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Sample records for polarizes moral judgments

  1. Emotion and moral judgment

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    Avramova, Y.R.; Inbar, Y.

    2013-01-01

    Research in psychology and cognitive science has consistently demonstrated the importance of emotion in a wide range of everyday judgments, including moral judgment. Most current accounts of moral judgment hold that emotion plays an important role, but the nature and extent of this role are still

  2. Moral Motivation, Moral Judgment, and Antisocial Behavior

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    Brooks, Jeff; Bock, Tonia; Narvaez, Darcia

    2013-01-01

    The link between judgment and action is weak throughout psychology, including moral psychology. That is, people often do not act in accordance with their reasoning. Might moral judgment development be better viewed as a capacity that inhibits "immoral" behavior? One model that helps account for the moral judgment-action gap is Rest's…

  3. Blind Ethics: Closing One's Eyes Polarizes Moral Judgments and Discourages Dishonest Behavior

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    Caruso, Eugene M.; Gino, Francesca

    2011-01-01

    Four experiments demonstrate that closing one's eyes affects ethical judgment and behavior because it induces people to mentally simulate events more extensively. People who considered situations with their eyes closed rather than open judged immoral behaviors as more unethical and moral behaviors as more ethical. In addition, considering…

  4. Objective and subjective responsibility in moral judgment as a function of enactment of role polarities

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    Vikan, Arne

    1976-01-01

    This study tested the hypothesis that objective and subjective responsibility responses in moral judgment may be formally equal forms of cognitive organization. Results showed that subjects acting as offenders gave subjective responsibility responses; the same subjects acting as offended gave objective responsibility responses. Thus, subjects'…

  5. Improving moral judgments: philosophical considerations

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    Kalis, A.

    2010-01-01

    In contemporary moral psychology, an often-heard claim is that knowing how we make moral judgments can help us make better moral judgments. Discussions about moral development and improvement are often framed in terms of the question of which mental processes have a better chance of leading to good

  6. Disgust as embodied moral judgment.

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    Schnall, Simone; Haidt, Jonathan; Clore, Gerald L; Jordan, Alexander H

    2008-08-01

    How, and for whom, does disgust influence moral judgment? In four experiments participants made moral judgments while experiencing extraneous feelings of disgust. Disgust was induced in Experiment 1 by exposure to a bad smell, in Experiment 2 by working in a disgusting room, in Experiment 3 by recalling a physically disgusting experience, and in Experiment 4 through a video induction. In each case, the results showed that disgust can increase the severity of moral judgments relative to controls. Experiment 4 found that disgust had a different effect on moral judgment than did sadness. In addition, Experiments 2-4 showed that the role of disgust in severity of moral judgments depends on participants' sensitivity to their own bodily sensations. Taken together, these data indicate the importance-and specificity-of gut feelings in moral judgments.

  7. Moral judgment in episodic amnesia.

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    Craver, Carl F; Keven, Nazim; Kwan, Donna; Kurczek, Jake; Duff, Melissa C; Rosenbaum, R Shayna

    2016-08-01

    To investigate the role of episodic thought about the past and future in moral judgment, we administered a well-established moral judgment battery to individuals with hippocampal damage and deficits in episodic thought (insert Greene et al. 2001). Healthy controls select deontological answers in high-conflict moral scenarios more frequently when they vividly imagine themselves in the scenarios than when they imagine scenarios abstractly, at some personal remove. If this bias is mediated by episodic thought, individuals with deficits in episodic thought should not exhibit this effect. We report that individuals with deficits in episodic memory and future thought make moral judgments and exhibit the biasing effect of vivid, personal imaginings on moral judgment. These results strongly suggest that the biasing effect of vivid personal imagining on moral judgment is not due to episodic thought about the past and future. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

  8. Wording effects in moral judgments

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    Ross E. O'Hara

    2010-12-01

    Full Text Available As the study of moral judgments grows, it becomes imperative to compare results across studies in order to create unified theories within the field. These efforts are potentially undermined, however, by variations in wording used by different researchers. The current study sought to determine whether, when, and how variations in wording influence moral judgments. Online participants responded to 15 different moral vignettes (e.g., the trolley problem using 1 of 4 adjectives: ``wrong'', ``inappropriate'', ``forbidden'', or ``blameworthy''. For half of the sample, these adjectives were preceded by the adverb ``morally''. Results indicated that people were more apt to judge an act as wrong or inappropriate than forbidden or blameworthy, and that disgusting acts were rated as more acceptable when ``morally'' was included. Although some wording differences emerged, effects sizes were small and suggest that studies of moral judgment with different wordings can legitimately be compared.

  9. Moral Judgments as Descriptions of Institutional Facts

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    Ferber, Rafael

    1994-01-01

    It deals with the question of what a moral judgment is. On the one hand, a satisfactory theory of moral judgments must take into account the descriptive character of moral judgments and the realistic language of morals. On the other hand, it must also meet the non-descriptive character of moral judgments that consists in the recommending or condemning element and in the fact that normative statements are derived from moral judgments. However, cognitivism and emotivism or “normativism” are...

  10. Utilitarian moral judgment in psychopathy.

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    Koenigs, Michael; Kruepke, Michael; Zeier, Joshua; Newman, Joseph P

    2012-08-01

    Psychopathic behavior is characteristically amoral, but to date research studies have largely failed to identify any systematic differences in moral judgment capability between psychopaths and non-psychopaths. In this study, we investigate whether significant differences in moral judgment emerge when taking into account the phenotypic heterogeneity of the disorder through a well-validated distinction between psychopathic subtypes. Three groups of incarcerated participants [low-anxious psychopaths (n = 12), high-anxious psychopaths (n = 12) and non-psychopaths (n = 24)] completed a moral judgment test involving hypothetical dilemmas. The moral dilemmas featured 'personal' (i.e. involving direct physical harm) or 'impersonal' (i.e. involving indirect or remote harm) actions. Compared to non-psychopaths, both groups of psychopaths were significantly more likely to endorse the impersonal actions. However, only the low-anxious psychopaths were significantly more likely to endorse the personal harms when commission of the harm would maximize aggregate welfare-the 'utilitarian' choice. High-anxious psychopaths and non-psychopaths did not significantly differ in their personal moral judgments. These results provide novel laboratory evidence of abnormal moral judgment in psychopaths, as well as additional support for the importance of considering psychopathic subtypes.

  11. Individual moral judgment and cultural ideologies.

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    Narvaez, D; Getz, I; Rest, J R; Thoma, S J

    1999-03-01

    Moral judgment cannot be reduced to cultural ideology, or vice versa. But when each construct is measured separately, then combined, the product predicts powerfully to moral thinking. In Study 1, 2 churches (N = 96) were selected for their differences on religious ideology, political identity, and moral judgment. By combining these 3 variables, a multiple correlation of .79 predicted to members' moral thinking (opinions on human rights issues). Study 2 replicated this finding in a secular sample, with the formula established in Study 1 (R = .77). Individual conceptual development in moral judgment and socialization into cultural ideology co-occur, simultaneously and reciprocally, in parallel, and not serially. Individual development in moral judgment provides the epistemological categories for cultural ideology, which in turn influences the course of moral judgment, to produce moral thinking (e.g., opinions about abortion, free speech).

  12. A subjective utilitarian theory of moral judgment.

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    Cohen, Dale J; Ahn, Minwoo

    2016-10-01

    Current theories hypothesize that moral judgments are difficult because rational and emotional decision processes compete. We present a fundamentally different theory of moral judgment: the Subjective Utilitarian Theory of moral judgment. The Subjective Utilitarian Theory posits that people try to identify and save the competing item with the greatest "personal value." Moral judgments become difficult only when the competing items have similar personal values. In Experiment 1, we estimate the personal values of 104 items. In Experiments 2-5, we show that the distributional overlaps of the estimated personal values account for over 90% of the variance in reaction times (RTs) and response choices in a moral judgment task. Our model fundamentally restructures our understanding of moral judgments from a competition between decision processes to a competition between similarly valued items. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved).

  13. Norm Acquisition, Rational Judgment and Moral Particularism

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    Westphal, Kenneth R.

    2012-01-01

    Moral particularism, defined as the view that moral judgment does not require moral principles, has become prominent both in moral philosophy and in philosophy of education. This article re-examines Nussbaum's case for particularism, based on Sophocles' "Antigone", because her stress on sensitive appreciation of circumstantial specifics is…

  14. High Achieving Students and Moral Judgment.

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    Narvaez, Darcia

    1993-01-01

    Analysis of scholastic test information and scores on the Defining Issues Test (DIT) of moral judgment for 122 eighth graders found a wide variation in DIT scores among high cognitive ability subjects, but no high scores among low ability subjects, suggesting that high cognitive ability is necessary but not sufficient for high moral judgment. (DB)

  15. Inference of trustworthiness from intuitive moral judgments.

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    Everett, Jim A C; Pizarro, David A; Crockett, M J

    2016-06-01

    Moral judgments play a critical role in motivating and enforcing human cooperation, and research on the proximate mechanisms of moral judgments highlights the importance of intuitive, automatic processes in forming such judgments. Intuitive moral judgments often share characteristics with deontological theories in normative ethics, which argue that certain acts (such as killing) are absolutely wrong, regardless of their consequences. Why do moral intuitions typically follow deontological prescriptions, as opposed to those of other ethical theories? Here, we test a functional explanation for this phenomenon by investigating whether agents who express deontological moral judgments are more valued as social partners. Across 5 studies, we show that people who make characteristically deontological judgments are preferred as social partners, perceived as more moral and trustworthy, and are trusted more in economic games. These findings provide empirical support for a partner choice account of moral intuitions whereby typically deontological judgments confer an adaptive function by increasing a person's likelihood of being chosen as a cooperation partner. Therefore, deontological moral intuitions may represent an evolutionarily prescribed prior that was selected for through partner choice mechanisms. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved).

  16. Atypical moral judgment following traumatic brain injury

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    Angelica Muresan

    2012-07-01

    Full Text Available Previous research has shown an association between emotions, particularly social emotions, and moral judgments. Some studies suggested an association between blunted emotion and the utilitarian moral judgments observed in patients with prefrontal lesions. In order to investigate how prefrontal brain damage affects moral judgment, we asked a sample of 29 TBI patients (12 females and 17 males and 41 healthy participants (16 females and 25 males to judge 22 hypothetical dilemmas split into three different categories (non-moral, impersonal and personal moral. The TBI group presented a higher proportion of affirmative (utilitarian responses for personal moral dilemmas when compared to controls, suggesting an atypical pattern of utilitarian judgements. We also found a negative association between the performance on recognition of social emotions and the proportion of affirmative responses on personal moral dilemmas. These results suggested that the preference for utilitarian responses in this type of dilemmas is accompanied by difficulties in social emotion recognition. Overall, our findings suggest that deontological moral judgments are associated with normal social emotion processing and that frontal lobe plays an important role in both emotion and moral judgment.

  17. Moral judgment reloaded: a moral dilemma validation study

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    Christensen, Julia F.; Flexas, Albert; Calabrese, Margareta; Gut, Nadine K.; Gomila, Antoni

    2014-01-01

    We propose a revised set of moral dilemmas for studies on moral judgment. We selected a total of 46 moral dilemmas available in the literature and fine-tuned them in terms of four conceptual factors (Personal Force, Benefit Recipient, Evitability, and Intention) and methodological aspects of the dilemma formulation (word count, expression style, question formats) that have been shown to influence moral judgment. Second, we obtained normative codings of arousal and valence for each dilemma showing that emotional arousal in response to moral dilemmas depends crucially on the factors Personal Force, Benefit Recipient, and Intentionality. Third, we validated the dilemma set confirming that people's moral judgment is sensitive to all four conceptual factors, and to their interactions. Results are discussed in the context of this field of research, outlining also the relevance of our RT effects for the Dual Process account of moral judgment. Finally, we suggest tentative theoretical avenues for future testing, particularly stressing the importance of the factor Intentionality in moral judgment. Additionally, due to the importance of cross-cultural studies in the quest for universals in human moral cognition, we provide the new set dilemmas in six languages (English, French, German, Spanish, Catalan, and Danish). The norming values provided here refer to the Spanish dilemma set. PMID:25071621

  18. Moral Judgment Reloaded: A Moral Dilemma validation study

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    Julia F. Christensen

    2014-07-01

    Full Text Available We propose a revised set of moral dilemmas for studies on moral judgment. We selected a total of 46 moral dilemmas available in the literature and fine-tuned them in terms of four conceptual factors (Personal Force, Benefit Recipient, Evitability and Intention and methodological aspects of the dilemma formulation (word count, expression style, question formats that have been shown to influence moral judgment. Second, we obtained normative codings of arousal and valence for each dilemma showing that emotional arousal in response to moral dilemmas depends crucially on the factors Personal Force, Benefit Recipient, and Intentionality. Third, we validated the dilemma set confirming that people's moral judgment is sensitive to all four conceptual factors, and to their interactions. Results are discussed in the context of this field of research, outlining also the relevance of our RT effects for the Dual Process account of moral judgment. Finally, we suggest tentative theoretical avenues for future testing, particularly stressing the importance of the factor Intentionality in moral judgment. Additionally, due to the importance of cross-cultural studies in the quest for universals in human moral cognition, we provide the new set dilemmas in six languages (English, French, German, Spanish, Catalan and Danish. The norming values provided here refer to the Spanish dilemma set.

  19. Construal levels and moral judgment: Some complications

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    Han Gong

    2012-09-01

    Full Text Available Eyal, T., Liberman, N., and Trope, Y., (2008. Judging near and distant virtue and vice. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44, 1204-1209, explored how psychological distance influences moral judgment and found that more extreme moral appraisals were given to distal behaviors rather than proximal behaviors. Contrary to Eyal et al., the current paper presents converging evidence showing that moral judgments become more extreme at lower-level construals compared to higher-level construals. In four experiments using two different priming techniques, we manipulated construal levels and assessed their effects on moral judgment. High-level consturals elicited less moral outrage toward transgressions and less positive ratings of virtuous behaviors than low-level construals. A replication study was also conducted to reconcile the inconsistencies between the current results and those of Eyal et al. Possible explanations for the different results between two studies are discussed.

  20. The Theory of Dyadic Morality: Reinventing Moral Judgment by Redefining Harm.

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    Schein, Chelsea; Gray, Kurt

    2018-02-01

    The nature of harm-and therefore moral judgment-may be misunderstood. Rather than an objective matter of reason, we argue that harm should be redefined as an intuitively perceived continuum. This redefinition provides a new understanding of moral content and mechanism-the constructionist Theory of Dyadic Morality (TDM). TDM suggests that acts are condemned proportional to three elements: norm violations, negative affect, and-importantly-perceived harm. This harm is dyadic, involving an intentional agent causing damage to a vulnerable patient (A→P). TDM predicts causal links both from harm to immorality (dyadic comparison) and from immorality to harm (dyadic completion). Together, these two processes make the "dyadic loop," explaining moral acquisition and polarization. TDM argues against intuitive harmless wrongs and modular "foundations," but embraces moral pluralism through varieties of values and the flexibility of perceived harm. Dyadic morality impacts understandings of moral character, moral emotion, and political/cultural differences, and provides research guidelines for moral psychology.

  1. Kohlberg's theory about moral judgment development and the instruments used for evaluation of moral judgment and moral competence in Brazil

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    Bataglia, Patrícia Unger Raphael [UNESP; Morais, Alessandra de [UNESP; Lepre, Rita Melissa [UNESP

    2010-01-01

    O presente artigo tem por objetivo abordar as bases, finalidades e composição de dois instrumentos de avaliação de juízo moral: a Moral Judgment Interview (MJI) e o Defining Issues Test (DIT), e um de competência moral: o Moral Judgment Test (MJT). Retoma a teoria do desenvolvimento moral de Kohlberg que fundamenta esses instrumentos, assim como os últimos estudos realizados com os mesmos. A MJI é uma entrevista semiestruturada que avalia o nível de juízo moral. O DIT é um teste objetivo que ...

  2. Wrongness in different relationships: Relational context effects on moral judgment.

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    Simpson, Ain; Laham, Simon M; Fiske, Alan Page

    2016-01-01

    Morality primarily serves social-relational functions. However, little research in moral psychology investigates how relational factors impact moral judgment, and a theoretically grounded approach to such investigations is lacking. We used Relational Models Theory and Moral Foundations Theory to explore how varying actor-victim relationships impacts judgment of different types of moral violations. Across three studies, using a diverse range of moral violations and varying the experimental design, relational context substantially influenced third-party judgment of moral violations, and typically independent of several factors strongly associated with moral judgment. Results lend novel but mixed support to Relationship Regulation Theory and provide some novel implications for Moral Foundations Theory. These studies highlight the importance of relational factors in moral psychology and provide guidelines for exploring how relational factors might shape moral judgment.

  3. Neural correlates of moral judgment in pedophilia.

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    Massau, Claudia; Kärgel, Christian; Weiß, Simone; Walter, Martin; Ponseti, Jorge; Hc Krueger, Tillmann; Walter, Henrik; Schiffer, Boris

    2017-09-01

    Pedophilia is a sexual preference that is often associated with child sex offending (CSO). Sexual urges towards prepubescent children and specifically acting upon those urges are universally regarded as immoral. However, up until now, it is completely unknown whether moral processing of sexual offenses is altered in pedophiles. A total of 31 pedophilic men and 19 healthy controls were assessed by using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in combination with a moral judgment paradigm consisting of 36 scenarios describing different types of offenses.Scenarios depicting sexual offenses against children compared to those depicting adults were associated with higher pattern of activation in the left temporo-parietal-junction (TPJ) and left posterior insular cortex, the posterior cingulate gyrus as well as the precuneus in controls relative to pedophiles, and vice versa. Moreover, brain activation in these areas were positively associated with ratings of moral reprehensibility and negatively associated with decision durations, but only in controls. Brain activation, found in key areas related to the broad network of moral judgment, theory of mind and (socio-)moral disgust - point to different moral processing of sexual offenses in pedophilia in general. The lack of associations between brain activation and behavioral responses in pedophiles further suggest a biased response pattern or dissected implicit valuation processes. © The Author (2017). Published by Oxford University Press.

  4. The role of emotions for moral judgments depends on the type of emotion and moral scenario.

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    Ugazio, Giuseppe; Lamm, Claus; Singer, Tania

    2012-06-01

    Emotions seem to play a critical role in moral judgment. However, the way in which emotions exert their influence on moral judgments is still poorly understood. This study proposes a novel theoretical approach suggesting that emotions influence moral judgments based on their motivational dimension. We tested the effects of two types of induced emotions with equal valence but with different motivational implications (anger and disgust), and four types of moral scenarios (disgust-related, impersonal, personal, and beliefs) on moral judgments. We hypothesized and found that approach motivation associated with anger would make moral judgments more permissible, while disgust, associated with withdrawal motivation, would make them less permissible. Moreover, these effects varied as a function of the type of scenario: the induced emotions only affected moral judgments concerning impersonal and personal scenarios, while we observed no effects for the other scenarios. These findings suggest that emotions can play an important role in moral judgment, but that their specific effects depend upon the type of emotion induced. Furthermore, induced emotion effects were more prevalent for moral decisions in personal and impersonal scenarios, possibly because these require the performance of an action rather than making an abstract judgment. We conclude that the effects of induced emotions on moral judgments can be predicted by taking their motivational dimension into account. This finding has important implications for moral psychology, as it points toward a previously overlooked mechanism linking emotions to moral judgments.

  5. The neural basis of intuitive and counterintuitive moral judgment

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    Wiech, Katja; Shackel, Nicholas; Farias, Miguel; Savulescu, Julian; Tracey, Irene

    2012-01-01

    Neuroimaging studies on moral decision-making have thus far largely focused on differences between moral judgments with opposing utilitarian (well-being maximizing) and deontological (duty-based) content. However, these studies have investigated moral dilemmas involving extreme situations, and did not control for two distinct dimensions of moral judgment: whether or not it is intuitive (immediately compelling to most people) and whether it is utilitarian or deontological in content. By contrasting dilemmas where utilitarian judgments are counterintuitive with dilemmas in which they are intuitive, we were able to use functional magnetic resonance imaging to identify the neural correlates of intuitive and counterintuitive judgments across a range of moral situations. Irrespective of content (utilitarian/deontological), counterintuitive moral judgments were associated with greater difficulty and with activation in the rostral anterior cingulate cortex, suggesting that such judgments may involve emotional conflict; intuitive judgments were linked to activation in the visual and premotor cortex. In addition, we obtained evidence that neural differences in moral judgment in such dilemmas are largely due to whether they are intuitive and not, as previously assumed, to differences between utilitarian and deontological judgments. Our findings therefore do not support theories that have generally associated utilitarian and deontological judgments with distinct neural systems. PMID:21421730

  6. Moral judgment as information processing: an integrative review.

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    Guglielmo, Steve

    2015-01-01

    How do humans make moral judgments about others' behavior? This article reviews dominant models of moral judgment, organizing them within an overarching framework of information processing. This framework poses two distinct questions: (1) What input information guides moral judgments? and (2) What psychological processes generate these judgments? Information Models address the first question, identifying critical information elements (including causality, intentionality, and mental states) that shape moral judgments. A subclass of Biased Information Models holds that perceptions of these information elements are themselves driven by prior moral judgments. Processing Models address the second question, and existing models have focused on the relative contribution of intuitive versus deliberative processes. This review organizes existing moral judgment models within this framework and critically evaluates them on empirical and theoretical grounds; it then outlines a general integrative model grounded in information processing, and concludes with conceptual and methodological suggestions for future research. The information-processing framework provides a useful theoretical lens through which to organize extant and future work in the rapidly growing field of moral judgment.

  7. Moral judgment as information processing: an integrative review

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    Guglielmo, Steve

    2015-01-01

    How do humans make moral judgments about others’ behavior? This article reviews dominant models of moral judgment, organizing them within an overarching framework of information processing. This framework poses two distinct questions: (1) What input information guides moral judgments? and (2) What psychological processes generate these judgments? Information Models address the first question, identifying critical information elements (including causality, intentionality, and mental states) that shape moral judgments. A subclass of Biased Information Models holds that perceptions of these information elements are themselves driven by prior moral judgments. Processing Models address the second question, and existing models have focused on the relative contribution of intuitive versus deliberative processes. This review organizes existing moral judgment models within this framework and critically evaluates them on empirical and theoretical grounds; it then outlines a general integrative model grounded in information processing, and concludes with conceptual and methodological suggestions for future research. The information-processing framework provides a useful theoretical lens through which to organize extant and future work in the rapidly growing field of moral judgment. PMID:26579022

  8. The Contrabassist and the CEO: Moral Judgment and Collective Identity

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    Alessandro Pinzani

    2003-01-01

    Full Text Available How much is a moral judgment on a single act influenced by circumstances which have little to do with the nature of the act itself? How much have certain moral judgments to do with the common history and shared experience of a certain group of individuals? Using two cases taken from life (a German musician and a German CEO behaving both in a morally wrong way but with very different consequences from the point of view of moral judgement and with very different reactions from the German public, the article tries to give an answer to these questions, touching issues like: guilt, moral responsibility, collective responsibility, and collective identity.

  9. Judgment of moral and social transgression in schizophrenia.

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    McGuire, Jonathan; Brüne, Martin; Langdon, Robyn

    2017-07-01

    Despite evidence of pervasive social-cognitive deficits in schizophrenia, little is known of moral cognition in this population. While recent research indicates that impairment of explicit moral reasoning is explained by these individuals' other cognitive deficits, their capacities for basic moral judgment are unknown. 45 people with schizophrenia and 27 healthy controls completed the Moral-Conventional Distinction Task: a classic task that assesses judgment of violations of moral or social convention on permissibility, severity, and authority-contingence. Justifications of judgments were also probed. Basic cognition was indexed by measures of IQ, verbal memory, and information processing speed. Self-report inventories were used to assess different facets of 'empathy' (e.g., perspective-taking, or theory of mind, and empathic concern), and aggressive tendencies. Groups did not differ significantly in judgments of permissibility or authority-contingency, or justifications of judgments. Patients did, however, rate violations of social (but not moral) convention more harshly. They also took longer to judge impermissibility of moral (but nor social) transgressions. Slower moral judgment in patients was associated with lower levels of self-reported empathic concern, while harsher condemnation of social transgression was associated with poorer (self-reported) perspective-taking. Findings provide no evidence that moral judgment is fundamentally compromised in schizophrenia. Evidence of slower moral judgment in schizophrenia does suggest, however, that patients were less influenced by automatic aversive responses to amoral conduct. The association found between poorer (self-reported) perspective-taking and greater condemnation of social transgressions also suggests that an insensitivity to others' extenuating motives may exacerbate social misunderstandings in schizophrenia. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  10. A person-centered approach to moral judgment.

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    Uhlmann, Eric Luis; Pizarro, David A; Diermeier, Daniel

    2015-01-01

    Both normative theories of ethics in philosophy and contemporary models of moral judgment in psychology have focused almost exclusively on the permissibility of acts, in particular whether acts should be judged on the basis of their material outcomes (consequentialist ethics) or on the basis of rules, duties, and obligations (deontological ethics). However, a longstanding third perspective on morality, virtue ethics, may offer a richer descriptive account of a wide range of lay moral judgments. Building on this ethical tradition, we offer a person-centered account of moral judgment, which focuses on individuals as the unit of analysis for moral evaluations rather than on acts. Because social perceivers are fundamentally motivated to acquire information about the moral character of others, features of an act that seem most informative of character often hold more weight than either the consequences of the act or whether a moral rule has been broken. This approach, we argue, can account for numerous empirical findings that are either not predicted by current theories of moral psychology or are simply categorized as biases or irrational quirks in the way individuals make moral judgments. © The Author(s) 2014.

  11. Hidden Paths from Morality to Cooperation: Moral Judgments Promote Trust and Trustworthiness

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    Simpson, Brent; Harrell, Ashley; Willer, Robb

    2013-01-01

    Classic sociological solutions to cooperation problems were rooted in the moral judgments group members make about one another's behaviors, but more recent research on prosocial behaviors has largely ignored this foundational work. Here, we extend theoretical accounts of the social effect of moral judgments. Where scholars have emphasized the…

  12. Low Levels of Empathic Concern Predict Utilitarian Moral Judgment

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    Gleichgerrcht, Ezequiel; Young, Liane

    2013-01-01

    Is it permissible to harm one to save many? Classic moral dilemmas are often defined by the conflict between a putatively rational response to maximize aggregate welfare (i.e., the utilitarian judgment) and an emotional aversion to harm (i.e., the non-utilitarian judgment). Here, we address two questions. First, what specific aspect of emotional responding is relevant for these judgments? Second, is this aspect of emotional responding selectively reduced in utilitarians or enhanced in non-utilitarians? The results reveal a key relationship between moral judgment and empathic concern in particular (i.e., feelings of warmth and compassion in response to someone in distress). Utilitarian participants showed significantly reduced empathic concern on an independent empathy measure. These findings therefore reveal diminished empathic concern in utilitarian moral judges. PMID:23593213

  13. Moral development in context: Associations of neighborhood and maternal discipline with preschoolers' moral judgments.

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    Ball, Courtney L; Smetana, Judith G; Sturge-Apple, Melissa L; Suor, Jennifer H; Skibo, Michael A

    2017-10-01

    Associations among moral judgments, neighborhood risk, and maternal discipline were examined in 118 socioeconomically diverse preschoolers (Mage = 41.84 months, SD = 1.42). Children rated the severity and punishment deserved for 6 prototypical moral transgressions entailing physical and psychological harm and unfairness. They also evaluated 3 criteria for assessing maturity in moral judgments: whether acts were considered wrong regardless of rules and wrong independent of authority, as well as whether moral rules were considered unacceptable to alter (collectively called criterion judgments). Mothers reported on their socioeconomic status, neighborhood characteristics and risk, and consistency of discipline; harsh maternal discipline was observed during a mother-child clean-up task. Structural equation modeling indicated that greater neighborhood risk was associated with less mature criterion judgments and ratings that transgressions were less serious and less deserving of punishment, particularly for children who were disciplined less harshly. Although harsh maternal discipline was associated with children's ratings of moral transgressions as more serious and deserving of punishment, this effect for severity judgments was more pronounced when mothers were inconsistent versus consistent in applying harsh discipline. Preschoolers who received consistent harsh discipline had less sophisticated moral criterion judgments than their less consistently or harshly disciplined peers. Results demonstrate the importance of social contexts in preschoolers' developing moral judgments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved).

  14. What makes moral dilemma judgments "utilitarian" or "deontological"?

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    Gawronski, Bertram; Beer, Jennifer S

    2017-12-01

    The distinction between utilitarianism and deontology has become a prevailing framework for conceptualizing moral judgment. According to the principle of utilitarianism, the morality of an action depends on its outcomes. In contrast, the principle of deontology states that the morality of an action depends on its consistency with moral norms. To identify the processes underlying utilitarian and deontological judgments, research in psychology and neuroscience has investigated responses to moral dilemmas that pit one principle against the other (e.g., trolley dilemma). However, the interpretation of responses in this paradigm is ambiguous, because the defining aspects of utilitarianism and deontology, outcomes and norms, are not manipulated. We illustrate how this shortcoming distorts interpretations of empirical findings and describe an alternative approach that overcomes the limitations of the traditional paradigm.

  15. Latent Fairness in Adults' Relationship-Based Moral Judgments.

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    Hao, Jian; Liu, Yanchun; Li, Jiafeng

    2015-01-01

    Can adults make fair moral judgments when individuals with whom they have different relationships are involved? The present study explored the fairness of adults' relationship-based moral judgments in two respects by performing three experiments involving 999 participants. In Experiment 1, 65 adults were asked to decide whether to harm a specific person to save five strangers in the footbridge and trolley dilemmas in a within-subject design. The lone potential victim was a relative, a best friend, a person they disliked, a criminal or a stranger. Adults' genetic relatedness to, familiarity with and affective relatedness to the lone potential victims varied. The results indicated that adults made different moral judgments involving the lone potential victims with whom they had different relationships. In Experiment 2, 306 adults responded to the footbridge and trolley dilemmas involving five types of lone potential victims in a within-subject design, and the extent to which they were familiar with and affectively related to the lone potential victim was measured. The results generally replicated those of Experiment 1. In addition, for close individuals, adults' moral judgments were less deontological relative to their familiarity with or positive affect toward these individuals. For individuals they were not close to, adults made deontological choices to a larger extent relative to their unfamiliarity with or negative affect toward these individuals. Moreover, for familiar individuals, the extent to which adults made deontological moral judgments more closely approximated the extent to which they were familiar with the individual. The adults' deontological moral judgments involving unfamiliar individuals more closely approximated their affective relatedness to the individuals. In Experiment 3, 628 adults were asked to make moral judgments with the type of lone potential victim as the between-subject variable. The results generally replicated those of the previous

  16. Latent Fairness in Adults’ Relationship-Based Moral Judgments

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hao, Jian; Liu, Yanchun; Li, Jiafeng

    2015-01-01

    Can adults make fair moral judgments when individuals with whom they have different relationships are involved? The present study explored the fairness of adults’ relationship-based moral judgments in two respects by performing three experiments involving 999 participants. In Experiment 1, 65 adults were asked to decide whether to harm a specific person to save five strangers in the footbridge and trolley dilemmas in a within-subject design. The lone potential victim was a relative, a best friend, a person they disliked, a criminal or a stranger. Adults’ genetic relatedness to, familiarity with and affective relatedness to the lone potential victims varied. The results indicated that adults made different moral judgments involving the lone potential victims with whom they had different relationships. In Experiment 2, 306 adults responded to the footbridge and trolley dilemmas involving five types of lone potential victims in a within-subject design, and the extent to which they were familiar with and affectively related to the lone potential victim was measured. The results generally replicated those of Experiment 1. In addition, for close individuals, adults’ moral judgments were less deontological relative to their familiarity with or positive affect toward these individuals. For individuals they were not close to, adults made deontological choices to a larger extent relative to their unfamiliarity with or negative affect toward these individuals. Moreover, for familiar individuals, the extent to which adults made deontological moral judgments more closely approximated the extent to which they were familiar with the individual. The adults’ deontological moral judgments involving unfamiliar individuals more closely approximated their affective relatedness to the individuals. In Experiment 3, 628 adults were asked to make moral judgments with the type of lone potential victim as the between-subject variable. The results generally replicated those of the

  17. Latent Fairness in Adults’ Relationship-Based Moral Judgments

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jian eHao

    2015-12-01

    Full Text Available Can adults make fair moral judgments when individuals with whom they have different relationships are involved? The present study explored the fairness of adults’ relationship-based moral judgments in two respects by performing three experiments involving 999 participants. In Experiment 1, 65 adults were asked to decide whether to harm a specific person to save five strangers in the footbridge and trolley dilemmas in a within-subject design. The lone potential victim was a relative, a best friend, a person they disliked, a criminal or a stranger. Adults’ genetic relatedness to, familiarity with and affective relatedness to the lone potential victims varied. The results indicated that adults made different moral judgments involving the lone potential victims with whom they had different relationships. In Experiment 2, 306 adults responded to the footbridge and trolley dilemmas involving five types of lone potential victims in a within-subject design, and the extent to which they were familiar with and affectively related to the lone potential victim was measured. The results generally replicated those of Experiment 1. In addition, for close individuals, adults’ moral judgments were less deontological relative to their familiarity with or positive affect toward these individuals. For individuals they were not close to, adults made deontological choices to a larger extent relative to their unfamiliarity with or negative affect toward these individuals. Moreover, for familiar individuals, the extent to which adults made deontological moral judgments more closely approximated the extent to which they were familiar with the individual. The adults’ deontological moral judgments involving unfamiliar individuals more closely approximated their affective relatedness to the individuals. In Experiment 3, 628 adults were asked to make moral judgments with the type of lone potential victim as the between-subject variable. The results generally

  18. Can model-free reinforcement learning explain deontological moral judgments?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ayars, Alisabeth

    2016-05-01

    Dual-systems frameworks propose that moral judgments are derived from both an immediate emotional response, and controlled/rational cognition. Recently Cushman (2013) proposed a new dual-system theory based on model-free and model-based reinforcement learning. Model-free learning attaches values to actions based on their history of reward and punishment, and explains some deontological, non-utilitarian judgments. Model-based learning involves the construction of a causal model of the world and allows for far-sighted planning; this form of learning fits well with utilitarian considerations that seek to maximize certain kinds of outcomes. I present three concerns regarding the use of model-free reinforcement learning to explain deontological moral judgment. First, many actions that humans find aversive from model-free learning are not judged to be morally wrong. Moral judgment must require something in addition to model-free learning. Second, there is a dearth of evidence for central predictions of the reinforcement account-e.g., that people with different reinforcement histories will, all else equal, make different moral judgments. Finally, to account for the effect of intention within the framework requires certain assumptions which lack support. These challenges are reasonable foci for future empirical/theoretical work on the model-free/model-based framework. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  19. Moral Development in Context: Associations of Neighborhood and Maternal Discipline with Preschoolers' Moral Judgments

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ball, Courtney L.; Smetana, Judith G.; Sturge-Apple, Melissa L.; Suor, Jennifer H.; Skibo, Michael A.

    2017-01-01

    Associations among moral judgments, neighborhood risk, and maternal discipline were examined in 118 socioeconomically diverse preschoolers (M[subscript age] = 41.84 months, SD = 1.42). Children rated the severity and punishment deserved for 6 prototypical moral transgressions entailing physical and psychological harm and unfairness. They also…

  20. Moral Emotions and Moral Judgments in Children's Narratives: Comparing Real-Life and Hypothetical Transgressions

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, Eveline; Gasser, Luciano; Malti, Tina

    2010-01-01

    How children make meaning of their own social experiences in situations involving moral issues is central to their subsequent affective and cognitive moral learning. Our study of young children's narratives describing their interpersonal conflicts shows that the emotions and judgments constructed in the course of these real-life narratives differ…

  1. Discrepancies between judgment and choice of action in moral dilemmas

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Sébastien eTassy

    2013-05-01

    Full Text Available Everyone has experienced the potential discrepancy between what one judges as morally acceptable and what one actually does when a choice between alternative behaviors is to be made. The present study explores empirically whether judgment and choice of action differ when people make decisions on dilemmas involving moral issues. 240 participants evaluated 24 moral and non-moral dilemmas either by judging (Is it acceptable to… or reporting the choice of action they would make (Would you do…. We also investigated the influence of varying the number of people benefiting from the decision and the closeness of relationship of the decision maker with the potential victim on these two types of decision. Variations in the number of beneficiaries from the decision did not influence judgment nor choice of action. By contrast, closeness of relationship with the victim had a greater influence on the choice of action than on judgment. This differentiation between evaluative judgments and choices of action argues in favor of each of them being supported by (at least partially different psychological processes.

  2. The Contact Principle and Utilitarian Moral Judgments in Young Children

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    Pellizzoni, Sandra; Siegal, Michael; Surian, Luca

    2010-01-01

    In three experiments involving 207 preschoolers and 28 adults, we investigated the extent to which young children base moral judgments of actions aimed to protect others on utilitarian principles. When asked to judge the rightness of intervening to hurt one person in order to save five others, the large majority of children aged 3 to 5 years…

  3. Structure of the Padua Moral Judgment Scale: A Study of Young Adults in Seven Countries.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Comunian, Anna L.

    The large majority of students in the Kohlbergian tradition have focused on stages of moral judgment development, on moral reasoning, and on research comparing the influence of standard variables such as age, education, and gender on moral reasoning skills. After briefly comparing the four most frequently employed moral judgment tests developed…

  4. How Large Is the Role of Emotion in Judgments of Moral Dilemmas?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Horne, Zachary; Powell, Derek

    2016-01-01

    Moral dilemmas often pose dramatic and gut-wrenching emotional choices. It is now widely accepted that emotions are not simply experienced alongside people's judgments about moral dilemmas, but that our affective processes play a central role in determining those judgments. However, much of the evidence purporting to demonstrate the connection between people's emotional responses and their judgments about moral dilemmas has recently been called into question. In the present studies, we reexamined the role of emotion in people's judgments about moral dilemmas using a validated self-report measure of emotion. We measured participants' specific emotional responses to moral dilemmas and, although we found that moral dilemmas evoked strong emotional responses, we found that these responses were only weakly correlated with participants' moral judgments. We argue that the purportedly strong connection between emotion and judgments of moral dilemmas may have been overestimated.

  5. Alcohol Dependence Associated with Increased Utilitarian Moral Judgment: A Case Control Study

    Science.gov (United States)

    Khemiri, Lotfi; Guterstam, Joar; Franck, Johan; Jayaram-Lindström, Nitya

    2012-01-01

    Recent studies indicate that emotional processes, mediated by the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC), are of great importance for moral judgment. Neurological patients with VMPC dysfunction have been shown to generate increased utilitarian moral judgments, i.e. are more likely to endorse emotionally aversive actions in order to maximize aggregate welfare, when faced with emotionally salient personal moral dilemmas. Patients with alcohol dependence (AD) also exhibit impairments in functions mediated by the prefrontal cortex, but whether they exhibit increased utilitarian moral reasoning has not previously been investigated. The aim of this study was to investigate moral judgment in AD patients (n = 20) compared to healthy controls (n = 20) matched by sex, age and education years. Each subject responded to a battery of 50 hypothetical dilemmas categorized as non-moral, moral impersonal and moral personal. They also responded to a questionnaire evaluating explicit knowledge of social and moral norms. Results confirmed our hypothesis that AD patients generated increased utilitarian moral judgment compared to controls when faced with moral personal dilemmas. Crucially, there was no difference in their responses to non-moral or impersonal moral dilemmas, nor knowledge of explicit social and moral norms. One possible explanation is that damage to the VMPC, caused by long term repeated exposure to alcohol results in emotional dysfunction, predisposing to utilitarian moral judgment. This work elucidates a novel aspect of the neuropsychological profile of AD patients, namely a tendency to generate utilitarian moral judgment when faced with emotionally salient moral personal dilemmas. PMID:22761922

  6. Alcohol dependence associated with increased utilitarian moral judgment: a case control study.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Khemiri, Lotfi; Guterstam, Joar; Franck, Johan; Jayaram-Lindström, Nitya

    2012-01-01

    Recent studies indicate that emotional processes, mediated by the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC), are of great importance for moral judgment. Neurological patients with VMPC dysfunction have been shown to generate increased utilitarian moral judgments, i.e. are more likely to endorse emotionally aversive actions in order to maximize aggregate welfare, when faced with emotionally salient personal moral dilemmas. Patients with alcohol dependence (AD) also exhibit impairments in functions mediated by the prefrontal cortex, but whether they exhibit increased utilitarian moral reasoning has not previously been investigated. The aim of this study was to investigate moral judgment in AD patients (n = 20) compared to healthy controls (n = 20) matched by sex, age and education years. Each subject responded to a battery of 50 hypothetical dilemmas categorized as non-moral, moral impersonal and moral personal. They also responded to a questionnaire evaluating explicit knowledge of social and moral norms. Results confirmed our hypothesis that AD patients generated increased utilitarian moral judgment compared to controls when faced with moral personal dilemmas. Crucially, there was no difference in their responses to non-moral or impersonal moral dilemmas, nor knowledge of explicit social and moral norms. One possible explanation is that damage to the VMPC, caused by long term repeated exposure to alcohol results in emotional dysfunction, predisposing to utilitarian moral judgment. This work elucidates a novel aspect of the neuropsychological profile of AD patients, namely a tendency to generate utilitarian moral judgment when faced with emotionally salient moral personal dilemmas.

  7. Disgust sensitivity is primarily associated with purity-based moral judgments

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Wagemans, F.M.A.; Brandt, M.J.; Zeelenberg, M.

    2018-01-01

    Individual differences in disgust sensitivity are associated with a range of judgments and attitudes related to the moral domain. Some perspectives suggest that the association between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments will be equally strong across all moral domains (i.e., purity, authority,

  8. Moral Judgment and Its Relation to Second-Order Theory of Mind

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fu, Genyue; Xiao, Wen S.; Killen, Melanie; Lee, Kang

    2014-01-01

    Recent research indicates that moral judgment and 1st-order theory of mind abilities are related. What is not known, however, is how 2nd-order theory of mind is related to moral judgment. In the present study, we extended previous findings by administering a morally relevant theory of mind task (an accidental transgressor) to 4- to 7-year-old…

  9. Moral Overtones of Food: Judgments of Others Based on What They Eat.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Stein, Richard I.; Nemeroff, Carol J.

    1995-01-01

    Investigated whether eating healthy or unhealthy foods gives rise to moral judgments about the consumer. Subjects were presented one of four bogus profiles of a person, differing only in gender and foods consumed, and rated the target on morality. Results confirmed that food choices influenced the raters' moral judgments. (RJM)

  10. Equity or equality? Moral judgments follow the money.

    Science.gov (United States)

    DeScioli, Peter; Massenkoff, Maxim; Shaw, Alex; Petersen, Michael Bang; Kurzban, Robert

    2014-12-22

    Previous research emphasizes people's dispositions as a source of differences in moral views. We investigate another source of moral disagreement, self-interest. In three experiments, participants played a simple economic game in which one player divides money with a partner according to the principle of equality (same payoffs) or the principle of equity (pay-offs proportional to effort expended). We find, first, that people's moral judgment of an allocation rule depends on their role in the game. People not only prefer the rule that most benefits them but also judge it to be more fair and moral. Second, we find that participants' views about equality and equity change in a matter of minutes as they learn where their interests lie. Finally, we find limits to self-interest: when the justification for equity is removed, participants no longer show strategic advocacy of the unequal division. We discuss implications for understanding moral debate and disagreement. © 2014 The Author(s) Published by the Royal Society. All rights reserved.

  11. L'Education Morale: Reinventer les Logiques de la Reflexion (Moral Education: Reinventing the Logic of Judgment).

    Science.gov (United States)

    Giroux, Aline

    1990-01-01

    Discusses the cognitive aspect of moral judgment. Considers the reductionist position that a judgment must conform to the canons of deductive logic to have epistemological value. Argues that moral thinking follows a different logic, requires other kinds of knowing, and demands a different type of rationality. (DMM)

  12. Unawareness of Self-interest Bias in Moral Judgments of Others’ Behavior

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Bocian Konrad

    2014-12-01

    Full Text Available Previous studies (Bocian & Wojciszke, 2014 showed that self-interest biases moral perception of others’ unethical actions. Moreover, affective changes in attitudinal responses towards the perpetrator of an immoral act drives the bias. In the present studies, we attempted to answer the question whether people are aware of the self-interest bias in their judgments of others’ behavior. We conducted two experiments showing that moral judgments of verbally described and imagined actions were dominated by norms rather than self-interest (Study 1 and that people were not aware that self-interest distorted their moral judgment (Study 2. The unawareness of the self-interest bias among the participants was attributable to omission of their own emotional responses when forecasting their moral judgments. We discuss the importance of emotions presence in studies on moral judgments as well as contribution of the present research to the intuitionist approach to moral judgment.

  13. At the heart of morality lies neuro-visceral integration: lower cardiac vagal tone predicts utilitarian moral judgment.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Park, Gewnhi; Kappes, Andreas; Rho, Yeojin; Van Bavel, Jay J

    2016-10-01

    To not harm others is widely considered the most basic element of human morality. The aversion to harm others can be either rooted in the outcomes of an action (utilitarianism) or reactions to the action itself (deontology). We speculated that the human moral judgments rely on the integration of neural computations of harm and visceral reactions. The present research examined whether utilitarian or deontological aspects of moral judgment are associated with cardiac vagal tone, a physiological proxy for neuro-visceral integration. We investigated the relationship between cardiac vagal tone and moral judgment by using a mix of moral dilemmas, mathematical modeling and psychophysiological measures. An index of bipolar deontology-utilitarianism was correlated with resting heart rate variability (HRV)-an index of cardiac vagal tone-such that more utilitarian judgments were associated with lower HRV. Follow-up analyses using process dissociation, which independently quantifies utilitarian and deontological moral inclinations, provided further evidence that utilitarian (but not deontological) judgments were associated with lower HRV. Our results suggest that the functional integration of neural and visceral systems during moral judgments can restrict outcome-based, utilitarian moral preferences. Implications for theories of moral judgment are discussed. © The Author (2016). Published by Oxford University Press. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.

  14. Developing Digital Privacy: Children's Moral Judgments Concerning Mobile GPS Devices.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gelman, Susan A; Martinez, Megan; Davidson, Natalie S; Noles, Nicholaus S

    2018-01-01

    New technology poses new moral problems for children to consider. We examined whether children deem object tracking with a mobile GPS device to be a property right. In three experiments, 329 children (4-10 years) and adults were asked whether it is acceptable to track the location of either one's own or another person's possessions using a mobile GPS device. Young children, like adults, viewed object tracking as relatively more acceptable for owners than nonowners. However, whereas adults expressed negative evaluations of someone tracking another person's possessions, young children expressed positive evaluations of this behavior. These divergent moral judgments of digital tracking at different ages have profound implications for how concepts of digital privacy develop and for the digital security of children. © 2017 The Authors. Child Development © 2017 Society for Research in Child Development, Inc.

  15. Better Minds, Better Morals: A Procedural Guide to Better Judgment.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Schaefer, G Owen; Savulescu, Julian

    2017-01-01

    Making more moral decisions - an uncontroversial goal, if ever there was one. But how to go about it? In this article, we offer a practical guide on ways to promote good judgment in our personal and professional lives. We will do this not by outlining what the good life consists in or which values we should accept.Rather, we offer a theory of procedural reliability : a set of dimensions of thought that are generally conducive to good moral reasoning. At the end of the day, we all have to decide for ourselves what is good and bad, right and wrong. The best way to ensure we make the right choices is to ensure the procedures we're employing are sound and reliable. We identify four broad categories of judgment to be targeted - cognitive, self-management, motivational and interpersonal. Specific factors within each category are further delineated, with a total of 14 factors to be discussed. For each, we will go through the reasons it generally leads to more morally reliable decision-making, how various thinkers have historically addressed the topic, and the insights of recent research that can offer new ways to promote good reasoning. The result is a wide-ranging survey that contains practical advice on how to make better choices. Finally, we relate this to the project of transhumanism and prudential decision-making. We argue that transhumans will employ better moral procedures like these. We also argue that the same virtues will enable us to take better control of our own lives, enhancing our responsibility and enabling us to lead better lives from the prudential perspective.

  16. Influence of Defense Mechanisms on Moral Judgment Development: A Longitudinal Study.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hart, Daniel; Chmiel, Susan

    1992-01-01

    At age 13, and for the next 20 years, male subjects were periodically interviewed about their moral judgments. Adolescents with mature use of defense mechanisms reasoned at higher stages of moral judgment 10 to 20 years after the initial interview than did those with immature use of defense mechanisms. (BC)

  17. A Study on the Link between Moral Judgment Competences and Critical Thinking Skills

    Science.gov (United States)

    Samanci, Nilay Keskin

    2015-01-01

    Although many studies have established a direct link between moral judgment competences and critical thinking skills, none has been found to reveal the nature of the link between these two skills in the national and international literature. The present study looked at biology and primary education teacher candidates' moral judgment and critical…

  18. Normative Value Conceptions of Modern Parents, Teachers, and Educators (Analysis of Moral Value Judgments)

    Science.gov (United States)

    Shelina, S. L.; Mitina, O. V.

    2015-01-01

    The article presents the results of an analysis of the moral value judgments of adults (parents, teachers, educators) that directly concern the socialization process of the young generation in the modern metropolis. This paper follows the model study by Jean Piaget that investigated the moral value judgments of children. A comparative analysis of…

  19. Bible Knowledge and Moral Judgment: Knowing Scripture and Using Ethical Reasoning

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nelson, Daniel

    2004-01-01

    The relationship between moral judgment and religious knowledge was investigated, with an analysis of the impact of academic skill on both domains. Fifty-six Bible college seniors completed measures of moral judgment (Defining Issues Test), Bible knowledge (Standardized Bible Content Test), and academic skill (Academic Profile). Results indicate…

  20. Children's Interpretive Understanding, Moral Judgments, and Emotion Attributions: Relations to Social Behaviour

    Science.gov (United States)

    Malti, Tina; Gasser, Luciano; Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, Eveline

    2010-01-01

    The study investigated interpretive understanding, moral judgments, and emotion attributions in relation to social behaviour in a sample of 59 5-year-old, 123 7-year-old, and 130 9-year-old children. Interpretive understanding was assessed by two tasks measuring children's understanding of ambiguous situations. Moral judgments and emotion…

  1. Moral Judgment, Cognitive Distortions and Implicit Theories in Young Sex Offenders

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    van Vugt, E.S.; Hendriks, J.; Stams, G.J.; van Exter, F.F.; Bijleveld, C.C.J.H.; van der Laan, P.H.; Asscher, J.J.

    2011-01-01

    This study focused on moral judgment, cognitive distortions and implicit theories in 77 young sex offenders of whom 56 were child abusers and 21 were peer abusers. The sociomoral reflection measure-short form (SRM-SF) was used to assess moral judgment, and was extended with questions about sexual

  2. Moral judgment, cognitive distortions and implicit theories in young sex offenders

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    van Vugt, E.; Hendriks, J.; Stams, G.J.; van Exter, F.; Bijleveld, C.; van der Laan, P.; Asscher, J.

