WorldWideScience

Sample records for qos-enabled double auction

  1. Probabilistic properties of the continuous double auction

    Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

    Šmíd, Martin

    2012-01-01

    Roč. 48, č. 1 (2012), s. 50-82 ISSN 0023-5954 R&D Projects: GA ČR GAP402/10/1610; GA ČR GAP402/10/0956; GA ČR(CZ) GA402/06/1417 Institutional research plan: CEZ:AV0Z10750506 Keywords : continuous double auction * limit order market * distribution Subject RIV: BB - Applied Statistics, Operational Research Impact factor: 0.619, year: 2012 http://library.utia.cas.cz/separaty/2012/E/smid-0372702.pdf

  2. Bidding Strategies in Agent-based Continuous Double Auctions

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    H. Ma (Huiye); H.-F. Leung

    2008-01-01

    htmlabstractOnline auctions are a platform to trade goods on the Internet. In this context, negotiation capabilities for software agents in continuous double auctions (CDAs) are a central concern. Agents need to be able to prepare bids for and evaluate offers on behalf of the users they represent

  3. Convergent Double Auction Mechanism for a Prosumers’ Decentralized Smart Grid

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Tadahiro Taniguchi

    2015-10-01

    Full Text Available In this paper, we propose a novel automated double auction mechanism called convergent linear function submission-based double-auction (CLFS-DA for a prosumers’ decentralized smart grid. The target decentralized smart grid is a regional electricity network that consists of many prosumers that have a battery and a renewable energy-based generator, such as photovoltaic cells. In the proposed double-auction mechanism, each intelligent software agent representing each prosumer submits linear demand and supply functions to an automated regional electricity market where they are registered. It is proven that the CLFS-DA mechanism is guaranteed to obtain one of the global optimal price profiles in addition to it achieving an exact balance between demand and supply, even through the learning period. The proof of convergence is provided on the basis of the theory of LFS-DA, which gives a clear bridge between a function submission-based double auction and a dual decomposition (DD-based real-time pricing procedure. The performance of the proposed mechanism is demonstrated numerically through a simulation experiment.

  4. Understanding Financial Market States Using an Artificial Double Auction Market.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yim, Kyubin; Oh, Gabjin; Kim, Seunghwan

    2016-01-01

    The ultimate value of theories describing the fundamental mechanisms behind asset prices in financial systems is reflected in the capacity of such theories to understand these systems. Although the models that explain the various states of financial markets offer substantial evidence from the fields of finance, mathematics, and even physics, previous theories that attempt to address the complexities of financial markets in full have been inadequate. We propose an artificial double auction market as an agent-based model to study the origin of complex states in financial markets by characterizing important parameters with an investment strategy that can cover the dynamics of the financial market. The investment strategies of chartist traders in response to new market information should reduce market stability based on the price fluctuations of risky assets. However, fundamentalist traders strategically submit orders based on fundamental value and, thereby stabilize the market. We construct a continuous double auction market and find that the market is controlled by the proportion of chartists, Pc. We show that mimicking the real state of financial markets, which emerges in real financial systems, is given within the range Pc = 0.40 to Pc = 0.85; however, we show that mimicking the efficient market hypothesis state can be generated with values less than Pc = 0.40. In particular, we observe that mimicking a market collapse state is created with values greater than Pc = 0.85, at which point a liquidity shortage occurs, and the phase transition behavior is described at Pc = 0.85.

  5. Adaptive Sniping for Volatile and Stable Continuous Double Auction Markets

    Science.gov (United States)

    Toft, I. E.; Bagnall, A. J.

    This paper introduces a new adaptive sniping agent for the Continuous Double Auction. We begin by analysing the performance of the well known Kaplan sniper in two extremes of market conditions. We generate volatile and stable market conditions using the well known Zero Intelligence-Constrained agent and a new zero-intelligence agent Small Increment (SI). ZI-C agents submit random but profitable bids/offers and cause high volatility in prices and individual trader performance. Our new zero-intelligence agent, SI, makes small random adjustments to the outstanding bid/offer and hence is more cautious than ZI-C. We present results for SI in self-play and then analyse Kaplan in volatile and stable markets. We demonstrate that the non-adaptive Kaplan sniper can be configured to suit either market conditions, but no single configuration is performs well across both market types. We believe that in a dynamic auction environment where current or future market conditions cannot be predicted a viable sniping strategy should adapt its behaviour to suit prevailing market conditions. To this end, we propose the Adaptive Sniper (AS) agent for the CDA. AS traders classify sniping opportunities using a statistical model of market activity and adjust their classification thresholds using a Widrow-Hoff adapted search. Our AS agent requires little configuration, and outperforms the original Kaplan sniper in volatile and stable markets, and in a mixed trader type scenario that includes adaptive strategies from the literature.

  6. Understanding Financial Market States Using an Artificial Double Auction Market.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Kyubin Yim

    Full Text Available The ultimate value of theories describing the fundamental mechanisms behind asset prices in financial systems is reflected in the capacity of such theories to understand these systems. Although the models that explain the various states of financial markets offer substantial evidence from the fields of finance, mathematics, and even physics, previous theories that attempt to address the complexities of financial markets in full have been inadequate. We propose an artificial double auction market as an agent-based model to study the origin of complex states in financial markets by characterizing important parameters with an investment strategy that can cover the dynamics of the financial market. The investment strategies of chartist traders in response to new market information should reduce market stability based on the price fluctuations of risky assets. However, fundamentalist traders strategically submit orders based on fundamental value and, thereby stabilize the market. We construct a continuous double auction market and find that the market is controlled by the proportion of chartists, Pc. We show that mimicking the real state of financial markets, which emerges in real financial systems, is given within the range Pc = 0.40 to Pc = 0.85; however, we show that mimicking the efficient market hypothesis state can be generated with values less than Pc = 0.40. In particular, we observe that mimicking a market collapse state is created with values greater than Pc = 0.85, at which point a liquidity shortage occurs, and the phase transition behavior is described at Pc = 0.85.

  7. A New Hybrid Algorithm to Solve Winner Determination Problem in Multiunit Double Internet Auction

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mourad Ykhlef

    2015-01-01

    Full Text Available Solving winner determination problem in multiunit double auction has become an important E-business task. The main issue in double auction is to improve the reward in order to match the ideal prices and quantity and make the best profit for sellers and buyers according to their bids and predefined quantities. There are many algorithms introduced for solving winner in multiunit double auction. Conventional algorithms can find the optimal solution but they take a long time, particularly when they are applied to large dataset. Nowadays, some evolutionary algorithms, such as particle swarm optimization and genetic algorithm, were proposed and have been applied. In order to improve the speed of evolutionary algorithms convergence, we will propose a new kind of hybrid evolutionary algorithm that combines genetic algorithm (GA with particle swarm optimization (PSO to solve winner determination problem in multiunit double auction; we will refer to this algorithm as AUC-GAPSO.

  8. Efficient Double Auction Mechanisms in the Energy Grid with Connected and Islanded Microgrids

    Science.gov (United States)

    Faqiry, Mohammad Nazif

    The future energy grid is expected to operate in a decentralized fashion as a network of autonomous microgrids that are coordinated by a Distribution System Operator (DSO), which should allocate energy to them in an efficient manner. Each microgrid operating in either islanded or grid-connected mode may be considered to manage its own resources. This can take place through auctions with individual units of the microgrid as the agents. This research proposes efficient auction mechanisms for the energy grid, with is-landed and connected microgrids. The microgrid level auction is carried out by means of an intermediate agent called an aggregator. The individual consumer and producer units are modeled as selfish agents. With the microgrid in islanded mode, two aggregator-level auction classes are analyzed: (i) price-heterogeneous, and (ii) price homogeneous. Under the price heterogeneity paradigm, this research extends earlier work on the well-known, single-sided Kelly mechanism to double auctions. As in Kelly auctions, the proposed algorithm implements the bidding without using any agent level private infor-mation (i.e. generation capacity and utility functions). The proposed auction is shown to be an efficient mechanism that maximizes the social welfare, i.e. the sum of the utilities of all the agents. Furthermore, the research considers the situation where a subset of agents act as a coalition to redistribute the allocated energy and price using any other specific fairness criterion. The price homogeneous double auction algorithm proposed in this research ad-dresses the problem of price-anticipation, where each agent tries to influence the equilibri-um price of energy by placing strategic bids. As a result of this behavior, the auction's efficiency is lowered. This research proposes a novel approach that is implemented by the aggregator, called virtual bidding, where the efficiency can be asymptotically maximized, even in the presence of price anticipatory bidders

  9. From Walras’ auctioneer to continuous time double auctions: a general dynamic theory of supply and demand

    Science.gov (United States)

    Donier, J.; Bouchaud, J.-P.

    2016-12-01

    In standard Walrasian auctions, the price of a good is defined as the point where the supply and demand curves intersect. Since both curves are generically regular, the response to small perturbations is linearly small. However, a crucial ingredient is absent of the theory, namely transactions themselves. What happens after they occur? To answer the question, we develop a dynamic theory for supply and demand based on agents with heterogeneous beliefs. When the inter-auction time is infinitely long, the Walrasian mechanism is recovered. When transactions are allowed to happen in continuous time, a peculiar property emerges: close to the price, supply and demand vanish quadratically, which we empirically confirm on the Bitcoin. This explains why price impact in financial markets is universally observed to behave as the square root of the excess volume. The consequences are important, as they imply that the very fact of clearing the market makes prices hypersensitive to small fluctuations.

  10. Double-sided auction mechanism design in electricity based on maximizing social welfare

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zou Xiaoyan

    2009-01-01

    An efficient electricity double-sided auction mechanism should control market power and enhance the social welfare of the electricity market. Based on this goal, the paper designs a new double-sided auction mechanism. In the new mechanism, the social welfare contribution of each participant plays a pivotal role, because this contribution is the critical factor in market clearing, payment settling, and transaction matching rules. In particular, each winner of the auction can gain transfer payments according to his contribution to social welfare in the electricity market, and this gives the mechanism the ability to control the market power of some participants. At the same time, this mechanism ensures that the market organizer balances his budget. We then conduct a theoretical and empirical analysis based on the Spanish electricity market. Both of the results show that compared to the uniform-pricing mechanism, the new mechanism can reduce market power of participants and enhance the social welfare of the electricity market.

  11. A False-name-Proof Double Auction Protocol for Arbitrary Evaluation Values

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sakurai, Yuko; Yokoo, Makoto

    We develop a new false-name-proof double auction protocol called the Generalized Threshold Price Double auction (GTPD) protocol. False-name-proofness generalizes strategy-proofness by incorporating the possibility of false-name bids, e.g., bids submitted using multiple e-mail addresses. An existing protocol called TPD protocol is false-name-proof but can handle only the cases where marginal utilities of each agent always decrease, while our new GTPD protocol can handle arbitrary evaluation values. When marginal utilities can increase, some bids cannot be divided into a single unit (e.g., an all-or-nothing bid). Due to the existence of such indivisible bids, meeting supply/demand becomes difficult. Furthermore, a seller/buyer can submit a false-name-bid by pretending to be a potential buyer/seller to manipulate allocations and payments. In the GTPD protocol, the auctioneer is required to absorb the supply-demand imbalance up to a given upper-bound. Also, the GTPD incorporate a new false-name-proof one-sided auction protocol that is guaranteed to sell/buy a certain number of units. Simulation results show that when the threshold price is set appropriately, this protocol can obtain a good social surplus, and the number of absorbed units is much smaller than the given upper-bound.

  12. Intelligent Continuous Double Auction method For Service Allocation in Cloud Computing

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Nima Farajian

    2013-10-01

    Full Text Available Market-oriented approach is an effective method for resource management because of its regulation of supply and demand and is suitable for cloud environment where the computing resources, either software or hardware, are virtualized and allocated as services from providers to users. In this paper a continuous double auction method for efficient cloud service allocation is presented in which i enables consumers to order various resources (services for workflows and coallocation, ii consumers and providers make bid and request prices based on deadline and workload time and in addition providers can tradeoff between utilization time and price of bids, iii auctioneers can intelligently find optimum matching by sharing and merging resources which result more trades. Experimental results show that proposed method is efficient in terms of successful allocation rate and resource utilization.

  13. Evaluating the impacts of farmers' behaviors on a hypothetical agricultural water market based on double auction

    Science.gov (United States)

    Du, Erhu; Cai, Ximing; Brozović, Nicholas; Minsker, Barbara

    2017-05-01

    Agricultural water markets are considered effective instruments to mitigate the impacts of water scarcity and to increase crop production. However, previous studies have limited understanding of how farmers' behaviors affect the performance of water markets. This study develops an agent-based model to explicitly incorporate farmers' behaviors, namely irrigation behavior (represented by farmers' sensitivity to soil water deficit λ) and bidding behavior (represented by farmers' rent seeking μ and learning rate β), in a hypothetical water market based on a double auction. The model is applied to the Guadalupe River Basin in Texas to simulate a hypothetical agricultural water market under various hydrological conditions. It is found that the joint impacts of the behavioral parameters on the water market are strong and complex. In particular, among the three behavioral parameters, λ affects the water market potential and its impacts on the performance of the water market are significant under most scenarios. The impacts of μ or β on the performance of the water market depend on the other two parameters. The water market could significantly increase crop production only when the following conditions are satisfied: (1) λ is small and (2) μ is small and/or β is large. The first condition requires efficient irrigation scheduling, and the second requires well-developed water market institutions that provide incentives to bid true valuation of water permits.

  14. Emergence of Cooperative Long-Term Market Loyalty in Double Auction Markets.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Alorić, Aleksandra; Sollich, Peter; McBurney, Peter; Galla, Tobias

    2016-01-01

    Loyal buyer-seller relationships can arise by design, e.g. when a seller tailors a product to a specific market niche to accomplish the best possible returns, and buyers respond to the dedicated efforts the seller makes to meet their needs. We ask whether it is possible, instead, for loyalty to arise spontaneously, and in particular as a consequence of repeated interaction and co-adaptation among the agents in a market. We devise a stylized model of double auction markets and adaptive traders that incorporates these features. Traders choose where to trade (which market) and how to trade (to buy or to sell) based on their previous experience. We find that when the typical scale of market returns (or, at fixed scale of returns, the intensity of choice) become higher than some threshold, the preferred state of the system is segregated: both buyers and sellers are segmented into subgroups that are persistently loyal to one market over another. We characterize the segregated state analytically in the limit of large markets: it is stabilized by some agents acting cooperatively to enable trade, and provides higher rewards than its unsegregated counterpart both for individual traders and the population as a whole.

  15. Emergence of Cooperative Long-Term Market Loyalty in Double Auction Markets

    Science.gov (United States)

    Alorić, Aleksandra; Sollich, Peter; McBurney, Peter; Galla, Tobias

    2016-01-01

    Loyal buyer-seller relationships can arise by design, e.g. when a seller tailors a product to a specific market niche to accomplish the best possible returns, and buyers respond to the dedicated efforts the seller makes to meet their needs. We ask whether it is possible, instead, for loyalty to arise spontaneously, and in particular as a consequence of repeated interaction and co-adaptation among the agents in a market. We devise a stylized model of double auction markets and adaptive traders that incorporates these features. Traders choose where to trade (which market) and how to trade (to buy or to sell) based on their previous experience. We find that when the typical scale of market returns (or, at fixed scale of returns, the intensity of choice) become higher than some threshold, the preferred state of the system is segregated: both buyers and sellers are segmented into subgroups that are persistently loyal to one market over another. We characterize the segregated state analytically in the limit of large markets: it is stabilized by some agents acting cooperatively to enable trade, and provides higher rewards than its unsegregated counterpart both for individual traders and the population as a whole. PMID:27120473

  16. A Novel Electricity Transaction Mode of Microgrids Based on Blockchain and Continuous Double Auction

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jian Wang

    2017-11-01

    Full Text Available The installed capacity of distributed generation (DG based on renewable energy sources has increased continuously in power systems, and its market-oriented transaction is imperative. However, traditional transaction management based on centralized organizations has many disadvantages, such as high operation cost, low transparency, and potential risk of transaction data modification. Therefore, a decentralized electricity transaction mode for microgrids is proposed in this study based on blockchain and continuous double auction (CDA mechanism. A buyer and seller initially complete the transaction matching in the CDA market. In view of the frequent price fluctuation in the CDA market, an adaptive aggressiveness strategy is used to adjust the quotation timely according to market changes. DG and consumer exchange digital certificate of power and expenditure on the blockchain system and the interests of consumers are then guaranteed by multi-signature when DG cannot generate power due to failure or other reasons. The digital certification of electricity assets is replaced by the sequence number with specific tags in the transaction script, and the size of digital certification can be adjusted according to transaction energy quantity. Finally, the feasibility of market mechanism through specific microgrid case and settlement process is also provided.

  17. Influence of individual rationality on continuous double auction markets with networked traders

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhang, Junhuan

    2018-04-01

    This paper investigates the influence of individual rationality of buyers and sellers on continuous double auction market outcomes in terms of the proportion of boundedly-rational buyers and sellers. The individual rationality is discussed in a social network artificial stock market model by embedding network formation and information set. Traders automatically select the most profitable trading strategy based on individual and social learning of the profits and trading strategies of themselves and their neighbors, and submit orders to markets. The results show that (i) a higher proportion of boundedly-rational sellers induces a higher market price, higher sellers' profits and a higher market efficiency; (ii) a higher proportion of boundedly-rational sellers induces a lower number of trades and lower buyers' profits; (iii) a higher proportion of boundedly-rational buyers induces a lower market price, a lower number of trades, and lower sellers' profits; (iv) a higher proportion of boundedly-rational buyers induces higher buyers' profits and a higher market efficiency.

  18. A simplified multiattribute procurement auction with postponed scoring by a double revelation mechanism

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Hougaard, Jens Leth; Nielsen, Kurt

    of linear scoring functions, consistent with the principal’s choice given linear preferences. The resulting scoring functions are used to score the original bids. While the highest score wins the second highest score settle the compensation. If the auction results in more than one highest scoring bid......, the Principal ends the auction by selecting the most preferred. The auction provides almost ideal incentives for bidders to reveal prices less than or equal to true cost. In general bidding below true cost involves a risk of getting a oss, nevertheless it may also both increase the chance of winning and result...

  19. Investor structure and the price-volume relationship in a continuous double auction market: An agent-based modeling perspective

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhang, Wei; Bi, Zhengzheng; Shen, Dehua

    2017-02-01

    This paper investigates the impact of investor structure on the price-volume relationship by simulating a continuous double auction market. Connected with the underlying mechanisms of the price-volume relationship, i.e., the Mixture of Distribution Hypothesis (MDH) and the Sequential Information Arrival Hypothesis (SIAH), the simulation results show that: (1) there exists a strong lead-lag relationship between the return volatility and trading volume when the number of informed investors is close to the number of uninformed investors in the market; (2) as more and more informed investors entering the market, the lead-lag relationship becomes weaker and weaker, while the contemporaneous relationship between the return volatility and trading volume becomes more prominent; (3) when the informed investors are in absolute majority, the market can achieve the new equilibrium immediately. Therefore, we can conclude that the investor structure is a key factor in affecting the price-volume relationship.

  20. Auction design for the wireless spectrum market

    CERN Document Server

    Lin, Peng; Zhang, Qian

    2014-01-01

    This Brief introduces the wireless spectrum market and discusses the current research for spectrum auctions. It covers the unique properties of spectrum auction, such as interference relationship, reusability, divisibility, composite effect and marginal effect, while also proposing how to build economic incentives into the network architecture and protocols in order to optimize the efficiency of wireless systems.Three scenarios for designing new auctions are demonstrated. First, a truthful double auction scheme for spectrum trading considering both the heterogeneous propagation properties of c

  1. Auctions API

    Data.gov (United States)

    General Services Administration — GSA Auctions offers Federal personal property assets ranging from common place items (such as office equipment and furniture) to more select products like scientific...

  2. Social Welfare Improvement by TCSC using Real Code Based Genetic Algorithm in Double-Sided Auction Market

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    MASOUM, M. A. S.

    2011-05-01

    Full Text Available This paper presents a genetic algorithm (GA to maximize total system social welfare and alleviate congestion by best placement and sizing of TCSC device, in a double-sided auction market. To introduce more accurate modeling, the valve loading effects is incorporated to the conventional quadratic smooth generator cost curves. By adding the valve point effect, the model presents nondifferentiable and nonconvex regions that challenge most gradient-based optimization algorithms. In addition, quadratic consumer benefit functions integrated in the objective function to guarantee that locational marginal prices charged at the demand buses is less than or equal to DisCos benefit, earned by selling that power to retail customers. The proposed approach makes use of the genetic algorithm to optimal schedule GenCos, DisCos and TCSC location and size, while the Newton-Raphson algorithm minimizes the mismatch of the power flow equations. Simulation results on the modified IEEE 14-bus and 30-bus test systems (with/without line flow constraints, before and after the compensation are used to examine the impact of TCSC on the total system social welfare improvement. Several cases are considered to test and validate the consistency of detecting best solutions. Simulation results are compared to solutions obtained by sequential quadratic programming (SQP approaches.

  3. Poisson-process generalization for the trading waiting-time distribution in a double-auction mechanism

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cincotti, Silvano; Ponta, Linda; Raberto, Marco; Scalas, Enrico

    2005-05-01

    In this paper, empirical analyses and computational experiments are presented on high-frequency data for a double-auction (book) market. Main objective of the paper is to generalize the order waiting time process in order to properly model such empirical evidences. The empirical study is performed on the best bid and best ask data of 7 U.S. financial markets, for 30-stock time series. In particular, statistical properties of trading waiting times have been analyzed and quality of fits is evaluated by suitable statistical tests, i.e., comparing empirical distributions with theoretical models. Starting from the statistical studies on real data, attention has been focused on the reproducibility of such results in an artificial market. The computational experiments have been performed within the Genoa Artificial Stock Market. In the market model, heterogeneous agents trade one risky asset in exchange for cash. Agents have zero intelligence and issue random limit or market orders depending on their budget constraints. The price is cleared by means of a limit order book. The order generation is modelled with a renewal process. Based on empirical trading estimation, the distribution of waiting times between two consecutive orders is modelled by a mixture of exponential processes. Results show that the empirical waiting-time distribution can be considered as a generalization of a Poisson process. Moreover, the renewal process can approximate real data and implementation on the artificial stocks market can reproduce the trading activity in a realistic way.

  4. The CO_2 emission permits market simulation using Continuous Double Auction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bartoszczuk, Pawel; Stanczak, Jaroslaw

    2016-01-01

    In this paper we consider the buying and selling prices of carbon dioxide (CO_2) emission permits in trading models with uncertainty. Permission prices, although usually omitted from standard models, may significantly influence the trading market. We thus construct a more realistic trade model. To do this, we introduced several important changes to the standard model, mainly we added The Continuous Double Action.

  5. The CO{sub 2} emission permits market simulation using Continuous Double Auction

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bartoszczuk, Pawel [Warsaw School of Economics (Poland); Stanczak, Jaroslaw

    2016-07-01

    In this paper we consider the buying and selling prices of carbon dioxide (CO{sub 2}) emission permits in trading models with uncertainty. Permission prices, although usually omitted from standard models, may significantly influence the trading market. We thus construct a more realistic trade model. To do this, we introduced several important changes to the standard model, mainly we added The Continuous Double Action.

  6. Evaluation of PersianCAT Agent's Accepting Policy in Continuous Double Auction, Participant in CAT 2007 Competition

    Science.gov (United States)

    Honari, Sina; Fos-Hati, Amin; Ebadi, Mojtaba; Gomrokchi, Maziar

    As there is a growing tendency towards online auctions, online Multi Agent Systems for economic activities like stock exchanges is more in demand. CAT (CATallactics) competition has produced a great opportunity for researchers since 2007 to put their theories into practice in a real-time economic-based competition, combining traders and brokers. As one of participants, we evaluated our new accepting policy by putting it to challenge. In this paper we give a general overview of one of our policies in the market.

  7. Essays in auction theory

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Maasland, E.

    2012-01-01

    Auction theory is a branch of game theory that considers human behavior in auction markets and the ensuing market outcomes. It is also successfully used as a tool to design real-life auctions. This thesis contains five essays addressing a variety of topics within the realm of auction theory. The

  8. Virtual power plant auctions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ausubel, Lawrence M.; Cramton, Peter

    2010-01-01

    Since their advent in 2001, virtual power plant (VPP) auctions have been implemented widely. In this paper, we describe the simultaneous ascending-clock auction format that has been used for virtually all VPP auctions to date, elaborating on other design choices that most VPP auctions have had in common as well as discussing a few aspects that have varied significantly among VPP auctions. We then evaluate the various objectives of regulators in requiring VPP auctions, concluding that the auctions have been effective devices for facilitating new entry into electricity markets and for developing wholesale power markets. (author)

  9. Virtual power plant auctions

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ausubel, Lawrence M.; Cramton, Peter [Department of Economics, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742 (United States)

    2010-12-15

    Since their advent in 2001, virtual power plant (VPP) auctions have been implemented widely. In this paper, we describe the simultaneous ascending-clock auction format that has been used for virtually all VPP auctions to date, elaborating on other design choices that most VPP auctions have had in common as well as discussing a few aspects that have varied significantly among VPP auctions. We then evaluate the various objectives of regulators in requiring VPP auctions, concluding that the auctions have been effective devices for facilitating new entry into electricity markets and for developing wholesale power markets. (author)

  10. Auction Sale Data

    Data.gov (United States)

    General Services Administration — This dataset contains sale data information for Agency reported items sold via GSA Auctions® Sales. The data is for closed sales during FY2009. GSA Auctions® offers...

  11. Auctions and energy networks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Helm, D.

    2003-01-01

    This article compares and contrasts the traditional planning approach to network investment, the regulatory treatment of capital expenditure within RPI-X price-cap regulation, and the use of auctions. It shows why auctions may be helpful in allocating existing capacity, but can only play a limited role in identifying future investment needs. Auctions cannot determine optimal investment. The application of auctions in the 2001 Transco price review is criticised and an alternative approach proposed. (Author)

  12. The USSO2 Auction

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard; Christensen, J.L.

    1999-01-01

    results showed that the auction generated a clearing price signal lower than the market price. Now the auction price seems to be determined by the outside market price. Still, in the important starting phase, a non-discriminative auction design would probably have generated better price signals since...

  13. Web Auctions in Europe

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    A. Pouloudi; J. Paarlberg; H.W.G.M. van Heck (Eric)

    2001-01-01

    textabstractThis paper argues that a better understanding of the business model of web auctions can be reached if we adopt a broader view and provide empirical research from different sites. In this paper the business model of web auctions is refined into four dimensions. These are auction model,

  14. Papers in auction theory

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Onderstal, A.M.

    2002-01-01

    This thesis is a collection of six papers in auction theory, with several economic applications, both to real life auctions and to other economic phenomena. In the introduction to the thesis, Onderstal argues why auction theory is an important branch of economic theory, and discusses several

  15. Hybrid keyword search auctions

    KAUST Repository

    Goel, Ashish

    2009-01-01

    Search auctions have become a dominant source of revenue generation on the Internet. Such auctions have typically used per-click bidding and pricing. We propose the use of hybrid auctions where an advertiser can make a per-impression as well as a per-click bid, and the auctioneer then chooses one of the two as the pricing mechanism. We assume that the advertiser and the auctioneer both have separate beliefs (called priors) on the click-probability of an advertisement. We first prove that the hybrid auction is truthful, assuming that the advertisers are risk-neutral. We then show that this auction is superior to the existing per-click auction in multiple ways: 1. We show that risk-seeking advertisers will choose only a per-impression bid whereas risk-averse advertisers will choose only a per-click bid, and argue that both kind of advertisers arise naturally. Hence, the ability to bid in a hybrid fashion is important to account for the risk characteristics of the advertisers. 2. For obscure keywords, the auctioneer is unlikely to have a very sharp prior on the click-probabilities. In such situations, we show that having the extra information from the advertisers in the form of a per-impression bid can result in significantly higher revenue. 3. An advertiser who believes that its click-probability is much higher than the auctioneer\\'s estimate can use per-impression bids to correct the auctioneer\\'s prior without incurring any extra cost. 4. The hybrid auction can allow the advertiser and auctioneer to implement complex dynamic programming strategies to deal with the uncertainty in the click-probability using the same basic auction. The per-click and per-impression bidding schemes can only be used to implement two extreme cases of these strategies. As Internet commerce matures, we need more sophisticated pricing models to exploit all the information held by each of the participants. We believe that hybrid auctions could be an important step in this direction. The

  16. Hybrid keyword search auctions

    KAUST Repository

    Goel, Ashish; Munagala, Kamesh

    2009-01-01

    Search auctions have become a dominant source of revenue generation on the Internet. Such auctions have typically used per-click bidding and pricing. We propose the use of hybrid auctions where an advertiser can make a per-impression as well as a per-click bid, and the auctioneer then chooses one of the two as the pricing mechanism. We assume that the advertiser and the auctioneer both have separate beliefs (called priors) on the click-probability of an advertisement. We first prove that the hybrid auction is truthful, assuming that the advertisers are risk-neutral. We then show that this auction is superior to the existing per-click auction in multiple ways: 1. We show that risk-seeking advertisers will choose only a per-impression bid whereas risk-averse advertisers will choose only a per-click bid, and argue that both kind of advertisers arise naturally. Hence, the ability to bid in a hybrid fashion is important to account for the risk characteristics of the advertisers. 2. For obscure keywords, the auctioneer is unlikely to have a very sharp prior on the click-probabilities. In such situations, we show that having the extra information from the advertisers in the form of a per-impression bid can result in significantly higher revenue. 3. An advertiser who believes that its click-probability is much higher than the auctioneer's estimate can use per-impression bids to correct the auctioneer's prior without incurring any extra cost. 4. The hybrid auction can allow the advertiser and auctioneer to implement complex dynamic programming strategies to deal with the uncertainty in the click-probability using the same basic auction. The per-click and per-impression bidding schemes can only be used to implement two extreme cases of these strategies. As Internet commerce matures, we need more sophisticated pricing models to exploit all the information held by each of the participants. We believe that hybrid auctions could be an important step in this direction. The hybrid

  17. Bidding strategies in Brazilian electricity auctions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Azevedo, Erick M.; Correia, Paulo B.

    2006-01-01

    Double bilateral contract auctions for electric energy purchase and sale occur in Brazil. These auctions present incomplete information and possess some subjectivity in relation to the future scenario of the Brazilian electric system, inserted in the agent's bids. In this work, a model using Bayes' rule and the game theory is proposed to aid the agent in its bid definition. Through the existing relations between the Conditional probabilities of Bayes' Rule, the model transforms beliefs into information. In this way, the absence of information is supplied and the problem is transformed into a game with complete information. The present study has no worries in terms of transmission constraints, since they are not usually considered in the bilateral contract auctions in Brazil. At the end, Nash equilibrium (NE) can be found through the expected payoff matrix of each agent. (author)

  18. Discovering the game in auctions

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Kaisers, M.; Tuyls, K.P.; Thuijsman, F.; Parsons, S.; Nijholt, A.; Pantic, M.

    2008-01-01

    Auctions are pervasive in today’s society. They provide a variety of markets, ranging from consumer-toconsumer online auctions to government-to-business auctions for telecommunications spectrum licenses. Starting from a set of trading strategies, this article enables a strategic choice by

  19. A comparison of Candle Auctions and Hard Close Auctions with Common Values

    OpenAIRE

    Sascha Füllbrunn

    2009-01-01

    With this study, we contribute to the literature of auction design by presenting a new auction format: the Candle auction, a popular auction in the Middle Ages. Considering a common value framework, we theoretically and experimentally point out that the Candle auction, where bidding is allowed until a stochastic deadline, yields a better outcome to the seller than the Hard Close auction, the popular eBay online auction format.

  20. The US SO2 Auction

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard; Christensen, Jan Lien

    1998-01-01

    An annual discriminative and revenue-neutral auction is linked to the new Acid Rain Program which allows electric utilities all over the US to trade SO2 emission permits. This innovative SO2 auction distributes 2% of the permits in circulation and takes place at the Chicago Board of Trade. Early...

  1. Premium Auctions and Risk Preferences

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Hu, A.; Offerman, T.J.S.; Zou, L.

    2010-01-01

    In a premium auction, the seller offers some "pay back", called premium, to the highest bidders. This paper investigates how the performance of such premium tactic is related to the participant's risk preferences. By developing an English premium auction model with symmetric interdependent values,

  2. Auctions with competing sellers and behavioral bidders

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Delnoij, J.M.J.

    2016-01-01

    With the rise of the Internet, the use of auctions has become increasingly prevalent. Nowadays, consumers can buy a myriad of goods by means of online auctions – cars, holidays, clothing, sports items, electronics and even lab equipment are auctioned on the Internet. Economists have studied auctions

  3. Auctioning incentive contracts: an experimental study

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Onderstal, S.; van de Meerendonk, A.

    2009-01-01

    In this note, we experimentally examine the relative performance of price-only auctions and multi-attribute auctions. We do so in procurement settings where the buyer can give the winning bidder incentives to exert effort on non-price dimensions after the auction. Both auctions theoretically

  4. Combinatorial Auctions without Money

    Science.gov (United States)

    2014-05-01

    istence of thresholds (a.k.a., critical prices) (for every set). The result in Theorem 3.4 relates to the characterization of truthful CAs with money and no...with money and no verification, each bidder optimizes her valu- ation minus the critical price over all her demanded sets; in the setting without money...auctions. ICALP, pp. 90-101, 2010. [2] P. Briest, P. Krysta, and B. Vöcking. Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design. STOC, pp. 39-48

  5. Advantaged Bidders in Franchise Auctions

    OpenAIRE

    van den Berg, V.A.C.

    2012-01-01

    Consider a government that auctions a franchise for, e.g., an airport, telecommunication network, or utility. Consider an 'incumbent bidder' that owns a complement or substitute. With an auction on the transfer (i.e. payment) to the government, the incumbent is advantaged.If the government regulates the market with an auction on the price asked to consumers, it depends who is advantaged. With complements, the incumbent is advantaged: it can set a lower price on the new franchise, as this inc...

  6. Online learning in repeated auctions

    OpenAIRE

    Weed, Jonathan; Perchet, Vianney; Rigollet, Philippe

    2015-01-01

    Motivated by online advertising auctions, we consider repeated Vickrey auctions where goods of unknown value are sold sequentially and bidders only learn (potentially noisy) information about a good's value once it is purchased. We adopt an online learning approach with bandit feedback to model this problem and derive bidding strategies for two models: stochastic and adversarial. In the stochastic model, the observed values of the goods are random variables centered around the true value of t...

  7. Network capacity auctions: promise and problems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Newbery, David M.

    2003-01-01

    Well-designed auctions work favorably for allocating idiosyncratic properties efficiently. Auctions are used to allocate entry capacity for United Kingdom gas and inter-connector capacity for electricity in several European Union countries and can work well for allocating existing capacity, though careful auction design is needed to mitigate potential market power. Using auction prices to guide investment decisions in networks is problematic if bidders fear that sub-optimal investment will be compensated by regulatory fiat, lowering future capacity values. (Author)

  8. Internet Auction Sellers: Does Size Really Matter?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Halstead, Diane; Becherer, Richard C.

    2003-01-01

    Examines the Internet auction phenomenon as it relates to the marketing mix of online auction sellers. The data indicate that, while there is great diversity among businesses that utilize online auctions, distinct cost leadership and differentiation marketing strategies are both evident. These two approaches are further distinguished in terms of…

  9. China's Land Market Auctions: Evidence of Corruption?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cai, Hongbin; Henderson, J Vernon; Zhang, Qinghua

    2013-01-01

    This paper studies the urban land market in China in 2003-2007. In China, all urban land is owned by the state. Leasehold use rights for land for (re)development are sold by city governments and are a key source of city revenue. Leasehold sales are viewed as a major venue for corruption, prompting a number of reforms over the years. Reforms now require all leasehold rights be sold at public auction. There are two main types of auction: regular English auction and an unusual type which we call a "two stage auction". The latter type of auction seems more subject to corruption, and to side deals between potential bidders and the auctioneer. Absent corruption, theory suggests that two stage auctions would most likely maximize sales revenue for properties which are likely to have relatively few bidders, or are "cold", which would suggest negative selection on property unobservables into such auctions. However, if such auctions are more corruptible, that could involve positive selection as city officials divert hotter properties to a more corruptible auction form. The paper finds that, overall, sales prices are lower for two stage auctions, and there is strong evidence of positive selection. The price difference is explained primarily by the fact that two stage auctions typically have just one bidder, or no competition despite the vibrant land market in Chinese cities.

  10. Experiences with auctions for renewable energy support

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Mora Alvarez, David Fernando; Islam, Marco; Soysal, Emilie Rosenlund

    2017-01-01

    Auctions is an increasingly popular instrument for introducing competitiveness in the support schemes for renewable energy, however, designing successful auctions appears to be a challenge. Policy makers seeking to introduce auctions are faced with a range of design choices, which may affect...

  11. 7 CFR 1955.148 - Auction sales.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... complexity of the sale. When the services of a professional auctioneer are advisable, the services will be... 7 Agriculture 14 2010-01-01 2009-01-01 true Auction sales. 1955.148 Section 1955.148 Agriculture... REGULATIONS (CONTINUED) PROPERTY MANAGEMENT Disposal of Inventory Property General § 1955.148 Auction sales...

  12. Exploring Online Auction Behaviors and Motivations

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jeon, Sua; Crutsinger, Christy; Kim, Haejung

    2008-01-01

    The availability and convenience of the Internet, combined with the variety of products available at any given time, have contributed to the success of online auctions.This exploratory study examined online auction behaviors among college students in an attempt to identify underlying dimensions of auction motivations. Questionnaires completed by…

  13. 40 CFR 73.70 - Auctions.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 40 Protection of Environment 16 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Auctions. 73.70 Section 73.70... ALLOWANCE SYSTEM Auctions, Direct Sales, and Independent Power Producers Written Guarantee § 73.70 Auctions... allowances pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section and § 73.72(q) in the amounts and at the times provided...

  14. Statistical Properties of Online Auctions

    Science.gov (United States)

    Namazi, Alireza; Schadschneider, Andreas

    We characterize the statistical properties of a large number of online auctions run on eBay. Both stationary and dynamic properties, like distributions of prices, number of bids etc., as well as relations between these quantities are studied. The analysis of the data reveals surprisingly simple distributions and relations, typically of power-law form. Based on these findings we introduce a simple method to identify suspicious auctions that could be influenced by a form of fraud known as shill bidding. Furthermore the influence of bidding strategies is discussed. The results indicate that the observed behavior is related to a mixture of agents using a variety of strategies.

  15. Dynamic spectrum auction in wireless communication

    CERN Document Server

    Chen, Yanjiao

    2015-01-01

    This brief explores current research on dynamic spectrum auctions, focusing on fundamental auction theory, characteristics of the spectrum market, spectrum auction architecture and possible auction mechanisms. The brief explains how dynamic spectrum auctions, which enable new users to gain spectrum access and existing spectrum owners to obtain financial benefits, can greatly improve spectrum efficiency by resolving the artificial spectrum shortage. It examines why operators and users face significant challenges due to specialty of the spectrum market and the related requirements imposed on the auction mechanism design. Concise and up-to-date, Dynamic Spectrum Auction in Wireless Communication is designed for researchers and professionals in computer science or electrical engineering. Students studying networking will also find this brief a valuable resource.

  16. Spite and Reciprocity in Auctions

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Yoshikazu Ikeda

    2011-09-01

    Full Text Available The paper presents a complete information model of bidding in second price sealed-bid and ascending-bid (English auctions, in which potential buyers know the unit valuation of other bidders and may spitefully prefer that their rivals earn a lower surplus. Bidders with spiteful preferences should overbid in equilibrium when they know their rival has a higher value than their own, and bidders with a higher value underbid to reciprocate the spiteful overbidding of the lower value bidders. The model also predicts different bidding behavior in second price as compared to ascending-bid auctions. The paper also presents experimental evidence broadly consistent with the model. In the complete information environment, lower value bidders overbid more than higher value bidders, and they overbid more frequently in the second price auction than in the ascending price auction. Overall, the lower value bidder submits bids that exceed value about half the time. These patterns are not found in the incomplete information environment, consistent with the model.

  17. Combinatorial auctions for electronic business

    Indian Academy of Sciences (India)

    R. Narasimhan (Krishtel eMaging) 1461 1996 Oct 15 13:05:22

    (6) Information feedback: An auction protocol may be a direct mechanism or an .... transparency of allocation decisions arise in resolving these ties. .... bidding, however more recently, combinatorial bids are allowed [50] making ...... Also, truth revelation and other game theoretic considerations are not taken into account.

  18. Auctions for coastal energy resources

    Science.gov (United States)

    Griffin, Robert M.

    It is becoming increasingly common to allocate public resources to the private sector for the purpose of developing these resources. One of the earliest uses of auctions in the U.S. for allocating rights to public resources was in the offshore oil and gas industry. The U.S. Federal government, through the Department of Interior (DOI), has used auctions to allocate development rights to offshore oil and gas resources to the private sector since the 1950's. Since then many things have changed. Oil and gas markets have gone through boom and bust cycles, giant technological advances in extraction and assessment have taken place, and alternative energy based in the coastal zone is now in demand in markets as well. There has been an enormous amount of research into the drivers of bidder behavior in auctions and optimal auction design in the last 60 years as well. Throughout all of this, the DOI has continued to use basically the same exact auction design to allocate oil and gas leases. The U.S. offshore oil and gas resources sold by the Department of Interior have accounted for more than $65 billion in revenue since the program started. These offshore resources are an important source of government revenue and national wealth. Additionally, the expansion of the energy sector offshore has enormous potential for electricity generation in the U.S., estimated by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory as approaching 54 gigawatts by 2030 (U.S. Department of Energy, 2008). Taken together, the DOI controls access to a large part of the future of energy in the U.S. The research herein assesses the auction formats used to allocate both fossil fuels and renewable resources on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). The first manuscript looks at the current method used by the DOI to allocate oil and gas leases on the OCS, and is primarily interested in how bidders behave in this environment. Using latent class estimation techniques to separate distinct bidding behavior in a laboratory

  19. Declarative Specification of Fault Tolerant Auction Protocols: The English Auction Case Study

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Dragoni, Nicola; Gaspari, Mauro

    2012-01-01

    Auction mechanisms are nowadays widely used in electronic commerce Web sites for buying and selling items among different users. The increasing importance of auction protocols in the negotiation phase is not limited to online marketplaces. In fact, the wide applicability of auctions as resource‐a...... about the specification of an English Auction protocol which tolerate crashes of bidding agents and we discuss its properties....

  20. Bidding behavior in a symmetric Chinese auction

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mauricio Benegas

    2015-01-01

    Full Text Available This paper purposes a symmetric all-pay auction where the bidders compete neither for an object nor the object itself but for a lottery on receive. That lottery is determined endogenously through the bids. This auction is known as chance auction or more popularly as Chinese auction. The model considers the possibility that for some bidders the optimal strategy is to bid zero and to rely on luck. It showed that bidders become less aggressive when the lottery satisfies a variational condition. It was also shown that luck factor is decisive to determine if the expected payoff in Chinese auction is bigger or smaller than expected payoff in standard all-pay auction.

  1. 40 CFR 73.73 - Delegation of auctions and sales and termination of auctions and sales.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 40 Protection of Environment 16 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Delegation of auctions and sales and termination of auctions and sales. 73.73 Section 73.73 Protection of Environment ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION... Independent Power Producers Written Guarantee § 73.73 Delegation of auctions and sales and termination of...

  2. Electronic Reverse Auctions in the Federal Government

    Science.gov (United States)

    2007-12-01

    notification e-mail to all vendors informing them that a solicitation was issued that matches their company profile. A notification will also be sent...auction design. According to Kambil and van Heck (2002) business-to-business ( B2B ) auctions should be conducted on the weekdays, with enough time...allowed for proper pricing and risk-assessment by the company . In contrast, sellers on eBay may decide to run their auctions for any length of time

  3. Auctions of capacity in network industries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stern, J.; Turvey, R.

    2003-01-01

    This paper provides an introduction to the key issues arising for auctions of network capacity including (i) the ability of auctions to handle long-run capacity expansion issues as well as short run capacity allocation; (ii) the definition of 'capacity' on networks; (iii) auction revenues and revenue reallocation to regulated network operators; and (iv) alternative market-based mechanisms to provide signals for capacity expansion. The paper covers some simple analytics before introducing various complications such as the use of auctions in complex networks. The paper discusses implications and provides a context within which to consider the other papers in this issue of Utilities Policy. (Author)

  4. Pre-Auction Offers in Asymmetric First-Price and Second-Price Auctions

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kirkegaard, René; Overgaard, Per Baltzer

    We consider “must-sell” auctions with asymmetric buyers. First, we study auctions with two asymmetric buyers, where the distribution of valuations of the strong buyer is “stretched” relative to that of the weak buyer. Then, it is known that ineffcient first-price auctions aremore profitable...... never increase the profitability of second-price auctions, since they introduce the wrong kind of favoritism from the perspective of seller profits....... for the seller than effcient second-price auctions. This is because the former favor the weak buyer. However, we show that the seller can do one better by augmenting the first-price auction by a pre-auction offer made exclusively to the strong buyer. Should thestrong buyer reject the offer, the object is simply...

