stimuli and sends them to a device under test (DUT). The progress is measured by coverage monitors added to the simulation environment. In this way, the non-exercised functionality can be identified. Moreover, the additional scoreboards indicate undesired DUT behaviour. Such verification environments were developed for three recent ASIC and FPGA projects which have successfully implemented the new work-flow: (1) the CLICpix2 65 nm CMOS hybrid pixel readout ASIC desi...

  1. Hierarchical Representation Learning for Kinship Verification.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kohli, Naman; Vatsa, Mayank; Singh, Richa; Noore, Afzel; Majumdar, Angshul

    2017-01-01

    Kinship verification has a number of applications such as organizing large collections of images and recognizing resemblances among humans. In this paper, first, a human study is conducted to understand the capabilities of human mind and to identify the discriminatory areas of a face that facilitate kinship-cues. The visual stimuli presented to the participants determine their ability to recognize kin relationship using the whole face as well as specific facial regions. The effect of participant gender and age and kin-relation pair of the stimulus is analyzed using quantitative measures such as accuracy, discriminability index d' , and perceptual information entropy. Utilizing the information obtained from the human study, a hierarchical kinship verification via representation learning (KVRL) framework is utilized to learn the representation of different face regions in an unsupervised manner. We propose a novel approach for feature representation termed as filtered contractive deep belief networks (fcDBN). The proposed feature representation encodes relational information present in images using filters and contractive regularization penalty. A compact representation of facial images of kin is extracted as an output from the learned model and a multi-layer neural network is utilized to verify the kin accurately. A new WVU kinship database is created, which consists of multiple images per subject to facilitate kinship verification. The results show that the proposed deep learning framework (KVRL-fcDBN) yields the state-of-the-art kinship verification accuracy on the WVU kinship database and on four existing benchmark data sets. Furthermore, kinship information is used as a soft biometric modality to boost the performance of face verification via product of likelihood ratio and support vector machine based approaches. Using the proposed KVRL-fcDBN framework, an improvement of over 20% is observed in the performance of face verification.

  2. Analysis of radiocarbon dates of an archaeological site in the Russian Far East: The marine reservoir effect as seen on charred remains on pottery

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kunikita, Dai; Yoshida, Kunio; Miyazaki, Yumiko; Saito, Keita; Endo, Aya; Matsuzaki, Hiroyuki; Ito, Shinji; Kobayashi, Tatsuo; Fujimoto, Tsuyoshi; Kuznetsov, A.M.; Krupyanko, A.A.; Tabarev, A.M.

    2007-01-01

    In order to obtain precise and accurate calibrated radiocarbon chronologies for archaeological sites, it is necessary to determine the provenance of the carbon material being dated. Of particular note is determining the provenance and radiocarbon age of charcoal remains on pottery. In this context, we discuss the decipherment of dates on the Ustinovka-8 site in the Russian Far East. Using δ 13 C, δ 15 N and C:N it is possible to ascribe charcoal provenance to terrestrial and marine origins. Our data show radiocarbon age difference that are clearly associated with carbon origin, and a maximum estimated ΔR of approximately 400 years during the Zaisanovskaya culture, 4400 cal BP. A combination of pottery analysis and 14 C dating at this site determined the Zaisanovskaya cultural period to be 4000-5000 cal BP, the Boismanskaya and the Late Rudninskaya cultural period 5800-6500 cal BP, and the Early Rudninskaya cultural period of 6800-7100 cal BP

  3. Self-verification motives at the collective level of self-definition.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chen, Serena; Chen, Karen Y; Shaw, Lindsay

    2004-01-01

    Three studies examined self-verification motives in relation to collective aspects of the self. Several moderators of collective self-verification were also examined--namely, the certainty with which collective self-views are held, the nature of one's ties to a source of self-verification, the salience of the collective self, and the importance of group identification. Evidence for collective self-verification emerged across all studies, particularly when collective self-views were held with high certainty (Studies 1 and 2), perceivers were somehow tied to the source of self-verification (Study 1), the collective self was salient (Study 2), and group identification was important (Study 3). To the authors' knowledge, these studies are the first to examine self-verification at the collective level of self-definition. The parallel and distinct ways in which self-verification processes may operate at different levels of self-definition are discussed.

  4. The new geospatial tools: global transparency enhancing safeguards verification

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pabian, Frank Vincent [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-09-16

    This paper focuses on the importance and potential role of the new, freely available, geospatial tools for enhancing IAEA safeguards and how, together with commercial satellite imagery, they can be used to promote 'all-source synergy'. As additional 'open sources', these new geospatial tools have heralded a new era of 'global transparency' and they can be used to substantially augment existing information-driven safeguards gathering techniques, procedures, and analyses in the remote detection of undeclared facilities, as well as support ongoing monitoring and verification of various treaty (e.g., NPT, FMCT) relevant activities and programs. As an illustration of how these new geospatial tools may be applied, an original exemplar case study provides how it is possible to derive value-added follow-up information on some recent public media reporting of a former clandestine underground plutonium production complex (now being converted to a 'Tourist Attraction' given the site's abandonment by China in the early 1980s). That open source media reporting, when combined with subsequent commentary found in various Internet-based Blogs and Wikis, led to independent verification of the reporting with additional ground truth via 'crowdsourcing' (tourist photos as found on 'social networking' venues like Google Earth's Panoramio layer and Twitter). Confirmation of the precise geospatial location of the site (along with a more complete facility characterization incorporating 3-D Modeling and visualization) was only made possible following the acquisition of higher resolution commercial satellite imagery that could be correlated with the reporting, ground photos, and an interior diagram, through original imagery analysis of the overhead imagery.

  5. Anti-Makeup: Learning A Bi-Level Adversarial Network for Makeup-Invariant Face Verification

    OpenAIRE

    Li, Yi; Song, Lingxiao; Wu, Xiang; He, Ran; Tan, Tieniu

    2017-01-01

    Makeup is widely used to improve facial attractiveness and is well accepted by the public. However, different makeup styles will result in significant facial appearance changes. It remains a challenging problem to match makeup and non-makeup face images. This paper proposes a learning from generation approach for makeup-invariant face verification by introducing a bi-level adversarial network (BLAN). To alleviate the negative effects from makeup, we first generate non-makeup images from makeu...

  6. 24 CFR 5.512 - Verification of eligible immigration status.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... immigration status. 5.512 Section 5.512 Housing and Urban Development Office of the Secretary, Department of... Noncitizens § 5.512 Verification of eligible immigration status. (a) General. Except as described in paragraph...) Primary verification—(1) Automated verification system. Primary verification of the immigration status of...

  7. Verification of RADTRAN

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kanipe, F.L.; Neuhauser, K.S.

    1995-01-01

    This document presents details of the verification process of the RADTRAN computer code which was established for the calculation of risk estimates for radioactive materials transportation by highway, rail, air, and waterborne modes

  8. Non proliferation regimes undertakings: Benefits and limits of synergies in verification technologies and procedures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richard, M.

    2001-01-01

    development and the implementation of adequate verification. During the last thirty years, multinational or mutual verification has become a fundamental element in building States' confidence in the agreements and amongst those States. It gives them the assurance that the agreements are efficient and that all other parties comply with their obligations. This trend has been confirmed with the discovery of the cheating of two NPT Parties in the beginning of the nineties. First, the clandestine programme of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq revealed after the Gulf war and, secondly, the inability of the IAEA to verify the initial declaration of the DPRK and the discovery of its attempt to build a clandestine nuclear programme along with a ballistic missile programme. These cheats have led to the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards, the reinforcement of export controls and new efforts to curb the proliferation of ballistic missiles. With the development of verification and monitoring regimes in scope, range and precision, the international interdependence has grown very rapidly. The verification protocols of these instruments share a lot of features: procedures, inspection techniques in the field and in the laboratory, information analyses, and so on. A wide range of techniques is employed which goes from the simple like exchange of information to more intrusive techniques like environmental sampling, permanent surveillance, on-site inspection, short notice access, etc... In the past ten years, the capabilities of verification techniques have been very much improved. For example, sampling and trace analysis allow to detect minute quantities of materials which could show evidence of proscribed activities, satellite imagery can allow to detect undeclared activities or undercover preparation But a one hundred percent assurance of compliance is more a political wish than a reality and is not needed for most of the agreements. Whatever the sophistication of techniques, a small

  9. CASL Verification and Validation Plan

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mousseau, Vincent Andrew [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Dinh, Nam [North Carolina State Univ., Raleigh, NC (United States)

    2016-06-30

    This report documents the Consortium for Advanced Simulation of LWRs (CASL) verification and validation plan. The document builds upon input from CASL subject matter experts, most notably the CASL Challenge Problem Product Integrators, CASL Focus Area leaders, and CASL code development and assessment teams. This document will be a living document that will track progress on CASL to do verification and validation for both the CASL codes (including MPACT, CTF, BISON, MAMBA) and for the CASL challenge problems (CIPS, PCI, DNB). The CASL codes and the CASL challenge problems are at differing levels of maturity with respect to validation and verification. The gap analysis will summarize additional work that needs to be done. Additional VVUQ work will be done as resources permit. This report is prepared for the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) CASL program in support of milestone CASL.P13.02.

  10. The monitoring and verification of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garwin, Richard L.

    2014-01-01

    This paper partially reviews and updates the potential for monitoring and verification of nuclear weapons, including verification of their destruction. Cooperative monitoring with templates of the gamma-ray spectrum are an important tool, dependent on the use of information barriers

  11. DarcyTools, Version 2.1. Verification and validation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Svensson, Urban

    2004-03-01

    DarcyTools is a computer code for simulation of flow and transport in porous and/or fractured media. The fractured media in mind is a fractured rock and the porous media the soil cover on the top of the rock; it is hence groundwater flows, which is the class of flows in mind. A number of novel methods and features form the present version of DarcyTools. In the verification studies, these methods are evaluated by comparisons with analytical solutions for idealized situations. The five verification groups, thus reflect the main areas of recent developments. The present report will focus on the Verification and Validation of DarcyTools. Two accompanying reports cover other aspects: - Concepts, Methods, Equations and Demo Simulations. - User's Guide. The objective of this report is to compile all verification and validation studies that have been carried out so far. After some brief introductory sections, all cases will be reported in Appendix A (verification cases) and Appendix B (validation cases)

  12. Verification and quality control of routine hematology analyzers.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Vis, J Y; Huisman, A

    2016-05-01

    Verification of hematology analyzers (automated blood cell counters) is mandatory before new hematology analyzers may be used in routine clinical care. The verification process consists of several items which comprise among others: precision, accuracy, comparability, carryover, background and linearity throughout the expected range of results. Yet, which standard should be met or which verification limit be used is at the discretion of the laboratory specialist. This paper offers practical guidance on verification and quality control of automated hematology analyzers and provides an expert opinion on the performance standard that should be met by the contemporary generation of hematology analyzers. Therefore (i) the state-of-the-art performance of hematology analyzers for complete blood count parameters is summarized, (ii) considerations, challenges, and pitfalls concerning the development of a verification plan are discussed, (iii) guidance is given regarding the establishment of reference intervals, and (iv) different methods on quality control of hematology analyzers are reviewed. © 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

  13. DarcyTools, Version 2.1. Verification and validation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Svensson, Urban [Computer-aided Fluid Engineering AB, Norrkoeping (Sweden)

    2004-03-01

    DarcyTools is a computer code for simulation of flow and transport in porous and/or fractured media. The fractured media in mind is a fractured rock and the porous media the soil cover on the top of the rock; it is hence groundwater flows, which is the class of flows in mind. A number of novel methods and features form the present version of DarcyTools. In the verification studies, these methods are evaluated by comparisons with analytical solutions for idealized situations. The five verification groups, thus reflect the main areas of recent developments. The present report will focus on the Verification and Validation of DarcyTools. Two accompanying reports cover other aspects: - Concepts, Methods, Equations and Demo Simulations. - User's Guide. The objective of this report is to compile all verification and validation studies that have been carried out so far. After some brief introductory sections, all cases will be reported in Appendix A (verification cases) and Appendix B (validation cases)

  14. Verification-Based Interval-Passing Algorithm for Compressed Sensing

    OpenAIRE

    Wu, Xiaofu; Yang, Zhen

    2013-01-01

    We propose a verification-based Interval-Passing (IP) algorithm for iteratively reconstruction of nonnegative sparse signals using parity check matrices of low-density parity check (LDPC) codes as measurement matrices. The proposed algorithm can be considered as an improved IP algorithm by further incorporation of the mechanism of verification algorithm. It is proved that the proposed algorithm performs always better than either the IP algorithm or the verification algorithm. Simulation resul...

  15. Multi-canister overpack project - verification and validation, MCNP 4A

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldmann, L.H.

    1997-01-01

    This supporting document contains the software verification and validation (V and V) package used for Phase 2 design of the Spent Nuclear Fuel Multi-Canister Overpack. V and V packages for both ANSYS and MCNP are included. Description of Verification Run(s): This software requires that it be compiled specifically for the machine it is to be used on. Therefore to facilitate ease in the verification process the software automatically runs 25 sample problems to ensure proper installation and compilation. Once the runs are completed the software checks for verification by performing a file comparison on the new output file and the old output file. Any differences between any of the files will cause a verification error. Due to the manner in which the verification is completed a verification error does not necessarily indicate a problem. This indicates that a closer look at the output files is needed to determine the cause of the error

  16. Verification of the Wind Response of a Stack Structure

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    D. Makovička

    2003-01-01

    Full Text Available This paper deals with verification analysis of the wind response of a power plant stack structure. Over a period two weeks the actual history of the dynamic response of the structure, and the direction and intensity of the actual wind load was measured, reported and processed with the use of a computer. The resulting data was used to verify the design stage data of the structure, with the natural frequencies and modes assumed by the design and with the dominant effect of other sources on the site. In conclusion the standard requirements are compared with the actual results of measurements and their expansion to the design load.

  17. Key Nuclear Verification Priorities: Safeguards and Beyond

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.

    2010-01-01

    In addressing nuclear verification priorities, we should look beyond the current safeguards system. Non-proliferation, which the safeguards system underpins, is not an end in itself, but an essential condition for achieving and maintaining nuclear disarmament. Effective safeguards are essential for advancing disarmament, and safeguards issues, approaches and techniques are directly relevant to the development of future verification missions. The extent to which safeguards challenges are successfully addressed - or otherwise - will impact not only on confidence in the safeguards system, but on the effectiveness of, and confidence in, disarmament verification. To identify the key nuclear verification priorities, we need to consider the objectives of verification, and the challenges to achieving these. The strategic objective of IAEA safeguards might be expressed as: To support the global nuclear non-proliferation regime by: - Providing credible assurance that states are honouring their safeguards commitments - thereby removing a potential motivation to proliferate; and - Early detection of misuse of nuclear material and technology - thereby deterring proliferation by the risk of early detection, enabling timely intervention by the international community. Or to summarise - confidence-building, detection capability, and deterrence. These will also be essential objectives for future verification missions. The challenges to achieving these involve a mix of political, technical and institutional dimensions. Confidence is largely a political matter, reflecting the qualitative judgment of governments. Clearly assessments of detection capability and deterrence have a major impact on confidence. Detection capability is largely thought of as 'technical', but also involves issues of legal authority, as well as institutional issues. Deterrence has both political and institutional aspects - including judgments on risk of detection and risk of enforcement action being taken. The

  18. Key Nuclear Verification Priorities - Safeguards and Beyond

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.

    2010-01-01

    In addressing nuclear verification priorities, we should look beyond the current safeguards system. Non-proliferation, which the safeguards system underpins, is not an end in itself, but an essential condition for achieving and maintaining nuclear disarmament. Effective safeguards are essential for advancing disarmament, and safeguards issues, approaches and techniques are directly relevant to the development of future verification missions. The extent to which safeguards challenges are successfully addressed - or otherwise - will impact not only on confidence in the safeguards system, but on the effectiveness of, and confidence in, disarmament verification. To identify the key nuclear verification priorities, we need to consider the objectives of verification, and the challenges to achieving these. The strategic objective of IAEA safeguards might be expressed as: To support the global nuclear non-proliferation regime by: - Providing credible assurance that states are honouring their safeguards commitments - thereby removing a potential motivation to proliferate; and - Early detection of misuse of nuclear material and technology - thereby deterring proliferation by the risk of early detection, enabling timely intervention by the international community. Or to summarise - confidence-building, detection capability, and deterrence. These will also be essential objectives for future verification missions. The challenges to achieving these involve a mix of political, technical and institutional dimensions. Confidence is largely a political matter, reflecting the qualitative judgment of governments. Clearly assessments of detection capability and deterrence have a major impact on confidence. Detection capability is largely thought of as 'technical', but also involves issues of legal authority, as well as institutional issues. Deterrence has both political and institutional aspects - including judgments on risk of detection and risk of enforcement action being taken. The

  19. On the organisation of program verification competitions

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Huisman, Marieke; Klebanov, Vladimir; Monahan, Rosemary; Klebanov, Vladimir; Beckert, Bernhard; Biere, Armin; Sutcliffe, Geoff

    In this paper, we discuss the challenges that have to be addressed when organising program verification competitions. Our focus is on competitions for verification systems where the participants both formalise an informally stated requirement and (typically) provide some guidance for the tool to

  20. Simulation environment based on the Universal Verification Methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fiergolski, A.

    2017-01-01

    Universal Verification Methodology (UVM) is a standardized approach of verifying integrated circuit designs, targeting a Coverage-Driven Verification (CDV). It combines automatic test generation, self-checking testbenches, and coverage metrics to indicate progress in the design verification. The flow of the CDV differs from the traditional directed-testing approach. With the CDV, a testbench developer, by setting the verification goals, starts with an structured plan. Those goals are targeted further by a developed testbench, which generates legal stimuli and sends them to a device under test (DUT). The progress is measured by coverage monitors added to the simulation environment. In this way, the non-exercised functionality can be identified. Moreover, the additional scoreboards indicate undesired DUT behaviour. Such verification environments were developed for three recent ASIC and FPGA projects which have successfully implemented the new work-flow: (1) the CLICpix2 65 nm CMOS hybrid pixel readout ASIC design; (2) the C3PD 180 nm HV-CMOS active sensor ASIC design; (3) the FPGA-based DAQ system of the CLICpix chip. This paper, based on the experience from the above projects, introduces briefly UVM and presents a set of tips and advices applicable at different stages of the verification process-cycle.

  1. HTGR analytical methods and design verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Neylan, A.J.; Northup, T.E.

    1982-05-01

    Analytical methods for the high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) include development, update, verification, documentation, and maintenance of all computer codes for HTGR design and analysis. This paper presents selected nuclear, structural mechanics, seismic, and systems analytical methods related to the HTGR core. This paper also reviews design verification tests in the reactor core, reactor internals, steam generator, and thermal barrier

  2. IMRT plan verification in radiotherapy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vlk, P.

    2006-01-01

    This article describes the procedure for verification of IMRT (Intensity modulated radiation therapy) plan, which is used in the Oncological Institute of St. Elisabeth in Bratislava. It contains basic description of IMRT technology and developing a deployment plan for IMRT planning system CORVUS 6.0, the device Mimic (Multilammelar intensity modulated collimator) and the overall process of verifying the schedule created. The aim of verification is particularly good control of the functions of MIMIC and evaluate the overall reliability of IMRT planning. (author)

  3. Automatic Verification of Timing Constraints for Safety Critical Space Systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fernandez, Javier; Parra, Pablo; Sanchez Prieto, Sebastian; Polo, Oscar; Bernat, Guillem

    2015-09-01

    In this paper is presented an automatic process of verification. We focus in the verification of scheduling analysis parameter. This proposal is part of process based on Model Driven Engineering to automate a Verification and Validation process of the software on board of satellites. This process is implemented in a software control unit of the energy particle detector which is payload of Solar Orbiter mission. From the design model is generated a scheduling analysis model and its verification model. The verification as defined as constraints in way of Finite Timed Automatas. When the system is deployed on target the verification evidence is extracted as instrumented points. The constraints are fed with the evidence, if any of the constraints is not satisfied for the on target evidence the scheduling analysis is not valid.

  4. Transparent 3D Visualization of Archaeological Remains in Roman Site in Ankara-Turkey with Ground Penetrating Radar Method

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kadioglu, S.

