A person-centered approach to moral judgment.

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Uhlmann, Eric Luis; Pizarro, David A; Diermeier, Daniel

2015-01-01

Both normative theories of ethics in philosophy and contemporary models of moral judgment in psychology have focused almost exclusively on the permissibility of acts, in particular whether acts should be judged on the basis of their material outcomes (consequentialist ethics) or on the basis of rules, duties, and obligations (deontological ethics). However, a longstanding third perspective on morality, virtue ethics, may offer a richer descriptive account of a wide range of lay moral judgments. Building on this ethical tradition, we offer a person-centered account of moral judgment, which focuses on individuals as the unit of analysis for moral evaluations rather than on acts. Because social perceivers are fundamentally motivated to acquire information about the moral character of others, features of an act that seem most informative of character often hold more weight than either the consequences of the act or whether a moral rule has been broken. This approach, we argue, can account for numerous empirical findings that are either not predicted by current theories of moral psychology or are simply categorized as biases or irrational quirks in the way individuals make moral judgments. © The Author(s) 2014.

The neural basis of intuitive and counterintuitive moral judgment

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Wiech, Katja; Shackel, Nicholas; Farias, Miguel; Savulescu, Julian; Tracey, Irene

2012-01-01

Neuroimaging studies on moral decision-making have thus far largely focused on differences between moral judgments with opposing utilitarian (well-being maximizing) and deontological (duty-based) content. However, these studies have investigated moral dilemmas involving extreme situations, and did not control for two distinct dimensions of moral judgment: whether or not it is intuitive (immediately compelling to most people) and whether it is utilitarian or deontological in content. By contrasting dilemmas where utilitarian judgments are counterintuitive with dilemmas in which they are intuitive, we were able to use functional magnetic resonance imaging to identify the neural correlates of intuitive and counterintuitive judgments across a range of moral situations. Irrespective of content (utilitarian/deontological), counterintuitive moral judgments were associated with greater difficulty and with activation in the rostral anterior cingulate cortex, suggesting that such judgments may involve emotional conflict; intuitive judgments were linked to activation in the visual and premotor cortex. In addition, we obtained evidence that neural differences in moral judgment in such dilemmas are largely due to whether they are intuitive and not, as previously assumed, to differences between utilitarian and deontological judgments. Our findings therefore do not support theories that have generally associated utilitarian and deontological judgments with distinct neural systems. PMID:21421730

The role of emotions for moral judgments depends on the type of emotion and moral scenario.

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Ugazio, Giuseppe; Lamm, Claus; Singer, Tania

2012-06-01

Emotions seem to play a critical role in moral judgment. However, the way in which emotions exert their influence on moral judgments is still poorly understood. This study proposes a novel theoretical approach suggesting that emotions influence moral judgments based on their motivational dimension. We tested the effects of two types of induced emotions with equal valence but with different motivational implications (anger and disgust), and four types of moral scenarios (disgust-related, impersonal, personal, and beliefs) on moral judgments. We hypothesized and found that approach motivation associated with anger would make moral judgments more permissible, while disgust, associated with withdrawal motivation, would make them less permissible. Moreover, these effects varied as a function of the type of scenario: the induced emotions only affected moral judgments concerning impersonal and personal scenarios, while we observed no effects for the other scenarios. These findings suggest that emotions can play an important role in moral judgment, but that their specific effects depend upon the type of emotion induced. Furthermore, induced emotion effects were more prevalent for moral decisions in personal and impersonal scenarios, possibly because these require the performance of an action rather than making an abstract judgment. We conclude that the effects of induced emotions on moral judgments can be predicted by taking their motivational dimension into account. This finding has important implications for moral psychology, as it points toward a previously overlooked mechanism linking emotions to moral judgments.

Latent Fairness in Adults' Relationship-Based Moral Judgments.

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Hao, Jian; Liu, Yanchun; Li, Jiafeng

2015-01-01

Can adults make fair moral judgments when individuals with whom they have different relationships are involved? The present study explored the fairness of adults' relationship-based moral judgments in two respects by performing three experiments involving 999 participants. In Experiment 1, 65 adults were asked to decide whether to harm a specific person to save five strangers in the footbridge and trolley dilemmas in a within-subject design. The lone potential victim was a relative, a best friend, a person they disliked, a criminal or a stranger. Adults' genetic relatedness to, familiarity with and affective relatedness to the lone potential victims varied. The results indicated that adults made different moral judgments involving the lone potential victims with whom they had different relationships. In Experiment 2, 306 adults responded to the footbridge and trolley dilemmas involving five types of lone potential victims in a within-subject design, and the extent to which they were familiar with and affectively related to the lone potential victim was measured. The results generally replicated those of Experiment 1. In addition, for close individuals, adults' moral judgments were less deontological relative to their familiarity with or positive affect toward these individuals. For individuals they were not close to, adults made deontological choices to a larger extent relative to their unfamiliarity with or negative affect toward these individuals. Moreover, for familiar individuals, the extent to which adults made deontological moral judgments more closely approximated the extent to which they were familiar with the individual. The adults' deontological moral judgments involving unfamiliar individuals more closely approximated their affective relatedness to the individuals. In Experiment 3, 628 adults were asked to make moral judgments with the type of lone potential victim as the between-subject variable. The results generally replicated those of the previous

Latent Fairness in Adults’ Relationship-Based Moral Judgments

Science.gov (United States)

Hao, Jian; Liu, Yanchun; Li, Jiafeng

2015-01-01

Can adults make fair moral judgments when individuals with whom they have different relationships are involved? The present study explored the fairness of adults’ relationship-based moral judgments in two respects by performing three experiments involving 999 participants. In Experiment 1, 65 adults were asked to decide whether to harm a specific person to save five strangers in the footbridge and trolley dilemmas in a within-subject design. The lone potential victim was a relative, a best friend, a person they disliked, a criminal or a stranger. Adults’ genetic relatedness to, familiarity with and affective relatedness to the lone potential victims varied. The results indicated that adults made different moral judgments involving the lone potential victims with whom they had different relationships. In Experiment 2, 306 adults responded to the footbridge and trolley dilemmas involving five types of lone potential victims in a within-subject design, and the extent to which they were familiar with and affectively related to the lone potential victim was measured. The results generally replicated those of Experiment 1. In addition, for close individuals, adults’ moral judgments were less deontological relative to their familiarity with or positive affect toward these individuals. For individuals they were not close to, adults made deontological choices to a larger extent relative to their unfamiliarity with or negative affect toward these individuals. Moreover, for familiar individuals, the extent to which adults made deontological moral judgments more closely approximated the extent to which they were familiar with the individual. The adults’ deontological moral judgments involving unfamiliar individuals more closely approximated their affective relatedness to the individuals. In Experiment 3, 628 adults were asked to make moral judgments with the type of lone potential victim as the between-subject variable. The results generally replicated those of the

Disgust sensitivity is primarily associated with purity-based moral judgments.

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Wagemans, Fieke M A; Brandt, Mark J; Zeelenberg, Marcel

2018-03-01

Individual differences in disgust sensitivity are associated with a range of judgments and attitudes related to the moral domain. Some perspectives suggest that the association between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments will be equally strong across all moral domains (i.e., purity, authority, loyalty, care, fairness, and liberty). Other perspectives predict that disgust sensitivity is primarily associated with judgments of specific moral domains (e.g., primarily purity). However, no study has systematically tested if disgust sensitivity is associated with moral judgments of the purity domain specifically, more generally to moral judgments of the binding moral domains, or to moral judgments of all of the moral domains equally. Across 5 studies (total N = 1,104), we find consistent evidence for the notion that disgust sensitivity relates more strongly to moral condemnation of purity-based transgressions (meta-analytic r = .40) than to moral condemnation of transgressions of any of the other domains (range meta-analytic rs: .07-.27). Our findings are in line with predictions from Moral Foundations Theory, which predicts that personality characteristics like disgust sensitivity make people more sensitive to a certain set of moral issues. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

A multidimensional analysis of disparities between individuals' moral judgments and moral intentions

OpenAIRE

Oktay, Selim

2001-01-01

Cataloged from PDF version of article. One major issue that needs to be investigated in the area of business ethics is the disparities between individuals' moral judgments and their actual behaviors. Since it is very difficult to measure actual behaviors, moral intentions are measured in the current study, instead of behaviors. A multidimensional approach including the analysis of gender differences and effects of work experience on moral judgments and moral intentions, fact...

Clinical judgment, moral anxiety, and the limits of psychiatry.

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Murray, Bradley

2017-12-01

It is common for clinicians working in psychiatry and related clinical disciplines to be called on to make diagnostic clinical judgments concerning moral anxiety, which is a kind of anxiety that is closely bound up with decisions individuals face as moral agents. To make such a judgment, it is necessary to make a moral judgment. Although it has been common to acknowledge that there are ways in which moral and clinical judgment interact, this type of interaction has remained unacknowledged. This raises questions as to the nature and limits of psychiatry-particularly concerning the extent to which psychiatric discourse ought to incorporate moral discourse, and the role of the clinician as an expert in identifying problematic anxiety.

Construal levels and moral judgment: Some complications

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Han Gong

2012-09-01

Full Text Available Eyal, T., Liberman, N., and Trope, Y., (2008. Judging near and distant virtue and vice. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44, 1204-1209, explored how psychological distance influences moral judgment and found that more extreme moral appraisals were given to distal behaviors rather than proximal behaviors. Contrary to Eyal et al., the current paper presents converging evidence showing that moral judgments become more extreme at lower-level construals compared to higher-level construals. In four experiments using two different priming techniques, we manipulated construal levels and assessed their effects on moral judgment. High-level consturals elicited less moral outrage toward transgressions and less positive ratings of virtuous behaviors than low-level construals. A replication study was also conducted to reconcile the inconsistencies between the current results and those of Eyal et al. Possible explanations for the different results between two studies are discussed.

At the heart of morality lies neuro-visceral integration: lower cardiac vagal tone predicts utilitarian moral judgment

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Kappes, Andreas; Rho, Yeojin; Van Bavel, Jay J.

2016-01-01

To not harm others is widely considered the most basic element of human morality. The aversion to harm others can be either rooted in the outcomes of an action (utilitarianism) or reactions to the action itself (deontology). We speculated that the human moral judgments rely on the integration of neural computations of harm and visceral reactions. The present research examined whether utilitarian or deontological aspects of moral judgment are associated with cardiac vagal tone, a physiological proxy for neuro-visceral integration. We investigated the relationship between cardiac vagal tone and moral judgment by using a mix of moral dilemmas, mathematical modeling and psychophysiological measures. An index of bipolar deontology-utilitarianism was correlated with resting heart rate variability (HRV)—an index of cardiac vagal tone—such that more utilitarian judgments were associated with lower HRV. Follow-up analyses using process dissociation, which independently quantifies utilitarian and deontological moral inclinations, provided further evidence that utilitarian (but not deontological) judgments were associated with lower HRV. Our results suggest that the functional integration of neural and visceral systems during moral judgments can restrict outcome-based, utilitarian moral preferences. Implications for theories of moral judgment are discussed. PMID:27317926

Relativism, Objectivity and Moral Judgment.

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Partington, Geoffrey

1979-01-01

Reaction against the naive moral absolutism of past historical writing has frequently led to unconditional moral and cultural relativism which is equally dangerous. A viable solution is contingent relativism in historical judgments, combining explicit and examinable criteria of human values and concern for contexts of time and place. (Author/SJL)

Utilitarian Moral Judgment Exclusively Coheres with Inference from Is to Ought.

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Elqayam, Shira; Wilkinson, Meredith R; Thompson, Valerie A; Over, David E; Evans, Jonathan St B T

2017-01-01

Faced with moral choice, people either judge according to pre-existing obligations ( deontological judgment), or by taking into account the consequences of their actions ( utilitarian judgment). We propose that the latter coheres with a more general cognitive mechanism - deontic introduction , the tendency to infer normative ('deontic') conclusions from descriptive premises (is-ought inference). Participants were presented with vignettes that allowed either deontological or utilitarian choice, and asked to draw a range of deontic conclusions, as well as judge the overall moral rightness of each choice separately. We predicted and found a selective defeasibility pattern, in which manipulations that suppressed deontic introduction also suppressed utilitarian moral judgment, but had little effect on deontological moral judgment. Thus, deontic introduction coheres with utilitarian moral judgment almost exclusively. We suggest a family of norm-generating informal inferences, in which normative conclusions are drawn from descriptive (although value-laden) premises. This family includes deontic introduction and utilitarian moral judgment as well as other informal inferences. We conclude with a call for greater integration of research in moral judgment and research into deontic reasoning and informal inference.

Assessment of moral judgment and empathy in young sex offenders: a comparison of clinical judgment and test results.

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van Vugt, Eveline; Asscher, Jessica; Hendriks, Jan; Stams, Geert Jan; Bijleveld, Catrien; van der Laan, Peter

2012-10-01

Professional decision making in forensic clinical practice may have lifelong consequences for offenders. Although information on moral development is important for prediction of reoffending and referral to adequate treatment, conclusions regarding moral development are still largely based on unstructured clinical judgment instead of assessment instruments. For this study, the authors examined to what extent unstructured clinical judgment of both moral judgment and victim empathy concurred with test results in a group of young sex offenders. Moral judgment was measured with the Sociomoral Reflection Measure-Short Form (SRM-SF), whereas victim empathy was measured with an extended version of the Basic Empathy Scale (BES). No significant associations were found between clinical judgment of moral judgment and the mean scores on the SRM-SF. However, clinical judgment of victim empathy was significantly associated with victim empathy on the Victim Empathy Scale but not consistently in the expected direction. Juvenile sex offenders, who were judged by clinicians to show little victim empathy, displayed lower mean scores on the Victim Empathy Scale than juvenile sex offenders who were evaluated to lack victim empathy or to have intact victim empathy. This study showed unstructured clinical judgment of moral development not to concur with test results. To improve decision-making processes regarding moral development, clinicians are advised to rely on instruments that assess moral development to inform clinical judgment. Further research is needed to examine which predictions are more accurate and to establish the predictive validity of moral development evaluations.

At the heart of morality lies neuro-visceral integration: lower cardiac vagal tone predicts utilitarian moral judgment.

Science.gov (United States)

Park, Gewnhi; Kappes, Andreas; Rho, Yeojin; Van Bavel, Jay J

2016-10-01

To not harm others is widely considered the most basic element of human morality. The aversion to harm others can be either rooted in the outcomes of an action (utilitarianism) or reactions to the action itself (deontology). We speculated that the human moral judgments rely on the integration of neural computations of harm and visceral reactions. The present research examined whether utilitarian or deontological aspects of moral judgment are associated with cardiac vagal tone, a physiological proxy for neuro-visceral integration. We investigated the relationship between cardiac vagal tone and moral judgment by using a mix of moral dilemmas, mathematical modeling and psychophysiological measures. An index of bipolar deontology-utilitarianism was correlated with resting heart rate variability (HRV)-an index of cardiac vagal tone-such that more utilitarian judgments were associated with lower HRV. Follow-up analyses using process dissociation, which independently quantifies utilitarian and deontological moral inclinations, provided further evidence that utilitarian (but not deontological) judgments were associated with lower HRV. Our results suggest that the functional integration of neural and visceral systems during moral judgments can restrict outcome-based, utilitarian moral preferences. Implications for theories of moral judgment are discussed. © The Author (2016). Published by Oxford University Press. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.

Experiencing Physical Pain Leads to More Sympathetic Moral Judgments

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Xiao, Qianguo; Zhu, Yi; Luo, Wen-bo

2015-01-01

Previous studies have shown that observing another’s pain can evoke other-oriented emotions, which instigate empathic concern for another’s needs. It is not clear whether experiencing first-hand physical pain may also evoke other-oriented emotion and thus influence people’s moral judgment. Based on the embodied simulation literature and neuroimaging evidence, the present research tested the idea that participants who experienced physical pain would be more sympathetic in their moral judgments. Study 1 showed that ice-induced physical pain facilitated higher self-assessments of empathy, which motivated participants to be more sympathetic in their moral judgments. Study 2 confirmed findings in study 1 and also showed that State Perspective Taking subscale of the State Empathy Scale mediated the effects of physical pain on moral judgment. These results provide support for embodied view of morality and for the view that pain can serve a positive psychosocial function. PMID:26465603

How Large Is the Role of Emotion in Judgments of Moral Dilemmas?

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Horne, Zachary; Powell, Derek

2016-01-01

Moral dilemmas often pose dramatic and gut-wrenching emotional choices. It is now widely accepted that emotions are not simply experienced alongside people's judgments about moral dilemmas, but that our affective processes play a central role in determining those judgments. However, much of the evidence purporting to demonstrate the connection between people's emotional responses and their judgments about moral dilemmas has recently been called into question. In the present studies, we reexamined the role of emotion in people's judgments about moral dilemmas using a validated self-report measure of emotion. We measured participants' specific emotional responses to moral dilemmas and, although we found that moral dilemmas evoked strong emotional responses, we found that these responses were only weakly correlated with participants' moral judgments. We argue that the purportedly strong connection between emotion and judgments of moral dilemmas may have been overestimated.

Neural development of mentalizing in moral judgment from adolescence to adulthood.

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Harenski, Carla L; Harenski, Keith A; Shane, Matthew S; Kiehl, Kent A

2012-01-01

The neural mechanisms underlying moral judgment have been extensively studied in healthy adults. How these mechanisms evolve from adolescence to adulthood has received less attention. Brain regions that have been consistently implicated in moral judgment in adults, including the superior temporal cortex and prefrontal cortex, undergo extensive developmental changes from adolescence to adulthood. Thus, their role in moral judgment may also change over time. In the present study, 51 healthy male participants age 13–53 were scanned with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while they viewed pictures that did or did not depict situations considered by most individuals to represent moral violations, and rated their degree of moral violation severity. Consistent with predictions, a regression analysis revealed a positive correlation between age and hemodynamic activity in the temporo-parietal junction when participants made decisions regarding moral severity.This region is known to contribute to mentalizing processes during moral judgment in adults and suggests that adolescents use these types of inferences less during moral judgment than do adults. A positive correlation with age was also present in the posterior cingulate. Overall, the results suggest that the brain regions utilized in moral judgment change over development.

Unawareness of Self-interest Bias in Moral Judgments of Others’ Behavior

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Bocian Konrad

2014-12-01

Full Text Available Previous studies (Bocian & Wojciszke, 2014 showed that self-interest biases moral perception of others’ unethical actions. Moreover, affective changes in attitudinal responses towards the perpetrator of an immoral act drives the bias. In the present studies, we attempted to answer the question whether people are aware of the self-interest bias in their judgments of others’ behavior. We conducted two experiments showing that moral judgments of verbally described and imagined actions were dominated by norms rather than self-interest (Study 1 and that people were not aware that self-interest distorted their moral judgment (Study 2. The unawareness of the self-interest bias among the participants was attributable to omission of their own emotional responses when forecasting their moral judgments. We discuss the importance of emotions presence in studies on moral judgments as well as contribution of the present research to the intuitionist approach to moral judgment.

Norm Acquisition, Rational Judgment and Moral Particularism

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Westphal, Kenneth R.

2012-01-01

Moral particularism, defined as the view that moral judgment does not require moral principles, has become prominent both in moral philosophy and in philosophy of education. This article re-examines Nussbaum's case for particularism, based on Sophocles' "Antigone", because her stress on sensitive appreciation of circumstantial specifics is…

Utilitarian Moral Judgment Exclusively Coheres with Inference from Is to Ought

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Shira Elqayam

2017-06-01

Full Text Available Faced with moral choice, people either judge according to pre-existing obligations (deontological judgment, or by taking into account the consequences of their actions (utilitarian judgment. We propose that the latter coheres with a more general cognitive mechanism – deontic introduction, the tendency to infer normative (‘deontic’ conclusions from descriptive premises (is-ought inference. Participants were presented with vignettes that allowed either deontological or utilitarian choice, and asked to draw a range of deontic conclusions, as well as judge the overall moral rightness of each choice separately. We predicted and found a selective defeasibility pattern, in which manipulations that suppressed deontic introduction also suppressed utilitarian moral judgment, but had little effect on deontological moral judgment. Thus, deontic introduction coheres with utilitarian moral judgment almost exclusively. We suggest a family of norm-generating informal inferences, in which normative conclusions are drawn from descriptive (although value-laden premises. This family includes deontic introduction and utilitarian moral judgment as well as other informal inferences. We conclude with a call for greater integration of research in moral judgment and research into deontic reasoning and informal inference.

How Large Is the Role of Emotion in Judgments of Moral Dilemmas?

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Zachary Horne

Full Text Available Moral dilemmas often pose dramatic and gut-wrenching emotional choices. It is now widely accepted that emotions are not simply experienced alongside people's judgments about moral dilemmas, but that our affective processes play a central role in determining those judgments. However, much of the evidence purporting to demonstrate the connection between people's emotional responses and their judgments about moral dilemmas has recently been called into question. In the present studies, we reexamined the role of emotion in people's judgments about moral dilemmas using a validated self-report measure of emotion. We measured participants' specific emotional responses to moral dilemmas and, although we found that moral dilemmas evoked strong emotional responses, we found that these responses were only weakly correlated with participants' moral judgments. We argue that the purportedly strong connection between emotion and judgments of moral dilemmas may have been overestimated.

Some problems in use of the moral judgment test.

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Villegas de Posada, Cristina

2005-06-01

The Moral Judgment Test has been widely used in evaluation of moral development; however, it presents some problems related to the trait measured, reliability, and validity of its summary score (C-index). This index reflects consistency in moral judgment, but this construct is different from moral development as stated by Kohlberg. Therefore, users interested in the latter evaluation should refer to other indexes derived from the test. Some of the analyzed problems could be partially corrected with more theory and research on moral consistency as a component of moral competence.

Liberating reason from the passions: overriding intuitionist moral judgments through emotion reappraisal.

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Feinberg, Matthew; Willer, Robb; Antonenko, Olga; John, Oliver P

2012-07-01

A classic problem in moral psychology concerns whether and when moral judgments are driven by intuition versus deliberate reasoning. In this investigation, we explored the role of reappraisal, an emotion-regulation strategy that involves construing an emotion-eliciting situation in a way that diminishes the intensity of the emotional experience. We hypothesized that although emotional reactions evoke initial moral intuitions, reappraisal weakens the influence of these intuitions, leading to more deliberative moral judgments. Three studies of moral judgments in emotionally evocative, disgust-eliciting moral dilemmas supported our hypothesis. A greater tendency to reappraise was related to fewer intuition-based judgments (Study 1). Content analysis of open-ended descriptions of moral-reasoning processes revealed that reappraisal was associated with longer time spent in deliberation and with fewer intuitionist moral judgments (Study 2). Finally, in comparison with participants who simply watched an emotion-inducing film, participants who had been instructed to reappraise their reactions while watching the film subsequently reported less intense emotional reactions to moral dilemmas, and these dampened reactions led, in turn, to fewer intuitionist moral judgments (Study 3).

On the role of attention and emotion in morality: attentional control modulates unrelated disgust in moral judgments.

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Van Dillen, Lotte F; van der Wal, Reine C; van den Bos, Kees

2012-09-01

The emotion of disgust can influence people's moral judgments, even if this emotion objectively is unrelated to the moral judgment in question. The present work demonstrates that attentional control regulates this effect. In three studies, disgust was induced. In an unrelated part of the studies, participants then judged a moral transgression. Disgust resulted in more severe moral judgments when attentional control (either measured by means of individual predisposition or manipulated with experimental control) was weak as opposed to strong (Studies 1-3). Findings further showed that attentional control mediated the positive relation between the intensity of participants' disgust responses and the severity of their moral judgments (Study 2). Moreover, attentional control has its effects through the regulation of affective processing (Study 3). Taken together, the findings suggest that unrelated influences of disgust on moral judgments are contingent on the attention system.

Disgust sensitivity is primarily associated with purity-based moral judgments

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Wagemans, F.M.A.; Brandt, M.J.; Zeelenberg, M.

2018-01-01

Individual differences in disgust sensitivity are associated with a range of judgments and attitudes related to the moral domain. Some perspectives suggest that the association between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments will be equally strong across all moral domains (i.e., purity, authority,

Can model-free reinforcement learning explain deontological moral judgments?

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Ayars, Alisabeth

2016-05-01

Dual-systems frameworks propose that moral judgments are derived from both an immediate emotional response, and controlled/rational cognition. Recently Cushman (2013) proposed a new dual-system theory based on model-free and model-based reinforcement learning. Model-free learning attaches values to actions based on their history of reward and punishment, and explains some deontological, non-utilitarian judgments. Model-based learning involves the construction of a causal model of the world and allows for far-sighted planning; this form of learning fits well with utilitarian considerations that seek to maximize certain kinds of outcomes. I present three concerns regarding the use of model-free reinforcement learning to explain deontological moral judgment. First, many actions that humans find aversive from model-free learning are not judged to be morally wrong. Moral judgment must require something in addition to model-free learning. Second, there is a dearth of evidence for central predictions of the reinforcement account-e.g., that people with different reinforcement histories will, all else equal, make different moral judgments. Finally, to account for the effect of intention within the framework requires certain assumptions which lack support. These challenges are reasonable foci for future empirical/theoretical work on the model-free/model-based framework. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Low levels of empathic concern predict utilitarian moral judgment.

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Gleichgerrcht, Ezequiel; Young, Liane

2013-01-01

Is it permissible to harm one to save many? Classic moral dilemmas are often defined by the conflict between a putatively rational response to maximize aggregate welfare (i.e., the utilitarian judgment) and an emotional aversion to harm (i.e., the non-utilitarian judgment). Here, we address two questions. First, what specific aspect of emotional responding is relevant for these judgments? Second, is this aspect of emotional responding selectively reduced in utilitarians or enhanced in non-utilitarians? The results reveal a key relationship between moral judgment and empathic concern in particular (i.e., feelings of warmth and compassion in response to someone in distress). Utilitarian participants showed significantly reduced empathic concern on an independent empathy measure. These findings therefore reveal diminished empathic concern in utilitarian moral judges.

Relationship between ethical ideology and moral judgment: Academic nurse educators' perception.

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Abou Hashish, Ebtsam Aly; Ali Awad, Nadia Hassan

2017-01-01

Ascertaining the relationship between ethical ideology, moral judgment, and ethical decision among academic nurse educators at work appears to be a challenge particularly in situations when they are faced with a need to solve an ethical problem and make a moral decision. This study aims to investigate the relationship between ethical ideology, moral judgment, and ethical decision as perceived by academic nurse educators. A descriptive correlational research design was conducted at Faculty of Nursing, Alexandria University. All academic nurse educators were included in the study (N = 220). Ethical Position Questionnaire and Questionnaire of Moral Judgment and Ethical Decisions were proved reliable to measure study variables. Ethical considerations: Approval was obtained from Ethics Committee at Faculty of Nursing, Alexandria University. Privacy and confidentiality of data were maintained and assured by obtaining subjects' informed consent. This study reveals a significant positive moderate correlation between idealism construct of ethical ideology and moral judgment in terms of recognition of the behavior as an ethical issue and the magnitude of emotional consequences of the ethical situation (p relativism construct of ethical ideology and overall moral judgment (p = 0.010). Approximately 3.5% of the explained variance of overall moral judgment is predicted by idealism together with relativism. The findings suggest that variations in ethical position and ideology are associated with moral judgment and ethical decision. Organizations of academic nursing education should provide a supportive work environment to help their academic staff to develop their self-awareness and knowledge of their ethical position and promoting their ethical ideologies and, in turn, enhance their moral judgment as well as develop ethical reasoning and decision-making capability of nursing students. More emphasis in nursing curricula is needed on ethical concepts for developing nursing

Reflection and Reasoning in Moral Judgment

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Paxton, Joseph M.; Ungar, Leo; Greene, Joshua D.

2012-01-01

While there is much evidence for the influence of automatic emotional responses on moral judgment, the roles of reflection and reasoning remain uncertain. In Experiment 1, we induced subjects to be more reflective by completing the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) prior to responding to moral dilemmas. This manipulation increased utilitarian…

Low levels of empathic concern predict utilitarian moral judgment.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Ezequiel Gleichgerrcht

Full Text Available Is it permissible to harm one to save many? Classic moral dilemmas are often defined by the conflict between a putatively rational response to maximize aggregate welfare (i.e., the utilitarian judgment and an emotional aversion to harm (i.e., the non-utilitarian judgment. Here, we address two questions. First, what specific aspect of emotional responding is relevant for these judgments? Second, is this aspect of emotional responding selectively reduced in utilitarians or enhanced in non-utilitarians? The results reveal a key relationship between moral judgment and empathic concern in particular (i.e., feelings of warmth and compassion in response to someone in distress. Utilitarian participants showed significantly reduced empathic concern on an independent empathy measure. These findings therefore reveal diminished empathic concern in utilitarian moral judges.

What makes moral dilemma judgments "utilitarian" or "deontological"?

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Gawronski, Bertram; Beer, Jennifer S

2017-12-01

The distinction between utilitarianism and deontology has become a prevailing framework for conceptualizing moral judgment. According to the principle of utilitarianism, the morality of an action depends on its outcomes. In contrast, the principle of deontology states that the morality of an action depends on its consistency with moral norms. To identify the processes underlying utilitarian and deontological judgments, research in psychology and neuroscience has investigated responses to moral dilemmas that pit one principle against the other (e.g., trolley dilemma). However, the interpretation of responses in this paradigm is ambiguous, because the defining aspects of utilitarianism and deontology, outcomes and norms, are not manipulated. We illustrate how this shortcoming distorts interpretations of empirical findings and describe an alternative approach that overcomes the limitations of the traditional paradigm.

The impact of autism spectrum disorder and alexithymia on judgments of moral acceptability.

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Brewer, Rebecca; Marsh, Abigail A; Catmur, Caroline; Cardinale, Elise M; Stoycos, Sarah; Cook, Richard; Bird, Geoffrey

2015-08-01

One's own emotional response toward a hypothetical action can influence judgments of its moral acceptability. Some individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) exhibit atypical emotional processing, and moral judgments. Research suggests, however, that emotional deficits in ASD are due to co-occurring alexithymia, meaning atypical moral judgments in ASD may be due to alexithymia also. Individuals with and without ASD (matched for alexithymia) judged the moral acceptability of emotion-evoking statements and identified the emotion evoked. Moral acceptability judgments were predicted by alexithymia. Crucially, however, this relationship held only for individuals without ASD. While ASD diagnostic status did not directly predict either judgment, those with ASD did not base their moral acceptability judgments on emotional information. Findings are consistent with evidence demonstrating that decision-making is less subject to emotional biases in those with ASD. (c) 2015 APA, all rights reserved).

Religious Roots: A Prolegomenon to Moral Judgment in American Policy

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2012-03-15

Bethany House Publishers, 1998), 71. For a very good commentary on this subject, read the chapters entitled, “The Absolutism of Moral Relativism ...Religious Roots: A Prolegomenon to Moral Judgment in American Policy by Lieutenant Colonel Greg Johnson Oregon Air...COVERED (From - To) 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Religious Roots: A Prolegomenon to Moral Judgment in American Policy Policy 5a. CONTRACT

Assessing Veterinary and Animal Science Students' Moral Judgment Development on Animal Ethics Issues.

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Verrinder, Joy M; Phillips, Clive J C

2015-01-01

Little has been done to assess veterinarians' moral judgment in relation to animal ethics issues. Following development of the VetDIT, a new moral judgment measure for animal ethics issues, this study aimed to refine and further validate the VetDIT, and to identify effects of teaching interventions on moral judgment and changes in moral judgment over time. VetDIT-V1 was refined into VetDIT-V2, and V3 was developed as a post-intervention test to prevent repetition. To test these versions for comparability, veterinary and animal science students (n=271) were randomly assigned to complete different versions. The VetDIT discriminates between stages of moral judgment, condensed into three schemas: Personal Interest (PI), Maintaining Norms (MN), and Universal Principles (UP). There were no differences in the scores for MN and UP between the versions, and we equated PI scores to account for differences between versions. Veterinary science students (n=130) who completed a three-hour small-group workshop on moral development theory and ethical decision making increased their use of UP in moral reasoning, whereas students (n=271) who received similar information in a 50-minute lecture did not. A longitudinal comparison of matched first- and third-year students (n=39) revealed no moral judgment development toward greater use of UP. The VetDIT is therefore useful for assessing moral judgment of animal and human ethics issues in veterinary and other animal-related professions. Intensive small-group workshops using moral development knowledge and skills, rather than lectures, are conducive to developing veterinary students' moral judgment.

A teoria de Kohlberg sobre o desenvolvimento do raciocínio moral e os instrumentos de avaliação de juízo e competência moral em uso no Brasil Kohlberg's theory about moral judgment development and the instruments used for evaluation of moral judgment and moral competence in Brazil

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Patricia Unger Raphael Bataglia

2010-04-01

Full Text Available O presente artigo tem por objetivo abordar as bases, finalidades e composição de dois instrumentos de avaliação de juízo moral: a Moral Judgment Interview (MJI e o Defining Issues Test (DIT, e um de competência moral: o Moral Judgment Test (MJT. Retoma a teoria do desenvolvimento moral de Kohlberg que fundamenta esses instrumentos, assim como os últimos estudos realizados com os mesmos. A MJI é uma entrevista semiestruturada que avalia o nível de juízo moral. O DIT é um teste objetivo que mede a proporção de respostas pós-convencionais. O MJT é um instrumento objetivo, que avalia a competência moral. Destaca-se a crescente utilização desses instrumentos em pesquisas sobre moralidade.This paper presents intends to address the objectives and composition of two instruments for evaluation of moral judgment: the "Moral Judgment Interview" (MJI and the "Defining Issues Test" (DIT and one for moral competence measurement: the "Moral Judgment Test" (MJT. It retakes Kohlberg's moral development theory which gives the foundation for these instruments. Presents Brazilian studies with each instrument. MJI is a semi-structured interview that evaluates the stage of moral judgment. DIT is an objective test that measures the percentage of post-conventional answers. MJT is an objective instrument that measures the moral judgment competence. Researches have used more and more these instruments.

When psychopathy impairs moral judgments: neural responses during judgments about causing fear.

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Marsh, Abigail A; Cardinale, Elise M

2014-01-01

Psychopathy is a disorder characterized by reduced empathy, shallow affect and behaviors that cause victims distress, like threats, bullying and violence. Neuroimaging research in both institutionalized and community samples implicates amygdala dysfunction in the etiology of psychopathic traits. Reduced amygdala responsiveness may disrupt processing of fear-relevant stimuli like fearful facial expressions. The present study links amygdala dysfunction in response to fear-relevant stimuli to the willingness of individuals with psychopathic traits to cause fear in other people. Thirty-three healthy adult participants varying in psychopathic traits underwent whole-brain fMRI scanning while they viewed statements that selectively evoke anger, disgust, fear, happiness or sadness. During scanning, participants judged whether it is morally acceptable to make each statement to another person. Psychopathy was associated with reduced activity in right amygdala during judgments of fear-evoking statements and with more lenient moral judgments about causing fear. No group differences in amygdala function or moral judgments emerged for other emotion categories. Psychopathy was also associated with increased activity in middle frontal gyrus (BA 10) during the task. These results implicate amygdala dysfunction in impaired judgments about causing distress in psychopathy and suggest that atypical amygdala responses to fear in psychopathy extend across multiple classes of stimuli.

Are emotions necessary and sufficient for making moral judgments?

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Marco Aurélio Sousa Alves

2013-07-01

Full Text Available http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2013v12n1p113 Jesse Prinz (2006, 2007 claimed that emotions are necessary and sufficient for moral judgments. First of all, I clarify what this claim amounts to. The view that he labels emotionism will then be critically assessed. Prinz marshals empirical findings to defend a series of increasingly strong theses about how emotions are essential for moral judgments. I argue that the empirical support upon which his arguments are based is not only insufficient, but it even suggests otherwise, if properly interpreted. My criticism is then extended to his sentimentalist theory, that accounts for how emotions are integrated into moral judgments. The central problem is that Prinz’s view fails to capture the rational aspect of moral evaluation. I make this failure explicit and defend that some version or other of neosentimentalism is a more promising route.

Serotonin selectively influences moral judgment and behavior through effects on harm aversion.

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Crockett, Molly J; Clark, Luke; Hauser, Marc D; Robbins, Trevor W

2010-10-05

Aversive emotional reactions to real or imagined social harms infuse moral judgment and motivate prosocial behavior. Here, we show that the neurotransmitter serotonin directly alters both moral judgment and behavior through increasing subjects' aversion to personally harming others. We enhanced serotonin in healthy volunteers with citalopram (a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor) and contrasted its effects with both a pharmacological control treatment and a placebo on tests of moral judgment and behavior. We measured the drugs' effects on moral judgment in a set of moral 'dilemmas' pitting utilitarian outcomes (e.g., saving five lives) against highly aversive harmful actions (e.g., killing an innocent person). Enhancing serotonin made subjects more likely to judge harmful actions as forbidden, but only in cases where harms were emotionally salient. This harm-avoidant bias after citalopram was also evident in behavior during the ultimatum game, in which subjects decide to accept or reject fair or unfair monetary offers from another player. Rejecting unfair offers enforces a fairness norm but also harms the other player financially. Enhancing serotonin made subjects less likely to reject unfair offers. Furthermore, the prosocial effects of citalopram varied as a function of trait empathy. Individuals high in trait empathy showed stronger effects of citalopram on moral judgment and behavior than individuals low in trait empathy. Together, these findings provide unique evidence that serotonin could promote prosocial behavior by enhancing harm aversion, a prosocial sentiment that directly affects both moral judgment and moral behavior.

The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.

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Haidt, J

2001-10-01

Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done by individuals and emphasizes instead the importance of social and cultural influences. The model is an intuitionist model in that it states that moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions). The model is more consistent that rationalist models with recent findings in social, cultural, evolutionary, and biological psychology, as well as in anthropology and primatology.

Moral Judgment and Its Relation to Second-Order Theory of Mind

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Fu, Genyue; Xiao, Wen S.; Killen, Melanie; Lee, Kang

2014-01-01

Recent research indicates that moral judgment and 1st-order theory of mind abilities are related. What is not known, however, is how 2nd-order theory of mind is related to moral judgment. In the present study, we extended previous findings by administering a morally relevant theory of mind task (an accidental transgressor) to 4- to 7-year-old…

How Large Is the Role of Emotion in Judgments of Moral Dilemmas?

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Horne, Zachary; Powell, Derek

2016-01-01

Moral dilemmas often pose dramatic and gut-wrenching emotional choices. It is now widely accepted that emotions are not simply experienced alongside people's judgments about moral dilemmas, but that our affective processes play a central role in determining those judgments. However, much of the evidence purporting to demonstrate the connection between people's emotional responses and their judgments about moral dilemmas has recently been called into question. In the present studies, we reexam...

Discrepancies between judgment and choice of action in moral dilemmas

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Sébastien eTassy

2013-05-01

Full Text Available Everyone has experienced the potential discrepancy between what one judges as morally acceptable and what one actually does when a choice between alternative behaviors is to be made. The present study explores empirically whether judgment and choice of action differ when people make decisions on dilemmas involving moral issues. 240 participants evaluated 24 moral and non-moral dilemmas either by judging (Is it acceptable to… or reporting the choice of action they would make (Would you do…. We also investigated the influence of varying the number of people benefiting from the decision and the closeness of relationship of the decision maker with the potential victim on these two types of decision. Variations in the number of beneficiaries from the decision did not influence judgment nor choice of action. By contrast, closeness of relationship with the victim had a greater influence on the choice of action than on judgment. This differentiation between evaluative judgments and choices of action argues in favor of each of them being supported by (at least partially different psychological processes.

Children's Moral Judgments and Moral Emotions Following Exclusion of Children with Disabilities: Relations with Inclusive Education, Age, and Contact Intensity

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Gasser, Luciano; Malti, Tina; Buholzer, Alois

2013-01-01

We investigated relations between children's moral judgments and moral emotions following disability-based exclusion and inclusive education, age, and contact intensity. Nine- and 12-year-old Swiss children (N = 351) from inclusive and noninclusive classrooms provided moral judgments and moral emotion attributions following six vignettes about…

Moral Judgment Development across Cultures: Revisiting Kohlberg's Universality Claims

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Gibbs, John C.; Basinger, Karen S.; Grime, Rebecca L.; Snarey, John R.

2007-01-01

This article revisits Kohlberg's cognitive developmental claims that stages of moral judgment, facilitative processes of social perspective-taking, and moral values are commonly identifiable across cultures. Snarey [Snarey, J. (1985). "The cross-cultural universality of social-moral development: A critical review of Kohlbergian research."…

Effects of Incidental Emotions on Moral Dilemma Judgments: An Analysis Using the CNI Model.

