Assessment of plutonium storage safety issues at Department of Energy facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-01-01

The Department of Energy (DOE) mission for utilization and storage of nuclear materials has recently changed as a result of the end of the ''Cold War'' era. Past and current plutonium storage practices largely reflect a temporary, in-process, or in-use storage condition which must now be changed to accommodate longer-term storage. This report summarizes information concerning current plutonium metal and oxide storage practices which was presented at the Office of Defense programs (DP) workshop in Albuquerque, New Mexico on May 26-27, 1993 and contained in responses to questions by DP-62 from the field organizations

Plutonium solution storage in plastic bottles: Operational experience and safety issues

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Conner, W.V.

1995-01-01

Computer spread sheet models were developed to gain a better understanding of the factors that lead to pressurization and failure of plastic bottles containing plutonium solutions. These models were developed using data obtained from the literature on gas generation rates for plutonium solutions. Leak rates from sealed plastic bottles were obtained from bottle leak tests conducted at Rocky Flats. Results from these bottle leak tests showed that narrow mouth four liter bottles will seal much better than wide mouth four liter bottles. The gas generation rate and leak rate data were used to develop models for predicting the rate of pressurization and maximum pressures expected in sealed bottles of plutonium solution containing various plutonium and acid concentrations. The computer models were used to develop proposed time limits for storing or transporting plutonium solutions in sealed plastic bottles. For plutonium solutions containing 1.5 g/l plutonium, storage in sealed bottles should not be allowed. However, transportation of higher concentration plutonium solution in sealed bottles is required, and safe transportation times of 1 shift to 6 days are proposed

Bulging of cans containing plutonium residues. Summary report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Van Konynenburg, R.A.; Wood, D.H.; Condit, R.H.; Shikany, S.D.

1996-03-01

In 1994, two cans in the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Plutonium Facility were found to be bulging as a result of the generation of gases form the plutonium ash residues contained in the cans. This report describes the chronology of this discovery, the response actions that revealed other pressurized cans, the analysis of the causes, the short-term remedial action, a followup inspection of the short-term storage packages, and a review of proposed long-term remedial options

Autoradiographic technique for rapid inventory of plutonium-containing fast critical assembly fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Brumbach, S.B.; Perry, R.B.

1977-10-01

A nondestructive autoradiographic technique is described which can provide a verification of the piece count and the plutonium content of plutonium-containing fuel elements. This technique uses the spontaneously emitted gamma rays from plutonium to form images of fuel elements on photographic film. Autoradiography has the advantage of providing an inventory verification without the opening of containers or the handling of fuel elements. Missing fuel elements, substitution of nonradioactive material, and substitution of elements of different size are detectable. Results are presented for fuel elements in various storage configurations and for fuel elements contained in a fast critical assembly

Design, construction and mounting of a container for transportation and storage of a closed plutonium glove box

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Aparicio, G.; Insegna, M.A.; Mathot, S.R.; Munoz, C.; Orlando, O.S.; Salguero, D.

1990-01-01

With the aim of confining a closed chemistry glove box (with reference to papers: 'Closure of an analytical chemistry glove box in alpha Laboratory' and 'Disconnection and transportation of a closed plutonium glove box to a controlled zone'), it was necessary to design and construct a container to assure transportation from its location (a controlled zone) up to a definitive storage place capable of supporting its posterior confinement. (Author) [es

Surveillance of sealed containers with plutonium oxide materials (ms163)

Science.gov (United States)

Worl, Laura; Berg, John; Ford, Doris; Martinez, Max; McFarlan, Jim; Morris, John; Padilla, Dennis; Rau, Karen; Smith, Coleman; Veirs, Kirk; Hill, Dallas; Prenger, Coyne

2000-07-01

DOE is embarking upon a program to store large quantities of plutonium-bearing materials for up to fifty years. Materials destined for long-term storage include metals and oxides that are stabilized and packaged according to the DOE storage standard, where the packaging consists of two nested, welded, stainless steel containers. We have designed instrumented storage containers that mimic the inner storage can specified in the 3013 standard at both full- and small-scale capacities (2.4 liter and 0.005 liter, respectively), Figures 1 and 2. The containers are designed to maintain the volume to material mass ratio while allowing the gas composition and pressure to be monitored over time.

Storage of plutonium and nuclear power plant actinide waste in the form of critical-mass-free ceramics containing neutron poisons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Nadykto, B.A. [RFNC-VNIIEF, Nizhni Novgorod Region (Russian Federation)

2001-07-01

The nuclear weapons production has resulted in accumulation of a large quantity of plutonium and uranium highly enriched with uranium-235 isotope (many tons). The work under ISTC Project 332B-97 treated the issues of safe plutonium storage through making critical-mass-free plutonium oxide compositions with neutron poisons. This completely excludes immediate utilization (without chemical reprocessing) of retained plutonium in nuclear devices. It is therewith possible to locate plutonium most compactly in the storage facility, which would allow reduction in required storage areas and costs. The issues of the surplus weapon-grade plutonium management and utilization have been comprehensively studied in the recent decade. The issues are treated in multiple scientific publications, conferences, and seminars. At the same time, issues of nuclear power engineering actinide waste storage are studied no less extensively. The general issues are material radioactivity and energy release and nuclear accident hazards due to critical mass generation. Plutonium accumulated in nuclear power plant spent fuel is more accessible than weapon-grade plutonium and can become of higher and higher interest with time as its activity reduces, including as material for nuclear devices. The urgency of plutonium management is presently related not only to accumulation of surplus weapon-grade plutonium, but also to the fact that it is high time to decide what has to be done regarding reactor plutonium. Presently, the possibility of actinide separation from NPP spent nuclear fuel and compact underground burial separately from other (mainly fragment) activity is being considered. Actinide and neutron poison base critical-mass-free ceramic materials (similar to plutonium ceramics) may be useful for this burial method. (author)

Storage of plutonium and nuclear power plant actinide waste in the form of critical-mass-free ceramics containing neutron poisons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nadykto, B.A.

2001-01-01

The nuclear weapons production has resulted in accumulation of a large quantity of plutonium and uranium highly enriched with uranium-235 isotope (many tons). The work under ISTC Project 332B-97 treated the issues of safe plutonium storage through making critical-mass-free plutonium oxide compositions with neutron poisons. This completely excludes immediate utilization (without chemical reprocessing) of retained plutonium in nuclear devices. It is therewith possible to locate plutonium most compactly in the storage facility, which would allow reduction in required storage areas and costs. The issues of the surplus weapon-grade plutonium management and utilization have been comprehensively studied in the recent decade. The issues are treated in multiple scientific publications, conferences, and seminars. At the same time, issues of nuclear power engineering actinide waste storage are studied no less extensively. The general issues are material radioactivity and energy release and nuclear accident hazards due to critical mass generation. Plutonium accumulated in nuclear power plant spent fuel is more accessible than weapon-grade plutonium and can become of higher and higher interest with time as its activity reduces, including as material for nuclear devices. The urgency of plutonium management is presently related not only to accumulation of surplus weapon-grade plutonium, but also to the fact that it is high time to decide what has to be done regarding reactor plutonium. Presently, the possibility of actinide separation from NPP spent nuclear fuel and compact underground burial separately from other (mainly fragment) activity is being considered. Actinide and neutron poison base critical-mass-free ceramic materials (similar to plutonium ceramics) may be useful for this burial method. (author)

Plutonium waste container identification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schmierer, T.J.

1979-01-01

The purpose of this paper is to define the parameters of a method for identifying plutonium waste containers. This information will form the basis for a permanent committee to develop a complete identification program for use throughout the world. Although a large portion of the information will be on handwritten notebooks and may not be as extensive as is desired, it will all be helpful. The final information will be programmed into computer language and be available to all interested parties as well as a central control committee which will have the expertise to provide each government with advice on the packaging, storage, and measurement of the waste for which it is responsible. As time progresses, this central control committee should develop permanent storage sites and establish a system of records which will last for hundreds of years

Nondestructive assay of plutonium residue in horizontal storage tanks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Marsh, S.F.

1985-01-01

Aqueous plutonium recovery and purification processes often involve the temporary storage of plutonium solutions in holding tanks. Because plutonium is known to precipitate from aqueous solutions under certain conditions, there is a continuing need to assay emptied tanks for plutonium residue. A portable gamma spectrometer system, specifically designed for this purpose, provides rapid assay of such plutonium residues in horizontal storage tanks. A means is thus available for the nondestructive analysis of these tanks on a regular schedule to ensure that significant deposits of plutonium are not allowed to accumulate. 5 figs

Deflagration in stainless steel storage containers containing plutonium dioxide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kleinschmidt, P.D.

1996-02-01

Detonation of hydrogen and oxygen in stainless steel storage containers produces maximum pressures of 68.5 psia and 426.7 psia. The cylinders contain 3,000 g of PuO 2 with 0.05 wt% and 0.5 wt% water respectively. The hydrogen and oxygen are produced by the alpha decomposition of the water. Work was performed for the Savannah River Site

Technological alternatives for plutonium storage

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-12-01

This paper discusses the problems of large long term storage since stores at fabrication plants may depend on the form of plutonium ultimately chosen for transport. The paper's conclusion includes: MOX can be regarded as more proliferation resistant than PUO 2 but no experience of long term storage is available, therefore further R and D is required; co-location of the store with reprocessing plants (and fuel fabrication plant) would appear to have advantages in non-proliferation, safeguards implementation, environmental protection and economic aspects; there are strong non-proliferation and security arguments for not moving plutonium away from the site where it was separated until there is an identifiable and scheduled end use. The design of the store, the form in which plutonium should be stored, particularly as MOX, and the costs and further R and D required are considered. The possible location of stores is also discussed and institutional questions briefly considered

Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Treatment and Storage Unit Waste Analysis Plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

PRIGNANO, A.L.

2000-01-01

The purpose of this waste analysis plan (WAP) is to document waste analysis activities associated with the Plutonium Finishing Plant Treatment and Storage Unit (PFP Treatment and Storage Unit) to comply with Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 173-303-300(1), (2), (4)(a) and (5). The PFP Treatment and Storage Unit is an interim status container management unit for plutonium bearing mixed waste radiologically managed as transuranic (TRU) waste. TRU mixed (TRUM) waste managed at the PFP Treatment and Storage Unit is destined for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) and therefore is not subject to land disposal restrictions [WAC 173-303-140 and 40 CFR 268]. The PFP Treatment and Storage Unit is located in the 200 West Area of the Hanford Facility, Richland Washington (Figure 1). Because dangerous waste does not include source, special nuclear, and by-product material components of mixed waste, radionuclides are not within the scope of this documentation. The information on radionuclides is provided only for general knowledge

PFP vault operations containers for Plutonium Handling and Storage Critical Characteristics

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

BONADIE, E.P.

2000-01-01

This document specifies the critical characteristics for containers procured for Plutonium Finishing Plant's (PFP's) Vault Operations system as required by HNF-PRO-268 and HNF-PRO-1819. These are the minimum specifications that the equipment must meet in order to perform its safety function

Plutonium working group report on environmental, safety and health vulnerabilities associated with the Department's plutonium storage. Volume 2, Appendix B, Part 1: Rocky Flats site assessment team report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-09-01

The most important vulnerability on a frequency basis is that liquids containing plutonium are stored in containers that are being attacked by the solutions. These containers are presently failing on a random basis. The most important vulnerability on a material at risk basis is that solid plutonium is packaged for short-term storage. These conditions are presently degrading the containers, potentially to failure, which allows release of the material in the building. This assessment comprehensively evaluated environmental, safety and health vulnerabilities resulting from the storage and handling of plutonium at the Rocky Flats Plant. The term ES and H vulnerability, for the purpose of this assessment, means any condition, other than diversion of material, that could lead to unnecessary or increased exposure of workers and the public to radiation or to the release of radioactive materials to the environment

Direct vitrification of plutonium-containing materials (PCM`s) with the glass material oxidation and dissolution system (GMODS)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Forsberg, C.W. Beahm, E.C.; Parker, G.W.; Rudolph, J.C.; Haas, P.A.; Malling, G.F.; Elam, K.; Ott, L.

1995-10-30

The end of the cold war has resulted in excess PCMs from nuclear weapons and associated production facilities. Consequently, the US government has undertaken studies to determine how best to manage and dispose of this excess material. The issues include (a) ensurance of domestic health, environment, and safety in handling, storage, and disposition, (b) international arms control agreements with Russia and other countries, and (c) economics. One major set of options is to convert the PCMs into glass for storage or disposal. The chemically inert characteristics of glasses make them a desirable chemical form for storage or disposal of radioactive materials. A glass may contain only plutonium, or it may contain plutonium along with other radioactive materials and nonradioactive materials. GMODS is a new process for the direct conversion of PCMs (i.e., plutonium metal, scrap, and residues) to glass. The plutonium content of these materials varies from a fraction of a percent to pure plutonium. GMODS has the capability to also convert other metals, ceramics, and amorphous solids to glass, destroy organics, and convert chloride-containing materials into a low-chloride glass and a secondary clean chloride salt strewn. This report is the initial study of GMODS for vitrification of PCMs as input to ongoing studies of plutonium management options. Several tasks were completed: initial analysis of process thermodynamics, initial flowsheet analysis, identification of equipment options, proof-of-principle experiments, and identification of uncertainties.

Plutonium Finishing Plant. Interim plutonium stabilization engineering study

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Sevigny, G.J.; Gallucci, R.H.; Garrett, S.M.K.; Geeting, J.G.H.; Goheen, R.S.; Molton, P.M.; Templeton, K.J.; Villegas, A.J. [Pacific Northwest Lab., Richland, WA (United States); Nass, R. [Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (United States)

1995-08-01

This report provides the results of an engineering study that evaluated the available technologies for stabilizing the plutonium stored at the Plutonium Finishing Plant located at the hanford Site in southeastern Washington. Further processing of the plutonium may be required to prepare the plutonium for interim (<50 years) storage. Specifically this document provides the current plutonium inventory and characterization, the initial screening process, and the process descriptions and flowsheets of the technologies that passed the initial screening. The conclusions and recommendations also are provided. The information contained in this report will be used to assist in the preparation of the environmental impact statement and to help decision makers determine which is the preferred technology to process the plutonium for interim storage.

Plutonium Finishing Plant. Interim plutonium stabilization engineering study

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sevigny, G.J.; Gallucci, R.H.; Garrett, S.M.K.; Geeting, J.G.H.; Goheen, R.S.; Molton, P.M.; Templeton, K.J.; Villegas, A.J.; Nass, R.

1995-08-01

This report provides the results of an engineering study that evaluated the available technologies for stabilizing the plutonium stored at the Plutonium Finishing Plant located at the hanford Site in southeastern Washington. Further processing of the plutonium may be required to prepare the plutonium for interim (<50 years) storage. Specifically this document provides the current plutonium inventory and characterization, the initial screening process, and the process descriptions and flowsheets of the technologies that passed the initial screening. The conclusions and recommendations also are provided. The information contained in this report will be used to assist in the preparation of the environmental impact statement and to help decision makers determine which is the preferred technology to process the plutonium for interim storage

CSER 00-006 Storage of Plutonium Residue Containers in 55 Gallon Drums at the PFP

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

DOBBIN, K.D.

2000-05-24

This criticality safety evaluation report (CSER) provides the required limit set and controls for safe transit and storage of these drums in the 234-5Z Building at the PFP. A mass limit of 200 g of plutonium or fissile equivalent per drum is acceptable

Plutonium Finishing Plant Treatment and Storage Unit Dangerous Waste Training Plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ENTROP, G.E.

2000-01-01

The training program for personnel performing waste management duties pertaining to the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Treatment and Storage Unit is governed by the general requirements established in the Plutonium Finishing Plant Dangerous Waste Training Plan (PFP DWTP). The PFP Treatment and Storage Unit DWTP presented below incorporates all of the components of the PFP DWTP by reference. The discussion presented in this document identifies aspects of the training program specific to the PFP Treatment and Storage Unit. The training program includes specifications for personnel instruction through both classroom and on-the-job training. Training is developed specific to waste management duties. Hanford Facility personnel directly involved with the PFP Treatment and Storage Unit will receive training to container management practices, spill response, and emergency response. These will include, for example, training in the cementation process and training pertaining to applicable elements of WAC 173-303-330(1)(d). Applicable elements from WAC 173-303-330(1)(d) for the PFP Treatment and Storage Unit include: procedures for inspecting, repairing, and replacing facility emergency and monitoring equipment; communications and alarm systems; response to fires or explosions; and shutdown of operations

Monitoring and detection of plutonium movement in storage vaults

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kuckertz, T.H.; Bieri, J.M.; Caldwell, J.T.; France, S.W.; Hastings, R.D.; Pratt, J.C.; Shunk, E.R.; Goin, R.W.

1981-01-01

We investigated a method for monitoring a typical large storage vault for unauthorized removal of plutonium. The method is based on the assumption that the neutron field in a vault produced by a particular geometric configuration of bulk plutonium remains constant in time and space as long as the configuration is undisturbed. To observe such a neutron field, we installed an array of 25 3 He proportional counters in the ceiling of a plutonium storage vault at Argonne National Laboratory West. Data collected by each counter were processed to determine whether statistically significant changes had occurred in the neutron field. Continuous observation experiments measured the long-term stability of the system. Removal experiments were performed in which known quantities of plutonium were removed from the vault. Both types of experiments demonstrated that the neutron monitoring system can detect removal or addition of bulk plutonium (11% 240 Pu) whose mass is as small as 0.04% of the total inventory

Plutonium accident resistant container project

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Andersen, J.A.

1978-05-01

The PARC (plutonium accident resistant container) project resulted in the design, development, and certification testing of a crashworthy air-transportable plutonium package (shipping container) for certification by the USNRC. This PAT-1 (plutonium air transportable) package survives a very severe sequential test program of impact, crush, puncture, slash, burn, and water immersion. There is also an individual hydrostatic pressure test. The package has a payload mass capacity of 2 kg of PuO2 and a thermal capacity of 25 watts. The design rationale for very high energy absorption (impact, crush, puncture, and slash protection) with residual high-level fire protection, resulted in a reasonalby small air-transportable package, advancing the packaging state-of-art. Optimization design iterations were utilized in the areas of impact energy absorption and stress and thermal analysis. Package test results are presented in relation to radioactive materials containment acceptance criteria, shielding and criticality standards

International management and storage of plutonium and spent fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-09-01

The first part of this study discusses certain questions that may arise from the disseminated production and storage of plutonium and, in the light of the relevant provisions of the Agency's Statute, examines possible arrangements for the storage of separated plutonium under international auspices and its release to meet energy or research requirements. The second part of the study deals similarly with certain problems presented by growing accumulations of spent fuel from light-water reactors in various countries and examines possible solutions, including the establishment of regional or multinational spent fuel storage facilities

Verification station for Sandia/Rockwell Plutonium Protection system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nicholson, N.; Hastings, R.D.; Henry, C.N.; Millegan, D.R.

1979-04-01

A verification station has been designed to confirm the presence of plutonium within a container module. These container modules [about 13 cm (5 in.) in diameter and 23 cm (9 in.) high] hold sealed food-pack cans containing either plutonium oxide or metal and were designed by Sandia Laboratories to provide security and continuous surveillance and safety. After the plutonium is placed in the container module, it is closed with a solder seal. The verification station discussed here is used to confirm the presence of plutonium in the container module before it is placed in a carousel-type storage array inside the plutonium storage vault. This measurement represents the only technique that uses nuclear detectors in the plutonium protection system

Water bath and air bath calorimeter qualification for measuring 3013 containers of plutonium oxide at the Hanford Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

WELSH, T.L.

2003-01-01

The purpose of this paper is to present qualification data generated from water and air-bath calorimeters measuring radioactive decay heat from plutonium oxide in DOE STD-3013-2000 (3013) containers at the Hanford Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). Published data concerning air and water bath calorimeters and especially 3013-qualified calorimeters is minimal at best. This paper will address the data from the measurement/qualification test plan, the heat standards used, and the calorimeter precision and accuracy results. The 3013 package is physically larger than earlier plutonium oxide storage containers, thereby necessitating a larger measurement chamber. To accommodate the measurements of the 3013 containers at PFP, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) supplied a water bath dual-chambered unit and the Savannah River Technology Center (SRTC) provided two air-bath calorimeters. Both types of Calorimeters were installed in the analytical laboratory at PFP. The larger 3013 containers presented a new set of potential measurement problems: longer counting times, heat conductivity through a much larger container mass and wall thickness, and larger amounts of copper shot to assist sample thermal conductivity. These potential problems were addressed and included in the measurement/qualification test plan

Plutonium accident resistant container project

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Andersen, J.A.

1978-09-01

The PARC (plutonium accident resistant container) project resulted in the design, development, and certification testing of a crashworthy air-transportable plutonium package (shipping container) for certification by the USNRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission). This PAT-1 (plutonium air transportable) package survives a very severe sequential test program of impact, crush, puncture, slash, burn, and water immersion. There is also an individual hydrostatic pressure test. The package has a payload mass capacity of 2 kg of PuO 2 and a thermal capacity of 25 watts. The design rationale for very high energy absorption (impact, crush, puncture, and slash protection) with residual high-level fire protection, resulted in a reasonably small air-transportable package, advancing the packaging state-of-art. Optimization design iterations were utilized in the areas of impact energy absorption and stress and thermal analysis. Package test results are presented in relation to radioactive materials containment acceptance criteria, shielding and criticality standards

Neutron monitoring of plutonium at the ZPPR storage vault

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Caldwell, J.T.; Kuckertz, T.H.; Bieri, J.M.; France, S.W.; Goin, R.W.; Hastings, R.D.; Pratt, J.C.; Shunk, E.R.

1981-12-01

We investigated a method for monitoring a typical large storage vault for unauthorized removal of plutonium. The method is based on the assumption that the neutron field in a vault produced by a particular geometric configuration of bulk plutonium remains constant in time and space as long as the configuration is undisturbed. To observe such a neutron field, we installed an array of 25 neutron detectors in the ceiling of a plutonium storage vault at Argonne National Laboratory West. Each neutron detector provided an independent spatial measurement of the vault neutron field. Data collected by each detector were processed to determine whether statistically significant changes had occurred in the neutron field. Continuous observation experiments measured the long-term stability of the system. Removal experiments were performed in which known quantities of plutonium were removed from the vault. Both types of experiments demonstrated that the neutron monitoring system can detect removal or addition of bulk plutonium (11% 240 Pu) whose mass is as small as 0.04% of the total inventory

Plutonium storage study

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1979-01-01

This Spanish study gives a more detailed analysis of a possible store for plutonium oxide. The capacity of the store is assumed to be 30 t Pu and the minimum storage time 2 years. The study includes a general description of the store and its design philosophy; comments on the quality and properties of the material stored; a detailed criticality study and comments on gas and heat generation and shielding requirements; and a brief cost evaluation. Costs are estimated to be about $110/kg PuO 2 /year

PROCESS OF ELIMINATING HYDROGEN PEROXIDE IN SOLUTIONS CONTAINING PLUTONIUM VALUES

Science.gov (United States)

Barrick, J.G.; Fries, B.A.

1960-09-27

A procedure is given for peroxide precipitation processes for separating and recovering plutonium values contained in an aqueous solution. When plutonium peroxide is precipitated from an aqueous solution, the supernatant contains appreciable quantities of plutonium and peroxide. It is desirable to process this solution further to recover plutonium contained therein, but the presence of the peroxide introduces difficulties; residual hydrogen peroxide contained in the supernatant solution is eliminated by adding a nitrite or a sulfite to this solution.

Short-term storage considerations for spent plutonium-thorium fuel bundles

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Blomeley, L.; Dugal, C.; Masala, E.; Tran, T., E-mail: laura.blomeley@cnl.ca [Canadian Nuclear Laboratories, Chalk River, Ontario (Canada)

2015-12-15

To support the development of advanced pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR) fuel cycles, it is necessary to study short-term storage solutions for spent reactor fuel. In this paper, some representational criticality safety and shielding assessments are presented for a particular PHWR plutonium-thorium based fuel bundle concept in a hypothetical aboveground dry storage module. The criticality assessment found that the important parameters for the storage design are neutron absorber content and fuel composition, particularly in light of the high sensitivity of code results to plutonium. The shielding assessment showed that the shielding as presented in the paper would need to be redesigned to provide greater gamma attenuation. These findings can be used to aid in designing fuel storage facilities. (author)

Method of stripping plutonium from tributyl phosphate solution which contains dibutyl phosphate-plutonium stable complexes

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ochsenfeld, W.; Schmieder, H.

1976-01-01

Fast breeder fuel elements which have been highly burnt-up are reprocessed by extracting uranium and plutonium into an organic solution containing tributyl phosphate. The tributyl phosphate degenerates at least partially into dibutyl phosphate and monobutyl phosphate, which form stable complexes with tetravalent plutonium in the organic solution. This tetravalent plutonium is released from its complexed state and stripped into aqueous phase by contacting the organic solution with an aqueous phase containing tetravalent uranium. 6 claims, 1 drawing figure

Plutonium inventories for stabilization and stabilized materials

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Williams, A.K.

1996-05-01

The objective of the breakout session was to identify characteristics of materials containing plutonium, the need to stabilize these materials for storage, and plans to accomplish the stabilization activities. All current stabilization activities are driven by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 94-1 (May 26, 1994) and by the recently completed Plutonium ES&H Vulnerability Assessment (DOE-EH-0415). The Implementation Plan for accomplishing stabilization of plutonium-bearing residues in response to the Recommendation and the Assessment was published by DOE on February 28, 1995. This Implementation Plan (IP) commits to stabilizing problem materials within 3 years, and stabilizing all other materials within 8 years. The IP identifies approximately 20 metric tons of plutonium requiring stabilization and/or repackaging. A further breakdown shows this material to consist of 8.5 metric tons of plutonium metal and alloys, 5.5 metric tons of plutonium as oxide, and 6 metric tons of plutonium as residues. Stabilization of the metal and oxide categories containing greater than 50 weight percent plutonium is covered by DOE Standard {open_quotes}Criteria for Safe Storage of Plutonium Metals and Oxides{close_quotes} December, 1994 (DOE-STD-3013-94). This standard establishes criteria for safe storage of stabilized plutonium metals and oxides for up to 50 years. Each of the DOE sites and contractors with large plutonium inventories has either started or is preparing to start stabilization activities to meet these criteria.

A performance indicator for reduction in vulnerability through stabilization of plutonium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Marchese, A.R.; Neogy, P.; Azarm, M.A.

1997-01-01

The US Department of Energy (DOE) is currently storing several metric tons of plutonium in various forms in a variety of facilities throughout the DOE complex. Since the cessation of weapons production in 1990, many of these facilities with plutonium in storage have not operated. Since the shutdown was regarded as temporary, little attempt was made at that time to empty the process lines of plutonium, or to place the plutonium in containers or packages that would provide safe storage for extended periods of time. As a result, the packages and containers providing interim storage are vulnerable to failure through leakage, rupture and other modes, and pose potential hazards to facility workers, the public and the environment. Here, an approach to measuring and tracking the reduction in vulnerabilities resulting from stabilizing and repackaging plutonium is developed and presented. The approach utilizes results obtained by the DOE Working Group on the vulnerabilities associated with plutonium storage

Plutonium uptake by plants from soil containing plutonium-238 dioxide particles. Final report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Brown, K.W.; McFarlane, J.C.

1977-05-01

Three plant species--alfalfa, lettuce, and radishes were grown in soils contaminated with plutonium-238 dioxide (238)PuO2 at concentrations of 23, 69, 92, and 342 nanocuries per gram (nCi/g). The length of exposure varied from 60 days for the lettuce and radishes to 358 days for the alfalfa. The magnitude of plutonium incorporation as indicated by the discrimination ratios for these species, after being exposed to the relatively insoluble PuO2, was similar to previously reported data using different chemical forms of plutonium. Evidence indicates that the predominant factor in plutonium uptake by plants may involve the chelation of plutonium contained in the soils by the action of compounds such as citric acid and/or other similar chelating agents released from the plant roots

Pulmonary carcinogenesis from plutonium-containing particles

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Thomas, R.G.; Smith, D.M.; Anderson, E.C.

1980-01-01

Induction of lung tumors by various types of radiation is of paramount concern to the nuclear industry. The data presented were obtained by exposing the pulmonary system of Syrian hamsters to particles of zirconium oxide containing various amounts of either plutonium-238 or -239 as the alpha radiation source. These particles were injected intravenously and lodged permanently in the capillary bed of the lung. When less than 20% of the lung tissue was irradiated, simulating the ''hot particle'' mode, tumors were not evident with lung burdens up to 500 nCi plutonium. More diffuse irradiation significantly increased the tumor incidence, with lung burdens of 50 to 150 nCi. When plutonium-laden microspheres were administered intratracheally, tumor production was considerably increased and the addition of 3 mg of iron oxide intratracheally further increased the incidence. Using the zirconium oxide matrix for the carrier of plutonium in aerosol particles produced tumor incidences of up to 50% in Syrian hamsters exposed by inhalation. Initial pulmonary (alveolar) burdens reached 100 nCi of plutonium. Similar inhalation studies using plutonium dioxide alone (no matrix) failed to produce any increase in lung tumorigenesis. The results are discussed in terms of possible mechanisms necessary for lung carcinogenesis. (H.K.)

The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory DOE-STD-3013 Surveillance Program for the Storage of Plutonium Packages

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Riley, D

2005-01-01

This document presents a site-specific DOE-STD-3013 (3013) surveillance program for 3013 material stored at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in the B332 Plutonium Facility. The 3013 standard requires the development of a surveillance program to assure the long-term safety of plutonium storage in 3013 compliant containers. A complex-wide Integrated Surveillance Program in Support of Long-Term Storage of Plutonium-Bearing Materials (ISP)(LA-UR-00-3246, Revision 1, March 2001) has been developed to give guidance on an acceptable surveillance approach and to set up a mechanism to integrate surveillance activities and facilitate the sharing of lessons learned. This LLNL 3013 surveillance program has been developed following guidelines established for Storage Sites in the ISP and is sufficient for the storage in the LLNL Plutonium Facility. The LLNL 3013 surveillance program must be coupled with the DOE complex wide Materials Identification and Surveillance (MIS) program and the ISP led by Savannah River Site (SRS). These programs support the technical basis for continuing safe storage of plutonium packages and provide the technical basis for the limited scope of the site-specific LLNL 3013 surveillance program. The LLNL 3013 surveillance program calls for surveillance of 3013 packages to begin approximately three years after packaging of the first oxide. One percent of the stored packages per year will be randomly selected and nondestructively examined (NDE) by LLNL per the guidelines of the ISP. Additional packages may be selected for NDE if recommended by the ISP Steering Committee and agreed upon by the MIS Working Group. One selected package will be shipped to SRS for destructive analysis each year starting when SRS can receive them. This is expected to be in FY2007. We expect to store a maximum of 400 3013 packages. This would result in an expected maximum of 4 surveillances per year. The activities outlined in the program evolved from the current

Precipitation of plutonium from acidic solutions using magnesium oxide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jones, S.A.

1994-01-01

Magnesium oxide will be used as a neutralizing agent for acidic plutonium-containing solutions. It is expected that as the magnesium oxide dissolves, the pH of the solution will rise, and plutonium will precipitate. The resulting solid will be tested for suitability to storage. The liquid is expected to contain plutonium levels that meet disposal limit requirements

Plutonium Finishing Plan (PFP) Treatment and Storage Unit Interim Status Closure Plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

PRIGNANO, A.L.

2000-01-01

This document describes the planned activities and performance standards for closing the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Treatment and Storage Unit. The PFP Treatment and Storage Unit is located within the 234-52 Building in the 200 West Area of the Hanford Facility. Although this document is prepared based upon Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 265, Subpart G requirements, closure of the unit will comply with Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 173-303-610 regulations pursuant to Section 5.3 of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) Action Plan (Ecology et al. 1996). Because the PFP Treatment and Storage Unit manages transuranic mixed (TRUM) waste, there are many controls placed on management of the waste. Based on the many controls placed on management of TRUM waste, releases of TRUM waste are not anticipated to occur in the PFP Treatment and Storage Unit. Because the intention is to clean close the PFP Treatment and Storage Unit, postclosure activities are not applicable to this closure plan. To clean close the unit, it will be demonstrated that dangerous waste has not been left onsite at levels above the closure performance standard for removal and decontamination. If it is determined that clean closure is not possible or is environmentally impractical, the closure plan will be modified to address required postclosure activities. The PFP Treatment and Storage Unit will be operated to immobilize and/or repackage plutonium-bearing waste in a glovebox process. The waste to be processed is in a solid physical state (chunks and coarse powder) and will be sealed into and out of the glovebox in closed containers. The containers of immobilized waste will be stored in the glovebox and in additional permitted storage locations at PFP. The waste will be managed to minimize the potential for spills outside the glovebox, and to preclude spills from reaching soil. Containment surfaces will be maintained to ensure

Nondestructive analysis of plutonium contaminated soil

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Smith, H.E.; Taylor, L.H.

1977-01-01

Plutonium contaminated soil is currently being removed from a covered liquid waste disposal trench near the Pu Processing facility on the Hanford Project. This soil with the plutonium is being mined using remote techniques and equipment. The mined soil is being packaged for placement into retrievable storage, pending possible recovery. To meet the requirements of criticality safety and materials accountability, a nondestructive analysis program has been developed to determine the quantity of plutonium in each packing-storage container. This paper describes the total measurement program: equipment systems, calibration techniques, matrix assumption, instrument control program and a review of laboratory operating experience

Los Alamos National Laboratory new generation standard nuclear material storage container - the SAVY4000 design

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stone, Timothy Amos

2010-01-01

Incidents involving release of nuclear materials stored in containers of convenience such as food pack cans, slip lid taped cans, paint cans, etc. has resulted in defense board concerns over the lack of prescriptive performance requirements for interim storage of nuclear materials. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has shared in these incidents and in response proactively moved into developing a performance based standard involving storage of nuclear material (RD003). This RD003 requirements document has sense been updated to reflect requirements as identified with recently issued DOE M 441.1-1 'Nuclear Material Packaging Manual'. The new packaging manual was issued at the encouragement of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board with a clear directive for protecting the worker from exposure due to loss of containment of stored materials. The Manual specifies a detailed and all inclusive approach to achieve a high level of protection; from package design and performance requirements, design life determinations of limited life components, authorized contents evaluations, and surveillance/maintenance to ensure in use package integrity over time. Materials in scope involve those stored outside an approved engineered-contamination barrier that would result in a worker exposure of in excess of 5 rem Committed Effective Does Equivalent (CEDE). Key aspects of meeting the challenge as developed around the SAVY-3000 vented storage container design will be discussed. Design performance and acceptance criteria against the manual, bounding conditions as established that the user must ensure are met to authorize contents in the package (based upon the activity of heat-source plutonium (90% Pu-238) oxide, which bounds the requirements for weapons-grade plutonium oxide), interface as a safety class system within the facility under the LANL plutonium facility DSA, design life determinations for limited life components, and a sense of design specific surveillance program

Preliminary safety evaluation for the plutonium stabilization and packaging system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shapley, J.E.

1997-01-01

This Preliminary Safety Evaluation (PSE) describes and analyzes the installation and operation of the Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging System (SPS) at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). The SPS is a combination of components required to expedite the safe and timely storage of Plutonium (Pu) oxide. The SPS program will receive site Pu packages, process the Pu for storage, package the Pu into metallic containers, and safely store the containers in a specially modified storage vault. The location of the SPS will be in the 2736- ZB building and the storage vaults will be in the 2736-Z building of the PFP, as shown in Figure 1-1. The SPS will produce storage canisters that are larger than those currently used for Pu storage at the PFP. Therefore, the existing storage areas within the PFP secure vaults will require modification. Other modifications will be performed on the 2736-ZB building complex to facilitate the installation and operation of the SPS

Dynamic and quasi-static simulation and analysis of the plutonium oxide/metal containers subject to 30-foot dropping

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gong, C.; Miller, R.F.

1995-01-01

This analysis of the plutonium oxide/metal storage containers is in support of the design and testing project The results from the dynamic analysis show some important facts that have not been considered before. The internal bagless transfer can will have higher stress than the primary container. The quasi-static analysis provides a conservative solution. In both vertical upright drop (dynamic) and inclined upside down drop (quasi-static) the containers are structurally sound

Decontaminaion of metals containing plutonium and americium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Seitz, M.G.; Gerding, T.J.; Steindler, M.J.

1979-06-01

Melt-slagging (melt-refining) techniques were evaluated as a decontamination and consolidation step for metals contaminated with oxides of plutonium and americium. Experiments were performed in which mild steel, stainless steel, and nickel contaminated with oxides of plutonium and americium were melted in the presence of silicate slags of various compositions. The metal products were low in contamination, with the plutonium and americium strongly fractionated to the slags. Partition coefficients (plutonium in slag/plutonium in steel) of 7 x 10 6 were measured with boro-silicate slag and of 3 x 10 6 with calcium, magnesium silicate slag. Decontamination of metals containing as much as 14,000 ppM plutonium appears to be as efficient as for metals with plutonium levels of 400 ppM. Staged extraction, that is, a remelting of processed metal with clean slag, results in further decontamination of the metal. The second extraction is effective with either resistance-furnace melting or electric-arc melting. Slag adhering to the metal ingots and in defects within the ingots is in the important contributors to plutonium retained in processed metals. If these sources of plutonium are controlled, the melt-refining process can be used on a large scale to convert highly contaminated metals to homogeneous and compact forms with very low concentrations of plutonium and americium. A conceptual design of a melt-refining process to decontaminate plutonium- and americium-contaminated metals is described. The process includes single-stage refining of contaminated metals to produce a metal product which would have less than 10 nCi/g of TRU-element contamination. Two plant sizes were considered. The smaller conceptual plant processes 77 kg of metal per 8-h period and may be portable.The larger one processes 140 kg of metal per 8-h period, is stationary, and may be near te maximum size that is practical for a metal decontamination process

Plutonium working group report on environmental, safety and health vulnerabilities associated with the Department's plutonium storage. Volume I: Summary

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-11-01

At the conclusion of the Cold War, the Department of Energy (DOE) stopped plutonium processing for nuclear weapons production. Facilities used for that purpose now hold significant quantities of plutonium in various forms. Unless properly stored and handled, plutonium can present environment, safety and health (ES ampersand H) hazards. Improperly stored plutonium poses a variety of hazards. When containers or packaging fail to fully protect plutonium metal from exposure to air, oxidation can occur and cause packaging failures and personnel contamination. Contamination can also result when plutonium solutions leak from bottles, tanks or piping. Plutonium in the form of scrap or residues generated by weapons production are often very corrosive, chemically reactive and difficult to contain. Buildings and equipment that are aging, poorly maintained or of obsolete design contribute to the overall problem. Inadvertent accumulations of plutonium of any form in sufficient quantities within facilities can result in nuclear criticality events that could emit large amounts of radiation locally. Contamination events and precursors of criticality events are causing safety and health concerns for workers at the Department's plutonium facilities. Contamination events also potentially threaten the public and the surrounding environment

Cation exchange process for recovery of plutonium from laboratory solutions containing chloride

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gray, L.W.

1978-10-01

A cation exchange technique was developed for the separation of plutonium from laboratory solutions containing either Pu(III) or Pu(III)--Pu(IV) mixtures in acidic solutions containing chloride ions. The procedure consists of adjusting the acid concentration to less than one molar and adjusting the valence of the plutonium ion to the (III) state, if necessary. The adjusted solution is fed to a cation exchange column and washed with distilled water to remove residual chlorides from the column. Plutonium is then eluted from the column with 5M nitric acid containing 0.34M sulfamic acid. This procedure was used to separate plutonium from 1.2M chloride solution on a production-scale column. Typical plutonium recovery was 99.97%, while greater than 96% of the original chloride was rejected

Plutonium working group report on environmental, safety and health vulnerabilities associated with the department's plutonium storage. Volume II, part 12: Working group assessment team report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-09-01

The Secretary of Energy's memorandum of March 15, 1994, established an initiative for a Department-wide assessment of the ES ampersand H vulnerabilities of the inventory of plutonium (Pu) in storage. Pu in intact nuclear weapons, spent fuel and transuranic (TRU) waste not colocated with other Pu was excluded from this assessment. The DOE Plutonium Vulnerability Working Group, which was formed for this purpose and produced the Project and Assessment Plans, will also manage the overall DOE complex assessments and produce a final report for the Secretary of Energy by September 30, 1994. The Project Plan and Assessment Plan for this assessment, and which established responsibilities for personnel essential to the study, were issued on April 25, 1994. This report contains the assessment of the Pantex Plant

Radiolytic and thermal stability of selected plutonium salts containing nitrate groups

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bryan, G.H.