  5. 7 CFR 29.36 - Auction market.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Auction market. 29.36 Section 29.36 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Standards, Inspections, Marketing... INSPECTION Regulations Definitions § 29.36 Auction market. A place to which tobacco is delivered by the...

  6. Online Reverse Auctions for Procurement of Services

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    U.L. Radkevitch (Uladzimir)

    2008-01-01

    textabstractOnline reverse auctions, in which a buyer seeks to select a supplier and suppliers compete for contracts by bidding online, revolutionized corporate procurement early this century. Shortly after they had been pioneered by General Electric, many companies rushed to adopt reverse auctions

  7. Auctioned IPOs : The U.S. Evidence

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Degeorge, F.; Derrien, F.; Womack, K.L.

    2009-01-01

    Between 1999 and 2007, WR Hambrecht has completed 19 IPOs in the U.S. using an auction mechanism. We analyze investor behavior and mechanism performance in these auctioned IPOs using detailed bidding data. The existence of some bids posted at high prices suggests that some investors (mostly retail)

  8. An Agent-Based Auction Protocol on Mobile Devices

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Yu-Fang Chung

    2014-01-01

    Full Text Available This paper proposes an English auction protocol to preserve a secure, fair, and effective online auction environment, where the operations are integrated with mobile agent technology for bidders participating in online auctions. The protocol consists of four participants, namely, registration manager, agent house, auction house, and bidder.

  9. Effects of Suboptimal Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions

    Science.gov (United States)

    Schneider, Stefan; Shabalin, Pasha; Bichler, Martin

    Though the VCG auction assumes a central place in the mechanism design literature, there are a number of reasons for favoring iterative combinatorial auction designs. Several promising ascending auction formats have been developed throughout the past few years based on primal-dual and subgradient algorithms and linear programming theory. Prices are interpreted as a feasible dual solution and the provisional allocation is interpreted as a feasible primal solution. iBundle( 3) (Parkes and Ungar 2000), dVSV (de Vries et al. 2007) and the Ascending Proxy auction (Ausubel and Milgrom 2002) result in VCG payoffs when the coalitional value function satisfies the buyer submodularity condition and bidders bid straightforward, which is an expost Nash equilibrium in that case. iBEA and CreditDebit auctions (Mishra and Parkes 2007) do not even require the buyer submodularity condition and achieve the same properties for general valuations. In many situations, however, one cannot assume bidders to bid straightforward and it is not clear from the theory how these non-linear personalized price auctions (NLPPAs) perform in this case. Robustness of auctions with respect to different bidding behavior is therefore a critical issue for any application. We have conducted a large number of computational experiments to analyze the performance of NLPPA designs with respect to different bidding strategies and different valuation models. We compare the results of NLPPAs to those of the VCG auction and those of iterative combinatorial auctions with approximate linear prices, such as ALPS (Bichler et al. 2009) and the Combinatorial Clock auction (Porter et al. 2003).

  10. The US SO{sub 2} AUCTION: A policy recommendation for future auctions

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Christensen, J.L.; Thinggaard Svendsen, G

    1998-07-01

    An annual discriminative and revenue-neutral auction is linked to the new Acid Rain Program which allows electric utilities all over the US to trade SO2 emission permits. This innovative SO2 auction distributes 2% of the permits in circulation and takes place at the Chicago Board of Trade. Early results showed that the auction generated a clearing price signal lower than the market price. Now the auction price seems to be determined by the outside market price. Still, in the important starting phase, a non-discriminative auction design would probably have generated better price signals since potentially severe downward biases in both seller price offers and buyer bids are due to the discriminative feature of the EPA auction. (au) 30 refs.

  11. The US SO{sub 2} AUCTION: A policy recommendation for future auctions

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Christensen, J.L.; Thinggaard Svendsen, G.

    1998-12-31

    An annual discriminative and revenue-neutral auction is linked to the new Acid Rain Program which allows electric utilities all over the US to trade SO2 emission permits. This innovative SO2 auction distributes 2% of the permits in circulation and takes place at the Chicago Board of Trade. Early results showed that the auction generated a clearing price signal lower than the market price. Now the auction price seems to be determined by the outside market price. Still, in the important starting phase, a non-discriminative auction design would probably have generated better price signals since potentially severe downward biases in both seller price offers and buyer bids are due to the discriminative feature of the EPA auction. (au) 30 refs.

  12. The US SO2 AUCTION: A policy recommendation for future auctions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Christensen, J.L.; Thinggaard Svendsen, G.

    1998-01-01

    An annual discriminative and revenue-neutral auction is linked to the new Acid Rain Program which allows electric utilities all over the US to trade SO2 emission permits. This innovative SO2 auction distributes 2% of the permits in circulation and takes place at the Chicago Board of Trade. Early results showed that the auction generated a clearing price signal lower than the market price. Now the auction price seems to be determined by the outside market price. Still, in the important starting phase, a non-discriminative auction design would probably have generated better price signals since potentially severe downward biases in both seller price offers and buyer bids are due to the discriminative feature of the EPA auction. (au) 30 refs

  13. Second best efficiency and the English auction

    Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

    Hernando-Veciana, Á.; Michelucci, Fabio

    2011-01-01

    Roč. 73, č. 2 (2011), s. 496-506 ISSN 0899-8256 Institutional research plan: CEZ:AV0Z70850503 Keywords : auctions * efficiency * mechanism design Subject RIV: AH - Economics Impact factor: 0.829, year: 2011

  14. Former Auctioneer Finds Voice After Aphasia

    Science.gov (United States)

    ... Aphasia Follow us Former Auctioneer Finds Voice After Aphasia Speech impairment changed his life One unremarkable September ... 10 Tips for Communicating with Someone who has Aphasia Talk to them in a quiet, calm, relaxed ...

  15. Auctioning access to networks: evidence and expectations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McDaniel, T.

    2003-01-01

    Under very strict assumptions the outcomes that make common auction designs theoretically attractive can be expected to emerge: goods will go to those who value them most and the allocation will maximize revenue for the auctioneer. In network industries such as electricity, gas, telecommunications, rail, and airlines where agents are of different sizes and incumbency these assumptions do not always apply for a number of reasons. For example, the auctioned product may be an intermediate good, bidders are not symmetric with respect to values and information, markets are mixed, and property rights are hard to define. We discuss why it is not straightforward to make theoretical predictions about expected outcomes for these industries and use the British gas industry to discuss the importance of competition and scarcity for auctions of network capacity. (Author)

  16. Empirical Analysis of Competition in Procurement Auctions

    OpenAIRE

    Tukiainen, Janne

    2008-01-01

    A vast amount of public services and goods are contracted through procurement auctions. Therefore it is very important to design these auctions in an optimal way. Typically, we are interested in two different objectives. The first objective is efficiency. Efficiency means that the contract is awarded to the bidder that values it the most, which in the procurement setting means the bidder that has the lowest cost of providing a service with a given quality. The second objective is to maximize ...

  17. Multidimensional procurement auctions with unknown weights

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Greve, Thomas

    This paper studies the consequences of holding a procurement auction when the principal chooses not to show its preferences. My paper extends the procurement auction model of Che (1993) to a situation where both the principal and the agents have private information. Thus, unknown parameters of bo...... gives rise to an analysis of a principal that can not fully commit to the outcome induced by the scoring rule. Therefore, my result apply to contract theory and it’s problems with imperfect commitment....

  18. 77 FR 38803 - Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Updated Data For Auction 901

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-06-29

    ... FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION [AU Docket No. 12-25; DA 12-990] Mobility Fund Phase I Auction... files of census blocks eligible for the Mobility Fund Phase I support to be offered in Auction 901... 32092, May 31, 2012, the Bureaus described how they identified census blocks eligible for the Mobility...

  19. Simulating the Effectiveness of an Alternative Salary Auction Mechanism

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Tan, Pei Yin

    2006-01-01

    ... the incentive of bidders to submit a truthful valuation of the jobs. An alternative auction mechanism that combined elements of both auction theory and matching was proposed to overcome these complications...

  20. Auctioning emission permits in a leader-follower setting

    OpenAIRE

    Alvarez, Francisco; André, Francisco J.

    2015-01-01

    We analise emission permit auctions under leader-follower competition when the leader bids strategically and the follower acts as price-taker both at the auction and the secondary market. We obtain linear equilibrium bidding strategies for both firms and a unique equilibrium of the auction, which is optimal ex-post for the leader. Under specific distributional assumptions we conclude that the auction always awards less permits to the leader than the cost-effective amount. Our central result i...

  1. Experiments with the auction algorithm for the shortest path problem

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Larsen, Jesper; Pedersen, Ib

    1999-01-01

    The auction approach for the shortest path problem (SPP) as introduced by Bertsekas is tested experimentally. Parallel algorithms using the auction approach are developed and tested. Both the sequential and parallel auction algorithms perform significantly worse than a state-of-the-art Dijkstra-l......-like reference algorithm. Experiments are run on a distributed-memory MIMD class Meiko parallel computer....

  2. The US SO2 Auction: Analysis and Generalization

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard; Christensen, J.L.

    1999-01-01

    results showed that the auction generated a clearing price signal lower than the market price. Now the auction price seems to be determined by the outside market price. Still, in the important starting phase, a non-discriminative auction design would probably have generated better price signals since...

  3. Static vs Dynamic Auctions with Ambiguity Averse Bidders

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Carvalho, M.

    2012-01-01

    Abstract: This paper presents the outcome of a dynamic price-descending auction when the distribution of the private values is uncertain and bidders exhibit ambiguity aversion. In contrast to sealed-bid auctions, in open auctions the bidders get information about the other bidders' private values

  4. Keeping out Trojan horses: auctions and bankruptcy in the laboratory

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Onderstal, S.; van der Veen, A.

    2011-01-01

    If a government auctions the right to market a good, continuity is likely to be of significant importance. In a laboratory experiment, we compare the effects of bidders' limited liability in the first-price sealed-bid auction and the English auction in a common value setting. Our data strongly

  5. Making uncompetitive auctions competitive: a survey of experiments

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Offerman, T.; Onderstal, S.; Hinloopen, J.; Normann, H.-T.

    2009-01-01

    In the past 15 years, governments around the world have often used auctions to sell scarce licenses to operate in markets. In many of these auctions, the number of interested competitors is relatively small compared to the number of available licenses. Auction design is crucial in such uncompetitive

  6. Selling pictures: the illustrated auction catalogue

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Elizabeth Pergam

    2014-12-01

    Full Text Available This essay is based upon a survey of reproductions in auction catalogues – from their first appearance in the early eighteenth century until their more consistent use in the second decade of the twentieth century. Examining the role of these illustrations sheds light on how auctions functioned; it was not just the works of art that were traded, but knowledge about those works of art became currency to be exchanged. In contrast to the high end engravings and photographs of luxury illustrated art books, reproductions in auction catalogues – publications produced as ephemeral marketing tools – were of noticeably lower quality. This study of the status of reproductions, therefore, investigates the evolving understanding of art knowledge, both aesthetic and economic, and the interdependence of the market and connoisseurship.

  7. Auction game in electric power market place

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kumar, J.; Sheble, G.

    1996-01-01

    The power industry in the US is presently an evolving changing business environment. While planning to meet future peak demand is still a concern, the efficient utilization of existing generation and transmission resources is fast becoming a primary interest. This interest suggests a move from cost-based market operations to price based market operations. Auction market structure is one of the various ways to perform price based operation. Such a market place would be very new and challenging to all players of the electric power industry. This paper describes an overview of the new business environment. The paper presents a detailed description of the auction game. The trading objectives in the bidding game are defined. The framework of auction process is described by defining the rules to play the game. Finally, strategies for market players are discussed

  8. License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers

    OpenAIRE

    Wolfstetter, Elmar; Giebe, Thomas

    2007-01-01

    This paper revisits the licensing of a non–drastic process innovation by an outside innovator to a Cournot oligopoly. We propose a new mechanism that combines a restrictive license auction with royalty licensing. This mechanism is more profitable than standard license auctions, auctioning royalty contracts, fixed–fee licensing, pure royalty licensing, and two-part tariffs. The key features are that royalty contracts are auctioned and that losers of the auction are granted the option to si...

  9. The US SO2 Auction and Environmental Regulation

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard; Christensen, J.L.

    1999-01-01

    The US Acid Rain Program (ARP) is now well-established. The ARP relies on tradable permits and includes an annual revenue-neutral SO2 auction. Has this auction been an important factor in establishing low transaction costs and a successful market? In answering this question, we first compare...... the price signals from the SO2 auction to those found in the market. Second, we try to explain empirical outcomes by analyzing strategic incentives and the number of buyers and sellers in the auction. The policy recommendation is that the non-discriminative SO2 auction is a very useful tool for kick...

  10. China’s Land Market Auctions: Evidence of Corruption?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cai, Hongbin; Henderson, J. Vernon; Zhang, Qinghua

    2013-01-01

    This paper studies the urban land market in China in 2003—2007. In China, all urban land is owned by the state. Leasehold use rights for land for (re)development are sold by city governments and are a key source of city revenue. Leasehold sales are viewed as a major venue for corruption, prompting a number of reforms over the years. Reforms now require all leasehold rights be sold at public auction. There are two main types of auction: regular English auction and an unusual type which we call a “two stage auction”. The latter type of auction seems more subject to corruption, and to side deals between potential bidders and the auctioneer. Absent corruption, theory suggests that two stage auctions would most likely maximize sales revenue for properties which are likely to have relatively few bidders, or are “cold”, which would suggest negative selection on property unobservables into such auctions. However, if such auctions are more corruptible, that could involve positive selection as city officials divert hotter properties to a more corruptible auction form. The paper finds that, overall, sales prices are lower for two stage auctions, and there is strong evidence of positive selection. The price difference is explained primarily by the fact that two stage auctions typically have just one bidder, or no competition despite the vibrant land market in Chinese cities. PMID:25506125

  11. Auction Mechanism of Micro-Grid Project Transfer

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Yong Long

    2017-10-01

    Full Text Available Micro-grid project transfer is the primary issue of micro-grid development. The efficiency and quality of the micro-grid project transfer directly affect the quality of micro-grid project construction and development, which is very important for the sustainable development of micro-grid. This paper constructs a multi-attribute auction model of micro-grid project transfer, which reflects the characteristics of micro-grid system and the interests of stakeholders, calculates the optimal bidding strategy and analyzes the influence of relevant factors on auction equilibrium by multi-stage dynamic game with complete information, and makes a numerical simulation analysis. Results indicate that the optimal strategy of auction mechanism is positively related to power quality, energy storage quality, and carbon emissions. Different from the previous lowest price winning mechanism, the auction mechanism formed in this paper emphasizes that the energy suppliers which provide the comprehensive optimization of power quality, energy storage quality, carbon emissions, and price will win the auction, when both the project owners and energy suppliers maximize their benefits under this auction mechanism. The auction mechanism is effective because it is in line with the principle of individual rationality and incentive compatibility. In addition, the number of energy suppliers participating in the auction and the cost of the previous auction are positively related to the auction equilibrium, both of which are adjusting the equilibrium results of the auction. At the same time, the utilization rate of renewable energy and the comprehensive utilization of energy also have a positive impact on the auction equilibrium. In the end, this paper puts forward a series of policy suggestions about micro-grid project auction. The research in this paper is of great significance to improve the auction quality of micro-grid projects and promote the sustainable development of micro-grid.

  12. Implementation of Auctions for Renewable Energy Support in Poland: a Case Study

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kitzing, Lena; Wendring, Paul

    This report deals with the planned implementation of auctions for Renewable Energy support in Poland from 2016 onwards. The report focuses on the implementation process and provides the necessary background information. Furthermore the planned auction design is described and discussed both from...... criteria, of appropriate auction formats and suitable design elements for RES auctions, as well as the analysis of past auction implementations....

  13. An Auction Market for Journal Articles

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Prüfer, J.; Zetland, D.

    2007-01-01

    Economic articles are published very slowly. We believe this results from the poor incentives referees face. We recommend that an auction market replace the current, push system for submitting papers and demonstrate that our proposed market has a stable, Pareto-improving equilibrium. Besides the

  14. Lessons from the Electricity Auctions in Brazil

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dutra, Joisa; Menezes, Flavio

    2005-01-01

    The first lesson to emerge from the recent auctions falls within a category that might be described as 'higher costs of reforms in developing economies.' These range from bidders' fears of future government-imposed price caps to technical issues, such as the potential loss of efficiency resulting from bidders' lack of knowledge about ceiling prices, reference supply, and the demand reduction mechanism

  15. Privacy-Enhancing Auctions Using Rational Cryptography

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Miltersen, Peter Bro; Nielsen, Jesper Buus; Triandopoulos, Nikolaos

    2009-01-01

    show how to use rational cryptography to approximately implement any given ex interim individually strictly rational equilibrium of such an auction without a trusted mediator through a cryptographic protocol that uses only point-to-point authenticated channels between the players. By “ex interim...

  16. Balloon popping with applications to ascending auctions

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    N.S. Immorlica (Nicole Simone); A. Karlin; M. Mahdian (Mohammad); K. Talwar; A. Sinclair

    2007-01-01

    textabstractWe study the power of ascending auctions in a scenario in which a seller is selling a collection of identical items to anonymous unit-demand bidders. We show that even with full knowledge of the set of bidders' private valuations for the items, if the bidders are ex-ante identical, no

  17. An Auction Market for Journal Articles

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Prüfer, J.; Zetland, D.

    2007-01-01

    Economic articles are published very slowly. We believe this results mainly from the poor incentives referees face. We recommend that an auction market replace the current system for submitting papers and demonstrate a strict Pareto-improvement of equilibrium. Besides the benefits of speed, this

  18. 7 CFR 46.25 - Auction sales.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Auction sales. 46.25 Section 46.25 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Standards, Inspections, Marketing Practices), DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE MARKETING OF PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES REGULATIONS (OTHER...

  19. Reserve price: Lessons learned from Brazilian electricity procurement auctions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rego, Erik Eduardo

    2013-01-01

    Auctions have been used in several formats in the electric energy industry. In general, regulators may be uncomfortable initiating a reverse auction at a higher-than-expected final price, fearing that participants may sell their energy at an excess profitability. Nevertheless, evidence from electricity procurement auctions conducted in Brazil supports the findings that these types of auctions have the opposite effect. By attracting a larger number of agents, these auctions can trigger stronger competition and lead to lower settlement pricing. Accordingly, the Brazilian cases examined in this article present significant evidence to support this directional theory. In fact, there are some cases of electricity procurement auctions that show that inadequate auction reserve pricing leads to inefficient outcomes and may also cause the auction to fail. On the other hand, auctions with adequate price caps have led to lower final clearing prices, thus contributing to reasonable final energy pricing. - Highlights: • Outcomes from Brazilian electricity procurement auctions were analyzed. • Cases of success and frustration after adopting (in)adequate reserve prices. • Setting different price caps per source is inefficient. • Higher-than-normal price cap is more effective than fine-tuning reserve prices

  20. Auction-based bandwidth allocation in the Internet

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wei, Jiaolong; Zhang, Chi

    2002-07-01

    It has been widely accepted that auctioning which is the pricing approach with minimal information requirement is a proper tool to manage scare network resources. Previous works focus on Vickrey auction which is incentive compatible in classic auction theory. In the beginning of this paper, the faults of the most representative auction-based mechanisms are discussed. And then a new method called uniform-price auction (UPA), which has the simplest auction rule is proposed and it's incentive compatibility in the network environment is also proved. Finally, the basic mode is extended to support applications which require minimum bandwidth guarantees for a given time period by introducing derivative market, and a market mechanism for network resource allocation which is predictable, riskless, and simple for end-users is completed.

  1. Common Agency and Coordinated Bids in Sponsored Search Auctions

    OpenAIRE

    Maris Goldmanis; Antonio Penta; Francesco Decarolis

    2012-01-01

    As auctions are becoming the main mechanism for selling advertisement space on the web, marketing agencies specialized in bidding in online auctions are proliferating. We analyze theoretically how bidding delegation to a common marketing agency can undermine both revenues and efficiency of the generalized second price auction, the format used by Google and Microsoft-Yahoo!. Our characterization allows us to quantify the revenue losses relative to both the case of full competition and the case...

  2. Essays on wholesale auctions in deregulated electricity markets

    Science.gov (United States)

    Baltaduonis, Rimvydas

    2007-12-01

    The early experience in the restructured electric power markets raised several issues, including price spikes, inefficiency, security, and the overall relationship of market clearing prices to generation costs. Unsatisfactory outcomes in these markets are thought to have resulted in part from strategic generator behaviors encouraged by inappropriate market design features. In this dissertation, I examine the performance of three auction mechanisms for wholesale power markets - Offer Cost Minimization auction, Payment Cost Minimization auction and Simple-Offer auction - when electricity suppliers act strategically. A Payment Cost Minimization auction has been proposed as an alternative to the traditional Offer Cost Minimization auction with the intention to solve the problem of inflated wholesale electricity prices. Efficiency concerns for this proposal were voiced due to insights predicated on the assumption of true production cost revelation. Using a game theoretic approach and an experimental method, I compare the two auctions, strictly controlling for the level of unilateral market power. A specific feature of these complex-offer auctions is that the sellers submit not only the quantities and the minimum prices that they are willing to sell at, but also the start-up fees, which are designed to reimburse the fixed start-up costs of the generation plants. I find that the complex structure of the offers leaves considerable room for strategic behavior, which consequently leads to anti-competitive and inefficient market outcomes. In the last chapter of my dissertation, I use laboratory experiments to contrast the performance of two complex-offer auctions against the performance of a simple-offer auction, in which the sellers have to recover all their generation costs - fixed and variable - through a uniform market-clearing price. I find that a simple-offer auction significantly reduces consumer prices and lowers price volatility. It mitigates anti-competitive effects

  3. The Role of Signals in Online Auction Purchase Decisions

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Cypryjański Jacek

    2015-06-01

    Full Text Available There is a growing interest in behavioural economics contradicting the empirical prediction of rational choice theory once applied to online auctions. The issue is of particular relevance due to the large use of online auctions and the anticipated growth in the future. Online auctions combine the conventional auction model with information technology. However, information asymmetry within such auctions causes risks and uncertainties that influence consumer purchase intentions. The research investigates online consumers’ behaviour. The Authors suggest that due to the high perceived risk of the online buying process consumers are prompted to use cues of seller’ reputation. In a series of six experiments conducted via the auction site Allegro.pl in Poland a number of signals from auction web pages has been manipulated to influence purchase intention. The results suggest that several signals can be used to stimulate online customers’ behaviour. The results of these experiments indicate that buyers are more susceptible to the influence of “visual” signals than signals that require greater involvement of the buyer (to read information. The conducted experiments contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of online auction users’ behaviour. And finally it provides some managerial implications to increase online auction effectiveness from the seller’s perspective.

  4. Statistical mechanics of budget-constrained auctions

    OpenAIRE

    Altarelli, F.; Braunstein, A.; Realpe-Gomez, J.; Zecchina, R.

    2009-01-01

    Finding the optimal assignment in budget-constrained auctions is a combinatorial optimization problem with many important applications, a notable example being the sale of advertisement space by search engines (in this context the problem is often referred to as the off-line AdWords problem). Based on the cavity method of statistical mechanics, we introduce a message passing algorithm that is capable of solving efficiently random instances of the problem extracted from a natural distribution,...

  5. Set-Asides and Subsidies in Auctions

    OpenAIRE

    Susan Athey; Dominic Coey; Jonathan Levin

    2011-01-01

    Set-asides and subsidies are used extensively in government procurement and natural resource sales. We analyze these policies in an empirical model of U.S. Forest Service timber auctions. The model fits the data well both within the sample of unrestricted sales where we estimate the model, and when we predict (out of sample) bidder entry and prices for small business set-asides. Our estimates suggest that restricting entry to small businesses substantially reduces efficiency and revenue, alth...

  6. Three essays on corruption and auctions

    OpenAIRE

    PAPIOTI, Katerina Chara

    2014-01-01

    Defence date: 1 December 2014 Examining Board: Professor Massimo Morelli, Bocconi University, Supervisor; Professor Andrea Mattozzi, EUI; Professor Marco Celentani, Universidad Carlos III; Professor Matthias Dahm, University of Nottingham. This thesis contributes to the understanding of corruption and auctions. It consists of three chapters focusing on diverse aspects of these two general topics as well as their combinations, from an applied microeconomic theory perspective: (i) the eff...

  7. Auction-theoretic analyses of the first offshore wind energy auction in Germany

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kreiss, J.; Ehrhart, K.-M.; Hanke, A.-K.

    2017-11-01

    The first offshore wind energy auction in Germany led to a striking result. The average award price was 0.44 ct/kWh and even more interesting, 3 out of 4 awarded projects had a strike price of 0.0 ct/kWh. That implies that those projects will only receive the actual wholesale market price for electricity as revenue. Although there has been a strong decline in costs of offshore wind projects, such a result is still surprising. We analyzed this result auction-theoretically and showed how the auction design and the market environment can explain part of the outcome. However, another aspect of the explanation is the high risk that the awarded bidders take regarding the future development of both the project costs and the wholesale market price.

  8. A Classroom Auction with Externalities: Applied to Mergers and Acquisitions

    Science.gov (United States)

    Meister, J. Patrick; Anderson, Kyle J.

    2007-01-01

    The authors describe an in-class exercise in which students participate in an auction to buy US Airways. The exercise is based on events of late 1995, in which neither United nor American Airlines decided to bid for US Airways. Two teams of students participate in an English auction. Students learn that the equilibrium of the sequential game is…

  9. A Trustworthy Internet Auction Model with Verifiable Fairness.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Liao, Gen-Yih; Hwang, Jing-Jang

    2001-01-01

    Describes an Internet auction model achieving verifiable fairness, a requirement aimed at enhancing the trust of bidders in auctioneers. Analysis results demonstrate that the proposed model satisfies various requirements regarding fairness and privacy. Moreover, in the proposed model, the losing bids remain sealed. (Author/AEF)

  10. Multi-Attribute Vickrey Auctions when Utility Functions are Unknown

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Máhr, T.; De Weerdt, M.M.

    2006-01-01

    Multi-attribute auctions allow negotiations over multiple attributes besides price. For example in task allocation, service providers can define their service by means of multiple attributes, such as quality of service, deadlines, or delay penalties. Auction mechanisms assume that the players have

  11. On the efficiency of the first price auction

    Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

    Hernando-Veciana, Á.; Michelucci, Fabio

    2017-01-01

    Roč. 156, July (2017), s. 159-161 ISSN 0165-1765 Institutional support: Progres-Q24 Keywords : efficiency * first price auction * english auction Subject RIV: AH - Economics OBOR OECD: Economic Theory Impact factor: 0.558, year: 2016

  12. Towards Formal Analysis of Insider Threats for Auctions

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kammueller, Florian; Kerber, Manfred; Probst, Christian W.

    2016-01-01

    is meaningful to prove correctness and scrutinize vulnerability to security and privacy attacks. Surveying the threats in auctions and insider collusions, we present an approach to model and analyze auction protocols for insider threats using the interactive theorem prover Isabelle. As a case study, we use...

  13. Approximating the Qualitative Vickrey Auction by a Negotiation Protocol

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hindriks, Koen V.; Tykhonov, Dmytro; de Weerdt, Mathijs

    A result of Bulow and Klemperer has suggested that auctions may be a better tool to obtain an efficient outcome than negotiation. For example, some auction mechanisms can be shown to be efficient and strategy-proof. However, they generally also require that the preferences of at least one side of the auction are publicly known. However, sometimes it is very costly, impossible, or undesirable to publicly announce such preferences. It thus is interesting to find methods that do not impose this constraint but still approximate the outcome of the auction. In this paper we show that a multi-round multi-party negotiation protocol may be used to this end if the negotiating agents are capable of learning opponent preferences. The latter condition can be met by current state of the art negotiation technology. We show that this protocol approximates the theoretical outcome predicted by a so-called Qualitative Vickrey auction mechanism (even) on a complex multi-issue domain.

  14. 77 FR 57085 - Mobility Fund Phase I Auction; Release of Files with Recalculated Road Miles for Auction 901...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-09-17

    ... FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION [AU Docket No. 12-25; DA 12-1446] Mobility Fund Phase I Auction... Mobility Fund Phase I support to be offered in Auction 901, which is to be held on September 27, 2012, and..., 77 FR 32092, May 31, 2012, the Bureaus identified census blocks eligible for the Mobility Fund Phase...

  15. Intelligent Personalized Trading Agents that facilitate Real-time Decisionmaking for Auctioneers and Buyers in the Dutch Flower Auctions

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    W. Ketter (Wolfgang); H.W.G.M. van Heck (Eric); R.A. Zuidwijk (Rob)

    2010-01-01

    textabstractIn this case the Dutch Flower Auctions (DFA) are discussed. The DFA are part of the supply network in which flowers are produced, stocked, and then sold through either mediation or auctioning. This case focuses on the buyers’ and auctioneers’ positions when flowers are traded through

  16. DOUBLE ORAL AUCTIONS AND TENDENCIES TOWARD MORAL HAZARD

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Kubák Matúš

    2012-12-01

    Full Text Available Moral hazard can be found almost in all fields of human activities. Moral hazard is a change of economic agent´s behaviour when circumstances change. Theoretical background of moral hazard issue in economics dates back to 1970s. Recognition of moral hazard started by published studies of Pauly (Pauly 1968, Zeckhauser (Zeckhauser 1970, Arrow (Arrow 1971 and Mirrlees (Mirrlees 1999. Current situation of the global economy (fall 2011 was caused largely by moral hazard executed by authorities such as governments, institutions, ranking agencies, banks, chief executive officers, politicians etc. Efforts to stabilise Eurozone, governments bail-outs to banks, governments purchases of toxic assets, rescue packages given to the bank sector and big companies, which are “too big to fail”, rescue packages given to debtor nations, golden parachutes given to employees which are leaving companies are nothing but the manifestations of moral hazard in economic and politic reality. This paper uses an economic experiment with 96 subjects to examine the tendencies of economic agents towards moral hazard. Design of the experiment allowed simulating third party’s intervention on a market (e.g. state funding accelerating purchase, health care insurance function on the market with health care. Obtained data are statistically evaluated and it is shown, that economic agents incline to moral hazard in case, when it is possible. Study shows how rational agents became less rational in terms of average market price, after intervention of a third party on the market. Third party intervention raises the average market prices presenting a manifestation of moral hazard. It is shown, that under given assumptions, even rational economic agents diverge from rational and market efficient strategies and behave irresponsibly. Despite generally negative attitude towards moral hazard, it is shown that economic agents have tendencies to behave in such a manner. During experiment we observed robust deviation in equilibrium market price before and after the third party intervention.

  17. Implementation of Auctions for Renewable Energy Support in the Netherlands and Denmark: A cooperation case study

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Gephart, Malte; Kitzing, Lena; Tiedeman, Silvana

    This report deals with the potential implementation of opened auctions for Renewable Energy support in the Netherlands from 2017 on. The report focuses on the implementation process and provides the necessary background information. Furthermore the planned auction design is described and discussed...... of success criteria, of appropriate auction formats and suitable design elements for RES auctions, as well as the analysis of past auction implementations....

  18. Brazilian experience in electricity auctions: Comparing outcomes from new and old energy auctions as well as the application of the hybrid Anglo-Dutch design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rego, Erik Eduardo; Parente, Virginia

    2013-01-01

    Since 2004, the Government of Brazil (GoB) has acted as an intermediary between distribution and generator companies in the energy procurement sector. The GoB procures energy from generator companies through auctions of long-term energy contracts. After an auction, the winning generator companies sign contracts directly with distribution companies. In particular, the GoB runs two different auctions: one for energy from existing power plants (i.e., old energy) and another for energy from power plants that have not yet been built (i.e., new energy). This paper describes these auctions and compares the outcomes from the old and new energy auctions from 2004 to 2010 using final auction prices. The Brazilian case is particularly interesting, not only because energy is predominantly supplied by hydropower plants but also because new energy auctions reach prices below those for old energy. Therefore, it is likely that it is not necessary to run the two different energy auctions. As a secondary objective, this article analyze whether the Anglo-Dutch hybrid auction model is a better design for electricity procurement in Brazil. - Highlights: ► We analyze the outcomes from the Brazilian old and new energy auctions. ► We evaluate the Anglo-Dutch auction design. ► Outcomes from both kind of auctions reveal that the prices are statistically similar. ► One kind of auction increase competition and minimize Eletrobras' market power

  19. Rationality, irrationality and escalating behavior in lowest unique bid auctions.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Radicchi, Filippo; Baronchelli, Andrea; Amaral, Luís A N

    2012-01-01

    Information technology has revolutionized the traditional structure of markets. The removal of geographical and time constraints has fostered the growth of online auction markets, which now include millions of economic agents worldwide and annual transaction volumes in the billions of dollars. Here, we analyze bid histories of a little studied type of online auctions--lowest unique bid auctions. Similarly to what has been reported for foraging animals searching for scarce food, we find that agents adopt Lévy flight search strategies in their exploration of "bid space". The Lévy regime, which is characterized by a power-law decaying probability distribution of step lengths, holds over nearly three orders of magnitude. We develop a quantitative model for lowest unique bid online auctions that reveals that agents use nearly optimal bidding strategies. However, agents participating in these auctions do not optimize their financial gain. Indeed, as long as there are many auction participants, a rational profit optimizing agent would choose not to participate in these auction markets.

  20. The inherent inefficiency of simultaneously feasible financial transmission rights auctions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Deng, Shi-Jie; Oren, Shmuel; Meliopoulos, A.P.

    2010-01-01

    Empirical evidence from the New York ISO shows that the clearing prices for point-to-point congestion revenue rights, also known as financial transmission rights (FTRs), resulting from centralized auctions conducted by Independent System Operators differ significantly and systematically from the realized congestion revenues that determine the accrued payoffs of these rights. The question addressed by this paper is whether such deviations are due to price discovery errors which will eventually vanish or due to inherent inefficiencies in the auction structure. We show that even with perfect foresight of average congestion rents the clearing prices for the FTRs depend on the bid quantity and therefore may not be priced correctly in the financial transmission right (FTR) auction. In particular, we prove that quantity limits on the FTR bids may cause the auction clearing prices to differ from the bid prices. This phenomenon which is inherent in the theoretical properties of the optimization algorithm used to clear the auction, is further illustrated through numerical simulations with test systems. We conclude that price discovery alone would not remedy the discrepancy between the auction prices and the realized values of the FTRs. Secondary markets or frequent reconfiguration auctions are necessary in order to achieve such convergence. (author)

  1. Rationality, irrationality and escalating behavior in lowest unique bid auctions.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Filippo Radicchi

    Full Text Available Information technology has revolutionized the traditional structure of markets. The removal of geographical and time constraints has fostered the growth of online auction markets, which now include millions of economic agents worldwide and annual transaction volumes in the billions of dollars. Here, we analyze bid histories of a little studied type of online auctions--lowest unique bid auctions. Similarly to what has been reported for foraging animals searching for scarce food, we find that agents adopt Lévy flight search strategies in their exploration of "bid space". The Lévy regime, which is characterized by a power-law decaying probability distribution of step lengths, holds over nearly three orders of magnitude. We develop a quantitative model for lowest unique bid online auctions that reveals that agents use nearly optimal bidding strategies. However, agents participating in these auctions do not optimize their financial gain. Indeed, as long as there are many auction participants, a rational profit optimizing agent would choose not to participate in these auction markets.

  2. Rationality, Irrationality and Escalating Behavior in Lowest Unique Bid Auctions

    Science.gov (United States)

    Radicchi, Filippo; Baronchelli, Andrea; Amaral, Luís A. N.

    2012-01-01

    Information technology has revolutionized the traditional structure of markets. The removal of geographical and time constraints has fostered the growth of online auction markets, which now include millions of economic agents worldwide and annual transaction volumes in the billions of dollars. Here, we analyze bid histories of a little studied type of online auctions – lowest unique bid auctions. Similarly to what has been reported for foraging animals searching for scarce food, we find that agents adopt Lévy flight search strategies in their exploration of “bid space”. The Lévy regime, which is characterized by a power-law decaying probability distribution of step lengths, holds over nearly three orders of magnitude. We develop a quantitative model for lowest unique bid online auctions that reveals that agents use nearly optimal bidding strategies. However, agents participating in these auctions do not optimize their financial gain. Indeed, as long as there are many auction participants, a rational profit optimizing agent would choose not to participate in these auction markets. PMID:22279553

  3. Optimize-and-Dispatch Architecture for Expressive Ad Auctions

    OpenAIRE

    Parkes, David C.; Sandholm, Tuomas

    2005-01-01

    Ad auctions are generating massive amounts of revenue for online search engines such as Google. Yet, the level of expressiveness provided to participants in ad auctions could be significantly enhanced. An advantage of this could be improved competition and thus improved revenue to a seller of the right to advertise to a stream of search queries. In this paper, we outline the kinds of expressiveness that one might expect to be useful for ad auctions and introduce a high-level “optimize-and-...

  4. Bandwidth auction for SVC streaming in dynamic multi-overlay

    Science.gov (United States)

    Xiong, Yanting; Zou, Junni; Xiong, Hongkai

    2010-07-01

    In this paper, we study the optimal bandwidth allocation for scalable video coding (SVC) streaming in multiple overlays. We model the whole bandwidth request and distribution process as a set of decentralized auction games between the competing peers. For the upstream peer, a bandwidth allocation mechanism is introduced to maximize the aggregate revenue. For the downstream peer, a dynamic bidding strategy is proposed. It achieves maximum utility and efficient resource usage by collaborating with a content-aware layer dropping/adding strategy. Also, the convergence of the proposed auction games is theoretically proved. Experimental results show that the auction strategies can adapt to dynamic join of competing peers and video layers.

  5. Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Yeon-Koo Che

    2006-03-01

    Full Text Available This paper develops a methodology for characterizing expected revenue from auctions when bidders' types come from an arbitrary distribution. In particular, types may be multidimensional, and there may be mass points in the distribution. One application extends existing revenue equivalence results. Another application shows that first-price auctions yield higher expected revenue than second-price auctions when bidders are risk averse and face financial constraints. This revenue ranking extends to risk-averse bidders with general forms of non-expected utility preferences.

  6. Auction fever: exploring informational social influences on bidder choices.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chen, Yi-Fen

    2011-01-01

    Previous investigations of herd behavior have identified the importance of informational social influences in consumer decision making. This research presents three studies examining herd behavior in online auctions. The three studies addressed the influence on bidder online choices of herd cues frequently found in online auctions, including bid number, feedback ratings, and number of questions and answers. This research also investigated the effect of different levels of herd cues on bidder online choices under high and low brand awareness in online auctions. The experimental results demonstrated that bidders use online herd cues when making decisions in online auctions. Additionally, different levels of herd cues influence bidder online choices in both high and low brand awareness product situations.

  7. Hiding information in open auctions with jump bids

    Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

    Ettinger, D.; Michelucci, Fabio

    2016-01-01

    Roč. 126, č. 594 (2016), s. 1484-1502 ISSN 0013-0133 Institutional support: RVO:67985998 Keywords : hiding information * open auctions * jump bids Subject RIV: AH - Economics Impact factor: 2.608, year: 2016

  8. An ascending multi-item auction with financially constrained bidders

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Gerard van der Laan

    2016-12-01

    Full Text Available Several heterogeneous items are to be sold to a group of potentially budget- constrained bidders. Every bidder has private knowledge of his own valuation of the items and his own budget. Due to budget constraints, bidders may not be able to pay up to their values and typically no Walrasian equilibrium exists. To deal with such markets, we propose the notion of 'equilibrium under allotment' and develop an ascending auction mechanism that always finds such an equilibrium assignment and a corresponding system of prices in finite time. The auction can be viewed as a novel generalization of the ascending auction of Demange et al. (1986 from settings without financial constraints to settings with financial constraints. We examine various strategic and efficiency properties of the auction and its outcome.

  9. Hiding information in open auctions with jump bids

    Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

    Ettinger, D.; Michelucci, Fabio

    2016-01-01

    Roč. 126, č. 594 (2016), s. 1484-1502 ISSN 0013-0133 Institutional support: PRVOUK-P23 Keywords : hiding information * open auctions * jump bids Subject RIV: AH - Economics Impact factor: 2.608, year: 2016

  10. Online Reverse Auctions: A Pricing Tool for Government Contracting

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Roll, Bruce

    2000-01-01

    Reverse Auctions (RA) are the next gene ration of procurement application software designed to link acquisition reform and common DoD procurement business processes with commercial best practices and advances in electronic commerce...

  11. Mediators as the Walrasian Auctioneers of Exchange Theory

    OpenAIRE

    Dickenson, David

    2003-01-01

    This article opens up mediation to systematic economic analysis by considering mediators as analogous to the Walrasian auctioneers of exchange theory. By altering trade-off rates among bargaining issues, mediators facilitate a process leading towards Pareto efficient voluntary settlements.

  12. Bounded Rationality at Large: Technological Standards in Airwaves Auctions

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Bruggeman, J.P.; Visser, Hendrik Jan; Visser, H.J.; van Rossum, Wouter

    2003-01-01

    In industries characterized by several technological standards, each with positive network externalities, competition is different from industries with technologically "loosely coupled" organizations. We therefore expected that in airwaves auctions for mobile telephony in the U.S., network

  13. Team Organization Method Using Salary Auction Game for Sustainable Motivation

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Sangkyun Kim

    2015-10-01

    Full Text Available In performing team-based projects in engineering class, students usually face many problems, such as free-riding, lack of responsibility, boredom, and insufficient initiative. This papers proposes a new method for performing team-based projects in engineering class—specifically, a gamified method for team organization using a salary auction game. On the description of the design and use of a salary auction game in engineering class, a case study conducted using a survey method is reported to validate the practical value of the proposed auction game. The salary auction game proposed in this paper demonstrates that a gamified team organization method in engineering class could be used as an effective tool to enhance motivation and to improve learning outcomes of engineering students.

  14. Lower costs as a result of auctioning of emission rights

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    De Bruyn, S.; Davidson, M.; Korteland, M.

    2008-01-01

    According to economic theory auctioning of emission allowances is not more efficient than free allocation. Free allocation of emission allowances in Europe involves product subsidy, thus removing the incentive for emission reduction. [mk] [nl

  15. Statistical mechanics of budget-constrained auctions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Altarelli, F; Braunstein, A; Realpe-Gomez, J; Zecchina, R

    2009-01-01

    Finding the optimal assignment in budget-constrained auctions is a combinatorial optimization problem with many important applications, a notable example being in the sale of advertisement space by search engines (in this context the problem is often referred to as the off-line AdWords problem). On the basis of the cavity method of statistical mechanics, we introduce a message-passing algorithm that is capable of solving efficiently random instances of the problem extracted from a natural distribution, and we derive from its properties the phase diagram of the problem. As the control parameter (average value of the budgets) is varied, we find two phase transitions delimiting a region in which long-range correlations arise

  16. Statistical mechanics of budget-constrained auctions

    Science.gov (United States)

    Altarelli, F.; Braunstein, A.; Realpe-Gomez, J.; Zecchina, R.

    2009-07-01

    Finding the optimal assignment in budget-constrained auctions is a combinatorial optimization problem with many important applications, a notable example being in the sale of advertisement space by search engines (in this context the problem is often referred to as the off-line AdWords problem). On the basis of the cavity method of statistical mechanics, we introduce a message-passing algorithm that is capable of solving efficiently random instances of the problem extracted from a natural distribution, and we derive from its properties the phase diagram of the problem. As the control parameter (average value of the budgets) is varied, we find two phase transitions delimiting a region in which long-range correlations arise.

  17. Auction dynamics: A volume constrained MBO scheme

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jacobs, Matt; Merkurjev, Ekaterina; Esedoǧlu, Selim

    2018-02-01

    We show how auction algorithms, originally developed for the assignment problem, can be utilized in Merriman, Bence, and Osher's threshold dynamics scheme to simulate multi-phase motion by mean curvature in the presence of equality and inequality volume constraints on the individual phases. The resulting algorithms are highly efficient and robust, and can be used in simulations ranging from minimal partition problems in Euclidean space to semi-supervised machine learning via clustering on graphs. In the case of the latter application, numerous experimental results on benchmark machine learning datasets show that our approach exceeds the performance of current state-of-the-art methods, while requiring a fraction of the computation time.

  18. Potential benefits of selling by auction the CIP 6 energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Campidoglio, C.

    2000-01-01

    This paper analyses the potential benefits of selling by auction the CIP 6 energy. This would both reduce the supply shortage and the prices on the eligible market, increase competition on the contract-for-difference market, indicate a clear price to which regulated energy charges could be indexed, thus extending the auction benefits to the franchise market to avoid the reintroduction of cross-subsidies [it

  19. Least-Present-Value-of-Revenue Auctions and Highway Franchising

    OpenAIRE

    Eduardo M.R.A. Engel; Ronald D. Fischer; Alexander Galetovic

    1998-01-01

    In recent years several countries have started massive highway franchising programs auctioned to private firms. In these auctions, the regulator typically sets the franchise term and firms bid on tolls, or, alternatively, the regulator sets tolls and the winner is the firm that asks for the shortest franchise term. In this paper we argue that many of the problems that highway franchises have encountered are due to the fact that the franchise term cannot adjust to demand realizations. We propo...