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Gawronski, Bertram; Conway, Paul; Armstrong, Joel; Friesdorf, Rebecca; Hütter, Mandy

2018-02-01

Effects of incidental emotions on moral dilemma judgments have garnered interest because they demonstrate the context-dependent nature of moral decision-making. Six experiments (N = 727) investigated the effects of incidental happiness, sadness, and anger on responses in moral dilemmas that pit the consequences of a given action for the greater good (i.e., utilitarianism) against the consistency of that action with moral norms (i.e., deontology). Using the CNI model of moral decision-making, we further tested whether the three kinds of emotions shape moral dilemma judgments by influencing (a) sensitivity to consequences, (b) sensitivity to moral norms, or (c) general preference for inaction versus action regardless of consequences and moral norms (or some combination of the three). Incidental happiness reduced sensitivity to moral norms without affecting sensitivity to consequences or general preference for inaction versus action. Incidental sadness and incidental anger did not show any significant effects on moral dilemma judgments. The findings suggest a central role of moral norms in the contribution of emotional responses to moral dilemma judgments, requiring refinements of dominant theoretical accounts and supporting the value of formal modeling approaches in providing more nuanced insights into the determinants of moral dilemma judgments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

Moral Overtones of Food: Judgments of Others Based on What They Eat.

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Stein, Richard I.; Nemeroff, Carol J.

1995-01-01

Investigated whether eating healthy or unhealthy foods gives rise to moral judgments about the consumer. Subjects were presented one of four bogus profiles of a person, differing only in gender and foods consumed, and rated the target on morality. Results confirmed that food choices influenced the raters' moral judgments. (RJM)

The Contrabassist and the CEO: Moral Judgment and Collective Identity

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Alessandro Pinzani

2003-01-01

Full Text Available How much is a moral judgment on a single act influenced by circumstances which have little to do with the nature of the act itself? How much have certain moral judgments to do with the common history and shared experience of a certain group of individuals? Using two cases taken from life (a German musician and a German CEO behaving both in a morally wrong way but with very different consequences from the point of view of moral judgement and with very different reactions from the German public, the article tries to give an answer to these questions, touching issues like: guilt, moral responsibility, collective responsibility, and collective identity.

Moral Judgment, Sensitivity To Reasons, and the Multi-system View

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Francesco Orsi

2012-11-01

Full Text Available In this paper I attempt a critical examination of the multi-system or dual-process view of moral judgment. This view aims to provide a psychological explanation of moral sensitivity, and in particular an explanation of conflicting moral sensitivities in dilemma cases such as the crying baby scenario. I argue that proponents of the multi-system view owe us a satisfactory account of the mechanisms underlying “consequentialist” responses to such scenarios. For one thing, the “cognitive” processes involved in consequentialist reasoning only seem to play a subserving role with respect to the final judgment (providing non-moral inputs to judgment, or exerting additional strength to override the immediate “deontological” response. In this sense, Greene and colleagues fail to identify a peculiar system of moral judgment specularly opposed to the affective “deontological” one. For another, Greene and colleagues’ work on the emotion-cognition dichotomy and the distinction between alarm-bell and currency emotions, though promising, still falls short of providing an adequate and consistent picture of the psychological mechanisms underlying “cognitive” evaluations and verdicts in dilemma scenarios. It is suggested that alongside further experimental work, proponents of this view should pay more attention to the conceptual underpinnings of their distinctions.

On the Role of Attention and Emotion in Morality: Attentional Control Modulates Unrelated Disgust in Moral Judgments

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Dillen, L.F. van; Wal, R.C. van der; Bos, K. van den

2012-01-01

The emotion of disgust can influence people’s moral judgments, even if this emotion objectively is unrelated to the moral judgment in question. The present work demonstrates that attentional control regulates this effect. In three studies, disgust was induced. In an unrelated part of the studies,

Crime and Punishment: Distinguishing the Roles of Causal and Intentional Analyses in Moral Judgment

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Cushman, Fiery

2008-01-01

Recent research in moral psychology has attempted to characterize patterns of moral judgments of actions in terms of the causal and intentional properties of those actions. The present study directly compares the roles of consequence, causation, belief and desire in determining moral judgments. Judgments of the wrongness or permissibility of…

Impact of Psychopathy on Moral Judgments about Causing Fear and Physical Harm.

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Elise M Cardinale

Full Text Available Psychopathy is a personality variable associated with persistent immoral behaviors. Despite this, attempts to link moral reasoning deficits to psychopathic traits have yielded mixed results with many findings supporting intact moral reasoning in individuals with psychopathic traits. Abundant evidence shows that psychopathy impairs responses to others' emotional distress. However, most studies of morality and psychopathy focus on judgments about causing others physical harm. Results of such studies may be inconsistent because physical harm is an imperfect proxy for emotional distress. No previous paradigm has explicitly separated judgments about physical harm and emotional distress and assessed how psychopathy affects each type of judgment. In three studies we found that psychopathy impairs judgments about causing others emotional distress (specifically fear but minimally affects judgments about causing physical harm and that judgments about causing fear predict instrumental aggression in psychopathy. These findings are consistent with reports linking psychopathy to insensitivity to others' fear, and suggest that sensitivity to others' fear may play a fundamental role in the types of moral decision-making impaired by psychopathy.

Neural correlates of moral judgment in pedophilia.

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Massau, Claudia; Kärgel, Christian; Weiß, Simone; Walter, Martin; Ponseti, Jorge; Hc Krueger, Tillmann; Walter, Henrik; Schiffer, Boris

2017-09-01

Pedophilia is a sexual preference that is often associated with child sex offending (CSO). Sexual urges towards prepubescent children and specifically acting upon those urges are universally regarded as immoral. However, up until now, it is completely unknown whether moral processing of sexual offenses is altered in pedophiles. A total of 31 pedophilic men and 19 healthy controls were assessed by using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in combination with a moral judgment paradigm consisting of 36 scenarios describing different types of offenses.Scenarios depicting sexual offenses against children compared to those depicting adults were associated with higher pattern of activation in the left temporo-parietal-junction (TPJ) and left posterior insular cortex, the posterior cingulate gyrus as well as the precuneus in controls relative to pedophiles, and vice versa. Moreover, brain activation in these areas were positively associated with ratings of moral reprehensibility and negatively associated with decision durations, but only in controls. Brain activation, found in key areas related to the broad network of moral judgment, theory of mind and (socio-)moral disgust - point to different moral processing of sexual offenses in pedophilia in general. The lack of associations between brain activation and behavioral responses in pedophiles further suggest a biased response pattern or dissected implicit valuation processes. © The Author (2017). Published by Oxford University Press.

The Foreign Language Effect on Moral Judgment: The Role of Emotions and Norms.

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Geipel, Janet; Hadjichristidis, Constantinos; Surian, Luca

2015-01-01

We investigated whether and why the use of a foreign language influences moral judgment. We studied the trolley and footbridge dilemmas, which propose an action that involves killing one individual to save five. In line with prior work, the use of a foreign language increased the endorsement of such consequentialist actions for the footbridge dilemma, but not for the trolley dilemma. But contrary to recent theorizing, this effect was not driven by an attenuation of emotions. An attenuation of emotions was found in both dilemmas, and it did not mediate the foreign language effect on moral judgment. An examination of additional scenarios revealed that foreign language influenced moral judgment when the proposed action involved a social or moral norm violation. We propose that foreign language influences moral judgment by reducing access to normative knowledge.

Bible Knowledge and Moral Judgment: Knowing Scripture and Using Ethical Reasoning

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Nelson, Daniel

2004-01-01

The relationship between moral judgment and religious knowledge was investigated, with an analysis of the impact of academic skill on both domains. Fifty-six Bible college seniors completed measures of moral judgment (Defining Issues Test), Bible knowledge (Standardized Bible Content Test), and academic skill (Academic Profile). Results indicate…

Manipulating Morality: Third-Party Intentions Alter Moral Judgments by Changing Causal Reasoning.

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Phillips, Jonathan; Shaw, Alex

2015-08-01

The present studies investigate how the intentions of third parties influence judgments of moral responsibility for other agents who commit immoral acts. Using cases in which an agent acts under some situational constraint brought about by a third party, we ask whether the agent is blamed less for the immoral act when the third party intended for that act to occur. Study 1 demonstrates that third-party intentions do influence judgments of blame. Study 2 finds that third-party intentions only influence moral judgments when the agent's actions precisely match the third party's intention. Study 3 shows that this effect arises from changes in participants' causal perception that the third party was controlling the agent. Studies 4 and 5, respectively, show that the effect cannot be explained by changes in the distribution of blame or perceived differences in situational constraint faced by the agent. © 2014 Cognitive Science Society, Inc.

tDCS Over DLPFC Leads to Less Utilitarian Response in Moral-Personal Judgment.

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Zheng, Haoli; Lu, Xinbo; Huang, Daqiang

2018-01-01

The profound nature of moral judgment has been discussed and debated for centuries. When facing the trade-off between pursuing moral rights and seeking better consequences, most people make different moral choices between two kinds of dilemmas. Such differences were explained by the dual-process theory involving an automatic emotional response and a controlled application of utilitarian decision-rules. In neurocognitive studies, the bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) has been demonstrated to play an important role in cognitive "rational" control processes in moral dilemmas. However, the profile of results across studies is not entirely consistent. Although one transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) study revealed that disrupting the right DLPFC led to less utilitarian responses, other TMS studies indicated that inhibition of the right DLPFC led to more utilitarian choices. Moreover, the right temporoparietal junction (TPJ) is essential for its function of integrating belief and intention in moral judgment, which is related to the emotional process according to the dual-process theory. Relatively few studies have reported the causal relationship between TPJ and participants' moral responses, especially in moral dilemmas. In the present study, we aimed to demonstrate a direct link between the neural and behavioral results by application of transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) in the bilateral DLPFC or TPJ of our participants. We observed that activating the right DLPFC as well as inhibiting the left DLPFC led to less utilitarian judgments, especially in moral-personal conditions, indicating that the right DLPFC plays an essential role, not only through its function of moral reasoning but also through its information integrating process in moral judgments. It was also revealed that altering the excitability of the bilateral TPJ using tDCS negligibly altered the moral response in non-moral, moral-impersonal and moral-personal dilemmas

tDCS Over DLPFC Leads to Less Utilitarian Response in Moral-Personal Judgment

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Haoli Zheng

2018-03-01

Full Text Available The profound nature of moral judgment has been discussed and debated for centuries. When facing the trade-off between pursuing moral rights and seeking better consequences, most people make different moral choices between two kinds of dilemmas. Such differences were explained by the dual-process theory involving an automatic emotional response and a controlled application of utilitarian decision-rules. In neurocognitive studies, the bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC has been demonstrated to play an important role in cognitive “rational” control processes in moral dilemmas. However, the profile of results across studies is not entirely consistent. Although one transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS study revealed that disrupting the right DLPFC led to less utilitarian responses, other TMS studies indicated that inhibition of the right DLPFC led to more utilitarian choices. Moreover, the right temporoparietal junction (TPJ is essential for its function of integrating belief and intention in moral judgment, which is related to the emotional process according to the dual-process theory. Relatively few studies have reported the causal relationship between TPJ and participants' moral responses, especially in moral dilemmas. In the present study, we aimed to demonstrate a direct link between the neural and behavioral results by application of transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS in the bilateral DLPFC or TPJ of our participants. We observed that activating the right DLPFC as well as inhibiting the left DLPFC led to less utilitarian judgments, especially in moral-personal conditions, indicating that the right DLPFC plays an essential role, not only through its function of moral reasoning but also through its information integrating process in moral judgments. It was also revealed that altering the excitability of the bilateral TPJ using tDCS negligibly altered the moral response in non-moral, moral-impersonal and moral

Cold-Hearted or Cool-Headed: Physical Coldness Promotes Utilitarian Moral Judgment

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Hiroko eNakamura

2014-10-01

Full Text Available In the current study, we examine the effect of physical coldness on personal moral dilemma judgment. Previous studies have indicated that utilitarian moral judgment—sacrificing a few people to achieve the greater good for others—was facilitated when: (1 participants suppressed an initial emotional response and deliberately thought about the utility of outcomes; (2 participants had a high-level construal mindset and focused on abstract goals (e.g., save many; or (3 there was a decreasing emotional response to sacrificing a few. In two experiments, we exposed participants to extreme cold or typical room temperature and then asked them to make personal moral dilemma judgments. The results of Experiment 1 indicated that coldness prompted utilitarian judgment, but the effect of coldness was independent from deliberate thought or abstract high-level construal mindset. As Experiment 2 revealed, coldness facilitated utilitarian judgment via reduced empathic feelings. Therefore, physical coldness did not affect the cool-headed deliberate process or the abstract high-level construal mindset. Rather, coldness biased people toward being cold-hearted, reduced empathetic concern about a sacrificed victim, and facilitated utilitarian moral judgments.

Moral judgment and its relation to second-order theory of mind.

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Fu, Genyue; Xiao, Wen S; Killen, Melanie; Lee, Kang

2014-08-01

Recent research indicates that moral judgment and 1st-order theory of mind abilities are related. What is not known, however, is how 2nd-order theory of mind is related to moral judgment. In the present study, we extended previous findings by administering a morally relevant theory of mind task (an accidental transgressor) to 4- to 7-year-old Chinese children (N = 79) and analyzing connections with 2nd-order theory of mind understanding. Using hierarchical multiple regression analyses, we found that above and beyond age, children's 1st-order theory of mind and 2nd-order theory of mind each significantly and uniquely contributed to children's moral evaluations of the intention in the accidental transgression. These findings highlight the important roles that 1st- and 2nd-order theory of mind play in leading children to make appropriate moral judgments based on an actor's intention in a social situation. PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved.

Intuition and Moral Decision-Making – The Effect of Time Pressure and Cognitive Load on Moral Judgment and Altruistic Behavior

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Bonn, Caroline; Johannesson, Magnus; Kirchler, Michael; Koppel, Lina; Västfjäll, Daniel

2016-01-01

Do individuals intuitively favor certain moral actions over others? This study explores the role of intuitive thinking—induced by time pressure and cognitive load—in moral judgment and behavior. We conduct experiments in three different countries (Sweden, Austria, and the United States) involving over 1,400 subjects. All subjects responded to four trolley type dilemmas and four dictator games involving different charitable causes. Decisions were made under time pressure/time delay or while experiencing cognitive load or control. Overall we find converging evidence that intuitive states do not influence moral decisions. Neither time-pressure nor cognitive load had any effect on moral judgments or altruistic behavior. Thus we find no supporting evidence for the claim that intuitive moral judgments and dictator game giving differ from more reflectively taken decisions. Across all samples and decision tasks men were more likely to make utilitarian moral judgments and act selfishly compared to women, providing further evidence that there are robust gender differences in moral decision-making. However, there were no significant interactions between gender and the treatment manipulations of intuitive versus reflective decision-making. PMID:27783704

Children's moral judgments and moral emotions following exclusion of children with disabilities: relations with inclusive education, age, and contact intensity.

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Gasser, Luciano; Malti, Tina; Buholzer, Alois

2013-03-01

We investigated relations between children's moral judgments and moral emotions following disability-based exclusion and inclusive education, age, and contact intensity. Nine- and 12-year-old Swiss children (N=351) from inclusive and noninclusive classrooms provided moral judgments and moral emotion attributions following six vignettes about social exclusion of children with disabilities. Children also reported on their level of sympathy towards children with disabilities and their contact intensity with children with disabilities. Overall, children condemned disability-based exclusion, attributed few positive emotions to excluder targets, and expressed high sympathy for children with disabilities, independent of age and educational setting. However, younger children from inclusive classrooms exhibited more moral judgments and moral emotions than younger children from noninclusive classrooms. Moreover, children who expressed high sympathy towards children with disabilities were more likely to report frequent contact with children with disabilities. The findings extend existing research on social exclusion by examining disability-based exclusion and are discussed with respect to developmental research on social and moral judgments and emotions following children's inclusion and exclusion decisions. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Impaired theory of mind for moral judgment in high-functioning autism.

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Moran, Joseph M; Young, Liane L; Saxe, Rebecca; Lee, Su Mei; O'Young, Daniel; Mavros, Penelope L; Gabrieli, John D

2011-02-15

High-functioning autism (ASD) is characterized by real-life difficulties in social interaction; however, these individuals often succeed on laboratory tests that require an understanding of another person's beliefs and intentions. This paradox suggests a theory of mind (ToM) deficit in adults with ASD that has yet to be demonstrated in an experimental task eliciting ToM judgments. We tested whether ASD adults would show atypical moral judgments when they need to consider both the intentions (based on ToM) and outcomes of a person's actions. In experiment 1, ASD and neurotypical (NT) participants performed a ToM task designed to test false belief understanding. In experiment 2, the same ASD participants and a new group of NT participants judged the moral permissibility of actions, in a 2 (intention: neutral/negative) × 2 (outcome: neutral/negative) design. Though there was no difference between groups on the false belief task, there was a selective difference in the moral judgment task for judgments of accidental harms, but not neutral acts, attempted harms, or intentional harms. Unlike the NT group, which judged accidental harms less morally wrong than attempted harms, the ASD group did not reliably judge accidental and attempted harms as morally different. In judging accidental harms, ASD participants appeared to show an underreliance on information about a person's innocent intention and, as a direct result, an overreliance on the action's negative outcome. These findings reveal impairments in integrating mental state information (e.g., beliefs, intentions) for moral judgment.

Cultural differences in moral judgment and behavior, across and within societies.

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Graham, Jesse; Meindl, Peter; Beall, Erica; Johnson, Kate M; Zhang, Li

2016-04-01

We review contemporary work on cultural factors affecting moral judgments and values, and those affecting moral behaviors. In both cases, we highlight examples of within-societal cultural differences in morality, to show that these can be as substantial and important as cross-societal differences. Whether between or within nations and societies, cultures vary substantially in their promotion and transmission of a multitude of moral judgments and behaviors. Cultural factors contributing to this variation include religion, social ecology (weather, crop conditions, population density, pathogen prevalence, residential mobility), and regulatory social institutions such as kinship structures and economic markets. This variability raises questions for normative theories of morality, but also holds promise for future descriptive work on moral thought and behavior. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Integrative moral judgment: dissociating the roles of the amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal cortex.

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Shenhav, Amitai; Greene, Joshua D

2014-03-26

A decade's research highlights a critical dissociation between automatic and controlled influences on moral judgment, which is subserved by distinct neural structures. Specifically, negative automatic emotional responses to prototypically harmful actions (e.g., pushing someone off of a footbridge) compete with controlled responses favoring the best consequences (e.g., saving five lives instead of one). It is unknown how such competitions are resolved to yield "all things considered" judgments. Here, we examine such integrative moral judgments. Drawing on insights from research on self-interested, value-based decision-making in humans and animals, we test a theory concerning the respective contributions of the amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) to moral judgment. Participants undergoing fMRI responded to moral dilemmas, separately evaluating options for their utility (Which does the most good?), emotional aversiveness (Which feels worse?), and overall moral acceptability. Behavioral data indicate that emotional aversiveness and utility jointly predict "all things considered" integrative judgments. Amygdala response tracks the emotional aversiveness of harmful utilitarian actions and overall disapproval of such actions. During such integrative moral judgments, the vmPFC is preferentially engaged relative to utilitarian and emotional assessments. Amygdala-vmPFC connectivity varies with the role played by emotional input in the task, being the lowest for pure utilitarian assessments and the highest for pure emotional assessments. These findings, which parallel those of research on self-interested economic decision-making, support the hypothesis that the amygdala provides an affective assessment of the action in question, whereas the vmPFC integrates that signal with a utilitarian assessment of expected outcomes to yield "all things considered" moral judgments.

A Mind-Reader Does Not Always Have Deontological Moral Judgments and Prosocial Behavior: A Developmental Perspective.

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Hao, Jian; Liu, Yanchun

2016-01-01

The rationalistic theories of morality emphasize that reasoning plays an important role in moral judgments and prosocial behavior. Theory of mind as a reasoning ability in the mental domain has been considered a facilitator of moral development. The present study examined whether theory of mind was consistently positively associated with morality from middle childhood to late adulthood. Two hundred and four participants, including 48 elementary school children, 45 adolescents, 62 younger adults, and 49 older adults, completed theory of mind, moral judgment and prosocial behavior tasks. Theory of mind was measured with strange stories that tapped into an understanding of lies, white lies, double bluffs, irony, and persuasion. Moral judgments were measured with variants of the trolley dilemma. Prosocial behavior was measured through participants' performance in an interactive situation in which a helping request was made. The results indicated specific rather than similar developmental trajectories of theory of mind, moral judgments, and prosocial behavior. There was a quadratic trend in theory of mind, a combination of quadratic and cubic trends in deontological moral judgments and a linear decline in helping behavior. It is thus suggested that theory of mind may not be associated with morality in an unchanging way during development. Further results indicated that theory of mind and deontological moral judgments were negatively correlated for children, adolescents, and older adults but positively correlated for younger adults. Theory of mind and helping behavior were positively correlated for children but negatively correlated for adolescents. However, the relationships disappeared in adulthood. In sum, the present study reveals that theory of mind may be a nice tool for its facilitation of deontological moral judgments and prosocial behavior, but it may also be a nasty tool for its blocking of deontological moral judgments and prosocial behavior. Moreover, theory

The effect of analytic and experiential modes of thought on moral judgment.

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Kvaran, Trevor; Nichols, Shaun; Sanfey, Alan

2013-01-01

According to dual-process theories, moral judgments are the result of two competing processes: a fast, automatic, affect-driven process and a slow, deliberative, reason-based process. Accordingly, these models make clear and testable predictions about the influence of each system. Although a small number of studies have attempted to examine each process independently in the context of moral judgment, no study has yet tried to experimentally manipulate both processes within a single study. In this chapter, a well-established "mode-of-thought" priming technique was used to place participants in either an experiential/emotional or analytic mode while completing a task in which participants provide judgments about a series of moral dilemmas. We predicted that individuals primed analytically would make more utilitarian responses than control participants, while emotional priming would lead to less utilitarian responses. Support was found for both of these predictions. Implications of these findings for dual-process theories of moral judgment will be discussed. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Equity or equality? Moral judgments follow the money

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DeScioli, Peter; Massenkoff, Maxim; Shaw, Alex; Petersen, Michael Bang; Kurzban, Robert

2014-01-01

Previous research emphasizes people's dispositions as a source of differences in moral views. We investigate another source of moral disagreement, self-interest. In three experiments, participants played a simple economic game in which one player divides money with a partner according to the principle of equality (same payoffs) or the principle of equity (payoffs proportional to effort expended). We find, first, that people's moral judgment of an allocation rule depends on their role in the g...

Neural correlates of moral judgment in pedophilia

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Massau, Claudia; Kärgel, Christian; Weiß, Simone; Walter, Martin; Ponseti, Jorge; HC Krueger, Tillmann; Walter, Henrik; Schiffer, Boris

2017-01-01

Abstract Pedophilia is a sexual preference that is often associated with child sex offending (CSO). Sexual urges towards prepubescent children and specifically acting upon those urges are universally regarded as immoral. However, up until now, it is completely unknown whether moral processing of sexual offenses is altered in pedophiles. A total of 31 pedophilic men and 19 healthy controls were assessed by using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in combination with a moral judgment ...

Children's Interpretive Understanding, Moral Judgments, and Emotion Attributions: Relations to Social Behaviour

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Malti, Tina; Gasser, Luciano; Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, Eveline

2010-01-01

The study investigated interpretive understanding, moral judgments, and emotion attributions in relation to social behaviour in a sample of 59 5-year-old, 123 7-year-old, and 130 9-year-old children. Interpretive understanding was assessed by two tasks measuring children's understanding of ambiguous situations. Moral judgments and emotion…

The time course of indirect moral judgment in gossip processing modulated by different agents.

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Peng, Xiaozhe; Jiao, Can; Cui, Fang; Chen, Qingfei; Li, Peng; Li, Hong

2017-10-01

Previous studies have investigated personal moral violations with different references (i.e., the protagonists in moral scenarios are the participants themselves or unknown other individuals). However, the roles of various agents in moral judgments have remained unclear. In the present study, ERPs were used to investigate moral judgments when the participants viewed gossip that described (im)moral behaviors committed by different agents (self, friend, celebrity). The results demonstrate that the P2 and late positive component (LPC) correspond to two successive processes of indirect moral judgment when individuals process gossip. Specifically, the P2 amplitude in the celebrity condition was more sensitive in distinguishing immoral behaviors from moral behaviors than that in the other two conditions, whereas the moral valence effect on the LPC was predominately driven by the self-reference. These findings expand our current understanding of moral judgments in a gossip evaluation task and demonstrate that the early processing of gossip depends on both the entertainment value of the agent and the salience of moral behaviors. Processing in the later stage reflects reactions to intensified affective stimuli, or reflects cognitive effort that was required to resolve the conflict between negative gossip about self and the self-positivity bias. © 2017 Society for Psychophysiological Research.

The Relationship between Moral Decision Making and Patterns of Consolidation and Transition in Moral Judgment Development.

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Thoma, Stephen J.; Rest, James R.

1999-01-01

Assessed the relationship between a measure of consolidation and transition in moral-judgment development and utility of moral concepts in sociomoral decision making in multiple cross-sectional and longitudinal samples. Found that participants' reliance on a Kohlbergian moral framework was highest during periods of consolidation and lowest during…

A Mind-Reader Does Not Always Have Deontological Moral Judgments and Prosocial Behavior: A Developmental Perspective

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Hao, Jian; Liu, Yanchun

2016-01-01

The rationalistic theories of morality emphasize that reasoning plays an important role in moral judgments and prosocial behavior. Theory of mind as a reasoning ability in the mental domain has been considered a facilitator of moral development. The present study examined whether theory of mind was consistently positively associated with morality from middle childhood to late adulthood. Two hundred and four participants, including 48 elementary school children, 45 adolescents, 62 younger adults, and 49 older adults, completed theory of mind, moral judgment and prosocial behavior tasks. Theory of mind was measured with strange stories that tapped into an understanding of lies, white lies, double bluffs, irony, and persuasion. Moral judgments were measured with variants of the trolley dilemma. Prosocial behavior was measured through participants' performance in an interactive situation in which a helping request was made. The results indicated specific rather than similar developmental trajectories of theory of mind, moral judgments, and prosocial behavior. There was a quadratic trend in theory of mind, a combination of quadratic and cubic trends in deontological moral judgments and a linear decline in helping behavior. It is thus suggested that theory of mind may not be associated with morality in an unchanging way during development. Further results indicated that theory of mind and deontological moral judgments were negatively correlated for children, adolescents, and older adults but positively correlated for younger adults. Theory of mind and helping behavior were positively correlated for children but negatively correlated for adolescents. However, the relationships disappeared in adulthood. In sum, the present study reveals that theory of mind may be a nice tool for its facilitation of deontological moral judgments and prosocial behavior, but it may also be a nasty tool for its blocking of deontological moral judgments and prosocial behavior. Moreover, theory

Moral Emotions and Moral Judgments in Children's Narratives: Comparing Real-Life and Hypothetical Transgressions

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Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, Eveline; Gasser, Luciano; Malti, Tina

2010-01-01

How children make meaning of their own social experiences in situations involving moral issues is central to their subsequent affective and cognitive moral learning. Our study of young children's narratives describing their interpersonal conflicts shows that the emotions and judgments constructed in the course of these real-life narratives differ…

Effects of Suboptimally Presented Erotic Pictures on Moral Judgments: A Cross-Cultural Comparison.

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Antonio Olivera-La Rosa

Full Text Available Previous research has identified a set of core factors that influence moral judgments. The present study addresses the interplay between moral judgments and four factors: (a incidental affects, (b sociocultural context, (c type of dilemma, and (d participant's sex. We asked participants in two different countries (Colombia and Spain to judge the acceptability of actions in response to personal and impersonal moral dilemmas. Before each dilemma an affective prime (erotic, pleasant or neutral pictures was presented suboptimally. Our results show that: a relative to neutral priming, erotic primes increase the acceptance of harm for a greater good (i.e., more utilitarian judgments, b relative to Colombians, Spanish participants rated causing harm as less acceptable, c relative to impersonal dilemmas, personal dilemmas reduced the acceptance of harm, and d relative to men, women were less likely to consider harm acceptable. Our results are congruent with findings showing that sex is a crucial factor in moral cognition, and they extend previous research by showing the interaction between culture and incidental factors in the making of moral judgments.

Effects of Suboptimally Presented Erotic Pictures on Moral Judgments: A Cross-Cultural Comparison.

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Olivera-La Rosa, Antonio; Corradi, Guido; Villacampa, Javier; Martí-Vilar, Manuel; Arango, Olber Eduardo; Rosselló, Jaume

2016-01-01

Previous research has identified a set of core factors that influence moral judgments. The present study addresses the interplay between moral judgments and four factors: (a) incidental affects, (b) sociocultural context, (c) type of dilemma, and (d) participant's sex. We asked participants in two different countries (Colombia and Spain) to judge the acceptability of actions in response to personal and impersonal moral dilemmas. Before each dilemma an affective prime (erotic, pleasant or neutral pictures) was presented suboptimally. Our results show that: a) relative to neutral priming, erotic primes increase the acceptance of harm for a greater good (i.e., more utilitarian judgments), b) relative to Colombians, Spanish participants rated causing harm as less acceptable, c) relative to impersonal dilemmas, personal dilemmas reduced the acceptance of harm, and d) relative to men, women were less likely to consider harm acceptable. Our results are congruent with findings showing that sex is a crucial factor in moral cognition, and they extend previous research by showing the interaction between culture and incidental factors in the making of moral judgments.

Moral judgment modulation by disgust is bi-directionally moderated by individual sensitivity

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How Hwee eOng

2014-03-01

Full Text Available Modern theories of moral judgment predict that both conscious reasoning and unconscious emotional influences affect the way people decide about right and wrong. In a series of experiments, we tested the effect of subliminal and conscious priming of disgust facial expressions on moral dilemmas. Trolley-car-type scenarios were used, with subjects rating how acceptable they found the utilitarian course of action to be. On average, subliminal priming of disgust facial expressions resulted in higher rates of utilitarian judgments compared to neutral facial expressions. Further, in replication, we found that individual change in moral acceptability ratings due to disgust priming was modulated by individual sensitivity to disgust, revealing a bi-directional function. Our second replication extended this result to show that the function held for both subliminally and consciously presented stimuli. Combined across these experiments, we show a reliable bi-directional function, with presentation of disgust expression primes to individuals with higher disgust sensitivity resulting in more utilitarian judgments (i.e., number-based and presentations to individuals with lower sensitivity resulting in more deontological judgments (i.e., rules-based. Our results may reconcile previous conflicting reports of disgust modulation of moral judgment by modeling how individual sensitivity to disgust determines the direction and degree of this effect.

Moral judgment modulation by disgust is bi-directionally moderated by individual sensitivity

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Ong, How Hwee; Mullette-Gillman, O’Dhaniel A.; Kwok, Kenneth; Lim, Julian

2014-01-01

Modern theories of moral judgment predict that both conscious reasoning and unconscious emotional influences affect the way people decide about right and wrong. In a series of experiments, we tested the effect of subliminal and conscious priming of disgust facial expressions on moral dilemmas. “Trolley-car”-type scenarios were used, with subjects rating how acceptable they found the utilitarian course of action to be. On average, subliminal priming of disgust facial expressions resulted in higher rates of utilitarian judgments compared to neutral facial expressions. Further, in replication, we found that individual change in moral acceptability ratings due to disgust priming was modulated by individual sensitivity to disgust, revealing a bi-directional function. Our second replication extended this result to show that the function held for both subliminally and consciously presented stimuli. Combined across these experiments, we show a reliable bi-directional function, with presentation of disgust expression primes to individuals with higher disgust sensitivity resulting in more utilitarian judgments (i.e., number-based) and presentations to individuals with lower sensitivity resulting in more deontological judgments (i.e., rules-based). Our results may reconcile previous conflicting reports of disgust modulation of moral judgment by modeling how individual sensitivity to disgust determines the direction and degree of this effect. PMID:24639665

Does children's moral compass waver under social pressure? Using the conformity paradigm to test preschoolers' moral and social-conventional judgments.

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Kim, Elizabeth B; Chen, Chuansheng; Smetana, Judith G; Greenberger, Ellen

2016-10-01

The current study tested whether preschoolers' moral and social-conventional judgments change under social pressure using Asch's conformity paradigm. A sample of 132 preschoolers (Mage=3.83years, SD=0.85) rated the acceptability of moral and social-conventional events and also completed a visual judgment task (i.e., comparing line length) both independently and after having viewed two peers who consistently made immoral, unconventional, or visually inaccurate judgments. Results showed evidence of conformity on all three tasks, but conformity was stronger on the social-conventional task than on the moral and visual tasks. Older children were less susceptible to pressure for social conformity for the moral and visual tasks but not for the conventional task. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

No Absolutism Here: Harm Predicts Moral Judgment 30× Better Than Disgust-Commentary on Scott, Inbar, & Rozin (2016).

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Gray, Kurt; Schein, Chelsea

2016-05-01

Moral absolutism is the idea that people's moral judgments are insensitive to considerations of harm. Scott, Inbar, and Rozin (2016, this issue) claim that most moral opponents to genetically modified organisms are absolutely opposed-motivated by disgust and not harm. Yet there is no evidence for moral absolutism in their data. Perceived risk/harm is the most significant predictor of moral judgments for "absolutists," accounting for 30 times more variance than disgust. Reanalyses suggest that disgust is not even a significant predictor of the moral judgments of absolutists once accounting for perceived harm and anger. Instead of revealing actual moral absolutism, Scott et al. find only empty absolutism: hypothetical, forecasted, self-reported moral absolutism. Strikingly, the moral judgments of so-called absolutists are somewhat more sensitive to consequentialist concerns than those of nonabsolutists. Mediation reanalyses reveal that moral judgments are most proximally predicted by harm and not disgust, consistent with dyadic morality. © The Author(s) 2016.

Variation in the oxytocin receptor gene (OXTR) is associated with differences in moral judgment.

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Bernhard, Regan M; Chaponis, Jonathan; Siburian, Richie; Gallagher, Patience; Ransohoff, Katherine; Wikler, Daniel; Perlis, Roy H; Greene, Joshua D

2016-12-01

Moral judgments are produced through the coordinated interaction of multiple neural systems, each of which relies on a characteristic set of neurotransmitters. Genes that produce or regulate these neurotransmitters may have distinctive influences on moral judgment. Two studies examined potential genetic influences on moral judgment using dilemmas that reliably elicit competing automatic and controlled responses, generated by dissociable neural systems. Study 1 (N = 228) examined 49 common variants (SNPs) within 10 candidate genes and identified a nominal association between a polymorphism (rs237889) of the oxytocin receptor gene (OXTR) and variation in deontological vs utilitarian moral judgment (that is, judgments favoring individual rights vs the greater good). An association was likewise observed for rs1042615 of the arginine vasopressin receptor gene (AVPR1A). Study 2 (N = 322) aimed to replicate these findings using the aforementioned dilemmas as well as a new set of structurally similar medical dilemmas. Study 2 failed to replicate the association with AVPR1A, but replicated the OXTR finding using both the original and new dilemmas. Together, these findings suggest that moral judgment is influenced by variation in the oxytocin receptor gene and, more generally, that single genetic polymorphisms can have a detectable effect on complex decision processes. © The Author (2016). Published by Oxford University Press.

Moral Development in Context: Associations of Neighborhood and Maternal Discipline with Preschoolers' Moral Judgments

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Ball, Courtney L.; Smetana, Judith G.; Sturge-Apple, Melissa L.; Suor, Jennifer H.; Skibo, Michael A.

2017-01-01

Associations among moral judgments, neighborhood risk, and maternal discipline were examined in 118 socioeconomically diverse preschoolers (M[subscript age] = 41.84 months, SD = 1.42). Children rated the severity and punishment deserved for 6 prototypical moral transgressions entailing physical and psychological harm and unfairness. They also…

Does Incidental Disgust Amplify Moral Judgment? A Meta-Analytic Review of Experimental Evidence.

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Landy, Justin F; Goodwin, Geoffrey P

2015-07-01

The role of emotion in moral judgment is currently a topic of much debate in moral psychology. One specific claim made by many researchers is that irrelevant feelings of disgust can amplify the severity of moral condemnation. Numerous researchers have found this effect, but there have also been several published failures to replicate it. Clarifying this issue would inform important theoretical debates among rival accounts of moral judgment. We meta-analyzed all available studies--published and unpublished--in which incidental disgust was manipulated prior to or concurrent with a moral judgment task (k = 50). We found evidence for a small amplification effect of disgust (d = 0.11), which is strongest for gustatory/olfactory modes of disgust induction. However, there is also some suggestion of publication bias in this literature, and when this is accounted for, the effect disappears entirely (d = -0.01). Moreover, prevalent confounds mean that the effect size that we estimate is best interpreted as an upper bound on the size of the amplification effect. On the basis of the results of this meta-analysis, we argue against strong claims about the causal role of affect in moral judgment and suggest a need for new, more rigorous research on this topic. © The Author(s) 2015.

Beyond "utilitarianism": maximizing the clinical impact of moral judgment research.

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Rosas, Alejandro; Koenigs, Michael

2014-01-01

The use of hypothetical moral dilemmas--which pit utilitarian considerations of welfare maximization against emotionally aversive "personal" harms--has become a widespread approach for studying the neuropsychological correlates of moral judgment in healthy subjects, as well as in clinical populations with social, cognitive, and affective deficits. In this article, we propose that a refinement of the standard stimulus set could provide an opportunity to more precisely identify the psychological factors underlying performance on this task, and thereby enhance the utility of this paradigm for clinical research. To test this proposal, we performed a re-analysis of previously published moral judgment data from two clinical populations: neurological patients with prefrontal brain damage and psychopathic criminals. The results provide intriguing preliminary support for further development of this assessment paradigm.

Once a Utilitarian, Consistently a Utilitarian? Examining Principledness in Moral Judgment via the Robustness of Individual Differences.

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Helzer, Erik G; Fleeson, William; Furr, R Michael; Meindl, Peter; Barranti, Maxwell

2017-08-01

Although individual differences in the application of moral principles, such as utilitarianism, have been documented, so too have powerful context effects-effects that raise doubts about the durability of people's moral principles. In this article, we examine the robustness of individual differences in moral judgment by examining them across time and across different decision contexts. In Study 1, consistency in utilitarian judgment of 122 adult participants was examined over two different survey sessions. In Studies 2A and 2B, large samples (Ns = 130 and 327, respectively) of adult participants made a series of 32 moral judgments across eight different contexts that are known to affect utilitarian endorsement. Contrary to some contemporary theorizing, our results reveal a strong degree of consistency in moral judgment. Across time and experimental manipulations of context, individuals maintained their relative standing on utilitarianism, and aggregated moral decisions reached levels of near-perfect consistency. Results support the view that on at least one dimension (utilitarianism), people's moral judgments are robustly consistent, with context effects tailoring the application of principles to the particulars of any given moral judgment. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

How clinicians make (or avoid) moral judgments of patients: implications of the evidence for relationships and research

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2010-01-01

Physicians, nurses, and other clinicians readily acknowledge being troubled by encounters with patients who trigger moral judgments. For decades social scientists have noted that moral judgment of patients is pervasive, occurring not only in egregious and criminal cases but also in everyday situations in which appraisals of patients' social worth and culpability are routine. There is scant literature, however, on the actual prevalence and dynamics of moral judgment in healthcare. The indirect evidence available suggests that moral appraisals function via a complex calculus that reflects variation in patient characteristics, clinician characteristics, task, and organizational factors. The full impact of moral judgment on healthcare relationships, patient outcomes, and clinicians' own well-being is yet unknown. The paucity of attention to moral judgment, despite its significance for patient-centered care, communication, empathy, professionalism, healthcare education, stereotyping, and outcome disparities, represents a blind spot that merits explanation and repair. New methodologies in social psychology and neuroscience have yielded models for how moral judgment operates in healthcare and how research in this area should proceed. Clinicians, educators, and researchers would do well to recognize both the legitimate and illegitimate moral appraisals that are apt to occur in healthcare settings. PMID:20618947

The Application of Moral Judgments to Other Cultures: Relativism and Universality.

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Wainryb, Cecilia

1993-01-01

Sixth and tenth graders and college students were asked to apply moral judgments which they had made about a familiar context to contexts in cultures different from their own. Most subjects contextualized their judgments with respect to cultures with different informational beliefs but made nonrelativistic judgments with respect to cultures with…

Influence of Age and Schooling on the Development of Moral Judgment

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Bonifacio Barba Casillas

2002-11-01

Full Text Available This article presents an evaluation of the moral development of 111 professionals, 84 of which work in basic education. J. Rest’s Defining Issues Test was applied, and mean differences were assessed with the t test (alpha = 0.05. A regression analysis was done. Using the arithmetic means of the moral stages and of the postconventional moral index (P index the moral profile of all the subjects were described in relation to four variables. The relationship of the P index with schooling, age and teaching level was analyzed, and the adults were compared with middle school and high school students. The professionals have a profile of moral development with a prominence of stage 4 of moral judgment, a feature shared with the students. The former have equilibrium in the use of Rest’s moral judgment schematics as well as a greater postconventional moral growth than do the latter. Among the professionals there are significant differences in the P index related with schooling, age and work level. The association between age and postgraduate study is the weightiest factor in postconventional moral growth.

