Differences in regulation and efficiency on the electricity market. A preliminary study in the Market Design program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bergendahl, Goeran; Lindblom, Ted; Olsson, Sven-Olof; Sandoff, Anders

2001-05-01

This paper reports the outcome of a pilot study focusing on corporate governance and mechanism design issues concerning the electricity industry. With respect to the on-going deregulation, enlargement and internationalisation of electricity markets, especial emphasis is put on exploring the importance of the regulatory environment for accomplishing overall market efficiency. Throughout this preliminary study a central assumption has been that the actors on electricity markets are trying to maximise profits under conditions of uncertainty and asymmetric information. This means that transaction costs should be taken into consideration when studying and analysing the efficiency of electricity markets. Accordingly, the theoretical framework of this paper is resting largely on information theories, like 'Transaction Cost Economics', 'Agency Theory', 'Public Choice and Regulation' and 'Information Economics'. The pilot study consists of three parts. The first part is focusing on the development of a relevant theoretical framework. This part is demonstrating important pricing principles and regulatory incentives for accomplishing an efficient electricity market and, thus, a fair competition between electricity actors, i.e. power companies and other traders of electricity. In such a market design we have distinguished three cornerstones: 1. Marginal cost based electricity pricing, both for energy and capacity. 2. Long-range planning of production and transmission expansions. 3. Transparent transmission pricing and open access to all regional and local transmission grids. The following areas are examples of theoretical research issues that are of a particular interest in practice: The production and transmission of electricity is characterised by considerable economies of scale. The financing of new production and transmission capacity is, however, hard to manage with internal funding when electricity prices are based on marginal costs. What methods or (pricing) strategies

Electric power market regulations in UK

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Federico, G.; Napolano, L.

2000-01-01

The wholesale electricity market in UK is being radically reformed, with the abolition of a centralised market (the Pool) and the introduction of a system based around bilateral trading and real-time balancing (NETA), with the aim of increasing competition in the sector. This article analyses the English experience to draw some implications on the relationship between market design, market structure and market power, and to provide some insights for the design of the future Italian market [it

Characteristics of the prices of operating reserves and regulation services in competitive electricity markets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wang Peng; Zareipour, Hamidreza; Rosehart, William D.

2011-01-01

In this paper, characteristics of the prices of reserves and regulation services in the Ontario, New York and ERCOT electricity markets are studied. More specifically, price variability, price jumps, long-range correlation, and non-linearity of the prices are analyzed using the available measures in the literature. For the Ontario electricity market, the prices of 10-min spinning, 10-min non-spinning, and 30-min operating reserves for the period May 1, 2002 to December 31, 2007 are analyzed. For the New York market, prices of the same reserves plus regulation service are studied for the period February 5, 2005 to December 31, 2008. For the ERCOT market, we analyze the prices of responsive reserve, regulation up and regulation down services, for the period January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2009. The studied characteristics of operating reserve and regulation prices are also compared with those of energy prices. The findings of this paper show that the studied reserve and regulation prices feature extreme volatility, more frequent jumps and spikes, different peak price occurrence time, and lower predictability, compared to the energy prices. - Research highlights: → We examine various statistical characteristics of reserve and regulation prices. → We compare characteristics of reserve and regulation and energy prices. → Reserve and regulation prices feature different patterns from energy prices. → Reserve and regulation prices are more dispersive and volatile than energy price.

Competition compliant wholesale electricity prices. An examination of the regulation on the integrity and transparency of wholesale energy market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Konar, Selma

2015-01-01

The development of wholesale electricity prices showed in recent years a very fluctuating course. The starting point for ensuring competitive compliant electricity prices have uniform rules that establish effective competition in the overall wholesale electricity, ensure greater transparency in the market and prohibit market abuse influence exercised on the wholesale price. The REMIT regulation creates a first union-law rules to this standardized specifications. The volume first examines the transparency, competitiveness, and supervisory structures in the wholesale electricity before legislating a regulation. It is clear, as the transparency and supervisory structures should be designed from the wholesale electricity ideally. On this basis, the work is dealing with the REMIT regulation. The author works out to market participants relevant notification and publication requirements, the follow-up demands on the company as well as the now existing prohibitions on market abuse and the related penalty catalog and analyze the supervisory structures newly created in the wholesale electricity. Here, the work also identified the weaknesses of the regulation and shows suitable solution approaches. [de

The Nordic financial electricity market

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

2010-11-15

NordREG is a cooperation of the Nordic energy regulators. The mission is to actively promote legal and institutional framework and conditions necessary for developing the Nordic and European electricity markets. The financial market is an important market for market participants to mitigate their risks. By providing tools for risk management, the financial market contributes to the efficient functioning of both wholesale and end-user markets. NordREG decided during 2009 to undertake a study on the Nordic financial electricity market. The aim of the report is to consider whether any improvements can be made to further increase the efficiency of the Nordic financial electricity market in order to secure an optimal price setting in the wholesale and the end-user markets

Risk and investment management in liberalized electricity markets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lemming, J.

2003-09-01

Electricity markets around the world are currently undergoing a liberalization process that changes the way electricity is traded and priced as a commodity. The electricity system has unique technical characteristics and the importance of electricity in today's information society is significant. The liberalization will not change the fact that politicians and regulators will be held responsible for keeping electricity on reasonable costs. What changes is the tool used by regulators to accomplish this task. The introduction of competitive markets implies that market participants will be held financial responsible for their decisions. System operators remain responsible for the physical balancing, thus electricity markets will remain strongly regulated even after liberalization. The hypothesis of this thesis is that the relevance of financial tools for electricity market risk management depends critically on the technical characteristics of electricity assets and on the demands placed by the stakeholders in the electricity sector. In many cases such technical characteristics and stakeholder demands will imply a need for revised and renewed tools compared to those used for portfolios of financial assets. (BA)

Stochastic Optimal Regulation Service Strategy for a Wind Farm Participating in the Electricity Market

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Zhang, Baohua; Hu, Weihao; Chen, Zhe

2015-01-01

in the stochastic optimization to deal with the uncertainty of the up regulation price and the up regulation activation of the power system.The Danish short-term electricity market and a wind farm in western Denmark are chosen to evaluate the effect of the proposed strategy. Simulation results showthe proposed......As modern wind farmshave the ability to provideregulation service for the power system, wind power plant operators may be motivated to participate in the regulating market to maximize their profit.In this paper, anoptimal regulation servicestrategy for a wind farm to participate...... strategy can increase the revenue of wind farms by leavinga certain amount of wind powerfor regulation service....

Empirical assessment of market power in the Alberta wholesale electricity market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Qu, F.

2007-01-01

In the 1990s, many countries began to unbundle regulated electricity monopolies into generation, transmission, distribution and retail companies. Transmission and distribution services remained regulated, but generation and retail services were open for competition. Wholesale and retail electricity markets were created. This paper presented a newly developed competitiveness index specifically for the Alberta market through a simple and standard economic approach. The Alberta Electric Utilities Act came into effect in January 1996. This paper described how the Alberta wholesale electricity market works and demonstrated how to model market power in the electricity market. In this study, power generating companies in Alberta were divided into 2 groups. The first group contained the 5 largest firms called strategic firms, while the other group contained the small generating companies called non-strategic firms or the competitive fringe. In the sample years 2003 and 2004, strategic firms withheld capacity when price was above marginal cost and behaved within the range of competitive pricing. They were more likely to price competitively than to use unilateral market power prices. In addition, firms had higher price-cost margins during the off-peak season. This paper explained in detail the reason for this unusual off-peak pattern. The index to measure a firm's strategic behaviour in the Alberta electricity market was developed according to price-cost margin data where firm-behaviour effect was distinguished from the demand-elasticity effect. It was concluded that policy-makers and regulations should consider the magnitude and source of market power when designing market structure, rules and trading practices. 9 refs., 5 tabs., 2 figs

Demand response in Indian electricity market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Siddiqui, Md Zakaria; Maere d'Aertrycke, Gauthier de; Smeers, Yves

2012-01-01

This paper outlines a methodology for implementing cost of service regulation in retail market for electricity in India when wholesale market is liberalised and operates through an hourly spot market. As in a developing country context political considerations make tariff levels more important than supply security, satisfying the earmarked level of demand takes a back seat. Retail market regulators are often forced by politicians to keep the retail tariff at suboptimal level. This imposes budget constraint on distribution companies to procure electricity that it requires to meet the earmarked level of demand. This is the way demand response is introduced in the system and has its impact on spot market prices. We model such a situation of not being able to serve the earmarked demand as disutility to the regulator which has to be minimised and we compute associated equilibrium. This results in systematic mechanism for cutting loads. We find that even a small cut in ability of the distribution companies to procure electricity from the spot market has profound impact on the prices in the spot market. - Highlights: ► Modelling the impact of retail tariff in different states on spot prices of electricity in India. ► Retail tariffs are usually fixed below appropriate levels by states due to political reasons. ► Due to revenue constraint distribution utility withdraws demand from spot market in peak hours. ► This adversely affects the scarcity rent of generators and subsequently future investment. ► We show possibility of strategic behaviour among state level regulators in setting retail tariff.

Pollution Under Environmental Regulation in Energy Markets

CERN Document Server

Gullì, Francesco

2013-01-01

Pollution Under Environmental Regulation in Energy Markets provides a study of environmental regulation when energy markets are imperfectly competitive. This theoretical treatment focuses on three relevant cases of energy markets. First, the residential space heating sector where hybrid regulation such as taxation and emissions trading together are possible. Second, the electricity market where transactions are organized in the form of multi-period auctions. Third, namely natural gas (input) and electricity (output) markets where there is combined imperfect competition in vertical related energy markets.   The development of free or low carbon technologies supported by energy policies, aiming at increasing security of supply, is also explored whilst considering competition policies that reduce market power in energy markets thus improving market efficiency. Pollution Under Environmental Regulation in Energy Markets discusses the key issues of whether imperfect competition can lessen the ability of environmen...

Grid Integration of Electric Vehicles in Open Electricity Markets

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

congestion management scenario within electric distribution networks •optimal EV charging management with the fleet operator concept and smart charging management •EV battery technology, modelling and tests •the use of EVs for balancing power fluctuations from renewable energy sources, looking at power......Presenting the policy drivers, benefits and challenges for grid integration of electric vehicles (EVs) in the open electricity market environment, this book provides a comprehensive overview of existing electricity markets and demonstrates how EVs are integrated into these different markets...... of the technologies for EV integration, this volume is informative for research professors and graduate students in power systems; it will also appeal to EV manufacturers, regulators, EV market professionals, energy providers and traders, mobility providers, EV charging station companies, and policy makers....

Market power in deregulated electricity markets : a review of the recent experience

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mullin, K.; Trebilcock, M.

2003-01-01

Traditionally, the electric power industry has been headed by vertically integrated monopolies that combined power generation, transmission, distribution and retail components of electricity supply. Electric utilities were generally publicly owned and subjected to rate-of-return regulation. The industry in many jurisdictions is now being unbundled with the advent of new generation technology that has led the way for small generation facilities to produce competitively priced electricity and enter the electricity market. Regulators have recognized that private monopolies had little incentive to minimize costs resulting in inefficient operation of the utility. The challenge lies in designing a system that truly promotes competitive markets. This presentation examined the characteristics of market power and described the experiences of several jurisdictions in dealing with possible market power abuse. The presentation also presented lessons learned in California, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, New Zealand, Alberta, and Ontario that could be applied to future electricity markets. In conclusion, the authors state that governments should use caution when implementing across-the-board price caps, because doing so discourages new investment in generation capacity.152 refs

Regulation of distributed generation. A European Policy Paper on the Integration of Distributed Generation in the Internal Electricity Market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Van Sambeek, E.J.W.; Scheepers, M.J.J.

2004-06-01

In the SUSTELNET project criteria and guidelines have been developed that can create a level playing field in electricity markets between distributed generation (DG) and large scale power generation and will improve the network and market access of DG and electricity supply from renewable energy resources (RES). This report focuses on the European dimensions of DG regulation. The key findings of the SUSTELNET project are compared with the EU legislation, i.e. the current Electricity, Renewables and CHP Directives. Additional EU policy, regulation and initiatives are identified that can help Member States in developing future economically efficient and sustainable electricity supply systems

Some design lessons from market-based greenhouse gas regulation in the restructured Australian electricity industry

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

MacGill, Iain; Outhred, Hugh; Nolles, Karel

2006-01-01

There is growing worldwide interest in the use of market-based policy instruments for climate change regulation in the electricity sector. These mechanisms would seem to offer some efficiency and flexibility advantages over more traditional regulatory approaches, while being highly compatible with competitive market-based electricity industries. Australia has been an early and enthusiastic adopter of both electricity industry restructuring and market-based environmental instruments. This paper first outlines some of these recent policy developments. In particular, we describe the objectives, design and outcomes to date of electricity industry restructuring, the Mandatory Renewable Energy Target, the NSW Greenhouse Benchmarks, the Queensland 13% Gas scheme and Government accredited Green Power. From this, we draw some key design lessons for such market-based instruments. These include the perils of abstraction in scheme design, the vital importance of setting appropriate baselines in 'baseline and credit' schemes, the possibility that such measures may interact in ways that reduce their environmental effectiveness, 'market for lemon' risks with tradable instruments that have measurement, verification or 'additionality' difficulties, and the challenges of creating transparent liquid markets for these mechanisms. The mixed performance of these Australian schemes to date illustrates the need for great care in designing such market-based approaches

Some design lessons from market-based greenhouse gas regulation in the restructured Australian electricity industry

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

MacGill, Iain [School of Electrical Engineering and Telecommunications, University of New South Wales, Sydney NSW 2052 (Australia)] e-mail: i.macgill@unsw.edu.au; Outhred, Hugh [School of Electrical Engineering and Telecommunications, University of New South Wales, Sydney NSW 2052 (Australia); Nolles, Karel [School of Electrical Engineering and Telecommunications, University of New South Wales, Sydney NSW 2052 (Australia)

2006-01-01

There is growing worldwide interest in the use of market-based policy instruments for climate change regulation in the electricity sector. These mechanisms would seem to offer some efficiency and flexibility advantages over more traditional regulatory approaches, while being highly compatible with competitive market-based electricity industries. Australia has been an early and enthusiastic adopter of both electricity industry restructuring and market-based environmental instruments. This paper first outlines some of these recent policy developments. In particular, we describe the objectives, design and outcomes to date of electricity industry restructuring, the Mandatory Renewable Energy Target, the NSW Greenhouse Benchmarks, the Queensland 13% Gas scheme and Government accredited Green Power. From this, we draw some key design lessons for such market-based instruments. These include the perils of abstraction in scheme design, the vital importance of setting appropriate baselines in 'baseline and credit' schemes, the possibility that such measures may interact in ways that reduce their environmental effectiveness, 'market for lemon' risks with tradable instruments that have measurement, verification or 'additionality' difficulties, and the challenges of creating transparent liquid markets for these mechanisms. The mixed performance of these Australian schemes to date illustrates the need for great care in designing such market-based approaches.

Some design lessons from market-based greenhouse gas regulation in the restructured Australian electricity industry

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Iain MacGill; Hugh Outhred; Karel Nolles [University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW (Australia). School of Electrical Engineering & Telecommunications

2006-01-01

There is growing worldwide interest in the use of market-based policy instruments for climate change regulation in the electricity sector. These mechanisms would seem to offer some efficiency and flexibility advantages over more traditional regulatory approaches, while being highly compatible with competitive market-based electricity industries. Australia has been an early and enthusiastic adopter of both electricity industry restructuring and market-based environmental instruments. This paper first outlines some of these recent policy developments. It then describes the objectives, design and outcomes to date of electricity industry restructuring, the Mandatory Renewable Energy Target, the NSW Greenhouse Benchmarks, the Queensland 13% Gas scheme and Government accredited Green Power. From this, some key design lessons are drawn for such market-based instruments. These include the perils of abstraction in scheme design, the vital importance of setting appropriate baselines in 'baseline and credit' schemes, the possibility that such measures may interact in ways that reduce their environmental effectiveness, 'market for lemon' risks with tradable instruments that have measurement, verification or 'additionality' difficulties, and the challenges of creating transparent liquid markets for these mechanisms. The mixed performance of these Australian schemes to date illustrates the need for great care in designing such market-based approaches. 36 refs., 2 figs.

Capacity Market Design: Motivation and Challenges in Alberta’s Electricity Market

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

David Brown

2018-03-01

Full Text Available Alberta’s electricity market is currently undergoing a period of substantial transition. The province should proceed with caution as it switches from an energy-only electricity market to a capacity market by 2021. Many other jurisdictions have already made the changeover and Alberta can learn from their experiences in order to avoid common mistakes and pitfalls that can arise with the deployment of a capacity market.There were growing concerns that the existing electricity market structure would not attract sufficient investment from conventional generation (e.g., natural gas due to the increased penetration of zero marginal cost renewable generation. As a result, the Alberta government has chosen to transition to a capacity market. For consumers, a capacity market aims to ensure there is sufficient investment in new generation capacity to “keep the lights on” and reduce price swings in the wholesale market. The capacity market will also help the province meet its goals for attracting investors and transitioning away from its dependence on coal-fired electricity generation.However, a switchover is not as simple as it sounds. In an energy-only market, firms are paid solely based on the provision of electricity in hourly wholesale markets. In capacity markets, electricity-generating firms are also paid for providing generation capacity, reflecting the potential to provide electricity at some point in the future. While capacity markets can help ensure there is a reliable supply of electricity, there are several challenges in the implementation of capacity markets. This paper discusses the motivation for the adoption of capacity markets, highlights challenges regulators face when implementing this market design in the context of Alberta, and summarizes the key trade-offs associated with energy-only versus capacity market designs.Relative to an energy-only market, a capacity market is more complex and requires that regulators specify numerous

Retail markets. Electricity and natural gas retail markets Observatory 2. Quarter 2014

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-06-01

The retail markets Observatory aims to provide general monitoring indicators of electricity and natural gas retail markets in France. This Observatory is updated on a Quarterly basis and published on CRE's web site (www.cre.fr). The first part of the report summarises the highlights of the electricity market (situation, market shares, suppliers, sales, dynamic analysis, regulated prices). The natural gas market is detailed in the second part

Retail markets. Electricity and natural gas retail markets Observatory 1. Quarter 2015

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-03-01

The retail markets Observatory aims to provide general monitoring indicators of electricity and natural gas retail markets in France. This Observatory is updated on a Quarterly basis and published on CRE's web site (www.cre.fr). The first part of the report summarises the highlights of the electricity market (situation, market shares, suppliers, sales, dynamic analysis, regulated prices). The natural gas market is detailed in the second part

Retail markets. Electricity and natural gas retail markets Observatory 3. Quarter 2015

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-09-01

The retail markets Observatory aims to provide general monitoring indicators of electricity and natural gas retail markets in France. This Observatory is updated on a Quarterly basis and published on CRE's web site (www.cre.fr). The first part of the report summarises the highlights of the electricity market (situation, market shares, suppliers, sales, dynamic analysis, regulated prices). The natural gas market is detailed in the second part

Retail markets. Electricity and natural gas retail markets Observatory 4. Quarter 2015

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-12-01

The retail markets Observatory aims to provide general monitoring indicators of electricity and natural gas retail markets in France. This Observatory is updated on a Quarterly basis and published on CRE's web site (www.cre.fr). The first part of the report summarises the highlights of the electricity market (situation, market shares, suppliers, sales, dynamic analysis, regulated prices). The natural gas market is detailed in the second part

Retail markets. Electricity and natural gas retail markets Observatory 1. Quarter 2016

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2016-03-01

The retail markets Observatory aims to provide general monitoring indicators of electricity and natural gas retail markets in France. This Observatory is updated on a Quarterly basis and published on CRE's web site (www.cre.fr). The first part of the report summarises the highlights of the electricity market (situation, market shares, suppliers, sales, dynamic analysis, regulated prices). The natural gas market is detailed in the second part

Retail markets. Electricity and natural gas retail markets Observatory 2. Quarter 2015

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-06-01

The retail markets Observatory aims to provide general monitoring indicators of electricity and natural gas retail markets in France. This Observatory is updated on a Quarterly basis and published on CRE's web site (www.cre.fr). The first part of the report summarises the highlights of the electricity market (situation, market shares, suppliers, sales, dynamic analysis, regulated prices). The natural gas market is detailed in the second part

Retail markets. Electricity and natural gas retail markets Observatory 4. Quarter 2013

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-12-01

The retail markets Observatory aims to provide general monitoring indicators of electricity and natural gas retail markets in France. This Observatory is updated on a Quarterly basis and published on CRE's web site (www.cre.fr). The first part of the report summarises the highlights of the electricity market (situation, market shares, suppliers, sales, dynamic analysis, regulated prices). The natural gas market is detailed in the second part

Retail markets. Electricity and natural gas retail markets Observatory 1. Quarter 2014

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-03-01

The retail markets Observatory aims to provide general monitoring indicators of electricity and natural gas retail markets in France. This Observatory is updated on a Quarterly basis and published on CRE's web site (www.cre.fr). The first part of the report summarises the highlights of the electricity market (situation, market shares, suppliers, sales, dynamic analysis, regulated prices). The natural gas market is detailed in the second part

Retail markets. Electricity and natural gas retail markets Observatory 3. Quarter 2014

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-09-01

The retail markets Observatory aims to provide general monitoring indicators of electricity and natural gas retail markets in France. This Observatory is updated on a Quarterly basis and published on CRE's web site (www.cre.fr). The first part of the report summarises the highlights of the electricity market (situation, market shares, suppliers, sales, dynamic analysis, regulated prices). The natural gas market is detailed in the second part

Retail markets. Electricity and natural gas retail markets Observatory 3. Quarter 2013

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-09-01

The retail markets Observatory aims to provide general monitoring indicators of electricity and natural gas retail markets in France. This Observatory is updated on a Quarterly basis and published on CRE's web site (www.cre.fr). The first part of the report summarises the highlights of the electricity market (situation, market shares, suppliers, sales, dynamic analysis, regulated prices). The natural gas market is detailed in the second part

Retail markets. Electricity and natural gas retail markets Observatory 4. Quarter 2014

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-12-01

The retail markets Observatory aims to provide general monitoring indicators of electricity and natural gas retail markets in France. This Observatory is updated on a Quarterly basis and published on CRE's web site (www.cre.fr). The first part of the report summarises the highlights of the electricity market (situation, market shares, suppliers, sales, dynamic analysis, regulated prices). The natural gas market is detailed in the second part

Market Monitor, development of the wholesale trade market of electricity 2006. Results

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vermeulen, M.; Mulder, M.; Van den Reek, W.; Thomeer, G.; De Kleijn, M.

2007-12-01

The Office of Energy Regulation carries out its legal task by means of a monitor, a practical tool to assess and analyze the wholesale market for electricity. Monitoring of the wholesale electricity market concerns continuous, accurate and structured following of developments in the market. The aim is to identify in time signals from the market that could lead to a decrease of competition and transparency. The starting point of the monitor for the wholesale electricity market is the selection of indicators which give insight in real competition, liquidity and transparency [nl

Cap-and-Trade Modeling and Analysis: Congested Electricity Market Equilibrium

Science.gov (United States)

Limpaitoon, Tanachai

This dissertation presents an equilibrium framework for analyzing the impact of cap-and-trade regulation on transmission-constrained electricity market. The cap-and-trade regulation of greenhouse gas emissions has gained momentum in the past decade. The impact of the regulation and its efficacy in the electric power industry depend on interactions of demand elasticity, transmission network, market structure, and strategic behavior of firms. I develop an equilibrium model of an oligopoly electricity market in conjunction with a market for tradable emissions permits to study the implications of such interactions. My goal is to identify inefficiencies that may arise from policy design elements and to avoid any unintended adverse consequences on the electric power sector. I demonstrate this modeling framework with three case studies examining the impact of carbon cap-and-trade regulation. In the first case study, I study equilibrium results under various scenarios of resource ownership and emission targets using a 24-bus IEEE electric transmission system. The second and third case studies apply the equilibrium model to a realistic electricity market, Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) 225-bus system with a detailed representation of the California market. In the first and second case studies, I examine oligopoly in electricity with perfect competition in the permit market. I find that under a stringent emission cap and a high degree of concentration of non-polluting firms, the electricity market is subject to potential abuses of market power. Also, market power can occur in the procurement of non-polluting energy through the permit market when non-polluting resources are geographically concentrated in a transmission-constrained market. In the third case study, I relax the competitive market structure assumption of the permit market by allowing oligopolistic competition in the market through a conjectural variation approach. A short-term equilibrium

Reforming the Russian electricity market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Valladares, Mayra Rodriguez

1999-08-01

Contains Executive Summary and Chapters on: Overview; Russian energy markets; Evolution of the power sector; The electricity market; Regulation and proposed reforms; Politics in the power sector; Economics of the power sector; Regional differences; Foreign involvement; Valuation and company management; Conclusions. (Author)

Gas and electricity 2001: new market mechanisms

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2001-11-01

This document brings together 15 testimonies of experts about the opening of gas and electricity markets: 1 - from the opening of the electricity market to the future deregulation of the gas market: what are the new rules of the world energy market? Gaz de France's strategy in front of the opening of the market. The problem of the gas supplies in Europe in the framework of the opening of markets; 2 - Is the access to the network the same for everybody: the regulation authority as catalyst of the electricity market; the technical network constraints and the conditions of access to the transport and interconnections; the regulatory and contractual framework of the access to interconnections; how a foreign producer can warrant the supply of electricity in France; 3 - which global offer and which new services to be supplied to clients today: what is the global offer of a new actor? Power supply and associated services: what is the global offer of new actors to answer the client's needs? 4 - What are the expectations and choices of consumers in a de-regulated environment; definitions and implementations of new European strategies of purchase: how the purchaser work has changed? 5 - What is the place of the energy trade: the implementation of the electricity stock exchange in France: Powernext. How to manage risks associated to a gas/electricity assets portfolio? (J.S.)

Electricity market players subgroup report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Borison, A.

1990-03-01

The purpose of this study is to examine competition in the electric power industry from an ''industrial organization'' point of view. The remainder of this report is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes the ''industrial organization'' approach used to analyze the electric power market. Industrial organization emphasizes specific market performance criteria, and the impact of market structure and behavior on performance. Chapter 3 identifies the participants in the electric power market, grouped primarily into regulated producers, unregulated producers, and consumers. Chapter 4 describes the varieties of electric power competition, organized along two dimensions: producer competition and consumer competition. Chapters 5 and 6 identify the issues raised by competition along the two dimensions. These issues include efficiency, equity, quality, and stability. Chapters 7 through 9 describe market structure, behavior and performance in three competitive scenarios: minimum competition, maximum competition, and moderate competition. Market structure, behavior and performance are discussed, and the issues raised in Chapters 5 and 6 are discussed in detail. Chapter 10 provides conclusions about ''winners and losers'' and identifies issues that require further study

The green electricity market model. Proposal for an optional, cost-neutral direct marketing model for supplying electricity customers

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Heinemann, Ronald

2014-01-01

One of the main goals of the Renewable Energy Law (EEG) is the market integration of renewable energy resources. For this purpose it has introduced compulsory direct marketing on the basis of a moving market premium. At the same time the green electricity privilege, a regulation which made it possible for customers to be supplied with electricity from EEG plants, has been abolished without substitution with effect from 1 August 2014. This means that, aside from other direct marketing channels, which will not be economically viable save for in a few exceptional cases, it will no longer be possible in future to sell electricity from EEG plants to electricity customers under the designation ''electricity from renewable energy''. The reason for this is that electricity sold under the market premium model can no longer justifiably be said to originate from renewable energy. As a consequence, almost all green electricity products sold in Germany carry a foreign green electricity certificate.

De-regulated electric power markets and operating nuclear power plants: the case of British energy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hewlett, James G.

2005-01-01

One issue addressed in almost all electric power restructuring/de-regulation plans in both the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK) was the recovery of operating nuclear power plant's spent fuel disposal costs and the expenditures to decommission the units when they are retired. Prior to restructuring, in theory at least, in both countries, electricity consumers were paying for the back end costs from operating nuclear power plants. Moreover, in virtually all cases in the US, states included special provisions to insure that consumers would continue to do so after power markets were de-regulated. When power markets in the UK were initially restructured/de-regulated and nuclear power privatized, the shareholders of British Energy (BE) were initially responsible for these costs. However, after electricity prices fell and BE collapsed, the British government shifted many of the costs to future taxpayers, as much as a century forward. If this was not done, the book value of BE's equity would have been about -3.5 billion pounds. That is, BE's liabilities would have been about -3.5 billion pounds greater than their assets. It is difficult to see how BE could remain viable under such circumstances

Energy subsidies in California's electricity market deregulation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ritschel, Alexander; Smestad, G.P.

2003-01-01

Deregulation and re-regulation of California's electricity market not only failed in terms of anticipated cost reductions, improved customer service and higher competition, it also led to the introduction of various additional energy subsidies. This paper analyzes California's electricity market deregulation process from a subsidy viewpoint. Under deregulation in California, investor-owned utilities were not allowed to pass their energy procurement costs fully on to their customers, and therefore subsequently, and inevitably, ran into severe financial problems. Such retail price regulation is an energy subsidy that is both economically and environmentally unfavorable, because it veils true price signals to electricity consumers and, in this way, discourages energy conservation. Other policies implemented in California that represent perverse energy subsidies are the purchase of power by the state of California, the suspension of retail competition, and the potential misuse of money from the recovery of stranded costs. Many interventions implemented by the state to smooth out the impacts of the energy crisis insulated electricity consumers from market realities, supported the existing structure of California's electricity market, which is predominantly based on fossil fuels, and suppressed market incentives to improve energy conservation

Essays on restructured electricity markets

Science.gov (United States)

Nicholson, Emma Leah

This dissertation focuses on the performance of restructured electricity markets in the United States. In chapter 1, I study bidder-specific offer caps ("BSOCs") which are used to mitigate market power in three wholesale electricity markets. The price of electricity is determined through multi-unit uniform price auctions and BSOCs impose an upper limit, which is increasing in marginal cost, on each generator's bid. I apply BSOCs in both the uniform and discriminatory price auctions and characterize the equilibria in a two firm model with stochastic demand. BSOCs unambiguously increase expected production efficiency in the uniform price auction and they can increase the expected profit of the generator with the lower cap. Chapter 2, coauthored with Ramteen Sioshansi, Ph.D., compares two types of uniform price auction formats used in wholesale electricity markets, centrally committed markets and self committed markets. In centrally committed markets, generators submit two-part bids consisting of a fixed startup cost and a variable (per MWh) energy cost, and the auctioneer ensures that no generator operates at a loss. Generators in self committed markets must incorporate their startup costs into their one part energy bids. We derive Nash equilibria for both the centrally and self committed electricity markets in a model with two symmetric generators with nonconvex costs and deterministic demand. Using a numerical example, we demonstrate that if the caps on the bid elements are chosen appropriately, the two market designs are equivalent in terms of generator revenues and settlement costs. Regulators and prominent academic experts believe that electric restructuring polices have stifled investment in new generation capacity. In chapter 3 I seek to determine whether these fears are supported by empirical evidence. I examine both total investment in megawatts and the number of new investments across regions that adopted different electric restructuring policies to

The role of power exchanges for the creation of a single European electricity market: market design and market regulation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Boisseleau, F.

2004-01-01

The electricity sector worldwide is undergoing a fundamental transformation of its institutional structure as a consequence of the complex interactions of political, economic and technological forces. The way the industry is organized is changing from vertically integrated monopolies to unbundled structures that favor market mechanisms. This process in Europe, known as the liberalization process, has had a wide impact on the European electricity industry. The focus of this dissertation is an analysis of the role of electricity power exchanges in the recently liberalized electricity markets of Europe. In the context of creating a competitive electricity market at a European level, the key questions considered are the functioning of these power exchanges with respect to electricity characteristics, market design and regulatory framework. In Europe, very little attention has been paid to the role of these new marketplaces and to the issue of market design in general. Hence the main purpose of this work was to analyze how these marketplaces facilitate the trading of electricity and the role they can play in the construction of a pan-European competitive electricity market. An analysis of power exchange requires taking into account the 'double-duality' of such institutions. One, power exchanges are both a market and an institution. As a market they facilitate the trading of electricity and determine an equilibrium price. As an institution power exchanges have their own objectives and constraints, and play a role in the market design of the overall electricity market. Two, the relationship between electricity power exchanges and liberalization is neither linear nor one way: liberalization encourages the birth of such marketplaces yet marketplaces are more than the results of such process, they are also a driving force of the liberalization process. This thesis is divided into three parts. The current situation in Europe and different existing theoretical approaches in

Electricity market 2001

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2001-09-01

The electricity markets in the Nordic countries have undergone major changes since the electricity market reform work was started in the early 1990s. Sweden, Norway and Finland have had a common electricity market since 1996. The work of also reforming the Danish electricity market was begun in the year 2000. The objective of the electricity market reform is to introduce increased competition, to give the consumers greater freedom of choice and also, by open and expanded trade in electricity, create the conditions for efficient pricing. The Swedish National Energy Administration is the supervisory authority as specified in the Electricity Act, and one of the tasks entrusted to it by the Government is to follow developments on the electricity market and to regularly compile and report current market information. The purpose of the 'Electricity market 2001' publication is to meet the need for generalized and readily accessible information on the conditions on the Nordic market. Iceland is not included in the description. The publication also includes summaries of information from recent years concerning electricity generation and utilization in the Nordic countries, the structure of the electricity market from the players' perspective, trade in electricity in the Nordic countries and in Northern Europe, electricity prices in the Nordic and other countries, and the impact of the electricity sector on the environment. The publication contains data on electricity generation and use during the past years, structure of the electricity market, trade in electricity in the Nordic countries and northern Europe, electricity prices in the Nordic countries and other countries as well as impact of electricity generation system on the environment.