  20. The Pollution Effect: Optimizing Keyword Auctions by Favoring Relevant Advertising

    OpenAIRE

    Linden, Greg; Meek, Christopher; Chickering, Max

    2011-01-01

    Most search engines sell slots to place advertisements on the search results page through keyword auctions. Advertisers offer bids for how much they are willing to pay when someone enters a search query, sees the search results, and then clicks on one of their ads. Search engines typically order the advertisements for a query by a combination of the bids and expected clickthrough rates for each advertisement. In this paper, we extend a model of Yahoo's and Google's advertising auctions to inc...

  1. Auctions for Renewable Support in Denmark:Instruments and lessons learnt

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kitzing, Lena; Wendring, Paul; Wigan, Fabian

    This report deals with all past and ongoing auctions for renewable support in Denmark. Since 2004, five single-item, technology-specific offshore wind auctions were held, with one more currently ongoing. One multi-item, multi-site nearshore wind auction is currently ongoing.......This report deals with all past and ongoing auctions for renewable support in Denmark. Since 2004, five single-item, technology-specific offshore wind auctions were held, with one more currently ongoing. One multi-item, multi-site nearshore wind auction is currently ongoing....

  2. Vickrey Auctions in Practice: From Nineteenth-Century Philately to Twenty-First-Century E-Commerce

    OpenAIRE

    David Lucking-Reiley

    2000-01-01

    William Vickrey (1961) proposed an auction mechanism in which bidders submit sealed bids, and the highest bidder wins the good in return for payment of the second-highest bid amount. For decades, economists have credited Vickrey with inventing this auction format, and have believed that the Vickrey auction is rarely used in practice. This paper presents evidence that Vickrey auctions have long been the predominant auction format for mail sales of collectible postage stamps. Stamp auctioneers ...

  3. To be or not to be an auctioneer: Some thoughts on the legal nature of online eBay auctions and the protection of consumers

    OpenAIRE

    Riefa, C

    2008-01-01

    This paper discusses the legal classification of online “eBay” auctions. The discussion has key implications on the scope of consumer protection law as sale by auctions are, for example, excluded from the scope of the Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 2000. The paper uncovers that online “eBay” auctions cannot always be considered as traditional auctions and that eBay, as an intermediary, is not to be considered as an auctioneer. This creates difficulties associated with a di...

  4. Competition in decentralized electricity markets: Three papers on electricity auctions

    Science.gov (United States)

    Harbord, David William Cameron

    This thesis consists of three self-contained papers on the analysis of electricity auctions written over a period of twelve years. The first paper models price competition in a decentralized wholesale market for electricity as a first-price, sealed-bid, multi-unit auction. In both the pure and mixed-strategy equilibria of the model, above marginal cost pricing and inefficient despatch of generating units occur. An alternative regulatory pricing rule is considered and it is shown that offering to supply at marginal cost can be induced as a dominant strategy for all firms. The second paper analyses strategic interaction between long-term contracts and price competition in the British electricity wholesale market, and confirms that forward contracts will tend to put downward pressure on spot market prices. A 'strategic commitment' motive for selling forward contracts is also identified: a generator may commit itself to bidding lower prices into the spot market in order to ensure that it will be despatched with its full capacity. The third paper characterizes bidding behavior and market outcomes in uniform and discriminatory electricity auctions. Uniform auctions result in higher average prices than discriminatory auctions, but the ranking in terms of productive efficiency is ambiguous. The comparative effects of other market design features, such as the number of steps in suppliers' bid functions, the duration of bids and the elasticity of demand are analyzed. The paper also clarifies some methodological issues in the analysis of electricity auctions. In particular we show that analogies with continuous share auctions are misplaced so long as firms are restricted to a finite number of bids.

  5. Auction design for the allocation of carbon emission allowances: uniform or discriminatory price?

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Cong, Ronggang; wei, yi-ming

    2010-01-01

    Only four states used auction in Phase Ⅰ (2005-2007) of the European Union Emission Trading System, of which four used a uniform-price sealed auction format. Here we discuss whether the auction should adopt a uniform-price or discriminatory-price format using an agent-based carbon allowances...... auction model established for the purpose. The main conclusions are as follows: (1) when carbon allowances are relatively scarce, the government should use a discriminatory-price auction; when carbon allowances are relatively abundant, the government should use a uniform-price auction. (2) Uncertainty......) The uniform-price auction is relatively insensitive to market structure. However, a monopoly market is more likely to develop under the discriminatory-price auction format. The results of the model have some policy implications for designing carbon market mechanisms in the future....

  6. Auctionable fixed transmission rights for congestion management

    Science.gov (United States)

    Alomoush, Muwaffaq Irsheid

    the transaction by the ISO, take a decision to expand the existing system, or retain the original structure of the system. Also, the thesis investigates the impact of wheeling transactions on congestion management, where we present a generalized mathematical model for the Fixed Transmission Right (FTR) auction. The auction guarantees FTR availability to all participants on a non-discriminatory basis, in which system users are permitted to buy, sell and trade FTRs through an auction. When FTRs are utilized with LMPs, they increase the efficient use of the transmission system and let a transmission customer gain advantageous features such as acquiring a mechanism to offset the extra cost due to congestion charges, providing financial and operational certainty and making system users pay for the actual use of the congested paths. The thesis also highlighted FTR trading in secondary markets to self-arrange access across different paths, create long-term transmission rights and provide more commercial certainty.

  7. Repo auction formats, bidders' behaviour and money market response in India

    OpenAIRE

    Singh, Bhupal; Dhal, Sarat C.

    1998-01-01

    The treasury securities repo-auction is an important instrument for central banks in managing liquidity and sending interest rate signal to the money market. In the Indian context, the repo-auctions have been used actively in the post-reform period. The present study illustrates the money market reaction to repo-auctions and points out whether such reaction is consistent with applied auction rules. The policy implications are analysed in the light of alternative rules pertaining to discrimina...

  8. The supply function equilibrium and its policy implications for wholesale electricity auctions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Holmberg, Paer; Newbery, David

    2010-01-01

    The supply function equilibrium provides a game-theoretic model of strategic bidding in oligopolistic wholesale electricity auctions. This paper presents an intuitive account of current understanding and shows how welfare losses depend on the number of firms in the market and their asymmetry. Previous results and general recommendations for divisible-good/multi-unit auctions provides guidance on the design of the auction format, setting the reservation price, the rationing rule, and restrictions on the offer curves in wholesale electricity auctions. (author)

  9. 77 FR 9655 - Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Updated List of Potentially Eligible Census Blocks

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-02-17

    ... FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION [AU Docket No. 12-25; DA 12-187] Mobility Fund Phase I Auction.... DATES: Pursuant to the Auction 901 (Mobility Fund Phase I) Comment Public Notice, 77 FR 7152, February... 9, 2012. ADDRESSES: Pursuant to the Auction 901 (Mobility Fund Phase I) Comment Public Notice, 77 FR...

  10. Experimental comparison of impact of auction format on carbon allowance market

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Cong, Ronggang; Wei, Yi-Ming

    2012-01-01

    auction and English clock auction) with heterogeneous bidders (coal power plants and gas power plants) from four perspectives (carbon price, auction efficiency, demand withholding and fluctuations in power supplies). Possibilities of collusion among bidders and impacts of allowance banking and penalty...

  11. How to Organize Sequential Auctions : Results of a Natural Experiment by Christie's

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Ginsburgh, V.; van Ours, J.C.

    2003-01-01

    In empirical studies of sequential auctions of identical objects prices have been found to decline.We study auctions of ancient Chinese porcelain recovered from shipwrecks.In these auctions there are very long sequences of lots of identical objects.We find that the average price decline is smaller

  12. Effective Spend Management Through Electronic Reverse Auction Configurations

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mojmír Prídavok

    2013-07-01

    Full Text Available The purpose of the paper is to analyz wide range of possible auction strategies and configurations of eRA, with respect to the ever changing market conditions. Electronic reverse auction (eRA represents an electronic sourcing method of competitive bidding among a number of qualified suppliers. Theory assumes that eRA represents pure market environment with information perfectly distributed between both buyers and suppliers. Although initial eRA cost savings in B2B could be as high as 40%, without deeper knowledge of different auctions strategies and configurations, additional cost reductions are not possible. To identify crucial determinant, the statistical (correlation analysis on the data set of more than 18.000 auction items with different configuration parameters was conducted. Findings suggest that the more bidders are invited to the eRA, the better results could be expected. Additionally, the complexity of the eRA parameterization does not seem to influent the success of the eRA. These results can influence usage and SW development of eRA application in real environment. This research extends already realized studies in the field of electronic auctions for the B2B processes

  13. Application for Single Price Auction Model (SPA) in AC Network

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wachi, Tsunehisa; Fukutome, Suguru; Chen, Luonan; Makino, Yoshinori; Koshimizu, Gentarou

    This paper aims to develop a single price auction model with AC transmission network, based on the principle of maximizing social surplus of electricity market. Specifically, we first formulate the auction market as a nonlinear optimization problem, which has almost the same form as the conventional optimal power flow problem, and then propose an algorithm to derive both market clearing price and trade volume of each player even for the case of market-splitting. As indicated in the paper, the proposed approach can be used not only for the price evaluation of auction or bidding market but also for analysis of bidding strategy, congestion effect and other constraints or factors. Several numerical examples are used to demonstrate effectiveness of our method.

  14. A Pareto Optimal Auction Mechanism for Carbon Emission Rights

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mingxi Wang

    2014-01-01

    Full Text Available The carbon emission rights do not fit well into the framework of existing multi-item auction mechanisms because of their own unique features. This paper proposes a new auction mechanism which converges to a unique Pareto optimal equilibrium in a finite number of periods. In the proposed auction mechanism, the assignment outcome is Pareto efficient and the carbon emission rights’ resources are efficiently used. For commercial application and theoretical completeness, both discrete and continuous markets—represented by discrete and continuous bid prices, respectively—are examined, and the results show the existence of a Pareto optimal equilibrium under the constraint of individual rationality. With no ties, the Pareto optimal equilibrium can be further proven to be unique.

  15. Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ghosh, Gagan Pratap

    In my dissertation, I investigate the effects of budget-constraints in multi-unit auctions. This is done in three parts. First, I analyze a case where all bidders have a common budget constraint. Precisely, I analyze an auction where two units of an object are sold at two simultaneous, sealed bid, first-price auctions, to bidders who have demand for both units. Bidders differ with respect to their valuations for the units. All bidders have an identical budget constraint which binds their ability to spend in the auction. I show that if valuation distribution is atom-less, then their does not exist any symmetric equilibrium in this auction game. In the second and third parts of my thesis, I analyze the sale of licenses for the right to drill for oil and natural gas in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) of the United States. These sales are conducted using simultaneous sealed-bid first-price auctions for multiple licenses, each representing a specific area (called a tract). Using aspects of observed bidding-behavior, I first make a prima facie case that bidders are budget-constrained in these auctions. In order to formalize this argument, I develop a simple extension of the standard model (where bidders differ in their valuations for the objects) by incorporating (random) budgets for the bidders. The auction-game then has a two-dimensional set of types for each player. I study the theoretical properties of this auction, assuming for simplicity that two units are being sold. I show that this game has an equilibrium in pure strategies that is symmetric with respect to the players and with respect to the units. The strategies are essentially pure in the sense that each bidder-type has a unique split (up to a permutation) of his budget between the two auctions. I then characterize the equilibrium in terms of the bid-distribution and iso-bid curves in the value-budget space. I derive various qualitative features of this equilibrium, among which are: (1) under mild

  16. Multi-Dimensional Customer Data Analysis in Online Auctions

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    LAO Guoling; XIONG Kuan; QIN Zheng

    2007-01-01

    In this paper, we designed a customer-centered data warehouse system with five subjects: listing, bidding, transaction,accounts, and customer contact based on the business process of online auction companies. For each subject, we analyzed its fact indexes and dimensions. Then take transaction subject as example,analyzed the data warehouse model in detail, and got the multi-dimensional analysis structure of transaction subject. At last, using data mining to do customer segmentation, we divided customers into four types: impulse customer, prudent customer, potential customer, and ordinary customer. By the result of multi-dimensional customer data analysis, online auction companies can do more target marketing and increase customer loyalty.

  17. Retailers and consumers in sequential auctions of collectibles

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Vincent Lyk-Jensen, Stéphanie; Chanel, Olivier

    2007-01-01

    We analyse an independent private-value model, where heterogeneous bidders compete for objects sold in sequential second-price auctions. In this heterogeneous game, bidders may have differently distributed valuations, and some have multi-unit demand with decreasing marginal values (retailers......); others have a specific single-unit demand (consumers). By examining equilibrium bidding strategies and price sequences, we show that the presence of consumers leads to more aggressive bidding from the retailers on average and heterogeneous bidders is a plausible explanation of the price decline effect....... The study of the expected revenue of the seller confirms the interest of auctioneers in inviting different types of bidders...

  18. Auction pricing of network access for North American railways

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Harrod, Steven

    2013-01-01

    The question of pricing train paths for "open access" railway networks in North America is discussed. An auction process is suggested as necessary to maintain transparency in the contracting process. Multiple random samples of auction pricing for a single track railway line demonstrate...... that the infrastructure entity will receive approximately 15.6% less than the true value of the contracted train paths. This loss of revenue threatens the objective of reducing government subsidy for the railway network. (C) 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved....

  19. Strategic Bidding in Hybrid CPC/CPM Auctions

    OpenAIRE

    Yi Zhu; Kenneth C. Wilbur

    2008-01-01

    Websites increasingly allow advertisers to choose whether to bid for advertising on a per-impression or per-click basis. We present the first analysis of this new hybrid auction market. The conventional wisdom in this industry is that brand advertisers (e.g., Coca-Cola) will bid for impressions, while direct response advertisers (e.g., Amazon.com) will bid for clicks. We find that in an auction setting similar to that used by Facebook and Google, brand advertisers may have an incentive to bid...

  20. Report on the behalf of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Armed Forces Commission on: the bill project (accelerated procedure) authorizing the ratification of the joint procurement agreement for a designation by auction of common bid platforms, and the bill project (accelerated procedure) authorizing the ratification of the joint procurement agreement for a designation by auction of an auction monitor. Nr 171

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boulaud, Didier

    2011-01-01

    This document first presents the currently operating greenhouse gas emission quota trading scheme and its evolution according to which quotas will be put up for auction. Then, it more precisely describes different aspects of this arrangement: general economy of the auction system, common auction platforms, auction monitor, and market procedures. Consequences on the French law are presented. The ratification procedure is discussed

  1. QoS Enabled Resource Allocation Over an UPnP-QoS - GMPLS Controlled Edge

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Brewka, Lukasz Jerzy; Sköldström, Pontus; Gavler, Anders

    2011-01-01

    This paper focuses on the problem of coherent resource allocation within home and access networks. The interdomain QoS signaling discussed here enables the initiation of the QoS provisioning in the home and access from the end device in users home. The home network considered in this paper is UPn......P-QoS enabled while the access network is GMPLS based. We propose and implement an interface between aforementioned network segments allowing for end-to-end QoS establishment. We present the QoS parameters and mechanisms in both UPnP-QoS and GMPLS and how they can be matched to create a coherent Qo...

  2. Appropriate design of auctions for renewable energy support – Prequalifications and penalties

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kreiss, Jan; Ehrhart, Karl-Martin; Haufe, Marie-Christin

    2017-01-01

    Auctions are a promising tool to accomplish renewable energy support (RES). However, they involve diverse risks for the auctioneer and the bidders. The major risk for the auctioneer – with respect to the expansion target and the acceptance of auctions for RES in general – is the risk of non-realization: awarded bidders do not realize their projects. The main reasons are bidders' uncertainties concerning their project costs. The auctioneer can reduce the non-realization risk by taking various measures. The most discussed and implemented measures are financial and physical prequalifications and penalties. An evaluation of these measures has relevant implications for an appropriate auctions design for RES. The non-realization option induces lower bids. A suitable combination of financial and physical prequalifications can reduce the non-realization risk significantly, however, involves sunk costs. Counterintuitively, first-price auction and second-price auction lead to different expected award prices and different realization probabilities. Penalties bear a high risk of inefficient auction outcomes. The appropriate parametrization and combination of the measures is challenging. Under consideration of all implications, we recommend high financial and adjusted physical prequalifications to achieve a sufficiently high realization rate while maintaining efficiency. - Highlights: • The non-realization risk is a major problem of auctions for RES. • Designated measures are financial and physical prequalifications and penalties. • Prequalifications and penalties have different effects on auction outcome. • The non-realization option violates the revenue equivalence theorem. • We recommend high financial and adjusted physical prequalifications.

  3. Modelling of auctioning mechanism for solar photovoltaic capacity

    Science.gov (United States)

    Poullikkas, Andreas

    2016-10-01

    In this work, a modified optimisation model for the integration of renewable energy sources for power-generation (RES-E) technologies in power-generation systems on a unit commitment basis is developed. The purpose of the modified optimisation procedure is to account for RES-E capacity auctions for different solar photovoltaic (PV) capacity electricity prices. The optimisation model developed uses a genetic algorithm (GA) technique for the calculation of the required RES-E levy (or green tax) in the electricity bills. Also, the procedure enables the estimation of the level of the adequate (or eligible) feed-in-tariff to be offered to future RES-E systems, which do not participate in the capacity auctioning procedure. In order to demonstrate the applicability of the optimisation procedure developed the case of PV capacity auctioning for commercial systems is examined. The results indicated that the required green tax, in order to promote the use of RES-E technologies, which is charged to the electricity customers through their electricity bills, is reduced with the reduction in the final auctioning price. This has a significant effect related to the reduction of electricity bills.

  4. Sealed bid auctions with ambiguity: theory and experiments

    Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

    Chen, Y.; Katuščák, Peter; Ozdenoren, E.

    2007-01-01

    Roč. 136, č. 1 (2007), s. 513-535 ISSN 0022-0531 R&D Projects: GA MŠk LC542 Institutional research plan: CEZ:MSM0021620846 Keywords : sealed bid auctions * ambiguity * experiment Subject RIV: AH - Economics Impact factor: 1.353, year: 2007

  5. Sealed bid auctions with ambiguity: an experimental study

    Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

    Chen, Y.; Katuščák, Peter; Ozdenoren, E.

    -, č. 269 (2005), s. 1-75 ISSN 1211-3298 Institutional research plan: CEZ:AV0Z70850503 Keywords : sealed bid auctions * ambiguity * experiment Subject RIV: AH - Economics http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp269.pdf

  6. Sealed-Bid Auction of Dutch Mussels : Statistical Analysis

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Kleijnen, J.P.C.; van Schaik, F.D.J.

    2007-01-01

    This article presents an econometric analysis of the many data on the sealed-bid auction that sells mussels in Yerseke town, the Netherlands. The goals of this analy- sis are obtaining insight into the important factors that determine the price of these mussels, and quantifying the performance of an

  7. Sealed-bid auction of Netherlands mussels: statistical analysis

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Kleijnen, J.P.C.; van Schaik, F.D.J.

    2011-01-01

    This article presents an econometric analysis of the many data on the sealed-bid auction that sells mussels in Yerseke town, the Netherlands. The goals of this analysis are obtaining insight into the important factors that determine the price of these mussels, and quantifying the performance of an

  8. Making Marketing Principles Tangible: Online Auctions as Living Case Studies

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wood, Charles M.; Suter, Tracy A.

    2004-01-01

    This article presents an effective course supplement for Principles of Marketing classes. An experiential project involving online auctions is offered to instructors seeking to create a more participatory student environment and an interactive teaching style. A number of learning points are illustrated that allow instructors to use an auction…

  9. Factors affecting the auction price of Veldram performance tested ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    The popularity of these auctions for performance tested rams (89.4 % of rams sold) indicate that Veld tested rams were sought after by buyers. The sale price of 296 Veld tested Dorper rams sold between 1994 and 2001, covering seven different tests, were compared with their measured and observed performances.

  10. Learning by investing: evidence from a naturally occurring auction

    Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

    Hanousek, Jan; Kočenda, Evžen

    2011-01-01

    Roč. 19, č. 1 (2011), s. 125-149 ISSN 0967-0750 R&D Projects: GA ČR GA402/09/1595; GA MŠk LC542 Institutional research plan: CEZ:MSM0021620846 Keywords : learning * naturally occurring auction * stock market Subject RIV: AH - Economics Impact factor: 0.679, year: 2011

  11. Efficient and secure comparison for on-line auctions

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Damgard, Ivan; Geisler, M.; Kroigaard, M.; Pieprzyk, J.; Ghodosi, H.; Dawson, E.

    2007-01-01

    We propose a protocol for secure comparison of integers based on homomorphic encryption. We also propose a homomorphic encryption scheme that can be used in our protocol and makes it more efficient than previous solutions. Our protocol is well-suited for application in on-line auctions, both with

  12. Cryptographically Secure Multiparty Computation and Distributed Auctions Using Homomorphic Encryption

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Anunay Kulshrestha

    2017-12-01

    Full Text Available We introduce a robust framework that allows for cryptographically secure multiparty computations, such as distributed private value auctions. The security is guaranteed by two-sided authentication of all network connections, homomorphically encrypted bids, and the publication of zero-knowledge proofs of every computation. This also allows a non-participant verifier to verify the result of any such computation using only the information broadcasted on the network by each individual bidder. Building on previous work on such systems, we design and implement an extensible framework that puts the described ideas to practice. Apart from the actual implementation of the framework, our biggest contribution is the level of protection we are able to guarantee from attacks described in previous work. In order to provide guidance to users of the library, we analyze the use of zero knowledge proofs in ensuring the correct behavior of each node in a computation. We also describe the usage of the library to perform a private-value distributed auction, as well as the other challenges in implementing the protocol, such as auction registration and certificate distribution. Finally, we provide performance statistics on our implementation of the auction.

  13. Auction design for gas pipeline transportation capacity-The case of Nabucco and its open season

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pickl, Matthias; Wirl, Franz

    2011-01-01

    As a response to the Russian dominance of the EU's natural gas supplies and the EU's increasing gas demands, major gas pipeline projects are currently under way to enhance the EU's energy supply security. Oftentimes to raise financing and to allocate gas transportation capacities, auctions are carried out to allow gas shippers to book transportation rights. In recent years, auctions have emerged as one of the most successful allocation mechanisms in the microeconomic theory. However, different auction designs can lead to different outcomes making the choice of auction design a decisive one, especially for divisible-good auctions. This paper seeks to give a formulation of an optimal auction design for gas pipeline transportation capacity. Specifically three different mechanisms are tested: (i) NPV allocation; (ii) pro rata allocation; and (iii) optimization. In addition, Nabucco is taken as a case study to empirically show results of such auction designs. Results show that a trade-off between revenue optimization and fair allocation can be observed: allocation per optimization is the favorable auction design when revenue maximization is more important than fair allocation. On the other hand, pro rata allocation is the auction design to be chosen when fairness of allocation is considered most central. - Research highlights: → Auction design for gas pipeline transportation capacity. → Empirical market-survey of Nabucco pipeline project auction as input data. → Testing of three different allocation mechanisms: (i) NPV allocation; (ii) pro rata allocation; and (iii) optimization. → Results show a trade-off between revenue optimization and fair allocation. → Allocation per optimization is the favorable auction design when revenue maximization is more important than fair allocation. → On the other hand, pro rata allocation is the auction design to be chosen when fairness of allocation is considered most central.

  14. Development of modified rational buyer auction for procurement of ancillary services utilizing participation matrix

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jamalzadeh, R.; Ardehali, M.M.; Rashidinejad, M.

    2008-01-01

    The rational buyer auction is based on a simultaneous auction that is the redesigned auction mechanism for ancillary services by the California independent system operator (CAISO). The incentive for the rational buyer auction is CAISO's intent to adopt a common sense rule of substituting higher-quality lower-cost services for lower-quality higher-cost services, when it results in reduced total procurement cost. For the purposes of designing a desirable auction where the minimum cost for the objective function as well as prevention of price reversal are achieved, either the payment cost in marginal pricing auction must be lowered or price reversal in rational buyer auction must be avoided. The objectives of this study are (a) to develop a newly proposed 'modified rational buyer' auction that does not allow price reversal and (b) to propose and validate a solution procedure that is based on participation matrix and discrete programming. The validation of the proposed solution procedure is accomplished through examination of two case studies available in the literature. Based on the first case study data, it is shown that the newly developed modified rational buyer auction avoids price reversal occurrence, while the total payment of ISO is increased by 5.8%, as compared with rational buyer auction. Also in comparison with marginal pricing auction, the ISO payment is lowered by 38.8%, when the newly developed modified rational buyer auction is utilized. For future work, it is recommended that the application of the modified rational buyer auction to joint dispatch of energy and ancillary services is investigated

  15. Auction development for the price-based electric power industry

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dekrajangpetch, Somgiat

    The restructuring of the electric power industry is to move away from the cost-based monopolistic environment of the past to the priced-based competitive environment. As the electric power industry is restructuring in many places, there are still many problems that need to be solved. The work in this dissertation contributes to solve some of the electric power auction problems. The majority of this work is aimed to help develop good markets. A LaGrangian relaxation (LR) Centralized Daily Commitment Auction (CDCA) has been implemented. It has been shown that the solution might not be optimal nor fair to some generation companies (GENCOs) when identical or similar generating units participate in a LR CDCA based auction. Supporting information for bidding strategies on how to change unit data to enhance the chances of bid acceptance has been developed. The majority of this work is based on Single Period Commodity Auction (SPCA). Alternative structures for the SPCA are outlined. Whether the optimal solution is degenerated is investigated. Good pricing criteria are summarized and the pricing method following good pricing criteria is developed. Electricity is generally considered as a homogeneous product. When availability level is used as additional characteristic to distinct electricity, electricity can be considered a heterogeneous product. The procedure to trade electricity as a heterogeneous product is developed. The SPCA is formulated as a linear program. The basic IPLP algorithm has been extended so that sensitivity analysis can be performed as in the simplex method. Sensitivity analysis is used to determine market reach. Additionally, sensitivity analysis is used in combination with the investigation of historical auction results to provide raw data for power system expansion. Market power is a critical issue in electric power deregulation. Firms with market power have an advantage over other competitor firms in terms of market reach. Various approaches to

  16. A uniform price auction with locational price adjustments for competitive electricity markets

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ethier, R.; Mount, T.; Schulze, W.; Zimmerman, R.; Thomas, R.

    1999-01-01

    Competitive electricity markets which rely on centralized dispatch require a mechanism to solicit offers from competing generators. Ideally, such an auction mechanism, provides incentives to submit offers equal to the marginal cost of generation for each generator. Economic theory suggests that the Uniform Price auction is an appropriate institution. However, an efficient implementation of this auction in an electricity context requires that the offers used in the auction reflect the appropriate locational price adjustments for transmission losses and congestion. This paper describes a uniform price auction that incorporates locational price adjustments on a Web-based platform suitable for experimentation. Preliminary results show dramatically different price and revenue results when compared with a simple continuous Discriminative auction. (author)

  17. Quid Pro Quo in IPOs: Why Book-Building is Dominating Auctions

    OpenAIRE

    Degeorge, François; Derrien, Francois; Womack, Kent L

    2004-01-01

    The book-building procedure for selling initial public offerings to investors has captured significant market share from auction alternatives in recent years, despite significantly lower costs in both direct fees and initial underpricing when using the auction mechanism. This paper shows that in the French market, where the frequency of book-building and auctions was about equal in the 1990s, the ostensible advantages to the issuer using book-building were advertising-related quid pro quo ben...

  18. Agent Based Trust Management Model Based on Weight Value Model for Online Auctions

    OpenAIRE

    Sathiyamoorthy, E.; Iyenger, N. Ch. Sriman Narayana; Ramachandran, V.

    2010-01-01

    This paper is aimed at the stipulations which arise in the traditional online auctions as a result of various anomalies in the reputation and trust calculation mechanism. We try to improve the scalability andefficiency of the online auctions by providing efficient trust management methodology considering several factors into consideration. A comparison between the performance of the auctions system with and without the agent methodology is done with good results.

  19. Design and Promotion Strategy of Marketing Platform of Aquatic Auction based on Internet

    Science.gov (United States)

    Peng, Jianliang

    For the online trade and promotion of aquatic products and related materials through the network between supply and demand, the design content and effective promotional strategies of aquatic auctions online marketing platform is proposed in this paper. Design elements involve the location of customer service, the basic function of the platform including the purchase of general orders, online auctions, information dissemination, and recommendation of fine products, human services, and payment preferences. Based on network and mobile e-commerce transaction support, the auction platform makes the transaction of aquatic products well in advance. The results are important practical value for the design and application of online marketing platform of aquatic auction.

  20. BSEA: A Blind Sealed-Bid E-Auction Scheme for E-Commerce Applications

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Rohit Kumar Das

    2016-12-01

    Full Text Available Due to an increase in the number of internet users, electronic commerce has grown significantly during the last decade. Electronic auction (e-auction is one of the famous e-commerce applications. Even so, security and robustness of e-auction schemes still remain a challenge. Requirements like anonymity and privacy of the b i d value are under threat from the attackers. Any auction protocol must not leak the anonymity and the privacy of the b i d value of an honest Bidder. Keeping these requirements in mind, we have firstly proposed a controlled traceable blind signature scheme (CTBSS because e-auction schemes should be able to trace the Bidders. Using CTBSS, a blind sealed-bid electronic auction scheme is proposed (BSEA. We have incorporated the notion of blind signature to e-auction schemes. Moreover, both the schemes are based upon elliptic curve cryptography (ECC, which provides a similar level of security with a comparatively smaller key size than the discrete logarithm problem (DLP based e-auction protocols. The analysis shows that BSEA fulfills all the requirements of e-auction protocol, and the total computation overhead is lower than the existing schemes.

  1. An Investigation of Value Updating Bidders in Simultaneous Online Art Auctions

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mayukh Dass

    2010-01-01

    Full Text Available Simultaneous online auctions, in which the auction of all items being sold starts at the same time and ends at the same time, are becoming popular especially in selling items such as collectables and art pieces. In this paper, we analyze the characteristics of bidders (Reactors in simultaneous auctions who update their preauction value of an item in the presence of influencing bidders (Influencers. We represent an auction as a network of bidders where the nodes represent the bidders participating in the auction and the ties between them represent an Influencer-Reactor relationship. We further develop a random effects bilinear model that is capable of handling covariates of both bidder types at the same time and account for higher-order dependence among the bidders during the auction. Using the model and data from a Modern Indian Art auction, we find that Reactors tend to update their values on items that have high preauction estimates, bid on items created by high investment risk artists, bid selectively only on certain items, and are more active in the second half of the auction. Implications for the auction house managers are discussed.

  2. A novel inclusion of intermittent generation resources in long term energy auctions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marambio, Rodrigo; Rudnick, Hugh

    2017-01-01

    Long term energy auctions are positioning as a valuable tool in order to attract new investments into power systems, especially in Latin American countries where emergent economies characteristics and their correspondent risks are usually present. Even though the focus of these auctions is the long term, there are short term issues involved which actual auction designs fail to include, resulting in an energy allocation that is not necessarily optimal for the system, a condition which becomes more evident in the presence of intermittent renewable technologies. A novel mechanism is formulated to obtain the optimal allocation in long term energy auctions, considering short term generation profiles from both intermittent and conventional base load technologies, and also their risk aversions. The proposed mechanism is developed and simulations are made for some scenarios in the Chilean power market, with different levels of renewable penetration. Significant cost savings are achieved for the final consumers in relation to energy purchases, in comparison with a mechanism that follows the demand profile. As more renewable intermittent capacity enters the power system it is evident the need for changes in the energy auctions allocation mechanisms, including elements to exploit the synergies among participants in the short term. - Highlights: • Risk management consideration in technology neutral auctions allocation. • Allocation mechanism in technology neutral auctions with intermittent technologies. • Renewable and conventional technologies energy auction offer curves. • Increase bid prices in auctions as a consequence of solar technology support.

  3. Auctions for renewable energy support - Taming the beast of competitive bidding

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Mora Alvarez, David Fernando; Kitzing, Lena; Soysal, Emilie Rosenlund

    countries. These insights are based on theoretical and empirical analysis (energy auctions in 12 European countries and 8 non-European countries), the use of state of the art simulation models and experiments, and through cooperation cases with some Member States providing tailor-made policy support...... in the implementation of auctions. AURES contributed to a strong knowledge-sharing with workshops, webinars, bi- and multilateral meetings, an interactive website and dedicated auction tools (AURES cash flow model and AURES auction designer). This final report covers a discussion of major findings and insights...

  4. Innovations in Defense Acquisition Auctions: Lessons Learned and Alternative Mechanism Designs

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Coughlan, Peter; Gates, William; Lamping, Jennifer

    2008-01-01

    .... In general, reverse auctions have been limited to procurement actions involving relatively standard price-driven commercial products-products typically purchased through traditional competitive markets...

  5. An auction game model for pool-based electricity markets

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gan, Deqiang; Wang, Jianquan; Bourcier, Donald V.

    2005-01-01

    A single-period auction game model for analyzing strategic behavior in pool-based electricity markets is introduced in the paper. We study the Nash equilibrium in a pure strategy sense of such games. First an equilibrium existence lemma is proved. Equilibrium characterization under tight capacity constraints is provided. Then it is demonstrated that an auction game does not possess a pure strategy Nash equilibrium under a wide range of market conditions. The paper provides a characterization of equilibrium under weak capacity constraints. We apply the introduced results to analyze market power indices presented in our earlier work and in related reports. Applications to actual market analysis, as well as limitations of the introduced model are provided. (author)

  6. Sellers' hedging incentives at EPA's emission trading auction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dijkstra, B.R.; Haan, M

    1999-01-01

    Cason (1993) argued that the auction the EPA (Environmental Protection Agency in the USA) used in order to start the market for sulfur allowances, is not efficient. The set-up of the auction gives both buyers and sellers an incentive to understate their valuation of an allowance. In this paper, we show that the sellers' incentives are even more perverse than Cason suggested. In particular, we show that sellers have an incentive to set their ask price equal to zero, while simultaneously hedging their bets by submitting a positive bid. It is not possible to derive the Nash equilibrium for this set-up. If such an equilibrium exists, sellers either set only a positive ask price, or an ask price equal to zero, and a positive bid as well. 14 refs

  7. CVM-X: Calibrating contingent values with experimental auction markets

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fox, J.A.; Shogren, J.F.; Hayes, D.J.; Kliebenstein, J.B.

    1998-01-01

    We design and implement a method, CVM-X, to calibrate hypothetical survey values using experimental auction markets. We test the procedure using consumer willingness-to-pay for irradiated/nonirradiated meat. Our results show that calibration factors for those who favor the irradiation process (0.67-0.69) are less severe than for those with an initial dislike of the process (0.55-0.59), suggesting that calibration may be commodity specific

  8. Budget constraints and optimization in sponsored search auctions

    CERN Document Server

    Yang, Yanwu

    2013-01-01

    The Intelligent Systems Series publishes reference works and handbooks in three core sub-topic areas: Intelligent Automation, Intelligent Transportation Systems, and Intelligent Computing. They include theoretical studies, design methods, and real-world implementations and applications. The series' readership is broad, but focuses on engineering, electronics, and computer science. Budget constraints and optimization in sponsored search auctions takes into account consideration of the entire life cycle of campaigns for researchers and developers working on search systems and ROI maximization

  9. A formulation of combinatorial auction via reverse convex programming

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Henry Schellhorn

    2005-01-01

    of this problem, where orders are aggregated and integrality constraints are relaxed. It was proved that this problem could be solved efficiently in two steps by calculating two fixed points, first the fixed point of a contraction mapping, and then of a set-valued function. In this paper, we generalize the problem to incorporate constraints on maximum price changes between two auction rounds. This generalized problem cannot be solved by the aforementioned methods and necessitates reverse convex programming techniques.

  10. Implicit price of mussel characteristics in the auction market

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Nguyen, Thong Tien

    2012-01-01

    This study explores desired and undesired characteristics of mussels in wholesale market by applying hedonic price analysis. Transaction data in auction market in Yerseke, the Netherlands, was used to estimate linear and semi-log price models. Meat content and size count, which are measured...... of raw mussels are significant discounting factors on the price. The study also investigates the impact of farming locations and seasons on the price and the price trend during the period of 2002–2009....

  11. African electricity market liberalization, competition and structuring: Should double bid markets be set up?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Founanou, M.

    2011-01-01

    In this paper, we analyse the possibility of using double auction mechanisms in the organization of the electricity markets in African countries. Today's electricity markets around the world are de-regulated and going through a restructuring process. In a context marked by the opening up to competition, a double auction for electricity supply is henceforth used to set prices in wholesale and retail electricity markets. Game theory analysis useful for studying the double auction prices proprieties. The double auction is a non-cooperative game, which is strategically equivalent to the auctions theory. The price formed, depending on the buyers and sellers' strategies, is a competitive price, which tends to the ideal price when competition operates intensely on both sides of market. For Africa, the presence of congestion costs and a chronic lack of capacity require the search for other solutions. We investigate optimal strategic behaviour when buyers and sellers are separated by a possibly constrained transmission line and show that bidders' strategies converge to truth-telling behaviour as the number of market participants increases. In the congestion case, this fails to occur. We also investigate how participants in wholesale electricity markets modify their bidding strategies as a function of the influence and behaviour of a transmission line owner. (author)

  12. AUCTION MECHANISMS FOR IMPLEMENTING TRADABLE NETWORK PERMIT MARKETS

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wada, Kentaro; Akamatsu, Takashi

    This paper proposes a new auction mechanism for implementing the tradable network permit markets. Assuming that each user makes a trip from an origin to a destination along a path in a specific time period, we design an auction mechanism that enables each user to purchase a bundle of permits corresponding to a set of links in the user's preferred path. The objective of the proposed mechanism is to achieve a socially optimal state with minimal revelation of users' private information. In order to achieve this, the mechanism employs an evolutionary approach that has an auction phase and a path capacity adjustment phase, which are repeated on a day-to-day basis. We prove that the proposed mechanism has the following desirable properties: (1) truthful bidding is the dominant strategy for each user and (2) the proposed mechanism converges to an approximate socially optimal state in the sense that the achieved value of the social surplus reaches its maximum value when the number of users is large.

  13. A robust internet-based auction to procure electricity forwards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Woo, C.K.; Lloyd, D.; Borden, M.; Warrington, R.; Baskette, C.

    2004-01-01

    Securing forward contracts to manage procurement-cost risk is an intuitively appealing and economically reasonable strategy for a load-serving local distribution company (LDC) in today's volatile electricity marketplace. However, knowing what to buy does not guarantee least-cost implementation. The forward-contract price quoted by a prospective seller may not be the 'best deal' that an LDC could have obtained, especially when the forward contract desired by the LDC is not actively traded. This paper reports the results from five internet-based auctions for electricity forward contracts with non-firm delivery and varying hourly quantities held monthly by a Florida municipal utility (MU) from September 2002 to January 2003. The results confirm that a multi-round auction design is robust in realizing competitive price offers made by credit-worthy sellers, time-efficient contracting, and consistent cost savings to the MU. Thus, the Anglo-Dutch auction described herein is a reasonable substitute for generation ownership by an LDC. (author)

  14. 6 essays about auctions: a theoretical and empirical analysis. Application to power markets

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lamy, L.

    2007-06-01

    This thesis is devoted to a theoretical and empirical analysis of auction mechanisms. Motivated by allocation issues in network industries, in particular by the liberalization of the electricity sector, it focus on auctions with externalities (either allocative or informational) and on multi-objects auctions. After an introduction which provides a survey of the use and the analysis of auctions in power markets, six chapters make this thesis. The first one considers standard auctions in Milgrom-Weber's model with interdependent valuations when the seller can not commit not to participate in the auction. The second and third chapters study the combinatorial auction mechanism proposed by Ausubel and Milgrom. The first of these two studies proposes a modification of this format with a final discount stage and clarifies the theoretical status of those formats, in particular the conditions such that truthful reporting is a dominant strategy. Motivated by the robustness issues of the generalizations of the Ausubel-Milgrom and the Vickrey combinatorial auctions to environments with allocative externalities between joint-purchasers, the second one characterizes the buyer-sub-modularity condition in a general model with allocative identity-dependent externalities between purchasers. In a complete information setup, the fourth chapter analyses the optimal design problem when the commitment abilities of the principal are reduced, namely she can not commit to a simultaneous participation game. The fifth chapter is devoted to the structural analysis of the private value auction model for a single-unit when the econometrician can not observe bidders' identities. The asymmetric independent private value (IPV) model is identified. A multi-step kernel-based estimator is proposed and shown to be asymptotically optimal. Using auctions data for the anglo-french electric Interconnector, the last chapter analyses a multi-unit ascending auctions through reduced forms. (author)

  15. 29 CFR 516.13 - Livestock auction employees exempt from overtime pay requirements under section 13(b)(13) of the...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 29 Labor 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Livestock auction employees exempt from overtime pay....13 Livestock auction employees exempt from overtime pay requirements under section 13(b)(13) of the... employee is employed both in agriculture and in connection with livestock auction operations: (a) The total...

  16. Robust Multi-unit Auction Protocol against False-name Bids

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yokoo, Makoto; Sakurai, Yuko; Matsubara, Shigeo

    This paper presents a new multi-unit auction protocol (IR protocol) that is robust against false-name bids. Internet auctions have become an integral part of Electronic Commerce and a promising field for applying agent and Artificial Intelligence technologies. Although the Internet provides an excellent infrastructure for executing auctions, the possibility of a new type of cheating called false-name bids has been pointed out. A false-name bid is a bid submitted under a fictitious name. A protocol called LDS has been developed for combinatorial auctions of multiple different items and has proven to be robust against false-name bids. Although we can modify the LDS protocol to handle multi-unit auctions, in which multiple units of an identical item are auctioned, the protocol is complicated and requires the auctioneer to carefully pre-determine the combination of bundles to obtain a high social surplus or revenue. For the auctioneer, our newly developed IR protocol is easier to use than the LDS, since the combination of bundles is automatically determined in a flexible manner according to the declared evaluation values of agents. The evaluation results show that the IR protocol can obtain a better social surplus than that obtained by the LDS protocol.

  17. Do auctions and forced divestitures increase competition? Evidence for retail gasoline markets

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Soetevent, A.R.; Haan, M.A.; Heijnen, P.

    2014-01-01

    To foster competition, governments can intervene by auctioning licenses to operate, or by imposing divestitures. The Dutch government has done exactly that, organizing auctions to redistribute tenancy rights for highway gasoline stations and imposing divestitures of such stations on the four major

  18. Do auctions and forced divestitures increase competition? Evidence for retail gasoline markets

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Soetevent, A.R.; Haan, M.A.; Heijnen, P.

    2008-01-01

    Where markets are insufficiently competitive, governments can intervene by auctioning licenses to operate or by forcing divestitures. The Dutch government has done exactly that, organizing auctions to redistribute tenancy rights for highway gasoline stations and forcing the divestiture of outlets of

  19. Price effects of sovereign debt auctions in the Euro-zone: the role of the crisis

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Beetsma, R.; de Jong, F.; Giuliodori, M.; Widijanto, D.

    2013-01-01

    Exploring the period since the inception of the euro, we show that secondary-market yields on Italian public debt increase in anticipation of auctions of new issues and decrease after the auction, while no or a smaller such effect is present for German public debt. However, these yield movements on

  20. Elicited Bid Functions in a (a)Symmetric First-Price Auctions

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Pezanis-Christou, P.; Sadrieh, A.

    2003-01-01

    We report on a series of experiments that examine bidding behavior in first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric and asymmetric bidders.To study the extent of strategic behavior, we use an experimental design that elicits bidders complete bid functions in each round (auction) of the

  1. Pure equilibrium strategies in multi-unit auctions with private value bidders

    Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

    Břeský, Michal

    -, č. 376 (2008), s. 1-44 ISSN 1211-3298 Institutional research plan: CEZ:MSM0021620846 Keywords : multiple-unit auction * existence of equilibrium in discontinuous games * pay-your- bid and uniform-price auctions Subject RIV: AH - Economics http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp376.pdf

  2. Rigging the lobbying process: An application of the all-pay-auction

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    M.R. Baye (Michael); D. Kovenock (Dan); C.G. de Vries (Casper)

    1993-01-01

    textabstractIn a world where a politician can explicitly auction off a prize to the high bidder, the standard auction literature can be used to analyse political behavior. The justice system, however, precludes politicians from explicitly selling the prize to the highest bidder. Thus politicians

  3. Auction Design for the Allocation of Emission Permits in the Presence of Market Power

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sunnevaag, K.J.