A Study on the Link between Moral Judgment Competences and Critical Thinking Skills

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Samanci, Nilay Keskin

2015-01-01

Although many studies have established a direct link between moral judgment competences and critical thinking skills, none has been found to reveal the nature of the link between these two skills in the national and international literature. The present study looked at biology and primary education teacher candidates' moral judgment and critical…

Decisional Bias as Implicit Moral Judgment

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Spring, Toni; Saltzstein, Herbert D.

2017-01-01

Decisional bias (false alarm rate) when judging the guilt/innocence of a suspect is offered as an implicit measure of moral judgment. Combining two data sets, 215 participants, ages 10-12, 13-15, and 16-18 watched the visually identical film involving a person setting a fire, framed either as (1) intentional but not resulting in a fire (BI-NF),…

Selective impairment of cognitive empathy for moral judgment in adults with high functioning autism.

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Gleichgerrcht, Ezequiel; Torralva, Teresa; Rattazzi, Alexia; Marenco, Victoria; Roca, María; Manes, Facundo

2013-10-01

Faced with a moral dilemma, conflict arises between a cognitive controlled response aimed at maximizing welfare, i.e. the utilitarian judgment, and an emotional aversion to harm, i.e. the deontological judgment. In the present study, we investigated moral judgment in adult individuals with high functioning autism/Asperger syndrome (HFA/AS), a clinical population characterized by impairments in prosocial emotions and social cognition. In Experiment 1, we compared the response patterns of HFA/AS participants and neurotypical controls to moral dilemmas with low and high emotional saliency. We found that HFA/AS participants more frequently delivered the utilitarian judgment. Their perception of appropriateness of moral transgression was similar to that of controls, but HFA/AS participants reported decreased levels of emotional reaction to the dilemma. In Experiment 2, we explored the way in which demographic, clinical and social cognition variables including emotional and cognitive aspects of empathy and theory of mind influenced moral judgment. We found that utilitarian HFA/AS participants showed a decreased ability to infer other people's thoughts and to understand their intentions, as measured both by performance on neuropsychological tests and through dispositional measures. We conclude that greater prevalence of utilitarianism in HFA/AS is associated with difficulties in specific aspects of social cognition.

Normative Value Conceptions of Modern Parents, Teachers, and Educators (Analysis of Moral Value Judgments)

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Shelina, S. L.; Mitina, O. V.

2015-01-01

The article presents the results of an analysis of the moral value judgments of adults (parents, teachers, educators) that directly concern the socialization process of the young generation in the modern metropolis. This paper follows the model study by Jean Piaget that investigated the moral value judgments of children. A comparative analysis of…

Situational variation in moral judgment: In a stage or on a stage?

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Carpendale, J I; Krebs, D L

1992-04-01

Two issues were examined in this study-the consistency of moral judgment across different types of dilemma and different social contexts, and the relationship between the structure (stage) of moral judgment and the content of moral decisions. Forty subjects were given two hypothetical dilemmas about business decisions and two standard Kohlberg dilemmas. Half the subjects directed their responses to a business audience, half to a philosophical audience. Responses to the moral dilemmas were scored in accordance with the Colby and Kohlberg (1987) scoring manual. Stage of moral reasoning was found to be significantly higher on the Kohlberg dilemmas than on the business dilemmas. A significant interaction between type of dilemma and audience was attributed to the tendency of subjects directing their responses to a business audience to interpret one of the business dilemmas in terms of the moral order of business, but for subjects directing their responses to a philosophy audience to treat it as a philosophical dilemma. The other business dilemma evoked uniformly low-level moral judgments. The amount of selfishness intrinsic in subjects' moral choices on the business dilemmas was significantly negatively correlated with moral maturity on the business dilemmas, but not with their moral maturity on Kohlberg's test. These results are interpreted as more consistent with models of moral development such as those advanced by C. G. Levine ([1979] "Stage Acquisition and Stage Use: An Appraisal of Stage Displacement Explanations of Variation in Moral Reasoning, " Human Development, Vol. 22, pp. 145-164), J. Rest ([1983] "Morality," in: P. H. Mussen [ed.], J. H. Flavell and E. Markman [Vol. eds.], Handbook of Child Psychology [Vol. 3, 4th ed.], John Wiley & Sons, New York), and R. Harré ([1984]) Personal Being: A Theory for Individual Psychology, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts), which posit a relatively wide range of within-person stage use and emphasize the

When Dishonesty Leads to Trust: Moral Judgments Biased by Self-interest are Truly Believed

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Bocian Konrad

2016-09-01

Full Text Available Research has shown that cheating is perceived as immoral when it serves the cheater’s interests, though it can be seen as moral when it serves the interests of the perceiver. However, are such biased moral judgments real, or are they merely lip service? To answer the question of whether biased moral judgments actually inform behavior, the authors asked participants to observe a confederate who either cheated for money or did not cheat, which benefited either the confederate alone or both the confederate and the participating observer. Then, participants evaluated the confederate and, finally, played a one shot trust game with her. Cheating influenced moral judgments and decreased behavioral trust, but this only occurred when self-interest was not involved. When self-interest was involved, participants showed no significant differences in trust levels, independent of whether the confederate had cheated or not. Implications for the dual process theory in moral psychology are discussed.

Serotonin Transporter Genotype (5-HTTLPR) Predicts Utilitarian Moral Judgments

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Marsh, Abigail A.; Crowe, Samantha L.; Yu, Henry H.; Gorodetsky, Elena K.; Goldman, David; Blair, R. J. R.

2011-01-01

Background The psychological and neurobiological processes underlying moral judgment have been the focus of extensive recent research. Here we show that serotonin transporter (5-HTTLPR) genotype predicts responses to moral dilemmas featuring foreseen harm to an innocent. Methodology/Principal Findings Participants in this study judged the acceptability of actions that would unintentionally or intentionally harm an innocent victim in order to save others' lives. An analysis of variance reveale...

Switching Away from Utilitarianism: The Limited Role of Utility Calculations in Moral Judgment

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Sheskin, Mark; Baumard, Nicolas

2016-01-01

Our moral motivations might include a drive towards maximizing overall welfare, consistent with an ethical theory called "utilitarianism." However, people show non-utilitarian judgments in domains as diverse as healthcare decisions, income distributions, and penal laws. Rather than these being deviations from a fundamentally utilitarian psychology, we suggest that our moral judgments are generally non-utilitarian, even for cases that are typically seen as prototypically utilitarian. We show t...

Disentangling the Effect of Valence and Arousal on Judgments Concerning Moral Transgressions.

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de la Viña, Luis; Garcia-Burgos, David; Okan, Yasmina; Cándido, Antonio; González, Felisa

2015-08-10

An increasing body of research has investigated the effect of emotions on judgments concerning moral transgressions. Yet, few studies have controlled for arousal levels associated with the emotions. High arousal may affect moral processing by triggering attention to salient features of transgressions, independently of valence. Therefore previously documented differences in effects of negative and positive emotions may have been confounded by differences in arousal. We conducted two studies to shed light on this issue. In Study 1 we developed a questionnaire including vignettes selected on the basis of psychometrical properties (i.e., mean ratings of the actions and variability). This questionnaire was administered to participants in Study 2, after presenting them with selected pictures inducing different valence but equivalent levels of arousal. Negative pictures led to more severe moral judgments than neutral (p = .054, d = 0.60) and positive pictures (p = .002, d = 1.02), for vignettes that were not associated with extreme judgments. In contrast, positive pictures did not reliably affect judgments concerning such vignettes. These findings suggest that the observed effects of emotions cannot be accounted for by an increase in attention linked to the arousal which accompanies these emotions.

Brazilian adolescents' prosocial moral judgment and behavior: relations to sympathy, perspective taking, gender-role orientation, and demographic characteristics.

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Eisenberg, N; Zhou, Q; Koller, S

2001-01-01

The goal of this study was to examine demographic and individual difference variables that predict level of prosocial moral judgment and self-reported prosocial behavior and to test mediating or moderating relations among predictors. The relations of prosocial moral reasoning and self-reported prosocial behavior to perspective taking, sympathy, age, sociometric status, and gender-role orientation were examined with a sample of 149 Brazilian adolescents who completed a series of questionnaire measures. Prosocial moral judgment was expected to be predicted by both sympathy and perspective taking, whereas sympathy or prosocial moral judgment was expected to mediate the relations of femininity and perspective taking to prosocial behavior. Self-reported perspective taking and sympathy interacted when predicting prosocial moral judgment; adolescents who were high in either sympathy or perspective taking (or both) scored high in prosocial moral reasoning. A feminine orientation predicted sympathy and perspective taking, perspective taking predicted prosocial moral reasoning and sympathy, and sympathy had both direct and indirect paths (through moral judgment) to prosocial behavior. The findings generally were consistent with the contention that both the tendency to take others' perspectives and to sympathize are related to level of prosocial moral reasoning, which in turn motivates prosocial behavior. Moreover, patterns of correlations among variables were similar to those found in the United States.

Beyond Affective Influences on Deontological Moral Judgment: The Role of Motivations for Prevention in the Moral Condemnation of Harm.

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Gamez-Djokic, Monica; Molden, Daniel

2016-09-20

Past research suggests that deontological judgments, which condemn deliberate harm no matter what the beneficial consequences, typically arise from emotional and intuitive reactions to the harm, whereas utilitarian judgments, which acknowledge the potential benefits of deliberate harm, typically arise from rational deliberation about whether these benefits outweigh the costs. The present research explores whether specific motivational orientations might, at times, increase the likelihood of deontological judgments without increasing emotional reactions. A meta-analysis of 10 newly conducted studies indicated that, compared with when focused on advancement (promotion), when people were focused on security (prevention) they made stronger deontological judgments in hypothetical moral dilemmas. Moreover, this effect could not be explained by participants' differing emotional reactions to the dilemmas when prevention-focused, but instead mirrored reports of their explicit reasoning. Implications for expanding current models of deontological and utilitarian moral judgment are discussed. © 2016 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.

Moral Judgments and Emotions: Adolescents' Evaluations in Intergroup Social Exclusion Contexts

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Cooley, Shelby; Elenbaas, Laura; Killen, Melanie

2012-01-01

This article examines children's moral judgments and emotional evaluations in the context of social exclusion. As they age, children and adolescents face increasingly complex situations in which group membership and allegiance are in opposition with morally relevant decisions, such as the exclusion of an individual from a group. While adolescents…

The Influence of Negligence, Intention, and Outcome on Children's Moral Judgments

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Nobes, Gavin; Panagiotaki, Georgia.; Pawson, Chris

2009-01-01

Piaget (1932) and subsequent researchers have reported that young children's moral judgments are based more on the outcomes of actions than on the agents' intentions. The current study investigated whether negligence might also influence these judgments and explain children's apparent focus on outcome. Children (3-8 years of age) and adults (N =…

Emotion and deliberative reasoning in moral judgment

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Denise Dellarosa Cummins

2012-09-01

Full Text Available According to an influential dual-process model, a moral judgment is the outcome of a rapid, affect-laden process and a slower, deliberative process. If these outputs conflict, decision time is increased in order to resolve the conflict. Violations of deontological principles proscribing the use of personal force to inflict intentional harm are presumed to elicit negative affect which biases judgments early in the decision-making process. This model was tested in three experiments. Moral dilemmas were classified using (a decision time and consensus as measures of system conflict and (b the aforementioned deontological criteria. In Experiment 1, decision time was either unlimited or reduced. The dilemmas asked whether it was appropriate to take a morally questionable action to produce a greater good outcome. Limiting decision time reduced the proportion of utilitarian (yes decisions, but contrary to the model’s predictions, (a vignettes that involved more deontological violations logged faster decision times, and (b violation of deontological principles was not predictive of decisional conflict profiles. Experiment 2 ruled out the possibility that time pressure simply makes people more like to say no. Participants made a first decision under time constraints and a second decision under no time constraints. One group was asked whether it was appropriate to take the morally questionable action while a second group was asked whether it was appropriate to refuse to take the action. The results replicated that of Experiment 1 regardless of whether yes or no constituted a utilitarian decision. In Experiment 3, participants rated the pleasantness of positive visual stimuli prior to making a decision. Contrary to the model’s predictions, the number of deontological decisions increased in the positive affect rating group compared to a group that engaged in a cognitive task or a control group that engaged in neither task. These results are consistent

Improving epistemological beliefs and moral judgment through an STS-based science ethics education program.

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Han, Hyemin; Jeong, Changwoo

2014-03-01

This study develops a Science-Technology-Society (STS)-based science ethics education program for high school students majoring in or planning to major in science and engineering. Our education program includes the fields of philosophy, history, sociology and ethics of science and technology, and other STS-related theories. We expected our STS-based science ethics education program to promote students' epistemological beliefs and moral judgment development. These psychological constructs are needed to properly solve complicated moral and social dilemmas in the fields of science and engineering. We applied this program to a group of Korean high school science students gifted in science and engineering. To measure the effects of this program, we used an essay-based qualitative measurement. The results indicate that there was significant development in both epistemological beliefs and moral judgment. In closing, we briefly discuss the need to develop epistemological beliefs and moral judgment using an STS-based science ethics education program.

Divergent roles of autistic and alexithymic traits in utilitarian moral judgments in adults with autism.

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Patil, Indrajeet; Melsbach, Jens; Hennig-Fast, Kristina; Silani, Giorgia

2016-03-29

This study investigated hypothetical moral choices in adults with high-functioning autism and the role of empathy and alexithymia in such choices. We used a highly emotionally salient moral dilemma task to investigate autistics' hypothetical moral evaluations about personally carrying out harmful utilitarian behaviours aimed at maximizing welfare. Results showed that they exhibited a normal pattern of moral judgments despite the deficits in social cognition and emotional processing. Further analyses revealed that this was due to mutually conflicting biases associated with autistic and alexithymic traits after accounting for shared variance: (a) autistic traits were associated with reduced utilitarian bias due to elevated personal distress of demanding social situations, while (b) alexithymic traits were associated with increased utilitarian bias on account of reduced empathic concern for the victim. Additionally, autistics relied on their non-verbal reasoning skills to rigidly abide by harm-norms. Thus, utilitarian moral judgments in autism were spared due to opposite influences of autistic and alexithymic traits and compensatory intellectual strategies. These findings demonstrate the importance of empathy and alexithymia in autistic moral cognition and have methodological implications for studying moral judgments in several other clinical populations.

Divergent roles of autistic and alexithymic traits in utilitarian moral judgments in adults with autism

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Patil, Indrajeet; Melsbach, Jens; Hennig-Fast, Kristina; Silani, Giorgia

2016-01-01

This study investigated hypothetical moral choices in adults with high-functioning autism and the role of empathy and alexithymia in such choices. We used a highly emotionally salient moral dilemma task to investigate autistics’ hypothetical moral evaluations about personally carrying out harmful utilitarian behaviours aimed at maximizing welfare. Results showed that they exhibited a normal pattern of moral judgments despite the deficits in social cognition and emotional processing. Further analyses revealed that this was due to mutually conflicting biases associated with autistic and alexithymic traits after accounting for shared variance: (a) autistic traits were associated with reduced utilitarian bias due to elevated personal distress of demanding social situations, while (b) alexithymic traits were associated with increased utilitarian bias on account of reduced empathic concern for the victim. Additionally, autistics relied on their non-verbal reasoning skills to rigidly abide by harm-norms. Thus, utilitarian moral judgments in autism were spared due to opposite influences of autistic and alexithymic traits and compensatory intellectual strategies. These findings demonstrate the importance of empathy and alexithymia in autistic moral cognition and have methodological implications for studying moral judgments in several other clinical populations. PMID:27020307

Enough Skill to Kill: Intentionality Judgments and the Moral Valence of Action

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Guglielmo, Steve; Malle, Bertram F.

2010-01-01

Extant models of moral judgment assume that an action's intentionality precedes assignments of blame. Knobe (2003b) challenged this fundamental order and proposed instead that the badness or blameworthiness of an action directs (and thus unduly biases) people's intentionality judgments. His and other researchers' studies suggested that blameworthy…

Between Kohlberg and Gilligan: Levels of Moral Judgment among Elementary School Principals

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Vitton, Charles J.; Wasonga, Teresa A.

2009-01-01

This research investigated levels of moral judgment among public elementary school principals as measured by the Defining Issues Test Version 2 for occupationally relevant and other moral dilemmas. The participants scored lower (38.7) than the predicted average P score (postconventional thinking) for individuals who have attained graduate level…

To push or not to push? Affective influences on moral judgment depend on decision frame.

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Pastötter, Bernhard; Gleixner, Sabine; Neuhauser, Theresa; Bäuml, Karl-Heinz T

2013-03-01

People's moods can influence moral judgment. Such influences may arise because moods affect moral emotion, or because moods affect moral thought. The present study provides evidence that, at least in the footbridge dilemma, moods affect moral thought. The results of two experiments are reported in which, after induction of positive, negative, or neutral moods and presentation of the footbridge scenario, participants were asked one of two differentially framed closing questions. In the active frame, participants were asked whether they would be active and push the man, making thoughts about pushing accessible; in the passive frame, they were asked whether they would be passive and not push the man, making thoughts about not pushing accessible. The results show that affective influences on moral judgment depended on participants' decision frame. Compared to neutral moods, positive moods induced utilitarian responding - i.e., deciding to push - in the active decision frame, but induced nonutilitarian responding - i.e., deciding to not push - in the passive decision frame; in negative moods, exactly the opposite picture arose. The results suggest that people's moods affect moral judgment by conferring value on moral thought. Positive moods promote and negative moods inhibit accessible thoughts. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Neural correlates of moral judgments in first- and third-person perspectives: implications for neuroethics and beyond

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2014-01-01

Background There appears to be an inconsistency in experimental paradigms used in fMRI research on moral judgments. As stimuli, moral dilemmas or moral statements/ pictures that induce emotional reactions are usually employed; a main difference between these stimuli is the perspective of the participants reflecting first-person (moral dilemmas) or third-person perspective (moral reactions). The present study employed functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in order to investigate the neural correlates of moral judgments in either first- or third-person perspective. Results Our results indicate that different neural mechanisms appear to be involved in these perspectives. Although conjunction analysis revealed common activation in the anterior medial prefrontal cortex, third person-perspective elicited unique activations in hippocampus and visual cortex. The common activation can be explained by the role the anterior medial prefrontal cortex may play in integrating different information types and also by its involvement in theory of mind. Our results also indicate that the so-called "actor-observer bias" affects moral evaluation in the third-person perspective, possibly due to the involvement of the hippocampus. We suggest two possible ways in which the hippocampus may support the process of moral judgment: by the engagement of episodic memory and its role in understanding the behaviors and emotions of others. Conclusion We posit that these findings demonstrate that first or third person perspectives in moral cognition involve distinct neural processes, that are important to different aspects of moral judgments. These  results are important to a deepened understanding of neural correlates of moral cognition—the so-called “first tradition” of neuroethics, with the caveat that any results must be interpreted and employed with prudence, so as to heed neuroethics “second tradition” that sustains the pragmatic evaluation of outcomes, capabilities and

Frontopolar and anterior temporal cortex activation in a moral judgment task. Preliminary functional MRI results in normal subjects

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Moll, Jorge; Oliveira-Souza, Ricardo de

2001-01-01

The objective was to study the brain areas which are activated when normal subjects make moral judgments. Ten normal adults underwent BOLD functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) during the auditory presentation of sentences that they were instructed to silently judge as either 'right' or 'wrong'. Half of the sentences had an explicit moral content ('We break the law when necessary'), the other half comprised factual statements devoid of moral connotation ('Stones are made of water'). After scanning, each subject rated the moral content, emotional valence, and judgment difficulty of each sentence on Likert-like scales. To exclude the effect of emotion on the activation results, individual responses were hemo dynamically modeled for event-related f MRI analysis. The general linear model was used to evaluate the brain areas activated by moral judgment. Regions activated during moral judgment included the frontopolar cortex (FPC), medial frontal gyrus, right anterior temporal cortex, lenticular nucleus, and cerebellum. Activation of FPC and medial frontal gyrus (B A 10/46 and 9) were largely independent of emotional experience and represented the largest areas of activation. These results concur with clinical observations assigning a critical role for the frontal poles and right anterior temporal cortex in the mediation of complex judgment processes according to moral constraints. The FPC may work in concert with the orbitofrontal and dorsolateral cortex in the regulation of human social conduct. (author)

In defense of the personal/impersonal distinction in moral psychology research: Cross-cultural validation of the dual process model of moral judgment

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Adam B. Moore

2011-04-01

Full Text Available The dual process model of moral judgment (DPM; Greene et al., 2004 argues that such judgments are influenced by both emotion-laden intuition and controlled reasoning. These influences are associated with distinct neural circuitries and different response tendencies. After reanalyzing data from an earlier study, McGuire et al. (2009 questioned the level of support for the dual process model and asserted that the distinction between emotion evoking moral dilemmas (personal dilemmas and those that do not trigger such intuitions (impersonal dilemmas is spurious. Using similar reanalysis methods on data reported by Moore, Clark, and Kane (2008, we show that the personal/impersonal distinction is reliable. Furthermore, new data show that this distinction is fundamental to moral judgment across widely different cultures (U.S. and China and supports claims made by the DPM.

Understanding the Role of Dispositional and Situational Threat Sensitivity in Our Moral Judgments

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Wright, Jennifer Cole; Baril, Galen L.

2013-01-01

Previous research has identified different moral judgments in liberals and conservatives. While both care about harm/fairness ("individualizing" foundations), conservatives emphasize in-group/authority/purity ("binding" foundations) more than liberals. Thus, some argue that conservatives have a more complex morality. We suggest…

Switching Away from Utilitarianism: The Limited Role of Utility Calculations in Moral Judgment.

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Sheskin, Mark; Baumard, Nicolas

2016-01-01

Our moral motivations might include a drive towards maximizing overall welfare, consistent with an ethical theory called "utilitarianism." However, people show non-utilitarian judgments in domains as diverse as healthcare decisions, income distributions, and penal laws. Rather than these being deviations from a fundamentally utilitarian psychology, we suggest that our moral judgments are generally non-utilitarian, even for cases that are typically seen as prototypically utilitarian. We show two separate deviations from utilitarianism in such cases: people do not think maximizing welfare is required (they think it is merely acceptable, in some circumstances), and people do not think that equal welfare tradeoffs are even acceptable. We end by discussing how utilitarian reasoning might play a restricted role within a non-utilitarian moral psychology.

Switching Away from Utilitarianism: The Limited Role of Utility Calculations in Moral Judgment.

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Mark Sheskin

Full Text Available Our moral motivations might include a drive towards maximizing overall welfare, consistent with an ethical theory called "utilitarianism." However, people show non-utilitarian judgments in domains as diverse as healthcare decisions, income distributions, and penal laws. Rather than these being deviations from a fundamentally utilitarian psychology, we suggest that our moral judgments are generally non-utilitarian, even for cases that are typically seen as prototypically utilitarian. We show two separate deviations from utilitarianism in such cases: people do not think maximizing welfare is required (they think it is merely acceptable, in some circumstances, and people do not think that equal welfare tradeoffs are even acceptable. We end by discussing how utilitarian reasoning might play a restricted role within a non-utilitarian moral psychology.

Reciprocal Associations between Young Children's Developing Moral Judgments and Theory of Mind

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Smetana, Judith G.; Jambon, Marc; Conry-Murray, Clare; Sturge-Apple, Melissa L.

2012-01-01

Associations between young children's developing theory of mind (ToM) and judgments of prototypical moral transgressions were examined 3 times across 1 year in 70 American middle class 2.5- to 4-year-olds. Separate path models controlling for cross-time stability in judgments, within-time associations, and children's age at Wave 1 indicated that…

Modulation of neural activity in the temporoparietal junction with transcranial direct current stimulation changes the role of beliefs in moral judgment

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Hang eYe

2015-12-01

Full Text Available Judgments about whether an action is morally right or wrong typically depend on our capacity to infer the actor’s beliefs and the outcomes of the action. Prior neuroimaging studies have found that mental state (e.g., beliefs, intentions attribution for moral judgment involves a complex neural network that includes the temporoparietal junction (TPJ. However, neuroimaging studies cannot demonstrate a direct causal relationship between the activity of this brain region and mental state attribution for moral judgment. In the current study, we used transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS to transiently alter neural activity in the TPJ. The participants were randomly assigned to one of three stimulation treatments (right anodal/left cathodal tDCS, left anodal/right cathodal tDCS, or sham stimulation. Each participant was required to complete two similar tasks of moral judgment before receiving tDCS and after receiving tDCS. We studied whether tDCS to the TPJ altered mental state attribution for moral judgment. The results indicated that restraining the activity of the right temporoparietal junction (RTPJ or the left the temporoparietal junction (LTPJ decreased the role of beliefs in moral judgments and led to an increase in the dependence of the participants’ moral judgments on the action’s consequences. We also found that the participants exhibited reduced reaction times both in the cases of intentional harms and attempted harms after receiving right cathodal/left anodal tDCS to the TPJ. These findings inform and extend the current neural models of moral judgment and moral development in typically developing people and in individuals with neurodevelopmental disorders such as autism.

To Push or Not to Push? Affective Influences on Moral Judgment Depend on Decision Frame

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Pastotter, Bernhard; Gleixner, Sabine; Neuhauser, Theresa; Bauml, Karl-Heinz T.

2013-01-01

People's moods can influence moral judgment. Such influences may arise because moods affect moral emotion, or because moods affect moral thought. The present study provides evidence that, at least in the footbridge dilemma, moods affect moral thought. The results of two experiments are reported in which, after induction of positive, negative, or…

Frontopolar and anterior temporal cortex activation in a moral judgment task. Preliminary functional MRI results in normal subjects

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Moll, Jorge [LABS and Rede D' Or Hospitais, Rio de Janeiro RJ (Brazil). Grupo de Neuroimagem e Neurologia do Comportamento; Eslinger, Paul J. [Pensylvania State Univ. (United States). College of Medicine. Div. of Neurology and Behavioral Science; The Milton S. Hershey Medical Center, Hershey, PN (United States); Oliveira-Souza, Ricardo de [Universidade do Rio de Janeiro (UNI-Rio), RJ (Brazil). Hospital Universitario Gaffree e Guinle]. E-mail: neuropsychiatry@hotmail.com

2001-09-01

The objective was to study the brain areas which are activated when normal subjects make moral judgments. Ten normal adults underwent BOLD functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) during the auditory presentation of sentences that they were instructed to silently judge as either 'right' or 'wrong'. Half of the sentences had an explicit moral content ('We break the law when necessary'), the other half comprised factual statements devoid of moral connotation ('Stones are made of water'). After scanning, each subject rated the moral content, emotional valence, and judgment difficulty of each sentence on Likert-like scales. To exclude the effect of emotion on the activation results, individual responses were hemo dynamically modeled for event-related f MRI analysis. The general linear model was used to evaluate the brain areas activated by moral judgment. Regions activated during moral judgment included the frontopolar cortex (FPC), medial frontal gyrus, right anterior temporal cortex, lenticular nucleus, and cerebellum. Activation of FPC and medial frontal gyrus (B A 10/46 and 9) were largely independent of emotional experience and represented the largest areas of activation. These results concur with clinical observations assigning a critical role for the frontal poles and right anterior temporal cortex in the mediation of complex judgment processes according to moral constraints. The FPC may work in concert with the orbitofrontal and dorsolateral cortex in the regulation of human social conduct. (author)

Dynamics of moral judgments in young soldiers during the period of military service

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Oshevskiy D.S.

2015-08-01

Full Text Available We have conducted an empirical study of the dynamics of the level of moral judgments in the military. Two groups of Missile Defense Force soldiers present the sample: preparing for demobilization (n=30 and new recruits (n=25. As the methods we used specially developed semi-structured interview modeling the situation of moral choice, and the questionnaire in order to assess the socio-psychological characteristics of the military and their attitude to service. The young soldiers have a positive trend in the development of moral judgments and a greater differentiation in the estimates. It is shown that the old-timers in comparison with newcomers have intensive development of group-oriented and prosocial moral reasoning. It presumably connected with successful adaptation to military service, following the manual, the ability to cope with aggressive impulses, flexibility and value assessments in decision-making. It is noted that educational work with young recruits should include measures to increase group cohesion in the army.

Critique of the Naturalization of Deontologism in Joshua Greene's Dual Process Theory of Moral Judgment

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Javier Gracia

2018-05-01

Full Text Available In this paper I propose to question the Joshua Greene’s neuroethical thesis about the essentially emotional character of so-called “deontological moral judgments”. Frist, I focus on the dual process theory of moral judgment and I criticize that they are considered only and mainly intuitive and non reflective. Se condly, I question that the “utilitarian judgment” is linked to mathematical calculation and the deontological judgment is exclusively reduced to non-reflective factor of emotion. The main objection to Greene’s naturalism raised by me is trying to eliminate the philosophical justification about the moral validity defended by Kant’s deontologism; meanwhile Greene reduces “deontological moral judgment” to exclusively psychological and neurophysiological factors associated with emotion.

Various Measures of Moral Judgment as a Function of Social Pressure.

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Guttmann, Joseph

1981-01-01

Tests 210 Israeli fifth graders' reactions to peer, adult, and control conditions. The four measures of moral judgment used were: resistance to temptation, severity of punishment, tendency to confess, and level of guilt feelings. (CM)

Exploring the role of Theory of Mind in Moral judgment: the case of children with Autism Spectrum Disorder

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Roberta eFadda

2016-04-01

Full Text Available This paper adds to the growing research on moral judgment by considering whether Theory of Mind (ToM might foster children's autonomous moral judgment achievement. A group of 30 children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD was compared in moral judgment (MJ and ToM with 30 typically developing (TD children. Participants were tested for moral judgment with a classical Piaget’s task and for ToM with a second order False Belief task. In the moral task, children were told two versions of a story: in one version the protagonist acted according to a moral intention but the action resulted in a harmful consequence; in the other version the protagonist acted according to an immoral intention, but the action resulted in a harmless consequence. Children were asked which of the two protagonists was the naughtier. In line with previous studies, the results indicated that, while the majority of TD participants succeeded in the second order False Belief task, only few individuals with ASD showed intact perspective taking abilities. The analysis of the MJ in relation to ToM showed that children with ASD lacking ToM abilities judged guilty the protagonists of the two versions of the story in the moral task because both of them violated a moral rule or because they considered the consequences of the actions, ignoring any psychological information. These results indicate a heteronomous morality in individuals with ASD, based on the respect of learned moral rules and outcomes rather than others’ subjective states.

Transcranial direct current stimulation of the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex shifts preference of moral judgments.

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Maria Kuehne

Full Text Available Attitude to morality, reflecting cultural norms and values, is considered unique to human social behavior. Resulting moral behavior in a social environment is controlled by a widespread neural network including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC, which plays an important role in decision making. In the present study we investigate the influence of neurophysiological modulation of DLPFC reactivity by means of transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS on moral reasoning. For that purpose we administered anodal, cathodal, and sham stimulation of the left DLPFC while subjects judged the appropriateness of hard moral personal dilemmas. In contrast to sham and cathodal stimulation, anodal stimulation induced a shift in judgment of personal moral dilemmas towards more non-utilitarian actions. Our results demonstrate that alterations of left DLPFC activity can change moral judgments and, in consequence, provide a causal link between left DLPFC activity and moral reasoning. Most important, the observed shift towards non-utilitarian actions suggests that moral decision making is not a permanent individual trait but can be manipulated; consequently individuals with boundless, uncontrollable, and maladaptive moral behavior, such as found in psychopathy, might benefit from neuromodulation-based approaches.

Ecology shapes moral judgments towards food-wasting behavior: Evidence from the Yali of West Papua, the Ngorongoro Maasai, and Poles.

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Misiak, Michał; Butovskaya, Marina; Sorokowski, Piotr

2018-06-01

People judge food wasting as an immoral behavior. Although moral concerns vary widely across cultures, to this date, food wasting moral judgments were investigated only among rich and industrialized ones. This study reports first evidence of cultural variability on moral judgments of food wasting between modern and traditional cultures. We conducted our study among the Maasai - pastoralists of Ngorongoro, Yali - horticulturalists of West Papua, and among citizens of Poland. According to the results, Maasai judge food wasting as more immoral compared to Yali and Poles. What's more, Yali judge food wasting harsher than Poles. These results suggest that there are cultural differences in moral judgments of food wasting. These differences might reflect the impact of unstable ecology on food economy of a given society. We hypothesize that harsh moral judgment concerning food waste may serve as a cultural adaptation for food insecurity. Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

The Comparative Effects of Adults and Peer Group Influence on Children's Moral Judgments.

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Siegal, M.; Boyes, M. C.

1980-01-01

In this review, little support is found for Piaget's claim that with increasing peer group interaction adult authority becomes less legitimate to the child. It is suggested that the adult exerts increasing influence with age on children's moral judgment and, therefore, emphasis on peer-centered moral education may be misdirected. (Author/SJL)

TMS Affects Moral Judgment, Showing the Role of DLPFC and TPJ in Cognitive and Emotional Processing

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Danique eJeurissen

2014-02-01

Full Text Available Decision-making involves a complex interplay of emotional responses and reasoning processes. In this study, we use TMS to explore the neurobiological substrates of moral decisions in humans. To examining the effects of TMS on the outcome of a moral-decision, we compare the decision outcome of moral-personal and moral-impersonal dilemmas to each other and examine the differential effects of applying TMS over the right DLPFC or right TPJ. In this comparison, we find that the TMS-induced disruption of the DLPFC during the decision process, affects the outcome of the moral-personal judgment, while TMS-induced disruption of TPJ affects only moral-impersonal conditions. In other words, we find a double-dissociation between DLPFC and TPJ in the outcome of a moral decision. Furthermore, we find that TMS-induced disruption of the DLPFC during non-moral, moral-impersonal, and moral-personal decisions lead to lower ratings of regret about the decision. Our results are in line with the dual-process theory and suggest a role for both the emotional response and cognitive reasoning process in moral judgment. Both the emotional and cognitive processes were shown to be involved in the decision outcome.

TMS affects moral judgment, showing the role of DLPFC and TPJ in cognitive and emotional processing.

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Jeurissen, Danique; Sack, Alexander T; Roebroeck, Alard; Russ, Brian E; Pascual-Leone, Alvaro

2014-01-01

Decision-making involves a complex interplay of emotional responses and reasoning processes. In this study, we use TMS to explore the neurobiological substrates of moral decisions in humans. To examining the effects of TMS on the outcome of a moral-decision, we compare the decision outcome of moral-personal and moral-impersonal dilemmas to each other and examine the differential effects of applying TMS over the right DLPFC or right TPJ. In this comparison, we find that the TMS-induced disruption of the DLPFC during the decision process, affects the outcome of the moral-personal judgment, while TMS-induced disruption of TPJ affects only moral-impersonal conditions. In other words, we find a double-dissociation between DLPFC and TPJ in the outcome of a moral decision. Furthermore, we find that TMS-induced disruption of the DLPFC during non-moral, moral-impersonal, and moral-personal decisions lead to lower ratings of regret about the decision. Our results are in line with the dual-process theory and suggest a role for both the emotional response and cognitive reasoning process in moral judgment. Both the emotional and cognitive processes were shown to be involved in the decision outcome.

Schools as Promoters of Moral Judgment: The Essential Role of Teachers' Encouragement of Critical Thinking

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Weinstock, Michael; Assor, Avi; Broide, Galia

2009-01-01

The assumption that high level functioning is characterized by a great deal of autonomy is central to some major theories of moral development [Kohlberg (in T. Lickona (ed.) "Moral development and behavior: Theory, research and social issues," 1976); Piaget ("The moral judgment of the child", 1932)] and to the self-determination theory of…

Moral opinion polarization and the erosion of trust

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Rapp, Carolin

2016-01-01

generalized trust, we focus on opinion polarization as another potential impact factor on trust. In more detail, we investigate the extent to which polarization over morally charged issues such as homsexuality, abortion and euthanasia affects individuals' likelihood to trust others. We hypothesize that moral...

Is high recovery more effective than expected recovery in addressing service failure? - a moral judgment perspective

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Chen, Tong; Ma, Ke; Bian, Xuemei; Zheng, Chundong; Devlin, James

2018-01-01

In the context of two distinctive consumer categories and two different product settings, this research examines the effects of recovery on recovery performance as a function of consumer moral judgment of service failure. The findings of two studies reveal that consumers' response to recovery anchors on the magnitude of recovery but these responses are adjusted according to consumers' moral judgment of service failure. Specifically, consumers react more positively toward expected recovery tha...

Gender differences in moral judgment and the evaluation of gender-specified moral agents.

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Capraro, Valerio; Sippel, Jonathan

2017-11-01

Whether, and if so, how exactly gender differences are manifested in moral judgment has recently been at the center of much research on moral decision making. Previous research suggests that women are more deontological than men in personal, but not impersonal, moral dilemmas. However, typical personal and impersonal moral dilemmas differ along two dimensions: Personal dilemmas are more emotionally salient than impersonal ones and involve a violation of Kant's practical imperative that humans must never be used as a mere means, but only as ends. Thus, it remains unclear whether the reported gender difference is due to emotional salience or to the violation of the practical imperative. To answer this question, we explore gender differences in three moral dilemmas: a typical personal dilemma, a typical impersonal dilemma, and an intermediate dilemma, which is not as emotionally salient as typical personal moral dilemmas, but contains an equally strong violation of Kant's practical imperative. While we replicate the result that women tend to embrace deontological ethics more than men in personal, but not impersonal, dilemmas, we find no gender differences in the intermediate situation. This suggests that gender differences in these type of dilemmas are driven by emotional salience, and not by the violation of the practical imperative. Additionally, we also explore whether people think that women should behave differently than men in these dilemmas. Across all three dilemmas, we find no statistically significant differences about how people think men and women should behave.

The Contact Principle and Utilitarian Moral Judgments in Young Children

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Pellizzoni, Sandra; Siegal, Michael; Surian, Luca

2010-01-01

In three experiments involving 207 preschoolers and 28 adults, we investigated the extent to which young children base moral judgments of actions aimed to protect others on utilitarian principles. When asked to judge the rightness of intervening to hurt one person in order to save five others, the large majority of children aged 3 to 5 years…

Reduced empathic concern leads to utilitarian moral judgments in trait alexithymia.

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Patil, Indrajeet; Silani, Giorgia

2014-01-01

Recent research with moral dilemmas supports dual-process model of moral decision making. This model posits two different paths via which people can endorse utilitarian solution that requires personally harming someone in order to achieve the greater good (e.g., killing one to save five people): (i) weakened emotional aversion to the prospect of harming someone due to reduced empathic concern for the victim; (ii) enhanced cognition which supports cost-benefit analysis and countervails the prepotent emotional aversion to harm. Direct prediction of this model would be that personality traits associated with reduced empathy would show higher propensity to endorse utilitarian solutions. As per this prediction, we found that trait alexithymia, which is well-known to have deficits in empathy, was indeed associated with increased utilitarian tendencies on emotionally aversive personal moral dilemmas and this was due to reduced empathic concern for the victim. Results underscore the importance of empathy for moral judgments in harm/care domain of morality.

Reduced empathic concern leads to utilitarian moral judgments in trait alexithymia

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Indrajeet ePatil

2014-05-01

Full Text Available Recent research with moral dilemmas supports dual-process model of moral decision making. This model posits two different paths via which people can endorse utilitarian solution that requires personally harming someone in order to achieve the greater good (e.g., killing one to save five people: (i weakened emotional aversion to the prospect of harming someone due to reduced empathic concern for the victim; (ii enhanced cognition which supports cost-benefit analysis and countervails the prepotent emotional aversion to harm. Direct prediction of this model would be that personality traits associated with reduced empathy would show higher propensity to endorse utilitarian solutions. As per this prediction, we found that trait alexithymia, which is well-known to have deficits in empathy, was indeed associated with increased utilitarian tendencies on emotionally aversive personal moral dilemmas and this was due to reduced empathic concern for the victim. Results underscore the importance of empathy for moral judgments in harm/care domain of morality.

Transgressors, victims, and cry babies: is basic moral judgment spared in autism?

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Leslie, Alan M; Mallon, Ron; DiCorcia, Jennifer A

2006-01-01

Human social intelligence comprises a wide range of complex cognitive and affective processes that appear to be selectively impaired in autistic spectrum disorders. The study of these neuro-developmental disorders and the study of canonical social intelligence have advanced rapidly over the last twenty years by investigating the two together. Specifically, studies of autism have provided important insights into the nature of "theory of mind" abilities, their normal development and underlying neural systems. At the same time, the idea of impaired development of the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying "theory of mind" has shed new light on the nature of autistic disorders. This general approach is not restricted to the study of impairments but extends to mapping areas of social intelligence that are spared in autism. Here we investigate basic moral judgment and find that it appears to be substantially intact in children with autism who are severely impaired in "theory of mind". At the same time, we extend studies of moral reasoning in normal development by way of a new control task, the "cry baby" task. Cry baby scenarios, in which the distress of the victim is "unreasonable" or "unjustified," do not elicit moral condemnation from normally developing preschoolers or from children with autism. Judgments of moral transgressions in which the victim displays distress are therefore not likely the result of a simple automatic reaction to distress and more likely involve moral reasoning. Mapping the cognitive comorbidity patterns of disordered development must encompass both impairments and sparings because both are needed to make sense of the neural and genetic levels.