Electricity market 2001

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2001-09-01

The electricity markets in the Nordic countries have undergone major changes since the electricity market reform work was started in the early 1990s. Sweden, Norway and Finland have had a common electricity market since 1996. The work of also reforming the Danish electricity market was begun in the year 2000. The objective of the electricity market reform is to introduce increased competition, to give the consumers greater freedom of choice and also, by open and expanded trade in electricity, create the conditions for efficient pricing. The Swedish National Energy Administration is the supervisory authority as specified in the Electricity Act, and one of the tasks entrusted to it by the Government is to follow developments on the electricity market and to regularly compile and report current market information. The purpose of the 'Electricity market 2001' publication is to meet the need for generalized and readily accessible information on the conditions on the Nordic market. Iceland is not included in the description. The publication also includes summaries of information from recent years concerning electricity generation and utilization in the Nordic countries, the structure of the electricity market from the players' perspective, trade in electricity in the Nordic countries and in Northern Europe, electricity prices in the Nordic and other countries, and the impact of the electricity sector on the environment. The publication contains data on electricity generation and use during the past years, structure of the electricity market, trade in electricity in the Nordic countries and northern Europe, electricity prices in the Nordic countries and other countries as well as impact of electricity generation system on the environment

E-laboratories : agent-based modeling of electricity markets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

North, M.; Conzelmann, G.; Koritarov, V.; Macal, C.; Thimmapuram, P.; Veselka, T.

2002-01-01

Electricity markets are complex adaptive systems that operate under a wide range of rules that span a variety of time scales. These rules are imposed both from above by society and below by physics. Many electricity markets are undergoing or are about to undergo a transition from centrally regulated systems to decentralized markets. Furthermore, several electricity markets have recently undergone this transition with extremely unsatisfactory results, most notably in California. These high stakes transitions require the introduction of largely untested regulatory structures. Suitable laboratories that can be used to test regulatory structures before they are applied to real systems are needed. Agent-based models can provide such electronic laboratories or ''e-laboratories.'' To better understand the requirements of an electricity market e-laboratory, a live electricity market simulation was created. This experience helped to shape the development of the Electricity Market Complex Adaptive Systems (EMCAS) model. To explore EMCAS' potential as an e-laboratory, several variations of the live simulation were created. These variations probed the possible effects of changing power plant outages and price setting rules on electricity market prices

Retail experience in the de-regulated market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cummings, R.

2003-01-01

This paper describes the experience gained to date in the de-regulated electricity market through an examination of the commercial market. In 2001, chaos provided opportunity, while in 2002 the emphasis was on operations. In 2003, the landscape reflected hyper-competition, selling second services, and a changing landscape. A discussion followed on the residential market with a look at market structure, economics, and uncertainty concerning the future. The following components were identified as working well: wholesale market, commercial market, market model/data, and innovation in offerings and green supply. Areas requiring further improvement were also identified. It was suggested that the residential de-regulated roadmap should be clarified and retail friendly transactions should be imposed. Other improvements involve education and operations/system capabilities. The author concluded that the deregulated electricity market is still an immature market, where progress is being made in the commercial market. The residential market is in a critical period, with a market model still evolving. figs

The Relationship Between Electricity Price and Wind Power Generation in Danish Electricity Markets

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Hu, Weihao; Chen, Zhe; Bak-Jensen, Birgitte

2010-01-01

of competitive electricity markets in some ways, is chosen as the studied power system. The relationship between the electricity price (both the spot price and the regulation price) and the wind power generation in an electricity market is investigated in this paper. The spot price, the down regulation price...... and the up regulation price generally decreases when the wind power penetration in the power system increases. The statistical characteristics of the spot price for different wind power penetration are analyzed. The findings of this paper may be useful for wind power generation companies to make the optimal...... bidding strategy and may be also useful for the optimal operation of modern power systems with high wind power penetrations....

Electricity market 2000

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Korsfeldt, T.; Petsala, B.

2000-08-01

The electricity markets in the Nordic countries have undergone major changes since the electricity market reform work was started in the early 1990s. Sweden, Norway and Finland have a common electricity market since 1996.The work of also reforming the Danish electricity market was begun in the year 2000. The objective of the electricity market reform is to introduce increased competition,to give the consumers greater freedom of choice and also, by open and expanded trade in electricity, create the conditions for efficient pricing. The Swedish National Energy Administration is the supervisory authority as specified in the Electricity Act, and one of the tasks entrusted to it by the Government is to follow developments on the electricity market and to regularly compile and report current market information. The purpose of the present publication is to meet the need for generalized and readily accessible information on the conditions on the Nordic markets.The publication includes summaries of information from recent years concerning electricity generation and utilization in the Nordic countries, the structure of the electricity market from the players' perspective trade in electricity in the Nordic countries and in Northern Europe, electricity prices in the Nordic and other countries, and the impact of the electricity sector on the environment.

Electricity market 2000

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Korsfeldt, T.; Petsala, B.

2000-08-01

The electricity markets in the Nordic countries have undergone major changes since the electricity market reform work was started in the early 1990s. Sweden, Norway and Finland have a common electricity market since 1996.The work of also reforming the Danish electricity market was begun in the year 2000. The objective of the electricity market reform is to introduce increased competition,to give the consumers greater freedom of choice and also, by open and expanded trade in electricity, create the conditions for efficient pricing. The Swedish National Energy Administration is the supervisory authority as specified in the Electricity Act, and one of the tasks entrusted to it by the Government is to follow developments on the electricity market and to regularly compile and report current market information. The purpose of the present publication is to meet the need for generalized and readily accessible information on the conditions on the Nordic markets.The publication includes summaries of information from recent years concerning electricity generation and utilization in the Nordic countries, the structure of the electricity market from the players' perspective trade in electricity in the Nordic countries and in Northern Europe, electricity prices in the Nordic and other countries, and the impact of the electricity sector on the environment

The role of regulators in competitive markets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Singer, J.

2002-01-01

Some of the key features of restructuring the electric power industry in Ontario were presented, with reference to Ontario Power Generation, a successor company to emerge from Ontario Hydro. Restructuring has resulted in a pool-based model with financial bilateral contracts, corporate separation instead of functional unbundling, and a market power mitigation framework based on decontrol of assets and revenue cap/rebate. The regulators in the Ontario model are the Ontario Energy Board, the Independent Electricity Market Operator, and the Federal Energy Regulators. Regulators are pressured to keep prices low while recognizing that price signals are essential for market functioning. The paper discussed the historical practice of system operators working under the assumption of 'reliability at any price', and examined if it is compatible with a market structure. It was noted that independent system operators hold significant power over market design and functioning, but have little oversight. 2 figs

The international electricity market infrastructure-insight from the nordic electricity market

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Ma, Zheng; Prljaca, Zerina; Jørgensen, Bo Nørregaard

2016-01-01

This paper aims to provide an overview of an international electricity market for the emerging market players to understand and manipulate their roles and relationships in the market by analyzing the former, present, and future Nordic electricity market. The emerging market players...... and their relationships are also discussed in the paper. This paper outlines several suggestions for the future Nordic electricity market development. Furthermore, this paper provides a recommendation for countries interested in participating and developing the cross-national electricity markets with the discussion...... of the historical development of the Nordic electricity market....

Use of demand response in electricity markets

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Singh, Sri Niwas; Østergaard, Jacob

2010-01-01

Demand response (DR) can provide sufficient measure, if implemented successfully, to provide economic, secure and stable supply to the customers even under the variability of the generated output from renewable energy source such as wind and solar. However, there are several issues to be analyzed...... before DR implementation. This paper critically examines the present practices of the DR in the various electricity markets existing in the world including Europe. The prospect of DR in various market levels such as day-ahead (spot) market, hour-ahead market, real time/regulating market and ancillary...... market is analyzed. This paper also addresses the key issues and challenges in the implementation of DR in the electricity markets....

Optimal electricity market for wind power

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Holttinen, H.

2005-01-01

This paper is about electricity market operation when looking from the wind power producers' point of view. The focus in on market time horizons: how many hours there is between the closing and delivering the bids. The case is for the Nordic countries, the Nordpool electricity market and the Danish wind power production. Real data from year 2001 was used to study the benefits of a more flexible market to wind power producer. As a result of reduced regulating market costs from better hourly predictions to the market, wind power producer would gain up to 8% more if the time between market bids and delivery was shortened from the day ahead Elspot market (hourly bids by noon for 12-36 h ahead). An after sales market where surplus or deficit production could be traded 2 h before delivery could benefit the producer almost as much, gaining 7%

Liberalization of power generation sector in the Croatian electricity market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Viskovic, Alfredo

2005-01-01

The electricity market liberalization and the restructuring of power utilities eventually leads to the establishment of a single electricity market in Europe, which is especially important for efficiency gains in electricity generation coupled with increased security of supply, economic competitiveness and fulfillment of environmental requirements. The European electricity market Directives as well as the Energy Community Treaty for South East Europe (legislative Menu) have remarkable impact on the restructuring of the Croatian power sector and the development of electricity generation. The Croatian model of restructuring includes legal un bundling (in the ownership of one holding company - Hrvatska Elektroprivreda (HEP)). The operation of HEP Group and its subsidiaries in the conditions of partially opened electricity market in an important element that shapes the interactions of competitive activities and regulated activities in the environment influenced by exogenous factors a thirteen percent electricity are controlled by the Energy Market Operator (MO), the Transmission System Operator (TSO) and the Energy Regulatory Agency (CERA). The introduction of eligible procedures and newly created operative procedures for power system operation, are creating completely new conditions for competition in the power generation sector, where almost all power plants are owned by HEP. New generating capacities in Croatia can be built through tendering and licensing procedures carried out by the Regulator. Electricity prices are still regulated by the Government (below the cost reflective level), there is a small share of industrial consumers and the annual electricity production is 12 TWh, with relatively large share of hydro plants. All these have implications on the development of the power generation sector in Croatia as well as on electricity market operation. The subject matter of this paper is an impact of power system restructuring and electricity market opening on the

Red Electrica de Espana S.A.. Instrument of regulation and liberalization of the Spanish electricity market (1944-2004)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Garrues-Irurzun, Josean; Lopez-Garcia, Santiago

2009-01-01

To understand the regulation system of the Spanish electricity market it is first necessary to understand on the one hand the system of tariffs and prices, and on the other the organization of the market for high voltage distribution. This article is concerned with this second aspect and traces its history from 1944, this is because before that date it was not possible to speak of a truly national market, but rather only of regional monopolies. In the 1940s, with Franco's new political regime, and the development of the Spanish electricity sector, it became necessary to completely rethink business strategies in relation to competition and cooperation, as well as the regulatory function of the state. In the 1950s, the main feature of the sector was the system of business self-regulation permitted by the state. Throughout the remaining years of Franco's government state intervention was particularly focussed on the subject of tariffs, but with the onset of democracy the state was to involve itself in the transmission network as well. A debate began as to whether it should be run by a private or public operator. In this dispute were ranged, on the one hand, the economic policy concepts of the major parties (PSOE and PP), and against them the strategic interests of the companies. Although the high voltage transmission network was nationalized by the state in the mid-1980s, establishing a 'traditional' model of regulation, the 1990s saw the triumph of a market-based regulation, strongly influenced by the dominant ideas in the European Union, which has converted Red Electrica into a private company. Currently the TSO (Transmission System Operators) model has been extended to Portugal and has entered into competition-cooperation with the other models of the European electricity market. (author)

Energy Flexibility Potential of Industrial Processes in the Regulating Power Market

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Ma, Zheng; Aabjerg Friis, Henrik Tønder; Gravers Mostrup, Christopher

2017-01-01

, and electric heating in replacement of conventional technologies. To enable the use of demand response, the consumers must have economical and practical incentives without loss of convenience. This study aims to investigate the demand-response market potential of a flexible industrial process in the current...... electricity market structure. The Danish West regulating power market is selected in this study with an ideal process simulation of an industrial roller press. By analysing market data, the value of flexible electricity consumption by the roller press in the regulating power market is demonstrated by an ideal...

Institutional contexts of market power in the electricity industry

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Foer, A.A.

1999-01-01

Market power is widely recognized as one of the principal issues that must be dealt with if the electricity industry is to make the transition from regulation to competition. In this article, the author provides a legal and economic introduction to what the antitrust community means by market power and offers a primer on why market power is so central an issue in the electricity industry. Finally and most importantly, he offers comments on the institutional contexts of market power, exploring a process which he calls Shermanization that helps explain the institutional aspect of moving from regulation to competition and holds implications for where oversight should reside during this complex transition

Protecting consumer interests in Alberta's deregulated electricity market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bradford, J.A.

2003-01-01

This paper explains why the province of Alberta decided to deregulate its electricity sector. In the early 1990s, electricity rates were reasonable in Alberta, there was no utility debt, and electricity costs were low. In 1994 California's open access transmission system suggested that open markets would result in lower electricity rates and attract new economic activity. The government of Alberta also believed that competitive markets would set prices with no need for economic regulation. In the initial transition to competition, regulated electricity rates were offered to customers who were not ready to switch to the new competitive market. The RRO rate was set by the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (EUB). The rates included the forecasted cost of purchasing energy from markets, cost of system access, and retail service costs. The end of the RRO rate was scheduled for 2005 when the market was expected be well developed. This paper also describes other protection mechanisms for consumers. Alberta's new electricity policy (NEP) eliminates generator participant costs related to transmission. EUB's zonal interconnection charges are also overruled along with the EUB-approved 50/50 division of transmission costs. Under the NEP, the ISO is to build transmission in anticipation of new generation. Consumers will fund the total cost to build new transmission capacity for exports and imports. This new transmission policy is a complete change from the original government policy which allocated some transmission costs to generators. The sudden change in policy was due to pressure from oil sands producers and oil sands co-generation developers. The claimed benefit to Albertans is a 25 per cent reduction in pool price and greater system reliability. However, the author cautioned that government interference with competitive electricity markets will cripple the electric power industry in the foreseeable future because it interferes with market prices

Liberalization of the Flemish market for electricity and natural gas

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

In this first report of the Flemish Regulating Institute for the Electricity and Natural Gas Market (VREG) only attention is paid to the market for electricity. Every 3 months a state of the art will be given of the liberalization process of the energy market in Flanders [nl

The liberalization of electricity markets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lepage, H.; Boucher, M.

2001-01-01

Since the end of the 1980s, the electric industry is changing. Privatization, vertical disintegrations, deregulation, restructuring, market openness are models which cause the world to question the regulated model inspired from natural monopolistic theories that are emerging in many parts of the industrialized world. Why are we witnessing these changes? What makes competitiveness possible in an industry where it was always assumed that market forces could not be relied upon? How do these markets function? On what basis and with what rules? What lessons can be learned from the experiments now taking place? This document updates this complex economic process, which proved irreversible, despite badly thought out deregulation in California and other locales. The authors explain the changes that have taken place in the electricity industry in the United States since the First World War and compares experiences with deregulation in Canada, Europe and Australia. The public monopoly being exercised by Hydro-Quebec in Quebec is examined in detail and avenues for changes in the context of liberalization of electricity markets in North America are discussed. refs., figs

Do regulatory mechanisms promote competition and mitigate market power? Evidence from Spanish electricity market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Moutinho, Victor; Moreira, António C.; Mota, Jorge

2014-01-01

This paper estimates the relationships between bidding quantities, marginal cost and market power measures in the Spanish wholesale electricity market for two different regulatory periods: 2002–2005 and 2006–2007. Using panel econometric techniques we find differences in the impacts on bidding strategies for both periods. Hence, the marginal cost and the market power measures affect bid and net quantities. The market power measures also suggest that the coefficient is consistently positive and highly significant for both periods. Moreover, the market power and marginal costs have mixed effects according to the models proposed for both periods. In addition, our results point to the effectiveness of the different effects of mitigating the market power in the Spanish electricity market. For the 2006–2007 period, the proposed causal relationships are partially validated by the cointegration results, which assumes there is a significant causality between the Lerner Index and the marginal cost. - Highlights: • Competition and regulation in the Spanish electricity market. • Net supplier and net demander behavior in the spot market. • Panel cointegration methods used: FMOLS, PMG, MG, DFE and DOLS. • The price cap regulation is effective in mitigating market power. • Market power and marginal cost have positive effects on bidding strategies

French retail electricity and gas markets functioning - 2012-2013 report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

French retail electricity and gas markets are still progressively opening to competition. Competition dynamics, even if more limited on the electricity market, is changing in a favorable way. These changes reflect the development of more competitive market offers with respect to regulated sales tariffs in both energies, as well as a better knowledge of these markets by end-users. In this context of retail markets development, the Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE) pays more and more attention to the monitoring of actors behaviour, in particular in the domain of price and offer transparency. This activity is going to become reinforced in the future with the scheduled disappearance of regulated sales tariffs. This report presents the situation of the French retail electricity and gas markets by December 31, 2012 (supplies, offers and prices), with a comparison with other European countries (Germany, UK, Belgium)

The consumers' role in a de-regulated electricity market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bye, Torstein; Doehl, Oeystein; Halvorsen, Bente; Larsen, Bodil M.; Larsson, Jan; Nesbakken, Runa

2001-01-01

The electricity market is market characterized by large price variations. This may have many causes, such as large variation of demand, large differences in the operating costs of the utilities or large variation in precipitation. Price variations caused by the supply side of the market may be counterbalanced by reducing consumption when the price is high, for example by using other energy sources, or by increasing consumption when the price is low

Stochastic Optimal Wind Power Bidding Strategy in Short-Term Electricity Market

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Hu, Weihao; Chen, Zhe; Bak-Jensen, Birgitte

2012-01-01

Due to the fluctuating nature and non-perfect forecast of the wind power, the wind power owners are penalized for the imbalance costs of the regulation, when they trade wind power in the short-term liberalized electricity market. Therefore, in this paper a formulation of an imbalance cost...... minimization problem for trading wind power in the short-term electricity market is described, to help the wind power owners optimize their bidding strategy. Stochastic optimization and a Monte Carlo method are adopted to find the optimal bidding strategy for trading wind power in the short-term electricity...... market in order to deal with the uncertainty of the regulation price, the activated regulation of the power system and the forecasted wind power generation. The Danish short-term electricity market and a wind farm in western Denmark are chosen as study cases due to the high wind power penetration here...

Eligibility in the electricity and gas retail markets in Spain

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Marti, F.

2003-01-01

The true liberalization of the electricity and gas retail markets in Spain was initiated in 1997 and 1998 respectively with the approval of the Electricity Act and the Hydrocarbons Act that set up the regulatory framework for both sectors. The initial eligibility calendars established were speeded up by later legal dispositions which set the full eligibility in January 2003. Therefore in January the number of eligible consumers increased from 65,000 electricity consumers to 22 million and from around 5,000 gas consumers to 4.5 million. In Spain there has been however a coexistence of a liberalized market and a regulated market. While in the liberalized market the consumer will pay a regulated Third Party Access (TPA) tariff for the use of the network and a free price for the energy, in the regulated market the consumer will pay all-inclusive tariffs which are established by the Government in the case of the electricity tariffs and by the Ministry of Economy in the case of the gas tariffs. Today any electricity and gas consumer can choose whether he wants to be supplied through the regulated market or through the liberalized one. Only the electricity HV (High Voltage Supply) all-inclusive tariffs are to disappear in 2007. No date has been set for the others. Also important is to highlight the increase in the consumption of both energy sources. The electricity demand has increased about 38 percent from 1997 (155 TWh/year) to 2002 (214 TWh/year). The gas sector, on the other hand, has increased at a higher rate. From 150 TWh/year in January 1999 to almost 270 TWh/year in July 2003, an 80 percent increase in four and a half years.(author)

The electricity markets around the Baltic Sea

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-12-01

A thorough description of the electric power markets in the countries surrounding the Baltic sea is given in this book. Environmental problems and regulations and nuclear power are surveyed. Factors that may affect an expanded trade of electricity between the countries are analyzed

Functioning of the Finnish electricity wholesale markets; Saehkoen tukkumarkkinan toimivuus Suomessa

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Vehvilainen, I.; Broeckl, M.; Hakala, L.; Vanhanen, J.

2012-12-15

The purpose of common Nordic electricity market has been to increase competition and efficiency. Market seems to be moving to the opposite direction in the 2010s. Wholesale market has become more fragmented as the market is split to larger number of price areas more often. Poor functioning of the wholesale markets is also the largest contributor to problems in the retail market. Politicians, market regulators, transmission system operators, and market players need to take action to improve the functioning of the market. Separation of price areas reduces competition in all market areas. The Finnish wholesale market is moderately or highly concentrated when Finland is separated from other price areas. Concentration is moderate, if all production capacity is considered. If only price setting hydropower and condensing power capacity are considered, the market is highly concentrated. High concentration can provide opportunities for the biggest producers to use strategic bidding to increase market prices. Larger number of price areas has reduced competition and liquidity with the financial area price products or CfDs. Poor functioning of CfD markets is emphasized by the low competition within the price areas. Bottlenecks between market areas create income for the Transmission System Operators (TSOs) that are responsible of the border transmissions. TSOs have no economic incentives to maintain and repair the border transmission lines, which seems peculiar when compared to e.g. regulation of electricity distribution companies. Finnish Fingrid shows a good example on transparent disclosure of received income and how the accrued funds are used. Import of electricity from Russia to Finland has been reduced since the end of 2011 because of the changes made in the Russian electricity market. Market liberalization in Russia has lead to a market structure that is different from the Nordic markets. Despite the differences, the two markets are becoming more integrated as the

Legal market abuse regulations of WpHG (law on stock trading) and the REMIT-VO in the electricity spot trading; Marktmissbrauchsrechtliche Regelungen des WpHG und der REMIT-VO im Stromspothandel

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Retsch, Alexander T.

2014-07-01

The thesis on legal market abuse regulations of WpHG (law on stock trading) and the REMIT-VO in the electricity spot trading include the discussion of the following issues: market abuse, its forms of appearance (market manipulation, insider trade, insider information), electricity spot trading, relevant legislative frame, market abuse regulations (WpHG), interdiction of market manipulation and related regulations.

Regulation and competition issues in Thai electricity sector

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wisuttisak, Pornchai

2012-01-01

This paper explores the issues related to regulatory reform and liberalisation leading toward competition in the Thai electricity sector, which is still under the monopoly control of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Following an overview of the current market structure of the Thai electricity sector, the process of liberalisation and deregulation that contributes to the uncompetitive market structure under SOEs’ control is examined. The author asserts that there are problems within the Energy Commission and the Energy Industry Act BE 2550 (2007) that contribute to the continuance of an uncompetitive electricity supply. Possible reforms to the Thai electricity regulation are proposed with the aim of creating market competition and efficiency in the Thai electricity sector. - Highlights: ► Author studies on the regulatory reform and a development of liberalisation plans on Thai electricity sector. ► The paper presents that the liberalisation plan was affected by the government implementation on electricity corporatisation. ► The paper asserts that the current energy regulation will not lead to market reform and competition in electricity. ► The paper also discusses on the current monopoly structure of Thai electricity sector under state owned enterprises. ► The paper concludes that Thailand needs an appropriate regulatory reform for building competition in electricity sector.

An options model for electric power markets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ghosh, Kanchan; Ramesh, V.C.

1997-01-01

The international electric utility industry is undergoing a radical transformation from an essentially regulated and monopolistic industry to an industry made uncertain with impending deregulation and the advent of competitive forces. This paper investigates the development of an options market for bulk power trading in a market setup while considering power system planning and operational constraints and/or requirements. In so doing it considers the different market based financial derivative instruments while can be used to trade electrical power in bulk and examines how established tools such as Optimal Power Flow (OPF) may be applied in helping to develop a price for bulk power transactions under a market based setup. (Author)

The Market Surveillance Panel in Ontario's electricity market : monitoring, investigating and reporting : backgrounder

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-04-01

The Market Surveillance Panel (MSP) is an independent body appointed by and accountable to the Independent Directors of Ontario's Independent Electricity Market Operator (IMO). The MSP is fundamental to the development of competitive electricity markets because it is instrumental in monitoring the activities of the Ontario electricity market open to competition as of May 2002. The role of the MSP is to monitor, investigate and report on the behaviour of markets that are administered by the IMO. It is instrumental in promoting the benefits of competition to Ontario energy users. While the MSP is not a regulator, it is empowered to make recommendations to the IMO, the Ontario Energy Board and the Competition Bureau. The role of the MSP is to identify, understand and explain market outcomes that are anomalous, with particular focus on real-time energy price movements and market outcomes, gaming and the exercise of local market power. The report notes that energy prices are expected to fluctuate more in a competitive market than in a regulated market, and that price movements are actually healthy. However, the role of the MSP is to assess energy prices by asking important questions regarding the signaling role of prices, and to ensure that the changes in prices are not a result of abuse of market power. The MSP will also focus on the impediments to effective competition and on recommending actions to mitigate them. 5 refs

The complexity of electricity markets: the limits of the liberalisation of electric industries

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Finon, Dominique

2015-12-01

As electric industries have been liberalised or privatised later than other public utilities, notably in developed countries, this article first recalls that this activity has been during a long time a monopoly hold by a public service, and precisely planned with tariffs regulated by public authorities. Then, the author explains how deregulation is performed for such an industry to allow competition to be introduced at all levels of the electric sector. He describes the operation mode of the wholesale market which is structured in an hourly market due to the non-storable characteristic of electricity, describes retail price formation by pilling up the wholesale price, regulated tariffs of transport and distribution, and a tax aimed at paying the cost of public policies. This price can be compared with the regulated tariff which previously encompassed everything without any dissociation. Finally, he highlights the main defects and drawbacks of this market which do not allow long term investments in base equipment, back up equipment and on low carbon equipment (renewable, nuclear, and others)

PRICING ELECTRIC POWER UNDER A HYBRID WHOLESALE MECHANISM: EVALUATING THE TURKISH ELECTRICITY MARKET

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Hatice Karahan

2013-01-01

Full Text Available During the restructuring process, Turkish electricity sector has gone through significant changes both in wholesale and retail markets. In this framework, the Market Financial Settlement Mechanism established for handling market imbalances has become a spot market in time. So, it can be claimed that the wholesale electricity market in Turkey is a hybrid mechanism composed of bilateral contracts and the balancing market. On the other hand, the main target of liberalization program is providing consumers with affordable electric power. Hence, this study attempts to explore the link between retail tariffs for ineligible consumers and prices in the two wholesale mechanisms, in the period after the launch of the day-ahead market. Findings suggest that regulated wholesale prices are more effective in the determination of end-user prices, whereas unregulated ones might have a price reduction effect in case the free market dominates. However, the volatility in spot market prices implies that the sector would better continue with the hybrid mechanism for quite some time.

A novel approach for modeling deregulated electricity markets

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Rubin, Ofir D., E-mail: rubino@agri.huji.ac.i [Department of Agricultural Economics and Management, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, P.O. Box 12, Rehovot 76100 (Israel); Babcock, Bruce A., E-mail: babcock@iastate.ed [Department of Economics, Iowa State University, 578F Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070 (United States); Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD), Iowa State University, Ames, IA 50011-1070 (United States)

2011-05-15

The theoretical framework developed in this study allows development of a model of deregulated electricity markets that explains two familiar empirical findings; the existence of forward premiums and price-cost markups in the spot market. This is a significant contribution because electricity forward premiums have been previously explained exclusively by the assumptions of perfect competition and risk-averse behavior while spot markups are generally the outcome of a body of literature assuming oligopolistic competition. Our theoretical framework indicates that a certain premium for forward contracting is required for efficient allocation of generation capacity. However, due to the uniqueness of electricity and the design of deregulated electricity markets this premium might be substantially higher than its optimal level. - Research highlights: {yields} The state of knowledge regarding modeling electricity markets is incomplete. {yields} Electricity forward premiums are not necessarily driven by risk aversion. {yields} Efficiency in production requires a certain premium for forward contracting. {yields} It is likely that market premiums are substantially higher than their optimal level. {yields} Policy regulation should not seek to eliminate forward premium entirely.

A novel approach for modeling deregulated electricity markets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rubin, Ofir D.; Babcock, Bruce A.

2011-01-01

The theoretical framework developed in this study allows development of a model of deregulated electricity markets that explains two familiar empirical findings; the existence of forward premiums and price-cost markups in the spot market. This is a significant contribution because electricity forward premiums have been previously explained exclusively by the assumptions of perfect competition and risk-averse behavior while spot markups are generally the outcome of a body of literature assuming oligopolistic competition. Our theoretical framework indicates that a certain premium for forward contracting is required for efficient allocation of generation capacity. However, due to the uniqueness of electricity and the design of deregulated electricity markets this premium might be substantially higher than its optimal level. - Research highlights: → The state of knowledge regarding modeling electricity markets is incomplete. → Electricity forward premiums are not necessarily driven by risk aversion. → Efficiency in production requires a certain premium for forward contracting. → It is likely that market premiums are substantially higher than their optimal level. → Policy regulation should not seek to eliminate forward premium entirely.

The operation of French electric power and natural gas retail markets - Report 2014-2015. Report 2015 by the CRE on the operation of French electricity and natural gas markets - Press file

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Monteil, Anne; Casadei, Cecile

2015-11-01

After a presentation of some key figures illustrating the French electricity and natural gas markets (customers, number of providers, and so on), and an executive summary, this voluminous report proposes a presentation of CRE's missions regarding the survey and control of retail markets, and of the methodology adopted to survey retail markets, and a recall of the main steps of electricity market and natural gas market opening. Then, it its first chapter, the report proposes a detailed picture and analysis by the end of 2014 for the electricity retail market, for the natural gas retail market, and a discussion about key process follow-up and power cut-off for unpaid bills. The second chapter addresses supplies and prices. It analyses the levels and evolutions of electricity regulated tariffs, of regulated tariffs for gas sales, and of the various market supplies. The third chapter addresses issues related to competition and to the operation of the retail market: the end of sales regulated tariffs, general framework for the survey of providers' practices, provider price practices, analysis of commercial practices implemented by providers, evolutions of the competitive environment on the retail market. An appendix briefly addresses retail markets and regulated tariffs in Europe. A second report proposes a more synthetic presentation which is used as a press file, proposes an executive summary, and addresses the following issues: status of competition (key data for 2014 and 2015), the end of sales regulated tariffs for professionals as a major step of market opening to competition, favourable regulatory context and market price leading to an intensified competition on the residential market, the preferred market supplies for residential consumers, comparison between fixed price and regulated tariffs, an almost non-existent opening in the competition of local distribution utilities, and regulated tariffs in Europe

The electricity market 2003

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2003-01-01

The electricity markets in the Nordic countries have undergone major changes since the electricity market reform work was started in the early 1990s. We now have a common Nordic electricity market that includes all of the Nordic countries, with the exception of Iceland. The objective of the electricity market reform is to introduce increased competition, to give consumers greater freedom of choice and also, by open and increased trade in electricity, create the conditions for efficient pricing. The Swedish Energy Agency is the supervisory authority specified in the Electricity Act, and one of the tasks entrusted to it by the Government is to follow developments on the electricity market and regularly compile and report current market information. The purpose of 'The Electricity Market 2003' publication is to meet the need for generalized and easily accessible information on the conditions on the Nordic market. The publication also includes summaries of the information from recent years concerning power generation and utilization in the Nordic countries, the structure of the electricity market from the players' perspective, trade in electricity in the Nordic countries and in northern Europe, electricity prices in the Nordic and other countries, and the impact of the electricity sector on the environment

Price volatility in wind dominant electricity markets

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Farashbashi-Astaneh, Seyed-Mostafa; Chen, Zhe

2013-01-01

High penetration of intermittent renewable energy sources causes price volatility in future electricity markets. This is specially the case in European countries that plan high penetration levels. This highlights the necessity for revising market regulations and mechanisms in accordance...... to generation combination portfolio. Proposed solutions should be able to tackle with emerging challenges which are mainly due to high variability and unpredictability of intermittent renewable resources. In this paper high price volatility will be introduced as an emerging challenge in wind dominant...... electricity markets. High price volatility is unappreciated because it imposes high financial risk levels to both electricity consumers and producers. Additionally high price variations impede tracking price signals by consumers in future smart grid and jeopardize implementation of demand response concepts...

Economic-efficiency considerations in restructuring electric markets

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Hill, L.J.

1996-12-01

In response to the Energy Policy Act of 1992 and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission`s subsequent rulemaking on transmission access, many states are exploring options to restructure their electric industries. In their deliberations on restructuring, policymakers should consider (1) the reliability of the electric system; (2) income-distribution effects on ratepayers and utilities; (3) social consequences such as effects on energy conservation, renewable energy, and the environment; and (4) economic efficiency. We address economic-efficiency considerations in this study. Economic efficiency is important because it is one of the primary reasons that policymakers should consider restructuring in the first place: improving the electric-industry`s efficiency lowers costs and, hence, electric prices. In this study, we look at the sources of (in)efficiency in existing and proposed electric markets with the objective of guiding policymakers to design efficient electric markets. The advantages of a competitive market are well known: it leads to lower costs for the utility, lower prices for consumers, more product choices, better customer service, and often the need for less regulation by federal and state agencies. In the short run, firms who cannot produce at the market-clearing price are forced to leave the industry, ensuring that customers have the lowest price possible. In the long run, competition promotes innovation and lower costs. The physical and institutional characteristics of the U.S. electric industry, however, could be impediments to attaining efficiently run, competitive markets. Because of these characteristics, there are multiple sources of efficiencies and inefficiencies in existing electric markets, and there will be multiple sources in restructured ones. The objective of policymakers should not be to trade one set of inefficiencies in existing electric markets for another set in restructured markets.