1976-04-01

(Pu(NO 3 ) 4 . XH 2 O, K 2 Pu(NO 3 ) 6 , and (NH 4 ) 2 Pu(NO 3 ) 6 ) were studied to evaluate their ability to serve as shipping forms that meet criteria. The radiolytic gas evolution study eliminated (NH 4 ) 2 Pu(NO 3 ) 6 from further consideration. None of the compounds produced H 2 or O 2 in sufficient quantity to produce a flammable mixture, except Pu(NO 3 ) 4 . XH 2 O which produced O 2 and H 2 in a ratio that is above explosive limits after long storage time. The ammonium salt decomposition appears to be about the same as that observed upon heating of NH 4 NO 3 to produce N 2 , H 2 O, and nitrous oxides. Plutonium nitrate contains hydration water. This water is of some concern due to the production of hydrogen by alpha-radiolysis. Two waters of hydration appear to be the lower limit to which Pu(NO 3 ) 4 . XH 2 O may be taken before decomposition of the solid begins. TGA results indicate the simple nitrate (Pu(NO 3 ) 4 . XH 2 O) is somewhat less thermally stable than either the ammonium or potassium hexanitrato plutonate which detracts somewhat from its suitability as a shipping form. Maintaining large quantities of this compound with a high 238 Pu content (less than 1 percent 238 Pu) may require specially designed and larger containers to prevent thermal degradation and gas pressure buildup problems. The informaion was presented to plutonium processors; the final consensus of this group was that in spite of some thermal instability of Pu(NO 3 ) 4 . XH 2 O at fairly low temperatures, it was preferable to K 2 Pu(NO 3 ) 6 due to the additional waste disposal problems the potassium would present. (Pu(NO 3 ) 4 . XH 2 O also has several other advantages. A possible problem that could arise due to the variable weight of plutonium nitrate could be in plutonium accountability, but this would be prevented if the plutonium content of the solution prior to evaporation to the solid is known

Advanced local dose rate calculations with the Monte Carlo code MCNP for plutonium nitrate storage containers

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Quade, U.

1994-01-01

Neutron- und Gamma dose rate calculations were performed for the storage containers filled with plutonium nitrate of the MOX fabrication facility of Siemens. For the particle transport calculations the Monte Carlo Code MCNP 4.2 was used. The calculated results were compared with experimental dose rate measurements. It can be stated that the choice of the code system was appropriate since all aspects of the many facettes of the problem were well reproduced in the calculations. The position dependency as well as the influence of the shieldings, the reflections and the mutual influences of the sources were well described by the calculations for the gamma and for the neutron dose rates. However, good agreement with the experimental results on the gamma dose rates could only be reached when the lead shielding of the detector was integrated into the geometry modelling of the calculations. For some few cases of thick shieldings and soft gamma ray sources the statistics of the calculational results were not sufficient. In such cases more elaborate variance reduction methods must be applied in future calculations. Thus the MCNP code in connection with NGSRC has been proven as an effective tool for the solution of this type of problems. (orig./HP) [de

Plutonium working group report on environmental, safety and health vulnerabilities associated with the Department's plutonium storage. Volume 2, Appendix B, Part 2: Hanford site assessment team report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-09-01

The Hanford Site Self Assessment of Plutonium Environmental Safety and Health (ES and H) Vulnerabilities was conducted in accordance with the US Department of Energy (DOE) Secretary's directive of February 1994. The implementation plans to carry out this directive are contained in the Project Plan and the Assessment Plan. For this assessment, vulnerabilities are defined as conditions or weaknesses that may lead to unnecessary or increased radiation exposure of the workers, release of radioactive materials to the environment, or radiation exposure of the public. The purpose for the Assessment is to evaluate environmental, safety and health vulnerabilities from plutonium operations and storage activities. Acts of sabotage or diversion of plutonium which obviously may have ES and H implications are excluded from this study because separate DOE programs evaluate those issues on a continuing basis. Security and safeguards activities which may have negative impacts on safety are included in the evaluation

Plutonium Vulnerability Management Plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-03-01

This Plutonium Vulnerability Management Plan describes the Department of Energy's response to the vulnerabilities identified in the Plutonium Working Group Report which are a result of the cessation of nuclear weapons production. The responses contained in this document are only part of an overall, coordinated approach designed to enable the Department to accelerate conversion of all nuclear materials, including plutonium, to forms suitable for safe, interim storage. The overall actions being taken are discussed in detail in the Department's Implementation Plan in response to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 94-1. This is included as Attachment B

Pyrophoric potential of plutonium-containing salt residues

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Haschke, John M.; Fauske, Hans K.; Phillips, Alan G.

2000-01-01

Ignition temperatures of plutonium and the pyrophoric potential of plutonium-containing pyrochemical salt residues are determined from differential thermal analysis (DTA) data and by modeling of thermal behavior. Exotherms observed at 90-200 deg. C for about 30% of the residues are attributed to reaction of plutonium with water from decomposition of hydrated salts. Exotherms observed near 300 deg. C are consistent with ignition of metal particles embedded in the salt. Onset of self-sustained reaction at temperatures as low as 90 deg. C is not precluded by these results and heat-balance models are developed and applied in predicting the static ignition point of massive metal and in evaluating salt pyrophoricity. Results show that ambient temperatures in excess of 200 deg. C are required for ignition of salt residues and that the most reactive salts cannot ignite at low temperatures because diffusion of oxidant to embedded metal is limited by low salt porosity

Safe handling, transport and storage of plutonium. Proceedings of a technical committee meeting held in Vienna, 18-21 October 1993

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-10-01

Plutonium inventories and utilization rates worldwide are growing. It is important for nuclear power programmes everywhere that no incidents or accidents with plutonium occur. It is therefore important that all who deal with plutonium, do so safely. All those who deal with plutonium should have available the best information on safety handling and storage. Several countries have mature plutonium programmes. However, information exchange on plutonium has been limited. This has precluded the development until now of consensus documentation on safe handling and storage of plutonium. The Technical Committee has been established to address these problems and this Technical Document is the first product in this process. The purpose of the meeting was to bring together experts with significant experience in handling, transporting and storing plutonium; to exchange information and experiences dealing with plutonium at their facilities; to describe their practices (guidelines, procedures, regulations, etc.) for safely dealing with plutonium; to assess the need to develop and publish a consensus plutonium safety practices document(s), and to recommend possible future IAEA activities in this technical area. Refs, figs and tabs

Plutonium working group report on environmental, safety and health vulnerabilities associated with the department's plutonium storage. Volume II, part 9, Oak Ridge Site working group assessment team report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-09-01

The objective of the Plutonium Environmental Safety and Health (ES ampersand H) Vulnerability Assessment at the Oak Ridge (OR) Site was to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the ES ampersand H vulnerabilities arising from the storage and handling of its current plutonium holdings. The term open-quotes ES ampersand H Vulnerabilityclose quotes is defined for the purpose of this project to mean conditions or weaknesses that could lead to unnecessary or increased radiation exposure of workers, release of radioactive materials to the environment, or radiation exposure to the public. This assessment was intended to take a open-quotes snap-shotclose quotes of Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and the Y-12 Plant's plutonium holdings and associated ES ampersand H vulnerabilities in the time frame of June 1 994. This vulnerability assessment process began with the OR Site Assessment Team (SAT) generating a self-assessment report including proposed vulnerabilities. The SAT identified 55 facilities which contain plutonium and other transuranics they considered might be in-scope for purposes of this study. The Working Group Assessment Team (WGAT), however, determined that 37 of the facilities actually contained only out-of-scope material (e.g., transuranic material not colocated with plutonium or transuranic (TRU) waste). The WGAT performed an independent assessment of the SATs report, conducted facility walkdowns, and reviewed reference documents such as Safety Analysis Reports (SARs), Operational Safety Requirements (OSRs), emergency preparedness plans, and procedures. The results of the WGAT review and open-quotes walkdownsclose quotes (a term as used here incorporating tours, document reviews, and detailed discussions with cognizant personnel) are discussed in Section 3.0. The ES ampersand H vulnerabilities that were identified are documented in Appendix A

Testing in support of on-site storage of residues in the Pipe Overpack Container

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ammerman, D.J.; Bobbe, J.G.; Arviso, M.

1997-02-01

The disposition of the large back-log of plutonium residues at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (Rocky Flats) will require interim storage and subsequent shipment to a waste repository. Current plans call for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) and the transportation to WIPP in the TRUPACT-II. The transportation phase will require the residues to be packaged in a container that is more robust than a standard 55-gallon waste drum. Rocky Flats has designed the Pipe Overpack Container to meet this need. It is desirable to use this same waste packaging for interim on-site storage in non-hardened buildings. To meet the safety concerns for this storage the Pipe Overpack Container has been subjected to a series of tests at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico. In addition to the tests required to qualify the Pipe Overpack Container as a waste container for shipment in the TRUPACT-II several tests were performed solely for the purpose of qualifying the container for interim storage. This report will describe these tests and the packages response to the tests. 12 figs., 3 tabs

An MCNP model of glove boxes in a plutonium processing facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dooley, D.E.; Kornreich, D.E.

1998-01-01

Nuclear material processing usually occurs simultaneously in several glove boxes whose primary purpose is to contain radioactive materials and prevent inhalation or ingestion of radioactive materials by workers. A room in the plutonium facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory has been slated for installation of a glove box for storing plutonium metal in various shapes during processing. This storage glove box will be located in a room containing other glove boxes used daily by workers processing plutonium parts. An MCNP model of the room and glove boxes has been constructed to estimate the neutron flux at various locations in the room for two different locations of the storage glove box and to determine the effect of placing polyethylene shielding around the storage glove box. A neutron dose survey of the room with sources dispersed as during normal production operations was used as a benchmark to compare the neutron dose equivalent rates calculated by the MCNP model

Plutonium storage thermal analysis (U)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hensel, S.J.; Lee, S.Y.; Schaade, J.B.

1997-01-01

Thermal modeling of plutonium metal ingots stored in food pack cans provides information useful for performing stored material safety evaluations. Four storage can geometries were modeled, and several conclusions can be made from the 14 cases analyzed. The ingot temperature increased from 7 degrees F to 12 degrees F (depending on can configuration) per additional watt of power. Including internal convection lowers computed ingot temperatures by 70 degrees F. Accounting for the heat flow through the bottom of the cans to the storage rack lowered computed ingot temperatures by an additional 70 degrees F to 80 degrees F. In the rimmed can systems storing ingots with a power of 10.35 watts, the ingot temperature varies from 190 degrees F to 213 degrees F. Including a plastic bag between the inner and outer can increases the ingot temperature by 15 degrees F. Adding a label to the outer can side reduces the outer can side temperature by 13 degrees F. Changes in ambient temperature affect the outer can temperatures more than the ingot temperature by a factor of 3. Similarly, a 5 degrees F drop in outer can temperature due to increased convection lowered the ingot temperature by only 2 degrees F

Reactor-grade plutonium inventory taking in the RT-1 storage production association Mayak site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zatorskij, Yu.M.

1999-01-01

General characterization of plutonium physical inventory taking (PIT) system at the RT-1 plant is given in the paper. The proposed PIT procedure is based on measuring indirect parameters of inventory plutonium, the so called attributes of items - containers with plutonium. The method how to assess quality of item attribute measurements is proposed. If any defect is detected, the container is sent back to the place where it been filed and packed in order to perform direct measurements of plutonium mass. Taking into account the above-mentioned techniques and the availability of several access control means it is proposed the period between two PIT procedures be equal to 12 months [ru

Thermal analyses of SRS Pu storage cans inside BNFL 3013 container

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Paul, P.K.

1999-10-01

Plutonium metal is stored at the Savannah River Site (SRS) using different storage can configurations. The temperatures at different locations in the storage configuration play an important role in designing and configuring different storage arrangements. The present work consists of calculating temperatures at different locations in two different storage configurations

A portable concentrator for processing plutonium containing solutions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chamberlain, D.B.; Conner, C.; Chen, L.

1995-01-01

This report describes a horizontal, compact agitated-film concentrator called a Rototherm, manufactured by Artisan Industries, Inc. which can be used to process aqueous solutions of radioactive wastes containing plutonium. The unit is designed to concentrate liquid streams to a high-solid content slurry

Conversion of plutonium-containing materials into borosilicate glass using the glass material oxidation and dissolution system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Forsberg, C.W.; Beahm, E.C.; Parker, G.W.

1996-01-01

The end of the cold war has resulted in excess plutonium-containing materials (PCMs) in multiple chemical forms. Major problems are associated with the long-term management of these materials: safeguards and nonproliferation issues; health, environment, and safety concerns; waste management requirements; and high storage costs. These issues can be addressed by conversion of the PCMs to glass: however, conventional glass processes require oxide-like feed materials. Conversion of PCMs to oxide-like materials followed by vitrification is a complex and expensive process. A new vitrification process has been invented, the Glass Material Oxidation and Dissolution System (GMODS) to allow direct conversion of PCMs to glass. GMODS directly converts metals, ceramics, and amorphous solids to glass; oxidizes organics with the residue converted to glass; and converts chlorides to borosilicate glass and a secondary sodium chloride stream. Laboratory work has demonstrated the conversion of cerium (a plutonium surrogate), uranium (a plutonium surrogate), Zircaloy, stainless steel, multiple oxides, and other materials to glass. Equipment options have been identified for processing rates between 1 and 100,000 t/y. Significant work, including a pilot plant, is required to develop GMODS for applications at an industrial scale

Plutonium working group report on environmental, safety and health vulnerabilities associated with the Department's plutonium storage. Volume 2, Appendix A: Process and protocol

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-09-01

This appendix contains documentation prepared by the Plutonium ES and H Vulnerability Working Group for conducting the Plutonium ES and H Vulnerability Assessment and training the assessment teams. It has the following five parts. (1) The Project Plan describes the genesis of the project, sets forth the goals, objectives and scope, provides definitions, the projected schedule, and elements of protocol. (2) The Assessment Plan provides a detailed methodology necessary to guide the many professionals who have been recruited to conduct the DOE-wide assessment. It provides guidance on which types and forms of plutonium are to be considered within the scope of the assessment, and lays out the assessment methodology to be used. (3) The memorandum from the Project to Operations Office Managers provides the protocol and direction for participation in the assessment by external stakeholders and members of the public; and the guidance for the physical inspection of plutonium materials in storage. (4) The memorandum from the Project to the assessment teams provides guidance for vulnerability screening criteria, vulnerability evaluation and prioritization process, and vulnerability quantification for prioritization. (5) The Team Training manual was used at the training session held in Colorado Springs on April 19--21, 1994 for all members of the Working Group Assessment Teams and for the leaders of the Site Assessment Teams. The goal was to provide the same training to all of the individuals who would be conducting the assessments, and thereby provide consistency in the conduct of the assessments and uniformity in reporting of the results. The training manual in Section A.5 includes supplemental material provided to the attendees after the meeting

Possible combustion hazards in 3013 plutonium waste container

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sherman, M.P.

1999-01-01

Are there combustion hazards in plutonium-contaminated waste containers caused by combustible gas generation? Current gas generation models in which the only reaction considered is radiolysis must inevitably predict eventual complete dissociation of any water present into hydrogen and oxygen. Waste prepared for the 3013 container should be less subject to this problem because organic material and most of the absorbed water should have been removed. Depending on the waste form, moisture content, organic content, temperature, and container material, the pressure rise due to gas generation will be bounded by backreactions, recombination of the hydrogen and oxygen, absorption of the oxygen by plutonium oxide, and possibly other chemical reactions. Examination of a variety of food pack waste containers at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has shown little pressure rise, indeed often subatmospheric pressures. In a few cases large hydrogen concentrations up to 47% mole fraction were observed, but with negligible oxygen content. The only fuel seen in significant quantities was H 2 and, in one case, CO; the only oxidizer seen in significant quantities was O 2 . Considerable work on measuring gas generation is being done at Westinghouse Savannah River Company and LANL. In a mixture of H 2 , O 2 , and other diluent gases, if the hydrogen concentration is below the value at the lean flammability limit, or if the oxygen concentration is below that at the rich flammability limit, a flame will not propagate from an ignition source. Assuming H 2 is the only fuel present in significant quantities, a mixture leaner than the lean limit will get only leaner if mixed with air and is therefore no combustion hazard. However, when a mixture containing large amounts of H 2 is nonflammable because there is insufficient O 2 , there is a hazard. If the mixture should leak into a volume containing O 2 , or the container is opened into the surrounding air, the mixture will pass through the

Apparatus for the storage of transport- and storage-containers containing radioactive fuel elements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vox, A.

1983-01-01

The invention concerns an apparatus for the storage of transport and storage containers containing radioactive fuel elements. For each transport or storage container there is a separate silo-type container of steel, concrete, prestressed concrete or suchlike breakproof and fireproof material, to be placed in the open, that can be opened for removal and placing of the transport or storage container respectively. (orig.) [de

Plutonium active operation of the Winfrith modular containment system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanders, M.J.; Pengelly, M.G.A.; McSherry, K.

1985-01-01

Three gloveboxes contaminated with plutonium have been dismantled inside the Winfrith Modular Containment System. This system is a portable, demountable pressurised suit area with its own filters and shower entry tunnel. Details of the operation are given. (U.K.)

Treatment of radioactive wastes containing plutonium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Orlando, O.S.; Aparicio, G.; Greco, L.; Orosco, E.H.; Cassaniti, P.; Salguero, D.; Toubes, B.; Perez, A.E.; Menghini, J.E.; Esteban, A.; Adelfang, P.

1987-01-01

The radioactive wastes generated in the process of manufacture and control of experimental fuel rods of mixed oxides, (U,Pu)O 2 , require an specific treatment due to the plutonium content. The composition of liquid wastes, mostly arising from chemical checks, is variable. The salt content, the acidity, and the plutonium and uranium content are different, which makes necessary a chemical treatment before the inclusion in concrete. The solid waste, such as neoprene gloves, PVC sleeves, filter paper, disposable or broken laboratory material, etc. are also included in concrete. In this report the methods used to dispose of wastes at Alpha Facility are described. With regard to the liquid wastes, the glove box built to process them is detailed, as well as the applied chemical treatment, including neutralization, filtration and later solidification. As for the solid wastes, it is described the cementation method consisting in introducing them into an expanded metal matrix, of the basket type, that contains as a concentric drum of 200 liter capacity which is smaller than the matrix, and the filling with wet cement mortar. (Author)

Plutonium dioxide storage: Conditions for preparation and handling

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Haschke, J.M.; Ricketts, T.E.

1995-08-01

Desorption and adsorption of plutonium dioxide are derived from production-scale experiments that demonstrate techniques of preparing weapons-grade material for extended storage. In combination with data from literature, results define conditions for preparing and certifying PuO 2 and provide essential information for developing and implementing a repackaging process compliant with DOE standards for safe storage of plutonium. As demonstrated by loss-on-ignition (LOI) analysis, adsorbates are effectively removed by heating the oxide in air at 950 C for two hours. After oxides are fired at this temperature, specific surface areas are consistently less than 5 m 2 /g. Due to this low surface area, water adsorption by fired oxide is limited to a maximum of 0.2 mass % at 50% relative humidity. Kinetic data for the adsorption process show that water is accommodated on the oxide surface by a sequence of distinct first-order steps comprising five types of adsorbate interaction and accumulating ten molecular layers of H 2 0 at 100% humidity. An equation defining the humidity dependence of the adsorption rate during the first step is applied in estimating time periods that a fired oxide may remain in given configurations without detrimental adsorption. Particle size measurements show that the source terms for environmental dispersal of oxides prepared by hydride-catalyzed reaction of metal and by oxalate calcination are approximately 20 and 0.1 mass %, respectively, and that the values are reduced by firing. Evidence for a chemical reaction between dioxide and water is discussed and practical applications of the results to oxide stabilization and LOI analysis are presented

PFPF canister counter for foreign plutonium (PCAS-3) hardware operations and procedures manual

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Menlove, H.O.; Baca, J.; Kroncke, K.E.; Miller, M.C.; Takahashi, S.; Seki, S.; Inose, S.; Yamamoto, T.

1993-01-01

A neutron coincidence counter has been designed for the measurement of plutonium powder contained in tall storage canisters. The counter was designed for installation in the Plutonium Fuel Production Facility fabrication plant. Each canister contains from one to five cans of PuO 2 . The neutron counter measures the spontaneous-fission rate from the plutonium and, when this is combined with the plutonium isotopic ratios, the plutonium mass is determined. The system can accommodate plutonium loadings up to 12 kg, with 10 kg being a typical loading. Software has been developed to permit the continuous operation of the system in an unattended mode. Authentication techniques have been developed for the system. This manual describes the system and its operation and gives performance and calibration parameters for typical applications

PARC (Plutonium Accident Resistant Container) project

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Andersen, J.A.

1978-01-01

Response by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to a public law limiting the air transport of plutonium resulted in a new Qualification Criteria and led to the PARC project. The PARC project resulted in the design, development, and certification testing of a crashworthy air transportable radioactive materials package for certification by the NRC. This package, identified by the NRC as the Model PAT-1 Package (PAT = Plutonium Air Transportable), has a mass capacity of 2 kg of PuO 2 and a thermal capacity of 25 watts; the internal volume of the inner containment vessel is 1460 cm 3 ; the package dimensions are 62 cm (24 - 1/2 in.) O.D. x 108 cm (42 - 1/2 in.) length and a mass of 227 kg (500 lbs). The design rationale for very high energy absorption (impact, crush, puncture, and slash protection) with residual high-level fire protection, resulted in a reasonably small air-transportable package, advancing the packaging state-of-the-art. Optimization design interactions were utilized in the areas of impact energy absorption and stress and thermal analysis. Package test results are presented in relation to the containment acceptance criteria of the Qualification Criteria and ANSI N 14.5 leaktight standards and the IAEA Safety Series No. 6 A2 radioactive material release quantities. Acceptability of the pre-accident and post-accident package configuration with respect to shielding and criticality standards are ascertained

TEMPERATURE PREDICTION IN 3013 CONTAINERS IN K AREA MATERIAL STORAGE (KAMS) FACILITY USING REGRESSION METHODS

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gupta, N

2008-01-01

3013 containers are designed in accordance with the DOE-STD-3013-2004. These containers are qualified to store plutonium (Pu) bearing materials such as PuO2 for 50 years. DOT shipping packages such as the 9975 are used to store the 3013 containers in the K-Area Material Storage (KAMS) facility at Savannah River Site (SRS). DOE-STD-3013-2004 requires that a comprehensive surveillance program be set up to ensure that the 3013 container design parameters are not violated during the long term storage. To ensure structural integrity of the 3013 containers, thermal analyses using finite element models were performed to predict the contents and component temperatures for different but well defined parameters such as storage ambient temperature, PuO 2 density, fill heights, weights, and thermal loading. Interpolation is normally used to calculate temperatures if the actual parameter values are different from the analyzed values. A statistical analysis technique using regression methods is proposed to develop simple polynomial relations to predict temperatures for the actual parameter values found in the containers. The analysis shows that regression analysis is a powerful tool to develop simple relations to assess component temperatures

International plutonium policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-12-01

The need to distinguish between diversion by sub-national groups and by governments is clearly stated. The paper identifies the international safeguards measures which already exist for the handling of plutonium. It proposes that the implementation of Article XII A5 of the IAEA statute concerning the international storage of plutonium could be an important additional measure. The paper also mentions the concept of using confinement as a complimentary safeguards measure and identifies the PIPEX concept. In addition, greater use is proposed of containment and surveillance procedures. The multiplication of small reprocessing plants spread over many countries is perceived as a proliferation risk. Other means such as co-location of reprocessing and fuel fabrication facilities are relevant to diversion by sub-national groups

Sampling and Analysis of the Headspace Gas in 3013 Type Plutonium Storage Containers at Los Alamos National Laboratory

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jackson, Jay M.; Berg, John M.; Hill, Dallas D.; Worl, Laura A.; Veirs, Douglas K.

2012-01-01

Department of Energy (DOE) sites have packaged approximately 5200 3013 containers to date. One of the requirements specified in DOESTD-3013, which specifies requirements for packaging plutonium bearing materials, is that the material be no greater than 0.5 weight percent moisture. The containers are robust, nested, welded vessels. A shelf life surveillance program was established to monitor these cans over their 50 year design life. In the event pressurization is detected by radiography, it will be necessary to obtain a head space gas sample from the pressurized container. This technique is also useful to study the head space gas in cans selected for random destructive evaluation. The atmosphere is sampled and the hydrogen to oxygen ratio is measured to determine the effects of radiolysis on the moisture in the container. A system capable of penetrating all layers of a 3013 container assembly and obtaining a viable sample of the enclosed gas and an estimate of internal pressure was designed.

Matrix Characterization of Plutonium Residues by Alpha-Particle Self-Interrogation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Prettyman, T.H.; Foster, L.A.; Staples, P.

1998-01-01

Legacy plutonium residues often have inadequate item descriptions. Nondestructive characterization can help segregate these items for reprocessing or provide information needed for disposal or storage. Alpha particle-induced gamma-ray spectra contain a wealth of information that can be used for matrix characterization. We demonstrate how this information can be used for item identification. Gamma-ray spectra were recorded at the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility from a variety of legacy, plutonium-processing residues and product materials. The comparison and analysis of these spectra are presented

Potentiometric determination of free nitric-acid in trilaurylamine solutions containing plutonium nitrate

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Perez, J.J.; Saey, J.C.

1965-01-01

A potentiometric method of determination of the free nitric acid in trilaurylamine solutions containing plutonium or thorium nitrates is described. The potentiometric titration is carried out in a mixture of benzene and 1,2-dichloro ethane with a standard solution of trilaurylamine as the titrant. When thorium nitrate is present the metal complex is not dissociated then the titration has a single end-point. In the case of plutonium nitrate the partial dissociation of the plutonium complex corresponds to a second point. The experimental error in duplicate analyses of 50 samples is about 1 per cent for free acid concentrations in the range of 0,03 to 0,1 N and plutonium concentrations between 1 to 5 g/l. (authors) [fr

Effect of the expansion associated with the plutonium α-β-γ phase transitions on storage can integrity

Science.gov (United States)

Spearing, Dane R.; Veirs, D. Kirk; Prenger, F. Coyne

2001-11-01

The effects of the volume expansion of plutonium metal through the α-β and β-γ phase transitions on a stainless steel storage container were examined. A cylindrical plutonium ingot was placed in the axial center of an annealed stainless steel cylinder and thermally cycled until a steady state in the strain response of the cylinder was reached. The average plastic hoop strain was 1.47% and 1.55% after six and four cycles through the α-β and α-β-γ phase transitions, respectively. Elastic strain was ˜0.2%, indicating a 8.96 MPa back pressure on the Pu ingot. This is an order of magnitude less than the compressive yield strength of α- and β-Pu at the transition temperature. Metallographic analyses indicate that anisotropic expansion of the Pu ingot is due to preferentially oriented grain growth of the β-Pu along the axial direction due to stress applied by the steel cylinder during the α-β phase transition.

Analysis of pressurization of plutonium oxide storage vials during a postulated fire

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Laurinat, J.; Kesterson, M.; Hensel, S.

2015-02-10

The documented safety analysis for the Savannah River Site evaluates the consequences of a postulated 1000 °C fire in a glovebox. The radiological dose consequences for a pressurized release of plutonium oxide powder during such a fire depend on the maximum pressure that is attained inside the oxide storage vial. To enable evaluation of the dose consequences, pressure transients and venting flow rates have been calculated for exposure of the storage vial to the fire. A standard B vial with a capacity of approximately 8 cc was selected for analysis. The analysis compares the pressurization rate from heating and evaporation of moisture adsorbed onto the plutonium oxide contents of the vial with the pressure loss due to venting of gas through the threaded connection between the vial cap and body. Tabulated results from the analysis include maximum pressures, maximum venting velocities, and cumulative vial volumes vented during the first 10 minutes of the fire transient. Results are obtained for various amounts of oxide in the vial, various amounts of adsorbed moisture, different vial orientations, and different surface fire exposures.

Plutonium working group report on environmental, safety and health vulnerabilities associated with the department's plutonium storage. Volume II, Appendix B, Part 10: Sandia National Laboratories - New Mexico site assessment team report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-09-01

On March 15, 1994, Secretary O'Leary directed the Office of Environment, Safety and Health to conduct an environment, safety and health (ES ampersand H) vulnerability study of plutonium at DOE sites. This report presents Sandia National Laboratories'/New Mexico (SNL/NM) response to that request. Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) is a multi-program laboratory operated for United States Department of Energy(DOE) by Martin Marietta Corporation. The primary mission of Sandia is research and development of nuclear weapons systems for concept to retirement. The laboratory also has extensive programs in nuclear reactor safety, nuclear safeguards, energy research, and microelectronics. The facilities addressed in the SNL/NM Site Assessment include the Hot Cell Facility (HCF), the Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR), and dedicated on-site nuclear material storage facilities. Also included in the assessment were sealed radiation sources that contain plutonium

Functional Design Criteria - plutonium stabilization and handling (PUSH) project W-460

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

NELSON, D.W.

1999-01-01

This Functional Design Criteria (FDC) contains information to guide the design of the Stabilization and Packaging Equipment necessary to oxidize and package the remaining plutonium-bearing Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) currently in the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) inventory. The FDC also guides the design of vault modifications to allow storage of 3013 packages of stabilized SNM for up to 50 years

Functional Design Criteria plutonium stabilization and handling (PUSH) project W-460

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NELSON, D.W.

1999-09-02

This Functional Design Criteria (FDC) contains information to guide the design of the Stabilization and Packaging Equipment necessary to oxidize and package the remaining plutonium-bearing Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) currently in the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) inventory. The FDC also guides the design of vault modifications to allow storage of 3013 packages of stabilized SNM for up to 50 years.

Prototype plutonium-storage monitor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bliss, M.; Craig, R.A.; Sunberg, D.S.; Warner, R.A.

1996-01-01

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has fabricated cerium-activated lithium silicate scintillating fibers via a hot-downdraw process. These fibers typically have an operational transmission length (e -1 length) of greater than 2 meters. This permits the fabrication of devices that, hitherto, were not possible to consider. A prototype neutron monitor for scrap Pu-storage containers was fabricated and tested for 70 days, taking data with a variety of sources in a high-background environment. These data and their implication in the context of a storage-monitor situation are discussed

Design safety features of containments used for handling plutonium in Reprocessing Plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Aherwal, P.; Achuthan, P.V.

2016-01-01

The plutonium present in spent fuel is separated from the associated uranium and fission products using solvent extraction cycles in process cells. Product plutonium nitrate solution containing trace concentrations of uranium and fission products is treated in the reconversion facility through a precipitation-calcination route and converted to sinterable grade plutonium oxide (PuO 2 ). All chemical operations involving materials with high plutonium content, both in solid and solution forms are carried out in glove boxes. Glove box provides an effective isolation from radioactive materials handled and acts as a barrier between the operator and the source of radiation. These glove boxes are interconnected for sequential operations and the interconnected glove box trains are installed within secondary enclosures called double skin which provides double barrier protection to operators

The PEACE PIPE: Recycling nuclear weapons into a TRU storage/shipping container

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Floyd, D.; Edstrom, C.; Biddle, K.; Orlowski, R.; Geinitz, R.; Keenan, K.; Rivera, M.

1997-01-01

This paper describes results of a contract undertaken by the National Conversion Pilot Project (NCPP) at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS) to fabricate stainless steel ''pipe'' containers for use in certification testing at Sandia National Lab, Albuquerque to qualify the container for both storage of transuranic (TRU) waste at RFETS and other DOE sites and shipping of the waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP). The paper includes a description of the nearly ten-fold increase in the amount of contained plutonium enabled by the product design, the preparation and use of former nuclear weapons facilities to fabricate the components, and the rigorous quality assurance and test procedures that were employed. It also describes how stainless steel nuclear weapons components can be converted into these pipe containers, a true ''swords into plowshare'' success story

Criticality experiments with annular cylinders containing plutonium solutions; Experiences de criticite sur des cylindres annulaires contenant des solutions de plutonium

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Molbert, M; Sauve, A; Houelle, M; Deilgat, E [Commissariat a l' Energie Atomique, Saclay (France). Centre d' Etudes Nucleaires

1964-07-01

The criticality station of Dijon involves three cells, shielded by concrete walls of 1.46 meter thickness. Those cells are designed to contain the criticality experiment apparatus. The engineering building is also involving: one chemical laboratory where plutonium solutions are prepared, one analysis laboratory, several activated solutions storages, several control rooms, One cell contains the B system, which is designed to study: annular cylindrical geometries, slab of 10 cm thickness, interaction between annular cylinders. This report includes the first results given by experiments on annular cylinders defined by their own geometry (outer and inner diameter of ring containing plutonium solutions). Those results have been plotted in curves, for several concentrations and for different reflection conditions (outer or inner light water reflector, cadmium screen), H{sub c} and M{sub c} = f (c) (where H{sub c} is the critical height of solution, M{sub c} is the critical mass, c is the plutonium concentration: 42,3 g/lplutonium and give H{sub c} and M{sub c} versus the distance between the two solutions. - an insulated annular cylinder 500 x 200: incomplete results are published the experiments on this cylinder being unfinished to the date of this present report publication. On this miscellaneous results, we have following informations know: - Screen effect of light water in central hole. Strengthened effect by cadmium foil on the inside wall. - Normalized interaction curves ( {alpha}*H{sub c}/H{sub c{infinity}} ) versus the distance between the two vessels, where H{sub c{infinity}} critical height of an insulated cylinder, shows that: 1) In light water, two cylinders set aside from 15 cm, can be considers like separated. 2) For some configurations, {alpha} vary

Studies on removal of plutonium from oxalic acid containing hydrochloric acid solutions

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Ghadse, D R; Noronha, D M; Joshi, A R [Fuel Chemistry Division, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Mumbai (India)

1994-06-01

Solution containing hydrochloric acid, oxalic acid and considerable quantities of plutonium may be generated while recycling of scrap produced during the metallic fuel fabrication. Plutonium from such waste is normally recovered by anion exchange method after the destruction of oxalic acid using suitable oxidising agent. Solvent extraction and ion exchange methods are being explored in this laboratory for recovery of Pu from oxalic acid containing HCl solutions without prior destruction of oxalic acid. This paper describes the results on the determination of distribution ratios for extraction of Pu(IV) from hydrochloric acid using Aliquot-336 or HDEHP under varying experimental conditions. (author). 5 refs., 5 tabs.

Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) [SEC 1 THRU 11

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

ULLAH, M K

2001-02-26

The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) is located on the US Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site in south central Washington State. The DOE Richland Operations (DOE-RL) Project Hanford Management Contract (PHMC) is with Fluor Hanford Inc. (FH). Westinghouse Safety Management Systems (WSMS) provides management support to the PFP facility. Since 1991, the mission of the PFP has changed from plutonium material processing to preparation for decontamination and decommissioning (D and D). The PFP is in transition between its previous mission and the proposed D and D mission. The objective of the transition is to place the facility into a stable state for long-term storage of plutonium materials before final disposition of the facility. Accordingly, this update of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) reflects the current status of the buildings, equipment, and operations during this transition. The primary product of the PFP was plutonium metal in the form of 2.2-kg, cylindrical ingots called buttoms. Plutonium nitrate was one of several chemical compounds containing plutonium that were produced as an intermediate processing product. Plutonium recovery was performed at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF) and plutonium conversion (from a nitrate form to a metal form) was performed at the Remote Mechanical C (RMC) Line as the primary processes. Plutonium oxide was also produced at the Remote Mechanical A (RMA) Line. Plutonium processed at the PFP contained both weapons-grade and fuels-grade plutonium materials. The capability existed to process both weapons-grade and fuels-grade material through the PRF and only weapons-grade material through the RMC Line although fuels-grade material was processed through the line before 1984. Amounts of these materials exist in storage throughout the facility in various residual forms left from previous years of operations.

A novel system for plutonium spectrophotometry using a modified La Calhene container

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Savage, D.J.; MacDonald, A.

1980-02-01

A specially modified La Calhene container is described which simplifies spectrophotometric measurements on plutonium solutions without requiring a dedicated specially modified spectrophotometer. (author)

Long-term retrievability and safeguards for immobilized weapons plutonium in geologic storage

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Peterson, P.F. [Univ. of California, Berkeley, CA (United States)

1996-05-01

If plutonium is not ultimately used as an energy source, the quantity of excess weapons plutonium (w-Pu) that would go into a US repository will be small compared to the quantity of plutonium contained in the commercial spent fuel in the repository, and the US repository(ies) will likely be only one (or two) locations out of many around the world where commercial spent fuel will be stored. Therefore excess weapons plutonium creates a small perturbation to the long-term (over 200,000 yr) global safeguard requirements for spent fuel. There are details in the differences between spent fuel and immobilized w-Pu waste forms (i.e. chemical separation methods, utility for weapons, nuclear testing requirements), but these are sufficiently small to be unlikely to play a significant role in any US political decision to rebuild weapons inventories, or to change the long-term risks of theft by subnational groups.

Long-term retrievability and safeguards for immobilized weapons plutonium in geologic storage

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Peterson, P.F.

1996-01-01

If plutonium is not ultimately used as an energy source, the quantity of excess weapons plutonium (w-Pu) that would go into a US repository will be small compared to the quantity of plutonium contained in the commercial spent fuel in the repository, and the US repository(ies) will likely be only one (or two) locations out of many around the world where commercial spent fuel will be stored. Therefore excess weapons plutonium creates a small perturbation to the long-term (over 200,000 yr) global safeguard requirements for spent fuel. There are details in the differences between spent fuel and immobilized w-Pu waste forms (i.e. chemical separation methods, utility for weapons, nuclear testing requirements), but these are sufficiently small to be unlikely to play a significant role in any US political decision to rebuild weapons inventories, or to change the long-term risks of theft by subnational groups

Sludge stabilization at the Plutonium Finishing Plant, Hanford Site, Richland, Washington

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-10-01

This Environmental Assessment evaluates the proposed action to operate two laboratory-size muffle furnaces in glovebox HC-21C, located in the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP), Hanford Site, Richland, Washington. The muffle furnaces would be used to stabilize chemically reactive sludges that contain approximately 25 kilograms (55 pounds) of plutonium by heating to approximately 500 to 1000 degrees C (900 to 1800 degrees F). The resulting stable powder, mostly plutonium oxide with impurities, would be stored in the PFP vaults. The presence of chemically reactive plutonium-bearing sludges in the process gloveboxes poses a risk to workers from radiation exposure and limits the availability of storage space for future plant cleanup. Therefore, there is a need to stabilize the material into a form suitable for long-term storage. This proposed action would be an interim action, which would take place prior to completion of an Environmental Impact Statement for the PFP which would evaluate stabilization of all plutonium-bearing materials and cleanout of the facility. However, only 10 percent of the total quantity of plutonium in reactive materials is in the sludges, so this action will not limit the choice of reasonable alternatives or prejudice the Record of Decision of the Plutonium Finishing Plant Environmental Impact Statement

Plutonium Finishing Plant transition project function analysis report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lund, D.P.

1995-09-01

The document contains the functions, function definitions, function interfaces, function interface definitions, Input Computer Automated Manufacturing Definition (IDEFO) diagrams, and function hierarchy charts that describe what needs to be performed to deactivate PFP and to continue safe storage, treatment and disposition of Plutonium and High Enriched Uranium

Test plan for demonstrating plutonium extraction from 10-L solutions using EIChrom extraction chromatographic resins

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Barney, G.S.