Sidetracked by trolleys: Why sacrificial moral dilemmas tell us little (or nothing) about utilitarian judgment.

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Kahane, Guy

2015-01-01

Research into moral decision-making has been dominated by sacrificial dilemmas where, in order to save several lives, it is necessary to sacrifice the life of another person. It is widely assumed that these dilemmas draw a sharp contrast between utilitarian and deontological approaches to morality, and thereby enable us to study the psychological and neural basis of utilitarian judgment. However, it has been previously shown that some sacrificial dilemmas fail to present a genuine contrast between utilitarian and deontological options. Here, I raise deeper problems for this research paradigm. Even when sacrificial dilemmas present a contrast between utilitarian and deontological options at a philosophical level, it is misleading to interpret the responses of ordinary folk in these terms. What is currently classified as "utilitarian judgment" does not in fact share essential features of a genuine utilitarian outlook, and is better explained in terms of commonsensical moral notions. When subjects deliberate about such dilemmas, they are not deciding between opposing utilitarian and deontological solutions, but engaging in a richer process of weighing opposing moral reasons. Sacrificial dilemmas therefore tell us little about utilitarian decision-making. An alternative approach to studying proto-utilitarian tendencies in everyday moral thinking is proposed.

The Effect of Analytic and Experiential Modes of Thought on Moral Judgment

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Kvaran, T.; Nichols, S.; Sanfey, A.G.

2013-01-01

According to dual-process theories, moral judgments are the result of two competing processes: a fast, automatic, affect-driven process and a slow, deliberative, reason-based process. Accordingly, these models make clear and testable predictions about the influence of each system. Although a small

Opposing effects of oxytocin on moral judgment in males and females.

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Scheele, Dirk; Striepens, Nadine; Kendrick, Keith M; Schwering, Christine; Noelle, Janka; Wille, Andrea; Schläpfer, Thomas E; Maier, Wolfgang; Hurlemann, René

2014-12-01

Current perspectives on the evolutionary roots of human morality suggest it arose to incentivize social cooperation by promoting feelings of disgust toward selfish behavior, although the underlying neural mechanisms remain unclear. To investigate whether the ancient mammalian neuropeptide oxytocin (OXT) influences self-referential processing in the domains of emotion evaluation and moral decision making, we conducted a pharmaco-functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and a behavioral experiment involving 157 healthy women and men who were treated with either OXT (24 IU) or placebo (PLC) intranasally. Our results show that OXT facilitated cortical midline responses during self-processing of disgust and selectively promoted self-interest moral judgments in men. In contrast, in women OXT increased the reaction time difference between accepted and rejected moral dilemmas and led them to suppress their self-interest and respond more altruistically for the benefit of others. Taken together, these findings suggest an OXT-related sexual dimorphism in human moral behavior which evolved adaptively to optimize both protection and nurturing of offspring by promoting selfish behavior in men and altruistic behavior in women. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Preschoolers' social and moral judgments of third-party helpers and hinderers align with infants' social evaluations.

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Van de Vondervoort, Julia W; Hamlin, J Kiley

2017-12-01

Two experiments explored preschoolers' social preferences and moral judgments of prosocial and antisocial others. In Experiment 1, 3- to 5-year-olds (N=74) observed helping and hindering scenarios previously used to explore sociomoral evaluation in preverbal infants. Whereas 3-year-olds in Experiment 1 did not reliably distinguish between the helper and hinderer when reporting social preferences or moral judgments, both 4- and 5-year-olds preferred the helper, judged the helper to be "nicer" than the hinderer, selectively allocated punishment to the hinderer, and were able to justify their punishment allocations. A simplified procedure and the addition of comprehension questions in Experiment 2 (N=24) improved 3-year-olds' performance, suggestive that their performance in Experiment 1 was likely due to processing or memory difficulties rather than an inability to engage in explicit social and moral evaluation. These studies reveal that young children readily interpret helping and hindering scenarios as socially and morally relevant. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

A Longitudinal and Qualitative Descriptive Study of Cadet Moral Judgment Development at the United States Air Force Academy

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

Luedtke, Christopher

1999-01-01

...) and Moral Experience Questionnaire (MEQ). The objective was to observe whether changes occurred in the moral judgment scores of cadets between entry into the Academy and the spring semester of their senior year...

The Concept of Cultural Relativity in Moral Judgments Concerning Gender-Related Issues.

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Boyd, D. R.; And Others

The comparative study was designed to determine whether cultural relativism and ethical reasoning develop in a hierarchical manner when applied to culturally different phenomena. The phenomena investigated were moral judgments concerning gender-related issues. Thirty-six first through sixth-grade students from two private schools and 130…

‘Utilitarian’ judgments in sacrificial moral dilemmas do not reflect impartial concern for the greater good

OpenAIRE

Kahane, Guy; Everett, Jim A.C.; Earp, Brian D.; Farias, Miguel; Savulescu, Julian

2015-01-01

A growing body of research has focused on so-called ?utilitarian? judgments in moral dilemmas in which participants have to choose whether to sacrifice one person in order to save the lives of a greater number. However, the relation between such ?utilitarian? judgments and genuine utilitarian impartial concern for the greater good remains unclear. Across four studies, we investigated the relationship between ?utilitarian? judgment in such sacrificial dilemmas and a range of traits, attitudes,...

Development of L. Kohlberg's idea of moral formation of cross-cultural universality of judgments in modern research

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N.A. Baykovskaya

2013-07-01

Full Text Available We examine the ideas of foreign researchers (J. Gibbs, K. Basinger, J. Flavel, J. Snarey, who reconsider L. Kohlberg's statements on cognitive development, which forms the basis of moral judgments formation, recognizable usually across cultures. We show the intersection points for various contemporary approaches. We describe the results of empirical studies of moral judgments development in children of primary school age. The sample consisted of Moscow secondary schools students and students of National Jewish Education Center (total 367 people: 198 girls and 169 boys aged 8 to 10 years. We used method of presentation of moral dilemma situations. The study results confirm the relevance of L. Kohlberg main statements on the content of pre-conventional level of moral reasoning in children, on the laws of transition to conventional level. They also demonstrate the features of interpretation of crosscultural universality, discussed by modern foreign authors.

When is a lie more of a lie? Moral judgment mediates the relationship between perceived benefits of others and lie-labeling

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Cantarero Katarzyna

2017-06-01

Full Text Available Lay perceptions of lying are argued to consist of a lie prototype. The latter was found to entail the intention to deceive, belief in falsity and falsity (Coleman & Kay, 1981. We proposed and found that the perceptions of the benefits of others are also an important factor that influences the extent, to which an act of intentional misleading someone to foster a false belief is labeled as a lie. Drawing from the intuitionist model of moral judgments (Haidt, 2001 we assumed that moral judgment of the behaviour would mediate the relationship. In Study 1 we analyzed data coming from a crosscultural project and found that perceived intention to benefit others was negatively related to lie labeling and that this relationship was mediated by the moral judgment of that act. In Study 2 we found that manipulating the benefits of others influenced the extent, to which an act of intentional misleading in order to foster a false belief is labeled as a lie and that, again, this relationship is mediated by the moral judgment of that act.

Assessing Medical Students' Moral Judgment over the Course of a Four-Year Professionalism and Humanism Curriculum

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Riegle, Sandra E.; Frye, Ann W.; Glenn, Jason; Smith, Kirk L.

2012-01-01

Teachers tasked with developing moral character in future physicians face an array of pedagogic challenges, among them identifying tools to measure progress in instilling the requisite skill set. One validated instrument for assessing moral judgment is the Defining Issues Test (DIT-2). Based on the work of Lawrence Kohlberg, the test's main…

Individual Differences in Moral Disgust Do Not Predict Utilitarian Judgments, Sexual and Pathogen Disgust Do.

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Laakasuo, Michael; Sundvall, Jukka; Drosinou, Marianna

2017-03-31

The role of emotional disgust and disgust sensitivity in moral judgment and decision-making has been debated intensively for over 20 years. Until very recently, there were two main evolutionary narratives for this rather puzzling association. One of the models suggest that it was developed through some form of group selection mechanism, where the internal norms of the groups were acting as pathogen safety mechanisms. Another model suggested that these mechanisms were developed through hygiene norms, which were piggybacking on pathogen disgust mechanisms. In this study we present another alternative, namely that this mechanism might have evolved through sexual disgust sensitivity. We note that though the role of disgust in moral judgment has been questioned recently, few studies have taken disgust sensitivity to account. We present data from a large sample (N = 1300) where we analyzed the associations between The Three Domain Disgust Scale and the most commonly used 12 moral dilemmas measuring utilitarian/deontological preferences with Structural Equation Modeling. Our results indicate that of the three domains of disgust, only sexual disgust is associated with more deontological moral preferences. We also found that pathogen disgust was associated with more utilitarian preferences. Implications of the findings are discussed.

Children's Moral Judgments as a Function of Intention, Damage, and an Actor's Physical Harm.

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Suls, Jerry; Kalle, Robert J.

1979-01-01

Examines children's moral judgments of story characters who accidently harm themselves. Children in kindergarten and in grades 3 and 5 rated actors in stories which varied in terms of intention, damage, and harm to the actor. (SS)

Ignorance Is No Excuse: Moral Judgments Are Influenced by a Genetic Variation on the Oxytocin Receptor Gene

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Walter, Nora T.; Montag, Christian; Markett, Sebastian; Felten, Andrea; Voigt, Gesine; Reuter, Martin

2012-01-01

Perspective-taking has become a main focus of studies on moral judgments. Recent fMRI studies have demonstrated that individual differences in brain activation predict moral decision making. In particular, pharmacological studies highlighted the crucial role for the neuropeptide oxytocin in social behavior and emotional perception. In the present…

Does Joshua Greene’s Dual Process Theory of Moral Judgment Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy?

OpenAIRE

Javier Gracia Calandín

2017-01-01

In this article I analyse whether Joshua Greene’s dual process theory of moral judgment commits the naturalistic fallacy. Firstly, and against current authors such as Patricia S. Churchland, I uphold the validity of the naturalistic fallacy denounced by Moore for more than a century. Secondly, I highlight and question Greene’s naturalized way of understanding Deontologism. Thirdly, I assert the distinction between "neural basis" and "moral foundation" as the key to avoid committing the natura...

An Event-Related Potential Study of Adolescents' and Young Adults' Judgments of Moral and Social Conventional Violations

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Lahat, Ayelet; Helwig, Charles C.; Zelazo, Philip David

2013-01-01

The neurocognitive development of moral and conventional judgments was examined. Event-related potentials were recorded while 24 adolescents (13 years) and 30 young adults (20 years) read scenarios with 1 of 3 endings: moral violations, conventional violations, or neutral acts. Participants judged whether the act was acceptable or unacceptable…

Moral Hindsight.

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Fleischhut, Nadine; Meder, Björn; Gigerenzer, Gerd

2017-03-01

How are judgments in moral dilemmas affected by uncertainty, as opposed to certainty? We tested the predictions of a consequentialist and deontological account using a hindsight paradigm. The key result is a hindsight effect in moral judgment. Participants in foresight, for whom the occurrence of negative side effects was uncertain, judged actions to be morally more permissible than participants in hindsight, who knew that negative side effects occurred. Conversely, when hindsight participants knew that no negative side effects occurred, they judged actions to be more permissible than participants in foresight. The second finding was a classical hindsight effect in probability estimates and a systematic relation between moral judgments and probability estimates. Importantly, while the hindsight effect in probability estimates was always present, a corresponding hindsight effect in moral judgments was only observed among "consequentialist" participants who indicated a cost-benefit trade-off as most important for their moral evaluation.

An Empirical Investigation of the Moral Judgment Development of a Sample of High School Kuwaiti Teachers

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Al-Shurai, Saad

2012-01-01

This study was conducted to investigate the moral development of one hundred Kuwaiti high school teachers. They ranged in age from 23 to 48 years with a mean of 28.6 years and a standard deviation of 8.3 years. The teachers' individual moral judgment levels were assessed by the Defining Issues Test (DIT)--an objective test designed by James Rest…

A comparison of four measures of moral reasoning.

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Wilmoth, G H; McFarland, S G

1977-08-01

Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Scale, Gilligan et al.'s Sexual Moral Judgment Scale, Maitland and Goldman's Objective Moral Judgment Scale, and Hogan's Maturity of Moral Judgment Scale, were examined for reliability and inter-scale relationships. All measures except the Objective Moral Judgment Scale had good reliabilities. The obtained relations between the Moral Judgment Scale and the Sexual Moral Judgment Scale replicated previous research. The Objective Moral Judgment Scale was not found to validly assess the Kohlberg stages. The Maturity of Moral Judgment Scale scores were strongly related to the subjects's classification on the Kohlberg stages, and the scale appears to offer a reliable, quickly scored, and valid index of mature thought, although the scale's continuous scores do not permit clear stage classification.

Development of a moral judgment measure for veterinary education.

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Verrinder, Joy M; Phillips, Clive J C

2014-01-01

Veterinarians increasingly face animal ethics issues, conflicts, and dilemmas, both in practice and in policy, such as the tension between clients' and animals' interests. Little has been done to measure the capacity of veterinarians to make ethical judgments to prevent and address these issues or to identify the effectiveness of strategies to build this capacity. The objectives of this study were, first, to develop a test to identify the capacity of veterinarians to make ethical decisions in relation to animal ethics issues and, second, to assess students' perceptions of the usefulness of three methods for the development of ethical decision making. The Veterinary Defining Issues Test (VetDIT) was piloted with 88 first-year veterinary students at an Australian university. The veterinary students were at a variety of reasoning stages in their use of the Personal Interest (PI), Maintaining Norms (MN), and Universal Principles (UP) reasoning methods in relation to both human ethics and animal ethics issues and operated at a higher level of reasoning for animal than human ethics. Thirty-eight students assessed three methods for developing ethical decision-making skills and identified these as being helpful in clarifying their positions, clarifying others' positions, increasing awareness of the complexity of making ethical decisions, using ethical frameworks and principles, and improving moral reasoning skills, with two methods identified as most helpful. These methods and the VetDIT have the potential to be used as tools for development and assessment of moral judgment in veterinary education to address animal ethics issues.

Implicit moral evaluations: A multinomial modeling approach.

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Cameron, C Daryl; Payne, B Keith; Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter; Scheffer, Julian A; Inzlicht, Michael

2017-01-01

Implicit moral evaluations-i.e., immediate, unintentional assessments of the wrongness of actions or persons-play a central role in supporting moral behavior in everyday life. Yet little research has employed methods that rigorously measure individual differences in implicit moral evaluations. In five experiments, we develop a new sequential priming measure-the Moral Categorization Task-and a multinomial model that decomposes judgment on this task into multiple component processes. These include implicit moral evaluations of moral transgression primes (Unintentional Judgment), accurate moral judgments about target actions (Intentional Judgment), and a directional tendency to judge actions as morally wrong (Response Bias). Speeded response deadlines reduced Intentional Judgment but not Unintentional Judgment (Experiment 1). Unintentional Judgment was stronger toward moral transgression primes than non-moral negative primes (Experiments 2-4). Intentional Judgment was associated with increased error-related negativity, a neurophysiological indicator of behavioral control (Experiment 4). Finally, people who voted for an anti-gay marriage amendment had stronger Unintentional Judgment toward gay marriage primes (Experiment 5). Across Experiments 1-4, implicit moral evaluations converged with moral personality: Unintentional Judgment about wrong primes, but not negative primes, was negatively associated with psychopathic tendencies and positively associated with moral identity and guilt proneness. Theoretical and practical applications of formal modeling for moral psychology are discussed. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Sidetracked by trolleys: Why sacrificial moral dilemmas tell us little (or nothing) about utilitarian judgment

OpenAIRE

Kahane, Guy

2015-01-01

Research into moral decision-making has been dominated by sacrificial dilemmas where, in order to save several lives, it is necessary to sacrifice the life of another person. It is widely assumed that these dilemmas draw a sharp contrast between utilitarian and deontological approaches to morality, and thereby enable us to study the psychological and neural basis of utilitarian judgment. However, it has been previously shown that some sacrificial dilemmas fail to present a genuine contrast be...

Mind Perception Is the Essence of Morality.

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Gray, Kurt; Young, Liane; Waytz, Adam

2012-04-01

Mind perception entails ascribing mental capacities to other entities, whereas moral judgment entails labeling entities as good or bad or actions as right or wrong. We suggest that mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. In particular, we suggest that moral judgment is rooted in a cognitive template of two perceived minds-a moral dyad of an intentional agent and a suffering moral patient. Diverse lines of research support dyadic morality. First, perceptions of mind are linked to moral judgments: dimensions of mind perception (agency and experience) map onto moral types (agents and patients), and deficits of mind perception correspond to difficulties with moral judgment. Second, not only are moral judgments sensitive to perceived agency and experience, but all moral transgressions are fundamentally understood as agency plus experienced suffering-that is, interpersonal harm-even ostensibly harmless acts such as purity violations. Third, dyadic morality uniquely accounts for the phenomena of dyadic completion (seeing agents in response to patients, and vice versa), and moral typecasting (characterizing others as either moral agents or moral patients). Discussion also explores how mind perception can unify morality across explanatory levels, how a dyadic template of morality may be developmentally acquired, and future directions.

From moral to legal judgment : the influence of normative context in lawyers and other academics

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Schleim, Stephan; Spranger, Tade M.; Erk, Susanne; Walter, Henrik

Various kinds of normative judgments are an integral part of everyday life. We extended the scrutiny of social cognitive neuroscience into the domain of legal decisions, investigating two groups, lawyers and other academics, during moral and legal decision-making. While we found activation of brain

Mind Perception Is the Essence of Morality

Science.gov (United States)

Gray, Kurt; Young, Liane; Waytz, Adam

2012-01-01

Mind perception entails ascribing mental capacities to other entities, whereas moral judgment entails labeling entities as good or bad or actions as right or wrong. We suggest that mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. In particular, we suggest that moral judgment is rooted in a cognitive template of two perceived minds—a moral dyad of an intentional agent and a suffering moral patient. Diverse lines of research support dyadic morality. First, perceptions of mind are linked to moral judgments: dimensions of mind perception (agency and experience) map onto moral types (agents and patients), and deficits of mind perception correspond to difficulties with moral judgment. Second, not only are moral judgments sensitive to perceived agency and experience, but all moral transgressions are fundamentally understood as agency plus experienced suffering—that is, interpersonal harm—even ostensibly harmless acts such as purity violations. Third, dyadic morality uniquely accounts for the phenomena of dyadic completion (seeing agents in response to patients, and vice versa), and moral typecasting (characterizing others as either moral agents or moral patients). Discussion also explores how mind perception can unify morality across explanatory levels, how a dyadic template of morality may be developmentally acquired, and future directions. PMID:22754268

From Folk Morality to Moral Philosophy

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

J Peikani

2014-02-01

Full Text Available According to our terminology, the mechanism people follow in moral judgments, which is far from the sayings and rules of moral philosophers, is folk morality. Above all, people in moral judgments regard human moral capacity and do not expect full morality of any one. People suppose that perfect moral life is an ideal which is beyond human abilities. This hidden presupposition forms the foundation of human moral behavior. On the other hand, it seems that the moral systems originating from moral philosophy have been constructed a priori and, assuming a perfect man, they expect people to become such a person. It seems that it is necessary for moral philosophers to change their way and begin speculation with respect to people’s moral capacities. In this paper, we argue that minimal ethical speculation increases the level of morality in society. The basis of this turn is new progresses and findings in the field of psychology and the connection between psychology and moral philosophy a connection which will be more and more important for moral philosophers parallel to scientific progresses. Of course, this is an immature idea and therefore confronts with some critiques.

Correction: No Child Left Alone: Moral Judgments about Parents Affect Estimates of Risk to Children

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Ashley J. Thomas

2016-10-01

Full Text Available This article details a correction to article Thomas, A. J., Stanford, P. K., & Sarnecka, B. W. (2016. No Child Left Alone: Moral Judgments about Parents Affect Estimates of Risk to Children. 'Collabra', 2(1, 10. DOI: http://doi.org/10.1525/collabra.33

On judgment and judgmentalism: how counselling can make people better.

Science.gov (United States)

Gibson, S

2005-10-01

Counsellors, like other members of the caring professions, are required to practise within an ethical framework, at least in so far as they seek professional accreditation. As such, the counsellor is called upon to exercise her moral agency. In most professional contexts this requirement is, in itself, unproblematic. It has been suggested, however, that counselling practice does present a problem in this respect, in so far as the counsellor is expected to take a non-judgemental stance and an attitude of "unconditional positive regard" toward the client. If, as might appear to be the case, this stance and attitude are at odds with the making of moral judgments, the possibility of an adequate ethics of counselling is called into question. This paper explores the nature and extent of the problem suggesting that, understood in a Kantian context, non-judgmentalism can be seen to be at odds with neither the moral agency of the counsellor nor that of the client. Instead, it is argued, the relationship between the non-judgmental counsellor and her client is a fundamentally moral relationship, based on respect for the client's unconditional worth as a moral agent.

Juízo e ação moral: desafios teóricos em psicologia Judgment and moral action: theoretic challenges in psychology

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Leonardo Lemos de Souza

2009-12-01

Full Text Available O presente artigo apresenta e discute a polêmica, no campo da psicologia moral, sobre as relações entre juízo e ação. Teorias de tradição racionalista e estruturalista, como as de Piaget e Kohlberg, afirmam uma relação de continuidade entre juízo e ação moral e, ao mesmo tempo, lançam pontos de discussão sobre a complexidade envolvida no tema. Por outro lado, novas frentes de trabalho sugerem a integração de outros elementos (a cultura, a afetividade e o self, além das estruturas que podem compor um referencial com o qual se evidenciem as relações entre os aspectos envolvidos nas condutas morais. Por fim, apesar das críticas acenarem com caminhos promissores na pesquisa sobre o juízo e a ação moral, ainda existem limites na construção de referenciais teóricos e metodológicos que articulem diferentes perspectivas de análise psicológica da moralidade.The attending article presents and discusses the debate within the cognitive constructivist theories, which have as main representatives Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg. Such theories of rationalist and structuralist tradition maintain continuity between judgment and moral action and, at the same time, launch points of discussion on the complexity involved in the theme. New work fronts suggest the integration of other elements: culture, affectionateness, and the self, beyond the structures that may compound a referential that explains the relations between the aspects involved in moral behavior. Lastly, despite the criticism indicating a promising path in the search about judgment and moral action, considering its complex character, there are still limits in the making of the theoretical and methodological frameworks that articulate different perspectives of moral psychological analyses.

"Lean not on your own understanding": Belief that morality is founded on divine authority and non-utilitarian moral judgments

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Jared Piazza

2013-11-01

Full Text Available Recent research has shown that religious individuals are much more resistant to utilitarian modes of thinking than their less religious counterparts, but the reason for this is not clear. We propose that a meta-ethical belief that morality is rooted in inviolable divine commands (i.e., endorsement of Divine Command Theory may help explain this finding. We present a novel 20-item scale measuring a belief that morality is founded on divine authority. The scale shows good internal reliability and convergent and discriminant validity. Study 1 found that this scale fully mediated the relationship that various religiosity measures had with a deontological thinking style in our sample of American adults. It also accounted for the link between religiosity and social conservative values. Furthermore, the relationship between the scale and these outcome variables held after statistically controlling for variables related to actively open-minded thinking and the Big Five. Study 2 replicated the results using naturalistic moral dilemmas that placed deontological and utilitarian concerns in conflict, and showed that the results of Study 1 cannot be explained by differences in moral foundations (e.g., concern for authority more generally or differences in the perceived function of rules. Quite the contrary, endorsement of the divine origins of morality fully mediated the relationship religiosity had with the so-called ``binding'' foundations (i.e., Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity. Our findings highlight the importance of meta-ethical beliefs for understanding individual differences in moral judgment.

Changes in Emotional-Social Intelligence, Caring, Leadership and Moral Judgment during Health Science Education Programs

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Larin, Helene; Benson, Gerry; Wessel, Jean; Martin, Lynn; Ploeg, Jenny

2014-01-01

In addition to having academic knowledge and clinical skills, health professionals need to be caring, ethical practitioners able to understand the emotional concerns of their patients and to effect change. The purpose of this study was to determine whether emotional-social intelligence, caring, leadership and moral judgment of health science…

Does Joshua Greene’s Dual Process Theory of Moral Judgment Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy?

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Javier Gracia Calandín

2017-02-01

Full Text Available In this article I analyse whether Joshua Greene’s dual process theory of moral judgment commits the naturalistic fallacy. Firstly, and against current authors such as Patricia S. Churchland, I uphold the validity of the naturalistic fallacy denounced by Moore for more than a century. Secondly, I highlight and question Greene’s naturalized way of understanding Deontologism. Thirdly, I assert the distinction between "neural basis" and "moral foundation" as the key to avoid committing the naturalistic fallacy. Finally and according to that key distinction I assess Greene’s neuroethical approach and I analyse some of its most critical aspects related to normative issues.

Moral Judgments on Short-Term Sexual Behaviors among Chinese College Students: Exploring the Roles of Gender and Physical Attractiveness.

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Xiao, Qianguo; Li, Aijuan; Zhu, Yi

2017-01-01

This study primarily investigated the effects of gender and physical attractiveness on moral judgments on three typical kinds of short-term sexual behaviors (short-term fling, one-night stand, and hookup) in the Chinese culture context. A total of 120 university student subjects were presented with a series of stereotypically physically attractive (versus physically unattractive) photos before they rated the extent to which each of the three short-term sexual behaviors are morally acceptable. The results showed that male students judged all three behaviors to be more morally acceptable than female students did. Further analyses showed that this gender difference was moderated by the level of physical attractiveness. Under the high attractiveness condition, short-term flings and hookups were judged more morally acceptable by male students than by female students, but this gender difference was not significant under the low attractiveness condition. However, with regard to one-night stands, the data showed that male students judged this type of behavior to be more morally acceptable than did female students under the low attractiveness condition, while this gender difference was not significant under the high attractiveness condition. Thus, these findings further our understanding of how Chinese young people view different types of short-term sexual behaviors, and provide novel evidence regarding how physical attractiveness influences people's moral judgments on short-term sexual behaviors.

The importance of moral construal: moral versus non-moral construal elicits faster, more extreme, universal evaluations of the same actions.

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Jay J Van Bavel

Full Text Available Over the past decade, intuitionist models of morality have challenged the view that moral reasoning is the sole or even primary means by which moral judgments are made. Rather, intuitionist models posit that certain situations automatically elicit moral intuitions, which guide moral judgments. We present three experiments showing that evaluations are also susceptible to the influence of moral versus non-moral construal. We had participants make moral evaluations (rating whether actions were morally good or bad or non-moral evaluations (rating whether actions were pragmatically or hedonically good or bad of a wide variety of actions. As predicted, moral evaluations were faster, more extreme, and more strongly associated with universal prescriptions-the belief that absolutely nobody or everybody should engage in an action-than non-moral (pragmatic or hedonic evaluations of the same actions. Further, we show that people are capable of flexibly shifting from moral to non-moral evaluations on a trial-by-trial basis. Taken together, these experiments provide evidence that moral versus non-moral construal has an important influence on evaluation and suggests that effects of construal are highly flexible. We discuss the implications of these experiments for models of moral judgment and decision-making.

Development of Moral Judgment according to Kohlberg as an Academic Performance Determining Factor in Social Sciences for a Group of Secondary Education Students

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José Díaz-Serrano

2015-09-01

Full Text Available This study aims at defining the relation between the students’ moral development level and their academic performance in the subject of Social Sciences-Geography, with the participation of twelve students enrolled in the third year of compulsory secondary education in school of Murcia, Spain. Kohlberg theorized the moral judgment development process in which people go through six stages, identifying in each one of them how we react when confronted with a moral dilemma; an instrument designed for this study, based on such theory, will allow us to know the stage of moral development of the participants. The results will reveal a tendency to a direct and positive relation, leading to the conclusion that it is interesting to examine the stage of moral judgment in the classroom. In addition, some educational and research recommendations are provided at the end of this paper.

'Utilitarian' judgments in sacrificial moral dilemmas do not reflect impartial concern for the greater good.

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Kahane, Guy; Everett, Jim A C; Earp, Brian D; Farias, Miguel; Savulescu, Julian

2015-01-01

A growing body of research has focused on so-called 'utilitarian' judgments in moral dilemmas in which participants have to choose whether to sacrifice one person in order to save the lives of a greater number. However, the relation between such 'utilitarian' judgments and genuine utilitarian impartial concern for the greater good remains unclear. Across four studies, we investigated the relationship between 'utilitarian' judgment in such sacrificial dilemmas and a range of traits, attitudes, judgments and behaviors that either reflect or reject an impartial concern for the greater good of all. In Study 1, we found that rates of 'utilitarian' judgment were associated with a broadly immoral outlook concerning clear ethical transgressions in a business context, as well as with sub-clinical psychopathy. In Study 2, we found that 'utilitarian' judgment was associated with greater endorsement of rational egoism, less donation of money to a charity, and less identification with the whole of humanity, a core feature of classical utilitarianism. In Studies 3 and 4, we found no association between 'utilitarian' judgments in sacrificial dilemmas and characteristic utilitarian judgments relating to assistance to distant people in need, self-sacrifice and impartiality, even when the utilitarian justification for these judgments was made explicit and unequivocal. This lack of association remained even when we controlled for the antisocial element in 'utilitarian' judgment. Taken together, these results suggest that there is very little relation between sacrificial judgments in the hypothetical dilemmas that dominate current research, and a genuine utilitarian approach to ethics. Copyright © 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Quasi-realism and the moral problem

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Carlsson, Andreas Brekke

2007-01-01

Moral judgments have two characteristic features. On the one hand they aim at objectivity. We normally think there are correct answers to be found on moral matters, and we think that is possible for our moral judgments to be mistaken. In this respect moral judgments behave as ordinary beliefs. On the other hand moral judgements are essentially practical. They are action guiding and closely connected to motivation. In this respect they behave as desires. If we combine these two features with a...

Fundamental Moral Attitudes to Animals and Their Role in Judgment: An Empirical Model to Describe Fundamental Moral Attitudes to Animals and Their Role in Judgment on the Culling of Healthy Animals During an Animal Disease Epidemic

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Cohen, N.E.; Brom, F.W.A.; Stassen, E.N.

2009-01-01

In this paper, we present and defend the theoretical framework of an empirical model to describe people’s fundamental moral attitudes (FMAs) to animals, the stratification of FMAs in society and the role of FMAs in judgment on the culling of healthy animals in an animal disease epidemic. We used

“Righteous Minds” in Health Care: Measurement and Explanatory Value of Social Intuitionism in Accounting for the Moral Judgments in a Sample of U.S. Physicians

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Tilburt, Jon C.; James, Katherine M.; Jenkins, Sarah M.; Antiel, Ryan M.; Curlin, Farr A.; Rasinski, Kenneth A.

2013-01-01

The broad diversity in physicians’ judgments on controversial health care topics may reflect differences in religious characteristics, political ideologies, and moral intuitions. We tested an existing measure of moral intuitions in a new population (U.S. physicians) to assess its validity and to determine whether physicians’ moral intuitions correlate with their views on controversial health care topics as well as other known predictors of these intuitions such as political affiliation and religiosity. In 2009, we mailed an 8-page questionnaire to a random sample of 2000 practicing U.S. physicians from all specialties. The survey included the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ30), along with questions on physicians’ judgments about controversial health care topics including abortion and euthanasia (no moral objection, some moral objection, strong moral objection). A total of 1032 of 1895 (54%) physicians responded. Physicians’ overall mean moral foundations scores were 3.5 for harm, 3.3 for fairness, 2.8 for loyalty, 3.2 for authority, and 2.7 for sanctity on a 0–5 scale. Increasing levels of religious service attendance, having a more conservative political ideology, and higher sanctity scores remained the greatest positive predictors of respondents objecting to abortion (β = 0.12, 0.23, 0.14, respectively, each pmoral intuitions may predict differences in physicians’ judgments about morally controversial topics and may interrelate with ideology and religiosity. Further examination of the diversity in physicians’ moral intuitions may prove illustrative in describing and addressing moral differences that arise in medical practice. PMID:24023864

"Righteous minds" in health care: measurement and explanatory value of social intuitionism in accounting for the moral judgments in a sample of U.S. physicians.

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Tilburt, Jon C; James, Katherine M; Jenkins, Sarah M; Antiel, Ryan M; Curlin, Farr A; Rasinski, Kenneth A

2013-01-01

The broad diversity in physicians' judgments on controversial health care topics may reflect differences in religious characteristics, political ideologies, and moral intuitions. We tested an existing measure of moral intuitions in a new population (U.S. physicians) to assess its validity and to determine whether physicians' moral intuitions correlate with their views on controversial health care topics as well as other known predictors of these intuitions such as political affiliation and religiosity. In 2009, we mailed an 8-page questionnaire to a random sample of 2000 practicing U.S. physicians from all specialties. The survey included the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ30), along with questions on physicians' judgments about controversial health care topics including abortion and euthanasia (no moral objection, some moral objection, strong moral objection). A total of 1032 of 1895 (54%) physicians responded. Physicians' overall mean moral foundations scores were 3.5 for harm, 3.3 for fairness, 2.8 for loyalty, 3.2 for authority, and 2.7 for sanctity on a 0-5 scale. Increasing levels of religious service attendance, having a more conservative political ideology, and higher sanctity scores remained the greatest positive predictors of respondents objecting to abortion (β = 0.12, 0.23, 0.14, respectively, each p<0.001) as well as euthanasia (β = 0.08, 0.17, and 0.17, respectively, each p<0.001), even after adjusting for demographics. Higher authority scores were also significantly negatively associated with objection to abortion (β = -0.12, p<0.01), but not euthanasia. These data suggest that the relative importance physicians place on the different categories of moral intuitions may predict differences in physicians' judgments about morally controversial topics and may interrelate with ideology and religiosity. Further examination of the diversity in physicians' moral intuitions may prove illustrative in describing and addressing moral differences that

The Association Between Callous-Unemotional Traits, Externalizing Problems, and Gender in Predicting Cognitive and Affective Morality Judgments in Adolescence.

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Fragkaki, Iro; Cima, Maaike; Meesters, Cor

2016-09-01

Morality deficits have been linked to callous-unemotional traits and externalizing problems in response to moral dilemmas, but these associations are still obscure in response to antisocial acts in adolescence. Limited evidence on young boys suggested that callous-unemotional traits and externalizing problems were associated with affective but not cognitive morality judgments. The present study investigated these associations in a community sample of 277 adolescents (M age  = 15.35, 64 % females). Adolescents with high callous-unemotional traits showed deficits in affective but not cognitive morality, indicating that they can identify the appropriate moral emotions in others, but experience deviant moral emotions when imagining themselves committing antisocial acts. Externalizing problems and male gender were also strongly related to deficits in affective morality, but they had smaller associations with deficits in cognitive morality too. Implications for treatment and the justice system are discussed.

‘Utilitarian’ judgments in sacrificial moral dilemmas do not reflect impartial concern for the greater good

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Kahane, Guy; Everett, Jim A.C.; Earp, Brian D.; Farias, Miguel; Savulescu, Julian

2015-01-01

A growing body of research has focused on so-called ‘utilitarian’ judgments in moral dilemmas in which participants have to choose whether to sacrifice one person in order to save the lives of a greater number. However, the relation between such ‘utilitarian’ judgments and genuine utilitarian impartial concern for the greater good remains unclear. Across four studies, we investigated the relationship between ‘utilitarian’ judgment in such sacrificial dilemmas and a range of traits, attitudes, judgments and behaviors that either reflect or reject an impartial concern for the greater good of all. In Study 1, we found that rates of ‘utilitarian’ judgment were associated with a broadly immoral outlook concerning clear ethical transgressions in a business context, as well as with sub-clinical psychopathy. In Study 2, we found that ‘utilitarian’ judgment was associated with greater endorsement of rational egoism, less donation of money to a charity, and less identification with the whole of humanity, a core feature of classical utilitarianism. In Studies 3 and 4, we found no association between ‘utilitarian’ judgments in sacrificial dilemmas and characteristic utilitarian judgments relating to assistance to distant people in need, self-sacrifice and impartiality, even when the utilitarian justification for these judgments was made explicit and unequivocal. This lack of association remained even when we controlled for the antisocial element in ‘utilitarian’ judgment. Taken together, these results suggest that there is very little relation between sacrificial judgments in the hypothetical dilemmas that dominate current research, and a genuine utilitarian approach to ethics. PMID:25460392

No Child Left Alone: Moral Judgments about Parents Affect Estimates of Risk to Children

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Ashley J. Thomas

2016-08-01

Full Text Available In recent decades, Americans have adopted a parenting norm in which every child is expected to be under constant direct adult supervision. Parents who violate this norm by allowing their children to be alone, even for short periods of time, often face harsh criticism and even legal action. This is true despite the fact that children are much more likely to be hurt, for example, in car accidents. Why then do bystanders call 911 when they see children playing in parks, but not when they see children riding in cars? Here, we present results from six studies indicating that moral judgments play a role: The less morally acceptable a parent’s reason for leaving a child alone, the more danger people think the child is in. This suggests that people’s estimates of danger to unsupervised children are affected by an intuition that parents who leave their children alone have done something morally wrong.

Moral foundations vignettes: a standardized stimulus database of scenarios based on moral foundations theory.

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Clifford, Scott; Iyengar, Vijeth; Cabeza, Roberto; Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter

2015-12-01

Research on the emotional, cognitive, and social determinants of moral judgment has surged in recent years. The development of moral foundations theory (MFT) has played an important role, demonstrating the breadth of morality. Moral psychology has responded by investigating how different domains of moral judgment are shaped by a variety of psychological factors. Yet, the discipline lacks a validated set of moral violations that span the moral domain, creating a barrier to investigating influences on judgment and how their neural bases might vary across the moral domain. In this paper, we aim to fill this gap by developing and validating a large set of moral foundations vignettes (MFVs). Each vignette depicts a behavior violating a particular moral foundation and not others. The vignettes are controlled on many dimensions including syntactic structure and complexity making them suitable for neuroimaging research. We demonstrate the validity of our vignettes by examining respondents' classifications of moral violations, conducting exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, and demonstrating the correspondence between the extracted factors and existing measures of the moral foundations. We expect that the MFVs will be beneficial for a wide variety of behavioral and neuroimaging investigations of moral cognition.

Moral foundations vignettes: a standardized stimulus database of scenarios based on moral foundations theory

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Iyengar, Vijeth; Cabeza, Roberto; Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter

2016-01-01

Research on the emotional, cognitive, and social determinants of moral judgment has surged in recent years. The development of moral foundations theory (MFT) has played an important role, demonstrating the breadth of morality. Moral psychology has responded by investigating how different domains of moral judgment are shaped by a variety of psychological factors. Yet, the discipline lacks a validated set of moral violations that span the moral domain, creating a barrier to investigating influences on judgment and how their neural bases might vary across the moral domain. In this paper, we aim to fill this gap by developing and validating a large set of moral foundations vignettes (MFVs). Each vignette depicts a behavior violating a particular moral foundation and not others. The vignettes are controlled on many dimensions including syntactic structure and complexity making them suitable for neuroimaging research. We demonstrate the validity of our vignettes by examining respondents’ classifications of moral violations, conducting exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, and demonstrating the correspondence between the extracted factors and existing measures of the moral foundations. We expect that the MFVs will be beneficial for a wide variety of behavioral and neuroimaging investigations of moral cognition. PMID:25582811

Legal Field and Social Representations : Analysis of Damage of The Grounds of Failure in Moral Judgments

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Morgana Neves de Jesus

2016-11-01

Full Text Available It is proposed to analyze the problem of the failure of judicial decisions, from the observation of the interference of social representations the lack of real motivation of judgments, from the statement of denaturation of the institute moral damage caused by internalized reproduction of concepts and meanings anchored and objectified in the collective unconscious of the various authorities and actors in the legal field. Seeks to understand the social representations reproduced in the legal and social field of the institute, which confirms the problem of inadequate statement of reasons and not resolving legal conflicts social damage morale.

Neural basis of moral verdict and moral deliberation

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Borg, Jana Schaich; Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter; Calhoun, Vince D.; Kiehl, Kent A.