Economic-efficiency considerations in restructuring electric markets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hill, L.J.

1996-12-01

In response to the Energy Policy Act of 1992 and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's subsequent rulemaking on transmission access, many states are exploring options to restructure their electric industries. In their deliberations on restructuring, policymakers should consider (1) the reliability of the electric system; (2) income-distribution effects on ratepayers and utilities; (3) social consequences such as effects on energy conservation, renewable energy, and the environment; and (4) economic efficiency. We address economic-efficiency considerations in this study. Economic efficiency is important because it is one of the primary reasons that policymakers should consider restructuring in the first place: improving the electric-industry's efficiency lowers costs and, hence, electric prices. In this study, we look at the sources of (in)efficiency in existing and proposed electric markets with the objective of guiding policymakers to design efficient electric markets. The advantages of a competitive market are well known: it leads to lower costs for the utility, lower prices for consumers, more product choices, better customer service, and often the need for less regulation by federal and state agencies. In the short run, firms who cannot produce at the market-clearing price are forced to leave the industry, ensuring that customers have the lowest price possible. In the long run, competition promotes innovation and lower costs. The physical and institutional characteristics of the U.S. electric industry, however, could be impediments to attaining efficiently run, competitive markets. Because of these characteristics, there are multiple sources of efficiencies and inefficiencies in existing electric markets, and there will be multiple sources in restructured ones. The objective of policymakers should not be to trade one set of inefficiencies in existing electric markets for another set in restructured markets

Electricity market liberalisation - the German model

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mueller, W.

2002-01-01

This article discusses the experience gained as a result of the opening of the German electricity market - not only from the national but also from European and international points of view. The history of electricity market liberalisation in Germany is described and the market's structure is compared with that of Switzerland. Both the advantages and disadvantages that have been brought about by liberalisation are discussed as well as the role of state regulation. Certain problem areas still to be tackled are discussed, such those in the areas of cartels, possibilities of supplier-change and tariffs. Also, liberalisation in the context of the European Union's efforts in this area are discussed, especially with respect to the consideration of differing structures in the various member countries of the Union

Two essays on electricity markets: Entry into hydroelectric generation industry and the political cycle of regulated prices

Science.gov (United States)

Moita, Rodrigo Menon Simoes

This dissertation is about the electricity industry and the problems that arise with the liberalization and de-regulation of the industry. Characteristics intrinsic to the electricity market create problems that can compromise an efficient functioning of this market. Each of the two chapters of this dissertation focus on a specific aspect of this industry. The first chapter analyzes entry in the hydroelectric generation industry. The operation of a generator upstream regularizes the river flow for generators located downstream on the same river, increasing the production capacity of the latter. This positive externality increases the attractiveness of the locations downstream whenever a generator decides to enter upstream. Therefore, the entry decision of a generator in a given location may affect all entry decisions in potential locations for plants located downstream. I first model the problem of generators located in cascade on the same river and show the positive effect of the externality. Second, I use a panel of data on investment decisions of hydro-generation firms to estimate an entry model that takes into account the effect of the externality generated by entry upriver. The results show a positive incentive to locate downstream from existing plants and from locations where entry is likely to occur. Location characteristics also play an important role on the entrants' decisions. The model provides estimates of the average expected market price across the different years covered by the sample and shows that it rose one year before the energy crisis of 2001, evidencing that the market anticipated the crisis. This result has important implications on the evaluation of the Brazilian market design. It shows that entry responded to a rise in expectations about excess demand in the future, contradicting the argument that the crisis was a consequence of mis-designed market institutions. The second chapter deals with the problem of the political cycle in regulated

Development needs of the electricity market. Final report by the working group on the five-year revision of the electricity market act

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2001-01-01

The opening of the Finnish electricity market was started by the Electricity Market Act that entered into force in 1995. The Act abolished the obstructions to competition in electricity production, foreign trade and sales. To guarantee the functioning of the electricity market in practice, the electricity network operators were obliged to gradually open up their networks for the use of other parties operating on the market. Finland has liberated her electricity market in the forefront and ahead of the prescribed time in relation to the obligations laid down in the EC Directive concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity. The working group has studied the development needs of the electricity market in the light of experience gained during the validity of the Electricity Market Act. As a general conclusion, the working group states that the Finnish electricity market is functioning in an appropriate manner and that there is no reason to essentially change the model chosen for the opening of the electricity market. The working group makes several proposals for actions and recommendations for improving the efficiency of the electricity market. According to the view of the working group, electricity users, production plants and distribution network operators should be authorised to construct a 110-440 kV connection line of their own to a 110 kV network or grid. Following the working group's proposal, the regulation concerning electricity retailers would be extended over to electricity vendors operating as retailers in a real-estate network. To guarantee the functioning of competition on the small-scale consumers' electricity market, the working group suggests that the customers would be entitled during one year to one change of vendor for which no separate fee would be collected. The working group proposes that construction authorisation conditions pertaining to border lines should be specified so that one condition for granting an authorisation would

Competition policy and regulation in hydro-dominated electricity markets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rangel, Luiz Fernando

2008-01-01

This paper discusses the main competition issues that arise in electricity systems dominated by hydro generation, arguing that technological differences between hydro and thermal plants may allow hydropower producers to exert market power in different and subtler ways compared to thermal generators. The key for market power in hydro-based systems is the strategic allocation of a given amount of output across periods, rather than a straightforward reduction of total output. The paper examines the interaction between strategic hydro reservoir operation and transmission capacity constraints, and summarizes the implications of market power for system reliability. A review of recent relevant literature is included. Finally, possible interventions to mitigate market power are analysed

The economics of electric energy storage and its interaction with market regulations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

He, X.

2012-01-01

This paper seeks to expose the interaction between the economics of EES and market regulation. An exhaustive investigation of relevant market regulations for the business of storage is conducted by examining (a) spot and futures markets, (b) ancillary services' procurement and (c) possible capacity enhancement. It is concluded that market regulation can be and should be improved in a number of ways to better recognize the value of EES. (author)

The gas and electric power markets opening in Europe, the implementation of the regulation authorities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2001-12-01

Because the gas and the electric power are not simple goods, the opening of their market needs a whole reflexion where the governments must be involved. To analyse this opening, this report presents in a first part the traditional organization of the gas and electric power sectors marked by the strong presence of the government and the end of this organization at the end of the years 1980. It details then the new regulation, the operators and the effects of the competition. In a last part it provides propositions for the institutional framework in France. (A.L.B.)

Strategies for Charging Electric Vehicles in the Electricity Market

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Juul, Nina; Pantuso, Giovanni; Iversen, Jan Emil Banning

2015-01-01

. We show that all vehicle owners will benefit from acting more intelligently on the energy market. Furthermore, the high value of the stochastic solution shows that, in case the regulating price differs from the expected, the solution to the deterministic problem becomes infeasible.......This paper analyses different charging strategies for a fleet of electric vehicles. Along with increasing the realism of the strategies, the opportunity for acting on the regulating market is also included. We test the value of a vehicle owner that can choose when and how to charge; by presenting...... optimally in response to predicted spot prices, and – in some settings – additional gains from using the up and down regulating prices. Particularly, strategies are chosen from uncontrolled charging through deterministic optimization, to modelling the charging and bidding problem with stochastic programming...

Market Survey Turkey. Electricity Market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-12-01

The present market survey presents the Turkish power market and derives business opportunities and prospects for Dutch trade and industry. This market survey has been carried out for the following four, from time to time overlapping, sectors that have been identified by EVD as potential opportunities for Dutch small and medium-sized enterprises (SME): renewable energy, energy efficiency, electricity generation, electricity distribution

Multi-agent simulation of competitive electricity markets: Autonomous systems cooperation for European market modeling

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Santos, Gabriel; Pinto, Tiago; Morais, Hugo; Sousa, Tiago M.; Pereira, Ivo F.; Fernandes, Ricardo; Praça, Isabel; Vale, Zita

2015-01-01

Highlights: • Definition of an ontology allowing the communication between multi-agents systems. • Social welfare evaluation in different electricity markets. • Demonstration of the use of the proposed ontology between two multi-agents systems. • Strategic biding in electricity markets. • European electricity markets comparison. - Abstract: The electricity market restructuring, and its worldwide evolution into regional and even continental scales, along with the increasing necessity for an adequate integration of renewable energy sources, is resulting in a rising complexity in power systems operation. Several power system simulators have been developed in recent years with the purpose of helping operators, regulators, and involved players to understand and deal with this complex and constantly changing environment. The main contribution of this paper is given by the integration of several electricity market and power system models, respecting to the reality of different countries. This integration is done through the development of an upper ontology which integrates the essential concepts necessary to interpret all the available information. The continuous development of Multi-Agent System for Competitive Electricity Markets platform provides the means for the exemplification of the usefulness of this ontology. A case study using the proposed multi-agent platform is presented, considering a scenario based on real data that simulates the European Electricity Market environment, and comparing its performance using different market mechanisms. The main goal is to demonstrate the advantages that the integration of various market models and simulation platforms have for the study of the electricity markets’ evolution

Unified electricity market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon

2011-01-01

A unified European electricity market means a unification and harmonisation of functioning of the national electricity market into one European Market or into one entity. It gives an opportunity to Slovenske elektrarne to open room for their wider activity within Europe where common rules for cross-boarder trade and markets functioning will apply. (author)

A research of the development of electricity and natural gas markets and the experiences gained from implementation of the electricity and natural gas market laws

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lewis, P.E.; Pakkanen, M.; Naervae, T.; Hernesniemi, L.; Partanen, J.; Viljainen, S.; Honkapuro, S.; Tahvanainen, K.; Jylhae, R.

2007-01-01

In the beginning of 2005 several changes in the electricity and natural gas market law came into effect. This report examines the influence and impact of these changes on the behaviour and development of these markets, looking at the role and position of both the energy industry and customers. The report combines existing data with new research data collected during spring and summer 2006. Whilst the recency of the law changes, along with the simultaneous impact of other market variables limits the salience of any impact, the report nevertheless provides clear and interesting conclusions. In the electricity market, one major legislative change that came into force in the beginning of 2005 concerned the supervision of the reasonableness of electricity distribution pricing. According to the newly adopted ex ante regulation principles, the regulatory authority now determines the guidelines for reasonable pricing prior the start of a predefined regulatory period. So far, the price development under the new regulatory system has been positive since, on average, the customers have experienced price decreases over the past year and a half. However, final conclusions on the overall price development are possible only after the second regulation period that ends in 2011. In general, the new regulatory system has improved the predictability of regulation but there are also some problems, namely the low level of regulated returns and the practically non-existent incentives for preventative maintenance of the distribution network, caring for the electricity quality and service level improvements. Even if the changes in the electricity market law are generally seen as a positive step forward, they have not had (and were not expected) a radical impact on e.g. electricity prices. Regarding electricity prices the most significant law changes comprise more extensive unbundling, the obligation to publish offer (competitive) price information and the limitation of 'obligation to

Stratum Electricity Markets: Toward Multi-temporal Distributed Risk Management for Sustainable Electricity Provision

Science.gov (United States)

Wu, Zhiyong (Richard)

Motivated by the overall challenge of ensuring long-term sustainable electricity service, we view this challenge as a long-term decision making problem under uncertainties. We start by recognizing that, independent of the industry organization, the uncertainties are enormous and often exogenous to the energy service providers. They are multi-dimensional and are result of fundamental drivers, ranging from the supply side, through the demand side, to the regulatory and policy sides. The basic contribution of this thesis comes from the recognition that long-term investments for ensuring reliable and stable electricity service critically depend on how these uncertainties are perceived, valued and managed by the different stakeholders within the complex industry organization such as the electric power industry. We explain several reasons why price signals obtained from current short-term electricity markets alone are not sufficient enough for long-term sustainable provision. Some enhancements are presented in the thesis to improve the short-term electricity market price signals to reflect the true cost of operation. New market mechanisms and instruments are needed to facilitate the stakeholders to better deal with long-term risks. The problems of ensuring long-term stable reliable service in the sense of the traditional resource adequacy requirements are revisited in both the restructuring industry and regulated industry. We introduce a so-called Stratum Electricity Market (SEM) design as the basic market mechanism for solving the problem of long-term reliable electricity service through a series of interactive multi-lateral market exchange platforms for risks communication, management and evaluations over various time horizons and by the different groups of stakeholders. In other words, our proposed SEM is a basic IT-enabled framework for the decision making processes by various parties over different time. Because of the uniqueness of electricity as a commodity, the

Electricity market design for facilitating the integration of wind energy. Experience and prospects with the Australian National Electricity Market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

MacGill, Iain

2010-01-01

Australia has been an early and enthusiastic adopter of both electricity industry restructuring and market-based environmental regulation. The Australian National Electricity Market (NEM) was established in 1999 and Australia also implemented one of the world's first renewable energy target schemes in 2001. With significant recent growth in wind generation, Australia provides an interesting case for assessing different approaches to facilitating wind integration into the electricity industry. Wind project developers in Australia must assess both potential energy market and Tradeable Green Certificate income streams when making investments. Wind-farm energy income depends on the match of its uncertain time varying output with the regional half hourly market price; a price that exhibits daily, weekly and seasonal patterns and considerable uncertainty. Such price signals assist in driving investments that maximize project value to the electricity industry as a whole, including integration costs and benefits for other participants. Recent NEM rule changes will formally integrate wind generation in the market's scheduling processes while a centralized wind forecasting system has also been introduced. This paper outlines experience to date with wind integration in the NEM, describes the evolution of market rules in response and assesses their possible implications for facilitating high future wind penetrations. (author)

Electricity market deregulation and its impact on the nuclear industry

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jung, Y.E.; Alfors, G.

2000-01-01

Electricity has traditionally been supplied in OECD countries by state-owned facilities, or state-protected monopolies with regulated pricing. More recently, however, several countries have deregulated their electricity markets, thus opening the door to competitive supply and pricing. Deregulation of electricity markets is a trend that is expected to be followed by many countries, and can have a significant impact on the future of nuclear power programmes. (authors)

RESTRUCTURED ELECTRICITY MARKETS: Three States' Experiences in Adding Generating Capacity

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

2002-01-01

...., restructured electricity markets by shifting from service provided through a regulated monopoly-the local electric utility-to service provided through open competition among the local utility and its competitors...

Flexible Consumers Reserving Electricity and Offering Profitable Downward Regulation

OpenAIRE

Höning, Nicolas; La Poutré, Han; Strunz, K.

2012-01-01

htmlabstractPrevious work on demand response in smart grids considers dynamic real-time prices, but has so far neglected to consider how consumers can also be involved in planning ahead, both for scheduling of consumption and reserving their ability to regulate downward during balancing. This work models a flexible consumer in a novel two-settlement electricity auction. The consumer buys electricity on an ahead market and offers downward regulation on the balancing market. Bidding in two- set...

Essays on electricity markets

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Rud, Linda

2009-07-01

The report covers several topics of electricity markets: The first essay, 'Selected Topics on Early Electricity Market Design in Norway' studies market design issues in establishing the market-based Norwegian electricity market. Essays 2-4 focus on issues of network congestion: 'Capacity Charges: A Price Adjustment Process for Managing Congestion in Electricity Transmission Networks' presents the capacity charge approach for managing transmission constraints in electricity networks. 'Understanding the Stochastics of Nodal Prices: Price Processes in a Constrained Network' seeks a further understanding of stochastic nodal prices processes. 'Investment Evaluation in a Constrained Electricity Network with Stochastic Nodal Price Processes' studies how the interaction of the competitive market and the capacitated network affects the evaluation of investments under uncertainty, and points out potential pitfalls of evaluation. In the last essay, 'A Newsboy Model Perspective on the Power Market: The Case of a Wind Power Producer' we discuss aspects of optimal bidding for a wind power producer. (Author)

Essays on electricity markets

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Rud, Linda

2009-07-01

The report covers several topics of electricity markets: The first essay, 'Selected Topics on Early Electricity Market Design in Norway' studies market design issues in establishing the market-based Norwegian electricity market. Essays 2-4 focus on issues of network congestion: 'Capacity Charges: A Price Adjustment Process for Managing Congestion in Electricity Transmission Networks' presents the capacity charge approach for managing transmission constraints in electricity networks. 'Understanding the Stochastics of Nodal Prices: Price Processes in a Constrained Network' seeks a further understanding of stochastic nodal prices processes. 'Investment Evaluation in a Constrained Electricity Network with Stochastic Nodal Price Processes' studies how the interaction of the competitive market and the capacitated network affects the evaluation of investments under uncertainty, and points out potential pitfalls of evaluation. In the last essay, 'A Newsboy Model Perspective on the Power Market: The Case of a Wind Power Producer' we discuss aspects of optimal bidding for a wind power producer. (Author)

Electric Power Regulation in Mexico

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Landa, J V [Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, Mexico City (Mexico)

1994-12-31

The history of the electrical power sector in Mexico, the prominent role that government plays in the generation, transformation, distribution and supply of electrical power, and the implications of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) for this sector were summarized. The slow pace of the Mexican electricity sector in achieving cost efficiency through pricing policy was criticized, and the issue of regulation versus deregulation of the electricity sector was examined in the context of NAFTA, emphasizing the contradiction between the idea of international trade and a highly regulated industry. Revisions of the original constitutional article to exclude electrical power generation from governmental control and to allow market mechanisms and competition to lower costs and increase efficiency was recommended.It was considered a pre-condition to a stable balance between competition and energy efficient environmentally friendly practices.

Future Electricity Markets

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Pinson, Pierre

2015-01-01

The changing face of energy production in Europe necessitates a rethink in the way that electricity markets are structured. The ‘5s’ (Future Electricity Markets) project is a multi-disciplinary project that is looking to challenge the current approach to the design and operation of electricity...

Independent regulatory authorities in European electricity markets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Larsen, Anders; Pedersen, Lene Holm; Sorensen, Eva Moll; Olsen, Ole Jess

2006-01-01

Liberalisation of the electricity market has taken place in most European countries within the last decade. It is considered a precondition of successful liberalisation to establish so-called independent regulatory authorities. In this article, we compare the status and practice of them in 16 European countries, and discuss the relationship between the organisation of the regulation and the market outcome

Electricity markets theories and applications

CERN Document Server

Lin, Jeremy

2017-01-01

Electricity Markets: Theories and Applications offers students and practitioners a clear understanding of the fundamental concepts of the economic theories, particularly microeconomic theories, as well as information on some advanced optimization methods of electricity markets. The authors--noted experts in the field--cover the basic drivers for the transformation of the electricity industry in both the United States and around the world and discuss the fundamentals of power system operation, electricity market design and structures, and electricity market operations. The text also explores advanced topics of power system operations and electricity market design and structure including zonal versus nodal pricing, market performance and market power issues, transmission pricing, and the emerging problems electricity markets face in smart grid and micro-grid environments. The authors also examine system planning under the context of electricity market regime. They explain the new ways to solve problems with t...

Status of French electricity and natural gas retail markets. Report 2015-2016 Control. Energy retail markets: how does competition progress?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2017-01-01

This publication aims at making data and indicators available to provide a view on recent evolutions of electric power and natural gas retail markets in France. After a presentation of some key figures produced by a survey on the knowledge of French people about market opening, this report first addresses the electric power market. It proposes an assessment of the electricity market opening by the end of December 2015: number of actors, number of large and non residential sites submitted to regulated prices, development of alternate providers, control of EDF commitments regarding long term contracts, assessment of competition intensity, follow-up of key processes and power cuts for non-payment. The report also proposes an analysis of the status of the power market on the territory of the main local distribution companies, and an analysis of electric power offers proposed to consumers (regulated prices, retail prices). The second part of the report addresses the same issues, but regarding the gas retail market

The surveillance of the electricity wholesale market and emission trading market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Luedemann, Volker

2015-01-01

The Regulation on Wholesale Market Integrity and Transparency (REMIT) and the German Law on the Establishment of a Market Transparency Office for Wholesale Trade in Electricity and Gas (MTS-G) have fundamentally changed the surveillance of electricity wholesale trade in Germany. From now on the Federal Network Agency and the Federal Cartel Office will be jointly responsible for monitoring the electricity wholesale trade for suspicious market phenomena and abusive behaviour. The REMIT specifies that the electricity trade must be surveilled ''with due consideration to interactions'' with the emission trade system. However, occurrences observed in recent years have shown that the emission trading system is in need of reform. This has also been recognised and has prompted extensive corrective action by the regulatory authorities of the European Union. These changes have yet to be transposed into the national surveillance regimes. The present article explains why the new role accorded to the Federal Network Agency under the REMIT fails to eliminate the structural shortcomings of the old surveillance system. At least the decision to put the collection and evaluation of data exclusively in the hands of the market transparency office and the cooperation this will prompt between the supervisory authorities responsible will make the task of surveilling the energy wholesale trading market a lot easier for the authorities. The energy transition and its exigencies will yet lead to further changes in the market and its surveillance regime.

The electricity market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

After a first part proposing predictions for electricity production and consumption for 2016, for the turnovers of electricity suppliers and producers, an indication of important recent important events regarding enterprises belonging to the sector, and a dashboard of the sector activity, an annual report proposes a detailed overview of trends and of the competition context for the electricity market. It identifies the main market opportunities for electricity suppliers, identifies eight determining factors for the sector activity, gives an overview of the sector context evolution between 2004 and 2014 (temperatures, rainfalls, manufacturing industry production, housing and office building stock, projected housing and office building). It analyses the evolution of the sector activity by presenting and commenting various activity indicators and financial performance of electricity producers. It analyses the sector economic structure: evolution of the economic fabric, presentation of various structural characteristics (cross-border exchanges, production capacities per energy source, nuclear plant fleet, thermal plant fleet, location, electricity supply market). It proposes a presentation of the various actors and of their respective market shares, and presentations of groups, electricity suppliers, and electricity producers. It indicates highlights and presents various rankings of the main enterprises in 2014

Slovenian and Spanish electricity markets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bregar, Z.

2004-01-01

Spanish electricity market has served as a basic model in the construction of the electricity market in Slovenia. However, in the final phase of its development additional solutions were adopted from other European and worldwide electricity markets. The electricity market thus obtained is in some aspects more complex and in others simpler with regard to the original model. This article describes two of the new solutions on the Slovenian electricity market: the introduction of numerous standardized electric energy products (Band, Peak, Off-peak, Hourly power etc.) to be traded on completely separate markets, and the introduction of continuous, real-time type trading on all of them but the hourly market.(author)

New approach in electricity network regulation: an issue on effective integration of distributed generation in electricity supply systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Scheepers, Martin J.J.; Wals, Adrian F.

2003-11-01

Technological developments and EU targets for penetration of renewable energy sources (RES) and greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction are decentralising the electricity infrastructure and services. Although, the liberalisation and internationalisation of the European electricity market has resulted in efforts to harmonise transmission pricing and regulation, hardly any initiative exists to consider the opening up and regulation of distribution networks to ensure effective participation of RES and distributed generation (DG) in the internal market. The SUSTELNET project has been created in order to close this policy gap. Its main objective is to develop regulatory roadmaps for the transition to an electricity market and network structure that creates a level playing field between centralised and decentralised generation and that facilitates the integration of RES, within the framework of the liberalisation of the EU electricity market. By analysing the technical, socio-economic and institutional dynamics of the European electricity system and markets, the project identifies the underlying patterns that provide the boundary conditions and levers for policy development to reach long term RES and GHG targets (2020-2030 time frame). This paper presents results of this analytical phase of the SUSTELNET project. Furthermore, preliminary results of the current work in progress are presented. Principles and criteria for a regulatory framework for sustainable electricity systems are discussed, as well as the development of medium to long-term transition strategies/roadmaps for network regulation and market transformation to facilitate the integration of RES and decentralised electricity generating systems.

Supporting renewable energy on liberalised markets: green electricity between additionally and consumer sovereignty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Menges, R.

2003-01-01

The German feed-in regulation has been perhaps the most effective promotional policy for green electricity. However, with the growing momentum of the liberalisation process the current regulation is challenged by structural problems about how to address the demand side. Price regulation leaves little room for private green electricity market activities. Moreover, the success of the feed-in regulation depends on a strict differentiation of the political segment and the emerging green electricity markets. The question, therefore, is about the role green electricity markets can (or should) perform in general. In order to evaluate green electricity markets the additionality criteria is frequently used, implying that markets are only desirable if they lead to additional environmental effects. The additionality criteria has two implications: First, transformed into individual behaviour, additionality implies that consumers are assumed to act as pure altruists. However, there is evidence from empirical studies that green electricity consumers behave more as impure altruists: they are not so much interested in the objective environmental impact of their behaviour but more objected to receive a private satisfaction from buying an environmental friendly product. Whereas theoretical models in the case of pure altruism suggest that private activities crowd out totally when policy becomes active in supporting the public good, this crowding out disappears in the case of impure altruism. Second, using end-state criteria such as the additionality principle as precondition, and neglecting process criteria such as consumer sovereignty, means to prevent establishing competitive market process right at the outset in principle. (author)

Supporting renewable energy on liberalised markets: green electricity between additionality and consumer sovereignty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Menges, Roland

2003-01-01

The German feed-in regulation has been perhaps the most effective promotional policy for green electricity. However, with the growing momentum of the liberalisation process the current regulation is challenged by structural problems about how to address the demand side. Price regulation lefts only little room for private green electricity market activities. Moreover, the success of the feed-in regulation depends on a strict differentiation of the political segment and the emerging green electricity markets. The question, therefore, is about the role green electricity markets can (or should) perform in general. In order to evaluate green electricity markets the additionality criteria is frequently used, implying that markets are only desirable if they lead to additional environmental effects. The additionality criteria has two implications: First, transformed into individual behaviour, additionality implies that consumers are assumed to act as pure altruists. However, there is evidence from empirical studies that green electricity consumers behave more as impure altruists: they are not so much interested in the objective environmental impact of their behaviour but more objected to receive a private satisfaction from buying an environmental friendly product. Whereas theoretical models in the case of pure altruism suggest that private activities crowd out totally when policy becomes active in supporting the public good, this crowding out disappears in the case of impure altruism. Second, using end-state criteria such as the additionality principle as pre-condition, and neglecting process criteria such as consumer sovereignty, means to prevent establishing competitive market process right at the outset in principle

Study on the Swiss electricity market - the current situation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Walti, N. O.

2007-01-01

This short article discusses the results of a study made on the opinions of energy suppliers in Switzerland with respect to future power generation in Switzerland. In particular, questions concerning new nuclear power stations and gas-fueled generating facilities are examined. The study was commissioned to tackle questions concerning the liberalisation of the electricity market, a future possible gap in supply, mains regulation and changes in market structure. The article discusses the findings of the study, in which 87 utilities took part, and lists strategic areas for action to be taken by electricity utilities such as efficiency analysis, regulation management, co-operative sourcing and possible mergers and acquisitions

Electricity market in Croatia according to the new energy laws

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Prelec, L.; Tomasic-Skevin, S.; Blagajac, S.; Dokmanovic, B.

2005-01-01

This paper presents laws and regulations related to the electricity market, with emphasis on changes introduced after the package of energy laws had been adopted in 2001. The paper gives an overview of by-laws, which are about to enter into force or are in final preparation stage, creating conditions for eligible customers to change supplier and freely negotiate electricity price. The paper also presents electricity market model in Croatia as well as procedure of supplier change. (author)

Why has the Nordic electricity market worked so well

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bergman, Lars

2005-06-01

There are two major threats to the success of electricity market reform in the Nordic countries. The first is that security of supply can not be maintained. The second is that market power prevents the potential benefits of competition to be realized. So far security of supply has been maintained, although exceptional storms have created serious problems in electricity distribution. The major power companies have been accused of exercising market power, but convincing proofs are lacking. At the same time power industry productivity has increased, and retail electricity prices (before tax) have become strongly linked to wholesale electricity prices. The situation may change in the future. Thus it remains to be seen that investments in new capacity are carried out when they are needed, and that mergers and capacity expansion do not significantly increase concentration and market power. But the development of the Nordic electricity market so far to a large extent is quite successful. Does this mean that the 'Nordic model' should be adopted all over the world? The answer is 'no'. In many ways the success of the Nordic model depends on area specific factors such as ample supply of hydropower and significant inter-connector capacities. Yet there are some 'universal' lessons that can be learned from the Nordic experiences. In particular the Nordic experiences suggest that a 'deregulated' market for electricity works well if: There are no price regulations and constraints on the development of financial markets; There is continued political support for a market based electricity supply system also when electricity is scarce and prices are high

Market integration of wind power in electricity system balancing

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Sorknæs, Peter; Andersen, Anders N.; Tang, Jens

2013-01-01

In most countries markets for electricity are divided into wholesale markets on which electricity is traded before the operation hour, and real-time balancing markets to handle the deviations from the wholesale trading. So far, wind power has been sold only on the wholesale market and has been...... known to increase the need for balancing. This article analyses whether wind turbines in the future should participate in the balancing markets and thereby play a proactive role. The analysis is based on a real-life test of proactive participation of a wind farm in West Denmark. It is found...... that the wind farm is able to play a proactive role regarding downward regulation and thereby increase profits....

African electricity market liberalization, competition and structuring: Should double bid markets be set up?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Founanou, M.

2011-01-01

In this paper, we analyse the possibility of using double auction mechanisms in the organization of the electricity markets in African countries. Today's electricity markets around the world are de-regulated and going through a restructuring process. In a context marked by the opening up to competition, a double auction for electricity supply is henceforth used to set prices in wholesale and retail electricity markets. Game theory analysis useful for studying the double auction prices proprieties. The double auction is a non-cooperative game, which is strategically equivalent to the auctions theory. The price formed, depending on the buyers and sellers' strategies, is a competitive price, which tends to the ideal price when competition operates intensely on both sides of market. For Africa, the presence of congestion costs and a chronic lack of capacity require the search for other solutions. We investigate optimal strategic behaviour when buyers and sellers are separated by a possibly constrained transmission line and show that bidders' strategies converge to truth-telling behaviour as the number of market participants increases. In the congestion case, this fails to occur. We also investigate how participants in wholesale electricity markets modify their bidding strategies as a function of the influence and behaviour of a transmission line owner. (author)

Report of the Commission on electricity market organization

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

After having stated the three objectives of a public policy for a sustainable development of the electricity market, this report shows that the current situation is neither economically satisfying on a short term basis, nor sustainable on a long term basis, notably because market prices in France do not reflect the competitive advantages of the production stock, because the multiplication of regulated prices does not ensure a global economic coherence, and because new incomers do not have any development margin. The authors then state that the regulation must evolve from a general and permanent one to a more targeted and dynamic one while taking the necessity of providing electricity to small consumers, the European law, and competitiveness into account. Two solutions are proposed for such an evolution

Dynamics of the Croatian electricity market opening

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pesut, D.; Zeljko, M.; Zutobradic, S.

2003-01-01

Customer eligibility is regulated by the Law on Electricity Market and its Article 23 (Official Gazette 79/01). Eligibility is understood as a possible supplier choice. To ensure the eligible status, annual demand should exceed 40 GWh. The category of customers that has gained the eligibility status based on the Law on Electricity Market makes out a total of around 7 percent of the annual electric energy consumption in Croatia. Thus, it can be said that electricity market openness in Croatia lies somewhat below 10 percent. According to the already mentioned Article 23, paragraph 4, the Government may determine annual demand threshold lowering as a condition to grant the eligibility status. According to the Law on Gas Market from 2001, the category of eligible gas customers in Croatia includes all electricity generators who use gas, regardless of the annual gas consumption, and other customers whose annual consumption exceeds 100 million m3. In 2002 there were seven such customers and they participated with 1,374,160,000 m3, i.e. 51 percent in the total gas consumption. As INA is the sole natural gas producer in Croatia with a long-term contract on the supply line lease for the transportation of Russian gas, it is also the only supplier of natural gas. Therefore, in 2002 each eligible customer bought gas from INA. Issues related to this field are: what kind of dynamics should one proceed with toward further energy market opening in Croatia? How large is this share of electricity, i.e. gas consumption in Croatia? What are the prerequisites, both organisational and technical, for this kind of market opening? (author)

Bill project for a new organisation of the electricity market (NOME): impact study

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

This document reports a study of the impact of the implementation of regulated access to electricity, of a capacity obligation, and of the evolution of regulated selling prices. It outlines that the progressive opening to concurrence of electricity in European markets did not reach in France the expected objectives: to let consumers get the benefit of investment in nuclear energy, incentives for innovation and demand reduction, promotion of investments within the frame of the electricity European market, etc. The authors describe the electricity market new organisation which is defined in the bill project, and the expected impacts on the different actors, macro-economical impacts, impacts on public finance and employment, environmental impacts, social impacts, and legal impacts

Regulated electricity retailing in Chile

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Galetovic, Alexander, E-mail: alexander@galetovic.cl [Facultad de Ciencias Economicas y Empresariales, Universidad de los Andes, Santiago, Chile. Av. San Carlos de Apoquindo 2200, Las Condes, Santiago (Chile); Munoz, Cristian M., E-mail: cmunozm@aes.com [AES Gener and Departamento de Ingenieria Electrica, Universidad Catolica de Chile (Chile)

2011-10-15

While some countries have unbundled distribution and retailing, skeptics argue that the physical attributes of electricity make retailers redundant. Instead, it is claimed that passive pass through of wholesale prices plus regulated charges for transmission and distribution suffice for customers to benefit from competitive generation markets. We review the Chilean experience with regulated retailing and pass through of wholesale prices. We argue that when energy wholesale prices are volatile and prices are stabilized, distortions emerge. Regulated retailers gain little by mitigating or correcting them. On the contrary, sometimes price distortions increase their profits. We estimate the cost of three distortions that neither regulated retailers nor the regulator have shown any interest in correcting. - Highlights: > We review Chile's experience with regulated electricity retailing. > Distortions emerge when energy wholesale prices are volatile and prices stabilized. > Regulated retailers gain little by mitigating or correcting distortions. > Sometimes price distortions increase retailers' profits. > We estimate the cost of three distortions, which retailers have not corrected.