    2003-01-01

    To the extent that emission permits have been allocated using market mechanisms, this has been done using a sealed-bid auction design, typically with discriminatory prices. However, several authors have recommended the ascending auction format. Basically, two 'competing' ascending auction designs have been suggested, the standard ascending auction (with clock or demand schedules), or an alternative ascending-clock implementation of Vickrey-pricing. The latter design was introduced as a response to problems of bid shading under the sealed-bid and the standard ascending auction format. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the allocation of permits under these two alternative mechanisms. The auction process and the resulting market outcome in the presence of oligopolistic competition are simulated. In this setting, it is not obvious that bid shading is the optimal strategy under the standard design, nor is it obvious that sincere bidding is the optimal strategy under the alternative ascending auction design. The alternative auction format makes it less costly to pursue a strategy to increase market shares through the acquisition of emission permits, thus increasing the competitor's costs, leading to overbidding as the optimal strategy

  4. The Role Of Product Quality Information, Market State Information And Transaction Costs In Electronic Auctions

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    O.R. Koppius (Otto); H.W.G.M. van Heck (Eric)

    2002-01-01

    textabstractElectronic auctions have rapidly increased in popularity, but the consequences of switching to an electronic auction are unclear. In part this is because multiple changes occur at the same time so one can only observe the combined effect of these changes and not the effect of each

  5. Recommendations on the role of auctions in a new renewable energy directive

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kitzing, Lena; Islam, Marco; Soysal, Emilie Rosenlund

    During the work in the AURES project, we have found evidence that auctions can be a suitable instrument for allocating support under budget and volume limitations and can achieve significant short-term efficiency gains, but it has not been proven that auctions in general are better suited to supp...

  6. Need and design of short-term auctions in the EU gas markets

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vazquez, Miguel; Hallack, Michelle

    2013-01-01

    In the EU, gas markets are based on socializing network flexibility services. However, shippers have different preferences on network flexibility, which are not reflected in current allocation models. We propose the introduction of auction mechanisms to allocate network services in the short run. The auction aims to represent simultaneously the diversity of players′ preferences and the trade-offs implied by network constraints. Two sealed-bid auctions are proposed: (a) an auction based on bids for gas, which allocates network services through the minimization of gas price differences; (b) an auction with explicit bids for line-pack, which allows shippers′ valuation of line-pack storage. - Highlights: • EU gas regulation faces serious difficulties in network resource allocation. • We propose two short-term auctions with implicit network allocation. • The difference between the two is the implicit or explicit allocation of line-pack. • The first auction considers line-pack as an instrument to arbitrage gas prices. • The second auction design considers line-pack as a tool to hedge volatility

  7. Hipster Racism and Sexism in Charity Date Auctions: Individualism, Privilege Blindness and Irony in the Academy

    Science.gov (United States)

    Current, Cheris Brewer; Tillotson, Emily

    2018-01-01

    This paper follows one small, Christian university's five-year experience with student charity date auctions. The contemporary re-emergence of date auctions represents a backlash against gender and racial progress. Student leaders believe that in a post-racial and post-sexist society, race and gender are decontextualised neutral elements of…

  8. Multiparty Quantum English Auction Scheme Using Single Photons as Message Carrier

    Science.gov (United States)

    Liu, Ge; Zhang, Jian-Zhong; Xie, Shu-Cui

    2018-03-01

    In this paper, a secure and economic multiparty english auction protocol using the single photons as message carrier of bids is proposed. In order to achieve unconditional security, fairness, undeniability and so on, we adopt the decoy photon checking technique and quantum encryption algorithm. Analysis result shows that our protocol satisfies all the characteristics of traditional english auction, meanwhile, it can resist malicious attacks.

  9. Show me the goods: The warranting effect of user-generated photographs in online auctions

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Johnson, B.K.; Vang, M.H.; van der Heide, B.

    2015-01-01

    Consumers using online auction websites face the challenge of appraising products at a distance. Sellers and buyers in online auctions navigate this challenge by displaying and evaluating various cues, a critical one being use of photographs. Warranting theory predicts that cues less subject to

  10. Non-existence of Equilibria in Simultaneous Auctions with a Common Budget-Constraint

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Ghosh, Gagan

    2015-01-01

    I analyze an auction environment where two units of an object are sold at two simultaneous, sealed-bid, first-price auctions to bidders who have a one-dimensional type space, where a type represents the value a bidder places on each of the two units. All bidders have an identical budget constrain...

  11. Strategic Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions with Capacity Constrained Bidders

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Schwenen, Sebastian

    2015-01-01

    This article employs a simple model to describe bidding behavior in multi-unit uniform price procurement auctions when firms are capacity constrained. Using data from the New York City procurement auctions for power generating capacity, I find that firms use simple bidding strategies to coordinate......'s capacities and its profits of undercutting increase....

  12. Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions

    Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

    Břeský, Michal

    2013-01-01

    Roč. 82, November (2013), s. 205-217 ISSN 0899-8256 R&D Projects: GA ČR(CZ) GAP402/11/1531 Institutional support: RVO:67985998 Keywords : multi-unit auction * multiple-object auction * market efficiency Subject RIV: AH - Economics Impact factor: 1.025, year: 2013

  13. Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions

    Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

    Břeský, Michal

    -, č. 384 (2009), s. 1-39 ISSN 1211-3298 Institutional research plan: CEZ:MSM0021620846 Keywords : multi-unit auction * multiple-object auction * market efficiency * optimal selling mechanism Subject RIV: AH - Economics http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp384.pdf

  14. 29 CFR 780.620 - Minimum wage for livestock auction work.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 29 Labor 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Minimum wage for livestock auction work. 780.620 Section 780.620 Labor Regulations Relating to Labor (Continued) WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR... for Exemption § 780.620 Minimum wage for livestock auction work. The application of the exemption is...

  15. 27 CFR 31.63 - Agents, auctioneers, brokers, etc., acting on behalf of others.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ..., brokers, etc., acting on behalf of others. 31.63 Section 31.63 Alcohol, Tobacco Products and Firearms... Exemptions and Exceptions Persons Who Are Not Dealers in Liquors Or Beer § 31.63 Agents, auctioneers, brokers... auction on behalf of others; (b) Agents or brokers who solicit orders for liquors in the name of a...

  16. Sets in Excess Demand in Ascending Auctions with Unit-Demand Bidders

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Andersson, T.D.; Andersson, C.; Talman, A.J.J.

    2010-01-01

    This paper analyzes the problem of selling a number of indivisible items to a set of unitdemand bidders. An ascending auction mechanism called the Excess Demand Ascending Auction (EDAA) is defined. The main results demonstrate that EDAA terminates in a finite number of iterations and that the exact

  17. Pricing strategies, the strength of bidding intentions, and online auction performance: a cross-cultural study.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Peng, Yu-Shu; Jan, Lih-Tsyr

    2009-10-01

    Over the past decade, electronic markets based on the Internet, particularly online auctions, have become popular venues for conducting business. Previous studies often focused on the construction of the best bidding model, while few studies have tried to integrate multiple pricing strategies to predict the probability of closing an auction and the price premium. This study constructs a mediated model to examine the relationship among pricing strategies, the strength of bidding intentions, and online auction performance. The sample consists of 1,055 auctions of iPod MP3 players from eBay Web sites in Hong Kong, Singapore, Belgium, and France. Empirical results show that the pricing strategies directly influence both the probability of closing an auction and the level of price premium. The pricing strategies also indirectly influence the price premium through the mediating effect of the strength of bidding intentions.

  18. Point Climat no. 25 'Auction revenues in EU ETS Phase 3: a new public resource'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chevaleyre, Guillaume; Berghmans, Nicolas

    2013-01-01

    Among the publications of CDC Climat Research, 'Climate Briefs' presents, in a few pages, hot topics in climate change policy. This issue addresses the following points: As from 1 January 2013, auctions will become the main mode for distributing CO 2 allowances within the EU ETS. By 2020, almost one billion EUAs will be sold every year and generate income for Member States. Although sales of Phase 3 allowances have begun, uncertainty still surrounds the total amount of allowances to be auctioned. In particular, benchmark free allocations, the potential review of the auction timetable and the exemption of international flights from the EU ETS will impact the final amounts auctioned and the EUA price. These factors will affect the final auction revenues of each Member States differently. Government authorities will need to take account of the variability of this new financial resource

  19. What’s a Cricketer’s Worth? Predicting Bid Prices for Indian Premier League Auctions

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Siddhartha K. RASTOGI

    2017-04-01

    Full Text Available Indian Premier League is a twenty-over format cricket tournament of teams representing different Indian cities. Beginning 2008, it is established now as a grand annual affair. The team franchises are auctioned on long term basis, whereas cricketers are auctioned every season under certain conditions. Despite such wealth of information, studies on IPL auctions are rare barring four cited models. The present paper studies the results of year 2011 English-style auction of cricketers and recalibrates the old yet most accurate model by Rastogi and Deodhar (2009. Both models use ordinary least square method of regression albeit with different variable. The old models lack predictive power, whereas the recalibrated model presented displays better predictive capability as compared to earlier models. It also succeeds in reducing overall predictability gap and stands significantly parsimonious vis-à-vis previous models. Further, the final model presented is applied on 2013 and 2014 auction data to show superior results.

  20. Carbon allowance auction design of China's emissions trading scheme: A multi-agent-based approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tang, Ling; Wu, Jiaqian; Yu, Lean; Bao, Qin

    2017-01-01

    In this paper, a multi-agent-based ETS simulation model is proposed for carbon allowance auction design in China. In the proposed model, two main agents, i.e., the government (the ETS implementer) and the firms in different sectors (the ETS targets), are considered. Under the ETS policy, all agents make various decisions individually according to their own goals, and interact with each other through three main markets: the commodity market, the primary carbon auction market and the secondary carbon trading market. Different popular auction designs are introduced into the ETS formulation to offer helpful insights into China's ETS design. (1) Generally, the ETS would lead to positive effects on China's carbon mitigation and energy structure improvement, but a negative impact on economy. (2) As for auction forms, the uniform-price design is relatively moderate, while the discriminative-price design is quite aggressive in both economic damage and emissions reduction. (3) As for carbon price, the uniform-price auction might generate a slightly higher market clearing price than the discriminative-price auction, and the prices under two auction rules fluctuate about RMB 40 per metric ton. (4) As for carbon cap, the total allowances in the carbon auction market should be carefully set to well balance economic growth and mitigation effect. - Highlights: • A multi-agent-based model is proposed for China's emissions trading scheme (ETS). • Two main economic agents are included: government and firms in different sectors. • Auction-based allocation for initial carbon allowances is especially investigated. • Economic and environmental impacts of different auction designs are analyzed. • Results confirm the validity of the model and give helpful insights into ETS design.

  1. A multi-attribute yardstick auction without prior scoring

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Hougaard, Jens Leth; Nielsen, Kurt; Papakonstantinou, Athanasios

    by reducing the principal’s articulation of his preferences to simply choosing the most preferred oer as if it was a market with posted prices. Although truthful reporting does not constitute a Nash equilibrium, we demonstrate by simulations that truth-telling may indeed be some kind of focal point....... By focusing on the initial winner in case everyone tells the truth, we show that even if the other bidders are allowed to misreport by as much as 20% of their true cost, the initial winner remains the winner in 80% of all simulated auctions in the case of 3 competing bidders. Furthermore, as it takes...

  2. Bid Regulations in a Multi-unit Uniform Price Auction

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Boom, Anette

    for larger rms does not guarantee market prices below that cap. A suffciently high bid floor only for smaller firms destroys some or all pure strategy equilibria despite their prices being above the bid floor. With a general bid floor this happens only with considerably higher bid floors.......This paper examines the effect of bid regulations on the range of potential equilibrium prices in a multi-unit uniform price auction with heterogenous bidders. General bid caps destroy equilibria with prices above the bid cap and create new equilibria with prices way below the cap. A cap only...

  3. Price Regulations in a Multi-unit Uniform Price Auction

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Boom, Anette

    not exceed the price cap whereas a selective bid cap for only the larger firms, does not guarantee this outcome. A sufficiently high bid floor always destroys pure strategy equilibria with equilibrium prices above the marginal costs, no matter whether the floor applies to all or only to relatively small......Inspired by recent regulations in the New York ICAP market we examine the effect of different price regulations on a multi-unit uniform price auction. We investigate a bid cap and a bid foor. Given suffciently high total capacities general bid caps always ensure that the market price does...

  4. Price Regulations in a Multi-unit Uniform Price Auction

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Boom, Anette

    Inspired by recent regulations in the New York ICAP market we examine the effect of different price regulations on a multi-unit uniform price auction. We investigate a bid cap and a bid foor. Given suffciently high total capacities general bid caps always ensure that the market price does...... not exceed the price cap whereas a selective bid cap for only the larger firms, does not guarantee this outcome. A sufficiently high bid floor always destroys pure strategy equilibria with equilibrium prices above the marginal costs, no matter whether the floor applies to all or only to relatively small...

  5. Efficient and Secure Comparison for On-Line Auctions

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Damgård, Ivan Bjerre; Krøigaard, Mikkel; Geisler, Martin Joakim

    2007-01-01

    We propose a protocol for secure comparison of integers based on homomorphic encryption. We also propose a homomorphic encryption scheme that can be used in our protocol and makes it more efficient than previous solutions. Our protocol is well-suited for application in on-line auctions, both...... with respect to functionality and performance. It minimizes the amount of information bidders need to send, and for comparison of 16 bit numbers with security based on 1024 bit RSA (executed by two parties), our implementation takes 0.28 seconds including all computation and communication. Using precomputation...

  6. Identification of shareholder ethics and responsibilities in online reverse auctions for construction projects.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hatipkarasulu, Yilmaz; Gill, James H

    2004-04-01

    The increasing number of companies providing internet services and auction tools helped popularize the online reverse auction trend for purchasing commodities and services in the last decade. As a result, a number of owners, both public and private, accepted the online reverse auctions as the bidding technique for their construction projects. Owners, while trying to minimize their costs for construction projects, are also required to address their ethical responsibilities to the shareholders. In the case of online reverse auctions for construction projects, the ethical issues involved in the bidding technique directly reflects on the owner's ethical and social responsibilities to their shareholders. The goal of this paper is to identify the shareholder ethics and responsibilities in online reverse auctions for construction projects by analyzing the ethical issues for the parties involved in the process. The identification of the ethical issues and responsibilities requires clear definition and understanding of professional ethics and the roles of the involved parties. In this paper, first, the concept of professional ethics and social responsibility is described in a general form. To illustrate the ethical issues and responsibilities, a sample case of bidding for a construction project using online reverse auction techniques is presented in which the shareholders were actively involved in questioning the ethical issues. The issues involved in the bidding process and their reflection on the shareholder responsibilities are described and analyzed for each stage of the process. A brief discussion of the overall process is also included to address the general ethical issues involved in online reverse auctions.

  7. Multiagent model and mean field theory of complex auction dynamics

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chen, Qinghua; Huang, Zi-Gang; Wang, Yougui; Lai, Ying-Cheng

    2015-09-01

    Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in analyzing a variety of socio-economic phenomena using methods from statistical and nonlinear physics. We study a class of complex systems arising from economics, the lowest unique bid auction (LUBA) systems, which is a recently emerged class of online auction game systems. Through analyzing large, empirical data sets of LUBA, we identify a general feature of the bid price distribution: an inverted J-shaped function with exponential decay in the large bid price region. To account for the distribution, we propose a multi-agent model in which each agent bids stochastically in the field of winner’s attractiveness, and develop a theoretical framework to obtain analytic solutions of the model based on mean field analysis. The theory produces bid-price distributions that are in excellent agreement with those from the real data. Our model and theory capture the essential features of human behaviors in the competitive environment as exemplified by LUBA, and may provide significant quantitative insights into complex socio-economic phenomena.

  8. Multiagent model and mean field theory of complex auction dynamics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chen, Qinghua; Wang, Yougui; Huang, Zi-Gang; Lai, Ying-Cheng

    2015-01-01

    Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in analyzing a variety of socio-economic phenomena using methods from statistical and nonlinear physics. We study a class of complex systems arising from economics, the lowest unique bid auction (LUBA) systems, which is a recently emerged class of online auction game systems. Through analyzing large, empirical data sets of LUBA, we identify a general feature of the bid price distribution: an inverted J-shaped function with exponential decay in the large bid price region. To account for the distribution, we propose a multi-agent model in which each agent bids stochastically in the field of winner’s attractiveness, and develop a theoretical framework to obtain analytic solutions of the model based on mean field analysis. The theory produces bid-price distributions that are in excellent agreement with those from the real data. Our model and theory capture the essential features of human behaviors in the competitive environment as exemplified by LUBA, and may provide significant quantitative insights into complex socio-economic phenomena. (paper)

  9. Using Experimental Auctions to Examine Demand for E-Cigarettes.

    Science.gov (United States)

    O'Connor, Richard; Rousu, Matthew C; Bansal-Travers, Maansi; Vogl, Lisa; Corrigan, Jay R

    2017-06-01

    E-cigarettes are the latest in a line of potentially reduced exposure products that have garnered interest among smokers. In this paper, we use experimental auctions to estimate smokers' demand for e-cigarettes and to assess the impact of advertisements on willingness to pay. These are actual auctions, with winners and losers, which means hypothetical biases often seen in surveys are minimized. We find smokers have positive demand for e-cigarettes, and that the print advertisements used in our study had greater effectiveness than video ads (b = 2.00, p e-cigarettes. Demand was greater for reusable versus disposable e-cigarettes. In multivariate models, demand for e-cigarettes was higher among non-white participants and among smokers willing to pay more for cigarettes. Our findings suggest that cigarette smokers are interested in e-cigarettes as alternatives to traditional products, particularly for reusable forms, and that this demand can be influenced by messaging/advertising. Given these reduced harm products are appealing, if smokers are able to switch completely to e-cigarettes, there is a good chance for accrual of significant harm reduction. © The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Research on Nicotine and Tobacco. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.

  10. Missing money and missing markets: Reliability, capacity auctions and interconnectors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Newbery, David

    2016-01-01

    In the energy trilemma of reliability, sustainability and affordability, politicians treat reliability as over-riding. The EU assumes the energy-only Target Electricity Model will deliver reliability but the UK argues that a capacity remuneration mechanism is needed. This paper argues that capacity auctions tend to over-procure capacity, exacerbating the missing money problem they were designed to address. The bias is further exacerbated by failing to address some of the missing market problems also neglected in the debate. It examines the case for, criticisms of, and outcome of the first GB capacity auction and problems of trading between different capacity markets. - Highlights: •Energy-only markets can work if they avoid missing money and missing market problems. •Policy makers over-estimate the cost of so-called “loss of load events”. •Policy makers tend to over-procure capacity, exacerbating the missing money problem. •Rectifying missing market problems simplifies trade between different capacity markets. •Addressing missing market problems makes under-procurement cheaper than over-procurement.

  11. Investing EU ETS auction revenues into energy savings

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sijm, J.P.M.; Boonekamp, P.G.M. [ECN Policy Studies, Petten (Netherlands); Summerton, P.; Pollitt, H.; Billington, S. [Cambridge Econometrics CE, Cambridge (United Kingdom)

    2013-05-15

    The overall objective of this study is to analyse the effects of using EU ETS auction revenues to stimulate investments in energy savings in three key target sectors, i.e. Households, Tertiary and Industry (including both ETS and non-ETS industrial installations). The scenarios used refer basically to the situation before the recent agreement on the Energy Efficiency Directive (EED) and include (a mixture of) different policy options to enhance energy savings in the target sectors, in particular (1) reducing the ETS cap, (2) introducing an Energy Efficiency Obligation (EEO) for energy suppliers or distributors, and/or (3) using ETS auction revenues to support additional (private) investments in raising energy efficiency. In order to meet this objective a variety of different policy scenarios have been defined and analysed by means of the 'Energy-Environment-Economy Model for Europe (E3ME)'. The study presents and discusses a large variety of scenario modelling results by the year 2020 at the EU27 level. These results refer to, among others, energy savings, GHG emissions, the ETS carbon price, household electricity bills and to changes in some macro- or socio-economic outcomes such as GDP, inflation, employment or international trade. Finally, the study discusses some policy findings and implications, including options to enhance the effectiveness of some EE policies, in particular those having a potential adverse effect on the ETS carbon price.

  12. Tendances Carbone no. 73 'Reforming the EU ETS, Act I: pushing back the allowance auction timetable'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alberola, Emilie

    2012-01-01

    Among the publications of CDC Climat Research, 'Tendances Carbone' bulletin specifically studies the developments of the European market for CO 2 allowances. This issue addresses the following points: On July 25 2012, the European Commission presented its first reform to re-calibrate the supply of allowances in EU ETS, via two proposals aimed at amending the ETS Directive and reviewing the auction regulations, in order to alter the auctioning timetable during the period between 2013 and 2020, with no legal risk. The aim is to withdraw a certain amount of the allowances auctioned in 2013, 2014 and 2015, in order to reintroduce that amount after 2018

  13. Opening and Closing Price Efficiency: Do Financial Markets need the Call Auction?

    OpenAIRE

    Ibikunle, Gbenga

    2015-01-01

    We model 73.62 million London Stock Exchange (LSE) trades and show that the LSE’s high rate of failure to open at the opening auction only relates to low volume stocks. Low volume stock traders avoid trading until the open; this seems connected to their evading the informed trading-dominated opening auction. For the largest volume stocks, the opening auction provides highly efficient opening prices, while the lower volume stocks attain similar levels of price efficiency only after the start o...

  14. Franchise Bidding in the Water Industry- Auction Schemes and Investment Incentives

    OpenAIRE

    Urs Meister

    2004-01-01

    The periodical re-auction of a water monopoly concession causes the danger of underinvestment. If the life-time of specific assets such as water pipes exceeds the contract length and transferring the ownership of assets is difficult, the incumbent franchisee faces a hold-up problem. Using a simple auction model that considers the specifics of the piped water sector this paper shows that investment incentives may vary depending on the applied auction scheme. The model is designed as a two stag...

  15. Agora Energiewende (2017). Future cost of onshore wind. Recent auction results, long-term outlook and implications for upcoming German auctions

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Thomassen, Georg; Deutsch, Matthias

    2017-04-15

    The costs for electricity from renewable generation have been falling significantly in recent years, and record low bids at auctions around the world have grasped the attention of the public. Solar photovoltaics and offshore wind auctions, in particular, have attracted a lot of interest. The results for onshore wind, however, are just as impressive. The future cost development of onshore wind is of great relevance, since it is a key pillar of the energy system transformation in many parts of the world. However, the estimated long-term cost reductions vary significantly, as different studies value the cost drivers of wind differently. In Germany, the opaque and complex cost structure of onshore wind is the root of much controversy. International auction results with winning bids of less than half of the typical German pay rate left people questioning the costs of domestic wind power. However this discussion often fails to account adequately for differences in the quality of wind resources. In light of the upcoming, and first, German onshore wind auctions, we aim to contribute to the ongoing discussion by providing the necessary context for international auction results, a general outlook on the future cost of onshore wind, and by illustrating the existing potential and hindrances for cost reductions in the German market.

  16. Agora Energiewende (2017). Future cost of onshore wind. Recent auction results, long-term outlook and implications for upcoming German auctions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thomassen, Georg; Deutsch, Matthias

    2017-01-01

    The costs for electricity from renewable generation have been falling significantly in recent years, and record low bids at auctions around the world have grasped the attention of the public. Solar photovoltaics and offshore wind auctions, in particular, have attracted a lot of interest. The results for onshore wind, however, are just as impressive. The future cost development of onshore wind is of great relevance, since it is a key pillar of the energy system transformation in many parts of the world. However, the estimated long-term cost reductions vary significantly, as different studies value the cost drivers of wind differently. In Germany, the opaque and complex cost structure of onshore wind is the root of much controversy. International auction results with winning bids of less than half of the typical German pay rate left people questioning the costs of domestic wind power. However this discussion often fails to account adequately for differences in the quality of wind resources. In light of the upcoming, and first, German onshore wind auctions, we aim to contribute to the ongoing discussion by providing the necessary context for international auction results, a general outlook on the future cost of onshore wind, and by illustrating the existing potential and hindrances for cost reductions in the German market.

  17. The use of importance and performance analysis (IPA) to evaluate effectiveness of the forward auction market agro commodities: A case study

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wulansari, Dwi Ratna; Sutopo, Wahyudi; Hisjam, Muh.

    2018-02-01

    The empowering auction market for commodities in East Java Province is one of five auction market revitalization programs conducted by the Republic of Indonesia c.q. Ministry of Trading started in 2014. One of the districts in East Java Province, namely Magetan District utilizes the commodity auction market to improve the competitiveness of their agricultural industry by shortening the supply chain. The Magetan District needs to evaluate their support for farmers or farmer groups to participate in the forward auction market (FAM). Implementation of the FAM commodities is divided into three main processes, namely pre-auction, auction, and post-auction. The auction market is organized to shorten the trading chain. Implementation of the FAM requires good planning, among Seller (namely Farmer or Farmer Group), organizer of Auction (namely Commodity Auction Company), Buyer, and Local Government (namely the farmer facilitator). This article is aimed to develop the instrument of a Performance Measurement Model Using Important and Performance Analysis (IPA) for Improving the FAM Effectiveness of Agro Commodity from Magetan District with Supply Chain Management approach. IPA is implemented at pre-auction, auction, and post-auction. The IPA model results in the diagram to decide the strategies in improving the FAM effectiveness, and then it can encourage farmers to improve welfare and realize the competitiveness of the auctioneer.

  18. Understanding overbidding: using the neural circuitry of reward to design economic auctions.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Delgado, Mauricio R; Schotter, Andrew; Ozbay, Erkut Y; Phelps, Elizabeth A

    2008-09-26

    We take advantage of our knowledge of the neural circuitry of reward to investigate a puzzling economic phenomenon: Why do people overbid in auctions? Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we observed that the social competition inherent in an auction results in a more pronounced blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) response to loss in the striatum, with greater overbidding correlated with the magnitude of this response. Leveraging these neuroimaging results, we design a behavioral experiment that demonstrates that framing an experimental auction to emphasize loss increases overbidding. These results highlight a role for the contemplation of loss in understanding the tendency to bid "too high." Current economic theories suggest overbidding may result from either "joy of winning" or risk aversion. By combining neuroeconomic and behavioral economic techniques, we find that another factor, namely loss contemplation in a social context, may mediate overbidding in auctions.

  19. Small-vessel Survey and Auction Sampling to Estimate Growth and Maturity of Eteline Snappers

    Data.gov (United States)

    National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Department of Commerce — Small-vessel Survey and Auction Sampling to Estimate Growth and Maturity of Eteline Snappers and Improve Data-Limited Stock Assessments. This biosampling project...

  20. 9 CFR 2.76 - Records: Operators of auction sales and brokers.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ..., DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE ANIMAL WELFARE REGULATIONS Records § 2.76 Records: Operators of auction sales and... breed or type of animal; (ii) The sex of the animal; and (iii) The date of birth or approximate age; and...

  1. Auction based spectrum management of cognitive radio networks

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Chang, H. B.; Chen, K.-C.; Prasad, Ramjee

    2009-01-01

    (PS-MSs), and we therefore construct a cognitive radio network (CRN) consisting of a PRN with multiple CR-MSs. We propose a spectrum management policy framework such that CR-MSs can compete in utilization of the PRN spectrum bands available to opportunistic transmission of CR-MSs by Vickrey auction...... to the PRN, the overall spectrum utilization, the profit of the service provider, the spectrum access opportunity of the CR-MSs are increased to achieve cowin situation for every party in cognitive radio networks.......Cognitive radio (CR) technology is considered as an effective solution to enhance overall spectrum efficiency, especially primary radio network (PRN) typically having relatively low spectrum utilization. However, to realize CR concept, it is essential to provide enough incentives to PRN and extra...

  2. The institutionalization of treasury note and bond auctions, 1970-75

    OpenAIRE

    Kenneth D. Garbade

    2004-01-01

    The substitution of auctions for fixed-price offerings was expected to lower the U.S. Treasury's cost of financing the federal debt. Despite this and other potential benefits, the Treasury failed in both 1935 and 1963 in its attempts to introduce regular auction sales of coupon-bearing securities. This article examines the Treasury's third and successful attempt between 1970 and 1975. The author identifies three likely reasons why the Treasury succeeded in the early 1970s: it closely imitated...

  3. On the economics of PURPA auctions. [Contracts between utilities and electricity producers in the USA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bolle, Friedel (Energiewirtschaftliches Inst. an der Univ. zu Koeln (Germany))

    1991-04-01

    It is shown that, under certain conditions, Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) auctions in the USA theoretically lead to efficient contracts between utilities and producers of electricity. In contrast to normal auctions bidders compete with (potentially non-linear) revenue functions and with non-price attributes. In practice, there are tremendous difficulties in the evaluation of bids which result from the long duration of contracts and from the necessity to evaluate risks and non-price attributes. (author).

  4. Combining auctions and performance-based payments in a forest enrichment field trial in Western Kenya.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Khalumba, Mercelyne; Wünscher, Tobias; Wunder, Sven; Büdenbender, Mirjam; Holm-Müller, Karin

    2014-06-01

    Cost-effectiveness is an important aspect in the assessment of payments for environmental services (PES) initiatives. In participatory field trials with communities in Western Kenya, we combined procurement auctions for forest enrichment contracts with performance-based payments and compared the outcomes with a baseline scenario currently used by the Kenyan Forest Service. Procurement auctions were the most cost-effective. The competitive nature of the auction reduced contracting expenses (provision costs), and the result-oriented payments provided additional incentives to care for the planted seedlings, resulting in their improved survival rates (service quantity). These gains clearly exceeded increases in transaction costs associated with conducting an auction. The number of income-poor auction participants and winners was disproportionately high and local institutional buy-in was remarkably strong. Our participatory approach may, however, require adaptations when conducted at a larger scale. Although the number of contracts we monitored was limited and prohibited the use of statistical tests, our study is one of the first to reveal the benefits of using auctions for PES in developing countries. © 2014 Society for Conservation Biology.

  5. Insider patent holder licensing in an oligopoly market with different cost structures: Fixed-fee, royalty, and auction

    OpenAIRE

    Ming-Chung Chang

    2010-01-01

    The issue of the optimal licensing contract in firms having different cost structures is studied when the innovator is a producing patent holder who has three alternative licensing strategies, namely, the fixed-fee, royalty rate, and auction strategies. We conclude that the auction licensing strategy is not the best strategy when the innovator is a producing patent holder. This finding differs from that of Kabiraj (2004) where the auction licensing method is the optimal licensing strategy whe...

  6. Green Auctions and Reduction of Information Rents in Payments for Environmental Services: An Experimental Investigation in Sunan County, Northwestern China

    Science.gov (United States)

    Deng, Xiaohong; Xu, Zhongmin

    2015-01-01

    Reducing information rents is an important task for government agencies wishing to purchase maximal environmental services with limited budgets. This paper reports on several green auction options for reducing information rents and improving the performance of the “Grain for Green” Payments for environmental services (PES) program implemented in northwestern China. In r experimental auctions and investigations, door-to-door interviews were conducted and bidding envelopes and survey questionnaires were used to determine the offers and the foregone profits of the participants. Three scenarios are analyzed in this paper: a uniform price auction, a discriminatory price auction, and an opportunity-cost system. The results show that compared to the uniform price auction system, the other auction systems can increase the cost-effectiveness of conservation contracting. Competitive bidding can reveal true opportunity costs and can reduce information rents extracted from the government by farmers using private information. The demographics and average bids of these auction types were also analyzed. “Perfect information” in the opportunity-cost offer system has the best performance but is very hard to implement in reality. The results of this research show that the auction is a valuable tool for purchasing conservation contracts in northwestern China, but that in the future, the performance of these auctions should be studied with relaxed model assumptions. PMID:25793263

  7. The large-scale solar feed-in tariff reverse auction in the Australian Capital Territory, Australia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Buckman, Greg; Sibley, Jon; Bourne, Richard

    2014-01-01

    Feed-in tariffs (FiTs) offer renewable energy developers significant investor certainty but sometimes at the cost of being misaligned with generation costs. Reverse FiT auctions, where the FiT rights for a predetermined capacity are auctioned, can overcome this problem but can be plagued by non-delivery risks, particularly of competitively priced proposals. In 2012 and 2013 the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) Government in Australia conducted a FiT reverse auction for 40 MW of large-scale solar generating capacity, the first such auction undertaken in the country. The auction was highly competitive in relation to price and demonstrating low delivery risks. Proposal capital costs, particularly engineering, procurement and construction costs, as well as internal rates of return, were lower than expected. The auction process revealed limited land availability for large-scale solar developments in the ACT as well as a significant perceived sovereign risk issue. The auction process was designed to mitigate non-delivery risk by requiring proposals to be pre-qualified on the basis of delivery risk, before considering FiT pricing. The scheme is likely to be used by the ACT Government to support further large-scale renewable energy development as part of its greenhouse gas reduction strategy which is underpinned by a 90-per cent-by-2020 renewable energy target. - Highlights: • Evolution of the reverse auction process in the Australian Capital Territory. • Analysis of the outcomes of the first Australian feed-in tariff reverse auction. • Identification of the major drivers of the low FiT prices achieved in the auction. • Identification of major issues that emerged in the auction

  8. 78 FR 65982 - Auction of H Block Licenses in the 1915-1920 MHz and 1995-2000 MHz Bands Rescheduled for January...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-11-04

    ... Filing Requirements, Reserve Price, Minimum Opening Bids, Upfront Payments, and Other Procedures for... procedures, reserve price, and minimum opening bids for the upcoming auction of H Block licenses (Auction 96... applicants with the procedures and other requirements for participation in the auction. [[Page 65983

  9. Mechanism design of reverse auction on concession period and generalized quality for PPP projects

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    Xianjia WANG; Shiwei WU

    2017-01-01

    Reverse auctions of PPP projects usually require the bid to specify several characteristics of quality and the concession period to be fulfilled.This paper sets up a summary function of generalized quality,which contributes to reducing the dimensions of information.Thus,the multidimensional reverse auction model of a PPP project can be replaced by a two-dimensional direct mechanism based on the concession period and the generalized quality.Based on the theory of the revelation principle,the feasibility conditions,equilibrium solution and generalized quality requirements of such a mechanism,considering the influence of a variable investment structure are described.Moreover,two feasible multidimensional reverse auctions for implementing such a direct mechanism:Adjusting the scoring function and establishing a special reverse auction rule are built.The analysis shows that in these types of reverse auctions,optimal allocation can be achieved,the social benefit under the incomplete information will be maximized,and the private sector with the highest integrated management level wins the bid.In such a direct mechanism,the investment and financial pressure of the public sector can be reduced.

  10. Uncertain Reasoning for Detection of Selling Stolen Goods in Online Auctions Using Contextual Information

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ladislav Beranek

    2014-01-01

    Full Text Available This work describes the design of a decision support system for detection of fraudulent behavior of selling stolen goods in online auctions. In this system, each seller is associated with a type of certification, namely “proper seller,” “suspect seller,” and “selling stolen goods.” The certification level is determined on the basis of a seller’s behaviors and especially on the basis of contextual information whose origin is outside online auctions portals. In this paper, we focus on representing knowledge about sellers in online auctions, the influence of additional information available from other Internet source, and reasoning on bidders’ trustworthiness under uncertainties using Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence. To demonstrate the practicability of our approach, we performed a case study using real auction data from Czech auction portal Aukro. The analysis results show that our approach can be used to detect selling stolen goods. By applying Dempster-Shafer theory to combine multiple sources of evidence for the detection of this fraudulent behavior, the proposed approach can reduce the number of false positive results in comparison to approaches using a single source of evidence.

  11. Competitive bidding for health insurance contracts: lessons from the online HMO auctions.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gupta, Alok; Parente, Stephen T; Sanyal, Pallab

    2012-12-01

    Healthcare is an important social and economic component of modern society, and the effective use of information technology in this industry is critical to its success. As health insurance premiums continue to rise, competitive bidding may be useful in generating stronger price competition and lower premium costs for employers and possibly, government agencies. In this paper, we assess an endeavor by several Fortune 500 companies to reduce healthcare procurement costs for their employees by having HMOs compete in open electronic auctions. Although the auctions were successful in generating significant cost savings for the companies in the first year, i.e., 1999, they failed to replicate the success and were eventually discontinued after two more years. Over the past decade since the failed auction experiment, effective utilization of information technologies have led to significant advances in the design of complex electronic markets. Using this knowledge, and data from the auctions, we point out several shortcomings of the auction design that, we believe, led to the discontinuation of the market after three years. Based on our analysis, we propose several actionable recommendations that policy makers can use to design a sustainable electronic market for procuring health insurance.

  12. Carbon auctions, energy markets and market power: An experimental analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dormady, Noah C.

    2014-01-01

    This paper provides an experimental analysis of a simultaneous energy-emissions market under conditions of market power. The experimental design employs real-world institutional features; including stochastic demand, permit banking, inter-temporal (multi-round) dynamics, a tightening cap, and resale. The results suggest that dominant firms can utilize energy-emissions market linkages to simultaneously inflate the price of energy and suppress the price of emissions allowances. Whereas under prior market designs, regulators were concerned with dominant firms exercising their market power over the emissions market to exclude rivals and manipulate the permit market by hoarding permits; the results of this paper suggest that this strategy is less profitable to dominant firms in contemporary auction-based markets than strategic capacity withholding in the energy market and associated demand reduction in the emissions market. - Highlights: • Laboratory simulation of joint energy-emissions market. • Evaluates market power under collusion and real-world institutional features. • Dominant firms can exercise market power to inflate energy prices. • Dominant firms can exercise market power to suppress emissions prices. • Supply withholding is an implicit demand reduction in the emissions market

  13. Physical contact influences how much people pay at celebrity auctions.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Newman, George E; Bloom, Paul

    2014-03-11

    Contagion is a form of magical thinking in which people believe that a person's immaterial qualities or essence can be transferred to an object through physical contact. Here we investigate how a belief in contagion influences the sale of celebrity memorabilia. Using data from three high-profile estate auctions, we find that people's expectations about the amount of physical contact between the object and the celebrity positively predicts the final bids for items that belonged to well-liked individuals (e.g., John F. Kennedy) and negatively predicts final bids for items that belonged to disliked individuals (e.g., Bernard Madoff). A follow-up experiment further suggests that these effects are driven by contagion beliefs: when asked to bid on a sweater owned by a well-liked celebrity, participants report that they would pay substantially less if it was sterilized before they received it. However, sterilization increases the amount they would pay for a sweater owned by a disliked celebrity. These studies suggest that magical thinking may still have effects in contemporary Western societies and they provide some unique demonstrations of contagion effects on real-world purchase decisions.

  14. Physical contact influences how much people pay at celebrity auctions

    Science.gov (United States)

    Newman, George E.; Bloom, Paul

    2014-01-01

    Contagion is a form of magical thinking in which people believe that a person’s immaterial qualities or essence can be transferred to an object through physical contact. Here we investigate how a belief in contagion influences the sale of celebrity memorabilia. Using data from three high-profile estate auctions, we find that people’s expectations about the amount of physical contact between the object and the celebrity positively predicts the final bids for items that belonged to well-liked individuals (e.g., John F. Kennedy) and negatively predicts final bids for items that belonged to disliked individuals (e.g., Bernard Madoff). A follow-up experiment further suggests that these effects are driven by contagion beliefs: when asked to bid on a sweater owned by a well-liked celebrity, participants report that they would pay substantially less if it was sterilized before they received it. However, sterilization increases the amount they would pay for a sweater owned by a disliked celebrity. These studies suggest that magical thinking may still have effects in contemporary Western societies and they provide some unique demonstrations of contagion effects on real-world purchase decisions. PMID:24567388

  15. Strategic Bidding Behaviors in Nondecreasing Sponsored Search Auctions

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Chen-Kun Tsung

    2013-01-01

    Full Text Available To realize the specific results in the sponsored search auctions, most advertisers submit particular bid prices. The bidding behaviors with specific purposes are called as the strategic bidding. However, some strategic bidding behaviors will result in negative effects, such as the elimination of the equilibrium and the payment increase for some advertisers. The bidding behaviors with negative results are termed as the vindictive bidding. We survey four strategic bidding behaviors which include a rational bidding and three vindictive bidding strategies. In this paper, we study the relationship between the effects resulted by the vindictive bidding and the valuations of the vindictive advertisers. In our experiments, the search engine provider (SEP is benefited by all vindictive bidding behaviors, and the increment of the SEP's revenue is proportional to the degree of the vindictiveness. Bidding vindictively without sacrificing the own utility improves the advertiser's utility with high probability. Moreover, we observe that the SEP's revenue is improved by the following situations. First, the vindictive advertiser with low valuation in the keywords with high market value results in more SEP's revenue than that in the keywords with low market value. The second case is to raise the bidding competition between advertisers.

  16. 77 FR 11115 - Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Limited Extension of Deadlines for Comments and Reply Comments on...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-02-24

    ... FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION [AU Docket No. 12-25; DA 12-236] Mobility Fund Phase I Auction... the Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Limited Extension of Comment Deadlines Public Notice (Public Notice... respect to the potential eligibility of specific census blocks for Mobility Fund Phase I support by March...

  17. 78 FR 68839 - Tribal Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Rescheduled for February 25, 2014; Notice of Changes to...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-11-15

    ... FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION [AU Docket No. 13-53; DA 13-2057] Tribal Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Rescheduled for February 25, 2014; Notice of Changes to Auction 902 Schedule Following Resumption... up to $50 million in one-time Tribal Mobility Fund Phase I support, will be conducted on February 25...

  18. Electronic Reverse Auctions: Integrating an E-Sourcing Tool into a Sales and Purchasing Cross-Course Negotiation Project

    Science.gov (United States)

    Williams, Jacqueline A.; Dobie, Kathryn

    2011-01-01

    Electronic reverse auctions are increasingly being used by firms to improve firm financial and operational performance. The described teaching innovation serves as a model for introducing electronic reverse auctions as a central element in a comprehensive negotiation exercise involving sales management and purchasing management students. Results…

  19. 49 CFR 599.402 - Requirements and limitations for salvage auctions that are consigned trade-in vehicles under the...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... that are consigned trade-in vehicles under the CARS program. 599.402 Section 599.402 Transportation... SAVE ACT PROGRAM Disposal of Trade-in Vehicle § 599.402 Requirements and limitations for salvage auctions that are consigned trade-in vehicles under the CARS program. (a) The salvage auction must: (1...

  20. 75 FR 56533 - Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Postpones Auction of 218-219 MHz Service and Phase II 220 MHz...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-09-16

    ... FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION [AU Docket No. 10-107; DA 10-1630] Wireless Telecommunications... Auction 89. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, Auctions and Spectrum... by the Chief, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau pursuant to authority delegated by 47 CFR 0.131...

  1. 76 FR 76174 - Request for Information on the State of the Offshore Renewable Energy Industry-Auction Format...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-12-06

    ... ``Multiple Factor Auctions,'' in which non- financial considerations are taken into account at the outset. If... tends to award leases to developers with good financial backing. Because the winning bidders would need... variations of the package auction format merit consideration for leasing packages of lots for offshore...

  2. 78 FR 21355 - Tribal Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Scheduled for October 24, 2013; Comment Sought on...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-04-10

    ... unit is the basic unit that will be used to determine the winners in Auction 902 and to measure... Bureaus will measure coverage based on population rather than road miles. Under the auction design options...: EV-DO, EV-DO Rev A, UMTS/HSPA, HSPA+, WiMAX, and LTE. If the Mosaik data did not show such coverage...

  3. Analysis on trust influencing factors and trust model from multiple perspectives of online Auction

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yu, Wang

    2017-10-01

    Current reputation models lack the research on online auction trading completely so they cannot entirely reflect the reputation status of users and may cause problems on operability. To evaluate the user trust in online auction correctly, a trust computing model based on multiple influencing factors is established. It aims at overcoming the efficiency of current trust computing methods and the limitations of traditional theoretical trust models. The improved model comprehensively considers the trust degree evaluation factors of three types of participants according to different participation modes of online auctioneers, to improve the accuracy, effectiveness and robustness of the trust degree. The experiments test the efficiency and the performance of our model under different scale of malicious user, under environment like eBay and Sporas model. The experimental results analysis show the model proposed in this paper makes up the deficiency of existing model and it also has better feasibility.

  4. A Sealed-Bid Two-Attribute Yardstick AuctionWithout Prior Scoring

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Leth Hougaard, Jens; Nielsen, Kurt; Papakonstantinou, Athanasios

    2016-01-01

    that following this type of equilibrium behavior often leads to winner’s curse. The simulations show that in auctions with more than 12 participants the chance of facing winner’s curse is around 95%. Truthful reporting, on the other hand, does not constitute a Nash equilibrium but it is ex post individually......We analyze a two-attribute single item procurement auction that uses yardstick competition to settle prices. The auction simplifies the procurement process by reducing the principal’s articulation of preferences to simply choosing the most preferred offer as if it was a market with posted prices...... rational. Using a simulation study we demonstrate that truthful bidding may indeed represent some kind of focal point....