    2009-04-01

    Transparent 3D Visualization of Archaeological Remains in Roman Site in Ankara-Turkey with Ground Penetrating Radar Method Selma KADIOGLU Ankara University, Faculty of Engineering, Department of Geophysical Engineering, 06100 Tandogan/ANKARA-TURKEY kadioglu@eng.ankara.edu.tr Anatolia has always been more the point of transit, a bridge between West and East. Anatolia has been a home for ideas moving from all directions. So it is that in the Roman and post-Roman periods the role of Anatolia in general and of Ancyra (the Roman name of Ankara) in particular was of the greatest importance. Now, the visible archaeological remains of Roman period in Ankara are Roman Bath, Gymnasium, the Temple of Augustus of Rome, Street, Theatre, City Defence-Wall. The Caesar Augustus, the first Roman Emperor, conquered Asia Minor in 25 BC. Then a marble temple was built in Ancyra, the administrative capital of province, today the capital of Turkish Republic, Ankara. This monument was consecrated to the Empreror and to the Goddess Rome. This temple is supposed to have built over an earlier temple dedicated to Kybele and Men between 25 -20 BC. After the death of the Augustus in 14AD, a copy of the text of "Res Gestae Divi Augusti" was inscribed on the interior of the pronaos in Latin, whereas a Greek translation is also present on an exterior wall of the cella. In the 5th century, it was converted in to a church by the Byzantines. The aim of this study is to determine old buried archaeological remains in the Augustus temple, Roman Bath and in the governorship agora in Ulus district. These remains were imaged with transparent three dimensional (3D) visualization of the ground penetrating radar (GPR) data. Parallel two dimensional (2D) GPR profile data were acquired in the study areas, and then a 3D data volume were built using parallel 2D GPR data. A simplified amplitude-colour range and appropriate opacity function were constructed and transparent 3D image were obtained to activate buried

  5. Design verification enhancement of field programmable gate array-based safety-critical I&C system of nuclear power plant

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ahmed, Ibrahim [Department of Nuclear Engineering, Kyung Hee University, 1732 Deogyeong-daero, Giheung-gu, Yongin-si, Gyeonggi-do 17104 (Korea, Republic of); Jung, Jaecheon, E-mail: jcjung@kings.ac.kr [Department of Nuclear Power Plant Engineering, KEPCO International Nuclear Graduate School, 658-91 Haemaji-ro, Seosang-myeon, Ulju-gun, Ulsan 45014 (Korea, Republic of); Heo, Gyunyoung [Department of Nuclear Engineering, Kyung Hee University, 1732 Deogyeong-daero, Giheung-gu, Yongin-si, Gyeonggi-do 17104 (Korea, Republic of)

    2017-06-15

    Highlights: • An enhanced, systematic and integrated design verification approach is proposed for V&V of FPGA-based I&C system of NPP. • RPS bistable fixed setpoint trip algorithm is designed, analyzed, verified and discussed using the proposed approaches. • The application of integrated verification approach simultaneously verified the entire design modules. • The applicability of the proposed V&V facilitated the design verification processes. - Abstract: Safety-critical instrumentation and control (I&C) system in nuclear power plant (NPP) implemented on programmable logic controllers (PLCs) plays a vital role in safe operation of the plant. The challenges such as fast obsolescence, the vulnerability to cyber-attack, and other related issues of software systems have currently led to the consideration of field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) as an alternative to PLCs because of their advantages and hardware related benefits. However, safety analysis for FPGA-based I&C systems, and verification and validation (V&V) assessments still remain important issues to be resolved, which are now become a global research point of interests. In this work, we proposed a systematic design and verification strategies from start to ready-to-use in form of model-based approaches for FPGA-based reactor protection system (RPS) that can lead to the enhancement of the design verification and validation processes. The proposed methodology stages are requirement analysis, enhanced functional flow block diagram (EFFBD) models, finite state machine with data path (FSMD) models, hardware description language (HDL) code development, and design verifications. The design verification stage includes unit test – Very high speed integrated circuit Hardware Description Language (VHDL) test and modified condition decision coverage (MC/DC) test, module test – MATLAB/Simulink Co-simulation test, and integration test – FPGA hardware test beds. To prove the adequacy of the proposed

  6. Design verification enhancement of field programmable gate array-based safety-critical I&C system of nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ahmed, Ibrahim; Jung, Jaecheon; Heo, Gyunyoung

    2017-01-01

    Highlights: • An enhanced, systematic and integrated design verification approach is proposed for V&V of FPGA-based I&C system of NPP. • RPS bistable fixed setpoint trip algorithm is designed, analyzed, verified and discussed using the proposed approaches. • The application of integrated verification approach simultaneously verified the entire design modules. • The applicability of the proposed V&V facilitated the design verification processes. - Abstract: Safety-critical instrumentation and control (I&C) system in nuclear power plant (NPP) implemented on programmable logic controllers (PLCs) plays a vital role in safe operation of the plant. The challenges such as fast obsolescence, the vulnerability to cyber-attack, and other related issues of software systems have currently led to the consideration of field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) as an alternative to PLCs because of their advantages and hardware related benefits. However, safety analysis for FPGA-based I&C systems, and verification and validation (V&V) assessments still remain important issues to be resolved, which are now become a global research point of interests. In this work, we proposed a systematic design and verification strategies from start to ready-to-use in form of model-based approaches for FPGA-based reactor protection system (RPS) that can lead to the enhancement of the design verification and validation processes. The proposed methodology stages are requirement analysis, enhanced functional flow block diagram (EFFBD) models, finite state machine with data path (FSMD) models, hardware description language (HDL) code development, and design verifications. The design verification stage includes unit test – Very high speed integrated circuit Hardware Description Language (VHDL) test and modified condition decision coverage (MC/DC) test, module test – MATLAB/Simulink Co-simulation test, and integration test – FPGA hardware test beds. To prove the adequacy of the proposed

  7. Two important safety-related verification tests in the design of Qinshan NPP 600 MWe reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Li Pengzhou; Li Tianyong; Yu Danping; Sun Lei

    2005-01-01

    This paper summarizes two most important verification tests performed in the design of reactor of Qinshan NPP Phase II: seismic qualification test of control rod drive line (CRDL), flow-induced vibration test of reactor internals both in 1:5 scaled model and on-site measurement during heat function testing (HFT). Both qualification tests proved that the structural design of the reactor has large safety margin. (authors)

  8. Independent Verification Survey Of The SPRU Lower Level Hillside Area At The Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory Niskayuna, New York

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harpenau, Evan M.; Weaver, Phyllis C.

    2012-01-01

    During August 10, 2011 through August 19, 2011, and October 23, 2011 through November 4, 2011, ORAU/ORISE conducted verification survey activities at the Separations Process Research Unit (SPRU) site that included in-process inspections, surface scans, and soil sampling of the Lower Level Hillside Area. According to the Type-B Investigation Report, Sr-90 was the primary contributor to the majority of the activity (60 times greater than the Cs-137 activity). The evaluation of the scan data and sample results obtained during verification activities determined that the primary radionuclide of concern, Sr-90, was well below the agreed upon soil cleanup objective (SCO) of 30 pCi/g for the site. However, the concentration of Cs-137 in the four judgmental samples collected in final status survey (FSS) Units A and B was greater than the SCO. Both ORAU and aRc surveys identified higher Cs-137 concentrations in FSS Units A and B; the greatest concentrations were indentified in FSS Unit A

  9. A framework for nuclear agreement and verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ali, A.

    1991-01-01

    This chapter assesses the prospects for a nuclear agreement between India and Pakistan. The chapter opens with a review of past and present political environments of the two countries. The discussion proceeds to describe the linkage of global arms control agreements, prospects for verification of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the role of nuclear power in any agreements, the intrusiveness of verification, and possible post-proliferation agreements. Various monitoring and verification technologies are described (mainly satellite oriented). The chapter concludes with an analysis of the likelihood of persuading India and Pakistan to agree to a nonproliferation arrangement

  10. Verification of Many-Qubit States

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Yuki Takeuchi

    2018-06-01

    Full Text Available Verification is a task to check whether a given quantum state is close to an ideal state or not. In this paper, we show that a variety of many-qubit quantum states can be verified with only sequential single-qubit measurements of Pauli operators. First, we introduce a protocol for verifying ground states of Hamiltonians. We next explain how to verify quantum states generated by a certain class of quantum circuits. We finally propose an adaptive test of stabilizers that enables the verification of all polynomial-time-generated hypergraph states, which include output states of the Bremner-Montanaro-Shepherd-type instantaneous quantum polynomial time (IQP circuits. Importantly, we do not make any assumption that the identically and independently distributed copies of the same states are given: Our protocols work even if some highly complicated entanglement is created among copies in any artificial way. As applications, we consider the verification of the quantum computational supremacy demonstration with IQP models, and verifiable blind quantum computing.

  11. The safeguards on-site laboratory at Sellafield. Five years operational experience

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Duinslaeger, L.; Belle, P. van; Mayer, K.; Casteleyn, K.; Abousahl, S.; Daures, P.; Eberle, H.; Enright, T.; Guiot, A.; Hild, M.; Horta Domenech, J.; Lajarge, P.; Laurent, P.; Le Terrier, A.; Lynch, B.; Marucci, M.; Millet, S.; Ottmar, H.; Richir, P.; Street, S.; Vallet, P.; Zuleger, E. [European Commission, Karlsruhe (Germany). Inst. for Transuranium Elements

    2004-06-01

    The start of operation of the large reprocessing facilities led Euratom Safeguards to a new approach for verification analysis of samples taken at the facility: the installation of on-site laboratories. The availability of analytical capabilities for independent verification measurements at the site of these facilities offers obvious advantages in view of timeliness of results. The 'On-Site Laboratory' (OSL) at the BNFL Sellafield site was the first ever and entered into operation in 1999. For almost five years, the Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU) has been operating the laboratory under routine conditions. During this period, more than one thousand safeguards samples were analysed. The experience gained in the management, logistics and operation of the OSL allow a critical review based on a significant period in time. This includes also aspects of training of staff, maintenance of equipment, flow of information, and improvements in the efficiency. The analytical issues are of key importance: based on the operational experience, the measurement methods were adapted (changing boundary conditions), the distribution of samples according to material type changed (start up of MOS fabrication plant), and the cutback in resources triggered a further streamlining of the analytical efforts. (orig.)

  12. Formal Verification -26 ...

    Indian Academy of Sciences (India)

    by testing of the components and successful testing leads to the software being ... Formal verification is based on formal methods which are mathematically based ..... scenario under which a similar error could occur. There are various other ...

  13. Verification of wet blasting decontamination technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matsubara, Sachito; Murayama, Kazunari; Yoshida, Hirohisa; Igei, Shigemitsu; Izumida, Tatsuo

    2013-01-01

    Macoho Co., Ltd. participated in the projects of 'Decontamination Verification Test FY 2011 by the Ministry of the Environment' and 'Decontamination Verification Test FY 2011 by the Cabinet Office.' And we tested verification to use a wet blasting technology for decontamination of rubble and roads contaminated by the accident of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant of the Tokyo Electric Power Company. As a results of the verification test, the wet blasting decontamination technology showed that a decontamination rate became 60-80% for concrete paving, interlocking, dense-grated asphalt pavement when applied to the decontamination of the road. When it was applied to rubble decontamination, a decontamination rate was 50-60% for gravel and approximately 90% for concrete and wood. It was thought that Cs-134 and Cs-137 attached to the fine sludge scraped off from a decontamination object and the sludge was found to be separated from abrasives by wet cyclene classification: the activity concentration of the abrasives is 1/30 or less than the sludge. The result shows that the abrasives can be reused without problems when the wet blasting decontamination technology is used. (author)

  14. The Changing Adventures of Mixed Low-Level Waste Disposal at the Nevada Test Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    After a 15-year hiatus, the United States Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) began accepting DOE off-site generated mixed low-level radioactive waste (MLLW) for disposal at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) in December 2005. This action was predicated on the acceptance by the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) of a waste analysis plan (WAP). The NNSA/NSO agreed to limit mixed waste disposal to 20,000 cubic meters (approximately 706,000 cubic feet) and close the facility by December 2010 or sooner, if the volume limit is reached. The WAP and implementing procedures were developed based on Hanford?s system of verification to the extent possible so the two regional disposal sites could have similar processes. Since the NNSA/NSO does not have a breaching facility to allow the opening of boxes at the site, verification of the waste occurs by visual inspection at the generator/treatment facility or by Real-Time-Radiography (RTR) at the NTS. This system allows the NTS to effectively, efficiently, and compliantly accept MLLW for disposal. The WAP, NTS Waste Acceptance Criteria, and procedures have been revised based on learning experiences. These changes include: RTR expectations; visual inspection techniques; tamper-indicating device selection; void space requirements; and chemical screening concerns. The NNSA/NSO, NDEP, and the generators have been working together throughout the debugging of the verification processes. Additionally, the NNSA/NSO will continue to refine the MLLW acceptance processes and strive for continual improvement of the program

  15. Clinical implications of the anisotropic analytical algorithm for IMRT treatment planning and verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bragg, Christopher M.; Wingate, Katrina; Conway, John

    2008-01-01

    Purpose: To determine the implications of the use of the Anisotropic Analytical Algorithm (AAA) for the production and dosimetric verification of IMRT plans for treatments of the prostate, parotid, nasopharynx and lung. Methods: 72 IMRT treatment plans produced using the Pencil Beam Convolution (PBC) algorithm were recalculated using the AAA and the dose distributions compared. Twenty-four of the plans were delivered to inhomogeneous phantoms and verification measurements made using a pinpoint ionisation chamber. The agreement between the AAA and measurement was determined. Results: Small differences were seen in the prostate plans, with the AAA predicting slightly lower minimum PTV doses. In the parotid plans, there were small increases in the lens and contralateral parotid doses while the nasopharyngeal plans revealed a reduction in the volume of the PTV covered by the 95% isodose (the V 95% ) when the AAA was used. Large changes were seen in the lung plans, the AAA predicting reductions in the minimum PTV dose and large reductions in the V 95% . The AAA also predicted small increases in the mean dose to the normal lung and the V 20 . In the verification measurements, all AAA calculations were within 3% or 3.5 mm distance to agreement of the measured doses. Conclusions: The AAA should be used in preference to the PBC algorithm for treatments involving low density tissue but this may necessitate re-evaluation of plan acceptability criteria. Improvements to the Multi-Resolution Dose Calculation algorithm used in the inverse planning are required to reduce the convergence error in the presence of lung tissue. There was excellent agreement between the AAA and verification measurements for all sites

  16. Verification of the network flow and transport/distributed velocity (NWFT/DVM) computer code

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Duda, L.E.

    1984-05-01

    The Network Flow and Transport/Distributed Velocity Method (NWFT/DVM) computer code was developed primarily to fulfill a need for a computationally efficient ground-water flow and contaminant transport capability for use in risk analyses where, quite frequently, large numbers of calculations are required. It is a semi-analytic, quasi-two-dimensional network code that simulates ground-water flow and the transport of dissolved species (radionuclides) in a saturated porous medium. The development of this code was carried out under a program funded by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to develop a methodology for assessing the risk from disposal of radioactive wastes in deep geologic formations (FIN: A-1192 and A-1266). In support to the methodology development program, the NRC has funded a separate Maintenance of Computer Programs Project (FIN: A-1166) to ensure that the codes developed under A-1192 or A-1266 remain consistent with current operating systems, are as error-free as possible, and have up-to-date documentations for reference by the NRC staff. Part of this effort would include verification and validation tests to assure that a code correctly performs the operations specified and/or is representing the processes or system for which it is intended. This document contains four verification problems for the NWFT/DVM computer code. Two of these problems are analytical verifications of NWFT/DVM where results are compared to analytical solutions. The other two are code-to-code verifications where results from NWFT/DVM are compared to those of another computer code. In all cases NWFT/DVM showed good agreement with both the analytical solutions and the results from the other code

  17. K Basins Field Verification Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Booth, H.W.

    1994-01-01

    The Field Verification Program establishes a uniform and systematic process to ensure that technical information depicted on selected engineering drawings accurately reflects the actual existing physical configuration. This document defines the Field Verification Program necessary to perform the field walkdown and inspection process that identifies the physical configuration of the systems required to support the mission objectives of K Basins. This program is intended to provide an accurate accounting of the actual field configuration by documenting the as-found information on a controlled drawing

  18. Engineering drawing field verification program. Revision 3

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ulk, P.F.

    1994-01-01

    Safe, efficient operation of waste tank farm facilities is dependent in part upon the availability of accurate, up-to-date plant drawings. Accurate plant drawings are also required in support of facility upgrades and future engineering remediation projects. This supporting document establishes the procedure for performing a visual field verification of engineering drawings, the degree of visual observation being performed and documenting the results. A copy of the drawing attesting to the degree of visual observation will be paginated into the released Engineering Change Notice (ECN) documenting the field verification for future retrieval and reference. All waste tank farm essential and support drawings within the scope of this program will be converted from manual to computer aided drafting (CAD) drawings. A permanent reference to the field verification status will be placed along the right border of the CAD-converted drawing, referencing the revision level, at which the visual verification was performed and documented

  19. Verification of Open Interactive Markov Chains

    OpenAIRE

    Brazdil, Tomas; Hermanns, Holger; Krcal, Jan; Kretinsky, Jan; Rehak, Vojtech

    2012-01-01

    Interactive Markov chains (IMC) are compositional behavioral models extending both labeled transition systems and continuous-time Markov chains. IMC pair modeling convenience - owed to compositionality properties - with effective verification algorithms and tools - owed to Markov properties. Thus far however, IMC verification did not consider compositionality properties, but considered closed systems. This paper discusses the evaluation of IMC in an open and thus compositional interpretation....

  20. Earth Science Enterprise Scientific Data Purchase Project: Verification and Validation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jenner, Jeff; Policelli, Fritz; Fletcher, Rosea; Holecamp, Kara; Owen, Carolyn; Nicholson, Lamar; Dartez, Deanna

    2000-01-01

    This paper presents viewgraphs on the Earth Science Enterprise Scientific Data Purchase Project's verification,and validation process. The topics include: 1) What is Verification and Validation? 2) Why Verification and Validation? 3) Background; 4) ESE Data Purchas Validation Process; 5) Data Validation System and Ingest Queue; 6) Shipment Verification; 7) Tracking and Metrics; 8) Validation of Contract Specifications; 9) Earth Watch Data Validation; 10) Validation of Vertical Accuracy; and 11) Results of Vertical Accuracy Assessment.

  1. Results of the independent radiological verification survey of the lower Sheffield Brook floodplain, Wayne, New Jersey

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yalcintas, M.G.; Carrier, R.F.

    1989-05-01

    Prior to 1971, the W.R. Grace Company processed and stored radioactive materials at Wayne, New Jersey, under license to the Atomic Energy Commission. Decontamination of structures and storage of waste materials on the property at the Wayne Interim Storage Site (WISS) took place in 1974. Surveys by the State of New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and by Oak Ridge Associated Universities for the NRC in 1982 indicated that properties adjacent to the WISS contained surface contamination by radioactive residuals in amounts exceeding those acceptable under US Department of Energy (DOE) remedial action guidelines. At the request of DOE, remedial actions have been conducted by Bechtel National, Inc., to remove radioactive residuals from properties adjacent to the site. It is the policy of DOE to assign an independent verification contractor to ensure the effectiveness of remedial actions performed within the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program. This report describes the methods and results of those studies that were conducted by the Measurement Applications and Development Group of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory for the lower Sheffield Brook floodplain west of the WISS. Based upon post-remedial action and verification survey data, it was concluded that residual soil concentrations and gamma levels following excavation and backfilling of the area are within the limits prescribed by DOE radiological guidelines. 12 refs., 6 figs., 8 tabs

  2. Design verification for large reprocessing plants (Proposed procedures)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rolandi, G.

    1988-07-01

    In the 1990s, four large commercial reprocessing plants will progressively come into operation: If an effective and efficient safeguards system is to be applied to these large and complex plants, several important factors have to be considered. One of these factors, addressed in the present report, concerns plant design verification. Design verification provides an overall assurance on plant measurement data. To this end design verification, although limited to the safeguards aspects of the plant, must be a systematic activity, which starts during the design phase, continues during the construction phase and is particularly performed during the various steps of the plant's commissioning phase. The detailed procedures for design information verification on commercial reprocessing plants must be defined within the frame of the general provisions set forth in INFCIRC/153 for any type of safeguards related activities and specifically for design verification. The present report is intended as a preliminary contribution on a purely technical level, and focusses on the problems within the Agency. For the purpose of the present study the most complex case was assumed: i.e. a safeguards system based on conventional materials accountancy, accompanied both by special input and output verification and by some form of near-real-time accountancy involving in-process inventory taking, based on authenticated operator's measurement data. C/S measures are also foreseen, where necessary to supplement the accountancy data. A complete ''design verification'' strategy comprehends: informing the Agency of any changes in the plant system which are defined as ''safeguards relevant''; ''reverifying by the Agency upon receiving notice from the Operator on any changes, on ''design information''. 13 refs

  3. Specification and Automated Verification of Real-Time Behaviour

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kristensen, C.H.; Andersen, J.H.; Skou, A.

    1995-01-01

    In this paper we sketch a method for specification and automatic verification of real-time software properties.......In this paper we sketch a method for specification and automatic verification of real-time software properties....

  4. Specification and Automated Verification of Real-Time Behaviour

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Andersen, J.H.; Kristensen, C.H.; Skou, A.

    1996-01-01

    In this paper we sketch a method for specification and automatic verification of real-time software properties.......In this paper we sketch a method for specification and automatic verification of real-time software properties....

  5. Formal Verification of Continuous Systems

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Sloth, Christoffer

    2012-01-01

    and the verification procedures should be algorithmically synthesizable. Autonomous control plays an important role in many safety-critical systems. This implies that a malfunction in the control system can have catastrophic consequences, e.g., in space applications where a design flaw can result in large economic...... losses. Furthermore, a malfunction in the control system of a surgical robot may cause death of patients. The previous examples involve complex systems that are required to operate according to complex specifications. The systems cannot be formally verified by modern verification techniques, due...

  6. Biometric Technologies and Verification Systems

    CERN Document Server

    Vacca, John R

    2007-01-01

    Biometric Technologies and Verification Systems is organized into nine parts composed of 30 chapters, including an extensive glossary of biometric terms and acronyms. It discusses the current state-of-the-art in biometric verification/authentication, identification and system design principles. It also provides a step-by-step discussion of how biometrics works; how biometric data in human beings can be collected and analyzed in a number of ways; how biometrics are currently being used as a method of personal identification in which people are recognized by their own unique corporal or behavior

  7. Runtime Verification Through Forward Chaining

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Alan Perotti

    2014-12-01

    Full Text Available In this paper we present a novel rule-based approach for Runtime Verification of FLTL properties over finite but expanding traces. Our system exploits Horn clauses in implication form and relies on a forward chaining-based monitoring algorithm. This approach avoids the branching structure and exponential complexity typical of tableaux-based formulations, creating monitors with a single state and a fixed number of rules. This allows for a fast and scalable tool for Runtime Verification: we present the technical details together with a working implementation.

  8. Current status of verification practices in clinical biochemistry in Spain.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gómez-Rioja, Rubén; Alvarez, Virtudes; Ventura, Montserrat; Alsina, M Jesús; Barba, Núria; Cortés, Mariano; Llopis, María Antonia; Martínez, Cecilia; Ibarz, Mercè

    2013-09-01

    Verification uses logical algorithms to detect potential errors before laboratory results are released to the clinician. Even though verification is one of the main processes in all laboratories, there is a lack of standardization mainly in the algorithms used and the criteria and verification limits applied. A survey in clinical laboratories in Spain was conducted in order to assess the verification process, particularly the use of autoverification. Questionnaires were sent to the laboratories involved in the External Quality Assurance Program organized by the Spanish Society of Clinical Biochemistry and Molecular Pathology. Seven common biochemical parameters were included (glucose, cholesterol, triglycerides, creatinine, potassium, calcium, and alanine aminotransferase). Completed questionnaires were received from 85 laboratories. Nearly all the laboratories reported using the following seven verification criteria: internal quality control, instrument warnings, sample deterioration, reference limits, clinical data, concordance between parameters, and verification of results. The use of all verification criteria varied according to the type of verification (automatic, technical, or medical). Verification limits for these parameters are similar to biological reference ranges. Delta Check was used in 24% of laboratories. Most laboratories (64%) reported using autoverification systems. Autoverification use was related to laboratory size, ownership, and type of laboratory information system, but amount of use (percentage of test autoverified) was not related to laboratory size. A total of 36% of Spanish laboratories do not use autoverification, despite the general implementation of laboratory information systems, most of them, with autoverification ability. Criteria and rules for seven routine biochemical tests were obtained.

  9. Do the TTBT and JVE provide a framework for 'effective' verification?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vergino, E.S.

    1998-01-01

    The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) was signed in 1974 by Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev with both the US and USSR agreeing to adhere to the 150 kt limit of the treaty as of March 31, 1976. Yet the treaty remained non ratified for more than twelve years and during this time during the height of the Cold War, the US and USSR continued to accuse one another of violating the treaty. During late 1987, during the Nuclear Testing Talks in Geneva the Joint Verification Experiment (JVE) was discussed and then was formally announced at the Shultz/Shevardnadze meeting in December, 1987. In the course of arranging JVE Information and data for five Soviet and five US nuclear tests, were exchanged. JVE activity culminated with Kearsarge, detonated on August 17, 1988 and Shagan, detonated on September 14, 1988. JVE provided a unique opportunity for US and USSR technical experts to work together to demonstrate that effective verification of the TTBT could be achieved. The TTBT was the first treaty in which the US pursued a series of complex protocols involving additional, intrusive verification measures. These required extensive collaboration between scientific and political communities, a collaboration necessary to address the balance between the technical capabilities and requirements and the political drivers and needs. During this talk the author discusses this balance, how the balance changed with time, the drivers for change and the lessons learned, and weather there are lessons to be learned that are applicable to the development of other, future, arms control agreements

  10. A Synthesized Framework for Formal Verification of Computing Systems

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Nikola Bogunovic

    2003-12-01

    Full Text Available Design process of computing systems gradually evolved to a level that encompasses formal verification techniques. However, the integration of formal verification techniques into a methodical design procedure has many inherent miscomprehensions and problems. The paper explicates the discrepancy between the real system implementation and the abstracted model that is actually used in the formal verification procedure. Particular attention is paid to the seamless integration of all phases of the verification procedure that encompasses definition of the specification language and denotation and execution of conformance relation between the abstracted model and its intended behavior. The concealed obstacles are exposed, computationally expensive steps identified and possible improvements proposed.