Regulated electricity retailing in Chile

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Galetovic, Alexander; Munoz, Cristian M.

2011-01-01

While some countries have unbundled distribution and retailing, skeptics argue that the physical attributes of electricity make retailers redundant. Instead, it is claimed that passive pass through of wholesale prices plus regulated charges for transmission and distribution suffice for customers to benefit from competitive generation markets. We review the Chilean experience with regulated retailing and pass through of wholesale prices. We argue that when energy wholesale prices are volatile and prices are stabilized, distortions emerge. Regulated retailers gain little by mitigating or correcting them. On the contrary, sometimes price distortions increase their profits. We estimate the cost of three distortions that neither regulated retailers nor the regulator have shown any interest in correcting. - Highlights: → We review Chile's experience with regulated electricity retailing. → Distortions emerge when energy wholesale prices are volatile and prices stabilized. → Regulated retailers gain little by mitigating or correcting distortions. → Sometimes price distortions increase retailers' profits. → We estimate the cost of three distortions, which retailers have not corrected.

The Liberalisation of the Electricity Market in Italy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dessenibus, A.; Viskovic, A.; Carollo, T.

2001-01-01

The electricity sector is under reform in all EU countries on both of the aspects of market organisation and Utilities' restructuring, the latter being a consequence of the former. Until very recently, most governments have considered the whole power sector to be a natural monopoly and therefore it should be closely regulated. Market liberalisation shifts decision-making from the State to the market and, for the first time in the history of electricity Utility, gives consumer a choice. The new framework is featured by the introduction of competition in electricity generation and end-users' supply, non-discriminatory access to the electricity network and a redefinition of the regulatory function of governments. This study briefly resumes the market reforms and the new market organisation in Italy. Italy has implemented the EU directive on internal electricity market since 1999. So far, the process of market liberalisation has not come to an end yet. Currently ENEL, the former vertically integrated monopolist, is dismissing 25 percent of its power generation capacity, by selling in the market three power generation companies (GENCOs). An independent Transmission System Operator is fully operative since July 1999 and a transparent and non-discriminatory access to the network is guaranteed to all of the electricity power generation companies. The Market Pool Operator is defining the code of the Market Pool that will be applied to the price settlement into the Pool. The opening of the market on the demand side is growing year by year, according to the enlargement of the consumers who are allowed to sign freely contracts of supply with distributors (eligible consumers). Three months after the selling of the third Genco, the eligibility threshold will be lowered at 0.1 GWh. At that time, the open market is expected to represent 70 percent of the overall electricity consumption in Italy. Available evidence on liberalisation process in United Kingdom and in Scandinavian

Canadian electricity trends and issues : an energy market assessment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2001-05-01

This report examines the supply and demand of electricity in Canada and provides a province by province analysis of trade, regulatory developments and electricity prices. The Canadian electricity market is regionally diverse, as evidenced by the variety of fuels used for power generation and the differences in market structure, regulation and pricing. Hydro accounts for 61 per cent of Canadian electricity generation. Other sources include coal (18 per cent), nuclear (13 per cent), natural gas (4 per cent) and oil and renewables (4 per cent). Most new power generation projects in Canada are expected to be gas-fired leading to a convergence between natural gas and electricity markets. Most provincial electricity markets are being adequately supplied, even with rising power demands. Alberta restructured its electricity market over a five year period culminating in full retail access on 1 January 2001. While power supply has been relatively tight in Alberta, new generation capacity is expected to become available over the next few years. Ontario plans to implement full retail access in May 2002. Most other provinces are implementing wholesale access. Canadian residential electricity prices are among the lowest of the industrialized countries, and tend to be lowest in hydro-rich provinces. Most hydro-rich provinces have surplus energy available for domestic and international trade. Some provinces are undergoing basic changes with respect to the restructuring of their markets through the unbundling of power generation, transmission and distribution services. 53 figs

Why (and how) to regulate power exchanges in the EU market integration context?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Meeus, Leonardo

2011-01-01

The European Union (EU) market integration is leading to increasingly monopolistic electricity market infrastructures, which has opened a debate on the regulation of these so-called power exchanges. In this paper, we start by stating that there are two types of power exchanges in Europe, i.e. 'merchant' and 'cost-of-service regulated' power exchanges. We then discuss how regulation can be used to better align their incentives with the main power exchange tasks. We conclude that adopting the cost-of-service regulated model for all power exchanges in Europe could be counterproductive in the current context, but that regulation can help ensure that the benefits of the EU market integration materialize. Promising regulatory actions include tempering the reinforced market power of power exchanges, and quality-of-service regulation for the ongoing cooperation among power exchanges to organize trade across borders. - Research highlights: → Market integration is leading to increasingly monopolistic electricity market infrastructures. → Regulation can help tempering the market power of these so-called power exchanges in Europe. → Cost-of-service regulation for all power exchanges could however be counterproductive. → More promising is to subject cooperation among power exchanges to quality of service regulation.

Markets, prices and regulation in energetic activities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Percebois, Jacques

2015-09-01

The author first outlines some fundamental characteristics of the different energy world markets (oil, natural gas, coal, electricity). He outlines their availability, locations, and different main geographical areas. Then, he discusses the relationships between costs and prices in which intervene external costs, taxes, feed-in tariffs, national regulations, incentives for consumers. He discusses the issue of regulation of some energy activities, i.e. how State may or may not intervene on the markets, how competition may influence the market, how activities can thus be divided (production, transport, distribution) with implications and consequences for prices. He finally outlines concerns about the future financing of investments required to face tomorrow's needs

Designing competitive electricity markets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chao, H.P.; Huntington, H.

1998-01-01

This volume of papers, originally presented at Stanford in March 1997 in a conference sponsored by the Electric Power Research Institute, examines several questions about the restructuring and deregulation of electricity markets. Its stated goal is to present guiding principles for evaluating proposals to restructure the US electric power industry. While a collection of essays is perhaps not the best place to lay out guiding principles, the volume does contain a great deal of learning about restructuring. The first essay is a reprint of Paul Joskow's excellent article in the ''Journal of Economic Perspectives''. An essay by William Hogan on the debate between zonal and locational pricing is next. Paul Kleindorfer lists the various governance schemes which other countries that have restructured have used to govern system operation, access to the market for power, and transmission ownership and pricing. One difficulty with the book, as well as the debate in the US, is that it fails to draw adequately upon the international experience. Shmuel Oren lays out the potential areas over which an ISO could have authority. The chapter by Stephen Rassenti and Vernon Smith that bilateral trading should never be allowed, implying that a mandatory pool should be established. A reduction in regulation may increase the incentives for technological innovation. Martin Baughman suggests a number of ways by which costs of transmitting and storing electricity may be reduced. Robert Wilson returns to the volume with a chapter on institutional design. To end the volume, Hung-Po Chao and Stephen Peck present an extension of their earlier work in the ''Journal of Regulatory Economics'' showing how markets for transmission rights would work in a transmission grid of three points

The Nordic electricity market and how it can be improved

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Togeby, M.

2012-05-15

The Nordic electricity market is acknowledged worldwide as being successful. However, the market is not perfect. In this report we emphasise the consumer perspective of the electricity market - it seems clear that further development is required here. Challenges to the Nordic electricity market include: 1) Efficient involvement of the consumer in the market and consumer trust in the market. 2) Efficient integration of large scale renewable energy - e.g. 15,000 MW wind power in 2020. 3) Limited competition in peak load situations, in situations with little hydro availability and in situations with congestions in the transmission system. This analysis recommends three areas as focus points for future market development: 4) Ways to radically increase the volume of demand response. 5) Ways to improve the system of default suppliers. 6) Ways to improve the regulation of distribution companies. The issues related to these three focus points differ from country to country, but the overarching issues are relevant in all market areas. (Author)

Why has the Nordic electricity market worked so well

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bergman, Lars [Stockholm School of Economics (Sweden)

2005-06-01

There are two major threats to the success of electricity market reform in the Nordic countries. The first is that security of supply can not be maintained. The second is that market power prevents the potential benefits of competition to be realized. So far security of supply has been maintained, although exceptional storms have created serious problems in electricity distribution. The major power companies have been accused of exercising market power, but convincing proofs are lacking. At the same time power industry productivity has increased, and retail electricity prices (before tax) have become strongly linked to wholesale electricity prices. The situation may change in the future. Thus it remains to be seen that investments in new capacity are carried out when they are needed, and that mergers and capacity expansion do not significantly increase concentration and market power. But the development of the Nordic electricity market so far to a large extent is quite successful. Does this mean that the 'Nordic model' should be adopted all over the world? The answer is 'no'. In many ways the success of the Nordic model depends on area specific factors such as ample supply of hydropower and significant inter-connector capacities. Yet there are some 'universal' lessons that can be learned from the Nordic experiences. In particular the Nordic experiences suggest that a 'deregulated' market for electricity works well if: There are no price regulations and constraints on the development of financial markets; There is continued political support for a market based electricity supply system also when electricity is scarce and prices are high.

The Integrated Nordic End-User Electricity Market - Feasibility and identified obstacles

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2006-02-01

The report identifies the various obstacles that currently exist which prevent the formation of a truly integrated Nordic electricity end-user market. The obstacles have been divided into three categories: technical, regulatory and commercial. NordREG proposes that to further integrate the Nordic end-user electricity markets, a number of differences of technical, legal and market nature ought to be gradually harmonized in order to facilitate market entry and cross-border trade. Technical obstacles: Especially the following problems related to the data and metering systems should be solved: Transferred messages, information and message timing should be harmonised; Message format should be decided; A common data transmission protocol should be specified. New solutions like web-based solutions should be studied; The identification of the final customers' metering point should be harmonised. Regulatory obstacles: The identified regulatory obstacles relate to three areas, namely the division of tasks between monopoly and competitive activities, the operation and duties of distribution network operators including how these are regulated, and the legal framework to provide protection for small end users. On the basis of the review of regulatory obstacles, the following recommendations are made: The principles of neutrality and the way these principles are being supervised by the regulator is a key issue to improve the functioning of the Nordic end-user market. Regulators should seek to harmonise regulation on neutrality and put it high on the agenda in a forthcoming process of market integration; The procedures for switching supplier should be as smooth, easy and quick as possible. It is also important that suppliers, especially the new market entrants, can participate in reliable, transparent and fluent switching practices, since this lowers the threshold for entering other than domestic electricity market. The switching model should be harmonised for the Nordic end

The Integrated Nordic End-User Electricity Market - Feasibility and identified obstacles

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2006-02-15

The report identifies the various obstacles that currently exist which prevent the formation of a truly integrated Nordic electricity end-user market. The obstacles have been divided into three categories: technical, regulatory and commercial. NordREG proposes that to further integrate the Nordic end-user electricity markets, a number of differences of technical, legal and market nature ought to be gradually harmonized in order to facilitate market entry and cross-border trade. Technical obstacles: Especially the following problems related to the data and metering systems should be solved: Transferred messages, information and message timing should be harmonised; Message format should be decided; A common data transmission protocol should be specified. New solutions like web-based solutions should be studied; The identification of the final customers' metering point should be harmonised. Regulatory obstacles: The identified regulatory obstacles relate to three areas, namely the division of tasks between monopoly and competitive activities, the operation and duties of distribution network operators including how these are regulated, and the legal framework to provide protection for small end users. On the basis of the review of regulatory obstacles, the following recommendations are made: The principles of neutrality and the way these principles are being supervised by the regulator is a key issue to improve the functioning of the Nordic end-user market. Regulators should seek to harmonise regulation on neutrality and put it high on the agenda in a forthcoming process of market integration; The procedures for switching supplier should be as smooth, easy and quick as possible. It is also important that suppliers, especially the new market entrants, can participate in reliable, transparent and fluent switching practices, since this lowers the threshold for entering other than domestic electricity market. The switching model should be harmonised for the Nordic end

Multi-agent simulation of competitive electricity markets: Autonomous systems cooperation for European market modeling

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Santos, Gabriel; Pinto, Tiago; Morais, Hugo

2015-01-01

The electricity market restructuring, and its worldwide evolution into regional and even continental scales, along with the increasing necessity for an adequate integration of renewable energy sources, is resulting in a rising complexity in power systems operation. Several power system simulators...... have been developed in recent years with the purpose of helping operators, regulators, and involved players to understand and deal with this complex and constantly changing environment. The main contribution of this paper is given by the integration of several electricity market and power system models......, respecting to the reality of different countries. This integration is done through the development of an upper ontology which integrates the essential concepts necessary to interpret all the available information. The continuous development of Multi-Agent System for Competitive Electricity Markets platform...

Nuclear regulatory challenges arising from competition in electricity markets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2001-01-01

In recent years a world-wide trend has been developing to introduce competition in electricity markets. As market competition unfolds, it produces a wide range of safety challenges for nuclear power plant operators and regulators. Nuclear regulators must be aware of the potential safety challenges produced and consider whether new regulatory response strategies are warranted. This report describes many of these challenges, their implications and possible regulatory response strategies. The intended audience is primarily nuclear safety regulators, although government authorities, nuclear power plant operators and the general public may also be interested. (author)

Market, Regulation, Market, Regulation

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Frankel, Christian; Galland, Jean-Pierre

2015-01-01

barriers to trade in Europe, realized the free movement of products by organizing progressively several orders of markets and regulation. Based on historical and institutional documents, on technical publications, and on interviews, this article relates how the European Commission and the Member States had......This paper focuses on the European Regulatory system which was settled both for opening the Single Market for products and ensuring the consumers' safety. It claims that the New Approach and Standardization, and the Global Approach to conformity assessment, which suppressed the last technical...... alternatively recourse to markets and to regulations, at the three main levels of the New Approach Directives implementation. The article focuses also more specifically on the Medical Devices sector, not only because this New Approach sector has long been controversial in Europe, and has recently been concerned...

Oligopolistic concurrence and investment: application to electricity markets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Meunier, G.

2008-12-01

This research aims at analysing investment strategies of firms which are in an oligopolistic situation. After a brief description of the physical characteristics of an electric system, the author describes the reforms and defines the problematic of an investment in electricity production within markets in imperfect concurrence. In a first part, the author analyses the heterogeneity (either exogenous or endogenous) and technology choices of oligopolistic firms. In case of an exogenous heterogeneity, he studies the impact of the number of firms on investment decisions. In the second part, the author examines the regulations introduced in industries in imperfect concurrence: electricity production by a public firm and interaction between emission allowance market and investment

An agent-based simulation of power generation company behavior in electricity markets under different market-clearing mechanisms

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Aliabadi, Danial Esmaeili; Kaya, Murat; Şahin, Güvenç

2017-01-01

Deregulated electricity markets are expected to provide affordable electricity for consumers through promoting competition. Yet, the results do not always fulfill the expectations. The regulator's market-clearing mechanism is a strategic choice that may affect the level of competition in the market. We conceive of the market-clearing mechanism as composed of two components: pricing rules and rationing policies. We investigate the strategic behavior of power generation companies under different market-clearing mechanisms using an agent-based simulation model which integrates a game-theoretical understanding of the auction mechanism in the electricity market and generation companies' learning mechanism. Results of our simulation experiments are presented using various case studies representing different market settings. The market in simulations is observed to converge to a Nash equilibrium of the stage game or to a similar state under most parameter combinations. Compared to pay-as-bid pricing, bid prices are closer to marginal costs on average under uniform pricing while GenCos' total profit is also higher. The random rationing policy of the ISO turns out to be more successful in achieving lower bid prices and lower GenCo profits. In minimizing GenCos' total profit, a combination of pay-as-bid pricing rule and random rationing policy is observed to be the most promising. - Highlights: • An agent-based simulation of generation company behavior in electricity markets is developed. • Learning dynamics of companies is modeled with an extended Q-learning algorithm. • Different market clearing mechanisms of the regulator are compared. • Convergence to Nash equilibria is analyzed under different cases. • The level of competition in the market is studied.

Large-scale integration of renewable energy into international electricity markets

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Lund, Henrik

2004-01-01

has lead to excess electricity production and thus low prices on the Nord Pool electricity market. This paper describes how such problems can be avoided by the introduction of flexible energy systems including changes in the regulation of power plants and investments in heat pumps and heat storage...... it possible for the system to secure a balance between supply and demand. At the same time most European electricity systems are in the process of being transformed into competitive electricity markets. Already today, the annual share of wind power in the western part of Denmark is nearly 20 percent, which...

Electricity market reform failures: UK, Norway, Alberta and California

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chikeung Woo; Lloyd, Debra; Tishler, Asher

2003-01-01

An analysis of electricity market reforms already taken place in the UK, Norway, Alberta (Canada) and California (USA) leads to our overall conclusion that the introduction of a competitive generation market, of itself, has failed to deliver reliable service at low and stable prices. The market reform failures are attributed to market power abuse by few dominant sellers (especially at times of transmission congestion), poor market design that invites strategic bidding by suppliers, the lack of customer response to price spikes, capacity shortage caused by demand growth not matched by new capacity, and thin trading of forward and futures contracts that are critical for price discovery and risk management. The paper then explains why an electricity market reform can easily fail to deliver the promised gains of better service at lower and more stable prices. The policy implication is that an electric market reform can be extremely risky, and may lead to a disastrous outcome. Thus, it is imprudent to implement such a reform in countries with limited sites for new generation and no indigenous fuels (e.g., Israel and Hong Kong). These countries should therefore consider introducing performance-based regulation that can immediately benefit electricity consumers in terms of lower prices, more stable prices, improved reliability, more choices, while encouraging the electric sector to pursue efficient operation and investment. (Author)

Electricity market reform failures: UK, Norway, Alberta and California

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Woo, C.-K.; Lloyd, Debra; Tishler, Asher

2003-01-01

An analysis of electricity market reforms already taken place in the UK, Norway, Alberta (Canada) and California (USA) leads to our overall conclusion that the introduction of a competitive generation market, of itself, has failed to deliver reliable service at low and stable prices. The market reform failures are attributed to market power abuse by few dominant sellers (especially at times of transmission congestion), poor market design that invites strategic bidding by suppliers, the lack of customer response to price spikes, capacity shortage caused by demand growth not matched by new capacity, and thin trading of forward and futures contracts that are critical for price discovery and risk management. The paper then explains why an electricity market reform can easily fail to deliver the promised gains of better service at lower and more stable prices. The policy implication is that an electric market reform can be extremely risky, and may lead to a disastrous outcome. Thus, it is imprudent to implement such a reform in countries with limited sites for new generation and no indigenous fuels (e.g., Israel and Hong Kong). These countries should therefore consider introducing performance-based regulation that can immediately benefit electricity consumers in terms of lower prices, more stable prices, improved reliability, more choices, while encouraging the electric sector to pursue efficient operation and investment

A bid solicitation and selection method for developing a competitive spot priced electric market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ancona, J.J.

1997-01-01

The electric utility industry is in the beginning throes of a transformation from a cost-based regulated structure to a more market based less regulated system. Traditional unit commitment and economic dispatch methodologies can continue to provide reliable least-cost solutions, providing they are modified to accommodate a larger sphere of market participants. This paper offers a method for an entity such as an Independent System Operator (ISO) to solicit and evaluate bids for developing a spot priced electric market by replicating existing utility practices that are effective and efficient, while creating an open and equitable competitive marketplace for electricity

Estimating the volatility of electricity prices: The case of the England and Wales wholesale electricity market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tashpulatov, Sherzod N.

2013-01-01

Price fluctuations that partially comove with demand are a specific feature inherent to liberalized electricity markets. The regulatory authority in Great Britain, however, believed that sometimes electricity prices were significantly higher than what was expected and, therefore, introduced price-cap regulation and divestment series. In this study, I analyze how the introduced institutional changes and regulatory reforms affected the dynamics of daily electricity prices in the England and Wales wholesale electricity market during 1990–2001. This research finds that the introduction of price-cap regulation did achieve the goal of lowering the price level at the cost of higher price volatility. Later, the first series of divestments is found to be successful at lowering price volatility, which however happens at the cost of a higher price level. Finally, this study also documents that the second series of divestments was more successful at lowering both the price level and volatility. - Author-Highlights: • The impact of regulation on the dynamics of electricity prices is examined. • Price-cap regulation has decreased the level at the cost of higher volatility. • The first series of divestments has reversed the trade-off. • The reversed trade-off is explained as an indication of tacit collusion. • The second series of divestments is found generally successful

French retail electricity and gas markets functioning - 2011-2012 report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

French retail electricity and gas markets are progressively opening to competition. These changes reflect the development of more competitive market offers with respect to regulated sales tariffs in both energies, as well as a better knowledge of these markets by end-users. In this context of retail markets development, the Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE) pays attention to the monitoring of actors behaviour, in particular in the domain of price and offer transparency. This report presents, first, the situation of the French retail electricity and gas markets by December 31, 2011. Then, an economic analysis of the supplies on retail market is made. Next, a qualitative analysis of transparency and operation on retail markets is presented. Finally, CRE makes some proposals for the improvement of the transparency and operation of these markets

Market power analysis for the Iranian electricity market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Asgari, Mohammad Hossein; Monsef, Hassan

2010-01-01

The market power problem in Iranian electricity market is addressed in this study. This paper by using various structural indices of market power and reviewing market results analyzes the intensity of competition in Iran's electricity market and examines whether this market is functioning at an appropriate level of efficiency. In this article the most well-known indices of market power are calculated in two approaches for two different scenarios (current situation and future outlook of generation sector's ownership in Iran's power industry). Comparing the results of these scenarios promises more competitive market for the second scenario. Calculating Residual Supply Index for Iran's power market shows despite admissible values of concentration ratios, due to supply scarcity during periods when the demand is close to the total available capacity, some suppliers can exercise market power even with a relatively small market share. The most important price and load indices like weighted average prices and load/price duration curves of Iranian electricity market during March 2007-March 2008 are also analyzed in this paper. These results imply the existence of economic withholding. The main limiting factors of competition and significant implemented countermeasures for market power mitigation in Iran's electricity market are also mentioned.

Negative Effects of Antimonopoly Regulation on the Russian Electric Power Industry

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Elena NEPRINTSEVA

2017-07-01

Full Text Available With the antimonopoly regulation in the domestic economy getting more stringent an analysis of the current measures of antimonopoly regulation in terms of their efficiency is now becoming ever more relevant. The aim of the study - analyze how the measures of antimonopoly regulation affect competitive relationships in the electric power industry. The following methods have been used in this work: empirical method, cause-effect method and scientific abstraction method. The article sets out an analysis of the antimonopoly regulation measures that the antimonopoly authority applies. It also provides an assessment of consequences that follow from such methods being applied for the promotion of competitive relationships on the market of electric power and capacity. A conclusion has been reached that the antimonopoly regulation measures being applied impede the progress of competitive relationships on the market of electric power and capacity. The continuing process of reformation in electric power industry aims to liberalize relationships in the area of electric power production. Yet, as a result of this process, generating capacities are becoming increasingly more concentrated mainly around state companies. This is mainly caused by the lack of certainty regarding the results of the industry reformation and a more stringent state regulation over the last years of the reforms. At the same time, for the purposes of limiting the market force, measures of antimonopoly regulation are being applied to generating companies. Such measures have an adverse effect on competitive relationships and stimulate further concentration.

The electricity markets around the Baltic Sea; Elmarknaderna runt Oestersjoen

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1995-12-01

A thorough description of the electric power markets in the countries surrounding the Baltic sea is given in this book. Environmental problems and regulations and nuclear power are surveyed. Factors that may affect an expanded trade of electricity between the countries are analyzed

Why (and how) to regulate power exchanges in the EU market integration context?

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Meeus, Leonardo, E-mail: leonardo.meeus@eui.e [Florence School of Regulation, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Via Boccaccio 151, Florence (Italy); Electrical Engineering Department (ESAT-ELECTA), KULeuven, Kasteelpark Arenberg 10, Heverlee (Belgium)

2011-03-15

The European Union (EU) market integration is leading to increasingly monopolistic electricity market infrastructures, which has opened a debate on the regulation of these so-called power exchanges. In this paper, we start by stating that there are two types of power exchanges in Europe, i.e. 'merchant' and 'cost-of-service regulated' power exchanges. We then discuss how regulation can be used to better align their incentives with the main power exchange tasks. We conclude that adopting the cost-of-service regulated model for all power exchanges in Europe could be counterproductive in the current context, but that regulation can help ensure that the benefits of the EU market integration materialize. Promising regulatory actions include tempering the reinforced market power of power exchanges, and quality-of-service regulation for the ongoing cooperation among power exchanges to organize trade across borders. - Research highlights: {yields} Market integration is leading to increasingly monopolistic electricity market infrastructures. {yields} Regulation can help tempering the market power of these so-called power exchanges in Europe. {yields} Cost-of-service regulation for all power exchanges could however be counterproductive. {yields} More promising is to subject cooperation among power exchanges to quality of service regulation.

Importance of Electricity Transport Pricing in Liberalised Energy Markets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wohlgemuth, N.

2001-01-01

Electricity has traditionally been supplied by vertically integrated companies providing generation, transmission and distribution services. Consumers have purchased a bundled commodity - delivered electricity - and there has been no need to price the components individually. This is no longer the case in competitive and unbundled electricity markets. One of the outstanding issues in the restructuring of the electricity markets is the way in which transmission costs are translated into tariffs. The efforts to create a single European electricity market are difficult to reconcile due to different national network pricing approaches. The European Commission's draft regulation on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges of electricity sets general principles for the pricing of international electricity exchanges. Nodal pricing provides incentives for an efficient use of generation and transmission assets. Experience shows that nodal pricing is workable, and its use may be expected to increase progressively. Postage stamp pricing does not generally provide adequate incentives for efficiency. However, inefficiencies may be small under certain conditions, and postage stamp pricing has the advantage of being relatively transparent and easy to implement. This paper presents an overview of objectives related to an effective design of transmission pricing approaches, of transmission pricing models and presents recent developments in Europe in this respect. Due to the great number of institutional designs of electricity market organisations, it will be difficult to design and implement a model of cross-border transmission pricing that results in a high degree of non-discriminatory international competition in electricity markets, a key objective of the Electricity Directive.(author)

Reliability payments to generation capacity in electricity markets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Olsina, Fernando; Pringles, Rolando; Larisson, Carlos; Garcés, Francisco

2014-01-01

Electric power is a critical input to modern economies. Generation adequacy and security of supply in power systems running under competition are currently topics of high concern for consumers, regulators and governments. In a market setting, generation investments and adequacy can only be achieved by an appropriate regulatory framework that sets efficient remuneration to power capacity. Theoretically, energy-only electricity markets are efficient and no additional mechanism is needed. Nonetheless, the energy-only market design suffers from serious drawbacks. Therefore, jointly with the evolution of electricity markets, many remunerating mechanisms for generation capacity have been proposed. Explicit capacity payment was the first remunerating approach implemented and perhaps still the most applied. However, this price-based regulation has been applied no without severe difficulties and criticism. In this paper, a new reliability payment mechanism is envisioned. Capacity of each generating unit is paid according to its effective contribution to overall system reliability. The proposed scheme has many attractive features and preserves the theoretical efficiency properties of energy-only markets. Fairness, incentive compatibility, market power mitigation and settlement rules are investigated in this work. The article also examines the requirements for system data and models in order to implement the proposed capacity mechanism. A numerical example on a real hydrothermal system serves for illustrating the practicability of the proposed approach and the resulting reliability payments to the generation units. - Highlights: • A new approach for remunerating supply reliability provided by generation units is proposed. • The contribution of each generating unit to lessen power shortfalls is determined by simulations. • Efficiency, fairness and incentive compatibility of the proposed reliability payment are assessed

Economic demand response model in liberalised electricity markets with respect to flexibility of consumers

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Sharifi, Reza; Anvari-Moghaddam, Amjad; Fathi, S. Hamid

2017-01-01

Before restructuring in the electricity industry, the primary decision-makers of the electricity market were deemed to be power generation and transmission companies, market regulation boards, and power industry regulators. In this traditional structure, consumers were interested in receiving...... electricity at flat rates while paying no attention to the problems of this industry. This attitude was the source of many problems, sometimes leading to collapse of power systems and widespread blackouts. Restructuring of the electricity industry however provided a multitude of solutions to these problems....... The most important solution can be demand response (DR) programs. This paper proposes an economic DR model for residential consumers in liberalized electricity markets to change their consumption pattern from times of high energy prices to other times to maximize their utility functions. This economic...

Economic and institutional dynamics of electricity markets deregulation: the interaction between sectoral regulation and antitrust policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fontanel, B.

2009-01-01

The purpose of this study is to define regulatory intervention as a part of a global monitoring procedure allowing the definition and adaptation of market structures and rules, given the observed behavior of market participants. Nevertheless, the possible inefficiency in its (decisional) coordination with competition authorities implies further analysis. We thus adopt a comparative methodology based on the studying PJM and NETA wholesale markets. This analysis enables us to stress two possible 'models' in the distribution and coordination of monitoring powers. The first one privileges a strong 'informational coordination' between the sectoral regulator and the Transmission System Operator. By contrast, the second model is characterized by a constrained informational coordination, leading to a greater 'decisional convergence' between regulatory intervention and antitrust policy. Lastly, we put these conclusions into perspective with the specific issue of the achievement of an efficient and integrated European market for electricity. In particular, we stress the need for a single regulatory agency, which should be given autonomous decisional powers in the adoption of regional markets reform initiatives (author)

Modelling the impact of market interventions on the strategic evolution of electricity markets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bunn, Derek W.; Oliveira, Fernando S.

2005-01-01

compared the effectiveness of market interventions under the two variants of market clearing. The results of our experiments suggest that an 'active' regulator might prefer a Pool market where quantities and prices are public knowledge and where regulation appears to be more effective. However, a more liberal regulatory body, i.e. that wishes all incentives to come from the market, might prefer a multi-clearing mechanism, which leads to higher consumer welfare (under the non-interventionist scenario). Finally, an interesting further observation from this work relates to the topic of modelling electricity markets using Cournot models. In such specifications, demand elasticity is crucial and is often done in an ad hoc way to achieve realistic prices. In the daily market place, demand is actually quite inelastic, except for conditions of extreme scarcity, but because oligopolies of generators in practice have not generally chosen to exercise their market power to the fullest extent (e.g. for political or repeated game reasons), higher values for elasticities have generally been specified as surrogates for longer term considerations in contrast, with the kinds of regulatory intervention explicitly represented in this study, rather lower, more realistic elasticities can be used for the behaviour of electricity consumers. (Author)

Security of supply in Competitive Electricity Markets. Conference proceedings

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-06-01

A stable and reliable electricity supply is a fundamental factor in our modern economy and many people think that the deregulated market is a threat to this - or at least, they think that there is a need for a new type of regulation. Others believe that the threat to security of supply comes from short sighted politicians rather than from competitive markets. Regulation in order to increase security of supply is a threat to well functioning competitive markets - not the other way around. To give an overview of different regulatory models and to discuss each model's particular pros and cons, ELFORSK (Swedish Electrical Utilities RandD Company) on behalf of the Swedish electricity industry, the national grid company Svenska Kraftnaet and the Regulating Authority has arranged this two-day Conference. This conference once again gathers people from many different parts of the world to exchange ideas and experiences from their respective area of operations. Our belief is that people from the industry, the governments as well as from the academic world will find these two days a useful opportunity to build new relationships and gain new insights into the topics covered. There are three main topics for the Conference: Experiences from Different Markets; The Value of Security of Supply; Ongoing research projects. The members of the Conference Committee are impressed by the quality of the papers presented at this Conference and we believe that this is a source of knowledge that will influence decisions makers in many countries. (11 papers presented at the conference have been indexed separately. Powerpoint presentations have not been indexed but are available from the Market Design homrpage)

Restructured electric power systems analysis of electricity markets with equilibrium models

CERN Document Server

2010-01-01

Electricity market deregulation is driving the power energy production from a monopolistic structure into a competitive market environment. The development of electricity markets has necessitated the need to analyze market behavior and power. Restructured Electric Power Systems reviews the latest developments in electricity market equilibrium models and discusses the application of such models in the practical analysis and assessment of electricity markets.

What next after the rejection of Swiss electricity market legislation?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Miolo, A.; Rechsteiner, S.

2002-01-01

This article discusses the situation in Switzerland after the rejection of new legislation on the liberalisation of the Swiss electricity market (Electricity Market Law, EMG) in a public vote in September 2002. The problems thus posed and the possibilities for further action available to those involved and affected are discussed. The legal situation after the rejection of the EMG is discussed with respect to Swiss regional structures and cantonal regulations. Three possible scenarios are discussed - the status quo, a solution to be provided by the electricity business or a Federal decree. The possibilities open to electricity enterprises for optimisation and the realisation of synergies to increase efficiency and competitiveness are discussed

Electricity prices in a competitive market: a preliminary analysis of the deregulated Thai electricity industry

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pipattanasomporn, M.; Ongsakul, W.; Pacudan, R.; Lefevre, T.