    2011-01-01

    This study focused on moral judgment, cognitive distortions and implicit theories in 77 young sex offenders of whom 56 were child abusers and 21 were peer abusers. The sociomoral reflection measure- short form (SRM-SF) was used to assess moral judgment, and was extended with questions about sexual

  3. Gender differences in moral judgment and the evaluation of gender-specified moral agents.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Capraro, Valerio; Sippel, Jonathan

    2017-11-01

    Whether, and if so, how exactly gender differences are manifested in moral judgment has recently been at the center of much research on moral decision making. Previous research suggests that women are more deontological than men in personal, but not impersonal, moral dilemmas. However, typical personal and impersonal moral dilemmas differ along two dimensions: Personal dilemmas are more emotionally salient than impersonal ones and involve a violation of Kant's practical imperative that humans must never be used as a mere means, but only as ends. Thus, it remains unclear whether the reported gender difference is due to emotional salience or to the violation of the practical imperative. To answer this question, we explore gender differences in three moral dilemmas: a typical personal dilemma, a typical impersonal dilemma, and an intermediate dilemma, which is not as emotionally salient as typical personal moral dilemmas, but contains an equally strong violation of Kant's practical imperative. While we replicate the result that women tend to embrace deontological ethics more than men in personal, but not impersonal, dilemmas, we find no gender differences in the intermediate situation. This suggests that gender differences in these type of dilemmas are driven by emotional salience, and not by the violation of the practical imperative. Additionally, we also explore whether people think that women should behave differently than men in these dilemmas. Across all three dilemmas, we find no statistically significant differences about how people think men and women should behave.

  4. The Distinction between Moral Judgment Development and Verbal Ability: Some Relevant Data Using Socio-Political Outcome Variables

    Science.gov (United States)

    Thoma, Stephen J.; Derryberry, Pitt; Narvaez, Darcia

    2009-01-01

    Critics of moral judgment measures question whether the obtained pattern of relationships between moral judgment scores and outcome variables might be better explained by verbal/general ability. To address this concern, we assess the degree to which moral judgment development reduces to verbal ability using the Defining Issues Test (DIT). Our…

  5. Neural development of mentalizing in moral judgment from adolescence to adulthood

    Science.gov (United States)

    Harenski, Carla L.; Harenski, Keith A.; Shane, Matthew S.; Kiehl, Kent A.

    2011-01-01

    The neural mechanisms underlying moral judgment have been extensively studied in healthy adults. How these mechanisms evolve from adolescence to adulthood has received less attention. Brain regions that have been consistently implicated in moral judgment in adults, including the superior temporal cortex and prefrontal cortex, undergo extensive developmental changes from adolescence to adulthood. Thus, their role in moral judgment may also change over time. In the present study, 51 healthy male participants age 13–53 were scanned with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while they viewed pictures that did or did not depict situations considered by most individuals to represent moral violations, and rated their degree of moral violation severity. Consistent with predictions, a regression analysis revealed a positive correlation between age and hemodynamic activity in the temporo-parietal junction when participants made decisions regarding moral severity. This region is known to contribute to mentalizing processes during moral judgment in adults and suggests that adolescents use these types of inferences less during moral judgment than do adults. A positive correlation with age was also present in the posterior cingulate. Overall, the results suggest that the brain regions utilized in moral judgment change over development. PMID:22267967

  6. tDCS Over DLPFC Leads to Less Utilitarian Response in Moral-Personal Judgment

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Haoli Zheng

    2018-03-01

    Full Text Available The profound nature of moral judgment has been discussed and debated for centuries. When facing the trade-off between pursuing moral rights and seeking better consequences, most people make different moral choices between two kinds of dilemmas. Such differences were explained by the dual-process theory involving an automatic emotional response and a controlled application of utilitarian decision-rules. In neurocognitive studies, the bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC has been demonstrated to play an important role in cognitive “rational” control processes in moral dilemmas. However, the profile of results across studies is not entirely consistent. Although one transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS study revealed that disrupting the right DLPFC led to less utilitarian responses, other TMS studies indicated that inhibition of the right DLPFC led to more utilitarian choices. Moreover, the right temporoparietal junction (TPJ is essential for its function of integrating belief and intention in moral judgment, which is related to the emotional process according to the dual-process theory. Relatively few studies have reported the causal relationship between TPJ and participants' moral responses, especially in moral dilemmas. In the present study, we aimed to demonstrate a direct link between the neural and behavioral results by application of transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS in the bilateral DLPFC or TPJ of our participants. We observed that activating the right DLPFC as well as inhibiting the left DLPFC led to less utilitarian judgments, especially in moral-personal conditions, indicating that the right DLPFC plays an essential role, not only through its function of moral reasoning but also through its information integrating process in moral judgments. It was also revealed that altering the excitability of the bilateral TPJ using tDCS negligibly altered the moral response in non-moral, moral-impersonal and moral

  7. Utilitarian Moral Judgment Exclusively Coheres with Inference from Is to Ought.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Elqayam, Shira; Wilkinson, Meredith R; Thompson, Valerie A; Over, David E; Evans, Jonathan St B T

    2017-01-01

    Faced with moral choice, people either judge according to pre-existing obligations ( deontological judgment), or by taking into account the consequences of their actions ( utilitarian judgment). We propose that the latter coheres with a more general cognitive mechanism - deontic introduction , the tendency to infer normative ('deontic') conclusions from descriptive premises (is-ought inference). Participants were presented with vignettes that allowed either deontological or utilitarian choice, and asked to draw a range of deontic conclusions, as well as judge the overall moral rightness of each choice separately. We predicted and found a selective defeasibility pattern, in which manipulations that suppressed deontic introduction also suppressed utilitarian moral judgment, but had little effect on deontological moral judgment. Thus, deontic introduction coheres with utilitarian moral judgment almost exclusively. We suggest a family of norm-generating informal inferences, in which normative conclusions are drawn from descriptive (although value-laden) premises. This family includes deontic introduction and utilitarian moral judgment as well as other informal inferences. We conclude with a call for greater integration of research in moral judgment and research into deontic reasoning and informal inference.

  8. Utilitarian Moral Judgment Exclusively Coheres with Inference from Is to Ought

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Shira Elqayam

    2017-06-01

    Full Text Available Faced with moral choice, people either judge according to pre-existing obligations (deontological judgment, or by taking into account the consequences of their actions (utilitarian judgment. We propose that the latter coheres with a more general cognitive mechanism – deontic introduction, the tendency to infer normative (‘deontic’ conclusions from descriptive premises (is-ought inference. Participants were presented with vignettes that allowed either deontological or utilitarian choice, and asked to draw a range of deontic conclusions, as well as judge the overall moral rightness of each choice separately. We predicted and found a selective defeasibility pattern, in which manipulations that suppressed deontic introduction also suppressed utilitarian moral judgment, but had little effect on deontological moral judgment. Thus, deontic introduction coheres with utilitarian moral judgment almost exclusively. We suggest a family of norm-generating informal inferences, in which normative conclusions are drawn from descriptive (although value-laden premises. This family includes deontic introduction and utilitarian moral judgment as well as other informal inferences. We conclude with a call for greater integration of research in moral judgment and research into deontic reasoning and informal inference.

  9. The Foreign Language Effect on Moral Judgment: The Role of Emotions and Norms.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Janet Geipel

    Full Text Available We investigated whether and why the use of a foreign language influences moral judgment. We studied the trolley and footbridge dilemmas, which propose an action that involves killing one individual to save five. In line with prior work, the use of a foreign language increased the endorsement of such consequentialist actions for the footbridge dilemma, but not for the trolley dilemma. But contrary to recent theorizing, this effect was not driven by an attenuation of emotions. An attenuation of emotions was found in both dilemmas, and it did not mediate the foreign language effect on moral judgment. An examination of additional scenarios revealed that foreign language influenced moral judgment when the proposed action involved a social or moral norm violation. We propose that foreign language influences moral judgment by reducing access to normative knowledge.

  10. The Foreign Language Effect on Moral Judgment: The Role of Emotions and Norms.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Geipel, Janet; Hadjichristidis, Constantinos; Surian, Luca

    2015-01-01

    We investigated whether and why the use of a foreign language influences moral judgment. We studied the trolley and footbridge dilemmas, which propose an action that involves killing one individual to save five. In line with prior work, the use of a foreign language increased the endorsement of such consequentialist actions for the footbridge dilemma, but not for the trolley dilemma. But contrary to recent theorizing, this effect was not driven by an attenuation of emotions. An attenuation of emotions was found in both dilemmas, and it did not mediate the foreign language effect on moral judgment. An examination of additional scenarios revealed that foreign language influenced moral judgment when the proposed action involved a social or moral norm violation. We propose that foreign language influences moral judgment by reducing access to normative knowledge.

  11. Blaming, praising, and protecting our humanity: the implications of everyday dehumanization for judgments of moral status.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bastian, Brock; Laham, Simon M; Wilson, Sam; Haslam, Nick; Koval, Peter

    2011-09-01

    Being human implies a particular moral status: having moral value, agency, and responsibility. However, people are not seen as equally human. Across two studies, we examine the consequences that subtle variations in the perceived humanness of actors or groups have for their perceived moral status. Drawing on Haslam's two-dimensional model of humanness and focusing on three ways people may be considered to have moral status - moral patiency (value), agency, or responsibility - we demonstrate that subtly denying humanness to others has implications for whether they are blamed, praised, or considered worthy of moral concern and rehabilitation. Moreover, we show that distinct human characteristics are linked to specific judgments of moral status. This work demonstrates that everyday judgments of moral status are influenced by perceptions of humanness. ©2010 The British Psychological Society.

  12. Relationship between ethical ideology and moral judgment: Academic nurse educators' perception.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Abou Hashish, Ebtsam Aly; Ali Awad, Nadia Hassan

    2017-01-01

    Ascertaining the relationship between ethical ideology, moral judgment, and ethical decision among academic nurse educators at work appears to be a challenge particularly in situations when they are faced with a need to solve an ethical problem and make a moral decision. This study aims to investigate the relationship between ethical ideology, moral judgment, and ethical decision as perceived by academic nurse educators. A descriptive correlational research design was conducted at Faculty of Nursing, Alexandria University. All academic nurse educators were included in the study (N = 220). Ethical Position Questionnaire and Questionnaire of Moral Judgment and Ethical Decisions were proved reliable to measure study variables. Ethical considerations: Approval was obtained from Ethics Committee at Faculty of Nursing, Alexandria University. Privacy and confidentiality of data were maintained and assured by obtaining subjects' informed consent. This study reveals a significant positive moderate correlation between idealism construct of ethical ideology and moral judgment in terms of recognition of the behavior as an ethical issue and the magnitude of emotional consequences of the ethical situation (p ethical ideology and overall moral judgment (p = 0.010). Approximately 3.5% of the explained variance of overall moral judgment is predicted by idealism together with relativism. The findings suggest that variations in ethical position and ideology are associated with moral judgment and ethical decision. Organizations of academic nursing education should provide a supportive work environment to help their academic staff to develop their self-awareness and knowledge of their ethical position and promoting their ethical ideologies and, in turn, enhance their moral judgment as well as develop ethical reasoning and decision-making capability of nursing students. More emphasis in nursing curricula is needed on ethical concepts for developing nursing competencies.

  13. Children's moral judgments and moral emotions following exclusion of children with disabilities: relations with inclusive education, age, and contact intensity.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gasser, Luciano; Malti, Tina; Buholzer, Alois

    2013-03-01

    We investigated relations between children's moral judgments and moral emotions following disability-based exclusion and inclusive education, age, and contact intensity. Nine- and 12-year-old Swiss children (N=351) from inclusive and noninclusive classrooms provided moral judgments and moral emotion attributions following six vignettes about social exclusion of children with disabilities. Children also reported on their level of sympathy towards children with disabilities and their contact intensity with children with disabilities. Overall, children condemned disability-based exclusion, attributed few positive emotions to excluder targets, and expressed high sympathy for children with disabilities, independent of age and educational setting. However, younger children from inclusive classrooms exhibited more moral judgments and moral emotions than younger children from noninclusive classrooms. Moreover, children who expressed high sympathy towards children with disabilities were more likely to report frequent contact with children with disabilities. The findings extend existing research on social exclusion by examining disability-based exclusion and are discussed with respect to developmental research on social and moral judgments and emotions following children's inclusion and exclusion decisions. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  14. Beyond Affective Influences on Deontological Moral Judgment: The Role of Motivations for Prevention in the Moral Condemnation of Harm.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gamez-Djokic, Monica; Molden, Daniel

    2016-09-20

    Past research suggests that deontological judgments, which condemn deliberate harm no matter what the beneficial consequences, typically arise from emotional and intuitive reactions to the harm, whereas utilitarian judgments, which acknowledge the potential benefits of deliberate harm, typically arise from rational deliberation about whether these benefits outweigh the costs. The present research explores whether specific motivational orientations might, at times, increase the likelihood of deontological judgments without increasing emotional reactions. A meta-analysis of 10 newly conducted studies indicated that, compared with when focused on advancement (promotion), when people were focused on security (prevention) they made stronger deontological judgments in hypothetical moral dilemmas. Moreover, this effect could not be explained by participants' differing emotional reactions to the dilemmas when prevention-focused, but instead mirrored reports of their explicit reasoning. Implications for expanding current models of deontological and utilitarian moral judgment are discussed. © 2016 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.

  15. Switching Away from Utilitarianism: The Limited Role of Utility Calculations in Moral Judgment

    OpenAIRE

    Sheskin, Mark; Baumard, Nicolas

    2016-01-01

    Our moral motivations might include a drive towards maximizing overall welfare, consistent with an ethical theory called "utilitarianism." However, people show non-utilitarian judgments in domains as diverse as healthcare decisions, income distributions, and penal laws. Rather than these being deviations from a fundamentally utilitarian psychology, we suggest that our moral judgments are generally non-utilitarian, even for cases that are typically seen as prototypically utilitarian. We show t...

  16. When Dishonesty Leads to Trust: Moral Judgments Biased by Self-interest are Truly Believed

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Bocian Konrad

    2016-09-01

    Full Text Available Research has shown that cheating is perceived as immoral when it serves the cheater’s interests, though it can be seen as moral when it serves the interests of the perceiver. However, are such biased moral judgments real, or are they merely lip service? To answer the question of whether biased moral judgments actually inform behavior, the authors asked participants to observe a confederate who either cheated for money or did not cheat, which benefited either the confederate alone or both the confederate and the participating observer. Then, participants evaluated the confederate and, finally, played a one shot trust game with her. Cheating influenced moral judgments and decreased behavioral trust, but this only occurred when self-interest was not involved. When self-interest was involved, participants showed no significant differences in trust levels, independent of whether the confederate had cheated or not. Implications for the dual process theory in moral psychology are discussed.

  17. The Influence of Negligence, Intention, and Outcome on Children's Moral Judgments

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nobes, Gavin; Panagiotaki, Georgia.; Pawson, Chris

    2009-01-01

    Piaget (1932) and subsequent researchers have reported that young children's moral judgments are based more on the outcomes of actions than on the agents' intentions. The current study investigated whether negligence might also influence these judgments and explain children's apparent focus on outcome. Children (3-8 years of age) and adults (N =…

  18. What Are They Thinking? The Moral Judgment of Children with Emotional and Behavioral Disorders

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hardman, Elizabeth L.

    2015-01-01

    This study was conducted to describe the moral judgment of 12 third- through fifth-grade children with and without emotional and behavioral disorders (EBD) and to explore how feelings affected their thought processes. Data were gathered via three individually conducted moral dilemma interviews with each child participant. These procedures produced…

  19. Moral Judgment, Personality, and Attitude to Authority in Early and Late Adolescence.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lapsley, Daniel K.; And Others

    1984-01-01

    This study was conducted to determine the relationship between moral judgment and personality or attitude toward authority; variation of attitude toward authority through adolescence; and bias of Kohlbergian moral development toward a liberal political philosophy. Results were discussed in terms of the political and psychological features of…

  20. The Comparative Effects of Adults and Peer Group Influence on Children's Moral Judgments.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Siegal, M.; Boyes, M. C.

    1980-01-01

    In this review, little support is found for Piaget's claim that with increasing peer group interaction adult authority becomes less legitimate to the child. It is suggested that the adult exerts increasing influence with age on children's moral judgment and, therefore, emphasis on peer-centered moral education may be misdirected. (Author/SJL)

  1. Moral Judgments and Emotions: Adolescents' Evaluations in Intergroup Social Exclusion Contexts

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cooley, Shelby; Elenbaas, Laura; Killen, Melanie

    2012-01-01

    This article examines children's moral judgments and emotional evaluations in the context of social exclusion. As they age, children and adolescents face increasingly complex situations in which group membership and allegiance are in opposition with morally relevant decisions, such as the exclusion of an individual from a group. While adolescents…

  2. Understanding the Role of Dispositional and Situational Threat Sensitivity in Our Moral Judgments

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wright, Jennifer Cole; Baril, Galen L.

    2013-01-01

    Previous research has identified different moral judgments in liberals and conservatives. While both care about harm/fairness ("individualizing" foundations), conservatives emphasize in-group/authority/purity ("binding" foundations) more than liberals. Thus, some argue that conservatives have a more complex morality. We suggest…

  3. Variation in the oxytocin receptor gene (OXTR) is associated with differences in moral judgment.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bernhard, Regan M; Chaponis, Jonathan; Siburian, Richie; Gallagher, Patience; Ransohoff, Katherine; Wikler, Daniel; Perlis, Roy H; Greene, Joshua D

    2016-12-01

    Moral judgments are produced through the coordinated interaction of multiple neural systems, each of which relies on a characteristic set of neurotransmitters. Genes that produce or regulate these neurotransmitters may have distinctive influences on moral judgment. Two studies examined potential genetic influences on moral judgment using dilemmas that reliably elicit competing automatic and controlled responses, generated by dissociable neural systems. Study 1 (N = 228) examined 49 common variants (SNPs) within 10 candidate genes and identified a nominal association between a polymorphism (rs237889) of the oxytocin receptor gene (OXTR) and variation in deontological vs utilitarian moral judgment (that is, judgments favoring individual rights vs the greater good). An association was likewise observed for rs1042615 of the arginine vasopressin receptor gene (AVPR1A). Study 2 (N = 322) aimed to replicate these findings using the aforementioned dilemmas as well as a new set of structurally similar medical dilemmas. Study 2 failed to replicate the association with AVPR1A, but replicated the OXTR finding using both the original and new dilemmas. Together, these findings suggest that moral judgment is influenced by variation in the oxytocin receptor gene and, more generally, that single genetic polymorphisms can have a detectable effect on complex decision processes. © The Author (2016). Published by Oxford University Press.

  4. Improving epistemological beliefs and moral judgment through an STS-based science ethics education program.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Han, Hyemin; Jeong, Changwoo

    2014-03-01

    This study develops a Science-Technology-Society (STS)-based science ethics education program for high school students majoring in or planning to major in science and engineering. Our education program includes the fields of philosophy, history, sociology and ethics of science and technology, and other STS-related theories. We expected our STS-based science ethics education program to promote students' epistemological beliefs and moral judgment development. These psychological constructs are needed to properly solve complicated moral and social dilemmas in the fields of science and engineering. We applied this program to a group of Korean high school science students gifted in science and engineering. To measure the effects of this program, we used an essay-based qualitative measurement. The results indicate that there was significant development in both epistemological beliefs and moral judgment. In closing, we briefly discuss the need to develop epistemological beliefs and moral judgment using an STS-based science ethics education program.

  5. The sadistic trait predicts minimization of intention and causal responsibility in moral judgment.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Trémolière, Bastien; Djeriouat, Hakim

    2016-01-01

    The present research tests the hypothesis that specific socially aversive traits-subclinical sadism in particular-are associated with an impaired judgment of moral wrongness, guilt, and punishment in various moral scenarios manipulating intent, cause and consequence of harm. In three online studies (total N=1069), participants completed a battery of tests scaled to assess sadism and the Dark Triad constructs, then faced different situations involving moral issues (attempted harm, intentional harm, accidental harm). Study 1 revealed that a sadistic personality trait was associated with minimization of the importance of harmful intent in moral judgment. Study 2 showed that a sadistic personality trait predicted minimization of the importance of causal mechanisms to harmful consequences in moral judgment. Study 3 showed that these effects were mediated by enjoyment of cruelty, a characteristic unique to sadists. In the light of Cushman's (2008) two-process model of moral judgment, this set of studies provides the first evidence that deficits in the integration of the theory of mind and causality can be observed in personality traits. The independent predictive value of sadism highlights that features other than emotional deficits are essential in explaining impaired moral evaluations. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  6. Homogeneity of Moral Judgment? Apprentices Solving Business Conflicts.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Beck, Klaus; Heinrichs, Karin; Minnameier, Gerhard; Parche-Kawik, Kirsten

    In an ongoing longitudinal study that started in 1994, the moral development of business apprentices is being studied. The focal point of this project is a critical analysis of L. Kohlberg's thesis of homogeneity, according to which people should judge every moral issue from the point of view of their "modal" stage (the most frequently…

  7. Transcranial direct current stimulation of the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex shifts preference of moral judgments.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Maria Kuehne

    Full Text Available Attitude to morality, reflecting cultural norms and values, is considered unique to human social behavior. Resulting moral behavior in a social environment is controlled by a widespread neural network including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC, which plays an important role in decision making. In the present study we investigate the influence of neurophysiological modulation of DLPFC reactivity by means of transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS on moral reasoning. For that purpose we administered anodal, cathodal, and sham stimulation of the left DLPFC while subjects judged the appropriateness of hard moral personal dilemmas. In contrast to sham and cathodal stimulation, anodal stimulation induced a shift in judgment of personal moral dilemmas towards more non-utilitarian actions. Our results demonstrate that alterations of left DLPFC activity can change moral judgments and, in consequence, provide a causal link between left DLPFC activity and moral reasoning. Most important, the observed shift towards non-utilitarian actions suggests that moral decision making is not a permanent individual trait but can be manipulated; consequently individuals with boundless, uncontrollable, and maladaptive moral behavior, such as found in psychopathy, might benefit from neuromodulation-based approaches.

  8. Divergent roles of autistic and alexithymic traits in utilitarian moral judgments in adults with autism

    Science.gov (United States)

    Patil, Indrajeet; Melsbach, Jens; Hennig-Fast, Kristina; Silani, Giorgia

    2016-01-01

    This study investigated hypothetical moral choices in adults with high-functioning autism and the role of empathy and alexithymia in such choices. We used a highly emotionally salient moral dilemma task to investigate autistics’ hypothetical moral evaluations about personally carrying out harmful utilitarian behaviours aimed at maximizing welfare. Results showed that they exhibited a normal pattern of moral judgments despite the deficits in social cognition and emotional processing. Further analyses revealed that this was due to mutually conflicting biases associated with autistic and alexithymic traits after accounting for shared variance: (a) autistic traits were associated with reduced utilitarian bias due to elevated personal distress of demanding social situations, while (b) alexithymic traits were associated with increased utilitarian bias on account of reduced empathic concern for the victim. Additionally, autistics relied on their non-verbal reasoning skills to rigidly abide by harm-norms. Thus, utilitarian moral judgments in autism were spared due to opposite influences of autistic and alexithymic traits and compensatory intellectual strategies. These findings demonstrate the importance of empathy and alexithymia in autistic moral cognition and have methodological implications for studying moral judgments in several other clinical populations. PMID:27020307

  9. Divergent roles of autistic and alexithymic traits in utilitarian moral judgments in adults with autism.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Patil, Indrajeet; Melsbach, Jens; Hennig-Fast, Kristina; Silani, Giorgia

    2016-03-29

    This study investigated hypothetical moral choices in adults with high-functioning autism and the role of empathy and alexithymia in such choices. We used a highly emotionally salient moral dilemma task to investigate autistics' hypothetical moral evaluations about personally carrying out harmful utilitarian behaviours aimed at maximizing welfare. Results showed that they exhibited a normal pattern of moral judgments despite the deficits in social cognition and emotional processing. Further analyses revealed that this was due to mutually conflicting biases associated with autistic and alexithymic traits after accounting for shared variance: (a) autistic traits were associated with reduced utilitarian bias due to elevated personal distress of demanding social situations, while (b) alexithymic traits were associated with increased utilitarian bias on account of reduced empathic concern for the victim. Additionally, autistics relied on their non-verbal reasoning skills to rigidly abide by harm-norms. Thus, utilitarian moral judgments in autism were spared due to opposite influences of autistic and alexithymic traits and compensatory intellectual strategies. These findings demonstrate the importance of empathy and alexithymia in autistic moral cognition and have methodological implications for studying moral judgments in several other clinical populations.

  10. Moral judgment modulation by disgust is bi-directionally moderated by individual sensitivity

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ong, How Hwee; Mullette-Gillman, O’Dhaniel A.; Kwok, Kenneth; Lim, Julian

    2014-01-01

    Modern theories of moral judgment predict that both conscious reasoning and unconscious emotional influences affect the way people decide about right and wrong. In a series of experiments, we tested the effect of subliminal and conscious priming of disgust facial expressions on moral dilemmas. “Trolley-car”-type scenarios were used, with subjects rating how acceptable they found the utilitarian course of action to be. On average, subliminal priming of disgust facial expressions resulted in higher rates of utilitarian judgments compared to neutral facial expressions. Further, in replication, we found that individual change in moral acceptability ratings due to disgust priming was modulated by individual sensitivity to disgust, revealing a bi-directional function. Our second replication extended this result to show that the function held for both subliminally and consciously presented stimuli. Combined across these experiments, we show a reliable bi-directional function, with presentation of disgust expression primes to individuals with higher disgust sensitivity resulting in more utilitarian judgments (i.e., number-based) and presentations to individuals with lower sensitivity resulting in more deontological judgments (i.e., rules-based). Our results may reconcile previous conflicting reports of disgust modulation of moral judgment by modeling how individual sensitivity to disgust determines the direction and degree of this effect. PMID:24639665

  11. Age and education in moral judgment of participants in team sports.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Proios, Miltiadis; Doganis, George

    2006-02-01

    The present aim was to investigate the effect of age and education on the moral reasoning of the same 535 individuals in sports for whom nature of sport experience was reported. All 535 participants (M age = 24.9 yr., SD = 8.3) were involved in sports at the time of the study as athletes (n = 342), referees (n = 145), or coaches (n = 48), and had a wide range of education. Analysis of variance of scores on the Defining Issues Test of Rest showed moral judgment in sports differs significantly amongst different age groups (F5.510 = 5.37, p education (F4.511 = 6.24, p education, higher moral judgment can be expected. It is apparent that moral development in sport is related to age and education, as also holds for a wider social setting.

  12. Effects of Suboptimally Presented Erotic Pictures on Moral Judgments: A Cross-Cultural Comparison.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Antonio Olivera-La Rosa

    Full Text Available Previous research has identified a set of core factors that influence moral judgments. The present study addresses the interplay between moral judgments and four factors: (a incidental affects, (b sociocultural context, (c type of dilemma, and (d participant's sex. We asked participants in two different countries (Colombia and Spain to judge the acceptability of actions in response to personal and impersonal moral dilemmas. Before each dilemma an affective prime (erotic, pleasant or neutral pictures was presented suboptimally. Our results show that: a relative to neutral priming, erotic primes increase the acceptance of harm for a greater good (i.e., more utilitarian judgments, b relative to Colombians, Spanish participants rated causing harm as less acceptable, c relative to impersonal dilemmas, personal dilemmas reduced the acceptance of harm, and d relative to men, women were less likely to consider harm acceptable. Our results are congruent with findings showing that sex is a crucial factor in moral cognition, and they extend previous research by showing the interaction between culture and incidental factors in the making of moral judgments.

  13. Effects of Suboptimally Presented Erotic Pictures on Moral Judgments: A Cross-Cultural Comparison

    Science.gov (United States)

    Martí-Vilar, Manuel; Arango, Olber Eduardo

    2016-01-01

    Previous research has identified a set of core factors that influence moral judgments. The present study addresses the interplay between moral judgments and four factors: (a) incidental affects, (b) sociocultural context, (c) type of dilemma, and (d) participant’s sex. We asked participants in two different countries (Colombia and Spain) to judge the acceptability of actions in response to personal and impersonal moral dilemmas. Before each dilemma an affective prime (erotic, pleasant or neutral pictures) was presented suboptimally. Our results show that: a) relative to neutral priming, erotic primes increase the acceptance of harm for a greater good (i.e., more utilitarian judgments), b) relative to Colombians, Spanish participants rated causing harm as less acceptable, c) relative to impersonal dilemmas, personal dilemmas reduced the acceptance of harm, and d) relative to men, women were less likely to consider harm acceptable. Our results are congruent with findings showing that sex is a crucial factor in moral cognition, and they extend previous research by showing the interaction between culture and incidental factors in the making of moral judgments. PMID:27367795

  14. Moral Judgment, Sensitivity To Reasons, and the Multi-system View

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Francesco Orsi

    2012-11-01

    Full Text Available In this paper I attempt a critical examination of the multi-system or dual-process view of moral judgment. This view aims to provide a psychological explanation of moral sensitivity, and in particular an explanation of conflicting moral sensitivities in dilemma cases such as the crying baby scenario. I argue that proponents of the multi-system view owe us a satisfactory account of the mechanisms underlying “consequentialist” responses to such scenarios. For one thing, the “cognitive” processes involved in consequentialist reasoning only seem to play a subserving role with respect to the final judgment (providing non-moral inputs to judgment, or exerting additional strength to override the immediate “deontological” response. In this sense, Greene and colleagues fail to identify a peculiar system of moral judgment specularly opposed to the affective “deontological” one. For another, Greene and colleagues’ work on the emotion-cognition dichotomy and the distinction between alarm-bell and currency emotions, though promising, still falls short of providing an adequate and consistent picture of the psychological mechanisms underlying “cognitive” evaluations and verdicts in dilemma scenarios. It is suggested that alongside further experimental work, proponents of this view should pay more attention to the conceptual underpinnings of their distinctions.

  15. Does Joshua Greene’s Dual Process Theory of Moral Judgment Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy?

    OpenAIRE

    Javier Gracia Calandín

    2017-01-01

    In this article I analyse whether Joshua Greene’s dual process theory of moral judgment commits the naturalistic fallacy. Firstly, and against current authors such as Patricia S. Churchland, I uphold the validity of the naturalistic fallacy denounced by Moore for more than a century. Secondly, I highlight and question Greene’s naturalized way of understanding Deontologism. Thirdly, I assert the distinction between "neural basis" and "moral foundation" as the key to avoid committing the natura...

  16. Group-based discrimination in judgments of moral purity-related behaviors: experimental and archival evidence.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Masicampo, E J; Barth, Maria; Ambady, Nalini

    2014-12-01

    Knowledge of individuals' group membership can alter moral judgments of their behavior. We found that such moral judgments were amplified when judgers learned that a person belonged to a group shown to elicit disgust in others. When a person was labeled as obese, a hippie, or "trailer trash," people judged that person's behavior differently than when such descriptors were omitted: Virtuous behaviors were more highly praised, and moral violations were more severely criticized. Such group-based discrimination in moral judgment was specific to the domain of moral purity. Members of disgust-eliciting groups but not members of other minorities were the target of harsh judgments for purity violations (e.g., lewd behavior) but not for other violations (e.g., refusing to help others). The same pattern held true for virtuous behaviors, so that members of disgust-eliciting groups were more highly praised than others but only in the purity domain. Furthermore, group-based discrimination was mediated by feelings of disgust toward the target group but not by other emotions. Last, analysis of New York Police Department officers' encounters with suspected criminals revealed a similar pattern to that found in laboratory experiments. Police officers were increasingly likely to make an arrest or issue a summons as body mass index increased (i.e., as obesity rose) among people suspected of purity crimes (e.g., prostitution) but not of other crimes (e.g., burglary). Thus, moral judgments in the lab and in the real world exhibit patterns of discrimination that are both group and behavior specific. PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved.

  17. Changes in Emotional-Social Intelligence, Caring, Leadership and Moral Judgment during Health Science Education Programs

    Science.gov (United States)

    Larin, Helene; Benson, Gerry; Wessel, Jean; Martin, Lynn; Ploeg, Jenny

    2014-01-01

    In addition to having academic knowledge and clinical skills, health professionals need to be caring, ethical practitioners able to understand the emotional concerns of their patients and to effect change. The purpose of this study was to determine whether emotional-social intelligence, caring, leadership and moral judgment of health science…

  18. Understanding the Relationship between Moral Judgment Development and Individual Characteristics: The Role of Educational Contexts

    Science.gov (United States)

    Maeda, Yukiko; Thoma, Steve J.; Bebeau, Muriel J.

    2009-01-01

    This study examines variation in moral judgment level as measured by the Defining Issues Test 2 (DIT-2; J. R. Rest & D. Narvaez, 1998), based on individual demographic information and educational contexts. Individual DIT-2 scores and demographic information were obtained from the archived data sets housed at the Center for the Study of Ethical…

  19. Correction: No Child Left Alone: Moral Judgments about Parents Affect Estimates of Risk to Children

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ashley J. Thomas

    2016-10-01

    Full Text Available This article details a correction to article Thomas, A. J., Stanford, P. K., & Sarnecka, B. W. (2016. No Child Left Alone: Moral Judgments about Parents Affect Estimates of Risk to Children. 'Collabra', 2(1, 10. DOI: http://doi.org/10.1525/collabra.33

  20. Deconfounding Distance Effects in Judgments of Moral Obligation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nagel, Jonas; Waldmann, Michael R.

    2013-01-01

    A heavily disputed question of moral philosophy is whether spatial distance between agent and victim is normatively relevant for the degree of obligation to help strangers in need. In this research, we focus on the associated descriptive question whether increased distance does in fact reduce individuals' sense of helping obligation. One problem…

  1. Divergent Effects of Different Positive Emotions on Moral Judgment

    Science.gov (United States)

    Strohminger, Nina; Lewis, Richard L.; Meyer, David E.

    2011-01-01

    Positive emotions are often treated as relatively similar in their cognitive-behavioral effects, and as having unambiguously beneficial consequences. For example, Valdesolo and DeSteno (2006) reported that a humorous video made people more prone to choose a utilitarian solution to a moral dilemma. They attributed this finding to increased positive…

  2. Switching Away from Utilitarianism: The Limited Role of Utility Calculations in Moral Judgment.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sheskin, Mark; Baumard, Nicolas

    2016-01-01

    Our moral motivations might include a drive towards maximizing overall welfare, consistent with an ethical theory called "utilitarianism." However, people show non-utilitarian judgments in domains as diverse as healthcare decisions, income distributions, and penal laws. Rather than these being deviations from a fundamentally utilitarian psychology, we suggest that our moral judgments are generally non-utilitarian, even for cases that are typically seen as prototypically utilitarian. We show two separate deviations from utilitarianism in such cases: people do not think maximizing welfare is required (they think it is merely acceptable, in some circumstances), and people do not think that equal welfare tradeoffs are even acceptable. We end by discussing how utilitarian reasoning might play a restricted role within a non-utilitarian moral psychology.

  3. Switching Away from Utilitarianism: The Limited Role of Utility Calculations in Moral Judgment.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mark Sheskin

    Full Text Available Our moral motivations might include a drive towards maximizing overall welfare, consistent with an ethical theory called "utilitarianism." However, people show non-utilitarian judgments in domains as diverse as healthcare decisions, income distributions, and penal laws. Rather than these being deviations from a fundamentally utilitarian psychology, we suggest that our moral judgments are generally non-utilitarian, even for cases that are typically seen as prototypically utilitarian. We show two separate deviations from utilitarianism in such cases: people do not think maximizing welfare is required (they think it is merely acceptable, in some circumstances, and people do not think that equal welfare tradeoffs are even acceptable. We end by discussing how utilitarian reasoning might play a restricted role within a non-utilitarian moral psychology.

  4. Emotional Reactions and Moral Judgment: the Effects of Morally Challenging Interactions in Military Operations

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    de Graaff, Miriam; Schut, M; Verweij, D.E.M.; Vermetten, H.G.J.M.; Giebels, Ellen

    2016-01-01

    This study explores the association between different types of morally challenging interactions during military deployment and response strategies (e.g., moral justification), as well as the mediating role of moral emotions. Interviews with Dutch servicemen who participated in military operations

  5. "Lean not on your own understanding": Belief that morality is founded on divine authority and non-utilitarian moral judgments

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jared Piazza

    2013-11-01

    Full Text Available Recent research has shown that religious individuals are much more resistant to utilitarian modes of thinking than their less religious counterparts, but the reason for this is not clear. We propose that a meta-ethical belief that morality is rooted in inviolable divine commands (i.e., endorsement of Divine Command Theory may help explain this finding. We present a novel 20-item scale measuring a belief that morality is founded on divine authority. The scale shows good internal reliability and convergent and discriminant validity. Study 1 found that this scale fully mediated the relationship that various religiosity measures had with a deontological thinking style in our sample of American adults. It also accounted for the link between religiosity and social conservative values. Furthermore, the relationship between the scale and these outcome variables held after statistically controlling for variables related to actively open-minded thinking and the Big Five. Study 2 replicated the results using naturalistic moral dilemmas that placed deontological and utilitarian concerns in conflict, and showed that the results of Study 1 cannot be explained by differences in moral foundations (e.g., concern for authority more generally or differences in the perceived function of rules. Quite the contrary, endorsement of the divine origins of morality fully mediated the relationship religiosity had with the so-called ``binding'' foundations (i.e., Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity. Our findings highlight the importance of meta-ethical beliefs for understanding individual differences in moral judgment.

  6. Does "science" make you moral? The effects of priming science on moral judgments and behavior.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ma-Kellams, Christine; Blascovich, Jim

    2013-01-01

    Previous work has noted that science stands as an ideological force insofar as the answers it offers to a variety of fundamental questions and concerns; as such, those who pursue scientific inquiry have been shown to be concerned with the moral and social ramifications of their scientific endeavors. No studies to date have directly investigated the links between exposure to science and moral or prosocial behaviors. Across four studies, both naturalistic measures of science exposure and experimental primes of science led to increased adherence to moral norms and more morally normative behaviors across domains. Study 1 (n = 36) tested the natural correlation between exposure to science and likelihood of enforcing moral norms. Studies 2 (n = 49), 3 (n = 52), and 4 (n = 43) manipulated thoughts about science and examined the causal impact of such thoughts on imagined and actual moral behavior. Across studies, thinking about science had a moralizing effect on a broad array of domains, including interpersonal violations (Studies 1, 2), prosocial intentions (Study 3), and economic exploitation (Study 4). These studies demonstrated the morally normative effects of lay notions of science. Thinking about science leads individuals to endorse more stringent moral norms and exhibit more morally normative behavior. These studies are the first of their kind to systematically and empirically test the relationship between science and morality. The present findings speak to this question and elucidate the value-laden outcomes of the notion of science.

  7. Individual differences in moral judgment competence are related to activity of the prefrontal cortex when attributing blame to evil intention.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Li, Xiaojing; Yang, Juan; Li, Peng; Li, Hong

    2016-01-01

    The weighing of intentions and consequences is inconsistent in adult's moral judgments, and this is particularly prominent when assigning blame to the immoral intentions in the absence of negative outcomes. The current study extends previous research by examining how individual differences in moral judgment competence are reflected in the cortical network when making judgments about immoral intentions. Twenty-four participants were scanned, using functional magnetic resonance imaging, while making judgments about three kinds of moral scenarios: a neutral condition, an immoral intention condition, and an immoral condition. The result showed that comparing with making judgments about the other two conditions, making judgments about the immoral intentions takes longer time and was associated with significantly elevated activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex. Additionally, moral judgment competence scores were inversely correlated with activity in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex when assigning blame to the immoral intentions. Greater activity in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in participants with lower moral judgment competence possibly reflected increased recruitment of cognitive resource applied to control impulsive response and integrate competitive information in making judgments about the immoral intention.

  8. Once a Utilitarian, Consistently a Utilitarian? Examining Principledness in Moral Judgment via the Robustness of Individual Differences.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Helzer, Erik G; Fleeson, William; Furr, R Michael; Meindl, Peter; Barranti, Maxwell

    2017-08-01

    Although individual differences in the application of moral principles, such as utilitarianism, have been documented, so too have powerful context effects-effects that raise doubts about the durability of people's moral principles. In this article, we examine the robustness of individual differences in moral judgment by examining them across time and across different decision contexts. In Study 1, consistency in utilitarian judgment of 122 adult participants was examined over two different survey sessions. In Studies 2A and 2B, large samples (Ns = 130 and 327, respectively) of adult participants made a series of 32 moral judgments across eight different contexts that are known to affect utilitarian endorsement. Contrary to some contemporary theorizing, our results reveal a strong degree of consistency in moral judgment. Across time and experimental manipulations of context, individuals maintained their relative standing on utilitarianism, and aggregated moral decisions reached levels of near-perfect consistency. Results support the view that on at least one dimension (utilitarianism), people's moral judgments are robustly consistent, with context effects tailoring the application of principles to the particulars of any given moral judgment. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

  9. How clinicians make (or avoid) moral judgments of patients: implications of the evidence for relationships and research

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    Physicians, nurses, and other clinicians readily acknowledge being troubled by encounters with patients who trigger moral judgments. For decades social scientists have noted that moral judgment of patients is pervasive, occurring not only in egregious and criminal cases but also in everyday situations in which appraisals of patients' social worth and culpability are routine. There is scant literature, however, on the actual prevalence and dynamics of moral judgment in healthcare. The indirect evidence available suggests that moral appraisals function via a complex calculus that reflects variation in patient characteristics, clinician characteristics, task, and organizational factors. The full impact of moral judgment on healthcare relationships, patient outcomes, and clinicians' own well-being is yet unknown. The paucity of attention to moral judgment, despite its significance for patient-centered care, communication, empathy, professionalism, healthcare education, stereotyping, and outcome disparities, represents a blind spot that merits explanation and repair. New methodologies in social psychology and neuroscience have yielded models for how moral judgment operates in healthcare and how research in this area should proceed. Clinicians, educators, and researchers would do well to recognize both the legitimate and illegitimate moral appraisals that are apt to occur in healthcare settings. PMID:20618947

  10. Comparing moral judgments of patients with frontotemporal dementia and frontal stroke.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Baez, Sandra; Couto, Blas; Torralva, Teresa; Sposato, Luciano A; Huepe, David; Montañes, Patricia; Reyes, Pablo; Matallana, Diana; Vigliecca, Nora S; Slachevsky, Andrea; Manes, Facundo; Ibanez, Agustin

    2014-09-01

    Several clinical reports have stated that patients with prefrontal lesions or patients with the behavioral variant of frontotemporal dementia share social cognition impairments. Moral reasoning is impaired in both conditions but there have been few investigations that directly compare this domain in the 2 groups. This work compared the moral judgments of these patient groups using a task designed to disentangle the contributions of intentions and outcomes in moral judgment. For both disorders, patients judged scenarios where the protagonists believed that they would cause harm but did not as being more permissible than the control group. Moreover, patients with frontotemporal dementia judged harmful outcomes in the absence of harmful intentions as less permissible than the control participants. There were no differences between the 2 conditions. Both disorders involved impairments in integrating intention and outcome information for moral judgment. This study was the first, to our knowledge, to directly compare a social cognition domain in 2 frontal pathologies with different etiology. Our results highlighted the importance of comparing patients with vascular lesions and patients with neurodegenerative diseases.

  11. Shared brain activity for aesthetic and moral judgments: implications for the Beauty-is-Good stereotype.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tsukiura, Takashi; Cabeza, Roberto

    2011-01-01

    The Beauty-is-Good stereotype refers to the assumption that attractive people possess sociably desirable personalities and higher moral standards. The existence of this bias suggests that the neural mechanisms for judging facial attractiveness and moral goodness overlap. To investigate this idea, we scanned participants with functional magnetic resonance imaging while they made attractiveness judgments about faces and goodness judgments about hypothetical actions. Activity in the medial orbitofrontal cortex increased as a function of both attractiveness and goodness ratings, whereas activity in the insular cortex decreased with both attractiveness and goodness ratings. Within each of these regions, the activations elicited by attractiveness and goodness judgments were strongly correlated with each other, supporting the idea of similar contributions of each region to both judgments. Moreover, activations in orbitofrontal and insular cortices were negatively correlated with each other, suggesting an opposing relationship between these regions during attractiveness and goodness judgments. These findings have implications for understanding the neural mechanisms of the Beauty-is-Good stereotype.

  12. A Mind-Reader Does Not Always Have Deontological Moral Judgments and Prosocial Behavior: A Developmental Perspective.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hao, Jian; Liu, Yanchun

    2016-01-01

    The rationalistic theories of morality emphasize that reasoning plays an important role in moral judgments and prosocial behavior. Theory of mind as a reasoning ability in the mental domain has been considered a facilitator of moral development. The present study examined whether theory of mind was consistently positively associated with morality from middle childhood to late adulthood. Two hundred and four participants, including 48 elementary school children, 45 adolescents, 62 younger adults, and 49 older adults, completed theory of mind, moral judgment and prosocial behavior tasks. Theory of mind was measured with strange stories that tapped into an understanding of lies, white lies, double bluffs, irony, and persuasion. Moral judgments were measured with variants of the trolley dilemma. Prosocial behavior was measured through participants' performance in an interactive situation in which a helping request was made. The results indicated specific rather than similar developmental trajectories of theory of mind, moral judgments, and prosocial behavior. There was a quadratic trend in theory of mind, a combination of quadratic and cubic trends in deontological moral judgments and a linear decline in helping behavior. It is thus suggested that theory of mind may not be associated with morality in an unchanging way during development. Further results indicated that theory of mind and deontological moral judgments were negatively correlated for children, adolescents, and older adults but positively correlated for younger adults. Theory of mind and helping behavior were positively correlated for children but negatively correlated for adolescents. However, the relationships disappeared in adulthood. In sum, the present study reveals that theory of mind may be a nice tool for its facilitation of deontological moral judgments and prosocial behavior, but it may also be a nasty tool for its blocking of deontological moral judgments and prosocial behavior. Moreover, theory

  13. A Mind-Reader Does Not Always Have Deontological Moral Judgments and Prosocial Behavior: A Developmental Perspective

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hao, Jian; Liu, Yanchun

    2016-01-01

    The rationalistic theories of morality emphasize that reasoning plays an important role in moral judgments and prosocial behavior. Theory of mind as a reasoning ability in the mental domain has been considered a facilitator of moral development. The present study examined whether theory of mind was consistently positively associated with morality from middle childhood to late adulthood. Two hundred and four participants, including 48 elementary school children, 45 adolescents, 62 younger adults, and 49 older adults, completed theory of mind, moral judgment and prosocial behavior tasks. Theory of mind was measured with strange stories that tapped into an understanding of lies, white lies, double bluffs, irony, and persuasion. Moral judgments were measured with variants of the trolley dilemma. Prosocial behavior was measured through participants' performance in an interactive situation in which a helping request was made. The results indicated specific rather than similar developmental trajectories of theory of mind, moral judgments, and prosocial behavior. There was a quadratic trend in theory of mind, a combination of quadratic and cubic trends in deontological moral judgments and a linear decline in helping behavior. It is thus suggested that theory of mind may not be associated with morality in an unchanging way during development. Further results indicated that theory of mind and deontological moral judgments were negatively correlated for children, adolescents, and older adults but positively correlated for younger adults. Theory of mind and helping behavior were positively correlated for children but negatively correlated for adolescents. However, the relationships disappeared in adulthood. In sum, the present study reveals that theory of mind may be a nice tool for its facilitation of deontological moral judgments and prosocial behavior, but it may also be a nasty tool for its blocking of deontological moral judgments and prosocial behavior. Moreover, theory

  14. Sidetracked by trolleys: Why sacrificial moral dilemmas tell us little (or nothing) about utilitarian judgment.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kahane, Guy

    2015-01-01

    Research into moral decision-making has been dominated by sacrificial dilemmas where, in order to save several lives, it is necessary to sacrifice the life of another person. It is widely assumed that these dilemmas draw a sharp contrast between utilitarian and deontological approaches to morality, and thereby enable us to study the psychological and neural basis of utilitarian judgment. However, it has been previously shown that some sacrificial dilemmas fail to present a genuine contrast between utilitarian and deontological options. Here, I raise deeper problems for this research paradigm. Even when sacrificial dilemmas present a contrast between utilitarian and deontological options at a philosophical level, it is misleading to interpret the responses of ordinary folk in these terms. What is currently classified as "utilitarian judgment" does not in fact share essential features of a genuine utilitarian outlook, and is better explained in terms of commonsensical moral notions. When subjects deliberate about such dilemmas, they are not deciding between opposing utilitarian and deontological solutions, but engaging in a richer process of weighing opposing moral reasons. Sacrificial dilemmas therefore tell us little about utilitarian decision-making. An alternative approach to studying proto-utilitarian tendencies in everyday moral thinking is proposed.

  15. Does Joshua Greene’s Dual Process Theory of Moral Judgment Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy?

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Javier Gracia Calandín

    2017-02-01

    Full Text Available In this article I analyse whether Joshua Greene’s dual process theory of moral judgment commits the naturalistic fallacy. Firstly, and against current authors such as Patricia S. Churchland, I uphold the validity of the naturalistic fallacy denounced by Moore for more than a century. Secondly, I highlight and question Greene’s naturalized way of understanding Deontologism. Thirdly, I assert the distinction between "neural basis" and "moral foundation" as the key to avoid committing the naturalistic fallacy. Finally and according to that key distinction I assess Greene’s neuroethical approach and I analyse some of its most critical aspects related to normative issues.

  16. Legal Field and Social Representations : Analysis of Damage of The Grounds of Failure in Moral Judgments

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Morgana Neves de Jesus

    2016-11-01

    Full Text Available It is proposed to analyze the problem of the failure of judicial decisions, from the observation of the interference of social representations the lack of real motivation of judgments, from the statement of denaturation of the institute moral damage caused by internalized reproduction of concepts and meanings anchored and objectified in the collective unconscious of the various authorities and actors in the legal field. Seeks to understand the social representations reproduced in the legal and social field of the institute, which confirms the problem of inadequate statement of reasons and not resolving legal conflicts social damage morale.

  17. Individual Differences in Moral Disgust Do Not Predict Utilitarian Judgments, Sexual and Pathogen Disgust Do.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Laakasuo, Michael; Sundvall, Jukka; Drosinou, Marianna

    2017-03-31

    The role of emotional disgust and disgust sensitivity in moral judgment and decision-making has been debated intensively for over 20 years. Until very recently, there were two main evolutionary narratives for this rather puzzling association. One of the models suggest that it was developed through some form of group selection mechanism, where the internal norms of the groups were acting as pathogen safety mechanisms. Another model suggested that these mechanisms were developed through hygiene norms, which were piggybacking on pathogen disgust mechanisms. In this study we present another alternative, namely that this mechanism might have evolved through sexual disgust sensitivity. We note that though the role of disgust in moral judgment has been questioned recently, few studies have taken disgust sensitivity to account. We present data from a large sample (N = 1300) where we analyzed the associations between The Three Domain Disgust Scale and the most commonly used 12 moral dilemmas measuring utilitarian/deontological preferences with Structural Equation Modeling. Our results indicate that of the three domains of disgust, only sexual disgust is associated with more deontological moral preferences. We also found that pathogen disgust was associated with more utilitarian preferences. Implications of the findings are discussed.