1994-01-01

Corrosive plutonium solutions stored in 10-L containers at the Plutonium Finishing Plant must be treated to convert the plutonium to a safe, solid form for storage and to remove the americium so that radiation exposure can be reduced. Extraction chromatographic resins will be tested for separating plutonium from these solutions in the laboratory. Separation parameters will be developed during the testing for large scale processing of the 10-L solutions and solutions of similar composition. Use of chromatographic resins will allow plutonium separation with minimum of chemical addition to the feed and without the need for plutonium valence adjustment. The separated plutonium will be calcined to plutonium oxide by direct solution calcination

Surplus plutonium disposition draft environmental impact statement. Volume 2

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-07-01

On May 22, 1997, DOE published a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the Federal Register (62 Federal Register 28009) announcing its decision to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) that would tier from the analysis and decisions reached in connection with the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic EIS (Storage and Disposition PEIS). DOE's disposition strategy allows for both the immobilization of surplus plutonium and its use as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in existing domestic, commercial reactors. The disposition of surplus plutonium would also involve disposal of the immobilized plutonium and MOX fuel (as spent nuclear fuel) in a geologic repository. The Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement analyzes alternatives that would use the immobilization approach (for some of the surplus plutonium) and the MOX fuel approach (for some of the surplus plutonium); alternatives that would immobilize all of the surplus plutonium; and the No Action Alternative. The alternatives include three disposition facilities that would be designed so that they could collectively accomplish disposition of up to 50 metric tons (55 tons) of surplus plutonium over their operating lives: (1) the pit disassembly and conversion facility would disassemble pits (a weapons component) and convert the recovered plutonium, as well as plutonium metal from other sources, into plutonium dioxide suitable for disposition; (2) the immobilization facility would include a collocated capability for converting nonpit plutonium materials into plutonium dioxide suitable for immobilization and would be located at either Hanford or SRS. DOE has identified SRS as the preferred site for an immobilization facility; (3) the MOX fuel fabrication facility would fabricate plutonium dioxide into MOX fuel. Volume 2 contains the appendices to the report and describe the following: Federal Register notices; contractor nondisclosure statement; adjunct melter

Chemical species of plutonium in Hanford radioactive tank waste

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Barney, G.S.

1997-01-01

Large quantities of radioactive wastes have been generated at the Hanford Site over its operating life. The wastes with the highest activities are stored underground in 177 large (mostly one million gallon volume) concrete tanks with steel liners. The wastes contain processing chemicals, cladding chemicals, fission products, and actinides that were neutralized to a basic pH before addition to the tanks to prevent corrosion of the steel liners. Because the mission of the Hanford Site was to provide plutonium for defense purposes, the amount of plutonium lost to the wastes was relatively small. The best estimate of the amount of plutonium lost to all the waste tanks is about 500 kg. Given uncertainties in the measurements, some estimates are as high as 1,000 kg (Roetman et al. 1994). The wastes generally consist of (1) a sludge layer generated by precipitation of dissolved metals from aqueous wastes solutions during neutralization with sodium hydroxide, (2) a salt cake layer formed by crystallization of salts after evaporation of the supernate solution, and (3) an aqueous supernate solution that exists as a separate layer or as liquid contained in cavities between sludge or salt cake particles. The identity of chemical species of plutonium in these wastes will allow a better understanding of the behavior of the plutonium during storage in tanks, retrieval of the wastes, and processing of the wastes. Plutonium chemistry in the wastes is important to criticality and environmental concerns, and in processing the wastes for final disposal. Plutonium has been found to exist mainly in the sludge layers of the tanks along with other precipitated metal hydrous oxides. This is expected due to its low solubility in basic aqueous solutions. Tank supernate solutions do not contain high concentrations of plutonium even though some tanks contain high concentrations of complexing agents. The solutions also contain significant concentrations of hydroxide which competes with other

The development and testing of a modular containment system under plutonium active conditions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanders, M.J.; Pengelly, M.G.A.

1984-05-01

A Modular Containment System has been designed, constructed and tested under plutonium active conditions at AEE Winfrith. The unit consists of a portable self-contained pressurised suit area, complete with shower entry tunnel and ventilation plant which can be assembled to enclose active plant to enable active operations to be carried out safely by operators dressed in standard pressurised suits. A fundamental feature of the system is the use of strippable coatings which are used to treat the interior surfaces prior to active operations to prevent permanent contamination of the structure. Details of construction are given together with results of trials. Whilst this report describes work with plutonium, the system has clear applications wherever temporary containment of radioactive or toxic materials is needed. (U.K.)

Plutonium research and related activities at the Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hartley, R.S.; Beard, C.A.; Barnes, D.L.

1998-01-01

With the end of the Cold War, the US and Russia are reducing their nuclear weapons stockpiles. What to do with the materials from thousands of excess nuclear weapons is an important international challenge. How to handle the remaining US stockpile to ensure safe storage and reliability, in light of the aging support infrastructure, is an important national challenge. To help address these challenges and related issues, the Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium is working on behalf of the State of Texas with the US Department of Energy (DOE). The center directs three major programs that address the key aspects of the plutonium management issue: (1) the Communications, Education, Training and Community Involvement Program, which focuses on informing the public about plutonium and providing technical education at all levels; (2) the Environmental, Safety, and Health (ES and H) Program, which investigates the key ES and H impacts of activities related to the DOE weapons complex in Texas; and (3) the Nuclear and Other Materials Program, which is aimed at minimizing safety and proliferation risks by helping to develop and advocate safe stewardship, storage, and disposition of nuclear weapons materials. This paper provides an overview of the center's nuclear activities described in four broad categories of international activities, materials safety, plutonium storage, and plutonium disposition

Corrosion Testing of 304L SS 3013 Inner Container and Teardrop Samples

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Tokash, Justin Charles [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Hill, Mary Ann [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Lillard, Scott [Univ. of Akron, OH (United States); Joyce, Stephen Anthony [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Tegtmeier, Eric Lee [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Berg, John M. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Veirs, Douglas Kirk [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Worl, Laura Ann [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2017-06-27

The Department of Energy (DOE) 3013 Standard specifies a minimum of two containers to be used for the storage of plutonium-bearing materials containing at least 30 wt.% plutonium and uranium. Three nested containers are typically used, the outer, inner, and convenience containers, shown in Figure 1. Both the outer and inner containers are sealed with a weld while the innermost convenience container must not be sealed. Lifetime of the containers is expected to be fifty years. The containers are fabricated of austenitic stainless steels (SS) due to their high corrosion resistance. Potential failure mechanisms of the storage containers have been examined by Kolman and Lillard et al.

Purpose and objectives for international plutonium storage

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kupp, R.W.

1983-01-01

Separated and decontaminated plutonium - out of a reactor, in a bottle, tank or canister represents an easy target for diversion into possible non-peaceful uses. It also presents a situation that is of concern from a terrorist attack standpoint. Because this special nuclear material has such national and international sensitivity, storage for those quantities which are ''in excess'' of those necessary to be used for peaceful purposes is of concern to the Nations of the World. Recognizing these concerns, Article XII.A.5 of the IAEA Statutes was developed (1956) and the introduction to this Sub-article 5 states ''...that with respect to any Agency Project or other arrangements where the Agency is requested by the parties concerned to apply safeguards, the Agency shall have the following rights and responsibilities to the extent relevant to the project or arrangement....'' Article XII.A.5 then continues: ''To approve the means to be used for chemical processing.... to insure that this chemical processing will not lend itself to diversion of materials for military purposes.... to require that special additional materials recovered or produced as by-product be used for peaceful purposes under continuing Agency safeguards, for research or in reactors.... and to require deposit with the Agency of any excess.... over what is needed for the above stated uses in order to prevent stockpiling of these materials, provided that thereafter, at the request of the member or members concerned.... (plutonium) shall be returned promptly.... for use under the same provisions as stated above.''

Excess plutonium disposition using ALWR technology

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Phillips, A.; Buckner, M.R.; Radder, J.A.; Angelos, J.G.; Inhaber, H.

1993-02-01

The Office of Nuclear Energy of the Department of Energy chartered the Plutonium Disposition Task Force in August 1992. The Task Force was created to assess the range of practicable means of disposition of excess weapons-grade plutonium. Within the Task Force, working groups were formed to consider: (1) storage, (2) disposal,and(3) fission options for this disposition,and a separate group to evaluate nonproliferation concerns of each of the alternatives. As a member of the Fission Working Group, the Savannah River Technology Center acted as a sponsor for light water reactor (LWR) technology. The information contained in this report details the submittal that was made to the Fission Working Group of the technical assessment of LWR technology for plutonium disposition. The following aspects were considered: (1) proliferation issues, (2) technical feasibility, (3) technical availability, (4) economics, (5) regulatory issues, and (6) political acceptance

Evaluation of the Magnesium Hydroxide Treatment Process for Stabilizing PFP Plutonium/Nitric Acid Solutions

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Gerber, Mark A.; Schmidt, Andrew J.; Delegard, Calvin H.; Silvers, Kurt L.; Baker, Aaron B.; Gano, Susan R.; Thornton, Brenda M.

2000-09-28

This document summarizes an evaluation of the magnesium hydroxide [Mg(OH)2] process to be used at the Hanford Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) for stabilizing plutonium/nitric acid solutions to meet the goal of stabilizing the plutonium in an oxide form suitable for storage under DOE-STD-3013-99. During the treatment process, nitric acid solutions bearing plutonium nitrate are neutralized with Mg(OH)2 in an air sparge reactor. The resulting slurry, containing plutonium hydroxide, is filtered and calcined. The process evaluation included a literature review and extensive laboratory- and bench-scale testing. The testing was conducted using cerium as a surrogate for plutonium to identify and quantify the effects of key processing variables on processing time (primarily neutralization and filtration time) and calcined product properties.

Plutonium working group report on environmental, safety and health vulnerabilities associated with the department's plutonium storage. Volume II, part 11: Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory working group assessment team report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-09-01

President Clinton has directed an Interagency Working Group to initiate a comprehensive review of long-term options for the disposition of surplus plutonium. As part of this initiative, Secretary of Energy, Hazel O'Leary, has directed that a Department of Energy project be initiated to develop options and recommendations for the safe storage of these materials in the interim. A step in the process is a plutonium vulnerability assessment of facilities throughout the Department. The Plutonium Vulnerability Working Group was formed to produce the Project and Assessment Plans, to manage the assessments and to produce a final report for the Secretary by September 30, 1994. The plans established the approach and methodology for the assessment. The Project Plan specifies a Working Group Assessment Team (WGAT) to examine each of the twelve DOE sites with significant holdings of plutonium. The Assessment Plan describes the methodology that the Site Assessment Team (SAT) used to report on the plutonium holdings for each specific site.This report provides results of the assessment of the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory

Aqueous Chloride Operations Overview: Plutonium and Americium Purification/Recovery

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kimball, David Bryan [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Skidmore, Bradley Evan [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2016-06-22

Acqueous Chloride mission is to recover plutonium and americium from pyrochemical residues (undesirable form for utilization and storage) and generate plutonium oxide and americium oxide. Plutonium oxide is recycled into Pu metal production flowsheet. It is suitable for storage. Americium oxide is a valuable product, sold through the DOE-OS isotope sales program.

Plutonium-containing aerosols found within containment enclosures in industrial mixed-oxide reactor fuel fabrication

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Newton, G.J.; Yeh, H.C.; Stanley, J.A.

1977-01-01

Mixed oxide (PuO 2 and UO 2 ) nuclear reactor fuel pellets are fabricated within safety enclosures at Babcock and Wilcox's Park Township site near Apollo, PA. Forty-two sample runs of plutonium-containing aerosols were taken from within glove boxes during routine industrial operations. A small, seven-stage cascade impactor and the Lovelace Aerosol Particle Separator (LAPS) were used to determine aerodynamic size distribution and gross alpha aerosol concentration. Powder comminution and blending produced aerosols with lognormal size distributions characterized by activity median aerodynamic diameters (AMAD) of 1.89 +- 0.33 μm, sigma/sub g/ = 1.62 +- 0.09 and a gross alpha aerosol concentration range of 0.1 to 150 nCi/l. Slug pressing and grinding produced aerosols of AMAD = 3.08 +- 0.1 μm, sigma/sub g/ = 1.53 +- 0.01 and AMAD = 2.26 +- 0.16 μm, sigma/sub g/ = 1.68 +- 0.20, respectively. Gross alpha aerosol concentrations ranged from 3.4 to 450 nCi/l. Centerless grinding produced similar-sized aerosols but the gross alpha concentration ranged from 220 to 1690 nCi/l. In vitro solubility studies on selected LAPS samples in a lung fluid simulant indicate that plutonium mixed-oxide aerosols are more soluble than laboratory-produced plutonium aerosols

Plutonium working group report on environmental, safety and health vulnerabilities associated with the department's plutonium storage. Volume II, part 10: Sandia National Laboratories - New Mexico working group assessment team report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-09-01

The Secretary of Energy's memorandum of March 15, 1994, established an initiative for a Department-wide assessment of the vulnerabilities of the inventory of plutonium in storage. Plutonium in intact nuclear weapons and spent fuel were excluded from this study. The DOE Plutonium Vulnerability Working Group, which was formed for this purpose and produced the Project and Assessment Plans, will also manage the open-quote snap-shot close-quote assessments and produce a final report for the Secretary by September 30, 1994. The Project Plan and Assessment Plan to accomplish this study, and which established responsibilities for personnel essential to the study, were issued on April 25, 1994

CSER 95-002: ALARA shielding for IAEA SNM container movement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Miller, E.M.

1995-01-01

This CSER qualifies use of a 5% borated, lead foil lined polyethylene 1 inch annulus as a bucket and in a small carrier to move sealed containers of plutonium. The containers are Oversize Cans or smaller containing plutonium limited in mass and H/Pu ratio by PFP storage and transportation CPS's. These ALARA shielding units reduce personnel exposure to the radiation from the containers as they are moved for assay and other required activities

Plutonium fuel an assessment. Report by an expert group

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1989-01-01

Since the 1950s, plutonium used in fast reactors has been seen as the key to unlocking the vast energy resources contained in the world's uranium reserves. However, the slowing down in projected installation rates of nuclear reactors, combined with discovery of additional uranium, have led to a postponement of the point in time when fast reactors will make large demands on plutonium supplies. There are several options concerning its use or storage in the meantime. This report sets out the facts and current views about plutonium and its civil use, both at present and in the medium term. It explains the factors influencing the choice of fuel options and illustrates how economic and logistic assessments of the alternatives can be undertaken

Test of a sample container for shipment of small size plutonium samples with PAT-2

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kuhn, E.; Aigner, H.; Deron, S.

1981-11-01

A light-weight container for the air transport of plutonium, to be designated PAT-2, has been developed in the USA and is presently undergoing licensing. The very limited effective space for bearing plutonium required the design of small size sample canisters to meet the needs of international safeguards for the shipment of plutonium samples. The applicability of a small canister for the sampling of small size powder and solution samples has been tested in an intralaboratory experiment. The results of the experiment, based on the concept of pre-weighed samples, show that the tested canister can successfully be used for the sampling of small size PuO 2 -powder samples of homogeneous source material, as well as for dried aliquands of plutonium nitrate solutions. (author)

Cooperative Studies in the Utilization and Storage of Excess Weapons-Grade Plutonium

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bolyatko, V. V. [Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (Russia)

1998-01-29

This technical report is a tangible and verifiable deliverable associated with the Nuclear Group subproject “Cooperative Studies in the Utilization and Storage of Excess Weapons-grade Plutonium.” This report is an assessment ofthe work performed by the Russian party from 1 October 1995 through 30 September 1996 regarding milestones defined in the contract between the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI) and the Texas Engineering Experiment Station (TEES). In these interactions, TEES serves as agent of the Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium (ANRCP) in the capacity oflead institution for the Nuclear Group of the ANRCP. The official Statement ofWork dated 8 April 1996 enumerates specific milestones and deliverables. In its present form, this report is an edited version ofthe translation submitted to TEES by MEPhI on 7 October 1996. The principal investigators for this subproject are Dr. Paul Nelson of TEES and Dr. Victor Bolyatko of the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute.

Plutonium working group report on environmental, safety and health vulnerabilities associated with the Department's plutonium storage. Volume II, part 1: Rocky Flats working group assessment team report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-09-01

The objective of the Plutonium Environment, Safety, and Health (ES ampersand H) Vulnerability Assessment Project was to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the ES ampersand H vulnerabilities arising from the Department of Energy (DOE) storage and handling of its current plutonium holdings. The purpose of this assessment was to identify and prioritize ES ampersand H vulnerabilities that could lead to unnecessary or increased radiation exposure of workers, release of radioactive materials to the environment, or radiation exposure of the public. The results will serve as an information base for identifying interim corrective actions and options for the safe management of fissile materials

Evaluation of nuclear fuel reprocessing strategies. 2. LWR fuel storage, recycle economics and plutonium logistics

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Prince, B.E.; Hadley, S.W.

1983-01-01

This is the second of a two-part report intended as a critical review of certain issues involved with closing the Light Water Reactor (LWR) fuel cycle and establishing the basis for future transition to commercial breeder applications. The report is divided into four main sections consisting of (1) a review of the status of the LWR spent fuel management and storage problem; (2) an analysis of the economic incentives for instituting reprocessing and recycle in LWRs; (3) an analysis of the time-dependent aspects of plutonium economic value particularly as related to the LWR-breeder transition; and (4) an analysis of the time-dependent aspects of plutonium requirements and supply relative to this transition

MIS High-Purity Plutonium Oxide Hydride Product 5501579 (SSR124): Final Report

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Veirs, Douglas Kirk [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Stroud, Mary Ann [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Berg, John M. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Narlesky, Joshua Edward [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Worl, Laura Ann [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Martinex, Max A. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Carillo, Alex [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2018-02-08

A high-purity plutonium dioxide material from the Material Identification and Surveillance (MIS) Program inventory has been studied with regard to gas generation and corrosion in a storage environment. Sample 5501579 represents process plutonium oxides from hydride oxide from Rocky Flats that are currently stored in 3013 containers. After calcination to 950°C, the material contained 87.42% plutonium with no major impurities. This study followed over time, the gas pressure of a sample with nominally 0.5 wt% water in a sealed container with an internal volume scaled to 1/500th of the volume of a 3013 container. Gas compositions were measured periodically over a six year period. The maximum observed gas pressure was 124 kPa. The increase over the initial pressure of 70 kPa was primarily due to generation of nitrogen and carbon dioxide gas. Hydrogen and oxygen were minor components of the headspace gas. At the completion of the study, the internal components of the sealed container showed signs of corrosion.

Volume reduction and plutonium recovery in alpha wastes by cryogenic crushing and lixiviation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Arnal, T.; Pajot, J.

1986-06-01

The industry of plutonium generates solid alpha wastes of medium activity called ''technological wastes''. They are mainly produced during the fabrication and reprocessing of nuclear reactor fuels and they are of a wide variety i.e: vinyl bags, gloves, glass, steel materials used in glove box operation, etc... These wastes contain relevant residual quantities of uranium and plutonium in the form of oxides or nitrates, reaching up to several dozen grams per cubic meter. Up to the beginning of the eighties, they were conditionned without any treatment and stored as such on the production site. However, for an economic and safe storage, recovering of the plutonium contained in these waste streams and reduction of their volume is of obvious importance. At the plutonium ''Complexe de Fabrication des Combustibles de Cadarache'' was developed a new technical solution of this problem that combines cryogenic crushing of the solid waste and plutonium recovery from the crushed material by chemical lixiviation. The first results obtained in applying this system on the industrial scale are reported briefly

Independent Verification Survey of the Clean Coral Storage Pile at the Johnston Atoll Plutonium Contaminated Soil Remediation Project

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wilson-Nichols, M.J.; Egidi, P.V.; Roemer, E.K.; Schlosser, R.M.

2000-01-01

f I The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Environmental Technology Section conducted an independent verification (IV) survey of the clean storage pile at the Johnston Atoll Plutonium Contaminated Soil Remediation Project (JAPCSRP) from January 18-25, 1999. The goal of the JAPCSRP is to restore a 24-acre area that was contaminated with plutonium oxide particles during nuclear testing in the 1960s. The selected remedy was a soil sorting operation that combined radiological measurements and mining processes to identify and sequester plutonium-contaminated soil. The soil sorter operated from about 1990 to 1998. The remaining clean soil is stored on-site for planned beneficial use on Johnston Island. The clean storage pile currently consists of approximately 120,000 m3 of coral. ORNL conducted the survey according to a Sampling and Analysis Plan, which proposed to provide an IV of the clean pile by collecting a minimum number (99) of samples. The goal was to ascertain wi th 95% confidence whether 97% of the processed soil is less than or equal to the accepted guideline (500-Bq/kg or 13.5-pCi/g) total transuranic (TRU) activity

Determination of plutonium in pure plutonium nitrate solutions - Gravimetric method

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1987-01-01

This International Standard specifies a precise and accurate gravimetric method for determining the concentration of plutonium in pure plutonium nitrate solutions and reference solutions, containing between 100 and 300 g of plutonium per litre, in a nitric acid medium. The weighed portion of the plutonium nitrate is treated with sulfuric acid and evaporated to dryness. The plutonium sulfate is decomposed and formed to oxide by heating in air. The oxide is ignited in air at 1200 to 1250 deg. C and weighed as stoichiometric plutonium dioxide, which is stable and non-hygroscopic

Nonproliferation and arms control assessment of weapons-usable fissile material storage and excess plutonium disposition alternatives

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-01-01

This report has been prepared by the Department of Energy's Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (DOE-NN) with support from the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD). Its purpose is to analyze the nonproliferation and arms reduction implications of the alternatives for storage of plutonium and HEU, and disposition of excess plutonium, to aid policymakers and the public in making final decisions. While this assessment describes the benefits and risks associated with each option, it does not attempt to rank order the options or choose which ones are best. It does, however, identify steps which could maximize the benefits and mitigate any vulnerabilities of the various alternatives under consideration

MIS High-Purity Plutonium Oxide Metal Oxidation Product TS707001 (SSR123): Final Report

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Veirs, Douglas Kirk [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Stroud, Mary Ann [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Berg, John M. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Narlesky, Joshua Edward [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Worl, Laura Ann [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Martinez, Max A. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Carillo, Alex [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2017-08-09

A high-purity plutonium dioxide material from the Material Identification and Surveillance (MIS) Program inventory has been studied with regard to gas generation and corrosion in a storage environment. Sample TS707001 represents process plutonium oxides from several metal oxidation operations as well as impure and scrap plutonium from Hanford that are currently stored in 3013 containers. After calcination to 950°C, the material contained 86.98% plutonium with no major impurities. This study followed over time, the gas pressure of a sample with nominally 0.5 wt% water in a sealed container with an internal volume scaled to 1/500th of the volume of a 3013 container. Gas compositions were measured periodically over a six year period. The maximum observed gas pressure was 138 kPa. The increase over the initial pressure of 80 kPa was primarily due to generation of nitrogen and carbon dioxide gas in the first six months. Hydrogen and oxygen were minor components of the headspace gas. At the completion of the study, the internal components of the sealed container showed signs of corrosion, including pitting.

Progress on plutonium stabilization

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Hurt, D. [Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Washington, DC (United States)

1996-05-01

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has safety oversight responsibility for most of the facilities where unstable forms of plutonium are being processed and packaged for interim storage. The Board has issued recommendations on plutonium stabilization and has has a considerable influence on DOE`s stabilization schedules and priorities. The Board has not made any recommendations on long-term plutonium disposition, although it may get more involved in the future if DOE develops plans to use defense nuclear facilities for disposition activities.

Progress on plutonium stabilization

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hurt, D.

1996-01-01

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has safety oversight responsibility for most of the facilities where unstable forms of plutonium are being processed and packaged for interim storage. The Board has issued recommendations on plutonium stabilization and has has a considerable influence on DOE's stabilization schedules and priorities. The Board has not made any recommendations on long-term plutonium disposition, although it may get more involved in the future if DOE develops plans to use defense nuclear facilities for disposition activities

X-ray fluorescence spectroscopy for the elemental analysis of plutonium-bearing materials for the materials disposition program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Voit, S.L.; Boerigter, S.T.; Rising, T.L.

1997-01-01

The US Fissile Materials Disposition (MD) program will disposition about 50 MT of plutonium in the next century. Both of the alternative technologies for disposition, MOX Fuel and Immobilization require knowledge of the incoming composition to 1--5 wt%. Wavelength Dispersive X-Ray Fluorescence (WDXRF) systems, a common elemental analysis technology with a variety of industrial applications and commercial vendors, can readily achieve this level of characterization. Since much of the excess plutonium will be packaged in a long-term storage container as part of the DOE Environmental Management (DOE-EM) program to stabilize plutonium-bearing materials, the characterization system must be implemented during the packaging process. The authors describe a preliminary design for the integration of the WDXRF system into the packaging system to be used at the Rocky Flats site. The Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging System (PuSPS), coupled with the WDXRF characterization system will provide MD with stabilized plutonium-bearing excess material that can be more readily fed to an immobilization facility. The overall added expense to the MD program of obtaining analytical information after materials have been packaged in long-term storage containers could far exceed the expense of implementing XRF analysis during the packaging process

Development on application of ultrasonic sealing techniques to plutonium transportation cask

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hayakawa, Tsuyoshi; Akiba, Mitsunori; D'Agraives, B.C.

1994-01-01

In a cooperation research between Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation and Commission of the European Communities, Joint Research Centre, Ispra establishment, application of ultrasonic sealing techniques to a plutonium container is developed in Ispra. The seal is derived from the sealing-bolt technology currently in use at the BNFL site of sellafield (UK) for the safeguarding of underwater spent fuel storage containers called MEBs. In this technique, one of the normal bolts closing the lid of the container is replaced by a special ultrasonically verifiable sealing-bolt. In the application to the plutonium container, it is proposed to attach a clamping seal which has the same internal configuration as a MEB sealing-bolt but is fastened with a 'one-way' mechanism to one of the protruding pins of the container. Similarly the seal is provided with an identity and integrity features. The uniqueness of the identity, as well as the integrity can be checked on the spot by an inspector carrying a reading equipment. Thus, in a few minutes, one identifies the seal and knows whether its integrity is intact, which tells that the container has not been opened or attempted to open illeagally. By application of the seal to the plutonium container, the containment/surveillance during the transportation will be upgraded. (author)

Estimate of the Sources of Plutonium-Containing Wastes Generated from MOX Fuel Production in Russia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kudinov, K. G.; Tretyakov, A. A.; Sorokin, Yu. P.; Bondin, V. V.; Manakova, L. F.; Jardine, L. J.

2002-01-01

incineration or calcination, alkali sintering, and dissolution of sintered products in nitric acid. Insoluble residues are then mixed with vitrifying components and Pu sludges, vitrified, and sent for storage and disposal. Implementation of the intergovernmental agreement between Russia and the United States (US) regarding the utilization of 34 tons of weapons plutonium will also require treatment of Pu containing MOX fabrication wastes at the MCC radiochemical production plant

Estimate of the Sources of Plutonium-Containing Wastes Generated from MOX Fuel Production in Russia

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kudinov, K. G.; Tretyakov, A. A.; Sorokin, Yu. P.; Bondin, V. V.; Manakova, L. F.; Jardine, L. J.

2002-02-26

of MOX-fuel production waste is incineration or calcination, alkali sintering, and dissolution of sintered products in nitric acid. Insoluble residues are then mixed with vitrifying components and Pu sludges, vitrified, and sent for storage and disposal. Implementation of the intergovernmental agreement between Russia and the United States (US) regarding the utilization of 34 tons of weapons plutonium will also require treatment of Pu containing MOX fabrication wastes at the MCC radiochemical production plant.

Thermal Analysis of the SAFKEG Package for Long Term Storage

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

NARENDRA, GUPTA

2005-01-01

Interim plutonium storage for up to 10 years in the K-reactor building is currently being planned at Savannah River Site (SRS). SAFKEG package could be used to store Pu metal and oxide (PuO2) in the K-reactor complex with other packagings like 9975. The SAFKEG is designed for carrying Type-B materials across the DOE complex and meets the 10CFR71 requirements. Thermal analyses were performed to ensure that the temperatures of the SAFKEG components will not exceed their temperature limits under the K-reactor storage conditions. Thermal analyses of the SAFKEG packaging with three content configurations using BNFL 3013 outer container (Rocky Flats, SRS bagless transfer cans, and BNFL inner containers) were performed for storage of PuO2 and plutonium metal

Plutonium working group report on environmental, safety and health vulnerabilities associated with the department's plutonium storage. Volume II, Appendix B, Part 13: Sites with small plutonium holdings site assessment team report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-09-01

This Appendix contains the initial responses to the Question Set received from each of the sites with small plutonium holdings. The WGAT report for sites with small plutonium holdings was then prepared, based on these initial site responses plus supplemental information obtained via telephone request with the site contractor and/or DOE Field Office personnel. These supplements serve to clarify information in the initial question set responses and/or obtain additional information. This WGAT report is published as Volume II, Part 13

Plutonium in uranium deposits

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Curtis, D.; Fabryka-Martin, J.; Aguilar, R.; Attrep, M. Jr.; Roensch, F.

1992-01-01

Plutonium-239 (t 1/2 , 24,100 yr) is one of the most persistent radioactive constituents of high-level wastes from nuclear fission power reactors. Effective containment of such a long-lived constituent will rely heavily upon its containment by the geologic environment of a repository. Uranium ore deposits offer a means to evaluate the geochemical properties of plutonium under natural conditions. In this paper, analyses of natural plutonium in several ores are compared to calculated plutonium production rates in order to evaluate the degree of retention of plutonium by the ore. The authors find that current methods for estimating production rates are neither sufficiently accurate nor precise to provide unambiguous measures of plutonium retention. However, alternative methods for evaluating plutonium mobility are being investigated, including its measurement in natural ground waters. Preliminary results are reported and establish the foundation for a comprehensive characterization of plutonium geochemistry in other natural environments

Residual Stresses In 3013 Containers

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mickalonis, J.; Dunn, K.

2009-01-01

The DOE Complex is packaging plutonium-bearing materials for storage and eventual disposition or disposal. The materials are handled according to the DOE-STD-3013 which outlines general requirements for stabilization, packaging and long-term storage. The storage vessels for the plutonium-bearing materials are termed 3013 containers. Stress corrosion cracking has been identified as a potential container degradation mode and this work determined that the residual stresses in the containers are sufficient to support such cracking. Sections of the 3013 outer, inner, and convenience containers, in both the as-fabricated condition and the closure welded condition, were evaluated per ASTM standard G-36. The standard requires exposure to a boiling magnesium chloride solution, which is an aggressive testing solution. Tests in a less aggressive 40% calcium chloride solution were also conducted. These tests were used to reveal the relative stress corrosion cracking susceptibility of the as fabricated 3013 containers. Significant cracking was observed in all containers in areas near welds and transitions in the container diameter. Stress corrosion cracks developed in both the lid and the body of gas tungsten arc welded and laser closure welded containers. The development of stress corrosion cracks in the as-fabricated and in the closure welded container samples demonstrates that the residual stresses in the 3013 containers are sufficient to support stress corrosion cracking if the environmental conditions inside the containers do not preclude the cracking process.

Plutonium Finishing Plant safety evaluation report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-01-01

The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) previously known as the Plutonium Process and Storage Facility, or Z-Plant, was built and put into operation in 1949. Since 1949 PFP has been used for various processing missions, including plutonium purification, oxide production, metal production, parts fabrication, plutonium recovery, and the recovery of americium (Am-241). The PFP has also been used for receipt and large scale storage of plutonium scrap and product materials. The PFP Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) was prepared by WHC to document the hazards associated with the facility, present safety analyses of potential accident scenarios, and demonstrate the adequacy of safety class structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and operational safety requirements (OSRs) necessary to eliminate, control, or mitigate the identified hazards. Documented in this Safety Evaluation Report (SER) is DOE's independent review and evaluation of the PFP FSAR and the basis for approval of the PFP FSAR. The evaluation is presented in a format that parallels the format of the PFP FSAR. As an aid to the reactor, a list of acronyms has been included at the beginning of this report. The DOE review concluded that the risks associated with conducting plutonium handling, processing, and storage operations within PFP facilities, as described in the PFP FSAR, are acceptable, since the accident safety analyses associated with these activities meet the WHC risk acceptance guidelines and DOE safety goals in SEN-35-91

Combined evaluation. Plutonium transports in France. Problems of safety and reliability of transport container FS47; Evaluation Conjointe. Transports de plutonium en France. Problemes de surete et de securite du container de transport FS47

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Marignac, Y.; Coeytaux, X. [Wise-Paris, 75 (France); Large, J.H. [Nuclear Engineer, Large and Associates, Londres (United Kingdom)

2004-09-15

This report concerns the safety and the protection of plutonium dioxide transported from Cogema La Hague to the mixed oxide fuel plant of Marcoule and Cadarache. The French approach of the transport safety is based on the combining of two essential principles: the first one affirms that the performances of the FS47 container in regard of containment (norms TS-R-1 from IAEA for the accidental conditions) is conceived to resist in any situation even terrorism or sabotage. In fact, the IAEA norm follows a probabilistic study without a voluntary attack such a terrorist one. The second principle rests on the ability to prevent the treat of terrorism acts, because of a secrecy policy on the plutonium transport. It appeared that the Green peace association has succeeded several times to know exactly the hours, the trips of the plutonium transport and this simple thing raises more questions than it solves. (N.C.)

Japan's spent fuel and plutonium management challenge

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Katsuta, Tadahiro; Suzuki, Tatsujiro

2011-01-01

Japan's commitment to plutonium recycling has been explicitly stated in its long-term program since 1956. Despite the clear cost disadvantage compared with direct disposal or storage of spent fuel, the Rokkasho reprocessing plant started active testing in 2006. Japan's cumulative consumption of plutonium has been only 5 tons to date and its future consumption rate is still uncertain. But once the Rokkasho reprocessing plant starts its full operation, Japan will separate about 8 tons of plutonium annually. Our analysis shows that, with optimum use of available at-reactor and away-from-reactor storage capacity, there would be no need for reprocessing until the mid-2020s. With an additional 30,000 tons of away-from-reactor (AFR) spent-fuel storage capacity reprocessing could be avoided until 2050. Deferring operation of the Rokkasho plant, at least until the plutonium stockpile had been worked down to the minimum required level, would also minimize international concern about Japan's plutonium stockpile. The authors are happy to acknowledge Frank von Hippel, Harold Feiveson, Jungming Kang, Zia Mian, M.V. Ramana, and other IPFM members, as well as the generous grant from the MacArthur Foundation for helping make this research possible.

Plutonium stabilization and storage research in the DNFSB 94-1 core technology program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Eller, P.G.; Avens, L.R.; Roberson, G.D.

1998-04-01

Recommendation 94-1 of the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board (DNFSB) addresses legacy actinide materials left in the US nuclear defense program pipeline when the production mission ended in 1989. The Department of Energy (DOE) Implementation Plan responding to this recommendation instituted a Core Technology program to augment the knowledge base about general chemical and physical processing and storage behavior and to assure safe interim nuclear material storage, until disposition policies are formulated. The Core Technology program focuses on plutonium, in concert with a complex-wide applied R/D program administered by Los Alamos National Laboratory. This paper will summarize the Core Technology program's first two years, describe the research program for FY98, and project the overall direction of the program in the future

Conversion of metal plutonium to plutonium dioxide by pyrochemical method

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Panov, A.V.; Subbotin, V.G. [Russian Federal Nuclear Center, ALL-Russian Science and Research Institute of Technical Physics, Snezhinsk (Russian Federation); Mashirev, V.P. [ALL-Russian Science and Research Institute of Chemical Technology, Moscow (Russian Federation)

2000-07-01

Report contains experimental results on metal plutonium of weapon origin samples conversion to plutonium dioxide by pyrochemical method. Circuits of processes are described. Their advantages and shortcomings are shown. Parameters of plutonium dioxide powders (phase and fraction compositions, poured density) manufactured by pyrochemical method in RFNC-VNIITF are shown as well. (authors)

Nonproliferation and arms control assessment of weapons-usable fissile material storage and excess plutonium disposition alternatives

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1997-01-01

This report has been prepared by the Department of Energy`s Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (DOE-NN) with support from the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD). Its purpose is to analyze the nonproliferation and arms reduction implications of the alternatives for storage of plutonium and HEU, and disposition of excess plutonium, to aid policymakers and the public in making final decisions. While this assessment describes the benefits and risks associated with each option, it does not attempt to rank order the options or choose which ones are best. It does, however, identify steps which could maximize the benefits and mitigate any vulnerabilities of the various alternatives under consideration.

Test Plan to Determine the Maximum Surface Temperatures for a Plutonium Storage Cubicle with Horizontal 3013 Canisters

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

HEARD, F.J.

2000-01-01

A simulated full-scale plutonium storage cubicle with 22 horizontally positioned and heated 3013 canisters is proposed to confirm the effectiveness of natural circulation. Temperature and airflow measurements will be made for different heat generation and cubicle door configurations. Comparisons will be made to computer based thermal Hydraulic models

Plutonium working group report on environmental, safety and health vulnerabilities associated with the department's plutonium storage. Volume II, part 6: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory working group assessment team report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-09-01

President Clinton directed an Interagency Working Group to initiate a comprehensive review of long-term options for the disposition of surplus plutonium. As part of this initiative, Secretary of Energy Hazel O'Leary directed the Department of Energy to develop options and plans for the interim safe storage of these materials. One step in this direction is a plutonium vulnerability assessment of DOE facilities by a open-quotes Plutonium Vulnerability Working Group.close quotes In this effort, the working group developed a Project Plan and an Assessment Plan which basically laid out the approach and methodology for the assessments. The plans were issued on April 25, 1994. The Project Plan specifies a WGAT for each site with significant holdings of plutonium. Also, the plan requires that each site form a Site Assessment Team (SAT) to provide the self assessment for the project. Additionally, the working group was tasked with managing the assessments at each site, and providing the results in a final report for the Secretary by September 30, 1994

Recombination rates of hydrogen and oxygen over pure and impure plutonium oxides

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Morales, L.

1999-01-01

Long-term, safe storage of excess plutonium-bearing materials is required until stabilization and disposal methods are implemented or defined. The US Department of Energy (DOE) has established a plan to address the stabilization, packing, and storage of plutonium-bearing materials from around the complex. The DOE's standard method, DOE-STD-3013-96 and its proposed revision, for stabilizing pure and impure actinide materials is by calcination in air followed by sealing the material in welded stainless steel containers. The 3013 standard contains and equation that predicts the total pressure buildup in the can over the anticipated storage time of 50 yr. This equation was meant to model a worst-case scenario to ensure that pressures would not exceed the strength of the container at the end of 50 yr. As a result, concerns about pressure generation in the storage cans, both absolute values and rates, have been raised with regard to rupture and dispersal of nuclear materials. Similar issues have been raised about the transportation of these materials around the complex. The purpose of this work is to provide a stronger technical basis for the 3013 standard by measuring the recombination rates of hydrogen/oxygen mixtures in contact with pure and impure plutonium oxides. The goal of these experiments was to determine whether the rate of recombination is faster than the rate of water radiolysis under controlled conditions. This was accomplished by using a calibrated pressure-volume-temperature apparatus to measure the recombination rates in a fixed volume as the gas mixture was brought into contact with oxide powders whose temperatures ranged from 50 to 300 C. These conditions were selected in order to bracket the temperature conditions expected in a typical storage can. In addition, a 2% H 2 /air mixture encompasses scenarios in which the cans are sealed in air, and over time various amounts of hydrogen are formed

Plutonium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Koelzer, W.

1989-03-01

This report contains with regard to 'plutonium' statements on chemistry, occurrence and reactions in the environment, handling procedures in the nuclear fuel cycle, radiation protection methods, biokinetics, toxicology and medical treatment to make available reliable data for the public discussion on plutonium especially its use in nuclear power plants and its radiological assessment. (orig.) [de

Plutonium stabilization and handling quality assurance program plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Weiss, E.V.

1998-01-01

This Quality Assurance Program Plan (QAPP) identifies project quality assurance requirements for all contractors involved in the planning and execution of Hanford Site activities for design, procurement, construction, testing and inspection for Project W-460, Plutonium Stabilization and Handling. The project encompasses procurement and installation of a Stabilization and Packaging System (SPS) to oxidize and package for long term storage remaining plutonium-bearing special nuclear materials currently in inventory at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP), and modification of vault equipment to allow storage of resulting packages of stabilized SNM

Criticality safety evaluation of Rocky Flats Plant one-gallon shipping containers

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shaw, M.E.