  5. An Efficient Electronic English Auction System with a Secure On-Shelf Mechanism and Privacy Preserving

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Hong Zhong

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available With the rapid development of the Internet, electronic commerce has become more and more popular. As an important element of e-commerce, many Internet companies such as Yahoo! and eBay have launched electronic auction systems. However, like most electronic commerce products, safety is an important issue that should be addressed. Many researchers have proposed secure electronic auction mechanisms, but we found that some of them do not exhibit the property of unlinkability, which leads to the leakage of users’ privacy. Considering the importance of privacy preservation, we have designed a new auction mechanism. Through symmetrical key establishment in the registration phase, all messages transmitted over the Internet would be protected and, meanwhile, achieve the property of unlinkability. The security analysis and performance analysis show that our protocol fulfills more security properties and is more efficient for implementation compared with recent works.

  6. Comparison of auctions and alternative policy options for RES-E support

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kitzing, Lena; Islam, Marco; Fitch-Roy, Oscar

    2016-01-01

    benefits of RES, there may be valid reasons for policy makers not to employ auctions, since under particular circumstances it may be desirable not to control quantities but the price. As such, they raise the question whether pure support cost minimisation should be the only goal when implementing......This report concludes the work carried out in the course of Task 6.2 of the AURES project. It is its aim to compare auctions with alternative policy instruments and in particular, to examine under which circumstances auctions may be superior and inferior to achieve intended policy targets....... For that purpose, we identify a number of potential drivers that might affect an instrument’s effectiveness, its efficiency and further success criteria. Among this list of relevant drivers, the basis for our analysis is the factor risk, where our core focus is on risk for policy makers. Assuming a world...

  7. An assessment of the Danish-German cross-border auctions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kristiansen, Tarjei

    2007-01-01

    This paper presents an analysis of the auction prices at the cross-border auction between West Denmark and Germany and between East Denmark and Germany (the Kontek cable). Monthly and annual transmission capacities appear to be more highly valued than daily transmission capacity on average. The two cross-border auctions show different trends: the auctions between West Denmark and Germany exhibit a higher level of prices in the southbound direction, and between East Denmark and Germany, higher prices in the northbound direction. We find a relatively strong correspondence in the pricing of products over different time frames (daily, monthly and annual auctions) between West Denmark and Germany and a weak correspondence for the products between East Denmark and Germany. In the daily auctions, market players can decide whether to use their capacity after the clearing of the day-ahead market, while in the monthly and annual auctions they must decide whether to use their capacity prior to clearing. If they choose not to use their capacity, the use-it-or-lose-it principle applies. The capacity is then subsequently released to the daily market. Since the daily cross-border auctions are free of commitment, they should be valued as options. Likewise, in the monthly and annual auctions market players can choose not to nominate their capacity but as this must occur before the clearing of the day-ahead market, they will not know the directions of the power flows a priori. If they nominate the capacity they must use it; if the direction turns out to be ''wrong,'' it is then possible to purchase capacity in the opposite direction in the daily auctions. If market players can accurately predict the outcome of the spot markets day ahead, the value of monthly and annual capacity should more closely reflect the value of an option. Thus, one would expect the value of the monthly and annual capacity to be between the value of an option and an obligation. Although this suggests that the

  8. A Two-Phase Model for Trade Matching and Price Setting in Double Auction Water Markets

    Science.gov (United States)

    Xu, Tingting; Zheng, Hang; Zhao, Jianshi; Liu, Yicheng; Tang, Pingzhong; Yang, Y. C. Ethan; Wang, Zhongjing

    2018-04-01

    Delivery in water markets is generally operated by agencies through channel systems, which imposes physical and institutional market constraints. Many water markets allow water users to post selling and buying requests on a board. However, water users may not be able to choose efficiently when the information (including the constraints) becomes complex. This study proposes an innovative two-phase model to address this problem based on practical experience in China. The first phase seeks and determines the optimal assignment that maximizes the incremental improvement of the system's social welfare according to the bids and asks in the water market. The second phase sets appropriate prices under constraints. Applying this model to China's Xiying Irrigation District shows that it can improve social welfare more than the current "pool exchange" method can. Within the second phase, we evaluate three objective functions (minimum variance, threshold-based balance, and two-sided balance), which represent different managerial goals. The threshold-based balance function should be preferred by most users, while the two-sided balance should be preferred by players who post extreme prices.

  9. Comparison of Group-Buying Online Auction and Posted Pricing Mechanism in an Uncertain Market

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    CHEN Jian; LIU Yunhui; SONG Xiping

    2004-01-01

    Demand uncertainty is a key factor for the seller's decision making, especially in the e-business environment, for the website to sell products through the online auction. In this paper, two kinds of demand uncertainties are considered: the consumer regime uncertainty and the inherent randomness of the market environment. Then, how to use a novel business model and group-buying auction (GBA) is analyzed in such a market environment. Based on the comparison of the GBA and the posted price mechanism, some conditions that favor the GBA are provided.

  10. Mechanism Design for Multi-slot Ads Auction in Sponsored Search Markets

    Science.gov (United States)

    Deng, Xiaotie; Sun, Yang; Yin, Ming; Zhou, Yunhong

    In this paper, we study pricing models for multi-slot advertisements, where advertisers can bid to place links to their sales webpages at one or multiple slots on a webpage, called the multi-slot AD auction problem. We develop and analyze several important mechanisms, including the VCG mechanism for multi-slot ads auction, the optimal social welfare solution, as well as two weighted GSP-like protocols (mixed and hybrid). Furthermore, we consider that forward-looking Nash equilibrium and prove its existence in the weighted GSP-like pricing protocols.

  11. Application of auctions as a pricing mechanism for the interchange of electric power

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Post, D.L.; Coppinger, S.S.; Sheble, G.B.

    1995-01-01

    The expected move to a market-based electric power industry will significantly change electric utility operations. These changes will fundamentally alter the pricing of electric power. How this pricing will be accomplished is a key issue. Traditionally, embedded cost based methods have been used. Recently, spot-pricing has received attention as a possible approach in a market-based electric power environment. Another market-based approach is the use of auctions. This paper will present the application of a sequential sealed-bid and sealed-offer auction to the pricing of electric power by using linear programming

  12. A new quantum sealed-bid auction protocol with secret order in post-confirmation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Jing-Tao; Chen, Xiu-Bo; Xu, Gang; Meng, Xiang-Hua; Yang, Yi-Xian

    2015-10-01

    A new security protocol for quantum sealed-bid auction is proposed to resist the collusion attack from some malicious bidders. The most significant feature of this protocol is that bidders prepare their particles with secret order in post-confirmation for encoding bids. In addition, a new theorem and its proof are given based on the theory of combinatorial mathematics, which can be used as evaluation criteria for the collusion attack. It is shown that the new protocol is immune to the collusion attack and meets the demand for a secure auction. Compared with those previous protocols, the security, efficiency and availability of the proposed protocol are largely improved.

  13. Capacity Allocation and Revenue Sharing in Airline Alliances: A Combinatorial Auction-Based Modeling

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ying-jing Gu

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available This paper attempts to establish a framework to help airline alliances effectively allocate their seat capacity with the purpose of maximizing alliances’ revenue. By assuming the airline alliance as the auctioneer and seat capacity in an itinerary as lots, the combinatorial auction model is constructed to optimize the allocation of the seat, and the revenue sharing method is established to share revenue between partners by Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG mechanism. The result of the numerical study shows that the seat capacity allocation is effective even without information exchanging completely and the twofold revenue shares method shows more excitation for the airlines.

  14. Long-term contract auctions and market power in regulated power industries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Soledad Arellano, M.; Serra, Pablo

    2010-01-01

    A number of countries with oligopolistic power industries have used marginal cost pricing to set the price of energy for small customers. This course of action, however, does not necessarily ensure an efficient outcome when competition is imperfect. The purpose of this paper is to study how the auction of long-term contracts could reduce market power. We do so in a two-firm, two-technology, linear-cost, static model where demand is summarized by a price inelastic load curve. In this context we show that the larger the proportion of total demand auctioned in advance, the lower are both the contract and the average spot price of energy.

  15. Price effects of sovereign debt auctions in the euro-zone: the role of the crisis

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Beetsma, R.; Giuliodori, M.; de Jong, F.; Widijanto, D.

    2016-01-01

    We show that new public debt issues cause an auction cycle for Italian secondary-market debt, but not for German debt. The cycle is mainly observed for the crisis period since mid-2007 and is larger when the crisis, as measured by yield volatility and CDS spreads of primary dealers, is more intense.

  16. Teaching Undergraduate Money and Banking: T-Bill Auctions and Stock Market Models

    Science.gov (United States)

    Saros, Daniel E.

    2009-01-01

    The author offers innovative approaches to 3 topics that are typically only briefly mentioned (if at all) in money and banking courses. The first topic is a Treasury bill auction experiment in which students have an opportunity to participate directly. The results from a class of 14 money and banking students are used to explain how an instructor…

  17. Equilibrium Selection with Risk Dominance in a Multiple-unit Unit Uniform Price Auction

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Boom, Anette

    This paper uses an adapted version of the linear tracing procedure, suggested by Harsanyi and Selten (1988), in order to discriminate between two types of multiple Nash equilibria. Equilibria of the same type are pay-off equivalent in the analysed multiple-unit unit price auction where two seller...

  18. A Dynamic Pricing Reverse Auction-Based Resource Allocation Mechanism in Cloud Workflow Systems

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Xuejun Li

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available Market-oriented reverse auction is an efficient and cost-effective method for resource allocation in cloud workflow systems since it can dynamically allocate resources depending on the supply-demand relationship of the cloud market. However, during the auction the price of cloud resource is usually fixed, and the current resource allocation mechanisms cannot adapt to the changeable market properly which results in the low efficiency of resource utilization. To address such a problem, a dynamic pricing reverse auction-based resource allocation mechanism is proposed. During the auction, resource providers can change prices according to the trading situation so that our novel mechanism can increase the chances of making a deal and improve efficiency of resource utilization. In addition, resource providers can improve their competitiveness in the market by lowering prices, and thus users can obtain cheaper resources in shorter time which would decrease monetary cost and completion time for workflow execution. Experiments with different situations and problem sizes are conducted for dynamic pricing-based allocation mechanism (DPAM on resource utilization and the measurement of Time⁎Cost (TC. The results show that our DPAM can outperform its representative in resource utilization, monetary cost, and completion time and also obtain the optimal price reduction rates.

  19. On Revenue-Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values

    Science.gov (United States)

    Constantin, Florin; Parkes, David C.

    In a dynamic market, being able to update one's value based on information available to other bidders currently in the market can be critical to having profitable transactions. This is nicely captured by the model of interdependent values (IDV): a bidder's value can explicitly depend on the private information of other bidders. In this paper we present preliminary results about the revenue properties of dynamic auctions for IDV bidders. We adopt a computational approach to design single-item revenue-optimal dynamic auctions with known arrivals and departures but (private) signals that arrive online. In leveraging a characterization of truthful auctions, we present a mixed-integer programming formulation of the design problem. Although a discretization is imposed on bidder signals the solution is a mechanism applicable to continuous signals. The formulation size grows exponentially in the dependence of bidders' values on other bidders' signals. We highlight general properties of revenue-optimal dynamic auctions in a simple parametrized example and study the sensitivity of prices and revenue to model parameters.

  20. Existence and computation of equilibria of first-price auctions with integral valuations and bids

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Escamocher, Guillaume; Miltersen, Peter Bro; Santillan, Rocio

    2009-01-01

    We consider existence and computation of symmetric Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) in single-item, sealed-bid, first-price auctions with integral valuations and bids. For the most general case, we show that existence of PSNE is NP-hard. Then, we present algorithmic results for the case...

  1. 77 FR 15369 - Mobility Fund Phase I Auction GIS Data of Potentially Eligible Census Blocks

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-03-15

    ... GIS Data of Potentially Eligible Census Blocks AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission. ACTION... Bureaus (the ``Bureaus'') announce the availability of geographic information system (GIS) data for the...). SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Mobility Fund Phase I Auction GIS Data for Potentially...

  2. Horticultural auctions in The Netherlands: A transition from 'price discovery' institution to 'marketing' institution

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Meulenberg, M.T.G.

    1989-01-01

    This paper depicts the evolution of Dutch auctions during the past hundred years from a "price discovery" institution to a "marketing" institution, focusing on price discovery. A conceptual framework is proposed to assess the suitablility of marketing management by agricultural marketing

  3. Market power in cap-and-trade auctions: A Monte Carlo approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dormady, Noah C.

    2013-01-01

    Recent greenhouse gas auctions have resulted in base level prices while remaining significantly concentrated. How do dominant firms receive such a large share of emissions allowances without bidding up the market price? This paper provides a Monte Carlo simulation analysis based on a contemporary regional greenhouse gas market in the United States. It introduces a C# simulation software environment, Oligopsony 1.0 that simulates uniform-price emissions auctions in repeated iterations. The results of these simulations indicate that there can be significant non-linearities between profit and market power as exercised through strategic demand reduction. This analysis finds the optimum point of strategic demand reduction that enables firms to exploit these non-linearities. The use of auctions to distribute tradeable pollution rights to firms in heavily concentrated markets can have significant unintended consequences, as it can exacerbate the problems of market power that exist within those markets. -- Highlights: •The theory of market power behavior in emissions auctions is furthered. •Monte Carlo simulation environment Oligopsony 1.0 is introduced. •Simulations provide analysis of optimum bids to exercise market power. •Significant non-linearities exist between profit and the exercise of market power

  4. See Art History in a New Light: Have an Art Auction

    Science.gov (United States)

    Benter, Doris J.

    2008-01-01

    At Portledge School in Locust Valley, New York, ninth graders in their upper school study art history for one semester. The visual arts department has created a vigorous new syllabus culminating in an hour-long mock art auction. The department selects several art movements (e.g., Post-Impressionism, Cubism, Abstract Expressionism, Social Realism,…

  5. Complexity and Tractability Islands for Combinatorial Auctions on Discrete Intervals with Gaps

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Döcker, J.; Dorn, B.; Endriss, U.; Krüger, D.; Kaminka, G.A.; Fox, M.; Bouquet, P.; Hüllermeyer, E.; Dignum, V.; Dignum, F.; van Harmelen, F.

    2016-01-01

    Combinatorial auctions are mechanisms for allocating bundles of goods to agents who each have preferences over these goods. Finding an economically efficient allocation, the so-called winner determination problem, is computationally intractable in the general case, which is why it is important to

  6. Price effects of sovereign debt auctions in the Euro-zone : The role of the crisis

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Beetsma, R.M.W.J.; Giuliodori, M.; de Jong, F.C.J.M.; Widijanto, D.

    We show that new public debt issues cause an auction cycle for Italian secondary-market debt, but not for German debt. The cycle is mainly observed for the crisis period since mid-2007 and is larger when the crisis, as measured by yield volatility and CDS spreads of primary dealers, is more intense.

  7. 31 CFR 356.20 - How does the Treasury determine auction awards?

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... yields or discount rates through successively higher yields or discount rates, up to the amount required... discount rate as described below. If the amount of noncompetitive bids would absorb most or all of the... the yield or discount rate for the securities we are auctioning. (2) Accepting bids at the high yield...

  8. Bidding behaviour in multi-unit auctions – an experimental investigation

    Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

    Engelmann, Dirk; Grimm, V.

    2009-01-01

    Roč. 119, č. 537 (2009), s. 855-882 ISSN 0013-0133 Institutional research plan: CEZ:AV0Z70850503 Keywords : multi-unit auctions * bidding behavior * laboratory experiments Subject RIV: AH - Economics Impact factor: 1.902, year: 2009

  9. 77 FR 69933 - Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-11-21

    ... (MVPDs) so that MVPDs can make the necessary changes to their channel lineups. The NPRM adopts the... design elements: (1) Bid collection procedures that determine how bids in the auction are gathered, (2) assignment procedures that determine which bids are accepted, and (3) pricing procedures that determine what...

  10. Reciprocity in Online Markets: Empirical Studies of Auction and Barter Markets

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ye, Shun

    2013-01-01

    My dissertation seeks to understand how reciprocity affects transaction outcomes and mechanism design in online markets. The first essay examines negative reciprocity illustrated as feedback-revoking behavior in the eBay auction market, focusing on its impact and implications for reputation system design. I utilize the biggest policy change of…

  11. Design Implications of Real-Time Feedback in Continuous Combinatorial Auctions: An Experimental Investigation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sanyal, Pallab

    2009-01-01

    Information Technology (IT) has spawned the growth of novel and innovative market mechanisms (such as online auctions) and associated businesses (such as eBay and Priceline) that were not feasible without the capabilities and reach of these modern information technologies. Previous studies on designing trading mechanisms for online markets…

  12. An Efficient Multi-Item Dynamic Auction with Budget Constrained Bidders

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Talman, A.J.J.; Yang, Z.F.

    2011-01-01

    An auctioneer wishes to sell several heterogeneous indivisible items to a group of potential bidders. Each bidder has valuations over the items but faces a budget constraint and may therefore not be able to pay up to his valuations. In such markets, a competitive equilibrium typically fails to

  13. Implementing a Multi-Agent System in Python with an Auction-Based Agreement Approach

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Ettienne, Mikko Berggren; Vester, Steen; Villadsen, Jørgen

    2012-01-01

    We describe the solution used by the Python-DTU team in the Multi-Agent Programming Contest 2011, where the scenario was called Agents on Mars. We present our auction-based agreement algorithm and discuss our chosen strategy and our choice of technology used for implementing the system. Finally, we...

  14. A theoretical analysis of procurement auctions for tertiary control in Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueller, Gernot; Rammerstorfer, Margarethe

    2008-01-01

    As far as energy policy is concerned, the design of the regulatory framework for energy transmission and distribution is a key issue. Consequently, also the embodiment of balancing power markets drives mainly the effectiveness of political implications for the energy sector. Initially, tertiary control in Germany was solely offered by transmission system operators of the respective power control areas and their associated power plant. The recast of the Energy Industry Act of 2005 led in last consequence to a common procurement auction for the supply of tertiary control, which starts on December 1, 2006. Admittedly, the reform has fallen short of expectations so far, first concerning the intensification of market entry of tertiary control providers as well as the desired decline of the price level. Hence, this article examines the effects of the changeover on observable demand charges. In order to identify attributes of the common procurement auction for tertiary control hampering market entry of providers, giving stimuli to collusion and strategic behavior, reducing intensity of competition and encouraging an upswing of prices, we analyze the design under an auction theoretical approach and deduce empirically whether structural components of the auction design have to be touched up again

  15. The implications of free allocation versus auctioning of EU ETS allowances for the power sector in the Netherlands

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sijm, J.P.M.; Hers, J.S.; Lise, W.

    2008-12-01

    The main objective of the present study is to analyse the implications of shifting from free allocation to auctioning of EU ETS allowances (EUAs) for the power sector in the Netherlands. In order to achieve this objective, this study has used three methodological approaches, including theoretical, empirical and model analyses of the impact of free allocations versus auctioning of EUAs on the power sector, notably in the Netherlands. In addition, as Combined Heat and Power (CHP) plays a major role in the electricity sector of the Netherlands, the present study also pays some particular attention to the implications of shifting from free allocation to EUA auctioning for the CHP sector in the Netherlands

  16. Comparisons of auction mechanisms in a multiple unit setting: A consideration for restructuring electric power markets

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bernard, John Charles

    The objective of this study was to compare the performance of five single sided auctions that could be used in restructured electric power markets across different market sizes in a multiple unit setting. Auction selection would profoundly influence an industry over $200 billion in size in the United States, and the consequences of implementing an inappropriate mechanism would be great. Experimental methods were selected to analyze the auctions. Two rounds of experiments were conducted, the first testing the sealed offer last accepted offer (LAO) and first rejected offer (FRO), and the clock English (ENG) and sealed offer English (SOE) in markets of sizes two and six. The FRO, SOE, and ENG used the same pricing rule. Second round testing was on the LAO, FRO, and the nonuniform price multiple unit Vickrey (MUV) in markets of sizes two, four, and six. Experiments lasted 23 and 75 periods for rounds 1 and 2 respectively. Analysis of variance and contrast analysis were used to examine the data. The four performance measures used were price, efficiency, profits per unit, and supply revelation. Five basic principles were also assessed: no sales at losses, all low cost capacity should be offered and sold, no high cost capacity should sell, and the market should clear. It was expected group size and auction type would affect performance. For all performance measures, group size was a significant variable, with smaller groups showing poorer performance. Auction type was significant only for the efficiency performance measure, where clock auctions outperformed the others. Clock auctions also proved superior for the first four principles. The FRO performed poorly in almost all situations, and should not be a preferred mechanism in any market. The ENG was highly efficient, but expensive for the buyer. The SOE appeared superior to the FRO and ENG. The clock improves efficiency over the FRO while less information kept prices under the ENG. The MUV was superior in revealing costs

  17. Efficient Nash Equilibrium Resource Allocation Based on Game Theory Mechanism in Cloud Computing by Using Auction.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nezarat, Amin; Dastghaibifard, G H

    2015-01-01

    One of the most complex issues in the cloud computing environment is the problem of resource allocation so that, on one hand, the cloud provider expects the most profitability and, on the other hand, users also expect to have the best resources at their disposal considering the budget constraints and time. In most previous work conducted, heuristic and evolutionary approaches have been used to solve this problem. Nevertheless, since the nature of this environment is based on economic methods, using such methods can decrease response time and reducing the complexity of the problem. In this paper, an auction-based method is proposed which determines the auction winner by applying game theory mechanism and holding a repetitive game with incomplete information in a non-cooperative environment. In this method, users calculate suitable price bid with their objective function during several round and repetitions and send it to the auctioneer; and the auctioneer chooses the winning player based the suggested utility function. In the proposed method, the end point of the game is the Nash equilibrium point where players are no longer inclined to alter their bid for that resource and the final bid also satisfies the auctioneer's utility function. To prove the response space convexity, the Lagrange method is used and the proposed model is simulated in the cloudsim and the results are compared with previous work. At the end, it is concluded that this method converges to a response in a shorter time, provides the lowest service level agreement violations and the most utility to the provider.

  18. A lesson from Argentina: Setting transmission tolls in a competitive auction is much better than regulating them

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Galetovic, Alexander [Facultad de Ciencias Economicas y Empresariales, Av. San Carlos de Apoquindo 2200, Santiago (Chile); Inostroza, Juan Ricardo [AES Gener S.A., Sanchez Fontecilla 310, piso 3, Santiago (Chile)

    2008-07-15

    There are at least two procedures for setting the tolls paid by power line users. One consists of regulating them in a standard process. The other, which is used in Argentina, involves auctioning the lines to the lowest toll. In this paper we show that an auction yields higher expected social welfare if n {>=} 2 bid. Expected social welfare is even higher if, as in Argentina, those who benefit from the line can also bid and build. Moreover, when the social welfare is utilitarian, an auction beats regulation even when the regulator can perfectly audit costs ex post. We describe and examine the auction of the fourth Comahue transmission line in Argentina. Assuming that the regulator's information about costs is similar to the information held by the industry, the model suggests that had tolls been regulated, they would have been at least 61% higher. (author)

  19. Encouraging information sharing to boost the name-your-own-price auction

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chen, Yahong; Li, Jinlin; Huang, He; Ran, Lun; Hu, Yusheng

    2017-08-01

    During a name-your-own-price (NYOP) auction, buyers can learn a lot of knowledge from their socially connected peers. Such social learning process makes them become more active to attend the auction and also helps them make decisions on what price to submit. Combining an information diffusion model and a belief decision model, we explore three effects of bidders' information sharing on the buyers' behaviors and the seller profit. The results indicate that information sharing significantly increases the NYOP popularity and the seller profit. When enlarging the quality or quantity of information sharing, or increasing the spreading efficiency of the network topology, the number of attenders and the seller profit are increased significantly. However, the spread of information may make bidders be more likely to bid higher and consequently lose surplus. In addition, the different but interdependent influence of the successful information and failure information are discussed in this work.

  20. Using Priced Options to Solve the Exposure Problem in Sequential Auctions

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mous, Lonneke; Robu, Valentin; La Poutré, Han

    This paper studies the benefits of using priced options for solving the exposure problem that bidders with valuation synergies face when participating in multiple, sequential auctions. We consider a model in which complementary-valued items are auctioned sequentially by different sellers, who have the choice of either selling their good directly or through a priced option, after fixing its exercise price. We analyze this model from a decision-theoretic perspective and we show, for a setting where the competition is formed by local bidders, that using options can increase the expected profit for both buyers and sellers. Furthermore, we derive the equations that provide minimum and maximum bounds between which a synergy buyer's bids should fall in order for both sides to have an incentive to use the options mechanism. Next, we perform an experimental analysis of a market in which multiple synergy bidders are active simultaneously.

  1. Sequential bidding in day-ahead auctions for spot energy and power systems reserve

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Swider, Derk J.

    2005-01-01

    In this paper a novel approach for sequential bidding on day-ahead auction markets for spot energy and power systems reserve is presented. For the spot market a relatively simple method is considered as a competitive market is assumed. For the reserve market one bidder is assumed to behave strategically and the behavior of the competitors is summarized in a probability distribution of the market price. This results in a method for sequential bidding, where the bidding prices and capacities on the spot and reserve markets are calculated by maximizing a stochastic non-linear objective function of expected profit. With an exemplary application is shown that the trading sequence leads to increasing bidding capacities and prices in the reverse rank number of the markets. Hence, the consideration of a defined trading sequence greatly influences the mathematical representation of the optimal bidding behavior under price uncertainty in day-ahead auctions for spot energy and power systems reserve. (Author)

  2. A Centralized Auction Mechanism for the Disability and Survivors Insurance in Chile

    Science.gov (United States)

    Reyes H., Gonzalo

    As part of the pension reform recently approved in Chile, the government introduced a centralized auction mechanism to provide the Disability and Survivors (D&S) Insurance that covers recent contributors among the more than 8 million participants in the mandatory private pension system. This paper is intended as a case study presenting the main distortions found in the decentralized operation of the system that led to this reform and the challenges faced when designing a competitive auction mechanism to be implemented jointly by the Pension Fund Managers (AFP). In a typical bilateral contract the AFP retained much of the risk and the Insurance Company acted in practice as a reinsurer. The process to hire this contract was not competitive and colligated companies ended up providing the service. Several distortions affected competition in the market through incentives to cream-skim members by AFPs (since they bear most of the risk) or efforts to block disability claims. Since the price of this insurance is hidden in the fees charged by AFPs for the administration of individual accounts and pension funds there was lack of price transparency. Since new AFPs have no history of members’ disability and mortality profile the insurance contract acted as a barrier to entry in the market of AFP services, especially when D&S insurance costs reached 50% of total costs. Cross-subsidies between members of the same AFP, inefficient risk pooling (due to pooling occurring at the AFP rather than at the system level) and regulatory arbitrage, since AFPs provided insurance not being regulated as an insurance company, were also present. A centralized auction mechanism solves these market failures, but also gives raise to new challenges, such as how to design a competitive auction that attracts participation and deters collusion. Design features that were incorporated in the regulation to tackle these issues, such as dividing coverage into predefined percentage blocks, are presented

  3. Evolving impact of the auction houses in Turkish contemporary art market

    OpenAIRE

    Kaya, Güldehen

    2017-01-01

    There are vital institutions serving theproduction, distrubution and consumption of the contemporary art works andconstituting the value of art. One of those institutions, an Auction House, asbeing solely a commercial entity, directly affects the perception of the artvalue via pricing. However, market value is not necessarily a fair andsufficient indicator and does not necessarily correspond to the artist’s careerpath. According to the artists, the perception of value attributed by thatprice ...

  4. GROUP-BUYING ONLINE AUCTION AND OPTIMAL INVENTORY POLICY IN UNCERTAIN MARKET

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    Jian CHEN; Yunhui LIU; Xiping SONG

    2004-01-01

    In this paper we consider a group-buying online auction (GBA) model for a monopolistic manufacturer selling novel products in the uncertain market. Firstly, we introduce the bidder's dominant strategy, after which we optimize the GBA price curve and the production volume together.Finally, we compare the GBA with the traditional posted pricing mechanism and find that the GBA is highly probable to be advantageous over the posted pricing mechanism in some appropriate market environments.

  5. Tree Based Decision Strategies and Auctions in Computational Multi-Agent Systems

    Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

    Šlapák, M.; Neruda, Roman

    2017-01-01

    Roč. 38, č. 4 (2017), s. 335-342 ISSN 0257-4306 Institutional support: RVO:67985807 Keywords : auction systems * decision making * genetic programming * multi-agent system * task distribution Subject RIV: IN - Informatics, Computer Science OBOR OECD: Computer sciences, information science, bioinformathics (hardware development to be 2.2, social aspect to be 5.8) http://rev-inv-ope.univ-paris1.fr/fileadmin/rev-inv-ope/files/38417/38417-04.pdf

  6. Relative willingness to pay and surplus comparison mechanism in experimental auctions

    OpenAIRE

    COMBRIS Pierre; SEABRA PINTO Alexandra; GIRAUD HERAUD Eric

    2015-01-01

    We study the relative willingness-to-pay (WTP) of consumers according to the diversity of supply in a market and we show how the presence of substitutes for a given product leads to question the incentive mechanisms commonly used in experimental auctions. We propose a Surplus Comparison Mechanism (SCM) in order to yield WTP estimates which better take into account the choice set available to consumers. After showing the efficiency of this mechanism we test the SCM in a laboratory experiment, ...

  7. EXPLORING THE CHOICE BEHAVIOR ON THE RETAILING DELIVERY PROVIDER FOR ONLINE AUCTION CONSUMERS

    OpenAIRE

    Wei-Shang Fan; Cheng-Min Feng; Yu-Kai Huang; Hsin-Ping Lin

    2012-01-01

    The development of e-commerce is an efficient business model that enables new relationships between consumers and suppliers. In particular, the online auction market is growing between 50% and 60% and, obviously, becoming a noticeable market. However, how to deliver goods to customers has become one of the challenges for sellers. In Taiwan, convenience stores have integrated e-commerce with the logistics system of convenience stores to a new retail delivery model: “Online shopping in an elect...

  8. Benford’s Law and Naturally Occurring Prices in Certain ebaY Auctions

    OpenAIRE

    David E. Giles

    2005-01-01

    We show that certain the winning bids for certain ebaY auctions obey Benford’s Law. One implication of this is that it is unlikely that these bids are subject to collusion among bidders, or “shilling” on the part of sellers. Parenthetically, we also show that numbers from the naturally occurring Fibonacci and Lucas sequences also obey Benford’s Law.

  9. Analysis of a yearly multi-round, multi-period, multi-product transmission rights auction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ziogos, N.P.; Bakirtzis, A.G.

    2008-01-01

    A yearly multi-round, multi-period, multi-product transmission rights (TR) auction issuing both point-to-point Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) and Flow-Gate Rights (FGRs) is studied in this paper. In each round the TR market participants (buyers or sellers) submit their bid or offer prices based on past energy market performance. A Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP) based energy market is assumed. The TR market participants' bid or offer prices reflect their expectation of the average annual LMP differences between withdrawal and injections points for FTRs and of the transmission link capacity prices for FGRs. The TR auction is performed in four rounds; in each round 25% of the entire system capability is awarded. TRs that are awarded in one round are modeled as fixed injections in subsequent rounds. Market participants that have acquired TRs in one round can sell them in subsequent rounds. A market participant can submit bids or offers for on-peak, off-peak or 24-h TRs. A three-area, nine-bus test system with six TR market participants is used for the analysis of the TR auction. (author)

  10. Clean air, clear market. Making emissions trading work: The role of a computer-assisted auction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bartels, C.W.; Marron, D.B.; Lipsky, M.I.

    1993-01-01

    Creating a new commodity presents the chance to develop new markets in which to trade it. In many cases, existing markets can be adapted easily; in other cases it proves worthwhile to develop new forms that reflect special characteristics of the commodity and those who trade it. In the case of the sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) emission allowances created by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, a number of standard market forms already have been adopted. While these will prove useful for handling some transactions, a new Market Clearing Auction (MCA) offers buyers and sellers a centralized marketplace for trading SO 2 emission allowances. The MCA, which was developed by the brokerage firm Cantor Fitzgerald, is a computer-assisted open-quotes smartclose quotes auction designed to replicate the outcome of an efficient market in emission allowances, and accepts bids and offers for any possible combination of allowances. Orders can be submitted for streams of allowances. Orders can be submitted for streams of allowances covering more than one year. The auction then determines the combination of bids and offers that maximizes the gains from trades in the market, and establishes uniform market clearing prices for each allowance issue (1995, 1996, and so on). Once executed, trades are settled on a cash-forward basis; that is, allowances are delivered and payments are made at future dates

  11. Improving the secrecy rate by turning foes to allies: An auction scheme

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ma, Ya-Yan; Wang, Bao-Yun

    2015-09-01

    Security against eavesdroppers is a critical issue in cognitive radio networks (CRNs). In this paper, a scenario consisting of one primary pair and multiple secondary pairs is considered. The secondary transmitters (STs) work in half-duplex mode and they are potential eavesdroppers on the primary transmission unless they are allowed to simultaneously transmit with the primary transmitter (PT). A modified second-price sealed-bid auction scheme is employed to model the interaction between the PT and STs. With the proposed auction scheme, the hostile relationship between the PT and STs is transformed into a cooperative relationship. An iterative algorithm based on the max-min criteria is proposed to find the optimal bidding power of the STs for an access chance in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. Numerical results show that the proposed auction scheme not only improves the PT’s security but also increases the access opportunities of the STs. Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 61271232 and 61372126) and the University Postgraduate Research and Innovation Project in Jiangsu Province, China (Grant No. CXZZ12-0472).

  12. Analysis of a monthly auction for financial transmission rights and flow-gate rights

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Biskas, P.N.; Ziogos, N.P.; Bakirtzis, A.G.

    2007-01-01

    A monthly transmission rights (TR) auction issuing both point-to-point financial transmission rights (FTRs) and flow-gate rights (FGRs) is studied in this paper. Initially, a locational marginal pricing (LMP) based energy market is presented, in which the linear security constrained optimal power flow (SCOPF) problem is solved for each hour of system operation, determining the nodal prices, the transmission link capacity prices and the transmission congestion charges (TCCs) that should be collected by the ISO in case of congestion. A monthly auction is conducted in the TR market issuing FTR obligations, FTR options and FGRs to market players, building a link between all types of transmission rights under the same market structure. Combining the advantages of financial and physical rights, the market efficiency can be enhanced by offering a variety of choices for risk management to market players. The monthly TR auction is tested on several case studies using the IEEE three-area RTS96 and useful conclusions are drawn concerning the utility of the various types of transmission rights as compared to one another, in terms of the reimbursement they provide to their holders. (author)

  13. A Hierarchical Auction-Based Mechanism for Real-Time Resource Allocation in Cloud Robotic Systems.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Lujia; Liu, Ming; Meng, Max Q-H

    2017-02-01

    Cloud computing enables users to share computing resources on-demand. The cloud computing framework cannot be directly mapped to cloud robotic systems with ad hoc networks since cloud robotic systems have additional constraints such as limited bandwidth and dynamic structure. However, most multirobotic applications with cooperative control adopt this decentralized approach to avoid a single point of failure. Robots need to continuously update intensive data to execute tasks in a coordinated manner, which implies real-time requirements. Thus, a resource allocation strategy is required, especially in such resource-constrained environments. This paper proposes a hierarchical auction-based mechanism, namely link quality matrix (LQM) auction, which is suitable for ad hoc networks by introducing a link quality indicator. The proposed algorithm produces a fast and robust method that is accurate and scalable. It reduces both global communication and unnecessary repeated computation. The proposed method is designed for firm real-time resource retrieval for physical multirobot systems. A joint surveillance scenario empirically validates the proposed mechanism by assessing several practical metrics. The results show that the proposed LQM auction outperforms state-of-the-art algorithms for resource allocation.

  14. The value of information in explicit cross-border capacity auction regimes in electricity markets

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richter, Jan; Viehmann, Johannes

    2014-01-01

    We study two electricity markets connected by a fixed amount of cross-border capacity. The total amount of capacity is known to all electricity traders and allocated via an auction. The capacity allocated to each bidder in the auction remains private information. We assume that traders are faced with a demand function reflecting the relationship between electricity transmitted between the markets and the spot price difference. Therefore, traders act like Bayesian–Cournot oligopolists in exercising their transmission rights when presented with incomplete information about the competitors’ capacities. Our analysis breaks down the welfare effect into three different components: Cournot behavior, capacity constraints, and incomplete information. We find that social welfare increases with the level of information with which traders are endowed. - Highlights: • We regard the utilization of explicitly auctioned cross-border capacities in electricity markets as a Bayesian Cournot game. • We analyze social welfare and find three forces diminishing it, (1) firms play a cournot game, (2) the presence of capacity constraints, (3) incomplete information. • We derive information regimes from “real world” examples and analyze their effect on social welfare

  15. Multi-attribute Reverse Auction Design Based on Fuzzy Data Envelopment Analysis Approach

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Deyan Chen

    2017-08-01

    Full Text Available Multi-attribute reverse auction is widely used for the procurements of enterprises or governments. To overcome the difficulty of identifying bidding attribute weight and score function of the buyer, the multi-round auction and bidding models with multiple winners are established based on fuzzy data envelopment analysis. The winner determination model of the buyer considers the integrated input-output efficiency of k winners. The bidding strategy of seller is divided into two parts: the first one estimates the weight of the ideal supplier that is thought to be the buyer’s preference; the second one is to calculate the weight of the test supplier which reflects the change trend of current weights and the seller’s weakness. The final predicted weight is the weighted sum of both. On the basis of known weight, the test supplier can improve his efficiency to increase the winning chance in the next round auction. Our models comprise crisp numbers and fuzzy numbers. Finally, a numerical example verifies the validity of the proposed models.

  16. Auctioneers vs. commissaires-priseurs: The carnival mirror of profession regulation in the international art market

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Elisabetta Lazzaro

    2013-06-01

    Full Text Available This paper is a comparative analysis of the recent evolution of the French and the Anglo-Saxon profession regulations of auctioneers in terms of entry barriers and exercise of the profession. Firstly, following Stephen and Love's (1999 framework of the regulation of legal profession, we highlight the differences between regulations focussing on different levels (entry restrictions, advertising, fees, fee contracts, and organisational form. We show that French commissaire-priseurs and Anglo-Saxon auctioneers are bounded to quite opposed rules, relating to both the level of regulation (licensing against registration or certification and the scope of this regulation. Secondly, we try to assess the success of these regulations in terms of economic efficiency by comparing the international markets shares of French and Anglo-Saxon auctioneers. We further highlight how a weak regulation can disturb prices mechanisms and, in some cases, favour speculation. The discussion of some emblematic scandals highlights distortions provoked by a strong, as well as a weak regulation

  17. Report of the work group on modalities of selling and putting up for auction CO2 emission permits in France. Elements related to phase 3

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The first part of this report shows that, despite recurring critics on the current emission permit price, the European market kept on maturing and proved its ability to reflect the evolution of fundamentals into prices. The second part shows that recent foreign experiences in putting up for auction CO 2 emission permits revealed convergencies as far as auction formats are concerned. The third part shows that the economic theory and these empirical experimental results support the idea of uniform auctions with a unique price accompanied with a reserved price. It discusses the evolution perspectives of these sales by auction, outlines that access to auctions should be opened to all industrial and financial actors, and the importance of the modalities of control and regulation of the emission permit market. It finally outlines and discusses the role France could play in the building up of a European platform and in the promotion of strictly harmonised rules

  18. Efficiency Intra-Cluster Device-to-Device Relay Selection for Multicast Services Based on Combinatorial Auction

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Yong Zhang

    2015-12-01

    Full Text Available In Long Term Evolution-Advanced (LTE-A networks, Device-to-device (D2D communications can be utilized to enhance the performance of multicast services by leveraging D2D relays to serve nodes with worse channel conditions within a cluster. For traditional D2D relay schemes, D2D links with poor channel condition may be the bottleneck of system sum data rate. In this paper, to optimize the throughput of D2D communications, we introduce an iterative combinatorial auction algorithm for efficient D2D relay selection. In combinatorial auctions, the User Equipments (UEs that fails to correctly receive multicast data from eNodeB (eNB are viewed as bidders that compete for D2D relays, while the eNB is treated as the auctioneer. We also give properties of convergency and low-complexity and present numerical simulations to verify the efficiency of the proposed algorithm.

  19. Price computation in electricity auctions with complex rules: An analysis of investment signals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vazquez, Carlos; Hallack, Michelle; Vazquez, Miguel

    2017-01-01

    This paper discusses the problem of defining marginal costs when integer variables are present, in the context of short-term power auctions. Most of the proposals for price computation existing in the literature are concerned with short-term competitive equilibrium (generators should not be willing to change the dispatch assigned to them by the auctioneer), which implies operational-cost recovery for all of the generators accepted in the auction. However, this is in general not enough to choose between the different pricing schemes. We propose to include an additional criterion in order to discriminate among different pricing schemes: prices have to be also signals for generation expansion. Using this condition, we arrive to a single solution to the problem of defining prices, where they are computed as the shadow prices of the balance equations in a linear version of the unit commitment problem. Importantly, not every linearization of the unit commitment is valid; we develop the conditions for this linear model to provide adequate investment signals. Compared to other proposals in the literature, our results provide a strong motivation for the pricing scheme and a simple method for price computation. - Highlights: • Pricing proposals in power markets often deal with just accounting-cost recovery. • Including opportunity costs is an additional property required for efficient pricing. • We develop a framework to analyze the pricing proposals found in the literature. • We propose a pricing mechanism to include the costs of short-run integer decisions. • As it includes short-run opportunity costs, it provides efficient long-term signals.

  20. Anatomy of the Rise and Fall of a Price-Fixing Conspiracy: Auctions at Sotheby's and Christie's

    OpenAIRE

    Ashenfelter, Orley C; Graddy, Kathryn

    2004-01-01

    The Sotheby's/Christie's price-fixing scandal that ended in the public trial of Alfred Taubman provides a unique window on a number of key economic and antitrust policy issues related to the use of the auction system. The trial provided detailed evidence as to how the price fixing worked, and the economic conditions under which it was started and began to fall apart. The outcome of the case also provides evidence on the novel auction process used to choose the lead counsel for the civil settl...

  1. A Robust Open Ascending-price Multi-unit Auction Protocol against False-name Bids

    Science.gov (United States)

    Iwasaki, Atsushi; Yokoo, Makoto; Terada, Kenji

    This paper develops a new ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol that has following characteristics: (i) it has an open format, (ii) sincere bidding is an equilibrium strategy even if the marginal utilities of each agent can increase and agents can submit false-name bids. False-name bids are bids submitted under fictitious names such as multiple e-mail addresses, which can be done easily in the Internet. This is the first protocol that has these two characteristics. We show that our new protocol outperforms an existing protocol, which satisfies (ii), with respect to the social surplus and the seller's revenue.

  2. The value of a public utility. Explanation of the auction of the Dutch utility Haarlemmermeer

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Voermans, F.

    2000-01-01

    The liberalisation of the natural gas sector and the energy sector in the Netherlands gives municipalities the opportunity to sell their energy companies. The municipality Haarlemmermeer was the first to have an international auction. In February Haarlemmermeer sold her utility for 242 million guilders to 'Westfaelische Gasversorgung' from Germany, despite the muttering of politics. Politicians prefer privatisation at a slow pace. The municipality gave the sale a long and hard thought and wasn't out to get the highest prize, as claimed by Rabo Securities, which accompanied the take-over of Haarlemmermeer. According to them the privatisation cannot be stopped and within five years all municipalities will have sold their shares

  3. The Impact of the Term Auction Facility on the Liquidity Risk Premium and Unsecured Interbank Spreads

    OpenAIRE

    Syrstad, Olav

    2014-01-01

    This paper investigates the effectiveness of the Federal Reserve's Term Auction Facility (TAF) in alleviating the liquidity shortage in USD and reducing the spread between the 3-month Libor rate and the expected policy rate. I construct a proxy for the 3-month liquidity risk premium based on data from the FX forward market which enables me to (i) decompose the Libor spread into a liquidity premium and a credit premium, and (ii) test the effectiveness of the TAF in reducing the liquidity premi...

  4. A Comparison between the Swedish 3G Beauty Contest and the UK 3G Auction

    OpenAIRE

    Welin, Erik

    2006-01-01

    This thesis compares the two different version of public franchise bidding for awarding 3G licenses used in Sweden and the UK, respectively a beauty contest and an auction. The fact is that the Swedish beauty contest has failed to tackle many of the problems discussed in connection with public franchise bidding in an effective way. Sweden has first of all had problems with enforcing the ambitious coverage criteria. The UK has on the other hand succeeded in tackling the problems and raised gov...

  5. Liquidity Shocks, Market Maker Turnover, and Bidding Behavior in Treasury Auctions

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Gonzalez-Eiras, Martin; Rudiger, Jesper

    2017-01-01

    aggressively. They also bid more aggressively for existing securities that are reissued when the regulation tightens the requirements for secondary market participation. Consistent with regulations which imply that auctioned securities are not a prime source of liquidity, we find that banks which face...... liquidity needs bid less aggressively for them. A novel implication of our results is that in institutional settings that feature turnover of market makers, bidding behavior should be modeled in a dynamic setting. We introduce a dynamic model and show that static estimates over-predict true valuations when...