  18. Dynamics of moral judgments in young soldiers during the period of military service

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Oshevskiy D.S.

    2015-08-01

    Full Text Available We have conducted an empirical study of the dynamics of the level of moral judgments in the military. Two groups of Missile Defense Force soldiers present the sample: preparing for demobilization (n=30 and new recruits (n=25. As the methods we used specially developed semi-structured interview modeling the situation of moral choice, and the questionnaire in order to assess the socio-psychological characteristics of the military and their attitude to service. The young soldiers have a positive trend in the development of moral judgments and a greater differentiation in the estimates. It is shown that the old-timers in comparison with newcomers have intensive development of group-oriented and prosocial moral reasoning. It presumably connected with successful adaptation to military service, following the manual, the ability to cope with aggressive impulses, flexibility and value assessments in decision-making. It is noted that educational work with young recruits should include measures to increase group cohesion in the army.

  19. No Child Left Alone: Moral Judgments about Parents Affect Estimates of Risk to Children

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ashley J. Thomas

    2016-08-01

    Full Text Available In recent decades, Americans have adopted a parenting norm in which every child is expected to be under constant direct adult supervision. Parents who violate this norm by allowing their children to be alone, even for short periods of time, often face harsh criticism and even legal action. This is true despite the fact that children are much more likely to be hurt, for example, in car accidents. Why then do bystanders call 911 when they see children playing in parks, but not when they see children riding in cars? Here, we present results from six studies indicating that moral judgments play a role: The less morally acceptable a parent’s reason for leaving a child alone, the more danger people think the child is in. This suggests that people’s estimates of danger to unsupervised children are affected by an intuition that parents who leave their children alone have done something morally wrong.

  20. Frontopolar and anterior temporal cortex activation in a moral judgment task. Preliminary functional MRI results in normal subjects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moll, Jorge; Oliveira-Souza, Ricardo de

    2001-01-01

    The objective was to study the brain areas which are activated when normal subjects make moral judgments. Ten normal adults underwent BOLD functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) during the auditory presentation of sentences that they were instructed to silently judge as either 'right' or 'wrong'. Half of the sentences had an explicit moral content ('We break the law when necessary'), the other half comprised factual statements devoid of moral connotation ('Stones are made of water'). After scanning, each subject rated the moral content, emotional valence, and judgment difficulty of each sentence on Likert-like scales. To exclude the effect of emotion on the activation results, individual responses were hemo dynamically modeled for event-related f MRI analysis. The general linear model was used to evaluate the brain areas activated by moral judgment. Regions activated during moral judgment included the frontopolar cortex (FPC), medial frontal gyrus, right anterior temporal cortex, lenticular nucleus, and cerebellum. Activation of FPC and medial frontal gyrus (B A 10/46 and 9) were largely independent of emotional experience and represented the largest areas of activation. These results concur with clinical observations assigning a critical role for the frontal poles and right anterior temporal cortex in the mediation of complex judgment processes according to moral constraints. The FPC may work in concert with the orbitofrontal and dorsolateral cortex in the regulation of human social conduct. (author)

  1. Frontopolar and anterior temporal cortex activation in a moral judgment task. Preliminary functional MRI results in normal subjects

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Moll, Jorge [LABS and Rede D' Or Hospitais, Rio de Janeiro RJ (Brazil). Grupo de Neuroimagem e Neurologia do Comportamento; Eslinger, Paul J. [Pensylvania State Univ. (United States). College of Medicine. Div. of Neurology and Behavioral Science; The Milton S. Hershey Medical Center, Hershey, PN (United States); Oliveira-Souza, Ricardo de [Universidade do Rio de Janeiro (UNI-Rio), RJ (Brazil). Hospital Universitario Gaffree e Guinle]. E-mail: neuropsychiatry@hotmail.com

    2001-09-01

    The objective was to study the brain areas which are activated when normal subjects make moral judgments. Ten normal adults underwent BOLD functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) during the auditory presentation of sentences that they were instructed to silently judge as either 'right' or 'wrong'. Half of the sentences had an explicit moral content ('We break the law when necessary'), the other half comprised factual statements devoid of moral connotation ('Stones are made of water'). After scanning, each subject rated the moral content, emotional valence, and judgment difficulty of each sentence on Likert-like scales. To exclude the effect of emotion on the activation results, individual responses were hemo dynamically modeled for event-related f MRI analysis. The general linear model was used to evaluate the brain areas activated by moral judgment. Regions activated during moral judgment included the frontopolar cortex (FPC), medial frontal gyrus, right anterior temporal cortex, lenticular nucleus, and cerebellum. Activation of FPC and medial frontal gyrus (B A 10/46 and 9) were largely independent of emotional experience and represented the largest areas of activation. These results concur with clinical observations assigning a critical role for the frontal poles and right anterior temporal cortex in the mediation of complex judgment processes according to moral constraints. The FPC may work in concert with the orbitofrontal and dorsolateral cortex in the regulation of human social conduct. (author)

  2. Does children's moral compass waver under social pressure? Using the conformity paradigm to test preschoolers' moral and social-conventional judgments.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kim, Elizabeth B; Chen, Chuansheng; Smetana, Judith G; Greenberger, Ellen

    2016-10-01

    The current study tested whether preschoolers' moral and social-conventional judgments change under social pressure using Asch's conformity paradigm. A sample of 132 preschoolers (Mage=3.83years, SD=0.85) rated the acceptability of moral and social-conventional events and also completed a visual judgment task (i.e., comparing line length) both independently and after having viewed two peers who consistently made immoral, unconventional, or visually inaccurate judgments. Results showed evidence of conformity on all three tasks, but conformity was stronger on the social-conventional task than on the moral and visual tasks. Older children were less susceptible to pressure for social conformity for the moral and visual tasks but not for the conventional task. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  3. Moral opinion polarization and the erosion of trust

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Rapp, Carolin

    2016-01-01

    generalized trust, we focus on opinion polarization as another potential impact factor on trust. In more detail, we investigate the extent to which polarization over morally charged issues such as homsexuality, abortion and euthanasia affects individuals' likelihood to trust others. We hypothesize that moral...... issues have a natural tendency to divide societies' opinions into opposing poles and, thus, to challenge social cohesion in modern civil societies. Based on hierarchical analyses of the fifth wave of the World Values Survey (WVS) - comprising a sample of 39 countries - our results reveal that individuals...

  4. Reduced empathic concern leads to utilitarian moral judgments in trait alexithymia

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Indrajeet ePatil

    2014-05-01

    Full Text Available Recent research with moral dilemmas supports dual-process model of moral decision making. This model posits two different paths via which people can endorse utilitarian solution that requires personally harming someone in order to achieve the greater good (e.g., killing one to save five people: (i weakened emotional aversion to the prospect of harming someone due to reduced empathic concern for the victim; (ii enhanced cognition which supports cost-benefit analysis and countervails the prepotent emotional aversion to harm. Direct prediction of this model would be that personality traits associated with reduced empathy would show higher propensity to endorse utilitarian solutions. As per this prediction, we found that trait alexithymia, which is well-known to have deficits in empathy, was indeed associated with increased utilitarian tendencies on emotionally aversive personal moral dilemmas and this was due to reduced empathic concern for the victim. Results underscore the importance of empathy for moral judgments in harm/care domain of morality.

  5. Sidetracked by trolleys: Why sacrificial moral dilemmas tell us little (or nothing) about utilitarian judgment

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kahane, Guy

    2015-01-01

    Research into moral decision-making has been dominated by sacrificial dilemmas where, in order to save several lives, it is necessary to sacrifice the life of another person. It is widely assumed that these dilemmas draw a sharp contrast between utilitarian and deontological approaches to morality, and thereby enable us to study the psychological and neural basis of utilitarian judgment. However, it has been previously shown that some sacrificial dilemmas fail to present a genuine contrast between utilitarian and deontological options. Here, I raise deeper problems for this research paradigm. Even when sacrificial dilemmas present a contrast between utilitarian and deontological options at a philosophical level, it is misleading to interpret the responses of ordinary folk in these terms. What is currently classified as “utilitarian judgment” does not in fact share essential features of a genuine utilitarian outlook, and is better explained in terms of commonsensical moral notions. When subjects deliberate about such dilemmas, they are not deciding between opposing utilitarian and deontological solutions, but engaging in a richer process of weighing opposing moral reasons. Sacrificial dilemmas therefore tell us little about utilitarian decision-making. An alternative approach to studying proto-utilitarian tendencies in everyday moral thinking is proposed. PMID:25791902

  6. Reduced empathic concern leads to utilitarian moral judgments in trait alexithymia

    Science.gov (United States)

    Patil, Indrajeet; Silani, Giorgia

    2014-01-01

    Recent research with moral dilemmas supports dual-process model of moral decision making. This model posits two different paths via which people can endorse utilitarian solution that requires personally harming someone in order to achieve the greater good (e.g., killing one to save five people): (i) weakened emotional aversion to the prospect of harming someone due to reduced empathic concern for the victim; (ii) enhanced cognition which supports cost-benefit analysis and countervails the prepotent emotional aversion to harm. Direct prediction of this model would be that personality traits associated with reduced empathy would show higher propensity to endorse utilitarian solutions. As per this prediction, we found that trait alexithymia, which is well-known to have deficits in empathy, was indeed associated with increased utilitarian tendencies on emotionally aversive personal moral dilemmas and this was due to reduced empathic concern for the victim. Results underscore the importance of empathy for moral judgments in harm/care domain of morality. PMID:24904510

  7. Opposing effects of oxytocin on moral judgment in males and females.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Scheele, Dirk; Striepens, Nadine; Kendrick, Keith M; Schwering, Christine; Noelle, Janka; Wille, Andrea; Schläpfer, Thomas E; Maier, Wolfgang; Hurlemann, René

    2014-12-01

    Current perspectives on the evolutionary roots of human morality suggest it arose to incentivize social cooperation by promoting feelings of disgust toward selfish behavior, although the underlying neural mechanisms remain unclear. To investigate whether the ancient mammalian neuropeptide oxytocin (OXT) influences self-referential processing in the domains of emotion evaluation and moral decision making, we conducted a pharmaco-functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and a behavioral experiment involving 157 healthy women and men who were treated with either OXT (24 IU) or placebo (PLC) intranasally. Our results show that OXT facilitated cortical midline responses during self-processing of disgust and selectively promoted self-interest moral judgments in men. In contrast, in women OXT increased the reaction time difference between accepted and rejected moral dilemmas and led them to suppress their self-interest and respond more altruistically for the benefit of others. Taken together, these findings suggest an OXT-related sexual dimorphism in human moral behavior which evolved adaptively to optimize both protection and nurturing of offspring by promoting selfish behavior in men and altruistic behavior in women. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

  8. Transgressors, victims, and cry babies: is basic moral judgment spared in autism?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Leslie, Alan M; Mallon, Ron; DiCorcia, Jennifer A

    2006-01-01

    Human social intelligence comprises a wide range of complex cognitive and affective processes that appear to be selectively impaired in autistic spectrum disorders. The study of these neuro-developmental disorders and the study of canonical social intelligence have advanced rapidly over the last twenty years by investigating the two together. Specifically, studies of autism have provided important insights into the nature of "theory of mind" abilities, their normal development and underlying neural systems. At the same time, the idea of impaired development of the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying "theory of mind" has shed new light on the nature of autistic disorders. This general approach is not restricted to the study of impairments but extends to mapping areas of social intelligence that are spared in autism. Here we investigate basic moral judgment and find that it appears to be substantially intact in children with autism who are severely impaired in "theory of mind". At the same time, we extend studies of moral reasoning in normal development by way of a new control task, the "cry baby" task. Cry baby scenarios, in which the distress of the victim is "unreasonable" or "unjustified," do not elicit moral condemnation from normally developing preschoolers or from children with autism. Judgments of moral transgressions in which the victim displays distress are therefore not likely the result of a simple automatic reaction to distress and more likely involve moral reasoning. Mapping the cognitive comorbidity patterns of disordered development must encompass both impairments and sparings because both are needed to make sense of the neural and genetic levels.

  9. Neural correlates of moral judgments in first- and third-person perspectives: implications for neuroethics and beyond

    Science.gov (United States)

    2014-01-01

    Background There appears to be an inconsistency in experimental paradigms used in fMRI research on moral judgments. As stimuli, moral dilemmas or moral statements/ pictures that induce emotional reactions are usually employed; a main difference between these stimuli is the perspective of the participants reflecting first-person (moral dilemmas) or third-person perspective (moral reactions). The present study employed functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in order to investigate the neural correlates of moral judgments in either first- or third-person perspective. Results Our results indicate that different neural mechanisms appear to be involved in these perspectives. Although conjunction analysis revealed common activation in the anterior medial prefrontal cortex, third person-perspective elicited unique activations in hippocampus and visual cortex. The common activation can be explained by the role the anterior medial prefrontal cortex may play in integrating different information types and also by its involvement in theory of mind. Our results also indicate that the so-called "actor-observer bias" affects moral evaluation in the third-person perspective, possibly due to the involvement of the hippocampus. We suggest two possible ways in which the hippocampus may support the process of moral judgment: by the engagement of episodic memory and its role in understanding the behaviors and emotions of others. Conclusion We posit that these findings demonstrate that first or third person perspectives in moral cognition involve distinct neural processes, that are important to different aspects of moral judgments. These  results are important to a deepened understanding of neural correlates of moral cognition—the so-called “first tradition” of neuroethics, with the caveat that any results must be interpreted and employed with prudence, so as to heed neuroethics “second tradition” that sustains the pragmatic evaluation of outcomes, capabilities and

  10. Neural correlates of moral judgments in first- and third-person perspectives: implications for neuroethics and beyond.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Avram, Mihai; Hennig-Fast, Kristina; Bao, Yan; Pöppel, Ernst; Reiser, Maximilian; Blautzik, Janusch; Giordano, James; Gutyrchik, Evgeny

    2014-04-01

    There appears to be an inconsistency in experimental paradigms used in fMRI research on moral judgments. As stimuli, moral dilemmas or moral statements/ pictures that induce emotional reactions are usually employed; a main difference between these stimuli is the perspective of the participants reflecting first-person (moral dilemmas) or third-person perspective (moral reactions). The present study employed functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in order to investigate the neural correlates of moral judgments in either first- or third-person perspective. Our results indicate that different neural mechanisms appear to be involved in these perspectives. Although conjunction analysis revealed common activation in the anterior medial prefrontal cortex, third person-perspective elicited unique activations in hippocampus and visual cortex. The common activation can be explained by the role the anterior medial prefrontal cortex may play in integrating different information types and also by its involvement in theory of mind. Our results also indicate that the so-called "actor-observer bias" affects moral evaluation in the third-person perspective, possibly due to the involvement of the hippocampus. We suggest two possible ways in which the hippocampus may support the process of moral judgment: by the engagement of episodic memory and its role in understanding the behaviors and emotions of others. We posit that these findings demonstrate that first or third person perspectives in moral cognition involve distinct neural processes, that are important to different aspects of moral judgments. These results are important to a deepened understanding of neural correlates of moral cognition-the so-called "first tradition" of neuroethics, with the caveat that any results must be interpreted and employed with prudence, so as to heed neuroethics "second tradition" that sustains the pragmatic evaluation of outcomes, capabilities and limitations of neuroscientific techniques and

  11. Universalismo versus relativismo no julgamento moral Universalism versus relativism in moral judgment

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Angela M. B. Biaggio

    1999-01-01

    Full Text Available Este trabalho analisa a posição de diversos autores que têm-se destacado no estudo do julgamento moral, quanto à questão do universalismo versus relativismo. Há valores universais? Há uma seqüência evolutiva de estágios de maturidade moral que se encontre em todas as culturas? Com base em análises e críticas de James Rest, Orlando Lourenço, Lutz Eckensberger e John Snarey, são analisadas posições universalistas, como as de Piaget e Kohlberg (com seus fundamentos em Kant e as posições relativistas, tendo como ponto extremo a de Shweder. Entre os dois campos extremos são comentadas as posições de Turiel, Gilligan, e outros autores.This article analyses positions of distinguished authors in the field of moral development, regarding the issue of universalism versus relativism. Based on analyses and critiques by James Rest, Orlando Lourenço, Lutz Eckensberger, and John Snarey, the author reviews unversalistic positions such as those of Piaget and Kohlberg (with their roots in Kant, and relativistic positions, having as their extreme the position of Shweder. Between the two extremes,the stands of Turiel, Gilligan and other authors are discussed.

  12. Moral opinion polarization and the erosion of trust.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rapp, Carolin

    2016-07-01

    Since Puntam's seminal work on declining levels of social capital, the question of how social trust is formed has reached unprecedented heights of critical enquiry. While most of the current research concentrates on ethnic diversity and income inequality as the main influences driving down generalized trust, we focus on opinion polarization as another potential impact factor on trust. In more detail, we investigate the extent to which polarization over morally charged issues such as homsexuality, abortion and euthanasia affects individuals' likelihood to trust others. We hypothesize that moral issues have a natural tendency to divide societies' opinions into opposing poles and, thus, to challenge social cohesion in modern civil societies. Based on hierarchical analyses of the fifth wave of the World Values Survey (WVS) - comprising a sample of 39 countries - our results reveal that individuals living in countries characterized by more opinion polarization tend to have less trust in other people. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  13. Comparative morality judgments about lesbians and gay men teaching and adopting children.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kirby, Brenda J; Michaelson, Christina

    2015-01-01

    The purpose of this study was to compare morality judgments of American Catholics and the general public about lesbians and gay men adopting and teaching children. The general sample endorsed higher agreement that lesbians and gay men should be allowed to adopt and to teach children compared to the Catholic only sample. Older participants were less accepting than all other age groups, and there was an interaction effect between education and political ideology such that those with less education and with more politically conservative beliefs were generally less accepting of lesbians and gay men adopting and teaching children.

  14. Exploring the role of Theory of Mind in Moral judgment: the case of children with Autism Spectrum Disorder

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Roberta eFadda

    2016-04-01

    Full Text Available This paper adds to the growing research on moral judgment by considering whether Theory of Mind (ToM might foster children's autonomous moral judgment achievement. A group of 30 children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD was compared in moral judgment (MJ and ToM with 30 typically developing (TD children. Participants were tested for moral judgment with a classical Piaget’s task and for ToM with a second order False Belief task. In the moral task, children were told two versions of a story: in one version the protagonist acted according to a moral intention but the action resulted in a harmful consequence; in the other version the protagonist acted according to an immoral intention, but the action resulted in a harmless consequence. Children were asked which of the two protagonists was the naughtier. In line with previous studies, the results indicated that, while the majority of TD participants succeeded in the second order False Belief task, only few individuals with ASD showed intact perspective taking abilities. The analysis of the MJ in relation to ToM showed that children with ASD lacking ToM abilities judged guilty the protagonists of the two versions of the story in the moral task because both of them violated a moral rule or because they considered the consequences of the actions, ignoring any psychological information. These results indicate a heteronomous morality in individuals with ASD, based on the respect of learned moral rules and outcomes rather than others’ subjective states.

  15. A Moral (Normative) Framework for the Judgment of Actions and Decisions in the Construction Industry and Engineering: Part II.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Alkhatib, Omar J

    2017-12-01

    The construction industry is typically characterized as a fragmented, multi-organizational setting in which members from different technical backgrounds and moral values join together to develop a particular business or project. The most challenging obstacle in the construction process is to achieve a successful practice and to identify and apply an ethical framework to manage the behavior of involved specialists and contractors and to ensure the quality of all completed construction activities. The framework should reflect a common moral ground for myriad people involved in this process to survive and compete ethically in today's turbulent construction market. This study establishes a framework for moral judgment of behavior and actions conducted in the construction process. The moral framework provides the basis of judging actions as "moral" or "immoral" based on three levels of moral accountability: personal, professional, and social. The social aspect of the proposed framework is developed primarily from the essential attributes of normative business decision-making models identified in the literature review and subsequently incorporates additional attributes related to professional and personal moral values. The normative decision-making models reviewed are based primarily on social attributes as related to moral theories (e.g., utilitarianism, duty, rights, virtue, etc.). The professional and moral attributes are established by identifying a set of common moral values recognized by professionals in the construction industry and required to prevent common construction breaches. The moral framework presented here is the complementary part of the ethical framework developed in Part I of this article and is based primarily on the personal behavior or the moral aspect of professional responsibility. The framework can be implemented as a form of preventive personal ethics, which would help avoid ethical dilemmas and moral implications in the first place

  16. Moral Judgments on Short-Term Sexual Behaviors among Chinese College Students: Exploring the Roles of Gender and Physical Attractiveness

    OpenAIRE

    Xiao, Qianguo; Li, Aijuan; Zhu, Yi

    2017-01-01

    This study primarily investigated the effects of gender and physical attractiveness on moral judgments on three typical kinds of short-term sexual behaviors (short-term fling, one-night stand, and hookup) in the Chinese culture context. A total of 120 university student subjects were presented with a series of stereotypically physically attractive (versus physically unattractive) photos before they rated the extent to which each of the three short-term sexual behaviors are morally acceptable....

  17. Active learning in a neuroethics course positively impacts moral judgment development in undergraduates.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Abu-Odeh, Desiree; Dziobek, Derek; Jimenez, Nathalia Torres; Barbey, Christopher; Dubinsky, Janet M

    2015-01-01

    The growing neuroscientific understanding of the biological basis of behaviors has profound social and ethical implications. To address the need for public awareness of the consequences of these advances, we developed an undergraduate neuroethics course, Neuroscience and Society, at the University of Minnesota. Course evolution, objectives, content, and impact are described here. To engage all students and facilitate undergraduate ethics education, this course employed daily reading, writing, and student discussion, case analysis, and team presentations with goals of fostering development of moral reasoning and judgment and introducing application of bioethical frameworks to topics raised by neuroscience. Pre- and post-course Defining Issues Test (DIT) scores and student end-of-course reflections demonstrated that course objectives for student application of bioethical frameworks to neuroethical issues were met. The active-learning, student-centered pedagogical approaches used to achieve these goals serve as a model for how to effectively teach neuroethics at the undergraduate level.

  18. Behavioral Norms, Moral Judgments, and Social Approval of Participant Roles in School Bullying in a Singapore Sample

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sim, Tick Ngee; Tan, Melinda Meizhen

    2013-01-01

    This study examines behavioral norms, moral judgments, and social approval of participant roles in classroom physical, verbal, and relational bullying, including a relatively new reporter role (where nothing is done during the bullying but there is subsequent reporting to a teacher). A sample of 1,131 Secondary 1 (mean age = 12 years 7 months) and…

  19. Effects of EQUIP for Educators on Students' Self-Serving Cognitive Distortions, Moral Judgment, and Antisocial Behavior

    Science.gov (United States)

    van der Velden, Floor; Brugman, Daniel; Boom, Jan; Koops, Willem

    2010-01-01

    A quasi-experimental pretest/posttest study using a control group was conducted to investigate the effects of EQUIP for Educators--implemented as a universal prevention program--on prevalence of antisocial behavior, attitude towards antisocial behavior, self serving cognitive distortions, and moral judgment of young adolescents. Participants were…

  20. Prisoners' perception of informing to the authorities: an analysis in terms of functional moral judgment.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wolf, Yuval; Addad, Moshe; Arkin, Nilly

    2003-12-01

    A series of functional measurement experiment show that prisoners modulate their moral judgments of violations of their in-group regulations. The participants were 67 women and 80 men, sentenced for at least three years for murder, robbery, drug-traffic or white collar offenses. Each was asked, individually, to imagine a series of incidents where incriminating information on in-group or out-group inmates is delivered to the prison authorities or to an ingroup source and to rate the deserved denigration of the informer, who was characterized as a leader or not and as a drug-addict or not who had a prison-leave or not. An assignment of approximately equal weight for social status, drug use and prison leave was found, beyond gender and type of offense. In line with the hypothesis of judgmental modularity, informing to an out-group source was judged much more severely than informing to in-group arbiter and than informing on an out-group inmate.

  1. The Relation of Moral Judgment Development and Educational Experience to Recall of Moral Narratives and Expository Texts

    Science.gov (United States)

    Narvaez, Darcia; Gleason, Tracy

    2007-01-01

    Moral text processing was used as an ecologically valid method for assessing implicit and explicit moral understanding and development. The authors tested undergraduates, seminarians, and graduate students in political science and philosophy for recall of moral narratives and moral expository texts. Multivariate analyses of covariance using…

  2. ‘Utilitarian’ judgments in sacrificial moral dilemmas do not reflect impartial concern for the greater good

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kahane, Guy; Everett, Jim A.C.; Earp, Brian D.; Farias, Miguel; Savulescu, Julian

    2015-01-01

    A growing body of research has focused on so-called ‘utilitarian’ judgments in moral dilemmas in which participants have to choose whether to sacrifice one person in order to save the lives of a greater number. However, the relation between such ‘utilitarian’ judgments and genuine utilitarian impartial concern for the greater good remains unclear. Across four studies, we investigated the relationship between ‘utilitarian’ judgment in such sacrificial dilemmas and a range of traits, attitudes, judgments and behaviors that either reflect or reject an impartial concern for the greater good of all. In Study 1, we found that rates of ‘utilitarian’ judgment were associated with a broadly immoral outlook concerning clear ethical transgressions in a business context, as well as with sub-clinical psychopathy. In Study 2, we found that ‘utilitarian’ judgment was associated with greater endorsement of rational egoism, less donation of money to a charity, and less identification with the whole of humanity, a core feature of classical utilitarianism. In Studies 3 and 4, we found no association between ‘utilitarian’ judgments in sacrificial dilemmas and characteristic utilitarian judgments relating to assistance to distant people in need, self-sacrifice and impartiality, even when the utilitarian justification for these judgments was made explicit and unequivocal. This lack of association remained even when we controlled for the antisocial element in ‘utilitarian’ judgment. Taken together, these results suggest that there is very little relation between sacrificial judgments in the hypothetical dilemmas that dominate current research, and a genuine utilitarian approach to ethics. PMID:25460392

  3. Ecology shapes moral judgments towards food-wasting behavior: Evidence from the Yali of West Papua, the Ngorongoro Maasai, and Poles.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Misiak, Michał; Butovskaya, Marina; Sorokowski, Piotr

    2018-06-01

    People judge food wasting as an immoral behavior. Although moral concerns vary widely across cultures, to this date, food wasting moral judgments were investigated only among rich and industrialized ones. This study reports first evidence of cultural variability on moral judgments of food wasting between modern and traditional cultures. We conducted our study among the Maasai - pastoralists of Ngorongoro, Yali - horticulturalists of West Papua, and among citizens of Poland. According to the results, Maasai judge food wasting as more immoral compared to Yali and Poles. What's more, Yali judge food wasting harsher than Poles. These results suggest that there are cultural differences in moral judgments of food wasting. These differences might reflect the impact of unstable ecology on food economy of a given society. We hypothesize that harsh moral judgment concerning food waste may serve as a cultural adaptation for food insecurity. Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  4. Neural Correlates of Moral Sensitivity and Moral Judgment Associated with Brain Circuitries of Selfhood: A Meta-Analysis

    Science.gov (United States)

    Han, Hyemin

    2017-01-01

    The present study meta-analyzed 45 experiments with 959 subjects and 463 activation foci reported in 43 published articles that investigated the neural mechanism of moral functions by comparing neural activity between the moral task conditions and non-moral task conditions with the Activation Likelihood Estimation method. The present study…

  5. Values, ethics and moral judgment: an familiar business exploratory study / Valores, ética e julgamento moral: um estudo exploratório em empresas familiares

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Janine Kieling Monteiro

    2005-01-01

    Full Text Available This paper has investigated ethical principals, moral values and moral judgements into family business. Two gaúcha business, with 28 people each, have participated in. It was utilized a questionnaire and MJI. The methodology used was the analyses of content and frequency. The main results were: both business have code of ethics and it common knowledge. It was said that bad behavior must be revealed and both business would adopt corrective measures despite the fact that punishment is unequal. The transgressions that have been committed the most were: lie, stealing, sexual harassment, use of drugs during office hours, hiring unqualified people by indication, hidden information about the company, messages and e-mails control and requirement of overtime without payment. Values, responsibility, respect and honesty have been highlighted. Significant differences in moral judgment not been founded.

  6. The Development of Intention-Based Morality: The Influence of Intention Salience and Recency, Negligence, and Outcome on Children's and Adults' Judgments

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nobes, Gavin; Panagiotaki, Georgia; Engelhardt, Paul E.

    2017-01-01

    Two experiments were conducted to investigate the influences on 4-8 year-olds' and adults' moral judgments. In both, participants were told stories from previous studies that had indicated that children's judgments are largely outcome-based. Building on recent research in which one change to these studies' methods resulted in substantially more…

  7. Juízo e ação moral: desafios teóricos em psicologia Judgment and moral action: theoretic challenges in psychology

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Leonardo Lemos de Souza

    2009-12-01

    Full Text Available O presente artigo apresenta e discute a polêmica, no campo da psicologia moral, sobre as relações entre juízo e ação. Teorias de tradição racionalista e estruturalista, como as de Piaget e Kohlberg, afirmam uma relação de continuidade entre juízo e ação moral e, ao mesmo tempo, lançam pontos de discussão sobre a complexidade envolvida no tema. Por outro lado, novas frentes de trabalho sugerem a integração de outros elementos (a cultura, a afetividade e o self, além das estruturas que podem compor um referencial com o qual se evidenciem as relações entre os aspectos envolvidos nas condutas morais. Por fim, apesar das críticas acenarem com caminhos promissores na pesquisa sobre o juízo e a ação moral, ainda existem limites na construção de referenciais teóricos e metodológicos que articulem diferentes perspectivas de análise psicológica da moralidade.The attending article presents and discusses the debate within the cognitive constructivist theories, which have as main representatives Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg. Such theories of rationalist and structuralist tradition maintain continuity between judgment and moral action and, at the same time, launch points of discussion on the complexity involved in the theme. New work fronts suggest the integration of other elements: culture, affectionateness, and the self, beyond the structures that may compound a referential that explains the relations between the aspects involved in moral behavior. Lastly, despite the criticism indicating a promising path in the search about judgment and moral action, considering its complex character, there are still limits in the making of the theoretical and methodological frameworks that articulate different perspectives of moral psychological analyses.

  8. The Reasons Young Children Give to Peers When Explaining Their Judgments of Moral and Conventional Rules

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mammen, Maria; Köymen, Bahar; Tomasello, Michael

    2018-01-01

    Moral justifications work, when they do, by invoking values that are shared in the common ground of the interlocutors. We asked 3- and 5-year-old peer dyads (N = 144) to identify and punish norm transgressors. In the moral condition, the transgressor violated a moral norm (e.g., by stealing); in the social rules condition, she/he violated a…

  9. "Righteous minds" in health care: measurement and explanatory value of social intuitionism in accounting for the moral judgments in a sample of U.S. physicians.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tilburt, Jon C; James, Katherine M; Jenkins, Sarah M; Antiel, Ryan M; Curlin, Farr A; Rasinski, Kenneth A

    2013-01-01

    The broad diversity in physicians' judgments on controversial health care topics may reflect differences in religious characteristics, political ideologies, and moral intuitions. We tested an existing measure of moral intuitions in a new population (U.S. physicians) to assess its validity and to determine whether physicians' moral intuitions correlate with their views on controversial health care topics as well as other known predictors of these intuitions such as political affiliation and religiosity. In 2009, we mailed an 8-page questionnaire to a random sample of 2000 practicing U.S. physicians from all specialties. The survey included the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ30), along with questions on physicians' judgments about controversial health care topics including abortion and euthanasia (no moral objection, some moral objection, strong moral objection). A total of 1032 of 1895 (54%) physicians responded. Physicians' overall mean moral foundations scores were 3.5 for harm, 3.3 for fairness, 2.8 for loyalty, 3.2 for authority, and 2.7 for sanctity on a 0-5 scale. Increasing levels of religious service attendance, having a more conservative political ideology, and higher sanctity scores remained the greatest positive predictors of respondents objecting to abortion (β = 0.12, 0.23, 0.14, respectively, each p<0.001) as well as euthanasia (β = 0.08, 0.17, and 0.17, respectively, each p<0.001), even after adjusting for demographics. Higher authority scores were also significantly negatively associated with objection to abortion (β = -0.12, p<0.01), but not euthanasia. These data suggest that the relative importance physicians place on the different categories of moral intuitions may predict differences in physicians' judgments about morally controversial topics and may interrelate with ideology and religiosity. Further examination of the diversity in physicians' moral intuitions may prove illustrative in describing and addressing moral differences that

  10. Living Slow and Being Moral : Life History Predicts the Dual Process of Other-Centered Reasoning and Judgments.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhu, Nan; Hawk, Skyler T; Chang, Lei

    2018-03-08

    Drawing from the dual process model of morality and life history theory, the present research examined the role of cognitive and emotional processes as bridges between basic environmental challenges (i.e., unpredictability and competition) and other-centered moral orientation (i.e., prioritizing the welfare of others). In two survey studies, cognitive and emotional processes represented by future-oriented planning and emotional attachment, respectively (Study 1, N = 405), or by perspective taking and empathic concern, respectively (Study 2, N = 424), positively predicted other-centeredness in prosocial moral reasoning (Study 1) and moral judgment dilemmas based on rationality or intuition (Study 2). Cognitive processes were more closely related to rational aspects of other-centeredness, whereas the emotional processes were more closely related to the intuitive aspects of other-centeredness (Study 2). Finally, the cognitive and emotional processes also mediated negative effects of unpredictability (i.e., negative life events and childhood financial insecurity), as well as positive effects of individual-level, contest competition (i.e., educational and occupational competition) on other-centeredness. Overall, these findings support the view that cognitive and emotional processes do not necessarily contradict each other. Rather, they might work in concert to promote other-centeredness in various circumstances and might be attributed to humans' developmental flexibility in the face of environmental challenges.

  11. "You have to make a judgment call".--Morals, judgments and the provision of quality sexual and reproductive health services for adolescents in South Africa.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Müller, Alexandra; Röhrs, Stefanie; Hoffman-Wanderer, Yonina; Moult, Kelley

    2016-01-01

    South Africa's legal framework on sexual and reproductive health (SRH) care for teenagers is complex. On the one hand, the law protects their right to make decisions regarding reproduction--e.g. giving girls of any age the right to terminate a pregnancy, and allowing adolescents to consent to receive contraception from age 12. On the other hand, the Sexual Offences Act sets the age of consent to sex at 16 years, and requires mandatory reporting of anyone younger. These contradictory obligations mean that nurses, doctors and counsellors are expected to provide care, and counsel teenagers about their choices, but also report and enforce the law. They must therefore make judgments about inherently moral issues: should teenagers be having sex, and what services should they receive? Based on in-depth interviews at 28 healthcare facilities conducted in 2012, and data from workshops on the 'conflicting laws' held in 2014, the paper uses the theoretical framework of street-level bureaucracy to understand barriers to nurses providing SRH care for teenagers in South Africa, and the implication that this has for adolescents' SRH. The paper argues that nurses' adaptation of the law is a response to significant structural constraints, moral discomfort, and poor understanding of the law--all taken against an ethical framework that emphasizes quality, responsive patient care. The result is uneven implementation that undermines SRH information, access to services, and ultimately increases risks for teens. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  12. It is the outcome that counts! Damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex disrupts the integration of outcome and belief information for moral judgment.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ciaramelli, Elisa; Braghittoni, Davide; di Pellegrino, Giuseppe

    2012-11-01

    Moral judgment involves considering not only the outcome of an action but also the intention with which it was pursued. Previous functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) research has shown that integrating outcome and belief information for moral judgment relies on a brain network including temporo-parietal, precuneus, and medial prefrontal regions. Here, we investigated whether the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) plays a crucial role in this process. Patients with lesions in vmPFC (vmPFC patients), and brain-damaged and healthy controls considered scenarios in which the protagonist caused intentional harm (negative-outcome, negative-belief), accidental harm (negative-outcome, neutral-belief), attempted harm (neutral-outcome, negative-belief), or no harm (neutral-outcome, neutral-belief), and rated the moral permissibility of the protagonists' behavior. All groups responded similarly to scenarios involving intentional harm and no harm. vmPFC patients, however, judged attempted harm as more permissible, and accidental harm as less permissible, than the control groups. For vmPFC patients, outcome information, rather than belief information, shaped moral judgment. The results indicate that vmPFC is necessary for integrating outcome and belief information during moral reasoning. During moral judgment vmPFC may mediate intentions' understanding, and overriding of prepotent responses to salient outcomes.

  13. The Relationship between Preschool Teachers' Professional Ethical Behavior Perceptions, Moral Judgment Levels and Attitudes to Teaching

    Science.gov (United States)

    Oktay, Ayla; Ramazan, Oya; Sakin, Ahmet

    2010-01-01

    Morality is the stance and attitude that makes a social human being; the display of behaviors such as praise, criticism, tolerance and intolerance, confirmation and rejection; the taking of sides by stating what one finds good or bad, right or wrong, instead of staying indifferent to what other people say and do (Pieper, 1999). Moral development…

  14. Intratask and Intertask Consistency of Moral Judgment Indices in First-, Third-, and Fifth-Grade Children.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Larson, Sandra; Kurdek, Lawrence A.

    1979-01-01

    Damon's positive justice task, Selman's social-moral dilemmas, and a variation of Piaget's intent/consequence stories were administered to 72 elementary school students. Results showed that the level of moral reasoning increased with grade level, but inconsistencies in task performance were found at both the intratask and the intertask levels.…

  15. [The Recognition of Emotions, Empathy and Moral Judgment in the National Mental Health Survey in Colombia, 2015].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Matallana, Diana; Gómez-Restrepo, Carlos; Ramirez, Paulina; Martínez, Nathalie Tamayo; Rondon, Martin

    2016-12-01

    Social cognition refers to the mental processes involved in social interactions. Different aspects, such as the perception of others, self-knowledge, motivation and the cultural context, can modulate empathy responses and moral judgments regarding the actions of others. The National Mental Health Survey (ENSM for its acronym in Spanish) explored aspects of social cognition such as the perception of emotions, empathy and moral judgment in situations in which another person experiences pain. To describe the overall findings of the ENSM in relation to the emotional perception and empathic responses to situations where pain is inflicted on others in an intentional or accidental manner. A total of 3863 people aged 18-96 years old completed the social cognition module. They were asked to identify the emotions expressed in the images of several faces. A modified version of the awareness of social inference test (TASIT) was used. Additionally, the cognitive, affective, and moral elements of empathy were assessed with a modified version of the empathy for pain task (EPT), which uses a sequence of images in which someone is being hurt. Happiness was identified by 91.5% of those interviewed; neutral or emotionless faces were identified by 65%; 55% of respondents correctly identified surprise. Only 19.7%, 21.8% and 27.4% could identify negative emotions like fear, disgust and sadness, respectively. When the data were analysed by age, poverty status, and different regions of the country, the results tend to vary. As regards empathy, 73.7% correctly identified intentional actions, and accidental actions were identified by 56.6%. According to the moral judgment of some respondents, even in situations where the pain was caused by accident, there must be some kind of punishment (20.7% deserved a low punishment and 26.8% a moderate one). Noteworthy findings include the high recognition of happiness by the respondents, in contrast to the apparent difficulty in recognising sadness

  16. Opinion versus Knowledge: The Influence of Testimony Format on Children's Judgments in Morally Relevant Contexts

    Science.gov (United States)

    Noh, Jee Young; Elenbaas, Laura Marie; Park, Kyung Ja; Chung, Young Sun; Killen, Melanie

    2017-01-01

    Research Findings: To test children's use of testimony of others, 3-9 years (N = 227) made judgments about a potential peer transgression in which the intentions of the protagonist were ambiguous, after hearing two different forms of testimony. The 2 forms of testimony were (a) opposing "opinion-based" testimony from an adult authority…

  17. Persistent bias in expert judgments about free will and moral responsibility: a test of the expertise defense.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Schulz, Eric; Cokely, Edward T; Feltz, Adam

    2011-12-01

    Many philosophers appeal to intuitions to support some philosophical views. However, there is reason to be concerned about this practice as scientific evidence has documented systematic bias in philosophically relevant intuitions as a function of seemingly irrelevant features (e.g., personality). One popular defense used to insulate philosophers from these concerns holds that philosophical expertise eliminates the influence of these extraneous factors. Here, we test this assumption. We present data suggesting that verifiable philosophical expertise in the free will debate-as measured by a reliable and validated test of expert knowledge-does not eliminate the influence of one important extraneous feature (i.e., the heritable personality trait extraversion) on judgments concerning freedom and moral responsibility. These results suggest that, in at least some important cases, the expertise defense fails. Implications for the practice of philosophy, experimental philosophy, and applied ethics are discussed. Copyright © 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  18. When is a lie more of a lie? Moral judgment mediates the relationship between perceived benefits of others and lie-labeling

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Cantarero Katarzyna

    2017-06-01

    Full Text Available Lay perceptions of lying are argued to consist of a lie prototype. The latter was found to entail the intention to deceive, belief in falsity and falsity (Coleman & Kay, 1981. We proposed and found that the perceptions of the benefits of others are also an important factor that influences the extent, to which an act of intentional misleading someone to foster a false belief is labeled as a lie. Drawing from the intuitionist model of moral judgments (Haidt, 2001 we assumed that moral judgment of the behaviour would mediate the relationship. In Study 1 we analyzed data coming from a crosscultural project and found that perceived intention to benefit others was negatively related to lie labeling and that this relationship was mediated by the moral judgment of that act. In Study 2 we found that manipulating the benefits of others influenced the extent, to which an act of intentional misleading in order to foster a false belief is labeled as a lie and that, again, this relationship is mediated by the moral judgment of that act.

  19. Face-to-Face and Online: An Investigation of Children's and Adolescents' Bullying Behavior through the Lens of Moral Emotions and Judgments

    Science.gov (United States)

    Conway, Lauryn; Gomez-Garibello, Carlos; Talwar, Victoria; Shariff, Shaheen

    2016-01-01

    The current study investigated the influence of type of aggression (cyberbullying or traditional bullying) and participant role (bystander or perpetrator) on children and adolescents' self-attribution of moral emotions and judgments, while examining the influence of chronological age. Participants (N = 122, 8-16 years) evaluated vignettes and were…

  20. How Not to Evaluate a Psychological Measure: Rebuttal to Criticism of the Defining Issues Test of Moral Judgment Development by Curzer and Colleagues

    Science.gov (United States)

    Thoma, Stephen J.; Bebeau, Muriel J.; Narvaez, Darcia

    2016-01-01

    In a 2014 paper in "Theory and Research in Education," Howard Curzer and colleagues critique the Defining Issues Test of moral judgment development according to eight criteria that are described as difficulties any measure of educational outcomes must address. This article highlights how Curzer et al. do not consult existing empirical…

  1. A meta-analysis of response-time tests of the sequential two-systems model of moral judgment.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Baron, Jonathan; Gürçay, Burcu

    2017-05-01

    The (generalized) sequential two-system ("default interventionist") model of utilitarian moral judgment predicts that utilitarian responses often arise from a system-two correction of system-one deontological intuitions. Response-time (RT) results that seem to support this model are usually explained by the fact that low-probability responses have longer RTs. Following earlier results, we predicted response probability from each subject's tendency to make utilitarian responses (A, "Ability") and each dilemma's tendency to elicit deontological responses (D, "Difficulty"), estimated from a Rasch model. At the point where A = D, the two responses are equally likely, so probability effects cannot account for any RT differences between them. The sequential two-system model still predicts that many of the utilitarian responses made at this point will result from system-two corrections of system-one intuitions, hence should take longer. However, when A = D, RT for the two responses was the same, contradicting the sequential model. Here we report a meta-analysis of 26 data sets, which replicated the earlier results of no RT difference overall at the point where A = D. The data sets used three different kinds of moral judgment items, and the RT equality at the point where A = D held for all three. In addition, we found that RT increased with A-D. This result holds for subjects (characterized by Ability) but not for items (characterized by Difficulty). We explain the main features of this unanticipated effect, and of the main results, with a drift-diffusion model.

  2. Examining Moral Judgment and Ethical Decision-Making in Information Technology Managers and Their Relationship

    Science.gov (United States)

    Shahand, Assadullah

    2010-01-01

    Growing incidences of corporate ethical misconducts have revived the debate over ethical reasoning and moral development of corporate managers. The role of information technology (IT) in the ethical dilemmas is becoming more evident as virtual environments become increasingly popular, organizations adopt digital form of record keeping, and the…

  3. Moral Judgments about Jewish-Arab Intergroup Exclusion: The Role of Cultural Identity and Contact

    Science.gov (United States)

    Brenick, Alaina; Killen, Melanie

    2014-01-01

    Prejudice and discrimination as justifications for social exclusion are often viewed as violations of the moral principles of welfare, justice, and equality, but intergroup exclusion can also often be viewed as a necessary and legitimate means to maintain group identity and cohesion (Rutland, Killen, & Abrams, 2010). The current study was…

  4. Sanctions and moral judgments: The moderating effect of sanction severity and trust in authorities

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Mulder, Laetitia; Verboon, Peter; de Cremer, David

    2011-01-01

    In order to induce people to follow rules, sanctions are often introduced. In this paper we argue for the importance of studying the positive influence of sanctioning systems on people’s moral convictions regarding the rule advocated by the sanction and of studying factors that moderate this

  5. From Human Nature to Moral Judgments : Reframing Debates about Disability and Enhancement

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Harnacke, C.E.

    2015-01-01

    My goal in my dissertation is to develop an account of how a theory of human nature should be integrated into bioethics and to show what bioethics can gain from using this account. I explore the relevance of human nature for moral argumentation, and especially for bioethics. Thereby, I focus on

  6. Bringing free will down to Earth: people's psychological concept of free will and its role in moral judgment.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Monroe, Andrew E; Dillon, Kyle D; Malle, Bertram F

    2014-07-01

    Belief in free will is widespread, and this belief is supposed to undergird moral and legal judgment. Despite the importance of the free will concept, however, there remains widespread confusion regarding its definition and its connection to blame. We address this confusion by testing two prominent models of the folk concept of free will-a metaphysical model, in which free will involves a soul as an uncaused "first mover," and a psychological model, in which free will involves choice, alignment with desires, and lack of constraints. We test the predictions of these two models by creating agents that vary in their capacity for choice and the presence of a soul. In two studies, people's judgments of free will and blame for these agents show little to no basis in ascriptions of a soul but are powerfully predicted by ascriptions of choice capacity. These results support a psychological model of the folk concept of free will. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  7. The Ethical Judgment and Moral Reaction to the Product-Harm Crisis: Theoretical Model and Empirical Research

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Dong Lu

    2016-07-01

    Full Text Available Based on the dual-process theory of ethical judgment, a research model is proposed for examining consumers’ moral reactions to a product-harm crisis. A national-wide survey was conducted with 801 respondents in China. The results of this study indicate that consumers will react to a product-harm crisis through controlled cognitive processing and emotional intuition. The results of the study also show that consumers view a product-harm crisis as an ethical issue, and they will make an ethical judgment according to the perceived severity and perceived relevance of the crisis. The ethical judgment in the perceived crisis severity and perceived crisis relevance will affect consumers’ condemning emotions in terms of contempt and anger. Through controlled cognitive processing, a personal consumption-related reaction (purchasing intention is influenced by the perceived crisis severity. Furthermore, a social and interpersonal reaction (negative word of mouth is influenced by the perceived crisis relevance through the controlled cognitive processing. This social and interpersonal reaction is also influenced by the perceived crisis severity and perceived crisis relevance through the intuition of other-condemning emotion. Moreover, this study finds that the product knowledge negatively moderates the impact of the perceived crisis severity on the condemning emotions. Therefore, when a consumer has a high level of product knowledge, the effect of perceived crisis severity on the condemning emotions will be attenuated, and vice versa. This study provides scholars and managers with means of understanding and handling of consumers’ reactions to a product-harm crisis.

  8. Julgamento moral sobre pena de morte e redução da maioridade penal Moral judgments on death penalty and reduction of criminal majority

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Lilian Kelly de Sousa Galvão

    2011-08-01

    Full Text Available O objetivo principal deste trabalho foi investigar o julgamento moral de estudantes do ensino médio e de licenciaturas sobre pena de morte e redução da maioridade penal. Para tanto, utilizou-se como suporte teórico e empírico a tipologia do desenvolvimento moral de Lawrence Kohlberg. Participaram deste estudo 200 estudantes que responderam, além de uma lista que solicitava informações de alguns dos seus dados biodemográficos, a questões relacionadas à pena de morte e à redução da maioridade penal. De um modo geral, os participantes opinaram favoravelmente pela pena de morte e pela redução da maioridade penal, e, em defesa de suas opiniões, utilizaram, sobretudo, argumentos típicos dos estágios hierarquicamente inferiores da tipologia kohlberguiana, havendo, contudo, algumas diferenças entre as respostas em função do grau de escolaridade. Esses resultados foram discutidos com base na teoria kohlberguiana e em estudos empíricos que tratam dos temas pena de morte e redução da maioridade penal.The aim of this study was to investigate the moral judgments of students of high school and degrees on the death penalty and the reduction of criminal majority. Thus, it was used to support the theoretical and empirical typology of moral development of Lawrence Kohlberg. The study included 200 students who responded, beyond a list that requested information from some of their bio-demographic data, questions related to death penalty and reduction of criminal majority. In general, participants opined in favor of the death penalty and the reduction of criminal majority, and in defense of their views, used mainly typical arguments hierarchically lower stages of the Kohlberg's typology there, however, some differences between the responses according to level of schooling. These results were discussed taking into consideration the Kohlberg's theory and empirical studies dealing with the issues of death penalty and reduction of criminal

  9. 'Adventurous' judgments
    A comparative exploration into human rights as a moral-political force in judicial law development

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Bas de Gaay Fortman

    2006-12-01

    Full Text Available This article looks at the development of law by the judiciary in the sense of judgments taking the law beyond the point of what was hitherto regarded as ius positivum. Its main perspective, however, is not the creation of law by the courts as such, but rather the ways and means in which the human rights idea has encouraged judges to deliver decisions that imply an overturning of 'settled' law. In the comparative exploration of 'adventurous' judgments that we shall embark on, our focus will be on the political morality of human rights as a driving force in judicial activism. It is assumed, in other words, that where the judiciary is 'active', human rights may play a part as general principles of law as distinct from rules already incorporated in positive law. Notably then, human rights in this way affect positive law in a manner other than through processes of international, regional and national standard setting connected with the establishment of new supervisory institutions and mechanisms. For this reason, the article does not so much consider typical human rights cases; instead the focus is on major decisions by national courts that were not in the first place regarded as human rights cases at all. In this endeavour, the article aims to be no more than an initial comparative exploration, intended to illustrate a function of human rights that is not normally highlighted, namely its function as an inspirational force towards 'adventurous' judgments. Yet, the judicial potential illustrated here is of great significance, as it may lead to law development inspired by the two principal pillars underpinning the international quest for the realization of human rights: universality and human dignity. After reviewing a variety of characteristic cases from such diverse legal backgrounds as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the United States of America, India, South Africa and Nigeria, some conclusions are drawn as to the ways in which human rights

  10. Thinking More or Feeling Less? Explaining the Foreign-Language Effect on Moral Judgment.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hayakawa, Sayuri; Tannenbaum, David; Costa, Albert; Corey, Joanna D; Keysar, Boaz

    2017-10-01

    Would you kill one person to save five? People are more willing to accept such utilitarian action when using a foreign language than when using their native language. In six experiments, we investigated why foreign-language use affects moral choice in this way. On the one hand, the difficulty of using a foreign language might slow people down and increase deliberation, amplifying utilitarian considerations of maximizing welfare. On the other hand, use of a foreign language might stunt emotional processing, attenuating considerations of deontological rules, such as the prohibition against killing. Using a process-dissociation technique, we found that foreign-language use decreases deontological responding but does not increase utilitarian responding. This suggests that using a foreign language affects moral choice not through increased deliberation but by blunting emotional reactions associated with the violation of deontological rules.