  11. Numerical Weather Forecasting at the Savannah River Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Buckley, R.L.

    1999-01-01

    Facilities such as the Savannah River Site (SRS), which contain the potential for hazardous atmospheric releases, rely on the predictive capabilities of dispersion models to assess possible emergency response actions. The operational design in relation to domain size and forecast time is presented, along with verification of model results over extended time periods with archived surface observations

  12. Monitoring, reporting and verification for national REDD + programmes: two proposals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Herold, Martin; Skutsch, Margaret

    2011-01-01

    Different options have been suggested by Parties to the UNFCCC (United Framework Convention on Climate Change) for inclusion in national approaches to REDD and REDD + (reduced deforestation, reduced degradation, enhancement of forest carbon stocks, sustainable management of forest, and conservation of forest carbon stocks). This paper proposes that from the practical and technical points of view of designing action for REDD and REDD + at local and sub-national level, as well as from the point of view of the necessary MRV (monitoring, reporting and verification), these should be grouped into three categories: conservation, which is rewarded on the basis of no changes in forest stock, reduced deforestation, in which lowered rates of forest area loss are rewarded, and positive impacts on carbon stock changes in forests remaining forest, which includes reduced degradation, sustainable management of forest of various kinds, and forest enhancement. Thus we have moved degradation, which conventionally is grouped with deforestation, into the forest management group reported as areas remaining forest land, with which it has, in reality, and particularly as regards MRV, much more in common. Secondly, in the context of the fact that REDD/REDD + is to take the form of a national or near-national approach, we argue that while systematic national monitoring is important, it may not be necessary for REDD/REDD + activities, or for national MRV, to be started at equal levels of intensity all over the country. Rather, areas where interventions seem easiest to start may be targeted, and here data measurements may be more rigorous (Tier 3), for example based on stakeholder self-monitoring with independent verification, while in other, untreated areas, a lower level of monitoring may be pursued, at least in the first instance. Treated areas may be targeted for any of the three groups of activities (conservation, reduced deforestation, and positive impact on carbon stock increases in

  13. Monitoring, reporting and verification for national REDD + programmes: two proposals

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Herold, Martin [Center for Geoinformation, Department of Environmental Science, Wageningen University, Droevendaalsesteeg 3, 6708 PB Wageningen (Netherlands); Skutsch, Margaret, E-mail: martin.herold@wur.nl [Centro de Investigaciones en GeografIa Ambiental, UNAM Campus Morelia (Mexico)

    2011-01-15

    Different options have been suggested by Parties to the UNFCCC (United Framework Convention on Climate Change) for inclusion in national approaches to REDD and REDD + (reduced deforestation, reduced degradation, enhancement of forest carbon stocks, sustainable management of forest, and conservation of forest carbon stocks). This paper proposes that from the practical and technical points of view of designing action for REDD and REDD + at local and sub-national level, as well as from the point of view of the necessary MRV (monitoring, reporting and verification), these should be grouped into three categories: conservation, which is rewarded on the basis of no changes in forest stock, reduced deforestation, in which lowered rates of forest area loss are rewarded, and positive impacts on carbon stock changes in forests remaining forest, which includes reduced degradation, sustainable management of forest of various kinds, and forest enhancement. Thus we have moved degradation, which conventionally is grouped with deforestation, into the forest management group reported as areas remaining forest land, with which it has, in reality, and particularly as regards MRV, much more in common. Secondly, in the context of the fact that REDD/REDD + is to take the form of a national or near-national approach, we argue that while systematic national monitoring is important, it may not be necessary for REDD/REDD + activities, or for national MRV, to be started at equal levels of intensity all over the country. Rather, areas where interventions seem easiest to start may be targeted, and here data measurements may be more rigorous (Tier 3), for example based on stakeholder self-monitoring with independent verification, while in other, untreated areas, a lower level of monitoring may be pursued, at least in the first instance. Treated areas may be targeted for any of the three groups of activities (conservation, reduced deforestation, and positive impact on carbon stock increases in

  14. Independent verification in operations at nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Donderi, D.C.; Smiley, A.; Ostry, D.J.; Moray, N.P.

    1995-09-01

    A critical review of approaches to independent verification in operations used in nuclear power plant quality assurance programs in other countries, was conducted for this study. This report identifies the uses of independent verification and provides an assessment of the effectiveness of the various approaches. The findings indicate that at Canadian nuclear power plants as much, if not more, independent verification is performed than at power plants in the other countries included in the study. Additional requirements in this area are not proposed for Canadian stations. (author)

  15. ASAMPSA-E guidance for level 2 PSA Volume 3. Verification and improvement of SAM strategies with L2 PSA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rahni, N.; Raimond, E.; Jan, P.; Lopez, J.; Loeffler, H.; Mildenberger, O.; Kubicek, J.; Vitazkova, J.; Ivanov, I.; Groudev, P.; Lajtha, G.; Serrano, C.; Zhabin, O.; Prosek, Andrej; Dirksen, G.; Yu, S.; Oury, L.; Hultqvist, G.

    2016-01-01

    For each NPP, severe accident management (SAM) strategies shall make use of components or systems and human resources to limit as far as possible the consequences of any severe accident on-site and off-site. L2 PSA is one of the tools that can be used to verify and improve these strategies. The present report (deliverable D40.5 of the project ASAMPSA-E) provides an opportunity for a comparison of objectives in the different countries in terms of SAM strategies verification and improvement. The report summarizes also experience of each partner (including potential deficiencies) involved in this activity, in order to derive some good practices and required progress, addressing: - SAM modeling in L2 PSA, - Positive and negative aspects in current SAM practices, - Discussion on possible criteria related to L2 PSA for verification and improvement: risk reduction (in relation with WP30 activities on risk metrics), reduction of uncertainties on the severe accident progression paths until NPP stabilization, reduction of human failure conditional probabilities (depending on the SAM strategy, the environmental conditions...), - Review with a perspective of verification and improvement of the main SAM strategies (corium cooling, RCS depressurization, control of flammable gases, reactivity control, containment function, containment pressure control, limitation of radioactive releases,...), - SAM strategies to be considered in the context of an extended L2 PSA (as far possible, depending on existing experience), taking into account all operating modes, accidents also occurring in the SFPs and long term and multi-unit accidents. The deliverable D40.5 is developed from the partners' experience. Many of the topics described here are beyond the common practices of L2 PSA applications: in some countries, L2 PSA application is limited to the calculations of frequencies of release categories with no formal requirement for SAM verification and improvement. (authors)

  16. Verification in Referral-Based Crowdsourcing

    Science.gov (United States)

    Naroditskiy, Victor; Rahwan, Iyad; Cebrian, Manuel; Jennings, Nicholas R.

    2012-01-01

    Online social networks offer unprecedented potential for rallying a large number of people to accomplish a given task. Here we focus on information gathering tasks where rare information is sought through “referral-based crowdsourcing”: the information request is propagated recursively through invitations among members of a social network. Whereas previous work analyzed incentives for the referral process in a setting with only correct reports, misreporting is known to be both pervasive in crowdsourcing applications, and difficult/costly to filter out. A motivating example for our work is the DARPA Red Balloon Challenge where the level of misreporting was very high. In order to undertake a formal study of verification, we introduce a model where agents can exert costly effort to perform verification and false reports can be penalized. This is the first model of verification and it provides many directions for future research, which we point out. Our main theoretical result is the compensation scheme that minimizes the cost of retrieving the correct answer. Notably, this optimal compensation scheme coincides with the winning strategy of the Red Balloon Challenge. PMID:23071530

  17. Nuclear Data Verification and Standardization

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Karam, Lisa R.; Arif, Muhammad; Thompson, Alan K.

    2011-10-01

    The objective of this interagency program is to provide accurate neutron interaction verification and standardization data for the U.S. Department of Energy Division of Nuclear Physics programs which include astrophysics, radioactive beam studies, and heavy-ion reactions. The measurements made in this program are also useful to other programs that indirectly use the unique properties of the neutron for diagnostic and analytical purposes. These include homeland security, personnel health and safety, nuclear waste disposal, treaty verification, national defense, and nuclear based energy production. The work includes the verification of reference standard cross sections and related neutron data employing the unique facilities and capabilities at NIST and other laboratories as required; leadership and participation in international intercomparisons and collaborations; and the preservation of standard reference deposits. An essential element of the program is critical evaluation of neutron interaction data standards including international coordinations. Data testing of critical data for important applications is included. The program is jointly supported by the Department of Energy and the National Institute of Standards and Technology.

  18. Verification and quality control of routine hematology analyzers

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Vis, J Y; Huisman, A

    2016-01-01

    Verification of hematology analyzers (automated blood cell counters) is mandatory before new hematology analyzers may be used in routine clinical care. The verification process consists of several items which comprise among others: precision, accuracy, comparability, carryover, background and

  19. Solid waste operations complex engineering verification program plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bergeson, C.L.

    1994-01-01

    This plan supersedes, but does not replace, the previous Waste Receiving and Processing/Solid Waste Engineering Development Program Plan. In doing this, it does not repeat the basic definitions of the various types or classes of development activities nor provide the rigorous written description of each facility and assign the equipment to development classes. The methodology described in the previous document is still valid and was used to determine the types of verification efforts required. This Engineering Verification Program Plan will be updated on a yearly basis. This EVPP provides programmatic definition of all engineering verification activities for the following SWOC projects: (1) Project W-026 - Waste Receiving and Processing Facility Module 1; (2) Project W-100 - Waste Receiving and Processing Facility Module 2A; (3) Project W-112 - Phase V Storage Facility; and (4) Project W-113 - Solid Waste Retrieval. No engineering verification activities are defined for Project W-112 as no verification work was identified. The Acceptance Test Procedures/Operational Test Procedures will be part of each project's Title III operation test efforts. The ATPs/OTPs are not covered by this EVPP

  20. 21 CFR 21.44 - Verification of identity.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... 21 Food and Drugs 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Verification of identity. 21.44 Section 21.44 Food... Verification of identity. (a) An individual seeking access to records in a Privacy Act Record System may be... identity. The identification required shall be suitable considering the nature of the records sought. No...

  1. Management of citation verification requests for multiple projects at Sandia National Laboratories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Crawford, C.S.

    1995-01-01

    Sandia National Laboratories' (SNL) Technical Library is now responsible for providing citation verification management support for all references cited in technical reports issued by the Nuclear Waste Management (NWM) Program. This paper dancing how this process is managed for the Yucca Mountain Site Characterization (YWP), Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL), and Greater Confinement Disposal (GCD) projects. Since technical reports are the main product of these projects, emphasis is placed on meeting the constantly evolving needs of these customers in a timely and cost-effective manner

  2. Burnup verification tests with the FORK measurement system-implementation for burnup credit

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ewing, R.I.

    1994-01-01

    Verification measurements may be used to help ensure nuclear criticality safety when burnup credit is applied to spent fuel transport and storage systems. The FORK system measures the passive neutron and gamma-ray emission from spent fuel assemblies while in the storage pool. It was designed at Los Alamos National Laboratory for the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards program and is well suited to verify burnup and cooling time records at commercial Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) sites. This report deals with the application of the FORK system to burnup credit operations

  3. A methodology for the rigorous verification of plasma simulation codes

    Science.gov (United States)

    Riva, Fabio

    2016-10-01

    The methodology used to assess the reliability of numerical simulation codes constitutes the Verification and Validation (V&V) procedure. V&V is composed by two separate tasks: the verification, which is a mathematical issue targeted to assess that the physical model is correctly solved, and the validation, which determines the consistency of the code results, and therefore of the physical model, with experimental data. In the present talk we focus our attention on the verification, which in turn is composed by the code verification, targeted to assess that a physical model is correctly implemented in a simulation code, and the solution verification, that quantifies the numerical error affecting a simulation. Bridging the gap between plasma physics and other scientific domains, we introduced for the first time in our domain a rigorous methodology for the code verification, based on the method of manufactured solutions, as well as a solution verification based on the Richardson extrapolation. This methodology was applied to GBS, a three-dimensional fluid code based on a finite difference scheme, used to investigate the plasma turbulence in basic plasma physics experiments and in the tokamak scrape-off layer. Overcoming the difficulty of dealing with a numerical method intrinsically affected by statistical noise, we have now generalized the rigorous verification methodology to simulation codes based on the particle-in-cell algorithm, which are employed to solve Vlasov equation in the investigation of a number of plasma physics phenomena.

  4. Verification and Performance Analysis for Embedded Systems

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Larsen, Kim Guldstrand

    2009-01-01

    This talk provides a thorough tutorial of the UPPAAL tool suite for, modeling, simulation, verification, optimal scheduling, synthesis, testing and performance analysis of embedded and real-time systems.......This talk provides a thorough tutorial of the UPPAAL tool suite for, modeling, simulation, verification, optimal scheduling, synthesis, testing and performance analysis of embedded and real-time systems....

  5. Tolerance Verification of Micro and Nano Structures on Polycarbonate Substrates

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Gasparin, Stefania; Tosello, Guido; Hansen, Hans Nørgaard

    2010-01-01

    Micro and nano structures are an increasing challenge in terms of tolerance verification and process quality control: smaller dimensions led to a smaller tolerance zone to be evaluated. This paper focuses on the verification of CD, DVD and HD-DVD nanoscale features. CD tolerance features are defi......Micro and nano structures are an increasing challenge in terms of tolerance verification and process quality control: smaller dimensions led to a smaller tolerance zone to be evaluated. This paper focuses on the verification of CD, DVD and HD-DVD nanoscale features. CD tolerance features...

  6. Standard Verification System (SVS)

    Data.gov (United States)

    Social Security Administration — SVS is a mainframe program that accesses the NUMIDENT to perform SSN verifications. This program is called by SSA Internal applications to verify SSNs. There is also...

  7. Comparison between In-house developed and Diamond commercial software for patient specific independent monitor unit calculation and verification with heterogeneity corrections.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kuppusamy, Vijayalakshmi; Nagarajan, Vivekanandan; Jeevanandam, Prakash; Murugan, Lavanya

    2016-02-01

    The study was aimed to compare two different monitor unit (MU) or dose verification software in volumetric modulated arc therapy (VMAT) using modified Clarkson's integration technique for 6 MV photons beams. In-house Excel Spreadsheet based monitor unit verification calculation (MUVC) program and PTW's DIAMOND secondary check software (SCS), version-6 were used as a secondary check to verify the monitor unit (MU) or dose calculated by treatment planning system (TPS). In this study 180 patients were grouped into 61 head and neck, 39 thorax and 80 pelvic sites. Verification plans are created using PTW OCTAVIUS-4D phantom and also measured using 729 detector chamber and array with isocentre as the suitable point of measurement for each field. In the analysis of 154 clinically approved VMAT plans with isocentre at a region above -350 HU, using heterogeneity corrections, In-house Spreadsheet based MUVC program and Diamond SCS showed good agreement TPS. The overall percentage average deviations for all sites were (-0.93% + 1.59%) and (1.37% + 2.72%) for In-house Excel Spreadsheet based MUVC program and Diamond SCS respectively. For 26 clinically approved VMAT plans with isocentre at a region below -350 HU showed higher variations for both In-house Spreadsheet based MUVC program and Diamond SCS. It can be concluded that for patient specific quality assurance (QA), the In-house Excel Spreadsheet based MUVC program and Diamond SCS can be used as a simple and fast accompanying to measurement based verification for plans with isocentre at a region above -350 HU. Copyright © 2016 Associazione Italiana di Fisica Medica. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  8. A GIS support system for declaration and verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Poucet, A.; Contini, S.; Bellezza, F.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The timely detection of a diversion of a significant amount of nuclear material from the civil cycle represents a complex activity that requires the use of powerful support systems. In this field the authors developed SIT (Safeguards Inspection Tool), an integrated platform for collecting, managing and analysing data from a variety of sources to support declarations and verification activities. Information dealt with is that requested by both INFCIRC/153 and INFCIRC/540 protocols. SIT is based on a low-cost Geographic Information System platform and extensive use is made of commercial software to reduce maintenance costs. The system has been developed using ARCVIEW GIS for Windows NT platforms. SIT is conceived as an integrator of multimedia information stored into local and remote databases; efforts have been focused on the automation of several tasks in order to produce a user-friendly system. Main characteristics of SIT are: Capability to deal with multimedia data, e.g. text, images, video, using user-selected COTS; Easy access to external databases, e.g. Oracle, Informix, Sybase, MS-Access, directly from the site map; Selected access to open source information via Internet; Capability to easily geo-reference site maps, to generate thematic layers of interest and to perform spatial analysis; Capability of performing aerial and satellite image analysis operations, e.g. rectification, change detection, feature extraction; Capability to easily add and run external models for e.g. material data accounting, completeness check, air dispersion models, material flow graph generation and to describe results in graphical form; Capability to use a Geo-positioning systems (GPS) with a portable computer, SIT is at an advanced stage of development and will be very soon interfaced with VERITY, a powerful Web search engine in order to allow open source information retrieval from geographical maps. The paper will describe the main features of SIT and the advantages of

  9. A GIS support system for declaration and verification

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Poucet, A; Contini, S; Bellezza, F [European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Institute for Systems Informatics and Safety (ISIS), Ispra (Italy)

    2001-07-01

    Full text: The timely detection of a diversion of a significant amount of nuclear material from the civil cycle represents a complex activity that requires the use of powerful support systems. In this field the authors developed SIT (Safeguards Inspection Tool), an integrated platform for collecting, managing and analysing data from a variety of sources to support declarations and verification activities. Information dealt with is that requested by both INFCIRC/153 and INFCIRC/540 protocols. SIT is based on a low-cost Geographic Information System platform and extensive use is made of commercial software to reduce maintenance costs. The system has been developed using ARCVIEW GIS for Windows NT platforms. SIT is conceived as an integrator of multimedia information stored into local and remote databases; efforts have been focused on the automation of several tasks in order to produce a user-friendly system. Main characteristics of SIT are: Capability to deal with multimedia data, e.g. text, images, video, using user-selected COTS; Easy access to external databases, e.g. Oracle, Informix, Sybase, MS-Access, directly from the site map; Selected access to open source information via Internet; Capability to easily geo-reference site maps, to generate thematic layers of interest and to perform spatial analysis; Capability of performing aerial and satellite image analysis operations, e.g. rectification, change detection, feature extraction; Capability to easily add and run external models for e.g. material data accounting, completeness check, air dispersion models, material flow graph generation and to describe results in graphical form; Capability to use a Geo-positioning systems (GPS) with a portable computer, SIT is at an advanced stage of development and will be very soon interfaced with VERITY, a powerful Web search engine in order to allow open source information retrieval from geographical maps. The paper will describe the main features of SIT and the advantages of

  10. As-Built Verification Plan Spent Nuclear Fuel Canister Storage Building MCO Handling Machine

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    SWENSON, C.E.

    2000-01-01

    This as-built verification plan outlines the methodology and responsibilities that will be implemented during the as-built field verification activity for the Canister Storage Building (CSB) MCO HANDLING MACHINE (MHM). This as-built verification plan covers THE ELECTRICAL PORTION of the CONSTRUCTION PERFORMED BY POWER CITY UNDER CONTRACT TO MOWAT. The as-built verifications will be performed in accordance Administrative Procedure AP 6-012-00, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project As-Built Verification Plan Development Process, revision I. The results of the verification walkdown will be documented in a verification walkdown completion package, approved by the Design Authority (DA), and maintained in the CSB project files

  11. 37 CFR 262.7 - Verification of royalty payments.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... Designated Agent have agreed as to proper verification methods. (b) Frequency of verification. A Copyright Owner or a Performer may conduct a single audit of the Designated Agent upon reasonable notice and... COPYRIGHT ARBITRATION ROYALTY PANEL RULES AND PROCEDURES RATES AND TERMS FOR CERTAIN ELIGIBLE...

  12. 40 CFR 1065.675 - CLD quench verification calculations.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 40 Protection of Environment 32 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false CLD quench verification calculations... POLLUTION CONTROLS ENGINE-TESTING PROCEDURES Calculations and Data Requirements § 1065.675 CLD quench verification calculations. Perform CLD quench-check calculations as follows: (a) Perform a CLD analyzer quench...

  13. Analysis and Transformation Tools for Constrained Horn Clause Verification

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kafle, Bishoksan; Gallagher, John Patrick

    2014-01-01

    Several techniques and tools have been developed for verification of properties expressed as Horn clauses with constraints over a background theory (CHC). Current CHC verification tools implement intricate algorithms and are often limited to certain subclasses of CHC problems. Our aim in this work...... is to investigate the use of a combination of off-the-shelf techniques from the literature in analysis and transformation of Constraint Logic Programs (CLPs) to solve challenging CHC verification problems. We find that many problems can be solved using a combination of tools based on well-known techniques from...... abstract interpretation, semantics-preserving transformations, program specialisation and query-answer transformations. This gives insights into the design of automatic, more general CHC verification tools based on a library of components....

  14. Verification of the thermal design of electronic equipment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hienonen, R.; Karjalainen, M.; Lankinen, R. [VTT Automation, Espoo (Finland). ProTechno

    1997-12-31

    The project `Verification of the thermal design of electronic equipment` studied the methodology to be followed in the verification of thermal design of electronic equipment. This project forms part of the `Cool Electronics` research programme funded by TEKES, the Finnish Technology Development Centre. This project was carried out jointly by VTT Automation, Lappeenranta University of Technology, Nokia Research Center and ABB Industry Oy VSD-Technology. The thermal design of electronic equipment has a significant impact on the cost, reliability, tolerance to different environments, selection of components and materials, and ergonomics of the product. This report describes the method for verification of thermal design. It assesses the goals set for thermal design, environmental requirements, technical implementation of the design, thermal simulation and modelling, and design qualification testing and the measurements needed. The verification method covers all packaging levels of electronic equipment from the system level to the electronic component level. The method described in this report can be used as part of the quality system of a corporation. The report includes information about the measurement and test methods needed in the verification process. Some measurement methods for the temperature, flow and pressure of air are described. (orig.) Published in Finnish VTT Julkaisuja 824. 22 refs.