2000-01-01

The electricity industry throughout the world is currently undergoing a significant transition towards restructuring and deregulation. Following this new legislation, Thailand has initiated an institutional and structural reform with a belief that this could be the best way forward for the Thai electricity supply industry (ESI) to improve efficiency, lower electricity prices, and tackle financial debts. This paper presents an analysis of the extent to which prices for generation services in a competitive market may differ from regulated electricity prices, if competitive prices are based on marginal costs and regulated prices are based on average costs, by using Thailand as a case study. (Author)

Wholesale electricity markets in Europe

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rios, J. L.

2010-01-01

Electricity Wholesale Markets provide efficient operation of power stations, facilitate hedging instruments for generators and retailers and deliver price signals for new investments. Despite having a common regulatory framework at European level whose last aim is a single electricity market, Wholesale markets have been unevenly developed in each Member State. The evolution form a spot-based market towards a forward-based market needs a certain level of liquidity, transparency and regulatory stability. Interconnections are the key element to promote the integration of electricity markets. To facilitate this, European Regional Initiatives have pushed regulatory harmonization between countries and market coupling projects. (Author)

Alberta's electricity forwards market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Andrews, D.

2002-01-01

This paper outlined how the province of Alberta is starting over with a wholesale electricity market. Wholesalers have retreated back to the real-time market. The Watt-Ex standard market design position paper, issued in October 2002, examines wholesale market issues. The author notes that the biggest constraint to competitive electricity market is the reliance on real-time markets to price a good portion of transactions. Doing so, creates extreme price volatility and ineffective price signals because demand and supply have only a limited ability to respond to prices

Deregulation of Electricity Market and Drivers of Demand for Electrical Energy in Industry

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Bojnec Štefan

2016-09-01

Full Text Available This paper investigates deregulation of electricity market focusing on electricity prices and drivers of demand for electrical energy in industry in Slovenia. The patterns in evolution of real electricity price developments and the three main components of the electricity price are calculated: liberalized market share for purchased electricity price, regulated infrastructure share for use of electricity network grids and mandatory state charges in the sale of electricity (duty, excise duty and value-added tax. To calculate the real value of electricity prices, producer price index of industrial commodities for electricity prices in industry is used as deflator and implicit deflator of gross domestic product for the size of the economy. In the empirical econometric part is used regression analysis for the amount electricity consumption in the industry depending on the real gross domestic product, direct and cross-price elasticity for natural gas prices in the industry. The results confirmed volatility in real electricity price developments with their increasing tendency and the increasing share of different taxes and state charges in the electricity prices for industry. Demand for electrical energy in industry is positively associated with gross domestic product and price of natural gas as substitute for electrical energy in industry use, and negatively associated with prices of electrical energy for industry.

The role of eligible customers in developing the electricity market in Slovenia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tomsic, M. G.; Fatur, T.; Merse, S.; Zagozen, D.

2002-01-01

The role of customers in the electricity market opening in Slovenia is discussed. Customer interest was initially limited to the largest customers, as only they could influence the situation in the first market opening period, from April 15 2001. Broad opening of the market, down to customers with 41 kW connected power (65 percent of total consumption) and full international opening (with a reciprocity clause), is scheduled for January 1 2003. The legal market structure is further defined by the requirement for separation of network ownership and operation, creation of a regulatory body and a regulated third-party access. During the last year before market opening, in 2002, mid-sized and small eligible customers contributed considerably to the creation of a useful electricity market. The effort was spearheaded by a group of customers that joined a project-based customer group. This and other customer groups contributed to a more balanced preparatory process, which is generally dominated by the government agencies and incumbent electricity suppliers. The customers' experts and consultants assisted the regulators in resolving some technical issues, such as setting the rules for auxiliary network services, power balancing and cross-border capacity allocation. The moving force for customer activities is an expectation that electric energy prices will drop, by some 10 percent , from the current levels in Slovenia, towards the levels experienced on the Central European open markets. The developments confirm the hypothesis that electricity market liberalisation, usually driven by legislation (top-down) is effective only when customers gain an adequate role. (author)

New nuclear power plants and the electricity market competition

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ruska, M.; Koreneff, G.

2009-11-01

The study assesses the effects the different nuclear power plant projects would have on crossownership, market concentration and market power in electricity market. The analyses are given both for Finnish and Nordic power markets. The authors feel that the electricity market should primarily be viewed as a common Nordic market in the future. During 2000 to 2008 the hours when Finland was an own price area ranged from 1 % to 29 % as annual averages. In the future it will be more and more seldom that Finland will become an own deficit price area, because the cross-border transmission capacity to Sweden will increase as will Finnish electricity production capacity. In addition, the extension of Nord Pool to the Baltic will increase the size of the market. The ownership of power plants is typically organized through power share companies in Finland. Two of the three nuclear power plant projects are joint ventures with several electricity producers and consumers. The current ownership relations and what effects the new projects might have on them were analyzed in this study. The competitiveness of different electricity production forms in the future was assessed using different market scenarios based on varying demand expectations. The capacity structure was assumed to stay quite unchanged, where the biggest change is expected to come from new renewable power capacity due to EU targets. Conventional condensing power production will decrease and Nordic electricity exports will increase in the future. The market concentration would increase in Finland with new nuclear plants, the most if Fortum were the builder. Vattenfall has a decidedly larger electricity production in the Nordic countries than Fortum, and Vattenfall's capacity would be unchanged by the new planned nuclear plants. The nuclear power plant projects do not therefore increase market concentration significantly on a Nordic level. Nuclear power is not used for day or hour regulation in Finland, which means

Study on electricity markets in Romania

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Alexandra FLOREA

2017-03-01

Full Text Available In this paper, we detail about the components of the wholesale electricity market in Romania: Market for Bilateral Contracts (Central Market with continuous double negotiation of bilateral electric energy contracts (CM - OTC, Centralized Market for bilateral electric energy contracts, Day-Ahead Market (DAM, Inter-Daily Market (IM, Balancing Market (BM, Centralized Market for universal service (CMUS. In addition, for each type of market we generated diagrams with the main business processes.

Reliability risks during the transition to competitive electricity markets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hughes, J.P.

2005-01-01

The Electricity Consumers Resource Council (ELCON) is a U.S. association representing industrial consumers of electricity, and is a long-standing advocate of competition in the electric power industry. However, because a reliable grid is necessary to support competitive wholesale markets, ELCON believes that the transmission system is an essential facility that must remain regulated. The initiatives discussed in this white paper represent significant steps that the National Electric Reliability Council (NERC) and the industry have taken to improve reliability in a competitive and restructured electric industry. Strategic manoeuvres of incumbent utilities to maintain market share were evaluated, as well as discrimination against potential competitors. It was suggested that, occasionally, indecisive federal policies have been taken advantage of by utilities. The unintended consequences of state restructuring policies that allow utilities to over-earn their revenue requirements were reviewed. NERC reliability standards will remain unenforceable until a new Electricity Reliability Organization has been certified. Flawed market designs and inadequate market power mitigation, as well as the financial distress of merchant generators, pose considerable risks. It was suggested that these risks could trigger transmission loading relief incidents, local outages or widespread outages. In the absence of mandatory reliability standards with penalties, and complementary market rules for mitigating generation and transmission market power, economic incentives will encourage other forms of opportunistic behavior that may be the root cause of other outages. Public concern regarding these risks to grid reliability may result in lost public support for competitive electricity markets. Proposed solutions include the certification of a new Electric Reliability Organization to establish and enforce mandatory reliability standards, and granting the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

The prerequisites for effective competition in restructured wholesale electricity markets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Haas, R.; Auer, H.

2006-01-01

This paper argues that effective competition in reformed wholesale electricity markets can only be achieved if the following six prerequisites are met: (1) separation of the grid from generation and supply; (2) wholesale price deregulation; (3) sufficient transmission capacity for a competitive market and non-discriminating grid access; (4) excess generation capacity developed by a large number of competing generators; (5) an equilibrium relationship between short-term spot markets and the long-term financial instruments that marketers use to manage spot-market price volatility; (6) an essentially hands-off government policy that encompasses reduced oversight and privatization. The absence of any one of the first five conditions may result in an oligopoly or monopoly market whose economic performance does not meet the efficiency standards of a competently managed regulated electrical utility. (author)

The French wholesale electricity, natural gas and CO2 markets in 2010-2011

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-10-01

. With the resumption of demand, wholesale prices on the principal European markets were above the low points reached in 2010. The average spot price in the North zone was euro 17.6 /MWh in 2010, corresponding to a rise of 40% compared to 2009. This rise continued in 2011, with the spot price reaching levels close to euro 25 /MWh. This fourth CRE report on performance of the French energy markets incorporates an analysis of the CO 2 markets for the first time. Since the entry into effect of the banking and financial regulation law in October 2010, CRE has been charged with monitoring transactions carried out by suppliers, traders and producers of electricity and natural gas on greenhouse gas emission quotas, and on the term contracts and financial instruments for which they constitute the underlying. This monitoring, which is a transposition of the recommendations of the Prada report, is coordinated with the French financial regulator AMF (Autorite des Marches Financiers), which monitors French spot and futures exchanges in CO 2 . Cooperation between CRE and the AMF was formalised in a memorandum of understanding signed and made public in December 2010. As provided by the banking and financial regulation law, this agreement covers the electricity, gas and CO 2 markets and allows to implement a regulation adapted to both the financialisation of the energy markets and their specificities. Confidence in the European carbon market was affected at the beginning of 2010 by quota thefts recorded in some European countries. The European Commission has since acted to strengthen the security of the registries, one of the key links in the carbon market infrastructure. European carbon prices have varied in a volatile fashion in a context of an excess supply of quotas compared to actual emissions in both 2010 and 2009. The prospect of going to phase III in 2013, when quotas will become paid in large part - completely for the electricity sector - is supporting prices. Recently, prices

Opening the electricity market - the Swiss Confederation's perspectives

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Steinmann, W.

2002-01-01

This article discusses the possibilities offered by the opening of the Swiss electricity market in the European context. The importance of appropriate legislation that would enable Switzerland to actively take part in the shaping of a Europe-wide electricity market is stressed. Measures to be considered such as those in the areas of third-party access, tariffs, security of supply and the promotion of renewable sources of energy are discussed. Questions of public service are addressed and comparisons are made to solutions that have been implemented in other areas such as post, telecommunications and the railway system. The regulations and structures suggested in Swiss proposals for legislation are discussed in detail

The green electricity market model. Proposal for an optional, cost-neutral direct marketing model for supplying electricity customers; Das Gruenstrommarktmodell. Vorschlag fuer ein optionales und kostenneutrales Direktvermarktungsmodell zur Versorgung von Stromkunden

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Heinemann, Ronald [NATURSTROM AG, Berlin (Germany)

2014-07-01

One of the main goals of the Renewable Energy Law (EEG) is the market integration of renewable energy resources. For this purpose it has introduced compulsory direct marketing on the basis of a moving market premium. At the same time the green electricity privilege, a regulation which made it possible for customers to be supplied with electricity from EEG plants, has been abolished without substitution with effect from 1 August 2014. This means that, aside from other direct marketing channels, which will not be economically viable save for in a few exceptional cases, it will no longer be possible in future to sell electricity from EEG plants to electricity customers under the designation ''electricity from renewable energy''. The reason for this is that electricity sold under the market premium model can no longer justifiably be said to originate from renewable energy. As a consequence, almost all green electricity products sold in Germany carry a foreign green electricity certificate.

Generation Companies’ Operative Strategies in the Spot Electricity Market

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Tovar-Hernández J.H.

2012-07-01

Full Text Available In traditional regulation the obligation to meet the consumer demand was assumed, this guaranteed to generation companies the full recovery of their costs. However, in order to achieve greater efficiency, reduce the price of electricity, meet the continuously growing electricity consumption, and equalize prices in different regions, a new structure of the electricity industry has been created, where electric energy is traded through a market. Generation company’s future cash flows depend on day to day market participation, in order to satisfy all of their financial and economic requirements. In this paper, future cash flows required to fulfill with economic and financial commitments by a generation company immerse in this new market structure are studied. For this purpose, future cash flows are considered to be dependent on a single asset: electricity. Several scenarios with different fuel prices are generated in order to estimate the generation company’s future cash flows. The response of the competing generation companies is taken into account at each scenario. The fuel price changes are modelled using a concurrent binary tree.

Electricity Market Optimization of Heat Pump Portfolio

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Biegel, Benjamin; Andersen, Palle; Pedersen, Tom S.

2013-01-01

We consider a portfolio of domestic heat pumps controlled by an aggregator. The aggregator is able to adjust the consumption of the heat pumps without affecting the comfort in the houses and uses this ability to shift the main consumption to hours with low electricity prices. Further......, the aggregator is able to place upward and downward regulating bids in the regulating power market based on the consumption flexibility. A simulation is carried out based on data from a Danish domestic heat pump project, historical spot prices, regulating power prices, and spot price predictions. The simulations...

Market power in electricity markets: Beyond concentration measures

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Borenstein, S.; Bushnell, J.; Knittel, C.R.

1999-01-01

The wave of electricity market restructuring both within the US and abroad has brought the issue of horizontal market power to the forefront of energy policy. Traditionally, estimation and prediction of market power has relied heavily on concentration measures. In this paper, the authors discuss the weaknesses of concentration measures as a viable measure of market power in the electricity industry, and they propose an alternative method based on market simulations that take advantage of existing plant level data. The authors discuss results from previous studies they have performed, and present new results that allow for the detection of threshold demand levels where market power is likely to be a problem. In addition, the authors analyze the impact of that recent divestitures in the California electricity market will have on estimated market power. They close with a discussion of the policy implications of the results

Electric vehicles in imperfect electricity markets: The case of Germany

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schill, Wolf-Peter

2011-01-01

We use a game-theoretic model to analyze the impacts of a hypothetical fleet of plug-in electric vehicles on the imperfectly competitive German electricity market. Electric vehicles bring both additional demand and additional storage capacity to the market. We determine the effects on prices, welfare, and electricity generation for various cases with different players in charge of vehicle operations. Vehicle loading increases generator profits, but decreases consumer surplus in the power market. If excess vehicle batteries can be used for storage, welfare results are reversed: generating firms suffer from the price-smoothing effect of additional storage, whereas power consumers benefit despite increasing overall demand. Strategic players tend to under-utilize the storage capacity of the vehicle fleet, which may have negative welfare implications. In contrast, we find a market power-mitigating effect of electric vehicle recharging on oligopolistic generators. Overall, electric vehicles are unlikely to be a relevant source of market power in Germany in the foreseeable future. - Highlights: → We study the effect of electric vehicles on an imperfectly competitive electricity market. → We apply a game-theoretic model to the German market. → There is a market power-mitigating effect of vehicle loading on oligopolistic generating firms. → Consumers benefit from electric vehicles if excess battery capacity can be used for grid storage. → Electric vehicles are unlikely to be a source of market power in Germany in the near future.

Wind power bidding in electricity markets with high wind penetration

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vilim, Michael; Botterud, Audun

2014-01-01

Highlights: • We analyze the pricing systems and wind power trading in electricity markets. • We propose a model that captures the relation between market prices and wind power. • A probabilistic bidding model can increase profits for wind power producers. • Profit maximizing bidding strategies carry risks for power system operators. • We conclude that modifications of current market designs may be needed. - Abstract: Objective: The optimal day-ahead bidding strategy is studied for a wind power producer operating in an electricity market with high wind penetration. Methods: A generalized electricity market is studied with minimal assumptions about the structure of the production, bidding, or consumption of electricity. Two electricity imbalance pricing schemes are investigated, the one price and the two price scheme. A stochastic market model is created to capture the price effects of wind power production and consumption. A bidding algorithm called SCOPES (Supply Curve One Price Estimation Strategy) is developed for the one price system. A bidding algorithm called MIMICS (Multivariate Interdependence Minimizing Imbalance Cost Strategy) is developed for the two price system. Results: Both bidding strategies are shown to have advantages over the assumed “default” bidding strategy, the point forecast. Conclusion: The success of these strategies even in the case of high deviation penalties in a one price system and the implicit deviation penalties of the two price system has substantial implications for power producers and system operators in electricity markets with a high level of wind penetration. Practice implications: From an electricity market design perspective, the results indicate that further penalties or regulations may be needed to reduce system imbalance

The liberalisation of the continental European electricity market : lessons learned

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Haas, R.; Auer, H.; Keseric, N.; Glachant, J.M.; Perez, Y.

2006-01-01

Before 1990, nearly all electricity supply companies in continental Europe (CE) were vertically integrated in a franchise market, either state-owned or under price-regulated mixed private-public ownership. In 1996, the European Commission (EC) issued a directive for a common electricity market, which launched the liberalisation of the electricity market in continental Europe (CE). The ultimate objective was to lower electricity prices throughout Europe by promoting competition in generation and supply through price deregulation and privatization. The intention of the EC was to create one common European electricity market. This paper analyzed the evolution of this market along with conditions needed to enhance competition in the long term. It also presented background information with major data on electricity supply and demand in the CE markets and outlined EC and national governments' market liberalisation initiatives and the major changes that countries have made. Currently, there are at least 7 distinct sub-markets separated by partly insufficient transmission capacity and differences in access conditions to the grid. In 2004, the total demand in the CE area was 2300 TWh. This paper also summarized generation capacity and load in CE; imports and exports between CE countries; past and current transmission issues; political issues for restructuring; providing non-discriminatory access to the market and to the grid; the new institutional and regulatory environment and the promotion of renewables. The performance of the market was also reviewed with particular reference to market access, mergers, acquisitions, market concentration, and the evolution of both wholesale and retail electricity prices. It was concluded that in order to bring about effective competition in the long run, the following conditions would be required: complete ownership separation of the transmission grid from generation and supply in all countries and sub-markets; adequate capacity margin in

The liberalisation of the continental European electricity market : lessons learned

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Haas, R.; Auer, H.; Keseric, N. [Vienna Univ. of Technology, Vienna (Austria). Energy Economics Group; Glachant, J.M.; Perez, Y. [Paris-Sud Univ., Paris (France). ADIS-Group Reseaux Jean-Monnet

2006-10-01

Before 1990, nearly all electricity supply companies in continental Europe (CE) were vertically integrated in a franchise market, either state-owned or under price-regulated mixed private-public ownership. In 1996, the European Commission (EC) issued a directive for a common electricity market, which launched the liberalisation of the electricity market in continental Europe (CE). The ultimate objective was to lower electricity prices throughout Europe by promoting competition in generation and supply through price deregulation and privatization. The intention of the EC was to create one common European electricity market. This paper analyzed the evolution of this market along with conditions needed to enhance competition in the long term. It also presented background information with major data on electricity supply and demand in the CE markets and outlined EC and national governments' market liberalisation initiatives and the major changes that countries have made. Currently, there are at least 7 distinct sub-markets separated by partly insufficient transmission capacity and differences in access conditions to the grid. In 2004, the total demand in the CE area was 2300 TWh. This paper also summarized generation capacity and load in CE; imports and exports between CE countries; past and current transmission issues; political issues for restructuring; providing non-discriminatory access to the market and to the grid; the new institutional and regulatory environment and the promotion of renewables. The performance of the market was also reviewed with particular reference to market access, mergers, acquisitions, market concentration, and the evolution of both wholesale and retail electricity prices. It was concluded that in order to bring about effective competition in the long run, the following conditions would be required: complete ownership separation of the transmission grid from generation and supply in all countries and sub-markets; adequate capacity

Which electricity market design to encourage the development of demand response?

OpenAIRE

Vincent Rious, Fabien Roques and Yannick Perez

2012-01-01

Demand response is a cornerstone problem in electricity markets under climate change constraint. Most liberalized electricity markets have a poor track record at encouraging the deployment of smart meters and the development of demand response. In Europe, different models are considered for demand response, from a development under a regulated regime to a development under competitive perspectives. In this paper, focusing on demand response and smart metering for mid-size and small consumers,...

Which electricity market design to encourage the development of demand response?

OpenAIRE

Rious , Vincent; Perez , Yannick; Roques , Fabien

2015-01-01

International audience; Demand response is a cornerstone problem in electricity markets under climate change constraints. Most liberalized electricity markets have a poor track record at encouraging the deployment of smart meters and the development of demand response. In Europe, different models are considered for demand response, from a development under a regulated regime to a development under competitive perspectives. In this paper focusing on demand response and smart metering for mid-­...

Offer of secondary reserve with a pool of electric vehicles on the German market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jargstorf, Johannes; Wickert, Manuel

2013-01-01

This paper analyzes the business case of offering secondary downward reserve for frequency control on the German market by a pool of electrical vehicles. Former benchmark studies promised high revenues especially for this case. The benefits could provide an incentive to customers to buy an electric vehicle. The business case is analyzed for the German market as a case study. Specific regulations for this market, real driving patterns and real market data are taken into account when calculating revenues. Secondary reserve is strictly regulated, requiring a very high level of availability. As a result, simulated revenues are lower than assumed. Simulation shows average revenues of less than 5€ per month and vehicle. As a major bottleneck for an offer of secondary reserve, fully charged batteries are identified. Additionally an issue is made of costs for communication and customer compensation. Based on the simulation results, it is argued that the market for secondary reserve should not be accessed with these small units. For electric vehicles, easier accessible markets with lower related costs should be considered instead. -- Highlights: •We analyze a business case of providing reserve power with electric vehicles. •We include legal regulations for providing reserve power in the calculation. •Reserve requirements lead to a significant drop in expected revenues. •Results show that vehicles are not suitable to offer reserve power

Design of a real time market for regulating power. FlexPower WP1 - Report 3

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bang, C.; Fock, F.; Togeby, M.

2011-12-15

The FlexPower project investigates the possibility of using broadcasted dynamic electricity prices as a simple and low cost means to activating a large number of flexible small-scale power units. The aim is to provide regulating power via an aggregated response from the numerous units on a volunteer basis. The power units could for example be electrical heating and cooling units, electrical vehicles, industrial demand and micro generation. Each power unit can have its own local controller and individual business model and objective function. The optimisation of the local controls may require forecasts of the services requested by the customer (such as heat for a house or charging power for an electrical vehicle) - in terms of quantity, timing and flexibility - and forecasts of the electricity prices. Based on international 'real-time' power market experiences, new dynamic FlexPower market mechanisms to perform regulating power are designed and tested via simulations, under laboratory conditions and in the field. A dedicated simulation tool is developed for this purpose. The FlexPower regulation can never be perfect, but is expected to be able to meet some of the present and future growing demand for regulating power. As a starting point, a 5-minute power price signal, based on the actual regulation power prices, is tested. WP1 addresses the following question: 1) How could a system with a one-way price be designed? How can the FlexPower mechanism be integrated into the present electricity market, including the market for regulating power? This report describes the FlexPower concept, and gives one suggestion as to how this new market could work. How this will affect the different stakeholders is discussed, and risks and opportunities in the new market are presented. (LN)

Electricity prices and generator behaviour in gross pool electricity markets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

O'Mahoney, Amy; Denny, Eleanor

2013-01-01

Electricity market liberalisation has become common practice internationally. The justification for this process has been to enhance competition in a market traditionally characterised by statutory monopolies in an attempt to reduce costs to end-users. This paper endeavours to see whether a pool market achieves this goal of increasing competition and reducing electricity prices. Here the electricity market is set up as a sealed bid second price auction. Theory predicts that such markets should result with firms bidding their marginal cost, thereby resulting in an efficient outcome and lower costs to consumers. The Irish electricity system with a gross pool market experiences among the highest electricity prices in Europe. Thus, we analyse the Irish pool system econometrically in order to test if the high electricity prices seen there are due to participants bidding outside of market rules or out of line with theory. Overall we do not find any evidence that the interaction between generator and the pool in the Irish electricity market is not efficient. Thus, the pool element of the market structure does not explain the high electricity prices experienced in Ireland. - Highlights: • We consider whether a gross pool achieves competitive behaviour. • We analyse the Irish pool system econometrically. • Results indicate the Irish pool system appears to work efficiently. • Generators appear to be bidding appropriately

Wholesale electricity, CO2, and gas market functioning. 2012-2013 report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-10-01

The Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE) monitors transactions by participants on the French wholesale electricity and gas markets since 2006 and it monitors CO 2 trading since late 2010 in cooperation with the AMF. This power is granted by Articles L. 131-2 and L. 131-3 of the Energy Code. Therefore, in the context of its monitoring mission, CRE ensures that wholesale energy market prices are consistent with the technical and economic fundamentals of these markets. In particular, CRE strives to verify that no market power is exercised in such a way that a participant abuses its situation to attain abnormal prices, notably with regard to its costs. This mission is now also part of the European Regulation on Energy Market Integrity and Transparency of 25 October 2011 (REMIT). The REMIT organises wholesale energy market monitoring, prohibits market abuse (insider trading and market manipulation), and requires market participants to disclose any inside information they hold. It entrusts market monitoring, at European level, to the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) in cooperation with national regulatory authorities responsible for national investigations and sanctions. The Brottes law of 15 April 2013 expressly entrusted CRE with the mission of ensuring REMIT implementation and CoRDis jurisdiction to sanction any breaches of the regulation. The energy markets are experiencing major change. The emergence of unconventional hydrocarbons in North America has profoundly changed the global balance of gas and oil production. American gas market prices dropped due to abundant supply causing a significant decline in imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from across the Atlantic and a strong incentive to produce electricity in gas-fired plants to the detriment of coal-fired plants. This significant decline in demand for coal in the United States significantly weakened global coal prices. World energy demand is mainly driven by emerging markets, particularly

Essays on microgrids, asymmetric pricing and market power in electricity markets

Science.gov (United States)

Lo Prete, Chiara

This dissertation presents four studies of the electricity industry. The first and second essays use economic-engineering models to assess different aspects of microgrid penetration in regional electricity markets, while the last two studies contain empirical analyses aimed at evaluating the performance of wholesale electricity markets. Chapter 2 develops a framework to quantify economic, environmental, efficiency and reliability impacts of different power production scenarios in a regional system, focusing on the interaction of microgrids with the existing transmission and distribution grid. The setting is the regional network formed by Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands. The study presents simulations of power market outcomes under various policies and levels of microgrid penetration, and evaluates them using a diverse set of metrics. Chapter 3 studies the interaction between a microgrid and a regulated electric utility in a regional electricity market. I consider the interaction among the utility, the microgrid developer and consumers in the framework of cooperative game theory (assuming exchangeable utility), and use regional market models to simulate scenarios in which microgrid introduction may or may not be socially beneficial. Under the assumptions of this chapter, customer participation is essential to the development of socially beneficial microgrids, while the utility has little or no gain from it. Discussed incentives to avoid that utilities block microgrid entry include additional revenue drivers related to microgrid connection, decoupling and performance-based mechanisms targeted at service quality. When prices are below marginal costs of utility provided power, microgrid development may be socially beneficial, but unprofitable for microgrid customers and its developer. By imposing lower charges and higher remuneration for its services, the regulator could ensure that microgrid value is positive, without adversely impacting the utility

Essays on competition in electricity markets

Science.gov (United States)

Bustos Salvagno, Ricardo Javier

The first chapter shows how technology decisions affect entry in commodity markets with oligopolistic competition, like the electricity market. I demonstrate an entry deterrence effect that works through cost uncertainty. Technology's cost uncertainty affects spot market expected profits through forward market trades. Therefore, incentives to engage in forward trading shape firms' decisions on production technologies. I show that high-cost but low-risk technologies are adopted by risk-averse incumbents to deter entry. Strategic technology adoption can end in a equilibrium where high-cost technologies prevail over low-cost but riskier ones. In the case of incumbents who are less risk-averse than entrants, entry deterrence is achieved by choosing riskier technologies. The main results do not depend on who chooses their technology first. Chapter two examines the Chilean experience on auctions for long-term supply contracts in electricity markets from 2006 to 2011. Using a divisible-good auction model, I provide a theoretical framework that explains bidding behavior in terms of expected spot prices and contracting positions. The model is extended to include potential strategic behavior on contracting decisions. Empirical estimations confirm the main determinants of bidding behavior and show heterogeneity in the marginal cost of over-contracting depending on size and incumbency. Chapter three analyzes the lag in capacity expansion in the Chilean electricity market from 2000 to 2004. Regarded as a result of regulatory uncertainty, the role of delays in the construction of a large hydro-power plant has been overlooked by the literature. We argue that those delays postponed projected investment and gave small windows of opportunity that only incumbents could take advantage of. We are able to retrace the history of investments through real-time information from the regulator's reports and a simple model enables us to explain the effect of those delays on suggested and under

Behavioral aspects of regulation: A discussion on switching and demand response in Turkish electricity market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sirin, Selahattin Murat; Gonul, Mustafa Sinan

2016-01-01

Electricity sector has been transformed from state-owned monopolistic utilities to competitive markets with an aim to promote incentives for improving efficiency, reducing costs and increasing service quality to customers. One of the cardinal assumptions of the liberalized and competitive electricity markets is the rational actor, and decision-makers are assumed to make the best decisions that maximize their utility. However, a vast literature on behavioral economics has shown the weakness of economic theory in explaining and predicting individuals’ decision-making behavior. This issue is quite important for competition in electricity markets in which consumers’ preferences have a significant role. Despite its importance, this issue has almost been neglected in Turkey, which has taken major steps in electricity sector restructuring. Therefore, this paper aims to examine switching and demand response behavior in Turkish electricity market by using multiple correspondence and panel data analysis, and findings are discussed in light of the neoclassical and behavioral economics literature. Analyses’ results show that consumers’ switching and demand response behavior is consistent with the neoclassical literature to some extent; however, behavioral factors are also affecting consumers’ decisions. Furthermore, there are systemic problems that hinder effective functioning of the electricity market and restrict competition. - Highlights: • Behavioral economics can provide insights for consumer’ decisions. • Switching and demand response behavior is examined by econometric methods. • Results is consistent with the neoclassical literature to some extent • However, behavioral factors are also affecting consumers’ decisions.

Integrating intermittent energy sources in liberalized electricity markets: from technical costs to economic penalties as a result of market rules

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Menanteau, Ph.; Finon, D.; Lamy, M.L.

2003-06-01

With the aim of preventing climatic change and ensuring the security of energy supplies, the recent European Directive on renewable energy production sources is aimed at bringing about a very substantial increase in electricity production from renewable sources in Europe by the 2010 horizon. Generally speaking, production of electricity from renewable sources will be assured by biomass and wind, and to a lesser extent by micro hydro, technologies whose characteristics are very different from the point of view of their integration into the electricity system. Their inclusion in the electricity systems will cause problems because of the intermittent nature of the production, a factor that does not enter into the paradigms of producers, system operators or regulators. The problems raised by the integration of intermittent production are technical in nature (risk of non-availability in peak periods, the need for additional reserves) and will incur adjustment costs, but the way in which the electricity markets function will impose economic penalties generally more substantial than the added technical costs. In this paper are examined in succession: (i) the additional costs raised by intermittence; (ii) the economic penalties imposed by the operating rules of de-regulated electricity markets with electricity production from renewable sources included, with particular reference to the case of the British and Nordic markets; and (iii) an analysis of the options that could limit the gap between the additional cost of intermittent production for the system and the adjustment surcharges imposed by the electricity markets, with the aim of reducing the tension between the deregulation of the electricity market and promoting the development of renewable energy sources. (A.L.B.)

Impact of Market Regulations on the Development of Wind Power - An International Comparison

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ackermann, Thomas; Soeder, Lennart

2000-01-01

This paper presents and briefly evaluates the most important existing market regulations and market schemes regarding its influence on the development of wind power. The evaluation of the existing market regulations focuses on the incentives provided by the various instruments to reduce production costs. The instruments and schemes are: Feed-in Tariffs, Net Metering, Bidding Process, Fixed Quotas, Green Certificate Trading, Green Power Exchange, Green Pricing. In addition, the impact of market regulations for international electricity markets with a power exchange are investigated. The analysis showed that new wind power generation can faces significant market barriers. (author)

Is the price squeeze doctrine still viable in fully-regulated energy markets?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Spiwak, L.J.

1993-01-01

Simply stated, a price squeeze occurs when a firm with monopoly power on the primary, or wholesale, level engages in a prolonged price increase that drives competitors out of the secondary, or retail level, and thereby extends its monopoly power to the secondary market. A price squeeze will not be found, however, for any short-term exercise in market power. Rather, because anticompetitive effects of a price squeeze are indirect, the price squeeze must last long enough and be severe enough to produce effects on actual or potential competition in the secondary market. In regulated electric industries, a price squeeze claim usually arises from the complex relationship between the supplier, the wholesale customer, the retail customer, and the federal and state regulators. The supplier sells electric power to both wholesale and retail customers. Wholesale transactions are regulated by federal regulators, and retail transactions are regulated at the state level. The wholesale customers in turn sell power to their retail customers. Over the last several years, there have been substantial developments in the application of the price squeeze doctrine to fully-regulated electric utilities. This article will examine the current developments in this area, and attempt to highlight the burdens potential litigants, both plaintiffs and defendants, must overcome to succeed

Update on the supplier certification and the status of the retail electric market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dingwall, B.A.