  11. Foreign language affects the contribution of intentions and outcomes to moral judgment.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Geipel, Janet; Hadjichristidis, Constantinos; Surian, Luca

    2016-09-01

    We examine whether the use of a foreign language, as opposed to the native language, influences the relative weight intentions versus outcomes carry in moral evaluations. In Study 1, participants were presented with actions that had positive outcomes but were motivated by dubious intentions, while in Study 2 with actions that had negative outcomes but were motivated by positive intentions. Participants received the materials either in their native or a foreign language. Foreign language prompted more positive moral evaluations in Study 1 and less positive evaluations in Study 2. These results show that foreign language reduces the relative weight placed on intentions versus outcomes. We discuss several theoretical accounts that are consistent with the results such as that foreign language attenuates emotions (triggered by intentions) or it depletes cognitive resources. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  12. Social judgment theory based model on opinion formation, polarization and evolution

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chau, H. F.; Wong, C. Y.; Chow, F. K.; Fung, Chi-Hang Fred

    2014-12-01

    The dynamical origin of opinion polarization in the real world is an interesting topic that physical scientists may help to understand. To properly model the dynamics, the theory must be fully compatible with findings by social psychologists on microscopic opinion change. Here we introduce a generic model of opinion formation with homogeneous agents based on the well-known social judgment theory in social psychology by extending a similar model proposed by Jager and Amblard. The agents’ opinions will eventually cluster around extreme and/or moderate opinions forming three phases in a two-dimensional parameter space that describes the microscopic opinion response of the agents. The dynamics of this model can be qualitatively understood by mean-field analysis. More importantly, first-order phase transition in opinion distribution is observed by evolving the system under a slow change in the system parameters, showing that punctuated equilibria in public opinion can occur even in a fully connected social network.

  13. Making Moral Judgments from a World-Historic Standpoint: The Case of Woodrow Wilson.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fuller, Steve

    This comment reflects on the recent row over Woodrow Wilson's legacy, which has focussed on his undeniable racism. This was in pursuit of a 'Progressive' agenda which paved the way for the United States to become the geopolitical force that it continues to be today. Without necessarily approving of Wilson's particular judgements, I argue that he operated with a 'world-historic' sense of morality characteristic of Realpolitik , a perspective which might be worth considering by those who believe that modern preoccupations with 'race', 'class' and 'gender' will remain part of the sociological firmament indefinitely.ᅟ.

  14. Morality.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Haidt, Jonathan

    2008-01-01

    Moral psychology is a rapidly growing field with two principle lineages. The main line began with Jean Piaget and includes developmental psychologists who have studied the acquisition of moral concepts and reasoning. The alternative line began in the 1990s with a new synthesis of evolutionary, neurological, and social-psychological research in which the central phenomena are moral emotions and intuitions. In this essay, I show how both of these lines have been shaped by an older debate between two 19th century narratives about modernity: one celebrating the liberation of individuals, the other mourning the loss of community and moral authority. I suggest that both lines of moral psychology have limited themselves to the moral domain prescribed by the liberation narrative, and so one future step for moral psychology should be to study alternative moral perspectives, particularly religious and politically conservative ones in which morality is, in part, about protecting groups, institutions, and souls. © 2008 Association for Psychological Science.

  15. Variations in judgments of intentional action and moral evaluation across eight cultures.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Robbins, Erin; Shepard, Jason; Rochat, Philippe

    2017-07-01

    Individuals tend to judge bad side effects as more intentional than good side effects (the Knobe or side-effect effect). Here, we assessed how widespread these findings are by testing eleven adult cohorts of eight highly contrasted cultures on their attributions of intentional action as well as ratings of blame and praise. We found limited generalizability of the original side-effect effect, and even a reversal of the effect in two rural, traditional cultures (Samoa and Vanuatu) where participants were more likely to judge the good side effect as intentional. Three follow-up experiments indicate that this reversal of the side-effect effect is not due to semantics and may be linked to the perception of the status of the protagonist. These results highlight the importance of factoring cultural context in our understanding of moral cognition. Copyright © 2017. Published by Elsevier B.V.

  16. Generosity towards a friend, an unknown person and an enemy: moral judgments of children and adolescents

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Liana Gama do Vale

    2009-12-01

    Full Text Available Neste estudo, investigamos, em um contexto psicogenético, se crianças e adolescentes, ao julgarem se uma pessoa deve ou não ser generosa para com outra, são influenciados pelo tipo de vínculo (amizade ou inimizade existente entre essas duas pessoas ou pela ausência de vínculo (desconhecido. Entrevistamos individualmente 30 alunos de uma escola pública de Vitória-ES, nas faixas etárias de 7, 10 e 13 anos. Utilizamos como instrumento uma história-dilema que trazia uma situação escolar cotidiana em que a generosidade poderia ser manifestada para com um personagem que, inicialmente, foi apresentado como amigo, depois, como desconhecido e, por último, como inimigo. Verificamos que a maioria dos participantes decide pela generosidade nas situações de amizade e ausência de vínculo. Os entrevistados de 7 e 10 anos, contudo, sugerem que a ação generosa para com um amigo deve ser mais intensa do que para com um desconhecido. Na situação de inimizade, a maioria dos participantes das três idades decide pela ausência de generosidade. Diante dos resultados encontrados, podemos afirmar, portanto, que a ausência de vínculo influencia os juízos da maioria dos participantes das duas primeiras faixas etárias. A inimizade, por sua vez, influencia os juízos da maior parte dos entrevistados das três idades pesquisadas.   Palavras-chave: juízo moral; generosidade; amizade; inimizade; vínculos.

  17. Moral Hindsight.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fleischhut, Nadine; Meder, Björn; Gigerenzer, Gerd

    2017-03-01

    How are judgments in moral dilemmas affected by uncertainty, as opposed to certainty? We tested the predictions of a consequentialist and deontological account using a hindsight paradigm. The key result is a hindsight effect in moral judgment. Participants in foresight, for whom the occurrence of negative side effects was uncertain, judged actions to be morally more permissible than participants in hindsight, who knew that negative side effects occurred. Conversely, when hindsight participants knew that no negative side effects occurred, they judged actions to be more permissible than participants in foresight. The second finding was a classical hindsight effect in probability estimates and a systematic relation between moral judgments and probability estimates. Importantly, while the hindsight effect in probability estimates was always present, a corresponding hindsight effect in moral judgments was only observed among "consequentialist" participants who indicated a cost-benefit trade-off as most important for their moral evaluation.

  18. No Effect of Weight on Judgments of Importance in the Moral Domain and Evidence of Publication Bias from a Meta-Analysis.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rabelo, André L A; Keller, Victor N; Pilati, Ronaldo; Wicherts, Jelte M

    2015-01-01

    In different cultures, people use the concept of weight to refer to important matters. Recent studies in grounded cognition suggested that experiences of weight affect unrelated judgments of importance in metaphor-congruent ways. Theories in grounded cognition and prime-to-behavior effects state that sensations of weight activate concepts of importance, which may affect morality-related variables that are influenced by judgments of importance. The present research aimed to test the effect of carrying a heavy (or light) clipboard on the perceived importance of helping and on the judged severity of moral transgressions. After finding no significant effects in two experiments, a third study explored whether these results were due to a specific lack of effect of weight on morality-related variables or to the concept of importance not being grounded in sensations of weight in Brazilian samples. Specifically, in Study 3 we attempted to replicate two seminal studies but found no significant effects. Together with evidence of publication bias in a meta-analysis of published studies, the current results suggest that the concept of importance may not be as universally grounded in sensations of weight as previously assumed. We discuss the implications of these results for grounded cognition theories and methodological and statistical aspects of priming studies.

  19. Resenha de: The Typic in Kant’s critique of practical reason: moral judgment and symbolic representation. De Adam Westra, 2016

    OpenAIRE

    Carlos Moisés De Oliveira

    2017-01-01

    A típica na crítica da razão prática: da possibilidade de unificação entre necessidade natural e liberdade The typic in critique of practical reason: From the possibility of unification between natural necessity and freedom Carlos Moisés de Oliveira· Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte, Brasil Resenha de: The Typic in Kant’s critique of practical reason: moral judgment and symbolic representation. De Adam Westra, 2016. ISBN: 978-3-11-045462-8.

  20. A validação do Teste de Juízo Moral (MJT para diferentes culturas: o caso brasileiro Moral Judgment Test (MJT adaptation for different cultures: Brazilian case

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Patricia Unger Raphael Bataglia

    2010-04-01

    Full Text Available O presente artigo trata da adaptação do Teste de Juízo Moral (MJT para a língua portuguesa. São apresentados os princípios do teste, seu formato e o processo de validação de conteúdo, constructo e de critério. Da mesma forma, a confiabilidade é discutida utilizando os resultados das pesquisas brasileiras que inclusive geraram a necessidade de elaboração de outro dilema para compor o MJT-xt (estendido.The present article deals with the adaptation of the Moral Judgment Test (MJT for the Portuguese language. The principles of the test, its format and the process of content, construct and criterion validation are presented. In the same way, reliability is discussed using Brazilian research results that produced the necessity of elaborating another dilemma to compose the MJT-xt (extended.

  1. Differences in Moral Judgment on Animal and Human Ethics Issues between University Students in Animal-Related, Human Medical and Arts Programs.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Verrinder, Joy M; Ostini, Remo; Phillips, Clive J C

    2016-01-01

    Moral judgment in relation to animal ethics issues has rarely been investigated. Among the research that has been conducted, studies of veterinary students have shown greater use of reasoning based on universal principles for animal than human ethics issues. This study aimed to identify if this was unique to students of veterinary and other animal-related professions. The moral reasoning of first year students of veterinary medicine, veterinary technology, and production animal science was compared with that of students in non-animal related disciplines of human medicine and arts. All students (n = 531) completed a moral reasoning test, the VetDIT, with animal and human scenarios. When compared with reasoning on human ethics issues, the combined group of students evaluating animal ethics issues showed higher levels of Universal Principles reasoning, lower levels of Personal Interest reasoning and similar levels of Maintaining Norms reasoning. Arts students showed more personal interest reasoning than students in most animal-related programs on both animal and human ethics issues, and less norms-based reasoning on animal ethics issues. Medical students showed more norms-based reasoning on animal ethics issues than all of the animal-related groups. There were no differences in principled reasoning on animal ethics issues between program groups. This has implications for animal-related professions and education programs showing that students' preference for principled reasoning on animal ethics issues is not unique to animal-related disciplines, and highlighting the need to develop student (and professional) capacity to apply principled reasoning to address ethics issues in animal industries to reduce the risk of moral distress.

  2. 'Adventurous' judgments A comparative exploration into human rights as a moral-political force in judicial law development

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Gaay Fortman, B. de

    2006-01-01

    This article looks at the development of law by the judiciary in the sense of judgments taking the law beyond the point of what was hitherto regarded as ius positivum. Its main perspective, however, is not the creation of law by the courts as such, but rather the ways and means in which the human

  3. Rejected by Peers--Attracted to Antisocial Media Content: Rejection-Based Anger Impairs Moral Judgment among Adolescents

    Science.gov (United States)

    Plaisier, Xanthe S.; Konijn, Elly A.

    2013-01-01

    Adolescence is an important developmental stage during which both peers and the media have a strong influence. Both peer rejection and the use of morally adverse media are associated with negative developmental outcomes. This study examines processes by which peer rejection might drive adolescents to select antisocial media content by tying…

  4. Enhancing Moral and Ethical Judgment through the Use of Case Histories: An Ethics Course for Pre-Service Teachers

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mc Danel de García, Mary Anne

    2013-01-01

    This article refers to an action research project involving pre-service teachers. The purpose of this study was to determine if specific learning outcomes could be successfully employed as objectives for an ethics course for preservice teacher preparation. Real life case histories were used by students to identify and reflect upon moral and…

  5. The significance of understanding the features of moral judgements ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    This paper is an elucidation of the importance of moral judgments in our conceptions of morality. It notes that no moral judgment can be made unless there is a pre-supposition of some moral standards, rules or principles of conduct. The paper argues that contrary to very popular views, moral judgments are not mainly ...

  6. Towards a Kantian Theory of Judgment : the power of judgment in its practical and aesthetic employment

    OpenAIRE

    During, D.K.; Duwell, M.

    2015-01-01

    Human beings orient themselves in the world via judgments; factual, moral, prudential, aesthetic, and all kinds of mixed judgments. Particularly for normative orientation in complex and contested contexts of action, it can be challenging to form judgments. This paper explores what one can reasonably expect from a theory of the power of judgment from a Kantian approach to ethics. We reconstruct practical (prudential and moral) judgments on basis of the self-reflexive capacities of human beings...

  7. Lived on school situations, self-respect and development of the moral judgment in the latency period

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Emile-Henri Riard

    2011-01-01

    Full Text Available According to an approach of clinical social psychology, the point of view adopted in this article is triple: 1- to consider the "common" school situations as potentially generators of difficulties; 2-join upstream to the adolescence to improve the understanding of this last one; 3 - to consider the lived of the pupils. The research led in France (children, 6 to 11 years old, by questionnaire (48 situations raising from the schooling: class, school playground, route place of residence / school, and place ofresidence were proposed; test of self-respect (Coopersmith; moral development (Kohlberg. Variables: age, sex, mode of housing environment, school position, classification, department....The results (variance’ analysis demonstrate a functioning "altogether" of the level of lived on difficulty. As significant variables, in ascending order lessening: the sex (the boys feel more the difficulties than the girls; the age (the level of lived difficulty decreases with the age but concerns especially the school playground; the mode of housing environment (collective. The class is the most carrier space of differences of lived on difficulties independently of variables. The level of autonomy and the self-respect are proportionned in broad outline conversely at the level of difficulty lived. The conclusion emphasizes the importance of the effects interactive and of accumulation of the situations

  8. Implicit moral evaluations: A multinomial modeling approach.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cameron, C Daryl; Payne, B Keith; Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter; Scheffer, Julian A; Inzlicht, Michael

    2017-01-01

    Implicit moral evaluations-i.e., immediate, unintentional assessments of the wrongness of actions or persons-play a central role in supporting moral behavior in everyday life. Yet little research has employed methods that rigorously measure individual differences in implicit moral evaluations. In five experiments, we develop a new sequential priming measure-the Moral Categorization Task-and a multinomial model that decomposes judgment on this task into multiple component processes. These include implicit moral evaluations of moral transgression primes (Unintentional Judgment), accurate moral judgments about target actions (Intentional Judgment), and a directional tendency to judge actions as morally wrong (Response Bias). Speeded response deadlines reduced Intentional Judgment but not Unintentional Judgment (Experiment 1). Unintentional Judgment was stronger toward moral transgression primes than non-moral negative primes (Experiments 2-4). Intentional Judgment was associated with increased error-related negativity, a neurophysiological indicator of behavioral control (Experiment 4). Finally, people who voted for an anti-gay marriage amendment had stronger Unintentional Judgment toward gay marriage primes (Experiment 5). Across Experiments 1-4, implicit moral evaluations converged with moral personality: Unintentional Judgment about wrong primes, but not negative primes, was negatively associated with psychopathic tendencies and positively associated with moral identity and guilt proneness. Theoretical and practical applications of formal modeling for moral psychology are discussed. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  9. Juvenile Delinquency and Moral Development.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sagi, Abraham; Eisikovits, Zvi

    1981-01-01

    Compared the moral development of delinquent and nondelinquent adolescents. Subjects (N=249) were administered a morality test for children including the following measures: resistance to temptation, moral stage, feelings after offense, judgment about the severity of punishment, and confession. In most measures of moral development, nondelinquents…

  10. Mind Perception Is the Essence of Morality.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gray, Kurt; Young, Liane; Waytz, Adam

    2012-04-01

    Mind perception entails ascribing mental capacities to other entities, whereas moral judgment entails labeling entities as good or bad or actions as right or wrong. We suggest that mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. In particular, we suggest that moral judgment is rooted in a cognitive template of two perceived minds-a moral dyad of an intentional agent and a suffering moral patient. Diverse lines of research support dyadic morality. First, perceptions of mind are linked to moral judgments: dimensions of mind perception (agency and experience) map onto moral types (agents and patients), and deficits of mind perception correspond to difficulties with moral judgment. Second, not only are moral judgments sensitive to perceived agency and experience, but all moral transgressions are fundamentally understood as agency plus experienced suffering-that is, interpersonal harm-even ostensibly harmless acts such as purity violations. Third, dyadic morality uniquely accounts for the phenomena of dyadic completion (seeing agents in response to patients, and vice versa), and moral typecasting (characterizing others as either moral agents or moral patients). Discussion also explores how mind perception can unify morality across explanatory levels, how a dyadic template of morality may be developmentally acquired, and future directions.

  11. Frontopolar and anterior temporal cortex activation in a moral judgment task: preliminary functional MRI results in normal subjects Ativação do córtex frontopolar e temporal anterior em uma tarefa de julgamento moral: resultados preliminares de ressonância magnética funcional em indivíduos normais

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jorge Moll

    2001-09-01

    Full Text Available OBJECTIVE: To study the brain areas which are activated when normal subjects make moral judgments. METHOD: Ten normal adults underwent BOLD functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI during the auditory presentation of sentences that they were instructed to silently judge as either "right" or "wrong". Half of the sentences had an explicit moral content ("We break the law when necessary", the other half comprised factual statements devoid of moral connotation ("Stones are made of water". After scanning, each subject rated the moral content, emotional valence, and judgment difficulty of each sentence on Likert-like scales. To exclude the effect of emotion on the activation results, individual responses were hemodynamically modeled for event-related fMRI analysis. The general linear model was used to evaluate the brain areas activated by moral judgment. RESULTS: Regions activated during moral judgment included the frontopolar cortex (FPC, medial frontal gyrus, right anterior temporal cortex, lenticular nucleus, and cerebellum. Activation of FPC and medial frontal gyrus (BA 10/46 and 9 were largely independent of emotional experience and represented the largest areas of activation. CONCLUSIONS: These results concur with clinical observations assigning a critical role for the frontal poles and right anterior temporal cortex in the mediation of complex judgment processes according to moral constraints. The FPC may work in concert with the orbitofrontal and dorsolateral cortex in the regulation of human social conduct.OBJETIVO: Estudar, com ressonância magnética funcional (RMf, as áreas cerebrais normalmente ativadas por julgamentos morais em tarefa de verificação de sentenças. MÉTODO: Dez adultos normais foram estudados com RMf-BOLD durante a apresentação auditiva de sentenças cujo conteúdo foram instruídos a julgar como "certo" ou "errado". Metade das sentenças possuía um conteúdo moral explícito ("Transgredimos a lei se necess

  12. Conciencia moral: ampliando su aplicación en salud. Aspectos teóricos y prácticos de los juicios de conciencia en Chile Consciência moral: ampliando sua aplicação em saúde. Aspectos teóricos e práticos dos juízos de consciência no país Moral conscience: widening its application in health. Theoretical and practical issues of moral judgment in Chile

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Antonieta Valderrama Sandoval

    2011-11-01

    Full Text Available La conciencia se entiende habitualmente como un aspecto individual y subjetivo del ser humano; sin embargo, recientemente se ha destacado su carácter racional y sujeto a criterios externos de evaluación. La aplicación de los juicios de la conciencia moral es transversal a todos los campos de la atención en salud, incluso en la relación cotidiana con los pacientes. La objeción de conciencia de los profesionales de la salud ha sido criticada porque podría faltar a la responsabilidad profesional; no obstante, seguir la conciencia recta es una obligación moral para todos, independiente del rol que se cumpla en un determinado momento. Impedir hacerlo es lesionar la autonomía e integridad moral de quien busca actuar en conciencia.A consciência é entendida habitualmente como um aspecto individual e subjetivo do ser humano; entretanto, recentemente se tem destacado seu caráter racional e sujeito a critérios externos de avaliação. A aplicação dos juízos da consciência moral é transversal a todos os campos da atenção em saúde, inclusive na relação cotidiana com os pacientes. A objeção de consciência dos profissionais de saúde tem sido criticada porque esta poderia faltar com a responsabilidade profissional; não obstante, seguir a consciência reta é uma obrigação moral para todos, independente do papel que se cumpra num determinado momento. Impedir fazê-lo é lesar a autonomia e a integridade moral de quem busca atuar com consciência.Generally, conscience is understood as an individual and subjective character of human being; nevertheless, recently its rational character has been highlighted and subjected to external evaluation criteria. The application of moral conscience judgments is transversal to all health care fields, even in daily relations with patients. Health care professionals conscience objection has been criticized because it could neglect professional responsibility; nevertheless, to follow an honest

  13. Coercive Interference and Moral Judgment

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    van der Rijt, J.W.

    2011-01-01

    Coercion is by its very nature hostile to the individual subjected to it. At the same time, it often is a necessary evil: political life cannot function without at least some instances of coercion. Hence, it is not surprising that coercion has been the topic of heated philosophical debate for many

  14. Explaining Moral Behavior.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Osman, Magda; Wiegmann, Alex

    2017-03-01

    In this review we make a simple theoretical argument which is that for theory development, computational modeling, and general frameworks for understanding moral psychology researchers should build on domain-general principles from reasoning, judgment, and decision-making research. Our approach is radical with respect to typical models that exist in moral psychology that tend to propose complex innate moral grammars and even evolutionarily guided moral principles. In support of our argument we show that by using a simple value-based decision model we can capture a range of core moral behaviors. Crucially, the argument we propose is that moral situations per se do not require anything specialized or different from other situations in which we have to make decisions, inferences, and judgments in order to figure out how to act.

  15. Towards a Kantian Theory of Judgment : the power of judgment in its practical and aesthetic employment

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    During, D.K.; Duwell, M.

    2015-01-01

    Human beings orient themselves in the world via judgments; factual, moral, prudential, aesthetic, and all kinds of mixed judgments. Particularly for normative orientation in complex and contested contexts of action, it can be challenging to form judgments. This paper explores what one can reasonably

  16. No effect of weight on judgments of importance in the moral domain and evidence of publication bias from a meta-analysis

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Rabelo, Andre L. A.; Keller, Victor N.; Pilati, Ronaldo; Wicherts, Jelte M.

    2015-01-01

    In different cultures, people use the concept of weight to refer to important matters. Recent studies in grounded cognition suggested that experiences of weight affect unrelated judgments of importance in metaphor-congruent ways. Theories in grounded cognition and prime-to-behavior effects state

  17. Moral Orientation Dynamics in Adolescence and Youth

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Molchanov S.V.

    2015-02-01

    Full Text Available The problem of moral development is actual for modern psychology. Modern conception of moral development defines two main principles in the basis of moral orientation: care principle and justice principle. Adolescence and youth are sensitive period to develop moral orientation. 139 subjects from three age groups: young adolescents, older adolescents and youth took part in the investigation. Results shows age dynamic of moral judgments preferences, moral dilemma solving with different levels of motivation to achieve and be approved.

  18. Neural basis of moral verdict and moral deliberation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Borg, Jana Schaich; Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter; Calhoun, Vince D.; Kiehl, Kent A.

    2011-01-01

    How people judge something to be morally right or wrong is a fundamental question of both the sciences and the humanities. Here we aim to identify the neural processes that underlie the specific conclusion that something is morally wrong. To do this, we introduce a novel distinction between “moral deliberation,” or the weighing of moral considerations, and the formation of a “moral verdict,” or the commitment to one moral conclusion. We predict and identify hemodynamic activity in the bilateral anterior insula and basal ganglia that correlates with committing to the moral verdict “this is morally wrong” as opposed to “this is morally not wrong,” a finding that is consistent with research from economic decision-making. Using comparisons of deliberation-locked vs. verdict-locked analyses, we also demonstrate that hemodynamic activity in high-level cortical regions previously implicated in morality—including the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate, and temporoparietal junction—correlates primarily with moral deliberation as opposed to moral verdicts. These findings provide new insights into what types of processes comprise the enterprise of moral judgment, and in doing so point to a framework for resolving why some clinical patients, including psychopaths, may have intact moral judgment but impaired moral behavior. PMID:21590588

  19. Emotion and Morality in Psychopathy and Paraphilias

    Science.gov (United States)

    Harenski, Carla L.; Kiehl, Kent A.

    2014-01-01

    Understanding the role of emotion in moral judgment has been an active area of investigation and debate. Here we comment on this topic by examining the interaction between emotion and moral judgment in certain psychopathological groups that are characterized by abnormalities in emotion processing, such as psychopaths and sexual offenders with paraphilic disorders. PMID:24899928

  20. On judgment and judgmentalism: how counselling can make people better.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gibson, S

    2005-10-01

    Counsellors, like other members of the caring professions, are required to practise within an ethical framework, at least in so far as they seek professional accreditation. As such, the counsellor is called upon to exercise her moral agency. In most professional contexts this requirement is, in itself, unproblematic. It has been suggested, however, that counselling practice does present a problem in this respect, in so far as the counsellor is expected to take a non-judgemental stance and an attitude of "unconditional positive regard" toward the client. If, as might appear to be the case, this stance and attitude are at odds with the making of moral judgments, the possibility of an adequate ethics of counselling is called into question. This paper explores the nature and extent of the problem suggesting that, understood in a Kantian context, non-judgmentalism can be seen to be at odds with neither the moral agency of the counsellor nor that of the client. Instead, it is argued, the relationship between the non-judgmental counsellor and her client is a fundamentally moral relationship, based on respect for the client's unconditional worth as a moral agent.

  1. A Neo-Kohlbergian Approach to Morality Research.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rest, James R.; Narvaez, Darcia; Thoma, Stephen J.; Bebeau, Muriel J.

    2000-01-01

    Proposes a model of moral judgment that builds on Lawrence Kohlberg's core assumptions. Addresses the concerns that have surfaced related to Kohlberg's work in moral judgment. Presents an overview of this model using Kohlberg's basic starting points, ideas from cognitive science, and developments in moral philosophy. (CMK)

  2. Cultural Practices, Oppression, and Morality.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Turiel, Elliot

    1998-01-01

    Argues that contested meanings, multiple judgments, and conflicts are part of cultures and the individual's thoughts and actions. Contends that people make moral judgments that may affirm or contradict cultural norms and practices, and sometimes invoke concepts of welfare, justice, and rights. Notes that some key aspects of Baumrind's neo-Marxist…

  3. Why People with More Emotion Regulation Difficulties Made a More Deontological Judgment: The Role of Deontological Inclinations.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhang, Lisong; Li, Zhongquan; Wu, Xiaoyuan; Zhang, Ziyuan

    2017-01-01

    Previous studies have demonstrated the key role of emotion in moral judgment, and explored the relationship between emotion regulation and moral judgment. The present study investigated the influence of individual differences in emotion regulation difficulties on moral judgment. Study 1 examined whether individuals with high emotion regulation difficulties made a more deontological judgment. Study 2 explored the underlying mechanism using a process-dissociation approach, examining whether deontological inclinations and utilitarian inclinations separately or jointly accounted for the association. The results indicated that individuals with high emotion regulation difficulties rated the utilitarian actions less morally appropriate, and one's deontological inclinations mediated the association between emotion regulation difficulties and moral judgment.

  4. The Moral Psychology of Watergate

    Science.gov (United States)

    Candee, Dan

    1975-01-01

    States that if conventional moral reasoning led the Watergate characters to err, they were not alone; three hundred and seventy people, predominantly college students drawn from a variety of New England and Midwestern campuses who had been given Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview, were asked to decide some of the same dilemmas which confronted…

  5. Why People with More Emotion Regulation Difficulties Made a More Deontological Judgment: The Role of Deontological Inclinations

    OpenAIRE

    Zhang, Lisong; Li, Zhongquan; Wu, Xiaoyuan; Zhang, Ziyuan

    2017-01-01

    Previous studies have demonstrated the key role of emotion in moral judgment, and explored the relationship between emotion regulation and moral judgment. The present study investigated the influence of individual differences in emotion regulation difficulties on moral judgment. Study 1 examined whether individuals with high emotion regulation difficulties made a more deontological judgment. Study 2 explored the underlying mechanism using a process-dissociation approach, examining whether deo...

  6. Moral Emotions and Morals

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Rocío Orsi Portalo

    2006-12-01

    Full Text Available My aim in this paper is to explore the ambivalent role played by the so called moral emotions in moral thinking, overall when the concept of responsibility is concerned. In the first part of this paper I show how moral emotions such as guilt and shame can appear in circumstances that are not under the agent’s control, and therefore the agent could be though of free or responsibility for them. By contrast, in the second part of this essay I put how the absence of moral emotions, or their twisted development, makes as well the flourishing of individual morality impossible.

  7. The Importance of Moral Construal: Moral versus Non-Moral Construal Elicits Faster, More Extreme, Universal Evaluations of the Same Actions

    Science.gov (United States)

    Van Bavel, Jay J.; Packer, Dominic J.; Haas, Ingrid Johnsen; Cunningham, William A.

    2012-01-01

    Over the past decade, intuitionist models of morality have challenged the view that moral reasoning is the sole or even primary means by which moral judgments are made. Rather, intuitionist models posit that certain situations automatically elicit moral intuitions, which guide moral judgments. We present three experiments showing that evaluations are also susceptible to the influence of moral versus non-moral construal. We had participants make moral evaluations (rating whether actions were morally good or bad) or non-moral evaluations (rating whether actions were pragmatically or hedonically good or bad) of a wide variety of actions. As predicted, moral evaluations were faster, more extreme, and more strongly associated with universal prescriptions—the belief that absolutely nobody or everybody should engage in an action—than non-moral (pragmatic or hedonic) evaluations of the same actions. Further, we show that people are capable of flexibly shifting from moral to non-moral evaluations on a trial-by-trial basis. Taken together, these experiments provide evidence that moral versus non-moral construal has an important influence on evaluation and suggests that effects of construal are highly flexible. We discuss the implications of these experiments for models of moral judgment and decision-making. PMID:23209557

  8. The importance of moral construal: moral versus non-moral construal elicits faster, more extreme, universal evaluations of the same actions.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Van Bavel, Jay J; Packer, Dominic J; Haas, Ingrid Johnsen; Cunningham, William A

    2012-01-01

    Over the past decade, intuitionist models of morality have challenged the view that moral reasoning is the sole or even primary means by which moral judgments are made. Rather, intuitionist models posit that certain situations automatically elicit moral intuitions, which guide moral judgments. We present three experiments showing that evaluations are also susceptible to the influence of moral versus non-moral construal. We had participants make moral evaluations (rating whether actions were morally good or bad) or non-moral evaluations (rating whether actions were pragmatically or hedonically good or bad) of a wide variety of actions. As predicted, moral evaluations were faster, more extreme, and more strongly associated with universal prescriptions-the belief that absolutely nobody or everybody should engage in an action-than non-moral (pragmatic or hedonic) evaluations of the same actions. Further, we show that people are capable of flexibly shifting from moral to non-moral evaluations on a trial-by-trial basis. Taken together, these experiments provide evidence that moral versus non-moral construal has an important influence on evaluation and suggests that effects of construal are highly flexible. We discuss the implications of these experiments for models of moral judgment and decision-making.

  9. The Influence of Moral Schemas on the Reconstruction of Moral Narratives in Eighth Graders and College Students.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Narvaez, Darcia

    1998-01-01

    Eighth graders (n=138) and college students (n=49) read and recalled four complex moral narratives in which moral arguments at different Kohlbergian stages were embedded. Participants with higher reasoning scores on a test of moral judgment development reconstructed more high-stage moral arguments during recall. (SLD)

  10. Moral expansiveness: Examining variability in the extension of the moral world.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Crimston, Daniel; Bain, Paul G; Hornsey, Matthew J; Bastian, Brock

    2016-10-01

    The nature of our moral judgments-and the extent to which we treat others with care-depend in part on the distinctions we make between entities deemed worthy or unworthy of moral consideration-our moral boundaries. Philosophers, historians, and social scientists have noted that people's moral boundaries have expanded over the last few centuries, but the notion of moral expansiveness has received limited empirical attention in psychology. This research explores variations in the size of individuals' moral boundaries using the psychological construct of moral expansiveness and introduces the Moral Expansiveness Scale (MES), designed to capture this variation. Across 6 studies, we established the reliability, convergent validity, and predictive validity of the MES. Moral expansiveness was related (but not reducible) to existing moral constructs (moral foundations, moral identity, "moral" universalism values), predictors of moral standing (moral patiency and warmth), and other constructs associated with concern for others (empathy, identification with humanity, connectedness to nature, and social responsibility). Importantly, the MES uniquely predicted willingness to engage in prosocial intentions and behaviors at personal cost independently of these established constructs. Specifically, the MES uniquely predicted willingness to prioritize humanitarian and environmental concerns over personal and national self-interest, willingness to sacrifice one's life to save others (ranging from human out-groups to animals and plants), and volunteering behavior. Results demonstrate that moral expansiveness is a distinct and important factor in understanding moral judgments and their consequences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved).

  11. Moral intuitions, moral expertise, and moral reasoning

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Musschenga, A.W.

    2009-01-01

    In this article I examine the consequences of the dominance of intuitive thinking in moral judging and deciding for the role of moral reasoning in moral education. I argue that evidence for the reliability of moral intuitions is lacking. We cannot determine when we can trust our intuitive moral

  12. Is moral beauty different from facial beauty? Evidence from an fMRI study.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Tingting; Mo, Lei; Mo, Ce; Tan, Li Hai; Cant, Jonathan S; Zhong, Luojin; Cupchik, Gerald

    2015-06-01

    Is moral beauty different from facial beauty? Two functional magnetic resonance imaging experiments were performed to answer this question. Experiment 1 investigated the network of moral aesthetic judgments and facial aesthetic judgments. Participants performed aesthetic judgments and gender judgments on both faces and scenes containing moral acts. The conjunction analysis of the contrasts 'facial aesthetic judgment > facial gender judgment' and 'scene moral aesthetic judgment > scene gender judgment' identified the common involvement of the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), inferior temporal gyrus and medial superior frontal gyrus, suggesting that both types of aesthetic judgments are based on the orchestration of perceptual, emotional and cognitive components. Experiment 2 examined the network of facial beauty and moral beauty during implicit perception. Participants performed a non-aesthetic judgment task on both faces (beautiful vs common) and scenes (containing morally beautiful vs neutral information). We observed that facial beauty (beautiful faces > common faces) involved both the cortical reward region OFC and the subcortical reward region putamen, whereas moral beauty (moral beauty scenes > moral neutral scenes) only involved the OFC. Moreover, compared with facial beauty, moral beauty spanned a larger-scale cortical network, indicating more advanced and complex cerebral representations characterizing moral beauty. © The Author (2014). Published by Oxford University Press. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.

  13. Moral foundations vignettes: a standardized stimulus database of scenarios based on moral foundations theory.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Clifford, Scott; Iyengar, Vijeth; Cabeza, Roberto; Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter

    2015-12-01

    Research on the emotional, cognitive, and social determinants of moral judgment has surged in recent years. The development of moral foundations theory (MFT) has played an important role, demonstrating the breadth of morality. Moral psychology has responded by investigating how different domains of moral judgment are shaped by a variety of psychological factors. Yet, the discipline lacks a validated set of moral violations that span the moral domain, creating a barrier to investigating influences on judgment and how their neural bases might vary across the moral domain. In this paper, we aim to fill this gap by developing and validating a large set of moral foundations vignettes (MFVs). Each vignette depicts a behavior violating a particular moral foundation and not others. The vignettes are controlled on many dimensions including syntactic structure and complexity making them suitable for neuroimaging research. We demonstrate the validity of our vignettes by examining respondents' classifications of moral violations, conducting exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, and demonstrating the correspondence between the extracted factors and existing measures of the moral foundations. We expect that the MFVs will be beneficial for a wide variety of behavioral and neuroimaging investigations of moral cognition.

  14. Moral motivation and judgment in virtue ethics

    OpenAIRE

    SAMPAIO DA SILVA, Rui

    2018-01-01

    L’éthique normative contemporaine est dominée par trois courants : l’éthique déontologique, le conséquentialisme et l’éthique de la vertu. Parce qu’elle rejette les calculs fondés sur les règles de l’éthique (tout comme la conséquentialisme et l’éthique déontologique), l’éthique de la vertu porte une attention particulière sur notre capacité à former des jugements moraux, comprise comme une capacité qui ne peut être réduite à une connaissance propositionnelle. Dans cet article, j’analyserai l...

  15. Surveillance cues enhance moral condemnation.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bourrat, Pierrick; Baumard, Nicolas; McKay, Ryan

    2011-05-05

    Humans pay close attention to the reputational consequences of their actions. Recent experiments indicate that even very subtle cues that one is being observed can affect cooperative behaviors. Expressing our opinions about the morality of certain acts is a key means of advertising our cooperative dispositions. Here, we investigated how subtle cues of being watched would affect moral judgments. We predicted that participants exposed to such cues would affirm their endorsement of prevailing moral norms by expressing greater disapproval of moral transgressions. Participants read brief accounts of two moral violations and rated the moral acceptability of each violation. Violations were more strongly condemned in a condition where participants were exposed to surveillance cues (an image of eyes interposed between the description of the violation and the associated rating scale) than in a control condition (in which the interposed image was of flowers). We discuss the role that public declarations play in the interpersonal evaluation of cooperative dispositions.

  16. Surveillance Cues Enhance Moral Condemnation

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Pierrick Bourrat

    2011-04-01

    Full Text Available Humans pay close attention to the reputational consequences of their actions. Recent experiments indicate that even very subtle cues that one is being observed can affect cooperative behaviors. Expressing our opinions about the morality of certain acts is a key means of advertising our cooperative dispositions. Here, we investigated how subtle cues of being watched would affect moral judgments. We predicted that participants exposed to such cues would affirm their endorsement of prevailing moral norms by expressing greater disapproval of moral transgressions. Participants read brief accounts of two moral violations and rated the moral acceptability of each violation. Violations were more strongly condemned in a condition where participants were exposed to surveillance cues (an image of eyes interposed between the description of the violation and the associated rating scale than in a control condition (in which the interposed image was of flowers. We discuss the role that public declarations play in the interpersonal evaluation of cooperative dispositions.

  17. Culture and the quest for universal principles in moral reasoning.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sachdeva, Sonya; Singh, Purnima; Medin, Douglas

    2011-06-01

    The importance of including cultural perspectives in the study of human cognition has become apparent in recent decades, and the domain of moral reasoning is no exception. The present review focuses on moral cognition, beginning with Kohlberg's model of moral development which relies heavily on people's justifications for their judgments and then shifting to more recent theories that rely on rapid, intuitive judgments and see justifications as more or less irrelevant to moral cognition. Despite this dramatic shift, analyses of culture and moral decision-making have largely been framed as a quest for and test of universal principles of moral judgment. In this review, we discuss challenges that remain in trying to understand crosscultural variability in moral values and the processes that underlie moral cognition. We suggest that the universalist framework may lead to an underestimation of the role of culture in moral reasoning. Although the field has made great strides in incorporating more and more cultural perspectives in order to understand moral cognition, theories of moral reasoning still do not allow for substantial variation in how people might conceptualize the domain of the moral. The processes that underlie moral cognition may not be a human universal in any simple sense, because moral systems may play different roles in different cultures. We end our review with a discussion of work that remains to be done to understand cultural variation in the moral domain.

  18. The Neural Correlates of Moral Thinking: A Meta-Analysis

    OpenAIRE

    Douglas J. Bryant; Wang F; Kelley Deardeuff; Emily Zoccoli; Chang S. Nam

    2016-01-01

    We conducted a meta-analysis to evaluate current research that aims to map the neural correlates of two typical conditions of moral judgment: right-wrong moral judgments and decision-making in moral dilemmas. Utilizing the activation likelihood estimation (ALE) method, we conducted a meta-analysis using neuroimaging data obtained from twenty-one previous studies that measured responses in one or the other of these conditions. We found that across the studies (n = 400), distinct neural circuit...

  19. The Child of the Moral Order

    Science.gov (United States)

    Voyat, Gilbert

    1975-01-01

    The consequences of Watergate for children, their education, and their ethical and moral commitment is discussed in terms of the child's development of moral judgment, and in terms of the practical issues of how values are transmitted from one generation to another. (Author/AM)

  20. Is moral beauty different from facial beauty? Evidence from an fMRI study

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Tingting; Mo, Ce; Tan, Li Hai; Cant, Jonathan S.; Zhong, Luojin; Cupchik, Gerald

    2015-01-01

    Is moral beauty different from facial beauty? Two functional magnetic resonance imaging experiments were performed to answer this question. Experiment 1 investigated the network of moral aesthetic judgments and facial aesthetic judgments. Participants performed aesthetic judgments and gender judgments on both faces and scenes containing moral acts. The conjunction analysis of the contrasts ‘facial aesthetic judgment > facial gender judgment’ and ‘scene moral aesthetic judgment > scene gender judgment’ identified the common involvement of the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), inferior temporal gyrus and medial superior frontal gyrus, suggesting that both types of aesthetic judgments are based on the orchestration of perceptual, emotional and cognitive components. Experiment 2 examined the network of facial beauty and moral beauty during implicit perception. Participants performed a non-aesthetic judgment task on both faces (beautiful vs common) and scenes (containing morally beautiful vs neutral information). We observed that facial beauty (beautiful faces > common faces) involved both the cortical reward region OFC and the subcortical reward region putamen, whereas moral beauty (moral beauty scenes > moral neutral scenes) only involved the OFC. Moreover, compared with facial beauty, moral beauty spanned a larger-scale cortical network, indicating more advanced and complex cerebral representations characterizing moral beauty. PMID:25298010

  1. The Objectivity of Truth, Morality, and Beauty

    OpenAIRE

    Bartlett, Dr. Steven James

    2017-01-01

    Whether truth, morality, and beauty have an objective basis has been a perennial question for philosophy, ethics, and aesthetics, while for a great many relativists and skeptics it poses a problem without a solution. In this essay, the author proposes an innovative approach that shows how cognitive intelligence, moral intelligence, and aesthetic intelligence provide the basis needed for objective judgments about truth, morality, and beauty.

  2. Consequences, norms, and generalized inaction in moral dilemmas: The CNI model of moral decision-making.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gawronski, Bertram; Armstrong, Joel; Conway, Paul; Friesdorf, Rebecca; Hütter, Mandy

    2017-09-01

    Research on moral dilemma judgments has been fundamentally shaped by the distinction between utilitarianism and deontology. According to the principle of utilitarianism, the moral status of behavioral options depends on their consequences; the principle of deontology states that the moral status of behavioral options depends on their consistency with moral norms. To identify the processes underlying utilitarian and deontological judgments, researchers have investigated responses to moral dilemmas that pit one principle against the other (e.g., trolley problem). However, the conceptual meaning of responses in this paradigm is ambiguous, because the central aspects of utilitarianism and deontology-consequences and norms-are not manipulated. We illustrate how this shortcoming undermines theoretical interpretations of empirical findings and describe an alternative approach that resolves the ambiguities of the traditional paradigm. Expanding on this approach, we present a multinomial model that allows researchers to quantify sensitivity to consequences (C), sensitivity to moral norms (N), and general preference for inaction versus action irrespective of consequences and norms (I) in responses to moral dilemmas. We present 8 studies that used this model to investigate the effects of gender, cognitive load, question framing, and psychopathy on moral dilemma judgments. The findings obtained with the proposed CNI model offer more nuanced insights into the determinants of moral dilemma judgments, calling for a reassessment of dominant theoretical assumptions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved).

  3. Philosophical implications and multidisciplinary challenges of moral physiology

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Schleim, Stephan; Schirmann, Felix

    2011-01-01

    Neuroethics deals with the normative implications of advances and new technology of neuroscience. Some scholars argue that experiments on moral judgment might allow solutions to moral problems in the future or already nowadays. We discuss this research under the label of moral physiology to

  4. Children's Moral Reasoning regarding Physical and Relational Aggression

    Science.gov (United States)

    Murray-Close, Dianna; Crick, Nicki R.; Galotti, Kathleen M.

    2006-01-01

    Elementary school children's moral reasoning concerning physical and relational aggression was explored. Fourth and fifth graders rated physical aggression as more wrong and harmful than relational aggression but tended to adopt a moral orientation about both forms of aggression. Gender differences in moral judgments of aggression were observed,…

  5. Moral Text Comprehension: Implications for Education and Research.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Narvaez, Darcia

    2001-01-01

    Reviews studies examining differences in moral schema development, using techniques that range from measuring implicit knowledge (such as the defining issues test) and explicit knowledge (such as with the moral judgment interview). Finds significant differences in the comprehension of moral narratives based on age/education and level of expertise.…

  6. Integrated Moral Conviction Theory of Student Cheating: An Empirical Test

    Science.gov (United States)

    Roberts, Foster; Thomas, Christopher H.; Novicevic, Milorad M.; Ammeter, Anthony; Garner, Bart; Johnson, Paul; Popoola, Ifeoluwa

    2018-01-01

    In this article, we develop an "integrated moral conviction theory of student cheating" by integrating moral conviction with (a) the dual-process model of Hunt-Vitell's theory that gives primacy to individual ethical philosophies when moral judgments are made and (b) the social cognitive conceptualization that gives primacy to moral…

  7. Moral Cognition: Explaining the Gender Difference in Antisocial Behavior.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Barriga, Alvaro Q.; Morrison, Elizabeth M.; Liau, Albert K.; Gibbs, John C.

    2001-01-01

    Examined whether gender discrepancy in late adolescents' antisocial behavior may be attributed to gender differences in other moral cognitive variables. Found that mature moral judgment and higher moral self-relevance were associated with lower self-serving cognitive distortion, partially mediating the relationship between those variables and…

  8. Roman Catholic beliefs produce characteristic neural responses to moral dilemmas.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Christensen, Julia F; Flexas, Albert; de Miguel, Pedro; Cela-Conde, Camilo J; Munar, Enric

    2014-02-01

    This study provides exploratory evidence about how behavioral and neural responses to standard moral dilemmas are influenced by religious belief. Eleven Catholics and 13 Atheists (all female) judged 48 moral dilemmas. Differential neural activity between the two groups was found in precuneus and in prefrontal, frontal and temporal regions. Furthermore, a double dissociation showed that Catholics recruited different areas for deontological (precuneus; temporoparietal junction) and utilitarian moral judgments [dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC); temporal poles], whereas Atheists did not (superior parietal gyrus for both types of judgment). Finally, we tested how both groups responded to personal and impersonal moral dilemmas: Catholics showed enhanced activity in DLPFC and posterior cingulate cortex during utilitarian moral judgments to impersonal moral dilemmas and enhanced responses in anterior cingulate cortex and superior temporal sulcus during deontological moral judgments to personal moral dilemmas. Our results indicate that moral judgment can be influenced by an acquired set of norms and conventions transmitted through religious indoctrination and practice. Catholic individuals may hold enhanced awareness of the incommensurability between two unequivocal doctrines of the Catholic belief set, triggered explicitly in a moral dilemma: help and care in all circumstances-but thou shalt not kill.

  9. Roman Catholic beliefs produce characteristic neural responses to moral dilemmas

    Science.gov (United States)

    Flexas, Albert; de Miguel, Pedro; Cela-Conde, Camilo J.; Munar, Enric

    2014-01-01

    This study provides exploratory evidence about how behavioral and neural responses to standard moral dilemmas are influenced by religious belief. Eleven Catholics and 13 Atheists (all female) judged 48 moral dilemmas. Differential neural activity between the two groups was found in precuneus and in prefrontal, frontal and temporal regions. Furthermore, a double dissociation showed that Catholics recruited different areas for deontological (precuneus; temporoparietal junction) and utilitarian moral judgments [dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC); temporal poles], whereas Atheists did not (superior parietal gyrus for both types of judgment). Finally, we tested how both groups responded to personal and impersonal moral dilemmas: Catholics showed enhanced activity in DLPFC and posterior cingulate cortex during utilitarian moral judgments to impersonal moral dilemmas and enhanced responses in anterior cingulate cortex and superior temporal sulcus during deontological moral judgments to personal moral dilemmas. Our results indicate that moral judgment can be influenced by an acquired set of norms and conventions transmitted through religious indoctrination and practice. Catholic individuals may hold enhanced awareness of the incommensurability between two unequivocal doctrines of the Catholic belief set, triggered explicitly in a moral dilemma: help and care in all circumstances—but thou shalt not kill. PMID:23160812

  10. Moral Change

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Eriksen, Cecilie

    Moral change and the dynamics leading to it are explored through the practice of law in the present thesis. Moral change raises a sceptical chal-lenge directed at moral normativity: How can we legitimately criticise and develop our practices and morality, if all we have at our disposal...... is transcendental, absolute, immanent and transcending. Using the later Wittgenstein’s work on justification and practice changes as well as eight narratives of moral changes in law, moral scepticism is shown to be empty. It is thus unable to challenge moral normativity. On the same background, a pluralistic...... account of the dynamics of moral change is worked out. It is argued that moral change can happen on the grounds of both causal factors and normative reasons, including moral reasons. Zooming in on those latter reasons, it is demon-strated that our sources of ethical critique and creativity are numerous...

  11. Ethical Judgments and Behaviors: Applying a Multidimensional Ethics Scale to Measuring ICT Ethics of College Students

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jung, Insung

    2009-01-01

    Assuming that ICT ethics are influenced by both moral and circumstantial factors, the study investigates Japanese college students' ethical judgments and behavioral intentions in three scenarios involving ICT-related ethical problems and explores why they make such decisions, relying on five moral philosophies: moral equity, relativism,…

  12. The Mismeasure of Morals: Antisocial Personality Traits Predict Utilitarian Responses to Moral Dilemmas

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bartels, Daniel M.; Pizarro, David A.

    2011-01-01

    Researchers have recently argued that utilitarianism is the appropriate framework by which to evaluate moral judgment, and that individuals who endorse non-utilitarian solutions to moral dilemmas (involving active vs. passive harm) are committing an error. We report a study in which participants responded to a battery of personality assessments…

  13. When Moral Awareness Isn't Enough: Teaching Our Students to Recognize Social Influence

    Science.gov (United States)

    Baker, Diane F.