1991-12-01

Criticality safety calculations have been performed to provide an analytical basis for handling, storage and transport of Rocky Flats Plant (RFP) one-gallon shipping containers. A mass limit was establish for metal (solid uranium or plutonium) and slurries (undissolved U or Pu solids in a ''mud,'' ''sludge,'' or ''slurry''). A separate volume limit was developed for plutonium solutions (liquids, either aqueous or organic, containing no visible undissolved solids)

Criticality safety evaluation of Rocky Flats Plant one-gallon shipping containers

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Shaw, M.E.

1991-12-01

Criticality safety calculations have been performed to provide an analytical basis for handling, storage and transport of Rocky Flats Plant (RFP) one-gallon shipping containers. A mass limit was establish for metal (solid uranium or plutonium) and slurries (undissolved U or Pu solids in a ``mud,`` ``sludge,`` or ``slurry``). A separate volume limit was developed for plutonium solutions (liquids, either aqueous or organic, containing no visible undissolved solids).

Next generation storage facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schlesser, J.A.

1994-01-01

With diminishing requirements for plutonium, a substantial quantity of this material requires special handling and ultimately, long-term storage. To meet this objective, we at Los Alamos, have been involved in the design of a storage facility with the goal of providing storage capabilities for this and other nuclear materials. This paper presents preliminary basic design data, not for the structure and physical plant, but for the container and arrays which might be configured within the facility, with strong emphasis on criticality safety features

World status report: plutonium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dircks, W.

1992-01-01

In a recent speech in Japan, the Deputy Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said that the economic case for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel had been severely eroded. An edited version of the speech is given. The changed prospects for nuclear energy is given as the reason why the demand for plutonium has declined sharply. The oil crisis of the 1970s reduced the demand for electric power and the economic justification for the use of recycled plutonium. The stockpile of isolated plutonium is growing rapidly giving rise to worries about its security. From this point of view, isolated plutonium is best kept in reactor fuel not separated out. In this connection the IAEA has offered to help in the storage of plutonium so that vigorous safety and security requirements are met. In Japan there is a debate about the plutonium which is dependent on the future of the fast breeder reactor programme. (UK)

Acid-digestion treatment of plutonium-containing waste

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wieczorek, H.; Kemmler, G.; Krause, H.

1981-01-01

The Radioactive Acid-Digestion Test Unit (RADTU) has been constructed at Hanford to demonstrate the application of the acid-digestion process for treating combustible transuranic wastes and scrap materials. The RADTU, with its original tray digestion vessel, has recently completed a six-month campaign processing potentially contaminated non-glovebox wastes from a Hanford plutonium facility. During this campaign, it processed 2100 kg largely cellulosic wastes at an average sustained processing rate of 3 kg/h as limited by the acid-waste contact and the water boil-off rate from the acid feeds. The on-line operating efficiency was nearly 50% on a twelve-hour day, five-day week basis. Following this campaign, a new annular high-rate digester has been installed for testing. In preliminary tests with simulated wastes, the new digester demonstrated a sustained capacity of 10 kg/h with greatly improved intimacy of contact between the digestion acid and the waste. The new design also doubles the heat-transfer surface, which is expected to provide at least twice the water boil-off rate of the previous tray digester design. Following shakedown testing with simulated and low-level wastes, the new unit will be used to process combustible plutonium scrap and waste from Hanford plutonium facilities for the purposes of volume reduction, plutonium recovery, and stabilization of the final waste form. (author)

Vacuum technologies developed for at-400A Type B transportation and storage package

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Franklin, K.W.; Cockrell, G.D.

1995-01-01

The AT-400A TYPE B transportation and storage container will be used at Pantex Plant for the transportation and interim storage of plutonium pits. The AT-400A was designed by a joint effort between Sandia National Labs, Los Alamos National Labs, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Mason and Hanger-Silas Mason Co., Inc. In order to meet the requirements for transportation and storage, five different vacuum technologies had to be developed. The goals of the various vacuum technologies were to verify the plutonium pit was sealed, perform the assembly verification leak check in accordance with ANSI N-14.5 and to provide a final inert gas backfill in the containment vessel. This paper will discuss the following five vacuum technologies: (1) Pit Leak Testing, (2) Containment Vessel Purge and Backfill with tracer gas, (3) Containment Vessel Leak Testing, (4) Containment Vessel Purge and Final Backfill, and (5) Leak Testing of the Containment Vessel Gas Transfer tube

Remote-Reading Safety and Safeguards Surveillance System for 3013 Containers

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lechelt, W. M.; Skorpik, J. R.; Silvers, K. L.; Szempruch, R. W.; Douglas, D. G.; Fein, K. O.

2002-01-01

At Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP), plutonium oxide is being loaded into stainless steel containers for long-term storage on the Hanford Site. These containers consist of two weld-sealed stainless steel cylinders nested one within the other. A third container holds the plutonium within the inner cylinder. This design meets the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) storage standard, DOE-STD- 3013-2000, which anticipates a 50-year storage lifetime. The 3013 standard also requires a container surveillance program to continuously monitor pressure and to assure safeguards are adequate. However, the configuration of the container system makes using conventional measurement and monitoring methods difficult. To better meet the 3013 monitoring requirements, a team from Fluor Hanford (who manages the PFP), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), and Vista Engineering Technologies, LLC, developed a safer, cost-efficient, remote PFP 3013 container surveillance system. This new surveillance system is a combination of two successfully deployed technologies: (1) a magnetically coupled pressure gauge developed by Vista Engineering and (2) a radio frequency (RF) tagging device developed by PNNL. This system provides continuous, 100% monitoring of critical parameters with the containers in place, as well as inventory controls. The 3013 container surveillance system consists of three main elements: (1) an internal magnetic pressure sensor package, (2) an instrument pod (external electronics package), and (3) a data acquisition storage and display computer. The surveillance system described in this paper has many benefits for PFP and DOE in terms of cost savings and reduced personnel exposure. In addition, continuous safety monitoring (i.e., internal container pressure and temperature) of every container is responsible nuclear material stewardship and fully meets and exceeds DOE's Integrated Surveillance Program requirements

Combined evaluation. Plutonium transports in France. Problems of safety and reliability of transport container FS47

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Marignac, Y.; Coeytaux, X.; Large, J.H.

2004-09-01

This report concerns the safety and the protection of plutonium dioxide transported from Cogema La Hague to the mixed oxide fuel plant of Marcoule and Cadarache. The French approach of the transport safety is based on the combining of two essential principles: the first one affirms that the performances of the FS47 container in regard of containment (norms TS-R-1 from IAEA for the accidental conditions) is conceived to resist in any situation even terrorism or sabotage. In fact, the IAEA norm follows a probabilistic study without a voluntary attack such a terrorist one. The second principle rests on the ability to prevent the treat of terrorism acts, because of a secrecy policy on the plutonium transport. It appeared that the Green peace association has succeeded several times to know exactly the hours, the trips of the plutonium transport and this simple thing raises more questions than it solves. (N.C.)

A summary of volatile impurity measurements and gas generation studies on MISSTD-1, a high-purity plutonium oxide produced by low-temperature calcination of plutonium oxalate

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Berg, John M. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Narlesky, Joshua E. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Veirs, Douglas K. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2012-06-08

Plutonium dioxide of high specific surface area was subjected to long-term tests of gas generation in sealed containers. The material preparation and the storage conditions were outside the bounds of acceptable parameters defined by DOE-STD-3013-2012 in that the material was stabilized to a lower temperature than required and had higher moisture content than allowed. The data provide useful information for better defining the bounding conditions for safe storage. Net increases in internal pressure and transient increases in H{sub 2} and O{sub 2} were observed, but were well within the bounds of gas compositions previously shown to not threaten integrity of 3013 containers.

A summary of volatile impurity measurements and gas generation studies on MISSTD-1, a high-purity plutonium oxide produced by low-temperature calcination of plutonium oxalate

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Berg, John M.; Narlesky, Joshua E.; Veirs, Douglas K.

2012-01-01

Plutonium dioxide of high specific surface area was subjected to long-term tests of gas generation in sealed containers. The material preparation and the storage conditions were outside the bounds of acceptable parameters defined by DOE-STD-3013-2012 in that the material was stabilized to a lower temperature than required and had higher moisture content than allowed. The data provide useful information for better defining the bounding conditions for safe storage. Net increases in internal pressure and transient increases in H 2 and O 2 were observed, but were well within the bounds of gas compositions previously shown to not threaten integrity of 3013 containers.

Criticality safety evaluation of Rocky Flats Plant one-gallon shipping containers

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Shaw, M.E.

1991-12-01

Criticality safety calculations have been performed to provide an analytical basis for handling, storage and transport of Rocky Flats Plant (RFP) one-gallon shipping containers. A mass limit was establish for metal (solid uranium or plutonium) and slurries (undissolved U or Pu solids in a mud,'' sludge,'' or slurry''). A separate volume limit was developed for plutonium solutions (liquids, either aqueous or organic, containing no visible undissolved solids).

Criticality safety evaluation for long term storage of FFTF fuel in interim storage casks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Richard, R.F.

1995-01-01

It has been postulated that a degradation phenomenon, referred to as ''hot cell rot'', may affect irradiated FFTF mixed plutonium-uranium oxide (MOX) fuel during dry interim storage. ''Hot cell rot'' refers to a variety of phenomena that degrade fuel pin cladding during exposure to air and inert gas environments. It is thought to be a form of caustic stress corrosion cracking or environmentally assisted cracking. Here, a criticality safety analysis was performed to address the effect of the ''hot cell rot'' phenomenon on the long term storage of irradiated FFTF fuel in core component containers. The results show that seven FFTF fuel assemblies or six Ident-69 pin containers stored in core component containers within interim storage casks will remain safely subcritical

Storage of platelets: effects associated with high platelet content in platelet storage containers.

Science.gov (United States)

Gulliksson, Hans; Sandgren, Per; Sjödin, Agneta; Hultenby, Kjell

2012-04-01

A major problem associated with platelet storage containers is that some platelet units show a dramatic fall in pH, especially above certain platelet contents. The aim of this study was a detailed investigation of the different in vitro effects occurring when the maximum storage capacity of a platelet container is exceeded as compared to normal storage. Buffy coats were combined in large-volume containers to create primary pools to be split into two equal aliquots for the preparation of platelets (450-520×10(9) platelets/unit) in SSP+ for 7-day storage in two containers (test and reference) with different platelet storage capacity (n=8). Exceeding the maximum storage capacity of the test platelet storage container resulted in immediate negative effects on platelet metabolism and energy supply, but also delayed effects on platelet function, activation and disintegration. Our study gives a very clear indication of the effects in different phases associated with exceeding the maximum storage capacity of platelet containers but throw little additional light on the mechanism initiating those negative effects. The problem appears to be complex and further studies in different media using different storage containers will be needed to understand the mechanisms involved.

Storage vessel for radiation contaminated container

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sakatani, Tadatsugu.

1996-01-01

In a storage vessel of the present invention, a plurality of radiation contaminated material containing bodies are vertically stacked in a cell chamber. Then, the storage vessel comprises a containing tube for containing a plurality of the containing bodies, cooling coils wound around the containing tube, a cooling medium circulating system connected to the cooling coils and circulating cooling medium, and a heat exchanger interposed to the cooling medium circulating system for removing heat of the cooling medium. Heat of the radioactive material containing bodies is transferred to cooling air and cooling coils by way of the container tube, thereby cooling the containing bodies. By the operation of circulating pumps in a cooling medium circulation system, the cooling medium circulates through a circulation channel comprising a cooling medium transfer pipes, cooling medium branching tubes, cooling coils and the heat exchanger, then heat of the cooling medium is transferred to a heat utilizing system by way of the heat exchanger to attain effective utilization of the heat. In this case, heat can be taken out stably even when the storage amount fluctuates and heat releasing amount is reduced, and improvement of heat transfer promotes the cooling of the containing bodies, which enables minimization of the size of the storage vessel. (T.M.)

Surplus plutonium disposition draft environmental impact statement. Summary

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-07-01

On May 22, 1997, DOE published a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the Federal Register (62 Federal Register 28009) announcing its decision to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) that would tier from the analysis and decisions reached in connection with the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic EIS (Storage and Disposition PEIS). DOE's disposition strategy allows for both the immobilization of surplus plutonium and its use as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in existing domestic, commercial reactors. The disposition of surplus plutonium would also involve disposal of the immobilized plutonium and MOX fuel (as spent nuclear fuel) in a geologic repository. The Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement analyzes alternatives that would use the immobilization approach (for some of the surplus plutonium) and the MOX fuel approach (for some of the surplus plutonium); alternatives that would immobilize all of the surplus plutonium; and the No Action Alternative. The alternatives include three disposition facilities that would be designed so that they could collectively accomplish disposition of up to 50 metric tons (55 tons) of surplus plutonium over their operating lives: (1) the pit disassembly and conversion facility would disassemble pits (a weapons component) and convert the recovered plutonium, as well as plutonium metal from other sources, into plutonium dioxide suitable for disposition; (2) the immobilization facility would include a collocated capability for converting nonpit plutonium materials into plutonium dioxide suitable for immobilization and would be located at either Hanford or SRS. DOE has identified SRS as the preferred site for an immobilization facility; (3) the MOX fuel fabrication facility would fabricate plutonium dioxide into MOX fuel

Plutonium safe handling

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tvehlov, Yu.

2000-01-01

The abstract, prepared on the basis of materials of the IAEA new leadership on the plutonium safe handling and its storage (the publication no. 9 in the Safety Reports Series), aimed at presenting internationally acknowledged criteria on the radiation danger evaluation and summarizing the experience in the safe management of great quantities of plutonium, accumulated in the nuclear states, is presented. The data on the weapon-class and civil plutonium, the degree of its danger, the measures for provision of its safety, including the data on accident radiation consequences with the fission number 10 18 , are presented. The recommendations, making it possible to eliminate the super- criticality danger, as well as ignition and explosion, to maintain the tightness of the facility, aimed at excluding the radioactive contamination and the possibility of internal irradiation, to provide for the plutonium security, physical protection and to reduce irradiation are given [ru

Separation of uranium and common impurities from solid analytical waste containing plutonium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pathak, Nimai; Kumar, Mithlesh; Thulasidas, S.K.; Hon, N.S.; Kulkarni, M.J.; Mhatre, Amol; Natarajan, V.

2014-07-01

The report describes separation of uranium (U) and common impurities from solid analytical waste containing plutonium (Pu). This will be useful in recovery of Pu from nuclear waste. This is an important activity of any nuclear program in view of the strategic importance of Pu. In Radiochemistry Division, the trace metal analysis of Pu bearing fuel materials such as PuO 2 , (U,Pu)O 2 and (U,Pu)C are being carried out using the DC arc-Carrier Distillation technique. During these analyses, solid analytical waste containing Pu and 241 Am is generated. This comprises of left-over of samples and prepared charges. The main constituents of this waste are uranium oxide, plutonium oxide and silver chloride used as carrier. This report describes the entire work carried out to separate gram quantities of Pu from large amounts of U and mg quantities of 241 Am and the effect of leaching of the waste with nitric acid as a function of batch size. The effect of leaching the solid analytical waste of (U,Pu)O 2 and AgCl with concentrated nitric acid for different time intervals was also studied. Later keeping the time constant, the effect of nitric acid molarity on the leaching of U and Pu was investigated. Four different lots of the waste having different amounts were subjected to multiple leaching with 8 M nitric acid, each for 15 minutes duration. In all the experiments the amount of Uranium, Plutonium and other impurities leached were determined using ICP as an excitation source. The results are discussed in this report. (author)

Compositions of airborne plutonium-bearing particles from a plutonium finishing operation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanders, S.M. Jr.

1976-11-01

The elemental composition of 111 plutonium-bearing particles was determined (using an electron microprobe) as part of a program to investigate the origin and behavior of the long-lived transuranic radionuclides released from fuel reprocessing facilities at the Savannah River Plant. These particles, collected from wet-cabinet and room-air exhausts from the plutonium finishing operation (JB-Line), were between 0.4 and 36 μm in diameter. Ninety-nine of the particles were found to be aggregates of various minerals and metals, six were quartz, and six were small (less than 2-μm-diameter) pieces of iron oxide. Collectively, these particles contained less minerals and more metals than natural dusts contain. The metallic constituents included elements normally not found in dusts, e.g., chromium, nickel, copper, and zinc. Concentrations of aluminum and iron exceeded those normally found in minerals. Elemental concentrations in individual particles covered a wide range: one 2-μm-diameter particle contained 97 percent NiO, a 9-μm-diameter particle contained 72 percent Cr 2 O 3 . Although the particles were selected because they produced plutonium fission tracks, the plutonium concentration was too low to be estimated by microprobe analysis in all but a 1-μm-diameter particle. This plutonium-bearing particle contained 73 percent PuO 2 by weight in combination with Fe 2 O 3 and mica; its activity was estimated at 0.17 pCi of 239 Pu

Pulmonary carcinogenesis from plutonium-containing particles

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Thomas, R.G.; Smith, D.M.; Anderson, E.C.

1980-01-01

Plutonium administered as an alpha radiation source to the respiratory tracts of Syrian hamsters has resulted in various incidences of neoplasia. Adenomas are the primary lung tumor observed, but adenocarcinomas are also prevalent

Plutonium-238 and plutonium-239 metabolism in dairy cows following ingestion of mixed oxides

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Patzer, R.G.; Mullen, A.A.; Sutton, W.W.; Potter, G.D.; Mosley, R.E.; Efurd, D.W.; Stalnaker, N.D.

1985-01-01

Dairy cows were given oral dosage of plutonium-238 and plutonium-239 dioxide particles in a study to determine the relative gastrointestinal absorption and tissue distribution of the nuclides. Two cows were given particles in which the two isotopes were homogeneously mixed within the particles. A third cow was given two batches of particles which contained either plutonium-238 or plutonium-239. Results indicate that, when the two isotopes of plutonium are homogeneous within the particles, there is no difference between plutonium-238 and plutonium-239 in the relative gastrointestinal absorption and tissue distribution

A Study of the Stability and Characterization Plutonium Dioxide and Chemical Characterization [of] Rocky Flats and Los Alamos Plutonium-Containing Incinerator Ash

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ray, A.K.; Boettger, J.C.; Behrens, Robert G.

1999-01-01

In the presentation ''A Study of the Stability and Characterization of Plutonium Dioxide'', the authors discuss their recent work on actinide stabilities and characterization, in particular, plutonium dioxide PuO 2 . Earlier studies have indicated that PuO 2 has the fluorite structure of CaF 2 and typical oxide semiconductor properties. However, detailed results on the bulk electronic structure of this important actinide oxide have not been available. The authors have used all-electron, full potential linear combinations Gaussian type orbitals fitting function (LCGTO-FF) method to study PuO 2 . The LCGTO-FF technique characterized by its use of three independent GTO basis sets to expand the orbitals, charge density, and exchange-correlation integral kernels. Results will be presented on zero pressure using both the Hedin-Lundquist local density approximation (LDA) model or the Perdew-Wang generalized gradient approximation (GGA) model. Possibilities of different characterizations of PuO 2 will be explored. The paper ''Chemical Characterization Rocky Flats and Los Alamos Plutonium-Containing Incinerator Ash'' describes the results of a comprehensive study of the chemical characteristics of virgin, calcined and fluorinated incinerator ash produced at the Rocky Flats Plant and at the Los Alamos National Laboratory prior to 1988. The Rocky Flats and Los Alamos virgin, calcined, and fluorinated ashes were also dissolved using standard nitrate dissolution chemistry. Corresponding chemical evaluations were preformed on the resultant ash heel and the results compared with those of the virgin ash. Fluorination studies using FT spectroscopy as a diagnostic tool were also performed to evaluate the chemistry of phosphorus, sulfur, carbon, and silicon containing species in the ash. The distribution of plutonium and other chemical elements with the virgin ash, ash heel, fluorinated ash, and fluorinated ash heel particulates were studied in detail using microprobe analysis. Some

Nondestructive Examination Of Plutonium-Bearing Material Containers

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yerger, L.; Mcclard, J.; Traver, L.; Grim, T.

2010-01-01

The first nondestructive examination (NDE) of 3013-type containers as part of the Department of Energy's (DOE's) Integrated Surveillance Program (ISP) was performed in February, 2005. Since that date 280 NDE surveillances on 255 containers have been conducted. These containers were packaged with plutonium-bearing materials at multiple DOE sites. The NDE surveillances were conducted at Hanford, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), and Savannah River Site (SRS). These NDEs consisted of visual inspection, mass verification, radiological surveys, prompt gamma analysis, and radiography. The primary purpose of performing NDE surveillances is to determine if there has been a significant pressure buildup inside the inner 3013 container. This is done by measuring the lid deflection of the inner 3013 container using radiography images. These lid deflection measurements are converted to pressure measurements to determine if a container has a pressure of a 100 psig or greater. Making this determination is required by Surveillance and Monitoring Plan (S and MP). All 3013 containers are designed to withstand at least 699 psig as specified by DOE-STD-3013. To date, all containers evaluated have pressures under 50 psig. In addition, the radiography is useful in evaluating the contents of the 3013 container as well as determining the condition of the walls of the inner 3013 container and the convenience containers. The radiography has shown no signs of degradation of any container, but has revealed two packaging anomalies. Quantitative pressure measurements based on lid deflections, which give more information than the 'less than or greater than 100 psig' (pass/fail) data are also available for many containers. Statistical analyses of the pass/fail data combined with analysis of the quantitative data show that it is extremely unlikely that any container in the population of 3013 containers considered in this study (e.g., containers packaged according to the DOE-STD-3013

Estimation of Plutonium-240 Mass in Waste Tanks Using Ultra-Sensitive Detection of Radioactive Xenon Isotopes from Spontaneous Fission

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bowyer, Theodore W. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Gesh, Christopher J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Haas, Daniel A. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Hayes, James C. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Johns, Jesse M. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Lukins, Craig D. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Mahoney, Lenna A. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Meacham, Joseph E. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Mendoza, Donaldo P. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Olsen, Khris B. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Prinke, Amanda M. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Reid, Bruce D. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Sevigny, Gary J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Sinkov, Sergey I. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Woods, Vincent T. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

2017-05-24

This report details efforts to develop a technique which is able to detect and quantify the mass of ²⁴⁰Pu in waste storage tanks and other enclosed spaces. If the isotopic ratios of the plutonium contained in the enclosed space is also known, then this technique is capable of estimating the total mass of the plutonium without physical sample retrieval and radiochemical analysis of hazardous material. Results utilizing this technique are reported for a Hanford Site waste tank (TX-118) and a well-characterized plutonium sample in a laboratory environment.

Spallation impact analysis of plutonium storage container at K-Area

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gong, C.

2000-01-01

A 100-pound concrete block falls 55-foot from ceiling spallation upon the top of the 9975 shipping package. This finite element analysis aims to evaluate the dynamic impact from the spallation upon the packaging. The geometric configuration of the packaging is meticulously modeled in detail. However, the drum is eliminated and the fiberboard with radius greater than 5.6 inches is conservatively omitted. The primary containment vessel and 3013 container were not included to simplify the model. The concrete block is modeled as a rigid body. The material properties are conservatively selected. The final results indicate that the secondary containment vessel is intact during this spallation impact. Consequently the primary containment vessel and 3013 container would not experience damage and containment is maintained. The secondary containment vessel protects the primary containment vessel from the dynamic impact. The top fiberboard is compressed from 3.5 inches to 0.875 inches will eventually recover to 1.8 inches according to tests performed at Savannah River Technology Center (SRTC)

Plutonium controversy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gofman, J.W.

1976-01-01

If the world chooses to seek a solution to the energy dilemma through nuclear energy, the element plutonium will become an article of commerce to be handled in quantities of thousands of tonnes annually. Plutonium is a uniquely potent inhalation carcinogen, the potential induction of lung cancer dwarfing other possible toxic effects. For reasons to be presented here, it is the author's opinion that plutonium's carcinogenicity has been very seriously underestimated. If one couples the corrected carcinogenicity with the probable degree of industrial containment of the plutonium, it appears that the commercialization of a plutonium-based energy economy is not an acceptable option for society. Sagan's statement that ''the experience of 30 years supports the contention that plutonium can be used safely'' is manifestly indefensible. No meaningful epidemiological study of plutonium-exposed workers for that 30-year period has ever been done. Since thousands of those possibly exposed have left the industry and are not even available to follow-up, it is doubtful that any meaningful study of ''the experience of 30 years'' will ever be accomplished

Project Execution Plan Project 98L-EWW-460 Plutonium Stabilization and Handling DOE 98-D-453

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

MCGRATH, G.M.

2000-01-01

This Project Execution Plan (PEP) describes the management methods and responsibilities of the project participants. Project W-460 is sufficiently large to warrant a stand alone PEP. This project specific PEP describes the relationships and responsibilities of the project team and identifies the technical, schedule, and cost baselines that have been established for the project. The Department of Energy (DOE), Hanford Works (Hanford), at Richland, Wa. currently does not have a system capable of stabilizing or packaging large quantities of plutonium-bearing solids to meet DOE technical standard DOE-STD-3013-99. This project will allow Hanford to meet this standard by installing stabilization and packaging equipment (SPE). The SPE is capable of stabilizing and packaging the current inventory of greater than 30 percent plutonium-bearing materials currently stored in the Plutonium Finishing Plant's (PFP) vaults into 3013 storage containers. The scope of this project is to procure and install the SPE via a Hanford contract and coordination with the Savannah River Site. In addition, the project will modify PFP vaults and upgrade the PFP Laboratory measurement systems. The Facility infrastructure will be modified to support the new SPE system and the new standardized storage container configuration

Project Execution Plan Project 98L-EWW-460 Plutonium Stabilization and Handling DOE 98-D-453

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

HOLSTEIN, W.A.

1999-08-01

This Project Execution Plan (PEP) describes the management methods and responsibilities of the project participants. Project W-460 is sufficiently large to warrant a stand alone PEP. This project specific PEP describes the relationships and responsibilities of the project team and identifies the technical, schedule, and cost baselines that have been established for the project. The Department of Energy (DOE), Hanford Works (Hanford), at Richland Wa. currently does not have a system capable of stabilizing or packaging large quantities of plutonium-bearing solids to meet DOE technical standard DOE-STD-3013-96. This project will allow Hanford to meet this standard by installing stabilization and packaging equipment (SPE). The SPE is capable of stabilizing and packaging the current inventory of greater than 50 percent plutonium-bearing materials currently stored in the Plutonium Finishing Plant's (PFP) vaults into 3013 storage containers. The scope of this project is to procure and install the SPE via a Hanford contract and coordination with the Savannah River Site. In addition, the project will modify PFP vaults and upgrade the PFP Laboratory measurement systems. The Facility infrastructure will be modified to support the new SPE system and the new standardized storage container configuration.

Project Execution Plan Project 98L-EWW-460 Plutonium Stabilization and Handling DOE 98-D-453

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

MCGRATH, G.M.

2000-06-21

This Project Execution Plan (PEP) describes the management methods and responsibilities of the project participants. Project W-460 is sufficiently large to warrant a stand alone PEP. This project specific PEP describes the relationships and responsibilities of the project team and identifies the technical, schedule, and cost baselines that have been established for the project. The Department of Energy (DOE), Hanford Works (Hanford), at Richland, Wa. currently does not have a system capable of stabilizing or packaging large quantities of plutonium-bearing solids to meet DOE technical standard DOE-STD-3013-99. This project will allow Hanford to meet this standard by installing stabilization and packaging equipment (SPE). The SPE is capable of stabilizing and packaging the current inventory of greater than 30 percent plutonium-bearing materials currently stored in the Plutonium Finishing Plant's (PFP) vaults into 3013 storage containers. The scope of this project is to procure and install the SPE via a Hanford contract and coordination with the Savannah River Site. In addition, the project will modify PFP vaults and upgrade the PFP Laboratory measurement systems. The Facility infrastructure will be modified to support the new SPE system and the new standardized storage container configuration.

Thermal response of a can handling unit (CHU) to a postulated plutonium hydride burn

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Crea, B.A.; Heard, F.J.

1998-01-01

A series of analyses were performed to support the design of the Can Handling Unit (CHU). The subject analyses focused on determining the time to repressurize a subatmospheric storage can containing plutonium metal versus the initial hole size and the transient thermal response to a postulated chemical reaction of 150 grams of plutonium hydride. Limiting the amount of gaseous reactants either by inerting the CHU or using a very small hole size for the initial opening appears to be a viable method of controlling the rate of the exothermic chemical reactions and system temperatures

Guide of good practices for occupational radiological protection in plutonium facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1998-06-01

This Technical Standard (TS) does not contain any new requirements. Its purpose is to provide guides to good practice, update existing reference material, and discuss practical lessons learned relevant to the safe handling of plutonium. the technical rationale is given to allow US Department of Energy (DOE) health physicists to adapt the recommendations to similar situations throughout the DOE complex. Generally, DOE contractor health physicists will be responsible to implement radiation protection activities at DOE facilities and DOE health physicists will be responsible for oversight of those activities. This guidance is meant to be useful for both efforts. This TS replaces PNL-6534, Health Physics Manual of Good Practices for Plutonium Facilities, by providing more complete and current information and by emphasizing the situations that are typical of DOE`s current plutonium operations; safe storage, decontamination, and decommissioning (environmental restoration); and weapons disassembly.

HB-Line Plutonium Oxide Data Collection Strategy

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Watkins, R. [Savannah River Nuclear Solutions; Varble, J. [Savannah River Nuclear Solutions; Jordan, J. [Savannah River Nuclear Solutions

2015-05-26

HB-Line and H-Canyon will handle and process plutonium material to produce plutonium oxide for feed to the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). However, the plutonium oxide product will not be transferred to the MFFF directly from HB-Line until it is packaged into a qualified DOE-STD-3013-2012 container. In the interim, HB-Line will load plutonium oxide into an inner, filtered can. The inner can will be placed in a filtered bag, which will be loaded into a filtered outer can. The outer can will be loaded into a certified 9975 with getter assembly in compliance with onsite transportation requirement, for subsequent storage and transfer to the K-Area Complex (KAC). After DOE-STD-3013-2012 container packaging capabilities are established, the product will be returned to HB-Line to be packaged into a qualified DOE-STD-3013-2012 container. To support the transfer of plutonium oxide to KAC and then eventually to MFFF, various material and packaging data will have to be collected and retained. In addition, data from initial HB-Line processing operations will be needed to support future DOE-STD-3013-2012 qualification as amended by the HB-Line DOE Standard equivalency. As production increases, the volume of data to collect will increase. The HB-Line data collected will be in the form of paper copies and electronic media. Paper copy data will, at a minimum, consist of facility procedures, nonconformance reports (NCRs), and DCS print outs. Electronic data will be in the form of Adobe portable document formats (PDFs). Collecting all the required data for each plutonium oxide can will be no small effort for HB-Line, and will become more challenging once the maximum annual oxide production throughput is achieved due to the sheer volume of data to be collected. The majority of the data collected will be in the form of facility procedures, DCS print outs, and laboratory results. To facilitate complete collection of this data, a traveler form will be developed which

Dry sample storage system for an analytical laboratory supporting plutonium processing

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Treibs, H.A.; Hartenstein, S.D.; Griebenow, B.L.; Wade, M.A.

1990-01-01

The Special Isotope Separation (SIS) plant is designed to provide removal of undesirable isotopes in fuel grade plutonium by the atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS) process. The AVLIS process involves evaporation of plutonium metal, and passage of an intense beam of light from a laser through the plutonium vapor. The laser beam consists of several discrete wavelengths, tuned to the precise wavelength required to ionize the undesired isotopes. These ions are attracted to charged plates, leaving the bulk of the plutonium vapor enriched in the desired isotopes to be collected on a cold plate. Major portions of the process consist of pyrochemical processes, including direct reduction of the plutonium oxide feed material with calcium metal, and aqueous processes for purification of plutonium in residues. The analytical laboratory for the plant is called the Material and Process Control Laboratory (MPCL), and provides for the analysis of solid and liquid process samples

Specification of test criteria for containers to be used in the air transport of plutonium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Brown, M.L.; Edwards, A.R.; Hall, S.F.

1980-01-01

Potential accidents in the transport by aeroplane of plutonium are considered. Past literature on the subject is reviewed. Civilian air accident statistics are surveyed: impact and fire are shown to be the major threats. Probabilities (given an accident) are derived for encountering and impact of above any given speed as a function of speed, and a fire of above any given duration, as a function of duration. The crash of two typical jet cargo aircraft (BAC-111, Boeing-707) against a rigid normal surface is considered and cargo hold decelerations derived from a one-dimensional model. The response of a cargo to such decelerations is calculated for loads of two typical containers, and related to the velocity of impact into a hard target necessary to produce similar damage in single containers. Free fall of containers and the effect on the surface struck are discussed. The response of two typical containers to a fire is calculated, allowing for the charring of insulating/shock absorbing material. Calculations without charring appear pessimistic. The consequences of plutonium release are estimated and risk spectra derived for two failure assumptions. The implications for container test criteria are discussed, and recommendations made

Disposal/storage container development experience

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Morrow, R.W. Jr.; Van Hoesen, S.D.; Fowler, E.; Barreira, D.G.; Emmett, R.W.

1988-01-01

Developmental work is currently underway at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory to design and manufacture a radioactive waste container suitable for both storage and disposal of radioactive wastes. The container is designed to fulfill the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements for on-site storage, as well as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's requirements for high integrity containers. The project also involves meeting the strict design and manufacturing ANSI/ASME NQA-1 guidelines. Special provisions of the container include a double containment system, with the inner barrier being corrosion resistant, the capability to monitor the internal cavity of the container, and off-gas venting capability. Further, yet related developmental work includes evaluating the cask for other varied uses, such as a processing cask, an ALARA shield, and even the possibility of Department of Transportation approval for an over-the-road transport cask

Storage Space Allocation of Inbound Container in Railway Container Terminal

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Li Wang

2014-01-01

Full Text Available Efficient storage strategy of railway container terminals is important in balancing resource utilization, reducing waiting time, and improving handling efficiency. In this paper, we consider the formulation and solution algorithm for storage space allocation problem of inbound containers in railway container terminal. The problem is formulated as two-stage optimization models, whose objectives are balancing the workload of inbound containers and reducing the overlapping amounts. An algorithm implement process based on rolling horizon approach is designed to solve the proposed models. Computational experiments on an actual railway container terminal show that the proposed approach is effective to solve space allocation problem of inbound container and is significant for the operation and organization of railway container terminals.

Health physics manual of good practices for plutonium facilities. [Contains glossary

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Brackenbush, L.W.; Heid, K.R.; Herrington, W.N.; Kenoyer, J.L.; Munson, L.F.; Munson, L.H.; Selby, J.M.; Soldat, K.L.; Stoetzel, G.A.; Traub, R.J.

1988-05-01

This manual consists of six sections: Properties of Plutonium, Siting of Plutonium Facilities, Facility Design, Radiation Protection, Emergency Preparedness, and Decontamination and Decommissioning. While not the final authority, the manual is an assemblage of information, rules of thumb, regulations, and good practices to assist those who are intimately involved in plutonium operations. An in-depth understanding of the nuclear, physical, chemical, and biological properties of plutonium is important in establishing a viable radiation protection and control program at a plutonium facility. These properties of plutonium provide the basis and perspective necessary for appreciating the quality of control needed in handling and processing the material. Guidance in selecting the location of a new plutonium facility may not be directly useful to most readers. However, it provides a perspective for the development and implementation of the environmental surveillance program and the in-plant controls required to ensure that the facility is and remains a good neighbor. The criteria, guidance, and good practices for the design of a plutonium facility are also applicable to the operation and modification of existing facilities. The design activity provides many opportunities for implementation of features to promote more effective protection and control. The application of ''as low as reasonably achievable'' (ALARA) principles and optimization analyses are generally most cost-effective during the design phase. 335 refs., 8 figs., 20 tabs.

Reanalysis of gastrointestinal absorption factors for plutonium and other actinide elements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bhattacharyya, M.H.; Larsen, R.P.; Toohey, R.E.; Moretti, E.S.; Oldham, R.D.; Spaletto, M.I.; Engel, M.C.

1981-01-01

This project studies the gastrointestinal absorption of plutonium and other actinide elements relevant to nuclear power production, at concentrations at or below their respective maximum permissible concentrations (MPC's) in drinking water, using high specific activity isotopes. The gastrointestinal absorption of plutonium is measured in mice, rats, and dogs exposed to plutonium either via drinking water or by gavage. Plutonium concentrations are determined in liver and eviscerated carcass at 6 days (mice and rats) or 4 weeks (dogs). Administered solutions are 1 x 10 -10 M in Pu (the molar concentration at MPC for 239 Pu) and contain one of several high specific activity isotopes ( 237 Pu, 47-day half-life; 236 Pu, 2.8-year half-life; 238 Pu, 86-year half-life). Fasted mice and rats, administered plutonium solutions that are: (1) low in concentration (10- 10 M); and (2) carefully prepared to assure a given oxidation state and to avoid hydrolysis and polymes, and major policy issues. The first HEED for near-term battery energy storage systems (lead/acid, nickel/zinc, and nickel/iron) astention being paid to potential releases of radionuclides at relatively short times after disposal

Precipitation of plutonium (III) oxalate and calcination to plutonium oxide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Esteban, A.; Orosco, E.H.; Cassaniti, P.; Greco, L.; Adelfang, P.

1989-01-01

The plutonium based fuel fabrication requires the conversion of the plutonium nitrate solution from nuclear fuel reprocessing into pure PuO2. The conversion method based on the precipitation of plutonium (III) oxalate and subsequent calcination has been studied in detail. In this procedure, plutonium (III) oxalate is precipitated, at room temperature, by the slow addition of 1M oxalic acid to the feed solution, containing from 5-100 g/l of plutonium in 1M nitric acid. Before precipitation, the plutonium is adjusted to trivalent state by addition of 1M ascorbic acid in the presence of an oxidation inhibitor such as hydrazine. Finally, the precipitate is calcinated at 700 deg C to obtain PuO2. A flowsheet is proposed in this paper including: a) A study about the conditions to adjust the plutonium valence. b) Solubility data of plutonium (III) oxalate and measurements of plutonium losses to the filtrate and wash solution. c) Characterization of the obtained products. Plutonium (III) oxalate has several potential advantages over similar conversion processes. These include: 1) Formation of small particle sizes powder with good pellets fabrication characteristics. 2) The process is rather insensitive to most process variables, except nitric acid concentration. 3) Ambient temperature operations. 4) The losses of plutonium to the filtrate are less than in other conversion processes. (Author) [es

AT-400A Type B transportation and storage package

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cockrell, G.D.; Franklin, K.W.

1995-01-01

This paper discusses the design considerations for the AT-400A container which will meet the requirements for the transportation and long-term storage of plutonium pits. The AT-400A was designed by a joint effort between Sandia National Labs, Los Alamos National Labs, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Mason and Hanger Silas Mason Co., Inc.. The paper will outline the problems and impact on the design of the container necessitated by the need to meet DOT TYPE B transportation requirements and undefined requirements for the interim and long-term storage of pits. Areas covered will include: (1) determining the storage requirements, (2) surveillance program for interim storage, and (3) impact of storage requirements on the containment vessel and inner fixturing design

Conceptual designs for a long term 238PuO2 storage vessel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kwon, D.M.; Replogle, W.C.

1996-08-01

This is a report on conceptual designs for a long term, 250 years, storage container for plutonium oxide ([sup 238]PuO[sub 2]). These conceptual designs are based on the use of a quartz filter to release the helium generated during the plutonium decay. In this report a review of filter material selection, design concepts, thermal modeling, and filter performance are discussed

Plutonium Immobilization Can Loading Conceptual Design

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kriikku, E.

1999-05-13

'The Plutonium Immobilization Facility will encapsulate plutonium in ceramic pucks and seal the pucks inside welded cans. Remote equipment will place these cans in magazines and the magazines in a Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) canister. The DWPF will fill the canister with glass for permanent storage. This report discusses the Plutonium Immobilization can loading conceptual design and includes a process block diagram, process description, preliminary equipment specifications, and several can loading issues. This report identifies loading pucks into cans and backfilling cans with helium as the top priority can loading development areas.'

Plutonium Immobilization Can Loading Conceptual Design

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kriikku, E.

1999-01-01

'The Plutonium Immobilization Facility will encapsulate plutonium in ceramic pucks and seal the pucks inside welded cans. Remote equipment will place these cans in magazines and the magazines in a Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) canister. The DWPF will fill the canister with glass for permanent storage. This report discusses the Plutonium Immobilization can loading conceptual design and includes a process block diagram, process description, preliminary equipment specifications, and several can loading issues. This report identifies loading pucks into cans and backfilling cans with helium as the top priority can loading development areas.'