  15. IAEA inspectors complete verification of nuclear material in Iraq

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    Full text: At the request of the Government of Iraq and pursuant to the NPT Safeguards Agreement with Iraq, a team of IAEA safeguards inspectors has completed the annual Physical Inventory Verification of declared nuclear material in Iraq, and is returning to Vienna. The material - natural or low-enriched uranium - is not sensitive from a proliferation perspective and is consolidated at a storage facility near the Tuwaitha complex, south of Baghdad. This inspection was conducted with the logistical and security assistance of the Multinational Force and the Office of the UN Security Coordinator. Inspections such as this are required by safeguards agreements with every non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT that has declared holdings of nuclear material, to verify the correctness of the declaration, and that material has not been diverted to any undeclared activity. Such inspections have been performed in Iraq on a continuing basis. The most recent took place in June 2003, following reports of looting of nuclear material at the Tuwaitha complex; IAEA inspectors recovered, repackaged and resealed all but a minute amount of material. NPT safeguards inspections are limited in scope and coverage as compared to the verification activities carried out in 1991-98 and 2002-03 by the IAEA under Security Council resolution 687 and related resolutions. 'This week's mission was a good first step,' IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei said. 'Now we hope to be in a position to complete the mandate entrusted to us by the Security Council, to enable the Council over time to remove all sanctions and restrictions imposed on Iraq - so that Iraq's rights as a full-fledged member of the international community can be restored.' The removal of remaining sanctions is dependent on completion of the verification process by the IAEA and the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). It should be noted that IAEA technical assistance to Iraq has been resumed over

  16. Methods of Software Verification

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    R. E. Gurin

    2015-01-01

    Full Text Available This article is devoted to the problem of software verification (SW. Methods of software verification designed to check the software for compliance with the stated requirements such as correctness, system security and system adaptability to small changes in the environment, portability and compatibility, etc. These are various methods both by the operation process and by the way of achieving result. The article describes the static and dynamic methods of software verification and paid attention to the method of symbolic execution. In its review of static analysis are discussed and described the deductive method, and methods for testing the model. A relevant issue of the pros and cons of a particular method is emphasized. The article considers classification of test techniques for each method. In this paper we present and analyze the characteristics and mechanisms of the static analysis of dependencies, as well as their views, which can reduce the number of false positives in situations where the current state of the program combines two or more states obtained both in different paths of execution and in working with multiple object values. Dependences connect various types of software objects: single variables, the elements of composite variables (structure fields, array elements, the size of the heap areas, the length of lines, the number of initialized array elements in the verification code using static methods. The article pays attention to the identification of dependencies within the framework of the abstract interpretation, as well as gives an overview and analysis of the inference tools.Methods of dynamic analysis such as testing, monitoring and profiling are presented and analyzed. Also some kinds of tools are considered which can be applied to the software when using the methods of dynamic analysis. Based on the work a conclusion is drawn, which describes the most relevant problems of analysis techniques, methods of their solutions and

  17. Verification and Validation in Systems Engineering

    CERN Document Server

    Debbabi, Mourad; Jarraya, Yosr; Soeanu, Andrei; Alawneh, Luay

    2010-01-01

    "Verification and validation" represents an important process used for the quality assessment of engineered systems and their compliance with the requirements established at the beginning of or during the development cycle. Debbabi and his coauthors investigate methodologies and techniques that can be employed for the automatic verification and validation of systems engineering design models expressed in standardized modeling languages. Their presentation includes a bird's eye view of the most prominent modeling languages for software and systems engineering, namely the Unified Model

  18. 37 CFR 260.6 - Verification of royalty payments.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... verification of the payment of royalty fees to those parties entitled to receive such fees, according to terms... 37 Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Verification of royalty... COPYRIGHT ARBITRATION ROYALTY PANEL RULES AND PROCEDURES RATES AND TERMS FOR PREEXISTING SUBSCRIPTION...

  19. Applying Monte Carlo Simulation to Launch Vehicle Design and Requirements Verification

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hanson, John M.; Beard, Bernard B.

    2010-01-01

    This paper is focused on applying Monte Carlo simulation to probabilistic launch vehicle design and requirements verification. The approaches developed in this paper can be applied to other complex design efforts as well. Typically the verification must show that requirement "x" is met for at least "y" % of cases, with, say, 10% consumer risk or 90% confidence. Two particular aspects of making these runs for requirements verification will be explored in this paper. First, there are several types of uncertainties that should be handled in different ways, depending on when they become known (or not). The paper describes how to handle different types of uncertainties and how to develop vehicle models that can be used to examine their characteristics. This includes items that are not known exactly during the design phase but that will be known for each assembled vehicle (can be used to determine the payload capability and overall behavior of that vehicle), other items that become known before or on flight day (can be used for flight day trajectory design and go/no go decision), and items that remain unknown on flight day. Second, this paper explains a method (order statistics) for determining whether certain probabilistic requirements are met or not and enables the user to determine how many Monte Carlo samples are required. Order statistics is not new, but may not be known in general to the GN&C community. The methods also apply to determining the design values of parameters of interest in driving the vehicle design. The paper briefly discusses when it is desirable to fit a distribution to the experimental Monte Carlo results rather than using order statistics.

  20. M3 version 3.0: Verification and validation; Hydrochemical model of ground water at repository site

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gomez, Javier B. (Dept. of Earth Sciences, Univ. of Zaragoza, Zaragoza (Spain)); Laaksoharju, Marcus (Geopoint AB, Sollentuna (Sweden)); Skaarman, Erik (Abscondo, Bromma (Sweden)); Gurban, Ioana (3D-Terra (Canada))

    2009-01-15

    Hydrochemical evaluation is a complex type of work that is carried out by specialists. The outcome of this work is generally presented as qualitative models and process descriptions of a site. To support and help to quantify the processes in an objective way, a multivariate mathematical tool entitled M3 (Multivariate Mixing and Mass balance calculations) has been constructed. The computer code can be used to trace the origin of the groundwater, and to calculate the mixing proportions and mass balances from groundwater data. The M3 code is a groundwater response model, which means that changes in the groundwater chemistry in terms of sources and sinks are traced in relation to an ideal mixing model. The complexity of the measured groundwater data determines the configuration of the ideal mixing model. Deviations from the ideal mixing model are interpreted as being due to reactions. Assumptions concerning important mineral phases altering the groundwater or uncertainties associated with thermodynamic constants do not affect the modelling because the calculations are solely based on the measured groundwater composition. M3 uses the opposite approach to that of many standard hydrochemical models. In M3, mixing is evaluated and calculated first. The constituents that cannot be described by mixing are described by reactions. The M3 model consists of three steps: the first is a standard principal component analysis, followed by mixing and finally mass balance calculations. The measured groundwater composition can be described in terms of mixing proportions (%), while the sinks and sources of an element associated with reactions are reported in mg/L. This report contains a set of verification and validation exercises with the intention of building confidence in the use of the M3 methodology. At the same time, clear answers are given to questions related to the accuracy and the precision of the results, including the inherent uncertainties and the errors that can be made

  1. High-throughput verification of transcriptional starting sites by Deep-RACE

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Olivarius, Signe; Plessy, Charles; Carninci, Piero

    2009-01-01

    We present a high-throughput method for investigating the transcriptional starting sites of genes of interest, which we named Deep-RACE (Deep–rapid amplification of cDNA ends). Taking advantage of the latest sequencing technology, it allows the parallel analysis of multiple genes and is free...

  2. Cleanup Verification Package for the 118-B-1, 105-B Solid Waste Burial Ground

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Capron, J.M.

    2008-01-01

    This cleanup verification package documents completion of remedial action, sampling activities, and compliance criteria for the 118-B-1, 105-B Solid Waste Burial Ground. This waste site was the primary burial ground for general wastes from the operation of the 105-B Reactor and P-10 Tritium Separation Project and also received waste from the 105-N Reactor. The burial ground received reactor hardware, process piping and tubing, fuel spacers, glassware, electrical components, tritium process wastes, soft wastes and other miscellaneous debris

  3. Land surface Verification Toolkit (LVT)

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kumar, Sujay V.

    2017-01-01

    LVT is a framework developed to provide an automated, consolidated environment for systematic land surface model evaluation Includes support for a range of in-situ, remote-sensing and other model and reanalysis products. Supports the analysis of outputs from various LIS subsystems, including LIS-DA, LIS-OPT, LIS-UE. Note: The Land Information System Verification Toolkit (LVT) is a NASA software tool designed to enable the evaluation, analysis and comparison of outputs generated by the Land Information System (LIS). The LVT software is released under the terms and conditions of the NASA Open Source Agreement (NOSA) Version 1.1 or later. Land Information System Verification Toolkit (LVT) NOSA.

  4. On Backward-Style Anonymity Verification

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kawabe, Yoshinobu; Mano, Ken; Sakurada, Hideki; Tsukada, Yasuyuki

    Many Internet services and protocols should guarantee anonymity; for example, an electronic voting system should guarantee to prevent the disclosure of who voted for which candidate. To prove trace anonymity, which is an extension of the formulation of anonymity by Schneider and Sidiropoulos, this paper presents an inductive method based on backward anonymous simulations. We show that the existence of an image-finite backward anonymous simulation implies trace anonymity. We also demonstrate the anonymity verification of an e-voting protocol (the FOO protocol) with our backward anonymous simulation technique. When proving the trace anonymity, this paper employs a computer-assisted verification tool based on a theorem prover.

  5. 78 FR 27882 - VA Veteran-Owned Small Business (VOSB) Verification Guidelines

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-05-13

    ... Verification Self-Assessment Tool that walks the veteran through the regulation and how it applies to the...) Verification Guidelines AGENCY: Department of Veterans Affairs. ACTION: Advanced notice of proposed rulemaking... regulations governing the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Veteran-Owned Small Business (VOSB) Verification...

  6. Verification and validation for waste disposal models

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-07-01

    A set of evaluation criteria has been developed to assess the suitability of current verification and validation techniques for waste disposal methods. A survey of current practices and techniques was undertaken and evaluated using these criteria with the items most relevant to waste disposal models being identified. Recommendations regarding the most suitable verification and validation practices for nuclear waste disposal modelling software have been made

  7. Property-driven functional verification technique for high-speed vision system-on-chip processor

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nshunguyimfura, Victor; Yang, Jie; Liu, Liyuan; Wu, Nanjian

    2017-04-01

    The implementation of functional verification in a fast, reliable, and effective manner is a challenging task in a vision chip verification process. The main reason for this challenge is the stepwise nature of existing functional verification techniques. This vision chip verification complexity is also related to the fact that in most vision chip design cycles, extensive efforts are focused on how to optimize chip metrics such as performance, power, and area. Design functional verification is not explicitly considered at an earlier stage at which the most sound decisions are made. In this paper, we propose a semi-automatic property-driven verification technique. The implementation of all verification components is based on design properties. We introduce a low-dimension property space between the specification space and the implementation space. The aim of this technique is to speed up the verification process for high-performance parallel processing vision chips. Our experimentation results show that the proposed technique can effectively improve the verification effort up to 20% for the complex vision chip design while reducing the simulation and debugging overheads.

  8. Design verification methodology for a solenoid valve for industrial applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, Chang Dae; Lim, Byung Ju; Chun, Kyung Yul

    2015-01-01

    Solenoid operated valves (SOV) are widely used in many applications due to their fast dynamic responses, cost effectiveness, and less contamination sensitive characteristics. In this paper, we tried to provide a convenient method of design verification of SOV to design engineers who depend on their experiences and experiment during design and development process of SOV. First, we summarize a detailed procedure for designing SOVs for industrial applications. All of the design constraints are defined in the first step of the design, and then the detail design procedure is presented based on design experiences as well as various physical and electromagnetic relationships. Secondly, we have suggested a verification method of this design using theoretical relationships, which enables optimal design of SOV from a point of view of safety factor of design attraction force. Lastly, experimental performance tests using several prototypes manufactured based on this design method show that the suggested design verification methodology is appropriate for designing new models of solenoids. We believe that this verification process is novel logic and useful to save time and expenses during development of SOV because verification tests with manufactured specimen may be substituted partly by this verification methodology.

  9. Verification test report on a solar heating and hot water system

    Science.gov (United States)

    1978-01-01

    Information is provided on the development, qualification and acceptance verification of commercial solar heating and hot water systems and components. The verification includes the performances, the efficiences and the various methods used, such as similarity, analysis, inspection, test, etc., that are applicable to satisfying the verification requirements.

  10. Temporal Specification and Verification of Real-Time Systems.

    Science.gov (United States)

    1991-08-30

    of concrete real - time systems can be modeled adequately. Specification: We present two conservative extensions of temporal logic that allow for the...logic. We present both model-checking algorithms for the automatic verification of finite-state real - time systems and proof methods for the deductive verification of real - time systems .

  11. TH-AB-201-01: A Feasibility Study of Independent Dose Verification for CyberKnife

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sato, A; Noda, T; Keduka, Y; Kawajiri, T; Itano, M; Yamazaki, T; Tachibana, H

    2016-01-01

    Purpose: CyberKnife irradiation is composed of tiny-size, multiple and intensity-modulated beams compared to conventional linacs. Few of the publications for Independent dose calculation verification for CyberKnife have been reported. In this study, we evaluated the feasibility of independent dose verification for CyberKnife treatment as Secondary check. Methods: The followings were measured: test plans using some static and single beams, clinical plans in a phantom and using patient’s CT. 75 patient plans were collected from several treatment sites of brain, lung, liver and bone. In the test plans and the phantom plans, a pinpoint ion-chamber measurement was performed to assess dose deviation for a treatment planning system (TPS) and an independent verification program of Simple MU Analysis (SMU). In the clinical plans, dose deviation between the SMU and the TPS was performed. Results: In test plan, the dose deviations were 3.3±4.5%, and 4.1±4.4% for the TPS and the SMU, respectively. In the phantom measurements for the clinical plans, the dose deviations were −0.2±3.6% for the TPS and −2.3±4.8% for the SMU. In the clinical plans using the patient’s CT, the dose deviations were −3.0±2.1% (Mean±1SD). The systematic difference was partially derived from inverse square law and penumbra calculation. Conclusion: The independent dose calculation for CyberKnife shows −3.0±4.2% (Mean±2SD) and our study, the confidence limit was achieved within 5% of the tolerance level from AAPM task group 114 for non-IMRT treatment. Thus, it may be feasible to use independent dose calculation verification for CyberKnife treatment as the secondary check. This research is partially supported by Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED)

  12. Environmental technology verification methods

    CSIR Research Space (South Africa)

    Szewczuk, S

    2016-03-01

    Full Text Available Environmental Technology Verification (ETV) is a tool that has been developed in the United States of America, Europe and many other countries around the world to help innovative environmental technologies reach the market. Claims about...

  13. Verification and Optimization of a PLC Control Schedule

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Brinksma, Hendrik; Mader, Angelika H.; Havelund, K.; Penix, J.; Visser, W.

    We report on the use of the SPIN model checker for both the verification of a process control program and the derivation of optimal control schedules. This work was carried out as part of a case study for the EC VHS project (Verification of Hybrid Systems), in which the program for a Programmable

  14. Compressive sensing using optimized sensing matrix for face verification

    Science.gov (United States)

    Oey, Endra; Jeffry; Wongso, Kelvin; Tommy

    2017-12-01

    Biometric appears as one of the solutions which is capable in solving problems that occurred in the usage of password in terms of data access, for example there is possibility in forgetting password and hard to recall various different passwords. With biometrics, physical characteristics of a person can be captured and used in the identification process. In this research, facial biometric is used in the verification process to determine whether the user has the authority to access the data or not. Facial biometric is chosen as its low cost implementation and generate quite accurate result for user identification. Face verification system which is adopted in this research is Compressive Sensing (CS) technique, in which aims to reduce dimension size as well as encrypt data in form of facial test image where the image is represented in sparse signals. Encrypted data can be reconstructed using Sparse Coding algorithm. Two types of Sparse Coding namely Orthogonal Matching Pursuit (OMP) and Iteratively Reweighted Least Squares -ℓp (IRLS-ℓp) will be used for comparison face verification system research. Reconstruction results of sparse signals are then used to find Euclidean norm with the sparse signal of user that has been previously saved in system to determine the validity of the facial test image. Results of system accuracy obtained in this research are 99% in IRLS with time response of face verification for 4.917 seconds and 96.33% in OMP with time response of face verification for 0.4046 seconds with non-optimized sensing matrix, while 99% in IRLS with time response of face verification for 13.4791 seconds and 98.33% for OMP with time response of face verification for 3.1571 seconds with optimized sensing matrix.

  15. 340 and 310 drawing field verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Langdon, J.

    1996-01-01

    The purpose of the drawing field verification work plan is to provide reliable drawings for the 310 Treated Effluent Disposal Facility (TEDF) and 340 Waste Handling Facility (340 Facility). The initial scope of this work plan is to provide field verified and updated versions of all the 340 Facility essential drawings. This plan can also be used for field verification of any other drawings that the facility management directs to be so updated. Any drawings revised by this work plan will be issued in an AutoCAD format

  16. Verification of Scientific Simulations via Hypothesis-Driven Comparative and Quantitative Visualization

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ahrens, James P [ORNL; Heitmann, Katrin [ORNL; Petersen, Mark R [ORNL; Woodring, Jonathan [Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL); Williams, Sean [Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL); Fasel, Patricia [Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL); Ahrens, Christine [Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL); Hsu, Chung-Hsing [ORNL; Geveci, Berk [ORNL

    2010-11-01

    This article presents a visualization-assisted process that verifies scientific-simulation codes. Code verification is necessary because scientists require accurate predictions to interpret data confidently. This verification process integrates iterative hypothesis verification with comparative, feature, and quantitative visualization. Following this process can help identify differences in cosmological and oceanographic simulations.

  17. Formal verification of Simulink/Stateflow diagrams a deductive approach

    CERN Document Server

    Zhan, Naijun; Zhao, Hengjun

    2017-01-01

    This book presents a state-of-the-art technique for formal verification of continuous-time Simulink/Stateflow diagrams, featuring an expressive hybrid system modelling language, a powerful specification logic and deduction-based verification approach, and some impressive, realistic case studies. Readers will learn the HCSP/HHL-based deductive method and the use of corresponding tools for formal verification of Simulink/Stateflow diagrams. They will also gain some basic ideas about fundamental elements of formal methods such as formal syntax and semantics, and especially the common techniques applied in formal modelling and verification of hybrid systems. By investigating the successful case studies, readers will realize how to apply the pure theory and techniques to real applications, and hopefully will be inspired to start to use the proposed approach, or even develop their own formal methods in their future work.

  18. Coronavirus envelope (E) protein remains at the site of assembly

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Venkatagopalan, Pavithra; Daskalova, Sasha M.; Lopez, Lisa A.; Dolezal, Kelly A.; Hogue, Brenda G.

    2015-01-01

    Coronaviruses (CoVs) assemble at endoplasmic reticulum Golgi intermediate compartment (ERGIC) membranes and egress from cells in cargo vesicles. Only a few molecules of the envelope (E) protein are assembled into virions. The role of E in morphogenesis is not fully understood. The cellular localization and dynamics of mouse hepatitis CoV A59 (MHV) E protein were investigated to further understanding of its role during infection. E protein localized in the ERGIC and Golgi with the amino and carboxy termini in the lumen and cytoplasm, respectively. E protein does not traffic to the cell surface. MHV was genetically engineered with a tetracysteine tag at the carboxy end of E. Fluorescence recovery after photobleaching (FRAP) showed that E is mobile in ERGIC/Golgi membranes. Correlative light electron microscopy (CLEM) confirmed the presence of E in Golgi cisternae. The results provide strong support that E proteins carry out their function(s) at the site of budding/assembly. - Highlights: • Mouse hepatitis coronavirus (MHV-CoV) E protein localizes in the ERGIC and Golgi. • MHV-CoV E does not transport to the cell surface. • MHV-CoV can be genetically engineered with a tetracysteine tag appended to E. • First FRAP and correlative light electron microscopy of a CoV E protein. • Live-cell imaging shows that E is mobile in ERGIC/Golgi membranes

  19. Coronavirus envelope (E) protein remains at the site of assembly

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Venkatagopalan, Pavithra [The Biodesign Institute, Center for Infectious Diseases and Vaccinology, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-5401 (United States); School of Life Sciences, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-5401 (United States); Microbiology Graduate Program, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-5401 (United States); Daskalova, Sasha M. [The Biodesign Institute, Center for Infectious Diseases and Vaccinology, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-5401 (United States); Department of Biochemistry and Chemistry, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-5401 (United States); Lopez, Lisa A. [The Biodesign Institute, Center for Infectious Diseases and Vaccinology, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-5401 (United States); School of Life Sciences, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-5401 (United States); Molecular and Cellular Biology Graduate Program, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-5401 (United States); Dolezal, Kelly A. [The Biodesign Institute, Center for Infectious Diseases and Vaccinology, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-5401 (United States); School of Life Sciences, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-5401 (United States); Microbiology Graduate Program, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-5401 (United States); Hogue, Brenda G., E-mail: Brenda.Hogue@asu.edu [The Biodesign Institute, Center for Infectious Diseases and Vaccinology, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-5401 (United States); School of Life Sciences, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-5401 (United States)

    2015-04-15

    Coronaviruses (CoVs) assemble at endoplasmic reticulum Golgi intermediate compartment (ERGIC) membranes and egress from cells in cargo vesicles. Only a few molecules of the envelope (E) protein are assembled into virions. The role of E in morphogenesis is not fully understood. The cellular localization and dynamics of mouse hepatitis CoV A59 (MHV) E protein were investigated to further understanding of its role during infection. E protein localized in the ERGIC and Golgi with the amino and carboxy termini in the lumen and cytoplasm, respectively. E protein does not traffic to the cell surface. MHV was genetically engineered with a tetracysteine tag at the carboxy end of E. Fluorescence recovery after photobleaching (FRAP) showed that E is mobile in ERGIC/Golgi membranes. Correlative light electron microscopy (CLEM) confirmed the presence of E in Golgi cisternae. The results provide strong support that E proteins carry out their function(s) at the site of budding/assembly. - Highlights: • Mouse hepatitis coronavirus (MHV-CoV) E protein localizes in the ERGIC and Golgi. • MHV-CoV E does not transport to the cell surface. • MHV-CoV can be genetically engineered with a tetracysteine tag appended to E. • First FRAP and correlative light electron microscopy of a CoV E protein. • Live-cell imaging shows that E is mobile in ERGIC/Golgi membranes.

  20. Ontology Matching with Semantic Verification.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jean-Mary, Yves R; Shironoshita, E Patrick; Kabuka, Mansur R

    2009-09-01

    ASMOV (Automated Semantic Matching of Ontologies with Verification) is a novel algorithm that uses lexical and structural characteristics of two ontologies to iteratively calculate a similarity measure between them, derives an alignment, and then verifies it to ensure that it does not contain semantic inconsistencies. In this paper, we describe the ASMOV algorithm, and then present experimental results that measure its accuracy using the OAEI 2008 tests, and that evaluate its use with two different thesauri: WordNet, and the Unified Medical Language System (UMLS). These results show the increased accuracy obtained by combining lexical, structural and extensional matchers with semantic verification, and demonstrate the advantage of using a domain-specific thesaurus for the alignment of specialized ontologies.

  1. Interpolant tree automata and their application in Horn clause verification

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kafle, Bishoksan; Gallagher, John Patrick

    2016-01-01

    This paper investigates the combination of abstract interpretation over the domain of convex polyhedra with interpolant tree automata, in an abstraction-refinement scheme for Horn clause verification. These techniques have been previously applied separately, but are combined in a new way in this ......This paper investigates the combination of abstract interpretation over the domain of convex polyhedra with interpolant tree automata, in an abstraction-refinement scheme for Horn clause verification. These techniques have been previously applied separately, but are combined in a new way...... clause verification problems indicates that the combination of interpolant tree automaton with abstract interpretation gives some increase in the power of the verification tool, while sometimes incurring a performance overhead....

  2. Heavy water physical verification in power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Morsy, S.; Schuricht, V.; Beetle, T.; Szabo, E.