    2014-01-01

    The traditional case-based method used to teach ethics in business classrooms gives students valuable practice identifying and applying key moral principles. This approach builds on a rational model of decision making and emphasizes moral awareness and moral judgment, encouraging students to describe moral dilemmas and assess the consequences of…

  14. Learning a commonsense moral theory.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kleiman-Weiner, Max; Saxe, Rebecca; Tenenbaum, Joshua B

    2017-10-01

    We introduce a computational framework for understanding the structure and dynamics of moral learning, with a focus on how people learn to trade off the interests and welfare of different individuals in their social groups and the larger society. We posit a minimal set of cognitive capacities that together can solve this learning problem: (1) an abstract and recursive utility calculus to quantitatively represent welfare trade-offs; (2) hierarchical Bayesian inference to understand the actions and judgments of others; and (3) meta-values for learning by value alignment both externally to the values of others and internally to make moral theories consistent with one's own attachments and feelings. Our model explains how children can build from sparse noisy observations of how a small set of individuals make moral decisions to a broad moral competence, able to support an infinite range of judgments and decisions that generalizes even to people they have never met and situations they have not been in or observed. It also provides insight into the causes and dynamics of moral change across time, including cases when moral change can be rapidly progressive, changing values significantly in just a few generations, and cases when it is likely to move more slowly. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  15. Moral responsibility and free will: A meta-analysis.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Feltz, Adam; Cova, Florian

    2014-11-01

    Fundamental beliefs about free will and moral responsibility are often thought to shape our ability to have healthy relationships with others and ourselves. Emotional reactions have also been shown to have an important and pervasive impact on judgments and behaviors. Recent research suggests that emotional reactions play a prominent role in judgments about free will, influencing judgments about determinism's relation to free will and moral responsibility. However, the extent to which affect influences these judgments is unclear. We conducted a meta-analysis to estimate the impact of affect. Our meta-analysis indicates that beliefs in free will are largely robust to emotional reactions. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  16. Moral Cognition

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Schleim, Stephan; Clausen, Jens; Levy, Neil

    2015-01-01

    Research on moral cognition is a growing and heavily multidisciplinary field. This section contains chapters addressing foundational psychological, neuroscientific, and philosophical issues of research on moral decision-making. Further- more, beyond summarizing the state of the art of their

  17. Religiosity and agency and communion: their relationship to religious judgmentalism.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Beck, R; Miller, C D

    2000-05-01

    The present study is an introduction to the construct of religious judgmentalism, defined as a willingness to make religious or moral judgments of others based on a limited period of observation; the study offers a prediction about which individuals will engage in such judgmental behavior. It was predicted that agency motives would significantly predict religious judgmentalism in a religious population but that communion motives and intrinsic religiosity would moderate this effect. Overall, the findings supported these predictions. Agency motives were positively correlated with religious judgmentalism. Intrinsic religiosity predicted a general unwillingness to make religious evaluations of others. Both intrinsic religiosity and communion motives did moderate the effects of high agency motives. Specifically, increases in communion motive and intrinsic religiosity, at high levels of agency motives, significantly predicted lower scores for religious judgmentalism. These findings were conceptualized as preliminary evidence for the position that interpersonal motives, rather than religiousness or religious motivation, predict social intolerance and criticism in religious individuals.

  18. Moral politics

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Rapp, Carolin; Traunmüller, Richard; Freitag, Markus

    2014-01-01

    This article combines the research strands of moral politics and political behavior by focusing on the effect of individual and contextual religiosity on individual vote decisions in popular initiatives and public referenda concerning morally charged issues. We rely on a total of 13 surveys with 1...... American research on moral politics, direct democracies, and the public role of religion....

  19. Contextual and perceptual brain processes underlying moral cognition: a quantitative meta-analysis of moral reasoning and moral emotions.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sevinc, Gunes; Spreng, R Nathan

    2014-01-01

    Human morality has been investigated using a variety of tasks ranging from judgments of hypothetical dilemmas to viewing morally salient stimuli. These experiments have provided insight into neural correlates of moral judgments and emotions, yet these approaches reveal important differences in moral cognition. Moral reasoning tasks require active deliberation while moral emotion tasks involve the perception of stimuli with moral implications. We examined convergent and divergent brain activity associated with these experimental paradigms taking a quantitative meta-analytic approach. A systematic search of the literature yielded 40 studies. Studies involving explicit decisions in a moral situation were categorized as active (n = 22); studies evoking moral emotions were categorized as passive (n = 18). We conducted a coordinate-based meta-analysis using the Activation Likelihood Estimation to determine reliable patterns of brain activity. Results revealed a convergent pattern of reliable brain activity for both task categories in regions of the default network, consistent with the social and contextual information processes supported by this brain network. Active tasks revealed more reliable activity in the temporoparietal junction, angular gyrus and temporal pole. Active tasks demand deliberative reasoning and may disproportionately involve the retrieval of social knowledge from memory, mental state attribution, and construction of the context through associative processes. In contrast, passive tasks reliably engaged regions associated with visual and emotional information processing, including lingual gyrus and the amygdala. A laterality effect was observed in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, with active tasks engaging the left, and passive tasks engaging the right. While overlapping activity patterns suggest a shared neural network for both tasks, differential activity suggests that processing of moral input is affected by task demands. The results provide novel

  20. Moral Severity is Represented as a Domain-General Magnitude.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Powell, Derek; Horne, Zachary

    2017-03-01

    The severity of moral violations can vary by degree. For instance, although both are immoral, murder is a more severe violation than lying. Though this point is well established in Ethics and the law, relatively little research has been directed at examining how moral severity is represented psychologically. Most prominent moral psychological theories are aimed at explaining first-order moral judgments and are silent on second-order metaethical judgments, such as comparisons of severity. Here, the relative severity of 20 moral violations was established in a preliminary study. Then, a second group of participants were asked to decide which of two moral violations was more severe for all possible combinations of these 20 violations. Participant's response times exhibited two signatures of domain-general magnitude comparisons: we observed both a distance effect and a semantic congruity effect. These findings suggest that moral severity is represented in a similar fashion as other continuous magnitudes.

  1. Moral knowledge and moral factuality

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ron Wilburn

    2010-12-01

    Full Text Available http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2008v7n1p69For naturalistic and non-intuitionistic moral realists, moral knowledge is more problematic than ordinary and scientific factual knowledge. For without special faculties of moral discernment, how could we ever detect moral facts and properties? Physical facts and properties may be accessible to perceptual recognition. But how could moral facts and properties ever be similarly accessible? To address this challenge, we need a meta-ethical account that does two things. First, it must explain how the discernment of moral facts and properties ultimately consists only of the detection of appropriate physical items. Second, it must explain why, despite this fact, moral perception seems so very puzzling. In this paper I endeavor to provide such an account. It is largely because of the relational nature of moral properties, and the corresponding externalistically determined normative content of moral property terms, I argue, that our epistemic access to moral knowledge appears mysterious. The metaphysics of moral factuality does a lot to explain the seeming elusiveness of moral knowledge, and in ways that are surprisingly mundane.

  2. Judgments of brand similarity

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Bijmolt, THA; Wedel, M; Pieters, RGM; DeSarbo, WS

    This paper provides empirical insight into the way consumers make pairwise similarity judgments between brands, and how familiarity with the brands, serial position of the pair in a sequence, and the presentation format affect these judgments. Within the similarity judgment process both the

  3. Stress alters personal moral decision making.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Youssef, Farid F; Dookeeram, Karine; Basdeo, Vasant; Francis, Emmanuel; Doman, Mekaeel; Mamed, Danielle; Maloo, Stefan; Degannes, Joel; Dobo, Linda; Ditshotlo, Phatsimo; Legall, George

    2012-04-01

    While early studies of moral decision making highlighted the role of rational, conscious executive processes involving frontal lobe activation more recent work has suggested that emotions and gut reactions have a key part to play in moral reasoning. Given that stress can activate many of the same brain regions that are important for and connected to brain centres involved in emotional processing we sought to evaluate if stress could influence moral decision making. Sixty-five undergraduate volunteers were randomly assigned to control (n=33) and experimental groups (n=32). The latter underwent the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST) and induction of stress was assessed by measurement of salivary cortisol levels. Subjects were then required to provide a response to thirty moral dilemmas via a computer interface that recorded both their decision and reaction time. Three types of dilemmas were used: non-moral, impersonal moral and personal moral. Using a binary logistic model there were no significant predicators of utilitarian response in non-moral and impersonal moral dilemmas. However the stressed group and females were found to predict utilitarian responses to personal moral dilemmas. When comparing percentage utilitarian responses there were no significant differences noted for the non-moral and impersonal moral dilemmas but the stressed group showed significantly less utilitarian responses compared to control subjects. The stress response was significantly negatively correlated with utilitarian responses. Females also showed significantly less utilitarian responses than males. We conclude that activation of the stress response predisposed participants to less utilitarian responses when faced with high conflict personal moral dilemmas and suggest that this offers further support for dual process theory of moral judgment. We also conclude that females tend to make less utilitarian personal moral decisions compared to males, providing further evidence that there are

  4. DILEMAS MORALES

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Sandra Realpe Quintero

    2001-01-01

    Full Text Available Antes del siglo XX la tradición filosófica moral ha reconocido la existencia de los conflictos morales pero ha rechazado la posibilidad de los auténticos dilemas morales. Para poder entender por qué hoy el tema de los dilemas morales ha reclamado para sí tanta atención, es importante ponernos de acuerdo en la definición de algunos conceptos. Un conflicto moral es una situación en la que un(a agente se ve confrontado(a con dos obligaciones morales que le instan a actuar. Un dilema moral es una situación extrema de conflicto moral en la que nuestro(a agente no puede seguir un curso de acción que sea conforme con sus dos obligaciones en conflicto. Para que un conflicto moral tenga el carácter de ser un auténtico dilema moral (genuine moral dilemma y no simplemente un aparente dilema moral (apparent moral di- DILEMAS MORALES SANDRA REALPE Licenciada en Filosofía, Univalle, Maestría en Filosofía, Univalle, Diplomado en Psicología Aplicada, Universidad de Londres, Diplomado en Etica de los Negocios Universidad de Colorado, profesora Universidad Icesi, Facultad de Derecho y Humanidades. E-mail: sandrarealpe@hotmail.com lemma, ninguna de las obligaciones en conflicto es en efecto más fuerte o logra invalidar a la otra obligación. A raíz de un artículo escrito en 1962 por E. J. Lemmon, titulado precisamente “Dilemas morales” (Moral Dilemmas, se abrió un debate entre los filósofos anglosajones contemporáneos acerca de la existencia o no de los auténticos dilemas morales. Informar sobre este debate reciente, esclarecer los argumentos de sus principales protagonistas, y hacer presente en nuestro medio un novedoso debate que es importante para reflexionar sobre un buen número de problemas morales, son nuestros principales propósitos en el presente ensayo. ...

  5. Is utilitarian sacrifice becoming more morally permissible?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hannikainen, Ivar R; Machery, Edouard; Cushman, Fiery A

    2018-01-01

    A central tenet of contemporary moral psychology is that people typically reject active forms of utilitarian sacrifice. Yet, evidence for secularization and declining empathic concern in recent decades suggests the possibility of systematic change in this attitude. In the present study, we employ hypothetical dilemmas to investigate whether judgments of utilitarian sacrifice are becoming more permissive over time. In a cross-sectional design, age negatively predicted utilitarian moral judgment (Study 1). To examine whether this pattern reflected processes of maturation, we asked a panel to re-evaluate several moral dilemmas after an eight-year interval but observed no overall change (Study 2). In contrast, a more recent age-matched sample revealed greater endorsement of utilitarian sacrifice in a time-lag design (Study 3). Taken together, these results suggest that today's younger cohorts increasingly endorse a utilitarian resolution of sacrificial moral dilemmas. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  6. Moral dilemmas in cognitive neuroscience of moral decision-making: a principled review.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Christensen, J F; Gomila, A

    2012-04-01

    Moral dilemma tasks have been a much appreciated experimental paradigm in empirical studies on moral cognition for decades and have, more recently, also become a preferred paradigm in the field of cognitive neuroscience of moral decision-making. Yet, studies using moral dilemmas suffer from two main shortcomings: they lack methodological homogeneity which impedes reliable comparisons of results across studies, thus making a metaanalysis manifestly impossible; and second, they overlook control of relevant design parameters. In this paper, we review from a principled standpoint the studies that use moral dilemmas to approach the psychology of moral judgment and its neural underpinnings. We present a systematic review of 19 experimental design parameters that can be identified in moral dilemmas. Accordingly, our analysis establishes a methodological basis for the required homogeneity between studies and suggests the consideration of experimental aspects that have not yet received much attention despite their relevance. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  7. Moral virtues

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Georg Spielthenner

    2004-01-01

    Full Text Available Although much has been published on virtues in recent years, there is still considerable uncertainty in philosophy (and even more among philosophical laymen about the concept of a virtue and especially about moral virtues. In this article, I will try to clarify these notions. In particular, I want to answer the question: When are virtues moral virtues? Clearly, not every practical virtue is a moral virtue. Why was the courage of the Nazi soldiers in the second world war not a moral virtue, but yet is presumably one if included among the cardinal virtues? To clarify this question, this article will deal with the concept of a virtue but I will also investigate the notion of virtues being of a moral nature. To this end, I propose and explain (I a definition of moral virtues and clarify this definition further in section (II, by explaining why I did not include qualities, which others have considered as essential.

  8. Intentionality, morality, and the incest taboo in Madagascar

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Paulo eSousa

    2016-04-01

    Full Text Available In a recent article (Astuti & Bloch, 2015, cognitive anthropologists Rita Astuti and Maurice Bloch claim that the Malagasy are ambivalent as to whether considerations of intentionality are relevant to moral judgments concerning incest and its presumed catastrophic consequences: when making moral judgments about those who commit incest, the Malagasy take into account whether the incest is intentional or not, but, when making moral judgments relating to incest’s catastrophic consequences, they do not take intentionality into account. Astuti & Bloch explain the irrelevance of intentionality in terms of incest entailing such a fundamental attack on the transcendental social order that the Malagasy become dumbfounded and leave aside considerations of intentionality. Finally, they claim that a similar dumbfound reaction is what is involved in the moral dumbfounding concerning incest that social psychologist Jonathan Haidt has found in the US. In this paper, we argue that (i Astuti & Bloch are unclear about many aspects of their claims (in particular, about the moral judgments at stake, (ii they do not provide sufficient evidence that considerations of intentionality are deemed irrelevant to moral judgments relating to incest’s presumed catastrophic consequences (and hence for the claim that the Malagasy are ambivalent, (iii their hypothesis that conceiving of incest as an attack on the transcendental social renders considerations of intentionality irrelevant lacks coherence, and (iv the extension of their explanatory account to the moral dumfounding of American students in Haidt’s well-known scenario of intentional incest is unwarranted.

  9. Intentionality, Morality, and the Incest Taboo in Madagascar.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sousa, Paulo; Swiney, Lauren

    2016-01-01

    In a recent article (Astuti and Bloch, 2015), cognitive anthropologists Astuti and Bloch claim that the Malagasy are ambivalent as to whether considerations of intentionality are relevant to moral judgments concerning incest and its presumed catastrophic consequences: when making moral judgments about those who commit incest, the Malagasy take into account whether the incest is intentional or not, but, when making moral judgments relating to incest's catastrophic consequences, they do not take intentionality into account. Astuti and Bloch explain the irrelevance of intentionality in terms of incest entailing such a fundamental attack on the transcendental social order that the Malagasy become dumbfounded and leave aside considerations of intentionality. Finally, they claim that a similar dumbfound reaction is what is involved in the moral dumbfounding concerning incest that social psychologist Jonathan Haidt has found in the US. In this article, we argue that (i) Astuti and Bloch are unclear about many aspects of their claims (in particular, about the moral judgments at stake), (ii) they do not provide sufficient evidence that considerations of intentionality are deemed irrelevant to moral judgments relating to incest's presumed catastrophic consequences (and hence for the claim that the Malagasy are ambivalent), (iii) their hypothesis that conceiving of incest as an attack on the transcendental social renders considerations of intentionality irrelevant lacks coherence, and (iv) the extension of their explanatory account to the moral dumfounding of American students in Haidt's well-known scenario of intentional incest is unwarranted.

  10. The Unifying Moral Dyad: Liberals and Conservatives Share the Same Harm-Based Moral Template.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Schein, Chelsea; Gray, Kurt

    2015-08-01

    Do moral disagreements regarding specific issues (e.g., patriotism, chastity) reflect deep cognitive differences (i.e., distinct cognitive mechanisms) between liberals and conservatives? Dyadic morality suggests that the answer is "no." Despite moral diversity, we reveal that moral cognition--in both liberals and conservatives--is rooted in a harm-based template. A dyadic template suggests that harm should be central within moral cognition, an idea tested--and confirmed--through six specific hypotheses. Studies suggest that moral judgment occurs via dyadic comparison, in which counter-normative acts are compared with a prototype of harm. Dyadic comparison explains why harm is the most accessible and important of moral content, why harm organizes--and overlaps with--diverse moral content, and why harm best translates across moral content. Dyadic morality suggests that various moral content (e.g., loyalty, purity) are varieties of perceived harm and that past research has substantially exaggerated moral differences between liberals and conservatives. © 2015 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.

  11. Moral Reasoning about School Bullying in Involved Adolescents

    Science.gov (United States)

    Levasseur, Caroline; Desbiens, Nadia; Bowen, François

    2017-01-01

    The aim of the present study was to investigate how bullying incident participant roles and moral reasoning relate to each other in adolescents. To do so, we examined sociomoral judgments about hypothetical bullying incidents and moral disengagement in adolescents identified as bullies, defenders of the victim and passive bystanders. Six-hundred…

  12. The Development of Generosity and Moral Cognition across Five Cultures

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cowell, Jason M.; Lee, Kang; Malcolm-Smith, Susan; Selcuk, Bilge; Zhou, Xinyue; Decety, Jean

    2017-01-01

    Morality is an evolved aspect of human nature, yet is heavily influenced by cultural environment. This developmental study adopted an integrative approach by combining measures of socioeconomic status (SES), executive function, affective sharing, empathic concern, theory of mind, and moral judgment in predicting sharing behavior in children (N =…

  13. Moral Cognitive Processes Explaining Antisocial Behavior in Young Adolescents

    Science.gov (United States)

    van der Velden, Floor; Brugman, Daniel; Boom, Jan; Koops, Willem

    2010-01-01

    This study addresses the longitudinal relationships between three kinds of moral cognitions--self-serving cognitive distortions, moral judgment, perception of community--and antisocial behavior in young adolescents. Aims were to gain insight in direct and indirect relationships, stability, and causality. The sample included 724 students (M age =…

  14. Moral cognitive processes explaining antisocial behavior in young adolescents

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Van der Velden, F.; Brugman, D.; Boom, J.; Koops, W.

    2010-01-01

    This study addresses the longitudinal relationships between three kinds of moral cognitions – self-serving cognitive distortions, moral judgment, perception of community – and antisocial behavior in young adolescents. Aims were to gain insight in direct and indirect relationships, stability, and

  15. Calibrating One's Moral Compass: How Principal Preparation Shapes School Leaders

    Science.gov (United States)

    Larsen, Donald E.; Derrington, Mary Lynne

    2012-01-01

    No textbook that an aspiring principal encounters in preparing for the role of school leader discusses what steps to follow when a member--or members--of the school staff challenge standards of professional judgment and moral rectitude. Instead, the most reliable guide at the principal's disposal may be the "moral compass" upon which the…

  16. Morality, Moral Luck and Responsibility. Fortune's Web

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Nielsen, Carsten Fogh

    2011-01-01

    Anmeldelse af Nafsika Athanassoulis bog: Morality, Moral Lock and Responsibility (Palgrave MacMillian 2010)......Anmeldelse af Nafsika Athanassoulis bog: Morality, Moral Lock and Responsibility (Palgrave MacMillian 2010)...

  17. Victimological aspects of court judgments

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Bačanović Oliver

    2012-01-01

    Full Text Available The subject of this paper is the review of the results of the research: „Analysis of judgments form the victimological aspect“ of the Basic court Skopje I in Skopje. It is the first research of it’s kind in the Republic of Macedonia, conducted by the project team of the Faculty of Security in Skopje in the period from January to April 2011. By using the content analysis (for this purpose a special instrument was developed 172 irrevocable court judgment brought in the period 2005-2010 were analyzed, for the following criminal offences: murder, crimes against sexual freedom and sexual morality (sexual assault, severe bodily injuries and insult. The aim of the research was to highlight the victimological dimensions of mentioned criminal offences, while special attention was paid to the role of a victim in a crime, victim‘ s interaction with the perpetrator, individual characteristics of the victim, as well as the characteristics of the time when and the space where the crime occurred.

  18. Discourse, Justification, and Education: Jürgen Habermas on Moral Epistemology and Dialogical Conditions of Moral Justification and Rightness

    Science.gov (United States)

    Okshevsky, Walter C.

    2016-01-01

    In this essay Walter Okshevsky addresses the question of whether a certain form of dialogically derived agreement can function as an epistemic (universal and necessary) criterion of moral judgment and ground of moral authority. Okshevsky examines arguments for and against in the literature of educational philosophy and develops Jürgen Habermas's…

  19. Neural evidence for moral intuition and the temporal dynamics of interactions between emotional processes and moral cognition.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gui, Dan-Yang; Gan, Tian; Liu, Chao

    2016-01-01

    Behavioral and neurological studies have revealed that emotions influence moral cognition. Although moral stimuli are emotionally charged, the time course of interactions between emotions and moral judgments remains unknown. In the present study, we investigated the temporal dynamics of the interaction between emotional processes and moral cognition. The results revealed that when making moral judgments, the time course of the event-related potential (ERP) waveform was significantly different between high emotional arousal and low emotional arousal contexts. Different stages of processing were distinguished, showing distinctive interactions between emotional processes and moral reasoning. The precise time course of moral intuition and moral reasoning sheds new light on theoretical models of moral psychology. Specifically, the N1 component (interpreted as representing moral intuition) did not appear to be influenced by emotional arousal. However, the N2 component and late positive potential were strongly affected by emotional arousal; the slow wave was influenced by both emotional arousal and morality, suggesting distinct moral processing at different emotional arousal levels.

  20. Reasoning, Cognitive Control, and Moral Intuition

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Richard ePatterson

    2012-12-01

    Full Text Available Recent Social Intuitionist work suggests that moral judgments are intuitive (not based on conscious deliberation or any significant chain of inference, and that the reasons we produce to explain or justify our judgments and actions are for the most part post hoc rationalizations rather than the actual source of those judgments. This is consistent with work on judgment and explanation in other domains, and it correctly challenges one-sidedly rationalistic accounts. We suggest that in fact reasoning has a great deal of influence on moral judgments and on intuitive judgments in general. This influence is not apparent from study of judgments simply in their immediate context, but it is crucial for the question of how cognition can help us avoid deleterious effects and enhance potentially beneficial effects of affect on judgment, action, and cognition itself. We begin with established work on several reactive strategies for cognitive control of affect (e.g., suppression, reappraisal, then give special attention to more complex sorts of conflict (extended deliberation involving multiple interacting factors, both affective and reflective. These situations are especially difficult to study in a controlled way, but we propose some possible experimental approaches. We then review proactive strategies for control, including avoidance of temptation and mindfulness meditation (Froeliger, et al, 2012, This Issue. We give special attention to the role of slow or cool cognitive processes (e.g., deliberation, planning, executive control in the inculcation of long-term dispositions, traits, intuitions, skills or habits. The latter are critical because they in turn give rise to a great many of our fast, intuitive judgments. The reasoning processes involved here are distinct from post hoc rationalizations and have a very real impact on countless intuitive judgments in concrete situations. This calls for a substantial enlargement of research on cognitive control.

  1. Teacher Judgments and Pupils' Causal Explanations: Social Valorization of Effort-Based Explanations in School Context

    Science.gov (United States)

    Matteucci, Maria Cristina; Tomasetto, Carlo; Selleri, Patrizia; Carugati, Felice

    2008-01-01

    Achievement evaluation in school contexts may be considered as a kind of social judgment, which is affected by social and moral determinants since it is not merely an estimation of pupils' accomplishment (Dompnier, Pansu, & Bressoux, 2006; Weiner, 2003). Teachers' judgments have been investigated starting from the analysis of two theoretical…

  2. The Moral Reasoning of Sports Management Students in the United States and Italy

    Science.gov (United States)

    Forte, Almerinda

    2013-01-01

    The researcher analyzed the moral reasoning ability of Sports Management students in the United States and Italy. The researcher statistically analyzed data collected through a survey questionnaire designed to measure moral reasoning. The Defining Issues Test (DIT) developed by James Rest using Kohlberg's six stages of moral judgment was used in…

  3. Moral Development at the United States Naval Academy: The Midshipman’s Perspective

    Science.gov (United States)

    2004-09-01

    Bancroft Hall all contribute to the moral development of midshipmen. As researchers like William G. Perry Jr. have advocated, combining developmental ... Narvaez later conceived of a model that links the cognitive aspects of moral development with behavior. Their theory, known as integrative theory, is...University of Minnesota. Rest, J. & Thoma S. (1985). Relationship of moral judgment development to formal education. Developmental Psychology. 21

  4. The Role of Transcendental Idealism in Kant's Dialectic of Aesthetic Judgment

    OpenAIRE

    Ward, Andrew

    2007-01-01

    A defence of the view that the introduction of transendental idealism, in the Dialectic of Aesthetic Judgment, plays a central role in resolving the antinomy which, as Kant contends, exists in our pure judgments of taste. It is further argued that the link that he holds to exist between the realms of nature and morality (or freedom) can only be successfully made out if transcendental idealism is accepted as underpinning our judgments concerning the beauties of nature.

  5. College Students' Judgment of Others Based on Described Eating Pattern

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pearson, Rebecca; Young, Michael

    2008-01-01

    Background: The literature available on attitudes toward eating patterns and people choosing various foods suggests the possible importance of "moral" judgments and desirable personality characteristics associated with the described eating patterns. Purpose: This study was designed to replicate and extend a 1993 study of college students'…

  6. Epistemological Development and Judgments and Reasoning about Teaching Methods

    Science.gov (United States)

    Spence, Sarah; Helwig, Charles C.

    2013-01-01

    Children's, adolescents', and adults' (N = 96 7-8, 10-11, and 13-14-year-olds and university students) epistemological development and its relation to judgments and reasoning about teaching methods was examined. The domain (scientific or moral), nature of the topic (controversial or noncontroversial), and teaching method (direct instruction by…

  7. The mismeasure of morals: antisocial personality traits predict utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bartels, Daniel M; Pizarro, David A

    2011-10-01

    Researchers have recently argued that utilitarianism is the appropriate framework by which to evaluate moral judgment, and that individuals who endorse non-utilitarian solutions to moral dilemmas (involving active vs. passive harm) are committing an error. We report a study in which participants responded to a battery of personality assessments and a set of dilemmas that pit utilitarian and non-utilitarian options against each other. Participants who indicated greater endorsement of utilitarian solutions had higher scores on measures of Psychopathy, machiavellianism, and life meaninglessness. These results question the widely-used methods by which lay moral judgments are evaluated, as these approaches lead to the counterintuitive conclusion that those individuals who are least prone to moral errors also possess a set of psychological characteristics that many would consider prototypically immoral. Copyright © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  8. Aesthetic Education for Morality: Schiller and Kant

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tauber, Zvi

    2006-01-01

    Kant's "Critique of Judgment," which was published in 1790, referred in detail to the affinity between beauty and morality. Schiller's writings from the 1790s dealing with aesthetics and ethics are intertwined, simultaneously, both with an affirmative reception of Kant's ideas and with critical attitudes against them. This applies to essays such…

  9. Moral communities.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chambers, David W

    2006-11-01

    This article explores the twin issues of whether organizations can act as ethical agents and what it means to exert moral influence over others. A discursive perspective is advanced that characterizes ethics as the action of communities based on promises. The received view of ethics as either the universal principles or individual responsibility is criticized as inadequate. Moral influence within community is considered under the various headings of democracy, office, brotherhood, agency, witness, and promise making. Moral influence among communities can include the damaging methods of "the superior position," coercion and misrepresentation, and appeal to third parties and the sound methods of rhetoric and promise making.

  10. Mistaking Judgments of the Agreeable and Judgments of Taste

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Francis Raven

    2008-12-01

    Full Text Available In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant develops a rigorous formulation of aesthetic judgments, in which he makes a sharp distinction between judgments of taste and judgments of the agreeable (both of which are, I claim, types of aesthetic judgments if only to dismiss judgments of the agreeable as worthy objects of study. Kant is primarily concerned with judgments of taste, the main example of which is judging something to be beautiful (whether it be a work of art or a natural object. He asserts that such judgments are subjective, universal, necessary, disinterested, and do not presuppose a purpose. The other type of aesthetic judgment are judgments of the agreeable, “which are the kind of judgment expressed by saying simply that one likes something or finds it pleasing.” These are judgments of what, in Kant’s words, please “the senses in sensation” as opposed to pleasing ourcognition in reflection.

  11. The Hague Judgments Convention

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Nielsen, Peter Arnt

    2011-01-01

    The Hague Judgments Convention of 2005 is the first global convention on international jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. The author explains the political and legal background of the Convention, its content and certain crucial issues during...

  12. The CAG polymorphism in androgen receptor (AR) gene impacts the moral permissibility of harmful behavior in females.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gong, Pingyuan; Fang, Pengpeng; Yang, Xing; Ru, Wenzhao; Wang, Bei; Gao, Xiaocai; Liu, Jinting

    2017-06-01

    The moral permissibility of harm is strikingly varied among individuals. In light of the connection between testosterone levels and utilitarian moral judgment, this study examined to what extent a CAG polymorphism in the androgen receptor gene, a genetic polymorphism with the ability to regulate testosterone function, contributes to individual differences in moral judgment. Four hundred and thirty-nine Chinese Han participants completed permissibility ratings of harm in moral dilemmas and moral transgression scenarios. Results showed a significant association between the CAG polymorphism and moral permissibility of harm in females. Females with more copies of the S allele, which is associated with higher availability of testosterone, were more likely to judge harmful utilitarian acts and unintentionally harmful acts as permissible, while these effects were absent in males. The findings provide the first evidence for a link between the androgen receptor gene and moral judgment and highlight the role of androgens in moral foundations. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  13. Moral transhumanism.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Persson, Ingmar; Savulescu, Julian

    2010-12-01

    In its basic sense, the term "human" is a term of biological classification: an individual is human just in case it is a member of the species Homo sapiens. Its opposite is "nonhuman": nonhuman animals being animals that belong to other species than H. sapiens. In another sense of human, its opposite is "inhuman," that is cruel and heartless (cf. "humane" and "inhumane"); being human in this sense is having morally good qualities. This paper argues that biomedical research and therapy should make humans in the biological sense more human in the moral sense, even if they cease to be human in the biological sense. This serves valuable biomedical ends like the promotion of health and well-being, for if humans do not become more moral, civilization is threatened. It is unimportant that humans remain biologically human, since they do not have moral value in virtue of belonging to H. sapiens.

  14. Moral Communities and Moral Leadership.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chambers, David W

    2015-01-01

    The American College of Dentists is embarking on a multiyear project to improve ethics in dentistry. Early indications are that the focus will be on actual moral behavior rather than theory, that we will include organizations as ethical units, and that we will focus on building moral leadership. There is little evidence that the "telling individuals how to behave" approach to ethics is having the hoped-for effect. As a profession, dentistry is based on shared trust. The public level of trust in practitioners is acceptable, but could be improved, and will need to be strengthened to reduce the risk of increasing regulation. While feedback from the way dentists and patients view ethics is generally reassuring, dentists are often at odds with patients and their colleagues over how the profesion manages itself. Individuals are an inconsistent mix of good and bad behavior, and it may be more helpful to make small improvements in the habits of all dentists than to try to take a few certifiably dishonest ones off the street. A computer simulation model of dentistry as a moral community suggests that the profession will always have the proportion of bad actors it will tolerate, that moral leadership is a difficult posture to maintain, that massive interventions to correct imbalances through education or other means will be wasted unless the system as a whole is modified, and that most dentists see no compelling benefit in changing the ethical climate of the profession because they are doing just fine. Considering organiza-tions as loci of moral behavior reveals questionable practices that otherwise remain undetected, including moral distress, fragmentation, fictitious dentists, moral fading, decoupling, responsibility shifting, and moral priming. What is most needed is not phillosophy or principles, but moral leadership.

  15. Elevated moral condemnation of third-party violations in multiple sclerosis patients.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Patil, Indrajeet; Young, Liane; Sinay, Vladimiro; Gleichgerrcht, Ezequiel

    2017-06-01

    Recent research has demonstrated impairments in social cognition associated with multiple sclerosis (MS). The present work asks whether these impairments are associated with atypical moral judgment. Specifically, we assessed whether MS patients are able to integrate information about intentions and outcomes for moral judgment (i.e., appropriateness and punishment judgments) in the case of third-party acts. We found a complex pattern of moral judgments in MS patients: although their moral judgments were comparable to controls' for specific types of acts (e.g., accidental or intentional harms), they nevertheless judged behaviors to be less appropriate and endorsed more severe punishment across the board, and they were also more likely to report that others' responses would be congruent with theirs. Further analyses suggested that elevated levels of externally oriented cognition in MS (due to co-occurring alexithymia) explain these effects. Additionally, we found that the distinction between appropriateness and punishment judgments, whereby harmful outcomes influence punishment judgments to a greater extent than appropriateness judgments, was preserved in MS despite the observed disruptions in the affective and motivational components of empathy. The current results inform the two-process model for intent-based moral judgments as well as possible strategies for improving the quality of life in MS patients.

  16. Unifying Kohlberg with Information Integration: The Moral Algebra of Recompense and of Kohlbergian Moral Informers

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Wilfried Hommers

    2010-01-01

    Full Text Available In order to unify two major theories of moral judgment, a novel task is employed which combines elements of Kohlberg's stage theory and of the theory of information integration. In contrast to the format of Kohlberg's moral judgment interview, a nonverbal and quantitative response which makes low demands on verbal facility was used . Moral informers differing in value, i.e. high and low, are presented. The differences in effect of those two pieces of information should be substantial for a person at that specific moral stage, but small for a person at a different stage. Hence, these differences may diagnose the person's moral stage in the simplest possible way as the two levels of each of the thoughts were about typical content of the four Kohlbergian preconventional and conventional stages. The novel task allowed additionally to measure the influence of another moral concept which was about the non-Kohlbergian moral concept of recompense. After a training phase, pairs of those thoughts were presented to allow for the study of integration and individual differences. German and Korean children, 8, 10, and 12 years in age, judged deserved punishment. The patterns of means, correlations and factor loadings showed that elements of both theories can be unified, but produced unexpected results also. Additive integration of each of the two pairs of moral informers appeared, either with two Kohlbergian moral informers or with another Kohlbergian moral informer in combination with information about recompense. Also cultural independence as well as dependence, developmental changes between 8 and 10 years, and an outstanding moral impact of recompense in size and distinctiveness were observed.

  17. Individual moral development and moral progress

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Schinkel, Anders; de Ruyter, Doret J.

    At first glance, one of the most obvious places to look for moral progress is in individuals, in particular in moral development from childhood to adulthood. In fact, that moral progress is possible is a foundational assumption of moral education. Beyond the general agreement that moral progress is

  18. Individual Moral Development and Moral Progress

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Schinkel, Anders; de Ruyter, Doret J.

    2017-01-01

    At first glance, one of the most obvious places to look for moral progress is in individuals, in particular in moral development from childhood to adulthood. In fact, that moral progress is possible is a foundational assumption of moral education. Beyond the general agreement that moral progress is

  19. Effects of anger, guilt, and envy on moral hypocrisy.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Polman, Evan; Ruttan, Rachel L

    2012-01-01

    In the current article the authors examined the impact of specific emotions on moral hypocrisy, the tendency among people to judge others more severely than they judge themselves. In two studies, they found that (a) anger increased moral hypocrisy, (b) guilt eliminated moral hypocrisy, and (c) envy reversed moral hypocrisy. In particular, these findings were observed in two domains. In Study 1, participants responded to moral dilemmas describing unethical behavior and rated how acceptable it would be if others engaged in the unethical behavior, or alternatively, if they themselves engaged in the unethical behavior. In Study 2, participants were asked how much they would like to donate to research on cancer, or alternatively, how much they think others should donate. The results demonstrate that specific emotions influence moral decision making, even when real money is at stake, and that emotions of the same valence have opposing effects on moral judgment.

  20. The Connection between Beauty and Morality in Kant's aesthetics

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ali salmani

    2015-09-01

    Full Text Available Abstract At first glance it seems that Kant distinguishes beauty from morality because while analyzing the matter of beauty according to quality, he explicitly separates pleasure of beauty from pleasure of agreeable and pleasure of good; and believes that the pleasure of the beauty is neither to satisfy our physical desires nor to achieve a moral purpose. On the other hand, Kant speaks of a connection between beauty and morality in some sections of his critique of judgment. This essay intends to study the mentioned sections and clarifies how one can distinguish beauty from morality and simultaneously believes in the connection between beauty and morality. Following this, we are going to discuss why Kant deems such a connection necessary. Examining this matter, we will find out that morality and aesthetics can be indirectly related to each other. Kant's most major concern with regard to the connection between beauty and morality is the connection between feelings and foredoom.

  1. Knowledge and Morality of School-Age Children and Adolescents Regarding Environmental Issues and Moral Dilemmas

    Science.gov (United States)

    Vestena, Carla Luciane Blum; Piske, Fernanda Hellen Ribeiro

    2017-01-01

    A research gap exists with regard to the analysis of school children and adolescents' awareness on environmental issues. Current investigation analyzes data of 240 children and adolescents, aged between 8 and 14 years, within different school contexts in the mid-southern region of Brazil, on their knowledge level and moral judgment on solid…

  2. Priming children's use of intentions in moral judgement with a metacognitive training

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Katarina eGvozdic

    2016-03-01

    Full Text Available Typically, adults give a primary role to the agent’s intention to harm when performing a moral judgment of accidental harm. By contrast, children often focus on outcomes, underestimating the actor’s mental states when judging someone for his action, and rely on what we suppose to be intuitive and emotional processes. The present study explored the processes involved in the development of the capacity to integrate agents’ intentions into their moral judgment of accidental harm in 5 to 8 year old children. This was done by the use of different metacognitive trainings reinforcing different abilities involved in moral judgments (mentalising abilities, executive abilities or no reinforcement, similar to a paradigm previously used in the field of deductive logic. Children’s moral judgments were gathered before and after the training with non-verbal cartoons depicting agents whose actions differed only based on their causal role or their intention to harm. We demonstrated that a metacognitive training could induce an important shift in children’s moral abilities, showing that only children who were explicitly instructed to not focus too much on the consequences of accidental harm, preferentially weighted the agents’ intentions in their moral judgments. Our findings confirm that children between the ages of 5 and 8 are sensitive to the intention of agents, however, at that age, this ability is insufficient in order to give a mature moral judgment. Our experiment is the first that suggests the critical role of inhibitory resources in processing accidental harm.

  3. Moral reasoning about great apes in research

    Science.gov (United States)

    Okamoto, Carol Midori

    2006-04-01

    This study explored how individuals (biomedical scientists, Great Ape Project activists, lay adults, undergraduate biology and environmental studies students, and Grade 12 and 9 biology students) morally judge and reason about using great apes in biomedical and language research. How these groups perceived great apes' mental capacities (e.g., pain, logical thinking) and how these perceptions related to their judgments were investigated through two scenarios. In addition, the kinds of informational statements (e.g., biology, economics) that may affect individuals' scenario judgments were investigated. A negative correlation was found between mental attributions and scenario judgments while no clear pattern occurred for the informational statements. For the biomedical scenario, all groups significantly differed in mean judgment ratings except for the biomedical scientists, GAP activists and Grade 9 students. For the language scenario, all groups differed except for the GAP activists, and undergraduate environmental studies and Grade 9 students. An in-depth qualitative analysis showed that although the biomedical scientists, GAP activists and Grade 9 students had similar judgments, they produced different mean percentages of justifications under four moral frameworks (virtue, utilitarianism, deontology, and welfare). The GAP activists used more virtue reasoning while the biomedical scientists and Grade 9 students used more utilitarian and welfare reasoning, respectively. The results are discussed in terms of developing environmental/humane education curricula.

  4. Moral Luck from Bernard Williams’ Point of View

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Zahra Khazai ; Fatemeh Tamaddon

    2016-08-01

    Full Text Available Moral luck is an important issue in meta- ethics. Its conflict to principle of control make challenges to moral moral assessment, moral judgment and moral responsibility. Bernard Williams is the first philosopher who uses the expression "moral luck" and tries to show that the contradiction between “moral” and “luck” is not so serious. Against Kantian’s idea and also our intuitions Williams doesn’t believe that morality is immune of luck and that unlike other values, is accessible to all people. If moral value is accessible to all, according to his idea, it should be not only immune of luck but also supreme. Giving some examples, Williams by concepts like justification, regret and retrospective, shows that morality hasn’t these characteristics. Dividing moral luck into four types: resultant, circumstantial, constitutive and causal, Thomas Nagel puts Williams' moral luck under the first type and criticizes it. This study seeks to explain Bernard Williams’ viewpoint on moral luck. At first it clears types of moral luck, principle of control and its contradiction with moral luck, then after explaining Williams’ account of moral luck criticizes it. Nagel’s criticisms and others show that although they accept the existence of moral luck and also their account is compatible to williams’ but they deny williams’ success in defending of this phenomenon. Finally, despite of all critiques, it seems that Williams’ failure in defense of moral luck didn’t decrease the importance of this matter, but made some stronger ideas were appeared by Thomas Nagel in this regard.

  5. MORALE Assignment

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    Carienvt

    Military and political leaders around the world regard high morale of the armed forces as one of the ... mental well-being of the individual soldier, the military unit as well as the armed force as a whole.2 It is thus ..... include elements such as dust, noise, harsh weather, lack of food and water and sleep deprivation. Van Dyk ...

  6. Moral Motivation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pahel, Kenneth

    1976-01-01

    Explains the rationale that there should be a kind of harmony between moral understanding or reasoning on the one hand, and the feeling dispositions on the other hand. Considers the views of Kant and Schopenhauer as they apply to the subject. (Author/RK)

  7. Emotion shapes the diffusion of moralized content in social networks.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Brady, William J; Wills, Julian A; Jost, John T; Tucker, Joshua A; Van Bavel, Jay J

    2017-07-11

    Political debate concerning moralized issues is increasingly common in online social networks. However, moral psychology has yet to incorporate the study of social networks to investigate processes by which some moral ideas spread more rapidly or broadly than others. Here, we show that the expression of moral emotion is key for the spread of moral and political ideas in online social networks, a process we call "moral contagion." Using a large sample of social media communications about three polarizing moral/political issues ( n = 563,312), we observed that the presence of moral-emotional words in messages increased their diffusion by a factor of 20% for each additional word. Furthermore, we found that moral contagion was bounded by group membership; moral-emotional language increased diffusion more strongly within liberal and conservative networks, and less between them. Our results highlight the importance of emotion in the social transmission of moral ideas and also demonstrate the utility of social network methods for studying morality. These findings offer insights into how people are exposed to moral and political ideas through social networks, thus expanding models of social influence and group polarization as people become increasingly immersed in social media networks.

  8. Emotion shapes the diffusion of moralized content in social networks

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wills, Julian A.; Jost, John T.; Tucker, Joshua A.; Van Bavel, Jay J.

    2017-01-01

    Political debate concerning moralized issues is increasingly common in online social networks. However, moral psychology has yet to incorporate the study of social networks to investigate processes by which some moral ideas spread more rapidly or broadly than others. Here, we show that the expression of moral emotion is key for the spread of moral and political ideas in online social networks, a process we call “moral contagion.” Using a large sample of social media communications about three polarizing moral/political issues (n = 563,312), we observed that the presence of moral-emotional words in messages increased their diffusion by a factor of 20% for each additional word. Furthermore, we found that moral contagion was bounded by group membership; moral-emotional language increased diffusion more strongly within liberal and conservative networks, and less between them. Our results highlight the importance of emotion in the social transmission of moral ideas and also demonstrate the utility of social network methods for studying morality. These findings offer insights into how people are exposed to moral and political ideas through social networks, thus expanding models of social influence and group polarization as people become increasingly immersed in social media networks. PMID:28652356

  9. Grounding Moralism: Moral Flaws and Aesthetic Properties

    Science.gov (United States)

    Smuts, Aaron

    2011-01-01

    Can moral flaws lessen an artwork's aesthetic value? Answering yes to this question requires both that artworks can be morally flawed and that moral flaws within a work of art can have an aesthetic impact. For present purposes, the author will assume that artworks can be morally flawed by such means as endorsing immoral perspectives, culpably…

  10. On Moral Luck and Nonideal Moral Education

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chinnery, Ann

    2015-01-01

    In contrast to the Kantian principle that we are morally accountable only for those actions over which we have control, Bernard Williams, Thomas Nagel, and others have argued that luck plays a significant role in the moral life. Put briefly, moral luck is at play when we are appropriately praised or blamed for our moral actions despite the fact…

  11. Moral, Religion, and Politics in I. Kant

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Eduardo Molina

    2012-04-01

    Full Text Available At the end of the Critique of Judgment, Kant addresses the problem of the proofs of the existence of God and carries out a detailed examination of the only proof he considers capable of eliciting assent: the moral proof. The article reviews the path followed by Kant in order to reach the idea of a moral author of the world on the basis of his analysis of the purposiveness of nature, and shows how this argument is linked to Kant’s ethical-political doctrine as set forth in his other works.

  12. Moral psychology is relationship regulation: moral motives for unity, hierarchy, equality, and proportionality.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rai, Tage Shakti; Fiske, Alan Page

    2011-01-01

    Genuine moral disagreement exists and is widespread. To understand such disagreement, we must examine the basic kinds of social relationships people construct across cultures and the distinct moral obligations and prohibitions these relationships entail. We extend relational models theory (Fiske, 1991) to identify 4 fundamental and distinct moral motives. Unity is the motive to care for and support the integrity of in-groups by avoiding or eliminating threats of contamination and providing aid and protection based on need or empathic compassion. Hierarchy is the motive to respect rank in social groups where superiors are entitled to deference and respect but must also lead, guide, direct, and protect subordinates. Equality is the motive for balanced, in-kind reciprocity, equal treatment, equal say, and equal opportunity. Proportionality is the motive for rewards and punishments to be proportionate to merit, benefits to be calibrated to contributions, and judgments to be based on a utilitarian calculus of costs and benefits. The 4 moral motives are universal, but cultures, ideologies, and individuals differ in where they activate these motives and how they implement them. Unlike existing theories (Haidt, 2007; Hauser, 2006; Turiel, 1983), relationship regulation theory predicts that any action, including violence, unequal treatment, and "impure" acts, may be perceived as morally correct depending on the moral motive employed and how the relevant social relationship is construed. This approach facilitates clearer understanding of moral perspectives we disagree with and provides a template for how to influence moral motives and practices in the world.

  13. Are Individualist Accounts of Collective Responsibility Morally Deficient?

    OpenAIRE

    Szigeti, Andras

    2013-01-01

    Individualists hold that moral responsibility can be ascribed to single human beings only. An important collectivist objection is that individualism is morally deficient because it leaves a normative residue. Without attributing responsibility to collectives there remains a “deficit in the accounting books” (Pettit). This collectivist strategy often uses judgment aggregation paradoxes to show that the collective can be responsible when no individual is. I argue that we do not need collectivis...

  14. Hermeneutics, evidence ad judgment

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Michele Taruffo

    2018-03-01

    Full Text Available The text analyzes several topics of the judicial process from the point of view of the important contributions offered by the hermeneutical philosophy. It deals mainly with the construction of factual narratives, the presentation of evidence and the discovery of truth made by the judge in his final judgment based upon the evidence.

  15. Original and Derived Judgment

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Foss, Kirsten; Foss, Nicolai Juul; Klein, Peter G.

    2007-01-01

    to subordinates, who exercise derived judgment. We call these employees `proxy-entrepreneurs', and ask how the firm's organizational structure - its formal and informal systems of rewards and punishments, rules for settling disputes and renegotiating agreements, means of evaluating performance and so on - can...

  16. Variability of Creativity Judgments

    Science.gov (United States)

    Caroff, Xavier; Besancon, Maud

    2008-01-01

    The Consensual Assessment Technique (CAT), developed by Amabile [Amabile, T.M. (1982). "Social psychology of creativity: A consensual assessment technique." "Journal of Personality and Social Psychology," 43, 997-1013], is frequently used to evaluate the creativity of productions. Judgments obtained with CAT are usually reliable and valid.…

  17. Calibrating Legal Judgments

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Frederick Schauer

    2017-09-01

    Full Text Available Objective to study the notion and essence of legal judgments calibration the possibilities of using it in the lawenforcement activity to explore the expenses and advantages of using it. Methods dialectic approach to the cognition of social phenomena which enables to analyze them in historical development and functioning in the context of the integrity of objective and subjective factors it determined the choice of the following research methods formallegal comparative legal sociological methods of cognitive psychology and philosophy. Results In ordinary life people who assess other peoplersaquos judgments typically take into account the other judgments of those they are assessing in order to calibrate the judgment presently being assessed. The restaurant and hotel rating website TripAdvisor is exemplary because it facilitates calibration by providing access to a raterrsaquos previous ratings. Such information allows a user to see whether a particular rating comes from a rater who is enthusiastic about every place she patronizes or instead from someone who is incessantly hard to please. And even when less systematized as in assessing a letter of recommendation or college transcript calibration by recourse to the decisional history of those whose judgments are being assessed is ubiquitous. Yet despite the ubiquity and utility of such calibration the legal system seems perversely to reject it. Appellate courts do not openly adjust their standard of review based on the previous judgments of the judge whose decision they are reviewing nor do judges in reviewing legislative or administrative decisions magistrates in evaluating search warrant representations or jurors in assessing witness perception. In most legal domains calibration by reference to the prior decisions of the reviewee is invisible either because it does not exist or because reviewing bodies are unwilling to admit using what they in fact know and employ. Scientific novelty for the first

  18. Liberating Moral Reflection

    Science.gov (United States)

    Horell, Harold D.