2011-01-01

How people judge something to be morally right or wrong is a fundamental question of both the sciences and the humanities. Here we aim to identify the neural processes that underlie the specific conclusion that something is morally wrong. To do this, we introduce a novel distinction between “moral deliberation,” or the weighing of moral considerations, and the formation of a “moral verdict,” or the commitment to one moral conclusion. We predict and identify hemodynamic activity in the bilateral anterior insula and basal ganglia that correlates with committing to the moral verdict “this is morally wrong” as opposed to “this is morally not wrong,” a finding that is consistent with research from economic decision-making. Using comparisons of deliberation-locked vs. verdict-locked analyses, we also demonstrate that hemodynamic activity in high-level cortical regions previously implicated in morality—including the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate, and temporoparietal junction—correlates primarily with moral deliberation as opposed to moral verdicts. These findings provide new insights into what types of processes comprise the enterprise of moral judgment, and in doing so point to a framework for resolving why some clinical patients, including psychopaths, may have intact moral judgment but impaired moral behavior. PMID:21590588

Gender Differences in Sexual Attraction and Moral Judgment: Research With Artificial Face Models.

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González-Álvarez, Julio; Cervera-Crespo, Teresa

2018-01-01

Sexual attraction in humans is influenced by cultural or moral factors, and some gender differences can emerge in this complex interaction. A previous study found that men dissociate sexual attraction from moral judgment more than women do. Two experiments consisting of giving attractiveness ratings to photos of real opposite-sex individuals showed that men, compared to women, were significantly less influenced by the moral valence of a description about the person shown in each photo. There is evidence of some processing differences between real and artificial computer-generated faces. The present study tests the robustness of González-Álvarez's findings and extends the research to an experimental design using artificial face models as stimuli. A sample of 88 young adults (61 females and 27 males, average age 19.32, SD = 2.38) rated the attractiveness of 80 3D artificial face models generated with the FaceGen Modeller 3.5 software. Each face model was paired with a "good" and a "bad" (from a moral point of view) sentence depicting a quality or activity of the person represented in the model (e.g., she/he is an altruistic nurse in Africa vs. she/he is a prominent drug dealer). Results were in line with the previous findings and showed that, with artificial faces as well, sexual attraction is less influenced by morality in men than in women. This gender difference is consistent with an evolutionary perspective on human sexuality.

Values, ethics and moral judgment: an familiar business exploratory study / Valores, ética e julgamento moral: um estudo exploratório em empresas familiares

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Janine Kieling Monteiro

2005-01-01

Full Text Available This paper has investigated ethical principals, moral values and moral judgements into family business. Two gaúcha business, with 28 people each, have participated in. It was utilized a questionnaire and MJI. The methodology used was the analyses of content and frequency. The main results were: both business have code of ethics and it common knowledge. It was said that bad behavior must be revealed and both business would adopt corrective measures despite the fact that punishment is unequal. The transgressions that have been committed the most were: lie, stealing, sexual harassment, use of drugs during office hours, hiring unqualified people by indication, hidden information about the company, messages and e-mails control and requirement of overtime without payment. Values, responsibility, respect and honesty have been highlighted. Significant differences in moral judgment not been founded.

Comparative morality judgments about lesbians and gay men teaching and adopting children.

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Kirby, Brenda J; Michaelson, Christina

2015-01-01

The purpose of this study was to compare morality judgments of American Catholics and the general public about lesbians and gay men adopting and teaching children. The general sample endorsed higher agreement that lesbians and gay men should be allowed to adopt and to teach children compared to the Catholic only sample. Older participants were less accepting than all other age groups, and there was an interaction effect between education and political ideology such that those with less education and with more politically conservative beliefs were generally less accepting of lesbians and gay men adopting and teaching children.

Is moral beauty different from facial beauty? Evidence from an fMRI study.

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Wang, Tingting; Mo, Lei; Mo, Ce; Tan, Li Hai; Cant, Jonathan S; Zhong, Luojin; Cupchik, Gerald

2015-06-01

Is moral beauty different from facial beauty? Two functional magnetic resonance imaging experiments were performed to answer this question. Experiment 1 investigated the network of moral aesthetic judgments and facial aesthetic judgments. Participants performed aesthetic judgments and gender judgments on both faces and scenes containing moral acts. The conjunction analysis of the contrasts 'facial aesthetic judgment > facial gender judgment' and 'scene moral aesthetic judgment > scene gender judgment' identified the common involvement of the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), inferior temporal gyrus and medial superior frontal gyrus, suggesting that both types of aesthetic judgments are based on the orchestration of perceptual, emotional and cognitive components. Experiment 2 examined the network of facial beauty and moral beauty during implicit perception. Participants performed a non-aesthetic judgment task on both faces (beautiful vs common) and scenes (containing morally beautiful vs neutral information). We observed that facial beauty (beautiful faces > common faces) involved both the cortical reward region OFC and the subcortical reward region putamen, whereas moral beauty (moral beauty scenes > moral neutral scenes) only involved the OFC. Moreover, compared with facial beauty, moral beauty spanned a larger-scale cortical network, indicating more advanced and complex cerebral representations characterizing moral beauty. © The Author (2014). Published by Oxford University Press. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.

Consequences, norms, and generalized inaction in moral dilemmas: The CNI model of moral decision-making.

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Gawronski, Bertram; Armstrong, Joel; Conway, Paul; Friesdorf, Rebecca; Hütter, Mandy

2017-09-01

Research on moral dilemma judgments has been fundamentally shaped by the distinction between utilitarianism and deontology. According to the principle of utilitarianism, the moral status of behavioral options depends on their consequences; the principle of deontology states that the moral status of behavioral options depends on their consistency with moral norms. To identify the processes underlying utilitarian and deontological judgments, researchers have investigated responses to moral dilemmas that pit one principle against the other (e.g., trolley problem). However, the conceptual meaning of responses in this paradigm is ambiguous, because the central aspects of utilitarianism and deontology-consequences and norms-are not manipulated. We illustrate how this shortcoming undermines theoretical interpretations of empirical findings and describe an alternative approach that resolves the ambiguities of the traditional paradigm. Expanding on this approach, we present a multinomial model that allows researchers to quantify sensitivity to consequences (C), sensitivity to moral norms (N), and general preference for inaction versus action irrespective of consequences and norms (I) in responses to moral dilemmas. We present 8 studies that used this model to investigate the effects of gender, cognitive load, question framing, and psychopathy on moral dilemma judgments. The findings obtained with the proposed CNI model offer more nuanced insights into the determinants of moral dilemma judgments, calling for a reassessment of dominant theoretical assumptions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved).

Explaining Moral Behavior.

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Osman, Magda; Wiegmann, Alex

2017-03-01

In this review we make a simple theoretical argument which is that for theory development, computational modeling, and general frameworks for understanding moral psychology researchers should build on domain-general principles from reasoning, judgment, and decision-making research. Our approach is radical with respect to typical models that exist in moral psychology that tend to propose complex innate moral grammars and even evolutionarily guided moral principles. In support of our argument we show that by using a simple value-based decision model we can capture a range of core moral behaviors. Crucially, the argument we propose is that moral situations per se do not require anything specialized or different from other situations in which we have to make decisions, inferences, and judgments in order to figure out how to act.

Sidetracked by trolleys: Why sacrificial moral dilemmas tell us little (or nothing) about utilitarian judgment

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Kahane, Guy

2015-01-01

Research into moral decision-making has been dominated by sacrificial dilemmas where, in order to save several lives, it is necessary to sacrifice the life of another person. It is widely assumed that these dilemmas draw a sharp contrast between utilitarian and deontological approaches to morality, and thereby enable us to study the psychological and neural basis of utilitarian judgment. However, it has been previously shown that some sacrificial dilemmas fail to present a genuine contrast between utilitarian and deontological options. Here, I raise deeper problems for this research paradigm. Even when sacrificial dilemmas present a contrast between utilitarian and deontological options at a philosophical level, it is misleading to interpret the responses of ordinary folk in these terms. What is currently classified as “utilitarian judgment” does not in fact share essential features of a genuine utilitarian outlook, and is better explained in terms of commonsensical moral notions. When subjects deliberate about such dilemmas, they are not deciding between opposing utilitarian and deontological solutions, but engaging in a richer process of weighing opposing moral reasons. Sacrificial dilemmas therefore tell us little about utilitarian decision-making. An alternative approach to studying proto-utilitarian tendencies in everyday moral thinking is proposed. PMID:25791902

Behavioral Norms, Moral Judgments, and Social Approval of Participant Roles in School Bullying in a Singapore Sample

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Sim, Tick Ngee; Tan, Melinda Meizhen

2013-01-01

This study examines behavioral norms, moral judgments, and social approval of participant roles in classroom physical, verbal, and relational bullying, including a relatively new reporter role (where nothing is done during the bullying but there is subsequent reporting to a teacher). A sample of 1,131 Secondary 1 (mean age = 12 years 7 months) and…

Is moral beauty different from facial beauty? Evidence from an fMRI study

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Wang, Tingting; Mo, Ce; Tan, Li Hai; Cant, Jonathan S.; Zhong, Luojin; Cupchik, Gerald

2015-01-01

Is moral beauty different from facial beauty? Two functional magnetic resonance imaging experiments were performed to answer this question. Experiment 1 investigated the network of moral aesthetic judgments and facial aesthetic judgments. Participants performed aesthetic judgments and gender judgments on both faces and scenes containing moral acts. The conjunction analysis of the contrasts ‘facial aesthetic judgment > facial gender judgment’ and ‘scene moral aesthetic judgment > scene gender judgment’ identified the common involvement of the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), inferior temporal gyrus and medial superior frontal gyrus, suggesting that both types of aesthetic judgments are based on the orchestration of perceptual, emotional and cognitive components. Experiment 2 examined the network of facial beauty and moral beauty during implicit perception. Participants performed a non-aesthetic judgment task on both faces (beautiful vs common) and scenes (containing morally beautiful vs neutral information). We observed that facial beauty (beautiful faces > common faces) involved both the cortical reward region OFC and the subcortical reward region putamen, whereas moral beauty (moral beauty scenes > moral neutral scenes) only involved the OFC. Moreover, compared with facial beauty, moral beauty spanned a larger-scale cortical network, indicating more advanced and complex cerebral representations characterizing moral beauty. PMID:25298010

A Neo-Kohlbergian Approach to Morality Research.

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Rest, James R.; Narvaez, Darcia; Thoma, Stephen J.; Bebeau, Muriel J.

2000-01-01

Proposes a model of moral judgment that builds on Lawrence Kohlberg's core assumptions. Addresses the concerns that have surfaced related to Kohlberg's work in moral judgment. Presents an overview of this model using Kohlberg's basic starting points, ideas from cognitive science, and developments in moral philosophy. (CMK)

BRAIN, EMOTION, AND MORAL JUDGEMENT

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Fransisca Ting

2016-06-01

Full Text Available The dual process theory posits that people relies on their emotion (especially negative emotions when they are faced with personal moral dilemmas, such as pushing a person off a footbridge in order to stop a trolley that would otherwise kill five people. In an fMRI investigation, the medial frontal gyrus, posterior cingulate gyrus, and bilateral angular gyrus are more activated in considering a personal moral dilemma, leading them to make a characteristically deontological judgment. On the other hand, people are less emotionally engaged in non‐personal moral dilemmas, leading them to be more consequentialist in their judgment. Empathy is argued to be a salient moral emotion that could alter one’s moral judgment in moral dilemmas. Specifically, when judging about the permissibility of a person’s proposed action, the subjects will judge those they empathize with less harshly, and when they themselves have to make the decision, they will tend to save the party they empathize with across dilemmas.

The Development of Intention-Based Morality: The Influence of Intention Salience and Recency, Negligence, and Outcome on Children's and Adults' Judgments

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Nobes, Gavin; Panagiotaki, Georgia; Engelhardt, Paul E.

2017-01-01

Two experiments were conducted to investigate the influences on 4-8 year-olds' and adults' moral judgments. In both, participants were told stories from previous studies that had indicated that children's judgments are largely outcome-based. Building on recent research in which one change to these studies' methods resulted in substantially more…

[The Recognition of Emotions, Empathy and Moral Judgment in the National Mental Health Survey in Colombia, 2015].

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Matallana, Diana; Gómez-Restrepo, Carlos; Ramirez, Paulina; Martínez, Nathalie Tamayo; Rondon, Martin

2016-12-01

Social cognition refers to the mental processes involved in social interactions. Different aspects, such as the perception of others, self-knowledge, motivation and the cultural context, can modulate empathy responses and moral judgments regarding the actions of others. The National Mental Health Survey (ENSM for its acronym in Spanish) explored aspects of social cognition such as the perception of emotions, empathy and moral judgment in situations in which another person experiences pain. To describe the overall findings of the ENSM in relation to the emotional perception and empathic responses to situations where pain is inflicted on others in an intentional or accidental manner. A total of 3863 people aged 18-96 years old completed the social cognition module. They were asked to identify the emotions expressed in the images of several faces. A modified version of the awareness of social inference test (TASIT) was used. Additionally, the cognitive, affective, and moral elements of empathy were assessed with a modified version of the empathy for pain task (EPT), which uses a sequence of images in which someone is being hurt. Happiness was identified by 91.5% of those interviewed; neutral or emotionless faces were identified by 65%; 55% of respondents correctly identified surprise. Only 19.7%, 21.8% and 27.4% could identify negative emotions like fear, disgust and sadness, respectively. When the data were analysed by age, poverty status, and different regions of the country, the results tend to vary. As regards empathy, 73.7% correctly identified intentional actions, and accidental actions were identified by 56.6%. According to the moral judgment of some respondents, even in situations where the pain was caused by accident, there must be some kind of punishment (20.7% deserved a low punishment and 26.8% a moderate one). Noteworthy findings include the high recognition of happiness by the respondents, in contrast to the apparent difficulty in recognising sadness

Moral education: School as a just community

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Miočinović Ljiljana Đ.

2003-01-01

Full Text Available The paper discusses Kohlberg’s view of moral education, how it was developing and changing over time. Starting from a theoretical postulate that thinking constitutes the essence of morality and from empirical findings of the stage development of moral judgment, in his early works Kohlberg defines moral education as "encouraging the natural course of moral judgment development". As a principal method of work, Kohlberg recommends the encouragement of a cognitive conflict by means of discussing hypothetic moral dilemmas. Criticisms that he is over-intellectualizing moral education, getting acquainted with a collective upbringing in kibbutz's, active participation in work in schools and prisons and finding that moral judgment and acting in everyday life is a response to the prevailing moral atmosphere of a group are leading to the changes in moral education goals and development of a new approach known as "just community". Now a group is in the focus of moral education, not an individual any longer, the major area of studies being group norms and expectations. The "just community" approach does not remain only at the classroom level discussing hypothetical moral dilemmas but directly influences the structure of school justice i.e. its rules and discipline, processes they are passed as well as the rights and duties of both teachers and students. Its goal is no longer to develop moral judgment of an individual student but to develop a group as moral community founded upon the norms of trust, participation and collective responsibility.

Towards a Kantian Theory of Judgment : the power of judgment in its practical and aesthetic employment

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During, D.K.; Duwell, M.

2015-01-01

Human beings orient themselves in the world via judgments; factual, moral, prudential, aesthetic, and all kinds of mixed judgments. Particularly for normative orientation in complex and contested contexts of action, it can be challenging to form judgments. This paper explores what one can reasonably

The measurement of principled morality by the Kohlberg Moral Dilemma Questionnaire.

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Heilbrun, A B; Georges, M

1990-01-01

The four stages preceding the postconventional level in the Kohlberg (1958, 1971, 1976) system of moral development are described as involving moral judgments that conform to external conditions of punishment, reward, social expectation, and conformity to the law. No special level of self-control seems necessary to behave in keeping with these conditions of external reinforcement. In contrast, the two stages of postconventional (principled) mortality involve defiance of majority opinion and defiance of the law--actions that would seem to require greater self-control. This study was concerned with whether postconventional moral reasoning, as measured by the Kohlberg Moral Dilemma Questionnaire (MDQ), can be associated with higher self-control. If so, prediction of principled moral behavior from the MDQ would be based not only on postconventional moral reasoning but bolstered by the necessary level of self-control as well. College students who came the closest to postconventional moral reasoning showed better self-control than college students who were more conventional or preconventional in their moral judgments. These results support the validity of the MDQ for predicting principled moral behavior.

Roman Catholic beliefs produce characteristic neural responses to moral dilemmas.

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Christensen, Julia F; Flexas, Albert; de Miguel, Pedro; Cela-Conde, Camilo J; Munar, Enric

2014-02-01

This study provides exploratory evidence about how behavioral and neural responses to standard moral dilemmas are influenced by religious belief. Eleven Catholics and 13 Atheists (all female) judged 48 moral dilemmas. Differential neural activity between the two groups was found in precuneus and in prefrontal, frontal and temporal regions. Furthermore, a double dissociation showed that Catholics recruited different areas for deontological (precuneus; temporoparietal junction) and utilitarian moral judgments [dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC); temporal poles], whereas Atheists did not (superior parietal gyrus for both types of judgment). Finally, we tested how both groups responded to personal and impersonal moral dilemmas: Catholics showed enhanced activity in DLPFC and posterior cingulate cortex during utilitarian moral judgments to impersonal moral dilemmas and enhanced responses in anterior cingulate cortex and superior temporal sulcus during deontological moral judgments to personal moral dilemmas. Our results indicate that moral judgment can be influenced by an acquired set of norms and conventions transmitted through religious indoctrination and practice. Catholic individuals may hold enhanced awareness of the incommensurability between two unequivocal doctrines of the Catholic belief set, triggered explicitly in a moral dilemma: help and care in all circumstances-but thou shalt not kill.

Extraversion, neuroticism, immoral judgment and criminal behaviour.

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Addad, M; Leslau, A

1989-01-01

The present study examines delinquent behaviour by integrating two approaches until now employed separately: Eysnck's theory linking delinquency to extraversion and neuroticism, and Kohlberg's theory of moral development and its connection to moral behaviour. The study analyzes the relations between extraversion, neuroticism and moral judgment, as well as their independent and/or interactive effect upon the development of anti-social behaviour. The relationships are tested by retrospective measurements of personality traits and moral judgment in three groups: delinquency (N = 203), control (N = 82) and comparative (N = 407) groups. Findings show that criminals are higher than control subjects in neuroticism and immoral judgment but not in extraversion. Similar relationships were found between criminals and the comparative group, with one exception: here extraversion was found to be positively related to delinquency, both independently and interactively with neuroticism. The implications of these results for differential development of anti-social behaviour are discussed.

Moral motivation within groups

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Lee, Romy van der

2013-01-01

Morality is of particular importance to people: People want to be considered moral and want to belong to moral groups. Consequently, morality judgments have the potential to motivate individuals to behave in ways that are considered to be ‘good’. In the current dissertation, I examined the impact of

Unifying Kohlberg with Information Integration: The Moral Algebra of Recompense and of Kohlbergian Moral Informers

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Hommers, Wilfried; Lee, Wha-Yong

2010-01-01

In order to unify two major theories of moral judgment, a novel task is employed which combines elements of Kohlberg's stage theory and of the theory of information integration. In contrast to the format of Kohlberg's moral judgment interview, a nonverbal and quantitative response which makes low demands on verbal facility was used. Moral…

From moral to legal judgment: the influence of normative context in lawyers and other academics.

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Schleim, Stephan; Spranger, Tade M; Erk, Susanne; Walter, Henrik

2011-01-01

Various kinds of normative judgments are an integral part of everyday life. We extended the scrutiny of social cognitive neuroscience into the domain of legal decisions, investigating two groups, lawyers and other academics, during moral and legal decision-making. While we found activation of brain areas comprising the so-called 'moral brain' in both conditions, there was stronger activation in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and middle temporal gyrus particularly when subjects made legal decisions, suggesting that these were made in respect to more explicit rules and demanded more complex semantic processing. Comparing both groups, our data show that behaviorally lawyers conceived themselves as emotionally less involved during normative decision-making in general. A group × condition interaction in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex suggests a modulation of normative decision-making by attention based on subjects' normative expertise.

Why People with More Emotion Regulation Difficulties Made a More Deontological Judgment: The Role of Deontological Inclinations.

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Zhang, Lisong; Li, Zhongquan; Wu, Xiaoyuan; Zhang, Ziyuan

2017-01-01

Previous studies have demonstrated the key role of emotion in moral judgment, and explored the relationship between emotion regulation and moral judgment. The present study investigated the influence of individual differences in emotion regulation difficulties on moral judgment. Study 1 examined whether individuals with high emotion regulation difficulties made a more deontological judgment. Study 2 explored the underlying mechanism using a process-dissociation approach, examining whether deontological inclinations and utilitarian inclinations separately or jointly accounted for the association. The results indicated that individuals with high emotion regulation difficulties rated the utilitarian actions less morally appropriate, and one's deontological inclinations mediated the association between emotion regulation difficulties and moral judgment.

Neural evidence for moral intuition and the temporal dynamics of interactions between emotional processes and moral cognition.

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Gui, Dan-Yang; Gan, Tian; Liu, Chao

2016-01-01

Behavioral and neurological studies have revealed that emotions influence moral cognition. Although moral stimuli are emotionally charged, the time course of interactions between emotions and moral judgments remains unknown. In the present study, we investigated the temporal dynamics of the interaction between emotional processes and moral cognition. The results revealed that when making moral judgments, the time course of the event-related potential (ERP) waveform was significantly different between high emotional arousal and low emotional arousal contexts. Different stages of processing were distinguished, showing distinctive interactions between emotional processes and moral reasoning. The precise time course of moral intuition and moral reasoning sheds new light on theoretical models of moral psychology. Specifically, the N1 component (interpreted as representing moral intuition) did not appear to be influenced by emotional arousal. However, the N2 component and late positive potential were strongly affected by emotional arousal; the slow wave was influenced by both emotional arousal and morality, suggesting distinct moral processing at different emotional arousal levels.

Elevated moral condemnation of third-party violations in multiple sclerosis patients.

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Patil, Indrajeet; Young, Liane; Sinay, Vladimiro; Gleichgerrcht, Ezequiel

2017-06-01

Recent research has demonstrated impairments in social cognition associated with multiple sclerosis (MS). The present work asks whether these impairments are associated with atypical moral judgment. Specifically, we assessed whether MS patients are able to integrate information about intentions and outcomes for moral judgment (i.e., appropriateness and punishment judgments) in the case of third-party acts. We found a complex pattern of moral judgments in MS patients: although their moral judgments were comparable to controls' for specific types of acts (e.g., accidental or intentional harms), they nevertheless judged behaviors to be less appropriate and endorsed more severe punishment across the board, and they were also more likely to report that others' responses would be congruent with theirs. Further analyses suggested that elevated levels of externally oriented cognition in MS (due to co-occurring alexithymia) explain these effects. Additionally, we found that the distinction between appropriateness and punishment judgments, whereby harmful outcomes influence punishment judgments to a greater extent than appropriateness judgments, was preserved in MS despite the observed disruptions in the affective and motivational components of empathy. The current results inform the two-process model for intent-based moral judgments as well as possible strategies for improving the quality of life in MS patients.

O significado e medida da competência moral revisitada: um modelo do duplo aspecto da competência moral The meaning and measurement of moral competence revisited: a dual-aspect model

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Georg Lind

2000-01-01

Full Text Available O presente artigo enfoca as questões metodológicas envolvidas na mensuração da competência moral, conforme definida por Lawrence Kohlberg. Compara o Moral Judgment Test (MJT com a entrevista de juízo moral elaborada por Kohlberg (MJI - Moral Judgment Interview e com o DIT (Defining Issues Test de James Rest. Os aspectos cognitivo e afetivo são contemplados no MJT de forma a não se confundirem, o que possibilita sua utilização na avaliação de processos de intervenção. Nestas situações pode-se verificar com maior clareza, através do MJT se as mudanças alcançadas referem-se a atitudes ou de fato ao aspecto da competência moral. O papel dos processos educacionais nas famílias, escolas e universidades é valorizado no desenvolvimento da competência moral.This paper focused on the methodological aspects related to the measurement of the moral-competence concept as defined by Lawrence Kohlberg. The Moral Judgment Test (MJT was compared to the Kohlberg’s Moral Judgment Interview (MJI and Rest’s Defining Issues Test (DIT. The cognitive and affective aspects are contemplated in the MJT in such a way that they are not confounded. This procedure allows their use in the assessment of outcomes in the intervention processes. In these situations, it can be verified more clearly through MJT if the changes obtained refer to attitudes or indeed to the moral-competence aspect. Educational processes in families, schools, and universities are valued in the development of moral competence.

Internet Trolling and Everyday Sadism: Parallel Effects on Pain Perception and Moral Judgment.

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Buckels, Erin E; Trapnell, Paul D; Andjelovic, Tamara; Paulhus, Delroy L

2018-04-16

To clarify the association between online trolling and sadistic personality; and provide evidence that the reward and rationalization processes at work in sadism are likewise manifest in online trolling. Online respondents (total N = 1,715) completed self-report measures of personality and trolling behavior. They subsequently engaged in one of two judgment tasks. In Study 1, respondents viewed stimuli depicting scenes of emotional/physical suffering, and provided ratings of (a) perceived pain intensity and (b) pleasure experienced while viewing the photos. In Study 2, the iTroll questionnaire was developed and validated. It was then administered alongside a moral judgment task. Across both studies, online trolling was strongly associated with a sadistic personality profile. Moreover, sadism and trolling predicted identical patterns of pleasure and harm minimization. The incremental contribution of sadism was sustained even when controlling for broader antisocial tendencies (i.e., the Dark Triad, callous-emotionality, and trait aggression). Results confirm that online trolling is motivated (at least in part) by sadistic tendencies. Coupled with effective rationalization mechanisms, sadistic pleasure can be consummated in such everyday behaviors as online trolling. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. © 2018 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Why People with More Emotion Regulation Difficulties Made a More Deontological Judgment: The Role of Deontological Inclinations

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Zhang, Lisong; Li, Zhongquan; Wu, Xiaoyuan; Zhang, Ziyuan

2017-01-01

Previous studies have demonstrated the key role of emotion in moral judgment, and explored the relationship between emotion regulation and moral judgment. The present study investigated the influence of individual differences in emotion regulation difficulties on moral judgment. Study 1 examined whether individuals with high emotion regulation difficulties made a more deontological judgment. Study 2 explored the underlying mechanism using a process-dissociation approach, examining whether deo...

Exploring the Role of Theory of Mind in Moral Judgment: The Case of Children with Autism Spectrum Disorder.

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Fadda, Roberta; Parisi, Marinella; Ferretti, Luca; Saba, Gessica; Foscoliano, Maria; Salvago, Azzurra; Doneddu, Giuseppe

2016-01-01

This paper adds to the growing research on moral judgment (MJ) by considering whether theory of mind (ToM) might foster children's autonomous MJ achievement. A group of 30 children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) was compared in MJ and ToM with 30 typically developing (TD) children. Participants were tested for MJ with a classical Piaget's task and for ToM with a second order False Belief task. In the moral task, children were told two versions of a story: in one version the protagonist acted according to a moral intention but the action resulted in a harmful consequence; in the other version the protagonist acted according to an immoral intention, but the action resulted in a harmless consequence. Children were asked which of the two protagonists was the "naughtier." In line with previous studies, the results indicated that, while the majority of TD participants succeeded in the second order False Belief task, only few individuals with ASD showed intact perspective taking abilities. The analysis of the MJ in relation to ToM showed that children with ASD lacking ToM abilities judged guilty the protagonists of the two versions of the story in the moral task because both of them violated a moral rule or because they considered the consequences of the actions, ignoring any psychological information. These results indicate a heteronomous morality in individuals with ASD, based on the respect of learned moral rules and outcomes rather than others' subjective states.

Face-to-Face and Online: An Investigation of Children's and Adolescents' Bullying Behavior through the Lens of Moral Emotions and Judgments

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Conway, Lauryn; Gomez-Garibello, Carlos; Talwar, Victoria; Shariff, Shaheen

2016-01-01

The current study investigated the influence of type of aggression (cyberbullying or traditional bullying) and participant role (bystander or perpetrator) on children and adolescents' self-attribution of moral emotions and judgments, while examining the influence of chronological age. Participants (N = 122, 8-16 years) evaluated vignettes and were…

Emotion and Morality in Psychopathy and Paraphilias

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Harenski, Carla L.; Kiehl, Kent A.

2011-01-01

Understanding the role of emotion in moral judgment has been an active area of investigation and debate. Here we comment on this topic by examining the interaction between emotion and moral judgment in certain psychopathological groups that are characterized by abnormalities in emotion processing, such as psychopaths and sexual offenders with paraphilic disorders.

Living Slow and Being Moral : Life History Predicts the Dual Process of Other-Centered Reasoning and Judgments.

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Zhu, Nan; Hawk, Skyler T; Chang, Lei

2018-06-01

Drawing from the dual process model of morality and life history theory, the present research examined the role of cognitive and emotional processes as bridges between basic environmental challenges (i.e., unpredictability and competition) and other-centered moral orientation (i.e., prioritizing the welfare of others). In two survey studies, cognitive and emotional processes represented by future-oriented planning and emotional attachment, respectively (Study 1, N = 405), or by perspective taking and empathic concern, respectively (Study 2, N = 424), positively predicted other-centeredness in prosocial moral reasoning (Study 1) and moral judgment dilemmas based on rationality or intuition (Study 2). Cognitive processes were more closely related to rational aspects of other-centeredness, whereas the emotional processes were more closely related to the intuitive aspects of other-centeredness (Study 2). Finally, the cognitive and emotional processes also mediated negative effects of unpredictability (i.e., negative life events and childhood financial insecurity), as well as positive effects of individual-level, contest competition (i.e., educational and occupational competition) on other-centeredness. Overall, these findings support the view that cognitive and emotional processes do not necessarily contradict each other. Rather, they might work in concert to promote other-centeredness in various circumstances and might be attributed to humans' developmental flexibility in the face of environmental challenges.

A Moral (Normative) Framework for the Judgment of Actions and Decisions in the Construction Industry and Engineering: Part II.

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Alkhatib, Omar J

2017-12-01

The construction industry is typically characterized as a fragmented, multi-organizational setting in which members from different technical backgrounds and moral values join together to develop a particular business or project. The most challenging obstacle in the construction process is to achieve a successful practice and to identify and apply an ethical framework to manage the behavior of involved specialists and contractors and to ensure the quality of all completed construction activities. The framework should reflect a common moral ground for myriad people involved in this process to survive and compete ethically in today's turbulent construction market. This study establishes a framework for moral judgment of behavior and actions conducted in the construction process. The moral framework provides the basis of judging actions as "moral" or "immoral" based on three levels of moral accountability: personal, professional, and social. The social aspect of the proposed framework is developed primarily from the essential attributes of normative business decision-making models identified in the literature review and subsequently incorporates additional attributes related to professional and personal moral values. The normative decision-making models reviewed are based primarily on social attributes as related to moral theories (e.g., utilitarianism, duty, rights, virtue, etc.). The professional and moral attributes are established by identifying a set of common moral values recognized by professionals in the construction industry and required to prevent common construction breaches. The moral framework presented here is the complementary part of the ethical framework developed in Part I of this article and is based primarily on the personal behavior or the moral aspect of professional responsibility. The framework can be implemented as a form of preventive personal ethics, which would help avoid ethical dilemmas and moral implications in the first place

Neural foundations to moral reasoning and antisocial behavior

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Yang, Yaling

2006-01-01

A common feature of the antisocial, rule-breaking behavior that is central to criminal, violent and psychopathic individuals is the failure to follow moral guidelines. This review summarizes key findings from brain imaging research on both antisocial behavior and moral reasoning, and integrates these findings into a neural moral model of antisocial behavior. Key areas found to be functionally or structurally impaired in antisocial populations include dorsal and ventral regions of the prefrontal cortex (PFC), amygdala, hippocampus, angular gyrus, anterior cingulate and temporal cortex. Regions most commonly activated in moral judgment tasks consist of the polar/medial and ventral PFC, amygdala, angular gyrus and posterior cingulate. It is hypothesized that the rule-breaking behavior common to antisocial, violent and psychopathic individuals is in part due to impairments in some of the structures (dorsal and ventral PFC, amygdala and angular gyrus) subserving moral cognition and emotion. Impairments to the emotional component that comprises the feeling of what is moral is viewed as the primary deficit in antisocials, although some disruption to the cognitive and cognitive-emotional components of morality (particularly self-referential thinking and emotion regulation) cannot be ruled out. While this neurobiological predisposition is likely only one of several biosocial processes involved in the etiology of antisocial behavior, it raises significant moral issues for the legal system and neuroethics. PMID:18985107

Psychopathy: what apology making tells us about moral agency.

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Ayob, Gloria; Thornton, Tim

2014-02-01

Psychopathy is often used to settle disputes about the nature of moral judgment. The "trolley problem" is a familiar scenario in which psychopathy is used as a test case. Where a convergence in response to the trolley problem is registered between psychopathic subjects and non-psychopathic (normal) subjects, it is assumed that this convergence indicates that the capacity for making moral judgments is unimpaired in psychopathy. This, in turn, is taken to have implications for the dispute between motivation internalists and motivation externalists, for instance. In what follows, we want to do two things: firstly, we set out to question the assumption that convergence is informative of the capacity for moral judgment in psychopathy. Next, we consider a distinct feature of psychopathy which we think provides strong grounds for holding that the capacity for moral judgment is seriously impaired in psychopathic subjects. The feature in question is the psychopathic subject's inability to make sincere apologies. Our central claim will be this: convergence in response to trolley problems does not tell us very much about the psychopathic subject's capacity to make moral judgments, but his inability to make sincere apologies does provide us with strong grounds for holding that this capacity is seriously impaired in psychopathy.

Contextual and perceptual brain processes underlying moral cognition: a quantitative meta-analysis of moral reasoning and moral emotions.

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Sevinc, Gunes; Spreng, R Nathan

2014-01-01

Human morality has been investigated using a variety of tasks ranging from judgments of hypothetical dilemmas to viewing morally salient stimuli. These experiments have provided insight into neural correlates of moral judgments and emotions, yet these approaches reveal important differences in moral cognition. Moral reasoning tasks require active deliberation while moral emotion tasks involve the perception of stimuli with moral implications. We examined convergent and divergent brain activity associated with these experimental paradigms taking a quantitative meta-analytic approach. A systematic search of the literature yielded 40 studies. Studies involving explicit decisions in a moral situation were categorized as active (n = 22); studies evoking moral emotions were categorized as passive (n = 18). We conducted a coordinate-based meta-analysis using the Activation Likelihood Estimation to determine reliable patterns of brain activity. Results revealed a convergent pattern of reliable brain activity for both task categories in regions of the default network, consistent with the social and contextual information processes supported by this brain network. Active tasks revealed more reliable activity in the temporoparietal junction, angular gyrus and temporal pole. Active tasks demand deliberative reasoning and may disproportionately involve the retrieval of social knowledge from memory, mental state attribution, and construction of the context through associative processes. In contrast, passive tasks reliably engaged regions associated with visual and emotional information processing, including lingual gyrus and the amygdala. A laterality effect was observed in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, with active tasks engaging the left, and passive tasks engaging the right. While overlapping activity patterns suggest a shared neural network for both tasks, differential activity suggests that processing of moral input is affected by task demands. The results provide novel

Contextual and perceptual brain processes underlying moral cognition: a quantitative meta-analysis of moral reasoning and moral emotions.

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Gunes Sevinc

Full Text Available BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES: Human morality has been investigated using a variety of tasks ranging from judgments of hypothetical dilemmas to viewing morally salient stimuli. These experiments have provided insight into neural correlates of moral judgments and emotions, yet these approaches reveal important differences in moral cognition. Moral reasoning tasks require active deliberation while moral emotion tasks involve the perception of stimuli with moral implications. We examined convergent and divergent brain activity associated with these experimental paradigms taking a quantitative meta-analytic approach. DATA SOURCE: A systematic search of the literature yielded 40 studies. Studies involving explicit decisions in a moral situation were categorized as active (n = 22; studies evoking moral emotions were categorized as passive (n = 18. We conducted a coordinate-based meta-analysis using the Activation Likelihood Estimation to determine reliable patterns of brain activity. RESULTS & CONCLUSIONS: Results revealed a convergent pattern of reliable brain activity for both task categories in regions of the default network, consistent with the social and contextual information processes supported by this brain network. Active tasks revealed more reliable activity in the temporoparietal junction, angular gyrus and temporal pole. Active tasks demand deliberative reasoning and may disproportionately involve the retrieval of social knowledge from memory, mental state attribution, and construction of the context through associative processes. In contrast, passive tasks reliably engaged regions associated with visual and emotional information processing, including lingual gyrus and the amygdala. A laterality effect was observed in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, with active tasks engaging the left, and passive tasks engaging the right. While overlapping activity patterns suggest a shared neural network for both tasks, differential activity suggests that

A meta-analysis of response-time tests of the sequential two-systems model of moral judgment.

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Baron, Jonathan; Gürçay, Burcu

2017-05-01

The (generalized) sequential two-system ("default interventionist") model of utilitarian moral judgment predicts that utilitarian responses often arise from a system-two correction of system-one deontological intuitions. Response-time (RT) results that seem to support this model are usually explained by the fact that low-probability responses have longer RTs. Following earlier results, we predicted response probability from each subject's tendency to make utilitarian responses (A, "Ability") and each dilemma's tendency to elicit deontological responses (D, "Difficulty"), estimated from a Rasch model. At the point where A = D, the two responses are equally likely, so probability effects cannot account for any RT differences between them. The sequential two-system model still predicts that many of the utilitarian responses made at this point will result from system-two corrections of system-one intuitions, hence should take longer. However, when A = D, RT for the two responses was the same, contradicting the sequential model. Here we report a meta-analysis of 26 data sets, which replicated the earlier results of no RT difference overall at the point where A = D. The data sets used three different kinds of moral judgment items, and the RT equality at the point where A = D held for all three. In addition, we found that RT increased with A-D. This result holds for subjects (characterized by Ability) but not for items (characterized by Difficulty). We explain the main features of this unanticipated effect, and of the main results, with a drift-diffusion model.

Disgust and the moralization of purity.

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Horberg, E J; Oveis, Christopher; Keltner, Dacher; Cohen, Adam B

2009-12-01

Guided by appraisal-based models of the influence of emotion upon judgment, we propose that disgust moralizes--that is, amplifies the moral significance of--protecting the purity of the body and soul. Three studies documented that state and trait disgust, but not other negative emotions, moralize the purity moral domain but not the moral domains of justice or harm/care. In Study 1, integral feelings of disgust, but not integral anger, predicted stronger moral condemnation of behaviors violating purity. In Study 2, experimentally induced disgust, compared with induced sadness, increased condemnation of behaviors violating purity and increased approval of behaviors upholding purity. In Study 3, trait disgust, but not trait anger or trait fear, predicted stronger condemnation of purity violations and greater approval of behaviors upholding purity. We found that, confirming the domain specificity of the disgust-purity association, disgust was unrelated to moral judgments about justice (Studies 1 and 2) or harm/care (Study 3). Finally, across studies, individuals of lower socioeconomic status (SES) were more likely than individuals of higher SES to moralize purity but not justice or harm/care.

Bridging the Divide: The Role of Motivation and Self-Regulation in Explaining the Judgment-Action Gap Related to Academic Dishonesty

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Jason M. Stephens

2018-03-01

Full Text Available There is often a divide between moral judgment and moral action; between what we believe we ought to do (or not do and what we do. Knowledge of this divide is not new, and numerous theories have attempted to offer more robust accounts of ethical decision-making and moral functioning. Knowledge of widespread academic dishonesty among students is also not new, and several studies have revealed that many students report cheating despite believing it is wrong. The present study, involving cross-sectional survey data from a sample of secondary students (N = 380 in the United States, contributes to the literature on this important area of theory and research by fulfilling three broad purposes. The first purpose concerned the assessment of students' judgments related to academic dishonesty, and offered evidence for the utility of a new instrument that measures what domain (personal, conventional, or moral students use to categorize various types of cheating behavior rather than how much they believe it to be wrong. The second purpose involved exploring the relations between domain judgments and engagement in academic dishonesty, and results provided evidence for the hypothesis that students who believed an action to be morally wrong would be less likely to report doing it. Finally, the third and most important purpose of the study involved bridging the divide between moral judgment and action of academic dishonesty by testing competing theoretical models of moral functioning. Results indicated that the data demonstrated the best fit to a modified version of the hypothesized four-component model, whereby self-regulation (in the form of selective moral disengagement played a significant mediating role in the relations between moral judgment and academic dishonesty, and that moral judgment also affected self-regulation indirectly through moral motivation (i.e., responsibility judgments. In brief, findings from this study offer support for the contention

How Not to Evaluate a Psychological Measure: Rebuttal to Criticism of the Defining Issues Test of Moral Judgment Development by Curzer and Colleagues

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Thoma, Stephen J.; Bebeau, Muriel J.; Narvaez, Darcia

2016-01-01

In a 2014 paper in "Theory and Research in Education," Howard Curzer and colleagues critique the Defining Issues Test of moral judgment development according to eight criteria that are described as difficulties any measure of educational outcomes must address. This article highlights how Curzer et al. do not consult existing empirical…

Valores, ética e julgamento moral: um estudo exploratório em empresas familiares Values, ethics and moral judgment: an familiar business exploratory study

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Janine Kieling Monteiro

2005-08-01

Full Text Available Este estudo investigou princípios éticos, valores morais e julgamento moral nas empresas familiares. Participaram 2 empresas gaúchas, com 28 participantes cada. Utilizou-se questionário e MJI. A metodologia foi análise de conteúdo e de freqüência. Os principais resultados foram: ambas empresas possuem código de ética que é conhecido. Foi citado que a má conduta deve ser denunciada, que ambas empresas adotariam medidas corretivas, apesar da punição ser desigual. As infrações mais cometidas foram: mentira, roubo, assédio sexual, consumo de drogas durante expediente, contratação por indicação de pessoas não-qualificadas, informações escondidas sobre empresa, controle de recados e e-mails e exigência de horas-extras sem pagamento adicional. Foram destacados valores como responsabilidade, respeito e honestidade. Não encontramos diferenças significativas no julgamento moral.This paper has investigated ethical principals, moral values and moral judgements into family business. Two gaúcha business, with 28 people each, have participated in. It was utilized a questionnaire and MJI. The methodology used was the analyses of content and frequency. The main results were: both business have code of ethics and it common knowledge. It was said that bad behavior must be revealed and both business would adopt corrective measures despite the fact that punishment is unequal. The transgressions that have been committed the most were: lie, stealing, sexual harassment, use of drugs during office hours, hiring unqualified people by indication, hidden information about the company, messages and e-mails control and requirement of overtime without payment. Values, responsibility, respect and honesty have been highlighted. Significant differences in moral judgment not been founded.