    1986-01-01

    This paper is a report on the Agency experience in verifying heavy water inventories in power plants. The safeguards objectives and goals for such activities are defined in the paper. The heavy water is stratified according to the flow within the power plant, including upgraders. A safeguards scheme based on a combination of records auditing, comparing records and reports, and physical verification has been developed. This scheme has elevated the status of heavy water safeguards to a level comparable to nuclear material safeguards in bulk facilities. It leads to attribute and variable verification of the heavy water inventory in the different system components and in the store. The verification methods include volume and weight determination, sampling and analysis, non-destructive assay (NDA), and criticality check. The analysis of the different measurement methods and their limits of accuracy are discussed in the paper

  3. A Correctness Verification Technique for Commercial FPGA Synthesis Tools

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Eui Sub; Yoo, Jun Beom; Choi, Jong Gyun; Kim, Jang Yeol; Lee, Jang Soo

    2014-01-01

    Once the FPGA (Filed-Programmable Gate Array) designers designs Verilog programs, the commercial synthesis tools automatically translate the Verilog programs into EDIF programs so that the designers can have largely focused on HDL designs for correctness of functionality. Nuclear regulation authorities, however, require more considerate demonstration of the correctness and safety of mechanical synthesis processes of FPGA synthesis tools, even if the FPGA industry have acknowledged them empirically as correct and safe processes and tools. In order to assure of the safety, the industry standards for the safety of electronic/electrical devices, such as IEC 61508 and IEC 60880, recommend using the formal verification technique. There are several formal verification tools (i.e., 'FormalPro' 'Conformal' 'Formality' and so on) to verify the correctness of translation from Verilog into EDIF programs, but it is too expensive to use and hard to apply them to the works of 3rd-party developers. This paper proposes a formal verification technique which can contribute to the correctness demonstration in part. It formally checks the behavioral equivalence between Verilog and subsequently synthesized Net list with the VIS verification system. A Net list is an intermediate output of FPGA synthesis process, and EDIF is used as a standard format of Net lists. If the formal verification succeeds, then we can assure that the synthesis process from Verilog into Net list worked correctly at least for the Verilog used. In order to support the formal verification, we developed the mechanical translator 'EDIFtoBLIFMV,' which translates EDIF into BLIF-MV as an input front-end of VIS system, while preserving their behavior equivalence.. We performed the case study with an example of a preliminary version of RPS in a Korean nuclear power plant in order to provide the efficiency of the proposed formal verification technique and implemented translator. It

  4. A Correctness Verification Technique for Commercial FPGA Synthesis Tools

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Eui Sub; Yoo, Jun Beom [Konkuk University, Seoul (Korea, Republic of); Choi, Jong Gyun; Kim, Jang Yeol; Lee, Jang Soo [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-10-15

    Once the FPGA (Filed-Programmable Gate Array) designers designs Verilog programs, the commercial synthesis tools automatically translate the Verilog programs into EDIF programs so that the designers can have largely focused on HDL designs for correctness of functionality. Nuclear regulation authorities, however, require more considerate demonstration of the correctness and safety of mechanical synthesis processes of FPGA synthesis tools, even if the FPGA industry have acknowledged them empirically as correct and safe processes and tools. In order to assure of the safety, the industry standards for the safety of electronic/electrical devices, such as IEC 61508 and IEC 60880, recommend using the formal verification technique. There are several formal verification tools (i.e., 'FormalPro' 'Conformal' 'Formality' and so on) to verify the correctness of translation from Verilog into EDIF programs, but it is too expensive to use and hard to apply them to the works of 3rd-party developers. This paper proposes a formal verification technique which can contribute to the correctness demonstration in part. It formally checks the behavioral equivalence between Verilog and subsequently synthesized Net list with the VIS verification system. A Net list is an intermediate output of FPGA synthesis process, and EDIF is used as a standard format of Net lists. If the formal verification succeeds, then we can assure that the synthesis process from Verilog into Net list worked correctly at least for the Verilog used. In order to support the formal verification, we developed the mechanical translator 'EDIFtoBLIFMV,' which translates EDIF into BLIF-MV as an input front-end of VIS system, while preserving their behavior equivalence.. We performed the case study with an example of a preliminary version of RPS in a Korean nuclear power plant in order to provide the efficiency of the proposed formal verification technique and implemented translator. It

  5. A hydrochemical data base for the Hanford Site, Washington

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Early, T.O.; Mudd, R.D.; Spice, G.D.; Starr, D.L.

    1985-02-01

    This data package contains a complete listing of the Site Hydrochemical Data Base for water samples associated with the Basalt Waste Isolation Project (BWIP). In addition to the detailed chemical analyses are a summary description of the data base format, detailed descriptions of verification procedures used to check data entries, and detailed descriptions of validation procedures used to evaluate data quality

  6. Logic verification system for power plant sequence diagrams

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fukuda, Mitsuko; Yamada, Naoyuki; Teshima, Toshiaki; Kan, Ken-ichi; Utsunomiya, Mitsugu.

    1994-01-01

    A logic verification system for sequence diagrams of power plants has been developed. The system's main function is to verify correctness of the logic realized by sequence diagrams for power plant control systems. The verification is based on a symbolic comparison of the logic of the sequence diagrams with the logic of the corresponding IBDs (interlock Block Diagrams) in combination with reference to design knowledge. The developed system points out the sub-circuit which is responsible for any existing mismatches between the IBD logic and the logic realized by the sequence diagrams. Applications to the verification of actual sequence diagrams of power plants confirmed that the developed system is practical and effective. (author)

  7. Formal verification of complex properties on PLC programs

    CERN Document Server

    Darvas, D; Voros, A; Bartha, T; Blanco Vinuela, E; Gonzalez Suarez, V M

    2014-01-01

    Formal verification has become a recommended practice in the safety-critical application areas. However, due to the complexity of practical control and safety systems, the state space explosion often prevents the use of formal analysis. In this paper we extend our former verification methodology with effective property preserving reduction techniques. For this purpose we developed general rule-based reductions and a customized version of the Cone of Influence (COI) reduction. Using these methods, the verification of complex requirements formalised with temporal logics (e.g. CTL, LTL) can be orders of magnitude faster. We use the NuSMV model checker on a real-life PLC program from CERN to demonstrate the performance of our reduction techniques.

  8. Implementation and verification of global optimization benchmark problems

    Science.gov (United States)

    Posypkin, Mikhail; Usov, Alexander

    2017-12-01

    The paper considers the implementation and verification of a test suite containing 150 benchmarks for global deterministic box-constrained optimization. A C++ library for describing standard mathematical expressions was developed for this purpose. The library automate the process of generating the value of a function and its' gradient at a given point and the interval estimates of a function and its' gradient on a given box using a single description. Based on this functionality, we have developed a collection of tests for an automatic verification of the proposed benchmarks. The verification has shown that literary sources contain mistakes in the benchmarks description. The library and the test suite are available for download and can be used freely.

  9. Projected Impact of Compositional Verification on Current and Future Aviation Safety Risk

    Science.gov (United States)

    Reveley, Mary S.; Withrow, Colleen A.; Leone, Karen M.; Jones, Sharon M.

    2014-01-01

    The projected impact of compositional verification research conducted by the National Aeronautic and Space Administration System-Wide Safety and Assurance Technologies on aviation safety risk was assessed. Software and compositional verification was described. Traditional verification techniques have two major problems: testing at the prototype stage where error discovery can be quite costly and the inability to test for all potential interactions leaving some errors undetected until used by the end user. Increasingly complex and nondeterministic aviation systems are becoming too large for these tools to check and verify. Compositional verification is a "divide and conquer" solution to addressing increasingly larger and more complex systems. A review of compositional verification research being conducted by academia, industry, and Government agencies is provided. Forty-four aviation safety risks in the Biennial NextGen Safety Issues Survey were identified that could be impacted by compositional verification and grouped into five categories: automation design; system complexity; software, flight control, or equipment failure or malfunction; new technology or operations; and verification and validation. One capability, 1 research action, 5 operational improvements, and 13 enablers within the Federal Aviation Administration Joint Planning and Development Office Integrated Work Plan that could be addressed by compositional verification were identified.

  10. Towards automatic verification of ladder logic programs

    OpenAIRE

    Zoubek , Bohumir; Roussel , Jean-Marc; Kwiatkowska , Martha

    2003-01-01

    International audience; Control system programs are usually validated by testing prior to their deployment. Unfortunately, testing is not exhaustive and therefore it is possible that a program which passed all the required tests still contains errors. In this paper we apply techniques of automatic verification to a control program written in ladder logic. A model is constructed mechanically from the ladder logic program and subjected to automatic verification against requirements that include...

  11. Inventory verification measurements using neutron multiplicity counting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ensslin, N.; Foster, L.A.; Harker, W.C.; Krick, M.S.; Langner, D.G.

    1998-01-01

    This paper describes a series of neutron multiplicity measurements of large plutonium samples at the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility. The measurements were corrected for bias caused by neutron energy spectrum shifts and nonuniform multiplication, and are compared with calorimetry/isotopics. The results show that multiplicity counting can increase measurement throughput and yield good verification results for some inventory categories. The authors provide recommendations on the future application of the technique to inventory verification

  12. ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY VERIFICATION: TEST/QA PLAN FOR THE VERIFICATION TESTING OF SELECTIVE CATALYTIC REDUCTION CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES FOR HIGHWAY, NONROAD, AND STATIONARY USE DIESEL ENGINES

    Science.gov (United States)

    The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency established the Environmental Technology Verification Program to accelerate the development and commercialization of improved environmental technology through third party verification and reporting of product performance. Research Triangl...

  13. Housekeeping Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 119: Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order was entered into by the State of Nevada, US Department of Energy, and US Department of Defense to identify sites of potential historical contamination and implement corrective actions based on public health and environmental considerations. The facilities subject to this agreement include the Nevada Test Site (NTS), parts of the Tonopah Test Range, parts to the Nellis Air Force Range, the Central Nevada Test Area, and the Project Shoal Area. Corrective Action Sites (CASs) are areas potentially requiring corrective actions and may include solid waste management units, individual disposal, or release sites. Based on geography, technical similarity, agency responsibility, or other appropriate reasons, CASs are grouped together into Corrective Action Units (CAUs) for the purpose of determining appropriate corrective actions. This report contains the Closure Verification Forms for cleanup activities that were performed at 19 CASs with in CAU 119 on the NTS. The form for each CAS provides the location, directions to the site, general description, and photographs of the site before and after cleanup activities. Activities included verification of the prior removal of both aboveground and underground gas/oil storage tanks, gas sampling tanks, pressure fuel tanks, tank stands, trailers, debris, and other material. Based on these former activities, no further action is required at these CASs

  14. Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Book of extended synopses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    The symposium covered the topics related to international safeguards, verification and nuclear materials security, namely: verification and nuclear material security; the NPT regime: progress and promises; the Additional Protocol as an important tool for the strengthening of the safeguards system; the nuclear threat and the nuclear threat initiative. Eighteen sessions dealt with the following subjects: the evolution of IAEA safeguards (including strengthened safeguards, present and future challenges; verification of correctness and completeness of initial declarations; implementation of the Additional Protocol, progress and experience; security of material; nuclear disarmament and ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq; evolution of IAEA verification in relation to nuclear disarmament); integrated safeguards; physical protection and illicit trafficking; destructive analysis for safeguards; the additional protocol; innovative safeguards approaches; IAEA verification and nuclear disarmament; environmental sampling; safeguards experience; safeguards equipment; panel discussion on development of state systems of accountancy and control; information analysis in the strengthened safeguard system; satellite imagery and remote monitoring; emerging IAEA safeguards issues; verification technology for nuclear disarmament; the IAEA and the future of nuclear verification and security

  15. Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Book of extended synopses

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2001-07-01

    The symposium covered the topics related to international safeguards, verification and nuclear materials security, namely: verification and nuclear material security; the NPT regime: progress and promises; the Additional Protocol as an important tool for the strengthening of the safeguards system; the nuclear threat and the nuclear threat initiative. Eighteen sessions dealt with the following subjects: the evolution of IAEA safeguards (including strengthened safeguards, present and future challenges; verification of correctness and completeness of initial declarations; implementation of the Additional Protocol, progress and experience; security of material; nuclear disarmament and ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq; evolution of IAEA verification in relation to nuclear disarmament); integrated safeguards; physical protection and illicit trafficking; destructive analysis for safeguards; the additional protocol; innovative safeguards approaches; IAEA verification and nuclear disarmament; environmental sampling; safeguards experience; safeguards equipment; panel discussion on development of state systems of accountancy and control; information analysis in the strengthened safeguard system; satellite imagery and remote monitoring; emerging IAEA safeguards issues; verification technology for nuclear disarmament; the IAEA and the future of nuclear verification and security.

  16. Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 106: Area 5, 11 Frenchman Flat Atmospheric Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matthews, Patrick; Peterson, Dawn

    2011-01-01

    samples. Results of verification samples show that remaining soil does not contain contamination exceeding the FALs. Therefore, the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) provides the following recommendations: (1) No further corrective actions are necessary for CAU 106. (2) A Notice of Completion to NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 106. (3) Corrective Action Unit 106 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.

  17. Verification Games: Crowd-Sourced Formal Verification

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-03-01

    additional paintbrushes. Additionally, in Paradox , human players are never given small optimization problems (for example, toggling the values of 50...were developed by the Center for Game Science: Pipe Jam, Traffic Jam, Flow Jam and Paradox . Verification tools and games were integrated to verify...4 4. Paradox …………………………………………………......5 5. MyClass ………………………………………………….....7 6. Results …………………………………………………......11 7. Time to

  18. SU-F-T-288: Impact of Trajectory Log Files for Clarkson-Based Independent Dose Verification of IMRT and VMAT

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Takahashi, R; Kamima, T [Cancer Institute Hospital of Japanese Foundation for Cancer Research, Koto, Tokyo (Japan); Tachibana, H [National Cancer Center, Kashiwa, Chiba (Japan)

    2016-06-15

    Purpose: To investigate the effect of the trajectory files from linear accelerator for Clarkson-based independent dose verification in IMRT and VMAT plans. Methods: A CT-based independent dose verification software (Simple MU Analysis: SMU, Triangle Products, Japan) with a Clarksonbased algorithm was modified to calculate dose using the trajectory log files. Eclipse with the three techniques of step and shoot (SS), sliding window (SW) and Rapid Arc (RA) was used as treatment planning system (TPS). In this study, clinically approved IMRT and VMAT plans for prostate and head and neck (HN) at two institutions were retrospectively analyzed to assess the dose deviation between DICOM-RT plan (PL) and trajectory log file (TJ). An additional analysis was performed to evaluate MLC error detection capability of SMU when the trajectory log files was modified by adding systematic errors (0.2, 0.5, 1.0 mm) and random errors (5, 10, 30 mm) to actual MLC position. Results: The dose deviations for prostate and HN in the two sites were 0.0% and 0.0% in SS, 0.1±0.0%, 0.1±0.1% in SW and 0.6±0.5%, 0.7±0.9% in RA, respectively. The MLC error detection capability shows the plans for HN IMRT were the most sensitive and 0.2 mm of systematic error affected 0.7% dose deviation on average. Effect of the MLC random error did not affect dose error. Conclusion: The use of trajectory log files including actual information of MLC location, gantry angle, etc should be more effective for an independent verification. The tolerance level for the secondary check using the trajectory file may be similar to that of the verification using DICOM-RT plan file. From the view of the resolution of MLC positional error detection, the secondary check could detect the MLC position error corresponding to the treatment sites and techniques. This research is partially supported by Japan Agency for Medical Research and Development (AMED)

  19. The first millennium AD climate fluctuations in the Tavoliere Plain (Apulia, Italy): New preliminary data from the 14C AMS-dated plant remains from the archaeological site of Faragola

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fiorentino, G.; Caracuta, V.; Volpe, G.; Turchiano, M.; Quarta, G.; D'Elia, M.; Calcagnile, L.

    2010-01-01

    The identification of ancient climate fluctuations represents an hard challenge for studies intended to outline the human-environment interaction in fragile ecosystems. The aim of this work is to test the potentialities of carbon stable isotopic content of AMS-dated archaeological plant remains as tool to infer variations in rainfall/temperature regimes. The results obtained in the analysis of the carbon stable isotopic content of 10 plant remains selected among the archaeobotanical remains collected at the archaeological site in Faragola (Apulia, Italy) and radiocarbon-dated by AMS are presented. The variation of δ 13 C values was considered on a chronological scale covering a time range comprised between the II century BC and the VII century AD. The obtained patterns were also compared with local and global-scale palaeoclimatic records.

  20. Verification Survey of the Building 315 Zero Power Reactor-6 Facility, Argonne National Laboratory-East, Argonne, Illinois

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    W. C. Adams

    2007-01-01

    status surveys (FSS) on Cell 5 that formerly contained the ZPR-6. For the FSS, ANL is following the guidance presented in Draft NUREG/CR-5849, 'Manual for Conducting Radiological Surveys in Support of License Termination', and portions of NUREG-1575, 'Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM)', as appropriate and DOE Order 5400.5, 'Radiation Protection of the Public and Environment'. (NRC 1992 and 2000 and DOE 1993 and 1995). At the time of the FSS, all contaminated systems and associated components within the scope of the surveyed areas had been removed (ANL 2006). DOE's Argonne Site Office (ASO) is responsible for oversight of the Building 315, Zero Power Reactor-6 remedial action and FSS activities. It is the policy of the DOE to perform independent (third party) verification of FSS activities (DOE 2006). The purpose of these independent verifications (IV) is to confirm that remedial actions have been effective in meeting established and site-specific guidelines and that the documentation accurately and adequately describes the radiological conditions at the site. The Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE) has been designated by the DOE as the organization responsible for this task at ANL, and has been requested to verify the final radiological status of the cleanup activities associated with the Building 315, ZPR-6 Decontamination and Decommissioning Project (ZPR6DDP) at ANL-E

  1. Verification of product design using regulation knowledge base and Web services

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Ik June [KAERI, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Lee, Jae Chul; Mun Du Hwan [Kyungpook National University, Daegu (Korea, Republic of); Kim, Byung Chul [Dong-A University, Busan (Korea, Republic of); Hwang, Jin Sang [PartDB Co., Ltd., Daejeom (Korea, Republic of); Lim, Chae Ho [Korea Institute of Industrial Technology, Incheon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-11-15

    Since product regulations contain important rules or codes that manufacturers must follow, automatic verification of product design with the regulations related to a product is necessary. For this, this study presents a new method for the verification of product design using regulation knowledge base and Web services. Regulation knowledge base consisting of product ontology and rules was built with a hybrid technique combining ontology and programming languages. Web service for design verification was developed ensuring the flexible extension of knowledge base. By virtue of two technical features, design verification is served to various products while the change of system architecture is minimized.

  2. Verification of product design using regulation knowledge base and Web services

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Ik June; Lee, Jae Chul; Mun Du Hwan; Kim, Byung Chul; Hwang, Jin Sang; Lim, Chae Ho

    2015-01-01

    Since product regulations contain important rules or codes that manufacturers must follow, automatic verification of product design with the regulations related to a product is necessary. For this, this study presents a new method for the verification of product design using regulation knowledge base and Web services. Regulation knowledge base consisting of product ontology and rules was built with a hybrid technique combining ontology and programming languages. Web service for design verification was developed ensuring the flexible extension of knowledge base. By virtue of two technical features, design verification is served to various products while the change of system architecture is minimized.

  3. Compromises produced by the dialectic between self-verification and self-enhancement.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Morling, B; Epstein, S

    1997-12-01

    Three studies of people's reactions to evaluative feedback demonstrated that the dialectic between self-enhancement and self-verification results in compromises between these 2 motives, as hypothesized in cognitive-experiential self-theory. The demonstration was facilitated by 2 procedural improvements: Enhancement and verification were established by calibrating evaluative feedback against self appraisals, and degree of enhancement and of verification were varied along a continuum, rather than categorically. There was also support for the hypotheses that processing in an intuitive-experiential mode favors enhancement and processing in an analytical-rational mode favors verification in the kinds of situations investigated.

  4. The Efficacy of Social Media as a Research Tool and Information Source for Safeguards Verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Skoeld, T.; Feldman, Y.

    2015-01-01

    The IAEA Department of Safeguards aims to provide credible assurances to the international community that States are fulfiling their safeguards obligations in that all nuclear material remains in peaceful use. In order to draw a soundly-based safeguards conclusion for a State that has a safeguards agreement in force with the IAEA, the Department establishes a knowledge base of the State's nuclear-related infrastructure and activities against which a State's declarations are evaluated for correctness and completeness. Open source information is one stream of data that is used in the evaluation of nuclear fuel cycle activities in the State. The Department is continuously working to ensure that it has access to the most up-to-date, accurate, relevant and credible open source information available, and has begun to examine the use of social media as a new source of information. The use of social networking sites has increased exponentially in the last decade. In fact, social media has emerged as the key vehicle for delivering and acquiring information in near real-time. Therefore, it has become necessary for the open source analyst to consider social media as an essential element in the broader concept of open source information. Characteristics, such as ''immediacy'', ''recency'', ''interractiveness'', which set social networks apart from the ''traditional media'', are also the same attributes that present a challenge for using social media as an efficient information-delivery platform and a credible source of information. New tools and technologies for social media analytics have begun to emerge to help systematically monitor and mine this large body of data. The paper will survey the social media landscape in an effort to identify platforms that could be of value for safeguards verification purposes. It will explore how a number of social networking sites, such as Twitter

  5. Calibration and verification of surface contamination meters --- Procedures and techniques

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schuler, C; Butterweck, G.; Wernli, C.; Bochud, F.; Valley, J.-F.

    2007-03-01

    A standardised measurement procedure for surface contamination meters (SCM) is presented. The procedure aims at rendering surface contamination measurements to be simply and safely interpretable. Essential for the approach is the introduction and common use of the radionuclide specific quantity 'guideline value' specified in the Swiss Radiation Protection Ordinance as unit for the measurement of surface activity. The according radionuclide specific 'guideline value count rate' can be summarized as verification reference value for a group of radionuclides ('basis guideline value count rate'). The concept can be generalized for SCM of the same type or for SCM of different types using he same principle of detection. A SCM multi source calibration technique is applied for the determination of the instrument efficiency. Four different electron radiation energy regions, four different photon radiation energy regions and an alpha radiation energy region are represented by a set of calibration sources built according to ISO standard 8769-2. A guideline value count rate representing the activity per unit area of a surface contamination of one guideline value can be calculated for any radionuclide using instrument efficiency, radionuclide decay data, contamination source efficiency, guideline value averaging area (100 cm 2 ), and radionuclide specific guideline value. n this way, instrument responses for the evaluation of surface contaminations are obtained for radionuclides without available calibration sources as well as for short-Iived radionuclides, for which the continuous replacement of certified calibration sources can lead to unreasonable costs. SCM verification is based on surface emission rates of reference sources with an active area of 100 cm 2 . The verification for a given list of radionuclides is based on the radionuclide specific quantity guideline value count rate. Guideline value count rates for groups of radionuclides can be represented within the maximum

  6. Integrated knowledge base tool for acquisition and verification of NPP alarm systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, Joo Hyun; Seong, Poong Hyun

    1998-01-01

    Knowledge acquisition and knowledge base verification are important activities in developing knowledge-based systems such as alarm processing systems. In this work, we developed the integrated tool, for knowledge acquisition and verification of NPP alarm processing systems, by using G2 tool. The tool integrates document analysis method and ECPN matrix analysis method, for knowledge acquisition and knowledge verification, respectively. This tool enables knowledge engineers to perform their tasks from knowledge acquisition to knowledge verification consistently

  7. Independent verification and validation testing of the FLASH computer code, Versiion 3.0

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Martian, P.; Chung, J.N.