    2013-01-01

    The author argues that if we are to foster life-giving and liberating moral reflection, we must first liberate moral reflection from distortions; specifically, from the distorting effects of moral insensitivity, destructive moral relativism, and confusions resulting from a failure to understand the dynamics of moral reflection. The author proposes…

  19. Piaget e a consciência moral: um kantismo evolutivo? Piaget and the moral conscience: an evolving kantism?

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Lia Beatriz de Lucca Freitas

    2002-01-01

    Full Text Available Este artigo apresenta os principais resultados de uma pesquisa sobre a teoria da moral de Jean Piaget. No estudo de seus textos sobre a moral, utilizamos o método da análise estrutural. Essa análise possibilitou-nos descobrir em Recherche o seu plano inicial de pesquisa e propor uma interpretação original do significado de seu livro O julgamento moral na criança. Além disso, constatamos que ele buscou traçar o caminho que conduz o ser humano da anomia à autonomia moral. Esses resultados permitiram explicar por que a sua teoria da moral, assim como a sua teoria do conhecimento, pode ser compreendida como um kantismo evolutivo.This paper gives the main results of a research on Piaget's theory of morality. In the study of his texts on morality, the method of structural analysis was used. This analysis made it possible to discover in Recherche his initial research project and to propose an original interpretation of his book The moral judgment of the child. Besides, it became evident that he tried to outline the way which leads the human being from a non-moral world to moral autonomy. These results show that his theory of morality, as well as his theory of knowledge, may be understood as an evolving kantism.

  20. Oscillatory correlates of moral decision-making: Effect of personality.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Knyazev, Gennady G; Savostyanov, Alexander N; Bocharov, Andrey V; Dorosheva, Elena A; Tamozhnikov, Sergey S; Saprigyn, Alexander E

    2016-01-01

    The role of emotion in moral decision-making is still a matter of debate. Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, and Cohen (2001) argue that 'personal' moral judgments are driven by emotional responses, while 'impersonal' judgments are largely driven by cognitive processes. In this study, oscillatory correlates of decision-making were compared in moral personal, moral impersonal, and nonmoral conditions, as well as in trials associated with utilitarian (i.e., favoring the 'greater good' over individual rights) and non-utilitarian choices. Event-related synchronization in delta and theta bands was greater in the right temporal lobe in personal than in both nonmoral and impersonal moral condition. Graph-theoretical analysis of connectivity patterns showed the prominent role of the orbitofrontal and cingulate cortices in personal moral decision-making, implying greater emotional and self-processing. Higher conscientiousness and intellect and lower behavioral activation were associated with greater difference in oscillatory responses between utilitarian and non-utilitarian choices in personal than in impersonal condition, indicating that sensitivity to moral issues and the ability to grasp the nuances of moral situation are essential for understanding the implications of utilitarian choices in personal and impersonal conditions.

  1. Anger and Moral Reasoning in Decision Making

    OpenAIRE

    Matúš Grežo; Ľubor Pilárik

    2013-01-01

    The aim of the research was to examine the impact of anger on moral reasoning and decision making. We were interested in whether anger leads to more punitive attributions and to greater willingness to help when one perceives immoral behavior. Participants (N=61) of the experimental design were randomly divided into two groups. The results show that anger may lead to more automatic information processing and also to an intuition based judgment. Angry participants chose harsher punishments and ...

  2. De Dicto Moral Desires and the Moral Sentiments : Adam Smith on the Role of De Dicto Moral Desires in the Virtuous Agent

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Archer, Alfred

    2017-01-01

    What role should a motivation to do the right thing, read de dicto, play in the life of a virtuous agent? According to a prominent argument from Michael Smith, those who are only ever motivated by such a desire are moral fetishists. Smith’s argument is designed to support motivational judgment

  3. A developmental model of hierarchical stage structure in objective moral judgements

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Boom, J.; Molenaar, P.C.M.

    1989-01-01

    A hierarchical structural model of moral judgment is proposed in which an S is characterized as occupying a particular moral stage. During development, the S's characteristic stage progresses along a latent, ordered dimension in an age-dependent way. Evaluation of prototypic statements

  4. Mortality Salience and Morality: Thinking about Death Makes People Less Utilitarian

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tremoliere, Bastien; De Neys, Wim; Bonnefon, Jean-Francois

    2012-01-01

    According to the dual-process model of moral judgment, utilitarian responses to moral conflict draw on limited cognitive resources. Terror Management Theory, in parallel, postulates that mortality salience mobilizes these resources to suppress thoughts of death out of focal attention. Consequently, we predicted that individuals under mortality…

  5. Liberalism, legal moralism and moral disagreement.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kuflik, Arthur

    2005-01-01

    According to "legal moralism" it is part of law's proper role to "enforce morality as such". I explore the idea that legal moralism runs afoul of morality itself: there are good moral reasons not to require by law all that there is nevertheless good moral reason to do. I suggest that many such reasons have broad common-sense appeal and could be appreciated even in a society in which everyone completely agreed about what morality requires. But I also critique legal moralism from the special perspective of liberal political justice. Liberalism requires that citizens who disagree with one another on a number of morally significant matters nevertheless coexist and cooperate within a political framework of basic rights protections. When it comes to working out the most basic terms of their political association, citizens are expected to address one another within the limits of what Rawls has called "public reason". Critics of liberalism claim that this is an essentially a-moral (or expedient) attempt to evade substantive moral issues--such as the moral status of the fetus. I argue, on the contrary, that liberalism's emphasis on public reason is itself grounded in very deep--though (suitably) "non-comprehensive"--moral considerations.

  6. Toward an Understanding of Moral Judgments Concerning Violent Behavior

    Science.gov (United States)

    2014-03-01

    returns were enormous. The primary approach was to speak to people through their roles in the tourism industry, as their personal backgrounds varied...do people participate in violent collective action? Selective incentives versus parochial altruism. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1167

  7. Religious Roots: A Prolegomenon to Moral Judgment in American Policy

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-03-15

    what contributed to religions like Islam, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons and others. If a person has a Christian worldview,41 he or she may primarily...SUBJECT TERMS Religion , Ethics, Policy, Worldview, Foreign Affairs, Diplomacy 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT 18...COUNT: 6397 PAGES: 38 KEY TERMS: Religion , Ethics, Policy, Worldview, Foreign Affairs, Diplomacy CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified All policy is

  8. Bridging the Divide: The Role of Motivation and Self-Regulation in Explaining the Judgment-Action Gap Related to Academic Dishonesty.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Stephens, Jason M

    2018-01-01

    There is often a divide between moral judgment and moral action; between what we believe we ought to do (or not do) and what we do. Knowledge of this divide is not new, and numerous theories have attempted to offer more robust accounts of ethical decision-making and moral functioning. Knowledge of widespread academic dishonesty among students is also not new, and several studies have revealed that many students report cheating despite believing it is wrong. The present study, involving cross-sectional survey data from a sample of secondary students ( N = 380) in the United States, contributes to the literature on this important area of theory and research by fulfilling three broad purposes. The first purpose concerned the assessment of students' judgments related to academic dishonesty, and offered evidence for the utility of a new instrument that measures what domain (personal, conventional, or moral) students use to categorize various types of cheating behavior rather than how much they believe it to be wrong. The second purpose involved exploring the relations between domain judgments and engagement in academic dishonesty, and results provided evidence for the hypothesis that students who believed an action to be morally wrong would be less likely to report doing it. Finally, the third and most important purpose of the study involved bridging the divide between moral judgment and action of academic dishonesty by testing competing theoretical models of moral functioning. Results indicated that the data demonstrated the best fit to a modified version of the hypothesized four-component model, whereby self-regulation (in the form of selective moral disengagement) played a significant mediating role in the relations between moral judgment and academic dishonesty, and that moral judgment also affected self-regulation indirectly through moral motivation (i.e., responsibility judgments). In brief, findings from this study offer support for the contention that moral

  9. Bridging the Divide: The Role of Motivation and Self-Regulation in Explaining the Judgment-Action Gap Related to Academic Dishonesty

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jason M. Stephens

    2018-03-01

    Full Text Available There is often a divide between moral judgment and moral action; between what we believe we ought to do (or not do and what we do. Knowledge of this divide is not new, and numerous theories have attempted to offer more robust accounts of ethical decision-making and moral functioning. Knowledge of widespread academic dishonesty among students is also not new, and several studies have revealed that many students report cheating despite believing it is wrong. The present study, involving cross-sectional survey data from a sample of secondary students (N = 380 in the United States, contributes to the literature on this important area of theory and research by fulfilling three broad purposes. The first purpose concerned the assessment of students' judgments related to academic dishonesty, and offered evidence for the utility of a new instrument that measures what domain (personal, conventional, or moral students use to categorize various types of cheating behavior rather than how much they believe it to be wrong. The second purpose involved exploring the relations between domain judgments and engagement in academic dishonesty, and results provided evidence for the hypothesis that students who believed an action to be morally wrong would be less likely to report doing it. Finally, the third and most important purpose of the study involved bridging the divide between moral judgment and action of academic dishonesty by testing competing theoretical models of moral functioning. Results indicated that the data demonstrated the best fit to a modified version of the hypothesized four-component model, whereby self-regulation (in the form of selective moral disengagement played a significant mediating role in the relations between moral judgment and academic dishonesty, and that moral judgment also affected self-regulation indirectly through moral motivation (i.e., responsibility judgments. In brief, findings from this study offer support for the contention

  10. Emotional and Utilitarian Appraisals of Moral Dilemmas Are Encoded in Separate Areas and Integrated in Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex

    Science.gov (United States)

    Montaser-Kouhsari, Leila; Woodward, James; Rangel, Antonio

    2015-01-01

    Moral judgment often requires making difficult tradeoffs (e.g., is it appropriate to torture to save the lives of innocents at risk?). Previous research suggests that both emotional appraisals and more deliberative utilitarian appraisals influence such judgments and that these appraisals often conflict. However, it is unclear how these different types of appraisals are represented in the brain, or how they are integrated into an overall moral judgment. We addressed these questions using an fMRI paradigm in which human subjects provide separate emotional and utilitarian appraisals for different potential actions, and then make difficult moral judgments constructed from combinations of these actions. We found that anterior cingulate, insula, and superior temporal gyrus correlated with emotional appraisals, whereas temporoparietal junction and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex correlated with utilitarian appraisals. Overall moral value judgments were represented in an anterior portion of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Critically, the pattern of responses and functional interactions between these three sets of regions are consistent with a model in which emotional and utilitarian appraisals are computed independently and in parallel, and passed to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex where they are integrated into an overall moral value judgment. SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Popular accounts of moral judgment often describe it as a battle for control between two systems, one intuitive and emotional, the other rational and utilitarian, engaged in winner-take-all inhibitory competition. Using a novel fMRI paradigm, we identified distinct neural signatures of emotional and utilitarian appraisals and used them to test different models of how they compete for the control of moral behavior. Importantly, we find little support for competitive inhibition accounts. Instead, moral judgments resembled the architecture of simple economic choices: distinct regions represented emotional

  11. Evolution, Moral Justification, and Moral Realism

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Uwe Peters

    2012-05-01

    Full Text Available Does evolutionary theory have the potential to undermine morality? In his book The Evolution of Morality, Richard Joyce (2006 argues for a positive answer. He contends that an evolutionary account of morality would undermine moral judgements and lend support to moral scepticism. I offer a critique of Joyce’s argument. As it turns out, his case can be read in two different ways. It could be construed as an argument to establish a general scepticism about the justification of moral judgements. Or it could be read as an argument that targets only a particular meta-ethical position, namely moral realism. My claim is that it fails on both interpretations. There is no reason to believe that evolutionary considerations undermine morality.

  12. Sources of Judgmental Uncertainty

    Science.gov (United States)

    1977-09-01

    sometimes at the end. To avoid primacy or recency effects , which were not part of this first study, for half of the subjects the orders of information items...summarize, 72 subjects were randomly assigned to two conditions of control and exposed to three conditions of orderliness. Order effects and primacy / recency ...WORDS (Continue on reverie atids If necessary and Identity by block number) ~ Judgmental Uncertainty Primacy / Recency Environmental UncertaintyN1

  13. Clinical versus actuarial judgment.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dawes, R M; Faust, D; Meehl, P E

    1989-03-31

    Professionals are frequently consulted to diagnose and predict human behavior; optimal treatment and planning often hinge on the consultant's judgmental accuracy. The consultant may rely on one of two contrasting approaches to decision-making--the clinical and actuarial methods. Research comparing these two approaches shows the actuarial method to be superior. Factors underlying the greater accuracy of actuarial methods, sources of resistance to the scientific findings, and the benefits of increased reliance on actuarial approaches are discussed.

  14. Calibrating Legal Judgments

    OpenAIRE

    Frederick Schauer; Barbara A. Spellman

    2017-01-01

    Objective to study the notion and essence of legal judgments calibration the possibilities of using it in the lawenforcement activity to explore the expenses and advantages of using it. Methods dialectic approach to the cognition of social phenomena which enables to analyze them in historical development and functioning in the context of the integrity of objective and subjective factors it determined the choice of the following research methods formallegal comparative legal sociolog...

  15. Schopenhauer's Moral Pessimism: Origin, Meaning and Reach

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    Dax Moraes

    2017-12-01

    Full Text Available “Moral pessimism” is an expression by which one may understand Schopenhauer’s thesis about immutability of character so far as it declares impossible each and every kind of moral enhancement, remaining only attainable some behavior adaptation based on natural egoism. This is otherwise a kind of result of epistemological problems raised by Kantian critique of reason that Schopenhauer carried to its limits. On the other hand, “moral pessimism” is to be faced not as a “practical” problem, but as a metaphysical one and its empirical consequences can be better considered as one may call “anthropological pessimism” once by this expression we mean not only a judgment about human nature alone but individual sufferings facing a world that menaces individual interests.

  16. La vrai morale se moque de la morale: questões éticas em Pascal

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Telma de Souza Birchal

    2002-12-01

    Full Text Available Em Pascal encontramos um duplo registro da questão moral: por um lado, o autor dos Pensées dirige uma dura crítica aos ideais morais da filosofia, especialmente aos do estoicismo; por outro, ele afirma uma "verdadeira moral" que "zomba da moral". A análise desse duplo registro será feita a partir de quatro contextos encontrados nos Pensamentos: 1- O contexto epistemológico da diferença entre espírito geométrico e espírito de finesse, ao qual se remetem os termos correlatos "moral do espírito" e "moral do julgamento"; 2- O contexto antropológico da "desproporção do homem" e da virtude como meio-termo; 3- O contexto antropológico - teológico da miséria e da grandeza do homem 4- O contexto metafísico-teológico da teoria das "três ordens de coisas". A "verdadeira moral" constitui-se, afinal, por dois movimentos: no primeiro, a moral pascaliana é simplesmente naturalista e compartilha do espírito mecanicista do seu século. Em seu segundo movimento, ela é teológica e constitui-se essencialmente como uma hermenêutica do desejo.We find in Pascal a double approach to the moral issue. On the one hand the author of the Pensées strongly criticizes the moral ideals of philosophy, in particular those of Stoicism but, on the other, he claims that there is a "true morals" which "mocks of morals". We here analyze this double approach from the point of view of four contexts exhibited in the Pensées: 1- The epistemological context that distinguishes the "esprit de géométrie" and the "esprit de finesse" which points, respectively, to a "moral of the ' esprit'" and to a "moral of judgment". 2- The anthropological context of the "disproportion of men" and of virtue as mean 3- The anthropological-theological context of the misery and greatness of man. 4- The metaphysical-theological context of the theory of the "three orders of things". The "true morals" is construed in two movements. In the first, Pascal's morals is naturalistic and

  17. Neural correlates of moral and non-moral emotion in female psychopathy

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Carla L Harenski

    2014-09-01

    Full Text Available This study presents the first neuroimaging investigation of female psychopathy in an incarcerated population. Prior studies have found that male psychopathy is associated with reduced limbic and paralimbic activation when processing emotional stimuli and making moral judgments. The goal of this study was to investigate whether these findings extend to female psychopathy. During fMRI scanning, 157 incarcerated and 46 non-incarcerated female participants viewed unpleasant pictures, half which depicted moral transgressions, and neutral pictures. Participants rated each picture on moral transgression severity. Psychopathy was assessed using the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R in all incarcerated participants. Non-incarcerated participants were included as a control group to derive brain regions of interest associated with viewing unpleasant versus neutral pictures (emotion contrast, and unpleasant pictures depicting moral transgressions versus unpleasant pictures without moral transgressions (moral contrast. Regression analyses in the incarcerated group examined the association between PCL-R scores and brain activation in the emotion and moral contrasts. Results of the emotion contrast revealed a negative correlation between PCL-R scores and activation in the right amygdala and rostral anterior cingulate. Results of the moral contrast revealed a negative correlation between PCL-R scores and activation in the right temporo-parietal junction. These results indicate that female psychopathy, like male psychopathy, is characterized by reduced limbic activation during emotion processing. In contrast, reduced temporo-parietal activation to moral transgressions has been less observed in male psychopathy. These results extend prior findings in male psychopathy to female psychopathy, and reveal aberrant neural responses to morally-salient stimuli that may be unique to female psychopathy.

  18. Refining moral agency: Insights from moral psychology and moral philosophy.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Milliken, Aimee

    2018-01-01

    Research in moral psychology has recently raised questions about the impact of context and the environment on the way the human mind works. In a 2012 call to action, Paley wrote: "If some of the conclusions arrived at by moral psychologists are true, they are directly relevant to the way nurses think about moral problems, and present serious challenges to favoured concepts in nursing ethics, such as the ethics of care, virtue, and the unity of the person" (p. 80). He urges nurse ethicists and scholars to evaluate the impact these findings may have for moral theory. In this paper, I review some of Paley's (Nursing Philosophy, 13, 2012, 80) critique, focusing on the argument that theories of nursing ethics have failed to account for the role of context; both in terms of its impact on the way nurses make moral judgements and in terms of the environment's influence on the way the mind works. I then examine nursing literature on moral agency, and focus on the role of the environment and context play within existing theory. I argue that theories of moral agency have often accounted for the role of context on the way nurses make decisions; however, less attention has been paid to its impact on the mind. With this background, I use insights from the fields of moral philosophy and moral psychology to refine the conceptualization of nurse moral agency in a way that is reflective of current cognitive, philosophical and nursing practice-based science. © 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

  19. MORAL INJURY.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Antonelli, Mildred

    2017-12-01

    The devastating effect on the self of moral injury, often a core component of trauma, occurring when one's actions have profoundly violated one's code of ethics, when one has been a victim of such violation, or when one has been a passive witness, has been extensively explored as it has occurred in veterans of the wars in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. Two examples illustrate its prevalence in civilian life. The literature shows violation of expected empathy from and for others, inherent in our nature, is more devastating than violation of the ethical code of our culture or sub-culture, adherence to which becomes urgent as our need emerges to belong to the culture or subculture of which we are a part, values which often contradict our innate sense of "what is right."

  20. Moral Values and Attitudes Toward Dutch Sow Husbandry

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Bergstra, T.J.; Gremmen, H.G.J.; Stassen, E.N.

    2015-01-01

    Attitudes toward sow husbandry differ between citizens and conventional pig farmers. Research showed that moral values could only predict the judgment of people in case of culling healthy animals in the course of a disease epidemic to a certain extent. Therefore, we hypothesized that attitudes of

  1. Moral and Social Reasoning in Autism Spectrum Disorders

    Science.gov (United States)

    Shulman, Cory; Guberman, Ainat; Shiling, Noa; Bauminger, Nirit

    2012-01-01

    This study compared moral and social reasoning in individuals with and without autism spectrum disorders (ASD). Ten familiar schoolyard transgressions were shown to 18 participants with and 18 participants without ASD. They judged the appropriateness of the behavior and explained their judgments. Analysis of the rationales revealed that…

  2. The immoral landscape? Scientists are associated with violations of morality

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Rutjens, B.T.; Heine, S.J.

    2016-01-01

    Do people think that scientists are bad people? Although surveys find that science is a highly respected profession, a growing discourse has emerged regarding how science is often judged negatively. We report ten studies (N = 2328) that investigated morality judgments of scientists and compared

  3. Juicios morales y fronteras biológicas: más allá de la frontera razón / emoción

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Cabezas, Mar

    2013-08-01

    Full Text Available We build boundaries that are theoretically based on biological grounds and we derive moral judgments from them. Likewise, we take for granted that emotions such as fear, disgust or rage were the element that led us to this mistake, especially when we realise the logical inconsistency of deriving moral judgments in this way. Consequently, we often associate emotions with prejudices, beliefs or fallacies, which we ought to free ourselves from. However, emotions are not the cause of the problem. Firstly, because the classical dichotomical framework that defends the reason/emotion polarity is also questionable. Secondly, because emotions, as alarms which transmit important information, may be a key element in the discovery and overcoming of the discriminations that arise at the boundaries of dichotomies. Thus, the aim here is to analyse the relationship between these three elements: biological boundaries, moral judgments and emotions. And then toargue in favour of the links between reason and emotions as a way of surpassing the old dichotomic model, and, to conclude, I will point out some of the benefits of replacing a dualistic framework by an interactive one.Construimos fronteras con supuesta base biológica y derivamos juicios morales de ellas. Asimismo, suponemos que fueron nuestras emociones —el miedo, el asco o la rabia— las que nos llevaron a tal error, especialmente cuando nos damos cuenta de la inconsistencia lógica de derivar juicios morales de dichas fronteras. En consecuencia, solemos identificar emociones con prejuicios, creencias u opciones falaces de las que más nos valdría librarnos. Sin embargo, como se tratará de argumentar a continuación, las emociones no son la causa del problema. Primero, porque el marco conceptual clásico dicotómico en el que razón y emoción son dos polos opuestos regidos por una tensión irreconciliable es a su vez cuestionable. Segundo, porque las emociones, en cuanto alarmas transmisoras de

  4. Moral Education in Taiwan.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Meyer, Jeffrey F.

    1988-01-01

    Reports the attitudes of 80 Taiwanese teachers of morality about moral education in the face of drastic social change and modernization. Discusses the content and nature of traditional Chinese morality, the effects of contemporary culture on children's moral development, and teaching methods. Contains 18 references. (SV)

  5. Educating Moral Emotions or Moral Selves: A False Dichotomy?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kristjansson, Kristjan

    2010-01-01

    In the post-Kohlbergian era of moral education, a "moral gap" has been identified between moral cognition and moral action. Contemporary moral psychologists lock horns over how this gap might be bridged. The two main contenders for such bridge-building are moral emotions and moral selves. I explore these two options from an Aristotelian…

  6. Remedies for moral damage before the European Court of Human Rights: Cyprus v. Turkey case

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Đajić Sanja

    2014-01-01

    Full Text Available This article provides the overview of the Cyprus v. Turkey judgment, a recently decided case before the Grand Chamber of the European Court for Human Rights. This is the first inter-State case which ended with pecuniary judgment for moral damages. The article begins with the overview of factual and legal issues in the Cyprus v. Turkey case which is followed by contextualizing this judgment within the general legal framework regarding moral damages and remedies available. The second part provides the insight into the case law of the International Court of Justice, European Court for Human Rights and international investment arbitration in order to assess the status of moral damages under general international law. While all international courts and tribunals recognize moral damage as a cause of action, they seem to respond differently to the issue of remedies. International Court of Justice seems to favour declaratory over pecuniary judgments; European Court of Human Rights tend to award both non-pecuniary and pecuniary remedies for moral damages; international investment tribunals seem to favour pecuniary remedies for moral damages. A separate issue is whether international law permits or rather proscribes punitive damages. While the ILC finds that general international law does not allow for punitive damages there are different opinions, at least within the ECHR setting, that moral damages are inherently punitive for fault-based conduct of the responsible state.

  7. Brogaard's Moral Contextualism

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Binderup, Lars Grassme

    2008-01-01

    Brogaard's non-indexical version of moral contextualism has two related problems. It is unable to account for the function of truth-governed assertoric moral discourse, since it leaves two (semantically clearheaded) disputants without any incentive to resolve seemingly contradictory moral claims....... non-objectivist, but less revisionist, since it takes the semantics of moral discourse at face value, and can also explain all of Brogaard's other linguistic evidence.......Brogaard's non-indexical version of moral contextualism has two related problems. It is unable to account for the function of truth-governed assertoric moral discourse, since it leaves two (semantically clearheaded) disputants without any incentive to resolve seemingly contradictory moral claims....... The moral contextualist could explain why people do feel such an incentive by ascribing false beliefs about the semantic workings of their own language. But, secondly, this leaves Brogaard's moral contextualism looking weaker than a Mackie-style invariantist error theory about morals. The latter is equally...

  8. Defining Legal Moralism

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Thaysen, Jens Damgaard

    2015-01-01

    This paper discusses how legal moralism should be defined. It is argued that legal moralism should be defined as the position that “For any X, it is always a pro tanto reason for justifiably imposing legal regulation on X that X is morally wrong (where “morally wrong” is not conceptually equivalent...... to “harmful”)”. Furthermore, a distinction between six types of legal moralism is made. The six types are grouped according to whether they are concerned with the enforcement of positive or critical morality, and whether they are concerned with criminalising, legally restricting, or refraining from legally...... protecting morally wrong behaviour. This is interesting because not all types of legal moralism are equally vulnerable to the different critiques of legal moralism that have been put forth. Indeed, I show that some interesting types of legal moralism have not been criticised at all....

  9. Original and Derived Judgment

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Foss, Kirsten; Foss, Nicolai Juul; Klein, Peter G.

    may delegate a wide range of decision rights to subordinates, who exercise derived judgment. We call these employees "proxy-entrepreneurs," and ask how the firm's or-ganizational structure — its formal and informal systems of rewards and punishments, rules for settling disputes and renegotiating...... agreements, means of evaluating perform-ance, and so on — can be designed to encourage forms of proxy-entrepreneurship that increase firm value while discouraging actions that destroy value. Building on key ideas from the entrepreneurship literature, Austrian economics, and the economic theory of the firm we...

  10. Deontological coherence: A framework for commonsense moral reasoning.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Holyoak, Keith J; Powell, Derek

    2016-11-01

    We review a broad range of work, primarily in cognitive and social psychology, that provides insight into the processes of moral judgment. In particular, we consider research on pragmatic reasoning about regulations and on coherence in decision making, both areas in which psychological theories have been guided by work in legal philosophy. Armed with these essential prerequisites, we sketch a psychological framework for how ordinary people make judgments about moral issues. Based on a literature review, we show how the framework of deontological coherence unifies findings in moral psychology that have often been explained in terms of a grab-bag of heuristics and biases. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved).

  11. The Socio-Moral Image Database (SMID): A novel stimulus set for the study of social, moral and affective processes.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Crone, Damien L; Bode, Stefan; Murawski, Carsten; Laham, Simon M

    2018-01-01

    A major obstacle for the design of rigorous, reproducible studies in moral psychology is the lack of suitable stimulus sets. Here, we present the Socio-Moral Image Database (SMID), the largest standardized moral stimulus set assembled to date, containing 2,941 freely available photographic images, representing a wide range of morally (and affectively) positive, negative and neutral content. The SMID was validated with over 820,525 individual judgments from 2,716 participants, with normative ratings currently available for all images on affective valence and arousal, moral wrongness, and relevance to each of the five moral values posited by Moral Foundations Theory. We present a thorough analysis of the SMID regarding (1) inter-rater consensus, (2) rating precision, and (3) breadth and variability of moral content. Additionally, we provide recommendations for use aimed at efficient study design and reproducibility, and outline planned extensions to the database. We anticipate that the SMID will serve as a useful resource for psychological, neuroscientific and computational (e.g., natural language processing or computer vision) investigations of social, moral and affective processes. The SMID images, along with associated normative data and additional resources are available at https://osf.io/2rqad/.

  12. Not Just Bad Actions: Affective Concern for Bad Outcomes Contributes to Moral Condemnation of Harm in Moral Dilemmas.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Reynolds, Caleb J; Conway, Paul

    2018-02-01

    Moral dilemmas typically entail directly causing harm (said to violate deontological ethics) to maximize overall outcomes (said to uphold utilitarian ethics). The dual process model suggests harm-rejection judgments derive from affective reactions to harm, whereas harm-acceptance judgments derive from cognitive evaluations of outcomes. Recently, Miller, Hannikainen, and Cushman (2014) argued that harm-rejection judgments primarily reflect self-focused-rather than other-focused-emotional responses, because only action aversion (self-focused reactions to the thought of causing harm), not outcome aversion (other-focused reactions to witnessing suffering), consistently predicted dilemma responses. However, they assessed only conventional relative dilemma judgments that treat harm-rejection and outcome-maximization responses as diametric opposites. Instead, we employed process dissociation to assess these response inclinations independently. In two studies (N = 558), we replicated Miller and colleagues' findings for conventional relative judgments, but process dissociation revealed that outcome aversion positively predicted both deontological and utilitarian inclinations-which canceled out for relative judgments. Additionally, individual differences associated with affective processing-psychopathy and empathic concern-correlated with the deontology but not utilitarian parameter. Together, these findings suggest that genuine other-oriented moralized concern for others' well-being contribute to both utilitarian and deontological response tendencies, but these tendencies nonetheless draw upon different psychological processes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

  13. Breadwinning Moms, Caregiving Dads: Double Standard in Social Judgments of Gender Norm Violators

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gaunt, Ruth

    2013-01-01

    This study explores the role of gender ideologies in moderating social judgments of gender norm violators. Three hundred and eleven participants evaluated a male or a female target who was either a primary breadwinner or a primary caregiver. Attributions of personal traits, moral emotions, and marital emotions were examined. Results showed that…

  14. Sociological concept of morale

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Marjanović Miloš

    2012-01-01

    Full Text Available The author first discusses the overall unity of the total normative regulation, from which it is separated in the late Roman empire the right, but only in the new century and the morale. There are analyzed the relationship between the moral and ethical reflection and Weber's distinction between pure ethics will (Gesinnungsethik and ethics of responsibility (Verantwortungsethik. The morale is determined by the good as the highest value, as a specific form of social norms but also as a kind of human behavior. These three definitions can be combined in an integrative approach. There are examined the dimensions of moral statements, subjective and objective side of morality, as well as the difference between morale and morality. A general notion of morale can not be defined in substantive but only in formal way . The formal definition is a constituent of general as well as of sociological concept of morale and it is related to morality as a social phenomenon. Its essence is to define the morale by specific norms, the characteristics of the internal and external mandatory (with the pricks of conscience as the most distinctive moral sanction and control exercised by the formal not institutionalized or diffuse society , and in consideration of morality as a social process (actions of people associated moral norms . The basic types of social moral process - being, education, functioning and changing of morale are described. There are briefly analyzed the influence of society to the morale and social function of morale, with special emphasis on the relationship between law and morale.

  15. Implicit Theories and Offender Representativeness in Judgments About Sexual Crime.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Harper, Craig A; Bartels, Ross M

    2018-04-01

    Implicit theories structure the way people understand and respond to various human actions. Typically, people believe attributes are either fixed (entitists) or malleable (incrementalists). The present study aimed to examine (a) whether attitudes toward sexual offenders differ depending upon one's implicit theory about human nature and sexual offenders, and (b) whether implicit theories are associated with judgments made about different types of child abusers. A sample of 252 community participants was recruited. Their attitudes, implicit theories, and political orientation were assessed via self-report. One of three vignettes describing an incidence of child sexual abuse was then presented. The cases were identical except the perpetrator was either an adult male, an adult female, or a male juvenile. Participants then made judgments about the offender's deserved sentence and moral character. Entitists (across both domains) held more negative attitudes than incrementalists, although the magnitude of the difference was greatest when examining implicit theories about sexual offenders. Compared with those with an incremental theory of sexual offenders, entity theorists judged sexual offending to be more (a) indicative of the perpetrator's moral character and (b) deserving of punishment. However, scores were greater toward the adult male relative to the adult female and juvenile. The findings suggest that implicit theories about sexual offenders are domain specific. They also indicate that judgments made by those with an entity theory (about sexual offenders) are affected by whether a case is representative of a stereotypical sexual offender. Implications of the findings are discussed, along with limitations and future research.

  16. TEORI PERKEMBANGAN MORAL DAN MODEL PENDIDIKAN MORAL

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Agus Abdul Rahman

    2018-02-01

    Full Text Available Moral values and it’s decadence were one of many problems that in Indonesia, whereas becoming a huge responsibility that hold by all member of society. The inquiry, designing and implementation of moral education strategy is foreseen as the most important aspect to improve society. Aside from great efforts to improve society, it is imperative that we also need to review and inquire more about moral development theory. Nowadays, it seems that moral development theory had moved from its role and position which moved from its autonomic, rationalistic and universalistic nature to more emotionally roles and becoming more culture bounded. The changes in society paradigm were also have many implications on education of moral development. In this paper there are at least 3 models that can be used in moral education, which are the learning of rule ethics, character ethics and the integration of both in multidimensional fields.

  17. Moral motivation based on multiple developmental structures: an exploration of cognitive and emotional dynamics.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kaplan, Ulas; Tivnan, Terrence

    2014-01-01

    Intrapersonal variability and multiplicity in the complexity of moral motivation were examined from Dynamic Systems and Self-Determination Theory perspectives. L. Kohlberg's (1969) stages of moral development are reconceptualized as soft-assembled and dynamically transformable process structures of motivation that may operate simultaneously within person in different degrees. Moral motivation is conceptualized as the real-time process of self-organization of cognitive and emotional dynamics out of which moral judgment and action emerge. A detailed inquiry into intrapersonal variation in moral motivation is carried out based on the differential operation of multiple motivational structures. A total of 74 high school students and 97 college students participated in the study by completing a new questionnaire, involving 3 different hypothetical moral judgments. As hypothesized, findings revealed significant multiplicity in the within-person operation of developmental stage structures, and intrapersonal variability in the degrees to which stages were used. Developmental patterns were found in terms of different distributions of multiple stages between high school and college samples, as well as the association between age and overall motivation scores. Differential relations of specific emotions to moral motivation revealed and confirmed the value of differentiating multiple emotions. Implications of the present theoretical perspective and the findings for understanding the complexity of moral judgment and motivation are discussed.

  18. A Law of Comparative Judgment.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Thurstone, L. L.

    1994-01-01

    The law of comparative judgment is described, and applications in the measurement of psychological values are reviewed. The law defines the psychological continuum and expresses the experimentally observed proportion of judgments as a function of scale values of stimuli, their respective discriminal dispersions, and the correlation between paired…

  19. Pitfalls in Teaching Judgment Heuristics

    Science.gov (United States)

    Shepperd, James A.; Koch, Erika J.

    2005-01-01

    Demonstrations of judgment heuristics typically focus on how heuristics can lead to poor judgments. However, exclusive focus on the negative consequences of heuristics can prove problematic. We illustrate the problem with the representativeness heuristic and present a study (N = 45) that examined how examples influence understanding of the…

  20. The Role of Moral Beliefs, Memories, and Preferences in Representations of Identity.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Heiphetz, Larisa; Strohminger, Nina; Young, Liane L

    2017-04-01

    People perceive that if their memories and moral beliefs changed, they would change. We investigated why individuals respond this way. In Study 1, participants judged that identity would change more after changes to memories and widely shared moral beliefs (e.g., about murder) versus preferences and controversial moral beliefs (e.g., about abortion). The extent to which participants judged that changes would affect their relationships predicted identity change (Study 2) and mediated the relationship between type of moral belief and perceived identity change (Study 3). We discuss the role that social relationships play in judgments of identity and highlight implications for psychology and philosophy. Copyright © 2016 Cognitive Science Society, Inc.

  1. Moral Education as Intercultural Moral Education

    Science.gov (United States)

    Frisancho, Susana; Delgado, Guillermo Enrique

    2018-01-01

    In a diverse country such as Peru, moral education should reflect social, cultural, political and spiritual dilemmas of both indigenous and non-indigenous peoples and their communities. To promote understanding and respect amongst people from different sociocultural backgrounds, moral education should encourage a dialogue between indigenous values…

  2. Moral Appearances: Emotions, Robots, and Human Morality.

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Coeckelbergh, Mark

    2010-01-01

    Can we build ‘moral robots’? If morality depends on emotions, the answer seems negative. Current robots do not meet standard necessary conditions for having emotions: they lack consciousness, mental states, and feelings. Moreover, it is not even clear how we might ever establish whether robots

  3. Reactions to morally motivated deviance

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Cramwinckel, F.M.; Van den Bos, K.; Van Dijk, E.

    2015-01-01

    People value morality in themselves and others. They want to be moral and good individuals, associate themselves with others who share their moral values, and belong to moral groups. As an ironic consequence of the importance of morality, people sometimes respond negatively to morally motivated

  4. Moral Education in Pakistan.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Haq, Shafiqua

    1980-01-01

    This report describes formal and informal methods of moral education operative in Pakistan. The nation's Islamic environment is explained; school policy, objectives, and practices are outlined; and informal moral education efforts through the mass media are noted. Problems in moral education in Pakistan and proposals for the future are discussed.…

  5. Sentimentalist Moral Education

    Science.gov (United States)

    Slote, Michael

    2010-01-01

    Care ethics, and moral sentimentalism more generally, have not developed a picture of moral education that is comparable in scope or depth to the rationalist/Kantian/Rawlsian account of moral education that has been offered by Lawrence Kohlberg. But it is possible to do so if one borrows from the work of Martin Hoffman and makes systematic use of…

  6. Mapping the Moral Domain

    Science.gov (United States)

    Graham, Jesse; Nosek, Brian A.; Haidt, Jonathan; Iyer, Ravi; Koleva, Spassena; Ditto, Peter H.

    2010-01-01

    The moral domain is broader than the empathy and justice concerns assessed by existing measures of moral competence, and it is not just a subset of the values assessed by value inventories. To fill the need for reliable and theoretically-grounded measurement of the full range of moral concerns, we developed the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) based on a theoretical model of five universally available (but variably developed) sets of moral intuitions: Harm/care, Fairness/reciprocity, Ingroup/loyalty, Authority/respect, and Purity/sanctity. We present evidence for the internal and external validity of the scale and the model, and in doing so present new findings about morality: 1. Comparative model fitting of confirmatory factor analyses provides empirical justification for a five-factor structure of moral concerns. 2. Convergent/discriminant validity evidence suggests that moral concerns predict personality features and social group attitudes not previously considered morally relevant. 3. We establish pragmatic validity of the measure in providing new knowledge and research opportunities concerning demographic and cultural differences in moral intuitions. These analyses provide evidence for the usefulness of Moral Foundations Theory in simultaneously increasing the scope and sharpening the resolution of psychological views of morality. PMID:21244182

  7. Are Psychopaths Morally Sensitive?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Maxwell, Bruce; Le Sage, Leonie

    2009-01-01

    Philosophical and psychological opinion is divided over whether moral sensitivity, understood as the ability to pick out a situation's morally salient features, necessarily involves emotional engagement. This paper seeks to offer insight into this question. It reasons that if moral sensitivity does draw significantly on affective capacities of…

  8. A Single Counterexample Leads to Moral Belief Revision.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Horne, Zachary; Powell, Derek; Hummel, John

    2015-11-01

    What kind of evidence will lead people to revise their moral beliefs? Moral beliefs are often strongly held convictions, and existing research has shown that morality is rooted in emotion and socialization rather than deliberative reasoning. In addition, more general issues-such as confirmation bias-further impede coherent belief revision. Here, we explored a unique means for inducing belief revision. In two experiments, participants considered a moral dilemma in which an overwhelming majority of people judged that it was inappropriate to take action to maximize utility. Their judgments contradicted a utilitarian principle they otherwise strongly endorsed. Exposure to this scenario led participants to revise their belief in the utilitarian principle, and this revision persisted over several hours. This method provides a new avenue for inducing belief revision. Copyright © 2015 Cognitive Science Society, Inc.

  9. The moral roots of environmental attitudes.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Feinberg, Matthew; Willer, Robb

    2013-01-01

    Americans' attitudes about the environment are highly polarized, but it is unclear why this is the case. We conducted five studies to examine this issue. Studies 1a and 1b demonstrated that liberals, but not conservatives, view the environment in moral terms and that this tendency partially explains the relation between political ideology and environmental attitudes. Content analyses of newspaper op-eds (Study 2a) and public-service announcements (Study 2b) found that contemporary environmental discourse is based largely on moral concerns related to harm and care, which are more deeply held by liberals than by conservatives. However, we found that reframing proenvironmental rhetoric in terms of purity, a moral value resonating primarily among conservatives, largely eliminated the difference between liberals' and conservatives' environmental attitudes (Study 3). These results establish the importance of moralization as a cause of polarization on environmental attitudes and suggest that reframing environmental discourse in different moral terms can reduce the gap between liberals and conservatives in environmental concern.

  10. From ethics of care to psychology of care: reconnecting ethics of care to contemporary moral psychology.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Govrin, Aner

    2014-01-01

    Moral psychology once regarded ethics of care as a promising theory. However, there is evidence to suggest that nowadays moral psychology completely ignores ethics of care's various insights. Moreover, ethics of care's core concepts - compassion, dependence, and the importance of early relations to moral development- are no longer considered to be relevant to the development of new theories in the field. In this paper, I will firstly discuss some of the reasons which, over recent years, have contributed to the marginalization of the role of ethics of care in moral psychology. Next, I will show that ethics of care's most promising idea centered on the care given to an infant and the importance of that care to the development of moral thinking. In this context, I will be describing the implications of John Bowlby's attachment theories, infant research, findings in moral psychology and neuroscience. I will argue that ethics of care needs to be radically re-thought and replaced by a psychology of care, an attachment approach to moral judgment, which would establish the centrality of the caregiver's role in moral development. The philosophical implications of this approach to the understanding of the "rationalists" and "intuitionists" debate about the true nature of moral judgment is also discussed.

  11. From ethics of care to psychology of care - Reconnecting ethics of care to contemporary moral psychology

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Aner eGovrin

    2014-10-01

    Full Text Available Moral psychology once regarded ethics of care as a promising theory. However, there is evidence to suggest that nowadays moral psychology completely ignores ethics of care’s various insights. Moreover, ethics of care’s core concepts – compassion, dependence, and the importance of early relations to moral development– are no longer considered to be relevant to the development of new theories in the field. In this paper, I will firstly discuss some of the reasons which, over recent years, have contributed to the marginalization of the role of ethics of care in moral psychology. Next, I will show that ethics of care’s most promising idea centered on the care given to an infant and the importance of that care to the development of moral thinking. In this context, I will be describing the implications of John Bowlby’s attachment theories, infant research, findings in moral psychology and neuroscience. I will argue that ethics of care needs to be radically re-thought and replaced by a psychology of care, an attachment approach to moral judgment, which would establish the centrality of the caregiver’s role in moral development. The philosophical implications of this approach to the understanding of the 'rationalists’’ and ‘intuitionists’’ debate about the true nature of moral judgment is also discussed.

  12. Morally autonomous practice?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Scott, P A

    1998-12-01

    The structures and contexts within which nurses work results in the moral agency and moral autonomy of the nurse being compromised. This claim results from a confusion of (1) the concept of autonomy with those of freedom and independence; and (2) a confusion of the notion of moral autonomy with that of autonomous professional practice. The drawing of appropriate distinctions allows clarification of the relevant concepts. It also underlines the responsibility of practitioners to recognize the moral dimension of their practice, and the moral implications of their actions, as they attempt to meet the health care needs of their patients and develop practice professionally.

  13. Religion, morality, evolution.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bloom, Paul

    2012-01-01

    How did religion evolve? What effect does religion have on our moral beliefs and moral actions? These questions are related, as some scholars propose that religion has evolved to enhance altruistic behavior toward members of one's group. I review here data from survey studies (both within and across countries), priming experiments, and correlational studies of the effects of religion on racial prejudice. I conclude that religion has powerfully good moral effects and powerfully bad moral effects, but these are due to aspects of religion that are shared by other human practices. There is surprisingly little evidence for a moral effect of specifically religious beliefs.

  14. Moral Learning: Conceptual foundations and normative relevance.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Railton, Peter

    2017-10-01

    What is distinctive about a bringing a learning perspective to moral psychology? Part of the answer lies in the remarkable transformations that have taken place in learning theory over the past two decades, which have revealed how powerful experience-based learning can be in the acquisition of abstract causal and evaluative representations, including generative models capable of attuning perception, cognition, affect, and action to the physical and social environment. When conjoined with developments in neuroscience, these advances in learning theory permit a rethinking of fundamental questions about the acquisition of moral understanding and its role in the guidance of behavior. For example, recent research indicates that spatial learning and navigation involve the formation of non-perspectival as well as ego-centric models of the physical environment, and that spatial representations are combined with learned information about risk and reward to guide choice and potentiate further learning. Research on infants provides evidence that they form non-perspectival expected-value representations of agents and actions as well, which help them to navigate the human environment. Such representations can be formed by highly-general mental processes such as causal and empathic simulation, and thus afford a foundation for spontaneous moral learning and action that requires no innate moral faculty and can exhibit substantial autonomy with respect to community norms. If moral learning is indeed integral with the acquisition and updating of casual and evaluative models, this affords a new way of understanding well-known but seemingly puzzling patterns in intuitive moral judgment-including the notorious "trolley problems." Copyright © 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  15. La especificidad del discurso moral en Kant

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mumbrú Mora, Àlex

    2014-06-01

    Full Text Available The main aim of our paper is to show that the specificity of moral speech forces Kant to introduce an exposition model that does not properly fit into none of the two models presented by Kant in the 59th paragraph of the Critique of Judgment. Halfway through schema and symbol, the notion of typus serves as a mediating element between the moral law and each of its possible realizations.El objetivo del presente artículo es mostrar cómo la especificidad del discurso moral obliga a introducir un modo de exposición de nuestros conceptos que no acaba de ajustarse plenamente a ninguno de los dos modelos presentados por Kant en el parágrafo 59 de la Crítica de la facultad de juzgar. Situándose a medio camino de esquema y símbolo, la noción de «tipo» (Typus actúa como elemento mediador entre la ley moral y cada una de sus posibles concreciones.

  16. Moral Hard-Wiring and Moral Enhancement.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Persson, Ingmar; Savulescu, Julian

    2017-05-01

    We have argued for an urgent need for moral bioenhancement; that human moral psychology is limited in its ability to address current existential threats due to the evolutionary function of morality to maximize cooperation in small groups. We address here Powell and Buchanan's novel objection that there is an 'inclusivist anomaly': humans have the capacity to care beyond in-groups. They propose that 'exclusivist' (group-based) morality is sensitive to environmental cues that historically indicated out-group threat. When this is not present, we are inclusivist. They conclude that moral bioenhancement is unnecessary or less effective than socio-cultural interventions. We argue that Powell and Buchanan underestimate the hard-wiring features of moral psychology; their appeal to adaptively plastic, conditionally expressed responses accounts for only a fragment of our moral psychology. In addition to restrictions on our altruistic concern that their account addresses - such as racism and sexism - there are ones it is ill-suited to address: that our concern is stronger for kin and friends and for concrete individuals rather than for statistical lives; also our bias towards the near future. Hard-wired features of our moral psychology that are not clearly restrictions in altruistic concern also include reciprocity, tit-for-tat, and others. Biomedical means are not the only, and maybe not the most important, means of moral enhancement. Socio-cultural means are of great importance and there are currently no biomedical interventions for many hard-wired features. Nevertheless research is desirable because the influence of these features is greater than our critics think. © 2017 The Authors Bioethics Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

  17. Brogaard's Moral Contextualism

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Binderup, Lars Grassme

    2008-01-01

    Brogaard's non-indexical version of moral contextualism has two related problems. It is unable to account for the function of truth-governed assertoric moral discourse, since it leaves two (semantically clearheaded) disputants without any incentive to resolve seemingly contradictory moral claims....... The moral contextualist could explain why people do feel such an incentive by ascribing false beliefs about the semantic workings of their own language. But, secondly, this leaves Brogaard's moral contextualism looking weaker than a Mackie-style invariantist error theory about morals. The latter is equally...... non-objectivist, but less revisionist, since it takes the semantics of moral discourse at face value, and can also explain all of Brogaard's other linguistic evidence....

  18. The Immoral Landscape? Scientists Are Associated with Violations of Morality.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rutjens, Bastiaan T; Heine, Steven J

    2016-01-01

    Do people think that scientists are bad people? Although surveys find that science is a highly respected profession, a growing discourse has emerged regarding how science is often judged negatively. We report ten studies (N = 2328) that investigated morality judgments of scientists and compared those with judgments of various control groups, including atheists. A persistent intuitive association between scientists and disturbing immoral conduct emerged for violations of the binding moral foundations, particularly when this pertained to violations of purity. However, there was no association in the context of the individualizing moral foundations related to fairness and care. Other evidence found that scientists were perceived as similar to others in their concerns with the individualizing moral foundations of fairness and care, yet as departing for all of the binding foundations of loyalty, authority, and purity. Furthermore, participants stereotyped scientists particularly as robot-like and lacking emotions, as well as valuing knowledge over morality and being potentially dangerous. The observed intuitive immorality associations are partially due to these explicit stereotypes but do not correlate with any perceived atheism. We conclude that scientists are perceived not as inherently immoral, but as capable of immoral conduct.

  19. Justice and Immigration: The Effect of Moral Exclusion

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Stefano Passini

    2018-02-01

    Full Text Available Numerous media news items suggest on a daily basis that people tend to use harsher criteria when they judge immigrants than members of their own in-group. In the present research project, we were interested in studying individual justice judgments of a violation of a law by an Italian (in-group or an immigrant (out-group member and the influence of moral exclusion processes on the assessment. In particular, we examined whether those people who tend to exclude out-groups from their scope of justice will give such biased judgments and will adopt double standards, while inclusive people will not. A total of 255 people evaluated the seriousness of a crime in two different law-breaking scenarios in which the offender’s and the victim’s nationalities were systematically changed (either Italian or Romanian. Moreover, participants completed a scale measuring the moral inclusion/exclusion of other social groups. As hypothesized, participants who tended to exclude some groups from their moral community judged the Romanian more harshly than the Italian culprit. On the contrary, those people that tended to have a more inclusive moral community did not show any difference in evaluation. In conclusion, the present research highlights the importance of considering the effect of moral inclusion/exclusion processes on the evaluation of justice events, especially in an intergroup context.

  20. The Immoral Landscape? Scientists Are Associated with Violations of Morality.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Bastiaan T Rutjens

    Full Text Available Do people think that scientists are bad people? Although surveys find that science is a highly respected profession, a growing discourse has emerged regarding how science is often judged negatively. We report ten studies (N = 2328 that investigated morality judgments of scientists and compared those with judgments of various control groups, including atheists. A persistent intuitive association between scientists and disturbing immoral conduct emerged for violations of the binding moral foundations, particularly when this pertained to violations of purity. However, there was no association in the context of the individualizing moral foundations related to fairness and care. Other evidence found that scientists were perceived as similar to others in their concerns with the individualizing moral foundations of fairness and care, yet as departing for all of the binding foundations of loyalty, authority, and purity. Furthermore, participants stereotyped scientists particularly as robot-like and lacking emotions, as well as valuing knowledge over morality and being potentially dangerous. The observed intuitive immorality associations are partially due to these explicit stereotypes but do not correlate with any perceived atheism. We conclude that scientists are perceived not as inherently immoral, but as capable of immoral conduct.