1999-01-01

The issue of rulemaking and code of conduct for energy marketers in Ontario is discussed. As the Ontario government is deregulating the electric power industry, it seems as though it is creating more rules, regulations and codes of conduct than in the previous regulated market. This paper presents an overview of the existing Consumer Protection Legislation, including the Consumer Protection Act, the Business Practices Act, and the Competition Act. Some of the major issues facing the electric retail market are reviewed. These are: (1) alternate contracting methods, (2) rebundling other products and services, (3) green power disclosure, (4) standard supply, (5) unbundling of competitive functions from monopoly providers, (6) exemptions for different utilities, and (7) disconnection of service. Text of the Ontario Energy Board's papers entitled 'Code of conduct for gas marketers', and the 'Code of conduct for energy marketers' are attached

Strategies for Charging Electric Vehicles in the Electricity Market

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Nina Juul

2015-06-01

Full Text Available This paper analyses different charging strategies for a fleet of electric vehicles. Along with increasing the realism of the strategies, the opportunity for acting on the regulating market is also included. We test the value of a vehicle owner that can choose when and how to charge; by presenting a model of four alternative charging strategies. We think of them as increasing in sophistication from dumb via delayed to deterministic and stochastic model-based charging. We show that 29% of the total savings from ‘dumb’ are due to delayed charging and that substantial additional gains come charging optimally in response to predicted spot prices, and – in some settings – additional gains from using the up and down regulating prices. Particularly, strategies are chosen from uncontrolled charging through deterministic optimization, to modelling the charging and bidding problem with stochastic programming. We show that all vehicle owners will benefit from acting more intelligently on the energy market. Furthermore, the high value of the stochastic solution shows that, in case the regulating price differs from the expected, the solution to the deterministic problem becomes infeasible.

Interconnections and market integration in the Irish Single Electricity Market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nepal, Rabindra; Jamasb, Tooraj

2012-01-01

Interconnections can be an effective way to increase competition and improve market integration in concentrated wholesale electricity markets with limited number of participants. This paper examines the potential for interconnections and increasing market integration in the Irish Single Electricity Market (SEM). We use a time-varying Kalman filter technique to assess the degree of market integration between SEM and other large, mature and interconnected wholesale electricity markets in Europe including Great Britain (GB). The results indicate no market integration between SEM and other European markets except for Elspot and GB. We show that the current state of market integration between SEM and GB is just 17% indicating potential to improve market integration via increased interconnector capacity. The results indicate that liquidity of wholesale markets might be a crucial factor in the market integration process while our results remain inconclusive in determining whether increased trade of renewables can improve market integration. - Highlights: ► We assess the degree of market integration between SEM and other EU electricity markets. ► Our results indicate no market integration between SEM and other European markets except for Elspot and GB. ► We show that the current state of market integration between SEM and GB is just 17%.

Evaluation of CO2 free electricity trading market in Japan by multi-agent simulations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sichao, Kan; Yamamoto, Hiromi; Yamaji, Kenji

2010-01-01

As of November 2008, a new market, the CO 2 free electricity market, started pilot trading within the Japan Electric Power Exchange (JEPX). The electricity in this market comes from renewable resources, nuclear or fossil thermal power with CDM credits. The demanders of the CO 2 free electricity are supposed to be the power companies with high emission rates. In this paper, we analyzed the effects of the new market by using a multi-agent based model to simulate the markets. From our simulation results, we found that the demander, under strict CO 2 emission regulations, tends to buy more electricity from the new CO 2 free market even though the price of this market is higher than that of the normal power exchange market. Suppliers with hydro or nuclear power plants only sell their electricity to the CO 2 free market, and suppliers with coal power plants also enter this market (with CDM credits). The media and peak demands in the normal market are met mainly by electricity from LNG power plants. We also compared the results from the multi-agent approach with those from the least-cost planning approach and found that the results of the two methods were similar. (author)

Electricity and gas market observatory. 1. quarter 2007

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

Since July 1, 2004, all electricity and gas consumers can be eligible according to their consumption site, as long as all or part of the electricity or gas consumed is designed for non-residential use. The purpose of the observatory is to provide the general public with indicators for monitoring market deregulation. It both covers the wholesale and retail electricity and gas markets in Metropolitan France. This observatory is updated every three months and data are available on CRE web-site (www.cre.fr). It presents: The electricity market; The retail electricity market: Eligible customer segments and their respective weights, Status at April 1, 2007, Dynamic analysis: 1. Quarter 2007; The wholesale electricity market: Traded volumes on the French wholesale electricity market and comparison with European markets, Prices on the French wholesale electricity market and European comparison, Import and export volumes, Concentration of the French electricity market, Striking facts of the 1. 2007 quarter; The gas market; The retail gas market: The eligible customer segments and their respective weights, Status at April 1. 2007; The wholesale gas market: Gas pricing and gas markets in Europe,The wholesale market in France. Some glossaries are attached to the document: Electricity and gas market observatories combined glossary; Specific electricity market observatory glossary; Specific gas market observatory glossary

Electricity and gas market observatory. 4. quarter 2006

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

Since July 1, 2004, all electricity and gas consumers can be eligible according to their consumption site, as long as all or part of the electricity or gas consumed is designed for non-residential use. The purpose of the observatory is to provide the general public with indicators for monitoring market deregulation. It both covers the wholesale and retail electricity and gas markets in Metropolitan France. This observatory is updated every three months and data are available on CRE web-site (www.cre.fr). It presents: The electricity market; The retail electricity market: Eligible customer segments and their respective weights, Status at January 1, 2007, Dynamic analysis: 4. Quarter 2007; The wholesale electricity market: Traded volumes on the French wholesale electricity market and comparison with European markets, Prices on the French wholesale electricity market and European comparison, Import and export volumes, Concentration of the French electricity market, Striking facts of the 4. 2006 quarter; The gas market; The retail gas market: The eligible customer segments and their respective weights, Status at January 1. 2007; The wholesale gas market: Gas pricing and gas markets in Europe,The wholesale market in France. Some glossaries are attached to the document: Electricity and gas market observatories combined glossary; Specific electricity market observatory glossary; Specific gas market observatory glossary

Electricity and gas market observatory. 1. quarter 2007

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2007-07-01

Since July 1, 2004, all electricity and gas consumers can be eligible according to their consumption site, as long as all or part of the electricity or gas consumed is designed for non-residential use. The purpose of the observatory is to provide the general public with indicators for monitoring market deregulation. It both covers the wholesale and retail electricity and gas markets in Metropolitan France. This observatory is updated every three months and data are available on CRE web-site (www.cre.fr). It presents: The electricity market; The retail electricity market: Eligible customer segments and their respective weights, Status at April 1, 2007, Dynamic analysis: 1. Quarter 2007; The wholesale electricity market: Traded volumes on the French wholesale electricity market and comparison with European markets, Prices on the French wholesale electricity market and European comparison, Import and export volumes, Concentration of the French electricity market, Striking facts of the 1. 2007 quarter; The gas market; The retail gas market: The eligible customer segments and their respective weights, Status at April 1. 2007; The wholesale gas market: Gas pricing and gas markets in Europe,The wholesale market in France. Some glossaries are attached to the document: Electricity and gas market observatories combined glossary; Specific electricity market observatory glossary; Specific gas market observatory glossary.

Electricity and gas market observatory. 4. quarter 2006

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2007-07-01

Since July 1, 2004, all electricity and gas consumers can be eligible according to their consumption site, as long as all or part of the electricity or gas consumed is designed for non-residential use. The purpose of the observatory is to provide the general public with indicators for monitoring market deregulation. It both covers the wholesale and retail electricity and gas markets in Metropolitan France. This observatory is updated every three months and data are available on CRE web-site (www.cre.fr). It presents: The electricity market; The retail electricity market: Eligible customer segments and their respective weights, Status at January 1, 2007, Dynamic analysis: 4. Quarter 2007; The wholesale electricity market: Traded volumes on the French wholesale electricity market and comparison with European markets, Prices on the French wholesale electricity market and European comparison, Import and export volumes, Concentration of the French electricity market, Striking facts of the 4. 2006 quarter; The gas market; The retail gas market: The eligible customer segments and their respective weights, Status at January 1. 2007; The wholesale gas market: Gas pricing and gas markets in Europe,The wholesale market in France. Some glossaries are attached to the document: Electricity and gas market observatories combined glossary; Specific electricity market observatory glossary; Specific gas market observatory glossary.

Simulation of producers behaviour in the electricity market by evolutionary games

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Menniti, Daniele; Pinnarelli, Anna; Sorrentino, Nicola [Department of Electronic, Computer and System Science, University of Calabria (Italy)

2008-03-15

Simulation of the electricity market participant's behaviour is important for producers and consumers to determine their bidding strategies and for regulating the market rules. In literature, for this aim a lot of papers suggest to use the well-known theory of non-cooperative games and the concept of Nash equilibrium. Unfortunately they cannot be applied in an easy way when a multi-players game has to be considered to simulate the operation of the electricity market. In this paper, the authors suggest to use the new theory of evolutionary games and the concept of near Nash equilibrium to simulate the electricity market in the presence of more than two producers. In particular, an opportune genetic algorithm has been developed; from the results reported in the paper, it is clear that this algorithm can be usefully utilised. (author)

Simulation of producers behaviour in the electricity market by evolutionary games

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Menniti, Daniele; Pinnarelli, Anna; Sorrentino, Nicola

2008-01-01

Simulation of the electricity market participant's behaviour is important for producers and consumers to determine their bidding strategies and for regulating the market rules. In literature, for this aim a lot of papers suggest to use the well-known theory of non-cooperative games and the concept of Nash equilibrium. Unfortunately they cannot be applied in an easy way when a multi-players game has to be considered to simulate the operation of the electricity market. In this paper, the authors suggest to use the new theory of evolutionary games and the concept of near Nash equilibrium to simulate the electricity market in the presence of more than two producers. In particular, an opportune genetic algorithm has been developed; from the results reported in the paper, it is clear that this algorithm can be usefully utilised. (author)

Efficiency and regulation of the Slovenian electricity distribution companies

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Filippini, Massimo; Hrovatin, Nevenka; Zoric, Jelena

2004-01-01

The Slovenian Energy Law, adopted in 1999, has opened the internal market to competition up to 64% of the final consumption. The opening of the internal market to foreign competition is envisaged for 2003. With regard to the methodology of price regulation, the Energy Law introduces the 'price-cap' regulation, which aims to give firms incentive for cost reduction. To provide information for effective price regulation, we estimated a cost frontier function on a sample of Slovenian electricity distribution utilities over the 1991-2000 period. The estimated efficient frontier could be used by Slovenian regulatory agency as a benchmark to regulate network access prices. Our results show that Slovenian distribution companies are cost inefficient. We have also proved the presence of increasing returns to scale with most utilities not achieving the minimum efficient scale. Thus, the Slovenian regulatory authority should consider how to induce mergers of small electricity distribution utilities into larger units

Market research for electric utilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shippee, G.

1999-01-01

Marketing research is increasing in importance as utilities become more marketing oriented. Marketing research managers need to maintain autonomy from the marketing director or ad agency and make sure their work is relevant to the utility's operation. This article will outline a model marketing research program for an electric utility. While a utility may not conduct each and every type of research described, the programs presented offer a smorgasbord of activities which successful electric utility marketers often use or have access to

Estimating WACC for Regulated Industries on Developing Financial Markets and in Times of Market Uncertainty

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Igor Stubelj

2014-03-01

Full Text Available The paper deals with the estimation of weighted average cost of capital (WACC for regulated industries in developing financial markets from the perspective of the current financial-economic crisis. In current financial market situation some evident changes have occurred: risk-free rates in solid and developed financial markets (e. g. USA, Germany have fallen, but due to increased market volatility, the risk premiums have increased. The latter is especially evident in transition economies where the amplitude of market volatility is extremely high. In such circumstances, there is a question of how to calculate WACC properly. WACC is an important measure in financial management decisions and in our case, business regulation. We argue in the paper that the most accurate method for calculating WACC is the estimation of the long-term WACC, which takes into consideration a long-term stable yield of capital and not the current market conditions. Following this, we propose some solutions that could be used for calculating WACC for regulated industries on the developing financial markets in times of market uncertainty. As an example, we present an estimation of the capital cost for a selected Slovenian company, which operates in the regulated industry of electric distribution.

Spanish and Portuguese electric market in the context of UE

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Quinto, J. de; Villafruela, L.

2007-01-01

In accordance to the Unique Act and other EU legislation related to the achievement of a single market for goods and services, the EU Commission has promoted a whole internal electricity and gas market. Due to the specific difficulties to reach this objective in the electricity and gas case, the EU strategy changed into a progressive step process, in which the final objective should be reached by the progressive integration of different neighbour national markets. Anyway, this is not easy because there are differences related to national interests and because the harmonization of different regulations is so complex. The creation of a supranational electricity market in the Iberian mainland (MIBEL) can be considered as a piece of this European strategy and a way to improve competition both in Spain and Portugal at least by an increase of the market geographical scale.MIBEL process started in November 2001, but finally is working since July 2006. But the process is not finish yet: it is still necessary to develop some relevant regulatory aspects. (Author) 15 refs

Cross-border effects of capacity mechanisms in electricity markets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Elberg, Christina

2014-01-01

To ensure security of supply in liberalized electricity markets, different types of capacity mechanisms are currently being debated or have recently been implemented in many European countries. The purpose of this study is to analyze the cross-border effects resulting from different choices on capacity mechanisms in neighboring countries. We consider a model with two connected countries that differ in the regulator's choice on capacity mechanism, namely strategic reserves or capacity payments. In both countries, competitive fi rms invest in generation capacity before selling electricity on the spot market. We characterize market equilibria and find the following main result: While consumers' costs may be the same under both capacity mechanisms in non-connected countries, we show that the different capacity mechanisms in interconnected countries induce redistribution effects. More precisely, we nd that consumers' costs are higher in countries in which reserve capacities are procured than in countries in which capacity payments are used to ensure the targeted reliable level of electricity.

Cross-border effects of capacity mechanisms in electricity markets

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Elberg, Christina

2014-07-15

To ensure security of supply in liberalized electricity markets, different types of capacity mechanisms are currently being debated or have recently been implemented in many European countries. The purpose of this study is to analyze the cross-border effects resulting from different choices on capacity mechanisms in neighboring countries. We consider a model with two connected countries that differ in the regulator's choice on capacity mechanism, namely strategic reserves or capacity payments. In both countries, competitive fi rms invest in generation capacity before selling electricity on the spot market. We characterize market equilibria and find the following main result: While consumers' costs may be the same under both capacity mechanisms in non-connected countries, we show that the different capacity mechanisms in interconnected countries induce redistribution effects. More precisely, we nd that consumers' costs are higher in countries in which reserve capacities are procured than in countries in which capacity payments are used to ensure the targeted reliable level of electricity.

The existing Nordic regulating power market. FlexPower WP1 - Report 1

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bang, C.; Fock, F.; Togeby, M.

2011-06-15

The FlexPower project investigates the possibility of using broadcasted dynamic electricity prices as a simple and low cost means to activating a large number of flexible small-scale power units. The aim is to provide regulating power via an aggregated response from the numerous units on a volunteer basis. The report provides a brief historical and contextual background of the Nordic electricity market. Thereafter it goes into greater detail describing the Nordic regulating power market, both how it functions in practice, and examining some of the historical trends from a Danish perspective. (LN)

Policy instruments for regulating the development of wind power in a liberated electricity market

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Morthorst, P E [Risoe National Lab., Roskilde (Denmark)

1999-03-01

Wind power is facing the dual challenge of entering a liberated electricity market and at the same time being one of the main contributors to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. The paper analyses the importance of the existing standard payment schemes in the development of wind power, and how this might be affected by the introduction of a liberated electricity market. The existing Danish standard payment scheme has strongly encouraged investments in wind turbines. It has been and still is very effective in promoting a high wind power capacity development, but at a high economic cost to the Danish Government. Different models of conditions for wind power at an electricity exchange do exist, but all seem to introduce a higher risk to the individual wind turbine owner than seen with the present payment scheme. In short it might be stated that going from the existing standard payment system to a market based system, the political uncertainty is converted to a market risk for the individual wind turbine owner. (au)

Policy instruments for regulating the development of wind power in a liberated electricity market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Morthorst, P.E.

1999-01-01

Wind power is facing the dual challenge of entering a liberated electricity market and at the same time being one of the main contributors to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. The paper analyses the importance of the existing standard payment schemes in the development of wind power, and how this might be affected by the introduction of a liberated electricity market. The existing Danish standard payment scheme has strongly encouraged investments in wind turbines. It has been and still is very effective in promoting a high wind power capacity development, but at a high economic cost to the Danish Government. Different models of conditions for wind power at an electricity exchange do exist, but all seem to introduce a higher risk to the individual wind turbine owner than seen with the present payment scheme. In short it might be stated that going from the existing standard payment system to a market based system, the political uncertainty is converted to a market risk for the individual wind turbine owner. (au)

Policy instruments for regulating the development of wind power in a liberated electricity market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Morthorst, P.E.

1999-01-01

Wind power is facing the dual challenge of entering a liberated electricity market and at the same time being one of the main contributors to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. The paper analyses the importance of the existing standard payment schemes in the development of wind power, and how this might be affected by the introduction of a liberated electricity market. The existing Danish standard payment scheme has strongly encouraged investments in wind turbines. It has been and still is very effective in promoting a high wind power capacity development, but at a high economic cost to the Danish Government. Different models of conditions for wind power at an electricity exchange do exist, but all seem to introduce a higher risk to the individual wind turbine owner than seen with the present payment scheme. In short it might be stated that going from the existing standard payment system to a market based system, the political uncertainty is converted to a market risk for the individual wind turbine owner. (author)

Value of flexible consumption in the electricity markets

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Biegel, Benjamin; Hansen, Lars Henrik; Stoustrup, Jakob

2014-01-01

A transition from an oil and coal based energy system to a systems based on renewable and sustainable energy sources has begun in many countries throughout the developed world. As a pioneer, Denmark currently has a wind energy penetration of 30% in the electricity sector and an end goal of 100......% renewables in all energy sectors by 2050. The main elements in this transition are an increase in the wind energy production and electrification of main energy sectors such as transport and heating. Activation of flexible consumption in the electricity markets is believed to be one of the means to compensate...... for the growth of fluctuating renewables and the decrease of conventional power plants providing system-stabilizing services. In this work, we examine the requirements for flexible consumption to be active in the spot market and the regulating power market in the Nordic system and estimate the costs of entering...

Consumer benefits and solutions in open electricity markets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kapetanovic, T.

2003-01-01

Liberalization of electricity markets aims at fostering competitiveness of economy, reducing costs and improving quality. These goals introduce new opportunities and require adequate solutions for the position of consumers. Transparent pricing and tariffs, freedom to choose a supplier, a possibility to decide on preferred primary source, e.g. renewables, are some of the benefits. Security, reliability and quality of supply are a challenge in the unbundled environment, to be solved accordingly as well as the non-discrimination, access and connection to the grid. The paper presents consumer-related experiences in liberalized electricity markets, based on the developments in Austria since the full market opening on October 1, 2001. The issues covered include grid access, consumer switching, price and tariff developments. The concept of incentive and quality-regulation is mentioned briefly, concluding with security of supply issues and impacts of the European Union legislation.(author)

Market research for electric utilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Shippee, G.

1999-12-01

Marketing research is increasing in importance as utilities become more marketing oriented. Marketing research managers need to maintain autonomy from the marketing director or ad agency and make sure their work is relevant to the utility's operation. This article will outline a model marketing research program for an electric utility. While a utility may not conduct each and every type of research described, the programs presented offer a smorgasbord of activities which successful electric utility marketers often use or have access to.

Analyzing interaction of electricity markets and environmental policies using equilibrium models

Science.gov (United States)

Chen, Yihsu

Around the world, the electric sector is evolving from a system of regulated vertically-integrated monopolies to a complex system of competing generation companies, unregulated traders, and regulated transmission and distribution. One emerging challenge faced by environmental policymakers and electricity industry is the interaction between electricity markets and environmental policies. The objective of this dissertation is to examine these interactions using large-scale computational models of electricity markets based on noncooperative game theory. In particular, this dissertation is comprised of four essays. The first essay studies the interaction of the United States Environmental Protection Agency NOx Budget Program and the mid-Atlantic electricity market. This research quantifies emissions, economic inefficiencies, price distortions, and overall social welfare under various market assumptions using engineering-economic models. The models calculate equilibria for imperfectly competitive markets---Cournot oligopoly---considering the actual landscape of power plants and transmission lines, and including the possibility of market power in the NOx allowances market. The second essay extends the results from first essay and models imperfectly competitive markets using a Stackelberg or leader-follower formulation. A leader in the power and NO x markets is assumed to have perfect foresight of its rivals' responses. The rivals' best response functions are explicitly embedded in the leader's constraints. The solutions quantify the extent to which a leader in the markets can extract economic rents on the expense of its followers. The third essay investigates the effect of implementing the European Union (EU) CO2 Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) on wholesale power prices in the Western European electricity market. This research uses theoretical and computational modeling approaches to quantify the degree to which CO2 costs were passed on to power prices, and quantifies the

The Greek Electricity Market Reforms: Political and Regulatory Considerations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Danias, Nikolaos; Kim Swales, John; McGregor, Peter

2013-01-01

The paper tracks the evolution of the Greek electricity market since the beginning of the liberalization process. Its progress is benchmarked against the criteria suggested by Littlechild (2006b). The Littlechild framework highlights key remaining deficiencies in the stances and policies adopted which need to be resolved in order for liberalization to proceed successfully. The focus is on the agendas of the Greek government, other domestic political forces and the European Union. A central requirement is the clear commitment to liberalization by the Greek government. In particular the government needs to give up political control over the previous vertically integrated, state-controlled electricity firm, Public Power Company (PPC), and allow more decision making powers and genuine independence to the market regulator. Liberalization is rendered more difficult by the present financial and economic crisis in Greece. - Highlights: • Greek electricity market liberalization is benchmarked against the Littlechild standard electricity market reform model. • Although the majority of the model requirements are met, liberalization in Greece is only partially successful. • Some elements of liberalization are qualitatively more significant than others. • More fundamental political economy issues need to be addressed in order for the liberalization to progress. • Financial crisis in Greece adds extra challenges

Outlook for electricity markets 2005-2006 : an energy market assessment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-06-01

The National Energy Board monitors the supply of electricity as well as its demand in both domestic and export markets. This document was produced in response to a survey with power generation, transmission and distribution companies, marketers, end-users, environmental groups and government agencies who demonstrated the need for more short-and medium-term energy market assessments to supplement the Board's longer term energy analysis. It on the short-term (2005-2006) issues that can have a long-term effect on the electricity sector. The document presents an analysis of Canadian electricity markets with particular focus on the main drivers affecting current trends in generation, demand, prices, infrastructure additions, and inter-regional and international trade. Current restructuring activities in Canada's electricity industry were also described along with the close relationship between the electricity sectors in Canada and the United States which stems from the integrated nature of the North American power grid. A regional market assessment and a summary was provided for each of Canada's provinces and territories with reference to market structure and current market developments. It was revealed that Canada's electricity markets have developed along provincial or regional boundaries. Utilities have tried to provide adequate and reliable electricity supply, environmental sustainability and acceptable electricity prices. It was concluded that supply is adequate in all regions in the short-term, but tight supply conditions could emerge as early as 2007. Alternative and renewable resource and demand management are becoming more important in addressing air quality issues and supply adequacy. Since uncertainty may delay investment and development of new infrastructure, utilities may be forced to increase electricity prices. It was suggested that interprovincial energy transfers should be further explored. Five recommendations were presented to address the key

Electricity and gas market observatory. 2. Quarter 2008

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-01-01

The purpose of the observatory is to provide the general public with indicators for monitoring market deregulation. It both covers the wholesale and retail electricity and gas markets in Metropolitan France. This observatory is updated every three months and data are available on CRE web site (www.cre.fr). Since the 1 of July 2007, all customers can choose their gas and electricity suppliers. Content: A - The electricity market: The retail electricity market (Introduction, Customer segments and their respective weight, Status at June 30, 2008, Dynamic analysis: 2. Quarter 2008); The wholesale electricity market (Introduction, Wholesale market activity in France, Prices on the French wholesale market and European comparison, Import and export volumes, Concentration of the French electricity market); B - The gas market: The retail gas market (Introduction, Customer segments and their respective weight, Status on June 30, 2008, Dynamic analysis: 2. Quarter 2008); The wholesale gas market (Gas pricing and gas markets in Europe, The wholesale market in France); C - Appendices: Electricity and gas market observatories combined glossary, Specific electricity market observatory glossary, Specific gas market observatory glossary

Electricity and natural gas retail markets - Observatory 3. Quarter 2017 (Figures as at 30/09/2017)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2017-01-01

The retail markets Observatory aims to provide general monitoring indicators of electricity and natural gas retail markets in France. This Observatory is updated on a Quarterly basis and published on CRE's web site (www.cre.fr). The first part of the report summarises the highlights of the electricity market (situation, market shares, suppliers, sales, dynamic analysis, regulated prices). The natural gas market is detailed in the second part

Electricity and natural gas retail markets - Observatory 4. Quarter 2016 (Figures as at 31/12/2016)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2016-01-01

The retail markets Observatory aims to provide general monitoring indicators of electricity and natural gas retail markets in France. This Observatory is updated on a Quarterly basis and published on CRE's web site (www.cre.fr). The first part of the report summarises the highlights of the electricity market (situation, market shares, suppliers, sales, dynamic analysis, regulated prices). The natural gas market is detailed in the second part

Electricity and natural gas retail markets - Observatory 3. Quarter 2016 (Figures as at 30/09/2016)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2016-01-01

The retail markets Observatory aims to provide general monitoring indicators of electricity and natural gas retail markets in France. This Observatory is updated on a Quarterly basis and published on CRE's web site (www.cre.fr). The first part of the report summarises the highlights of the electricity market (situation, market shares, suppliers, sales, dynamic analysis, regulated prices). The natural gas market is detailed in the second part

Electricity and natural gas retail markets - Observatory 2. Quarter 2016 (Figures as at 30/06/2016)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2016-01-01

The retail markets Observatory aims to provide general monitoring indicators of electricity and natural gas retail markets in France. This Observatory is updated on a Quarterly basis and published on CRE's web site (www.cre.fr). The first part of the report summarises the highlights of the electricity market (situation, market shares, suppliers, sales, dynamic analysis, regulated prices). The natural gas market is detailed in the second part

Electricity and natural gas retail markets - Observatory 2. Quarter 2017 (Figures as at 30/06/2017)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2017-01-01

The retail markets Observatory aims to provide general monitoring indicators of electricity and natural gas retail markets in France. This Observatory is updated on a Quarterly basis and published on CRE's web site (www.cre.fr). The first part of the report summarises the highlights of the electricity market (situation, market shares, suppliers, sales, dynamic analysis, regulated prices). The natural gas market is detailed in the second part

Electricity and natural gas retail markets - Observatory 1. Quarter 2017 (Figures as at 31/03/2017)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2017-01-01

The retail markets Observatory aims to provide general monitoring indicators of electricity and natural gas retail markets in France. This Observatory is updated on a Quarterly basis and published on CRE's web site (www.cre.fr). The first part of the report summarises the highlights of the electricity market (situation, market shares, suppliers, sales, dynamic analysis, regulated prices). The natural gas market is detailed in the second part

Electricity and natural gas retail markets - Observatory 4. Quarter 2017 (Figures as at 31/12/2017)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2017-01-01

The retail markets Observatory aims to provide general monitoring indicators of electricity and natural gas retail markets in France. This Observatory is updated on a Quarterly basis and published on CRE's web site (www.cre.fr). The first part of the report summarises the highlights of the electricity market (situation, market shares, suppliers, sales, dynamic analysis, regulated prices). The natural gas market is detailed in the second part

Electricity and gas market observatory. 1. Quarter 2007

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

Since July 1, 2004, all electricity and gas consumers can be eligible according to their consumption site, as long as all or part of the electricity or gas consumed is designed for non-residential use. The purpose of the observatory is to provide the general public with indicators for monitoring market deregulation. It both covers the wholesale and retail electricity and gas markets in Metropolitan France. This observatory is updated every three months and data are available on CRE web site (www.cre.fr). It completes the information already published by CRE: - practical information for eligible customers: consumer guide, list of suppliers, - communications regarding markets running; CRE's annual activity report. Content: A - The electricity market: The retail electricity market (Introduction, Eligible customer segments and their respective weights, Status at April 1, 2007, Dynamic analysis: 1. Quarter 2007); The wholesale electricity market (Introduction, Traded volumes on the French wholesale electricity market and comparison with European markets, Prices on the French wholesale electricity market and European comparison, Import and export volumes, Concentration of the French electricity market, Striking facts of the 1. 2007 quarter); B - The gas market: The retail gas market (Introduction, The eligible customer segments and their respective weights, Status at April 1, 2007); The wholesale gas market (Gas pricing and gas markets in Europe, The wholesale market in France); C - Appendices: Electricity and gas market observatories combined glossary, Specific electricity market observatory glossary, Specific gas market observatory glossary

Electricity and gas market observatory. 4. Quarter 2006

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2006-01-01

Since July 1, 2004, all electricity and gas consumers can be eligible according to their consumption site, as long as all or part of the electricity or gas consumed is designed for non-residential use. The purpose of the observatory is to provide the general public with indicators for monitoring market deregulation. It both covers the wholesale and retail electricity and gas markets in Metropolitan France. This observatory is updated every three months and data are available on CRE web site (www.cre.fr). It completes the information already published by CRE: - practical information for eligible customers: consumer guide, list of suppliers, - communications regarding markets running; CRE's annual activity report. Content: A - The electricity market: The retail electricity market (Introduction, Eligible customer segments and their respective weights, Status at January 1, 2007, Dynamic analysis: 4. Quarter 2006); The wholesale electricity market (Introduction, Traded volumes on the French wholesale electricity market and comparison with European markets, Prices on the French wholesale electricity market and European comparison, Import and export volumes, Concentration of the French electricity market, Striking facts of the 4. 2006 quarter); B - The gas market: The retail gas market (Introduction, The eligible customer segments and their respective weights, Status at January 1, 2007); The wholesale gas market (Gas pricing and gas markets in Europe, The wholesale market in France); C - Appendices: Electricity and gas market observatories combined glossary, Specific electricity market observatory glossary, Specific gas market observatory glossary

Electricity and gas market observatory. 4. Quarter 2008

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-01-01

The purpose of the observatory is to provide the general public with indicators for monitoring market deregulation. It both covers the wholesale and retail electricity and gas markets in Metropolitan France. This observatory is updated every three months and data are available on CRE web site (www.cre.fr). Since the 1 of July 2007, all customers can choose their gas and electricity suppliers. Content: A - The electricity market: The retail electricity market (Introduction, Customer segments and their respective weight, Status on December 31, 2008, Dynamic analysis: 4. Quarter 2008); The wholesale electricity market (Introduction, Wholesale market activity in France, Prices on the French wholesale market and European comparison, Import and export volumes, Concentration of the French electricity market); B - The gas market: The retail gas market (Introduction, Customer segments and their respective weight, Status on December 31, 2008, Dynamic analysis: 4. Quarter 2008); The wholesale gas market (Gas pricing and gas markets in Europe, The wholesale market in France, Prices on the French wholesale market and European comparison, Concentration of the French gas market); C - Appendices: Electricity and gas market observatories combined glossary, Specific electricity market observatory glossary, Specific gas market observatory glossary

Papers of the CAMPUT 2003 educational conference : Markets in Transition : The changing face of regulation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2003-01-01

The North American energy landscape is evolving: markets are in transition and regulatory roles are shifting. Regulators, government policy makers, and industry representatives exchanged information concerning the changes facing regulatory agencies, industry and energy users. The eleven sessions of the conference were entitled: (1) the future of the regulator in a continental energy market, (2) gas markets in transition, (3) electricity markets in transition (including Regional Transmission Organization/Standard Market Design issues), (4) are open access markets the answer? (5) the changing face of regulation, what's up? (6) energy policy updates in British Columbia and Atlantic Canada, (7) Ontario electricity update and deregulation one year later, (8) northern issues, (9) intervener funding, (10) affiliate transactions, regulatory and business issues, and (11) cost of capital update. The conference featured 43 presentations, of which two were indexed separately for inclusion in the database

Electricity market equilibrium model with resource constraint and transmission congestion

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Gao, F. [ABB, Inc., Santa Clara, CA 95050 (United States); Sheble, G.B. [Portland State University, Portland, OR 97207 (United States)

2010-01-15

Electricity market equilibrium model not only helps Independent System Operator/Regulator analyze market performance and market power, but also provides Market Participants the ability to build optimal bidding strategies based on Microeconomics analysis. Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) is attractive compared to traditional models and many efforts have been made on it before. However, most past research focused on a single-period, single-market model and did not address the fact that GENCOs hold a portfolio of assets in both electricity and fuel markets. This paper first identifies a proper SFE model, which can be applied to a multiple-period situation. Then the paper develops the equilibrium condition using discrete time optimal control considering fuel resource constraints. Finally, the paper discusses the issues of multiple equilibria caused by transmission network and shows that a transmission constrained equilibrium may exist, however the shadow price may not be zero. Additionally, an advantage from the proposed model for merchant transmission planning is discussed. (author)

Electricity market equilibrium model with resource constraint and transmission congestion

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gao, F.; Sheble, G.B.

2010-01-01

Electricity market equilibrium model not only helps Independent System Operator/Regulator analyze market performance and market power, but also provides Market Participants the ability to build optimal bidding strategies based on Microeconomics analysis. Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) is attractive compared to traditional models and many efforts have been made on it before. However, most past research focused on a single-period, single-market model and did not address the fact that GENCOs hold a portfolio of assets in both electricity and fuel markets. This paper first identifies a proper SFE model, which can be applied to a multiple-period situation. Then the paper develops the equilibrium condition using discrete time optimal control considering fuel resource constraints. Finally, the paper discusses the issues of multiple equilibria caused by transmission network and shows that a transmission constrained equilibrium may exist, however the shadow price may not be zero. Additionally, an advantage from the proposed model for merchant transmission planning is discussed. (author)

Electricity market opening and electricity generation system's expansion in Slovenia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kosnjek, Z.; Vidmar, M.; Bregar, Z.