    1992-06-01

    Independent testing of the FLASH computer code, Version 3.0, was conducted to determine if the code is ready for use in hydrological and environmental studies at various Department of Energy sites. This report describes the technical basis, approach, and results of this testing. Verification tests, and validation tests, were used to determine the operational status of the FLASH computer code. These tests were specifically designed to test: correctness of the FORTRAN coding, computational accuracy, and suitability to simulating actual hydrologic conditions. This testing was performed using a structured evaluation protocol which consisted of: blind testing, independent applications, and graduated difficulty of test cases. Both quantitative and qualitative testing was performed through evaluating relative root mean square values and graphical comparisons of the numerical, analytical, and experimental data. Four verification test were used to check the computational accuracy and correctness of the FORTRAN coding, and three validation tests were used to check the suitability to simulating actual conditions. These tests cases ranged in complexity from simple 1-D saturated flow to 2-D variably saturated problems. The verification tests showed excellent quantitative agreement between the FLASH results and analytical solutions. The validation tests showed good qualitative agreement with the experimental data. Based on the results of this testing, it was concluded that the FLASH code is a versatile and powerful two-dimensional analysis tool for fluid flow. In conclusion, all aspects of the code that were tested, except for the unit gradient bottom boundary condition, were found to be fully operational and ready for use in hydrological and environmental studies

  8. DOE-EPRI distributed wind Turbine Verification Program (TVP III)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McGowin, C.; DeMeo, E. [Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA (United States); Calvert, S. [Dept. of Energy, Washington, DC (United States)] [and others

    1997-12-31

    In 1992, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) initiated the Utility Wind Turbine Verification Program (TVP). The goal of the program is to evaluate prototype advanced wind turbines at several sites developed by U.S. electric utility companies. Two six MW wind projects have been installed under the TVP program by Central and South West Services in Fort Davis, Texas and Green Mountain Power Corporation in Searsburg, Vermont. In early 1997, DOE and EPRI selected five more utility projects to evaluate distributed wind generation using smaller {open_quotes}clusters{close_quotes} of wind turbines connected directly to the electricity distribution system. This paper presents an overview of the objectives, scope, and status of the EPRI-DOE TVP program and the existing and planned TVP projects.

  9. Transmutation Fuel Performance Code Thermal Model Verification

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gregory K. Miller; Pavel G. Medvedev

    2007-09-01

    FRAPCON fuel performance code is being modified to be able to model performance of the nuclear fuels of interest to the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). The present report documents the effort for verification of the FRAPCON thermal model. It was found that, with minor modifications, FRAPCON thermal model temperature calculation agrees with that of the commercial software ABAQUS (Version 6.4-4). This report outlines the methodology of the verification, code input, and calculation results.

  10. Verification and Validation of RADTRAN 5.5.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Osborn, Douglas.; Weiner, Ruth F.; Mills, George Scott; Hamp, Steve C.

    2005-02-01

    This document contains a description of the verification and validation process used for the RADTRAN 5.5 code. The verification and validation process ensured the proper calculational models and mathematical and numerical methods were used in the RADTRAN 5.5 code for the determination of risk and consequence assessments. The differences between RADTRAN 5 and RADTRAN 5.5 are the addition of tables, an expanded isotope library, and the additional User-Defined meteorological option for accident dispersion. 3

  11. Central site monitoring: results from a test of accuracy in identifying trials and sites failing Food and Drug Administration inspection.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lindblad, Anne S; Manukyan, Zorayr; Purohit-Sheth, Tejashri; Gensler, Gary; Okwesili, Paul; Meeker-O'Connell, Ann; Ball, Leslie; Marler, John R

    2014-04-01

    Site monitoring and source document verification account for 15%-30% of clinical trial costs. An alternative is to streamline site monitoring to focus on correcting trial-specific risks identified by central data monitoring. This risk-based approach could preserve or even improve the quality of clinical trial data and human subject protection compared to site monitoring focused primarily on source document verification. To determine whether a central review by statisticians using data submitted to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) by clinical trial sponsors can identify problem sites and trials that failed FDA site inspections. An independent Analysis Center (AC) analyzed data from four anonymous new drug applications (NDAs) where FDA had performed site inspections overseen by FDA's Office of Scientific Investigations (OSI). FDA team members in the OSI chose the four NDAs from among all NDAs with data in Study Data Tabulation Model (SDTM) format. Two of the NDAs had data that OSI had deemed unreliable in support of the application after FDA site inspections identified serious data integrity problems. The other two NDAs had clinical data that OSI deemed reliable after site inspections. At the outset, the AC knew only that the experimental design specified two NDAs with significant problems. FDA gave the AC no information about which NDAs had problems, how many sites were inspected, or how many were found to have problems until after the AC analysis was complete. The AC evaluated randomization balance, enrollment patterns, study visit scheduling, variability of reported data, and last digit reference. The AC classified sites as 'High Concern', 'Moderate Concern', 'Mild Concern', or 'No Concern'. The AC correctly identified the two NDAs with data deemed unreliable by OSI. In addition, central data analysis correctly identified 5 of 6 (83%) sites for which FDA recommended rejection of data and 13 of 15 sites (87%) for which any regulatory deviations were

  12. Software verification in on-line systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ehrenberger, W.

    1980-01-01

    Operator assistance is more and more provided by computers. Computers contain programs, whose quality should be above a certain level, before they are allowed to be used in reactor control rooms. Several possibilities for gaining software reliability figures are discussed in this paper. By supervising the testing procedure of a program, one can estimate the number of remaining programming errors. Such an estimation, however, is not very accurate. With mathematical proving procedures one can gain some knowledge on program properties. Such proving procedures are important for the verification of general WHILE-loops, which tend to be error prone. The program analysis decomposes a program into its parts. First the program structure is made visible, which includes the data movements and the control flow. From this analysis test cases can be derived that lead to a complete test. Program analysis can be done by hand or automatically. A statistical program test normally requires a large number of test runs. This number is diminished if details concerning both the program to be tested or its use are known in advance. (orig.)

  13. Comparing formal verification approaches of interlocking systems

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Haxthausen, Anne Elisabeth; Nguyen, Hoang Nga; Roggenbach, Markus

    2016-01-01

    these approaches. As a first step towards this, in this paper we suggest a way to compare different formal approaches for verifying designs of route-based interlocking systems and we demonstrate it on modelling and verification approaches developed within the research groups at DTU/Bremen and at Surrey......The verification of railway interlocking systems is a challenging task, and therefore several research groups have suggested to improve this task by using formal methods, but they use different modelling and verification approaches. To advance this research, there is a need to compare....../Swansea. The focus is on designs that are specified by so-called control tables. The paper can serve as a starting point for further comparative studies. The DTU/Bremen research has been funded by the RobustRailS project granted by Innovation Fund Denmark. The Surrey/Swansea research has been funded by the Safe...

  14. Temelin 3,4 Siting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kubanova, Iva; Fuzer, Jiri

    2011-01-01

    will follow. Siting process is three-step process in the Czech Republic. Finished EIA process managed by Ministry of Environment is a prerequisite for siting approval issued by State Office for Nuclear Safety. Then the final territorial decision is issued by building (construction) authority which can be located either in the relevant close city or in Southern Bohemia Region Office. Temelin site is a proven site, so siting of Temelin 3,4 is focused mainly on verification of available site data and methods used, verification of site suitability for new generation reactors and application of current licensing requirements. As a basis Initial Safety Report must be prepared and covers topics prescribed by the Czech Atomic Law: general project information, site evaluation, technical concept description, preliminary evaluation of operation impact on population, environment (with reference to EIA process), future decommissioning method, physical protection analyses and siting quality assurance evaluation and principles for next stages. CEZ, a. s. currently prepares Initial Safety Report in format pre-agreed with State Office for Nuclear Safety

  15. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 573: Alpha Contaminated Sites Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Matthews, Patrick [Navarro, Las Vegas, NV (United States)

    2017-03-01

    This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 573: Alpha Contaminated Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada. CAU 573 comprises the two corrective action sites (CASs): 05-23-02-GMX Alpha Contaminated Are-Closure in Place and 05-45-01-Atmospheric Test Site - Hamilton- Clean Closure. The purpose of this CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 573 based on the implementation of the corrective actions. Corrective action activities were performed at Hamilton from May 25 through June 30, 2016; and at GMX from May 25 to October 27, 2016, as set forth in the Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD)/Corrective Action Plan (CAP) for Corrective Action Unit 573: Alpha Contaminated Sites; and in accordance with the Soils Activity Quality Assurance Plan, which establishes requirements, technical planning, and general quality practices. Verification sample results were evaluated against data quality objective criteria developed by stakeholders that included representatives from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection and the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) during the corrective action alternative (CAA) meeting held on November 24, 2015. Radiological doses exceeding the final action level were assumed to be present within the high contamination areas associated with CAS 05-23-02, thus requiring corrective action. It was also assumed that radionuclides were present at levels that require corrective action within the soil/debris pile associated with CAS 05-45-01. During the CAU 573 CAA meeting, the CAA of closure in place with a use restriction (UR) was selected by the stakeholders as the preferred corrective action of the high contamination areas at CAS 05-23-02 (GMX), which contain high levels of removable contamination; and the CAA of clean closure was selected by the

  16. Implementation and verification of global optimization benchmark problems

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Posypkin Mikhail

    2017-12-01

    Full Text Available The paper considers the implementation and verification of a test suite containing 150 benchmarks for global deterministic box-constrained optimization. A C++ library for describing standard mathematical expressions was developed for this purpose. The library automate the process of generating the value of a function and its’ gradient at a given point and the interval estimates of a function and its’ gradient on a given box using a single description. Based on this functionality, we have developed a collection of tests for an automatic verification of the proposed benchmarks. The verification has shown that literary sources contain mistakes in the benchmarks description. The library and the test suite are available for download and can be used freely.

  17. Integrated Java Bytecode Verification

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Gal, Andreas; Probst, Christian; Franz, Michael

    2005-01-01

    Existing Java verifiers perform an iterative data-flow analysis to discover the unambiguous type of values stored on the stack or in registers. Our novel verification algorithm uses abstract interpretation to obtain definition/use information for each register and stack location in the program...

  18. Automatic verification of a lip-synchronisation protocol using Uppaal

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Bowman, H.; Faconti, G.; Katoen, J.-P.; Latella, D.; Massink, M.

    1998-01-01

    We present the formal specification and verification of a lip-synchronisation protocol using the real-time model checker Uppaal. A number of specifications of this protocol can be found in the literature, but this is the first automatic verification. We take a published specification of the

  19. Aspects of the design and verification of software for a computerized reactor protection system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Voges, U.

    1976-01-01

    In contrary to hardware, software lasts forever. If software is considered to be correct, it remains correct all the time (except you make any changes to it). Therefore failure rates, MTBF, MTTR etc. cannot be used for software. The main effort has to be put on: 1) how to make reliable software, 2) how to prove software to be correct. The first part deals with the developmental stage, the specification, design and implementation of the software, the second part with the 'produced' software, its test and verification. (orig./RW) [de

  20. Numident Online Verification Utility (NOVU)

    Data.gov (United States)

    Social Security Administration — NOVU is a mainframe application that accesses the NUMIDENT to perform real-time SSN verifications. This program is called by other SSA online programs that serve as...

  1. Systematic study of source mask optimization and verification flows

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ben, Yu; Latypov, Azat; Chua, Gek Soon; Zou, Yi

    2012-06-01

    Source mask optimization (SMO) emerged as powerful resolution enhancement technique (RET) for advanced technology nodes. However, there is a plethora of flow and verification metrics in the field, confounding the end user of the technique. Systemic study of different flows and the possible unification thereof is missing. This contribution is intended to reveal the pros and cons of different SMO approaches and verification metrics, understand the commonality and difference, and provide a generic guideline for RET selection via SMO. The paper discusses 3 different type of variations commonly arise in SMO, namely pattern preparation & selection, availability of relevant OPC recipe for freeform source and finally the metrics used in source verification. Several pattern selection algorithms are compared and advantages of systematic pattern selection algorithms are discussed. In the absence of a full resist model for SMO, alternative SMO flow without full resist model is reviewed. Preferred verification flow with quality metrics of DOF and MEEF is examined.

  2. Verification of Space Weather Forecasts using Terrestrial Weather Approaches

    Science.gov (United States)

    Henley, E.; Murray, S.; Pope, E.; Stephenson, D.; Sharpe, M.; Bingham, S.; Jackson, D.

    2015-12-01

    The Met Office Space Weather Operations Centre (MOSWOC) provides a range of 24/7 operational space weather forecasts, alerts, and warnings, which provide valuable information on space weather that can degrade electricity grids, radio communications, and satellite electronics. Forecasts issued include arrival times of coronal mass ejections (CMEs), and probabilistic forecasts for flares, geomagnetic storm indices, and energetic particle fluxes and fluences. These forecasts are produced twice daily using a combination of output from models such as Enlil, near-real-time observations, and forecaster experience. Verification of forecasts is crucial for users, researchers, and forecasters to understand the strengths and limitations of forecasters, and to assess forecaster added value. To this end, the Met Office (in collaboration with Exeter University) has been adapting verification techniques from terrestrial weather, and has been working closely with the International Space Environment Service (ISES) to standardise verification procedures. We will present the results of part of this work, analysing forecast and observed CME arrival times, assessing skill using 2x2 contingency tables. These MOSWOC forecasts can be objectively compared to those produced by the NASA Community Coordinated Modelling Center - a useful benchmark. This approach cannot be taken for the other forecasts, as they are probabilistic and categorical (e.g., geomagnetic storm forecasts give probabilities of exceeding levels from minor to extreme). We will present appropriate verification techniques being developed to address these forecasts, such as rank probability skill score, and comparing forecasts against climatology and persistence benchmarks. As part of this, we will outline the use of discrete time Markov chains to assess and improve the performance of our geomagnetic storm forecasts. We will also discuss work to adapt a terrestrial verification visualisation system to space weather, to help

  3. The role of the United Nations in the field of verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-01-01

    By resolution 43/81 B of 7 December 1988, the General Assembly requested the Secretary General to undertake, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, an in-depth study of the role of the United Nations in the field of verification. In August 1990, the Secretary-General transmitted to the General Assembly the unanimously approved report of the experts. The report is structured in six chapters and contains a bibliographic appendix on technical aspects of verification. The Introduction provides a brief historical background on the development of the question of verification in the United Nations context, culminating with the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 43/81 B, which requested the study. Chapters II and III address the definition and functions of verification and the various approaches, methods, procedures and techniques used in the process of verification. Chapters IV and V examine the existing activities of the United Nations in the field of verification, possibilities for improvements in those activities as well as possible additional activities, while addressing the organizational, technical, legal, operational and financial implications of each of the possibilities discussed. Chapter VI presents the conclusions and recommendations of the Group

  4. Integrating Fingerprint Verification into the Smart Card-Based Healthcare Information System

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jin-Won Park

    2009-01-01

    Full Text Available As VLSI technology has been improved, a smart card employing 32-bit processors has been released, and more personal information such as medical, financial data can be stored in the card. Thus, it becomes important to protect personal information stored in the card. Verification of the card holder's identity using a fingerprint has advantages over the present practices of Personal Identification Numbers (PINs and passwords. However, the computational workload of fingerprint verification is much heavier than that of the typical PIN-based solution. In this paper, we consider three strategies to implement fingerprint verification in a smart card environment and how to distribute the modules of fingerprint verification between the smart card and the card reader. We first evaluate the number of instructions of each step of a typical fingerprint verification algorithm, and estimate the execution time of several cryptographic algorithms to guarantee the security/privacy of the fingerprint data transmitted in the smart card with the client-server environment. Based on the evaluation results, we analyze each scenario with respect to the security level and the real-time execution requirements in order to implement fingerprint verification in the smart card with the client-server environment.

  5. Integrating Fingerprint Verification into the Smart Card-Based Healthcare Information System

    Science.gov (United States)

    Moon, Daesung; Chung, Yongwha; Pan, Sung Bum; Park, Jin-Won

    2009-12-01

    As VLSI technology has been improved, a smart card employing 32-bit processors has been released, and more personal information such as medical, financial data can be stored in the card. Thus, it becomes important to protect personal information stored in the card. Verification of the card holder's identity using a fingerprint has advantages over the present practices of Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) and passwords. However, the computational workload of fingerprint verification is much heavier than that of the typical PIN-based solution. In this paper, we consider three strategies to implement fingerprint verification in a smart card environment and how to distribute the modules of fingerprint verification between the smart card and the card reader. We first evaluate the number of instructions of each step of a typical fingerprint verification algorithm, and estimate the execution time of several cryptographic algorithms to guarantee the security/privacy of the fingerprint data transmitted in the smart card with the client-server environment. Based on the evaluation results, we analyze each scenario with respect to the security level and the real-time execution requirements in order to implement fingerprint verification in the smart card with the client-server environment.

  6. Machine-assisted verification of latent fingerprints: first results for nondestructive contact-less optical acquisition techniques with a CWL sensor

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hildebrandt, Mario; Kiltz, Stefan; Krapyvskyy, Dmytro; Dittmann, Jana; Vielhauer, Claus; Leich, Marcus

    2011-11-01

    A machine-assisted analysis of traces from crime scenes might be possible with the advent of new high-resolution non-destructive contact-less acquisition techniques for latent fingerprints. This requires reliable techniques for the automatic extraction of fingerprint features from latent and exemplar fingerprints for matching purposes using pattern recognition approaches. Therefore, we evaluate the NIST Biometric Image Software for the feature extraction and verification of contact-lessly acquired latent fingerprints to determine potential error rates. Our exemplary test setup includes 30 latent fingerprints from 5 people in two test sets that are acquired from different surfaces using a chromatic white light sensor. The first test set includes 20 fingerprints on two different surfaces. It is used to determine the feature extraction performance. The second test set includes one latent fingerprint on 10 different surfaces and an exemplar fingerprint to determine the verification performance. This utilized sensing technique does not require a physical or chemical visibility enhancement of the fingerprint residue, thus the original trace remains unaltered for further investigations. No particular feature extraction and verification techniques have been applied to such data, yet. Hence, we see the need for appropriate algorithms that are suitable to support forensic investigations.

  7. 45 CFR 1626.7 - Verification of eligible alien status.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 45 Public Welfare 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Verification of eligible alien status. 1626.7... CORPORATION RESTRICTIONS ON LEGAL ASSISTANCE TO ALIENS § 1626.7 Verification of eligible alien status. (a) An alien seeking representation shall submit appropriate documents to verify eligibility, unless the only...

  8. A Quantitative Approach to the Formal Verification of Real-Time Systems.

    Science.gov (United States)

    1996-09-01

    Computer Science A Quantitative Approach to the Formal Verification of Real - Time Systems Sergio Vale Aguiar Campos September 1996 CMU-CS-96-199...ptisiic raieaiSI v Diambimos Lboiamtad _^ A Quantitative Approach to the Formal Verification of Real - Time Systems Sergio Vale Aguiar Campos...implied, of NSF, the Semiconduc- tor Research Corporation, ARPA or the U.S. government. Keywords: real - time systems , formal verification, symbolic

  9. Los Alamos National Laboratory Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project: 1991 quality program status report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-07-01

    This status report summarizes the activities and accomplishments of the Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos) Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project's (YMP) quality assurance program for calendar year 1991. The report is divided into three Sections: Program Activities, Verification Activities, and Trend Analysis

  10. Tomotherapy: IMRT and tomographic verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mackie, T.R.

    2000-01-01

    include MLC's and many clinics use them to replace 90% or more of the field-shaping requirements of conventional radiotherapy. Now, several academic centers are treating patients with IMRT using conventional MLC's to modulate the field. IMRT using conventional MLC's have the advantage that the patient is stationary during the treatment and the MLC's can be used in conventional practice. Nevertheless, tomotherapy using the Peacock system delivers the most conformal dose distributions of any commercial system to date. The biggest limitation with the both the NOMOS Peacock tomotherapy system and conventional MLC's for IMRT delivery is the lack of treatment verification. In conventional few-field radiotherapy one relied on portal images to determine if the patient was setup correctly and the beams were correctly positioned. With IMRT the image contrast is superimposed on the beam intensity variation. Conventional practice allowed for monitor unit calculation checks and point dosimeters placed on the patient's surface to verify that the treatment was properly delivered. With IMRT it is impossible to perform hand calculations of monitor units and dosimeters placed on the patient's surface are prone to error due to high gradients in the beam intensity. NOMOS has developed a verification phantom that allows multiple sheets of film to be placed in a light-tight box that is irradiated with the same beam pattern that is used to treat the patient. The optical density of the films are adjusted, normalized, and calibrated and then quantitatively compared with the dose calculated for the phantom delivery. However, this process is too laborious to be used for patient-specific QA. If IMRT becomes ubiquitous and it can be shown that IMRT is useful on most treatment sites then there is a need to design treatment units dedicated to IMRT delivery and verification. Helical tomotherapy is such a redesign. Helical tomotherapy is the delivery of a rotational fan beam while the patient is

  11. Distorted Fingerprint Verification System

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Divya KARTHIKAESHWARAN

    2011-01-01

    Full Text Available Fingerprint verification is one of the most reliable personal identification methods. Fingerprint matching is affected by non-linear distortion introduced in fingerprint impression during the image acquisition process. This non-linear deformation changes both the position and orientation of minutiae. The proposed system operates in three stages: alignment based fingerprint matching, fuzzy clustering and classifier framework. First, an enhanced input fingerprint image has been aligned with the template fingerprint image and matching score is computed. To improve the performance of the system, a fuzzy clustering based on distance and density has been used to cluster the feature set obtained from the fingerprint matcher. Finally a classifier framework has been developed and found that cost sensitive classifier produces better results. The system has been evaluated on fingerprint database and the experimental result shows that system produces a verification rate of 96%. This system plays an important role in forensic and civilian applications.

  12. Enhanced verification test suite for physics simulation codes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kamm, James R.; Brock, Jerry S.; Brandon, Scott T.; Cotrell, David L.; Johnson, Bryan; Knupp, Patrick; Rider, William J.; Trucano, Timothy G.; Weirs, V. Gregory

    2008-09-01

    This document discusses problems with which to augment, in quantity and in quality, the existing tri-laboratory suite of verification problems used by Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). The purpose of verification analysis is demonstrate whether the numerical results of the discretization algorithms in physics and engineering simulation codes provide correct solutions of the corresponding continuum equations.

  13. Test-driven verification/validation of model transformations

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    László LENGYEL; Hassan CHARAF

    2015-01-01

    Why is it important to verify/validate model transformations? The motivation is to improve the quality of the trans-formations, and therefore the quality of the generated software artifacts. Verified/validated model transformations make it possible to ensure certain properties of the generated software artifacts. In this way, verification/validation methods can guarantee different requirements stated by the actual domain against the generated/modified/optimized software products. For example, a verified/ validated model transformation can ensure the preservation of certain properties during the model-to-model transformation. This paper emphasizes the necessity of methods that make model transformation verified/validated, discusses the different scenarios of model transformation verification and validation, and introduces the principles of a novel test-driven method for verifying/ validating model transformations. We provide a solution that makes it possible to automatically generate test input models for model transformations. Furthermore, we collect and discuss the actual open issues in the field of verification/validation of model transformations.