  6. Media visibility on the formation of female celebrity: Catarina, a virgin for auction

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Lígia Campos de Cerqueira Lana

    2013-09-01

    Full Text Available This article analyzes the role of media visibility in the rise of CatherineMigliorini’s celebrity, famous after putting her virginity up for auction oninternet. The history of the case and its main events, texts written by experts, images and statements of Catarina are investigated from the perspective of women’s visibility transformations. Although media critique, the celebrity Catarina displayed expected abilities of women in media visibility, as the possession of a sexy, young and assertive body, able to be used as capital.

  7. The impact of free trial acceptance on demand for alternative nicotine products: evidence from experimental auctions.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rousu, Matthew C; O'Connor, Richard J; Bansal-Travers, Maansi; Pitcavage, James M; Thrasher, James F

    2015-06-11

    This study explored the relationship between product trials and consumer demand for alternative nicotine products (ANP). An experimental auction was conducted with 258 adult smokers, wherein participants were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions. The participants received the opportunity to try, but did not have to accept, one of three relatively novel ST products (i.e., snus, dissolvable tobacco, or medicinal nicotine), or they were placed into a control group (i.e., no trial). All the participants then bid on all three of these products, as well as on cigarettes. We assessed interest in using ANP based on both trial of the product and bids placed for the products in the experimental auction. Fewer smokers were willing to try snus (44%) than dissolvable tobacco (64%) or medicine nicotine (68%). For snus, we find modest evidence suggesting that willingness to try is associated with greater demand for the product. For dissolvable tobacco or medicinal nicotine, we find no evidence that those who accept the product trial have higher demand for the product. Free trials of a novel ANP were not strongly associated with product demand, as assessed by willingness to pay. Given the debate over the potential for ANP to reduce the harm from smoking, these results are important in understanding the impact of free trial offers on adoption of ST product as a strategy to reduce harm from tobacco use.

  8. Improving Fraudster Detection in Online Auctions by Using Neighbor-Driven Attributes

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jun-Lin Lin

    2015-12-01

    Full Text Available Online auction websites use a simple reputation system to help their users to evaluate the trustworthiness of sellers and buyers. However, to improve their reputation in the reputation system, fraudulent users can easily deceive the reputation system by creating fake transactions. This inflated-reputation fraud poses a major problem for online auction websites because it can lead legitimate users into scams. Numerous approaches have been proposed in the literature to address this problem, most of which involve using social network analysis (SNA to derive critical features (e.g., k-core, center weight, and neighbor diversity for distinguishing fraudsters from legitimate users. This paper discusses the limitations of these SNA features and proposes a class of SNA features referred to as neighbor-driven attributes (NDAs. The NDAs of users are calculated from the features of their neighbors. Because fraudsters require collusive neighbors to provide them with positive ratings in the reputation system, using NDAs can be helpful for detecting fraudsters. Although the idea of NDAs is not entirely new, experimental results on a real-world dataset showed that using NDAs improves classification accuracy compared with state-of-the-art methods that use the k-core, center weight, and neighbor diversity.

  9. Multi-objective market clearing of joint energy and reserves auctions ensuring power system security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aghaei, J.; Shayanfar, H.; Amjady, N.

    2009-01-01

    A model and solution approach to day-ahead market clearing of joint energy and reserves auctions is proposed in this paper. The model represents the clearing system used by ISO in charge of both the market operation and system security. A Multiobjective Mathematical Programming (MMP) formulation is implemented for provision of ancillary services (Automatic Generation Control or AGC, Spinning, Non-spinning and operational reserves) as well as energy in simultaneous auctions by pool-based aggregated market scheme. System security is taken into account in the market clearing procedure as the extra objective functions of the optimization problem. So, in the MMP formulation of the market clearing process, the objective functions (generation cost and security indices) are optimized while meeting AC power flow constraints, system reserve requirements and lost opportunity cost (LOC) considerations. The model is applied to the IEEE 24-bus Reliability Test System (IEEE 24-bus RTS), and simulation studies are carried out to examine the effectiveness of the proposed method

  10. Electricity market auction settings in a future Danish electricity system with a high penetration of renewable energy sources - A comparison of marginal pricing and pay-as-bid

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nielsen, Steffen; Sorknaes, Peter; Ostergaard, Poul Alberg

    2011-01-01

    The long-term goal for Danish energy policy is to be free of fossil fuels through the increasing use of renewable energy sources (RES) including fluctuating renewable electricity (FRE). The Danish electricity market is part of the Nordic power exchange, which uses a Marginal Price auction system (MPS) for the day-ahead auctions. The market price is thus equal to the bidding price of the most expensive auction winning unit. In the MPS, the FRE bid at prices of or close to zero resulting in reduced market prices during hours of FRE production. In turn, this reduces the FRE sources' income from market sales. As more FRE is implemented, this effect will only become greater, thereby reducing the income for FRE producers. Other auction settings could potentially help to reduce this problem. One candidate is the pay-as-bid auction setting (PAB), where winning units are paid their own bidding price. This article investigates the two auction settings, to find whether a change of auction setting would provide a more suitable frame for large shares of FRE. This has been done with two energy system scenarios with different shares of FRE. From the analysis, it is found that MPS is generally better for the FRE sources. The result is, however, very sensitive to the base assumptions used for the calculations. -- Highlights: → In this study two different auction settings for the Danish electricity market are compared. → Two scenarios are used in the analyses, one representing the present system and one representing a future 100% renewable energy system. → We find that marginal price auction system is most suitable for supporting fluctuating renewable energy in both scenarios. → The results are very sensitive to the assumptions about bidding prices for each technology.

  11. Security analysis with improved design of post-confirmation mechanism for quantum sealed-bid auction with single photons

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhang, Ke-Jia; Kwek, Leong-Chuan; Ma, Chun-Guang; Zhang, Long; Sun, Hong-Wei

    2018-02-01

    Quantum sealed-bid auction (QSA) has been widely studied in quantum cryptography. For a successful auction, post-confirmation is regarded as an important mechanism to make every bidder verify the identity of the winner after the auctioneer has announced the result. However, since the auctioneer may be dishonest and collude with malicious bidders in practice, some potential loopholes could exist. In this paper, we point out two types of collusion attacks for a particular post-confirmation technique with EPR pairs. And it is not difficult to see that there exists no unconditionally secure post-confirmation mechanism in the existing QSA model, if the dishonest participants have the ability to control multiparticle entanglement. In the view of this, we note that some secure implementation could exist if the participants are supposed to be semi-quantum, i.e., they can only control single photons. Finally, two potential methods to design post-confirmation mechanism are presented in this restricted scenario.

  12. The influence of an online auction's product price and e-retailer reputation on consumers' perception, attitude, and behavioral intention.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wu, Wann-Yih; Huang, Po-Ching; Fu, Chen-Su

    2011-06-01

    Online auctions combine the conventional auction model with information technology. However, information asymmetry within such auctions causes risks and uncertainties that influence consumer purchase intentions. In this study, a 2 (product price: high vs. low) × 2 (e-retailer reputation: high vs. low) experimental design was used to understand whether the product price and e-retailer reputation will influence consumers' perceived risk, attitude toward the website and purchase intention. The results of this study indicate that perceived risk negatively influences consumer attitude toward the website and online purchase intention, while consumer attitude toward the website positively influences purchase intention. Moreover, involvement moderates the influence of product price and e-retailer reputation only on social risk but does not have a significant effect on consumer attitude toward the website. This study contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of online auction users' behavior. Finally, the managerial implications, limitations and future research directions are also provided. © 2011 The Authors. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology © 2011 The Scandinavian Psychological Associations.

  13. 78 FR 50086 - Notice of Competitive Auction for Solar Energy Development on Public Lands in the State of Colorado

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-08-16

    ... Competitive Auction for Solar Energy Development on Public Lands in the State of Colorado AGENCY: Bureau of...) application and a plan of development for solar energy projects on approximately 3,705 acres of public land in... designated Solar Energy Zones (SEZ): Los Mogotes East SEZ and De Tilla Gulch SEZ. Applications for solar...

  14. Legally separated joint ownership of bidder and auctioneer: illustrated by the partial deregulation of the EU electricity markets

    Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

    van Koten, Silvester

    -, č. 346 (2007), s. 1-47 ISSN 1211-3298 R&D Projects: GA MŠk LC542 Institutional research plan: CEZ:AV0Z70850503 Keywords : asymmetric auctions * bid ding behavior * electricity markets Subject RIV: AH - Economics http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp346.pdf

  15. 31 CFR 356.4 - What are the book-entry systems in which auctioned Treasury securities may be issued?

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... in which auctioned Treasury securities may be issued? There are three book-entry securities systems... marketable Treasury securities. We maintain and transfer securities in these three book-entry systems at... inflation. Securities may be transferred from one system to the other, unless the securities are not...

  16. 76 FR 1158 - Auction of 700 MHz Band Licenses Scheduled for July 19, 2011; Comment Sought on Competitive...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-01-07

    ... geographic area for which the applicant plans to bid, and also to familiarize itself with the Commission's... licenses in any of the same or overlapping geographic areas as that applicant. 12. After the close of... should explain their reasoning. iii. Bidding Rounds 14. Auction 92 will consist of sequential bidding...

  17. 76 FR 21350 - Auction of 700 MHz Band Licenses Scheduled for July 19, 2011; Notice and Filing Requirements...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-04-15

    ... notices pertaining to this auction. ii. Prohibited Communications and Compliance With Antitrust Laws To... result in enforcement action. h. Antitrust Laws 24. Applicants are also reminded that, regardless of compliance with the Commission's rules, they remain subject to the antitrust laws, which are designed to...

  18. 78 FR 24404 - Auction of Lower and Upper Paging Band Licenses Scheduled for July 16, 2013; Notice of Filing...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-04-25

    ... impermissible subject matters because they may convey pricing information and bidding strategies. Compliance... communicating with each other about bids, bidding strategies, or settlements unless such applicants have... strategy. In some instances, this prohibition extends to communications regarding the post-auction market...

  19. Reputation mechanism: From resolution for truthful online auctions to the model of optimal one-gambler problem

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bradonjic, Milan [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01

    In this paper we study reputation mechanisms, and show how the notion of reputation can help us in building truthful online auction mechanisms. From the mechanism design prospective, we derive the conditions on and design a truthful online auction mechanism. Moreover, in the case when some agents may lay or cannot have the real knowledge about the other agents reputations, we derive the resolution of the auction, such that the mechanism is truthful. Consequently, we move forward to the optimal one-gambler/one-seller problem, and explain how that problem is refinement of the previously discussed online auction design in the presence of reputation mechanism. In the setting of the optimal one-gambler problem, we naturally rise and solve the specific question: What is an agent's optimal strategy, in order to maximize his revenue? We would like to stress that our analysis goes beyond the scope, which game theory usually discusses under the notion of reputation. We model one-player games, by introducing a new parameter (reputation), which helps us in predicting the agent's behavior, in real-world situations, such as, behavior of a gambler, real-estate dealer, etc.

  20. 76 FR 78645 - Auction of FM Broadcast Construction Permits Scheduled for March 27, 2012; Notice and Filing...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-12-19

    ... in media of mass communications, may cause diminishment or loss of the bidding credit, and must be... the New Entrant Bidding Credit will be unavailable in Auction 93. 55. A medium of mass communications... and non-reserved channels, are included among media of mass communications as defined in 47 CFR 73...

  1. 75 FR 38545 - Notice of Realty Action: Competitive Auction of Public Lands in White Pine County, NV

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-02

    ... DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR Bureau of Land Management [LLNVL01000 L14300000.EU0000 241A; N-86667; 10-08807; MO 4500012445; TAS: 14X5232] Notice of Realty Action: Competitive Auction of Public Lands..., cashier's check, certified check or U.S. postal money order, or any combination thereof, and made payable...

  2. 78 FR 25465 - Notice of Realty Action: Modified Competitive Auction of Public Lands in Lincoln County, NV

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-05-01

    ... DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR Bureau of Land Management [LLNVL01000. L158480000.EU0000 241A; N-86674; 12-08807; MO 4500046714; TAS: 14X5232] Notice of Realty Action: Modified Competitive Auction of..., certified check or U.S. postal money order, or any combination thereof, and made payable in U.S. dollars to...

  3. 75 FR 8703 - Auction of Lower and Upper Paging Bands Licenses Scheduled for May 25, 2010; Notice and Filing...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-02-25

    ... of such geographic area licensees to use certain portions of the electromagnetic spectrum or provide... of the electromagnetic spectrum or provide service to certain areas in their geographic license areas...: Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, Auctions and Spectrum Access Division: For legal questions: Scott...

  4. Bidding behavior when one bidder and the auctioneer are vertically integrated: implications for the partial deregulation of EU electricity markets

    Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

    van Koten, Silvester

    -, č. 313 (2006), s. 1-35 ISSN 1211-3298 R&D Projects: GA MŠk LC542 Institutional research plan: CEZ:AV0Z70850503 Keywords : asymmetric auctions * bidding behavior * electricity markets Subject RIV: AH - Economics http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp313.pdf

  5. 77 FR 33097 - Application To Participate in an Auction for Mobility Fund Phase I Support and Application for...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-06-05

    ... America Fund & Intercarrier Compensation Reform Order (Order), FCC 11-161 and a Bureau Order, DA 12-147...-147] Application To Participate in an Auction for Mobility Fund Phase I Support and Application for Mobility Fund Phase I Support AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission. ACTION: Final rule; announcement...

  6. Double Trouble

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Elsaesser, Thomas; Kievit, Robert; Simons, Jan

    1994-01-01

    Double Trouble highlights the career of Dutch scriptwriter and television producer Chiem van Houweninge, well-known for his long-running TV comedy series and as author of episodes for TV detective series. Double Trouble gives Van Houweninge's own views on writing and filming in television prime

  7. Effects of scarcity, aesthetics and ecology on wildlife auction prices of large African mammals.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dalerum, Fredrik; Miranda, María; Muñiz, Cristina; Rodríguez, Plácido

    2018-02-01

    For successful integration of biological conservation into economic markets, economic processes need to capture ecological values. South African wildlife ranching is a tourist-based activity that generates unique information on the economic value of wildlife species. We used public data from South African wildlife auctions to evaluate if annual prices 1991-2012 related to species characteristics associated with scarcity, aesthetics and ecology of South African carnivores and ungulates. While none of the species characteristics influenced carnivore prices, ungulate prices were related to characteristics associated with novelty and aesthetics, which relative importance had increased over time. We raise both ecological and economic concerns for this apparent focus. Our results also suggest a potential importance of non-species-related factors, such as market and buyer characteristics. We encourage further evaluation of the relative influences of species characteristics versus factors that are intrinsically linked to economic processes on price variations in South African wildlife.

  8. Market clearing of joint energy and reserves auctions using augmented payment minimization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Amjady, N.; Aghaei, J.; Shayanfar, H.A.

    2009-01-01

    This paper presents the market clearing of joint energy and reserves auctions and its mathematical formulation, focusing on a possible implementation of the Payment Cost Minimization (PCM). It also discusses another key point in debate: whether market clearing algorithm should minimize offer costs or payment costs? An aggregated simultaneous market clearing approach is proposed for provision of ancillary services as well as energy, which is in the form of Mixed Integer Nonlinear Programming (MINLP) formulation. In the MINLP formulation of the market clearing process, the objective function (Payment cost or offer cost) are optimized while meeting AC power flow constraints, system reserve requirements and lost opportunity cost (LOC) considerations. The model is applied to the IEEE 24-bus Reliability Test System (IEEE 24-bus RTS), and simulation studies are carried out to examine the effectiveness of each objective function. (author)

  9. Sell by auction instead of giving away. A solution for the atomic conflict

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frondel, Manuel; Schmidt, Christoph M.; Bochum Univ.

    2010-01-01

    Controversial as it may be, an extension of the limited operating permits granted to German nuclear power plants could benefit all interests involved: climate protection, security of supply and the efficiency of power production. Public acceptance of the contemplated extension is poor, but this need not be so. An intelligently organised auction could make it possible to sell permit extensions such that the additional profit made by electricity producers would largely be skimmed off and public revenue maximised. If the nuclear power dividend thus earned were to be wisely invested by the political leadership for society's future prosperity, the present nuclear power conflict could be transformed into a sustainable nuclear power consensus, for the benefit of the environment, consumers and the energy-dependent sectors of the economy.

  10. Effects of information on young consumers' willingness to pay for genetically modified food: experimental auction analysis.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kajale, Dilip B; Becker, T C

    2014-01-01

    This study examines the effects of information on consumers' willingness to pay (WTP) for genetically modified food (GMF). We used Vickrey second price experimental auction method for elicitation of consumer WTP for GM potato chips and GM soya-chocolate bar. The sample used in this study was university students from Delhi, India. Four information formats (positive, negative, no information, and combined information about GM technology) were used for the examination. The results show that, when students received the combine information they were willing to pay around 17%-20% premium for GMF and when received the negative information they demanded around 22% discount for GMF. While the positive- and the no-information formats alone have no considerable effect on consumers' WTP for GMF. Overall, our findings suggest that while doing marketing of GMF in India, the best strategy is to provide combined information about GM technology.

  11. Efficiency of financial transmission rights markets in centrally coordinated periodic auctions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Adamson, Seabron; Noe, Thomas; Parker, Geoffrey

    2010-01-01

    Electricity market design in the United States is increasingly dominated by locational marginal pricing (LMP) of energy and transmission. LMP markets are typically coupled with periodic auctions of financial transmission rights (FTRs) to hedge transmission price risks. While LMP designs offer considerable advantages, forward price discovery in these markets requires participants to form efficient expectations on spot congestion price differences. In this paper, we examine trends in the efficiency of one of the early LMP markets, the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO), analyzing a panel data set of over 9000 contracts over a six-year period beginning September 2000. We show that NYISO FTR markets were inefficient in their early years, but that market participants learned to predict forward prices and thus efficiency improved for FTRs not solely within the New York City/Long Island sub-region. FTRs within this sub-region, which has a number of special characteristics, remain relatively inefficient. (author)

  12. Supplier bidding strategy based on non-cooperative game theory concepts in single auction power pools

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kang, Dong-Joo; Kim, Balho H.; Hur, Don

    2007-01-01

    In single auction power pools, only generators bid several energy price segments depending on the amount of energy supply, at individual generating companies' (GENCO) own discretion, for every trading interval. Then all selected bidders are paid a uniform Market Clearing Price (MCP). In this paper, it is realized that each GENCO has the complete information on its own payoff as well as the other parties' payoffs, corresponding to each potential combination of choices of strategies by all the players. Specifically, all the suppliers attempt to estimate the others' bids using the concept of Nash equilibrium in the general sense of profit maximization. Under some simplified assumptions, this problem can be modeled as a simultaneous-move game confronted by the bidders. Here, the system demand forecast by competitive sellers is captured for the purpose of constructing the optimal bidding strategy. Finally, a numerical example is presented demonstrating the effectiveness of the proposed solution scheme. (author)

  13. Risk analysis of bidding strategies in an electricity pay as bid auction: A new theorem

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rahimiyan, Morteza; Rajabi Mashhadi, Habib

    2007-01-01

    Considering the uncertainties in the power market, the bidding problem has an important role for the power supplier to reach his goals, and using risk management methods to protect against the market risk is unavoidable. Thus, in this paper, the bidding decision making problem is formulated from a supplier's viewpoint in a spot market. The spot market works based on a pay as bid auction or a discriminatory price auction. The market clearing price (MCP) is uncertain, and we consider a probabilistic model for it. Regarding the literature of the bidding problem and forecasting methods of MCP, a normal probability density function, pdf (N(μ m , σ m )), is a proper distribution for the MCP. The statistical parameters of MCP vary on different times (peak and off peak), and considering the concept of supplier risk, their effects on the supplier expected benefit and expected sell from selling energy will be discussed analytically. An important section of this research work concerns the optimal bidding strategy when μ m and σ m vary in different conditions of the power market. Thus, the coefficient of variation index (CV), as a proper measure, mathematically defined as σ m divided by μ m , is introduced to measure the market risk index. In this paper, the CV index is used to analyze and manage the supplier risk and introduce the optimal strategy. Then, for a constant amount of the CV as a theorem, it is proved that: (1) the maximum of the expected sell occurs at a constant level of the supplier risk and (2) the optimal bid price linearly depends on the standard deviation of the MCP. This theorem is generalized for the case that the expected value of the supplier benefit is considered as an objective function in the bidding process. Some numerical examples are presented, and application of the proposed theorem is discussed

  14. Essays on empirical analysis of multi-unit auctions: Impacts of financial transmission rights on the restructured electricity industry

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zang, Hailing

    This dissertation uses recently developed empirical methodologies for the study of multi-unit auctions to test the impacts of Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) on the competitiveness of restructured electricity markets. FTRs are a special type of financial option that hedge against volatility in the cost of transporting electricity over the grid. Policy makers seek to use the prices of FTRs as market signals to incentivize efficient investment and utilization of transmission capacity. However, prices will not send the correct signals if market participants strategically use FTRs. This dissertation uses data from the Texas electricity market to test whether the prices of FTRs are efficient to achieve such goals. The auctions studied are multi-unit, uniform-price, sealed-bid auctions. The first part of the dissertation studies the auctions on the spot market of the wholesale electricity industry. I derive structural empirical models to test theoretical predictions as to whether bidders fully internalize the effect of FTRs on profits into their bidding decisions. I find that bidders are learning as to how to optimally bid above marginal cost for their inframarginal capacities. The bidders also learn to bid to include FTRs into their profit maximization problem during the course of the first year. But starting from the second year, they deviated from optimal bidding that includes FTRs in the profit maximization problems. Counterfactual analysis show that the primary effect of FTRs on market outcomes is changing the level of prices rather than production efficiency. Finally, I find that in most months, the current allocations of FTRs are statistically equivalent to the optimal allocations. The second part of the dissertation studies the bidding behavior in the FTR auctions. I find that FTRs' strategic impact on the FTR purchasing behavior is significant for large bidders---firms exercising market power in the FTR auctions. Second, trader forecasts future FTR credit

  15. The Brazilian experience of incentive of renewable sources expansion by means of electric power auctions; A experiencia brasileira de incentivo a expansao das fontes renovaveis por meio de leiloes de energia eletrica

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Viana, Alexandre Guedes [Camara de Comercializacao de Energia Eletrica (CCEE), Sao Paulo, SP (Brazil); Parente, Virginia [Universidade de Sao Paulo (USP), SP (Brazil)

    2010-07-01

    The aim of this paper is to present the Brazilian experience to encourage renewable sources of power generation through the auctions into the Regulated Environment of Contracting. These auctions are subdivided into auctions of existing plants, new plants, alternative sources and structural plants. In this process we observe the structure of the mechanism for contracting new projects of renewable sources without neglecting the low tariffs issues. Thus, the auctions of electricity in Brazil is an alternative to be considered in an attempt to group market mechanisms, low tariffs and incentives to renewable sources of generation. (author)

  16. Design of sustainable food chains: Measuring consumers' willingness-to-pay through the performance of experimental auctions

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Costa, Ana I.A.

    Today's EU animal production systems face a major challenge. On one hand, they must deal with society's demand for production strategies that are safer, more environmental-friendly and ensure better animal welfare. On the other hand, they have to address food suppliers' aspirations for economic....... Moreover, the ability to quantify consumers' willingness-to-pay for new, ethically-improved foods is vital for the economic sustainability of the animal production sector, as well as for the generation of addedvalue products. This abstract presents the outcome of a pilot study of Dutch consumers...... conducted previously3,4. The type of auction employed was the second-price, sealed bid auction. The results obtained give some indication that Dutch consumers' might be willing to pay more for ethical benefits, namely those perceived to be associated with safety. Nevertheless, our findings also indicate...

  17. An Auction-Based Spectrum Leasing Mechanism for Mobile Macro-Femtocell Networks of IoT

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Xin Chen

    2017-02-01

    Full Text Available The Internet of Things (IoT is a vision of the upcoming society. It can provide pervasive communication between two or more entities using 4G-LTE (Long Term Evolution communication technology. In 4G-LTE networks, there are two important problems: helping manage the spectrum demands of IoT devices and achieving much more revenue with the limited resource. This paper proposes a pricing framework to investigate the spectrum leasing in mobile heterogeneous networks with single macrocell and multiple femtocells. We modeled the leasing procedure between the macrocell service provider (MSP and femtocell holders (FHs as an auction to motivate the MSP to lease its spectrum resource. All FHs act as the bidders, and the monopolist MSP acts as the auctioneer. In the auction, FHs submit their bids to rent the spectrum resource so that they can make a profit by selling it to their subscribers. The MSP determines the spectrum leasing amount and chooses the winning FHs by solving the dynamic programming-based 0–1 knapsack problem. In our proposed framework, we focus on the spectrum pricing strategy and revenue maximization of the MSP. The simulation results show that the proposed scheme provides effective motivation for the MSP to lease the spectrum to FHs, and both the MSP and FHs can benefit from spectrum leasing.

  18. The impact of product information and trials on demand for smokeless tobacco and cigarettes: evidence from experimental auctions.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rousu, Matthew C; O'Connor, Richard J; Thrasher, James F; June, Kristie M; Bansal-Travers, Maansi; Pitcavage, James

    2014-03-01

    Epidemiological and toxicological evidence suggests lower risk of smokeless tobacco (ST) products compared to cigarettes. Less is known, however, about consumer perceptions and use of novel forms of ST, including snus and dissolvable tobacco. In this study, we conducted in-person experimental auctions in Buffalo, NY, Columbia, SC, and Selinsgrove, PA with 571 smokers to test the impact of information and product trials on smokers' preferences. Auctions were conducted between November 2010-November 2011. We found no evidence of an impact of product trials on demand in our auctions. Anti-ST information increased demand for cigarettes when presented alone, but when presented with pro-ST information it decreased demand for cigarettes. It did not decrease demand for ST products. Anti-smoking information increased demand for ST products, but did not affect cigarette demand. These findings suggest that credible and effective communications about tobacco harm reduction should reinforce the negative effects of smoking. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  19. Dynamics of risk management tools and auctions in the second phase of the Brazilian Electricity Market reform

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    De Souza, Fabio Cavaliere; Legey, Luiz Fernando Loureiro

    2010-01-01

    In 2004, the reform of the Brazilian Electricity Market underwent a thorough revision. One of its causes was the electricity rationing that began in June 2001 and lasted until February 2002. Among other measures, the 2004 revision devised new mechanisms intended to reduce risks associated to contracts settled in electricity auctions and those related to investments in new generation plants. As 4 years have passed since the onset of the reform's revision, sufficiently enough data are now available for an analysis of the post-revision dynamics of the Brazilian Electricity Market. This is the purpose of the present paper. We focus on the dynamics of the different types of electricity auctions and on the so-called Mechanism for Compensation of Surpluses and Deficits, both created in the wake of the 2004 revision. The ultimate goal is to understand the behavior of the agents involved in auctions - notably buyers and sellers of electricity - and propose remedial actions to eliminate existing loopholes in the present regulatory framework. To achieve this goal, four steps were necessary. Firstly, a data base to support the analysis was built. Then, the main drivers of the dynamics of the risk management tools were identified. Finally, consequences of the implemented changes were discussed and corrections for observed pitfalls proposed. (author)

  20. An Auction-Based Spectrum Leasing Mechanism for Mobile Macro-Femtocell Networks of IoT.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chen, Xin; Xing, Lei; Qiu, Tie; Li, Zhuo

    2017-02-16

    The Internet of Things (IoT) is a vision of the upcoming society. It can provide pervasive communication between two or more entities using 4G-LTE (Long Term Evolution) communication technology. In 4G-LTE networks, there are two important problems: helping manage the spectrum demands of IoT devices and achieving much more revenue with the limited resource. This paper proposes a pricing framework to investigate the spectrum leasing in mobile heterogeneous networks with single macrocell and multiple femtocells. We modeled the leasing procedure between the macrocell service provider (MSP) and femtocell holders (FHs) as an auction to motivate the MSP to lease its spectrum resource. All FHs act as the bidders, and the monopolist MSP acts as the auctioneer. In the auction, FHs submit their bids to rent the spectrum resource so that they can make a profit by selling it to their subscribers. The MSP determines the spectrum leasing amount and chooses the winning FHs by solving the dynamic programming-based 0-1 knapsack problem. In our proposed framework, we focus on the spectrum pricing strategy and revenue maximization of the MSP. The simulation results show that the proposed scheme provides effective motivation for the MSP to lease the spectrum to FHs, and both the MSP and FHs can benefit from spectrum leasing.

  1. Report on the behalf of the Foreign Affairs Commission on: the bill adopted by the Senate and authorizing the ratification of the joint procurement agreement for a designation by auction of common bid platforms, and the bill adopted by the Senate authorizing the ratification of the joint procurement agreement for a designation by auction of an auction control. Nr 4092 and Nr 4093

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Guillet, Jean-Jacques

    2011-01-01

    This report presents the carbon quota system as an alternative to a system based on carbon taxing. It discusses the dismissal of carbon taxing and the implementation of a system based on quotas. It outlines how useful but fragile this system is, describes the three allocation stages, and presents the auction system. Then, it discusses the objectives of both agreements, comments the case of States which do not participate to the common platform

  2. 6 essays about auctions: a theoretical and empirical analysis. Application to power markets; 6 Essais sur les encheres: approches theorique et empirique. Application aux marches de l'electricite

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lamy, L

    2007-06-15

    This thesis is devoted to a theoretical and empirical analysis of auction mechanisms. Motivated by allocation issues in network industries, in particular by the liberalization of the electricity sector, it focus on auctions with externalities (either allocative or informational) and on multi-objects auctions. After an introduction which provides a survey of the use and the analysis of auctions in power markets, six chapters make this thesis. The first one considers standard auctions in Milgrom-Weber's model with interdependent valuations when the seller can not commit not to participate in the auction. The second and third chapters study the combinatorial auction mechanism proposed by Ausubel and Milgrom. The first of these two studies proposes a modification of this format with a final discount stage and clarifies the theoretical status of those formats, in particular the conditions such that truthful reporting is a dominant strategy. Motivated by the robustness issues of the generalizations of the Ausubel-Milgrom and the Vickrey combinatorial auctions to environments with allocative externalities between joint-purchasers, the second one characterizes the buyer-sub-modularity condition in a general model with allocative identity-dependent externalities between purchasers. In a complete information setup, the fourth chapter analyses the optimal design problem when the commitment abilities of the principal are reduced, namely she can not commit to a simultaneous participation game. The fifth chapter is devoted to the structural analysis of the private value auction model for a single-unit when the econometrician can not observe bidders' identities. The asymmetric independent private value (IPV) model is identified. A multi-step kernel-based estimator is proposed and shown to be asymptotically optimal. Using auctions data for the anglo-french electric Interconnector, the last chapter analyses a multi-unit ascending auctions through reduced forms. (author)

  3. Double Chooz

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Buck, Christian [Max-Planck-Institut fuer Kernphysik, Saupfercheckweg 1, D-69117 Heidelberg (Germany)

    2006-05-15

    The goal of the Double Chooz reactor neutrino experiment is to search for the neutrino mixing parameter {theta}{sub 13}. Double Chooz will use two identical detectors at 150 m and 1.05 km distance from the reactor cores. The near detector is used to monitor the reactor {nu}-bar {sub e} flux while the second is dedicated to the search for a deviation from the expected (1/distance){sup 2} behavior. This two detector concept will allow a relative normalization systematic error of ca. 0.6 %. The expected sensitivity for sin{sup 2}2{theta}{sub 13} is then in the range 0.02 - 0.03 after three years of data taking. The antineutrinos will be detected in a liquid scintillator through the capture on protons followed by a gamma cascade, produced by the neutron capture on Gd.

  4. Double supergeometry

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cederwall, Martin [Division for Theoretical Physics, Department of Physics, Chalmers University of Technology,SE 412 96 Gothenburg (Sweden)

    2016-06-27

    A geometry of superspace corresponding to double field theory is developed, with type I I supergravity in D=10 as the main example. The formalism is based on an orthosymplectic extension OSp(d,d|2s) of the continuous T-duality group. Covariance under generalised super-diffeomorphisms is manifest. Ordinary superspace is obtained as a solution of the orthosymplectic section condition. A systematic study of curved superspace Bianchi identities is performed, and a relation to a double pure spinor superfield cohomology is established. A Ramond-Ramond superfield is constructed as an infinite-dimensional orthosymplectic spinor. Such objects in minimal orbits under the OSp supergroup (“pure spinors”) define super-sections.

  5. Double ambidexterity

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kaulio, Matti; Thorén, Kent; Rohrbeck, René

    2017-01-01

    We leverage the business model innovation and ambidexterity literature to investigate a contradictory case, the Swedish-Finnish Telecom operator TeliaSonera. Despite being challenged by three major disruptions, the company not only still exists but also enjoys remarkably good financial performance....... Building on extant archival data and interviews, we carefully identify and map 26 organizational responses during 1992–2016. We find that the firm has overcome three critical phases by experimenting and pioneering with portfolios of business models and/or technological innovations. We describe...... this behaviour as double ambidexterity. We use an in-depth case study to conceptualize double ambidexterity and discuss its impact on the business's survival and enduring success....

  6. Auction-Based Resource Allocation for Cooperative Video Transmission Protocols over Wireless Networks

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Zhu Han

    2009-01-01

    Full Text Available Cooperative transmission has been proposed as a novel transmission strategy that takes advantage of broadcast nature of wireless networks, forms virtual MIMO system, and provides diversity gains. In this paper, wireless video transmission protocols are proposed, in which the spectrum resources are first allocated for the source side to broadcast video packets to the relay and destination, and then for the relay side to transmit side information generated from the received packets. The proposed protocols are optimized to minimize the end-to-end expected distortion via choosing bandwidth/power allocation, configuration of side information, subject to bandwidth and power constraints. For multiuser cases, most of current resource allocation approaches cannot be naturally extended and applied to the networks with relay nodes for video transmission. This paper extends the share auction approach into the cooperative video communication scenarios and provides a near-optimal solution for resource allocation. Experimental results have demonstrated that the proposed approach has significant advantage of up to 4 dB gain in single user case and 1.3 dB gain in multiuser case over the reference systems in terms of peak-to-signal-noise ratio. In addition, it reduces the formidable computational complexity of the optimal solution to linear complexity with performance degradation of less than 0.3 dB.

  7. Game auction prices are not related to biodiversity contributions of southern African ungulates and large carnivores

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dalerum, Fredrik; Miranda, Maria

    2016-02-01

    There is an urgent need for human societies to become environmentally sustainable. Because public policy is largely driven by economic processes, quantifications of the relationship between market prices and environmental values can provide important information for developing strategies towards sustainability. Wildlife in southern Africa is often privately owned and traded at game auctions to be utilized for commercial purposes mostly related to tourism. This market offers an interesting opportunity to evaluate how market prices relate to biologically meaningful species characteristics. In this market, prices were not correlated with species contributions to either phylogenetic or functional diversity, and species contributions to phylogenetic or functional diversity did not influence the trends in prices over time for the past 20 years. Since this economic market did not seem to appreciate evolutionary or ecologically relevant characteristics, we question if the game tourism market may contribute towards biodiversity conservation in southern Africa. We suggest that market prices in general may have limited values as guides for directing conservation and environmental management. We further suggest that there is a need to evaluate what humans value in biological organisms, and how potentially necessary shifts in such values can be instigated.

  8. Genetic relationships between temperament of calves at auction and carcass traits in Japanese Black cattle.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Takeda, Kazuya; Uchida, Hiroshi; Inoue, Keiichi

    2017-10-01

    Correlations of calves' temperament with carcass traits were estimated to clarify the genetic relationships between them in Japanese Black cattle. The temperament records for 3128 calves during auction at a calf market were scored on a scale of 1 (calm) to 5 (nervous) as temperament score (TS), and the TS were divided into two groups (TSG): TS 1 and 2 comprised TSG 1, and 3 to 5 constituted TSG 2. Carcass data were obtained from 33 552 fattened cattle. A threshold animal model was used for analyzing the underlying liability for TSG, whereas a linear one was used for TS and carcass traits. The heritability estimates for TS and TSG were 0.12 and 0.11, respectively. On the other hand, moderate to high heritability estimates were obtained for carcass traits (0.40 to 0.68). The temperament scores were negatively correlated with carcass weight, rib thickness and subcutaneous fat thickness (-0.13 to -0.59). In contrast, weak to moderate positive correlations were found between the temperament scores and rib eye area or yield estimate (0.16 to 0.45). The temperament scores and beef marbling score had no correlation. These results showed that it is possible to improve temperament and carcass traits simultaneously. © 2017 Japanese Society of Animal Science.

  9. Simulation Optimization of Search and Rescue in Disaster Relief Based on Distributed Auction Mechanism

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jian Tang

    2017-11-01

    Full Text Available In this paper, we optimize the search and rescue (SAR in disaster relief through agent-based simulation. We simulate rescue teams’ search behaviors with the improved Truncated Lévy walks. Then we propose a cooperative rescue plan based on a distributed auction mechanism, and illustrate it with the case of landslide disaster relief. The simulation is conducted in three scenarios, including “fatal”, “serious” and “normal”. Compared with the non-cooperative rescue plan, the proposed rescue plan in this paper would increase victims’ relative survival probability by 7–15%, increase the ratio of survivors getting rescued by 5.3–12.9%, and decrease the average elapsed time for one site getting rescued by 16.6–21.6%. The robustness analysis shows that search radius can affect the rescue efficiency significantly, while the scope of cooperation cannot. The sensitivity analysis shows that the two parameters, the time limit for completing rescue operations in one buried site and the maximum turning angle for next step, both have a great influence on rescue efficiency, and there exists optimal value for both of them in view of rescue efficiency.

  10. An Optimization Framework for Combining the Petroleum Replenishment Problem with the Optimal Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Chefi Triki

    2016-08-01

    Full Text Available We address in this paper a periodic petroleum station replenishment problem (PPSRP that aims to plan the delivery of petroleum products to a set of geographically dispatched stations. It is assumed that each station is characterized by its weekly demand and by its frequency of service. The main objective of the delivery process is to minimize the total travelled distance by the vailable trucks over an extended planning horizon. The problem configuration is described through a set of trucks with several compartments each and a set of stations with demands and prefixed delivery frequencies. Given such input data, the minimization of the total distance is subject to assignment and routing constraints that express the capacity limitations of each truck's compartment in terms of the frequency and the pathways' restrictions. In this paper, we develop and solve the full space mathematical formulation for the PPSRP with application to the Omani context. Our ultimate aim is to include such a model into an integrated framework having the objective of advising petroleum distribution companies on how to prepare bids in case of participation in combinatorial auctions of the transportation procurement.

  11. Design of the incentive mechanism in electricity auction market based on the signaling game theory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liu, Zhen; Zhang, Xiliang; Lieu, Jenny

    2010-01-01

    At present, designing a proper bidding mechanism to decrease the generators' market power is considered to be one of the key approaches to deepen the reform of the electricity market. Based on the signaling game theory, the paper analyzes the main electricity bidding mechanisms in the electricity auction markets and considers the degree of information disturbance as an important factor for evaluating bidding mechanisms. Under the above studies, an incentive electricity bidding mechanism defined as the Generator Semi-randomized Matching (GSM) mechanism is proposed. In order to verify the new bidding mechanism, this paper uses the Swarm platform to develop a simulation model based on the multi-agents. In the simulation model, the generators and purchasers use the partly superior study strategy to adjust their price and their electricity quantity. Then, the paper examines a simulation experiment of the GSM bidding mechanism and compares it to a simulation of the High-Low Matching (HLM) bidding mechanism. According to the simulation results, several conclusions can be drawn when comparing the proposed GSM bidding mechanism to the equilibrium state of HLM: the clearing price decreases, the total transaction volume increases, the profits of electricity generators decreases, and the overall benefits of purchasers increases. Index Terms - signaling game; semi-randomized matching; high-low match. (author)

  12. Control system of the inspection robots group applying auctions and multi-criteria analysis for task allocation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Panfil, Wawrzyniec; Moczulski, Wojciech

    2017-10-01

    In the paper presented is a control system of a mobile robots group intended for carrying out inspection missions. The main research problem was to define such a control system in order to facilitate a cooperation of the robots resulting in realization of the committed inspection tasks. Many of the well-known control systems use auctions for tasks allocation, where a subject of an auction is a task to be allocated. It seems that in the case of missions characterized by much larger number of tasks than number of robots it will be better if robots (instead of tasks) are subjects of auctions. The second identified problem concerns the one-sided robot-to-task fitness evaluation. Simultaneous assessment of the robot-to-task fitness and task attractiveness for robot should affect positively for the overall effectiveness of the multi-robot system performance. The elaborated system allows to assign tasks to robots using various methods for evaluation of fitness between robots and tasks, and using some tasks allocation methods. There is proposed the method for multi-criteria analysis, which is composed of two assessments, i.e. robot's concurrency position for task among other robots and task's attractiveness for robot among other tasks. Furthermore, there are proposed methods for tasks allocation applying the mentioned multi-criteria analysis method. The verification of both the elaborated system and the proposed tasks' allocation methods was carried out with the help of simulated experiments. The object under test was a group of inspection mobile robots being a virtual counterpart of the real mobile-robot group.

  13. Varying the number of bidders in the first-price sealed-bid auction: experimental evidence for the one-shot game

    OpenAIRE

    Tibor Neugebauer; Sascha F llbrunn

    2013-01-01

    The paper reports experimental data on the behavior in the first-price sealed-bid auction for a varying number of bidders when values and bids are private information. This feedback-free design is proposed for the experimental test of the one-shot game situation. We consider both within-subject and betweensubjects variations. In line with the qualitative risk neutral Nash equilibrium prediction, the data show that bids increase in the number of bidders. However, in auctions involving a small ...

  14. Open auctioning of nuclear drawing rights: a fair way out from regulated tariffs on the mass market

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Finon, D.

    2008-12-01

    The author presents a tariff approach which will consider the nuclear assets of the French operator as a property belonging to the French citizens who accepted the development of these equipment and who, as consumers, have already largely paid these assets. He describes this market mechanism which would assign drawing rights to all competitors. This mechanism is inspired by the VVP Spanish instrument, bidding or auctioning instruments implemented in different countries, and the EDF's drawing right assignment mechanism. He highlights and discusses the benefits and drawbacks of such an instrument

  15. The Interplay of Virtual Communities: A Multiple Case Study of E-Retailers in Yahoo E-Auctions

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Julia Zhi-Xian Zhao

    2012-06-01

    Full Text Available This study investigated how businesses operate e-shops in a transaction-oriented virtual community. This research employed a multiple case study approach by observing three cases of e-retailers, as being new e-commerce initiates, operating their businesses on the Yahoo! e-auction website. The results showed that e-shops displaying amusing stories can attract site visitors and “spick and span” e-shop design format can be helpful for converting visitors into buyers.

  16. 78 FR 45524 - Auction of H Block Licenses in the 1915-1920 MHz and 1995-2000 MHz Bands; Comment Sought on...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-07-29

    ... prospective transmitter sites located in, or near, the geographic area for which it plans to bid; confirm the... geographic areas as that applicant. 26. After the close of bidding, bidders' license selections, upfront... reasoning. B. Auction Structure i. Bidding Rounds 28. Under the Bureau's proposal to use an SMR format...

  17. Choosing between Auctions and Negotiations in Online B2B Markets for IT Services: The Effect of Prior Relationships and Performance

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    U.L. Radkevitch (Uladzimir); H.W.G.M. van Heck (Eric); O.R. Koppius (Otto)

    2008-01-01

    textabstractThe choice of contract allocation mechanism in procurement affects such aspects of transactions as information exchange between buyer and supplier, supplier competition, pricing and, eventually, performance. In this study we investigate the buyer’s choice between reverse auctions and

  18. The Wasteland Auction Policy in Northwest China: Solving Environmental Degradation and Rural Poverty? / Rural Development in Transitional China: A Special Issue

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Ho, P.P.S.

    2003-01-01

    In order to relieve rural poverty and solve the problem of soil and water erosion on marginal land, various provinces and regions throughout China proclaimed a new policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This 'Four Wastelands Auction Policy' attempts to boost the development of land of low

  19. Varying the number of bidders in the first-price sealed-bid auction: experimental evidence for the one-shot game

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Füllbrunn, S.C.; Neugebauer, T.