International shipment of plutonium by air

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mercado, J.E.; McGrogan, J.P.

1995-05-01

In support of the United States (US) Government's decision to place excess plutonium oxide at the US Department of Energy's (DOE) Hanford Site under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, the Department of State notified the Congress that a plutonium storage vault at the Plutonium Finishing Plant at the Hanford Site would be added to the eligible facilities list. As part of the preparations to transfer the plutonium oxide under IAEA safeguards, samples of the powder were taken from the inventory to be shipped to the IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Austria, for laboratory analysis. The analysis of these samples was of high priority, and the IAEA requested that the material be shipped by aircraft, the most expeditious method

French Approach for Long Term Storage Safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Marciano, Jacob; Carreton, Jean-Pierre; Lizot, Marie Therese; Lhomme, Veronique

2014-01-01

IRSN presents its statement regarding long-term storage facilities; in France, the regulatory documents do not define the long term duration. The storage facility lifetime can only be appreciated according to the needs and materials stored therein. However, the magnitude of the long-term can be estimated at a few hundred years compared to a few decades for current storage. Usually, in France, construction of storage facilities is driven from the necessity various necessities, linked to the management of radioactive material (eg spent fuel) and to the management of radioactive waste. Because of the variety of 'stored materials and objects' (fission product solutions, plutonium oxide powders, activated solids, drums containing technological waste, spent fuel...), a great number of storage facility design solutions have been developed (surface, subsurface areas, dry or wet conditions...) in the World. After describing the main functions of a storage facility, IRSN displays the safety principles and the associated design principles. The specific design principles applied to particular storage (dry or wet spent fuel storage, depleted uranium or reprocessed uranium storage, plutonium storage, waste containing tritium storage, HLW and ILLW storage...) are also presented. Finally, the concerns due to the long-term duration storage and related safety assessment are developed. After discussing these issues, IRSN displays its statement. The authorization procedures governing the facility lifetime are similar to those of any basic nuclear installation, the continuation of the facility operation remaining subject to periodic safety reviews (in France, every 10 years). The applicant safety cases have to show, that the safety requirements are always met; this requires, at minimum, to take into account at the design stage, comfortable design margins. (author)

Direct conversion of plutonium metal, scrap, residue, and transuranic waste to glass

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Forsberg, C.W.; Beahm, E.C.; Parker, G.W.; Malling, J.F.; Rudolph, J.

1995-01-01

A method for the direct conversion of metals, ceramics, organics, and amorphous solids to borosilicate glass has been invented. The process is called the Glass Material Oxidation and Dissolution System (GMODS). Traditional glass-making processes can convert only oxide materials to glass. However, many wastes contain complex mixtures of metals, ceramics, organics, and amorphous solids. Conversion of such mixtures to oxides followed by their conversion to glass is often impractical. GMODS may create a practical method to convert such mixtures to glass. Plutonium-containing materials (PCMS) exist in many forms, including metals, ceramics, organics, amorphous solids, and mixtures thereof. These PCMs vary from plutonium metal to filters made of metal, organic binders, and glass fibers. For storage and/or disposal of PCMS, it is desirable to convert PCMs to borosilicate glass. Borosilicate glass is the preferred repository waste form for high-level waste (HLW) because of its properties. PCMs converted to a transuranic borosilicate homogeneous glass would easily pass all waste acceptance and storage criteria. Conversion of PCMs to a glass would also simplify safeguards by conversion of heterogeneous PCMs to homogeneous glass. Thermodynamic calculations and proof-of-principle experiments on the GMODS process with cerium (plutonium surrogate), uranium, stainless steel, aluminum, Zircaloy-2, and carbon were successfully conducted. Initial analysis has identified potential flowsheets and equipment. Major unknowns remain, but the preliminary data suggests that GMODS may be a major new treatment option for PCMs

Properties of plutonium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ahn, Jin Su; Yoon, Hwan Ki; Min, Kyung Sik; Kim, Hyun Tae; Ahn, Jong Sung; Kwag, Eon Ho; Ryu, Keon Joong

1996-03-01

Plutonium has unique chemical and physical properties. Its uniqueness in use has led to rare publications, in Korea. This report covers physical aspects of phase change of metal plutonium, mechanical properties, thermal conductivity, etc, chemical aspects of corrosion, oxidation, how to produce plutonium from spent fuels by describing various chemical treatment methods, which are currently used and were used in the past. It also contains characteristics of the purex reprocessing process which is the most widely used nowadays. And show processes to purify and metalize from recovered plutonium solution. Detection and analysis methods are introduced with key pints for handling, critical safety, toxicity, and effects on peoples. This report gives not only a general idea on what plutonium is, rather than deep technical description, but also basic knowledge on plutonium production and safeguards diversion from the view point of nonproliferation. 18 refs. (Author) .new

Properties of plutonium

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Ahn, Jin Su; Yoon, Hwan Ki; Min, Kyung Sik; Kim, Hyun Tae; Ahn, Jong Sung; Kwag, Eon Ho; Ryu, Keon Joong [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daeduk (Korea, Republic of)

1996-03-01

Plutonium has unique chemical and physical properties. Its uniqueness in use has led to rare publications, in Korea. This report covers physical aspects of phase change of metal plutonium, mechanical properties, thermal conductivity, etc, chemical aspects of corrosion, oxidation, how to produce plutonium from spent fuels by describing various chemical treatment methods, which are currently used and were used in the past. It also contains characteristics of the purex reprocessing process which is the most widely used nowadays. And show processes to purify and metalize from recovered plutonium solution. Detection and analysis methods are introduced with key pints for handling, critical safety, toxicity, and effects on peoples. This report gives not only a general idea on what plutonium is, rather than deep technical description, but also basic knowledge on plutonium production and safeguards diversion from the view point of nonproliferation. 18 refs. (Author) .new.

Sampling and decontamination plan for the Transuranic Storage Area--1/-R container storage unit

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Barry, G.A.

1992-11-01

This document describes the sampling and decontamination of the Transuranic Storage Area (TSA)-l/-R container storage area and the earthen-covered portion of the TSA-2 container storage unit at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex. Stored containers from the earthen-covered asphalt pads will be retrieved from the TSA-l/-R and TSA-2 container storage units. Container retrieval will be conducted under the TSA retrieval enclosure, a fabricated steel building to be constructed over the earthen-covered pad to provide containment and weather protection. Following container retrieval, the TSA retrieval enclosure will be decontaminated to remove radioactive and hazardous contamination. The underlying soils will be sampled and analyzed to determine whether any contaminated soils require removal

Design of double containment canister cask storage system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Asami, M.; Matsumoto, T.; Oohama, T.; Kuriyama, K.; Kawakami, K.

2004-01-01

Spent fuels discharged from Japanese LWR will be stored as recycled-fuel-resources in interim storage facilities. The concrete cask storage system is one of important forms for the spent fuel interim storage. In Japan, the interim storage facility will be located near the coast, therefore it is important to prevent SCC (Stress Corrosion Cracking) caused by sea salt particles and to assure the containment integrity of the canister which contains spent fuels. KEPCO, NFT and OCL have designed the double containment canister cask storage system that can assure the long-term containment integrity and monitor the containment performance without storage capacity decrease. Major features of the combined canister cask system are shown as follows: This system can survey containment integrity of dual canisters by monitoring the pressure of the gap between canisters. The primary canister has dual lids sealed by welding. The secondary canister has single lid tightened by bolts and sealed by metallic gaskets. The primary canister is contained in the transport cask during transportation, and the gap between the primary canister and the transport cask is filled with He gas. Under storage condition in the concrete cask, the primary canister is contained in the secondary canister, and the gap between these canisters is filled with helium gas. Hence this system can prevent the primary canister to contact sea salt particle in the air and from SCC. Decrease of cooling performance because of the double canister is compensated by fins fitted on the secondary canister surface. Then, this system can prevent the decrease of storage capacity determined by the fuel temperature limit. This system can assure that the primary canister will keep intact for long term storage. Therefore, in the case of pressure down of the gap between canisters, it can be considered that the secondary canister containment is damaged, and the primary canister will be transferred to another secondary canister at the

Guidelines for international plutonium management: Overview and implications

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bryson, M.C.; Fitzgerald, C.P.; Kincaid, C.

1998-01-01

In September, 1997, nine of the world's plutonium-using countries agreed to a set of guidelines for international plutonium management, with acceptances to be submitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency on December 1. Following three years of discussion, the guidelines provide a unified package of accepted rules for the storage, handling, and transportation of civil plutonium as well as military plutonium that has been declared as no longer required for defense purposes. New requirements include a formal declaration of national plutonium strategies, which will recognize the environmental, economic, and proliferation concerns and the consequent importance of balancing plutonium supply and demand. Nations will also make annual declaration of their non-military stockpiles of unirradiated plutonium, together with estimates of the plutonium content in spent reactor fuel. These guidelines represent the first formally accepted recognition of the need for plutonium management of this scope and could thus provide a partial basis for future monitoring and policy regimes

Plutonium working group report on environmental, safety and health vulnerabilities associated with the Department's plutonium storage. Volume 2, Appendix B, Part 3: Los Alamos National Laboratory site assessment team report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-09-01

Environmental safety and health (ES and H) vulnerabilities are defined as conditions or weaknesses that may lead to unnecessary or increased radiation exposure of the workers, release of radioactive materials to the environment, or radiation exposure of the public. In response to the initiative by the Secretary of Energy, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has performed a self assessment of the ES and H vulnerabilities of plutonium inventories at the laboratory. The objective of this site-specific self assessment is to identify and report ES and H vulnerabilities associated with the storage, handling, and processing of plutonium and maintenance of plutonium-contaminated facilities. This self-assessment of ES and H vulnerabilities and validation by a peer group is not another compliance audit or fault-finding exercise. It has a fact finding mission to develop a database of potential environment, safety, and health vulnerabilities that may lead to unnecessary or increased radiation exposure of the workers, release of radioactive materials to the environment, or radiation exposure of the public

Integrated development and testing plan for the plutonium immobilization project

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kan, T.

1998-01-01

This integrated plan for the DOE Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (MD) describes the technology development and major project activities necessary to support the deployment of the immobilization approach for disposition of surplus weapons-usable plutonium. The plan describes details of the development and testing (D and T) tasks needed to provide technical data for design and operation of a plutonium immobilization plant based on the ceramic can-in-canister technology (''Immobilization Fissile Material Disposition Program Final Immobilization Form Assessment and Recommendation'', UCRL-ID-128705, October 3, 1997). The plan also presents tasks for characterization and performance testing of the immobilization form to support a repository licensing application and to develop the basis for repository acceptance of the plutonium form. Essential elements of the plant project (design, construction, facility activation, etc.) are described, but not developed in detail, to indicate how the D and T results tie into the overall plant project. Given the importance of repository acceptance, specific activities to be conducted by the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (RW) to incorporate the plutonium form in the repository licensing application are provided in this document, together with a summary of how immobilization D and T activities provide input to the license activity. The ultimate goal of the Immobilization Project is to develop, construct, and operate facilities that will immobilize from about 18 to 50 tonnes (MT) of U.S. surplus weapons usable plutonium materials in a manner that meets the ''spent fuel'' standard (Fissile Materials Storage and Disposition Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement Record of Decision, ''Storage and Disposition Final PEIS'', issued January 14, 1997, 62 Federal Register 3014) and is acceptable for disposal in a geologic repository. In the can-in-canister technology, this is accomplished by encapsulating the

Safely disposing and controlling the various forms of excess military plutonium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Albright, D.

1991-01-01

The growing surplus of plutonium will continue to pose safety, health, and verification problems. Although long term storage and disposal of plutonium seems technically feasible, or at least comparable in technical difficulty to commercial spent fuel disposal, significant political obstacles within the government and the public, may make it difficult to solve this problem. Although options to build verifiable warhead dismantlement facilities or to recycle plutonium in reactors and thus convert separated plutonium into irradiated fuel are straight forward concepts, their realization remains difficult for economic and political reasons. The plutonium recycle option also raises additional proliferation concerns about its impact on civilian nuclear programs. In the absence of a long term solution, the United States can implement various storage or interim disposal options that involve minimal processing, but that ease verification problems and provide adequate safety and protection of public health

Conversion of plutonium scrap and residue to boroilicate glass using the GMODS process

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Forsberg, C.W.; Beahm, E.C.; Parker, G.W.; Rudolph, J.; Elam, K.R.; Ferrada, J.J.

1995-01-01

Plutonium scrap and residue represent major national and international concerns because (1) significant environmental, safety, and health (ES ampersand H) problems have been identified with their storage; (2) all plutonium recovered from the black market in Europe has been from this category; (3) storage costs are high; and (4) safeguards are difficult. It is proposed to address these problems by conversion of plutonium scrap and residue to a CRACHIP (CRiticality, Aerosol, and CHemically Inert Plutonium) glass using the Glass Material Oxidation and Dissolution System (GMODS). CRACHIP refers to a set of requirements for plutonium storage forms that minimize ES ampersand H concerns. The concept is several decades old. Conversion of plutonium from complex chemical mixtures and variable geometries into a certified, qualified, homogeneous CRACHIP glass creates a stable chemical form that minimizes ES ampersand H risks, simplifies safeguards and security, provides an easy-to-store form, decreases storage costs, and allows for future disposition options. GMODS is a new process to directly convert metals, ceramics, and amorphous solids to glass; oxidize organics with the residue converted to glass; and convert chlorides to borosilicate glass and a secondary sodium chloride stream. Laboratory work has demonstrated the conversion of cerium (a plutonium surrogate), uranium (a plutonium surrogate), Zircaloy, stainless steel, and other materials to glass. GMODS is an enabling technology that creates new options. Conventional glassmaking processes require conversion of feeds to oxide-like forms before final conversion to glass. Such chemical conversion and separation processes are often complex and expensive

Treatment of simulated plutonium-containing wastewater by ultrafiltration-reverse osmosis technology

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Xiong Zhonghua; Fan Xianhua; Luo Deli; Wang Tuo; Chen Qi

2008-01-01

Ultrafiltration and reverse osmosis were employed for the treatment of low level radioactive water containing plutonium. The system consists of ultrafiltration module with hollow fibre membrane and reverse osmosis module with spiral membrane. The decontamination efficiency and volume concentration ratio affected by technical parameters were explored in the experiment. The results show that the decontamination efficiency achieves 99.94% and the volume concentration ratio achieves 12.5 at pH=10 for solution fed into the membrane separation system. This technology will be applied in radioactive waste minimization as a new treatment method. (authors)

Chloride removal from plutonium alloy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Holcomb, H.P.

1983-01-01

SRP is evaluating a program to recover plutonium from a metallic alloy that will contain chloride salt impurities. Removal of chloride to sufficiently low levels to prevent damaging corrosion to canyon equipment is feasible as a head-end step following dissolution. Silver nitrate and mercurous nitrate were each successfully used in laboratory tests to remove chloride from simulated alloy dissolver solution containing plutonium. Levels less than 10 ppM chloride were achieved in the supernates over the precipitated and centrifuged insoluble salts. Also, less than 0.05% loss of plutonium in the +3, +4, or +6 oxidation states was incurred via precipitate carrying. These results provide impetus for further study and development of a plant-scale process to recover plutonium from metal alloy at SRP

Simulation-Based Optimization for Storage Allocation Problem of Outbound Containers in Automated Container Terminals

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Ning Zhao

2015-01-01

Full Text Available Storage allocation of outbound containers is a key factor of the performance of container handling system in automated container terminals. Improper storage plans of outbound containers make QC waiting inevitable; hence, the vessel handling time will be lengthened. A simulation-based optimization method is proposed in this paper for the storage allocation problem of outbound containers in automated container terminals (SAPOBA. A simulation model is built up by Timed-Colored-Petri-Net (TCPN, used to evaluate the QC waiting time of storage plans. Two optimization approaches, based on Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO and Genetic Algorithm (GA, are proposed to form the complete simulation-based optimization method. Effectiveness of this method is verified by experiment, as the comparison of the two optimization approaches.

Conceptual design report, plutonium stabilization and handling,project W-460

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Weiss, E.V.

1997-03-06

Project W-460, Plutonium Stabilization and Handling, encompasses procurement and installation of a Stabilization and Packaging System (SPS) to oxidize and package for long term storage remaining plutonium-bearing special nuclear materials currently in inventory at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP), and modification of vault equipment to allow storage of resulting packages of stabilized SNM for up to fifty years. This Conceptual Design Report (CDR) provides conceptual design details for the vault modification, site preparation and site interface with the purchased SPS. Two concepts are described for vault configuration; acceleration of this phase of the project did not allow completion of analysis which would clearly identify a preferred approach.

Purification process of uranium hexafluoride containing traces of plutonium fluoride and/or neptunium fluoride

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Aubert, J.; Bethuel, L.; Carles, M.

1983-01-01

In this process impure uranium hexafluoride is contacted with a metallic fluoride chosen in the group containing lead fluoride PbF 2 , uranium fluorides UFsub(4+x) (0 3 at a temperature such as plutonium and/or neptunium are reduced and pure uranium hexafluoride is recovered. Application is made to uranium hexafluoride purification in spent fuel reprocessing [fr

Plutonium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mueller-Christiansen, K.; Wollesen, M.

1979-01-01

As emotions and fear of plutonium are neither useful for the non-professionals nor for the political decision makers and the advantages and disadvantages of plutonium can only put against each other under difficulties, the paper wants to present the most essential scientific data of plutonium in a generally understandable way. Each of the individual sections is concluded and they try to give an answer to the most discussed questions. In order to make understanding easier, the scientific facts are only brought at points where it cannot be done without for the correctness of the presentation. Many details were left out knowingly. On the other hand, important details are dealt with several times if it seems necessary for making the presentation correct. The graphical presentations and the figures in many cases contain more than said in the text. They give the interested reader hints to scientific-technical coherences. The total material is to enable the reader to form his own opinion on plutonium problems which are being discussed in public. (orig./HP) [de

Plutonium isotopic measurements by gamma-ray spectroscopy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Haas, F.X.; Lemming, J.F.

1976-01-01

A nondestructive technique is described for calculating plutonium-238, plutonium-240, plutonium-241 and americium-241 relative to plutonium-239 from measured peak areas in the high resolution gamma-ray spectra of solid plutonium samples. Gamma-ray attenuation effects were minimized by selecting sets of neighboring peaks in the spectrum whose components are due to the different isotopes. Since the detector efficiencies are approximately the same for adjacent peaks, the accuracy of the isotopic ratios is dependent on the half-lives, branching intensities, and measured peak areas. The data presented describe the results obtained by analyzing gamma-ray spectra in the energy region from 120 to 700 keV. Most of the data analyzed were obtained from plutonium material containing 6 percent plutonium-240. Sample weights varied from 0.25 g to approximately 1.2 kg. The methods were also applied to plutonium samples containing up to 23 percent plutonium-240 with weights of 0.25 to 200 g. Results obtained by gamma-ray spectroscopy are compared to chemical analyses of aliquots taken from the bulk samples

Elaboration and characterisation of plutonium waste reference materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Perolat, J.P.

1990-01-01

The Analysis Methods Establishment Commission (CETAMA) has set up a program for the elaboration and characterisation of plutonium waste reference materials. The object of this program is to give laboratories the possibility to test and calibrate apparatus used in non-destructive methods for the analysis of plutonium waste. The different parameters of this program are presented: - characterisation of plutonium, - type and number of containers, - plutonium distribution inside the different containers, - description of the matrix

Burning weapons-grade plutonium in reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Newman, D.F.

1993-06-01

As a result of massive reductions in deployed nuclear warheads, and their subsequent dismantlement, large quantities of surplus weapons- grade plutonium will be stored until its ultimate disposition is achieved in both the US and Russia. Ultimate disposition has the following minimum requirements: (1) preclude return of plutonium to the US and Russian stockpiles, (2) prevent environmental damage by precluding release of plutonium contamination, and (3) prevent proliferation by precluding plutonium diversion to sub-national groups or nonweapons states. The most efficient and effective way to dispose of surplus weapons-grade plutonium is to fabricate it into fuel and use it for generation of electrical energy in commercial nuclear power plants. Weapons-grade plutonium can be used as fuel in existing commercial nuclear power plants, such as those in the US and Russia. This recovers energy and economic value from weapons-grade plutonium, which otherwise represents a large cost liability to maintain in safeguarded and secure storage. The plutonium remaining in spent MOX fuel is reactor-grade, essentially the same as that being discharged in spent UO 2 fuels. MOX fuels are well developed and are currently used in a number of LWRs in Europe. Plutonium-bearing fuels without uranium (non-fertile fuels) would require some development. However, such non-fertile fuels are attractive from a nonproliferation perspective because they avoid the insitu production of additional plutonium and enhance the annihilation of the plutonium inventory on a once-through fuel cycle

The radiological hazard of plutonium isotopes and specific plutonium mixtures

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Heindel, G.; Clow, J.; Inkret, W.; Miller, G.

1995-11-01

The US Department of Energy defines the hazard categories of its nuclear facilities based upon the potential for accidents to have significant effects on specific populations and the environment. In this report, the authors consider the time dependence of hazard category 2 (significant on-site effects) for facilities with inventories of plutonium isotopes and specific weapons-grade and heat-source mixtures of plutonium isotopes. The authors also define relative hazard as the reciprocal of the hazard category 2 threshold value and determine its time dependence. The time dependence of both hazard category 2 thresholds and relative hazards are determined and plotted for 10,000 years to provide useful information for planning long-term storage or disposal facilities

Plutonium working group report on environmental, safety and health vulnerabilities associated with the department's plutonium storage. Volume II, Appendix B, Part 12: Pantex site assessment team report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-09-01

The U.S. DOE Pantex Plant is located in the panhandle of Texas approximately 17 miles northeast of Amarillo. The Plant site was originally constructed in 1942 for conventional shell- and bomb-loading. In 1950, this Plant began to perform nuclear explosives operations. Today, the Pantex Plant is operated by Mason ampersand Hanger - Silas Mason Co., Inc. Pantex Plant functions include (1) final assembly of new nuclear explosives; (2) maintenance, modification, and quality assurance testing of nuclear explosives already in the military stockpile; (3) disassembly of nuclear explosives that are no longer required in the military stockpile; and (4) interim storage of nuclear explosives components. This report presents results of an environmental, safety, and health assessment of the Pantex Plant for the storage of plutonium

Vacuum distillation of plutonium pyrochemical salts

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bourges, Gilles; Faure, S.; Fiers, B.; Saintignon, S.; Lemoine, O.; Cardona-Barrau, D.; Devillard, D.

2012-01-01

A pyrochemical process is developed to upgrade the safety of plutonium spent salts interim storage. The feed material, consisting of alkali or alkali-earth chlorides containing various Pu and Am species, is first oxidized to convert the actinides into oxides. Then the chlorides are removed by vacuum distillation which requires temperature from 750 degrees C to 1100 degrees C. After a comprehensive R and D program, full-scale equipment was built to test the distillation of active salts. Tests with NaCl/KCl oxidized spent salt give decontamination factor of chlorides higher than 20000. The distilled salt meets the radiologic requirements to be discarded as low level waste. (authors)

Geomorphology of plutonium in the Northern Rio Grande

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Graf, W.L. [Arizona Univ., Tempe, AZ (United States). Dept., of Geography

1993-03-01

Nearly all of the plutonium in the natural environment of the Northern Rio Grande is associated with soils and sediment, and river processes account for most of the mobility of these materials. A composite regional budget for plutonium based on multi-decadal averages for sediment and plutonium movement shows that 90 percent of the plutonium moving into the system is from atmospheric fallout. The remaining 10 percent is from releases at Los Alamos. Annual variation in plutonium flux and storage exceeds 100 percent. The contribution to the plutonium budget from Los Alamos is associated with relatively coarse sediment which often behaves as bedload in the Rio Grande. Infusion of these materials into the main stream were largest in 1951, 1952, 1957, and 1968. Because of the schedule of delivery of plutonium to Los Alamos for experimentation and weapons manufacturing, the latter two years are probably the most important. Although the Los Alamos contribution to the entire plutonium budget was relatively small, in these four critical years it constituted 71--86 percent of the plutonium in bedload immediately downstream from Otowi.

Geomorphology of plutonium in the Northern Rio Grande

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Graf, W.L.

1993-03-01

Nearly all of the plutonium in the natural environment of the Northern Rio Grande is associated with soils and sediment, and river processes account for most of the mobility of these materials. A composite regional budget for plutonium based on multi-decadal averages for sediment and plutonium movement shows that 90 percent of the plutonium moving into the system is from atmospheric fallout. The remaining 10 percent is from releases at Los Alamos. Annual variation in plutonium flux and storage exceeds 100 percent. The contribution to the plutonium budget from Los Alamos is associated with relatively coarse sediment which often behaves as bedload in the Rio Grande. Infusion of these materials into the main stream were largest in 1951, 1952, 1957, and 1968. Because of the schedule of delivery of plutonium to Los Alamos for experimentation and weapons manufacturing, the latter two years are probably the most important. Although the Los Alamos contribution to the entire plutonium budget was relatively small, in these four critical years it constituted 71--86 percent of the plutonium in bedload immediately downstream from Otowi

Container Materials, Fabrication And Robustness

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dunn, K.; Louthan, M.; Rawls, G.; Sindelar, R.; Zapp, P.; Mcclard, J.

2009-01-01

The multi-barrier 3013 container used to package plutonium-bearing materials is robust and thereby highly resistant to identified degradation modes that might cause failure. The only viable degradation mechanisms identified by a panel of technical experts were pressurization within and corrosion of the containers. Evaluations of the container materials and the fabrication processes and resulting residual stresses suggest that the multi-layered containers will mitigate the potential for degradation of the outer container and prevent the release of the container contents to the environment. Additionally, the ongoing surveillance programs and laboratory studies should detect any incipient degradation of containers in the 3013 storage inventory before an outer container is compromised.

Update on the Department of Energy's 1994 plutonium vulnerability assessment for the plutonium finishing plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

HERZOG, K.R.

1999-01-01

A review of the environmental, safety, and health vulnerabilities associated with the continued storage of PFP's inventory of plutonium bearing materials and other SNM. This report re-evaluates the five vulnerabilities identified in 1994 at the PFP that are associated with SNM storage. This new evaluation took a more detailed look and applied a risk ranking process to help focus remediation efforts

Preparation of hexavalent plutonium and its determination in the presence of tetravalent plutonium; Preparation de plutonium hexavalent et dosage en presence de plutonium tetravalent

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Corpel, J [Commissariat a l' Energie Atomique, Saclay (France). Centre d' Etudes Nucleaires; Corpel, J [Institut du Radium, 75 - Paris (France)

1958-07-01

In order to study the eventual reduction of plutonium from the VI-valent state to the IV-valent state, in sulphuric medium, under the influence of its own {alpha} radiation or of the {gamma}-rays from a cobalt-60 source, we have developed a method for preparing pure hexavalent plutonium and two methods for determining solutions containing tetravalent and hexavalent plutonium simultaneously. Hexavalent plutonium was prepared by anodic oxidation at a platinum electrode. Study of the oxidation yield as a function of various factors has made it possible to define experimental conditions giving complete oxidation. For concentrations in total plutonium greater than 1.5 x 10{sup -3} M, determination of the two valencies IV and VI was carried out by spectrophotometry at two wavelengths. For lower concentrations, the determination was done by counting, after separation of the tetravalent plutonium in the form of fluoride in the presence of a carrier. (author) [French] Afin d'etudier l'eventuelle reduction du plutonium de l'etat de valence VI a l'etat de valence IV, en milieu sulfurique sous l'influence de son propre rayonnement {alpha} ou des rayons {gamma} d'une source de cobalt-60, nous avons mis au point une methode de preparation de plutonium hexavalent pur et deux methodes de dosage des solutions contenant simultanement du plutonium tetravalent et du plutonium hexavalent. Nous avons prepare le plutonium hexavalent par oxydation anodique au contact d'une electrode de platine. L'etude de rendement de l'oxydation en fonction des divers facteurs nous a permis de definir des conditions experimentales donnant une oxydation complete. Pour des concentrations en plutonium total superieures a 1,5.10{sup -3} M, le dosage des deux valences IV et VI a ete realise par spectrophotometrie a deux longueurs d'onde. Pour des concentrations inferieures, le dosage a ete effectue par comptage apres separation du plutonium tetravalent sous la forme du fluorure en presence d'un entraineur

Materials identification and surveillance project item evaluation: Items, impure plutonium oxide (ATL27960) and pure plutonium oxide (PEOR3258)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Allen, T.; Appert, Q.; Davis, C.

1997-03-01

In this report, Los Alamos scientists characterize properties relevant to storage of an impure plutonium oxide (74 mass % plutonium) in accordance with the Department of Energy (DOE) standard DOE-STD-3013-96. This oxide is of interest because it is the first impure plutonium oxide sample to be evaluated and it is similar to other materials that must be stored. Methods used to characterize the oxide at certain points during calcination include surface-area analyses, mass loss-on-ignition (LOI) measurements, elemental analysis, moisture-adsorption measurements, and quantitative supercritical-CO 2 extraction of adsorbed water. Significant decreases in the LOI and surface area occurred as the oxide was calcined at progressively increasing temperatures. Studies indicate that supercritical-CO 2 extraction is an effective method for removing adsorbed water from oxides. We extracted the water from powdered oxides (high-purity ZrO 2 , pure PuO 2 , and impure plutonium oxide) using CO 2 at 3000 psi pressure and 75 degrees C, and we quantitatively determined it by using gravimetric and dew-point procedures. The effectiveness of the extraction method is demonstrated by good agreement between the amounts of water extracted from pure zirconium and plutonium dioxides and the mass changes obtained from LOI analyses. However, the amount of moisture (0.025 mass %) extracted from the impure plutonium oxide after it had been calcined at 950 degrees C and stored for a period of months is much less than the LOI value (0.97 mass %). These results imply that the impure plutonium oxide is free of adsorbed water after calcination at 950 degrees C, even though the sample does not satisfy the LOI requirement of <0.50 mass % for storage

LLNL Site plan for a MOX fuel lead assembly mission in support of surplus plutonium disposition

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bronson, M.C.

1997-10-01

The principal facilities that LLNL would use to support a MOX Fuel Lead Assembly Mission are Building 332 and Building 334. Both of these buildings are within the security boundary known as the LLNL Superblock. Building 332 is the LLNL Plutonium Facility. As an operational plutonium facility, it has all the infrastructure and support services required for plutonium operations. The LLNL Plutonium Facility routinely handles kilogram quantities of plutonium and uranium. Currently, the building is limited to a plutonium inventory of 700 kilograms and a uranium inventory of 300 kilograms. Process rooms (excluding the vaults) are limited to an inventory of 20 kilograms per room. Ongoing operations include: receiving SSTS, material receipt, storage, metal machining and casting, welding, metal-to-oxide conversion, purification, molten salt operations, chlorination, oxide calcination, cold pressing and sintering, vitrification, encapsulation, chemical analysis, metallography and microprobe analysis, waste material processing, material accountability measurements, packaging, and material shipping. Building 334 is the Hardened Engineering Test Building. This building supports environmental and radiation measurements on encapsulated plutonium and uranium components. Other existing facilities that would be used to support a MOX Fuel Lead Assembly Mission include Building 335 for hardware receiving and storage and TRU and LLW waste storage and shipping facilities, and Building 331 or Building 241 for storage of depleted uranium.

LLNL Site plan for a MOX fuel lead assembly mission in support of surplus plutonium disposition

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bronson, M.C.

1997-01-01

The principal facilities that LLNL would use to support a MOX Fuel Lead Assembly Mission are Building 332 and Building 334. Both of these buildings are within the security boundary known as the LLNL Superblock. Building 332 is the LLNL Plutonium Facility. As an operational plutonium facility, it has all the infrastructure and support services required for plutonium operations. The LLNL Plutonium Facility routinely handles kilogram quantities of plutonium and uranium. Currently, the building is limited to a plutonium inventory of 700 kilograms and a uranium inventory of 300 kilograms. Process rooms (excluding the vaults) are limited to an inventory of 20 kilograms per room. Ongoing operations include: receiving SSTS, material receipt, storage, metal machining and casting, welding, metal-to-oxide conversion, purification, molten salt operations, chlorination, oxide calcination, cold pressing and sintering, vitrification, encapsulation, chemical analysis, metallography and microprobe analysis, waste material processing, material accountability measurements, packaging, and material shipping. Building 334 is the Hardened Engineering Test Building. This building supports environmental and radiation measurements on encapsulated plutonium and uranium components. Other existing facilities that would be used to support a MOX Fuel Lead Assembly Mission include Building 335 for hardware receiving and storage and TRU and LLW waste storage and shipping facilities, and Building 331 or Building 241 for storage of depleted uranium

Fire protection considerations in the design of plutonium handling and storage facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Blanchard, A.

2000-01-01

Unwanted fire in a facility that handles plutonium must be addressed early in the facility design. Such fires have the potential for transporting radioactive contamination throughout the building and widespread downwind dispersal. Features that mitigate such events can be severely challenged during the fire. High temperatures can cause storage containers to burst; a very efficient dispersal mechanism for radioactive contamination. The fire will also establish ventilation patterns that cause the migration of smoke and radioactive contamination throughout the facility. The smoke and soot generated by the fire will enter the exhaust system and travel to the filtration system where it will deposit on the filters. The quantity of smoke generated during a typical multi-room fire is expected to blind most High Efficiency Particulate Airfilter (HEPA) media. The blinding can have two possible outcomes. (1) The air movement though the facility is reduced, compromising the negative pressure containment and allowing contamination to leave the building though doors and other openings; or (2) the filters collapse allowing the contamination to bypass the filtration media and exit the building through the filter plenum. HEPA filter blinding during severe fires can be prevented or mitigated. Increasing the face surface area of HEPA filters will increase the smoke filtration capacity of the system, thus preventing blinding. As an alternative sandfilters can be provided to mitigate the effects of the HEPA filter bypass. Both concepts have distinct advantages. This paper will explore these two design concepts and two others; it will describe the design requirements necessary for each concept to prevent unacceptable contamination spread. The intent is to allow the filter media selection to be based on a comprehensive understanding of the four different design concepts

Design and Implementation of Equipment for Enhanced Safeguards of a Plutonium Storage in a Reprocessing Plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Richir, P.; Dechamp, L.; Buchet, P.; Dransart, P.; Dzbikowicz, Z.; Peerani, P.; ); Pierssens, L.; Persson, L.; Ancius, D.; Synetos, S.; ); Edmonds, N.; Homer, A.; Benn, K.-A.; Polkey, A.

2015-01-01

The Nuclear Security unit (NUSEC) of the Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU, JRC) was entrusted by DG ENER to design and implement equipment in order to achieve enhanced safeguards of a plutonium dioxide storage located on the MAGNOX reprocessing plant in Sellafield (UK). Enhanced safeguards must lead to a win-win situation for all parties involved. In this case the DG ENER inspectorate will save inspection time, manpower and future financial resources and the operator will have the right to access its storage without the need for inspector presence. To reach this goal, while at the same time taking into account current budget constraints, NUSEC developed applications that use equipment commonly used in the safety and security fields but so far have not been used in safeguards. For instance, two laser scanners are used to detect entry/exit events into and out of the store and to provide the necessary information to an algorithm in order to categorize objects/people passing the scanners, e.g., a Fork Lift Truck, a trolley used to bring in PuO 2 containers, a system used for the dispatch of cans, people, etc. An RFID reader is used to identify equipment duly authorized to access the store. All PuO 2 containers arriving from the production line must be weighed, identified and measured using gamma and neutron detectors before they can be transferred to the store. For this purpose an Unattended Combined Measurement System (UCMS) was designed and manufactured by the JRC in order to do all verification activities using a single instrument. This paper describes the design features of the equipment and its implementation with the support of the Sellafield Ltd. in the framework of the MAGNOX store project. (author)

Surplus plutonium disposition draft environmental impact statement. Volume 1, Part A

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-07-01

On May 22, 1997, DOE published a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the Federal Register (62 Federal Register 28009) announcing its decision to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) that would tier from the analysis and decisions reached in connection with the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic EIS (Storage and Disposition PEIS). DOE's disposition strategy allows for both the immobilization of surplus plutonium and its use as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in existing domestic, commercial reactors. The disposition of surplus plutonium would also involve disposal of the immobilized plutonium and MOX fuel (as spent nuclear fuel) in a geologic repository. The Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement analyzes alternatives that would use the immobilization approach (for some of the surplus plutonium) and the MOX fuel approach (for some of the surplus plutonium); alternatives that would immobilize all of the surplus plutonium; and the No Action Alternative. The alternatives include three disposition facilities that would be designed so that they could collectively accomplish disposition of up to 50 metric tons (55 tons) of surplus plutonium over their operating lives: (1) the pit disassembly and conversion facility would disassemble pits (a weapons component) and convert the recovered plutonium, as well as plutonium metal from other sources, into plutonium dioxide suitable for disposition; (2) the immobilization facility would include a collocated capability for converting nonpit plutonium materials into plutonium dioxide suitable for immobilization and would be located at either Hanford or SRS. DOE has identified SRS as the preferred site for an immobilization facility; (3) the MOX fuel fabrication facility would fabricate plutonium dioxide into MOX fuel. This volume includes background information; purpose of and need for the proposed action; alternatives for disposition of surplus weapons useable plutonium; and

Experiences in the management of plutonium-containing solid-wastes at the Nuclear Research Center Karlsruhe

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Baehr, W.; Hild, W.; Scheffler, K.

1974-10-01

Solid-plutonium-containing wastes from a fuel production plant, a reprocessing plant and several research laboratories are treated at the decontamination department of the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center for disposal in the Asse salt mine. Conditioning as well as future aspects in α-waste management are the subject of this Paper. (orig.) [de

CSER 00-008 use of PFP Glovebox HC-18BS for Storage and Transport of Fissionable Material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ERICKSON, D.G.

2000-01-01

This CSER addresses the feasibility of increasing the allowed number of open containers and permitting the transfer and storage of fissionable material in Glovebox HC-18BS without regard to form or density (metal, oxide having an H/X (le) 20, material having unrestricted moderation and plutonium hydroxide having a plutonium density of 0.2 g/cm 3 )

A conceptual and calculational model for gas formation from impure calcined plutonium oxides

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lyman, John L.; Eller, P. Gary

2000-01-01

Safe transport and storage of pure and impure plutonium oxides requires an understanding of processes that may generate or consume gases in a confined storage vessel. We have formulated conceptual and calculational models for gas formation from calcined materials. The conceptual model for impure calcined plutonium oxides is based on the data collected to date

GTA Welding Research and Development for Plutonium Containment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sessions, C.E.