  14. Weldon Spring Site Remedial Action Project quarterly environmental data summary (QEDS) for fourth quarter 1998

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-02-01

    This report contains the Quarterly Environmental Data Summary (QEDS) for the fourth quarter of 1998 in support of the Weldon Spring Site Remedial Action Project Federal Facilities Agreement. The data, except for air monitoring data and site KPA generated data (uranium analyses) were received from the contract laboratories, verified by the Weldon Spring Site verification group, and merged into the database during the fourth quarter of 1998. KPA results for on-site total uranium analyses performed during fourth quarter 1998 are included. Air monitoring data presented are the most recent complete sets of quarterly data.

  15. Analysis of Dextromethorphan and Dextrorphan in Skeletal Remains Following Decomposition in Different Microclimate Conditions.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Unger, K A; Watterson, J H

    2016-10-01

    The effects of decomposition microclimate on the distribution of dextromethorphan (DXM) and dextrorphan (DXT) in skeletonized remains of rats acutely exposed to DXM were examined. Animals (n = 10) received DXM (75 mg/kg, i.p.), were euthanized 30 min post-dose and immediately allowed to decompose at either Site A (shaded forest microenvironment on a grass-covered soil substrate) or Site B (rocky substrate exposed to direct sunlight, 600 m from Site A). Ambient temperature and relative humidity were automatically recorded 3 cm above rats at each site. Skeletal elements (vertebral columns, ribs, pelvic girdles, femora, tibiae, humeri and scapulae) were harvested, and analyzed using microwave assisted extraction, microplate solid phase extraction, and GC/MS. Drug levels, expressed as mass-normalized response ratios, and the ratios of DXT and DXM levels were compared across bones and between microclimate sites. No significant differences in DXT levels or metabolite/parent ratios were observed between sites or across bones. Only femoral DXM levels differed significantly between microclimate sites. For pooled data, microclimate was not observed to significantly affect analyte levels, nor the ratio of levels of DXT and DXM. These data suggest that microclimate conditions do not influence DXM and metabolite distribution in skeletal remains. © The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.

  16. Verification and validation of RADMODL Version 1.0

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kimball, K.D.

    1993-03-01

    RADMODL is a system of linked computer codes designed to calculate the radiation environment following an accident in which nuclear materials are released. The RADMODL code and the corresponding Verification and Validation (V ampersand V) calculations (Appendix A), were developed for Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC) by EGS Corporation (EGS). Each module of RADMODL is an independent code and was verified separately. The full system was validated by comparing the output of the various modules with the corresponding output of a previously verified version of the modules. The results of the verification and validation tests show that RADMODL correctly calculates the transport of radionuclides and radiation doses. As a result of this verification and validation effort, RADMODL Version 1.0 is certified for use in calculating the radiation environment following an accident

  17. Verification and validation of RADMODL Version 1.0

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kimball, K.D.

    1993-03-01

    RADMODL is a system of linked computer codes designed to calculate the radiation environment following an accident in which nuclear materials are released. The RADMODL code and the corresponding Verification and Validation (V&V) calculations (Appendix A), were developed for Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC) by EGS Corporation (EGS). Each module of RADMODL is an independent code and was verified separately. The full system was validated by comparing the output of the various modules with the corresponding output of a previously verified version of the modules. The results of the verification and validation tests show that RADMODL correctly calculates the transport of radionuclides and radiation doses. As a result of this verification and validation effort, RADMODL Version 1.0 is certified for use in calculating the radiation environment following an accident.

  18. Preliminary Hazard Classification for the Remediation of the 100-B/C Area Remaining Sites (Confirmatory Sampling Effort)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Routt, T.M.

    2000-01-01

    This document provides the preliminary hazard classification for the sampling and characterization activities to be conducted at the 100-B/C confirmatory sampling effort sites in support of remedial design and eventual remediation of these sites

  19. Independent Verification Survey of the Clean Coral Storage Pile at the Johnston Atoll Plutonium Contaminated Soil Remediation Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilson-Nichols, M.J.; Egidi, P.V.; Roemer, E.K.; Schlosser, R.M.

    2000-01-01

    f I The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Environmental Technology Section conducted an independent verification (IV) survey of the clean storage pile at the Johnston Atoll Plutonium Contaminated Soil Remediation Project (JAPCSRP) from January 18-25, 1999. The goal of the JAPCSRP is to restore a 24-acre area that was contaminated with plutonium oxide particles during nuclear testing in the 1960s. The selected remedy was a soil sorting operation that combined radiological measurements and mining processes to identify and sequester plutonium-contaminated soil. The soil sorter operated from about 1990 to 1998. The remaining clean soil is stored on-site for planned beneficial use on Johnston Island. The clean storage pile currently consists of approximately 120,000 m3 of coral. ORNL conducted the survey according to a Sampling and Analysis Plan, which proposed to provide an IV of the clean pile by collecting a minimum number (99) of samples. The goal was to ascertain wi th 95% confidence whether 97% of the processed soil is less than or equal to the accepted guideline (500-Bq/kg or 13.5-pCi/g) total transuranic (TRU) activity

  20. Online 3D EPID-based dose verification: Proof of concept

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Spreeuw, Hanno; Rozendaal, Roel, E-mail: r.rozendaal@nki.nl; Olaciregui-Ruiz, Igor; González, Patrick; Mans, Anton; Mijnheer, Ben [Department of Radiation Oncology, The Netherlands Cancer Institute, Amsterdam 1066 CX (Netherlands); Herk, Marcel van [University of Manchester, Manchester Academic Health Science Centre, The Christie NHS Foundation Trust, Manchester M20 4BX (United Kingdom)

    2016-07-15

    Purpose: Delivery errors during radiotherapy may lead to medical harm and reduced life expectancy for patients. Such serious incidents can be avoided by performing dose verification online, i.e., while the patient is being irradiated, creating the possibility of halting the linac in case of a large overdosage or underdosage. The offline EPID-based 3D in vivo dosimetry system clinically employed at our institute is in principle suited for online treatment verification, provided the system is able to complete 3D dose reconstruction and verification within 420 ms, the present acquisition time of a single EPID frame. It is the aim of this study to show that our EPID-based dosimetry system can be made fast enough to achieve online 3D in vivo dose verification. Methods: The current dose verification system was sped up in two ways. First, a new software package was developed to perform all computations that are not dependent on portal image acquisition separately, thus removing the need for doing these calculations in real time. Second, the 3D dose reconstruction algorithm was sped up via a new, multithreaded implementation. Dose verification was implemented by comparing planned with reconstructed 3D dose distributions delivered to two regions in a patient: the target volume and the nontarget volume receiving at least 10 cGy. In both volumes, the mean dose is compared, while in the nontarget volume, the near-maximum dose (D2) is compared as well. The real-time dosimetry system was tested by irradiating an anthropomorphic phantom with three VMAT plans: a 6 MV head-and-neck treatment plan, a 10 MV rectum treatment plan, and a 10 MV prostate treatment plan. In all plans, two types of serious delivery errors were introduced. The functionality of automatically halting the linac was also implemented and tested. Results: The precomputation time per treatment was ∼180 s/treatment arc, depending on gantry angle resolution. The complete processing of a single portal frame

  1. Online 3D EPID-based dose verification: Proof of concept

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Spreeuw, Hanno; Rozendaal, Roel; Olaciregui-Ruiz, Igor; González, Patrick; Mans, Anton; Mijnheer, Ben; Herk, Marcel van

    2016-01-01

    Purpose: Delivery errors during radiotherapy may lead to medical harm and reduced life expectancy for patients. Such serious incidents can be avoided by performing dose verification online, i.e., while the patient is being irradiated, creating the possibility of halting the linac in case of a large overdosage or underdosage. The offline EPID-based 3D in vivo dosimetry system clinically employed at our institute is in principle suited for online treatment verification, provided the system is able to complete 3D dose reconstruction and verification within 420 ms, the present acquisition time of a single EPID frame. It is the aim of this study to show that our EPID-based dosimetry system can be made fast enough to achieve online 3D in vivo dose verification. Methods: The current dose verification system was sped up in two ways. First, a new software package was developed to perform all computations that are not dependent on portal image acquisition separately, thus removing the need for doing these calculations in real time. Second, the 3D dose reconstruction algorithm was sped up via a new, multithreaded implementation. Dose verification was implemented by comparing planned with reconstructed 3D dose distributions delivered to two regions in a patient: the target volume and the nontarget volume receiving at least 10 cGy. In both volumes, the mean dose is compared, while in the nontarget volume, the near-maximum dose (D2) is compared as well. The real-time dosimetry system was tested by irradiating an anthropomorphic phantom with three VMAT plans: a 6 MV head-and-neck treatment plan, a 10 MV rectum treatment plan, and a 10 MV prostate treatment plan. In all plans, two types of serious delivery errors were introduced. The functionality of automatically halting the linac was also implemented and tested. Results: The precomputation time per treatment was ∼180 s/treatment arc, depending on gantry angle resolution. The complete processing of a single portal frame

  2. Online 3D EPID-based dose verification: Proof of concept.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Spreeuw, Hanno; Rozendaal, Roel; Olaciregui-Ruiz, Igor; González, Patrick; Mans, Anton; Mijnheer, Ben; van Herk, Marcel

    2016-07-01

    Delivery errors during radiotherapy may lead to medical harm and reduced life expectancy for patients. Such serious incidents can be avoided by performing dose verification online, i.e., while the patient is being irradiated, creating the possibility of halting the linac in case of a large overdosage or underdosage. The offline EPID-based 3D in vivo dosimetry system clinically employed at our institute is in principle suited for online treatment verification, provided the system is able to complete 3D dose reconstruction and verification within 420 ms, the present acquisition time of a single EPID frame. It is the aim of this study to show that our EPID-based dosimetry system can be made fast enough to achieve online 3D in vivo dose verification. The current dose verification system was sped up in two ways. First, a new software package was developed to perform all computations that are not dependent on portal image acquisition separately, thus removing the need for doing these calculations in real time. Second, the 3D dose reconstruction algorithm was sped up via a new, multithreaded implementation. Dose verification was implemented by comparing planned with reconstructed 3D dose distributions delivered to two regions in a patient: the target volume and the nontarget volume receiving at least 10 cGy. In both volumes, the mean dose is compared, while in the nontarget volume, the near-maximum dose (D2) is compared as well. The real-time dosimetry system was tested by irradiating an anthropomorphic phantom with three VMAT plans: a 6 MV head-and-neck treatment plan, a 10 MV rectum treatment plan, and a 10 MV prostate treatment plan. In all plans, two types of serious delivery errors were introduced. The functionality of automatically halting the linac was also implemented and tested. The precomputation time per treatment was ∼180 s/treatment arc, depending on gantry angle resolution. The complete processing of a single portal frame, including dose verification, took

  3. Safeguards for final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. Methods and technologies for the Olkiluoto site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Okko, O.

    2003-05-01

    The final disposal of the nuclear material shall introduce new safeguards concerns which have not been addressed previously in IAEA safeguards approaches for spent fuel. The encapsulation plant to be built at the site will be the final opportunity for verification of spent fuel assemblies prior to their transfer to the geological repository. Moreover, additional safety and safeguards measures are considered for the underground repository. Integrated safeguards verification systems will also concentrate on environmental monitoring to observe unannounced activities related to possible diversion schemes at the repository site. The final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in geological formation will begin in Finland within 10 years. After the geological site investigations and according to legal decision made in 2001, the final repository of the spent nuclear fuel shall be located at the Olkiluoto site in Eurajoki. The next phase of site investigations contains the construction of an underground facility, called ONKALO, for rock characterisation purposes. The excavation of the ONKALO is scheduled to start in 2004. Later on, the ONKALO may form a part of the final repository. The plans to construct the underground facility for nuclear material signify that the first safeguards measures, e.g. baseline mapping of the site area, need to take prior to the excavation phase. In order to support the development and implementation of the regulatory control of the final disposal programme, STUK established an independent expert group, LOSKA. The group should support the STUK in the development of the technical safeguards requirements, in the implementation of the safeguards and in the evaluation of the plans of the facility operator. This publication includes four background reports produced by this group. The first of these 'NDA verification of spent fuel, monitoring of disposal canisters, interaction of the safeguards and safety issues in the final disposal' describes the new

  4. Formal Verification of Real-Time System Requirements

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Marcin Szpyrka

    2000-01-01

    Full Text Available The methodology of system requirements verification presented in this paper is a proposition of a practical procedure for reducing some negatives of the specification of requirements. The main problem that is considered is to create a complete description of the system requirements without any negatives. Verification of the initially defined requirements is based on the coloured Petri nets. Those nets are useful for testing some properties of system requirements such as completeness, consistency and optimality. An example ofthe litt controller is presented.

  5. Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 135: Area 25 Underground Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cox, D. H.

    2000-01-01

    The Area 25 Underground Storage Tanks site Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 135 will be closed by unrestricted release decontamination and verification survey, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consert Order (FFACO, 1996). The CAU includes one Corrective Action Site (CAS). The Area 25 Underground Storage Tanks, (CAS 25-02-01), referred to as the Engine-Maintenance Assembly and Disassembly (E-MAD) Waste Holdup Tanks and Vault, were used to receive liquid waste from all of the radioactive drains at the E-MAD Facility. Based on the results of the Corrective Action Investigation conducted in June 1999 discussed in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 135: Area 25 Underground Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (DOE/NV,1999a), one sample from the radiological survey of the concrete vault interior exceeded radionuclide preliminary action levels. The analytes from the sediment samples that exceeded the preliminary action levels are polychlorinated biphenyls, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act metals, total petroleum hydrocarbons as diesel-range organics, and radionuclides. Unrestricted release decontamination and verification involves removal of concrete and the cement-lined pump sump from the vault. After verification that the contamination has been removed, the vault will be repaired with concrete, as necessary. The radiological- and chemical-contaminated pump sump and concrete removed from the vault would be disposed of at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site. The vault interior will be field surveyed following removal of contaminated material to verify that unrestricted release criteria have been achieved

  6. Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 135: Area 25 Underground Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    D. H. Cox

    2000-07-01

    The Area 25 Underground Storage Tanks site Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 135 will be closed by unrestricted release decontamination and verification survey, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consert Order (FFACO, 1996). The CAU includes one Corrective Action Site (CAS). The Area 25 Underground Storage Tanks, (CAS 25-02-01), referred to as the Engine-Maintenance Assembly and Disassembly (E-MAD) Waste Holdup Tanks and Vault, were used to receive liquid waste from all of the radioactive drains at the E-MAD Facility. Based on the results of the Corrective Action Investigation conducted in June 1999 discussed in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 135: Area 25 Underground Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (DOE/NV,1999a), one sample from the radiological survey of the concrete vault interior exceeded radionuclide preliminary action levels. The analytes from the sediment samples that exceeded the preliminary action levels are polychlorinated biphenyls, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act metals, total petroleum hydrocarbons as diesel-range organics, and radionuclides. Unrestricted release decontamination and verification involves removal of concrete and the cement-lined pump sump from the vault. After verification that the contamination has been removed, the vault will be repaired with concrete, as necessary. The radiological- and chemical-contaminated pump sump and concrete removed from the vault would be disposed of at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site. The vault interior will be field surveyed following removal of contaminated material to verify that unrestricted release criteria have been achieved.

  7. Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Work Plan for Corrective Action Unit 461: Joint Test Assembly Sites and Corrective Action Unit 495: Unconfirmed Joint Test Assembly Sites Tonopah Test Range, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jeff Smith

    1998-08-01

    This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration plan addresses the action necessary for the clean closure of Corrective Action Unit 461 (Test Area Joint Test Assembly Sites) and Corrective Action Unit 495 (Unconfirmed Joint Test Assembly Sites). The Corrective Action Units are located at the Tonopah Test Range in south central Nevada. Closure for these sites will be completed by excavating and evaluating the condition of each artillery round (if found); detonating the rounds (if necessary); excavating the impacted soil and debris; collecting verification samples; backfilling the excavations; disposing of the impacted soil and debris at an approved low-level waste repository at the Nevada Test Site

  8. Finite Countermodel Based Verification for Program Transformation (A Case Study

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Alexei P. Lisitsa

    2015-12-01

    Full Text Available Both automatic program verification and program transformation are based on program analysis. In the past decade a number of approaches using various automatic general-purpose program transformation techniques (partial deduction, specialization, supercompilation for verification of unreachability properties of computing systems were introduced and demonstrated. On the other hand, the semantics based unfold-fold program transformation methods pose themselves diverse kinds of reachability tasks and try to solve them, aiming at improving the semantics tree of the program being transformed. That means some general-purpose verification methods may be used for strengthening program transformation techniques. This paper considers the question how finite countermodels for safety verification method might be used in Turchin's supercompilation method. We extract a number of supercompilation sub-algorithms trying to solve reachability problems and demonstrate use of an external countermodel finder for solving some of the problems.

  9. Technical workshop on safeguards, verification technologies, and other related experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The aim of the Technical Workshop on safeguards was to encourage a clearer understanding of the IAEA Safeguards System, its origins and evolution and the present state of the art. Presentations held by the IAEA officials and outside experts examined as well other components of the non-proliferation regime, the current practices and procedures, and the future prospects. A series of presentations described the characteristics of the interaction between global and regional verification systems and described relevant past and present experience. Prominence given to such state of the art verification technologies as environmental sampling, satellite imaging and monitoring thorough remote and unattended techniques demonstrated, beyond any doubt, the essentially dynamic nature of verification. It is generally acknowledged that there have been major achievements in preventing spread of nuclear weapons, but no verification system can in itself prevent proliferation

  10. Technical workshop on safeguards, verification technologies, and other related experience

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-12-31

    The aim of the Technical Workshop on safeguards was to encourage a clearer understanding of the IAEA Safeguards System, its origins and evolution and the present state of the art. Presentations held by the IAEA officials and outside experts examined as well other components of the non-proliferation regime, the current practices and procedures, and the future prospects. A series of presentations described the characteristics of the interaction between global and regional verification systems and described relevant past and present experience. Prominence given to such state of the art verification technologies as environmental sampling, satellite imaging and monitoring thorough remote and unattended techniques demonstrated, beyond any doubt, the essentially dynamic nature of verification. It is generally acknowledged that there have been major achievements in preventing spread of nuclear weapons, but no verification system can in itself prevent proliferation Refs, figs, tabs

  11. Learning a Genetic Measure for Kinship Verification Using Facial Images

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Lu Kou

    2015-01-01

    Full Text Available Motivated by the key observation that children generally resemble their parents more than other persons with respect to facial appearance, distance metric (similarity learning has been the dominant choice for state-of-the-art kinship verification via facial images in the wild. Most existing learning-based approaches to kinship verification, however, are focused on learning a genetic similarity measure in a batch learning manner, leading to less scalability for practical applications with ever-growing amount of data. To address this, we propose a new kinship verification approach by learning a sparse similarity measure in an online fashion. Experimental results on the kinship datasets show that our approach is highly competitive to the state-of-the-art alternatives in terms of verification accuracy, yet it is superior in terms of scalability for practical applications.

  12. Towards Model Validation and Verification with SAT Techniques

    OpenAIRE

    Gogolla, Martin

    2010-01-01

    After sketching how system development and the UML (Unified Modeling Language) and the OCL (Object Constraint Language) are related, validation and verification with the tool USE (UML-based Specification Environment) is demonstrated. As a more efficient alternative for verification tasks, two approaches using SAT-based techniques are put forward: First, a direct encoding of UML and OCL with Boolean variables and propositional formulas, and second, an encoding employing an...

  13. Engineering a static verification tool for GPU kernels

    OpenAIRE

    Bardsley, E; Betts, A; Chong, N; Collingbourne, P; Deligiannis, P; Donaldson, AF; Ketema, J; Liew, D; Qadeer, S

    2014-01-01

    We report on practical experiences over the last 2.5 years related to the engineering of GPUVerify, a static verification tool for OpenCL and CUDA GPU kernels, plotting the progress of GPUVerify from a prototype to a fully functional and relatively efficient analysis tool. Our hope is that this experience report will serve the verification community by helping to inform future tooling efforts. ? 2014 Springer International Publishing.

  14. Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Book of extended synopses. Addendum

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    The symposium covered the topics related to international safeguards, verification and nuclear materials security, namely: verification and nuclear material security; the NPT regime: progress and promises; the Additional Protocol as an important tool for the strengthening of the safeguards system; the nuclear threat and the nuclear threat initiative. Eighteen sessions dealt with the following subjects: the evolution of IAEA safeguards ( including strengthened safeguards, present and future challenges; verification of correctness and completeness of initial declarations; implementation of the Additional Protocol, progress and experience; security of material; nuclear disarmament and ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq; evolution of IAEA verification in relation to nuclear disarmament); integrated safeguards; physical protection and illicit trafficking; destructive analysis for safeguards; the additional protocol; innovative safeguards approaches; IAEA verification and nuclear disarmament; environmental sampling; safeguards experience; safeguards equipment; panel discussion on development of state systems of accountancy and control; information analysis in the strengthened safeguard system; satellite imagery and remote monitoring; emerging IAEA safeguards issues; verification technology for nuclear disarmament; the IAEA and the future of nuclear verification and security

  15. Formal verification of reactor process control software using assertion checking environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sharma, Babita; Balaji, Sowmya; John, Ajith K.; Bhattacharjee, A.K.; Dhodapkar, S.D.

    2005-01-01

    Assertion Checking Environment (ACE) was developed in-house for carrying out formal (rigorous/ mathematical) functional verification of embedded software written in MISRA C. MISRA C is an industrially sponsored safe sub-set of C programming language and is well accepted in the automotive and aerospace industries. ACE uses static assertion checking technique for verification of MISRA C programs. First the functional specifications of the program are derived from the specifications in the form of pre- and post-conditions for each C function. These pre- and post-conditions are then introduced as assertions (formal comments) in the program code. The annotated C code is then formally verified using ACE. In this paper we present our experience of using ACE for the formal verification of process control software of a nuclear reactor. The Software Requirements Document (SRD) contained textual specifications of the process control software. The SRD was used by the designers to draw logic diagrams which were given as input to a code generator. The verification of the generated C code was done at 2 levels viz. (i) verification against specifications derived from logic diagrams, and (ii) verification against specifications derived from SRD. In this work we checked approximately 600 functional specifications of the software having roughly 15000 lines of code. (author)

  16. Container Verification Using Optically Stimulated Luminescence

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tanner, Jennifer E.; Miller, Steven D.; Conrady, Matthew M.; Simmons, Kevin L.; Tinker, Michael R.