  1. Binding Moral Foundations and the Narrowing of Ideological Conflict to the Traditional Morality Domain.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Malka, Ariel; Osborne, Danny; Soto, Christopher J; Greaves, Lara M; Sibley, Chris G; Lelkes, Yphtach

    2016-09-01

    Moral foundations theory (MFT) posits that binding moral foundations (purity, authority, and ingroup loyalty) are rooted in the need for groups to promote order and cohesion, and that they therefore underlie political conservatism. We present evidence that binding foundations (and the related construct of disgust sensitivity) are associated with lower levels of ideological polarization on political issues outside the domain of moral traditionalism. Consistent support for this hypothesis was obtained from three large American Internet-based samples and one large national sample of New Zealanders (combined N = 7,874). We suggest that when political issues do not have inherent relevance to moral traditionalism, binding foundations promote a small centrist shift away from ideologically prescribed positions, and that they do so out of desire for national uniformity and cohesion. © 2016 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.

  2. Automatic Expansion of a Social Judgment Lexicon for Sentiment Analysis

    OpenAIRE

    Silva, Mário J.; Carvalho, Paula; Costa, Carlos; Sarmento, Luís

    2010-01-01

    Reviewed by Francisco Couto We present a new method for automatically enlarging a sentiment lexicon for mining social judgments from text, i.e., extracting opinions about human subjects. We use a two-step approach: first, we find which adjectives can be used as human modifiers, and then we assign their polarity attribute. To identify the human modifiers, we developed a set of hand-crafted lexico-syntactic rules representing elementary copular and adnominal constructions where such predicat...

  3. Are 'counter-intuitive' deontological judgments really counter-intuitive? An empirical reply to.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Paxton, Joseph M; Bruni, Tommaso; Greene, Joshua D

    2014-09-01

    A substantial body of evidence indicates that utilitarian judgments (favoring the greater good) made in response to difficult moral dilemmas are preferentially supported by controlled, reflective processes, whereas deontological judgments (favoring rights/duties) in such cases are preferentially supported by automatic, intuitive processes. A recent neuroimaging study by Kahane et al. challenges this claim, using a new set of moral dilemmas that allegedly reverse the previously observed association. We report on a study in which we both induced and measured reflective responding to one of Greene et al.'s original dilemmas and one of Kahane et al.'s new dilemmas. For the original dilemma, induced reflection led to more utilitarian responding, replicating previous findings using the same methods. There was no overall effect of induced reflection for the new dilemma. However, for both dilemmas, the degree to which an individual engaged in prior reflection predicted the subsequent degree of utilitarian responding, with more reflective subjects providing more utilitarian judgments. These results cast doubt on Kahane et al.'s conclusions and buttress the original claim linking controlled, reflective processes to utilitarian judgment and automatic, intuitive processes to deontological judgment. Importantly, these results also speak to the generality of the underlying theory, indicating that what holds for cases involving utilitarian physical harms also holds for cases involving utilitarian lies. © The Author (2013). Published by Oxford University Press. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.

  4. Morality and Psychopathic Criminals. Ethicocentrism, Mental Incapacity, Free Will, and the Fear of Decriminalization

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Lorenzo Magnani

    2012-01-01

    Full Text Available Present-day legal judgments of psychopathic criminals strongly avoid the exploitation of “moral” considerations. Currently, the attribution of responsibility to criminals often takes advantage of the cognitive concept of mental incapacity so that, in these cases, the moral judgment about moral conducts of “psycho-pathological” criminals is potentially extinguished. I contend that the theories and methods that are currently used in western societies to discharge moral and legal responsibility are not clear in their epistemic structure and so partially unreliable. To support this conclusion I take advantage of my recent cognitive studies concerning the multiplicity of moral frameworks, the gene/cognitive niche co-evolution, and the concept of free will.

  5. Morality and moral development: Traditional Hindu concepts

    Science.gov (United States)

    Srivastava, Chhitij; Dhingra, Vishal; Bhardwaj, Anupam; Srivastava, Alka

    2013-01-01

    Morality (from the Latin word moralitas that means “manner, character, proper behavior”) is the differentiation of intentions, decisions, and actions between those that are good (or right) and those that are bad (or wrong). It is determined by how one's genetic makeup interacts with the environment. The development of morality has been a subject of investigation for a number of decades, and our understanding of neuro-biological and psychological mechanisms has increased manifolds in the last few decades. Development of morality has been of particular significance to psychiatric literature because of its significant contribution to the development of one's personality and it's aberration in various disorders. Cultures that have been just, equal and moral have been widely accepted and appreciated. In this review, we shall summarize the modern theories of moral development and then look into a part of our past and cultural heritage and review the traditional Hindu concepts of morality and their contribution to development of one's personality and their relevance in the current times. PMID:23858269

  6. Eager feelings and vigilant reasons: Regulatory focus differences in judging moral wrongs

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cornwell, James F. M.; Higgins, E. Tory

    2015-01-01

    For over a decade, moral psychologists have been actively researching the processes underlying moral judgments that are made intuitively without reference to an action’s concrete harms or injustice, such as the well-known case of non-procreative, consensual incest. We suggest that the reason some judge this scenario as wrong (using intuitive feelings) and others do not (using deliberative reasons) is due to an important motivational distinction. Consistent with this view, across seven studies, we demonstrate that negative judgments of such intuitive moral scenarios are more intense when processed in the promotion focus compared to the prevention focus, and that this is due to differences in whether eager (intuitive) versus vigilant (deliberative) means are employed in judging these moral wrongs. By examining various boundary conditions for this phenomenon and foundations for these judgments, we learn about the overall differences between promotion and prevention regarding how proscriptive judgments are processed, and begin to integrate these differences with existing theories in moral psychology. PMID:26726912

  7. Social class rank, essentialism, and punitive judgment.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kraus, Michael W; Keltner, Dacher

    2013-08-01

    Recent evidence suggests that perceptions of social class rank influence a variety of social cognitive tendencies, from patterns of causal attribution to moral judgment. In the present studies we tested the hypotheses that upper-class rank individuals would be more likely to endorse essentialist lay theories of social class categories (i.e., that social class is founded in genetically based, biological differences) than would lower-class rank individuals and that these beliefs would decrease support for restorative justice--which seeks to rehabilitate offenders, rather than punish unlawful action. Across studies, higher social class rank was associated with increased essentialism of social class categories (Studies 1, 2, and 4) and decreased support for restorative justice (Study 4). Moreover, manipulated essentialist beliefs decreased preferences for restorative justice (Study 3), and the association between social class rank and class-based essentialist theories was explained by the tendency to endorse beliefs in a just world (Study 2). Implications for how class-based essentialist beliefs potentially constrain social opportunity and mobility are discussed.

  8. Moral Education in Japan

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Roesgaard, Marie Højlund

    ‘religion’ is not a subject in schools. So, how do the Japanese go about the business of teaching values and morality? Using the Japanese example, this volume looks at moral education from the basic point of view of universal and common human values, with due attention given to culture-specific traits....... It places moral education within the context of globalization and cosmopolitanism and shows, that moral education in Japan is a useful key to understanding how globalization and cosmopolitanism can work within a specific system, in this case Japanese values education. In recent years various changes...... values. How are the new requirements and the renewed focus on moral education met in schools and by educators? This volume will describe the history of moral education in Japan, analyse the recent changes of the curriculum, analyse the practices in selected schools via fieldwork and case-studies and take...

  9. Moral realism in nursing.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Edwards, Steven D

    2014-04-01

    For more than 15 years Professor Per Nortvedt has been arguing the case for moral realism in nursing and the health-care context more generally. His arguments focus on the clinical contexts of nursing and medicine and are supplemented by a series of persuasive examples. Following a description of moral realism, and the kinds of considerations that support it, criticisms of it are developed that seem persuasive. It is argued that our moral responses are explained by our beliefs as opposed to moral realities. In particular, two key arguments presented by Nortvedt are challenged: the so-called argument from convergence and the argument from clinical sensitivity. Both of these key planks in the case for moral realism are rejected, and an alternative 'social conditioning' account briefly sketched, which, it is claimed, has the same explanatory power as Nortvedt's thesis but does not rest on an appeal to independently existing moral properties. © 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

  10. Feminist Judgments as Teaching Resources

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Rosemary Hunter

    2012-10-01

    Full Text Available This paper discusses feminist judgments as a specific vehicle for teaching students to think critically about law. The analysis of appellate judgments forms a central plank of Anglo-Commonwealth and US jurisprudence and legal education. While academic scholarship generally offers various forms of commentary on decided cases, feminist judgment-writing projects have recently embarked on a new form of critical scholarship. Rather than critiquing judgments from a feminist perspective in academic essays, the participants in these projects have set out instead to write alternative judgments, as if they had been one of the judges sitting on the court at the time. After introducing the UK Feminist Judgments Project and describing what is ‘different’ about the judgments it has produced, the paper explains some of the ways in which these judgments have been used in UK law schools to teach critical thinking. The paper finally speculates on the potential production and application of feminist judgments or their equivalents beyond the common law context. Este artículo analiza las sentencias feministas como un vehículo específico para enseñar a los estudiantes a analizar el derecho desde un punto de vista crítico. El análisis de las sentencias de apelación constituye un elemento central de la jurisprudencia y la enseñanza del derecho en los países angloamericanos y de la Commonwealth. Mientras la comunidad académica ofrece generalmente diversas formas de comentario de casos resueltos, los proyectos de literatura judicial feminista se han embarcado recientemente en un nuevo sistema de crítica académica. En lugar de redactar ensayos académicos criticando las sentencias judiciales desde una perspectiva feminista, los participantes de estos proyectos se han propuesto redactar sentencias alternativas, como si hubieran sido uno de los jueces del tribunal en cuestión. Después de presentar el Proyecto de Sentencias Feministas del Reino Unido y

  11. Deontological and utilitarian inclinations in moral decision making: a process dissociation approach.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Conway, Paul; Gawronski, Bertram

    2013-02-01

    Dual-process theories of moral judgment suggest that responses to moral dilemmas are guided by two moral principles: the principle of deontology states that the morality of an action depends on the intrinsic nature of the action (e.g., harming others is wrong regardless of its consequences); the principle of utilitarianism implies that the morality of an action is determined by its consequences (e.g., harming others is acceptable if it increases the well-being of a greater number of people). Despite the proposed independence of the moral inclinations reflecting these principles, previous work has relied on operationalizations in which stronger inclinations of one kind imply weaker inclinations of the other kind. The current research applied Jacoby's (1991) process dissociation procedure to independently quantify the strength of deontological and utilitarian inclinations within individuals. Study 1 confirmed the usefulness of process dissociation for capturing individual differences in deontological and utilitarian inclinations, revealing positive correlations of both inclinations to moral identity. Moreover, deontological inclinations were uniquely related to empathic concern, perspective-taking, and religiosity, whereas utilitarian inclinations were uniquely related to need for cognition. Study 2 demonstrated that cognitive load selectively reduced utilitarian inclinations, with deontological inclinations being unaffected. In Study 3, a manipulation designed to enhance empathy increased deontological inclinations, with utilitarian inclinations being unaffected. These findings provide evidence for the independent contributions of deontological and utilitarian inclinations to moral judgments, resolving many theoretical ambiguities implied by previous research. (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved.

  12. Ethical safety of deep brain stimulation: A study on moral decision-making in Parkinson's disease.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fumagalli, Manuela; Marceglia, Sara; Cogiamanian, Filippo; Ardolino, Gianluca; Picascia, Marta; Barbieri, Sergio; Pravettoni, Gabriella; Pacchetti, Claudio; Priori, Alberto

    2015-07-01

    The possibility that deep brain stimulation (DBS) in Parkinson's disease (PD) alters patients' decisions and actions, even temporarily, raises important clinical, ethical and legal questions. Abnormal moral decision-making can lead to ethical rules violations. Previous experiments demonstrated the subthalamic (STN) activation during moral decision-making. Here we aim to study whether STN DBS can affect moral decision-making in PD patients. Eleven patients with PD and bilateral STN DBS implant performed a computerized moral task in ON and OFF stimulation conditions. A control group of PD patients without DBS implant performed the same experimental protocol. All patients underwent motor, cognitive and psychological assessments. STN stimulation was not able to modify neither reaction times nor responses to moral task both when we compared the ON and the OFF state in the same patient (reaction times, p = .416) and when we compared DBS patients with those treated only with the best medical treatment (reaction times: p = .408, responses: p = .776). Moral judgment is the result of a complex process, requiring cognitive executive functions, problem-solving, anticipations of consequences of an action, conflict processing, emotional evaluation of context and of possible outcomes, and involving different brain areas and neural circuits. Our data show that STN DBS leaves unaffected moral decisions thus implying relevant clinical and ethical implications for DBS consequences on patients' behavior, on decision-making and on judgment ability. In conclusion, the technique can be considered safe on moral behavior. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  13. Role of morality in the experience of guilt and shame within the armed forces.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nazarov, A; Jetly, R; McNeely, H; Kiang, M; Lanius, R; McKinnon, M C

    2015-07-01

    Despite advances in our understanding of mental health issues among military forces, a large proportion of military personnel continue to exhibit deployment-related psychological issues. Recent work has identified symptoms of guilt and shame related to moral injury as contributing significantly to combat-related mental health issues. This systematic scoping review explores the association between morality and symptoms of guilt and shame within military forces. A search of the literature pertaining to guilt, shame and morality within military samples was conducted. Nineteen articles were selected for review. There is strong evidence linking exposure to and the perceived perpetration of moral transgressions with experiences of guilt and shame. Critically, symptoms of guilt and shame were related to adverse mental health outcomes, particularly the onset of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). No studies have explored moral judgment in conjunction with assessments of guilt or moral injury. These findings have important implications for the prevention and treatment of PTSD-related symptoms in military samples. By measuring moral judgment prior to deployment, it may be possible to predict the likelihood of incurring moral injuries and the development of associated symptoms. Early intervention programmes aimed at ameliorating guilt and shame are required to prevent the long-term development of deployment-related psychological distress. © 2015 John Wiley & Sons A/S. Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

  14. Achievement goals affect metacognitive judgments

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ikeda, Kenji; Yue, Carole L.; Murayama, Kou; Castel, Alan D.

    2017-01-01

    The present study examined the effect of achievement goals on metacognitive judgments, such as judgments of learning (JOLs) and metacomprehension judgments, and actual recall performance. We conducted five experiments manipulating the instruction of achievement goals. In each experiment, participants were instructed to adopt mastery-approach goals (i.e., develop their own mental ability through a memory task) or performance-approach goals (i.e., demonstrate their strong memory ability through getting a high score on a memory task). The results of Experiments 1 and 2 showed that JOLs of word pairs in the performance-approach goal condition tended to be higher than those in the mastery-approach goal condition. In contrast, cued recall performance did not differ between the two goal conditions. Experiment 3 also demonstrated that metacomprehension judgments of text passages were higher in the performance-approach goal condition than in the mastery-approach goals condition, whereas test performance did not differ between conditions. These findings suggest that achievement motivation affects metacognitive judgments during learning, even when achievement motivation does not influence actual performance. PMID:28983496

  15. Morality in clinical space

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Laursen, Sara Seerup; Dehlholm-Lambertsen, Birgitte; Stenager, Egon

    2018-01-01

    This paper explores the moral implications of treatment of young people with functional somatic symptoms. Based on an ethnographic field study at a Danish pain clinic for youngsters (age 8 to 18), the paper seeks to unearth the cultural, moral values that clinical practice steers by and upholds...... at a specific location and in specific cases. The two cases illustrate that the underlying norms and values can give rise to very different moral assessments of symptoms and selves within the same diagnostic category....

  16. Moral Agency, Moral Imagination, and Moral Community: Antidotes to Moral Distress.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Traudt, Terri; Liaschenko, Joan; Peden-McAlpine, Cynthia

    2016-01-01

    Moral distress has been covered extensively in the nursing literature and increasingly in the literature of other health professions. Cases that cause nurses' moral distress that are mentioned most frequently are those concerned with prolonging the dying process. Given the standard of aggressive treatment that is typical in intensive care units (ICUs), much of the existing moral distress research focuses on the experiences of critical care nurses. However, moral distress does not automatically occur in all end-of-life circumstances, nor does every critical care nurse suffer its damaging effects. What are the practices of these nurses? What specifically do they do to navigate around or through the distressing situations? The nursing literature is lacking an answer to these questions. This article reports a study that used narrative analysis to explore the reported practices of experienced critical care nurses who are skilled at and comfortable working with families and physicians regarding the withdrawal of aggressive treatment. A major finding was that these nurses did not report experiencing the damaging effects of moral distress as described in the nursing literature. The verbal communication and stated practices relevant to this finding are organized under three major themes: (1) moral agency, (2) moral imagination, and (3) moral community. Further, a total of eight subthemes are identified. The practices that constitute these themes and subthemes are further detailed and discussed in this article. Understanding these practices can help mitigate critical care nurses' moral distress. Copyright 2016 The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved.

  17. Sleep and moral awareness.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Barnes, Christopher M; Gunia, Brian C; Wagner, David T

    2015-04-01

    The implications of sleep for morality are only starting to be explored. Extending the ethics literature, we contend that because bringing morality to conscious attention requires effort, a lack of sleep leads to low moral awareness. We test this prediction with three studies. A laboratory study with a manipulation of sleep across 90 participants judging a scenario for moral content indicates that a lack of sleep leads to low moral awareness. An archival study of Google Trends data across 6 years highlights a national dip in Web searches for moral topics (but not other topics) on the Monday after the Spring time change, which tends to deprive people of sleep. Finally, a diary study of 127 participants indicates that (within participants) nights with a lack of sleep are associated with low moral awareness the next day. Together, these three studies suggest that a lack of sleep leaves people less morally aware, with important implications for the recognition of morality in others. © 2014 European Sleep Research Society.

  18. Toward a Return to Plurality in Arendtian Judgment

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jack E. Marsh Jr.

    2008-12-01

    Full Text Available Without further ado: the perplexities surrounding the relation of Arendt’s early and late theories of judgment are rooted in her singular commitment to the abiding yet fragile possibility of human freedom. These perplexities are not a function of the theoretical faux paux conventionally ascribed to her by well meaning interpreters and sympathetic critics. Indeed, her work exhibits an admirable, if scandalous, refusal to be reduced to the imperatives of an overdetermined moral-theoretical field, an impertinence I hope to honor in this essay. For example, Seyla Benhabib seek to “resolve” Arendtian “puzzles” through reinscribing them within the neo-Kantian architectonics of discourse ethics. Ronald Beiner, by contrast, wonders why Arendt didn’t further mine Aristotelian wells in elaborating her own account(s of judgment.2 Herein I will take up these putative ambiguities. Interpreters are undoubtedly correct that decisive ambiguities remain between Arendt’s early and late accounts of judgment, but these ambiguities issue from Arendt’s own problems, concerns, and project.

  19. Morality constrains the default representation of what is possible.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Phillips, Jonathan; Cushman, Fiery

    2017-05-02

    The capacity for representing and reasoning over sets of possibilities, or modal cognition, supports diverse kinds of high-level judgments: causal reasoning, moral judgment, language comprehension, and more. Prior research on modal cognition asks how humans explicitly and deliberatively reason about what is possible but has not investigated whether or how people have a default, implicit representation of which events are possible. We present three studies that characterize the role of implicit representations of possibility in cognition. Collectively, these studies differentiate explicit reasoning about possibilities from default implicit representations, demonstrate that human adults often default to treating immoral and irrational events as impossible, and provide a case study of high-level cognitive judgments relying on default implicit representations of possibility rather than explicit deliberation.

  20. Testing Moral Foundation Theory: Are Specific Moral Emotions Elicited by Specific Moral Transgressions?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Landmann, Helen; Hess, Ursula

    2018-01-01

    Moral foundation theory posits that specific moral transgressions elicit specific moral emotions. To test this claim, participants (N = 195) were asked to rate their emotions in response to moral violation vignettes. We found that compassion and disgust were associated with care and purity respectively as predicted by moral foundation theory.…

  1. Moralized Psychology or Psychologized Morality? Ethics and Psychology in Recent Theorizing about Moral and Character Education

    Science.gov (United States)

    Carr, David

    2007-01-01

    Moral philosophy seems well placed to claim the key role in theorizing about moral education. Indeed, moral philosophers have from antiquity had much to say about psychological and other processes of moral formation. Given this history, it may seem ironic that much systematic latter-day theorizing about moral education has been social scientific,…

  2. Moral Education versus Indoctrination

    Science.gov (United States)

    Copp, David

    2016-01-01

    Moral education is open to worries about indoctrination given the controversies there are about a wide range of ethical matters. I argue, however, that moral education is no more liable to being "indoctrinal" than education in history or science. I begin by proposing an account of what indoctrination involves. I then note that moral…

  3. Una idea de moral

    OpenAIRE

    García Soto, Luis

    2001-01-01

    El objeto del presente trabajo es examinar la idea de moral, que encontremos en A. Sánchez Vázquez y en M. Foucault, y, a partir de ahí, esbozar un concepto de moral que pueda definir adecuadamente la moralidad contemporánea occidental.

  4. The Breakdown of Morale

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    N. Vikander (Nick)

    2009-01-01

    textabstractThis paper studies how morale in teams can break down. It interprets high morale as team members working together productively, either because of a sense of fairness or because of implicit incentives from repeated interactions. Team members learn that lay-offs will occur at a fixed

  5. Moral og videnproduktion

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Munch, Birgitte

    Research report concerning moral and ethical problems inherent in the consulting engineers' profession. Based upon 25 in-depth interviews in 11 firms, the report is contributing to the understanding of the concepts and meaning of moral and ethics in a world of technical rationality. The objectivity...

  6. Moral og Videnproduktion

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Munch, Birgitte

    En analyse af relationerne mellem viden og moral i de tekniske rådgivningskulturer. Publikationen beskriver de moralske og etiske overvejelser der præger rådgivernes professionelle univers i den praktiske udførelse af konsulentprojekter, og eftersporer den gensidige konstruktion af viden, moral og...

  7. Moral Life and Education

    Science.gov (United States)

    Noddings, Nel

    2016-01-01

    Nel Noddings, Lee Jacks Professor of Education, Emerita, at Stanford University, agrees with Professors Lapsley and Woodbury that moral aims are central to education. She has argued that the main aim of education is to produce better people--better in "all aspects of a complete life: moral, physical, social, vocational, aesthetic,…

  8. IS MORALITY AN ILLUSION?

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    PROF EKWUEME

    For well over two millennia, philosophers and theologians assumed that morality presupposed com- pliance to a set of ideals used for the ... ethics, whereby morality is to be left at the discretion of the individual. The assumption is that each indi- ..... to abdicate his or her family responsibilities. Apart from these considerations, ...

  9. Ethics under uncertainty: the morality and appropriateness of utilitarianism when outcomes are uncertain.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kortenkamp, Katherine V; Moore, Colleen F

    2014-01-01

    Real-life moral dilemmas inevitably involve uncertainty, yet research has not considered how uncertainty affects utilitarian moral judgments. In addition, even though moral dilemma researchers regularly ask respondents, "What is appropriate?" but interpret it to mean, "What is moral?," little research has examined whether a difference exists between asking these 2 types of questions. In this study, 140 college students read moral dilemmas that contained certain or uncertain consequences and then responded as to whether it was appropriate and whether it was moral to kill 1 to save many (a utilitarian choice). Ratings of the appropriateness and morality of the utilitarian choice were lower under uncertainty than certainty. A follow-up experiment found that these results could not be explained entirely by a change in the expected values of the outcomes or a desire to avoid the worst-case scenario. In addition, the utilitarian choice to kill 1 to save many was rated as more appropriate than moral. The results imply that moral decision making may depend critically on whether uncertainties in outcomes are admitted and whether people are asked about appropriateness or morality.

  10. Negotiating Moral Value

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Koch, Lene; Svendsen, Mette N.

    2015-01-01

    laboratories. The normal procedure would be to kill research animals after the termination of an experiment; in this case, however, a decision was reached to close down the lab. The moral landscape had changed, and it was no longer considered acceptable to use nonhuman primates in Danish biomedicine. From...... being considered a biological resource serving as a model of man, the monkeys had become moral subjects with a claim to a life suiting their natural needs. Simultaneously, the monkeys became instrumental in creating moral legitimacy for the actors involved in their rescue. What we see is an instance...... of pathfinding in a changing moral landscape where actors negotiate nonhuman primate nature as they create new moral positions for themselves....

  11. Two Distinct Moral Mechanisms for Ascribing and Denying Intentionality.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ngo, Lawrence; Kelly, Meagan; Coutlee, Christopher G; Carter, R McKell; Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter; Huettel, Scott A

    2015-12-04

    Philosophers and legal scholars have long theorized about how intentionality serves as a critical input for morality and culpability, but the emerging field of experimental philosophy has revealed a puzzling asymmetry. People judge actions leading to negative consequences as being more intentional than those leading to positive ones. The implications of this asymmetry remain unclear because there is no consensus regarding the underlying mechanism. Based on converging behavioral and neural evidence, we demonstrate that there is no single underlying mechanism. Instead, two distinct mechanisms together generate the asymmetry. Emotion drives ascriptions of intentionality for negative consequences, while the consideration of statistical norms leads to the denial of intentionality for positive consequences. We employ this novel two-mechanism model to illustrate that morality can paradoxically shape judgments of intentionality. This is consequential for mens rea in legal practice and arguments in moral philosophy pertaining to terror bombing, abortion, and euthanasia among others.

  12. Two Distinct Moral Mechanisms for Ascribing and Denying Intentionality

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ngo, Lawrence; Kelly, Meagan; Coutlee, Christopher G.; Carter, R. McKell; Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter; Huettel, Scott A.

    2015-01-01

    Philosophers and legal scholars have long theorized about how intentionality serves as a critical input for morality and culpability, but the emerging field of experimental philosophy has revealed a puzzling asymmetry. People judge actions leading to negative consequences as being more intentional than those leading to positive ones. The implications of this asymmetry remain unclear because there is no consensus regarding the underlying mechanism. Based on converging behavioral and neural evidence, we demonstrate that there is no single underlying mechanism. Instead, two distinct mechanisms together generate the asymmetry. Emotion drives ascriptions of intentionality for negative consequences, while the consideration of statistical norms leads to the denial of intentionality for positive consequences. We employ this novel two-mechanism model to illustrate that morality can paradoxically shape judgments of intentionality. This is consequential for mens rea in legal practice and arguments in moral philosophy pertaining to terror bombing, abortion, and euthanasia among others. PMID:26634909

  13. Experiential Social Justice Judgment Processes

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Maas, M.

    2008-01-01

    Social justice can be thought of as an idea that exists within the minds of individuals and that concerns issues like what is right and wrong, what ought to be or not to be, and what is fair or unfair. This subjective quality of the justice judgment process makes it rather unpredictable how people

  14. Topics in Probabilistic Judgment Aggregation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Guanchun

    2011-01-01

    This dissertation is a compilation of several studies that are united by their relevance to probabilistic judgment aggregation. In the face of complex and uncertain events, panels of judges are frequently consulted to provide probabilistic forecasts, and aggregation of such estimates in groups often yield better results than could have been made…

  15. Why Be Moral? Moral Identity Motivation and Age

    Science.gov (United States)

    Krettenauer, Tobias; Victor, Rosemary

    2017-01-01

    Moral identity research to date has largely failed to provide evidence for developmental trends in moral identity, presumably because of restrictions in the age range of studies and the use of moral identity measures that are insensitive to age-related change. The present study investigated moral identity motivation across a broad age range (14-65…

  16. Moral Identity as Moral Ideal Self: Links to Adolescent Outcomes

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hardy, Sam A.; Walker, Lawrence J.; Olsen, Joseph A.; Woodbury, Ryan D.; Hickman, Jacob R.

    2014-01-01

    The purposes of this study were to conceptualize moral identity as moral ideal self, to develop a measure of this construct, to test for age and gender differences, to examine links between moral ideal self and adolescent outcomes, and to assess purpose and social responsibility as mediators of the relations between moral ideal self and outcomes.…

  17. Cultural Conceptions of Morality: Examining Laypeople's Associations of Moral Character

    Science.gov (United States)

    Vauclair, Christin-Melanie; Wilson, Marc; Fischer, Ronald

    2014-01-01

    Whether moral conceptions are universal or culture-specific is controversial in moral psychology. One option is to refrain from imposing theoretical constraints and to ask laypeople from different cultures how "they" conceptualize morality. Our article adopts this approach by examining laypeople's associations of moral character in…

  18. Moral Psychology and the Problem of Moral Criteria

    Science.gov (United States)

    Welch, Patrick

    2011-01-01

    This article is intended as an initial investigation into the foundations of moral psychology. I primarily examine a recent work in moral education, Daniel Lapsley's and Darcia Narvaez"s "Character education", whose authors seem to assume at points that criteria for discerning moral actions and moral traits can be derived apart from ethics or…

  19. Children's Moral Emotions and Moral Cognition: Towards an Integrative Perspective

    Science.gov (United States)

    Malti, Tina; Latzko, Brigitte

    2010-01-01

    This chapter presents a brief introduction to the developmental and educational literature linking children's moral emotions to cognitive moral development. A central premise of the chapter is that an integrative developmental perspective on moral emotions and moral cognition provides an important conceptual framework for understanding children's…

  20. Gender differences in responses to moral dilemmas: a process dissociation analysis.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Friesdorf, Rebecca; Conway, Paul; Gawronski, Bertram

    2015-05-01

    The principle of deontology states that the morality of an action depends on its consistency with moral norms; the principle of utilitarianism implies that the morality of an action depends on its consequences. Previous research suggests that deontological judgments are shaped by affective processes, whereas utilitarian judgments are guided by cognitive processes. The current research used process dissociation (PD) to independently assess deontological and utilitarian inclinations in women and men. A meta-analytic re-analysis of 40 studies with 6,100 participants indicated that men showed a stronger preference for utilitarian over deontological judgments than women when the two principles implied conflicting decisions (d = 0.52). PD further revealed that women exhibited stronger deontological inclinations than men (d = 0.57), while men exhibited only slightly stronger utilitarian inclinations than women (d = 0.10). The findings suggest that gender differences in moral dilemma judgments are due to differences in affective responses to harm rather than cognitive evaluations of outcomes. © 2015 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.

  1. Developing Moral Maturity: An Evaluation of the Media Ethics Course Using the DIT-2

    Science.gov (United States)

    Auger, Giselle A.; Gee, Charlie

    2016-01-01

    The purpose of this study was to add to the limited body of knowledge on the effect of the media ethics course, specifically to investigate the effect of the course on the growth in moral judgment reasoning of students through a quasi-experimental pre-test, post-test analysis using the Defining Issues Test 2 (DIT-2). Results demonstrated…

  2. Data from a pre-publication independent replication initiative examining ten moral judgement effects

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Tierney, W. (Warren); Schweinsberg, M. (Martin); Jordan, J. (Jennifer); Kennedy, D.M. (Deanna M.); Qureshi, I. (Israr); Sommer, S.A. (S. Amy); Thornley, N. (Nico); Madan, N. (Nikhil); M. Vianello (Michelangelo); Awtrey, E. (Eli); Zhu, L.L. (Luke Lei); Diermeier, D. (Daniel); Heinze, J.E. (Justin E.); Srinivasan, M. (Malavika); Tannenbaum, D. (David); Bivolaru, E. (Eliza); Dana, J. (Jason); Davis-Stober, C.P. (Clintin P.); Du Plessis, C. (Christilene); Gronau, Q.F. (Quentin F.); Hafenbrack, A.C. (Andrew C.); Liao, E.Y. (Eko Yi); Ly, A. (Alexander); Marsman, M. (Maarten); Murase, T. (Toshio); Schaerer, M. (Michael); Tworek, C.M. (Christina M.); E.J. Wagenmakers (Eric-Jan); Wong, L. (Lynn); Anderson, T. (Tabitha); Bauman, C.W. (Christopher W.); Bedwell, W.L. (Wendy L.); Brescoll, V. (Victoria); Canavan, A. (Andrew); J. Chandler (Jesse); Cheries, E. (Erik); Cheryan, S. (Sapna); Cheung, F. (Felix); Cimpian, A. (Andrei); Clark, M.A. (Mark A.); Cordon, D. (Diana); Cushman, F. (Fiery); Ditto, P.H. (Peter H.); Amell, A. (Alice); Frick, S.E. (Sarah E.); Gamez-Djokic, M. (Monica); Grady, R.H. (Rebecca Hofstein); Graham, J. (Jesse); Gu, J. (Jun); Hahn, A. (Adam); Hanson, B.E. (Brittany E.); Hartwich, N.J. (Nicole J.); Hein, K. (Kristie); Inbar, Y. (Yoel); Jiang, L. (Lily); Kellogg, T. (Tehlyr); Legate, N. (Nicole); Luoma, T.P. (Timo P.); Maibeucher, H. (Heidi); Meindl, P. (Peter); Miles, J. (Jennifer); Mislin, A. (Alexandra); Molden, D.C. (Daniel C.); Motyl, M. (Matt); Newman, G. (George); Ngo, H.H. (Hoai Huong); Packham, H. (Harvey); Ramsay, P.S. (P. Scott); Ray, J.L. (Jennifer L.); Sackett, A.M. (Aaron M.); Sellier, A.-L. (Anne-Laure); Sokolova, T. (Tatiana); Sowden, W. (Walter); Storage, D. (Daniel); Sun, X. (Xiaomin); Van Bavel, J.J. (Jay J.); Washburn, A.N. (Anthony N.); Wei, C. (Cong); Wetter, E. (Erik); Wilson, C.T. (Carlos T.); Darroux, S.-C. (Sophie-Charlotte); Uhlmann, E.L. (Eric Luis)

    2016-01-01

    textabstractWe present the data from a crowdsourced project seeking to replicate findings in independent laboratories before (rather than after) they are published. In this Pre-Publication Independent Replication (PPIR) initiative, 25 research groups attempted to replicate 10 moral judgment effects

  3. Judgment in an auditor's materiality assessments

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kristensen, Rikke Holmslykke

    2015-01-01

    and qualitative components of materiality judgments, which include both task, person and interpersonal interactions in line with general audit judgment and decision-making theory. This analysis offers an enhanced understanding of what the »black box« of professional materiality judgment contains. The analysis...

  4. Engaging Students in Social Judgment Theory

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mallard, Jessica

    2010-01-01

    Social Judgment Theory is a way to explain when persuasive messages are most likely to succeed and how people make judgments about them. This theory is often covered in communication theory and persuasion courses, but is also applicable when discussing persuasion in basic speech and introductory communication courses. Social Judgment Theory…

  5. 22 CFR 208.920 - Civil judgment.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... creates a civil liability for the complained of wrongful acts, or a final determination of liability under... 22 Foreign Relations 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Civil judgment. 208.920 Section 208.920 Foreign...) Definitions § 208.920 Civil judgment. Civil judgment means the disposition of a civil action by any court of...

  6. 22 CFR 1006.920 - Civil judgment.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... creates a civil liability for the complained of wrongful acts, or a final determination of liability under... 22 Foreign Relations 2 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 true Civil judgment. 1006.920 Section 1006.920...) Definitions § 1006.920 Civil judgment. Civil judgment means the disposition of a civil action by any court of...

  7. 21 CFR 1404.920 - Civil judgment.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... creates a civil liability for the complained of wrongful acts, or a final determination of liability under... 21 Food and Drugs 9 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Civil judgment. 1404.920 Section 1404.920 Food and...) Definitions § 1404.920 Civil judgment. Civil judgment means the disposition of a civil action by any court of...

  8. 34 CFR 85.920 - Civil judgment.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... creates a civil liability for the complained of wrongful acts, or a final determination of liability under... 34 Education 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Civil judgment. 85.920 Section 85.920 Education Office...) Definitions § 85.920 Civil judgment. Civil judgment means the disposition of a civil action by any court of...

  9. 22 CFR 1508.920 - Civil judgment.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... creates a civil liability for the complained of wrongful acts, or a final determination of liability under... 22 Foreign Relations 2 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 true Civil judgment. 1508.920 Section 1508.920...) Definitions § 1508.920 Civil judgment. Civil judgment means the disposition of a civil action by any court of...

  10. 2 CFR 180.915 - Civil judgment.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... creates a civil liability for the complained of wrongful acts, or a final determination of liability under... 2 Grants and Agreements 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Civil judgment. 180.915 Section 180.915... § 180.915 Civil judgment. Civil judgment means the disposition of a civil action by any court of...

  11. Moral Philosophy, Moral Expertise, and the Argument from Disagreement.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cross, Ben

    2016-03-01

    Several recent articles have weighed in on the question of whether moral philosophers can be counted as moral experts. One argument denying this has been rejected by both sides of the debate. According to this argument, the extent of disagreement in modern moral philosophy prevents moral philosophers from being classified as moral experts. Call this the Argument From Disagreement (AD). In this article, I defend a version of AD. Insofar as practical issues in moral philosophy are characterized by disagreement between moral philosophers who are more or less equally well credentialed on the issue, non-philosophers have no good reasons to defer to their views. © 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

  12. Religion and morality.

    Science.gov (United States)

    McKay, Ryan; Whitehouse, Harvey

    2015-03-01

    The relationship between religion and morality has long been hotly debated. Does religion make us more moral? Is it necessary for morality? Do moral inclinations emerge independently of religious intuitions? These debates, which nowadays rumble on in scientific journals as well as in public life, have frequently been marred by a series of conceptual confusions and limitations. Many scientific investigations have failed to decompose "religion" and "morality" into theoretically grounded elements; have adopted parochial conceptions of key concepts-in particular, sanitized conceptions of "prosocial" behavior; and have neglected to consider the complex interplay between cognition and culture. We argue that to make progress, the categories "religion" and "morality" must be fractionated into a set of biologically and psychologically cogent traits, revealing the cognitive foundations that shape and constrain relevant cultural variants. We adopt this fractionating strategy, setting out an encompassing evolutionary framework within which to situate and evaluate relevant evidence. Our goals are twofold: to produce a detailed picture of the current state of the field, and to provide a road map for future research on the relationship between religion and morality. PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2015 APA, all rights reserved.

  13. Revisiting Folk Moral Realism.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pölzler, Thomas

    2017-01-01

    Moral realists believe that there are objective moral truths. According to one of the most prominent arguments in favour of this view, ordinary people experience morality as realist-seeming, and we have therefore prima facie reason to believe that realism is true. Some proponents of this argument have claimed that the hypothesis that ordinary people experience morality as realist-seeming is supported by psychological research on folk metaethics. While most recent research has been thought to contradict this claim, four prominent earlier studies (by Goodwin and Darley, Wainryb et al., Nichols, and Nichols and Folds-Bennett) indeed seem to suggest a tendency towards realism. My aim in this paper is to provide a detailed internal critique of these four studies. I argue that, once interpreted properly, all of them turn out in line with recent research. They suggest that most ordinary people experience morality as "pluralist-" rather than realist-seeming, i.e., that ordinary people have the intuition that realism is true with regard to some moral issues, but variants of anti-realism are true with regard to others. This result means that moral realism may be less well justified than commonly assumed.

  14. Moral Hazard and Stability

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Tumennasan, Norovsambuu

    2014-01-01

    Economists perceive moral hazard as an undesirable problem because it undermines efficiency. Carefully designed contracts can mitigate the moral hazard problem, but this assumes that a team is already formed. This paper demonstrates that these contracts are sometimes the reason why teams do...... not form. Formally, we study the team formation problem in which the agents’ efforts are not verifiable and the size of teams does not exceed quota r . We show that if the team members cannot make transfers, then moral hazard affects stability positively in a large class of games. For example, a stable...

  15. Inverting the moral economy

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Olwig, Mette Fog; Noe, Christine; Kangalawe, Richard

    2017-01-01

    Governments, donors and investors often promote land acquisitions for forest plantations as global climate change mitigation via carbon sequestration. Investors’ forestry thereby becomes part of a global moral economy imaginary. Using examples from Tanzania we critically examine the global moral...... economy’s narrative foundation, which presents trees as axiomatically ‘green’, ‘idle’ land as waste and economic investments as benefiting the relevant communities. In this way the traditional supposition of the moral economy as invoked by the economic underclass to maintain the basis of their subsistence...

  16. Inverting the moral economy

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Olwig, Mette Fog; Noe, Christine; Kangalawe, Richard

    2015-01-01

    Governments, donors and investors often promote land acquisitions for forest plantations as global climate change mitigation via carbon sequestration. Investors’ forestry thereby becomes part of a global moral economy imaginary. Using examples from Tanzania we critically examine the global moral...... economy’s narrative foundation, which presents trees as axiomatically ‘green’, ‘idle’ land as waste and economic investments as benefiting the relevant communities. In this way the traditional supposition of the moral economy as invoked by the economic underclass to maintain the basis of their subsistence...

  17. Felt Moral Obligation and the Moral Judgement-Moral Action Gap: Toward a Phenomenology of Moral Life

    Science.gov (United States)

    Williams, Richard N.; Gantt, Edwin E.

    2012-01-01

    The step-off point for this article is the problem of the "moral judgement-moral action gap" as found in contemporary literature of moral education and moral development. We argue that this gap, and the conceptual problems encountered by attempts to bridge it, reflects the effect of a different, deeper and more problematic conceptual gap: the…

  18. Who Engages with Moral Beauty?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Diessner, Rhett; Iyer, Ravi; Smith, Meghan M.; Haidt, Jonathan

    2013-01-01

    Aristotle considered moral beauty to be the "telos" of the human virtues. Displays of moral beauty have been shown to elicit the moral emotion of elevation and cause a desire to become a better person and to engage in prosocial behavior. Study 1 ("N" = 5380) shows engagement with moral beauty is related to several psychological…

  19. Kant's Account of Moral Education

    Science.gov (United States)

    Giesinger, Johannes

    2012-01-01

    While Kant's pedagogical lectures present an account of moral education, his theory of freedom and morality seems to leave no room for the possibility of an education for freedom and morality. In this paper, it is first shown that Kant's moral philosophy and his educational philosophy are developed within different theoretical paradigms: whereas…

  20. Spontaneous Development of Moral Concepts

    Science.gov (United States)

    Siegal, M.

    1975-01-01

    Moral competence is more difficult to attain than scientific competence. Since language comprehension plays a central role in conceptual development, and moral language is difficult to learn, there is a common deficiency in moral conceptual development. This suggests a theory of non-spontaneous solutions to moral problems. (Author/MS)

  1. the moralities of antiretroviral treatment

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    the moralities of antiretroviral treatment. Klaus Fiedler. AIDS - a moral issue. When HIV I AIDS was discovered in 1984 and began to spread all over the world, it was a moral ... may have to perform) and it has increased the number of working days lost due to attendance .... the other side, moral issues are addressed in detail.

  2. Polarization Optics

    OpenAIRE

    Fressengeas, Nicolas

    2010-01-01

    The physics of polarization optics *Polarized light propagation *Partially polarized light; DEA; After a brief introduction to polarization optics, this lecture reviews the basic formalisms for dealing with it: Jones Calculus for totally polarized light and Stokes parameters associated to Mueller Calculus for partially polarized light.

  3. Emotions and clinical ethics support. A moral inquiry into emotions in moral case deliberation.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Molewijk, Bert; Kleinlugtenbelt, Dick; Pugh, Scott M; Widdershoven, Guy

    2011-12-01

    Emotions play an important part in moral life. Within clinical ethics support (CES), one should take into account the crucial role of emotions in moral cases in clinical practice. In this paper, we present an Aristotelian approach to emotions. We argue that CES can help participants deal with emotions by fostering a joint process of investigation of the role of emotions in a case. This investigation goes beyond empathy with and moral judgment of the emotions of the case presenter. In a moral case deliberation, the participants are invited to place themselves in the position of the case presenter and to investigate their own emotions in the situation. It is about critically assessing the facts in the case that cause the emotion and the related (moral) thoughts that accompany the emotion. It is also about finding the right emotion in a given situation and finding the right balance in dealing with that emotion. These steps in the moral inquiry give rise to group learning. It is a process of becoming open towards the perspectives of others, leading to new insights into what is an appropriate emotion in the specific situation. We show how this approach works in moral case deliberation. A physician presents a situation in which he is faced with a pregnant woman who is about to deliver multiple extremely premature infants at the threshold of viability. The moral deliberation of the case and the emotions therein leads to the participants' conclusion that "compassion" is a more adequate emotion than "sadness". The emotion "sadness" is pointed towards the tragedy that is happening to the woman. The emotion "compassion" is pointed towards the woman; it combines consideration and professional responsibility. Through the shift towards compassion, participants experienced more creativity and freedom to deal with the sad situation and to support the woman. The paper ends with an analysis and reflection on the deliberation process. In the conclusion we argue for more attention to

  4. The Epistemology of Moral Bioenhancement.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Crutchfield, Parker

    2016-07-01

    Moral bioenhancement is the potential practice of manipulating individuals' moral behaviors by biological means in order to help resolve pressing moral issues such as climate change and terrorism. This practice has obvious ethical implications, and these implications have been and continue to be discussed in the bioethics literature. What have not been discussed are the epistemological implications of moral bioenhancement. This article details some of these implications of engaging in moral bioenhancement. The argument begins by making the distinction between moral bioenhancement that manipulates the contents of mental states (e.g. beliefs) and that which manipulates other, non-representational states (e.g. motivations). Either way, I argue, the enhanced moral psychology will fail to conform to epistemic norms, and the only way to resolve this failure and allow the moral bioenhancement to be effective in addressing the targeted moral issues is to make the moral bioenhancement covert. © 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

  5. Explaining moral religions.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Baumard, Nicolas; Boyer, Pascal

    2013-06-01

    Moralizing religions, unlike religions with morally indifferent gods or spirits, appeared only recently in some (but not all) large-scale human societies. A crucial feature of these new religions is their emphasis on proportionality (between deeds and supernatural rewards, between sins and penance, and in the formulation of the Golden Rule, according to which one should treat others as one would like others to treat oneself). Cognitive science models that account for many properties of religion can be extended to these religions. Recent models of evolved dispositions for fairness in cooperation suggest that proportionality-based morality is highly intuitive to human beings. The cultural success of moralizing movements, secular or religious, could be explained based on proportionality. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  6. Humanistic Psychology and Morality

    Science.gov (United States)

    Anders Richards, Donald

    1975-01-01

    The place of the encounter group within the framework of humanistic psychology is examined and an assessment of the moral significance of the humanistic psychology movement and the encounter group technique is attempted. (Editor)

  7. Mind attributions about moral actors: intentionality is greater given coherent cues.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hughes, Jamie S; Trafimow, David

    2015-06-01

    Attributions about intentionality and the capacity for agency were explored from coherence perspectives. Coherence perspectives suggest that social perceivers use information about an actor's motives, traits, and the outcomes of action to create meaningful explanations of action. According to the typecasting theory, intentionality and agency attributions should be related and predicted by one's role in a moral dyad. Across four studies, with different operational definitions of moral dyads and agency, we found evidence in favour of coherence perspectives. Social perceivers relied on mental states, character, and behavioural cues to make intentionality judgments. Further, intentionality attributions about behaviours were unrelated to inferences about agency. The discussion centres on the importance of coherent explanation in moral judgment. © 2014 The British Psychological Society.

  8. Moral reasoning in women with posttraumatic stress disorder related to childhood abuse.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nazarov, Anthony; Walaszczyk, Victoria; Frewen, Paul; Oremus, Carolina; Lanius, Ruth; McKinnon, Margaret C

    2016-01-01

    Preliminary evidence suggests that relative to healthy controls, patients with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) show deficits on several inter-related social cognitive tasks, including theory of mind, and emotion comprehension. Systematic investigations examining other aspects of social cognition, including moral reasoning, have not been conducted in PTSD stemming from childhood trauma. To conduct a comprehensive assessment of moral reasoning performance in individuals with PTSD stemming from childhood abuse. Moral reasoning performance was assessed in 28 women with PTSD related to prolonged childhood trauma and 19 matched healthy controls. Performance was assessed using 12 modified moral dilemmas and was queried in three domains: utilitarian/deontological sacrificial dilemmas (personal and impersonal), social order vs. compassion, and altruism vs. self-interest. Participants were asked whether a proposed action was morally acceptable or unacceptable and whether or not they would perform this action under the circumstances described. Women with PTSD were less likely to carry out utilitarian actions in personal, sacrificial moral dilemmas, a choice driven primarily by consequential intrapersonal disapproval. Increased concern regarding intrapersonal disapproval was related to higher symptoms of guilt in the PTSD group. Patients with PTSD demonstrated less altruistic moral reasoning, primarily associated with decreased empathic role-taking for beneficiaries. Women with PTSD due to childhood trauma show alterations in moral reasoning marked by decreased utilitarian judgment and decreased altruism. Childhood trauma may continue to impact moral choices made into adulthood.

  9. Nurse moral disengagement.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fida, Roberta; Tramontano, Carlo; Paciello, Marinella; Kangasniemi, Mari; Sili, Alessandro; Bobbio, Andrea; Barbaranelli, Claudio

    2016-08-01

    Ethics is a founding component of the nursing profession; however, nurses sometimes find it difficult to constantly adhere to the required ethical standards. There is limited knowledge about the factors that cause a committed nurse to violate standards; moral disengagement, originally developed by Bandura, is an essential variable to consider. This study aimed at developing and validating a nursing moral disengagement scale and investigated how moral disengagement is associated with counterproductive and citizenship behaviour at work. The research comprised a qualitative study and a quantitative study, combining a cross-validation approach and a structural equation model. A total of 60 Italian nurses (63% female) involved in clinical work and enrolled as students in a postgraduate master's programme took part in the qualitative study. In 2012, the researchers recruited 434 nurses (76% female) from different Italian hospitals using a convenience sampling method to take part in the quantitative study. All the organisations involved and the university gave ethical approval; all respondents participated on a voluntary basis and did not receive any form of compensation. The nursing moral disengagement scale comprised a total of 22 items. Results attested the mono-dimensionality of the scale and its good psychometric properties. In addition, results highlighted a significant association between moral disengagement and both counterproductive and citizenship behaviours. Results showed that nurses sometimes resort to moral disengagement in their daily practice, bypassing moral and ethical codes that would normally prevent them from enacting behaviours that violate their norms and protocols. The nursing moral disengagement scale can complement personnel monitoring and assessment procedures already in place and provide additional information to nursing management for designing interventions aimed at increasing compliance with ethical codes by improving the quality of the

  10. The Morality of Property

    OpenAIRE

    Smith, Henry Edward; Merrill, Thomas

    2007-01-01

    The relationship between property and morality has been obscured by three elements in our intellectual tradition. First is the assumption, which can be traced to Bentham, that property is a pure creature of law.' An institution assumed to be wholly dependent on law for its existence is unlikely to be infused with strong moral content. Second is the related tradition, also Benthamite, of examining questions about property law from a utilitarian perspective. 2 Utilitarianis...

  11. Tightening the focus: moral panic, moral regulation and liberal government.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hier, Sean P

    2011-09-01

    The purpose of this article is to tighten the focus of moral panic studies by clarifying and elaborating on an analytical framework that conceptualizes moral panic as a form of moral regulation. The first part of the article explains why moral panic should be conceptualized as a form of moral regulation. The second part presents a rejoinder to Critcher's (2009) critique of the widening focus of moral panic studies. The third part elaborates on the conceptual relationship between the sociologies of moral panic and moral regulation by offering fresh insights into the sociological and political importance of moral panic as a technique of liberal government. © London School of Economics and Political Science 2011.