    2013-01-01

    The paper reports experimental data on the behavior in the first-price sealed-bid auction for a varying number of bidders when values and bids are private information. This feedback-free design is proposed for the experimental test of the one-shot game situation. We consider both within-subjects and

  20. Electric energy auctions in Brazil and its effect on emissions of greenhouse gases by the electric sector; Leiloes de energia eletrica no Brasil e sua influencia nas emissoes de gases de efeito estufa pelo setor eletrico

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Alpire, Ricardo; Pereira, Osvaldo Livio Soliano [Universidade Salvador (UNIFACS), BA (Brazil)

    2010-07-01

    The result of the auctions of electricity, after the new regulatory framework in 2004, has shown the increased participation of fossil sources of thermal generation, contributing to increased emission of greenhouse gases by the Brazilian Electricity Sector. This article aims to analyze the correlation between growth in electric generation sector and rising greenhouse gases, especially through the study of the winning projects of electric power auctions conducted with the advent of the New Institutional Model of the Power Sector from 2004, comparing with the existing policies and prospects of the next auction of the electric sector. (author)

  1. Double inflation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silk, J.; Turner, M.S.

    1986-04-01

    The Zel'dovich spectrum of adiabatic density perturbations is a generic prediction of inflation. There is increasing evidence that when the spectrum is normalized by observational data on small scales, there is not enough power on large scales to account for the observed large-scale structure in the Universe. Decoupling the spectrum on large and small scales could solve this problem. As a means of decoupling the large and small scales we propose double inflation (i.e., two episodes of inflation). In this scenario the spectrum on large scales is determined by the first episode of inflation and those on small scales by a second episode of inflation. We present three models for such a scenario. By nearly saturating the large angular-scale cosmic microwave anisotropy bound, we can easily account for the observed large-scale structure. We take the perturbations on small scales to be very large, deltarho/rho approx. = 0.1 to 0.01, which results in the production of primordial black holes (PBHs), early formation of structure, reionization of the Universe, and a rich array of astrophysical events. The Ω-problem is also addressed by our scenario. Allowing the density perturbations produced by the second episode of inflation to be large also lessens the fine-tuning required in the scalar potential and makes reheating much easier. We briefly speculate on the possibility that the second episode of inflation proceeds through the nucleation of bubbles, which today manifest themselves as empty bubbles whose surfaces are covered with galaxies. 37 refs., 1 fig

  2. Double Outlet Right Ventricle

    Science.gov (United States)

    ... Right Ventricle Menu Topics Topics FAQs Double Outlet Right Ventricle Double outlet right ventricle (DORV) is a rare form of congenital heart disease. En español Double outlet right ventricle (DORV) is a rare form of congenital ...

  3. Double hard scattering without double counting

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Diehl, Markus [Deutsches Elektronen-Synchrotron (DESY), Hamburg (Germany); Gaunt, Jonathan R. [VU Univ. Amsterdam (Netherlands). NIKHEF Theory Group; Schoenwald, Kay [Deutsches Elektronen-Synchrotron (DESY), Zeuthen (Germany)

    2017-02-15

    Double parton scattering in proton-proton collisions includes kinematic regions in which two partons inside a proton originate from the perturbative splitting of a single parton. This leads to a double counting problem between single and double hard scattering. We present a solution to this problem, which allows for the definition of double parton distributions as operator matrix elements in a proton, and which can be used at higher orders in perturbation theory. We show how the evaluation of double hard scattering in this framework can provide a rough estimate for the size of the higher-order contributions to single hard scattering that are affected by double counting. In a numeric study, we identify situations in which these higher-order contributions must be explicitly calculated and included if one wants to attain an accuracy at which double hard scattering becomes relevant, and other situations where such contributions may be neglected.

  4. Double hard scattering without double counting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Diehl, Markus; Gaunt, Jonathan R.

    2017-02-01

    Double parton scattering in proton-proton collisions includes kinematic regions in which two partons inside a proton originate from the perturbative splitting of a single parton. This leads to a double counting problem between single and double hard scattering. We present a solution to this problem, which allows for the definition of double parton distributions as operator matrix elements in a proton, and which can be used at higher orders in perturbation theory. We show how the evaluation of double hard scattering in this framework can provide a rough estimate for the size of the higher-order contributions to single hard scattering that are affected by double counting. In a numeric study, we identify situations in which these higher-order contributions must be explicitly calculated and included if one wants to attain an accuracy at which double hard scattering becomes relevant, and other situations where such contributions may be neglected.

  5. Effect of brand and advertising medium on demand for e-cigarettes: Evidence from an experimental auction.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rousu, Matthew C; O'Connor, Richard; Corrigan, Jay

    2017-09-01

    Print and television advertisements for e-cigarettes are currently legal in the United States. Given that e-cigarettes are a lower-risk alternative to cigarettes, these ads could have a positive public health impact if they motivate smokers to switch to e-cigarettes. However, the public health impact of e-cigarette ads could be negative if ads increase demand for both e-cigarettes and cigarettes. We use experimental auctions -in which participants bid in real auctions and winners pay for the items they purchase - to study the effect of print and TV e-cigarettes ads on demand for the brand from the ad, for another e-cigarettes brand, and for cigarettes. We ran experiments with 288 Pennsylvania smokers in November 2014-March 2015 and we found that in cases where an ad affects demand for e-cigarettes, the ad moves demand for cigarettes in the same direction. For example, the Blu print ad increases demand for Blu e-cigarettes and cigarettes among non-white participants. The Vuse TV ad reduces demand for both types of e-cigarettes and for cigarettes. We also find that non-white participants are willing to pay more for e-cigarettes in the absence of advertising, and that smokers who worry most about their health are willing to pay more for e-cigarettes. The results of this study point to the need for greater scrutiny of advertising for e-cigarette products such that they do not also induce demand for tobacco cigarettes.

  6. Effect of brand and advertising medium on demand for e-cigarettes: Evidence from an experimental auction

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Matthew C. Rousu

    2017-09-01

    Full Text Available Print and television advertisements for e-cigarettes are currently legal in the United States. Given that e-cigarettes are a lower-risk alternative to cigarettes, these ads could have a positive public health impact if they motivate smokers to switch to e-cigarettes. However, the public health impact of e-cigarette ads could be negative if ads increase demand for both e-cigarettes and cigarettes. We use experimental auctions –in which participants bid in real auctions and winners pay for the items they purchase – to study the effect of print and TV e-cigarettes ads on demand for the brand from the ad, for another e-cigarettes brand, and for cigarettes. We ran experiments with 288 Pennsylvania smokers in November 2014–March 2015 and we found that in cases where an ad affects demand for e-cigarettes, the ad moves demand for cigarettes in the same direction. For example, the Blu print ad increases demand for Blu e-cigarettes and cigarettes among non-white participants. The Vuse TV ad reduces demand for both types of e-cigarettes and for cigarettes. We also find that non-white participants are willing to pay more for e-cigarettes in the absence of advertising, and that smokers who worry most about their health are willing to pay more for e-cigarettes. The results of this study point to the need for greater scrutiny of advertising for e-cigarette products such that they do not also induce demand for tobacco cigarettes.

  7. Potential benefits of selling by auction the CIP 6 energy; Effetti della vendita tramite asta dell'energia CIP 6

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Campidoglio, C. [Istituto per la Ricerca Sociale, Milan (Italy). Osservatorio Energia

    2000-12-01

    This paper analyses the potential benefits of selling by auction the CIP 6 energy. This would both reduce the supply shortage and the prices on the eligible market, increase competition on the contract-for-difference market, indicate a clear price to which regulated energy charges could be indexed, thus extending the auction benefits to the franchise market to avoid the reintroduction of cross-subsidies. [Italian] L'articolo analizza i possibili benefici della vendita tramita asta dell'energia CIP 6. In particolare, l'asta ridurrebbe la scarsita' d'offerta e quindi i pressi sul mercato libero, aumenterebbe la concorrenza nel mercato dei contratti per differenza, fornirebbe un prezzo chiaro a cui indicizzare il prezzo dell'energia in tariffa, estendendo i benefici dell'asta sul mercato vincolato ed evitando la reintroduzione di sussidi incrociati.

  8. Modeling generation expansion in the context of a security of supply mechanism based on long-term auctions. Application to the Colombian case

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodilla, P.; Batlle, C.; Salazar, J.; Sanchez, J.J.

    2011-01-01

    In an attempt to provide electricity generation investors with appropriate economic incentives so as to maintain quality of supply at socially optimal levels, a growing number of electricity market regulators have opted for implementing a security of supply mechanism based on long-term auctions. In this context, the ability to analyze long-term investment dynamics is a key issue not only for market agents, but also for regulators. This paper describes a model developed to serve this purpose. A general system-dynamics-inspired methodology has been designed to be able to simulate these long-term auction mechanisms in the formats presently in place. A full-scale simulation based on the Colombian system was conducted to illustrate model capabilities. (author)

  9. Modeling generation expansion in the context of a security of supply mechanism based on long-term auctions. Application to the Colombian case

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rodilla, P.; Batlle, C. [Institute for Research in Technology, University Pontificia Comillas, Sta. Cruz de Marcenado 26, 28015 Madrid (Spain); Salazar, J. [Empresas Publicas de Medellin, Carrera 58 No. 42-125 Edificio Inteligente, Medellin (Colombia); Sanchez, J.J. [Secretaria de Estado de Cambio Climatico, Ministerio de Medio Ambiente, Rural y Marino. Plaza San Juan de la Cruz, 28071 Madrid (Spain)

    2011-01-15

    In an attempt to provide electricity generation investors with appropriate economic incentives so as to maintain quality of supply at socially optimal levels, a growing number of electricity market regulators have opted for implementing a security of supply mechanism based on long-term auctions. In this context, the ability to analyze long-term investment dynamics is a key issue not only for market agents, but also for regulators. This paper describes a model developed to serve this purpose. A general system-dynamics-inspired methodology has been designed to be able to simulate these long-term auction mechanisms in the formats presently in place. A full-scale simulation based on the Colombian system was conducted to illustrate model capabilities. (author)

  10. Estimating the impact of various menu labeling formats on parents' demand for fast-food kids' meals for their children: An experimental auction.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hobin, Erin; Lillico, Heather; Zuo, Fei; Sacco, Jocelyn; Rosella, Laura; Hammond, David

    2016-10-01

    This study experimentally tested whether parents' demand for fast-food kids' meals for their children is influenced by various menu labeling formats disclosing calorie and sodium information. The study also examined the effect of various menu labeling formats on parents' ability to identify fast-food kids' meals with higher calorie and sodium content. Online surveys were conducted among parents of children aged 3-12. Parents were randomized to view 1 of 5 menu conditions: 1) No Nutrition Information; 2) Calories-Only; 3) Calories + Contextual Statement (CS); 4) Calories, Sodium, + CS; and, 5) Calorie and Sodium in Traffic Lights + CS. Using an established experimental auction study design, parents viewed replicated McDonald's menus according to their assigned condition and were asked to bid on 4 Happy Meals. A randomly selected price was chosen; bids equal to or above this price "won" the auction, and bids less than this price "lost" the auction. After the auction, participants were asked to identify the Happy Meal with the highest calories and sodium content. Adjusting for multiple comparisons and covariates, the Calories, Sodium, + CS menu had a mean attributed value across all 4 Happy Meals which was 8% lower (-$0.31) than the Calories + CS menu (p < 0.05). Significantly more parents in the 4 menu conditions providing calories were able to correctly identify the Happy Meal with the highest calories (p < 0.0001) and significantly more parents in the 2 conditions providing sodium information were able to correctly identify the Happy Meal with the highest sodium content (p < 0.0001). Menus disclosing both calories and sodium information may reduce demand for fast-food kids' meals and better support parents in making more informed and healthier food choices for their children. Copyright © 2016. Published by Elsevier Ltd.

  11. Effect of management, marketing, and certified health programs on the sale price of beef calves sold through a livestock video auction service from 1995 through 2009.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Seeger, Jon T; King, Michael E; Grotelueschen, Dale M; Rogers, Glenn M; Stokka, Gerald S

    2011-08-15

    To evaluate and update the previously quantified effects of management, marketing, and certified health programs on the sale price of beef calves sold through a livestock video auction service. Longitudinal study. 41,657 lots representing 5,042,272 beef calves sold from 1995 through 2009. Data describing each lot of beef calves marketed from 1995 through 2009 by a livestock video auction service were obtained from sale catalogues. For each year of the study, multiple regression analysis was used to quantify the effect of management, marketing, and certified health programs on sale price. Sale date, base sale weight, quadratic effect of base weight, sex of calf, region of origin, breed description, inclusion in a certified health program, and number of calves in the lot significantly affected sale price for every year of the study. Variation in body weight, flesh score, and number of days between sale and delivery date had significant effects on price in most of the years; frame score and calves with horns affected price in 7 of 15 years; age and source verification influenced sale price in every year since source verification was introduced in 2005; and the auction service's progressive genetics program increased price during the 1 year that program was available. Some management, marketing, and certified health initiatives have consistently increased the sale price of beef calves, and producers can increase the price of their calves by implementing these practices.

  12. Auction approaches of long-term contracts to ensure generation investment in electricity markets: Lessons from the Brazilian and Chilean experiences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moreno, R.; Barroso, L.A.; Rudnick, H.; Mocarquer, S.; Bezerra, B.

    2010-01-01

    The implementation of auctions of long-term electricity contracts is arising as an alternative to ensure generation investment and therefore achieve a reliable electricity supply. The aim is to reconcile generation adequacy with efficient energy purchase, correct risk allocation among investors and consumers, and the politico-economic environment of the country. In this paper, a generic proposal for a long-term electricity contracts approach is made, including practical design concepts for implementation. This proposal is empirically derived from the auctions implemented in Brazil and Chile during the last 6 years. The study is focused on practices and lessons which are especially useful for regulators and policy makers that want to facilitate the financing of new desirable power plants in risky environments and also efficiently allocate supply contracts among investors at competitive prices. Although this mechanism is generally seen as a significant improvement in market regulation, there are questions and concerns on auction performance that require careful design and which are identified in this paper. In addition, the experiences and proposal described can serve to derive further mechanisms in order to promote the entrance of particular generation technologies, e.g. renewables, in the developed world and therefore achieve a clean electricity supply.

  13. International double taxation

    OpenAIRE

    Körbl, Hugo

    2012-01-01

    1 Summary This thesis deals with the issue of international double taxation of income and capital and methods for its solution. International double taxation is an issue which states began to deal with in the late 19th century. This interest intensified after the First World War when also the League of Nations (predecessor of the United Nations) began to deal with international double taxation. Most attention the phenomenon of double taxation of income and capital with an international elemen...

  14. Natural gas ballast requirement to allow participation of thermal plants in the new energy auctions: analysis and proposals; Requisito de lastro de gas natural para viabilizar a participacao de termeletricas nos leiloes de energia nova: analise e propostas

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Avila, Pedro Luis de; Bezerra, Bernardo Vieira; Barroso, Luiz Augusto Nobrega; Pereira, Mario Veiga; Rosenblatt, Jose [PSR, Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil)

    2012-07-01

    Since the first New Energy Auction (LEN), held in December 2005, there has been a continuous process of improving the auction rules and mechanism. For the specific case of gas-fired plants, a significant change was observed between the LEN A-3/2011 and LEN A-5/2011, and refers to the need of natural gas ballast for candidate projects in the auction. This rule was introduced by ANP Resolution No. 52, which establishes that the gas supply agreements must be backed up by proven reserves (analogous to the requirement in the power sector contracts of physical guarantee backup), and Ordinance MME No. 21/2008, which deals with power plants qualification for the new energy auctions. The latter was amended by MME Ordinance No. 514, which requires proven natural gas reserves to support the GSA of all candidate projects in a LEN. In other words, the gas supplier now has to prove that there are sufficient gas reserves to meet requirements of all candidate project in an auction, regardless of the plausibility of their engagement in the auction. In this context, the present study discusses these issues and has as main contributions: (I) a review of current regulations on contract ballast in the Brazilian natural gas sector, (II) a proposal to conciliate the need of fuel supply contract ballast to the dynamics of the natural gas sector, and (III) a proposal to conciliate the need for fuel contract ballast to the contracting process of the thermoelectric power in the new energy auctions. These contributions aim at a better integration between the sectors of natural gas and electricity in Brazil, leading to a more efficient use of resources and infrastructure development. (author)

  15. Detection of equine herpesvirus-4 and physiological stress patterns in young Thoroughbreds consigned to a South African auction sale.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Badenhorst, Marcha; Page, Patrick; Ganswindt, Andre; Laver, Peter; Guthrie, Alan; Schulman, Martin

    2015-06-02

    The prevalence of equine herpesvirus types-1 and -4 (EHV-1 and -4) in South African Thoroughbreds at auction sales is currently undefined. Commingling of young Thoroughbreds from various populations together with physiological stress related to their transport and confinement at a sales complex, may be associated with shedding and transmission of EHV-1 and -4. This prospective cohort study sampled 90 young Thoroughbreds consigned from eight farms, originating from three provinces representative of the South African Thoroughbred breeding demographic to a sales complex. Nasal swabs for quantitative real-time polymerase chain reaction (qPCR) assay to detect EHV-1 and -4 nucleic acid and blood samples for enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay for EHV-1 and -4 antibodies were collected from all horses on arrival and departure. Additional nasal swabs for qPCR were obtained serially from those displaying pyrexia and, or nasal discharge. Daily faecal samples were used for determination of faecal glucocorticoid metabolite (FGM) concentrations as a measurement of physiological stress and these values were modelled to determine the factors best explaining FGM variability. EHV-4 nucleic acid was detected in 14.4 % and EHV-1 from none of the animals in the study population. Most (93.3 %) and very few (1.1 %) of this population showed antibodies indicating prior exposure to EHV-4 and EHV-1 respectively. Pyrexia and nasal discharge were poor predictors for detecting EHV-4 nucleic acid. The horses' FGM concentrations increased following arrival before decreasing for most of the remaining study period including the auction process. Model averaging showed that variation in FGM concentrations was best explained by days post-arrival and transport duration. In this study population, sales consignment was associated with limited detection of EHV-4 nucleic acid in nasal secretions, with most showing prior exposure to EHV-4 and very few to EHV-1. The physiological stress response shown by

  16. Double layers in space

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlqvist, P.

    1982-07-01

    For more than a decade it has been realised that electrostatic double layers are likely to occur in space. We briefly discuss the theoretical background of such double layers. Most of the paper is devoted to an account of the observational evidence for double layers in the ionosphere and magnetosphere of the Earth. Several different experiments are reviewed including rocket and satellite measurements and ground based observations. It is concluded that the observational evidence for double layers in space is very strong. The experimental results indicate that double layers with widely different properties may exist in space. (Author)

  17. Double layers in space

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlqvist, P.

    1982-01-01

    For more than a decade it has been realised that electrostatic double layers are likely to occur in space. The author briefly discusses the theoretical background of such double layers. Most of the paper is devoted to an account of the observational evidence for double layers in the ionosphere and magnetosphere of the Earth. Several different experiments are reviewed including rocket and satellite measurements and ground based observations. It is concluded that the observational evidence for double layers in space is very strong. The experimental results indicate that double layers with widely different properties may exist in space. (Auth.)

  18. Double-double effect and coordination number

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mioduski, T.

    1992-01-01

    The original method of interpretation together with its theoretical foundations is developed, making it possible to use location and direction of the double-double (tetrad) effect within the Ln and An series to determine the coordination number (CN) complexes of the f-block elements. The method is applied for potentiometric and radiometric equilibrium studies. It has been pointed and that the decisive factor for the direction of the double-double effect in the case of the Gibbs energy variations is a difference in the CN of the f-element ion between the reaction product complex and that for the reaction substrate the ''regular'' effect for a given tetrad is accompanied by decrease in the CN while the ''reverse'' effect by increase in the CN. (author). 122 refs, 5 tabs, 8 figs

  19. Lessons from the first auction of carbon credits in Brazil; Licoes do primeiro leilao de creditos de carbono no Brasil

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pereira, Osvaldo Soliano; Andrade, Carla; Goncalves, Gustavo Mano [Universidade Salvador (UNIFACS), BA (Brazil). Mestrado em Regulacao da Industria de Energia], e-mail: osoliano@unfacs.br, e-mail: carlasap@hotmail.com, e-mail: gmano@terra.com.br

    2008-07-01

    The Kyoto Protocol, of 1997, foresaw three mechanisms by means of which the market could contribute for the reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases worldwide. The only one of these mechanisms that allows the participation of the countries not listed in the Annex I of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is the Clean Development Mechanism - CDM. CDM is an important opportunity for these countries to develop projects of emissions reduction and to generate incomes to be applied in projects of sustainable social and environmental improvements. This article offers an analysis of the antecedents and the results of the first auction of Certified Emission Reductions (CER) carried out in Brazil, by 'Bolsa de Mercadorias and Futuros - BM and F', in September 26, 2007, in order to demonstrate to the success of the initiative and its utility for the future of the preservation actions and environmental improvements in the country, also displaying the criticisms of some environmentalist sectors due to the multiplication of landfills as result of economic incentive of the CER generation. (author)

  20. Observing Double Stars

    Science.gov (United States)

    Genet, Russell M.; Fulton, B. J.; Bianco, Federica B.; Martinez, John; Baxter, John; Brewer, Mark; Carro, Joseph; Collins, Sarah; Estrada, Chris; Johnson, Jolyon; Salam, Akash; Wallen, Vera; Warren, Naomi; Smith, Thomas C.; Armstrong, James D.; McGaughey, Steve; Pye, John; Mohanan, Kakkala; Church, Rebecca

    2012-05-01

    Double stars have been systematically observed since William Herschel initiated his program in 1779. In 1803 he reported that, to his surprise, many of the systems he had been observing for a quarter century were gravitationally bound binary stars. In 1830 the first binary orbital solution was obtained, leading eventually to the determination of stellar masses. Double star observations have been a prolific field, with observations and discoveries - often made by students and amateurs - routinely published in a number of specialized journals such as the Journal of Double Star Observations. All published double star observations from Herschel's to the present have been incorporated in the Washington Double Star Catalog. In addition to reviewing the history of visual double stars, we discuss four observational technologies and illustrate these with our own observational results from both California and Hawaii on telescopes ranging from small SCTs to the 2-meter Faulkes Telescope North on Haleakala. Two of these technologies are visual observations aimed primarily at published "hands-on" student science education, and CCD observations of both bright and very faint doubles. The other two are recent technologies that have launched a double star renaissance. These are lucky imaging and speckle interferometry, both of which can use electron-multiplying CCD cameras to allow short (30 ms or less) exposures that are read out at high speed with very low noise. Analysis of thousands of high speed exposures allows normal seeing limitations to be overcome so very close doubles can be accurately measured.

  1. Formation of double layers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leung, P.; Wong, A.Y.; Quon, B.H.

    1981-01-01

    Experiments on both stationary and propagating double layers and a related analytical model are described. Stationary double layers were produced in a multiple plasma device, in which an electron drift current was present. An investigation of the plasma parameters for the stable double layer condition is described. The particle distribution in the stable double layer establishes a potential profile, which creates electron and ion beams that excite plasma instabilities. The measured characteristics of the instabilities are consistent with the existence of the double layer. Propagating double layers are formed when the initial electron drift current is large. Ths slopes of the transition region increase as they propagate. A physical model for the formation of a double layer in the experimental device is described. This model explains the formation of the low potential region on the basis of the space charge. This space charge is created by the electron drift current. The model also accounts for the role of ions in double layer formation and explains the formation of moving double layers. (Auth.)

  2. Double deflation and aggregation

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Dietzenbacher, Erik; Hoen, A.R.

    Published input-output tables in constant prices are relatively scarce. Therefore, input-output tables often have to be deflated by the practitioners themselves. The method of double deflation is used predominantly for this purpose. The present paper shows that the double-deflation method is subject

  3. Congenital maxillary double lip

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Dinesh Singh Chauhan

    2012-01-01

    Full Text Available Double lip, also referred to as "macrocheilia," is a rare anomaly which affects the upper lip more commonly than the lower lip. It consists of a fold of excess or redundant hypertrophic tissue on the mucosal side of the lip. The congenital double lip is believed to be present at birth and becomes more prominent after eruption of teeth. It affects esthetics and also interferes with speech and mastication. Simple surgical excision produces good functional and cosmetic results. We report a case of a non-syndromic congenital maxillary double lip in a 21-year-old male patient.

  4. Challenges in managing freshwater fishery resource through Lebak Lebung Auction approach: a case study in Pangkalan Lampam District Ogan Komering Ilir Regency

    Science.gov (United States)

    Muslimin, B.; Suadi

    2018-03-01

    Responsible management of fishery resources has been a tradition of Ogan Komering Ilir (OKI) of South Sumatera for generations. It was recorded that since 1630 the Dutch Government had made auction policy for managing water territory in OKI Regency as an effort to preserve nature and to avoid the conflict of inland water ownership. Currently, the community-based management model has been adopted by local governments into formal regulations, known as Regional Regulation on Auction of Flood Water Swamp and Rivers (Lelang Lebak Lebung dan Sungai or L3S). This paper describes the success factors and the threats for the failure of the L3S management model in OKI Regency, based on a case study in Pangkalan Lampam District. The study showed that the management mechanism through the L3S system had been well instituted and become a well-established management practice. The management model is in line with the principle of co-management and the approach has become critical success factor in L3S management. However, ecological, economic and social aspects influence the sustainability of such fishery management model. Besides, L3S management model faces limited data and information related to fish stocks, which result in difficulties in determining the total allowable catch.

  5. Pion double charge exchange

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cooper, M.D.

    1978-01-01

    The pion double charge exchange data on the oxygen isotopes is reviewed and new data on 9 Be, 12 C, 24 Mg, and 28 Si are presented. Where theoretical calculations exist, they are compared to the data. 9 references

  6. Neutrinoless double beta decay

    Indian Academy of Sciences (India)

    2012-10-06

    Oct 6, 2012 ... Anyhow, the 'multi-isotope' ansatz is needed to compensate for matrix element ... The neccessary half-life requirement to touch this ... site energy depositions (like double beta decay) and multiple site interactions (most of.

  7. Project Half Double

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Svejvig, Per; Ehlers, Michael; Adland, Karoline Thorp

    activities carried out within the framework of the projects. The formal part of Project Half Double was initiated in June 2015. We started out by developing, refining and testing the Half Double methodology on seven pilot projects in the first phase of the project, which will end June 2016. The current......Project Half Double has a clear mission to succeed in finding a project methodology that can increase the success rate of our projects while increasing the speed at which we generate new ideas and develop new products and services. Chaos and complexity should be seen as a basic condition...... and as an opportunity rather than a threat and a risk. We are convinced that by doing so, we can strengthen Denmark’s competitiveness and play an important role in the battle for jobs and future welfare. The overall goal is to deliver “projects in half the time with double the impact”, where projects in half the time...

  8. Project Half Double

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Svejvig, Per; Gerstrøm, Anna; Frederiksen, Signe Hedeboe

    The Half Double mission: Project Half Double has a clear mission. We want to succeed in finding a project methodology that can increase the success rate of our projects while increasing the development speed of new products and services. We are convinced that by doing so we can strengthen...... the competitiveness of Denmark and play an important role in the battle for jobs and future welfare. The overall goal is to deliver “Projects in half the time with double the impact” where projects in half the time should be understood as half the time to impact (benefit realization, effect is achieved......) and not as half the time for project execution. The Half Double project journey: It all began in May 2013 when we asked ourselves: How do we create a new and radical project paradigm that can create successful projects? Today we are a movement of hundreds of passionate project people, and it grows larger...

  9. Double beta decay: experiments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fiorini, Ettore

    2006-01-01

    The results obtained so far and those of the running experiments on neutrinoless double beta decay are reviewed. The plans for second generation experiments, the techniques to be adopted and the expected sensitivities are compared and discussed

  10. A double layer review

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Block, L.P.

    1977-06-01

    A review of the main results on electrostatic double layers (sometimes called space charge layers or sheaths) obtained from theory, and laboratory and space experiments up to the spring of 1977 is given. By means of barium jets and satellite probes, double layers have now been found at the altitudes, earlier predicted theoretically. The general potential distribution above the auroral zone, suggested by inverted V-events and electric field reversals, is corroborated. (author)

  11. Aristotle and Double Effect

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Di Nucci, Ezio

    2014-01-01

    There are some interesting similarities between Aristotle’s ‘mixed actions’ in Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics and the actions often thought to be justifiable with the Doctrine of Double Effect. Here I analyse these similarities by comparing Aristotle’s examples of mixed actions with standard...... cases from the literature on double effect such as, amongst others, strategic bombing, the trolley problem, and craniotomy. I find that, despite some common features such as the dilemmatic structure and the inevitability of a bad effect, Aristotle’s mixed actions do not count as cases justifiable...... through application of the Doctrine of Double Effect because they fail to meet the crucial necessary condition of the Doctrine according to which the bad effect can only be a merely foreseen side- effect and not an intended means....

  12. Coulomb double helical structure

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kamimura, Tetsuo; Ishihara, Osamu

    2012-01-01

    Structures of Coulomb clusters formed by dust particles in a plasma are studied by numerical simulation. Our study reveals the presence of various types of self-organized structures of a cluster confined in a prolate spheroidal electrostatic potential. The stable configurations depend on a prolateness parameter for the confining potential as well as on the number of dust particles in a cluster. One-dimensional string, two-dimensional zigzag structure and three-dimensional double helical structure are found as a result of the transition controlled by the prolateness parameter. The formation of stable double helical structures resulted from the transition associated with the instability of angular perturbations on double strings. Analytical perturbation study supports the findings of numerical simulations.

  13. John Deakin: Double Exposures

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Paul Rousseau

    2015-11-01

    Full Text Available In this series of short films made by Jonathan Law, the art historian James Boaden, and the curator of The John Deakin Archive, Paul Rousseau, discuss the double-exposure images made by the photographer John Deakin (1912-1972 in the 1950s and 1960s. The films ask you, firstly, to look closely at the images being discussed. Each one begins with a sustained and intense shot of a single image before opening up to a wide-ranging discussion about Deakin, double exposures, and photography.

  14. Double Photoionization Near Threshold

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wehlitz, Ralf

    2007-01-01

    The threshold region of the double-photoionization cross section is of particular interest because both ejected electrons move slowly in the Coulomb field of the residual ion. Near threshold both electrons have time to interact with each other and with the residual ion. Also, different theoretical models compete to describe the double-photoionization cross section in the threshold region. We have investigated that cross section for lithium and beryllium and have analyzed our data with respect to the latest results in the Coulomb-dipole theory. We find that our data support the idea of a Coulomb-dipole interaction.

  15. Double Chooz experiment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Palomares, C.

    2009-01-01

    Double Chooz will use two identical detectors at different distances from the Chooz nuclear power station to search for a non-vanishing value of θ 13 , and, hopefully, to open the way to experiments aspiring to discover CP violation in the leptonic sector. The far detector is expected to be operative by the end of 2009. Installation of the near detector will occur in 2010. Double Chooz has the capacity to exclude sin 2 (2θ 13 ) 31 2 = 2.5 x 10 -3 eV 2 with three years of data running both near and far detectors. (author)

  16. Double-helix stellarator

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moroz, P.E.

    1997-09-01

    A new stellarator configuration, the Double-Helix Stellarator (DHS), is introduced. This novel configuration features a double-helix center post as the only helical element of the stellarator coil system. The DHS configuration has many unique characteristics. One of them is the extreme low plasma aspect ratio, A ∼ 1--1.2. Other advantages include a high enclosed volume, appreciable rotational transform, and a possibility of extreme-high-β MHD equilibria. Moreover, the DHS features improved transport characteristics caused by the absence of the magnetic field ripple on the outboard of the torus. Compactness, simplicity and modularity of the coil system add to the DHS advantages for fusion applications

  17. Measuring Dutch consumers' willingness-to-pay for ethically-improved foods and supply chains through the performance of experimental auctions

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Costa, Ana I.A.

    for ethical benefits to be introduced in fish production, namely for those perceived to be associated with food safety. Nevertheless, these findings also point out that consumers' may not always value the ethical attributes they consider relevant in a consistent manner, especially if these seem to contradict......This paper presents the outcome of a pilot study on Dutch consumers' willingness-to-pay for fresh fish originating from production systems with different levels of ethical attributes, as estimated through the performance of experimental auctions. Fifteen Dutch citizens living in Noord......-Holland and being regular consumers of fresh fish were selected to participate in this study. Two experimental sessions were held in December 2003. Information regarding the subjects, their knowledge about fish production systems and the perceived relevance of different ethical attributes was collected prior...

  18. Willingness to pay for small solar powered bed net fans: results of a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak auction in Ghana.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yukich, Joshua O; Briët, Olivier J T; Ahorlu, Collins K; Nardini, Peter; Keating, Joseph

    2017-08-07

    Long-lasting insecticidal nets (LLINs) are one of the main interventions recommended by the World Health Organization for malaria vector control. LLINs are ineffective if they are not being used. Subsequent to the completion of a cluster randomized cross over trial conducted in rural Greater Accra where participants were provided with the 'Bɔkɔɔ System'-a set of solar powered net fan and light consoles with a solar panel and battery-or alternative household water filters, all trial participants were invited to participate in a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak auction to determine the mean willingness to pay (WTP) for the fan and light consoles and to estimate the demand curve for the units. Results demonstraed a mean WTP of approximately 55 Cedis (~13 USD). Demand results suggested that at a price which would support full manufacturing cost recovery, a majority of households in the area would be willing to purchase at least one such unit.

  19. Double aortic arch

    Science.gov (United States)

    Surgery can be done to fix double aortic arch. The surgeon ties off the smaller branch and separates it from the larger branch. Then the surgeon closes the ends of the aorta with stitches. This relieves pressure on the esophagus and windpipe.

  20. Singapore's double festival

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fraser, Gordon

    1990-09-15

    Coinciding with celebrations for the nation's 25th anniversary, the 25th International Conference on High Energy Physics, held in Singapore from 2-8 August, was itself a double festival, with the Standard Model of contemporary physics and CERN's new LEP electron-positron collider providing the twin themes.

  1. Layered double hydroxides

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    López Rayo, Sandra; Imran, Ahmad; Hansen, Hans Chr. Bruun

    2017-01-01

    A novel zinc (Zn) fertilizer concept based on Zn doped layered double hydroxides (Zn-doped Mg-Fe-LDHs) has been investigated. Zn-doped Mg-Fe-LDHs were synthetized, their chemical composition was analyzed and their nutrient release was studied in buffered solutions with different pH values. Uptake...

  2. Double Beta Decay Experiments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Piepke, A.

    2005-01-01

    The experimental observation of neutrino oscillations and thus neutrino mass and mixing gives a first hint at new particle physics. The absolute values of the neutrino mass and the properties of neutrinos under CP-conjugation remain unknown. The experimental investigation of the nuclear double beta decay is one of the key techniques for solving these open problems

  3. Auctioning payment entitlements

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Nielsen, Kurt

    2005-01-01

    Payment entitlements is a new commodity that arises from the new European common agricultural policy. The agricultural subsidies are decoupled from the actual production and replaced by the so-called payment entitlements. A payment entitlement has a farm specific value and may be freely traded. T...

  4. Auctioning Bulk Mobile Messages

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    S. Meij (Simon); L-F. Pau (Louis-François); H.W.G.M. van Heck (Eric)

    2003-01-01

    textabstractThe search for enablers of continued growth of SMS traffic, as well as the take-off of the more diversified MMS message contents, open up for enterprises the potential of bulk use of mobile messaging , instead of essentially one-by-one use. In parallel, such enterprises or value added

  5. Competing Auctions of Skills

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kennes, John; le Maire, Daniel

    We generalize McAfee’s (1993) game of competing sellers to the case of heterogeneous sellers. In the generalized McAfee (GM) game, the equilibrium expected job offer distribution of each worker (seller) type evolves over time as a function of stochastic events. We derive a tractable method...... of solving the GM game. We estimate, using non-parametric methods, a close fit between a benchmark GM game and a cross-section of Danish data on productivity and unemployment. The theoretical properties of the GM game, which relate to on-the-job search, assortative matching, aggregate and match specific...

  6. Competing Auctions of Skills

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kennes, John; le Maire, Christian Daniel

    The model of competing sellers McAfee (1993) is applied to a labor market environment with heterogeneous workers, who differ by outside option and skill type, and heterogeneous firms, who differ by the amount of output produced when matched to each possible worker tyoe. We derive both a static...

  7. Intermediation and Competing Auctions

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kennes, John; Schiff, Aaron

    this information to some or all buyers. We show that this always raises total welfare, even if it causes the informed buyers not to trade with low quality sellers. However, buyers and some sellers may be made worse off in equilibrium. We also examine the provision of information by a profit maximizing monopoly...

  8. Double quick, double click reversible peptide "stapling".

    Science.gov (United States)

    Grison, Claire M; Burslem, George M; Miles, Jennifer A; Pilsl, Ludwig K A; Yeo, David J; Imani, Zeynab; Warriner, Stuart L; Webb, Michael E; Wilson, Andrew J

    2017-07-01

    The development of constrained peptides for inhibition of protein-protein interactions is an emerging strategy in chemical biology and drug discovery. This manuscript introduces a versatile, rapid and reversible approach to constrain peptides in a bioactive helical conformation using BID and RNase S peptides as models. Dibromomaleimide is used to constrain BID and RNase S peptide sequence variants bearing cysteine (Cys) or homocysteine ( h Cys) amino acids spaced at i and i + 4 positions by double substitution. The constraint can be readily removed by displacement of the maleimide using excess thiol. This new constraining methodology results in enhanced α-helical conformation (BID and RNase S peptide) as demonstrated by circular dichroism and molecular dynamics simulations, resistance to proteolysis (BID) as demonstrated by trypsin proteolysis experiments and retained or enhanced potency of inhibition for Bcl-2 family protein-protein interactions (BID), or greater capability to restore the hydrolytic activity of the RNAse S protein (RNase S peptide). Finally, use of a dibromomaleimide functionalized with an alkyne permits further divergent functionalization through alkyne-azide cycloaddition chemistry on the constrained peptide with fluorescein, oligoethylene glycol or biotin groups to facilitate biophysical and cellular analyses. Hence this methodology may extend the scope and accessibility of peptide stapling.

  9. Subatmospheric double containment system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gans, D. Jr.; Noble, J.H.

    1978-01-01

    A reinforced concrete double wall nuclear containment structure with each wall including an essentially impervious membrane or liner and porous concrete filling the annulus between the two walls is described. The interior of the structure is maintained at subatmospheric pressure, and the annulus between the two walls is maintained at a subatmospheric pressure intermediate between that of the interior and the surrounding atmospheric pressure, during normal operation. In the event of an accident within the containment structure the interior pressure may exceed atmospheric pressure, but leakage from the interior to the annulus between the double walls will not result in the pressure of the annulus exceeding atmospheric pressure so that there is no net outleakage from the containment structure

  10. Double rupture disc experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    Result of these observations, comparisons and evaluations can be summarized in the following list of concerns regarding the use of double rupture discs coupled to the liquid space of a steam generator that is subjected to a large leak sodium water reaction event. Single rupture disc show delayed collapse characteristics in LLTR Series I and double disc assemblies are presumed to be more complex with additional delay before opening to give pressure relief. Delayed failure increases pressures in the IHTS and must be adequately covered by design requirements. With CRBR design, the first disc may fail only partially reducing the loading on the second disc with the result that relief performance may not meet requirements

  11. Gravitational double layers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Senovilla, José M M

    2014-01-01

    I analyze the properties of thin shells through which the scalar curvature R is discontinuous in gravity theories with Lagrangian F(R) = R − 2Λ + αR 2 on the bulk. These shells/domain walls are of a new kind because they possess, in addition to the standard energy–momentum tensor, an external energy flux vector, an external scalar pressure/tension and, most exotic of all, another energy–momentum contribution resembling classical dipole distributions on a shell: a double layer. I prove that all these contributions are necessary to make the entire energy–momentum tensor divergence-free. This is the first known occurrence of such a type of double layer in a gravity theory. I present explicit examples in constant-curvature five-dimensional bulks, with a brief study of their properties: new physical behaviors arise. (fast track communications)

  12. The double Laplacian growth

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Loutsenko, I.; Yermolayeva, O.

    2008-06-01

    The dynamics of the idealized Laplacian growth (or the Hele-Shaw problem) can be approximated by the Poiselle flow which in appropriate units takes the form of the Darcy law. In this paper we account for the liquid inertia in the Hele-Shaw problem at zero surface tension limit. The Laplace dynamics for the pressure is extended here with one more for the velocity potential for which we call this growth process the Double Laplacian. The application of the conformal mappings technique leads to doubled dynamics for both the conformal map and the complex potential, which is presented in the paper for the radial and the planar growth. We apply the stability analysis and discuss the integrability for the stated problem. (author)

  13. Algebra of Majorana doubling.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lee, Jaehoon; Wilczek, Frank

    2013-11-27

    Motivated by the problem of identifying Majorana mode operators at junctions, we analyze a basic algebraic structure leading to a doubled spectrum. For general (nonlinear) interactions the emergent mode creation operator is highly nonlinear in the original effective mode operators, and therefore also in the underlying electron creation and destruction operators. This phenomenon could open up new possibilities for controlled dynamical manipulation of the modes. We briefly compare and contrast related issues in the Pfaffian quantum Hall state.

  14. Twisted quantum doubles

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Daijiro Fukuda

    2004-01-01

    Full Text Available Using diagrammatic pictures of tensor contractions, we consider a Hopf algebra (Aop⊗ℛλA** twisted by an element ℛλ∈A*⊗Aop corresponding to a Hopf algebra morphism λ:A→A. We show that this Hopf algebra is quasitriangular with the universal R-matrix coming from ℛλ when λ2=idA, generalizing the quantum double construction which corresponds to the case λ=idA.

  15. Exploring consumers’ perception and willingness to pay for “Non-Added Sulphite” wines through experimental auctions: A case study in Italy and Spain

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mario Amato

    2017-12-01

    Full Text Available Although scientific literature is still uncertain towards the real causes that can link headache episodes with moderate wine consumption, a growing proportion of consumers seems to address sulphites as possible culprits. Hence, the objective of this study is to assess consumers` willingness to pay for wine bearing a sulphites-free label in two traditional wine producing countries, Italy and Spain. The methodological framework is based on the specification of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM type of auction applied to consumers purchasing wine in the supermarket stores of both countries. A left censored Tobit model is used to analyse the bidding behaviour for conventional and 'Non-Added Sulphite' (NAS wine. Results in both countries show that consumers who link the headaches with the consumption of sulphite are willing to exchange the habitually consumed bottle of wine with a NAS wine and pay extra premium prices. Keywords: Experimental auctions, Non-added sulphite wines, Consumer behavior

  16. Ac-induced disruption of the doubleDs structure in tomato

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Rommens, Caius M.T.; Biezen, Erik A. van der; Ouwerkerk, Pieter B.F.; Nijkamp, H. John J.; Hille, Jacques

    1991-01-01

    The maize doubleDs element is stably maintained in the tomato genome. Upon the subsequent introduction of Ac into a plant containing doubleDs, disruption of the doubleDs structure and DNA rearrangements at the site of the doubleDs element were observed. No indications were obtained for excision of

  17. The Double Star mission

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Liu

    2005-11-01

    Full Text Available The Double Star Programme (DSP was first proposed by China in March, 1997 at the Fragrant Hill Workshop on Space Science, Beijing, organized by the Chinese Academy of Science. It is the first mission in collaboration between China and ESA. The mission is made of two spacecraft to investigate the magnetospheric global processes and their response to the interplanetary disturbances in conjunction with the Cluster mission. The first spacecraft, TC-1 (Tan Ce means "Explorer", was launched on 29 December 2003, and the second one, TC-2, on 25 July 2004 on board two Chinese Long March 2C rockets. TC-1 was injected in an equatorial orbit of 570x79000 km altitude with a 28° inclination and TC-2 in a polar orbit of 560x38000 km altitude. The orbits have been designed to complement the Cluster mission by maximizing the time when both Cluster and Double Star are in the same scientific regions. The two missions allow simultaneous observations of the Earth magnetosphere from six points in space. To facilitate the comparison of data, half of the Double Star payload is made of spare or duplicates of the Cluster instruments; the other half is made of Chinese instruments. The science operations are coordinated by the Chinese DSP Scientific Operations Centre (DSOC in Beijing and the European Payload Operations Service (EPOS at RAL, UK. The spacecraft and ground segment operations are performed by the DSP Operations and Management Centre (DOMC and DSOC in China, using three ground station, in Beijing, Shanghai and Villafranca.

  18. Double your money

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moxon, Suzanne

    1998-01-01

    The government-owned Hydro-Quebec was instructed to take certain actions, one of which was to increase profits. The company has published a report describing its plans for 1998-2002. The company expects to increase sales and double its income over the five years. Hydro-Quebec (which produces or purchases 97% of the electricity consumed in the province) will freeze prices until April 2002. Environmental considerations and liaison with local communities are included in the 5-year plan. The company expects to invest c$1.2B in international markets over the five years and C$20M per year are earmarked for research. (UK)

  19. Layered double hydroxides

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    López Rayo, Sandra; Imran, Ahmad; Hansen, Hans Chr. Bruun

    2017-01-01

    A novel zinc (Zn) fertilizer concept based on Zn doped layered double hydroxides (Zn-doped Mg-Fe-LDHs) has been investigated. Zn-doped Mg-Fe-LDHs were synthetized, their chemical composition was analyzed and their nutrient release was studied in buffered solutions with different pH values. Uptake...... equation showing maximum release at pH 5.2, reaching approximately 45% of the total Zn content. The Zn concentrations in the plants receiving the LDHs were between 2- and 9.5-fold higher than those in plants without Zn addition. A positive effect of the LDHs was also found in soil. This work documents...

  20. Double sodium rubidium molybdates

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mokhoseev, M.V.; Khal'baeva, K.M.; Khajkina, E.G.; Ogurtsov, A.M.