    2008-01-01

    Containment verification is a high priority for safeguards containment and surveillance. Nuclear material containers, safeguards equipment cabinets, camera housings, and detector cable conduit are all vulnerable to tampering. Even with a high security seal on a lid or door, custom-built hinges and interfaces, and special colors and types of finishes, the surfaces of enclosures can be tampered with and any penetrations repaired and covered over. With today's technology, these repairs would not be detected during a simple visual inspection. Several suggested solutions have been to develop complicated networks of wires, fiber-optic cables, lasers or other sensors that line the inside of a container and alarm when the network is disturbed. This results in an active system with real time evidence of tampering but is probably not practical for most safeguards applications. A more practical solution would be to use a passive approach where an additional security feature was added to surfaces which would consist of a special coating or paint applied to the container or enclosure. One type of coating would incorporate optically stimulated luminescent (OSL) material. OSL materials are phosphors that luminesce in proportion to the ionizing radiation dose when stimulated with the appropriate optical wavelengths. The OSL fluoresces at a very specific wavelength when illuminated at another, very specific wavelength. The presence of the pre-irradiated OSL material in the coating is confirmed using a device that interrogates the surface of the enclosure using the appropriate optical wavelength and then reads the resulting luminescence. The presence of the OSL indicates that the integrity of the surface is intact. The coating itself could be transparent which would allow the appearance of the container to remain unchanged or the OSL material could be incorporated into certain paints or epoxies used on various types of containers. The coating could be applied during manufacturing

  17. IP cores design from specifications to production modeling, verification, optimization, and protection

    CERN Document Server

    Mohamed, Khaled Salah

    2016-01-01

    This book describes the life cycle process of IP cores, from specification to production, including IP modeling, verification, optimization, and protection. Various trade-offs in the design process are discussed, including  those associated with many of the most common memory cores, controller IPs  and system-on-chip (SoC) buses. Readers will also benefit from the author’s practical coverage of new verification methodologies. such as bug localization, UVM, and scan-chain.  A SoC case study is presented to compare traditional verification with the new verification methodologies. ·         Discusses the entire life cycle process of IP cores, from specification to production, including IP modeling, verification, optimization, and protection; ·         Introduce a deep introduction for Verilog for both implementation and verification point of view.  ·         Demonstrates how to use IP in applications such as memory controllers and SoC buses. ·         Describes a new ver...

  18. Exploring the Possible Use of Information Barriers for future Biological Weapons Verification Regimes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Luke, S.J.

    2011-01-01

    This report describes a path forward for implementing information barriers in a future generic biological arms-control verification regime. Information barriers have become a staple of discussion in the area of arms control verification approaches for nuclear weapons and components. Information barriers when used with a measurement system allow for the determination that an item has sensitive characteristics without releasing any of the sensitive information. Over the last 15 years the United States (with the Russian Federation) has led on the development of information barriers in the area of the verification of nuclear weapons and nuclear components. The work of the US and the Russian Federation has prompted other states (e.g., UK and Norway) to consider the merits of information barriers for possible verification regimes. In the context of a biological weapons control verification regime, the dual-use nature of the biotechnology will require protection of sensitive information while allowing for the verification of treaty commitments. A major question that has arisen is whether - in a biological weapons verification regime - the presence or absence of a weapon pathogen can be determined without revealing any information about possible sensitive or proprietary information contained in the genetic materials being declared under a verification regime. This study indicates that a verification regime could be constructed using a small number of pathogens that spans the range of known biological weapons agents. Since the number of possible pathogens is small it is possible and prudent to treat these pathogens as analogies to attributes in a nuclear verification regime. This study has determined that there may be some information that needs to be protected in a biological weapons control verification regime. To protect this information, the study concludes that the Lawrence Livermore Microbial Detection Array may be a suitable technology for the detection of the

  19. Exploring the Possible Use of Information Barriers for future Biological Weapons Verification Regimes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Luke, S J

    2011-12-20

    This report describes a path forward for implementing information barriers in a future generic biological arms-control verification regime. Information barriers have become a staple of discussion in the area of arms control verification approaches for nuclear weapons and components. Information barriers when used with a measurement system allow for the determination that an item has sensitive characteristics without releasing any of the sensitive information. Over the last 15 years the United States (with the Russian Federation) has led on the development of information barriers in the area of the verification of nuclear weapons and nuclear components. The work of the US and the Russian Federation has prompted other states (e.g., UK and Norway) to consider the merits of information barriers for possible verification regimes. In the context of a biological weapons control verification regime, the dual-use nature of the biotechnology will require protection of sensitive information while allowing for the verification of treaty commitments. A major question that has arisen is whether - in a biological weapons verification regime - the presence or absence of a weapon pathogen can be determined without revealing any information about possible sensitive or proprietary information contained in the genetic materials being declared under a verification regime. This study indicates that a verification regime could be constructed using a small number of pathogens that spans the range of known biological weapons agents. Since the number of possible pathogens is small it is possible and prudent to treat these pathogens as analogies to attributes in a nuclear verification regime. This study has determined that there may be some information that needs to be protected in a biological weapons control verification regime. To protect this information, the study concludes that the Lawrence Livermore Microbial Detection Array may be a suitable technology for the detection of the

  20. Verification of industrial x-ray machine: MINTs experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aziz Amat; Saidi Rajab; Eesan Pasupathi; Saipo Bahari Abdul Ratan; Shaharudin Sayuti; Abd Nassir Ibrahim; Abd Razak Hamzah

    2005-01-01

    Radiation and electrical safety of the industrial x-ray equipment required to meet Atomic Energy Licensing Board(AELB) guidelines ( LEM/TEK/42 ) at the time of installation and subsequently a periodic verification should be ensured. The purpose of the guide is to explain the requirements employed in conducting the test on industrial x-ray apparatus and be certified in meeting with our local legislative and regulation. Verification is aimed to provide safety assurance information on electrical requirements and the minimum radiation exposure to the operator. This regulation is introduced on new models imported into the Malaysian market. Since June, 1997, Malaysian Institute for Nuclear Technology Research (MINT) has been approved by AELB to provide verification services to private company, government and corporate body throughout Malaysia. Early January 1997, AELB has made it mandatory that all x-ray equipment for industrial purpose (especially Industrial Radiography) must fulfill certain performance test based on the LEM/TEK/42 guidelines. MINT as the third party verification encourages user to improve maintenance of the equipment. MINT experiences in measuring the performance on intermittent and continuous duty rating single-phase industrial x-ray machine in the year 2004 indicated that all of irradiating apparatus tested pass the test and met the requirements of the guideline. From MINT record, 1997 to 2005 , three x-ray models did not meet the requirement and thus not allowed to be used unless the manufacturers willing to modify it to meet AELB requirement. This verification procedures on electrical and radiation safety on industrial x-ray has significantly improved the the maintenance cultures and safety awareness in the usage of x-ray apparatus in the industrial environment. (Author)

  1. Experimental preparation and verification of quantum money

    Science.gov (United States)

    Guan, Jian-Yu; Arrazola, Juan Miguel; Amiri, Ryan; Zhang, Weijun; Li, Hao; You, Lixing; Wang, Zhen; Zhang, Qiang; Pan, Jian-Wei

    2018-03-01

    A quantum money scheme enables a trusted bank to provide untrusted users with verifiable quantum banknotes that cannot be forged. In this work, we report a proof-of-principle experimental demonstration of the preparation and verification of unforgeable quantum banknotes. We employ a security analysis that takes experimental imperfections fully into account. We measure a total of 3.6 ×106 states in one verification round, limiting the forging probability to 10-7 based on the security analysis. Our results demonstrate the feasibility of preparing and verifying quantum banknotes using currently available experimental techniques.

  2. VBMC: a formal verification tool for VHDL programs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ajith, K.J.; Bhattacharjee, A.K.

    2014-01-01

    The design of Control and Instrumentation (C and I) systems used in safety critical applications such as nuclear power plants involves partitioning of the overall system functionality into subparts and implementing each subpart in hardware and/or software as appropriate. With increasing use of programmable devices like FPGA, the hardware subsystems are often implemented in Hardware Description Languages (HDL) like VHDL. Since the functional bugs in such hardware subsystems used in safety critical C and I systems have disastrous consequences, it is important to use rigorous reasoning to verify the functionalities of the HDL models. This paper describes an indigenously developed software tool named VBMC (VHDL Bounded Model Checker) for mathematically proving/refuting functional properties of hardware designs described in VHDL. VBMC accepts hardware design as VHDL program file, functional property in PSL, and verification bound (number of cycles of operation) as inputs. It either reports that the design satisfies the functional property for the given verification bound or generates a counter example providing the reason of violation. In case of satisfaction, the proof holds good for the verification bound. VBMC has been used for the functional verification of FPGA based intelligent I/O boards developed at Reactor Control Division, BARC. (author)

  3. VBMC: a formal verification tool for VHDL program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ajith, K.J.; Bhattacharjee, A.K.

    2014-08-01

    The design of Control and Instrumentation (C and I) systems used in safety critical applications such as nuclear power plants involves partitioning of the overall system functionality into sub-parts and implementing each sub-part in hardware and/or software as appropriate. With increasing use of programmable devices like FPGA, the hardware subsystems are often implemented in Hardware Description Languages (HDL) like VHDL. Since the functional bugs in such hardware subsystems used in safety critical C and I systems have serious consequences, it is important to use rigorous reasoning to verify the functionalities of the HDL models. This report describes the design of a software tool named VBMC (VHDL Bounded Model Checker). The capability of this tool is in proving/refuting functional properties of hardware designs described in VHDL. VBMC accepts design as a VHDL program file, functional property in PSL, and verification bound (number of cycles of operation) as inputs. It either reports that the design satisfies the functional property for the given verification bound or generates a counterexample providing the reason of violation. In case of satisfaction, the proof holds good for the verification bound. VBMC has been used for the functional verification of FPGA based intelligent I/O boards developed at Reactor Control Division, BARC. (author)

  4. Analysis of an indirect neutron signature for enhanced UF_6 cylinder verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kulisek, J.A.; McDonald, B.S.; Smith, L.E.; Zalavadia, M.A.; Webster, J.B.

    2017-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) currently uses handheld gamma-ray spectrometers combined with ultrasonic wall-thickness gauges to verify the declared enrichment of uranium hexafluoride (UF_6) cylinders. The current method provides relatively low accuracy for the assay of "2"3"5U enrichment, especially for natural and depleted UF_6. Furthermore, the current method provides no capability to assay the absolute mass of "2"3"5U in the cylinder due to the localized instrument geometry and limited penetration of the 186-keV gamma-ray signature from "2"3"5U. Also, the current verification process is a time-consuming component of on-site inspections at uranium enrichment plants. Toward the goal of a more-capable cylinder assay method, the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory has developed the hybrid enrichment verification array (HEVA). HEVA measures both the traditional 186-keV direct signature and a non-traditional, high-energy neutron-induced signature (HEVA_N_T). HEVA_N_T enables full-volume assay of UF_6 cylinders by exploiting the relatively larger mean free paths of the neutrons emitted from the UF_6. In this work, Monte Carlo modeling is used as the basis for characterizing HEVA_N_T in terms of the individual contributions to HEVA_N_T from nuclides and hardware components. Monte Carlo modeling is also used to quantify the intrinsic efficiency of HEVA for neutron detection in a cylinder-assay geometry. Modeling predictions are validated against neutron-induced gamma-ray spectra from laboratory measurements and a relatively large population of Type 30B cylinders spanning a range of enrichments. Implications of the analysis and findings on the viability of HEVA for cylinder verification are discussed, such as the resistance of the HEVA_N_T signature to manipulation by the nearby placement of neutron-conversion materials.

  5. Limiting climate change verification of compliance with treaty commitments to limit greenhouse gas emissions from forests and land use by remote sensing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lanchbery, J.; Salt, J.

    1993-01-01

    This report contains the results of a study of how to verify compliance with treaty commitments to limit anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. The study concentrated on establishing methods of verifying compliance with the Framework Convention on Climate Change. In particular, it examined methods of monitoring commitments to limit anthropogenic emissions from forests, agriculture and waste (for example, landfill sites) rather than from fossil fuel burning, which has been the subject of other detailed studies. Verification of compliance with international agreements must be carried out at a national level, because nation states are the parties to such agreements and it is their compliance with their commitments that must be checked by any verification regime. Therefore, it is essential that any verification regime is able to measure the amount (preferably the mass) of greenhouse gas which is anthropogenically generated within each nation which is party to an agreement to limit emissions of them. Also, because gases disperse rapidly in the atmosphere, it is necessary to monitor emissions at their source. The first task in the study reported here was thus to identify emission sources. (orig.)

  6. Independent verification: operational phase liquid metal breeder reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bourne, P.B.

    1981-01-01

    The Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) recently achieved 100-percent power and now is in the initial stages of operation as a test reactor. An independent verification program has been established to assist in maintaining stable plant conditions, and to assure the safe operation of the reactor. Independent verification begins with the development of administrative procedures to control all other procedures and changes to the plant configurations. The technical content of the controlling procedures is subject to independent verification. The actual accomplishment of test procedures and operational maneuvers is witnessed by personnel not responsible for operating the plant. Off-normal events are analyzed, problem reports from other operating reactors are evaluated, and these results are used to improve on-line performance. Audits are used to confirm compliance with established practices and to identify areas where individual performance can be improved

  7. Verification of EPA's ''Preliminary Remediation Goals for radionuclides'' (PRG) electronic calculator

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jannik, Tim [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States). Savannah River National Lab. (SRNL); Stagich, Brooke [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States). Savannah River National Lab. (SRNL)

    2015-08-28

    The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) requested an external, independent verification study of their updated “Preliminary Remediation Goals for Radionuclides” (PRG) electronic calculator. The calculator provides PRGs for radionuclides that are used as a screening tool at Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) sites. These risk-based PRGs establish concentration limits under specific exposure scenarios. The purpose of this verification study is to determine that the calculator has no inherit numerical problems with obtaining solutions as well as to ensure that the equations are programmed correctly. There are 167 equations used in the calculator. To verify the calculator, all equations for each of seven receptor types (resident, construction worker, outdoor and indoor worker, recreator, farmer, and composite worker) were hand calculated using the default parameters. The same four radionuclides (Am-241, Co-60, H-3, and Pu-238) were used for each calculation for consistency throughout.

  8. An evaluation of the management system verification pilot at Hanford

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Briggs, C.R.; Ramonas, L.; Westendorf, W.

    1998-01-01

    The Chemical Management System (CMS), currently under development at Hanford, was used as the ''test program'' for pilot testing the value added aspects of the Chemical Manufacturers Association's (CMA) Management Systems Verification (MSV) process. The MSV process, which was developed by CMA's member chemical companies specifically as a tool to assist in the continuous improvement of environment, safety and health (ESH) performance, represents a commercial sector ''best practice'' for evaluating ESH management systems. The primary purpose of Hanford's MSV Pilot was to evaluate the applicability and utility of the MSV process in the Department of Energy (DOE) environment. However, because the Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) is the framework for ESH management at Hanford and at all DOE sites, the pilot specifically considered the MSV process in the context of a possible future adjunct to Integrated Safety Management System Verification (ISMSV) efforts at Hanford and elsewhere within the DOE complex. The pilot involved the conduct of two-hour interviews with four separate panels of individuals with functional responsibilities related to the CMS including the Department of Energy Richland Operations (DOE-RL), Fluor Daniel Hanford (FDH) and FDH's major subcontractors (MSCS). A semi-structured interview process was employed by the team of three ''verifiers'' who directed open-ended questions to the panels regarding the development, integration and effectiveness of management systems necessary to ensure the sustainability of the CMS effort. An ''MSV Pilot Effectiveness Survey'' also was completed by each panel participant immediately following the interview

  9. Technical procedures for land use, Deaf Smith County site, Texas: Environmental Field Program: Final draft

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-09-01

    This volume contains Technical Procedures pursuant to the Land Use Site Study Plan including land use data acquisition, land use/land cover map compilation, verification of land use/land cover map accuracy, and land use/land cover data analysis. 22 refs., 5 figs

  10. TWRS system drawings and field verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shepard, D.G.

    1995-01-01

    The Configuration Management Program combines the TWRS Labeling and O and M drawing and drawing verification programs. The combined program will produce system drawings for systems that are normally operated or have maintenance performed on the system, label individual pieces of equipment for proper identification, even if system drawings are not warranted, and perform verification of drawings that are identified as essential in Tank Farm Essential Drawing Plans. During fiscal year 1994, work was begun to label Tank Farm components and provide user friendly system based drawings for Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) operations and maintenance. During the first half of fiscal 1995, the field verification program continued to convert TWRS drawings into CAD format and verify the accuracy based on visual inspections. During the remainder of fiscal year 1995 these efforts will be combined into a single program providing system based drawings and field verification of TWRS equipment and facilities. This combined program for TWRS will include all active systems for tank farms. Operations will determine the extent of drawing and labeling requirements for single shell tanks, i.e. the electrical distribution, HVAC, leak detection, and the radiation monitoring system. The tasks required to meet these objectives, include the following: identify system boundaries or scope for drawing being verified; label equipment/components in the process systems with a unique Equipment Identification Number (EIN) per the TWRS Data Standard; develop system drawings that are coordinated by ''smart'' drawing numbers and/or drawing references as identified on H-14-020000; develop a Master Equipment List (MEL) multi-user data base application which will contain key information about equipment identified in the field; and field verify and release TWRS Operation and Maintenance (O and M) drawings

  11. CATS Deliverable 5.1 : CATS verification of test matrix and protocol

    OpenAIRE

    Uittenbogaard, J.; Camp, O.M.G.C. op den; Montfort, S. van

    2016-01-01

    This report summarizes the work conducted within work package (WP) 5 "Verification of test matrix and protocol" of the Cyclist AEB testing system (CATS) project. It describes the verification process of the draft CATS test matrix resulting from WP1 and WP2, and the feasibility of meeting requirements set by CATS consortium based on requirements in Euro NCAP AEB protocols regarding accuracy, repeatability and reproducibility using the developed test hardware. For the cases where verification t...

  12. Formal verification of industrial control systems

    CERN Multimedia

    CERN. Geneva

    2015-01-01

    Verification of critical software is a high priority but a challenging task for industrial control systems. For many kinds of problems, testing is not an efficient method. Formal methods, such as model checking appears to be an appropriate complementary method. However, it is not common to use model checking in industry yet, as this method needs typically formal methods expertise and huge computing power. In the EN-ICE-PLC section, we are working on a [methodology][1] and a tool ([PLCverif][2]) to overcome these challenges and to integrate formal verification in the development process of our PLC-based control systems. [1]: http://cern.ch/project-plc-formalmethods [2]: http://cern.ch/plcverif

  13. Focussed approach to verification under FMCT

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bragin, V.; Carlson, J.; Bardsley, J.; Hill, J.

    1998-01-01

    FMCT will have different impacts on individual states due to the enormous variance in their nuclear fuel cycles and the associated fissile material inventories. The problem is how to negotiate a treaty that would achieve results favourable for all participants, given that interests and priorities vary so much. We believe that focussed verification, confined to safeguarding of enrichment and reprocessing facilities in NWS and TS, coupled with verification of unirradiated direct-use material produced after entry-into-force of a FMCT and supported with measures to detect possible undeclared enrichment and reprocessing activities, is technically adequate for the FMCT. Eventually this would become the appropriate model for all states party to the NPT

  14. Nevada National Security Site. Site-Directed Research and Development FY 2011 Annual Report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bender, Howard

    2012-01-01

    This fiscal year 2011 annual report of the Site-Directed Research and Development program, the 10th anniversary edition, recognizes a full decade of innovative R and D accomplishments in support of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Last year the NNSS itself was renamed to reflect a diversifying mission, and our R and D program has contributed significantly to shape emerging missions that will continue to evolve. New initiatives in stockpile stewardship science, nonproliferation, and treaty verification and monitoring have had substantial successes in FY 2011, and many more accomplishments are expected. SDRD is the cornerstone on which many of these initiatives rest. Historically supporting our main focus areas, SDRD is also building a solid foundation for new, and non-traditional, emerging national security missions. The program continues its charter to advance science and technology for a broad base of agencies including the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and many others.

  15. Formal Development and Verification of a Distributed Railway Control System

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Haxthausen, Anne Elisabeth; Peleska, Jan

    1999-01-01

    In this article we introduce the concept for a distributed railway control system and present the specification and verification of the main algorithm used for safe distributed control. Our design and verification approach is based on the RAISE method, starting with highly abstract algebraic...

  16. Formal Development and Verification of a Distributed Railway Control System

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Haxthausen, Anne Elisabeth; Peleska, Jan

    1998-01-01

    In this article we introduce the concept for a distributed railway control system and present the specification and verification of the main algorithm used for safe distributed control. Our design and verification approach is based on the RAISE method, starting with highly abstract algebraic spec...

  17. European Train Control System: A Case Study in Formal Verification

    Science.gov (United States)

    Platzer, André; Quesel, Jan-David

    Complex physical systems have several degrees of freedom. They only work correctly when their control parameters obey corresponding constraints. Based on the informal specification of the European Train Control System (ETCS), we design a controller for its cooperation protocol. For its free parameters, we successively identify constraints that are required to ensure collision freedom. We formally prove the parameter constraints to be sharp by characterizing them equivalently in terms of reachability properties of the hybrid system dynamics. Using our deductive verification tool KeYmaera, we formally verify controllability, safety, liveness, and reactivity properties of the ETCS protocol that entail collision freedom. We prove that the ETCS protocol remains correct even in the presence of perturbation by disturbances in the dynamics. We verify that safety is preserved when a PI controlled speed supervision is used.

  18. Time-space modal logic for verification of bit-slice circuits

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hiraishi, Hiromi

    1996-03-01

    The major goal of this paper is to propose a new modal logic aiming at formal verification of bit-slice circuits. The new logic is called as time-space modal logic and its major feature is that it can handle two transition relations: one for time transition and the other for space transition. As for a verification algorithm, a symbolic model checking algorithm of the new logic is shown. This could be applicable to verification of bit-slice microprocessor of infinite bit width and 1D systolic array of infinite length. A simple benchmark result shows the effectiveness of the proposed approach.

  19. Verification of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT): The Potential Role of the IAEA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chung, Jin Ho

    2016-01-01

    The objective of a future verification of a FMCT(Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty) is to deter and detect non-compliance with treaty obligations in a timely and non-discriminatory manner with regard to banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices. Since the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has already established the IAEA safeguards as a verification system mainly for Non -Nuclear Weapon States (NNWSs), it is expected that the IAEA's experience and expertise in this field will make a significant contribution to setting up a future treaty's verification regime. This paper is designed to explore the potential role of the IAEA in verifying the future treaty by analyzing verification abilities of the Agency in terms of treaty verification and expected challenges. Furthermore, the concept of multilateral verification that could be facilitated by the IAEA will be examined as a measure of providing a credible assurance of compliance with a future treaty. In this circumstance, it is necessary for the IAEA to be prepared for playing a leading role in FMCT verifications as a form of multilateral verification by taking advantage of its existing verification concepts, methods, and tools. Also, several challenges that the Agency faces today need to be overcome, including dealing with sensitive and proliferative information, attribution of fissile materials, lack of verification experience in military fuel cycle facilities, and different attitude and culture towards verification between NWSs and NNWSs

  20. Verification of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT): The Potential Role of the IAEA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chung, Jin Ho [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-05-15

    The objective of a future verification of a FMCT(Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty) is to deter and detect non-compliance with treaty obligations in a timely and non-discriminatory manner with regard to banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices. Since the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has already established the IAEA safeguards as a verification system mainly for Non -Nuclear Weapon States (NNWSs), it is expected that the IAEA's experience and expertise in this field will make a significant contribution to setting up a future treaty's verification regime. This paper is designed to explore the potential role of the IAEA in verifying the future treaty by analyzing verification abilities of the Agency in terms of treaty verification and expected challenges. Furthermore, the concept of multilateral verification that could be facilitated by the IAEA will be examined as a measure of providing a credible assurance of compliance with a future treaty. In this circumstance, it is necessary for the IAEA to be prepared for playing a leading role in FMCT verifications as a form of multilateral verification by taking advantage of its existing verification concepts, methods, and tools. Also, several challenges that the Agency faces today need to be overcome, including dealing with sensitive and proliferative information, attribution of fissile materials, lack of verification experience in military fuel cycle facilities, and different attitude and culture towards verification between NWSs and NNWSs.