2002-01-01

This paper discusses the development of two welding systems that are used to contain actinide metals and oxides for long term storage. The systems are termed the bagless transfer system (BTS) and the outer container welder (OCW) system. The BTS is so named because it permits the containment of actinides without a polymeric package (i.e., bag). The development of these two systems was directed by Department of Energy Standard 3013, hereafter referred to as DOE 3013. This document defines the product and container requirements. In addition, it references national codes and standards for leak rates, ANSI N14.5, and design, American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section VIII (BandPVC)

Plutonium working group report on environmental, safety and health vulnerabilities associated with the Department's plutonium storage. Volume II, Appendix B, Part 8: Argonne National Laboratory - East and New Brunswick Laboratory site assessment team report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-09-01

The objective of the Plutonium ES ampersand H Vulnerability Assessment Project is to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the environmental, safety and health (ES ampersand H) vulnerabilities arising from the Department's storage and handling of Its current plutonium holdings. The term open-quote ES ampersand H vulnerabilitiesclose quotes is defined for the purpose of this project to mean conditions or weaknesses that could lead to unnecessary or increased radiation exposure of workers, release of radioactive materials to the environment, or radiation exposure of the public. The assessment will identify and prioritize ES ampersand H vulnerabilities, and will serve as an information base for identifying corrective actions and options for the safe management of fissile materials. The Argonne National Laboratory-East (ANL-E) Site Assessment Team (SAT) was formed from Department of Energy (DOE) Chicago Operations Office-Argonne Area Office Personnel, to conduct a self-assessment of the plutonium holdings and any associated ES ampersand H vulnerabilities at the ANL-E site

Surplus plutonium disposition draft environmental impact statement. Volume 1, Part B

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-07-01

On May 22, 1997, DOE published a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the Federal Register (62 Federal Register 28009) announcing its decision to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) that would tier from the analysis and decisions reached in connection with the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic EIS (Storage and Disposition PEIS). DOE's disposition strategy allows for both the immobilization of surplus plutonium and its use as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in existing domestic, commercial reactors. The disposition of surplus plutonium would also involve disposal of the immobilized plutonium and MOX fuel (as spent nuclear fuel) in a geologic repository. The Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement analyzes alternatives that would use the immobilization approach (for some of the surplus plutonium) and the MOX fuel approach (for some of the surplus plutonium); alternatives that would immobilize all of the surplus plutonium; and the No Action Alternative. The alternatives include three disposition facilities that would be designed so that they could collectively accomplish disposition of up to 50 metric tons (55 tons) of surplus plutonium over their operating lives: (1) the pit disassembly and conversion facility would disassemble pits (a weapons component) and convert the recovered plutonium, as well as plutonium metal from other sources, into plutonium dioxide suitable for disposition; (2) the immobilization facility would include a collocated capability for converting nonpit plutonium materials into plutonium dioxide suitable for immobilization and would be located at either Hanford or SRS. DOE has identified SRS as the preferred site for an immobilization facility; (3) the MOX fuel fabrication facility would fabricate plutonium dioxide into MOX fuel. This volume has chapters on environmental consequences; environmental regulations, permits, and consultations; a glossary; list of preparers; distribution list

Plutonium working group report on environmental, safety and health vulnerabilities associated with the Department's plutonium storage. Volume 2, Appendix B, Part 4: Savannah River Site site assessment team report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-09-01

The Plutonium Environmental, Safety, and Health (ES and H) Vulnerability Assessment is being conducted by the DOE Office of Environment, Safety, and Health (DOE-EH) to evaluate the ES and H vulnerabilities arising from the Department's storage and handling of its holdings of plutonium and other transuranic isotopes. This report on Savannah River Site (SRS) facilities and materials provides the results of a self-assessment for the purpose of identifying issues as potential vulnerabilities. The report provides data and analyses for the DOE-EH and independent Working Group Assessment Team, which will make the final determination as to ES and H vulnerabilities at SRS. The term ES and H vulnerabilities is defined for the purpose of this assessment to mean conditions that could lead to unnecessary or increased radiation exposure of workers, release of radioactive materials to the environment, or radiation exposure of the public. The self-assessment identifies and prioritizes candidate or potential vulnerabilities and issues for consideration by the Working Group Assessment Team, and will serve as an information base for identifying interim corrective actions and options for the safe management of fissile materials. It will also establish a foundation for decision making regarding the safe management and disposition of DOE plutonium

The use of plutonium rapides surregenerateurs aspects techniques et economiques

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Guillet, H.; Delayre, R.; Mougniot, J.C.; Ferrari, A.

1977-01-01

Nuclear energy production utilizing U 235 and U 238 inevitably results in the formation of plutonium. Some of this is directly used by the reactor in power production. Some reactors, e.g. the Candu type, burn most of their plutonium ''in situ''. However the surplus quantity of plutonium produced is increasing, and by 1990 the world stock of plutonium is predicted to be about 1000 tons (300 tons in Europe and 400 in the USA). This represents approximately 0.1 Q of potential power, where Q=10 21 joules. Proposals for dealing with this plutonium include its storage, either as irradiated fuel or as a refined substance (plutonium nitrate or oxide); its use in thermal reactors as a substitute for U 235 ; its use in fast breeder reactors which can act as consumers of plutonium as well as producers and which can therefore regulate the world's plutonium stocks. Leaving aside the question of storage, certain technical conditions must be fulfilled. It is essential that reprocessing plants should be operational and available in adequate numbers. An industry able to make use of plutonium should be developed with large capacity units. There seem to be no problems with plutonium use in reactors: conclusive experiments have proved the accuracy of calculations regarding plutonium recycling in thermal reactors and a number of fast breeders have proved the possibility of using plutonium in them. Experience acquired during the past ten years permits us to deal with the safety and safeguards problem of using plutonium. Many economic questions remain, however, including questions affecting the utilization of plutonium, such as the cost of regenerating irradiated fuel and of making fuel, and questions affecting the strategy of using plutonium in different ways, such as the price at which it should be sold. Also the cost of producing electricity using plutonium is not yet clear. It is unavoidable that plutonium will be used in nuclear power development. The technical and economic problems

Plutonium Disposition Now exclamation point

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Buckner, M.R.

1995-01-01

A means for use of existing processing facilities and reactors for plutonium disposition is described which requires a minimum capital investment and allows rapid implementation. The scenario includes interim storage and processing under IAEA control, and fabrication into MOX fuel in existing or planned facilities in Europe for use in operating reactors in the two home countries. Conceptual studies indicate that existing Westinghouse four-loop designs can safety dispose of 0.94 MT of plutonium per calendar year. Thus, it would be possible to consume the expected US excess stockpile of about 50 MT in two to three units of this type, and it is highly likely that a comparable amount of the FSU excess plutonium could be deposed of in a few VVER-1000's. The only major capital project for this mode of plutonium disposition would be the weapons-grade plutonium processing which could be done in a dedicated international facility or using existing facilities in the US and FSU under IAEA control. This option offers the potential for quick implementation at a very low cost to the governments of the two countries

Project Execution Plan Project 98L-EWW-460 Plutonium Stabilization and Handling DOE No. 98-D-453

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

HOLSTEIN, W.A.

1999-01-01

This Project Execution Plan (PEP) describes the management methods and responsibilities of the project participants. Project W-460 is sufficiently large to warrant a stand alone PEP. This project specific PEP describes the relationships and responsibilities of the project team and identifies the technical, schedule, and cost baselines that have been established for the project. The Department of Energy (DOE), Hanford Works (Hanford), at Richland, WA., currently does not have a system capable of stabilizing or packaging large quantities of plutonium-bearing solids to meet DOE technical standard DOE-STD-3013-96. This project will allow Hanford to meet this standard by installing stabilization and packaging equipment (SPE). The SPE is capable of stabilizing and packaging the current inventory of greater than 50 percent plutonium-bearing materials currently stored in the Plutonium Finishing Plant's (PFP) vaults into 3013 storage containers. The scope of this project is to procure and install the SPE via a Hanford contract and coordination with the Savannah River Site. In addition, the project will modify PFP vaults and upgrade the PFP Laboratory measurement systems. The Facility infrastructure will be modified to support the new SPE system and the new standardized storage container configuration. Use of this document is described in the Project Hanford Policy and Procedure System under HNF-PRO-1999, Construction Program Conceptual Phase

Production of Plutonium Metal from Aqueous Solutions

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Orth, D.A.

2003-01-16

The primary separation of plutonium from irradiated uranium by the Purex solvent extraction process at the Savannah River Plant produces a dilute plutonium solution containing residual fission products and uranium. A cation exchange process is used for concentration and further decontamination of the plutonium, as the first step in the final preparation of metal. This paper discusses the production of plutonium metal from the aqueous solutions.

Enzymatic degradation of plutonium-contaminated cellulose products

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Heintz, C.E.; Rainwater, K.A.; Swift, L.M.; Barnes, D.L.; Worl, L.; Avens, L.

1999-01-01

Enzyme solutions produced for commercial purposes unrelated to waste management have the potential for reducing the volume of wastes in streams containing cellulose, lipid and protein materials. For example, the authors have shown that cellulases used in denim production and in detergent formulations are able to digest cellulose-containing sorbents and other cellulose-based wastes contaminated either with crude oil or with radionuclides. This presentation describes the use of one such enzyme preparation (Rapidase trademark) for the degradation of cotton sorbents intentionally contaminated with low levels of plutonium. This is part of a feasibility study to determine if such treatments have a role in reducing the volume of low level and transuranic wastes to minimize the amount of radionuclide-contaminated waste that must be disposed of in secured storage areas

Charge distribution on plutonium-containing aerosols produced in mixed-oxide reactor fuel fabrication and the laboratory

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yeh, H.C.; Newton, G.J.; Teague, S.V.

1976-01-01

The inhalation toxicity of potentially toxic aerosols may be affected by the electrostatic charge on the particles. Charge may influence the deposition site during inhalation and therefore its subsequent clearance and dose patterns. The electrostatic charge distributions on plutonium-containing aerosols were measured with a miniature, parallel plate, aerosol electrical mobility spectrometer. Two aerosols were studied: a laboratory-produced 238 PuO 2 aerosol (15.8 Ci/g) and a plutonium mixed-oxide aerosol (PU-MOX, natural UO 2 plus PuO 2 , 0.02 Ci/g) formed during industrial centerless grinding of mixed-oxide reactor fuel pellets. Plutonium-238 dioxide particles produced in the laboratory exhibited a small net positive charge within a few minutes after passing through a 85 Kr discharger due to alpha particle emission removal of valence electrons. PU-MOX aerosols produced during centerless grinding showed a charge distribution essentially in Boltzmann equilibrium. The gross alpha aerosol concentrations (960-1200 nCi/l) within the glove box were sufficient to provide high ion concentrations capable of discharging the charge induced by mechanical and/or nuclear decay processes

Effects of various moderators on the critical mass of plutonium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Doherty, A.L.

1986-01-01

The fissile material storage tanks in the Hanford Plutonium Critical Mass Laboratory (CML) in Richland, Washington, are presently being upgraded. During the design and planning phase of this modification, criticality analysis was necessary to compare potential moderator/absorber materials used as isolators between tanks. A parameter study was performed to assist in determining the appropriate moderator material to be used in the plutonium nitrate storage tank system in the mix room at the CML. Four moderator/absorber materials were identified as providing adequate isolation between the tanks

Continuous plutonium(IV) oxalate precipitation, filtration, and calcination process. [From product streams from Redox, Purex, or Recuplex solvent extraction plants

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Beede, R L

1956-09-27

A continuous plutonium (IV) oxalate precipitation, filtration, and calcination process has been developed. Continuous and batch decomposition of the oxalate in the filtrates has been demonstrated. The processes have been demonstrated in prototype equipment. Plutonium (IV) oxalate was precipitated continuously at room temperature by the concurrent addition of plutonium (IV) nitrate feed and oxalic acid into the pan of a modified rotary drum filter. The plutonium (IV) oxalate was calcined to plutonium dioxide, which could be readily hydrofluorinated. Continuous decomposition of the oxalate in synthetic plutonium (IV) oxalate filtrates containing plutonium (IV) oxalate solids was demonstrated using co-current flow in a U-shaped reactor. Feeds containing from 10 to 100 g/1 Pu, as plutonium (IV) nitrate, and 1.0 to 6.5 M HNO/sub 3/, respectively, can be processed. One molar oxalic acid is used as the precipitant. Temperatures of 20 to 35/sup 0/C for the precipitation and filtration are satisfactory. Plutonium (IV) oxalate can be calcined at 300 to 400/sup 0/C in a screw-type drier-calciner to plutonium dioxide and hydrofluorinated at 450 to 550/sup 0/C. Plutonium dioxide exceeding purity requirements has been produced in the prototype equipment. Advantages of continuous precipitation and filtration are: uniform plutonium (IV) oxalate, improved filtration characteristics, elimination of heating and cooling facilities, and higher capacities through a single unit. Advantages of the screw-type drier-calciner are the continuous production of an oxide satisfactory for feed for the proposed plant vibrating tube hydrofluorinator, and ease of coupling continuous precipitation and filtration to this proposed hydrofluorinator. Continuous decomposition of oxalate in filtrates offers advantages in decreasing filtrate storage requirements when coupled to a filtrate concentrator. (JGB)

Determination of plutonium in environment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sakanoue, Masanobu

1978-01-01

Past and present methods of determining the amount of plutonium in the environment are summarized. Determination of the amount of plutonium in uranium ore began in 1941. Plutonium present in polluted environments due to nuclear explosions, nuclear power stations, etc. was measured in soil and sand in Nagasaki in 1951 and in ash in Bikini in 1954. Analytical methods of measuring the least amount of plutonium in the environment were developed twenty years later. Many studies on and reviews of these methods have been reported all over the world, and a standard analytical procedure has been adopted. A basic analytical method of measurement was drafted in Japan in 1976. The yield, treatment of samples, dissolution, separation, control of measurable ray sources determination by α spectrometry, cross-check determination, and treatment of samples containing hardly soluble plutonium were examined. At present, the amount of plutonium can be determined by all of these methods. The presence of plutonium was studied further, and the usefulness of determination of the plutonium isotope ratio is discussed. (Kumagai, S.)

Constitutional problems in the handling of plutonium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Witt, S. de.

1989-01-01

Reprocessing and final storage involve two different systems of nuclear energy utilization: with or without the use of plutonium. There is a choice available between these two systems. The paper discusss the constitutional implications of this choice. The permission of the use of plutonium as nuclear fuel by the Atomic Energy Law is irreconcilable with the Basic Law, i.e. the Constitution. If the corresponding provisions of the Atomic Energy Law are repealed, then only the plutonium-related branch will be revoked and not the legal permission of nuclear energy as a whole. The fact is not ignored that the Atomic Energy law does not permit the construction and operation of a plant or the handling of plutonium if this were to violate a basic right. However, the plutonium-related branch of nculear energy utilization inevitably results in such basic right violations; hence the Atomic Energy law is unconstitutional in this respect. (orig./HSCH) [de

Plutonium and americium separation from salts

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hagan, P.G.; Miner, F.J.

1976-01-01

Salts or materials containing plutonium and americium are dissolved in hydrochloric acid, heated, and contacted with an alkali metal carbonate solution to precipitate plutonium and americium carbonates which are thereafter readily separable from the solution

Applications of acoustic reasonance spectroscopy as a safeguards-and-security technology in plutonium management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Baiardo, J.P.; Wright, P.V.; Heiple, C.R.

1995-01-01

Recent negotiations between the United States and the former Soviet Union have resulted in agreements to aggressively reduce our respective nuclear weapon stockpiles. This is a very long-term activity that involves dismantlement, interim storage, and processing of a variety of components and materials. In addition, the end of the Cold War followed by the abrupt shutdown of a significant portion of the weapons complex in the United States has left tons of excess plutonium in various forms in storage for extended periods of time with resulting serious safety concerns. While long-term storage of plutonium in any form requires monitoring to mitigate safety, security, and nonproliferation concerns, the weapon dismantlement phase also requires monitoring for identification and verification without revealing design information. Clearly, the need for sensitive, noninvasive, and rapid monitoring techniques is highly desirable. Acoustic resonance spectroscopy (ARS) may emerge as one such technique; indeed, ARS has already been proven in a number of applications to date including Chemical Weapons Treaty verification and determination of waste drum pressurization and it is being investigated as a method to detect changes in sealed weapon component containers

F. Biological hazards of plutonium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1976-01-01

Plutonium is an unavoidable result of present nuclear power programmes. Its predominant isotopes are extremely long-lived and very toxic if absorbed in the body. In view of the increasing potential for plutonium and man to come into contact, the consequences of any plutonium release into the environment should be scientifically examined. This report is an attempt to place in one document a fully referenced account of the on-going work in many areas. There are three sections. Part 1 deals with the amounts of plutonium available in the fuel cycle, its properties and the probability of routine or accidental release. Part 2 examines the ways in which plutonium can reach man, in particular through food chains or inhalation. Part 3 details the biological effects of plutonium once it is absorbed into the body, assesses the amounts likely to be harmful and discusses the adequacy of present standards for plutonium burdens. There are two appendices. The likely differences between Pu-239, the most studied isotope, and other plutonium isotopes or transuranic nuclides are outlined in Appendix A. Appendix B contains a fuller account of the ways in which the fate of ingested or inhaled plutonium have been determined

Recovery studies for plutonium machining oil coolant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Navratil, J.D.; Baldwin, C.E.

1977-01-01

Lathe coolant oil, contaminated with plutonium and having a carbon tetrachloride diluent, is generated in plutonium machining areas at Rocky Flats. A research program was initiated to determine the nature of plutonium in this mixture of oil and carbon tetrachloride. Appropriate methods then could be developed to remove the plutonium and to recycle the oil and carbon tetrachloride. Studies showed that the mixtures of spent oil and carbon tetrachloride contained particulate plutonium and plutonium species that are soluble in water or in oil and carbon tetrachloride. The particulate plutonium was removed by filtration; the nonfilterable plutonium was removed by adsorption on various materials. Laboratory-scale tests indicated the lathe-coolant oil mixture could be separated by distilling the carbon tetrachloride to yield recyclable products

Potential hydrogen and oxygen partial pressures in legacy plutonium oxide packages at Oak Ridge

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Veirs, Douglas K. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2014-07-07

An approach to estimate the maximum hydrogen and oxygen partial pressures within sealed containers is described and applied to a set of packages containing high-purity plutonium dioxide. The approach uses experimentally determined maximum hydrogen and oxygen partial pressures and scales the experimentally determined pressures to the relevant packaged material properties. The important material properties are the specific wattage and specific surface area (SSA). Important results from the experimental determination of maximum partial pressures are (1) the ratio of hydrogen to oxygen is stoichiometric, and (2) the maximum pressures increase with increasing initial rates of production. The material properties that influence the rates are the material specific wattage and the SSA. The unusual properties of these materials, high specific wattage and high SSA, result in higher predicted maximum pressures than typical plutonium dioxide in storage. The pressures are well within the deflagration range for mixtures of hydrogen and oxygen.

Selective permeation of plutonium(IV) through a supported liquid membrane containing tri-iso-amyl phosphate as an ionophore

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shukla, J.P.; Kedari, C.S.; Dharmapurikar, G.R.

1998-01-01

Selective ionophoric mobility of plutonium with ease of concentration upgradation from aqueous nitrate solutions was investigated. A thin flat-sheet supported liquid membrane (SLM) impregnated with tri-iso-amyl phosphate (TAP) was used. Accurel polypropylene hydrophobic microporous membrane 'Enka' was tested as the solid polymeric support. The source phase generally contained extremely dilute (ca. 10 -6 mol/dm -3 ) to moderately concentrated plutonium(IV) nitrate solutions (ca. 10 -3 mol/dm -3 ) in about 4 mol/dm -3 HNO 3 . Membrane permeability and selectivity dependency on variables like nitric acid concentration in the source phase, carrier concentration, receiving phase composition, etc. were systematically evaluated. More than 90% pertraction of plutonium could be easily accomplished in single run employing a feed solution consisting of about 1 mg/dm -3 Pu and 4 mol/dm -3 HNO 3 , carrier concentration of 0.8 mol/dm -3 TAP/dodecane; the receiving phase was 0.5 mol/dm -3 sodium carbonate or 0.5 mol/dm -3 ascorbic acid. The selective diffusivity of plutonium(IV) was observed from various effluents originating from fuel reprocessing operations. Reusability of membrane supports was also found to be satisfactory. (author)

Storage for the Fast Flux Test Facility unirradiated fuel in the Plutonium Finishing Plant Complex, Hanford Site, Richland, Washington

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1992-01-01

This Environmental Assessment evaluates the proposed action to relocate and store unirradiated Fast Flux Test Facility fuel in the Plutonium Finishing Plant Complex on the Hanford Site, Richland, Washington. The US Department of Energy has decided to cease fuel fabrication activities in the 308 Building in the 300 Area. This decision was based on a safety concern over the ability of the fuel fabrication portion of the 308 Building to withstand a seismic event. The proposed action to relocate and store the fuel is based on the savings that could be realized by consolidating security costs associated with storage of the fuel. While the 308 Building belowgrade fuel storage areas are not at jeopardy by a seismic event, the US Department of Energy is proposing to cease storage operations along with the related fabrication operations. The US Department of Energy proposes to remove the unirradiated fuel pins and fuel assemblies from the 308 Building and store them in Room 192A, within the 234-5Z Building, a part of the Plutonium Finishing Plant Complex, located in the 200 West Area. Minor modifications to Room 192A would be required to accommodate placement of the fuel. The US Department of Energy estimates that removing all of the fuel from the 308 Building would save $6.5 million annually in security expenditures for the Fast Flux Test Facility. Environmental impacts of construction, relocation, and operation of the proposed action and alternatives were evaluated. This evaluation concluded that the proposed action would have no significant impacts on the human environment

Plutonium fires; Incendies de plutonium

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Mestre, E.

1959-06-23

The author reports an information survey on accidents which occurred when handling plutonium. He first addresses accidents reported in documents. He indicates the circumstances and consequences of these accidents (explosion in glove boxes, fires of plutonium chips, plutonium fire followed by filter destruction, explosion during plutonium chip dissolution followed by chip fire). He describes hazards associated with plutonium fires: atmosphere and surface contamination, criticality. The author gives some advices to avoid plutonium fires. These advices concern electric installations, the use of flammable solvents, general cautions associated with plutonium handling, venting and filtration. He finally describes how to fight plutonium fires, and measures to be taken after the fire (staff contamination control, atmosphere control)

Options for converting excess plutonium to feed for the MOX fuel fabrication facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Watts, Joe A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Smith, Paul H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Psaras, John D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Jarvinen, Gordon D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Costa, David A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Joyce, Jr., Edward L [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2009-01-01

The storage and safekeeping of excess plutonium in the United States represents a multibillion-dollar lifecycle cost to the taxpayers and poses challenges to National Security and Nuclear Non-Proliferation. Los Alamos National Laboratory is considering options for converting some portion of the 13 metric tons of excess plutonium that was previously destined for long-term waste disposition into feed for the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). This approach could reduce storage costs and security ri sks, and produce fuel for nuclear energy at the same time. Over the course of 30 years of weapons related plutonium production, Los Alamos has developed a number of flow sheets aimed at separation and purification of plutonium. Flow sheets for converting metal to oxide and for removing chloride and fluoride from plutonium residues have been developed and withstood the test oftime. This presentation will address some potential options for utilizing processes and infrastructure developed by Defense Programs to transform a large variety of highly impure plutonium into feedstock for the MFFF.

A combinatorial chemistry approach to the investigation of cerium oxide and plutonium oxide reactions with small molecules

Science.gov (United States)

Brady, John T.; Warner, Benjamin P.; Bridgewater, Jon S.; Havrilla, George J.; Morris, David E.; Buscher, C. Thomas

2000-07-01

We are currently investigating the potential chemistry of the 3013 Standard waste storage containers. These containers are filled with waste that is a mixture of inorganic salts and plutonium oxide that has been calcined to remove water and other volatiles. There has been concern about possible pressure buildup due to the formation of hydrogen or other gases. We are utilizing a combinatorial chemistry approach to investigate a range of possible reactions that may occur in the containers with various concentrations of metal oxides and inorganic salts.

Solubility of plutonium dioxide aerosols, in vitro

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Newton, G.J.; Kanapilly, G.M.

1976-01-01

Solubility of plutonium aerosols is an important parameter in establishing risk estimates for industrial workers who might accidentally inhale these materials and in evaluating environmental health impacts associated with Pu. In vitro solubility of industrial plutonium aerosols in a simulated lung fluid is compared to similar studies with ultrafine aerosols from laser ignition of delta phase plutonium metal and laboratory-produced spherical particles of 238 PuO 2 and 239 PuO 2 . Although relatively insoluble, industrial plutonium-mixed oxide aerosols were much more soluble than laboratory-produced plutonium dioxide particles. Chain agglomerate aerosols from laser ignition of metallic Pu indicated in vitro dissolution half-times of 10 and 50 days for activity median aerodynamic diameter (AMAD) of 0.7 and 2.3 μm, respectively. Plutonium-containing mixed oxide aerosols indicated dissolution half-times of 40 to 500 days for particles formed by industrial powder comminution and blending. Centerless grinding of fuel pellets yielded plutonium-containing aerosols with dissolution half-times of 1200 to 8000 days. All mixed oxide particles were in the size range 1.0 μm to 2.5 μm AMAD

Stop plutonium; Stop plutonium

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2003-02-01

This press document aims to inform the public on the hazards bound to the plutonium exploitation in France and especially the plutonium transport. The first part is a technical presentation of the plutonium and the MOX (Mixed Oxide Fuel). The second part presents the installation of the plutonium industry in France. The third part is devoted to the plutonium convoys safety. The highlight is done on the problem of the leak of ''secret'' of such transports. (A.L.B.)

Development of a fresh plutonium fuel container for a prototype fast breeder reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ohtake, T.; Takahashi, S.; Mishima, T.; Kurakami, J.; Yamamoto, Y.; Ohuchi, Y.

1989-01-01

Japan gives a good deal of encouragement to development of a fast breeder reactor (which is considered as the most likely candidate for nuclear power generation) to secure long-term energy source. And, following an experimental fast breeder reactor Joyo, a prototype fast breeder reactor Monju is now under vigorous construction. Related to development of the prototype fast breeder reactor, it is necessary and important to develop transport container which is used for transporting fresh fuel assemblies from Plutonium Fuel Production Facility to the Monju power plant. Therefore, the container is now being developed by Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC). Currently, shipment and vibration tests, handling performance tests, shielding performance tests and prototype container tests are executed with prototype containers fabricated according to a final design, in order to experimentally confirm soundness of transport container and its contents, and propriety of design technique. This paper describes the summary of general specifications and structures of this container and the summary of preliminary safety analysis of package

Decommissioning and Decontamination Program: Battelle Plutonium Facility, Environmental assessment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1979-09-01

This assessment describes the decontamination of Battelle-Columbus Plutonium Facility and removal from the site of all material contamination which was associated with or produced by the Plutonium Facility. Useable uncontaminated material will be disposed of by procedures normally employed in scrap declaration and transfer. Contaminated waste will be transported to approved radioactive waste storage sites. 5 refs., 1 fig

Excess Weapons Plutonium Immobilization in Russia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jardine, L.; Borisov, G.B.

2000-01-01

The joint goal of the Russian work is to establish a full-scale plutonium immobilization facility at a Russian industrial site by 2005. To achieve this requires that the necessary engineering and technical basis be developed in these Russian projects and the needed Russian approvals be obtained to conduct industrial-scale immobilization of plutonium-containing materials at a Russian industrial site by the 2005 date. This meeting and future work will provide the basis for joint decisions. Supporting R and D projects are being carried out at Russian Institutes that directly support the technical needs of Russian industrial sites to immobilize plutonium-containing materials. Special R and D on plutonium materials is also being carried out to support excess weapons disposition in Russia and the US, including nonproliferation studies of plutonium recovery from immobilization forms and accelerated radiation damage studies of the US-specified plutonium ceramic for immobilizing plutonium. This intriguing and extraordinary cooperation on certain aspects of the weapons plutonium problem is now progressing well and much work with plutonium has been completed in the past two years. Because much excellent and unique scientific and engineering technical work has now been completed in Russia in many aspects of plutonium immobilization, this meeting in St. Petersburg was both timely and necessary to summarize, review, and discuss these efforts among those who performed the actual work. The results of this meeting will help the US and Russia jointly define the future direction of the Russian plutonium immobilization program, and make it an even stronger and more integrated Russian program. The two objectives for the meeting were to: (1) Bring together the Russian organizations, experts, and managers performing the work into one place for four days to review and discuss their work with each other; and (2) Publish a meeting summary and a proceedings to compile reports of all the

Plutonium recycle. In-core fuel management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vincent, F.; Berthet, A.; Le Bars, M.

1985-01-01

Plutonium recycle in France will concern a dozen of PWR 900 MWe controlled in gray mode till 1995. This paper presents the main characteristics of fuel management with plutonium recycle. The organization of management studies will be copied from this developed for classical management studies. Up these studies, a ''feasibility report'' aims at establishing at each stage of the fuel cycle, the impact of the utilization of fuel containing plutonium [fr

Plutonium in the marine environment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jarvis, N.V.; Linder, P.W.; Wade, P.W.

1994-01-01

The shipping of plutonium from Europe to Japan around the Cape is a contentious issue which has raised public concern that South Africa may be at risk to plutonium exposure should an accident occur. The paper describes the containers in which the plutonium (in the form of plutonium oxide, PuO 2 ) is housed and consequences of the unlikely event of these becoming ruptured. Wind-borne pollution is considered not to be a likely scenario, with the plutonium oxide particles more likely to remain practically insoluble and sediment. Plutonium aqueous and environmental chemistry is briefly discussed. Some computer modelling whereby plutonium oxide is brought into contact with seawater has been performed and the results are presented. The impact on marine organisms is discussed in terms of studies performed at marine dump sites and after the crash of a bomber carrying nuclear warheads in Thule, Greenland in 1968. Various pathways from the sea to land are considered in the light of studies done at Sellafield, a reprocessing plant in the United Kingdom. Some recent debates in the popular scientific press, such as that on the leukemia cluster at Sellafield, are described. Plutonium biochemistry and toxicity are discussed as well as medical histories of workers exposed to plutonium. 35 refs., 2 tabs., 1 fig

Shipment and Storage Containers for Tritium Production Transportation Casks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Massey, W.M.

1998-04-01

The need for a shipping and storage container for the Tritium production transportation casks is addressed in this report. It is concluded that a shipping and storage container is not required. A recommendation is made to eliminate the requirement for this container because structural support and inerting requirements can be satisfied completely by the cask with a removable basket

Long-term logistic analysis of FBR introduction strategy: avoiding both uranium and plutonium shortage

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Suzuki, T.

1995-01-01

Despite comfortable predictions on short to mid-term uranium resources, there is still a concern about long-term availability of competitive uranium resources. In order to achieve substantial uranium saving, early introduction of Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) is desirable. But it is also known that rapid introduction of FBR could result in plutonium storage. Will there be enough plutonium on a global scale to sustain fast FBR growth? is there any other way to save uranium resource? This paper concludes that multi-option strategies to achieve flexible long-term strategy to avoid both uranium and plutonium storage are desirable. (authors)

Radiolytic gas generation in plutonium contaminated waste materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kazanjian, A.R.

1976-01-01

Many plutonium contaminated waste materials decompose into gaseous products because of exposure to alpha radiation. The gases generated (usually hydrogen) over long-storage periods may create hazardous conditions. To determine the extent of such hazards, knowing the gas generation yields is necessary. These yields were measured by contacting some common Rocky Flats Plant waste materials with plutonium and monitoring the enclosed atmospheres for extensive periods of time. The materials were Plexiglas, polyvinyl chloride, glove-box gloves, machining oil, carbon tetrachloride, chlorothene VG solvent, Kimwipes (dry and wet), polyethylene, Dowex-1 resin, and surgeon's gloves. Both 239 Pu oxide and 238 Pu oxide were used as radiation sources. The gas analyses were made by mass spectrometry and the results obtained were the total gas generation, the hydrogen generation, the oxygen consumption rate, and the gas composition over the entire storage period. Hydrogen was the major gas produced in most of the materials. The total gas yields varied from 0.71 to 16 cm 3 (standard temperature pressure) per day per curie of plutonium. The oxygen consumption rates varied from 0.0088 to 0.070 millimoles per day per gram of plutonium oxide-239 and from 0.0014 to 0.0051 millimoles per day per milligram 238 Pu

Plutonium Focus Area research and development plan. Revision 1

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1996-11-01

The Department of Energy (DOE) committed to a research and development program to support the technology needs for converting and stabilizing its nuclear materials for safe storage. The R and D Plan addresses five of the six material categories from the 94-1 Implementation Plan: plutonium (Pu) solutions, plutonium metals and oxides, plutonium residues, highly enriched uranium, and special isotopes. R and D efforts related to spent nuclear fuel (SNF) stabilization were specifically excluded from this plan. This updated plan has narrowed the focus to more effectively target specific problem areas by incorporating results form trade studies. Specifically, the trade studies involved salt; ash; sand, slag, and crucible (SS and C); combustibles; and scrub alloy. The plan anticipates possible disposition paths for nuclear materials and identifies resulting research requirements. These requirements may change as disposition paths become more certain. Thus, this plan represents a snapshot of the current progress and will continue to be updated on a regular basis. The paper discusses progress in safeguards and security, plutonium stabilization, special isotopes stabilization, highly-enriched uranium stabilization--MSRE remediation project, storage technologies, engineered systems, core technology, and proposed DOE/Russian technology exchange projects.

Plutonium Focus Area research and development plan. Revision 1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1996-11-01

The Department of Energy (DOE) committed to a research and development program to support the technology needs for converting and stabilizing its nuclear materials for safe storage. The R and D Plan addresses five of the six material categories from the 94-1 Implementation Plan: plutonium (Pu) solutions, plutonium metals and oxides, plutonium residues, highly enriched uranium, and special isotopes. R and D efforts related to spent nuclear fuel (SNF) stabilization were specifically excluded from this plan. This updated plan has narrowed the focus to more effectively target specific problem areas by incorporating results form trade studies. Specifically, the trade studies involved salt; ash; sand, slag, and crucible (SS and C); combustibles; and scrub alloy. The plan anticipates possible disposition paths for nuclear materials and identifies resulting research requirements. These requirements may change as disposition paths become more certain. Thus, this plan represents a snapshot of the current progress and will continue to be updated on a regular basis. The paper discusses progress in safeguards and security, plutonium stabilization, special isotopes stabilization, highly-enriched uranium stabilization--MSRE remediation project, storage technologies, engineered systems, core technology, and proposed DOE/Russian technology exchange projects

Nuclear waste storage container with metal matrix

Science.gov (United States)

Sump, Kenneth R.

1978-01-01

The invention relates to a storage container for high-level waste having a metal matrix for the high-level waste, thereby providing greater impact strength for the waste container and increasing heat transfer properties.

Nuclear waste storage container with metal matrix

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sump, K.R.

1978-01-01

The invention relates to a storage container for high-level waste having a metal matrix for the high-level waste, thereby providing greater impact strength for the waste container and increasing heat transfer properties

Storage yard operations in container terminals : Literature overview, trends, and research directions

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Carlo, Hector J.; Vis, Iris F. A.; Roodbergen, Kees Jan

2014-01-01

Inbound and outbound containers are temporarily stored in the storage yard at container terminals. A combination of container demand increase and storage yard capacity scarcity create complex operational challenges for storage yard managers. This paper presents an in-depth overview of storage yard

Pressure Indication of 3013 Inner Containers Using Digital Radiography

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

HENSEL, SJ

2004-01-01

Plutonium bearing materials packaged for long term storage per the Department of Energy Standard 3013 (DOE-STD-3013) are required to be examined periodically in a non-destructive manner (i.e. without compromising the storage containers) for pressure buildup. Radiography is the preferred technology for performing the examinations. The concept is to measure and record the container lid position. As a can pressurizes the lid will deflect outward and thus provide an indication of the internal pressure. A radiograph generated within 30 days of creation of each storage container serves as the baseline from which future surveillance examinations will be compared. A problem with measuring the lid position was discovered during testing of a digital radiography system. The solution was to provide a distinct feature upon the lower surface of the container lid from which the digital radiography system could easily track the lid position

Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium 1999 plan

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1999-01-30

The purpose of the Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium is to serve the Texas Panhandle, the State of Texas and the US Department of Energy by: conducting scientific and technical research; advising decision makers; and providing information on nuclear weapons materials and related environment, safety, health, and nonproliferation issues while building academic excellence in science and technology. This paper describes the electronic resource library which provides the national archives of technical, policy, historical, and educational information on plutonium. Research projects related to the following topics are described: Environmental restoration and protection; Safety and health; Waste management; Education; Training; Instrumentation development; Materials science; Plutonium processing and handling; and Storage.

Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium 1999 plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

The purpose of the Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium is to serve the Texas Panhandle, the State of Texas and the US Department of Energy by: conducting scientific and technical research; advising decision makers; and providing information on nuclear weapons materials and related environment, safety, health, and nonproliferation issues while building academic excellence in science and technology. This paper describes the electronic resource library which provides the national archives of technical, policy, historical, and educational information on plutonium. Research projects related to the following topics are described: Environmental restoration and protection; Safety and health; Waste management; Education; Training; Instrumentation development; Materials science; Plutonium processing and handling; and Storage

Design-Only Conceptual Design Report: Plutonium Immobilization Plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

DiSabatino, A.; Loftus, D.

1999-01-01

This design-only conceptual design report was prepared to support a funding request by the Department of Energy Office of Fissile Materials Disposition for engineering and design of the Plutonium Immobilization Plant, which will be used to immobilize up to 50 tonnes of surplus plutonium. The siting for the Plutonium Immobilization Plant will be determined pursuant to the site-specific Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement in a Plutonium Deposition Record of Decision in early 1999. This document reflects a new facility using the preferred technology (ceramic immobilization using the can-in-canister approach) and the preferred site (at Savannah River). The Plutonium Immobilization Plant accepts plutonium from pit conversion and from non-pit sources and, through a ceramic immobilization process, converts the plutonium into mineral-like forms that are subsequently encapsulated within a large canister of high-level waste glass. The final immobilized product must make the plutonium as inherently unattractive and inaccessible for use in nuclear weapons as the plutonium in spent fuel from commercial reactors and must be suitable for geologic disposal. Plutonium immobilization at the Savannah River Site uses: (1) A new building, the Plutonium Immobilization Plant, which will convert non-pit surplus plutonium to an oxide form suitable for the immobilization process, immobilize plutonium in a titanate-based ceramic form, place cans of the plutonium-ceramic forms into magazines, and load the magazines into a canister; (2) The existing Defense Waste Processing Facility for the pouring of high-level waste glass into the canisters; and (3) The Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility to receive and store feed materials. The Plutonium Immobilization Plant uses existing Savannah River Site infra-structure for analytical laboratory services, waste handling, fire protection, training, and other support utilities and services. The Plutonium Immobilization Plant

A perspective on safeguarding and monitoring of excess military plutonium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sutcliffe, W.G.

1994-01-01

The purpose of this paper is to provide a perspective and framework for the development of safeguarding and monitoring procedures for the various stages of disposition of excess military plutonium. The paper briefly outlines and comments on some of the issues involved in safeguarding and monitoring excess military plutonium as it progresses from weapons through dismantlement, to fabrication as reactor fuel, to use in a reactor, and finally to storage and disposal as spent fuel. open-quotes Militaryclose quotes refers to ownership, and includes both reactor-grade and weapon-grade plutonium. open-quotes Excessclose quotes refers to plutonium (in any form) that a government decides is no longer needed for military use and can be irrevocably removed from military stockpiles. Many of the issues and proposals presented in this paper are based on, or are similar to, those mentioned in the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report on excess military plutonium. Safeguards for plutonium disposition are discussed elsewhere in terms of requirements established by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Here, the discussion is less specific. The term open-quotes safeguardingclose quotes is used broadly to refer to materials control and accountancy (MC ampersand A), containment and surveillance (C ampersand S), and physical protection of nuclear materials by the state that possesses those materials. This is also referred to as material protection, control, and accountancy (MPCA). The term open-quotes safeguardingclose quotes was chosen for brevity and to distinguish MPCA considered in this paper from international or IAEA safeguards. open-quotes Monitoringclose quotes is used to refer to activities designed to assure another party (state or international organization) that the nuclear materials of the host state (the United States or Russia) are secure and not subject to unauthorized

Plutonium stabilization and packaging system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1996-01-01

This document describes the functional design of the Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging System (Pu SPS). The objective of this system is to stabilize and package plutonium metals and oxides of greater than 50% wt, as well as other selected isotopes, in accordance with the requirements of the DOE standard for safe storage of these materials for 50 years. This system will support completion of stabilization and packaging campaigns of the inventory at a number of affected sites before the year 2002. The package will be standard for all sites and will provide a minimum of two uncontaminated, organics free confinement barriers for the packaged material

Flexible process options for the immobilisation of residues and wastes containing plutonium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stewart, M.W.A.; Moricca, S.A.; Day, R. A.; Begg, B. D.; Scales, C. R.; Maddrell, E. R.; Eilbeck, A. B.