2000-01-01

Slovenia is rapidly adopting the European Union (EU) legislation to make itself ready to be admitted the fifteen EU member countries. In the area of energy or electricity supply industry, Slovenia has consequently enforced the Energy law, which in its essence follows the idea of the Directive 96/92/EC. Globally, the Directive defines common rules of the internal electricity market within EU. Any EU member country is responsible for assuring a competitive electricity market and implementing corresponding instruments as foreseen by the Directive. The share of the national market opening is calculated on the basis of eligible customers' consumption versus the overall consumption in a particular member country. Also, the Directive defines the rate of the electricity market opening. It is interesting to note that the EU member countries have been opening their national electricity markets at a greater speed than specified by the Directive. The overall Slovenian Electricity Supply Industry shall have to adapt itself to new imperatives, whereby the greatest changes will by all means take place in the area of electricity generation. As the reaction of eligible domestic market customers is quite unpredictable, the direct electricity import from foreign countries can only be estimated on a variant basis. EU countries that have deregulated their electricity market have been, step by step, gaining valuable experiences. The majority of them show a considerable pressure on having prices of the EPS generation sector reduced. A similar development can by all means be expected in Slovenia, too. it is expected that the major burden of the electricity market liberalisation and electric power interconnecting within EU will be carried by the EPS generation sector. The analyses of developed variants show that the burden, imposed by the transition onto the market economy, will be predominantly carried by the coal fired electricity supply industry. Further development of electricity

Electricity and gas market observatory. 3. Quarter 2007

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The purpose of the observatory is to provide the general public with indicators for monitoring market deregulation. It both covers the wholesale and retail electricity and gas markets in Metropolitan France. This observatory is updated every three months and data are available on CRE web site (www.cre.fr). Since the 1 of July 2007, all customers can choose their gas and electricity suppliers. The present observatory is including residential customer's statistics. Content: A - The electricity market: The retail electricity market (Introduction, Customer segments and their respective weight, Status at September 30, 2007, Dynamic analysis: 3. Quarter 2007); The wholesale electricity market (Introduction, Wholesale market activity in France, Wholesale market activity in France, Prices on the French wholesale market and European comparison, Import and export volumes, Concentration of the French electricity market); B - The gas market: The retail gas market (Introduction, Customer segments and their respective weight, Status on September 30, 2007, Dynamic analysis: 3. Quarter 2007); The wholesale gas market (Gas pricing and gas markets in Europe, The wholesale market in France); C - Appendices: Electricity and gas market observatories combined glossary, Specific electricity market observatory glossary, Specific gas market observatory glossary

The impact of electricity market liberalization in Turkey. 'Free consumer' and distributional monopoly cases

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bahce, Serdal; Taymaz, Erol

2008-01-01

Electricity sector has grown substantially in Turkey since the early 1960s as a result of rapid industrialization and urbanization. The vertically integrated state-owned company had a legally established monopoly on the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity in Turkey. With the support and encouragement of international organizations like the World Bank, Turkey has initiated a comprehensive program to liberalize and privatize the electricity market in 2001. The liberalization of the electricity market in Turkey started in the distribution side of the market. The distribution network was divided into 21 distribution regions and in each of these, separate - initially state-owned - distribution companies have been authorized to distribute and sell electricity. The plan envisaged to complete privatization of all distribution companies until the end of 2006. This study compares the welfare implication of privatization of the distribution networks by comparing two extreme cases, a pure regional distributional monopoly case and a representative pure 'free' consumer case, with a benchmark case of administered price regulation. For this purpose, we develop a simulation model of the Turkish electricity system, and use the data on generation and distribution costs. Our simulation analysis shows that substantial welfare losses occur if the distributional companies behave as regional monopolists. Our findings reiterate the importance of regulation and market design. (author)

Electricity and gas market observatory. 2. quarter 2007

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

Since July 1, 2004, all electricity and gas consumers can be eligible according to their consumption site, as long as all or part of the electricity or gas consumed is designed for non-residential use. The purpose of the observatory is to provide the general public with indicators for monitoring market deregulation. It both covers the wholesale and retail electricity and gas markets in Metropolitan France. This observatory is updated every three months and data are available on CRE web-site (www.cre.fr). It presents: The electricity market; The retail electricity market: Non-residential customer segments and their respective weights, Status at July 1, 2007, Dynamic analysis: 2. Quarter 2007; The wholesale electricity market: Wholesale market activity in France, Prices on the French wholesale market and European comparison, Import and export volumes, Concentration of the French electricity market, Striking facts of the second quarter 2007; The gas market; The retail gas market: The non-residential customer segments and their respective weights, Status at July 1. 2007; The wholesale gas market: Gas pricing and gas markets in Europe,The wholesale market in France. Some glossaries are attached to the document: Electricity and gas market observatories combined glossary; Specific electricity market observatory glossary; Specific gas market observatory glossary

Electricity and gas market observatory. 2. quarter 2007

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2007-07-01

Since July 1, 2004, all electricity and gas consumers can be eligible according to their consumption site, as long as all or part of the electricity or gas consumed is designed for non-residential use. The purpose of the observatory is to provide the general public with indicators for monitoring market deregulation. It both covers the wholesale and retail electricity and gas markets in Metropolitan France. This observatory is updated every three months and data are available on CRE web-site (www.cre.fr). It presents: The electricity market; The retail electricity market: Non-residential customer segments and their respective weights, Status at July 1, 2007, Dynamic analysis: 2. Quarter 2007; The wholesale electricity market: Wholesale market activity in France, Prices on the French wholesale market and European comparison, Import and export volumes, Concentration of the French electricity market, Striking facts of the second quarter 2007; The gas market; The retail gas market: The non-residential customer segments and their respective weights, Status at July 1. 2007; The wholesale gas market: Gas pricing and gas markets in Europe,The wholesale market in France. Some glossaries are attached to the document: Electricity and gas market observatories combined glossary; Specific electricity market observatory glossary; Specific gas market observatory glossary.

Demand participation in the restructured Electric Reliability Council of Texas market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zarnikau, Jay W.

2010-01-01

Does an electricity market which has been restructured to foster competition provide greater opportunities for demand response than a traditional regulated utility industry? The experiences of the restructured Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) market over the past eight years provide some hope that it is possible to design a competitive market which will properly value and accommodate demand response. While the overall level of demand response in ERCOT is below the levels enjoyed prior to restructuring, there have nonetheless been some promising advances, including the integration of demand-side resources into competitive markets for ancillary services. ERCOT's experiences demonstrate that the degree of demand participation in a restructured market is highly sensitive to the market design. But even in a market which has been deregulated to a large degree, regulatory intervention and special demand-side programs may be needed in order to bolster demand response. (author)

Electricity and gas market observatory. 1. Quarter 2008

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-01-01

The purpose of the observatory is to provide the general public with indicators for monitoring market deregulation. It both covers the wholesale and retail electricity and gas markets in Metropolitan France. This observatory is updated every three months and data are available on CRE web site (www.cre.fr). Since the 1. of July 2007, all customers can choose their gas and electricity suppliers. Content: A - The electricity market: The retail electricity market (Introduction, Customer segments and their respective weight, Status at March 31, 2007, Dynamic analysis: 1. Quarter 2008); The wholesale electricity market (Introduction, Wholesale market activity in France, Prices on the French wholesale market and European comparison, Import and export volumes, Concentration of the French electricity market); B - The gas market: The retail gas market (Introduction, Customer segments and their respective weight, Status on March 31, 2008, Dynamic analysis: 1. Quarter 2008); The wholesale gas market (Gas pricing and gas markets in Europe, The wholesale market in France, Striking fact of the first quarter 2008); C - Appendices: Electricity and gas market observatories combined glossary, Specific electricity market observatory glossary, Specific gas market observatory glossary

Electricity and gas market observatory. 4. Quarter 2007

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The purpose of the observatory is to provide the general public with indicators for monitoring market deregulation. It both covers the wholesale and retail electricity and gas markets in Metropolitan France. This observatory is updated every three months and data are available on CRE web site (www.cre.fr). Since the 1. of July 2007, all customers can choose their gas and electricity suppliers. Content: A - The electricity market: The retail electricity market (Introduction, Customer segments and their respective weight, Status at December 31, 2007, Dynamic analysis: 4. Quarter 2007); The wholesale electricity market (Introduction, Wholesale market activity in France, Prices on the French wholesale market and European comparison, Import and export volumes, Concentration of the French electricity market, Striking fact of the fourth quarter 2007); B - The gas market: The retail gas market (Introduction, Customer segments and their respective weight, Status on December 31. 2007, Dynamic analysis: 4. Quarter 2007); The wholesale gas market (Gas pricing and gas markets in Europe, The wholesale market in France, Striking fact of the fourth quarter 2007); C - Appendices: Electricity and gas market observatories combined glossary, Specific electricity market observatory glossary, Specific gas market observatory glossary

Electricity and gas market observatory 1. Quarter 2009

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

The purpose of the observatory is to provide the general public with indicators for monitoring market deregulation. It both covers the wholesale and retail electricity and gas markets in Metropolitan France. This observatory is updated every three months and data are available on CRE web site (www.cre.fr). Since the 1. of July 2007, all customers can choose their gas and electricity suppliers. Content: A - The electricity market: The retail electricity market (Introduction, Customer segments and their respective weight, Status on March 31, 2009, Dynamic analysis: 1. Quarter 2009), The wholesale electricity market (Introduction, Wholesale market activity in France, Prices on the French wholesale market and European comparison, Import and export volumes, Concentration of the French electricity market). B - The gas market: The retail gas market (Introduction, Customer segments and their respective weight, Status on March 31. 2009, Dynamic analysis: 1. Quarter 2009), The wholesale gas market (Main steps in the French Wholesale gas market, Gas pricing and gas markets in Europe, The wholesale market in France, Prices on the French wholesale market and European comparison, Concentration of the French gas market) C - Appendices: Electricity and gas market observatories combined glossary, Specific electricity market observatory glossary, Specific gas market observatory glossary

Design choices for electricity markets

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

De Vries, Laurens

2007-07-01

Ten years after the first European Electricity Directive, the goal of creating a single European electricity market has not been reached, despite concerted efforts by the EU and certain member states to continue with the reforms. The policy of subsidiarity for many aspects of market design has as a consequence that member countries are implementing a variety of different market designs and are implementing the reforms at varying speeds. The Florence regulatory process, which was intended to provide a bottom-up approach for coordination and harmonization, has effectively stalled and been replaced by a series of 'mini fora' in which smaller groups of countries work on integrating their markets. At the same time, the European electricity supply industry is facing some significant challenges. This paper investigates the different choices that can be made in the design of electricity markets, how they relate to each other and how they relate to the policy goals. (auth)

Operation of Modern Distribution Power Systems in Competitive Electricity Markets

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Hu, Weihao

, DG units, loads and electricity price are studied. Further, the effect of energy storage systems will be considered, and an optimal operation strategy for energy storage devices in a large scale wind power system in the electricity market is proposed. The western Danish power system, which has large...... strategy for trading wind power in the Danish short-term electricity market in order to minimize the imbalance costs for regulation. A load optimization method based on spot price for demand side management in Denmark is proposed in order to save the energy costs for 3 types of typical Danish consumers...... maximum profit of the BESS is proposed. Two kinds of BESS, based on polysulfide-bromine (PSB) and vanadium redox (VRB) battery technologies, are studied. Optimal operation strategies of PEV in the spot market are then proposed in order to decrease the energy cost for PEV owners. Furthermore...

Overview : what is happening in the electricity market?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Konow, H.R.

2004-01-01

This paper presents an overview of the Ontario electricity market. An outline of current industry challenges was presented, with an examination of restructuring practices with reference to environmental, regulatory and price pressures. A comparison was drawn between Alberta successes and Ontario stalls. Provincial market restructuring initiatives throughout Canada were overviewed, with specific reference to competitiveness, disaggregation, and the increasing focus on core business and improved efficiency. Benefits of new business practices were identified. They included open access transmission and wholesale markets, increasing participation of private capital and the leveraging of core competencies and assets. Environmental pressures were examined, with reference to Kyoto commitments, air quality, customer expectations, and future siting and approvals battles. Issues concerning rates increases were examined. It was suggested that increases were caused by the following: rate freezes in the past; new capacity and infrastructure; increasing input resource costs; and ageing infrastructure. An outline of Canada-U.S. electricity trade statistics was presented, including a chart of Canadian net exports by province for the years 2002 and 2003. A chart of reserve margins in Ontario and Quebec for the years 1990 to 2002 was also presented. Electricity demand projection until the year 2020 was evaluated, with estimates of immediate and future investment needs. A world energy investment outlook for 2003 was provided, including details of projected global needs. It was estimated that the electricity sector required 60 per cent of the world's energy investment to the year 2030. Conditions for success in the industry were examined, including the need for a policy and regulatory framework to ensure an attractive investment climate. It was suggested that new plans should consider the current investment climate as well as smart and effective regulation. A sustainable future was

Regulatory environment and its impact on the market value of investor-owned electric utilities

Science.gov (United States)

Vishwanathan, Raman

While other regulated industries have one by one been exposed to competitive reform, electric power, for over eighty years, has remained a great monopoly. For all those years, the vertically integrated suppliers of electricity in the United States have been assigned exclusive territorial (consumer) franchises and have been closely regulated. This environment is in the process change because the electric power industry is currently undergoing some dramatic adjustments. Since 1992, a number of states have initiated regulatory reform and are moving to allow retail customers to choose their energy supplier. There has also been a considerable federal government role in encouraging competition in the generation and transmission of electricity. The objective of this research is to investigate the reaction of investors to the prevailing regulatory environment in the electric utility industry by analyzing the market-to-book value for investor-owned electric utilities in the United States as a gauge of investor concern or support for change. In this study, the variable of interest is the market valuation of utilities, as it captures investor confidence to changes in the regulatory environment. Initially a classic regression model is analyzed on the full sample (of the 96 investor-owned utilities for the years 1992 through 1996), providing a total number of 480 (96 firms over 5 years) observations. Later fixed- and random-effects models are analyzed for the same full-sample model specified in the previous analysis. Also, the analysis is carried forward to examine the impact of the size of the utility and its degree of reliability on nuclear power generation on market values. In the period of this study, 1992--1996, the financial security markets downgraded utilities that were still operating in a regulated environment or had a substantial percentage of their power generation from nuclear power plants. It was also found that the financial market was sensitive to the size of

The European electricity market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1988-01-01

The creation of a single European market also will have its effects on the power and electricity sector. Expectations tied to this abandonment of borders on the electricity market are different: some hope for a reduction of energy costs, others fear safeguarded supplies to be at risk. It cannot be fully judged at present what the situation will be on a strongly integrated, European power and electricity market, and the brochure in hand is intended to present a first survey of the situation from the perspective of the power industry and energy policy, concentrating on main aspects. The survey is compiled in the form of reprints of journal articles written on this topic by a number of well-known German experts in the field. (orig./HP) [de

Capacity Market Design: Motivation and Challenges in Alberta’s Electricity Market

OpenAIRE

David Brown

2018-01-01

Alberta’s electricity market is currently undergoing a period of substantial transition. The province should proceed with caution as it switches from an energy-only electricity market to a capacity market by 2021. Many other jurisdictions have already made the changeover and Alberta can learn from their experiences in order to avoid common mistakes and pitfalls that can arise with the deployment of a capacity market.There were growing concerns that the existing electricity market structure wo...

New market based price regulation on combined heat and power in Denmark

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Koch, Jesper; Nielsen, Marianne; Hansen, Anders B.; Lawaetz, Henrik

2003-01-01

Major economic risks can become reality when local co-generation plants (L-CHP ) meet the full market penetration with new market based price regulation. Co-generation produces more than 50% of the national electricity consumption and half of the production is generated from L-CHP. The new price regulation is assumed to take action in 2004. The paper will present an analysis of a market based price regulation on the L-CHP-sector. The paper will spotlight on L-CHP in district heating systems supplying heat for domestic purposes. When smaller and medium sized CHP sell electricity they are paid an average price of 46 Euro per MWh. The return of selling electricity shall primarily cover the expenditure of buying gas for electricity production and writing off investments cost of a CHP-plant. With the framework of today it is a fact that the plants (in average) are only slightly competitive compared to individual heat production plants. When CHP meet market conditions there is a high risk that electricity prices will be reduced significantly (prices of 20 - 30 Euro per MWh) for a longer period. Significantly reduced electricity prices will result in dramatically increased heat prices. If no action is taken there will be a potential risk that heat consumers in the smaller and medium sized cities together must pay an extra bill of 200 million Euro each year. It corresponds to an average increase of the heating bill of 300 - 500 Euro per year for an average house. This is far from acceptable. There will also be a high risk that companies with industrial CHP will permanently convert to heat only boiler and only use their CHP occasionally because CHP plants might not be cost-effective when electricity prices are low. These effects can cause a significant increase of the national CO 2 emission

Papers of the CAMPUT 2003 educational conference : Markets in Transition : The changing face of regulation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2003-01-01

The North American energy landscape is evolving: markets are in transition and regulatory roles are shifting. Regulators, government policy makers, and industry representatives exchanged information concerning the changes facing regulatory agencies, industry and energy users. The eleven sessions of the conference were entitled: (1) the future of the regulator in a continental energy market, (2) gas markets in transition, (3) electricity markets in transition (including Regional Transmission Organization/Standard Market Design issues), (4) are open access markets the answer? (5) the changing face of regulation, what's up? (6) energy policy updates in British Columbia and Atlantic Canada, (7) Ontario electricity update and deregulation one year later, (8) northern issues, (9) intervener funding, (10) affiliate transactions, regulatory and business issues, and (11) cost of capital update. The conference featured 43 presentations, of which two were indexed separately for inclusion in the database. refs., tabs., figs

Supply security and short-run capacity markets for electricity

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Creti, Anna; Fabra, Natalia

2007-01-01

The creation of electricity markets has raised the fundamental question as to whether markets create the right incentives for the provision of the reserves needed to maintain supply security in the short-run, or whether some form of regulation is required. In some states in the US, electricity distributors have been made responsible for providing such reserves by contracting capacity in excess of their forecasted peak demand. The so-called Installed Capacity Markets provide one means of contracting reserves, and are the subject of this paper. Under monopoly as well as under perfect competition, we identify firms' short-run opportunity costs of committing resources in the capacity market and the costs of inducing full capacity commitment. The long-run investment problem is not considered. From a welfare viewpoint, we also compare the desirability of providing reserves either through capacity markets or through the demand side (i.e. power curtailments). At the optimum, capacity obligations equal peak demand (plus expected outages) and the capacity deficiency rate (which serves as a price cap) is set at firms' opportunity costs of providing full capacity commitment. (Author)

Electricity market reforms: Institutional developments, investment dynamics and game modeling

Science.gov (United States)

Pineau, Pierre-Olivier

The reform trend of the 1990's in electricity markets recreates, to some extent, the institutional framework from which they developed one century ago. Although these reforms do not endeavor to completely remove regulation, the basic objectives of deregulation dwell on limiting central and governmental control over the industry in order to promote free competition at all possible levels. To assess whether the electricity industry is or is not moving back to a 19th century structure is not the goal of this thesis. We will rather try to understand on what grounds deregulation reforms stand and review how different countries and large utilities have reacted to this trend. The special nature of electricity (non-storable basic good, centrally produced) creates different obstacles in the restructuring of electricity markets, compared to other industries like the airline or telecommunication ones. For example, the dominant positions of some utilities, the production structure and the importance of electricity in modern life could transform these reforms in a threatening move for consumers. Another specific issue arising from deregulation, now that national energy policy goals no longer rule the behavior of utilities, is how investment will be coordinated in the new market. A key element to keep in sight is the competition level targeted by these reforms. To which extent full competition can really occur in electricity markets remains an unanswered question. Indeed, the oligopolistic structure of the market could prevent such an outcome. An investigation of the investment dynamics in such a context seems therefore appropriate, and this will be an important theme of the thesis. This work offers an analysis of deregulated electricity markets and studies the oligopolistic market dynamics that could prevail in the new structure. Two complementary approaches are used for these purposes. The first is institutional and presents a thorough illustration of the economic arguments

Power exchange game in the electricity market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pyykko, S.; Partanen, J.; Viljainen, S.; Lassila, J.; Honkapuro, S.; Tahvanainen, K.

2006-01-01

Since it is not economically reasonable to build parallel electricity networks, in Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark, electricity distribution is protected by monopoly. However, electricity production and selling have been opened up to competition by connecting the transmission networks of these countries together, and it is possible to produce electricity where it is cheapest. A common electricity power market, called Nord Pool, has been created where electricity can be bought, sold or used as an exchange product. In order to help students understand the operation of electricity markets and the use of different electricity exchange products, the Department of Electrical Engineering at Lappeenranta University developed a scheme in which the theory can be used in practice. In the scheme, students are given the responsibility to manage the electricity markets of power companies in order analyze, plan and make decisions, which are skills required on the open power markets. The paper provided an introduction to the electricity markets in Nordic countries and discussed Nord Pool and its products. Information about education at the Department of Electrical Engineering at Lappeenranta University of Technology was also presented. The paper also provided details of the power exchange scheme on the electricity markets. 6 refs., 17 figs

Does wind energy mitigate market power in deregulated electricity markets?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ben-Moshe, Ori; Rubin, Ofir D.

2015-01-01

A rich body of literature suggests that there is an inverse relationship between wind power penetration rate into the electricity market and electricity prices, but it is unclear whether these observations can be generalized. Therefore, in this paper we seek to analytically characterize market conditions that give rise to this inverse relationship. For this purpose, we expand a recently developed theoretical framework to facilitate flexibility in modeling the structure of the electric industry with respect to the degree of market concentration and diversification in the ownership of wind power capacity. The analytical results and their attendant numerical illustrations indicate that the introduction of wind energy into the market does not always depress electricity prices. Such a drop in electricity prices is likely to occur when the number of firms is large enough or the ownership of wind energy is sufficiently diversified, or most often a combination of the two. Importantly, our study defines the circumstances in which the question of which type of firm invests in wind power capacity is crucial for market prices. - Highlights: • Studies show that electricity prices decrease with increased wind power capacity. • We investigate market conditions that give rise to this inverse relationship. • Average prices for wind energy are systematically lower than average market prices. • Conventional generation firms may increase market power by investing in wind farms. • Energy policy should seek to diversify the ownership of wind power capacity

Measuring market performance in restructured electricity markets: An empirical analysis of the PJM energy market

Science.gov (United States)

Tucker, Russell Jay

2002-09-01

Today the electric industry in the U.S. is transitioning to competitive markets for wholesale electricity. Independent system operators (ISOs) now manage broad regional markets for electrical energy in several areas of the U.S. A recent rulemaking by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) encourages the development of regional transmission organizations (RTOs) and restructured competitive wholesale electricity markets nationwide. To date, the transition to competitive wholesale markets has not been easy. The increased reliance on market forces coupled with unusually high electricity demand for some periods have created conditions amenable to market power abuse in many regions throughout the U.S. In the summer of 1999, hot and humid summer conditions in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, Delaware, and the District of Columbia pushed peak demand in the PJM Interconnection to record levels. These demand conditions coincided with the introduction of market-based pricing in the wholesale electricity market. Prices for electricity increased on average by 55 percent, and reached the $1,000/MWh range. This study examines the extent to which generator market power raised prices above competitive levels in the PJM Interconnection during the summer of 1999. It simulates hourly market-clearing prices assuming competitive market behavior and compares these prices with observed market prices in computing price markups over the April 1-August 31, 1999 period. The results of the simulation analysis are supported with an examination of actual generator bid data of incumbent generators. Price markups averaged 14.7 percent above expected marginal cost over the 5-month period for all non-transmission-constrained hours. The evidence presented suggests that the June and July monthly markups were strongly influenced by generator market power as price inelastic peak demand approached the electricity generation capacity constraint of the market. While this analysis of the

Are households better off in liberalized electricity markets

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Olsen, Ole Jess; Johnsen, Tor Arnt; Pakkanen, Merja

wholesale market. Norway was first (1991), then came Finland and Sweden (1996) and Denmark was last (2000). Together with the UK the Nordic countries are now considered the avantgarde with respect to implementation of the European electricity market directives. The purpose of liberalization is to increase...... utilities mostly acted under very little surveillance and the authorities only intervened in specific cases of abuse. The separation of operational and regulatory functions was far from clear-cut - state and municipal agencies often had both functions. Today much more detailed principles of regulations...... administrated by independent regulatory agencies have been developed. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the situation for Nordic household consumers after liberalization of the electricity supply industry. A number of new regulatory principles have been introduced and some of them with particular regard...

Assessing the options for a competitive electricity market in Israel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tishler, A.; Newman, J.; Spekterman, I.; Woo, C.K.

2008-01-01

In July 2006, the Israeli government affirmed its 2003 decision to reform the Israeli electricity industry, currently dominated by the Israel Electric Corporation (IEC), a government-owned vertically integrated electric utility. The reform calls for the deregulation and privatization of the generation and customer service segments of the industry, leaving transmission and distribution (T and D) regulated to provide open access to all end-users. This paper projects the performance of the post-reform market structure for the period 2007-2030 relative to that of the status quo. The post-reform generation market's prices are determined according to the Cournot conjecture. To mitigate excessive price volatility and surges, the generation market also includes a firm that is contracted to make peak electricity sales to customers at a pre-determined price, only when the competitive price exceeds the pre-determined level. Our results show (a) the post-reform retail prices for end-users will exceed those under the status quo; (b) the post-reform profits may not be sufficient to keep firms operating combined cycle generation units financially viable; and (c) the net benefit from deregulating the electricity sector in Israel will most likely be negative. (author)

Electricity and gas market observatory. 2. Quarter 2007

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The purpose of the observatory is to provide the general public with indicators for monitoring market deregulation. It both covers the wholesale and retail electricity and gas markets in Metropolitan France. This observatory is updated every three months and data are available on CRE web site (www.cre.fr). The present observatory is dedicated only to eligible customers before 1 July 2007, i.e. non-residential customers. Statistics related to residential customers will be published in the next observatory (1 December 2007). Content: A - The electricity market: The retail electricity market (Introduction, Non-residential customer segments and their respective weights, Status at July 1, 2007, Dynamic analysis: 2. Quarter 2007); The wholesale electricity market (Introduction, Wholesale market activity in France, Wholesale market activity in France, Prices on the French wholesale market and European comparison, Import and export volumes, Concentration of the French electricity market, Striking fact of the second quarter 2007); B - The gas market: The retail gas market (Introduction, The non-residential customer segments and their respective weights, Status at July 1, 2007); The wholesale gas market (Gas pricing and gas markets in Europe, The wholesale market in France); C - Appendices: Electricity and gas market observatories combined glossary, Specific electricity market observatory glossary, Specific gas market observatory glossary

Optimal Charging of Electric Vehicles with Trading on the Intraday Electricity Market

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Ilham Naharudinsyah

2018-06-01

Full Text Available Trading on the energy market is a possible way to reduce the electricity costs of charging electric vehicles at public charging stations. In many European countries, it is possible to trade electricity until shortly before the period of delivery on so called intraday electricity markets. In the present work, the potential for reducing the electricity costs by trading on the intraday market is investigated using the example of the German market. Based on simulations, the authors reveal that by optimizing the charging schedule together with the trading on the intraday electricity market, the costs can be reduced by around 8% compared to purchasing all the required energy from the energy supplier. By allowing the charging station operator to resell the energy to the intraday electricity market, an additional cost reduction of around 1% can be achieved. Besides the potential cost savings, the impacts of the trading unit and of the lead time of the intraday electricity market on the costs are investigated. The authors reveal that the achievable electricity costs can be strongly affected by the lead time, while the trading unit has only a minor effect on the costs.

Power generation investment in electricity markets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2003-01-01

Most IEA countries are liberalizing their electricity markets, shifting the responsibility for financing new investment in power generation to private investors. No longer able to automatically pass on costs to consumers, and with future prices of electricity uncertain, investors face a much riskier environment for investment in electricity infrastructure. This report looks at how investors have responded to the need to internalize investment risk in power generation. While capital and total costs remain the parameters shaping investment choices, the value of technologies which can be installed quickly and operated flexibly is increasingly appreciated. Investors are also managing risk by greater use of contracting, by acquiring retail businesses, and through mergers with natural gas suppliers. While liberalization was supposed to limit government intervention in the electricity market, volatile electricity prices have put pressure on governments to intervene and limit such prices. This study looks at several cases of volatile prices in IEA countries' electricity markets, and finds that while market prices can be a sufficient incentive for new investment in peak capacity, government intervention into the market to limit prices may undermine such investment

The adaptation of the electric power companies to the power market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Otterstad, B.; Ottosen, R.

1993-02-01

This report describes the challenges met by the Norwegian electric power companies in adapting to a more market oriented business and their possibilities and strategies when facing the uncertainties on the market side. The main principles of adaptation to the market are described and various strategies are illustrated by means of simple calculations and figures. The theoretical basis for analyses of adaptation to the market and for pricing period contracts and options are discussed. The report concludes with a discussion of the de-regulation of the North American gas market and draws parallels to the Norwegian power market. 17 figs

Measuring the degree of economic opening in the German electricity market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mueller, C.; Wienken, W.

2004-01-01

Barriers to entry can cause differences between ''legal'' and ''economic'' degrees of market openness. The German electricity market is legally 100% open. The industrial segment is also close to being economically 100% open. The general pattern indicates a mature market. However, the domestic segment is economically only 61% open. Possible explanations of this difference from its legal openness are mismatch of regulation and market strategies of incumbents. For the total market, the economic degree of market openness is 89% based on volumes. It is 61% based on customer numbers, reflecting the fact that the vast majority of customers are domestic. (author)

The Renewables Influence on Market Splitting: the Iberian Spot Electricity Market

OpenAIRE

Nuno Carvalho Figueiredo; Patrícia Pereira da Silva; Pedro Cerqueira

2014-01-01

This paper aims to assess the influence of wind power generation on the market splitting behaviour of the Iberian electricity spot markets. We use logit models to express the probability response for market splitting of day-ahead spot electricity prices together with explanatory variables like, wind speed, available transmission capacity and electricity demand. The results show that the probability of market splitting increases with the increase of wind power generation. The European intercon...

The economics of electricity markets

CERN Document Server

Biggar, Darryl R

2014-01-01

With the transition to liberalized electricity markets in many countries, the shift to more environmentally sustainable forms of power generation and increasing penetration of electric vehicles and smart appliances, a fundamental understanding of the economic principles underpinning the electricity industry is vital. Using clarity and precision, the authors successfully explain economic theory of all liberalized electricity market types from a cross-disciplinary engineering and policy perspective. No prior engineering knowledge or economics expertise is assumed in introducing key ideas such as nodal pricing, optimal dispatch and efficient pricing or in extending those models to areas including investment, risk management and the handling of contingencies. Key features: Comprehensively covers the principles of all liberalized electricity market types, including the US, Europe, New Zealand and Australia. Provides up to date coverage of research and policy iss es, including design of financial transmission rig...

Strategy of investment in electricity sources--Market value of a power plant and the electricity market

Science.gov (United States)

Bartnik, R.; Hnydiuk-Stefan, A.; Buryn, Z.

2017-11-01

This paper reports the results of the investment strategy analysis in different electricity sources. New methodology and theory of calculating the market value of the power plant and value of the electricity market supplied by it are presented. The financial gain forms the most important criteria in the assessment of an investment by an investor. An investment strategy has to involve a careful analysis of each considered project in order that the right decision and selection will be made while various components of the projects will be considered. The latter primarily includes the aspects of risk and uncertainty. Profitability of an investment in the electricity sources (as well as others) is offered by the measures applicable for the assessment of the economic effectiveness of an investment based on calculations e.g. power plant market value and the value of the electricity that is supplied by a power plant. The values of such measures decide on an investment strategy in the energy sources. This paper contains analysis of exemplary calculations results of power plant market value and the electricity market value supplied by it.

Bill project on a new organisation of the electricity market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

A first text discusses the motivations of this bill project: to guarantee French supply security, to contribute to France economical competitiveness, to protect the environment, to give everybody access to energy, and to comply with the European energy market. It also comments the bill project content, the objectives aimed at through the different bill articles. These articles settle a regulated access to electricity and a regulatory frame for pricing, define provider responsibilities, deal with installation dismantling expenses. This presentation is followed by the bill text and by the report of an impact study of the implementation of a regulated access to electricity, of a capacity obligation, and of the evolution of regulated selling prices

The influence of the market as a determinant for a national electricity strategy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Deventer, J.R. van; Kimpton, A.D.

1996-01-01

The market characteristics of a mature developed economy and an immature developing economy are compared. It is discussed how these characteristics provide a major influence on the governance, regulation, structure and policy of an Electricity Supply Industry (ESI). This market dualism provides opportunities for many different strategies. A mature market, with most of the social demands satisfied, can adopt a strategy of weak regulation and the accompanying privatisation and competition. With an immature market, where the social demands, such as electrification, have not been met, a typical vertically integrated utility structure, operating under the guidance of the government, is the classic solution. (author)

The safety and reliability of the electricity transportation network, and the opening of markets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Merlin, A.

2003-01-01

Following a decade in which the electricity sector was concerned by the opening of markets the world over, the year 2003 highlighted the challenges of secure supply and of the safety of electrical systems. Major incidents are nothing new throughout history, and occurred well before the trend towards opening the markets dot underway. However, it is necessary to verify that the rules for the organisation, clarification of responsibilities and regulation make it possible to control the growing complexity of interconnected systems related to opening the market up to competition. Faced with such situations, changes are necessary in Europe. Firstly, it is important to have the second European directive on the internal electricity market introduced everywhere, this directive providing common rules to be met by all key players to ensure greater safety within the electricity system, and strengthening the role of the electricity transport network manager, who is separate from the other players in the market. It is also necessary to draft a third directive, focusing on both security of supply and the operational safety of the European electricity system. (authors)

Towards a unified European electricity market: The contribution of data-mining to support realistic simulation studies

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Pinto, Tiago; Santos, Gabriel; Pereira, Ivo F.