  12. The Accidental Transgressor: Morally Relevant Theory of Mind

    Science.gov (United States)

    Killen, Melanie; Mulvey, Kelly Lynn; Richardson, Cameron; Jampol, Noah

    2014-01-01

    To test young children’s false belief theory of mind in a morally relevant context, two experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1, children (N = 162) at 3.5, 5.5, and 7.5 years of age were administered 3 tasks: prototypic moral transgression task, false belief theory of mind task (ToM), and an “accidental transgressor” task, which measured a morally relevant false belief theory of mind (MoToM). Children who did not pass false belief ToM were more likely to attribute negative intentions to an accidental transgressor than children who passed false belief ToM, and to use moral reasons when blaming the accidental transgressor. In Experiment 2, children (N = 46) who did not pass false belief ToM viewed it as more acceptable to punish the accidental transgressor than did participants who passed false belief ToM. Findings are discussed in light of research on the emergence of moral judgment and theory of mind. PMID:21377148

  13. Moral character predominates in person perception and evaluation.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Goodwin, Geoffrey P; Piazza, Jared; Rozin, Paul

    2014-01-01

    What sorts of trait information do people most care about when forming impressions of others? Recent research in social cognition suggests that "warmth," broadly construed, should be of prime importance in impression formation. Yet, some prior research suggests that information about others' specifically moral traits--their moral "character"--may be a primary dimension. Although warmth and character have sometimes been conceived of as interchangeable, we argue that they are separable, and that across a wide variety of contexts, character is usually more important than warmth in impression formation. We first showed that moral character and social warmth traits are indeed separable (Studies 1 and 2). Further studies that used correlational and experimental methods showed that, as predicted, in most contexts, moral character information is more important in impression formation than is warmth information (Studies 2-6). Character information was also more important than warmth information with respect to judgments of traits' perceived fundamentalness to identity, their uniquely human quality, their context-independence, and their controllability (Study 2). Finally, Study 7 used an archival method to show that moral character information appears more prominently than warmth information in obituaries, and more strongly determines the impressions people form of the individuals described in those obituaries. We discuss implications for current theories of person perception and social cognition.

  14. Is equal moral consideration really compatible with unequal moral status?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rossi, John

    2010-09-01

    The issue of moral considerability, or how much moral importance a being's interests deserve, is one of the most important in animal ethics. Some leading theorists--most notably David DeGrazia--have argued that a principle of "equal moral consideration" is compatible with "unequal moral status." Such a position would reconcile the egalitarian force of equal consideration with more stringent obligations to humans than animals. The article presents arguments that equal consideration is not compatible with unequal moral status, thereby forcing those who would justify significantly different moral protections for humans and animals to argue for unequal consideration.

  15. Hippocampal Damage Increases Deontological Responses during Moral Decision Making.

    Science.gov (United States)

    McCormick, Cornelia; Rosenthal, Clive R; Miller, Thomas D; Maguire, Eleanor A

    2016-11-30

    Complex moral decision making is associated with the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) in humans, and damage to this region significantly increases the frequency of utilitarian judgments. Since the vmPFC has strong anatomical and functional links with the hippocampus, here we asked how patients with selective bilateral hippocampal damage would derive moral decisions on a classic moral dilemmas paradigm. We found that the patients approved of the utilitarian options significantly less often than control participants, favoring instead deontological responses-rejecting actions that harm even one person. Thus, patients with hippocampal damage have a strikingly opposite approach to moral decision making than vmPFC-lesioned patients. Skin-conductance data collected during the task showed increased emotional arousal in the hippocampal-damaged patients and they stated that their moral decisions were based on emotional instinct. By contrast, control participants made moral decisions based on the integration of an adverse emotional response to harming others, visualization of the consequences of one's action, and the rational re-evaluation of future benefits. This integration may be disturbed in patients with either hippocampal or vmPFC damage. Hippocampal lesions decreased the ability to visualize a scenario and its future consequences, which seemed to render the adverse emotional response overwhelmingly dominant. In patients with vmPFC damage, visualization might also be reduced alongside an inability to detect the adverse emotional response, leaving only the utilitarian option open. Overall, these results provide insights into the processes involved in moral decision making and highlight the complementary roles played by two closely connected brain regions. The ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) is closely associated with the ability to make complex moral judgements. When this area is damaged, patients become more utilitarian (the ends justify the means) and have

  16. The Moral Dimensions of Infrastructure.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Epting, Shane

    2016-04-01

    Moral issues in urban planning involving technology, residents, marginalized groups, ecosystems, and future generations are complex cases, requiring solutions that go beyond the limits of contemporary moral theory. Aside from typical planning problems, there is incongruence between moral theory and some of the subjects that require moral assessment, such as urban infrastructure. Despite this incongruence, there is not a need to develop another moral theory. Instead, a supplemental measure that is compatible with existing moral positions will suffice. My primary goal in this paper is to explain the need for this supplemental measure, describe what one looks like, and show how it works with existing moral systems. The secondary goal is to show that creating a supplemental measure that provides congruency between moral systems that are designed to assess human action and non-human subjects advances the study of moral theory.

  17. Are ‘counter-intuitive’ deontological judgments really counter-intuitive? An empirical reply to Kahane et al. (2012)

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bruni, Tommaso; Greene, Joshua D.

    2014-01-01

    A substantial body of evidence indicates that utilitarian judgments (favoring the greater good) made in response to difficult moral dilemmas are preferentially supported by controlled, reflective processes, whereas deontological judgments (favoring rights/duties) in such cases are preferentially supported by automatic, intuitive processes. A recent neuroimaging study by Kahane et al. challenges this claim, using a new set of moral dilemmas that allegedly reverse the previously observed association. We report on a study in which we both induced and measured reflective responding to one of Greene et al.’s original dilemmas and one of Kahane et al.’s new dilemmas. For the original dilemma, induced reflection led to more utilitarian responding, replicating previous findings using the same methods. There was no overall effect of induced reflection for the new dilemma. However, for both dilemmas, the degree to which an individual engaged in prior reflection predicted the subsequent degree of utilitarian responding, with more reflective subjects providing more utilitarian judgments. These results cast doubt on Kahane et al.’s conclusions and buttress the original claim linking controlled, reflective processes to utilitarian judgment and automatic, intuitive processes to deontological judgment. Importantly, these results also speak to the generality of the underlying theory, indicating that what holds for cases involving utilitarian physical harms also holds for cases involving utilitarian lies. PMID:23887818

  18. True happiness: The role of morality in the folk concept of happiness.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Phillips, Jonathan; De Freitas, Julian; Mott, Christian; Gruber, June; Knobe, Joshua

    2017-02-01

    Recent scientific research has settled on a purely descriptive definition of happiness that is focused solely on agents' psychological states (high positive affect, low negative affect, high life satisfaction). In contrast to this understanding, recent research has suggested that the ordinary concept of happiness is also sensitive to the moral value of agents' lives. Five studies systematically investigate and explain the impact of morality on ordinary assessments of happiness. Study 1 demonstrates that moral judgments influence assessments of happiness not only for untrained participants, but also for academic researchers and even in those who study happiness specifically. Studies 2 and 3 then respectively ask whether this effect may be explained by general motivational biases or beliefs in a just world. In both cases, we find evidence against these explanations. Study 4 shows that the impact of moral judgments cannot be explained by changes in the perception of descriptive psychological states. Finally, Study 5 compares the impact of moral and nonmoral value, and provides evidence that unlike nonmoral value, moral value is part of the criteria that govern the ordinary concept of happiness. Taken together, these studies provide a specific explanation of how and why the ordinary concept of happiness deviates from the definition used by researchers studying happiness. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved).

  19. Gender and the experience of moral distress in critical care nurses.

    Science.gov (United States)

    O'Connell, Christopher B

    2015-02-01

    Nursing practice is complex, as nurses are challenged by increasingly intricate moral and ethical judgments. Inadequately studied in underrepresented groups in nursing, moral distress is a serious problem internationally for healthcare professionals with deleterious effects to patients, nurses, and organizations. Moral distress among nurses has been shown to contribute to decreased job satisfaction and increased turnover, withdrawal from patients, physical and psychological symptoms, and intent to leave current position or to leave the profession altogether. Do significant gender differences exist in the moral distress scores of critical care nurses? This study utilized a quantitative, descriptive methodology to explore moral distress levels in a sample of critical care nurses to determine whether gender differences exist in their mean moral distress scores. Participants (n = 31) were critical care nurses from an American Internet nursing community who completed the Moral Distress Scale-Revised online over a 5-day period in July 2013. Institutional review board review approved the study, and accessing and completing the survey implied informed consent. The results revealed a statistically significant gender difference in the mean moral distress scores of participants. Females reported statistically significantly higher moral distress scores than did males. Overall, the moral distress scores for both groups were relatively low. The findings of a gender difference have not previously been reported in the literature. However, other findings are consistent with previous studies on moral distress. Although the results of this study are not generalizable, they do suggest the need for continuing research on moral distress in underrepresented groups in nursing, including cultural and ethnic groups. © The Author(s) 2014.

  20. SOCIÉTÉ ET MORALE

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ioan HUMÃ

    2008-09-01

    Full Text Available The moral is also a field of options. We can not hope about the moral pride of Superman; where there isn’t any compassion, dedication, understanding and sacrifice, there isn’t any moral. Also we do not believe in any false moral of solvent egalitarianism and of abstract universal love. At the same time, we do not retain the moral quotient of the technical license, producer of uncivilized “freedoms”. On the contrary we believe that the moral is born minute by minute on the grueling road of the daily tension, disinterested commitment in the communion.

  1. Climate change and moral judgement

    Science.gov (United States)

    Markowitz, Ezra M.; Shariff, Azim F.

    2012-04-01

    Converging evidence from the behavioural and brain sciences suggests that the human moral judgement system is not well equipped to identify climate change -- a complex, large-scale and unintentionally caused phenomenon -- as an important moral imperative. As climate change fails to generate strong moral intuitions, it does not motivate an urgent need for action in the way that other moral imperatives do. We review six reasons why climate change poses significant challenges to our moral judgement system and describe six strategies that communicators might use to confront these challenges. Enhancing moral intuitions about climate change may motivate greater support for ameliorative actions and policies.

  2. Religion and Morality

    Science.gov (United States)

    2014-01-01

    The relationship between religion and morality has long been hotly debated. Does religion make us more moral? Is it necessary for morality? Do moral inclinations emerge independently of religious intuitions? These debates, which nowadays rumble on in scientific journals as well as in public life, have frequently been marred by a series of conceptual confusions and limitations. Many scientific investigations have failed to decompose “religion” and “morality” into theoretically grounded elements; have adopted parochial conceptions of key concepts—in particular, sanitized conceptions of “prosocial” behavior; and have neglected to consider the complex interplay between cognition and culture. We argue that to make progress, the categories “religion” and “morality” must be fractionated into a set of biologically and psychologically cogent traits, revealing the cognitive foundations that shape and constrain relevant cultural variants. We adopt this fractionating strategy, setting out an encompassing evolutionary framework within which to situate and evaluate relevant evidence. Our goals are twofold: to produce a detailed picture of the current state of the field, and to provide a road map for future research on the relationship between religion and morality. PMID:25528346

  3. Moral guidance, moral philosophy, and moral issues in practice.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Holt, J; Long, T

    1999-04-01

    Approaches to teaching ethics to nurses have been debated in literature for some years. Three issues in particular are commonly addressed: the intentions of such teaching; the value of examples and case studies; and the compatibility of philosophical approaches with the clinical reality experienced by students. It is argued here that moral guidance as a strategy is unacceptable, and that a basic introduction to philosophical methods is the key to effective learning of the skills required for autonomous analysis and decision making. A means for including the use of personal experiences and case study material is presented which relies upon the provision of a framework of analysis to facilitate structured thinking and the pursuit of justifiable arguments. The approach suggested is compatible with students' existing experiences and work-context, and enhances the integration of ethical reasoning into the multi-faceted totality of clinical practice.

  4. Moral sensitivity and moral distress in Iranian critical care nurses.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Borhani, Fariba; Abbaszadeh, Abbas; Mohamadi, Elham; Ghasemi, Erfan; Hoseinabad-Farahani, Mohammad Javad

    2017-06-01

    Moral sensitivity is the foremost prerequisite to ethical performance; a review of literature shows that nurses are sometimes not sensitive enough for a variety of reasons. Moral distress is a frequent phenomenon in nursing, which may result in paradoxes in care, dealing with patients and rendering high-quality care. This may, in turn, hinder the meeting of care objectives, thus affecting social healthcare standards. The present research was conducted to determine the relationship between moral sensitivity and moral distress of nurses in intensive care units. This study is a descriptive-correlation research. Lutzen's moral sensitivity questionnaire and Corley Moral Distress Questionnaire were used to gather data. Participants and research context: A total of 153 qualified nurses working in the hospitals affiliated to Shahid Beheshti University of Medical Sciences were selected for this study. Subjects were selected by census method. Ethical considerations: After explaining the objectives of the study, all the participants completed and signed the written consent form. To conduct the study, permission was obtained from the selected hospitals. Nurses' average moral sensitivity grade was 68.6 ± 7.8, which shows a moderate level of moral sensitivity. On the other hand, nurses also experienced a moderate level of moral distress (44.8 ± 16.6). Moreover, there was no meaningful statistical relationship between moral sensitivity and moral distress (p = 0.26). Although the nurses' moral sensitivity and moral distress were expected to be high in the intensive care units, it was moderate. This finding is consistent with the results of some studies and contradicts with others. As moral sensitivity is a crucial factor in care, it is suggested that necessary training be provided to develop moral sensitivity in nurses in education and practical environments. Furthermore, removing factors that contribute to moral distress may help decrease it in nurses.

  5. Moral Geography and Exploration of the Moral Possibility Space

    OpenAIRE

    Bongrae Seok

    2017-01-01

    This article reviews Owen Flanagan’s latest book “The Geography of Morals, Varieties of Moral Possibilities” (2017). By exploring the space of moral possibility (i.e., diverse options and viewpoints of morality from different philosophical and religious traditions throughout the world), Flanagan argues that ethics is not simply a study of a priori conditions of normative rules and ideal values but a process of developing a careful understanding of varying conditions of human ecology and build...

  6. Morals and markets.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Falk, Armin; Szech, Nora

    2013-05-10

    The possibility that market interaction may erode moral values is a long-standing, but controversial, hypothesis in the social sciences, ethics, and philosophy. To date, empirical evidence on decay of moral values through market interaction has been scarce. We present controlled experimental evidence on how market interaction changes how human subjects value harm and damage done to third parties. In the experiment, subjects decide between either saving the life of a mouse or receiving money. We compare individual decisions to those made in a bilateral and a multilateral market. In both markets, the willingness to kill the mouse is substantially higher than in individual decisions. Furthermore, in the multilateral market, prices for life deteriorate tremendously. In contrast, for morally neutral consumption choices, differences between institutions are small.

  7. Transhumanism and moral equality.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wilson, James

    2007-10-01

    Conservative thinkers such as Francis Fukuyama have produced a battery of objections to the transhumanist project of fundamentally enhancing human capacities. This article examines one of these objections, namely that by allowing some to greatly extend their capacities, we will undermine the fundamental moral equality of human beings. I argue that this objection is groundless: once we understand the basis for human equality, it is clear that anyone who now has sufficient capacities to count as a person from the moral point of view will continue to count as one even if others are fundamentally enhanced; and it is mistaken to think that a creature which had even far greater capacities than an unenhanced human being should count as more than an equal from the moral point of view.

  8. Neural Correlates of Causal Power Judgments

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Denise Dellarosa Cummins

    2014-12-01

    Full Text Available Causal inference is a fundamental component of cognition and perception. Probabilistic theories of causal judgment (most notably causal Bayes networks derive causal judgments using metrics that integrate contingency information. But human estimates typically diverge from these normative predictions. This is because human causal power judgments are typically strongly influenced by beliefs concerning underlying causal mechanisms, and because of the way knowledge is retrieved from human memory during the judgment process. Neuroimaging studies indicate that the brain distinguishes causal events from mere covariation, and between perceived and inferred causality. Areas involved in error prediction are also activated, implying automatic activation of possible exception cases during causal decision-making.

  9. What Develops in Moral Development? A Model of Moral Sensibility

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sherblom, Stephen A.

    2012-01-01

    The field of moral psychology would benefit from an integrative model of what develops in moral development, contextualized within the larger scope of social science research. Moral sensibility is proposed as the best concept to embody stated aims, but the content of this concept must be more finely articulated and conceptualized as a dynamic…

  10. From moral agents to moral factors: the structural ethics approach

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Brey, Philip A.E.; Kroes, P.; Verbeek, P.P.C.C.

    2014-01-01

    It has become a popular position in the philosophy of technology to claim that some or all technological artifacts can qualify as moral agents. This position has been developed to account for the moral role of technological artifacts in society and to help clarify the moral responsibility of

  11. 1 The Necessity of Moral Principles in Moral Education Emmanuel ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    NGOZI

    their attempts at moral education of their children and wards. Hence they are .... between duties. They tend, therefore, to think of all morality in terms of individual decision and choice. This is surely an exaggerated and over-dramatic view of how we are placed. .... stress man's general responsibility for the moral system which.

  12. Sources of moral distress for nursing staff providing care to residents with dementia.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Spenceley, Shannon; Witcher, Chad Sg; Hagen, Brad; Hall, Barry; Kardolus-Wilson, Arron

    2017-10-01

    The World Health Organization estimates the number of people living with dementia at approximately 35.6 million; they project a doubling of this number by 2030 and tripling by 2050. Although the majority of people living with a dementia live in the community, residential facility care by nursing care providers is a significant component of the dementia journey in most countries. Research has also shown that caring for persons with dementia can be emotionally, physically, and ethically challenging, and that turnover in nursing staff in residential care settings tends to be high. Moral distress has been explored in a variety of settings where nurses provide acute or intensive care. The concept, however, has not previously been explored in residential facility care settings, particularly as related to the care of persons with dementia. In this paper, we explore moral distress in these settings, using Nathaniel's definition of moral distress: the pain or anguish affecting the mind, body, or relationships in response to a situation in which the person is aware of a moral problem, acknowledges moral responsibility, makes a moral judgment about the correct action and yet, as a result of real or perceived constraints, cannot do what is thought to be right. We report findings from a qualitative study of moral distress in a single health region in a Canadian province. Our aim in this paper is to share findings that elucidate the sources of moral distress experienced by nursing care providers in the residential care of people living with dementia.

  13. Waging modern war: An analysis of the moral literature on the nuclear arms debate

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Palmer-Fernandez, G.F.

    1992-01-01

    The primary aim was to examine the dominant views on the subject of deterrence and the use of nuclear weapons, to compare them with each other, and to consider objections that have or might be made against them. A second, more controversial and substantive, aim was to show that nuclear weapons and war-fighting plans engender some disturbing moral dilemmas that call into question fundamental ways of thinking about morality and some of the common intuitions on the relation of intentions and actions. The author examines the moral literature, both religious and secular, on nuclear arms policy written between the early 1960s and the late 1980s. Three different schools of thought, or 'parties,' are identified. To establish the differences among these parties, the author shows the various ways in which judgments on the use of nuclear weapons and on deterrence are linked either by a prohibitive moral principle which draws a moral equivalence going from action to intention or by a factual assumption about the nature of nuclear weapons. He concludes with the suggestion that the dilemmas that arise in the moral evaluation of nuclear deterrence represent a profound and much wider problem in moral theory between the ideals of character and the moral claims of politics

  14. Judgmental Forecasting of Operational Capabilities

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Hallin, Carina Antonia; Tveterås, Sigbjørn; Andersen, Torben Juul

    This paper explores a new judgmental forecasting indicator, the Employee Sensed Operational Capabilities (ESOC). The purpose of the ESOC is to establish a practical prediction tool that can provide early signals about changes in financial performance by gauging frontline employees’ sensing of cha...... can predict financial performance. Monthly data were collected from frontline employees in three different companies during an 18-month period, and the initial results indicate that the ESOChas predictive power.......This paper explores a new judgmental forecasting indicator, the Employee Sensed Operational Capabilities (ESOC). The purpose of the ESOC is to establish a practical prediction tool that can provide early signals about changes in financial performance by gauging frontline employees’ sensing...... of changes in the firm’s operational capabilities. We present the first stage of the development of ESOC by applying a formative measurement approach to test the index in relation to financial performance and against an organizational commitment scale. We use distributed lag models to test whether the ESOC...

  15. Moralizing Food Technology

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Coff, Christian Eyde

    2015-01-01

    Food technologies are common on many levels in society and used by both food professionals and consumers. Food technologies are not neutral. They inform and shape the behaviour of people. This paper presents a theoretical framework for analysing the mediating role of food technology and its...... influence on food ethics. Post-phenomenology and the idea of a technologically mediated morality are central theoretical approaches. Four elements are included in the analytical framework: perception, interpretation, intentionality, and mediated morality. The framework is applied to two cases; food safety...

  16. Moral Violations Reduce Oral Consumption

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chan, Cindy; Van Boven, Leaf; Andrade, Eduardo B.; Ariely, Dan

    2014-01-01

    Consumers frequently encounter moral violations in everyday life. They watch movies and television shows about crime and deception, hear news reports of corporate fraud and tax evasion, and hear gossip about cheaters and thieves. How does exposure to moral violations influence consumption? Because moral violations arouse disgust and because disgust is an evolutionarily important signal of contamination that should provoke a multi-modal response, we hypothesize that moral violations affect a key behavioral response to disgust: reduced oral consumption. In three experiments, compared with those in control conditions, people drank less water and chocolate milk while (a) watching a film portraying the moral violations of incest, (b) writing about moral violations of cheating or theft, and (c) listening to a report about fraud and manipulation. These findings imply that “moral disgust” influences consumption in ways similar to core disgust, and thus provide evidence for the associations between moral violations, emotions, and consumer behavior. PMID:25125931

  17. Moral Violations Reduce Oral Consumption.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chan, Cindy; Van Boven, Leaf; Andrade, Eduardo B; Ariely, Dan

    2014-07-01

    Consumers frequently encounter moral violations in everyday life. They watch movies and television shows about crime and deception, hear news reports of corporate fraud and tax evasion, and hear gossip about cheaters and thieves. How does exposure to moral violations influence consumption? Because moral violations arouse disgust and because disgust is an evolutionarily important signal of contamination that should provoke a multi-modal response, we hypothesize that moral violations affect a key behavioral response to disgust: reduced oral consumption. In three experiments, compared with those in control conditions, people drank less water and chocolate milk while (a) watching a film portraying the moral violations of incest, (b) writing about moral violations of cheating or theft, and (c) listening to a report about fraud and manipulation. These findings imply that "moral disgust" influences consumption in ways similar to core disgust, and thus provide evidence for the associations between moral violations, emotions, and consumer behavior.

  18. Neuroscience, Moral Psychology and Law: First Lines on the (Impossibility of Rational Persuasion

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Thais de Bessa Gontijo de Oliveira

    2015-12-01

    Full Text Available Although Law is often influenced by values, nowadays a widely held expert opinion is that the application of law is a result or rational reasoning. It is believed that those applying legal rules consider the conflicting arguments from both parties, and come to a decision by rational means. Nevertheless, new discoveries from Neuroscience and Moral Psychology show that many of these moral judgments that inevitably underlie legal judgments occur unconsciously and not rationally. Once such judgments are passed, they are immune to any dissenting rational  argument.  Through  literature  review,  we  discuss  in  the  present  paper  some derivations  of  these  new  findings  to  Law.  For  instance,  it  is  advisable  that  deeper philosophical training is installed in professional qualification for lawyers and magistrates, making  these  people  more  open-minded  towards  reasons  against  their  own  moral convictions. Furthermore, it is important to consider limiting the mandate of Hight Courts Ministers, in order to prevent that the moral convictions of these people pervade for too long.

  19. Untangling Partnership and Domination Morality

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    David Loye

    2015-06-01

    Full Text Available Riane Eisler’s (1987 cultural transformation theory is an effective framework for understanding many of the constructs that shape society. This article uses Eisler’s theory to explain the formation of morality and the construction of conscience. It contrasts partnership morality and domination morality, and describes the factors that shape our tendency to embrace one or the other. The article helps us understand that we have a choice, and invites us to choose partnership morality.

  20. Judgment Confidence and Judgment Accuracy of Teachers in Judging Self-Concepts of Students

    Science.gov (United States)

    Praetorius, Anna-Katharina; Berner, Valerie-Danielle; Zeinz, Horst; Scheunpflug, Annette; Dresel, Markus

    2013-01-01

    Accurate teacher judgments of student characteristics are considered to be important prerequisites for adaptive instruction. A theoretically important condition for putting these judgments into operation is judgment confidence. Using a German sample of 96 teachers and 1,388 students, the authors examined how confident teachers are in their…

  1. Moral Cognitivism | Lillehammer | Philosophical Papers

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    The paper explicates a set of criteria the joint satisfaction of which is taken to qualify moral judgements as cognitive. The paper examines evidence that some moral judgements meet these criteria, and relates the resulting conception of moral judgements to ongoing controversies about cognitivism in ethics. Philosophical ...

  2. Moral Intelligence in the Schools

    Science.gov (United States)

    Clarken, Rodney H.

    2009-01-01

    Moral intelligence is newer and less studied than the more established cognitive, emotional and social intelligences, but has great potential to improve our understanding of learning and behavior. Moral intelligence refers to the ability to apply ethical principles to personal goals, values and actions. The construct of moral intelligence consists…

  3. Crime fiction and moral emotions

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Grodal, Torben Kragh

    2011-01-01

    typology of moral systems and how different stages relate to different social systems. Further, a functional description of the various moral emotions is used to characterize crime fictions. The use of moral emotions in crime fiction is exemplified in Oplev’s The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo (2009), angry...

  4. Simulation Games in Moral Education

    Science.gov (United States)

    Boulogne, Jack

    1978-01-01

    Discusses the value of simulation games in moral education in four categories: fun and games; games as simulations of real life; games as motivators; and morality and game theory. Also examines the gaming aspects of morality, as well as the physical, psychological, precedent-setting, and internal consequences of an action. (Author/JK)

  5. Philosophy, Casuistry, and Moral Development

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fullinwider, Robert K.

    2010-01-01

    Moral educators have little to learn from the moral theories in which philosophers routinely trade. These theories--including those by Slote, Hume, and Kant--leave behind the concrete world in which the moral educator labors. As interesting as they may be, they merely devise alternative routes to the same destination--to the main general features…

  6. Confronting moral distress in Nursing: recognizing nurses as moral agents

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Franco A. Carnevale

    2013-09-01

    Full Text Available The concept of moral distress has brought forth a substantively different way of understanding some of the difficulties confronted by nurses in their practice. This concept highlights that nurses' distress can be an indication of nurses' conscientious moral engagement with their professional practice that has confronted practices or an environment that impedes them from acting according to their own ethical standards. Moral distress can be an indicator of problems in nurses' practice environments. This concept is described and related to moral agency in nursing practice. Selected research on moral distress is reviewed, followed by a discussion of recommendations for addressing this problem.

  7. Protecting the Innocence of Youth: Moral Sanctity Values Underlie Censorship From Young Children.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Anderson, Rajen A; Masicampo, E J

    2017-11-01

    Three studies examined the relationship between people's moral values (drawing on moral foundations theory) and their willingness to censor immoral acts from children. Results revealed that diverse moral values did not predict censorship judgments. It was not the case that participants who valued loyalty and authority, respectively, sought to censor depictions of disloyal and disobedient acts. Rather, censorship intentions were predicted by a single moral value-sanctity. The more people valued sanctity, the more willing they were to censor from children, regardless of the types of violations depicted (impurity, disloyalty, disobedience, etc.). Furthermore, people who valued sanctity objected to indecent exposure only to apparently innocent and pure children-those who were relatively young and who had not been previously exposed to immoral acts. These data suggest that sanctity, purity, and the preservation of innocence underlie intentions to censor from young children.

  8. Peace and war: a study of morality and US strategic nuclear policies. Study project report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ginder, D.B.; Hicks, I.

    1983-05-01

    The paper examines the quesitons of peace and war and the morality of nuclear deterrence. These vital and enduring questions have been again become a focus of societal debate, especially in the light of the Catholic Bishop's pastoral letter. The nuclear debate is all encompassing, raising philosophical, political, social, strategic an religious questions. These issues present problems that each informed citizen will have to discern both morally and politically. The purpose of the paper is not to evaluate the morality of the defense and deterrent policies/strategies of the United States, but to provide the reader with the information to allow him to formulate judgment on this important question and be able to reconcile personal moral values with national policy and strategy.

  9. EL CONCEPTO DEL DAÑO MORAL BAJO EL PRISMA DE LA JURISPRUDENCIA

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Blanca Casado Andrés

    2015-04-01

    Full Text Available At present debates continue taking place on what it must be understood by moral hurt, probably the abstraction of the term is the reason. Nevertheless, the autonomy of the moral hurt and his admission for the courts (from the year 1912 turns out to be unquestionable, as his indemnity. Our Courts do not offer a definition of moral hurt. His contribution is merely practical, and though there are numerous the judgments that analyze the question of the moral hurts, the majority they limit themselves to solving the raised case, with a clear tendency to enumerate the most significant suppositions in relation to the protected goods and to extend the area of this type of hurts.

  10. Sex, Technology and Morality.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Case, Verna; And Others

    1986-01-01

    Provides an overview of the course "Sex, Technology, and Morality" which focuses on the human reproductive process and examines the advances in reproductive technology. The course emphasizes the social, political, and ethical implications of actual and possible technologies associated with human reproduction. (ML)

  11. Moral Teaching in Geography.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Smith, David M.

    1995-01-01

    Argues that geography is in a unique position to highlight and emphasize moral issues that otherwise might be neglected. Contemporary issues that naturally intersect with geographic concepts include citizenship and immigration, and the allocation of resources. Recommends examining relative concepts of justice, equality, and community. (MJP)

  12. Moral and metaphors:

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Læssøe, Jeppe

    2005-01-01

    This summary is based on a workshop discussion at the conference "Elusive Consumtion", Gothenburg, June 2002. The workshop took it point of departure in a keynote speech held by Richard Wilk, Indiana University, USA, on 'Morals and Metaphors'. Consumption is not an exact, but a fuzzy concept. Thus...

  13. Music and Morality.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kilpatrick, William

    1995-01-01

    Music can help create a good moral environment if it is music that can be shared, that channels emotions and shapes the soul, that has stood the test of time, and that tells a story. Today's rock music all too often plays a destructive role in leading youth away from virtue. (SLD)

  14. Moral actor, selfish agent.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Frimer, Jeremy A; Schaefer, Nicola K; Oakes, Harrison

    2014-05-01

    People are motivated to behave selfishly while appearing moral. This tension gives rise to 2 divergently motivated selves. The actor-the watched self-tends to be moral; the agent-the self as executor-tends to be selfish. Three studies present direct evidence of the actor's and agent's distinct motives. To recruit the self-as-actor, we asked people to rate the importance of various goals. To recruit the self-as-agent, we asked people to describe their goals verbally. In Study 1, actors claimed their goals were equally about helping the self and others (viz., moral); agents claimed their goals were primarily about helping the self (viz., selfish). This disparity was evident in both individualist and collectivist cultures, attesting to the universality of the selfish agent. Study 2 compared actors' and agents' motives to those of people role-playing highly prosocial or selfish exemplars. In content (Study 2a) and in the impressions they made on an outside observer (Study 2b), actors' motives were similar to those of the prosocial role-players, whereas agents' motives were similar to those of the selfish role-players. Study 3 accounted for the difference between the actor and agent: Participants claimed that their agent's motives were the more realistic and that their actor's motives were the more idealistic. The selfish agent/moral actor duality may account for why implicit and explicit measures of the same construct diverge, and why feeling watched brings out the better angels of human nature.

  15. New wars, new morality?

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Akkerman, T.

    2009-01-01

    Has war fundamentally changed? If so, it may be time for reconsidering accepted moral standards for waging wars and for conduct in war. The new war thesis holds that wars have fundamentally altered since the end of the Cold War. Proponents such as Kaldor and Weiss hold that wars today are intrastate

  16. Overconfidence and Moral Hazard

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    de la Rosa, Leonidas Enrique

    2011-01-01

    In this paper, I study the effects of overconfidence on incentive contracts in a moral-hazard framework. Agent overconfidence can have conflicting effects on the equilibrium contract. On the one hand, an optimistic or overconfident agent disproportionately values success-contingent payments...

  17. Philosophy and Morality.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ediger, Marlow

    Philosophical thinking which has stood the test of time is summarized in this document. The rationale is that all students benefit from studies of philosophical thinking emphasizing moral standards. Thinkers included are: Plato, Aristotle, Peter Abelard, Francis Bacon, Sir Thomas More, Thomas Campanella, Thomas Hobbes, Benedict Spinoza, John…

  18. Rethinking Moral Responsibility

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Vedder, A.H.; Johnson, D.; Moor, J.; Tavani, H.

    2000-01-01

    Questions regarding the moral responsibility of Internet access and service providers relating to possible negative aspects of information on the Internet call for a reassessment of the ways in which we think about attributing blame, guilt, and duties of reparation and compensation. They invite us

  19. Finding faults: how moral dilemmas illuminate cognitive structure.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cushman, Fiery; Greene, Joshua D

    2012-01-01

    Philosophy is rife with intractable moral dilemmas. We propose that these debates often exist because competing psychological systems yield different answers to the same problem. Consequently, philosophical debate points to the natural fault lines between dissociable psychological mechanisms, and as such provides a useful guide for cognitive neuroscience. We present two case studies from recent research into moral judgment: dilemmas concerning whether to harm a person in order to save several others, and whether to punish individuals for harms caused accidentally. Finally, we analyze two features of mental conflict that apparently contribute to philosophical discord: the insistence that one answer to a problem must be correct ("non-negotiability") and the absence of an independent means of determining the correct answer ("non-adjudicability"). Fiery Cushman thanks the Mind/Brain/Behavior Initiative for its generous support during the preparation of this work.

  20. Moral panic, moral regulation, and the civilizing process.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hier, Sean

    2016-09-01

    This article compares two analytical frameworks ostensibly formulated to widen the focus of moral panic studies. The comparative analysis suggests that attempts to conceptualize moral panics in terms of decivilizing processes have neither substantively supplemented the explanatory gains made by conceptualizing moral panic as a form of moral regulation nor provided a viable alternative framework that better explains the dynamics of contemporary moral panics. The article concludes that Elias's meta-theory of the civilizing process potentially provides explanatory resources to investigate a possible historical-structural shift towards the so-called age of (a)moral panic; the analytical demands of such a project, however, require a sufficiently different line of inquiry than the one encouraged by both the regulatory and decivilizing perspectives on moral panic. © London School of Economics and Political Science 2016.

  1. Defense mechanisms and morality: a link between isolation and moralization.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Björklund, F

    2000-03-01

    The relationship between morality and perceptual defense mechanisms was studied. Three new scales were constructed to measure different aspects of morality: moralism (the tendency to evaluate everything in terms of right and wrong), conscience (strength of feelings of right and wrong) and reparation (inclination to repair the damage one has caused). Perceptual defense mechanisms were measured with Kragh's Defense Mechanism Test (DMT). Three hypotheses about relationships between morality and defense mechanisms, derived from psychoanalytical literature, were tested on 54 male University students. Results show positive correlations between the defense mechanism isolation of affect and moralism, and between identification with the aggressor and reparation. Total amount of perceptual defense correlated positively with moralism. It is argued that the psychological study of morality should take unconscious processes into consideration.

  2. Moral hypocrisy: appearing moral to oneself without being so.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Batson, C D; Thompson, E R; Seuferling, G; Whitney, H; Strongman, J A

    1999-09-01

    How can people appear moral to themselves when they fail to act morally? Two self-deception strategies were considered: (a) misperceive one's behavior as moral and (b) avoid comparing one's behavior with moral standards. In Studies 1 and 2 the authors documented the importance of the 2nd strategy but not the 1st. Among participants who flipped a coin to assign themselves and another participant "fairly" to tasks, even a clearly labeled coin that prevented misperception did not produce a fair result (Study 1). Inducing behavior-standard comparison through self-awareness did (Study 2). Study 3 qualified the self-awareness effect: When moral standards were not salient before acting, self-awareness no longer increased alignment of behavior with standards. Instead, it increased alignment of standards with behavior and produced less moral action. Overall, results showed 3 different faces of moral hypocrisy.

  3. Fostering Nurses' Moral Agency and Moral Identity: The Importance of Moral Community.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Liaschenko, Joan; Peter, Elizabeth

    2016-09-01

    It may be the case that the most challenging moral problem of the twenty-first century will be the relationship between the individual moral agent and the practices and institutions in which the moral agent is embedded. In this paper, we continue the efforts that one of us, Joan Liaschenko, first called for in 1993, that of using feminist ethics as a lens for viewing the relationship between individual nurses as moral agents and the highly complex institutions in which they do the work of nursing. Feminist ethics, with its emphasis on the inextricable relationship between ethics and politics, provides a useful lens to understand the work of nurses in context. Using Margaret Urban Walker's and Hilde Lindemann's concepts of identity, relationships, values, and moral agency, we argue that health care institutions can be moral communities and profoundly affect the work and identity and, therefore, the moral agency of all who work within those structures, including nurses. Nurses are not only shaped by these organizations but also have the power to shape them. Because moral agency is intimately connected to one's identity, moral identity work is essential for nurses to exercise their moral agency and to foster moral community in health care organizations. We first provide a brief history of nursing's morally problematic relationship with institutions and examine the impact institutional master narratives and corporatism exert today on nurses' moral identities and agency. We close by emphasizing the significance of ongoing dialogue in creating and sustaining moral communities, repairing moral identities, and strengthening moral agency. © 2016 The Hastings Center.

  4. Influence diagram in evaluating the subjective judgment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hong, Y.

    1997-01-01

    The author developed the idea of the subjective influence diagrams to evaluate subjective judgment. The subjective judgment of a stake holder is a primary decision making proposition. It involves a basic decision process an the individual attitude of the stake holder for his decision purpose. The subjective judgment dominates the some final decisions. A complex decision process may include the subjective judgment. An influence diagram framework is a simplest tool for analyzing subjective judgment process. In the framework, the characters of influence diagrams generate the describing the analyzing, and the evaluating of the subjective judgment. The relationship between the information and the decision, such as independent character between them, is the main issue. Then utility function is the calculating tool to evaluation, the stake holder can make optimal decision. Through the analysis about the decision process and relationship, the building process of the influence diagram identically describes the subjective judgment. Some examples are given to explain the property of subjective judgment and the analysis process

  5. 32 CFR 1602.13 - Judgmental Classification.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 6 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Judgmental Classification. 1602.13 Section 1602.13 National Defense Other Regulations Relating to National Defense SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM DEFINITIONS § 1602.13 Judgmental Classification. A classification action relating to a registrant's claim for...

  6. Aging and Confidence Judgments in Item Recognition

    Science.gov (United States)

    Voskuilen, Chelsea; Ratcliff, Roger; McKoon, Gail

    2018-01-01

    We examined the effects of aging on performance in an item-recognition experiment with confidence judgments. A model for confidence judgments and response time (RTs; Ratcliff & Starns, 2013) was used to fit a large amount of data from a new sample of older adults and a previously reported sample of younger adults. This model of confidence…

  7. Otonomi Moral Keagamaan Mahasiswa

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Muhammad Idrus

    2014-07-01

    Full Text Available Secara umum tujuan penelitian ini adalah untuk memahami dan menganalisis fenomena otonomi moral keagamaan mahasiswa Fakultas Tarbiyah, yang diharapkan dapat menjadi balikan bagi perumusan model ideal pendidikan moral yang sesuai dengan kaidah agama Islam. Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif dengan desain studi kasus terpancang {embedded case study, dengan mengambil latar Fakultas Tarbiyah UII. Model ini diharapkan dapat memberikan gambaran makna mendalam tentang perilaku keseharian mahasiswa-mahasiswi sesuai fokus penelitian yang diajukan. Pengamatan, wawancara, rekaman audio dan rekaman visual digunakan dalam proses pengumpulan data yang melibatkan mahasiswa dan dosen. Analisis domain, taksonomik, komponensial dan tema digunakan dalam mereduksi dan mengklasifikasi data yang diperoleh u ntuk mendeskripsikan kenyataan empiris. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan perilaku kegamaan yang ditampilkan para informan cenderung tidak memiliki otonomi moral keagamaan yang baik, atau masih dalam tahapan heteronomi. Hal tersebut ditunjukkan adanya pelbagai harapan atas pelaksanaan perintah yang dilakukan, ataupun penghindaran larangan. Kedua, dalam memeluk agama tampaknya secara umum informan masih bersifat pewarisan dari para orang tuanya. Ketiga, dalam upayanya untuk membangkitkan otonomi moral keagamaan mahasiswa, dosen melakukan dengan cara himbauan, nasehat, ataupun bimbingan yang diberikan pada waktu-waktu tertentu dan tidak terjadual dalam kegiatan tatap muka di kelas. Berdasarkan pada hasil penelitian diajukan beberapa saran, yaitu: Pertama, adanya pengakuan informan bahwa agama yang dianutnya merupakan agama warisan orang tua mereka, dapat dijadikan sebagai fokus pada penelitian berikut. Kedua, dalam penelitian ini kajian otonomi moral keagamaan dilihat dari sudut pandang agama Islam. Tentunya melihat variasi agama yang ada di Indonesia, sudut pandang penelitian lanjutan dapat dilakukan melalui "kaca mata" agama-agama yang berbeda.

  8. Striving for the moral self : The effects of recalling past moral actions on future moral behavior

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Jordan, J.; Mullen, E.; Murnighan, J.K.

    People's desires to see themselves as moral actors can contribute to their striving for and achievement of a sense of self-completeness. The authors use self-completion theory to predict (and show) that recalling one's own (im)moral behavior leads to compensatory rather than consistent moral action

  9. People's Judgments About Classic Property Law Cases.

    Science.gov (United States)

    DeScioli, Peter; Karpoff, Rachel

    2015-06-01

    People's judgments about property shape how they relate to other people with respect to resources. Property law cases can provide a valuable window into ownership judgments because disputants often use conflicting rules for ownership, offering opportunities to distinguish these basic rules. Here we report a series of ten studies investigating people's judgments about classic property law cases dealing with found objects. The cases address a range of issues, including the relativity of ownership, finder versus landowner rights, object location, objects below- versus above-ground, mislaid versus lost objects, contracts between landowners and finders, and the distinction between public and private space. The results show nuanced patterns in ownership judgments that are not well-explained by previous psychological theories. Also, people's judgments often conflict with court decisions and legal principles. These empirical patterns can be used to generate and test novel hypotheses about the intuitive logic of ownership.

  10. Associative judgment and vector space semantics.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bhatia, Sudeep

    2017-01-01

    I study associative processing in high-level judgment using vector space semantic models. I find that semantic relatedness, as quantified by these models, is able to provide a good measure of the associations involved in judgment, and, in turn, predict responses in a large number of existing and novel judgment tasks. My results shed light on the representations underlying judgment, and highlight the close relationship between these representations and those at play in language and in the assessment of word meaning. In doing so, they show how one of the best-known and most studied theories in decision making research can be formalized to make quantitative a priori predictions, and how this theory can be rigorously tested on a wide range of natural language judgment problems. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved).

  11. KOMPETENSI MORAL DAN INTENSI WHISTLEBLOWING

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Harti Budi yanti

    2018-02-01

    Full Text Available This study examines the effect of age, gender and moral competence on whistleblowing intentions. Most of the respondents had a medium moral competence score. The older women group proved to be higher in moral competence scores than men of the same age. Age and gender do not affect whistle blowing intentions. However, moral competence strengthens the influence of age and gender on whistle blowing intentions. The results of this test provide support for human resource development practitioners to start paying attention to moral competence in addition to technical competence as the basis of consideration of recruitment, promotion and layoffs.

  12. Moral distress in emergency nurses.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fernandez-Parsons, Robin; Rodriguez, Lori; Goyal, Deepika

    2013-11-01

    For nurses, moral distress leads to burnout, attrition, compassion fatigue, and patient avoidance. Using a quantitative, cross-sectional, and descriptive design, we assessed the frequency, intensity, and type of moral distress in 51 emergency nurses in 1 community hospital using a 21-item, self-report, Likert-type questionnaire. Results showed a total mean moral distress level of 3.18, indicative of overall low moral distress. Situations with the highest levels of moral distress were related to the competency of health care providers and following family wishes to continue life support, also known as futile care. Moral distress was the reason given by 6.6% of registered nurses for leaving a previous position, 20% said that they had considered leaving a position but did not, and 13.3% stated that they are currently considering leaving their position because of moral distress. Copyright © 2013 Emergency Nurses Association. Published by Mosby, Inc. All rights reserved.

  13. Infection, incest, and iniquity: investigating the neural correlates of disgust and morality.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Schaich Borg, Jana; Lieberman, Debra; Kiehl, Kent A

    2008-09-01

    Disgust, an emotion related to avoiding harmful substances, has been linked to moral judgments in many behavioral studies. However, the fact that participants report feelings of disgust when thinking about feces and a heinous crime does not necessarily indicate that the same mechanisms mediate these reactions. Humans might instead have separate neural and physiological systems guiding aversive behaviors and judgments across different domains. The present interdisciplinary study used functional magnetic resonance imaging (n = 50) and behavioral assessment to investigate the biological homology of pathogen-related and moral disgust. We provide evidence that pathogen-related and sociomoral acts entrain many common as well as unique brain networks. We also investigated whether morality itself is composed of distinct neural and behavioral subdomains. We provide evidence that, despite their tendency to elicit similar ratings of moral wrongness, incestuous and nonsexual immoral acts entrain dramatically separate, while still overlapping, brain networks. These results (i) provide support for the view that the biological response of disgust is intimately tied to immorality, (ii) demonstrate that there are at least three separate domains of disgust, and (iii) suggest strongly that morality, like disgust, is not a unified psychological or neurological phenomenon.

  14. EXPERIENCES OF VIOLENCE AND MORAL REASONING IN A CONTEXT OF VENGEANCE/ EXPERIENCIAS DE VIOLENCIA Y RAZONAMIENTO MORAL EN UN CONTEXTO DE VENGANZA/ EXPERIÊNCIAS DE VIOLÊNCIA E RACIONAMENTO MORAL EM UM CONTEXTO DE VINGANÇA

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Roberto Posada Gilède

    2012-12-01

    Full Text Available Relations between exposure to violence and moral reasoning were explored. Ninety-six participants aged 6-16 years evaluated the acceptability of stealing and causing physical harm in a situation of vengeance. Self-reports of exposure to violence were collected from each participant. Findings indicated that previous exposure to violence is related to moral reasoning in contexts of vengeance. Participants who reported having witnessed more violence, especially against family members, evaluated causing physical harm more positively, provided justifications entailing retaliation more frequently, and offered fewer reasons related to the conventional and personal realms, in a context of vengeance. Moreover, witnessing particular violent events was found to be positively correlated with judgments justified with reasons involving retaliation. These results suggest that participants think of vengeance as a way to restore justice (a moral issue through expiatory sanction.

  15. Does Ethics Education Influence the Moral Action of Practicing Nurses and Social Workers?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Grady, Christine; Danis, Marion; Soeken, Karen L.; O’Donnell, Patricia; Taylor, Carol; Farrar, Adrienne; Ulrich, Connie M.

    2009-01-01

    Purpose/methods This study investigated the relationship between ethics education and training, and the use and usefulness of ethics resources, confidence in moral decisions, and moral action/activism through a survey of practicing nurses and social workers from four United States (US) census regions. Findings The sample (n = 1215) was primarily Caucasian (83%), female (85%), well educated (57% with a master’s degree). no ethics education at all was reported by 14% of study participants (8% of social workers had no ethics education, versus 23% of nurses), and only 57% of participants had ethics education in their professional educational program. Those with both professional ethics education and in-service or continuing education were more confident in their moral judgments and more likely to use ethics resources and to take moral action. Social workers had more overall education, more ethics education, and higher confidence and moral action scores, and were more likely to use ethics resources than nurses. Conclusion Ethics education has a significant positive influence on moral confidence, moral action, and use of ethics resources by nurses and social workers. PMID:18576241

  16. On the appropriateness of appropriateness judgments

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Yoav Ganzach

    2007-02-01

    Full Text Available We compare experts' judgments of the appropriateness of a treatment (interferon treatment for melanoma on the basis of important attributes of this disease (thickness, ulceration, lymph node involvement and type of metastases to a decision analytic model in which the probabilities of deterioration are derived from the medical literature and from epidemiological studies. The comparison is based on what we call extit{the linearity test}, which examines whether appropriateness judgments are a linear function of the epidemiological value of $p_2$, the probability of deterioration of the patient condition if he would have received the treatment. This comparison allows for the assessment of the validity of the experts' judgments under the assumption that the decision analytic model is valid, or alternatively, the assessment of the validity of the decision analytic model under the assumption that the experts' judgments are valid. Under the former assumption the results indicate that appropriateness judgments are by and large accurate. Under the latter assumption the results support the idea of a extit{constant treatment effect}, the idea that efficacy of a treatment is constant over various levels of severity of the disease. Our results also support the idea that experts' aggregate judgments far exceed individuals' judgments.

  17. Promoting Health, Producing Moralisms?

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Brogaard Kristensen, Dorthe; Askegaard, Søren; Hauge Jeppesen, Lene

    2010-01-01

    Based on an ethnographic study of 25 Danish consumers, the aim of this paper is threefold. Firstly, based on a critique of traditional approaches to consumer health campaigning, it argues for a more socially diversified approach for understanding consumer construction and pursuit of healthy...... behaviour. Secondly, it presents a typology of discourses that are employed by consumers in constructing their (health oriented) food consumption. Thirdly, it addresses certain social and moral dilemmas inherent in consumer health promotional campaigns....

  18. Tillid, socialitet og moral

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Pedersen, Esther Oluffa

    2011-01-01

    Artiklen diskuterer tillids og mistillids dobbeltkarakter som umiddelbar indstilling og villet handling. Det argumenteres, at tillid er et væsenligt fænomen til forståelse af menneskelig socialitet, idet tillid i sin grund er et forhold, der udspænder sig mellem mennesker. Desuden undersøges forh...... forholdet til moral, hvor det hævdes, at tillid mellem mennesker ikke nødvendigvis er moralsk legitimeret....

  19. Moral og frihed

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Møller, Rasmus Bysted

    2011-01-01

    at eliminere denne tvetydighed ved at levere en rationel rekonstruktion af det meningsmæssige indhold i begrebet kontrakausal frihed, således at en mere præcis teoretisk forståelse kan afløse de vage intuitioner vi har på området. Det er endvidere artiklens tese, at forbindelsen mellem frihed og moral skyldes...

  20. Moral hazard in ecology

    Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

    Fayle, Tom Maurice

    2015-01-01

    Roč. 3, Article no. 3 (2015), s. 1-2 R&D Projects: GA ČR GA14-32302S Grant - others:Australian Research Council Discovery Grant(AU) DP140101541 Institutional support: RVO:60077344 Keywords : economic crisis * moral hazard * power asymmetry Subject RIV: EH - Ecology, Behaviour http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fevo.2015.00003/full