2007-01-01

Residues and waste streams containing plutonium present unique technical, safety, regulatory, security, and socio-political challenges. In the UK these streams range from lightly plutonium contaminated materials (PCM) through to residue s resulting directly from Pu processing operations. In addition there are potentially stocks of Pu oxide powders whose future designation may be either a waste or an asset, due to their levels of contamination making their reuse uneconomic, or to changes in nuclear policy. While waste management routes exist for PCM, an immobilisation process is required for streams containing higher levels of Pu. Such a process is being developed by Nexia Solutions and ANSTO to treat and immobilise Pu waste and residues currently stored on the Sellafield site. The characteristics of these Pu waste streams are highly variable. The physical form of the Pu waste ranges from liquids, sludges, powders/granules, to solid components (e.g., test fuels), with the Pu present as an ion in solution, as a salt, metal, oxide or other compound. The chemistry of the Pu waste streams also varies considerably with a variety of impurities present in many waste streams. Furthermore, with fissile isotopes present, criticality is an issue during operations and in the store or repository. Safeguards and security concerns must be assessed and controlled. The process under development, by using a combination of tailored waste form chemistry combined with flexible process technology aims to develop a process line to handle a broad range of Pu waste streams. It aims to be capable of dealing with not only current arisings but those anticipated to arise as a result of future operations or policy changes. (authors)

A calibration to predict the concentrations of impurities in plutonium oxide by prompt gamma analysis: Revision 1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Narlesky, Joshua E.; Foster, Lynn A.; Kelly, Elizabeth J.; Murray, Roy E. IV

2009-01-01

Over 5,500 containers of excess plutonium-bearing materials have been packaged for long-term storage following the requirements of DOE-STD- 3013. Knowledge of the chemical impurities in the packaged materials is important because certain impurities, such as chloride salts, affect the behavior of the material in storage leading to gas generation and corrosion when sufficient moisture also is present. In most cases, the packaged materials are not well characterized, and information about the chemical impurities is limited to knowledge of the material's processing history. The alpha-particle activity from the plutonium and americium isotopes provides a method of nondestructive self-interrogation to identify certain light elements through the characteristic, prompt gamma rays that are emitted from alpha-particle-induced reactions with these elements. Gamma-ray spectra are obtained for each 3013 container using a highresolution, coaxial high-purity germanium detector. These gamma-ray spectra are scanned from 800 to 5,000 keV for characteristic, prompt gamma rays from the detectable elements, which include lithium, beryllium, boron, nitrogen, oxygen, fluorine, sodium, magnesium, aluminum, silicon, phosphorus, chlorine, and potassium. The lower limits of detection for these elements in a plutonium-oxide matrix increase with atomic number and range from 100 or 200 ppm for the lightest elements such as lithium and beryllium, to 19,000 ppm for potassium. The peak areas from the characteristic, prompt gamma rays can be used to estimate the concentration of the light-element impurities detected in the material on a semiquantitative basis. The use of prompt gamma analysis to assess impurity concentrations avoids the expense and the risks generally associated with performing chemical analysis on radioactive materials. The analyzed containers are grouped by impurity content, which helps to identify high-risk containers for surveillance and in sorting materials before packaging.

Automation of plutonium spectrophotometry

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Perez, J.J.; Boisde, G.; Goujon de Beauvivier, M.; Chevalier, G.; Isaac, M.

1980-01-01

Instrumentation was designed and constructed for automatic control of plutonium by molecular absorption spectrophotometry, on behalf of the reprocessing facilities, to meet two objectives: on-line measurement, of the valency state of plutonium, on by-pass, with the measured concentration covering the process concentration range up to a few mg.l -1 ; laboratory measurement of plutonium adjusted to valency VI, with operation carried out using a preparative system meeting the required containment specifications. For this two objectives, the photometer, optical cell connections are made by optical fibers resistant to β, γ radiation. Except this characteristic the devices are different according to the quality required for result [fr

Phenomenology of the behavior of nuclear fuels containing plutonium in the cycles of water reactors. Development of a model on the equivalence of Plutonium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Azzoug, D.

1990-05-01

In the scope of fuel recycling, in nuclear reactors with water cooling systems, a model concerning the plutonium equivalence and adapted to the thermal spectra is proposed. The physical phenomena involving the plutonium isotopes are studied. A method based on the sensitivity analysis allows the understanding of the plutonium isotope behavior. An equivalence model of plutonium for thermal spectre is established. The validity of the model for different cycle lengths and supports is proved [fr

Plutonium contaminated materials research programme

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Higson, S.G.

1986-01-01

The paper is a progress report for 1985 from the Plutonium Contaminated Materials Working Party (PCMWP). The PCMWP co-ordinates research and development on a national basis in the areas of management, treatment and immobilisation of plutonium contaminated materials, for the purpose of waste management. The progress report contains a review of the development work carried out in eight areas, including: reduction of arisings, plutonium measurement, sorting and packaging, washing of shredded combustible PCM, decommissioning and non-combustible PCM treatment, PCM immobilisation, treatment of alpha bearing liquid wastes, and engineering objectives. (UK)

Corrosive gas generation potential from chloride salt radiolysis in plutonium environments

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tandon, L.; Allen, T.H.; Mason, R.E.; Penneman, R.A.

1999-01-01

The specific goal of this project was to evaluate the magnitude and practical significance of radiation effects involving mixtures of chloride salts and plutonium dioxide (PuO 2 ) sealed in stainless steel containers and stored for up to 50 yr, after stabilization at 950 C and packaging according to US Department of Energy (DOE) standards. The potential for generating chemically aggressive molecular chlorine (and hydrogen chloride by interaction with adsorbed water or hydrogen gas) by radiolysis of chloride ions was studied. To evaluate the risks, an annotated bibliography on chloride salt radiolysis was created with emphasis on effects of plutonium alpha radiation. The authors present data from the material identification and surveillance (MIS) project obtained from examination and analysis of representative PuO 2 items from various DOE sites, including the headspace gas analysis data of sealed mixtures of PuO 2 and chloride salts following long-term storage

Estimate of the Sources of Plutonium-Containing Wastes Generated from MOX Fuel Production in Russia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kudinov, K.G.; Tretyakov, A.A.; Sorokin, Y.P.; Bondin, V.V.; Manakova, L.F.; Jardine, L.J.

2001-01-01

In Russia, mixed oxide (MOX) fuel is produced in a pilot facility ''Paket'' at ''MAYAK'' Production Association. The Mining-Chemical Combine (MCC) has developed plans to design and build a dedicated industrial-scale plant to produce MOX fuel and fuel assemblies (FA) for VVER-1000 water reactors and the BN-600 fast-breeder reactor, which is pending an official Russian Federation (RF) site-selection decision. The design output of the plant is based on production capacity of 2.75 tons of weapons plutonium per year to produce the resulting fuel assemblies: 1.25 tons for the BN-600 reactor FAs and the remaining 1.5 tons for VVER-1000 FAs. It is likely the quantity of BN-600 FAs will be reduced in actual practice. The process of nuclear disarmament frees a significant amount of weapons plutonium for other uses, which, if unutilized, represents a constant general threat. In France, Great Britain, Belgium, Russia, and Japan, reactor-grade plutonium is used in MOX-fuel production. Making MOX-fuel for CANDU (Canada) and pressurized water reactors (PWR) (Europe) is under consideration Russia. If this latter production is added, as many as 5 tons of Pu per year might be processed into new FAs in Russia. Many years of work and experience are represented in the estimates of MOX fuel production wastes derived in this report. Prior engineering studies and sludge treatment investigations and comparisons have determined how best to treat Pu sludges and MOX fuel wastes. Based upon analyses of the production processes established by these efforts, we can estimate that there will be approximately 1200 kg of residual wastes subject to immobilization per MT of plutonium processed, of which approximately 6 to 7 kg is Pu in the residuals per MT of Pu processed. The wastes are various and complicated in composition. Because organic wastes constitute both the major portion of total waste and of the Pu to be immobilized, the recommended treatment of MOX-fuel production waste is incineration

Plutonium finishing plant dangerous waste training plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ENTROP, G.E.

1999-01-01

This training plan describes general requirements, worker categories, and provides course descriptions for operation of the Plutonium Finish Plant (PFP) waste generation facilities, permitted treatment, storage and disposal (TSD) units, and the 90-Day Accumulation Areas

Stabilizing plutonium materials at Hanford: systems engineering for PFP transition project effort on DNFSB 94-1

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Huber, T.E., Westinghouse Hanford

1996-07-02

This report discusses the basic objectives of the stabilization and packaging activities at the Plutonium Finishing Plant that satisfy the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board Recommendation 94-1 by transforming the plutonium materials at hanford into forms or conditions which are suitable for safe storage to appropriate storage criteria; or discard that meets appropriate waste acceptance criteria.

Management of Russian military plutonium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zaleski, C.P.

1996-01-01

The objective of this paper is to propose and discuss a solution which enables storing as quickly as possible all weapons-grade plutonium from Russian military program in a way which would prevent diversion. Two main conditions apply to this solution. First, it should be achieved in a manner acceptable to Russian government, notably by preserving plutonium for possible future energy production, and second, the economics of the total system should be good enough to ensure no charge or limited charge for the storage of plutonium. A proposal is made to store plutonium in a specially designed fast reactor or specially designed reactor core. This solution could be favorable in comparison to other solutions applying the above mentioned goal and conditions. Additionally the proposed solution would have the following side advantages: utilizing available personnel and installations of the Russian nuclear complex; providing possible basis for decommissioning of older and less safe Russian reactors; giving experience of construction and operation of a series of sodium-cooled fast reactors. The major problem however is the need for large capital investment with the risk of getting no adequate return on investment due to difficult political and economic situation in Russia

Pricing Scheme of Ocean Carrier for Inbound Container Storage for Assistance of Container Supply Chain Finance

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Mingzhu Yu

2014-01-01

Full Text Available The aim of this paper is to investigate the pricing scheme of ocean carrier for inbound container storage so as to assist container supply chain finance. In this paper, how an ocean carrier should set price of inbound container storage to the customer while facing the contract from the container terminal operator is first analyzed. Then, two different contract systems, the free-time contract system which is widely used in practice and the free-space contract system which is newly developed recently, are considered. In the two different contract systems, inbound container storage pricing models are constructed, and accordingly optimal solution approaches for the ocean carrier are provided. For comparison purpose, some numerical experiments for the two different contract systems are conducted to investigate the effects of the container terminal operator’s decision on the system outcomes. Numerical experiments show that (1 the carrier is more flexible in the free-space contract system and can receive more profit by using the free-storage-space as a pooling storage system and (2 the free-space contract system benefits both the carrier in profit and the busy terminal in traffic control.

Plutonium titration by controlled potential coulometry; Dosage du plutonium par coulometrie a potentiel impose

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Leguay, N.

2011-07-01

The LAMMAN (Nuclear Materials Metrology Laboratory) is the support laboratory of the CETAMA (Analytical Method Committee), whose two main activities are developing analytic methods, and making and characterizing reference materials. The LAMMAN chose to develop the controlled potential coulometry because it is a very accurate analytical technique which allows the connection between the quantity of element electrolysed to the quantity of electricity measured thanks to the Faraday's law: it does not require the use of a chemical standard. This method was first used for the plutonium titration and was developed in the Materials Analysis and Metrology Laboratory (LAMM), for upgrading its performances and developing it to the titration of other actinides. The equipment and the material used were developed to allow the work in confined atmosphere (in a glove box), with all the restrictions involved. Plutonium standard solutions are used to qualify the method, and in particular to do titrations with an uncertainty better than 0.1 %. The present study allowed making a bibliographic research about controlled potential coulometry applied to the actinides (plutonium, uranium, neptunium, americium and curium). A full procedure was written to set all the steps of plutonium titration, from the preparation of samples to equipments storage. A method validation was done to check the full procedure, and the experimental conditions: working range, uncertainty, performance... Coulometric titration of the plutonium from pure solution (without interfering elements) was developed to the coulometric titration of the plutonium in presence of uranium, which allows to do accurate analyses for the analyses of some parts of the reprocessing of the spent nuclear fuel. The possibility of developing this method to other actinides than plutonium was highlighted thanks to voltammetric studies, like the coulometric titration of uranium with a working carbon electrode in sulphuric medium. (author)

Modified titrimetric determination of plutonium using photometric end-point detection

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Baughman, W.J.; Dahlby, J.W.

1980-04-01

A method used at LASL for the accurate and precise assay of plutonium metal was modified for the measurement of plutonium in plutonium oxides, nitrate solutions, and in other samples containing large quantities of plutonium in oxidized states higher than +3. In this modified method, the plutonium oxide or other sample is dissolved using the sealed-reflux dissolution method or other appropriate methods. Weighed aliquots, containing approximately 100 mg of plutonium, of the dissolved sample or plutonium nitrate solution are fumed to dryness with an HC1O 4 -H 2 SO 4 mixture. The dried residue is dissolved in dilute H 2 SO 4 , and the plutonium is reduced to plutonium (III) with zinc metal. The excess zinc metal is dissolved with HCl, and the solution is passed through a lead reductor column to ensure complete reduction of the plutonium to plutonium (III). The solution, with added ferroin indicator, is then titrated immediately with standardized ceric solution to a photometric end point. For the analysis of plutonium metal solutions, plutonium oxides, and nitrate solutions, the relative standard deviation are 0.06, 0.08, and 0.14%, respectively. Of the elements most likely to be found with the plutonium, only iron, neptunium, and uranium interfere. Small amounts of uranium and iron, which titrate quantitatively in the method, are determined by separate analytical methods, and suitable corrections are applied to the plutonium value. 4 tables, 4 figures

Plutonium use - Present status and prospects

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dievoet, J. van; Fossoul, E.; Jonckheere, E.; Bemden, E. van den

1977-01-01

The use of plutonium in thermal and fast reactors is a demonstrated, if not proven, technology. Moreover, plutonium is being produced in increasing quantities. Evaluation of this production on a world scale shows that it would be theoretically possible to construct numerous breeders and thus to make the best use of plutonium, while considerably reducing uranium consumption. This source of plutonium is nevertheless dependent on the reprocessing of irradiated fuel. Long delays in installing and adequate world reprocessing capacity are weakening the prospects for introducing breeders. Furthermore, the critical situation regarding reprocessing may delay the development of complementary reprocessing methods for fuels with a high plutonium content and high burnup. The recycling of plutonium is now a well-known technique and any objections to it hardly bear analysis. Utilization of plutonium offers an appreciable saving in terms of uranium and separative work units; and it can also be shown that immediate reprocessing of the recycling fuel is not essential for the economics of the concept. Temporary storage of recycled fuel is a particularly safe form of concentrating plutonium, namely in irradiated plutonium-bearing fuel assemblies. Finally, recycling offers such flexibility that it represents no obstacle to fuel management at power plants with light-water reactors. These strategic considerations imply that the technology of using plutonium for fabricating thermal or fast reactor fuels is both technically reliable and economically viable. The methods used in industrial facilities are fully reassuring in this respect. Although various unsolved problems exist, none seems likely to impede current developments, while the industrial experience gained has enabled the economics and reliability of the methods to be improved appreciably. Apart from the techno-economic aspects, the plutonium industry must face extremely important problems in connection with the safety of personnel

An Opportunity to Immobilize 1.6 MT or More of Weapons-Grade Plutonium at the Mayak and Krasnoyarsk-26 Sites

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jardine, L J; Borisov, G B; Rovny, S I; Kudinov, K G; Shvedov, A A

2001-01-01

The Mayak Production Association (PA Mayak), an industrial site in Russia, will be assigned multiple new plutonium disposition missions in order to implement the ''Agreement Between The Government Of The United States Of America And The Government Of Russian Federation Concerning The Management And Disposition Of Plutonium Designated As No Longer Required For Defense Purposes And Related Cooperation'' signed September 1, 2000, by Gore and Kasyanov, In addition, the mission of industrial-scale mixed-oxide (MOX) fabrication will be assigned to either the Mining Chemical Combine (MCC) industrial site at Krasnoyarsk-26 (K-26) or PA Mayak. Over the next decades, these new missions will generate radioactive wastes containing weapons-grade plutonium. The existing Mayak and K-26 onsite facilities and infrastructures cannot currently treat and immobilize these Pu-containing wastes for storage and disposal. However, the wastes generated under the Agreement must be properly immobilized, treated, and managed. New waste treatment and immobilization missions at Mayak may include operating facilities for plutonium metal-to-oxide conversion processes, industrial-scale MOX fuel fabrication, BN-600 PAKET hybrid core MOX fuel fabrication, and a plutonium conversion demonstration process. The MCC K-26 site, if assigned the industrial-scale MOX fuel fabrication mission, would also need to add facilities to treat and immobilize the Pu-containing wastes. This paper explores the approach and cost of treatment and immobilization facilities at both Mayak and K-26. The current work to date at Mayak and MCC K-26 indicates that the direct immobilization of 1.6 MT of weapons-grade plutonium is a viable and cost-effective alternative

The Minatom concept of surplus weapons plutonium utilization in Russia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yegorov, N.N.; Bogdan, V.V.; Kagramanian, V.S.

1996-01-01

The fuel cycle industry in Russia has necessary basis and experience to begin solving problems of ensuring safe utilisation of weapons plutonium. Russian concept of plutonium management (both civil and military) is based on the fuel cycle closing in the nuclear power industry to increase the efficiency of the fuel use and decrease the activity of the long lived waste. Short term program of plutonium management in Russia includes safe and reliable storage of weapons and separated civil plutonium until they are used in reactors. Further studies are needed concerning optimal use of MOX fuel in fast BN reactors as well as in WWER type reactors having in mind non-proliferation aspects, nuclear radiation safety, economics and ecology

Radiation damage and annealing in plutonium tetrafluoride

Science.gov (United States)

McCoy, Kaylyn; Casella, Amanda; Sinkov, Sergey; Sweet, Lucas; McNamara, Bruce; Delegard, Calvin; Jevremovic, Tatjana

2017-12-01

A sample of plutonium tetrafluoride that was separated prior to 1966 at the Hanford Site in Washington State was analyzed at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) in 2015 and 2016. The plutonium tetrafluoride, as received, was an unusual color and considering the age of the plutonium, there were questions about the condition of the material. These questions had to be answered in order to determine the suitability of the material for future use or long-term storage. Therefore, thermogravimetric/differential thermal analysis and X-ray diffraction evaluations were conducted to determine the plutonium's crystal structure, oxide content, and moisture content; these analyses reported that the plutonium was predominately amorphous and tetrafluoride, with an oxide content near ten percent. Freshly fluorinated plutonium tetrafluoride is known to be monoclinic. During the initial thermogravimetric/differential thermal analyses, it was discovered that an exothermic event occurred within the material near 414 °C. X-ray diffraction analyses were conducted on the annealed tetrafluoride. The X-ray diffraction analyses indicated that some degree of recrystallization occurred in conjunction with the 414 °C event. The following commentary describes the series of thermogravimetric/differential thermal and X-ray diffraction analyses that were conducted as part of this investigation at PNNL.

Radiation damage and annealing in plutonium tetrafluoride

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

McCoy, Kaylyn; Casella, Amanda; Sinkov, Sergey

2017-01-01

A sample of plutonium tetrafluoride that was separated prior to 1966 at the Hanford Site in Washington State was analyzed at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) in 2015 and 2016. The plutonium tetrafluoride, as received, was an unusual color and considering the age of the plutonium, there were questions about the condition of the material. These questions had to be answered in order to determine the suitability of the material for future use or long-term storage. Therefore, thermogravimetric/differential thermal analysis and X-ray diffraction evaluations were conducted to determine the plutonium's crystal structure, oxide content, and moisture content; these analyses reported that the plutonium was predominately amorphous and tetrafluoride, with an oxide content near ten percent. Freshly fluorinated plutonium tetrafluoride is known to be monoclinic. And during the initial thermogravimetric/differential thermal analyses, it was discovered that an exothermic event occurred within the material near 414 °C. X-ray diffraction analyses were conducted on the annealed tetrafluoride. The X-ray diffraction analyses indicated that some degree of recrystallization occurred in conjunction with the 414 °C event. This commentary describes the series of thermogravimetric/differential thermal and X-ray diffraction analyses that were conducted as part of this investigation at PNNL.

Assay of low-level plutonium effluents

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hsue, S.T.; Hsue, F.; Bowersox, D.F.

1981-01-01

In the plutonium recovery section at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, an effluent solution is generated that contains low plutonium concentration and relatively high americium concentration. Nondestructive assay of this solution is demonstrated by measuring the passive L x-rays following alpha decay. Preliminary results indicate that an average deviation of 30% between L x-ray and alpha counting can be achieved for plutonium concentrations above 10 mg/L and Am/Pu ratios of up to 3; for plutonium concentrations less than 10 mg/L, the average deviation is 40%. The sensitivity of the L x-ray assay is approx. 1 mg Pu/L

Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium. Quarterly technical progress report, February 1, 1998--April 30, 1998

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1998-06-01

Activities from the Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium are described. Areas of work include materials science of nuclear and explosive materials, plutonium processing and handling, robotics, and storage.

75 FR 41850 - Amended Notice of Intent to Modify the Scope of the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental...

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-19

... and packaging capabilities, including direct metal oxidation, to fulfill plutonium storage..., disassemble nuclear weapons pits (a weapons component) and convert the plutonium metal to an oxide form for fabrication into mixed uranium-plutonium oxide (MOX) reactor fuel in the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility...

Risks attached to container- and bunker-storage of nuclear waste

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jager, D. de

1987-12-01

The results are presented of a literature study into the risks attached to the two dry-storage options selected by the Dutch Central Organization For Radioactive Waste (COVRA): the container- and the bunker-storage for irradiated nuclear-fuel elements and nuclear waste. Since the COVRA does not make it clear how these concepts should have to be realized, the experiences abroad with dry interim-storage are considered. In particular the Castor-container-storage and the bunker storage proposed in the committee MINSK (Possibilities of Interim-storage in the Netherlands of Irradiated nuclear-fuel elements and Nuclear waste) are studied further in depth. The committee MINSK has performed a study into the technical realizability of various interim-storage facilities, among which a storage in bunkers. (author). 75 refs.; 14 figs.; 16 tabs

Sequential potentiometric determination of uranium and plutonium in a single aliquot

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rao, V.K.; Charyulu, M.M.; Natarajan, P.R.

1983-01-01

A method is reported for sequential potentiometric determination of uranium and plutonium present is an aliquot. Plutonium is first determined by oxidizing it to the hexavalent state with perchloric acid followed by iron(II) reduction and titration of excess ferrous iron with chromium(VI). Uranium is subsequently determined by reduction to the quadrivalent state using titanium(III) and titration with vanadium(V). The interference of plutonium and iron(II) is eliminated by the addition of a mixture containing sulfamic acid, nitric acid, and molybdenum(VI). The results of the analysis of mixture containing 3-5 mg quantities of uranium and plutonium are reliable with errors less than 0.3% and 0.2%, respectively. The application of the method for the analysis of mixtures containing various amounts of uranium and plutonium has been examined. (author)

Plutonium Immobilization Can Loading Concepts

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kriikku, E.; Ward, C.; Stokes, M.; Randall, B.; Steed, J.; Jones, R.; Hamilton, L.; Rogers, L.; Fiscus, J.; Dyches, G.

1998-05-01

The Plutonium Immobilization Facility will encapsulate plutonium in ceramic pucks and seal the pucks inside welded cans. Remote equipment will place these cans in magazines and the magazines in a Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) canister. The DWPF will fill the canister with glass for permanent storage. This report discusses five can loading conceptual designs and the lists the advantages and disadvantages for each concept. This report identifies loading pucks into cans and backfilling cans with helium as the top priority can loading development areas. The can loading welder and cutter are very similar to the existing Savannah River Site (SRS) FB-Line bagless transfer welder and cutter and thus they are a low priority development item

Analysis and characterization of plutonium in pyrochemical salt residues

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Haschke, John M.; Phillips, Alan G.

2000-01-01

Quantitative measurement of hydrogen produced during salt-catalyzed hydrolysis of plutonium in pyrochemical salt residues show that the metal is present in concentrations of 10 ± 5 mass%. The analytical method is based on stoichiometric reaction of metal with water to form plutonium monoxide monohydride (PuOH) and hydrogen. Results of a kinetic model developed to describe the observed time dependence of the hydrolysis rate shows that metal is present predominately as particles with essentially spherical geometries and diameters near 1 mm. The presence of smaller metallic particles cannot be verified or excluded. Plutonium concentrations measured for residues stored in different configurations suggest that a sizable fraction of the metal has oxidized during storage. Application of the hydrolysis method in determining concentrations and dimensions of metallic plutonium in other nuclear waste forms is proposed

Plutonium and surrogate fission products in a composite ceramic waste form

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Esh, D. W.; Frank, S. M.; Goff, K. M.; Johnson, S. G.; Moschetti, T. L.; O'Holleran, T.

1999-01-01

Argonne National Laboratory is developing a ceramic waste form to immobilize salt containing fission products and transuranic elements. Preliminary results have been presented for ceramic waste forms containing surrogate fission products such as cesium and the lanthanides. In this work results from scanning electron microscopy/energy dispersive spectroscopy and x-ray diffraction are presented in greater detail for ceramic waste forms containing surrogate fission products. Additionally, results for waste forms containing plutonium and surrogate fission products are presented. Most of the surrogate fission products appear to be silicates or aluminosilicates whereas the plutonium is usually found in an oxide form. There is also evidence for the presence of plutonium within the sodalite phase although the chemical speciation of the plutonium is not known

Plutonium speciation affected by environmental bacteria

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Neu, M.P.; Icopini, G.A.; Boukhalfa, H.

2005-01-01

Plutonium has no known biological utility, yet it has the potential to interact with bacterial cellular and extracellular structures that contain metal-binding groups, to interfere with the uptake and utilization of essential elements, and to alter cell metabolism. These interactions can transform plutonium from its most common forms, solid, mineral-adsorbed, or colloidal Pu(IV), to a variety of biogeochemical species that have much different physico-chemical properties. Organic acids that are extruded products of cell metabolism can solubilize plutonium and then enhance its environmental mobility, or in some cases facilitate plutonium transfer into cells. Phosphate- and carboxylate-rich polymers associated with cell walls can bind plutonium to form mobile biocolloids or Pu-laden biofilm/mineral solids. Bacterial membranes, proteins or redox agents can produce strongly reducing electrochemical zones and generate molecular Pu(III/IV) species or oxide particles. Alternatively, they can oxidize plutonium to form soluble Pu(V) or Pu(VI) complexes. This paper reviews research on plutonium-bacteria interactions and closely related studies on the biotransformation of uranium and other metals. (orig.)

Plutonium assay of large waste burial containers at the Pacific Northwest Laboratory

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Haggard, D.L.; Newman, D.F.

1987-01-01

As one phase of an upgrade program at one of the Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory facilities, two plutonium glovebox hoods were replaced. They were dismantled, packaged in plastic for contamination control, and loaded into waste burial boxes. All of the plutonium-contaminated waste material from the two glovebox hoods was placed into six stainless steel boxes with identification letters A through F. Boxes A through E have 104.8- x 196.2- x 119.4-cm i.d.'s. Box F has an i.d. of 154.9 x 266.7 x 192.4 cm. The loaded boxes were assayed for plutonium content using both neutron and gamma-ray techniques. The difference between the results were greater than anticipated. Because of the importance of accurate plutonium assay measurements, additional measurements of box contents were made using a variety of techniques and assumptions including downloading of boxes and measurement of individual packages. These measurements have shown that a far-field, gamma-ray assay of a loaded waste box usually provides adequate measurement of low-density plutonium content, such as that found in packages of plastic, cellulose, and clothing. Comparing the far-field assays of the loaded waste boxes to the quantities determined by the assays of the downloaded packages resulted in good agreement between the two methods for boxes with low attenuation. Based on these results, it was concluded that it was valid to use the far-field assay results for the boxes that were not downloaded

Plutonium stabilization and disposition focus area, FY 1999 and FY 2000 multi-year program plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-03-01

Consistent with the Environmental Management's (EM's) plan titled, ''Accelerating Cleanup: Paths to Closure'', and ongoing efforts within the Executive Branch and Congress, this Multi-Year Program Plan (MYPP) for the Plutonium Focus Area was written to ensure that technical gap projects are effectively managed and measured. The Plutonium Focus Area (PFA) defines and manages technology development programs that contribute to the effective stabilization of nuclear materials and their subsequent safe storage and final disposition. The scope of PFA activities includes the complete spectrum of plutonium materials, special isotopes, and other fissile materials. The PFA enables solutions to site-specific and complex-wide technology issues associated with plutonium remediation, stabilization, and preparation for disposition. The report describes the current technical activities, namely: Plutonium stabilization (9 studies); Highly enriched uranium stabilization (2 studies); Russian collaboration program (2 studies); Packaging and storage technologies (6 studies); and PFA management work package/product line (3 studies). Budget information for FY 1999 and FY 2000 is provided

Plutonium stabilization and disposition focus area, FY 1999 and FY 2000 multi-year program plan

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1998-03-01

Consistent with the Environmental Management`s (EM`s) plan titled, ``Accelerating Cleanup: Paths to Closure``, and ongoing efforts within the Executive Branch and Congress, this Multi-Year Program Plan (MYPP) for the Plutonium Focus Area was written to ensure that technical gap projects are effectively managed and measured. The Plutonium Focus Area (PFA) defines and manages technology development programs that contribute to the effective stabilization of nuclear materials and their subsequent safe storage and final disposition. The scope of PFA activities includes the complete spectrum of plutonium materials, special isotopes, and other fissile materials. The PFA enables solutions to site-specific and complex-wide technology issues associated with plutonium remediation, stabilization, and preparation for disposition. The report describes the current technical activities, namely: Plutonium stabilization (9 studies); Highly enriched uranium stabilization (2 studies); Russian collaboration program (2 studies); Packaging and storage technologies (6 studies); and PFA management work package/product line (3 studies). Budget information for FY 1999 and FY 2000 is provided.

STP-ECRTS - THERMAL AND GAS ANALYSES FOR SLUDGE TRANSPORT AND STORAGE CONTAINER (STSC) STORAGE AT T PLANT

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

CROWE RD; APTHORPE R; LEE SJ; PLYS MG

2010-04-29

The Sludge Treatment Project (STP) is responsible for the disposition of sludge contained in the six engineered containers and Settler tank within the 105-K West (KW) Basin. The STP is retrieving and transferring sludge from the Settler tank into engineered container SCS-CON-230. Then, the STP will retrieve and transfer sludge from the six engineered containers in the KW Basin directly into a Sludge Transport and Storage Containers (STSC) contained in a Sludge Transport System (STS) cask. The STSC/STS cask will be transported to T Plant for interim storage of the STSC. The STS cask will be loaded with an empty STSC and returned to the KW Basin for loading of additional sludge for transportation and interim storage at T Plant. CH2MHILL Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) contracted with Fauske & Associates, LLC (FAI) to perform thermal and gas generation analyses for interim storage of STP sludge in the Sludge Transport and Storage Container (STSCs) at T Plant. The sludge types considered are settler sludge and sludge originating from the floor of the KW Basin and stored in containers 210 and 220, which are bounding compositions. The conditions specified by CHPRC for analysis are provided in Section 5. The FAI report (FAI/10-83, Thermal and Gas Analyses for a Sludge Transport and Storage Container (STSC) at T Plant) (refer to Attachment 1) documents the analyses. The process considered was passive, interim storage of sludge in various cells at T Plant. The FATE{trademark} code is used for the calculation. The results are shown in terms of the peak sludge temperature and hydrogen concentrations in the STSC and the T Plant cell. In particular, the concerns addressed were the thermal stability of the sludge and the potential for flammable gas mixtures. This work was performed with preliminary design information and a preliminary software configuration.

Determination of free acid in plutonium (IV) solutions - thermometrically, potentiometrically

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Williams, T.L.; Tucker, G.M.; Huff, G.A.; Jordan, L.G.

1981-09-01

The thermometric titration technique was found to offer certain advantages over potentiometry in the determination of free acid in Pu(IV) solutions. The thermometric technique was applied to the determination of free acid in plutonium nitrate solutions using potassium fluoride to suppress the hydrolytic interference of plutonium(IV). The results indicate that 0.2 to 2.0 milliequivalents of free acid can be determined with acceptable bias and precision in solutions containing up to 30 milligrams of plutonium. In contrast, neither the thermometric nor the potentiometric technique was suitable for samples containing more than eight milligrams of plutonium complexed with potassium oxalate

Reclamation of plutonium from pyrochemical processing residues

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gray, L.W.; Gray, J.H.; Holcomb, H.P.; Chostner, D.F.

1987-04-01

Savannah River Laboratory (SRL), Savannah River Plant (SRP), and Rocky Flats Plant (RFP) have jointly developed a process to recover plutonium from molten salt extraction residues. These NaCl, KCL, and MgCl 2 residues, which are generated in the pyrochemical extraction of 241 Am from aged plutonium metal, contain up to 25 wt % dissolved plutonium and up to 2 wt % americium. The overall objective was to develop a process to convert these residues to a pure plutonium metal product and discardable waste. To meet this objective a combination of pyrochemical and aqueous unit operations was used. The first step was to scrub the salt residue with a molten metal (aluminum and magnesium) to form a heterogeneous ''scrub alloy'' containing nominally 25 wt % plutonium. This unit operation, performed at RFP, effectively separated the actinides from the bulk of the chloride salts. After packaging in aluminum cans, the ''scrub alloy'' was then dissolved in a nitric acid - hydrofluoric acid - mercuric nitrate solution at SRP. Residual chloride was separated from the dissolver solution by precipitation with Hg 2 (NO 3 ) 2 followed by centrifuging. Plutonium was then separated from the aluminum, americium and magnesium using the Purex solvent extraction system. The 241 Am was diverted to the waste tank farm, but could be recovered if desired

The storage capacity of cocoa seeds (Theobroma cacao L.) through giving Polyethylene Glycol (PEG) in the various of storage container

Science.gov (United States)

Lahay, R. R.; Misrun, S.; Sipayung, R.

2018-02-01

Cocoa is plant which it’s seed character is recalcitrant. Giving PEG and using various of storage containers was hoped to increase storage capacity of cocoa seeds as long as period of saving. The reseach was aimed to identify the storage capacity of cocoa seeds through giving PEG in the various of storage containers. Research took place in Hataram Jawa II, Kabupaten Simalungun, Propinsi Sumatera Utara, Indonesia. The method of this research is spit-split plot design with 3 replication. Storage period was put on main plot which was consisted of 4 level, PEG concentration was put on sub plot, consisted of 4 level and storage container was put on the sub sub plot consisted of 3 types. The results showed that until 4 days at storage with 45 % PEG concentration at all storage container, percentage of seed germination at storage can be decreased to be 2.90 %, and can be defensed until 16 days with 45 % PEG concentration at perforated plastic storage container. Percentage of molded seeds and seed moisture content were increased with added period of storage but seed moisture content was increased until 12 days at storage and was decreased at 16 days in storage.

CONVERSION OF PLUTONIUM TRIFLUORIDE TO PLUTONIUM TETRAFLUORIDE

Science.gov (United States)

Fried, S.; Davidson, N.R.

1957-09-10

A large proportion of the trifluoride of plutonium can be converted, in the absence of hydrogen fluoride, to the tetrafiuoride of plutonium. This is done by heating plutonium trifluoride with oxygen at temperatures between 250 and 900 deg C. The trifiuoride of plutonium reacts with oxygen to form plutonium tetrafluoride and plutonium oxide, in a ratio of about 3 to 1. In the presence of moisture, plutonium tetrafluoride tends to hydrolyze at elevated temperatures and therefore it is desirable to have the process take place under anhydrous conditions.

Light water breeder reactor using a uranium-plutonium cycle

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Radkowsky, A.; Chen, R.

1990-01-01

This patent describes a light water receptor (LWR) for breeding fissile material using a uranium-plutonium cycle. It comprises: a prebreeder section having plutonium fuel containing a Pu-241 component, the prebreeder section being operable to produce enriched plutonium having an increased Pu-241 component; and a breeder section for receiving the enriched plutonium from the prebreeder section, the breeder section being operable for breeding fissile material from the enriched plutonium fuel. This patent describes a method of operating a light water nuclear reactor (LWR) for breeding fissile material using a uranium-plutonium cycle. It comprises: operating the prebreeder to produce enriched plutonium fuel having an increased Pu-241 component; fueling a breeder section with the enriched plutonium fuel to breed the fissile material

Overview of surplus weapons plutonium disposition

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Rudy, G.

1996-05-01

The safe disposition of surplus weapons useable plutonium is a very important and urgent task. While the functions of long term storage and disposition directly relate to the Department`s weapons program and the environmental management program, the focus of this effort is particularly national security and nonproliferation.

Storage container for radioactive wastes

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Catalayoud, L.; Gerard, M.

1990-01-01

Tightness, shock resistance and corrosion resistance of containers for storage of radioactive wastes it obtained by complete fabrication with concrete reinforced with metal fibers. This material is used for molding the cask, the cover and the joint connecting both parts. Dovetail grooves are provided on the cask and the cover for the closure [fr

IMPROVED PROCESS OF PLUTONIUM CARRIER PRECIPITATION

Science.gov (United States)

Faris, B.F.

1959-06-30

This patent relates to an improvement in the bismuth phosphate process for separating and recovering plutonium from neutron irradiated uranium, resulting in improved decontamination even without the use of scavenging precipitates in the by-product precipitation step and subsequently more complete recovery of the plutonium in the product precipitation step. This improvement is achieved by addition of fluomolybdic acid, or a water soluble fluomolybdate, such as the ammonium, sodium, or potassium salt thereof, to the aqueous nitric acid solution containing tetravalent plutonium ions and contaminating fission products, so as to establish a fluomolybdate ion concentration of about 0.05 M. The solution is then treated to form the bismuth phosphate plutonium carrying precipitate.

Density of Plutonium Turnings Generated from Machining Activities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Gonzales, John Robert [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Vigil, Duane M. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Jachimowski, Thomas A. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Archuleta, Alonso [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Arellano, Gerald Joseph [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Melton, Vince Lee [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2016-10-20

The purpose of this project was to determine the density of plutonium (Pu) turnings generated from the range of machining activities, using both surrogate material and machined Pu turnings. Verify that 500 grams (g) of plutonium will fit in a one quart container using a surrogate equivalent volume and that 100 grams of Pu will fit in a one quart Savy container.

Storage Optimization for Export Containers in the Port of Izmir

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Deniz Türsel Eliiyi

2013-07-01

Full Text Available In this study, we consider a real-life export container storage problem at an important container terminal in the Port of Izmir, Turkey. Currently, the container storage decisions at the port are taken by operators manually, which leads to continuous unnecessary re-handling movements of the containers. High transportation costs, waste of time, and inefficient capacity utilization in the container storage area are the consequences of non-optimal decisions. The main goal of this study is to minimize the transportation costs and the number of re-handling moves while storing the export containers at the terminal yard. We formulate the problem in two stages. While the first stage assigns the containers of the same vessel to a group of yard bays via an optimization model, the second stage decides on the exact location of each container with the help of an efficient heuristic approach. The experimental results with real data are presented and discussed.

Plutonium uniqueness

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Silver, G.L.

1984-01-01

A standard is suggested against which the putative uniqueness of plutonium may be tested. It is common folklore that plutonium is unique among the chemical elements because its four common oxidation states can coexist in the same solution. Whether this putative uniqueness appears only during transit to equilibrium, or only at equilibrium, or all of the time, is not generally made clear. But while the folklore may contain some truth, it cannot be put to test until some measure of 'uniqueness' is agreed upon so that quantitative comparisons are possible. One way of measuring uniqueness is as the magnitude of the product of the mole fractions of the element at equilibrium. A 'coexistence index' is defined and discussed. (author)

Beating plutonium swords into electrical plowshares

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ofte, D.

1993-01-01

After decades of producing large quantities of weapons-grade plutonium, the United States and the Confederation of Independent States are faced with an unanticipated dilemma of a growing surplus of that material. This circumstance could not have been anticipated just a few years ago after living with a weapons program that from its inception in the United States was characterized by a chronic tight supply situation. The rapid drawdown of the nuclear weapons stockpile presents a near-term problem of storage capacity in the system until the United States makes a disposition decision for what may be in excess of 50 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium

Plutonium, proliferation, and the price of reprocessing

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gilinsky, V.