    1990-01-01

    According to ceramic technique double sodium-rubidium molybdates of the compositions Rb 2-x Na x MoO 4 (0.5≤x≤0.67) and Na 3 Rb(MoO 4 ) 2 have been prepared. It is ascertained that Rb 2-x Na x MoO 4 is crystallized in glaserite structural type (trigonal crystal system, sp.gr. P3m1, Z=2) and melts incongruently at 640 deg C. Na 3 Rb(MoO 4 ) 2 at room temperature is unstable and gradually decomposes into Na 2 MoO 4 and Rb 2-x Na x MoO 4

  1. Double profunda brachii artery

    OpenAIRE

    Gavishiddappa A Hadimani; Jyoti V Hadimani; Ishwar B Bagoji; Shardha Bai Rathod; Balappa M Bannur

    2016-01-01

    Brachial artery (BA) is a continuation of the axillary artery at the lower border of teres major. In the cubital fossa, BA divides into radial artery and ulnar artery as terminal branches. Large branch given from the BA in the upper part is profunda brachii artery. In the present case, we noticed double profunda brachii that arises from the BA. They are profunda brachii artery 1 and profunda brachii artery 2. Profunda brachii artery 1 arises in the proximal part of the BA and profunda brachii...

  2. Firewalls from double purity

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bousso, Raphael

    2013-10-01

    The firewall paradox is often presented as arising from double entanglement, but I argue that more generally the paradox is double purity. Near-horizon modes are purified by the interior, in the infalling vacuum. Hence, they cannot also be pure alone, or in combination with any third system, as demanded by unitarity. This conflict arises independently of the Page time, for entangled and for pure states. It implies that identifications of Hilbert spaces cannot resolve the paradox. Traditional complementarity requires the unitary identification of infalling matter with a scrambled subsystem of the Hawking radiation. Extending this map to the infalling vacuum overdetermines the out-state. More general complementarity maps (“A=RB,” “ER=EPR”) necessarily fail when the near-horizon zone is pure. I argue that pure-zone states span the microcanonical ensemble, and that this suffices to make the horizon a special place. I advocate that the ability to detect the horizon locally, rather than the degree or probability of violence, is what makes firewalls problematic. Conversely, if the production of matter at the horizon can be dynamically understood and shown to be consistent, then firewalls do not constitute a violation of the equivalence principle.

  3. The tariffs deadlock. Agreements and disagreements. Auctions make disappointments. Congestion: the auctions way. Energy in Switzerland. The fortnight of energy prices. Patrick Pierron: 'inverting steam'. Pierre Lepetit: 'the power has waken up'. Green electricity: is it necessary to establish a voluntaristic contribution?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Corbier, M.Ch.; Schneid, O.

    2001-01-01

    This issue of 'Energies News' makes comments about the worldwide events of the moment in the domain of energy. Four articles concern the production, transportation and distribution of electricity after the transposition of the European directive and deal with the electricity tariffs, auctions and transit capacities. One short article summarizes the key-energy data of Switzerland in a couple of tables and graphs and a brief note presents the situation of the oil market after the September 11, 2001 terror events. One interview (P. Pierron, federal secretary of the CFDT syndicate) makes an analysis of the competition in the French and European energy market, while another interview (P. Lepetit, IFRI) analyzes the possible impacts of the September 11 events on the US energy policy. A last article analyzes the different solutions for the financing of the development of electricity produced from renewable energy sources and the opinion of the public with respect to an increase of electricity tariffs accordingly. (J.S.)

  4. Double Degenerate Stars

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Xin-Lian, Luo; Hua, Bai; Lei, Zhao

    2008-01-01

    Regardless of the formation mechanism, an exotic object, the double degenerate star (DDS), is introduced and investigated, which is composed of baryonic matter and some unknown fermion dark matter. Different from the simple white dwarfs (WDs), there is additional gravitational force provided by the unknown fermion component inside DDSs, which may strongly affect the structure and the stability of such kind of objects. Many possible and strange observational phenomena connecting with them are concisely discussed. Similar to the normal WD, this object can also experience thermonuclear explosion as type Ia supernova explosion when DDS's mass exceeds the maximum mass that can be supported by electron degeneracy pressure. However, since the total mass of baryonic matter can be much lower than that of WD at Chandrasekhar mass limit, the peak luminosity should be much dimmer than what we expect before, which may throw a slight shadow on the standard candle of SN Ia in the research of cosmology. (general)

  5. Double photoionization of strontium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sokell, Emma; Grimm, Michael; Sheridan, Paul, E-mail: emma.sokell@ucd.i [School of Physics, University College Dublin, Belfield, Dublin 4 (Ireland)

    2010-02-01

    Resonant triple-differential cross-section (TDCS) measurements have been used to study the double photoionization process in strontium. Two sets of measurements were made at the photon energy of the 4p {yields} 4d resonance. The coplanar geometry was used and the fixed analyser, positioned at -90{sup 0} to the main axis of polarization of the photons, detected electrons with {approx}65% of the available excess energy. The mutual angle between the two electrons had a range just short of 90 {yields} 270{sup 0}. The TDCS exhibit unexpected lobes at a mutual angle of 180{sup 0}. Comparison with other measurements made with the same geometry but with different sharings of the available energy indicate that these TDCS all show the unexpected lobe. Some possible explanations for the lobe are considered.

  6. Double-Skin Facade

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kalyanova, Olena

    favored by companies and their employees. To bring the reduction of energy use in these buildings application of suitable tools and methods is necessary to achieve successful design solutions. Earlier work on the topic of DSF modelling was examined from various publications. As a result, the main...... IEA Annex 34/43, subtask E "Double-Skin Facade". The results of empirical validation are discussed in this work. Discussion and analysis of experimental results is carried out. It has lead to hypothesis of recirculation flow phenomenon in the DSF cavity. Finally, a suggestion of a new numerical model...... is developed to account for recirculation flow appearance in the DSF cavity. The model is based on a simple mass balance between the boundary layer flow and the main flow in the cavity....

  7. Deconvoluting double Doppler spectra

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ho, K.F.; Beling, C.D.; Fung, S.; Chan, K.L.; Tang, H.W.

    2001-01-01

    The successful deconvolution of data from double Doppler broadening of annihilation radiation (D-DBAR) spectroscopy is a promising area of endeavour aimed at producing momentum distributions of a quality comparable to those of the angular correlation technique. The deconvolution procedure we test in the present study is the constrained generalized least square method. Trials with computer simulated DDBAR spectra are generated and deconvoluted in order to find the best form of regularizer and the regularization parameter. For these trials the Neumann (reflective) boundary condition is used to give a single matrix operation in Fourier space. Experimental D-DBAR spectra are also subject to the same type of deconvolution after having carried out a background subtraction and using a symmetrize resolution function obtained from an 85 Sr source with wide coincidence windows. (orig.)

  8. Beyond the double banana

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Rosenzweig, Ivana; Fogarasi, András; Johnsen, Birger

    2014-01-01

    PURPOSE: To investigate whether extending the 10-20 array with 6 electrodes in the inferior temporal chain and constructing computed montages increases the diagnostic value of ictal EEG activity originating in the temporal lobe. In addition, the accuracy of computer-assisted spectral source......). Spectral source analysis used source montage to calculate density spectral array, defining the earliest oscillatory onset. From this, phase maps were calculated for localization. The reference standard was the decision of the multidisciplinary epilepsy surgery team on the seizure onset zone. Clinical...... performance was compared with the double banana (longitudinal bipolar montage, 10-20 array). RESULTS: Adding the inferior temporal electrode chain, computed montages (reference free, common average, and source derivation), and voltage maps significantly increased the sensitivity. Phase maps had the highest...

  9. Double-mode pulsation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cox, A.N.

    1982-01-01

    Double mode pulsation is a very pervasive phenomenon in stars all over the Hertzsprung-Russell diagram. In order of increasing radius, examples are: ZZ Ceti stars, the sun, the delta Scuti stars, RR Lyrae variables, the β Cephei variables and those related to them, Cepheids, and maybe even the Mira stars. These many modes have been interpreted as both radial and nonradial modes, but in many cases the actual mode has not been clearly identified. Yellow giants seem to be the most simple pulsators with a large majority of the RR Lyrae variables and Cepheids showing only one pulsation period. We limit this review to those very few cases for classical Cepheids and RR Lyrae variables which display two modes. For these we know many facts about these stars, but the actual cause of the pulsation in two modes simultaneously remains unknown

  10. Dual double field theory

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bergshoeff, Eric A. [Centre for Theoretical Physics, University of Groningen,Nijenborgh 4, 9747 AG Groningen (Netherlands); Hohm, Olaf [Simons Center for Geometry and Physics, Stony Brook University,Stony Brook, NY 11794-3636 (United States); Penas, Victor A. [Centre for Theoretical Physics, University of Groningen,Nijenborgh 4, 9747 AG Groningen (Netherlands); Riccioni, Fabio [INFN - Sezione di Roma, Dipartimento di Fisica, Università di Roma “La Sapienza”,Piazzale Aldo Moro 2, 00185 Roma (Italy)

    2016-06-06

    We present the dual formulation of double field theory at the linearized level. This is a classically equivalent theory describing the duals of the dilaton, the Kalb-Ramond field and the graviton in a T-duality or O(D,D) covariant way. In agreement with previous proposals, the resulting theory encodes fields in mixed Young-tableau representations, combining them into an antisymmetric 4-tensor under O(D,D). In contrast to previous proposals, the theory also requires an antisymmetric 2-tensor and a singlet, which are not all pure gauge. The need for these additional fields is analogous to a similar phenomenon for “exotic' dualizations, and we clarify this by comparing with the dualizations of the component fields. We close with some speculative remarks on the significance of these observations for the full non-linear theory yet to be constructed.

  11. Double profunda brachii artery

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Gavishiddappa A Hadimani

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available Brachial artery (BA is a continuation of the axillary artery at the lower border of teres major. In the cubital fossa, BA divides into radial artery and ulnar artery as terminal branches. Large branch given from the BA in the upper part is profunda brachii artery. In the present case, we noticed double profunda brachii that arises from the BA. They are profunda brachii artery 1 and profunda brachii artery 2. Profunda brachii artery 1 arises in the proximal part of the BA and profunda brachii artery 2 arises distal to the profunda brachii artery 1. Both the arteries run inferolaterally in the spiral groove along with radial nerve. Variations of profunda brachii artery are important during harvesting of the lateral arm flaps and may lead to inadvertent injury during percutaneous arterial catheterization or injection of drugs.

  12. GENERALIZED DOUBLE PARETO SHRINKAGE.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Armagan, Artin; Dunson, David B; Lee, Jaeyong

    2013-01-01

    We propose a generalized double Pareto prior for Bayesian shrinkage estimation and inferences in linear models. The prior can be obtained via a scale mixture of Laplace or normal distributions, forming a bridge between the Laplace and Normal-Jeffreys' priors. While it has a spike at zero like the Laplace density, it also has a Student's t -like tail behavior. Bayesian computation is straightforward via a simple Gibbs sampling algorithm. We investigate the properties of the maximum a posteriori estimator, as sparse estimation plays an important role in many problems, reveal connections with some well-established regularization procedures, and show some asymptotic results. The performance of the prior is tested through simulations and an application.

  13. Double optical gating

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gilbertson, Steve

    The observation and control of dynamics in atomic and molecular targets requires the use of laser pulses with duration less than the characteristic timescale of the process which is to be manipulated. For electron dynamics, this time scale is on the order of attoseconds where 1 attosecond = 10 -18 seconds. In order to generate pulses on this time scale, different gating methods have been proposed. The idea is to extract or "gate" a single pulse from an attosecond pulse train and switch off all the other pulses. While previous methods have had some success, they are very difficult to implement and so far very few labs have access to these unique light sources. The purpose of this work is to introduce a new method, called double optical gating (DOG), and to demonstrate its effectiveness at generating high contrast single isolated attosecond pulses from multi-cycle lasers. First, the method is described in detail and is investigated in the spectral domain. The resulting attosecond pulses produced are then temporally characterized through attosecond streaking. A second method of gating, called generalized double optical gating (GDOG), is also introduced. This method allows attosecond pulse generation directly from a carrier-envelope phase un-stabilized laser system for the first time. Next the methods of DOG and GDOG are implemented in attosecond applications like high flux pulses and extreme broadband spectrum generation. Finally, the attosecond pulses themselves are used in experiments. First, an attosecond/femtosecond cross correlation is used for characterization of spatial and temporal properties of femtosecond pulses. Then, an attosecond pump, femtosecond probe experiment is conducted to observe and control electron dynamics in helium for the first time.

  14. The role of auctions and forward markets in the EU ETS: counterbalancing the cost-inefficiencies of combining generous allocation with a ban on banking

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ehrhart, K.M.; Hoppe, C.; Schleich, J.; Seifert, S.

    2005-07-01

    From an analysis of the available national allocation plans for the first period (2005-2007) of the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS), it can be inferred that (i) the total allocation to installations covered under the EU ETS is rather generous and (ii) most EU Member States ban the transfer of allowances (banking) into the second period (2008-2012). In this article, we explore the cost-efficiency issues associated with such a generous allocation of allowances to the trading sectors in combination with the ban on banking. It is argued that allocation to the trading sectors is higher than implied by a cost-minimization approach. Moreover, due to the reduced level of flexibility, a ban on banking increases overall compliance costs. In addition, the results of a simulation game conducted with real company participants and with a student control group suggest that a generous primary allocation in the first phase combined with a ban on banking also leads to a cost-inefficient choice of abatement measures within periods. The results of the simulations are also consistent with the conjecture that forward markets and auctioning off a part of the total quantity of allowances result in more reliable price signals and most cost-efficient outcomes. (author)

  15. Market-Based Instruments for the Conservation of Underutilized Crops: In-Store Experimental Auction of Native Chili Products in Bolivia

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jaqueline Garcia-Yi

    2014-11-01

    Full Text Available Native chilies (Capsicum spp. are currently underutilized in Bolivia, one of this crop’s centers of diversity. Fewer local farmers cultivate native chilies annually due to low market demand. Increasing its private use value can lead to the in-situ conservation of this crop. The objective of the paper is to evaluate the market acceptability of three native chili products: (a chili marmalade; (b chili cooking paste; and (c pickled chilies. Multi-product Becker-DeGroot-Marschak experimental auctions and hedonic tests were conducted with 337 participants in La Paz and Santa Cruz. Data were analyzed using seemingly unrelated regressions. Results suggest that consumers are willing to pay price premiums of about 25–50 percent. Biodiversity conservation and improvements in farmers’ quality of life statements would not have influence on first purchase decisions but rather on repurchase decisions and therefore on consumers’ product loyalty. This in turn could lead to sustainable agro-biodiversity conservation, centered on consumers’ purchase of these products over time.

  16. Etiological aspects of double monsters.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jaschevatzky, O E; Goldman, B; Kampf, D; Wexler, H; Grünstein, S

    1980-06-01

    Four cases of double monsters are reported, including a rare case of craniofacial duplication (diprosopus). Based on the findings observed, etiological factors of these malformations are discussed. We suggest that exogenous (environmental) factors such as habits, way of life or religious practices of certain populations can influence the development of double monsters.

  17. Double Charge Exchange Reactions and Double Beta Decay

    Science.gov (United States)

    Auerbach, N.

    2018-05-01

    The subject of this presentation is at the forefront of nuclear physics, namely double beta decay. In particular one is most interested in the neutrinoless process of double beta decay, when the decay proceeds without the emission of two neutrinos. The observation of such decay would mean that the lepton conservation symmetry is violated and that the neutrinos are of Majorana type, meaning that they are their own anti-particles. The life time of this process has two unknowns, the mass of the neutrino and the nuclear matrix element. Determining the nuclear matrix element and knowing the cross-section well will set limits on the neutrino mass. There is a concentrated effort among the nuclear physics community to calculate this matrix element. Usually these matrix elements are a very small part of the total strength of the transition operators involved in the process. There is no simple way to “calibrate” the nuclear double beta decay matrix element. The double beta decay is a double charge exchange process, therefore it is proposed that double charge exchange reactions using ion projectiles on nuclei that are candidates for double beta decay, will provide additional necessary information about the nuclear matrix elements.

  18. Double chambered right ventricle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cho, Chul Koo; Yu, Yun Jeong; Yeon, Kyung Mo; Han, Man Chung

    1983-01-01

    Fourteen cases of double chambered right ventricle were diagnosed angiographically and of these nine cases were confirmed after operation and autopsy at Seoul National University Hospital in recent four years since 1979. The clinical and radiological findings with the emphasis on the cinecardiographic findings were analysed. The summaries of the analysis are as follows: 1. Among 14 cases, 6 cases were male and 8 cases were female. Age distribution was from 4 years to 36 years. 2. In chest x-ray findings, pulmonary vascularity was increased in 8 cases, decreased in 4 cases, and normal in 2 cases. Cardiomegaly was observed in 8 cases and other showed normal heart size. 3. In cinecardiography, 11 cases had interventricular septal defect. Among these 11 cases, VSD located in proximal high pressure chamber was in 2 cases and located in distal low pressure chamber was in 9 cases. 4. The location of aberrant muscle bundle in sinus portion of right ventricle was in 8 cases. In the rest 6 cases, the aberrant muscle bundle was located below the infundibulum of right ventricle. 5. For accurate diagnosis and differential diagnosis with other congenital cardiac anomalies such as Tetralogy of Fallot or isolated pulmonic stenosis, biplane cineangiography and catheterization is an essential procedure

  19. Double chambered right ventricle

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cho, Chul Koo; Yu, Yun Jeong; Yeon, Kyung Mo; Han, Man Chung [Seoul National University College of Medicine, Seoul (Korea, Republic of)

    1983-12-15

    Fourteen cases of double chambered right ventricle were diagnosed angiographically and of these nine cases were confirmed after operation and autopsy at Seoul National University Hospital in recent four years since 1979. The clinical and radiological findings with the emphasis on the cinecardiographic findings were analysed. The summaries of the analysis are as follows: 1. Among 14 cases, 6 cases were male and 8 cases were female. Age distribution was from 4 years to 36 years. 2. In chest x-ray findings, pulmonary vascularity was increased in 8 cases, decreased in 4 cases, and normal in 2 cases. Cardiomegaly was observed in 8 cases and other showed normal heart size. 3. In cinecardiography, 11 cases had interventricular septal defect. Among these 11 cases, VSD located in proximal high pressure chamber was in 2 cases and located in distal low pressure chamber was in 9 cases. 4. The location of aberrant muscle bundle in sinus portion of right ventricle was in 8 cases. In the rest 6 cases, the aberrant muscle bundle was located below the infundibulum of right ventricle. 5. For accurate diagnosis and differential diagnosis with other congenital cardiac anomalies such as Tetralogy of Fallot or isolated pulmonic stenosis, biplane cineangiography and catheterization is an essential procedure.

  20. Double Tracks closure report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-06-01

    This report describes the remediation activities performed and the results of postremediation radiation surveys conducted at the Double Tracks site, located on Range 71 North, of the Nellis Air Force Range (NAFR) in southern Nevada. This remediation was conducted from June to August 1996 in accordance with the Interim Corrective Action Plan (ICAP) to remediate the site to an acceptable risk to human health and the environment. Soil with a total transuranic activity greater than 200 picoCuries per gram (pCi/g) was excavated, shipped to the Nevada Test Site (NTS), and disposed at the Area 3 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS). A total of 52.3 grams of plutonium (Pu) with an activity of 5.12 Curies was disposed. The concrete pad at ground zero (GZ) was broken up, placed in a Sealand reg-sign container, and shipped to the NTS Area 6 decontamination pad. Additionally, approximately 10 m 3 (350 ft 3 ) of soil containing small chips of concrete was shipped to the NTS Area 6 decontamination pad. The concrete and soil/concrete mixture will be further characterized prior to disposal. At the time this report was written, characterization samples were being collected, with analytical results expected in January 1997. It is anticipated that the material will be disposed in mid-1997. This remediation is an interim action because final cleanup levels have not been established

  1. Double Beta Decay

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fiorini, Ettore

    2008-01-01

    The importance of neutrinoless Double Beta Decay (DBD) is stressed in view of the recent results of experiments on neutrino oscillations which indicate that the difference between the squared masses of two neutrinos of different flavours is finite [For a recent review including neutrino properties and recent results see: Review of Particle Physics, J. of Phys. G: Nuclear and Particle Physics 33, 1]. As a consequence the mass of at least one neutrino has to be different from zero and it becomes imperative to determine its absolute value. The various experimental techniques to search for DBD are discussed together with the difficult problems of the evaluation of the corresponding nuclear matrix elements. The upper limits on neutrino mass coming from the results of the various experiments are reported together with the indication for a non zero value by one of them not confirmed so far. The two presently running experiments on neutrinoless DBD are briefly described together with the already approved or designed second generation searches aiming to reach the values on the absolute neutrino mass indicated by the results on neutrino oscillations

  2. Analyzing Double Image Illusion through Double Indiscernibility and Lattice Theory

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Kohei Sonoda

    2011-10-01

    Full Text Available The figure-ground division plays a fundamental role in all image perceptions. Although there are a lot of studies about extraction of a figure such as detection of edges or grouping of texture, there are few discussions about a relationship between obtained figure and ground. We focused on double image illusions having two complementary relationships be- tween figure and ground and analyzed them. We divided the double image illusions according to two different interpretations and using these divisions we extracted and analyzed their logical structures by lattices derived from rough sets that we had developed. As a result we discovered unusual logical structures in double image illusions.

  3. Z₂-double cyclic codes

    OpenAIRE

    Borges, J.

    2014-01-01

    A binary linear code C is a Z2-double cyclic code if the set of coordinates can be partitioned into two subsets such that any cyclic shift of the coordinates of both subsets leaves invariant the code. These codes can be identified as submodules of the Z2[x]-module Z2[x]/(x^r − 1) × Z2[x]/(x^s − 1). We determine the structure of Z2-double cyclic codes giving the generator polynomials of these codes. The related polynomial representation of Z2-double cyclic codes and its duals, and the relation...

  4. Aspects of the doubled worldsheet

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Driezen, Sibylle; Sevrin, Alexander; Thompson, Daniel C. [Theoretische Natuurkunde, Vrije Universiteit Brussel and The International Solvay Institutes,Pleinlaan 2, B-1050 Brussels (Belgium)

    2016-12-16

    We clarify the relation between various approaches to the manifestly T-duality symmetric string. We explain in detail how the PST covariant doubled string arises from an unusual gauge fixing. We pay careful attention to the role of “spectator” fields in this process and also show how the T-duality invariant doubled dilaton emerges naturally. We extend these ideas to non-Abelian T-duality and show they give rise to the duality invariant formalism based on the semi-Abelian Drinfeld Double. We then develop the N=(0,1) supersymmetric duality invariant formalism.

  5. Supplier's optimal bidding strategy in electricity pay-as-bid auction: Comparison of the Q-learning and a model-based approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rahimiyan, Morteza; Rajabi Mashhadi, Habib

    2008-01-01

    In this paper, the bidding decision making problem in electricity pay-as-bid auction is studied from a supplier's point of view. The bidding problem is a complicated task, because of suppliers' uncertain behaviors and demand fluctuation. In a specific case, in which, the market clearing price (MCP) is considered as a continuous random variable with a known probability distribution function (PDF), an analytic solution is proposed. The suggested solution is generalized to consider the effect of supplier market power due to transmission congestion. As a result, an algebraic equation is developed to compute optimal offering price. The basic assumption in this approach is to take the known probabilistic model for the MCP. The above-mentioned method, called model-based approach, is not more applicable in a realistic situation. In order to overcome the drawback of this method, which needs information about the MCP and its PDF, the supplier learns from past experiences using the Q-learning algorithm to find out the optimal bid price. The simulation results of the model-based and Q-learning methods are compared on a studied system. It is shown that a supplier using the Q-learning algorithm is able to find the optimal bidding strategy similar to one obtained by the model-based approach. Furthermore, to analyze a more realistic situation, the suppliers' behaviors are modeled using a multi-agent system. Simulation results illustrate that the studied supplier finds the optimal bidding strategy in power market using the Q-learning algorithm. (author)

  6. Alignment in double capture processes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moretto-Capelle, P.; Benhenni, M.; Bordenave-Montesquieu, A.; Benoit-Cattin, P.; Gleizes, A.

    1993-01-01

    The electron spectra emitted when a double capture occurs in N 7+ +He and Ne 8+ +He systems at 10 qkeV collisional energy, allow us to determine the angular distributions of the 3 ell 3 ell ' lines through a special spectra fitting procedure which includes interferences between neighbouring states. It is found that the doubly excited states populated in double capture processes are generally aligned

  7. Alignment in double capture processes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Moretto-Capelle, P.; Benhenni, M.; Bordenave-Montesquieu, A.; Benoit-Cattin, P.; Gleizes, A. (IRSAMC, URA CNRS 770, Univ. Paul Sabatier, 118 rte de Narbonne, 31062 Toulouse Cedex (France))

    1993-06-05

    The electron spectra emitted when a double capture occurs in N[sup 7+]+He and Ne[sup 8+]+He systems at 10 qkeV collisional energy, allow us to determine the angular distributions of the 3[ell]3[ell] [prime] lines through a special spectra fitting procedure which includes interferences between neighbouring states. It is found that the doubly excited states populated in double capture processes are generally aligned.

  8. Methods of Mitigating Double Taxation

    OpenAIRE

    Lindhe, Tobias

    2002-01-01

    This paper presents a comprehensive overview of existing methods of mitigating double taxation of corporate income within a standard cost of capital model. Two of the most well-known and most utilized methods, the imputation and the split rate systems, do not mitigate double taxation in corporations where the marginal investment is financed with retained earnings. However, all methods are effective when the marginal investment is financed with new share issues. The corporate tax rate, fiscal ...

  9. Decades with four double triodes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wahl, R.

    1952-01-01

    Decades with four double triodes The described decade consists of four double triodes and four crystals germanium; which has the following characteristics: - Attack in negative impulses. - Sensitivity 12 volts ± 40 % for signals of 1 μs about. - Time of resolution 2,5 μs. - Voltage 250 v ± 40 %. - heating 6,3 v ± 40 %. - Tolerance on the values of the elements of installation 10%. (author) [fr

  10. Double layers above the aurora

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Temerin, M.; Mozer, F.S.

    1987-01-01

    Two different kinds of double layers were found in association with auroral precipitation. One of these is the so-called electrostatic shock, which is oriented at an oblique angle to the magnetic field in such a way that the perpendicular electric field is much larger than the parallel electric field. This type of double layer is often found at the edges of regions of upflowing ion beams and the direction of the electric fields in the shock points toward the ion beam. The potential drop through the shock can be several kV and is comparable to the total potential needed to produce auroral acceleration. Instabilities associated with the shock may generate obliquely propagating Alfven waves, which may accelerate electrons to produce flickering auroras. The flickering aurora provides evidence that the electrostatic shock may have large temporal fluctuations. The other kind of double layer is the small-amplitude double layer found in regions of upward flowing in beams, often in association with electrostatic ion cyclotron waves. The parallel and perpendicular electric fields in these structures are comparable in magnitude. The associated potentials are a few eV. Since many such double layers are found in regions of upward flowing ion beams, the combined potential drop through a set of these double layers can be substantial

  11. Global effects of double layers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Raad, M.A.

    1984-12-01

    Locally the formation of an electrostatic double layer in a current carrying plasma leads to a direct acceleration of particles which may penetrate far into the surrounding medium. The potential across the double layer, giving this acceleration, must be maintained by the external system and is a basic parameter for the local to global coupling. The double layer potential is associated with an electric field parallel to the magnetic field. In general this leads to a magnetohydrodynamic relaxation of the surrounding medium providing the influx of energy which is dissipated by the double layer. The double layer potential is limited as is the maximum possible rate of energy influx. If the global response of the external medium can be represented by an external circuit and if an equivalent circuit element can be found to represent the double layer, for example a negative resistance for intermediate time scales, it is possible to give a description of the dynamics and stability of the whole system. (Author)

  12. Congenital double-double lip: A rare case report

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Swati Phore

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available A double lip is a rare anomaly characterized by a horizontal fold of redundant mucosal tissue that is situated proximal to the vermilion border. It may be either congenital or acquired and has no gender or race predilection. It occurs most often in the upper lip, although both upper and lower lips are occasionally involved. Surgical intervention (simple excision produces good functional and cosmetic results. In this report, a case of a nonsyndromic congenital maxillary double upper lip and lower lip, both are described. Double lip is of special interest in dental profession as a dental surgeon is normally the first one to diagnose this rare and uncommon condition. Authors hereby discuss a very rare condition in which both upper and lower lips are involved.

  13. Decades with four double triodes; Decades a quatre doubles triodes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wahl, R [Commissariat a l' Energie Atomique, Lab. du Fort de Chatillon, Fontenay-aux-Roses (France). Centre d' Etudes Nucleaires

    1952-07-01

    Decades with four double triodes The described decade consists of four double triodes and four crystals germanium; which has the following characteristics: - Attack in negative impulses. - Sensitivity 12 volts {+-} 40 % for signals of 1 {mu}s about. - Time of resolution 2,5 {mu}s. - Voltage 250 v {+-} 40 %. - heating 6,3 v {+-} 40 %. - Tolerance on the values of the elements of installation 10%. (author) [French] La decade decrite comprend quatre doubles triodes et quatre cristaux germanium; elle a les caracteristiques suivantes: - Attaque en impulsions negatives. - Sensiblite 12 volts {+-} 40 % pour des signaux de 1 {mu}s environ. - Temps de resolution 2,5 {mu}s. - Alimentation 250 v {+-} 40 %. - Chauffage 6,3 v {+-} 40 %. - Tolerance sur les valeurs des elements de montage l0 %. (auteur)

  14. Reliability Modeling of Double Beam Bridge Crane

    Science.gov (United States)

    Han, Zhu; Tong, Yifei; Luan, Jiahui; Xiangdong, Li

    2018-05-01

    This paper briefly described the structure of double beam bridge crane and the basic parameters of double beam bridge crane are defined. According to the structure and system division of double beam bridge crane, the reliability architecture of double beam bridge crane system is proposed, and the reliability mathematical model is constructed.

  15. Alternate Double Single Track Lines

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Moraga Contreras, P.; Grande Andrade, Z.; Castillo Ron, E.

    2016-07-01

    The paper discusses the advantages and shortcomings of alternate double single track (ADST) lines with respect to double track lines for high speed lines. ADST lines consists of sequences of double and single track segments optimally selected in order to reduce the construction and maintenance costs of railway lines and to optimize the timetables used to satisfy a given demand. The single tracks are selected to coincide with expensive segments (tunnels and viaducts) and the double tracks are chosen to coincide with flat areas and only where they are necessary. At the same time, departure times are adjusted for trains to cross at the cheap double track segments. This alternative can be used for new lines and also for existing conventional lines where some new tracks are to be constructed to reduce travel time (increase speed). The ADST proposal is illustrated with some examples of both types (new lines and where conventional lines exist), including the Palencia-Santander, the Santiago-Valparaíso-Viña del Mar and the Dublin-Belfast lines, where very important reductions (90 %) are obtained, especially where a railway infrastructure already exist. (Author)

  16. On the physics of relativistic double layers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlqvist, P.

    1982-06-01

    A model of a strong, time-independent, and relativistic double layer is studied. Besides double layers having the electric field parallel to the current the model also describes a certain type of oblique double layers. The 'Langmuir condition' (ratio of ion current density to electron current density) as well as an expression for the potential drop of the double layer are derived. Furthermore, the distribution of charged particles, electric field, and potential within the double layer are clarified and discussed. It is found that the properties of relativistic double layers differ substantially from the properties of corresponding non-relativistic double layers. (Author)

  17. The double Brewster angle effect

    Science.gov (United States)

    Thirion-Lefevre, Laetitia; Guinvarc'h, Régis

    2018-01-01

    The Double Brewster angle effect (DBE) is an extension of the Brewster angle to double reflection on two orthogonal dielectric surfaces. It results from the combination of two pseudo-Brewster angles occurring in complementary incidence angles domains. It can be observed for a large range of incidence angles provided that double bounces mechanism is present. As a consequence of this effect, we show that the reflection coefficient at VV polarization can be at least 10 dB lower than the reflection coefficient at HH polarization over a wide range of incidence angle - typically from 20 to 70∘. It is experimentally demonstrated using a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) image that this effect can be seen on buildings and forests. For large buildings, the difference can reach more than 20 dB. xml:lang="fr"

  18. Double photoionisation spectra of molecules

    CERN Document Server

    Eland, John

    2017-01-01

    This book contains spectra of the doubly charged positive ions (dications) of some 75 molecules, including the major constituents of terrestrial and planetary atmospheres and prototypes of major chemical groups. It is intended to be a new resource for research in all areas of molecular spectroscopy involving high energy environments, both terrestrial and extra-terrestrial. All the spectra have been produced by photoionisation using laboratory lamps or synchrotron radiation and have been measured using the magnetic bottle time-of-flight technique by coincidence detection of correlated electron pairs. Full references to published work on the same species are given, though for several molecules these are the first published spectra. Double ionisation energies are listed and discussed in relation to the molecular electronic structure of the molecules. A full introduction to the field of molecular double ionisation is included and the mechanisms by which double photoionisation can occur are examined in detail. A p...

  19. Double-polarizating scanning radiometer

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mishev, D.N.; Nazyrski, T.G.

    1986-01-01

    The double-polarizating single-channel scanning radiometer comprises the following serial connected parts: a scanning double-polarizating aerial, a block for polarization separation, a radiometer receiver, an analog-to-digit converter and an information flow forming block. The low frequency input of the radiometer receiver is connected with a control block, which is also connected with a first bus of a microprocessor, the second bus of which is connected with the A-D converter. The control input of the scanning double-polarizating aerial is connected with the first microprocessor bus. The control inputs of the block for polarization separation are linked by an electronic switch with the output of the forming block, the input of which is connected to the first input of the control block. The control inputs of the block for polarization separation are connected with the second and the third input of the information flow forming block. 2 cls

  20. Investigation by CRE into record high electricity prices on Powernext Day-ahead Auction in October and November 2007. Analysis report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    In October and November 2007, electricity prices hit record highs on the Powernext Day-Ahead Auction trading platform. While, during the first nine months of the year, prices for delivery between 6 pm and 8 pm averaged euros 36 /MWh, rising to a maximum of euros 118 /MWh, they spiked at: - euros 1,236 /MWh for delivery on Monday, 29 October 2007 between 6 pm and 7 pm; - euros 2,500 /MWh for delivery on Monday, 12 November 2007 between 8 pm and 9 pm; - euros 1,762 /MWh for delivery on Thursday, 15 November 2007 between 6 pm and 7 pm. Day ahead prices of electricity have a major effect on the procurement costs of suppliers, and consequently on the formation of selling prices to end consumers. Article 28 of French Act No.2000-108 of 10 February 2000 stipulates that CRE 'shall monitor, for electricity and natural gas, all transactions made between suppliers, brokers and producers, all transactions made on the organised markets and cross-border trading. It shall ensure that bids made by suppliers, brokers and producers are consistent with their financial and technical requirements'. Article 33 of the same Act specifies that, 'In performing the tasks entrusted to it, the French Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE) may gather any information it requires from the Ministers for the Economy and for Energy, from public electricity transmission and distribution system operators, from operators of infrastructures for the natural gas transmission and distribution networks and operators of liquefied natural gas facilities, as well as from any other company involved in the electricity and natural gas market. It may also call upon any person whose evidence it deems necessary for the purposes of its investigations'. In this context, and in application of its duty to monitor the electricity wholesale markets, CRE has undertaken an investigation to analyse the mechanisms underlying the formation of such high prices. To this end, CRE gathered information relative to decisions taken by

  1. Double-plug seismic connector

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Annoot, I.R.

    1984-01-01

    The double-plug seismic electric connector comprises an elongated insulating body. A male connector plug is at one end of the body and a female connector plug is at the opposite end of the body. Each plug has a pair of male and female contacts. A pair of spaced axial conductors is embedded within the insulating body for interconnecting the opposite male and female contacts. The inner end of a double-wire cable is embedded within the insulating body and each wire inner end is connected to one of the conductors

  2. Magnetoresistance stories of double perovskites

    Indian Academy of Sciences (India)

    grain surfaces have also been proposed to act as tunnel barriers in Sr2FeMoO6. ... these double perovskites, a gradual decrease in the low-field MR and saturation ... simultaneously, and therefore serious material engineering was needed.

  3. Double Coffee opens in China

    Index Scriptorium Estoniae

    2009-01-01

    Läti suursaadik Ingrida Levrence avas esimese Double Coffee kohviku Hiina pealinnas Pekingi südames. Rahvusvaheline kohvikukett kavatseb laieneda mõne kohviku võrra igal aastal. Seni tegutsetakse Lätis, Eestis, Leedus, Ukrainas ja Valgevenes

  4. Eight Arguments against Double Effect

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Di Nucci, Ezio

    I offer eight arguments against the Doctrine of Double Effect, a normative principle according to which in pursuing the good it is sometimes morally permissible to bring about some evil as a side-effect or merely foreseen consequence: the same evil would not be morally justified as an intended...

  5. A Double-Minded Fractal

    Science.gov (United States)

    Simoson, Andrew J.

    2009-01-01

    This article presents a fun activity of generating a double-minded fractal image for a linear algebra class once the idea of rotation and scaling matrices are introduced. In particular the fractal flip-flops between two words, depending on the level at which the image is viewed. (Contains 5 figures.)

  6. Double standards with radioactive waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Parkinson, A.

    2002-01-01

    The author claims that whether it is short-lived waste from Commonwealth facilities, long-lived plutonium waste from an atomic bomb test site on Aboriginal land, or reactor waste from Lucas Heights, the Australian government applies double standards to suit its own agenda

  7. Constraining neutrinoless double beta decay

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dorame, L.; Meloni, D.; Morisi, S.; Peinado, E.; Valle, J.W.F.

    2012-01-01

    A class of discrete flavor-symmetry-based models predicts constrained neutrino mass matrix schemes that lead to specific neutrino mass sum-rules (MSR). We show how these theories may constrain the absolute scale of neutrino mass, leading in most of the cases to a lower bound on the neutrinoless double beta decay effective amplitude.

  8. Magnetoresistance stories of double perovskites

    Indian Academy of Sciences (India)

    2015-05-28

    May 28, 2015 ... Tunnelling magnetoresistance (TMR) in polycrystalline double perovskites has been an important research topic for more than a decade now, where the nature of the insulating tunnel barrier is the core issue of debate. Other than the nonmagnetic grain boundaries as conventional tunnel barriers, intragrain ...

  9. Doubled-ended ceramic thyratron

    CERN Multimedia

    1974-01-01

    The double-ended ceramic thyratron CX 1171 B, with its coaxial voltage divider for the SPS. Such a switch, paralleled by three ignitrons in series forms the "thyragnitron" arrangement, and can switch 10 kA, 25 ms pulses, with very fast rise times.

  10. Some theoretical aspects of electrostatic double layers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlqvist, P.

    1978-11-01

    A review is presented of the main results of the theoretical work on electrostatic double layers. The general properties of double layers are first considered. Then the time-independent double layer is discussed. The discussion deals with the potential drop, the thickness, and some necessary criteria for the existence and stability of the layer. As a complement to the study of the timeindependent double layer a few remarks are also made upon the timedependent double layer. Finally the question of how double layers are formed and maintained is treated. Several possible formation mechanisms are considered. (author)

  11. Lightweight Double Neutron Star Found

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kohler, Susanna

    2018-02-01

    More than forty years after the first discovery of a double neutron star, we still havent found many others but a new survey is working to change that.The Hunt for PairsThe observed shift in the Hulse-Taylor binarys orbital period over time as it loses energy to gravitational-wave emission. [Weisberg Taylor, 2004]In 1974, Russell Hulse and Joseph Taylor discovered the first double neutron star: two compact objects locked in a close orbit about each other. Hulse and Taylors measurements of this binarys decaying orbit over subsequent years led to a Nobel prize and the first clear evidence of gravitational waves carrying energy and angular momentum away from massive binaries.Forty years later, we have since confirmed the existence of gravitational waves directly with the Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory (LIGO). Nonetheless, finding and studying pre-merger neutron-star binaries remains a top priority. Observing such systems before they merge reveals crucial information about late-stage stellar evolution, binary interactions, and the types of gravitational-wave signals we expect to find with current and future observatories.Since the Hulse-Taylor binary, weve found a total of 16 additional double neutron-star systems which represents only a tiny fraction of the more than 2,600 pulsars currently known. Recently, however, a large number of pulsar surveys are turning their eyes toward the sky, with a focus on finding more double neutron stars and at least one of them has had success.The pulse profile for PSR J1411+2551 at 327 MHz. [Martinez et al. 2017]A Low-Mass DoubleConducted with the 1,000-foot Arecibo radio telescope in Puerto Rico, the Arecibo 327 MHz Drift Pulsar Survey has enabled the recent discovery of dozens of pulsars and transients. Among them, as reported by Jose Martinez (Max Planck Institute for Radio Astronomy) and coauthors in a recent publication, is PSR J1411+2551: a new double neutron star with one of the lowest masses ever measured

  12. Monocular Elevation Deficiency - Double Elevator Palsy

    Science.gov (United States)

    ... Español Condiciones Chinese Conditions Monocular Elevation Deficiency/ Double Elevator Palsy En Español Read in Chinese What is monocular elevation deficiency (Double Elevator Palsy)? Monocular Elevation Deficiency, also known by the ...

  13. Transition from single to multiple double layers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chan, C.; Hershkowitz, N.

    1982-01-01

    It is shown that laboratory double layers become multiple double layers when the ratio of Debye length to system length is decreased. This result exhibits characteristics described by boundary layer theory

  14. The Double R Theory of Language Comprehension

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Ball, Jerry

    2004-01-01

    ... (also known as Cognitive Semantics). This technical report explicates the basic principles and assumptions of Double R Grammar and compares Double R Grammar to Chomsky's X-Bar Theory as well as Langacker's Cognitive Linguistic...

  15. Bifurcation structure of successive torus doubling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sekikawa, Munehisa; Inaba, Naohiko; Yoshinaga, Tetsuya; Tsubouchi, Takashi

    2006-01-01

    The authors discuss the 'embryology' of successive torus doubling via the bifurcation theory, and assert that the coupled map of a logistic map and a circle map has a structure capable of generating infinite number of torus doublings

  16. Double-compartment wrist arthrography

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Quinn, S.F.; Pittman, C.; Belsole, R.; Greene, T.L.; Rayhack, J.; Clark, R.A.; King, P.S.

    1987-01-01

    Seventy patients with clinical wrist problems were studied with double-compartment wrist arthrography. Midcarpal and radiocarpal compartment arthrograms were obtained in all patients. Digital subtraction technique was used to subtract out contrast from the first compartmental injection. Digital technique also allowed a dynamic record of each injection, which helped determine sites of intercompartmental communication. Postarthrography exercises recorded on videotape were performed after each injection. There were 34 normal studies. Abnormalities in the other 36 patients included: scapholunate communication (n = 9), lunatotriquetral communication (n = 6), communication with tendon sheaths (n = 4), communication with distal radioulnar compartment (n = 14), abnormal synovium process (n = 9), and communication through the radial or ulnar collateral ligament (n = 3). Double-compartment wrist arthrography may provide additional information for complex problems of the wrist

  17. International and domestic aspects of double taxation

    OpenAIRE

    Murgáčová, Miroslava

    2010-01-01

    International and local aspects of double taxation Abstract The purpose of my thesis is to analyze international double taxation taking into account both local legislation and international aspects. Double taxation is the situation, where the same income (or capital) is subject to the same tax more than once. Mostly, the international double taxation appears when the state of the source of income implies taxes on the income of the non-residents and the state of residence of the income receive...

  18. Antecedents to Reverse Auction Use

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Hawkins, Timothy G; Gravier, Michael J

    2006-01-01

    .... The authors rely upon strategic sourcing concepts coupled with theories of competition, goal-setting, leadership, referent-dependence theory, expectancy theory, and the theory of planned behavior...

  19. Who is entitled to double effect?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Boyle, J

    1991-10-01

    The doctrine of double effect continues to be an important tool in bioethical casuistry. Its role within the Catholic moral tradition continues, and there is considerable interest in it by contemporary moral philosophers. But problems of justification and correct application remain. I argue that if the traditional Catholic conviction that there are exceptionless norms prohibiting inflicting some kinds of harms on people is correct, then double effect is justified and necessary. The objection that double effect is superfluous is a rejection of that normative conviction, not a refutation of double effect itself. This justification suggests the correct way of applying double effect to controversial cases. But versions of double effect which dispense with the absolutism of the Catholic tradition lack justification and fall to the objection that double effect is an unnecessary complication.

  20. A vacuum with double structure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yamamoto, Hiroshi; Kudo, Kiyoshi

    1975-01-01

    For the purpose of proving the conservation of norm in the field theory of complex mass proposed by one of the present authors, a new space is introduced where the state vectors have a double structure and the norms are complex numbers in general. The new space contains the Hilbert space as a subspace where the norms are real and positive. It is shown that the S-matrix transforms a vector of the Hilbert space into a vector of the same space. Other states in the new space may appear as intermediate virtual states. In this way the field theory of complex mass is formally proved to be physically interpretable. (auth.)