The Neural Correlates of Moral Thinking: A Meta-Analysis

OpenAIRE

Douglas J. Bryant; Wang F; Kelley Deardeuff; Emily Zoccoli; Chang S. Nam

2016-01-01

We conducted a meta-analysis to evaluate current research that aims to map the neural correlates of two typical conditions of moral judgment: right-wrong moral judgments and decision-making in moral dilemmas. Utilizing the activation likelihood estimation (ALE) method, we conducted a meta-analysis using neuroimaging data obtained from twenty-one previous studies that measured responses in one or the other of these conditions. We found that across the studies (n = 400), distinct neural circuit...

Culture and the quest for universal principles in moral reasoning.

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Sachdeva, Sonya; Singh, Purnima; Medin, Douglas

2011-06-01

The importance of including cultural perspectives in the study of human cognition has become apparent in recent decades, and the domain of moral reasoning is no exception. The present review focuses on moral cognition, beginning with Kohlberg's model of moral development which relies heavily on people's justifications for their judgments and then shifting to more recent theories that rely on rapid, intuitive judgments and see justifications as more or less irrelevant to moral cognition. Despite this dramatic shift, analyses of culture and moral decision-making have largely been framed as a quest for and test of universal principles of moral judgment. In this review, we discuss challenges that remain in trying to understand crosscultural variability in moral values and the processes that underlie moral cognition. We suggest that the universalist framework may lead to an underestimation of the role of culture in moral reasoning. Although the field has made great strides in incorporating more and more cultural perspectives in order to understand moral cognition, theories of moral reasoning still do not allow for substantial variation in how people might conceptualize the domain of the moral. The processes that underlie moral cognition may not be a human universal in any simple sense, because moral systems may play different roles in different cultures. We end our review with a discussion of work that remains to be done to understand cultural variation in the moral domain.

Priming children's use of intentions in moral judgement with a metacognitive training

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Katarina eGvozdic

2016-03-01

Full Text Available Typically, adults give a primary role to the agent’s intention to harm when performing a moral judgment of accidental harm. By contrast, children often focus on outcomes, underestimating the actor’s mental states when judging someone for his action, and rely on what we suppose to be intuitive and emotional processes. The present study explored the processes involved in the development of the capacity to integrate agents’ intentions into their moral judgment of accidental harm in 5 to 8 year old children. This was done by the use of different metacognitive trainings reinforcing different abilities involved in moral judgments (mentalising abilities, executive abilities or no reinforcement, similar to a paradigm previously used in the field of deductive logic. Children’s moral judgments were gathered before and after the training with non-verbal cartoons depicting agents whose actions differed only based on their causal role or their intention to harm. We demonstrated that a metacognitive training could induce an important shift in children’s moral abilities, showing that only children who were explicitly instructed to not focus too much on the consequences of accidental harm, preferentially weighted the agents’ intentions in their moral judgments. Our findings confirm that children between the ages of 5 and 8 are sensitive to the intention of agents, however, at that age, this ability is insufficient in order to give a mature moral judgment. Our experiment is the first that suggests the critical role of inhibitory resources in processing accidental harm.

Emotional Reactions and Moral Judgment: the Effects of Morally Challenging Interactions in Military Operations

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de Graaff, Miriam; Schut, M; Verweij, D.E.M.; Vermetten, H.G.J.M.; Giebels, Ellen

2016-01-01

This study explores the association between different types of morally challenging interactions during military deployment and response strategies (e.g., moral justification), as well as the mediating role of moral emotions. Interviews with Dutch servicemen who participated in military operations

The Mismeasure of Morals: Antisocial Personality Traits Predict Utilitarian Responses to Moral Dilemmas

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Bartels, Daniel M.; Pizarro, David A.

2011-01-01

Researchers have recently argued that utilitarianism is the appropriate framework by which to evaluate moral judgment, and that individuals who endorse non-utilitarian solutions to moral dilemmas (involving active vs. passive harm) are committing an error. We report a study in which participants responded to a battery of personality assessments…

Does "science" make you moral? The effects of priming science on moral judgments and behavior.

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Ma-Kellams, Christine; Blascovich, Jim

2013-01-01

Previous work has noted that science stands as an ideological force insofar as the answers it offers to a variety of fundamental questions and concerns; as such, those who pursue scientific inquiry have been shown to be concerned with the moral and social ramifications of their scientific endeavors. No studies to date have directly investigated the links between exposure to science and moral or prosocial behaviors. Across four studies, both naturalistic measures of science exposure and experimental primes of science led to increased adherence to moral norms and more morally normative behaviors across domains. Study 1 (n = 36) tested the natural correlation between exposure to science and likelihood of enforcing moral norms. Studies 2 (n = 49), 3 (n = 52), and 4 (n = 43) manipulated thoughts about science and examined the causal impact of such thoughts on imagined and actual moral behavior. Across studies, thinking about science had a moralizing effect on a broad array of domains, including interpersonal violations (Studies 1, 2), prosocial intentions (Study 3), and economic exploitation (Study 4). These studies demonstrated the morally normative effects of lay notions of science. Thinking about science leads individuals to endorse more stringent moral norms and exhibit more morally normative behavior. These studies are the first of their kind to systematically and empirically test the relationship between science and morality. The present findings speak to this question and elucidate the value-laden outcomes of the notion of science.

Children's developing metaethical judgments.

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Schmidt, Marco F H; Gonzalez-Cabrera, Ivan; Tomasello, Michael

2017-12-01

Human adults incline toward moral objectivism but may approach things more relativistically if different cultures are involved. In this study, 4-, 6-, and 9-year-old children (N=136) witnessed two parties who disagreed about moral matters: a normative judge (e.g., judging that it is wrong to do X) and an antinormative judge (e.g., judging that it is okay to do X). We assessed children's metaethical judgment, that is, whether they judged that only one party (objectivism) or both parties (relativism) could be right. We found that 9-year-olds, but not younger children, were more likely to judge that both parties could be right when a normative ingroup judge disagreed with an antinormative extraterrestrial judge (with different preferences and background) than when the antinormative judge was another ingroup individual. This effect was not found in a comparison case where parties disagreed about the possibility of different physical laws. These findings suggest that although young children often exhibit moral objectivism, by early school age they begin to temper their objectivism with culturally relative metaethical judgments. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Moral relativism and the premisibility of promoting moral judgments across divergent value systems

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Nilsen, Kine

2005-01-01

"When in Rome do as the Romans do - but what if the Romans go in for some rather nasty doings" (Blackburn 2003:12)? This is Simon Blackburn's challenge towards relativism. The relativist position is often presented as the ultimate example of moral tolerance promptly stating that "anything goes". Because no universally acknowledged hierarchy of moral vaues can be discovered or referred to, all moral claims are judged only in reference to the social context from which they originate (Shafer-Lan...

Moral, Conventional, and Personal Rules: The Perspective of Foster Youth

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Mullins, David; Tisak, Marie S.

2006-01-01

Forty-five foster youth (9-13 year old and 14-17 year olds) were asked to evaluate moral, conventional, and personal rules and violations by providing judgments and reasons. The results suggest that foster youths' judgments distinguished between the moral, conventional, and personal domains. However, in providing reasons to support their judgments…

Moral Rationality and Intuition: An Exploration of Relationships between the Defining Issues Test and the Moral Foundations Questionnaire

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Glover, Rebecca J.; Natesan, Prathiba; Wang, Jie; Rohr, Danielle; McAfee-Etheridge, Lauri; Booker, Dana D.; Bishop, James; Lee, David; Kildare, Cory; Wu, Minwei

2014-01-01

Explorations of relationships between Haidt's Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) and indices of moral decision-making assessed by the Defining Issues Test have been limited to correlational analyses. This study used Harm, Fairness, Ingroup, Authority and Purity to predict overall moral judgment and individual Defining Issues Test-2 (DIT-2)…

Are happier people less judgmental of other people's selfish behaviors? Experimental survey evidence from trust and gift exchange games.

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Drouvelis, Michalis; Powdthavee, Nattavudh

2015-10-01

What determines people's moral judgments of selfish behaviors? Here we study whether people's normative views in trust and gift exchange games, which underlie many situations of economic and social significance, are themselves functions of positive emotions. We use experimental survey methods to investigate the moral judgments of impartial observers empirically, and explore whether we could influence subsequent judgments by deliberately making some individuals happier. We find that moral judgments of selfish behaviors in the economic context depend strongly on the behavior of the interaction partner of the judged person, but their relationships are significantly moderated by an increase in happiness for the person making the judgment.

[The contribution of neuroscience to the understanding of moral behavior].

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Slachevsky, Andrea; Silva, Jaime R; Prenafeta, María Luisa; Novoa, Fernando

2009-03-01

The neuro-scientific study of moral actions and judgments is particularly relevant to medicine, especially when assessing behavior disorders secondary to brain diseases. In this paper, moral behavior is reviewed from an evolutionary and neuro-scientific perspective. We discuss the role of emotions in moral decisions, the role of brain development in moral development and the cerebral basis of moral behavior. Empirical evidence shows a relationship between brain and moral development: changes in cerebral architecture are related to changes in moral decision complexity. Moral development takes a long time, achieving its maturity during adulthood. It is suggested that moral cognition depends on cerebral regions and neural networks related to emotional and cognitive processing (i.e. prefrontal and temporal cortex) and that moral judgments are complex affective and cognitive phenomena. This paper concludes with the suggestion that a satisfactory clinical/legal evaluation of a patient requires that the neural basis of moral behavior should be taken into account.

Moral maturity and delinquency after prenatal alcohol exposure.

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Schonfeld, Amy M; Mattson, Sarah N; Riley, Edward P

2005-07-01

Prenatal exposure to alcohol is associated with cognitive, behavioral and social deficits, including delinquency. Although delinquent populations and those with intellectual and behavioral deficits exhibit impaired moral judgment and reasoning, this area remains unexplored in alcohol-exposed individuals. Moral maturity and delinquency were evaluated in 27 participants with prenatal alcohol exposure (ALC group) and 29 nonexposed controls (CON group) matched on age (range: 10-18), gender, handedness, socioeconomic status and ethnicity. Moral maturity was evaluated using the Sociomoral Reflection Measure-Short Form, and delinquency was evaluated with the Conduct Disorder (CD) Questionnaire. Additional measures included social desirability and inhibition. The ALC group performed at a lower level of moral maturity than the CON group. Whereas Verbal IQ primarily predicted this difference, a deficit on the moral value judgment having to do with relationships with others was specific to prenatal alcohol exposure. Furthermore, delinquency was higher in the ALC group, and specific sociomoral values were predictive of delinquent behavior. Finally, half of the children and adolescents with a history of prenatal alcohol exposure but without fetal alcohol syndrome had probable CD. The results of this study indicate that interventions aimed at reducing delinquency in those with prenatal alcohol exposure are necessary, and targeting moral judgment for this purpose may be beneficial.

Bringing free will down to Earth: people's psychological concept of free will and its role in moral judgment.

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Monroe, Andrew E; Dillon, Kyle D; Malle, Bertram F

2014-07-01

Belief in free will is widespread, and this belief is supposed to undergird moral and legal judgment. Despite the importance of the free will concept, however, there remains widespread confusion regarding its definition and its connection to blame. We address this confusion by testing two prominent models of the folk concept of free will-a metaphysical model, in which free will involves a soul as an uncaused "first mover," and a psychological model, in which free will involves choice, alignment with desires, and lack of constraints. We test the predictions of these two models by creating agents that vary in their capacity for choice and the presence of a soul. In two studies, people's judgments of free will and blame for these agents show little to no basis in ascriptions of a soul but are powerfully predicted by ascriptions of choice capacity. These results support a psychological model of the folk concept of free will. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Adolescents' Self-Attributed Moral Emotions Following a Moral Transgression: Relations with Delinquency, Confidence in Moral Judgment and Age

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Krettenauer, Tobias; Eichler, Dana

2006-01-01

The study investigates adolescents' self-attributed moral emotions following a moral transgression by expanding research with children on the happy-victimizer phenomenon. In a sample of 200 German adolescents from Grades 7, 9, 11, and 13 (M=16.18 years, SD=2.41), participants were confronted with various scenarios describing different moral rule…

Familia, Permisividad y Juicio Moral en Estudiantes de Enseñanza Media de la Provincia de Concepción Family, Permissivity, and Moral Judgement of High School Students of Concepción, Chile

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María Elena Mathiesen

2004-05-01

Full Text Available Se presenta la moralidad de estudiantes de enseñanza media de la Provincia de Concepción, Chile, medida por la aceptación de conductas morales cuestionables y el nivel de desarrollo del juicio moral. Se presentan relaciones entre moralidad y características del joven y su familia. Para ello, se aplicó una encuesta de carácter social a una muestra representativa de 546 estudiantes. Los resultados muestran una baja permisividad moral, más alta en sexualidad y más baja en moralidad personal y legal. Menos de la mitad de los jóvenes emitieron juicios morales válidos. No se encontraron correlaciones significativas entre permisividad moral y juicio moral. Hubo diferencias significativas de moralidad según sexo y religión. Se detectaron relaciones inversas entre permisividad y funcionamiento familiar, y directas, entre rendimiento escolar y juicio moral.This study describes morality in high school students of the Province of Concepción, Chile. The morality was measured through acceptance of questionable moral behaviors and moral judgment development. Relationships between morality and the characteristics of youths an their families are also presented. A social survey was applied to a representative sample of 546 high school students. The results show low moral permissiveness, higher regarding sexuality and lower in personal and legal morality. Less than half of the subjects submitted valid moral judgments. No significant correlations were found between moral permissiveness and moral judgment development. Significant differences of morality were found according to sex and religion. Inverse relationships were found between permissivity and family functioning. Also, direct relationships were found between academic achievement and moral judgment.

Cultural Practices, Oppression, and Morality.

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Turiel, Elliot

1998-01-01

Argues that contested meanings, multiple judgments, and conflicts are part of cultures and the individual's thoughts and actions. Contends that people make moral judgments that may affirm or contradict cultural norms and practices, and sometimes invoke concepts of welfare, justice, and rights. Notes that some key aspects of Baumrind's neo-Marxist…

On the Adaptive Value of Moralized Revulsion from an Evolutionist Perspective

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María Natalia Zavadivker

2014-04-01

Full Text Available The article addresses the role played by “moralized revulsion”, understood as the emotional disgust we feel against individuals and social practices that we deem to be the object of moral evaluation, from an evolutionist perspective. The first part provides a general analysis of the emotion of revulsion and its triggers. Then, the paper discusses two opposing positions regarding the reliability and instrumental value of revulsion in promoting “adequate” moral judgments and inciting to moral action. It then proposes a reinterpretation of the problem from an evolutionist perspective, attempting to correlate the diverse value judgments promoted by moralized revulsion with different adaptive strategies. Finally, it correlates those strategies with liberal and conservative moral positions.

Investigating the Neural and Cognitive Basis of Moral Luck: It's Not What You Do but What You Know.

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Young, Liane; Nichols, Shaun; Saxe, Rebecca

2010-09-01

Moral judgments, we expect, ought not to depend on luck. A person should be blamed only for actions and outcomes that were under the person's control. Yet often, moral judgments appear to be influenced by luck. A father who leaves his child by the bath, after telling his child to stay put and believing that he will stay put, is judged to be morally blameworthy if the child drowns (an unlucky outcome), but not if his child stays put and doesn't drown. Previous theories of moral luck suggest that this asymmetry reflects primarily the influence of unlucky outcomes on moral judgments. In the current study, we use behavioral methods and fMRI to test an alternative: these moral judgments largely reflect participants' judgments of the agent's beliefs. In "moral luck" scenarios, the unlucky agent also holds a false belief. Here, we show that moral luck depends more on false beliefs than bad outcomes. We also show that participants with false beliefs are judged as having less justified beliefs and are therefore judged as more morally blameworthy. The current study lends support to a rationalist account of moral luck: moral luck asymmetries are driven not by outcome bias primarily, but by mental state assessments we endorse as morally relevant, i.e. whether agents are justified in thinking that they won't cause harm.

Developing Moral Responsibleness through Professional Education.

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Strom, Sharon M.; Tennyson, W. Wesley

1989-01-01

Argues that more attention must be given in counselor preparation and practice to developing critical reflectiveness about valued ends when making professional judgments. Describes and evaluates an instructional model designed to further students' capacities and motivations for making rational moral judgments in counseling. (Author/TE)

The science of morality and its normative implications

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Bruni, Tommaso; Mameli, Matteo; Rini, Regina A.

2014-01-01

Neuromoral theorists are those who claim that a scientific understanding of moral judgment through the methods of psychology, neuroscience and related disciplines can have normative implications and can be used to improve the human ability to make moral judgments. We consider three neuromoral theories: one suggested by Gazzaniga, one put forward by Gigerenzer, and one developed by Greene. By contrasting these theories we reveal some of the fundamental issues that neuromoral theories in genera...

Responding to moral dilemmas: the roles of empathy and collectivist values among the Chinese.

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Mann, Stephen K F; Cheng, Viviana

2013-08-01

The present study assessed how empathy and vertical collectivism are related to moral competency in a sample of Hong Kong Chinese university students (N = 153; 70 men, 83 women). The Emotional Tendency Scale, Individualism-Collectivism Scale, and Moral Judgment Test were used to quantify empathy, vertical collectivism, and moral competency, respectively. Results showed that empathy was not statistically significantly correlated with moral judgment. The interaction of vertical collectivism and empathy predicted a theoretically important portion of the variance in moral competency. The role of culture in moral development was discussed.

Learning a commonsense moral theory.

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Kleiman-Weiner, Max; Saxe, Rebecca; Tenenbaum, Joshua B

2017-10-01

We introduce a computational framework for understanding the structure and dynamics of moral learning, with a focus on how people learn to trade off the interests and welfare of different individuals in their social groups and the larger society. We posit a minimal set of cognitive capacities that together can solve this learning problem: (1) an abstract and recursive utility calculus to quantitatively represent welfare trade-offs; (2) hierarchical Bayesian inference to understand the actions and judgments of others; and (3) meta-values for learning by value alignment both externally to the values of others and internally to make moral theories consistent with one's own attachments and feelings. Our model explains how children can build from sparse noisy observations of how a small set of individuals make moral decisions to a broad moral competence, able to support an infinite range of judgments and decisions that generalizes even to people they have never met and situations they have not been in or observed. It also provides insight into the causes and dynamics of moral change across time, including cases when moral change can be rapidly progressive, changing values significantly in just a few generations, and cases when it is likely to move more slowly. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Risk Emotions and Risk Judgments: Passive Bodily Experience and Active Moral Reasoning in Judgmental Constellations.

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Coeckelbergh, Mark; Roeser, Sabine

2010-01-01

Experts typically accuse lay people of “emotional” responses to technological risk as opposed to their own “rational” judgment. This attitude is in tune with risk perception research that qualifies lay people’s responses in terms of bias. By contrast, cognitivists argue that emotions are judgments

The Forms and Functions of Real-Life Moral Decision-Making.

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Krebs, Dennis L.; Denton, Kathy; Wark, Gillian

1997-01-01

Observes that the Kohlbergian model of morality does not give a good account of the ways in which people make moral decisions in their everyday lives. Argues that a functional model of moral judgment and moral behavior derived from evolutionary theory may supply a better account of real-life morality. (DSK)

Homogeneity of Moral Judgment? Apprentices Solving Business Conflicts.

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Beck, Klaus; Heinrichs, Karin; Minnameier, Gerhard; Parche-Kawik, Kirsten

In an ongoing longitudinal study that started in 1994, the moral development of business apprentices is being studied. The focal point of this project is a critical analysis of L. Kohlberg's thesis of homogeneity, according to which people should judge every moral issue from the point of view of their "modal" stage (the most frequently…

Emotional and Utilitarian Appraisals of Moral Dilemmas Are Encoded in Separate Areas and Integrated in Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex

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Montaser-Kouhsari, Leila; Woodward, James; Rangel, Antonio

2015-01-01

Moral judgment often requires making difficult tradeoffs (e.g., is it appropriate to torture to save the lives of innocents at risk?). Previous research suggests that both emotional appraisals and more deliberative utilitarian appraisals influence such judgments and that these appraisals often conflict. However, it is unclear how these different types of appraisals are represented in the brain, or how they are integrated into an overall moral judgment. We addressed these questions using an fMRI paradigm in which human subjects provide separate emotional and utilitarian appraisals for different potential actions, and then make difficult moral judgments constructed from combinations of these actions. We found that anterior cingulate, insula, and superior temporal gyrus correlated with emotional appraisals, whereas temporoparietal junction and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex correlated with utilitarian appraisals. Overall moral value judgments were represented in an anterior portion of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Critically, the pattern of responses and functional interactions between these three sets of regions are consistent with a model in which emotional and utilitarian appraisals are computed independently and in parallel, and passed to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex where they are integrated into an overall moral value judgment. SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Popular accounts of moral judgment often describe it as a battle for control between two systems, one intuitive and emotional, the other rational and utilitarian, engaged in winner-take-all inhibitory competition. Using a novel fMRI paradigm, we identified distinct neural signatures of emotional and utilitarian appraisals and used them to test different models of how they compete for the control of moral behavior. Importantly, we find little support for competitive inhibition accounts. Instead, moral judgments resembled the architecture of simple economic choices: distinct regions represented emotional

Gender differences in responses to moral dilemmas: a process dissociation analysis.

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Friesdorf, Rebecca; Conway, Paul; Gawronski, Bertram

2015-05-01

The principle of deontology states that the morality of an action depends on its consistency with moral norms; the principle of utilitarianism implies that the morality of an action depends on its consequences. Previous research suggests that deontological judgments are shaped by affective processes, whereas utilitarian judgments are guided by cognitive processes. The current research used process dissociation (PD) to independently assess deontological and utilitarian inclinations in women and men. A meta-analytic re-analysis of 40 studies with 6,100 participants indicated that men showed a stronger preference for utilitarian over deontological judgments than women when the two principles implied conflicting decisions (d = 0.52). PD further revealed that women exhibited stronger deontological inclinations than men (d = 0.57), while men exhibited only slightly stronger utilitarian inclinations than women (d = 0.10). The findings suggest that gender differences in moral dilemma judgments are due to differences in affective responses to harm rather than cognitive evaluations of outcomes. © 2015 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.

Children's Moral Reasoning regarding Physical and Relational Aggression

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Murray-Close, Dianna; Crick, Nicki R.; Galotti, Kathleen M.

2006-01-01

Elementary school children's moral reasoning concerning physical and relational aggression was explored. Fourth and fifth graders rated physical aggression as more wrong and harmful than relational aggression but tended to adopt a moral orientation about both forms of aggression. Gender differences in moral judgments of aggression were observed,…

A validação do Teste de Juízo Moral (MJT para diferentes culturas: o caso brasileiro Moral Judgment Test (MJT adaptation for different cultures: Brazilian case

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Patricia Unger Raphael Bataglia

2010-04-01

Full Text Available O presente artigo trata da adaptação do Teste de Juízo Moral (MJT para a língua portuguesa. São apresentados os princípios do teste, seu formato e o processo de validação de conteúdo, constructo e de critério. Da mesma forma, a confiabilidade é discutida utilizando os resultados das pesquisas brasileiras que inclusive geraram a necessidade de elaboração de outro dilema para compor o MJT-xt (estendido.The present article deals with the adaptation of the Moral Judgment Test (MJT for the Portuguese language. The principles of the test, its format and the process of content, construct and criterion validation are presented. In the same way, reliability is discussed using Brazilian research results that produced the necessity of elaborating another dilemma to compose the MJT-xt (extended.

Can the Knobe Effect Be Explained Away? Methodological Controversies in the Study of the Relationship Between Intentionality and Morality.

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Cova, Florian; Lantian, Anthony; Boudesseul, Jordane

2016-10-01

Based on the "Knobe Effect," Knobe has argued that moral evaluations can influence intentionality judgments. However, two methodological objections have been raised against this claim: first, that participants' answers do not accurately reflect what they think and, second, that the Knobe Effect can be fully explained by non-moral factors, such as the agent's desires or beliefs. In this article, we discuss these two methodological objections to the existence of the Knobe Effect and provide new evidence that moral evaluations can shape intentionality judgments. First, Study 1 shows that standard measures of intentionality do not overestimate participants' intentionality judgments. Second, Studies 2 and 3 suggest that participants' moral evaluations still mediate the impact of positive versus negative side-effects on judgments about intentional action, even when taking into account a whole range of non-moral factors. Results suggest that moral evaluations play an irreducible role in shaping our judgments about intentional action. © 2016 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.

Moral Beliefs and Cognitive Homogeneity

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Nevia Dolcini

2018-04-01

Full Text Available The Emotional Perception Model of moral judgment intends to account for experientialism about morality and moral reasoning. In explaining how moral beliefs are formed and applied in practical reasoning, the model attempts to overcome the mismatch between reason and action/desire: morality isn’t about reason for actions, yet moral beliefs, if caused by desires, may play a motivational role in (moral agency. The account allows for two kinds of moral beliefs: genuine moral beliefs, which enjoy a relation to desire, and motivationally inert moral beliefs acquired in ways other than experience. Such etiology-based dichotomy of concepts, I will argue, leads to the undesirable view of cognition as a non-homogeneous phenomenon. Moreover, the distinction between moral beliefs and moral beliefs would entail a further dichotomy encompassing the domain of moral agency: one and the same action might possibly be either genuine moral, or not moral, if acted by individuals lacking the capacity for moral feelings, such as psychopaths.

Unifying Kohlberg with Information Integration: The Moral Algebra of Recompense and of Kohlbergian Moral Informers

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Wilfried Hommers

2010-01-01

Full Text Available In order to unify two major theories of moral judgment, a novel task is employed which combines elements of Kohlberg's stage theory and of the theory of information integration. In contrast to the format of Kohlberg's moral judgment interview, a nonverbal and quantitative response which makes low demands on verbal facility was used . Moral informers differing in value, i.e. high and low, are presented. The differences in effect of those two pieces of information should be substantial for a person at that specific moral stage, but small for a person at a different stage. Hence, these differences may diagnose the person's moral stage in the simplest possible way as the two levels of each of the thoughts were about typical content of the four Kohlbergian preconventional and conventional stages. The novel task allowed additionally to measure the influence of another moral concept which was about the non-Kohlbergian moral concept of recompense. After a training phase, pairs of those thoughts were presented to allow for the study of integration and individual differences. German and Korean children, 8, 10, and 12 years in age, judged deserved punishment. The patterns of means, correlations and factor loadings showed that elements of both theories can be unified, but produced unexpected results also. Additive integration of each of the two pairs of moral informers appeared, either with two Kohlbergian moral informers or with another Kohlbergian moral informer in combination with information about recompense. Also cultural independence as well as dependence, developmental changes between 8 and 10 years, and an outstanding moral impact of recompense in size and distinctiveness were observed.

The Ethical Judgment and Moral Reaction to the Product-Harm Crisis: Theoretical Model and Empirical Research

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Dong Lu

2016-07-01

Full Text Available Based on the dual-process theory of ethical judgment, a research model is proposed for examining consumers’ moral reactions to a product-harm crisis. A national-wide survey was conducted with 801 respondents in China. The results of this study indicate that consumers will react to a product-harm crisis through controlled cognitive processing and emotional intuition. The results of the study also show that consumers view a product-harm crisis as an ethical issue, and they will make an ethical judgment according to the perceived severity and perceived relevance of the crisis. The ethical judgment in the perceived crisis severity and perceived crisis relevance will affect consumers’ condemning emotions in terms of contempt and anger. Through controlled cognitive processing, a personal consumption-related reaction (purchasing intention is influenced by the perceived crisis severity. Furthermore, a social and interpersonal reaction (negative word of mouth is influenced by the perceived crisis relevance through the controlled cognitive processing. This social and interpersonal reaction is also influenced by the perceived crisis severity and perceived crisis relevance through the intuition of other-condemning emotion. Moreover, this study finds that the product knowledge negatively moderates the impact of the perceived crisis severity on the condemning emotions. Therefore, when a consumer has a high level of product knowledge, the effect of perceived crisis severity on the condemning emotions will be attenuated, and vice versa. This study provides scholars and managers with means of understanding and handling of consumers’ reactions to a product-harm crisis.

The failure of medical education to develop moral reasoning in medical students.

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Murrell, Vicki S

2014-12-27

The goal of this study was to determine differences in moral judgment among students in medical school. This cross-sectional study involved students currently enrolled in undergraduate medical education. Recruited via email, 192 students took an online version of the Defining Issues Test to determine their current stage of moral judgment, as well as their percentage of postconventional thought. Independent variables included year of graduation, which indicated curriculum completion as well as participation in a professionalism course. Data was analyzed primarily using One-Way Analysis of Variance. Of the 192 participants, 165 responses were utilized. ANOVA showed no significant differences in moral judgment between or among any of the student cohorts, which were grouped by year of matriculation. Comparisons included students in the four years of medical school, divided by graduation year; students about to graduate (n=30) vs. those still in school (n=135); and students who had participated in a course in professionalism (n=91) vs. those who had not (n=74). These results demonstrate a lack of evolution in the moral reasoning of medical students and raise the issue of what might stimulate positive changes in moral judgment during the medical school experience.

Temporal dynamics of disgust and morality: an event-related potential study.

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Qun Yang

Full Text Available Disgust is argued to be an emotion that motivates the avoidance of disease-causing entities in the physical domain and unacceptable behaviors in the social-moral domain. Empirical work from behavioral, physiological and brain imaging studies suggests moral judgments are strongly modulated by disgust feelings. Yet, it remains unclear how they are related in the time course of neural processing. Examining the temporal order of disgust emotion and morality could help to clarify the role of disgust in moral judgments. In the present research, a Go/No-Go paradigm was employed to evoke lateralized readiness potentials (LRPs to investigate the temporal order of physical disgust and moral information processing. Participants were asked to give a "yes" or "no" response regarding the physical disgust and moral wrongness of a social act. The results showed that the evaluation of moral information was processed prior to that of physical disgust information. This suggests that moral information is available earlier than physical disgust, and provides more data on the biological heterogeneity between disgust and morality in terms of the time course of neural activity. The findings implicate that physical disgust emotion may not be necessary for people to make moral judgments. They also suggest that some of our moral experience may be more fundamental (than physical disgust experience to our survival and development, as humans spend a considerable amount of time engaging in social interaction.

Religious Conviction, Morality and Social Convention among Finnish Adolescents

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Vainio, Annukka

2011-01-01

The assumptions of Kohlberg, Turiel and Shweder regarding the features of moral reasoning were compared empirically. The moral reasoning of Finnish Evangelical Lutheran, Conservative Laestadian and non-religious adolescents was studied using Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview and Turiel Rule Transgression Interview methods. Religiosity and choice…

Why moral philosophers are not and should not be moral experts.

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Archard, David

2011-03-01

Professional philosophers are members of bioethical committees and regulatory bodies in areas of interest to bioethicists. This suggests they possess moral expertise even if they do not exercise it directly and without constraint. Moral expertise is defined, and four arguments given in support of scepticism about their possession of such expertise are considered and rejected: the existence of extreme disagreement between moral philosophers about moral matters; the lack of a means clearly to identify moral experts; that expertise cannot be claimed in that which lacks objectivity; and that ordinary people do not follow the advice of moral experts. I offer a better reason for scepticism grounded in the relation between moral philosophy and common-sense morality: namely that modern moral philosophy views even a developed moral theory as ultimately anchored in common-sense morality, that set of basic moral precepts which ordinary individuals have command of and use to regulate their own lives. Even if moral philosophers do nevertheless have a limited moral expertise, in that they alone can fully develop a set of moral judgments, I sketch reasons - grounded in the values of autonomy and of democracy - why moral philosophers should not wish non-philosophers to defer to their putative expertise. © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

The moral appropriateness of shame

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M. Ally

2005-07-01

Full Text Available In this article I explore the much neglected moral emotion of shame and consider the senses in which it may be regarded as morally appropriate. I argue that there is a connection between coming to terms with shame for those who feel ashamed, and judgments concerning its moral appropriateness. The elucidation of normative connections between shame, self-respect and autonomy implies the need to accept certain aspects of shame as regrettable yet, sometimes, as valuable.

The Unifying Moral Dyad: Liberals and Conservatives Share the Same Harm-Based Moral Template.

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Schein, Chelsea; Gray, Kurt

2015-08-01

Do moral disagreements regarding specific issues (e.g., patriotism, chastity) reflect deep cognitive differences (i.e., distinct cognitive mechanisms) between liberals and conservatives? Dyadic morality suggests that the answer is "no." Despite moral diversity, we reveal that moral cognition--in both liberals and conservatives--is rooted in a harm-based template. A dyadic template suggests that harm should be central within moral cognition, an idea tested--and confirmed--through six specific hypotheses. Studies suggest that moral judgment occurs via dyadic comparison, in which counter-normative acts are compared with a prototype of harm. Dyadic comparison explains why harm is the most accessible and important of moral content, why harm organizes--and overlaps with--diverse moral content, and why harm best translates across moral content. Dyadic morality suggests that various moral content (e.g., loyalty, purity) are varieties of perceived harm and that past research has substantially exaggerated moral differences between liberals and conservatives. © 2015 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.

Frontopolar and anterior temporal cortex activation in a moral judgment task: preliminary functional MRI results in normal subjects Ativação do córtex frontopolar e temporal anterior em uma tarefa de julgamento moral: resultados preliminares de ressonância magnética funcional em indivíduos normais

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Jorge Moll

2001-09-01

Full Text Available OBJECTIVE: To study the brain areas which are activated when normal subjects make moral judgments. METHOD: Ten normal adults underwent BOLD functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI during the auditory presentation of sentences that they were instructed to silently judge as either "right" or "wrong". Half of the sentences had an explicit moral content ("We break the law when necessary", the other half comprised factual statements devoid of moral connotation ("Stones are made of water". After scanning, each subject rated the moral content, emotional valence, and judgment difficulty of each sentence on Likert-like scales. To exclude the effect of emotion on the activation results, individual responses were hemodynamically modeled for event-related fMRI analysis. The general linear model was used to evaluate the brain areas activated by moral judgment. RESULTS: Regions activated during moral judgment included the frontopolar cortex (FPC, medial frontal gyrus, right anterior temporal cortex, lenticular nucleus, and cerebellum. Activation of FPC and medial frontal gyrus (BA 10/46 and 9 were largely independent of emotional experience and represented the largest areas of activation. CONCLUSIONS: These results concur with clinical observations assigning a critical role for the frontal poles and right anterior temporal cortex in the mediation of complex judgment processes according to moral constraints. The FPC may work in concert with the orbitofrontal and dorsolateral cortex in the regulation of human social conduct.OBJETIVO: Estudar, com ressonância magnética funcional (RMf, as áreas cerebrais normalmente ativadas por julgamentos morais em tarefa de verificação de sentenças. MÉTODO: Dez adultos normais foram estudados com RMf-BOLD durante a apresentação auditiva de sentenças cujo conteúdo foram instruídos a julgar como "certo" ou "errado". Metade das sentenças possuía um conteúdo moral explícito ("Transgredimos a lei se necess

Moral Cognition: Explaining the Gender Difference in Antisocial Behavior.

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Barriga, Alvaro Q.; Morrison, Elizabeth M.; Liau, Albert K.; Gibbs, John C.

2001-01-01

Examined whether gender discrepancy in late adolescents' antisocial behavior may be attributed to gender differences in other moral cognitive variables. Found that mature moral judgment and higher moral self-relevance were associated with lower self-serving cognitive distortion, partially mediating the relationship between those variables and…

Deontological coherence: A framework for commonsense moral reasoning.

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Holyoak, Keith J; Powell, Derek

2016-11-01

We review a broad range of work, primarily in cognitive and social psychology, that provides insight into the processes of moral judgment. In particular, we consider research on pragmatic reasoning about regulations and on coherence in decision making, both areas in which psychological theories have been guided by work in legal philosophy. Armed with these essential prerequisites, we sketch a psychological framework for how ordinary people make judgments about moral issues. Based on a literature review, we show how the framework of deontological coherence unifies findings in moral psychology that have often been explained in terms of a grab-bag of heuristics and biases. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved).

Metaethics in context of engineering ethical and moral systems

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Frank, L.E.; Klincewicz, M.

2016-01-01

It is not clear to what the projects of creating an artificial intelligence (AI) that does ethics, is moral, or makes moral judgments amounts. In this paper we discuss some of the extant metaethical theories and debates in moral philosophy by which such projects should be informed, specifically

Emotional and Utilitarian Appraisals of Moral Dilemmas Are Encoded in Separate Areas and Integrated in Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex.

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Hutcherson, Cendri A; Montaser-Kouhsari, Leila; Woodward, James; Rangel, Antonio

2015-09-09

Moral judgment often requires making difficult tradeoffs (e.g., is it appropriate to torture to save the lives of innocents at risk?). Previous research suggests that both emotional appraisals and more deliberative utilitarian appraisals influence such judgments and that these appraisals often conflict. However, it is unclear how these different types of appraisals are represented in the brain, or how they are integrated into an overall moral judgment. We addressed these questions using an fMRI paradigm in which human subjects provide separate emotional and utilitarian appraisals for different potential actions, and then make difficult moral judgments constructed from combinations of these actions. We found that anterior cingulate, insula, and superior temporal gyrus correlated with emotional appraisals, whereas temporoparietal junction and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex correlated with utilitarian appraisals. Overall moral value judgments were represented in an anterior portion of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Critically, the pattern of responses and functional interactions between these three sets of regions are consistent with a model in which emotional and utilitarian appraisals are computed independently and in parallel, and passed to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex where they are integrated into an overall moral value judgment. Significance statement: Popular accounts of moral judgment often describe it as a battle for control between two systems, one intuitive and emotional, the other rational and utilitarian, engaged in winner-take-all inhibitory competition. Using a novel fMRI paradigm, we identified distinct neural signatures of emotional and utilitarian appraisals and used them to test different models of how they compete for the control of moral behavior. Importantly, we find little support for competitive inhibition accounts. Instead, moral judgments resembled the architecture of simple economic choices: distinct regions represented emotional

'Adventurous' judgments
A comparative exploration into human rights as a moral-political force in judicial law development

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Bas de Gaay Fortman

2006-12-01

Full Text Available This article looks at the development of law by the judiciary in the sense of judgments taking the law beyond the point of what was hitherto regarded as ius positivum. Its main perspective, however, is not the creation of law by the courts as such, but rather the ways and means in which the human rights idea has encouraged judges to deliver decisions that imply an overturning of 'settled' law. In the comparative exploration of 'adventurous' judgments that we shall embark on, our focus will be on the political morality of human rights as a driving force in judicial activism. It is assumed, in other words, that where the judiciary is 'active', human rights may play a part as general principles of law as distinct from rules already incorporated in positive law. Notably then, human rights in this way affect positive law in a manner other than through processes of international, regional and national standard setting connected with the establishment of new supervisory institutions and mechanisms. For this reason, the article does not so much consider typical human rights cases; instead the focus is on major decisions by national courts that were not in the first place regarded as human rights cases at all. In this endeavour, the article aims to be no more than an initial comparative exploration, intended to illustrate a function of human rights that is not normally highlighted, namely its function as an inspirational force towards 'adventurous' judgments. Yet, the judicial potential illustrated here is of great significance, as it may lead to law development inspired by the two principal pillars underpinning the international quest for the realization of human rights: universality and human dignity. After reviewing a variety of characteristic cases from such diverse legal backgrounds as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the United States of America, India, South Africa and Nigeria, some conclusions are drawn as to the ways in which human rights

Julgamento moral sobre pena de morte e redução da maioridade penal Moral judgments on death penalty and reduction of criminal majority

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Lilian Kelly de Sousa Galvão

2011-08-01

Full Text Available O objetivo principal deste trabalho foi investigar o julgamento moral de estudantes do ensino médio e de licenciaturas sobre pena de morte e redução da maioridade penal. Para tanto, utilizou-se como suporte teórico e empírico a tipologia do desenvolvimento moral de Lawrence Kohlberg. Participaram deste estudo 200 estudantes que responderam, além de uma lista que solicitava informações de alguns dos seus dados biodemográficos, a questões relacionadas à pena de morte e à redução da maioridade penal. De um modo geral, os participantes opinaram favoravelmente pela pena de morte e pela redução da maioridade penal, e, em defesa de suas opiniões, utilizaram, sobretudo, argumentos típicos dos estágios hierarquicamente inferiores da tipologia kohlberguiana, havendo, contudo, algumas diferenças entre as respostas em função do grau de escolaridade. Esses resultados foram discutidos com base na teoria kohlberguiana e em estudos empíricos que tratam dos temas pena de morte e redução da maioridade penal.The aim of this study was to investigate the moral judgments of students of high school and degrees on the death penalty and the reduction of criminal majority. Thus, it was used to support the theoretical and empirical typology of moral development of Lawrence Kohlberg. The study included 200 students who responded, beyond a list that requested information from some of their bio-demographic data, questions related to death penalty and reduction of criminal majority. In general, participants opined in favor of the death penalty and the reduction of criminal majority, and in defense of their views, used mainly typical arguments hierarchically lower stages of the Kohlberg's typology there, however, some differences between the responses according to level of schooling. These results were discussed taking into consideration the Kohlberg's theory and empirical studies dealing with the issues of death penalty and reduction of criminal

Discourse, Justification, and Education: Jürgen Habermas on Moral Epistemology and Dialogical Conditions of Moral Justification and Rightness

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Okshevsky, Walter C.