2014-01-01

Worldwide electricity markets have been evolving into regional and even continental scales. The aim at an efficient use of renewable based generation in places where it exceeds the local needs is one of the main reasons. A reference case of this evolution is the European Electricity Market, where...... countries are connected, and several regional markets were created, each one grouping several countries, and supporting transactions of huge amounts of electrical energy. The continuous transformations electricity markets have been experiencing over the years create the need to use simulation platforms...... to support operators, regulators, and involved players for understanding and dealing with this complex environment. This paper focuses on demonstrating the advantage that real electricity markets data has for the creation of realistic simulation scenarios, which allow the study of the impacts...

Sustainable Governance for the Opened Electric Vehicle Charging and Upgraded Facilities Market

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Tian Wu

2017-11-01

Full Text Available Since the China State Grid opened the market for infrastructure construction of electric charging stations and allowed Tesla, Potevio, BAIC BJEV and other enterprises to provide their own charging stations and other infrastructure construction, the development of electric vehicles has been greatly affected. How to maintain a sustainable governance in the opened electric vehicle charging and upgraded facilities market is an important policy issues. This paper presents a monopolistic competition model for the differentiated products market and addresses several issues related to Cournot equilibrium to illustrate why the expected free market actually operates in a monopolistic competition market structure. The analytic solution of the model shows that whether the extent of firm entry is insufficient, excessive or optimum is determined by consumers’ time preference, level of production differentiation and features of cost structure, including fixed cost and marginal cost. The sensitivity analysis has been performed among the above factors and tracked some other factors which would determine the effect of the new policy issues. The main policy suggestion is that the government should optimize entry regulations and lay down the criterion of charging interface standards for charging stations to avoid the electric vehicle charging and upgraded facilities marketization process of a one-size-fits-all solution and form a monopolistic competition market.

Generation adequacy and transmission interconnection in regional electricity markets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cepeda, Mauricio; Saguan, Marcelo; Finon, Dominique; Pignon, Virginie

2009-01-01

The power system capacity adequacy has public good features that cannot be entirely solved by electricity markets. Regulatory intervention is then necessary and established methods have been used to assess adequacy and help regulators to fix this market failure. In regional electricity markets, transmission interconnections play an important role in contributing to adequacy. However, the adequacy problem and related policy are typically considered at a national level. This paper presents a simple model to study how the interconnection capacity interacts with generation adequacy. First results indicate that increasing interconnection capacity between systems improves adequacy up to a certain level; further increases do not procure additional adequacy improvements. Furthermore, besides adequacy improvement, increasing transmission capacity under asymmetric adequacy criteria or national system characteristics could create several concerns about externalities. These results imply that regional coordination of national adequacy policies is essential to internalise adequacy of cross-border effects.

The restructuring of the Ontario electricity market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Doucet, J.A.

1999-01-01

A summary of the current status of the deregulation of the electricity market in Ontario was presented. To follow global deregulation trends, the Ontario Government has embarked on a considerable restructuring of the Ontario electricity market. The monopoly position of Ontario Hydro has been removed by restructuring the provincial utility into two separate companies, GENCO and SERVCO, which will be responsible for the generation and transmission and distribution of electricity, respectively. Other mechanisms put in place to favour a free and competitive market for electricity in the province, such as the arrival on the market of other electricity producers, and the establishment of the independent market operator, are also discussed. 2 tabs

Production and competition in the European electric sector. 4. report from the research project 'renewable energy in the community's internal market'

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kjersgaard, A.

1997-01-01

The aim is to elucidate the dynamic interactive pricing, competition and market mechanisms that are valid for the European electric power market. The perspective in the report is to analyse the vertical flow of substance and values of energy, the interaction of the actors, and the economic relations. The first link in the vertical chain is the energy raw materials supplies: the reserves and production of fossil and nuclear fuels and the relation to globalization of electricity production. The next link is the production of electricity: the production technologies used and their positioning, the importance of large trans-national utilities in relation to technological changes. The third link is the market and the changes of the market between production, transmission, distribution and consumption of electricity, and the consequences of these changes. Two horizontal regulating sectional views are analysed: The European Union regulations of the electric power sector and the Danish regulations of power supplies. Finally, production and competition of electric power from renewable energy sources, i.e. wind power, in a future European energy market is put into perspective. (LN) 134 refs

Market power and storage in electricity markets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Skaar, Jostein

2004-05-01

Market power in liberalised electricity markets dominated by hydropower is analyzed in four chapters. The existing literature on competition in hydropower markets is briefly presented and examined. Chapter 1 discusses the effects of market power in the context of acquisitions in a situation where transmission capacity is constrained. Chapter 2 and 3 elaborate on the issue of competition and market power when water inflow is uncertain, and finally Chapter 4 focuses on the supply function equilibrium model in the context of a hydropower market

Assessing the efficiency of US electricity markets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Arciniegas, I.; Barrett, C.; Marathe, A.

2003-01-01

The recent California's energy crisis has raised doubts about the benefits of energy deregulation. While it is true that the California electricity market is in turmoil, other electricity markets like the Pennsylvania-NewJersey-Maryland (PJM) are doing fine. This paper assesses the mark of efficiency reached by the electricity markets in California, New York, and PJM. It also compares the degree of efficiency across markets (forward vs. real time) and across time. No significant differences between the California and PJM electricity markets were discovered in the year of California's energy crisis (2000) using the co-integration tests. This research suggests that differences in price behavior between these two markets during 2000 did not arise from differences in efficiency. According to our analysis and measures of efficiency, PJM and California electricity markets are more efficient than the New York market. Also, as these markets become more mature over time, their efficiency level goes up. We also found evidence that a multi-settlement scheduling system leads to higher efficiency. (author)

Electricity market reforms : institutional developments, investment dynamics and game modeling (Finland)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pineau, P.-O.

2001-01-01

During the 1990s, there was a definite trend to reform the electric power industry from the way in which it operated a century ago. The reform does not try to totally remove regulation. Rather, the basic objective is to limit central and governmental control over the industry so that free competition can be encouraged at all possible levels. This thesis tried to understand the status of deregulatory reforms and reviews how different countries and large utilities have reacted to the trend. Electricity is particular in that it is a non-storable basic good that is centrally produced. Compared to other industries such as the airline or telecommunication industry, this special nature creates barriers in the restructuring of power markets. An issue that is emerging with deregulation is that national energy policy goals no longer determine the behaviour of utilities. This will impact on how investments will be coordinated in the new market. A major factor to keep in mind is the competition level sought by these reforms. It is not yet known to which extent full competition can really occur in electricity markets. The oligopolistic structure of the market may even prevent such an outcome. It is important to examine the investment dynamics in such a context. This was the primary theme of the thesis. The two complementary approaches used included an example of an institution and its economic arguments that support market reform. A detailed example of the reform process in the electricity market in Finland was presented. The second approach was more analytical and was based on the market equilibria that may occur as a result of market reform. A dynamic model of investment for the power market was again applied to the electricity market in Finland

Electricity market reforms : institutional developments, investment dynamics and game modeling (Finland)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Pineau, P.-O.

2001-07-01

During the 1990s, there was a definite trend to reform the electric power industry from the way in which it operated a century ago. The reform does not try to totally remove regulation. Rather, the basic objective is to limit central and governmental control over the industry so that free competition can be encouraged at all possible levels. This thesis tried to understand the status of deregulatory reforms and reviews how different countries and large utilities have reacted to the trend. Electricity is particular in that it is a non-storable basic good that is centrally produced. Compared to other industries such as the airline or telecommunication industry, this special nature creates barriers in the restructuring of power markets. An issue that is emerging with deregulation is that national energy policy goals no longer determine the behaviour of utilities. This will impact on how investments will be coordinated in the new market. A major factor to keep in mind is the competition level sought by these reforms. It is not yet known to which extent full competition can really occur in electricity markets. The oligopolistic structure of the market may even prevent such an outcome. It is important to examine the investment dynamics in such a context. This was the primary theme of the thesis. The two complementary approaches used included an example of an institution and its economic arguments that support market reform. A detailed example of the reform process in the electricity market in Finland was presented. The second approach was more analytical and was based on the market equilibria that may occur as a result of market reform. A dynamic model of investment for the power market was again applied to the electricity market in Finland.

The benefits of integrating European electricity markets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Newbery, David; Strbac, Goran; Viehoff, Ivan

2016-01-01

The European Commission's Target Electricity Model (TEM) aims to integrate EU electricity markets. This paper estimates the potential benefit of coupling interconnectors to increase the efficiency of trading day-ahead, intra-day and balancing services across borders. Further gains are possible by eliminating unscheduled flows and avoiding the curtailment of renewables with better market design. In the short run the gains could be as high as €3.9 billion/yr, more than 100% of the current gains from trade. About one-quarter of this total comes from day-ahead coupling and another third from shared balancing. If shared balancing is so valuable, completing the TEM becomes more urgent, and regulators should ensure these gains are paid to interconnectors to make the needed investment in the cross-border links more commercially profitable. - Highlights: •The benefits from day-ahead market coupling are €1 bn/yr. •Intra-day and balancing benefits add a further €1.3 bn/yr. •Total benefits including removing unscheduled flows could be €3.4 bn/yr. •Sharing balancing and reserves is high priority. •Rewarding interconnectors for all services reduces barriers to expansion.

The design of tomorrow's European electricity market; Das europaeische Strommarktdesign der Zukunft

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kranner, Karl; Sharma, Stephan [Verbund AG, Wien (Austria). Geschaefststeuerung und Marketing

2013-01-15

In today's times of rising feed-in rates from renewable energy and competing market models, the need for an integrated European energy market is growing ever more urgent. The first phase of liberalisation of the European electricity markets was marked by the development of national sub-markets which differed in their degree of liberty. Due to network bottlenecks at the borders, substantial price differences were seen to arise between market regions, with the exception of those between Germany and Austria. This leads to the question as to how the integration of the internal European energy market can best be brought about. A six-point programme elaborated by Verbund AG banks on market mechanisms rather than regulation as a means of strengthening the electricity market.

New Brunswick electricity market rules : summary

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2004-02-01

The electricity market rules for New Brunswick were reviewed with particular reference to two broad classifications. The first classification is based on the roles and responsibilities of the system operator (SO) in facilitating the Bilateral Contract market, as well as the role of market participants in participating in the Bilateral Contract market. The second classification is based on the roles and responsibilities of each of the SO, market participants and transmitters in maintaining the reliability of the integrated electricity system and ensuring a secure supply of electricity for consumers in New Brunswick. The market rules consist of 10 chapters entitled: (1) introduction to the market rules and administrative rules of general application, (2) market participation and the use of the SO-controlled grid, (3) market administration, (4) technical and connection requirements, testing and commissioning, (5) system reliability, (6) operational requirements, (7) settlement, (8) connection of new or modified facilities, (9) transmission system planning, investment and operation, and (10) definitions and interpretation

Competition policies on the electricity markets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dubois, U.

2008-01-01

This article puts forward a critical analysis of European competition instruments and practices in terms of market power on the electricity wholesale markets. Due to the speck nature of electrical activities, competition policies come up against difficulties of market power identification at first, since there is no model for detecting perfectly the potential or real exertion of market power in this sector. What is more, since competition authorities rely on specific intervention methods, their ability to limit the exertion of market power is relatively low. For a large number of their interventions involves controlling concentrations. In the light of this double phenomenon, this article discusses some recent developments of European competition policies on the electricity wholesale markets. The sector inquiry of 2007 seems to mark the start of a new competition policy practice in the electricity sector. The initiative and decision-making power now seem to be nesting mainly at a European level where action is not only to be found in terms of controlling mergers and acquisitions, but also stretches to involve an in-depth evaluation of the way the different markets work. This action is manifested in decisions to investigate some companies as well as legislative proposals in the framework of the third package. Thus we are moving towards a greater monitoring of electricity markets using more formal supervision instruments and on a more continuous basis. (author)

Electricity pricing and load dispatching in deregulated electricity market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Geerli; Niioka, S.; Yokoyama, R.

2003-01-01

A rapid move to a market-based electric power industry will significantly alter the structure of electricity pricing and system operation. In this paper, we consider a game of negotiation in the electricity market, involving electric utilities, independent power producers (IPPs) and large-scale customers. We analyze the two-level game strategies for the negotiation process between utilities, IPPs and customers. These have been previously recognized as a way to come up with a rational decision for competitive markets, in which players intend to maximize their own profits. The derived operation rules based on competition can be viewed as an extension of the conventional equal incremental cost method for the deregulated power system. The proposed approach was applied to several systems to verify its effectiveness. (Author)

Papers of a Canadian Institute conference : Western electricity markets forum : Are you prepared for regulatory restructuring and standard market design?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2003-01-01

This forum on western electricity markets presented the latest information concerning several challenges facing the electricity markets of both Western Canada and the United States. Corporate leaders and industry regulators addressed a number of issues. Among them, the California Independent System Operator presented its views on the Standard Market Design initiative which has the potential to alter the dynamics of power markets in Canada and the United States. The creation of a new International Organization for Standardization (ISO) structure for Alberta's deregulated power markets was discussed by both the Power Pool of Alberta and the Alberta Department of Energy. The outlook for electricity price volatility in the west was examined in a presentation by BP Energy Canada. The prospect for transmission links between Alberta and other western states and provinces was the topic of presentations made by ATCO Electric and AltaLink. The future of the power generation in Alberta was discussed by TransAlta, EPCOR, and ENMAX. In addition, there were two case studies presented from the California Energy Commission and the Independent Electricity Market Operator (IMO) of Ontario concerning the progress made to date on electricity deregulation. A look at lessons to be learned from other jurisdictions was also included. A total of sixteen presentations were made at this forum, of which five have been indexed separately for inclusion in this database. refs., tabs., figs

Balancing renewable on intra day electricity markets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sokol, R.; Bems, J.

2012-01-01

Intra day electricity markets contribute to facilitate transition from conventional sources to renewable which need to be balanced on real-time basic due to the unpredictable nature of weather. This paper describes the way from regional electricity markets to a single pan-european market model which is target model of the European Commission. Single liquid intra day electricity market where market participants can balance their portfolios is prerequisite to a full utilisation of renewable power sources and a solution for some problems experienced by TSOs with loop and parallel flows from neighbouring countries. Integrated German and French intra day electricity market which uses Flexible Intra day Trading Scheme is described in this paper as a market which could be extended further to the CEE region with very poor liquidity of its local intra day markets. (Authors)

The electricity market 2002

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2002-10-01

The purpose of the 'Electricity market 2002' publication is to meet the need for generalized and readily accessible information on the conditions on the Nordic market. Iceland is not included in the description. The publication also includes summaries of information from recent years concerning electricity generation and utilization in the Nordic countries, the structure of the electricity market from the players' perspective, trade in electricity in the Nordic countries and in Northern Europe, electricity prices in the Nordic and other countries, and the impact of the electricity sector on the environment. The publication contains data on electricity generation and use during the past years, structure of the electricity market, trade in electricity in the Nordic countries and northern Europe, electricity prices in the Nordic countries and other countries as well as impact of electricity generation system on the environment. The market price of electricity is affected by a number of factors, including fuel prices, availability of water, and the power and energy balances of the various countries. The availability of water in Norway and Sweden has been very good in recent years, which has had a major influence on the price. 1996 was a dry year, which led to a high system price on Nord Pool. The price of electricity then dropped and has remained at a relatively low level up to the year 2001. The price of electricity rose during the spring of 2001 and remained at a higher level also during the summer months. The main reason was that the availability of water was lower than normal in Norway during the early part of the year. This created a higher demand for imported electricity in Norway and caused some apprehension that the year would be dry. The total price of electricity to the end users has not followed the system price development. The total cost of electricity to the end consumers consists of three items, i.e. the price of electricity, the network

State regulation of the coming competitive market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lively, M.B.

1997-01-01

Utilities and state commissions can have retail competition without a federal presence by integrating economics and reliability through a concept called Wide Open Load Following, or WOLF. Under WOLF, the transaction between the utility and the consumer would continue to be a sale that is subject to regulation by the state commission. As a retail sale, the transaction requires no FERC involvement. This article shows how WOLF combines economics and physics for pricing retail electric sales in a competitive market so that the sales remain under the jurisdiction of a state authority, even while third parties participate in the market

Regulation and competition in United Kingdom electricity and gas industries

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

McGowan, F.

1992-01-01

Focussing on the role of regulation in developing competition, this paper reviews the development of a regulation system to monitor and control prices, as well as, quality of service, in the UK's recently privatized electricity and gas industries. The review covers: the control mechanisms applied to the natural gas tariff and contract markets in the area of common carriage; performance monitoring and the concept of yardstick competition in the electric power industry; and the management and control, by OFFER (Office of Electricity Regulation), of the total 'pool' of generated electricity. It is noted that whereas Great Britain's particular energy supply situation permits this nation to attempt privatization/competition regulation, the energy balances of other European countries make similar attempts, for them, risky. The UK experience with privatization/competition regulation so far has shown that regulation is indispensable in guaranteeing competition, and that the incorporation of the controlling board within the framework of anti-trust legislation and the granting of full autonomy to this board has greatly favoured its effectiveness

Coordination and decision making of regulation, operation, and market activities in power systems

Science.gov (United States)

Nakashima, Tomoaki

Electric power has been traditionally supplied to customers at regulated rates by vertically integrated utilities (VIUs), which own generation, transmission, and distribution systems. However, the regulatory authorities of VIUs are promoting competition in their businesses to lower the price of electric energy. Consequently, in new deregulated circumstances, many suppliers and marketers compete in the generation market, and conflict of interest may often occur over transmission. Therefore, a neutral entity, called an independent system operator (ISO), which operates the power system independently, has been established to give market participants nondiscriminatory access to transmission sectors with a natural monopoly, and to facilitate competition in generation sectors. Several types of ISOs are established at present, with their respective regions and authorities. The ISO receives many requests from market participants to transfer power, and must evaluate the feasibility of their requests under the system's condition. In the near future, regulatory authorities may impose various objectives on the ISOs. Then, based on the regulators' policies, the ISO must determine the optimal schedules from feasible solutions, or change the market participants' requests. In a newly developed power market, market participants will conduct their transactions in order to maximize their profit. The most crucial information in conducting power transactions is price and demand. A direct transaction between suppliers and consumers may become attractive because of its stability of price, while in a power exchange market, gaming and speculation of participants may push up electricity prices considerably. To assist the consumers in making effective decisions, suitable methods for forecasting volatile market price are necessary. This research has been approached from three viewpoints: Firstly, from the system operator's point of view, desirable system operation and power market structure

Electricity marketing and retailing

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hanlon, C.

2001-01-01

ECNG Inc. is a full service provider of independent and objective energy advice and management services to industrial, commercial and institutional end-users of all forms of energy. ECNG manages 10 per cent of the Ontario gas market and expects a 10 per cent share of electricity (14 TWh). ECNG has a balanced portfolio with expertise in both petroleum and electricity sectors. The company has also dealt extensively with retailers, marketers, wholesalers and suppliers on issues regarding deregulation

Analysis of competition and market power in the wholesale electricity market in India

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shukla, Umesh Kumar; Thampy, Ashok

2011-01-01

The electricity reforms were initiated in India with the objective of promoting competition in the electricity market. In order to promote competition, the Electricity Act 2003 was enacted and various policy initiatives were taken by the Government of India. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) also facilitated competition through the regulatory framework of availability based tariff, Indian Electricity Grid Code, open access in inter-state transmission, inter-state trading and power exchanges. Despite these initiatives, electricity prices increased in the Wholesale Electricity Market in India (WEMI). This paper analyses the market structure and competitiveness in the WEMI. There are, of course, various potential reasons for the rise in the electricity price. This paper seeks to investigate, if market power was one of the reasons for increase in market prices. Concentration ratio, Herfindahl-Hirschman index, Supply Margin Assessment, and Residual Supply Index have been used to measure market power. This paper also uses the price-cost mark-up to examine, if exercise of market power led to higher margins. The analysis suggests that market power of firms may be part of the reason for the increase in electricity prices in WEMI. The study suggests various measures to increase competition in the WEMI.

Electricity market price volatility: The case of Ontario

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zareipour, Hamidreza; Bhattacharya, Kankar; Canizares, Claudio A.

2007-01-01

Price volatility analysis has been reported in the literature for most competitive electricity markets around the world. However, no studies have been published yet that quantify price volatility in the Ontario electricity market, which is the focus of the present paper. In this paper, a comparative volatility analysis is conducted for the Ontario market and its neighboring electricity markets. Volatility indices are developed based on historical volatility and price velocity concepts, previously applied to other electricity market prices, and employed in the present work. The analysis is carried out in two scenarios: in the first scenario, the volatility indices are determined for the entire price time series. In the second scenario, the price time series are broken up into 24 time series for each of the 24 h and volatility indices are calculated for each specific hour separately. The volatility indices are also applied to the locational marginal prices of several pricing points in the New England, New York, and PJM electricity markets. The outcomes reveal that price volatility is significantly higher in Ontario than the three studied neighboring electricity markets. Furthermore, comparison of the results of this study with similar findings previously published for 15 other electricity markets demonstrates that the Ontario electricity market is one of the most volatile electricity markets world-wide. This high volatility is argued to be associated with the fact that Ontario is a single-settlement, real-time market

Determining market boundaries in the electricity sector

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Godde, Anne

2013-01-01

The purpose of the present study was to develop a method of determining market boundaries in preparation of identifying all the competitive forces which a company in the electricity sector must address and deciding on this basis whether it has a dominant position in the market. The study focused in particular on current developments in the German electricity sector, this being the only way to permit a demarcation that accurately reflects the true economic situation. First the question was addressed whether a determination of market boundaries is at all necessary for performing a competitive analysis and in what specific constellations they could play a role. Giving due consideration to the special features of the electricity sector the most preferable market demarcation methods were applied to individual areas of the electricity sector that are of competitive relevance. Efforts were directed at arriving at market boundaries most conducive to the goal of identifying those competitive forces which a company in the electricity sector must address. For this purpose a critical assessment was undertaken of established market demarcation practices in Europe and Germany in order to determine whether ''classical'' market demarcation methods could be applied or whether modifications were needed on account of special features of market structure. The author also describes and discusses alternatives to the established market demarcation methods. She also elucidates methods of determining the boundaries of markets that have emerged as a result of recent developments in the electricity sector, for example through the growth of electricity production from renewable resources, or which are still in the process of formation.

The surveillance of the electricity wholesale market and emission trading market; Die Ueberwachung von Stromgrosshandelsmarkt und Emissionshandelsmarkt

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Luedemann, Volker [Hochschule Osnabrueck (Germany). Forschungszentrum Energiewirtschaft/Energierecht (fee); Hochschule Osnabrueck (Germany). Wirtschafts- und Wettbewerbsrecht; Konar, Selma [Sozietaet Becker Buettner Held, Muenchen (Germany)

2015-05-15

The Regulation on Wholesale Market Integrity and Transparency (REMIT) and the German Law on the Establishment of a Market Transparency Office for Wholesale Trade in Electricity and Gas (MTS-G) have fundamentally changed the surveillance of electricity wholesale trade in Germany. From now on the Federal Network Agency and the Federal Cartel Office will be jointly responsible for monitoring the electricity wholesale trade for suspicious market phenomena and abusive behaviour. The REMIT specifies that the electricity trade must be surveilled ''with due consideration to interactions'' with the emission trade system. However, occurrences observed in recent years have shown that the emission trading system is in need of reform. This has also been recognised and has prompted extensive corrective action by the regulatory authorities of the European Union. These changes have yet to be transposed into the national surveillance regimes. The present article explains why the new role accorded to the Federal Network Agency under the REMIT fails to eliminate the structural shortcomings of the old surveillance system. At least the decision to put the collection and evaluation of data exclusively in the hands of the market transparency office and the cooperation this will prompt between the supervisory authorities responsible will make the task of surveilling the energy wholesale trading market a lot easier for the authorities. The energy transition and its exigencies will yet lead to further changes in the market and its surveillance regime.

Efficient pricing and investment in electricity markets with intermittent resources

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chao, Hung-po

2011-01-01

Facing growing technological and environmental challenges, the electricity industry needs effective pricing mechanism to promote efficient risk management and investment decisions. In a restructured electricity market with competitive wholesale prices and traditionally regulated retail rates, however, there are technical and institutional barriers that prevent dynamic pricing with price responsive demand. In regions with limited energy storage capacity, intermittent renewable resources present special challenges. This could adversely affect the effectiveness of public policies causing inefficient investments in energy technologies. In this paper, we present an updated economic model of pricing and investment in restructured electricity market and use the model in a simulation study for an initial assessment of renewable energy strategy and alternative pricing mechanisms. A key objective of the study is to shed light on the policy issues so that effective decisions can be made to improve efficiency. - Highlights: → Renewable resources present special challenges in regions with limited energy storage capacity. → This paper presents an updated economic model of pricing and investment in restructured electricity market. → A simulation study assesses renewable energy strategy and alternative pricing mechanisms. → The study results inform policy decisions to improve efficient investments in energy technologies.

Social Welfare implications of demand response programs in competitive electricity markets

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Boisvert, Richard N.; Neenan, Bernard F.

2003-08-01

The price volatility exhibited by wholesale electricity markets has stymied the movement to restructure the industry, and may derail it altogether. Market designers argue that prices are superior to regulation for directing long-term investments to the proper location and function, and that price volatility is a natural manifestation of a robustly competitive market. However, episodes of prices that soar to previously unimaginable heights try customers' patience and cause policy makers to reconsider if the prize is worth the consequences.

Electricity market design and risk management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Boschi, Federico; Cervigni, Guido

2005-01-01

We show that each wholesale electricity market design trades-off between efficiency and liquidity. Efficiency requires that the product traded in the wholesale market closely reflect the physical features of electricity. Liquidity requires standardization of the products that ore traded on the wholesale market. We stress that Iiquidity comes at a cost since an excessive degree of standardization may lead to significant inefficiencies and forge wealth transfers among market participants [it

Electricity market design for the future

OpenAIRE

robinson, david; Keay, Malcolm

2017-01-01

This paper explains why current electricity markets are not fit for purpose and propose a new market design. Electricity markets operating today were designed for the technical and economic conditions of the 1990's. These conditions have changed substantially, especially with increased penetration of intermittent renewables and the growing potential for distributed energy resources and consumer involvement. Today's markets are incompatible with these trends. They do not provide h...

Liberalisation and Market Opening Versus Energy Policy and Regulation Proposals: the German Experiences

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wieners, J.

2001-01-01

In 1998 the German electricity market became fully liberalised for competition. Prices for all consumer groups recorded a considerable drop. Service centres accepted measures for cost reduction, new strategies resulted in mergers. However, in view of economic efficiency, the German Government set life surroundings as the primary task. With new electricity market regulation numerous grants were introduced into renewable energy sources as well as the combined production of heat and electricity, which had a destabilising effect on all price savings on the part of the competition.(author)

The influence of the market as a determinant for a national electricity strategy

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Deventer, J.R. van; Kimpton, A.D. [ESCOM (South Africa)

1996-12-31

The market characteristics of a mature developed economy and an immature developing economy are compared. It is discussed how these characteristics provide a major influence on the governance, regulation, structure and policy of an Electricity Supply Industry (ESI). This market dualism provides opportunities for many different strategies. A mature market, with most of the social demands satisfied, can adopt a strategy of weak regulation and the accompanying privatisation and competition. With an immature market, where the social demands, such as electrification, have not been met, a typical vertically integrated utility structure, operating under the guidance of the government, is the classic solution. (author). 2 refs.

The influence of the market as a determinant for a national electricity strategy

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Van Deventer, J.R.; Kimpton, A.D. [Electricity Supply Commission, Johannesburg (South Africa)

1995-12-31

This paper compares and contrasts the market characteristics of a mature developed economy and an immature developing economy and how these characteristics provide a major influence on the governance, regulation, structure and policy of an Electricity Supply Industry. This market dualism provides opportunities for many different strategies. A mature market, with most of the social demands satisfied, can adopt a strategy of weak regulation and the accompanying privatisation and competition. With an immature market (South Africa), where the social demands, such as electrification, have not been met, a typically integrated utility structure, operating under the guidance of the government is the classic solution. 2 refs.

Bayesian Analysis of Demand Elasticity in the Italian Electricity Market

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Maria Chiara D'Errico

2015-09-01

Full Text Available The liberalization of the Italian electricity market is a decade old. Within these last ten years, the supply side has been extensively analyzed, but not the demand side. The aim of this paper is to provide a new method for estimation of the demand elasticity, based on Bayesian methods applied to the Italian electricity market. We used individual demand bids data in the day-ahead market in the Italian Power Exchange (IPEX, for 2011, in order to construct an aggregate demand function at the hourly level. We took into account the existence of both elastic and inelastic bidders on the demand side. The empirical results show that elasticity varies significantly during the day and across periods of the year. In addition, the elasticity hourly distribution is clearly skewed and more so in the daily hours. The Bayesian method is a useful tool for policy-making, insofar as the regulator can start with a priori historical information on market behavior and estimate actual market outcomes in response to new policy actions.

Forecasting the Electricity Demand and Market Shares in Retail Electricity Market Based on System Dynamics and Markov Chain

OpenAIRE

Qingyou Yan; Chao Qin; Mingjian Nie; Le Yang

2018-01-01

Due to the deregulation of retail electricity market, consumers can choose retail electric suppliers freely, and market entities are facing fierce competition because of the increasing number of new entrants. Under these circumstances, forecasting the changes in all market entities, when market share stabilized, is important for suppliers making marketing decisions. In this paper, a market share forecasting model was established based on Markov chain, and a system dynamics model was construct...

Portfolio optimization in electricity markets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Liu, Min; Wu, Felix F.

2007-01-01

In a competitive electricity market, Generation companies (Gencos) face price risk and delivery risk that affect their profitability. Risk management is an important and essential part in the Genco's decision making. In this paper, risk management through diversification is considered. The problem of energy allocation between spot markets and bilateral contracts is formulated as a general portfolio optimization problem with a risk-free asset and n risky assets. Historical data of the PJM electricity market are used to demonstrate the approach. (author)

Gas and electricity suppliers in front of the end of regulated tariffs. Market predictions and competition analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

This report first proposes an analysis of the gas and electricity markets between 2000 and 2014, and of their perspectives: identification of 8 determining factors to understand the market dynamics, analysis of the activity (electricity and natural gas consumption, electricity and gas distribution among sectors like agriculture, industry, housing, office building, and energy, and prices), and forecast scenario for electricity and natural gas consumption by 2017. The next part analyses the competition and its perspectives: analysis for the electricity and natural gas distribution market, discussion of dynamics and perspectives for different strategic groups. Then, the report proposes an analysis of structural brakes and drivers, and of the main markets (housing, office buildings, industries). The competition context and the involved forces are then discussed. Highlights for the sector and the evolution of supply are then addressed by outlining the improvement of commercial focus, the adaptation of supply with respect to customers, an image-based differentiation, and the development of innovating offers including solutions for energy efficiency. An overview of the competition context is then proposed with sheet providing key data for different types of operators (historical operators, alternative independent operators, foreign energy operators, local suppliers)

Towards a regional electricity market in Southeast Europe

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ichord, R.F. Jr.

2002-01-01

Historical evolution of the region's electric power policy is overviewed. The regional characteristics of Southern Europe's electric power market are summarized. The reform indicators of the region's electricity markets are discussed. The status of privatization is presented. Factors in developing regional electricity market are considered. (R.P.)

Economic evaluation of photovoltaic electric power generation connected to the grid in deregulated electric power markets; Avaliacao economica da geracao de energia eletrica fotovoltaica conectada a rede em mercados eletricos desregulados

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Zumaran, David Richard Orosco

2000-12-01

This work presents an analysis of economic, tariff and regulating issues related to the introduction of Grid Connected Photovoltaic Systems in a deregulated electric market context; a case study for the peruvian electric market is realized. Based on the pricing system of the electric market, it is developed an economic assessment model that can be used by institutions interested in promoting this technology for generating electricity. (author)

Electric glass capturing markets

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Wikman, K.; Wikstroem, T.

1996-11-01

Electric glass has found its place on the construction market. In public buildings, electrically heatable windows are becoming the leading option for large glass walls. Studies on detached houses, both new and renovated, show that floor heating combined with electrically heatable windowpanes is the best choice with respect to resident`s comfort. (orig.)

Using Intelligent System Approaches for Simulation of Electricity Markets

Science.gov (United States)

Hamagami, Tomoki

Significances and approaches of applying intelligent systems to artificial electricity market is discussed. In recent years, with the moving into restructuring of electric system in Japan, the deregulation for the electric market is progressing. The most major change of the market is a founding of JEPX (Japan Electric Power eXchange.) which is expected to help lower power bills through effective use of surplus electricity. The electricity market designates exchange of electric power between electric power suppliers (supplier agents) themselves. In the market, the goal of each supplier agents is to maximize its revenue for the entire trading period, and shows complex behavior, which can model by a multiagent platform. Using the multiagent simulations which have been studied as “artificial market" helps to predict the spot prices, to plan investments, and to discuss the rules of market. Moreover, intelligent system approaches provide for constructing more reasonable policies of each agents. This article, first, makes a brief summary of the electricity market in Japan and the studies of artificial markets. Then, a survey of tipical studies of artificial electricity market is listed. Through these topics, the future vision is presented for the studies.