2016-01-01

In this essay Walter Okshevsky addresses the question of whether a certain form of dialogically derived agreement can function as an epistemic (universal and necessary) criterion of moral judgment and ground of moral authority. Okshevsky examines arguments for and against in the literature of educational philosophy and develops Jürgen Habermas's…

Emotion-based learning systems and the development of morality.

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Blair, R J R

2017-10-01

In this paper it is proposed that important components of moral development and moral judgment rely on two forms of emotional learning: stimulus-reinforcement and response-outcome learning. Data in support of this position will be primarily drawn from work with individuals with the developmental condition of psychopathy as well as fMRI studies with healthy individuals. Individuals with psychopathy show impairment on moral judgment tasks and a pronounced increased risk for instrumental antisocial behavior. It will be argued that these impairments are developmental consequences of impaired stimulus-aversive conditioning on the basis of distress cue reinforcers and response-outcome learning in individuals with this disorder. Copyright © 2017. Published by Elsevier B.V.

Reasoning, Cognitive Control, and Moral Intuition

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Richard ePatterson

2012-12-01

Full Text Available Recent Social Intuitionist work suggests that moral judgments are intuitive (not based on conscious deliberation or any significant chain of inference, and that the reasons we produce to explain or justify our judgments and actions are for the most part post hoc rationalizations rather than the actual source of those judgments. This is consistent with work on judgment and explanation in other domains, and it correctly challenges one-sidedly rationalistic accounts. We suggest that in fact reasoning has a great deal of influence on moral judgments and on intuitive judgments in general. This influence is not apparent from study of judgments simply in their immediate context, but it is crucial for the question of how cognition can help us avoid deleterious effects and enhance potentially beneficial effects of affect on judgment, action, and cognition itself. We begin with established work on several reactive strategies for cognitive control of affect (e.g., suppression, reappraisal, then give special attention to more complex sorts of conflict (extended deliberation involving multiple interacting factors, both affective and reflective. These situations are especially difficult to study in a controlled way, but we propose some possible experimental approaches. We then review proactive strategies for control, including avoidance of temptation and mindfulness meditation (Froeliger, et al, 2012, This Issue. We give special attention to the role of slow or cool cognitive processes (e.g., deliberation, planning, executive control in the inculcation of long-term dispositions, traits, intuitions, skills or habits. The latter are critical because they in turn give rise to a great many of our fast, intuitive judgments. The reasoning processes involved here are distinct from post hoc rationalizations and have a very real impact on countless intuitive judgments in concrete situations. This calls for a substantial enlargement of research on cognitive control.

How Does Reasoning (Fail to) Contribute to Moral Judgment? Dumbfounding and Disengagement

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Hindriks, Frank

Recent experiments in moral psychology have been taken to imply that moral reasoning only serves to reaffirm prior moral intuitions. More specifically, Jonathan Haidt concludes from his moral dumbfounding experiments, in which people condemn other people’s behavior, that moral reasoning is biased

Brain correlates of aesthetic judgment of beauty.

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Jacobsen, Thomas; Schubotz, Ricarda I; Höfel, Lea; Cramon, D Yves V

2006-01-01

Functional MRI was used to investigate the neural correlates of aesthetic judgments of beauty of geometrical shapes. Participants performed evaluative aesthetic judgments (beautiful or not?) and descriptive symmetry judgments (symmetric or not?) on the same stimulus material. Symmetry was employed because aesthetic judgments are known to be often guided by criteria of symmetry. Novel, abstract graphic patterns were presented to minimize influences of attitudes or memory-related processes and to test effects of stimulus symmetry and complexity. Behavioral results confirmed the influence of stimulus symmetry and complexity on aesthetic judgments. Direct contrasts showed specific activations for aesthetic judgments in the frontomedian cortex (BA 9/10), bilateral prefrontal BA 45/47, and posterior cingulate, left temporal pole, and the temporoparietal junction. In contrast, symmetry judgments elicited specific activations in parietal and premotor areas subserving spatial processing. Interestingly, beautiful judgments enhanced BOLD signals not only in the frontomedian cortex, but also in the left intraparietal sulcus of the symmetry network. Moreover, stimulus complexity caused differential effects for each of the two judgment types. Findings indicate aesthetic judgments of beauty to rely on a network partially overlapping with that underlying evaluative judgments on social and moral cues and substantiate the significance of symmetry and complexity for our judgment of beauty.

Social Understanding in Israeli-Jewish, Israeli-Palestinian, Palestinian, and Jordanian 5-year-old Children: Moral Judgments and Stereotypes.

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Brenick, Alaina; Killen, Melanie; Lee-Kim, Jennie; Fox, Nathan; Leavitt, Lewis; Raviv, Amiram; Masalha, Shafiq; Murra, Farid; Smadi, Yahia

2010-11-30

An empirical investigation was conducted of young Palestinian, Jordanian, Israeli-Palestinian, and Israeli-Jewish children's ( N = 433; M = 5.7 years of age) cultural stereotypes and their evaluations of peer intergroup exclusion based upon a number of different factors, including being from a different country and speaking a different language. Children in this study live in a geographical region that has a history of cultural and religious tension, violence, and extreme intergroup conflict. Our findings revealed that the negative consequences of living with intergroup tension are related to the use of stereotypes. At the same time, the results for moral judgments and evaluations about excluding peers provided positive results about the young children's inclusive views regarding peer interactions.

Remedies for moral damage before the European Court of Human Rights: Cyprus v. Turkey case

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Đajić Sanja

2014-01-01

Full Text Available This article provides the overview of the Cyprus v. Turkey judgment, a recently decided case before the Grand Chamber of the European Court for Human Rights. This is the first inter-State case which ended with pecuniary judgment for moral damages. The article begins with the overview of factual and legal issues in the Cyprus v. Turkey case which is followed by contextualizing this judgment within the general legal framework regarding moral damages and remedies available. The second part provides the insight into the case law of the International Court of Justice, European Court for Human Rights and international investment arbitration in order to assess the status of moral damages under general international law. While all international courts and tribunals recognize moral damage as a cause of action, they seem to respond differently to the issue of remedies. International Court of Justice seems to favour declaratory over pecuniary judgments; European Court of Human Rights tend to award both non-pecuniary and pecuniary remedies for moral damages; international investment tribunals seem to favour pecuniary remedies for moral damages. A separate issue is whether international law permits or rather proscribes punitive damages. While the ILC finds that general international law does not allow for punitive damages there are different opinions, at least within the ECHR setting, that moral damages are inherently punitive for fault-based conduct of the responsible state.

The difference of being human: Morality

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Ayala, Francisco J.

2010-01-01

In The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex, published in 1871, Charles Darwin wrote: “I fully … subscribe to the judgment of those writers who maintain that of all the differences between man and the lower animals the moral sense or conscience is by far the most important.” I raise the question of whether morality is biologically or culturally determined. The question of whether the moral sense is biologically determined may refer either to the capacity for ethics (i.e., the proclivity to judge human actions as either right or wrong), or to the moral norms accepted by human beings for guiding their actions. I propose that the capacity for ethics is a necessary attribute of human nature, whereas moral codes are products of cultural evolution. Humans have a moral sense because their biological makeup determines the presence of three necessary conditions for ethical behavior: (i) the ability to anticipate the consequences of one's own actions; (ii) the ability to make value judgments; and (iii) the ability to choose between alternative courses of action. Ethical behavior came about in evolution not because it is adaptive in itself but as a necessary consequence of man's eminent intellectual abilities, which are an attribute directly promoted by natural selection. That is, morality evolved as an exaptation, not as an adaptation. Moral codes, however, are outcomes of cultural evolution, which accounts for the diversity of cultural norms among populations and for their evolution through time. PMID:20445091

Universalismo versus relativismo no julgamento moral Universalism versus relativism in moral judgment

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Angela M. B. Biaggio

1999-01-01

Full Text Available Este trabalho analisa a posição de diversos autores que têm-se destacado no estudo do julgamento moral, quanto à questão do universalismo versus relativismo. Há valores universais? Há uma seqüência evolutiva de estágios de maturidade moral que se encontre em todas as culturas? Com base em análises e críticas de James Rest, Orlando Lourenço, Lutz Eckensberger e John Snarey, são analisadas posições universalistas, como as de Piaget e Kohlberg (com seus fundamentos em Kant e as posições relativistas, tendo como ponto extremo a de Shweder. Entre os dois campos extremos são comentadas as posições de Turiel, Gilligan, e outros autores.This article analyses positions of distinguished authors in the field of moral development, regarding the issue of universalism versus relativism. Based on analyses and critiques by James Rest, Orlando Lourenço, Lutz Eckensberger, and John Snarey, the author reviews unversalistic positions such as those of Piaget and Kohlberg (with their roots in Kant, and relativistic positions, having as their extreme the position of Shweder. Between the two extremes,the stands of Turiel, Gilligan and other authors are discussed.

Decision Processes in Military Moral Dilemmas: The Role of Moral Intensity and Moral Judgment

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2008-12-01

Kohlberg , L. (1969). Stage and sequence: The cognitive-developmental approach to socialization. In D. Goslin (Ed.), Handbook of Socialization Theory and...Research (pp. 347- 380). Chicago, IL: Rand McNally. [30] Kohlberg , L. (1981). The Philosophy of Moral Development (Vol. 1). San Francisco: Harper

Integrated Moral Conviction Theory of Student Cheating: An Empirical Test

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Roberts, Foster; Thomas, Christopher H.; Novicevic, Milorad M.; Ammeter, Anthony; Garner, Bart; Johnson, Paul; Popoola, Ifeoluwa

2018-01-01

In this article, we develop an "integrated moral conviction theory of student cheating" by integrating moral conviction with (a) the dual-process model of Hunt-Vitell's theory that gives primacy to individual ethical philosophies when moral judgments are made and (b) the social cognitive conceptualization that gives primacy to moral…

Not Just Bad Actions: Affective Concern for Bad Outcomes Contributes to Moral Condemnation of Harm in Moral Dilemmas.

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Reynolds, Caleb J; Conway, Paul

2018-02-01

Moral dilemmas typically entail directly causing harm (said to violate deontological ethics) to maximize overall outcomes (said to uphold utilitarian ethics). The dual process model suggests harm-rejection judgments derive from affective reactions to harm, whereas harm-acceptance judgments derive from cognitive evaluations of outcomes. Recently, Miller, Hannikainen, and Cushman (2014) argued that harm-rejection judgments primarily reflect self-focused-rather than other-focused-emotional responses, because only action aversion (self-focused reactions to the thought of causing harm), not outcome aversion (other-focused reactions to witnessing suffering), consistently predicted dilemma responses. However, they assessed only conventional relative dilemma judgments that treat harm-rejection and outcome-maximization responses as diametric opposites. Instead, we employed process dissociation to assess these response inclinations independently. In two studies (N = 558), we replicated Miller and colleagues' findings for conventional relative judgments, but process dissociation revealed that outcome aversion positively predicted both deontological and utilitarian inclinations-which canceled out for relative judgments. Additionally, individual differences associated with affective processing-psychopathy and empathic concern-correlated with the deontology but not utilitarian parameter. Together, these findings suggest that genuine other-oriented moralized concern for others' well-being contribute to both utilitarian and deontological response tendencies, but these tendencies nonetheless draw upon different psychological processes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

Effect of professional expertise and exposure to everyday life decision-making on moral choices.

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Boccia, Maddalena; Verde, Paola; Angelino, Gregorio; Carrozzo, Paolo; Vecchi, Diego; Piccardi, Laura; Colangeli, Stefano; Cordellieri, Pierluigi; Ferlazzo, Fabio; Giannini, Anna Maria

2017-07-27

Moral sense is defined as a feeling of fairness or unfairness of an action that knowingly causes harm to people other than the subject. It is crucial in determining human behavior and becomes pivotal in operational environments. Here we assessed whether professional daily life experience in an operational environment affects moral judgment by asking 41 military pilots of the Italian Air Force (P) and 69 controls (C) to solve 40 moral dilemmas. We found that P gave more morally acceptable utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas. Interestingly, men and women in P equally accepted utilitarian resolutions of moral dilemmas, whereas in C women were less prone than men to accept utilitarian responses. We conclude that professional daily life experience of P, in an operational environment, affects moral judgment and mitigates gender predisposition towards moral dilemmas. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Cold or Calculating? Reduced Activity in the Subgenual Cingulate Cortex Reflects Decreased Emotional Aversion to Harming in Counterintuitive Utilitarian Judgment

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Wiech, Katja; Kahane, Guy; Shackel, Nicholas; Farias, Miguel; Savulescu, Julian; Tracey, Irene

2013-01-01

Recent research on moral decision-making has suggested that many common moral judgments are based on immediate intuitions. However, some individuals arrive at highly counterintuitive utilitarian conclusions about when it is permissible to harm other individuals. Such utilitarian judgments have been attributed to effortful reasoning that has…

Moral motivation based on multiple developmental structures: an exploration of cognitive and emotional dynamics.

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Kaplan, Ulas; Tivnan, Terrence

2014-01-01

Intrapersonal variability and multiplicity in the complexity of moral motivation were examined from Dynamic Systems and Self-Determination Theory perspectives. L. Kohlberg's (1969) stages of moral development are reconceptualized as soft-assembled and dynamically transformable process structures of motivation that may operate simultaneously within person in different degrees. Moral motivation is conceptualized as the real-time process of self-organization of cognitive and emotional dynamics out of which moral judgment and action emerge. A detailed inquiry into intrapersonal variation in moral motivation is carried out based on the differential operation of multiple motivational structures. A total of 74 high school students and 97 college students participated in the study by completing a new questionnaire, involving 3 different hypothetical moral judgments. As hypothesized, findings revealed significant multiplicity in the within-person operation of developmental stage structures, and intrapersonal variability in the degrees to which stages were used. Developmental patterns were found in terms of different distributions of multiple stages between high school and college samples, as well as the association between age and overall motivation scores. Differential relations of specific emotions to moral motivation revealed and confirmed the value of differentiating multiple emotions. Implications of the present theoretical perspective and the findings for understanding the complexity of moral judgment and motivation are discussed.

Moral bioenhancement and the utilitarian catastrophe.

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Agar, Nicholas

2015-01-01

This article challenges recent calls for moral bioenhancement-the use of biomedical means, including pharmacological and genetic methods, to increase the moral value of our actions or characters. It responds to those who take a practical interest in moral bioenhancement. I argue that moral bioenhancement is unlikely to be a good response to the extinction threats of climate change and weapons of mass destruction. Rather than alleviating those problems, it is likely to aggravate them. We should expect biomedical means to generate piecemeal enhancements of human morality. These predictably strengthen some contributors to moral judgment while leaving others comparatively unaffected. This unbalanced enhancement differs from the manner of improvement that typically results from sustained reflection. It is likely to make its subjects worse rather than better at moral reasoning.

Testing the Moral Algebra of Two Kohlbergian Informers

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Hommers, Wilfried; Lewand, Martin; Ehrmann, Dominic

2012-01-01

This paper seeks to unify two major theories of moral judgment: Kohlberg's stage theory and Anderson's moral information integration theory. Subjects were told about thoughts of actors in Kohlberg's classic altruistic Heinz dilemma and in a new egoistical dilemma. These actors's thoughts represented Kohlberg's stages I (Personal Risk) and IV…

Adolescent Concepts of Responsibility in Different Typesof Moral Dilemmas

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Molchanov S.V.

2017-12-01

Full Text Available The paper presents results of an empirical study of adolescents' concepts of responsibility in different types of moral dilemmas characterized by violations of moral norms. The study proved that the type of moral dilemma and the context of interaction of its participants determine the adolescents' readiness to recognize the responsibility of the main character of the dilemma for violating the norm. In dilemmas of asocial type adolescents are more willing to recognize the responsibility of the offender whose behavior leads to obvious damage for one of the participants in the interaction. As for prosocial dilemmas and dilemmas of confronting norms, adolescents tend to deny the responsibility of the offender. The paper provides a comparative analysis of empirically identified types of adolescent concepts of responsibility, including the differentiated responsibility with egoistic orientation, high responsibility, low responsibility and ‘polar’ responsibility. The authors highlight the ambiguity of the relationship between adolescents’ evaluation of behavior, their readiness to recognize responsibility in moral transgression, and their judgment about the necessity of punishment. The paper concludes with the discussion concerning the relationship between the level of development of moral judgments/moral reasoning and the concepts of responsibility in adolescents.

The Possibility of Moral Reasoning in Hare’s Prescriptivism

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m zamani

2011-09-01

Full Text Available The contemporary approaches to moral philosophy have experienced diverging directions regarding the possibility and justification of reasoning. Hare claims that in spite of the fact that intuitivists like Moore, Ross, and Prichard block the use of reasoning by accepting the intuitiveness of knowledge of good and bad, emotivism takes the same rout by focusing on emotions and emphasizing the freedom of choice. While descriptivism and also naturalism accept the possibility of reasoning through admitting the indicative nature of ethical speech, they reject or limit the freedom of choice. He tries to justify both the freedom of choice and the possibility of rational reasoning in moral. In so doing, Hare takes refuge in the non-self-contradiction and compatibility principles to insist on the universalizability of rules of moral reasoning. To make judgments of relevance is the prerequisite in morals which subsequently encompasses universalizability and the possibility of reasoning. Using the linguistic analysis, Hare tries to show that as language in which predicate-logic governs statements, imperatives and moral sentences are governed by rational relationships and principles of compatibility. From this point of view, an individual’s judgments are justifiable, provided that it is not in contradiction with his previous judgments. The aim of this study is to state, analyze, and criticize Hare’s views regarding the provision of rational reasoning and its possibility in terms of the challenges he faces with regard to competing schools of thought.

The complex relation between morality and empathy.

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Decety, Jean; Cowell, Jason M

2014-07-01

Morality and empathy are fundamental components of human nature across cultures. However, the wealth of empirical findings from developmental, behavioral, and social neuroscience demonstrates a complex relation between morality and empathy. At times, empathy guides moral judgment, yet other times empathy can interfere with it. To better understand such relations, we propose abandoning the catchall term of empathy in favor of more precise concepts, such as emotional sharing, empathic concern, and affective perspective-taking. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Ethical Judgments and Behaviors: Applying a Multidimensional Ethics Scale to Measuring ICT Ethics of College Students

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Jung, Insung

2009-01-01

Assuming that ICT ethics are influenced by both moral and circumstantial factors, the study investigates Japanese college students' ethical judgments and behavioral intentions in three scenarios involving ICT-related ethical problems and explores why they make such decisions, relying on five moral philosophies: moral equity, relativism,…

Cold or calculating? Reduced activity in the subgenual cingulate cortex reflects decreased emotional aversion to harming in counterintuitive utilitarian judgment

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Wiech, Katja; Kahane, Guy; Shackel, Nicholas; Farias, Miguel; Savulescu, Julian; Tracey, Irene

2013-01-01

Recent research on moral decision-making has suggested that many common moral judgments are based on immediate intuitions. However, some individuals arrive at highly counterintuitive utilitarian conclusions about when it is permissible to harm other individuals. Such utilitarian judgments have been attributed to effortful reasoning that has overcome our natural emotional aversion to harming others. Recent studies, however, suggest that such utilitarian judgments might also result from a decreased aversion to harming others, due to a deficit in empathic concern and social emotion. The present study investigated the neural basis of such indifference to harming using functional neuroimaging during engagement in moral dilemmas. A tendency to counterintuitive utilitarian judgment was associated both with ‘psychoticism’, a trait associated with a lack of empathic concern and antisocial tendencies, and with ‘need for cognition’, a trait reflecting preference for effortful cognition. Importantly, only psychoticism was also negatively correlated with activation in the subgenual cingulate cortex (SCC), a brain area implicated in empathic concern and social emotions such as guilt, during counterintuitive utilitarian judgments. Our findings suggest that when individuals reach highly counterintuitive utilitarian conclusions, this need not reflect greater engagement in explicit moral deliberation. It may rather reflect a lack of empathic concern, and diminished aversion to harming others. PMID:23280149

When Moral Awareness Isn't Enough: Teaching Our Students to Recognize Social Influence

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Baker, Diane F.

2014-01-01

The traditional case-based method used to teach ethics in business classrooms gives students valuable practice identifying and applying key moral principles. This approach builds on a rational model of decision making and emphasizes moral awareness and moral judgment, encouraging students to describe moral dilemmas and assess the consequences of…

Morality and Psychopathic Criminals. Ethicocentrism, Mental Incapacity, Free Will, and the Fear of Decriminalization

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Lorenzo Magnani

2012-01-01

Full Text Available Present-day legal judgments of psychopathic criminals strongly avoid the exploitation of “moral” considerations. Currently, the attribution of responsibility to criminals often takes advantage of the cognitive concept of mental incapacity so that, in these cases, the moral judgment about moral conducts of “psycho-pathological” criminals is potentially extinguished. I contend that the theories and methods that are currently used in western societies to discharge moral and legal responsibility are not clear in their epistemic structure and so partially unreliable. To support this conclusion I take advantage of my recent cognitive studies concerning the multiplicity of moral frameworks, the gene/cognitive niche co-evolution, and the concept of free will.

Differences in Moral Judgment on Animal and Human Ethics Issues between University Students in Animal-Related, Human Medical and Arts Programs.

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Verrinder, Joy M; Ostini, Remo; Phillips, Clive J C

2016-01-01

Moral judgment in relation to animal ethics issues has rarely been investigated. Among the research that has been conducted, studies of veterinary students have shown greater use of reasoning based on universal principles for animal than human ethics issues. This study aimed to identify if this was unique to students of veterinary and other animal-related professions. The moral reasoning of first year students of veterinary medicine, veterinary technology, and production animal science was compared with that of students in non-animal related disciplines of human medicine and arts. All students (n = 531) completed a moral reasoning test, the VetDIT, with animal and human scenarios. When compared with reasoning on human ethics issues, the combined group of students evaluating animal ethics issues showed higher levels of Universal Principles reasoning, lower levels of Personal Interest reasoning and similar levels of Maintaining Norms reasoning. Arts students showed more personal interest reasoning than students in most animal-related programs on both animal and human ethics issues, and less norms-based reasoning on animal ethics issues. Medical students showed more norms-based reasoning on animal ethics issues than all of the animal-related groups. There were no differences in principled reasoning on animal ethics issues between program groups. This has implications for animal-related professions and education programs showing that students' preference for principled reasoning on animal ethics issues is not unique to animal-related disciplines, and highlighting the need to develop student (and professional) capacity to apply principled reasoning to address ethics issues in animal industries to reduce the risk of moral distress.

Differences in Moral Judgment on Animal and Human Ethics Issues between University Students in Animal-Related, Human Medical and Arts Programs

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Verrinder, Joy M.; Ostini, Remo; Phillips, Clive J. C.

2016-01-01

Moral judgment in relation to animal ethics issues has rarely been investigated. Among the research that has been conducted, studies of veterinary students have shown greater use of reasoning based on universal principles for animal than human ethics issues. This study aimed to identify if this was unique to students of veterinary and other animal-related professions. The moral reasoning of first year students of veterinary medicine, veterinary technology, and production animal science was compared with that of students in non-animal related disciplines of human medicine and arts. All students (n = 531) completed a moral reasoning test, the VetDIT, with animal and human scenarios. When compared with reasoning on human ethics issues, the combined group of students evaluating animal ethics issues showed higher levels of Universal Principles reasoning, lower levels of Personal Interest reasoning and similar levels of Maintaining Norms reasoning. Arts students showed more personal interest reasoning than students in most animal-related programs on both animal and human ethics issues, and less norms-based reasoning on animal ethics issues. Medical students showed more norms-based reasoning on animal ethics issues than all of the animal-related groups. There were no differences in principled reasoning on animal ethics issues between program groups. This has implications for animal-related professions and education programs showing that students’ preference for principled reasoning on animal ethics issues is not unique to animal-related disciplines, and highlighting the need to develop student (and professional) capacity to apply principled reasoning to address ethics issues in animal industries to reduce the risk of moral distress. PMID:26934582

Moral reasoning about great apes in research

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Okamoto, Carol Midori

2006-04-01

This study explored how individuals (biomedical scientists, Great Ape Project activists, lay adults, undergraduate biology and environmental studies students, and Grade 12 and 9 biology students) morally judge and reason about using great apes in biomedical and language research. How these groups perceived great apes' mental capacities (e.g., pain, logical thinking) and how these perceptions related to their judgments were investigated through two scenarios. In addition, the kinds of informational statements (e.g., biology, economics) that may affect individuals' scenario judgments were investigated. A negative correlation was found between mental attributions and scenario judgments while no clear pattern occurred for the informational statements. For the biomedical scenario, all groups significantly differed in mean judgment ratings except for the biomedical scientists, GAP activists and Grade 9 students. For the language scenario, all groups differed except for the GAP activists, and undergraduate environmental studies and Grade 9 students. An in-depth qualitative analysis showed that although the biomedical scientists, GAP activists and Grade 9 students had similar judgments, they produced different mean percentages of justifications under four moral frameworks (virtue, utilitarianism, deontology, and welfare). The GAP activists used more virtue reasoning while the biomedical scientists and Grade 9 students used more utilitarian and welfare reasoning, respectively. The results are discussed in terms of developing environmental/humane education curricula.

Pedagogical Formation Students' Resistance Behaviors towards Teaching-Learning Processes and Their Moral Maturity

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Argon, Türkan; Sezen-Gültekin, Gözde

2016-01-01

Moral maturity, defined as the competence in moral emotions, thoughts, judgments, attitudes and behaviors, is one of the most important qualities that the would-be teachers at Faculties of Education must possess. Teachers with moral maturity will train students with the qualities of reliability, responsibility, fairness, objectivity, consistency…

De Dicto Moral Desires and the Moral Sentiments : Adam Smith on the Role of De Dicto Moral Desires in the Virtuous Agent

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Archer, Alfred

2017-01-01

What role should a motivation to do the right thing, read de dicto, play in the life of a virtuous agent? According to a prominent argument from Michael Smith, those who are only ever motivated by such a desire are moral fetishists. Smith’s argument is designed to support motivational judgment

A constructionist review of morality and emotions: no evidence for specific links between moral content and discrete emotions.

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Cameron, C Daryl; Lindquist, Kristen A; Gray, Kurt

2015-11-01

Morality and emotions are linked, but what is the nature of their correspondence? Many "whole number" accounts posit specific correspondences between moral content and discrete emotions, such that harm is linked to anger, and purity is linked to disgust. A review of the literature provides little support for these specific morality-emotion links. Moreover, any apparent specificity may arise from global features shared between morality and emotion, such as affect and conceptual content. These findings are consistent with a constructionist perspective of the mind, which argues against a whole number of discrete and domain-specific mental mechanisms underlying morality and emotion. Instead, constructionism emphasizes the flexible combination of basic and domain-general ingredients such as core affect and conceptualization in creating the experience of moral judgments and discrete emotions. The implications of constructionism in moral psychology are discussed, and we propose an experimental framework for rigorously testing morality-emotion links. © 2015 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.

The Development of Generosity and Moral Cognition across Five Cultures

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Cowell, Jason M.; Lee, Kang; Malcolm-Smith, Susan; Selcuk, Bilge; Zhou, Xinyue; Decety, Jean

2017-01-01

Morality is an evolved aspect of human nature, yet is heavily influenced by cultural environment. This developmental study adopted an integrative approach by combining measures of socioeconomic status (SES), executive function, affective sharing, empathic concern, theory of mind, and moral judgment in predicting sharing behavior in children (N =…

Persistent bias in expert judgments about free will and moral responsibility: a test of the expertise defense.

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Schulz, Eric; Cokely, Edward T; Feltz, Adam

2011-12-01

Many philosophers appeal to intuitions to support some philosophical views. However, there is reason to be concerned about this practice as scientific evidence has documented systematic bias in philosophically relevant intuitions as a function of seemingly irrelevant features (e.g., personality). One popular defense used to insulate philosophers from these concerns holds that philosophical expertise eliminates the influence of these extraneous factors. Here, we test this assumption. We present data suggesting that verifiable philosophical expertise in the free will debate-as measured by a reliable and validated test of expert knowledge-does not eliminate the influence of one important extraneous feature (i.e., the heritable personality trait extraversion) on judgments concerning freedom and moral responsibility. These results suggest that, in at least some important cases, the expertise defense fails. Implications for the practice of philosophy, experimental philosophy, and applied ethics are discussed. Copyright © 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

The Moral Reasoning of Sports Management Students in the United States and Italy

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Forte, Almerinda

2013-01-01

The researcher analyzed the moral reasoning ability of Sports Management students in the United States and Italy. The researcher statistically analyzed data collected through a survey questionnaire designed to measure moral reasoning. The Defining Issues Test (DIT) developed by James Rest using Kohlberg's six stages of moral judgment was used in…

Personal and Impersonal Stimuli Differentially Engage Brain Networks during Moral Reasoning

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Xue, Shao-Wei; Wang, Yan; Tang, Yi-Yuan

2013-01-01

Moral decision making has recently attracted considerable attention as a core feature of all human endeavors. Previous functional magnetic resonance imaging studies about moral judgment have identified brain areas associated with cognitive or emotional engagement. Here, we applied graph theory-based network analysis of event-related potentials…

Mortality Salience and Morality: Thinking about Death Makes People Less Utilitarian

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Tremoliere, Bastien; De Neys, Wim; Bonnefon, Jean-Francois

2012-01-01

According to the dual-process model of moral judgment, utilitarian responses to moral conflict draw on limited cognitive resources. Terror Management Theory, in parallel, postulates that mortality salience mobilizes these resources to suppress thoughts of death out of focal attention. Consequently, we predicted that individuals under mortality…

Neuroscience, Moral Psychology and Law: First Lines on the (Impossibility of Rational Persuasion

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Thais de Bessa Gontijo de Oliveira

2015-12-01

Full Text Available Although Law is often influenced by values, nowadays a widely held expert opinion is that the application of law is a result or rational reasoning. It is believed that those applying legal rules consider the conflicting arguments from both parties, and come to a decision by rational means. Nevertheless, new discoveries from Neuroscience and Moral Psychology show that many of these moral judgments that inevitably underlie legal judgments occur unconsciously and not rationally. Once such judgments are passed, they are immune to any dissenting rational  argument.  Through  literature  review,  we  discuss  in  the  present  paper  some derivations  of  these  new  findings  to  Law.  For  instance,  it  is  advisable  that  deeper philosophical training is installed in professional qualification for lawyers and magistrates, making  these  people  more  open-minded  towards  reasons  against  their  own  moral convictions. Furthermore, it is important to consider limiting the mandate of Hight Courts Ministers, in order to prevent that the moral convictions of these people pervade for too long.

The Immoral Landscape? Scientists Are Associated with Violations of Morality.

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Rutjens, Bastiaan T; Heine, Steven J

2016-01-01

Do people think that scientists are bad people? Although surveys find that science is a highly respected profession, a growing discourse has emerged regarding how science is often judged negatively. We report ten studies (N = 2328) that investigated morality judgments of scientists and compared those with judgments of various control groups, including atheists. A persistent intuitive association between scientists and disturbing immoral conduct emerged for violations of the binding moral foundations, particularly when this pertained to violations of purity. However, there was no association in the context of the individualizing moral foundations related to fairness and care. Other evidence found that scientists were perceived as similar to others in their concerns with the individualizing moral foundations of fairness and care, yet as departing for all of the binding foundations of loyalty, authority, and purity. Furthermore, participants stereotyped scientists particularly as robot-like and lacking emotions, as well as valuing knowledge over morality and being potentially dangerous. The observed intuitive immorality associations are partially due to these explicit stereotypes but do not correlate with any perceived atheism. We conclude that scientists are perceived not as inherently immoral, but as capable of immoral conduct.

The Immoral Landscape? Scientists Are Associated with Violations of Morality.

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Bastiaan T Rutjens

Full Text Available Do people think that scientists are bad people? Although surveys find that science is a highly respected profession, a growing discourse has emerged regarding how science is often judged negatively. We report ten studies (N = 2328 that investigated morality judgments of scientists and compared those with judgments of various control groups, including atheists. A persistent intuitive association between scientists and disturbing immoral conduct emerged for violations of the binding moral foundations, particularly when this pertained to violations of purity. However, there was no association in the context of the individualizing moral foundations related to fairness and care. Other evidence found that scientists were perceived as similar to others in their concerns with the individualizing moral foundations of fairness and care, yet as departing for all of the binding foundations of loyalty, authority, and purity. Furthermore, participants stereotyped scientists particularly as robot-like and lacking emotions, as well as valuing knowledge over morality and being potentially dangerous. The observed intuitive immorality associations are partially due to these explicit stereotypes but do not correlate with any perceived atheism. We conclude that scientists are perceived not as inherently immoral, but as capable of immoral conduct.

Aggressive and Nonaggressive Children's Moral Judgments and Moral Emotion Attributions in Situations Involving Retaliation and Unprovoked Aggression

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Gasser, Luciano; Malti, Tina; Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, Eveline

2012-01-01

The authors investigated 7- and 9-year-old children's moral understanding of retaliation as compared to unprovoked aggression with regard to their aggressive behavior status. Based on peer ratings, 48 children were selected as overtly aggressive and 91 as nonaggressive. Their moral understanding of retaliation and unprovoked aggression was…

Religiosity and agency and communion: their relationship to religious judgmentalism.

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Beck, R; Miller, C D

2000-05-01

The present study is an introduction to the construct of religious judgmentalism, defined as a willingness to make religious or moral judgments of others based on a limited period of observation; the study offers a prediction about which individuals will engage in such judgmental behavior. It was predicted that agency motives would significantly predict religious judgmentalism in a religious population but that communion motives and intrinsic religiosity would moderate this effect. Overall, the findings supported these predictions. Agency motives were positively correlated with religious judgmentalism. Intrinsic religiosity predicted a general unwillingness to make religious evaluations of others. Both intrinsic religiosity and communion motives did moderate the effects of high agency motives. Specifically, increases in communion motive and intrinsic religiosity, at high levels of agency motives, significantly predicted lower scores for religious judgmentalism. These findings were conceptualized as preliminary evidence for the position that interpersonal motives, rather than religiousness or religious motivation, predict social intolerance and criticism in religious individuals.

Justice and Immigration: The Effect of Moral Exclusion

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Stefano Passini

2018-02-01

Full Text Available Numerous media news items suggest on a daily basis that people tend to use harsher criteria when they judge immigrants than members of their own in-group. In the present research project, we were interested in studying individual justice judgments of a violation of a law by an Italian (in-group or an immigrant (out-group member and the influence of moral exclusion processes on the assessment. In particular, we examined whether those people who tend to exclude out-groups from their scope of justice will give such biased judgments and will adopt double standards, while inclusive people will not. A total of 255 people evaluated the seriousness of a crime in two different law-breaking scenarios in which the offender’s and the victim’s nationalities were systematically changed (either Italian or Romanian. Moreover, participants completed a scale measuring the moral inclusion/exclusion of other social groups. As hypothesized, participants who tended to exclude some groups from their moral community judged the Romanian more harshly than the Italian culprit. On the contrary, those people that tended to have a more inclusive moral community did not show any difference in evaluation. In conclusion, the present research highlights the importance of considering the effect of moral inclusion/exclusion processes on the evaluation of justice events, especially in an intergroup context.

In the Orchard: Farm Worker Children's Moral and Environmental Reasoning

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Severson, Rachel L.; Kahn, Peter H., Jr.

2010-01-01

In this study, farm worker children (N = 40) in 2nd and 5th grade were interviewed about (a) their conceptions and judgments of pesticide exposure and (b) their reasoning about the moral standing of nature. First, results showed that all participants negatively judged pesticide exposure based on moral obligatory criteria. Yet, most children…

Calibrating One's Moral Compass: How Principal Preparation Shapes School Leaders

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Larsen, Donald E.; Derrington, Mary Lynne

2012-01-01

No textbook that an aspiring principal encounters in preparing for the role of school leader discusses what steps to follow when a member--or members--of the school staff challenge standards of professional judgment and moral rectitude. Instead, the most reliable guide at the principal's disposal may be the "moral compass" upon which the…

Neural correlates of moral and non-moral emotion in female psychopathy

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Carla L Harenski

2014-09-01

Full Text Available This study presents the first neuroimaging investigation of female psychopathy in an incarcerated population. Prior studies have found that male psychopathy is associated with reduced limbic and paralimbic activation when processing emotional stimuli and making moral judgments. The goal of this study was to investigate whether these findings extend to female psychopathy. During fMRI scanning, 157 incarcerated and 46 non-incarcerated female participants viewed unpleasant pictures, half which depicted moral transgressions, and neutral pictures. Participants rated each picture on moral transgression severity. Psychopathy was assessed using the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R in all incarcerated participants. Non-incarcerated participants were included as a control group to derive brain regions of interest associated with viewing unpleasant versus neutral pictures (emotion contrast, and unpleasant pictures depicting moral transgressions versus unpleasant pictures without moral transgressions (moral contrast. Regression analyses in the incarcerated group examined the association between PCL-R scores and brain activation in the emotion and moral contrasts. Results of the emotion contrast revealed a negative correlation between PCL-R scores and activation in the right amygdala and rostral anterior cingulate. Results of the moral contrast revealed a negative correlation between PCL-R scores and activation in the right temporo-parietal junction. These results indicate that female psychopathy, like male psychopathy, is characterized by reduced limbic activation during emotion processing. In contrast, reduced temporo-parietal activation to moral transgressions has been less observed in male psychopathy. These results extend prior findings in male psychopathy to female psychopathy, and reveal aberrant neural responses to morally-salient stimuli that may be unique to female psychopathy.

Deconfounding Distance Effects in Judgments of Moral Obligation

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Nagel, Jonas; Waldmann, Michael R.

2013-01-01

A heavily disputed question of moral philosophy is whether spatial distance between agent and victim is normatively relevant for the degree of obligation to help strangers in need. In this research, we focus on the associated descriptive question whether increased distance does in fact reduce individuals' sense of helping obligation. One problem…

How attitude strength and information influence moral decision making: Evidence from event-related potentials.

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Hundrieser, Manuela; Stahl, Jutta

2016-05-01

Moral judgments are based on complex processing. This study aimed to investigate neural correlates of moral decisions. Participants (N = 32) were asked to express their opinion on various moral issues while ERPs were recorded. After reading texts containing either confirming or contradicting arguments regarding the issues, participants were asked to express their opinion again. A higher N400 amplitude and a higher amplitude of the late positive potential for value-incongruent words compared to value-congruent words could be observed. Furthermore, after participants had read conflicting arguments, slower responses and larger N400 differences (value-incongruent minus value-congruent) were observed. These results showed that language processing for a moral context is influenced by the subjective value system, and it can be assumed that a demanding cognitive elaboration contributed to the observed RT and N400 priming effects. This is the first ERP study comparing moral judgments before and after reading confirming or conflicting information; it revealed that evaluative reasoning can influence neural processing for moral decisions. © 2016 Society for Psychophysiological Research.

Knowledge and Morality of School-Age Children and Adolescents Regarding Environmental Issues and Moral Dilemmas

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Vestena, Carla Luciane Blum; Piske, Fernanda Hellen Ribeiro

2017-01-01

A research gap exists with regard to the analysis of school children and adolescents' awareness on environmental issues. Current investigation analyzes data of 240 children and adolescents, aged between 8 and 14 years, within different school contexts in the mid-southern region of Brazil, on their knowledge level and moral judgment on solid…

Neural correlates of moral and non-moral emotion in female psychopathy

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Carla L Harenski; Bethany G Edwards; Keith A Harenski; Kent A Kiehl; Kent A Kiehl

2014-01-01

This study presents the first neuroimaging investigation of female psychopathy in an incarcerated population. Prior studies have found that male psychopathy is associated with reduced limbic and paralimbic activation when processing emotional stimuli and making moral judgments. The goal of this study was to investigate whether these findings extend to female psychopathy. During fMRI scanning, 157 incarcerated and 46 non-incarcerated female participants viewed unpleasant pictures, half which d...

Examining overlap in behavioral and neural representations of morals, facts, and preferences.

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Theriault, Jordan; Waytz, Adam; Heiphetz, Larisa; Young, Liane

2017-11-01

Metaethical judgments refer to judgments about the information expressed by moral claims. Moral objectivists generally believe that moral claims are akin to facts, whereas moral subjectivists generally believe that moral claims are more akin to preferences. Evidence from developmental and social psychology has generally favored an objectivist view; however, this work has typically relied on few examples, and analyses have disallowed statistical generalizations beyond these few stimuli. The present work addresses whether morals are represented as fact-like or preference-like, using behavioral and neuroimaging methods, in combination with statistical techniques that can (a) generalize beyond our sample stimuli, and (b) test whether particular item features are associated with neural activity. Behaviorally, and contrary to prior work, morals were perceived as more preference-like than fact-like. Neurally, morals and preferences elicited common magnitudes and spatial patterns of activity, particularly within the dorsal-medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), a critical region for social cognition. This common DMPFC activity for morals and preferences was present across whole-brain conjunctions, and in individually localized functional regions of interest (targeting the theory of mind network). By contrast, morals and facts did not elicit any neural activity in common. Follow-up item analyses suggested that the activity elicited in common by morals and preferences was explained by their shared tendency to evoke representations of mental states. We conclude that morals are represented as far more subjective than prior work has suggested. This conclusion is consistent with recent theoretical research, which has argued that morality is fundamentally about regulating social relationships. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved).

Evaluating moral reasoning in nursing education.

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McLeod-Sordjan, Renee

2014-06-01

Evidence-based practice suggests the best approach to improving professionalism in practice is ethics curricula. However, recent research has demonstrated that millennium graduates do not advocate for patients or assert themselves during moral conflicts. The aim of this article is the exploration of evaluation techniques to evaluate one measurable outcome of ethics curricula: moral reasoning. A review of literature, published between 1995 and 2013, demonstrated that the moral orientations of care and justice as conceptualized by Gilligan and Kohlberg are utilized by nursing students to solve ethical dilemmas. Data obtained by means of reflective journaling, Ethics of Care Interview (ECI) and Defining Issues Test (DIT), would objectively measure the interrelated pathways of care-based and justice-based moral reasoning. In conclusion, educators have an ethical responsibility to foster students' ability to exercise sound clinical judgment, and support their professional development. It is recommended that educators design authentic assessments to demonstrate student's improvement of moral reasoning. © The Author(s) 2013.

Risk Emotions and Risk Judgments: Passive Bodily Experience and Active Moral Reasoning in Judgmental Constellations

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Coeckelbergh, Mark

2007-01-01

Experts typically accuse lay people of ‘emotional’ responses to technological risk as opposed to their own ‘rational’ judgment. This attitude is in tune with risk perception research that qualifies lay people’s responses in terms of bias (e.g. Slovic et. al. 2004), and with the Kantian view of

Unsentimental Ethics: Towards a Content-Specific Account of the Moral-Conventional Distinction

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Royzman, Edward B.; Leeman, Robert F.; Baron, Jonathan

2009-01-01

In this paper, we offer an overview and a critique of the existing theories of the moral-conventional distinction, with emphasis on Nichols's [Nichols, S. (2002). Norms with feeling: Towards a psychological account of moral judgment. "Cognition, 84", 221-236] neo-sentimentalist approach. After discussing some distinctive features of Nichols's…

Moral and cognitive development in retarded and nonretarded children.

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Taylor, J J; Achenbach, T M

1975-07-01

Subjects were 30 cultural-familially retarded and 30 nonretarded children matched for MA within 3 MA levels. The subjects were administered measures of moral judgement and cognitive operations hypothesized by Kohlberg to constitute necessary but not sufficient conditions for attainment of specific moral stages. Moral and cognitive performance improved with MA, but there were no differences between the MA-matched retarded and nonretarded children. Moral judgement related more strongly to MA then to any of the specific cognitive operations tested. The findings failed to support Kohlberg and Gilligan's (1971) hypothesis that the moral judgment of older individuals should be more advanced than that of younger individuals matched for cognitive level, but they were in accord with Zigler's (1969) "developmental" concept of cultural-familial retardation.

Epistemological Development and Judgments and Reasoning about Teaching Methods

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Spence, Sarah; Helwig, Charles C.

2013-01-01

Children's, adolescents', and adults' (N = 96 7-8, 10-11, and 13-14-year-olds and university students) epistemological development and its relation to judgments and reasoning about teaching methods was examined. The domain (scientific or moral), nature of the topic (controversial or noncontroversial), and teaching method (direct instruction by…

Are 'counter-intuitive' deontological judgments really counter-intuitive? An empirical reply to.

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Paxton, Joseph M; Bruni, Tommaso; Greene, Joshua D

2014-09-01

A substantial body of evidence indicates that utilitarian judgments (favoring the greater good) made in response to difficult moral dilemmas are preferentially supported by controlled, reflective processes, whereas deontological judgments (favoring rights/duties) in such cases are preferentially supported by automatic, intuitive processes. A recent neuroimaging study by Kahane et al. challenges this claim, using a new set of moral dilemmas that allegedly reverse the previously observed association. We report on a study in which we both induced and measured reflective responding to one of Greene et al.'s original dilemmas and one of Kahane et al.'s new dilemmas. For the original dilemma, induced reflection led to more utilitarian responding, replicating previous findings using the same methods. There was no overall effect of induced reflection for the new dilemma. However, for both dilemmas, the degree to which an individual engaged in prior reflection predicted the subsequent degree of utilitarian responding, with more reflective subjects providing more utilitarian judgments. These results cast doubt on Kahane et al.'s conclusions and buttress the original claim linking controlled, reflective processes to utilitarian judgment and automatic, intuitive processes to deontological judgment. Importantly, these results also speak to the generality of the underlying theory, indicating that what holds for cases involving utilitarian physical harms also holds for cases involving utilitarian lies. © The Author (2013). Published by Oxford University Press. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.

Effects of anger, guilt, and envy on moral hypocrisy.

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Polman, Evan; Ruttan, Rachel L

2012-01-01

In the current article the authors examined the impact of specific emotions on moral hypocrisy, the tendency among people to judge others more severely than they judge themselves. In two studies, they found that (a) anger increased moral hypocrisy, (b) guilt eliminated moral hypocrisy, and (c) envy reversed moral hypocrisy. In particular, these findings were observed in two domains. In Study 1, participants responded to moral dilemmas describing unethical behavior and rated how acceptable it would be if others engaged in the unethical behavior, or alternatively, if they themselves engaged in the unethical behavior. In Study 2, participants were asked how much they would like to donate to research on cancer, or alternatively, how much they think others should donate. The results demonstrate that specific emotions influence moral decision making, even when real money is at stake, and that emotions of the same valence have opposing effects on moral judgment.

Deontological and utilitarian inclinations in moral decision making: a process dissociation approach.

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Conway, Paul; Gawronski, Bertram

2013-02-01

Dual-process theories of moral judgment suggest that responses to moral dilemmas are guided by two moral principles: the principle of deontology states that the morality of an action depends on the intrinsic nature of the action (e.g., harming others is wrong regardless of its consequences); the principle of utilitarianism implies that the morality of an action is determined by its consequences (e.g., harming others is acceptable if it increases the well-being of a greater number of people). Despite the proposed independence of the moral inclinations reflecting these principles, previous work has relied on operationalizations in which stronger inclinations of one kind imply weaker inclinations of the other kind. The current research applied Jacoby's (1991) process dissociation procedure to independently quantify the strength of deontological and utilitarian inclinations within individuals. Study 1 confirmed the usefulness of process dissociation for capturing individual differences in deontological and utilitarian inclinations, revealing positive correlations of both inclinations to moral identity. Moreover, deontological inclinations were uniquely related to empathic concern, perspective-taking, and religiosity, whereas utilitarian inclinations were uniquely related to need for cognition. Study 2 demonstrated that cognitive load selectively reduced utilitarian inclinations, with deontological inclinations being unaffected. In Study 3, a manipulation designed to enhance empathy increased deontological inclinations, with utilitarian inclinations being unaffected. These findings provide evidence for the independent contributions of deontological and utilitarian inclinations to moral judgments, resolving many theoretical ambiguities implied by previous research. (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved.

Moral development and recidivism: a meta-analysis.

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Van Vugt, Eveline; Gibbs, John; Stams, Geert Jan; Bijleveld, Catrien; Hendriks, Jan; van der Laan, Peter

2011-12-01

A meta-analysis of 19 studies (N = 15,992 offenders) showed a significant inverse relation between more mature moral development and recidivism. Moderator analyses revealed a larger effect size for moral cognition (r = .20) than for moral emotion (r = .11). Effect sizes for production measures (r = .57) were much larger than for recognition measures (r = .16) and unstructured (clinical) judgment (r = .10). Larger effect sizes were found for female delinquents (r = .32) than for male delinquents (r = .21). Only small differences in effect sizes were found between juvenile delinquents (r = .10) and adult delinquents (r = .16). Finally, self-report measures of recidivism revealed much larger effect sizes (r = .32) than official reports of recidivism (r = .09). The discussion focuses on the theoretical and practical meaning of the magnitude of the effect size for the relation between moral development and recidivism.

Role of morality in the experience of guilt and shame within the armed forces.

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Nazarov, A; Jetly, R; McNeely, H; Kiang, M; Lanius, R; McKinnon, M C

2015-07-01

Despite advances in our understanding of mental health issues among military forces, a large proportion of military personnel continue to exhibit deployment-related psychological issues. Recent work has identified symptoms of guilt and shame related to moral injury as contributing significantly to combat-related mental health issues. This systematic scoping review explores the association between morality and symptoms of guilt and shame within military forces. A search of the literature pertaining to guilt, shame and morality within military samples was conducted. Nineteen articles were selected for review. There is strong evidence linking exposure to and the perceived perpetration of moral transgressions with experiences of guilt and shame. Critically, symptoms of guilt and shame were related to adverse mental health outcomes, particularly the onset of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). No studies have explored moral judgment in conjunction with assessments of guilt or moral injury. These findings have important implications for the prevention and treatment of PTSD-related symptoms in military samples. By measuring moral judgment prior to deployment, it may be possible to predict the likelihood of incurring moral injuries and the development of associated symptoms. Early intervention programmes aimed at ameliorating guilt and shame are required to prevent the long-term development of deployment-related psychological distress. © 2015 John Wiley & Sons A/S. Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

The Connection between Beauty and Morality in Kant's aesthetics

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Ali salmani

2015-09-01

Full Text Available Abstract At first glance it seems that Kant distinguishes beauty from morality because while analyzing the matter of beauty according to quality, he explicitly separates pleasure of beauty from pleasure of agreeable and pleasure of good; and believes that the pleasure of the beauty is neither to satisfy our physical desires nor to achieve a moral purpose. On the other hand, Kant speaks of a connection between beauty and morality in some sections of his critique of judgment. This essay intends to study the mentioned sections and clarifies how one can distinguish beauty from morality and simultaneously believes in the connection between beauty and morality. Following this, we are going to discuss why Kant deems such a connection necessary. Examining this matter, we will find out that morality and aesthetics can be indirectly related to each other. Kant's most major concern with regard to the connection between beauty and morality is the connection between feelings and foredoom.

Divergent Effects of Different Positive Emotions on Moral Judgment

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Strohminger, Nina; Lewis, Richard L.; Meyer, David E.

2011-01-01

Positive emotions are often treated as relatively similar in their cognitive-behavioral effects, and as having unambiguously beneficial consequences. For example, Valdesolo and DeSteno (2006) reported that a humorous video made people more prone to choose a utilitarian solution to a moral dilemma. They attributed this finding to increased positive…

True happiness: The role of morality in the folk concept of happiness.

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Phillips, Jonathan; De Freitas, Julian; Mott, Christian; Gruber, June; Knobe, Joshua

2017-02-01

Recent scientific research has settled on a purely descriptive definition of happiness that is focused solely on agents' psychological states (high positive affect, low negative affect, high life satisfaction). In contrast to this understanding, recent research has suggested that the ordinary concept of happiness is also sensitive to the moral value of agents' lives. Five studies systematically investigate and explain the impact of morality on ordinary assessments of happiness. Study 1 demonstrates that moral judgments influence assessments of happiness not only for untrained participants, but also for academic researchers and even in those who study happiness specifically. Studies 2 and 3 then respectively ask whether this effect may be explained by general motivational biases or beliefs in a just world. In both cases, we find evidence against these explanations. Study 4 shows that the impact of moral judgments cannot be explained by changes in the perception of descriptive psychological states. Finally, Study 5 compares the impact of moral and nonmoral value, and provides evidence that unlike nonmoral value, moral value is part of the criteria that govern the ordinary concept of happiness. Taken together, these studies provide a specific explanation of how and why the ordinary concept of happiness deviates from the definition used by researchers studying happiness. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved).

Emotion shapes the diffusion of moralized content in social networks.

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Brady, William J; Wills, Julian A; Jost, John T; Tucker, Joshua A; Van Bavel, Jay J

2017-07-11

Political debate concerning moralized issues is increasingly common in online social networks. However, moral psychology has yet to incorporate the study of social networks to investigate processes by which some moral ideas spread more rapidly or broadly than others. Here, we show that the expression of moral emotion is key for the spread of moral and political ideas in online social networks, a process we call "moral contagion." Using a large sample of social media communications about three polarizing moral/political issues ( n = 563,312), we observed that the presence of moral-emotional words in messages increased their diffusion by a factor of 20% for each additional word. Furthermore, we found that moral contagion was bounded by group membership; moral-emotional language increased diffusion more strongly within liberal and conservative networks, and less between them. Our results highlight the importance of emotion in the social transmission of moral ideas and also demonstrate the utility of social network methods for studying morality. These findings offer insights into how people are exposed to moral and political ideas through social networks, thus expanding models of social influence and group polarization as people become increasingly immersed in social media networks.

Schopenhauer's Moral Pessimism: Origin, Meaning and Reach

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Dax Moraes

2017-12-01

Full Text Available “Moral pessimism” is an expression by which one may understand Schopenhauer’s thesis about immutability of character so far as it declares impossible each and every kind of moral enhancement, remaining only attainable some behavior adaptation based on natural egoism. This is otherwise a kind of result of epistemological problems raised by Kantian critique of reason that Schopenhauer carried to its limits. On the other hand, “moral pessimism” is to be faced not as a “practical” problem, but as a metaphysical one and its empirical consequences can be better considered as one may call “anthropological pessimism” once by this expression we mean not only a judgment about human nature alone but individual sufferings facing a world that menaces individual interests.

Moral reasoning and emotion attributions of adolescent bullies, victims, and bully-victims.

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Perren, Sonja; Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, Eveline; Malti, Tina; Hymel, Shelley

2012-11-01

This study investigated different facets of moral development in bullies, victims, and bully-victims among Swiss adolescents. Extending previous research, we focused on both bullying and victimization in relation to adolescents' morally disengaged and morally responsible reasoning as well as moral emotion attributions. A total of 516 adolescents aged 12-18 (57% females) reported the frequency of involvement in bullying and victimization. Participants were categorized as bullies (14.3%), bully-victims (3.9%), and victims (9.7%). Moral judgment, moral justifications, and emotion attributions to a hypothetical perpetrator of a moral transgression (relational aggression) were assessed. Bullies showed more morally disengaged reasoning than non-involved students. Bully-victims more frequently indicated that violating moral rules is right. Victims produced more victim-oriented justifications (i.e., more empathy) but fewer moral rules. Among victims, the frequency of morally responsible justifications decreased and the frequency of deviant rules increased with age. The findings are discussed from an integrative moral developmental perspective. ©2011 The British Psychological Society.

Stress alters personal moral decision making.

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Youssef, Farid F; Dookeeram, Karine; Basdeo, Vasant; Francis, Emmanuel; Doman, Mekaeel; Mamed, Danielle; Maloo, Stefan; Degannes, Joel; Dobo, Linda; Ditshotlo, Phatsimo; Legall, George

2012-04-01

While early studies of moral decision making highlighted the role of rational, conscious executive processes involving frontal lobe activation more recent work has suggested that emotions and gut reactions have a key part to play in moral reasoning. Given that stress can activate many of the same brain regions that are important for and connected to brain centres involved in emotional processing we sought to evaluate if stress could influence moral decision making. Sixty-five undergraduate volunteers were randomly assigned to control (n=33) and experimental groups (n=32). The latter underwent the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST) and induction of stress was assessed by measurement of salivary cortisol levels. Subjects were then required to provide a response to thirty moral dilemmas via a computer interface that recorded both their decision and reaction time. Three types of dilemmas were used: non-moral, impersonal moral and personal moral. Using a binary logistic model there were no significant predicators of utilitarian response in non-moral and impersonal moral dilemmas. However the stressed group and females were found to predict utilitarian responses to personal moral dilemmas. When comparing percentage utilitarian responses there were no significant differences noted for the non-moral and impersonal moral dilemmas but the stressed group showed significantly less utilitarian responses compared to control subjects. The stress response was significantly negatively correlated with utilitarian responses. Females also showed significantly less utilitarian responses than males. We conclude that activation of the stress response predisposed participants to less utilitarian responses when faced with high conflict personal moral dilemmas and suggest that this offers further support for dual process theory of moral judgment. We also conclude that females tend to make less utilitarian personal moral decisions compared to males, providing further evidence that there are

Moral judgments and emotions in contexts of peer exclusion and victimization.

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Killen, Melanie; Malti, Tina

2015-01-01

Morality is at the core of social development. How individuals treat one another, develop a sense of obligation toward others regarding equality and equity, and understand the emotions experienced by victims and victimizers, are essential ingredients for healthy development, and for creating a just and civil society. In this chapter, we review research on two forms of social exclusion, intergroup exclusion and interpersonal victimization, from a moral development perspective, identifying distinctions as well as areas of overlap and intersections. Intergroup exclusion (defined as exclusion based on group membership, such as gender, race, ethnicity, and nationality) is most often analyzed at the group level in contrast to interpersonal victimization (defined as the repeated infliction of physical and psychological harm on another) which is most often analyzed at the individual level. In this chapter, we assert that research needs to examine both group-level and individual-level factors for intergroup and interpersonal exclusion and that moral development provides an important framework for investigating these phenomena. © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

From ethics of care to psychology of care - Reconnecting ethics of care to contemporary moral psychology

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Aner eGovrin

2014-10-01

Full Text Available Moral psychology once regarded ethics of care as a promising theory. However, there is evidence to suggest that nowadays moral psychology completely ignores ethics of care’s various insights. Moreover, ethics of care’s core concepts – compassion, dependence, and the importance of early relations to moral development– are no longer considered to be relevant to the development of new theories in the field. In this paper, I will firstly discuss some of the reasons which, over recent years, have contributed to the marginalization of the role of ethics of care in moral psychology. Next, I will show that ethics of care’s most promising idea centered on the care given to an infant and the importance of that care to the development of moral thinking. In this context, I will be describing the implications of John Bowlby’s attachment theories, infant research, findings in moral psychology and neuroscience. I will argue that ethics of care needs to be radically re-thought and replaced by a psychology of care, an attachment approach to moral judgment, which would establish the centrality of the caregiver’s role in moral development. The philosophical implications of this approach to the understanding of the 'rationalists’’ and ‘intuitionists’’ debate about the true nature of moral judgment is also discussed.

Aesthetic Education for Morality: Schiller and Kant

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Tauber, Zvi

2006-01-01

Kant's "Critique of Judgment," which was published in 1790, referred in detail to the affinity between beauty and morality. Schiller's writings from the 1790s dealing with aesthetics and ethics are intertwined, simultaneously, both with an affirmative reception of Kant's ideas and with critical attitudes against them. This applies to essays such…

The Accidental Transgressor: Morally Relevant Theory of Mind

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Killen, Melanie; Mulvey, Kelly Lynn; Richardson, Cameron; Jampol, Noah

2014-01-01

To test young children’s false belief theory of mind in a morally relevant context, two experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1, children (N = 162) at 3.5, 5.5, and 7.5 years of age were administered 3 tasks: prototypic moral transgression task, false belief theory of mind task (ToM), and an “accidental transgressor” task, which measured a morally relevant false belief theory of mind (MoToM). Children who did not pass false belief ToM were more likely to attribute negative intentions to an accidental transgressor than children who passed false belief ToM, and to use moral reasons when blaming the accidental transgressor. In Experiment 2, children (N = 46) who did not pass false belief ToM viewed it as more acceptable to punish the accidental transgressor than did participants who passed false belief ToM. Findings are discussed in light of research on the emergence of moral judgment and theory of mind. PMID:21377148

Emotion shapes the diffusion of moralized content in social networks

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Wills, Julian A.; Jost, John T.; Tucker, Joshua A.; Van Bavel, Jay J.

2017-01-01

Political debate concerning moralized issues is increasingly common in online social networks. However, moral psychology has yet to incorporate the study of social networks to investigate processes by which some moral ideas spread more rapidly or broadly than others. Here, we show that the expression of moral emotion is key for the spread of moral and political ideas in online social networks, a process we call “moral contagion.” Using a large sample of social media communications about three polarizing moral/political issues (n = 563,312), we observed that the presence of moral-emotional words in messages increased their diffusion by a factor of 20% for each additional word. Furthermore, we found that moral contagion was bounded by group membership; moral-emotional language increased diffusion more strongly within liberal and conservative networks, and less between them. Our results highlight the importance of emotion in the social transmission of moral ideas and also demonstrate the utility of social network methods for studying morality. These findings offer insights into how people are exposed to moral and political ideas through social networks, thus expanding models of social influence and group polarization as people become increasingly immersed in social media networks. PMID:28652356

Moral Luck from Bernard Williams’ Point of View

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Zahra Khazai ; Fatemeh Tamaddon

2016-08-01

Full Text Available Moral luck is an important issue in meta- ethics. Its conflict to principle of control make challenges to moral moral assessment, moral judgment and moral responsibility. Bernard Williams is the first philosopher who uses the expression "moral luck" and tries to show that the contradiction between “moral” and “luck” is not so serious. Against Kantian’s idea and also our intuitions Williams doesn’t believe that morality is immune of luck and that unlike other values, is accessible to all people. If moral value is accessible to all, according to his idea, it should be not only immune of luck but also supreme. Giving some examples, Williams by concepts like justification, regret and retrospective, shows that morality hasn’t these characteristics. Dividing moral luck into four types: resultant, circumstantial, constitutive and causal, Thomas Nagel puts Williams' moral luck under the first type and criticizes it. This study seeks to explain Bernard Williams’ viewpoint on moral luck. At first it clears types of moral luck, principle of control and its contradiction with moral luck, then after explaining Williams’ account of moral luck criticizes it. Nagel’s criticisms and others show that although they accept the existence of moral luck and also their account is compatible to williams’ but they deny williams’ success in defending of this phenomenon. Finally, despite of all critiques, it seems that Williams’ failure in defense of moral luck didn’t decrease the importance of this matter, but made some stronger ideas were appeared by Thomas Nagel in this regard.

Julgamento moral de jovens em diferentes contextos políticos

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Júlio Rique

2013-08-01

Full Text Available This study compared the moral thinking of young Brazilians in the 1970 and 1980, with 97 young of the year 2011 with an average age of 19years. They answered the Moral Judgment Interview-MJI. The youth interviewed in 2011also responded to a question about what is justice. The results indicated that youth in the 1970s and 1980s had a conventional moral thinking guided by social expectations and maintaining the values of the peer group. Currently, young people have moral thinking based on respect of the laws and the maintenance of the social order. A content analysis of the question of what justice is revealed advanced and primitive conceptions. We discuss the differences in moral thought and conceptions of justice based on the interpretation of that moral thinking toward respect for law, order and authority, overlaps the respect for basic civil rights and duties.

Rational non-interventional paternalism: why doctors ought to make judgments of what is best for their patients.

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Savulescu, J

1995-12-01

This paper argues that doctors ought to make all things considered value judgments about what is best for their patients. It illustrates some of the shortcomings of the model of doctor as 'fact-provider'. The 'fact-provider' model fails to take account of the fact that practising medicine necessarily involves making value judgments; that medical practice is a moral practice and requires that doctors reflect on what ought to be done, and that patients can make choices which fail to express their autonomy and which are based on mistaken judgments of value. If doctors are properly to respect patient autonomy and to function as moral agents, they must make evaluations of what their patients ought to do, all things considered. This paper argues for 'rational, non-interventional paternalism'. This is a practice in which doctors form conceptions of what is best for their patients and argue rationally with them. It differs from old-style paternalism in that it is not committed to doing what is best.

Adolescent Civic and Political Engagement: Associations between Domain-Specific Judgments and Behavior

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Metzger, Aaron; Smetana, Judith G.

2009-01-01

Judgments and justifications for different forms of civic involvement and their associations with organized and civic behavior were examined in 312 middle-class primarily White adolescents (M = 17.01 years). Adolescents applied moral, conventional, and personal criteria to distinguish involvement in community service, standard political, social…

Why (and how) should we study the interplay between emotional arousal, Theory of Mind, and inhibitory control to understand moral cognition?

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Buon, Marine; Seara-Cardoso, Ana; Viding, Essi

2016-12-01

Findings in the field of experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience have shed new light on our understanding of the psychological and biological bases of morality. Although a lot of attention has been devoted to understanding the processes that underlie complex moral dilemmas, attempts to represent the way in which individuals generate moral judgments when processing basic harmful actions are rare. Here, we will outline a model of morality which proposes that the evaluation of basic harmful actions relies on complex interactions between emotional arousal, Theory of Mind (ToM) capacities, and inhibitory control resources. This model makes clear predictions regarding the cognitive processes underlying the development of and ability to generate moral judgments. We draw on data from developmental and cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and psychopathology research to evaluate the model and propose several conceptual and methodological improvements that are needed to further advance our understanding of moral cognition and its development.

Juicios morales y fronteras biológicas: más allá de la frontera razón / emoción

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Cabezas, Mar

2013-08-01

Full Text Available We build boundaries that are theoretically based on biological grounds and we derive moral judgments from them. Likewise, we take for granted that emotions such as fear, disgust or rage were the element that led us to this mistake, especially when we realise the logical inconsistency of deriving moral judgments in this way. Consequently, we often associate emotions with prejudices, beliefs or fallacies, which we ought to free ourselves from. However, emotions are not the cause of the problem. Firstly, because the classical dichotomical framework that defends the reason/emotion polarity is also questionable. Secondly, because emotions, as alarms which transmit important information, may be a key element in the discovery and overcoming of the discriminations that arise at the boundaries of dichotomies. Thus, the aim here is to analyse the relationship between these three elements: biological boundaries, moral judgments and emotions. And then toargue in favour of the links between reason and emotions as a way of surpassing the old dichotomic model, and, to conclude, I will point out some of the benefits of replacing a dualistic framework by an interactive one.Construimos fronteras con supuesta base biológica y derivamos juicios morales de ellas. Asimismo, suponemos que fueron nuestras emociones —el miedo, el asco o la rabia— las que nos llevaron a tal error, especialmente cuando nos damos cuenta de la inconsistencia lógica de derivar juicios morales de dichas fronteras. En consecuencia, solemos identificar emociones con prejuicios, creencias u opciones falaces de las que más nos valdría librarnos. Sin embargo, como se tratará de argumentar a continuación, las emociones no son la causa del problema. Primero, porque el marco conceptual clásico dicotómico en el que razón y emoción son dos polos opuestos regidos por una tensión irreconciliable es a su vez cuestionable. Segundo, porque las emociones, en cuanto alarmas transmisoras de

The Role of Moral Beliefs, Memories, and Preferences in Representations of Identity.

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Heiphetz, Larisa; Strohminger, Nina; Young, Liane L

2017-04-01

People perceive that if their memories and moral beliefs changed, they would change. We investigated why individuals respond this way. In Study 1, participants judged that identity would change more after changes to memories and widely shared moral beliefs (e.g., about murder) versus preferences and controversial moral beliefs (e.g., about abortion). The extent to which participants judged that changes would affect their relationships predicted identity change (Study 2) and mediated the relationship between type of moral belief and perceived identity change (Study 3). We discuss the role that social relationships play in judgments of identity and highlight implications for psychology and philosophy. Copyright © 2016 Cognitive Science Society, Inc.

The Navy’s Moral Compass: Commanding Officers and Personal Misconduct

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2016-07-01

commanding officer corps and our service, to take positive action to develop each officer’s moral compass and establish an ethical standard. Step One...high moral ground in their discretionary judgments. Furthermore, the Army Operating Concept of 2010 includes three pages of ethical and behavioral...Journal of Business Ethics 12, no. 6 (1993), p. 265. 24. U.S. Navy Dept., U.S. Navy Regulations (Washington, D.C.: 1990), sec. 802, para. 1. 25

Ethical safety of deep brain stimulation: A study on moral decision-making in Parkinson's disease.

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Fumagalli, Manuela; Marceglia, Sara; Cogiamanian, Filippo; Ardolino, Gianluca; Picascia, Marta; Barbieri, Sergio; Pravettoni, Gabriella; Pacchetti, Claudio; Priori, Alberto

2015-07-01

The possibility that deep brain stimulation (DBS) in Parkinson's disease (PD) alters patients' decisions and actions, even temporarily, raises important clinical, ethical and legal questions. Abnormal moral decision-making can lead to ethical rules violations. Previous experiments demonstrated the subthalamic (STN) activation during moral decision-making. Here we aim to study whether STN DBS can affect moral decision-making in PD patients. Eleven patients with PD and bilateral STN DBS implant performed a computerized moral task in ON and OFF stimulation conditions. A control group of PD patients without DBS implant performed the same experimental protocol. All patients underwent motor, cognitive and psychological assessments. STN stimulation was not able to modify neither reaction times nor responses to moral task both when we compared the ON and the OFF state in the same patient (reaction times, p = .416) and when we compared DBS patients with those treated only with the best medical treatment (reaction times: p = .408, responses: p = .776). Moral judgment is the result of a complex process, requiring cognitive executive functions, problem-solving, anticipations of consequences of an action, conflict processing, emotional evaluation of context and of possible outcomes, and involving different brain areas and neural circuits. Our data show that STN DBS leaves unaffected moral decisions thus implying relevant clinical and ethical implications for DBS consequences on patients' behavior, on decision-making and on judgment ability. In conclusion, the technique can be considered safe on moral behavior. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Hierarchical structure of moral stages assessed by a sorting task

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Boom, J.; Brugman, D.; Van der Heijden, P.G.M.

2001-01-01

Following criticism of Kohlberg’s theory of moral judgment, an empirical re-examination of hierarchical stage structure was desirable. Utilizing Piaget’s concept of reflective abstraction as a basis, the hierarchical stage structure was investigated using a new method. Study participants (553 Dutch

Moral asymmetries in judgments of agency withstand ludicrous causal deviance

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Sousa, Paulo; Holbrook, Colin; Swiney, Lauren

2015-01-01

Americans have been shown to attribute greater intentionality to immoral than to amoral actions in cases of causal deviance, that is, cases where a goal is satisfied in a way that deviates from initially planned means (e.g., a gunman wants to hit a target and his hand slips, but the bullet ricochets off a rock into the target). However, past research has yet to assess whether this asymmetry persists in cases of extreme causal deviance. Here, we manipulated the level of mild to extreme causal deviance of an immoral versus amoral act. The asymmetry in attributions of intentionality was observed at all but the most extreme level of causal deviance, and, as we hypothesized, was mediated by attributions of blame/credit and judgments of action performance. These findings are discussed as they support a multiple-concepts interpretation of the asymmetry, wherein blame renders a naïve concept of intentional action (the outcome matches the intention) more salient than a composite concept (the outcome matches the intention and was brought about by planned means), and in terms of their implications for cross-cultural research on judgments of agency. PMID:26441755

Morality constrains the default representation of what is possible.

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Phillips, Jonathan; Cushman, Fiery

2017-05-02

The capacity for representing and reasoning over sets of possibilities, or modal cognition, supports diverse kinds of high-level judgments: causal reasoning, moral judgment, language comprehension, and more. Prior research on modal cognition asks how humans explicitly and deliberatively reason about what is possible but has not investigated whether or how people have a default, implicit representation of which events are possible. We present three studies that characterize the role of implicit representations of possibility in cognition. Collectively, these studies differentiate explicit reasoning about possibilities from default implicit representations, demonstrate that human adults often default to treating immoral and irrational events as impossible, and provide a case study of high-level cognitive judgments relying on default implicit representations of possibility rather than explicit deliberation.

Are ‘counter-intuitive’ deontological judgments really counter-intuitive? An empirical reply to Kahane et al. (2012)

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Bruni, Tommaso; Greene, Joshua D.

2014-01-01

A substantial body of evidence indicates that utilitarian judgments (favoring the greater good) made in response to difficult moral dilemmas are preferentially supported by controlled, reflective processes, whereas deontological judgments (favoring rights/duties) in such cases are preferentially supported by automatic, intuitive processes. A recent neuroimaging study by Kahane et al. challenges this claim, using a new set of moral dilemmas that allegedly reverse the previously observed association. We report on a study in which we both induced and measured reflective responding to one of Greene et al.’s original dilemmas and one of Kahane et al.’s new dilemmas. For the original dilemma, induced reflection led to more utilitarian responding, replicating previous findings using the same methods. There was no overall effect of induced reflection for the new dilemma. However, for both dilemmas, the degree to which an individual engaged in prior reflection predicted the subsequent degree of utilitarian responding, with more reflective subjects providing more utilitarian judgments. These results cast doubt on Kahane et al.’s conclusions and buttress the original claim linking controlled, reflective processes to utilitarian judgment and automatic, intuitive processes to deontological judgment. Importantly, these results also speak to the generality of the underlying theory, indicating that what holds for cases involving utilitarian physical harms also holds for cases involving utilitarian lies. PMID:23887818

Moral Foundations of Welfare Attitudes: The Role of Moral Intuition and Reasoning in Pursuing Social Justice

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Findor Andrej

2015-12-01

Full Text Available The article interconnects the research on welfare attitudes and welfare chauvinism with moral psychology in order to develop an interdisciplinary analytical approach designed for studying attitudes to welfare policies and potentially overcoming the divisions prevalent in many European democracies. It introduces Moral Foundations Theory (MFT - an empirical approach to analysing intuitions, reasoning, and emotions constituting moral judgment - and outlines its understanding of competing versions of fairness and distributive justice. The potential contributions of MFT are exemplified on a case study situated in contemporary Slovakia which deals with two conflicting conceptions of fairness, as equity and as equality, embodied in the diverging attitudes towards an amendment to the Act on the Assistance in Material Need (2013. The article argues that MFT and related research programmes are irreplaceable components in an interdisciplinary study of the plurality of welfare policy attitudes. It also highlights the transformative potential of MFT and related research programmes in devising interventions aimed at changing (political attitudes to welfare and reducing their polarisation.

United we stand, divided we fall: Cognition, emotion, and the moral link between them.

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Manfrinati, Andrea

2015-01-01

Contrary to Greene's dual-process theory of moral judgment (Greene 2013), this commentary suggests that the network view of the brain proposed by Pessoa, in which emotion and cognition may be used as labels in the context of certain behaviors, but will not map clearly into compartmentalized pieces of the brain, could represent a better explanation of the rationale behind people's moral behavior.

The immoral landscape? Scientists are associated with violations of morality

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Rutjens, B.T.; Heine, S.J.

2016-01-01

Do people think that scientists are bad people? Although surveys find that science is a highly respected profession, a growing discourse has emerged regarding how science is often judged negatively. We report ten studies (N = 2328) that investigated morality judgments of scientists and compared

EL CONCEPTO DEL DAÑO MORAL BAJO EL PRISMA DE LA JURISPRUDENCIA

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Blanca Casado Andrés

2015-04-01

Full Text Available At present debates continue taking place on what it must be understood by moral hurt, probably the abstraction of the term is the reason. Nevertheless, the autonomy of the moral hurt and his admission for the courts (from the year 1912 turns out to be unquestionable, as his indemnity. Our Courts do not offer a definition of moral hurt. His contribution is merely practical, and though there are numerous the judgments that analyze the question of the moral hurts, the majority they limit themselves to solving the raised case, with a clear tendency to enumerate the most significant suppositions in relation to the protected goods and to extend the area of this type of hurts.

Toward a Return to Plurality in Arendtian Judgment

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Jack E. Marsh Jr.

2008-12-01

Full Text Available Without further ado: the perplexities surrounding the relation of Arendt’s early and late theories of judgment are rooted in her singular commitment to the abiding yet fragile possibility of human freedom. These perplexities are not a function of the theoretical faux paux conventionally ascribed to her by well meaning interpreters and sympathetic critics. Indeed, her work exhibits an admirable, if scandalous, refusal to be reduced to the imperatives of an overdetermined moral-theoretical field, an impertinence I hope to honor in this essay. For example, Seyla Benhabib seek to “resolve” Arendtian “puzzles” through reinscribing them within the neo-Kantian architectonics of discourse ethics. Ronald Beiner, by contrast, wonders why Arendt didn’t further mine Aristotelian wells in elaborating her own account(s of judgment.2 Herein I will take up these putative ambiguities. Interpreters are undoubtedly correct that decisive ambiguities remain between Arendt’s early and late accounts of judgment, but these ambiguities issue from Arendt’s own problems, concerns, and project.

Judging the morality of utilitarian actions: How poor utilitarian accessibility makes judges irrational.

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Kusev, Petko; van Schaik, Paul; Alzahrani, Shrooq; Lonigro, Samantha; Purser, Harry

2016-12-01

Is it acceptable and moral to sacrifice a few people's lives to save many others? Research on moral dilemmas in psychology, experimental philosophy, and neuropsychology has shown that respondents judge utilitarian personal moral actions (footbridge dilemma) as less appropriate than equivalent utilitarian impersonal moral actions (trolley dilemma). Accordingly, theorists (e.g., Greene et al., 2001) have argued that judgments of appropriateness in personal moral dilemmas are more emotionally salient and cognitively demanding (taking more time to be rational) than impersonal moral dilemmas. Our novel findings show an effect of psychological accessibility (driven by partial contextual information; Kahneman, 2003) on utilitarian moral behavior and response time for rational choices. Enhanced accessibility of utilitarian outcomes through comprehensive information about moral actions and consequences boosted utility maximization in moral choices, with rational choices taking less time. Moreover, our result suggests that previous results indicating emotional interference, with rational choices taking more time to make, may have been artifacts of presenting partial information.

Victimological aspects of court judgments

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Bačanović Oliver

2012-01-01

Full Text Available The subject of this paper is the review of the results of the research: „Analysis of judgments form the victimological aspect“ of the Basic court Skopje I in Skopje. It is the first research of it’s kind in the Republic of Macedonia, conducted by the project team of the Faculty of Security in Skopje in the period from January to April 2011. By using the content analysis (for this purpose a special instrument was developed 172 irrevocable court judgment brought in the period 2005-2010 were analyzed, for the following criminal offences: murder, crimes against sexual freedom and sexual morality (sexual assault, severe bodily injuries and insult. The aim of the research was to highlight the victimological dimensions of mentioned criminal offences, while special attention was paid to the role of a victim in a crime, victim‘ s interaction with the perpetrator, individual characteristics of the victim, as well as the characteristics of the time when and the space where the crime occurred.

Moral Understanding in the Psychopath*

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Malatesti, Luca

2010-01-01

A pressing and difficult practical problem concerns the general issue of the right social response to offenders classified as having antisocial personality disorder. This paper approaches this general problem by focusing, from a philosophical perspective, on the still relevant but more approachable question whether psychopathic offenders are morally responsible. In particular, I investigate whether psychopaths possess moral understanding. A plausible way to approach the last question requires a satisfactory philosophical interpretation of the empirical evidence that appears to show that psychopaths fail to draw the distinction between conventional and moral norms. Specifically, I will consider a recent philosophical debate polarized between supporters of rationalist and sentimentalist accounts of moral understanding. These opponents have discussed whether the case of psychopathy offers empirical support for their account and undermine the rival view. I will argue that the available empirical data leave the outcome of this discussion indeterminate. However, this implies that both these principal theories of moral understanding, if independently motivated, would imply that psychopaths have certain deficits that might affect their moral understanding and, consequently, their moral responsibility. PMID:21151766