1978-01-01

France and Britain disagree with the US on whether deferring fuel reprocessing that provides plutonium for export can help contain proliferation. The US has veto power over reprocessing of US-supplied fuels for non-EURATOM countries, but exceptions will be made for movement within the EURATOM community. Political issues will be influenced by the magnitude of the financial investments, however, and commercial considerations have until recently dominated and complicated international safeguards. The author notes that US policy was reversed by the gradual acknowledgment that the same international inspection of plutonium stockpiles would not work as it had for low-enriched fuel and that economic interests must have a lower priority to avoiding proliferation. He cites the combination of sudden policy shifts, failure to prove that present reactors are best, and long-term distrust of US economic motives as failing to persuade either the French or British, who feel the best safeguard is provided by their high-security reprocessing facilities. Still to be resolved are the conditions under which plutonium must be returned to its owners, a problem that must determine safe international transport and storage and international management. Technical fixes, such as the CIVEX process, cannot contribute to the solution for several decades, while reprocessing is no longer considered a first step in waste disposal and would be more expensive and complicated than present waste disposal procedures. The author concedes merit in President Carter's requirement of separating ''the legitimate and necessary use of uranium'' and nuclear fuels that are also explosives

Fabrication of zircon for disposition of weapons plutonium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, K.C.; Huang, J.Y.; Serrano, P.L.

1997-01-01

This is the final report of a one-year, Laboratory-Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). In an effort to address the problems of long term storage and nuclear waste minimization, zircon has been proposed as a host medium for plutonium and other actinides recovered from dismantled nuclear weapons. The objective of this work is to investigate the feasibility of large scale fabrication of Pu-bearing zircon. Since PuO 2 is thermodynamically less stable than ZrO 2 , it is expected that the process parameters determined for synthesizing ZrSiO 4 (zircon) would be applicable to those for PuSiO 4 (Pu-zircon). Furthermore, since the foremost concern in plutonium processing is the potential for contamination release, this work emphasizes the development of process parameters, using zircon first, to anticipate potential material problems in the containment system for reaction mixtures during processing. Stoichiometric mixtures of ZrO 2 and SiO 2 , in hundred-gram batches, have been subjected to hot isostatic pressing (HIP) at temperatures near 1,500 C and pressures approximately 10,000 psi. The product materials have been analyzed by x-ray powder diffraction, and are found to consist of zircon after approximately two hours of reaction time. From this work, it is clear that the fabrication of large quantities of Pu-zircon is feasible. The most notable result of this work is evidence for the existence of container problems. This result, in turn, suggests potential solutions to these problems. Experiments with the quartz inner container, the glass sealant, a sacrificial metal barrier, and a metal outer container are being investigated to mitigate these potential hazards

Storage chamber for container of radiation-contaminated material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Takakura, Masahide.

1996-01-01

The present invention concerns a storage chamber for containing radiation-contaminated materials in containing tubes and having cooling fluids circulated at the outer side of the containing tubes. The storage chamber comprises a gas supply means connected to the inside of the container tube for supplying a highly heat-conductive gas and a gas exhaustion means for discharging the gas present in the container tube. When containing vessels for radiation-contaminated materials are contained in the container tube, the gases present inside of the container tube is exhausted by means of the gas exhaustion means, and highly heat conductive gases are filled from the gas supply means to the space between the container tube and the containing vessels for the radiation-contaminated materials. When the temperature of the highly heat conductive gas is elevated due to the heat generation of the radiation-contaminated materials, the container tube is heated, and then cooled by the cooling fluid at the outer side of the container tube. In this case, the heat of the radiation-contaminated material-containing vessels is removed by the heat conduction by the highly heat conductive gas to reduce temperature gradient between the containing vessels and the containing tube. This can enhance the cooling effect. (T.M.)

Plutonium recovery from spent reactor fuel by uranium displacement

Science.gov (United States)

Ackerman, J.P.

1992-03-17

A process is described for separating uranium values and transuranic values from fission products containing rare earth values when the values are contained together in a molten chloride salt electrolyte. A molten chloride salt electrolyte with a first ratio of plutonium chloride to uranium chloride is contacted with both a solid cathode and an anode having values of uranium and fission products including plutonium. A voltage is applied across the anode and cathode electrolytically to transfer uranium and plutonium from the anode to the electrolyte while uranium values in the electrolyte electrolytically deposit as uranium metal on the solid cathode in an amount equal to the uranium and plutonium transferred from the anode causing the electrolyte to have a second ratio of plutonium chloride to uranium chloride. Then the solid cathode with the uranium metal deposited thereon is removed and molten cadmium having uranium dissolved therein is brought into contact with the electrolyte resulting in chemical transfer of plutonium values from the electrolyte to the molten cadmium and transfer of uranium values from the molten cadmium to the electrolyte until the first ratio of plutonium chloride to uranium chloride is reestablished.

Plutonium recovery from spent reactor fuel by uranium displacement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ackerman, J.P.

1992-01-01

A process is described for separating uranium values and transuranic values from fission products containing rare earth values when the values are contained together in a molten chloride salt electrolyte. A molten chloride salt electrolyte with a first ratio of plutonium chloride to uranium chloride is contacted with both a solid cathode and an anode having values of uranium and fission products including plutonium. A voltage is applied across the anode and cathode electrolytically to transfer uranium and plutonium from the anode to the electrolyte while uranium values in the electrolyte electrolytically deposit as uranium metal on the solid cathode in an amount equal to the uranium and plutonium transferred from the anode causing the electrolyte to have a second ratio of plutonium chloride to uranium chloride. Then the solid cathode with the uranium metal deposited thereon is removed and molten cadmium having uranium dissolved therein is brought into contact with the electrolyte resulting in chemical transfer of plutonium values from the electrolyte to the molten cadmium and transfer of uranium values from the molten cadmium to the electrolyte until the first ratio of plutonium chloride to uranium chloride is reestablished

Plutonium working group report on environmental, safety and health vulnerabilities associated with the Department's plutonium storage. Volume II, part 8: Argonne National Laboratory - East and New Brunswick Laboratory working group assessment team report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-09-01

The Plutonium Vulnerability Working Group Assessment Team No. 1 (WGAT-1) visited Argonne National Laboratory-East (ANL-E) and New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL), located at the ANL-Illinois site, from May 23 through May 27 and June 6 through June 10, 1994. The objective of the WGAT-1, the ANL-E Site Assessment Team (SAT), and the NBL SAT was to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the environment, safety, and health (ES ampersand H) vulnerabilities arising at ANL-E and NBL from the storage and handling of the Department's current plutonium holdings. During the first visit to the site (May 23-27), WGAT-1 toured various site facilities and, after each tour, met with SAT members to conduct 'table-top' discussions. In addition, various briefings were given to ANL-E management, NBL management, and DOE management. During the second visit (June 6-10), WGAT-1 completed their assessment report, and met with various site technical representatives

THE DEACTIVATION, DECONTAMINATION AND DECOMMISSIONING OF THE PLUTONIUM FINISHING PLANT, A FORMER PLUTONIUM PROCESSING FACILITY AT DOE'S HANFORD SITE

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

CHARBONEAU, S.L.

2006-01-01

The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) was constructed as part of the Manhattan Project during World War II. The Manhattan Project was developed to usher in the use of nuclear weapons to end the war. The primary mission of the PFP was to provide plutonium used as special nuclear material (SNM) for fabrication of nuclear devices for the war effort. Subsequent to the end of World War II, the PFP's mission expanded to support the Cold War effort through plutonium production during the nuclear arms race and later the processing of fuel grade mixed plutonium-uranium oxide to support DOE's breeder reactor program. In October 1990, at the close of the production mission for PFP, a shutdown order was prepared by the Department of Energy (DOE) in Washington,; DC--and issued to the Richland DOE field office. Subsequent to the shutdown order, a team from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) analyzed the hazards at PFP associated with the continued storage of certain forms of plutonium solutions and solids. The assessment identified many discrete actions that were required to stabilize the different plutonium forms into stable form and repackage the material in high integrity containers. These actions were technically complicated and completed as part of the PFP nuclear material stabilization project between 1995 and early 2005. The completion of the stabilization project was a necessary first step in deactivating PFP. During stabilization, DOE entered into negotiations with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the State of Washington and established milestones for the Deactivation and Decommissioning (DandD) of the PFP. The DOE and its contractor, Fluor Hanford (Fluor), have made great progress in deactivating, decontaminating and decommissioning the PFP at the Hanford Site as detailed in this paper. Background information covering the PFP DandD effort includes descriptions of negotiations with the State of Washington concerning consent

Weapons grade plutonium disposition in PWR, CANDU and FR

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Deplech, M.; Tommasi, J.; Zaetta, A.

2000-01-01

In the frame work of the AIDA/MOX phase I/I/ program (1994-1997) between France and Russia, the disposition of plutonium in reactors was studied. The LWR (Light Water Reactor), FR (Fast reactors), CANDU (Heavy Water Reactors), HTR (High Temperature Reactors) options for using excess dismantled weapons plutonium for peaceful commercial nuclear power generating purposes offer some advantages over the remaining options (storage). The AIDA/MOX phase 1 program covers different topics, among which are the neutronic aspects of loading reactors with weapons-grade plutonium. The conclusions are that the weapon plutonium consumption is similar in the different type of reactors. However, the use of inert matrices allows to increase the mass balance for a same denaturing level. The use of Thorium as a matrix or special isotopes to increase the proliferation resistance prove to be insufficient. (author)

Civil plutonium held in France in December 31, 2000

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-02-01

Spent fuels comprise about 1% of plutonium which is separated during the reprocessing and recycled to prepare the mixed uranium-plutonium fuel (MOX), which in turn is burnt in PWRs. Plutonium can be in a non-irradiated or separated form, or in an irradiated form when contained in the spent fuel. Each year, in accordance with the 1997 directives relative to the management of plutonium, France has to make a status of its civil plutonium stock and communicate it to the IAEA using a standard model form. This short document summarizes the French plutonium stocks at the end of 1999 and 2000. (J.S.)

Plutonium contaminated materials research programme. Progress Report for 1983/84 from the Plutonium Contaminated Materials Working Party

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Higson, S.G.

1984-01-01

Plutonium contaminated material (PCM) is a generic term applied to a wide variety of materials which have become contaminated by plutonium compounds, by virtue of their use inside the primary containment of fuel cycle plants, but which generally have low beta gamma content. The report falls under the headings: introduction; organisation and role of the PCMWP; management practices; 1983/84 progress report (a) reduction of arisings; (b) plutonium measurement; (c) treatment of solid PCM; (d) treatment of alpha bearing liquid wastes; (e) actinide chemistry; (f) engineering objectives. (U.K.)

Plutonium working group report on environmental, safety and health vulnerabilities associated with the department's plutonium storage. Volume II, Appendix B, Part 6: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory site assessment team report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-09-01

The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Main Site is located about 40 miles east of San Francisco at the southeast end of the Livermore Valley in southern Alameda County, California. The initial mission of LLNL, operated by the University of California, was to do the research, development, and testing necessary to support the design of nuclear weapons. Over the years, this mission has been broadened to encompass such areas as strategic defense, energy, the environment, biomedicine, the economy, and education.This report presents results from an environment, safety, and health assessment report concerned with the storage of plutonium

Use of a Shielded High Resolution Gamma Spectrometry System to Segregate LLW from Contact Handleable ILW Containing Plutonium - 13046

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lester, Rosemary; Wilkins, Colin [Canberra UK Ltd, Unit 1 B528.1, Harwell Science Campus, Oxfordshire OX11 0DF (United Kingdom); Chard, Patrick [Canberra UK Ltd, Forss Business and Technology park, Thurso, Caithness KW14 7UZ (United Kingdom); Jaederstroem, Henrik; LeBlanc, Paul; Mowry, Rick [Canberra Industries, Inc., 800 Research Parkway, Meriden, Connecticut, 06450 (United States); MacDonald, Sanders; Gunn, William [Dounreay Site Restoration Limited, Dounreay, Thurso, Caithness, KW14 7TZ (United Kingdom)

2013-07-01

Dounreay Site Restoration Limited (DSRL) have a number of drums of solid waste that may contain Plutonium Contaminated Material. These are currently categorised as Contact Handleable Intermediate Level Waste (CHILW). A significant fraction of these drums potentially contain waste that is in the Low Level Waste (LLW) category. A Canberra Q2 shielded high resolution gamma spectrometry system is being used to quantify the total activity of drums that are potentially in the LLW category in order to segregate those that do contain LLW from CHILW drums and thus to minimise the total volume of waste in the higher category. Am-241 is being used as an indicator of the presence of plutonium in the waste from its strong 59.54 keV gamma-ray; a knowledge of the different waste streams from which the material originates allows a pessimistic waste 'fingerprint' to be used in order to determine an upper limit to the activities of the weak and non-gamma-emitting plutonium and associated radionuclides. This paper describes the main features of the high resolution gamma spectrometry system being used by DSRL to perform the segregation of CHILW and LLW and how it was configured and calibrated using the Canberra In-Situ Object Counting System (ISOCS). It also describes how potential LLW drums are selected for assay and how the system uses the existing waste stream fingerprint information to determine a reliable upper limit for the total activity present in each measured drum. Results from the initial on-site commissioning trials and the first measurements of waste drums using the new monitor are presented. (authors)

An oxyde mixture fuel containing uranium and plutonium dioxides and process to obtain this oxyde mixture

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hannerz, K.

1976-01-01

An oxide-mixture fuel containing uranium and plutonium dioxides having the slage of spherical, or nearly spherical, oxide-mixture particles with a diameter within the range of from 0.2 to 2 mn charactarized in that each oxide-mixture particles is provided with an outer layer comprising mainly UO2, the thickness of which is at least 0.05; whereas the inner portion of the oxide-mixture particles comprises mainly PUO 2

Corrosion assessment of dry fuel storage containers

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Graves, C.E.

1994-09-01

The structural stability as a function of expected corrosion degradation of 75 dry fuel storage containers located in the 200 Area Low-Level Waste Burial Grounds was evaluated. These containers include 22 concrete burial containers, 13 55-gal (208-l) drums, and 40 Experimental Breeder Reactor II (EBR-II) transport/storage casks. All containers are buried beneath at least 48 in. of soil and a heavy plastic tarp with the exception of 35 of the EBR-II casks which are exposed to atmosphere. A literature review revealed that little general corrosion is expected and pitting corrosion of the carbon steel used as the exterior shell for all containers (with the exception of the concrete containers) will occur at a maximum rate of 3.5 mil/yr. Penetration from pitting of the exterior shell of the 208-l drums and EBR-II casks is calculated to occur after 18 and 71 years of burial, respectively. The internal construction beneath the shell would be expected to preclude containment breach, however, for the drums and casks. The estimates for structural failure of the external shells, large-scale shell deterioration due to corrosion, are considerably longer, 39 and 150 years respectively for the drums and casks. The concrete burial containers are expected to withstand a service life of 50 years.

Experimental Studies on Plutonium Kinetics in Marine Biota

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fowler, S.; Heyraud, M.; Beasley, T.M.

1976-01-01

Laboratory experiments were undertaken to measure plutonium flux through marine organisms and to clarify the pathways by which this important element is cycled in the marine environment. The use of a specially prepared isotope, plutonium-237, allowed measurements to be made with standard Nal(Tl) scintillation techniques. Mussels, shrimp and worms were allowed to accumulate plutonium-237 from sea water for up to 25 days. Accumulation by shrimp was relatively slow and the degree of uptake was strongly influenced by moulting. Cast moults contained large fractions of the shrimps ' plutonium content, indicating the high affinity of plutonium for surface areas. Only small amounts of the isotope in the moult are lost to water; hence, moulting is considered to be an important biological parameter in the biogeochemical cycling of plutonium. Mussels attained higher concentration factors than shrimp with most of the accumulated isotope (> 80%) located in the shell. Byssus threads often contained large fractions of the mussels' plutonium-237 content and reached concentration factors as high as 4100. Worms readily accumulated plutonium-237 in either the +4 or +6 state, reaching concentration factors of approximately 200, Retention studies indicated a relatively slow loss of plutonium-237 from all animals studied. In the case of mussels, a computed half-time for a large fraction of the animals plutonium content was of the order of 2 years. The more rapid loss from shrimp (Tb 1/2 = 1.5 months) was due principally to the large fraction of plutonium lost at moult. Food chain studies with shrimp indicated that tissue build-up via plutonium ingestion would be a slow process. Total excretion was not entirely a result of passing contaminated food through the gut; approximately 15% of the ingested plutonium was removed from the contaminated food and subsequently excreted by processes other than defaecation of labelled food. Ratios of four different plutonium isotopes used in

Experimental studies on plutonium kinetics in marine biota

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fowler, S.; Heyraud, M.; Beasley, T.M.

1975-01-01

Laboratory experiments were undertaken to measure plutonium flux through marine organisms and to clarify the pathways by which this important element is cycled in the marine environment. The use of a specially prepared isotope, plutonium-237, allowed measurements to be made with standard NaI(Tl) scintillation techniques. Mussels, shrimp and worms were allowed to accumulate plutonium-237 from seawater for up to 25 days. Accumulation by shrimp was relatively slow and the degree of uptake was strongly influenced by moulting. Cast moults contained large fractions of the shrimps' plutonium content, indicating the high affinity of plutonium for surface areas. Only small amounts of the isotope in the moult are lost to water; hence, moulting is considered to be an important biological parameter in the biogeochemical cycling of plutonium. Mussels attained higher concentration factors than shrimp with most of the accumulated isotope (>80%) located in the shell. Byssus threads often contained large fractions of the mussels' plutonium-237 content and reached concentration factors as high as 4100. Worms readily accumulated plutonium-237 in either the +4 or +6 state, reaching concentration factors of approximately 200. Retention studies indicated a relatively slow loss of plutonium-237 from all animals studied. In the case of mussels, a computed half-time for a large fraction of the animals' plutonium content was of the order of 2 years. The more rapid loss from shrimp (Tbsub(1/2)=1.5 months) was due principally to the large fraction of plutonium lost at moult. Food chain studies with shrimp indicated that tissue build-up via plutonium ingestion would be a slow process. Total excretion was not entirely a result of passing contaminated food through the gut; approximately 15% of the ingested plutonium was removed from the contaminated food and subsequently excreted by processes other than defaecation of labelled food. Ratios of four different plutonium isotopes used in the

Accountability methods for plutonium and uranium: the NRC manuals

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Gutmacher, R.G.; Stephens, F.B.

1977-09-28

Four manuals containing methods for the accountability of plutonium nitrate solutions, plutonium dioxide, uranium dioxide and mixed uranium-plutonium oxide have been prepared by us and issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. A similar manual on methods for the accountability of uranium and plutonium in reprocessing plant dissolver solutions is now in preparation. In the present paper, we discuss the contents of the previously issued manuals and give a preview of the manual now being prepared.

Accountability methods for plutonium and uranium: the NRC manuals

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gutmacher, R.G.; Stephens, F.B.

1977-01-01

Four manuals containing methods for the accountability of plutonium nitrate solutions, plutonium dioxide, uranium dioxide and mixed uranium-plutonium oxide have been prepared by us and issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. A similar manual on methods for the accountability of uranium and plutonium in reprocessing plant dissolver solutions is now in preparation. In the present paper, we discuss the contents of the previously issued manuals and give a preview of the manual now being prepared

Plutonium use - present status and perspectives

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dievoet, J. van; Fossoul, E.; Jonckheere, E.; Bemden, E. van den

1977-01-01

Plutonium is being produced in increasing quantities in the so-called proven reactors, which are mostly of the light-water type. Evaluation of this production on a world scale shows that it would be theoretically possible to construct a large number of breeders and thus to make the best use of the intrinsic qualities of plutonium as a fissionable material, while considerably reducing the consumption of uranium. This source of plutonium is nevertheless dependent on an essential stage of the fuel cycle, namely reprocessing of irradiated fuel. The long delays in installing an adequate world reprocessing capacity are substantially weakening the prospects for the introduction of breeders. Furthermore, the critical situation as regards reprocessing may delay the development of complementary reprocessing methods for fuels with a high plutonium content and high burn-up. When it is recalled that fast reactors themselves may suffer some delay in their technological development, if only because of the intention to build power plants of very high unit capacity immediately, it must be concluded that another use will have to be considered for the plutonium available in future -use in thermal reactors, i.e. recycling. The recycling of plutonium is a well-known technique today and the objections which could be raised against it hardly stand up to analysis. Utilization of plutonium offers an appreciable saving in terms of uranium and separative work units, the consumption being of a low order of magnitude in comparison with the total amount of plutonium needed for the eventual fabrication of the first fast reactor cores. It can also be shown that immediate reprocessing of the recycling fuel is not essential for the economics of the concept. Temporary storage of recycled fuel has the advantage of concentrating plutonium in a particularly safe form, namely in irradiated plutonium-bearing fuel assemblies. Lastly, recycling offers such flexibility that it does not in practice represent

Storage of hydrogen in advanced high pressure container. Appendices

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bentzen, J.J.; Lystrup, A.

2005-07-01

The objective of the project has been to study barriers for a production of advanced high pressure containers especially suitable for hydrogen, in order to create a basis for a container production in Denmark. The project has primarily focused on future Danish need for hydrogen storage in the MWh area. One task has been to examine requirement specifications for pressure tanks that can be expected in connection with these stores. Six potential storage needs have been identified: (1) Buffer in connection with start-up/regulation on the power grid. (2) Hydrogen and oxygen production. (3) Buffer store in connection with VEnzin vision. (4) Storage tanks on hydrogen filling stations. (5) Hydrogen for the transport sector from 1 TWh surplus power. (6) Tanker transport of hydrogen. Requirements for pressure containers for the above mentioned use have been examined. The connection between stored energy amount, pressure and volume compared to liquid hydrogen and oil has been stated in tables. As starting point for production technological considerations and economic calculations of various container concepts, an estimation of laminate thickness in glass-fibre reinforced containers with different diameters and design print has been made, for a 'pure' fibre composite container and a metal/fibre composite container respectively. (BA)

An isotopic analysis system for plutonium samples enriched in 238Pu

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ruhter, W.D.; Camp, D.C.

1991-08-01

We have designed and built a gamma-ray spectrometer system that measures the relative plutonium isotopic abundances of plutonium oxide enriched in 238 Pu. The first system installed at Westinghouse Savannah River Company was tested and evaluated on plutonium oxide in stainless steel EP60/61 containers. 238 Pu enrichments ranged from 20% to 85%. Results show that 200 grams of plutonium oxide in an EP60.61 container can be measured with ±0.3% precision and better than ±1.0% accuracy in the specific power using a counting time of 50 minutes. 3 refs., 2 figs

Radiation damage and annealing in plutonium tetrafluoride

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

McCoy, Kaylyn; Casella, Amanda; Sinkov, Sergey; Sweet, Lucas; McNamara, Bruce; Delegard, Calvin; Jevremovic, Tatjana

2017-12-01

Plutonium tetrafluoride that was separated prior to 1966 at the Hanford Site in Washington State was analyzed at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) in 2015 and 2016. The plutonium tetrafluoride, as received, was an off-normal color and considering the age of the plutonium, there were questions about the condition of the material. These questions had to be answered in order to determine the suitability of the material for future use or long-term storage. Therefore, Thermogravimetric/Differential Thermal Analysis and X-ray Diffraction evaluations were conducted to determine the plutonium’s crystal structure, oxide content, and moisture content; these analyses reported that the plutonium was predominately amorphous and tetrafluoride, with an oxide content near ten percent. Freshly fluorinated plutonium tetrafluoride is known to be monoclinic. During the initial Thermogravimetric/Differential Thermal analyses, it was discovered that an exothermic event occurred within the material near 414°C. X-ray Diffraction analyses were conducted on the annealed tetrafluoride. The X-ray Diffraction analyses indicated that some degree of recrystallization occurred in conjunction with the 414°C event. The following commentary describes the series of Thermogravimetric/Differential Thermal and X-ray Diffraction analyses that were conducted as part of this investigation at PNNL, in collaboration with the University of Utah Nuclear Engineering Program.

Surveillance and Monitoring Program Full-Scale Experiments to Evaluate the Potential for Corrosion in 3013 Containers

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Narlesky, Joshua Edward [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Berg, John M. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Duque, Juan [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Harradine, David Martin [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Hill, Dallas Dwight [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Kaczar, Gregory Michael [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Lillard, R. Scott [Univ. of Akron, OH (United States); Lopez, Annabelle Sarita [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Martinez, Max Alfonso [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Peppers, Larry G. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Rios, Daniel [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Romero, Edward L. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Stroud, Mary Ann [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Trujillo, Leonardo Alberto [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Veirs, Douglas Kirk [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Wilson, Kennard Virden Jr. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Worl, Laura Ann [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2017-11-21

A set of six long-term, full-scale experiments were initiated to determine the type and extent of corrosion that occurs in 3013 containers packaged with chloride-bearing plutonium oxide materials. The materials were exposed to a high relative humidity environment representative of actual packaging conditions for the materials in storage. The materials were sealed in instrumented, inner 3013 containers with corrosion specimens designed to test the corrosiveness of the environment inside the containers under various conditions. This report focuses on initial loading conditions that are used to establish a baseline to show how the conditions change throughout the storage lifetime of the containers.

Plutonium in a grassland ecosystem

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Little, C.A.

1976-01-01

This study was concerned with plutonium contamination of grassland at the U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration Rocky Flats plant northwest of Denver, Colorado. Of interest were: the definition of major plutonium-containing ecosystem compartments; the relative amounts in those compartments; how those values related to studies done in other geogrphical areas; whether or not the predominant isotopes, 238 Pu and 239 Pu, behaved differently; and what mechanisms might have allowed for the observed patterns of contamination. Samples of soil, litter, vegetation, arthropods, and small mammals were collected for plutonium analysis and mass determination from each of two macroplots. Small aliquots (5 g or less) were analyzed by a rapid liquid scintillation technique and by alpha spectrometry. Of the compartments sampled, greater than 99% of the total plutonium was contained in the soil. The concentrations of plutonium in soil were significantly inversely correlated with distance from the contamination source, depth of the sample, and particle size of the sieved soil samples. The soil data suggested that the distribution of contamination largely resulted from physical transport processes. A mechanism of agglomerated submicron plutonium oxide particles and larger (1-500 μm) host soil particles was proposed. Concentrations of Pu in litter and vegetation were inversely correlated to distance from the source and directly correlated to soil concentrations at the same location. Comparatively high concentration ratios of vegetation to soil suggested wind resuspension of contamination as an important transport mechanism. Arthropod and small mammal samples were highly skewed, kurtotic, and quite variable, having coefficients of variation (standard deviation/mean) as high as 600%. Bone Pu concentrations were lower than other tissues. Hide, GI, and lung were generally not higher in Pu than kidney, liver and muscle

A host phase for the disposal of weapons plutonium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lutze, Werner; Helean, K.B.; Gong, W.L.; Ewing, Rodney C.

1999-01-01

Research was conducted into the possible use of zircon (ZrSiO 4 ) as a host phase for storage or disposal of excess weapons plutonium. Zircon is one of the most chemically durable minerals. Its structure can accommodate a variety of elements, including plutonium and uranium. Natural zircon contains uranium and thorium together in different quantities, usually in the range of less than one weight percent up to several weight percent. Zircon occurs in nature as a crystalline or a partially to fully metamict mineral, depending on age and actinide element concentration, i.e., on radiation damage. These zircon samples have been studied extensively and the results are documented in the literature in terms of radiation damage to the crystal structure and related property changes, e.g., density, hardness, loss of uranium and lead, etc. Thus, a unique suite of natural analogues are available to describe the effect of decay of 239 Pu on zircon's structure and how zircon's physical and chemical properties will be affected over very long periods of time. Actually, the oldest zircon samples known are over 3 billion years old. This period covers the time for decay of 239 Pu (half-life 24,300 yr.) and most of its daughter 235 U (half-life 700 million yr.). Because of its chemical durability, even under extreme geological conditions, zircon is the most widely used mineral for geochronological dating (7,000 publications). It is the oldest dated mineral on earth and in the universe. Zircon has already been doped with about 10 weight percent of plutonium. Pure PuSiO 4 has also been synthesized and has the same crystal structure as zircon. However, use of zircon as a storage medium or waste form for plutonium requires further materials characterization. Experiments can either be conducted in laboratories where plutonium can be handled or plutonium can be simulated by other elements, and experiments can be done under less restricted conditions. The authors conducted work with zircon

Underground storage tanks containing hazardous chemicals

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wise, R.F.; Starr, J.W.; Maresca, J.W. Jr.; Hillger, R.W.; Tafuri, A.N.

1991-01-01

The regulations issued by the United States Environmental Protection Agency in 1988 require, with several exceptions, that underground storage tank systems containing petroleum fuels and hazardous chemicals be routinely tested for releases. This paper summarizes the release detection regulations for tank systems containing chemicals and gives a preliminary assessment of the approaches to release detection currently being used. To make this assessment, detailed discussions were conducted with providers and manufacturers of leak detection equipment and testing services, owners or operators of different types of chemical storage tank systems, and state and local regulators. While these discussions were limited to a small percentage of each type of organization, certain observations are sufficiently distinctive and important that they are reported for further investigation and evaluation. To make it clearer why certain approaches are being used, this paper also summarizes the types of chemicals being stored, the effectiveness of several leak detection testing systems, and the number and characteristics of the tank systems being used to store these products

Communication Received from France Concerning Its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2006-01-01

The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 2 May 2013 from the Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Switzerland, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as 'Guidelines') and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2012

Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

The Director General has received a note verbale dated 14 June 2012 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2011 [fr

Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

The Director General has received a note verbale dated 21 July 2009 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2008

Communication Received from France Concerning Its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2006-01-01

The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 2 May 2013 from the Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Switzerland, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as 'Guidelines') and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2012 [es

Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

The Director General has received a note verbale dated 31 July 2013 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2012 [es

Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The Director General has received a note verbale dated 24 August 2010 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2009 [es

Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The Director General has received a Note Verbale dated 17 July 2007 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2006 [es

Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

The Director General has received a note verbale dated 14 June 2012 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2011 [es

Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

The Director General has received a note verbale dated 31 July 2013 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2012

Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The Director General has received a note verbale dated 24 August 2010 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2009

Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

The Director General has received a note verbale dated 16 September 2011 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2010

Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

The Director General has received a note verbale dated 31 July 2013 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2012

Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

The Director General has received a note verbale dated 31 July 2013 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2012 [fr

Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

The Director General has received a note verbale dated 16 September 2011 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2010 [es

Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The Director General has received a Note Verbale dated 17 July 2007 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2006

Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The Director General has received a note verbale dated 24 August 2010 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2009 [fr

Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

The Director General has received a note verbale dated 16 September 2011 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2010 [fr

Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The Director General has received a Note Verbale dated 17 July 2007 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2006 [fr

Communication Received from France Concerning Its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2006-01-01

The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 2 May 2013 from the Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Switzerland, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as 'Guidelines') and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2012 [fr

USING POLYMERIC HYDROGEN GETTERS TO PREVENT COMBUSTIBLE ATMOSPHERES DURING INTERIM SAFE STORAGE OF PLUTONIUM OXIDE

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Woodsmall, T

2007-01-01

Nuclear Materials Management (NMM) of WSRC has recently installed the capability to perform both non-destructive and destructive examination of 3013 containers of Pu oxide in accordance with DOE-STD-3013. The containers will be opened and the oxide will be sampled for analysis. The remaining bulk oxide must then be safely stored in a non-3013-compliant configuration. Available processing equipment and controls cannot prevent the oxide from adsorbing moisture during this process. Subsequent radiolysis of moisture during storage may generate combustible quantities of gases while waiting final processing, and satisfying DOE Interim Safe Storage Criteria (ISSC) would require that storage containers be vented at impractical frequencies. With support from an independent National Laboratory, WSRC/NMM has demonstrated that a commercial hydrogen getter material will effectively prevent the accumulation of combustible gas concentrations. A project overview, including storage requirements and strategies, as well as getter technology, current test results, and anticipated future developments will be addressed

Determination of plutonium in soils by mass spectrometry

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Storms, H.A.; Carlson, D.C.; Hunter, F.F.

1974-01-01

A procedure is described in which mass spectrometry is utilized for the determination of plutonium in soils. Using this procedure we have measured plutonium isotopic compositions at concentrations as low as 2 x 10 -14 grams Pu per gram soil. A thermal ionization source with canoe-shaped rhenium filament, is utilized in the mass spectrometer. The plutonium, when loaded onto the filament, is contained in a single Dowex-1 resin bead which is about 350 micrometers in diameter. Concentrating the plutonium within this single bead is a key step in the procedure and produces a relatively clean plutonium fraction. The resin bead also serves as an effective diffusion barrier such that the plutonium is prevented from being removed with the lower boiling impurities. The Pu remains in the bead until the temperature is sufficiently high for efficient production of Pu + ions. Plutonium ionization efficiencies as high as 2.5 percent have been measured

Plutonium disposition via immobilization in ceramic or glass

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Gray, L.W.; Kan, T.; Shaw, H.F.; Armantrout, A.

1997-03-05

The management of surplus weapons plutonium is an important and urgent task with profound environmental, national, and international security implications. In the aftermath of the Cold War, Presidential Policy Directive 13, and various analyses by renown scientific, technical, and international policy organizations have brought about a focused effort within the Department of Energy to identify and implement paths for the long term disposition of surplus weapons- usable plutonium. The central goal of this effort is to render surplus weapons plutonium as inaccessible and unattractive for reuse in nuclear weapons as the much larger and growing stock of plutonium contained in spent fuel from civilian reactors. One disposition option being considered for surplus plutonium is immobilization, in which the plutonium would be incorporated into a glass or ceramic material that would ultimately be entombed permanently in a geologic repository for high-level waste.

International and institutional aspects of reprocessing and plutonium management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-09-01

Various institutional alternatives applicable to reprocessing, plutonium management and recycle are considered, not as a definitive analysis but rather as a basis for identifying the institutional approaches and measures which the Working Group might wish to examine more thoroughly. Seven alternatives arrangements for reprocessing are presented. These range from suspending the operation of existing reprocessing plants through placing national facilities under safeguards to limiting reprocessing to a few large facilities subject to plutonium management, multinational or international control. Finally, the comprehensive alternative of an International Nuclear Fuel Authority with worldwide responsibility for reprocessing and plutonium management is considered. Plutonium management alternatives to complement the reprocessing options, are then outlined. These include national discretion on the separation and disposition of plutonium under safeguards, an agreed Code of Practice for plutonium management at national facilities and the international storage of plutonium. The advantages and disadvantages of the alternative are discussed tentatively. It is recognised that the alternatives are presented in a simplified form and that their elements can be combined or separated in many ways. Although strengthening the institutions relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is imperative and can contribute to non-proliferation, such arrangements might open other proliferation risks through the spread of sensitive materials, facilities and technology. While there are risks with any fuel cycle, where plutonium in quantity is separated these risks are of a high order. Although these can be mitigated, they will have to be set against the energy and economic case for reprocessing and alternatives other than plutonium considered

Transuranic Storage Area (TSA)-3 container storage unit RCRA closure plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Barry, G.A.; Lodman, D.L.; Spry, M.J.; Poor, K.J.

1992-11-01

This document describes the proposed plan for closure of the Transuranic Storage Area (TSA)-3 container storage unit at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory in accordance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act closure requirements. The location, size, capacity, history, and current status of the unit are described. The unit will be closed by decontaminating structures and equipment that may have contacted waste. Sufficient sampling and documentation of all activities will be performed to demonstrate clean closure. A tentative schedule is provided in the form of a milestone chart

Functional design criteria for the 242-A evaporator and PUREX [Plutonium-Uranium Extraction] Plant condensate interim retention basin

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cejka, C.C.

1990-01-01

This document contains the functional design criteria for a 26- million-gallon retention basin and 10 million gallons of temporary storage tanks. The basin and tanks will be used to store 242-A Evaporator process condensate, the Plutonium-Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Plant process distillate discharge stream, and the PUREX Plant ammonia scrubber distillate stream. Completion of the project will allow both the 242-A Evaporator and the PUREX Plant to restart. 4 refs

Chemical speciation of plutonium in the radioactive waste burial ground at the Savannah River Plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wilhite, E.L.

1978-08-01

The plutonium chemical species in two types of samples from the Savannah River Plant burial ground for radioactive waste were identified. Samples analyzed were water and sediment from burial ground monitoring well C-17 and soil from an alpha waste burial trench. Soluble plutonium in the monitoring well was less than 12A in diameter, was cationic, and contained about 43% Pu(VI) and 25% Pu(IV). The equilibrium distribution coefficient (K /sub d/) for soluble plutonium from the well water (pH 7) to burial ground soil was about 60. Soil plutonium from the waste trench was not cation-exchanged; 78% of the soil plutonium was associated with metallic oxides in the soil. Approximately 9% of the Pu was contained in the crystalline soil matrix. Thus, about 87% of the plutonium in the soil was in a relatively immobile form. Ion-exchangeable and organic acid forms of plutonium amounted to only about 2.5% each. The bulk of the plutonium now on burial ground soils will be immobile except for movement of soil particles containing plutonium. 6 tables

Study on treatment of wastewater containing plutonium in CIAE (China Institute of Atomic Energy)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zeng Jishu; Su Xiguang; Xia Deying; Zhou Hongping

1993-09-01

The wastewater containing plutonium in China Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE) is a kind of specific decontamination liquid waste containing 239,240 Pu, 241 Am etc, its alpha-radioactivity is about 1 x 10 5 Bq/L. It is not suitable for treatment in Low-Level Radwaste Treatment Plant (LLRTP) due to its high alpha-radioactivity level and has been stored for 17 years. In view of safe management of radioactive waste, a conceptual treatment process for this liquid waste is presented. and the methods in the process are demonstrated. The results obtained show that any method of chemical coagulation precipitation, adsorption by P301 absorbent and ion exchange by macro porous cation exchange resin (D001-CC) can drop the alpha-radioactivity level below 3.7 x 10 3 Bq/L which could meet the acceptable requirements of LLRTP

Plutonium in nature; Le plutonium dans la nature

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Madic, C.

1994-12-31

Plutonium in nature comes from natural sources and anthropogenic ones. Plutonium at the earth surface comes principally from anthropogenic sources. It is easily detectable in environment. The plutonium behaviour in environment is complex. It seems necessary for the future to reduce releases in environment, to improve predictive models of plutonium behaviour in geosphere, to precise biological impact of anthropogenic plutonium releases.

Plutonium in a grassland ecosystem

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Little, C.A.

1976-08-01

A study was made of plutonium contamination of grassland at the Rocky Flats plant northwest of Denver, Colorado. Of interest were: the definition of major plutonium-containing ecosystem compartments; the relative amounts in those compartments; how those values related to studies done in other geographical areas; whether or not the predominant isotopes, 238 Pu and 239 Pu, behaved differently; and what mechanisms might have allowed for the observed patterns of contamination. Samples of soil, litter, vegetation, arthropods, and small mammals were collected for Pu analysis and mass determination from each of two macroplots. Small aliquots (5 g or less) were analyzed by a rapid liquid scintillation technique and by alpha spectrometry. Of the compartments sampled, greater than 99 percent of the total plutonium was contained in the soil and the concentrations were significantly inversely correlated with distance from the contamination source, depth of the sample, and particle size of the sieved soil samples. The soil data suggested that the distribution of contamination largely resulted from physical transport processes

Plutonium Protection System (PPS). Volume 2. Hardware description. Final report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Miyoshi, D.S.

1979-05-01

The Plutonium Protection System (PPS) is an integrated safeguards system developed by Sandia Laboratories for the Department of Energy, Office of Safeguards and Security. The system is designed to demonstrate and test concepts for the improved safeguarding of plutonium. Volume 2 of the PPS final report describes the hardware elements of the system. The major areas containing hardware elements are the vault, where plutonium is stored, the packaging room, where plutonium is packaged into Container Modules, the Security Operations Center, which controls movement of personnel, the Material Accountability Center, which maintains the system data base, and the Material Operations Center, which monitors the operating procedures in the system. References are made to documents in which details of the hardware items can be found

Selecting a plutonium vitrification process

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Jouan, A. [Centre d`Etudes de la Vallee du Rhone, Bagnols sur Ceze (France)

1996-05-01

Vitrification of plutonium is one means of mitigating its potential danger. This option is technically feasible, even if it is not the solution advocated in France. Two situations are possible, depending on whether or not the glass matrix also contains fission products; concentrations of up to 15% should be achievable for plutonium alone, whereas the upper limit is 3% in the presence of fission products. The French continuous vitrification process appears to be particularly suitable for plutonium vitrification: its capacity is compatible with the required throughout, and the compact dimensions of the process equipment prevent a criticality hazard. Preprocessing of plutonium metal, to convert it to PuO{sub 2} or to a nitric acid solution, may prove advantageous or even necessary depending on whether a dry or wet process is adopted. The process may involve a single step (vitrification of Pu or PuO{sub 2} mixed with glass frit) or may include a prior calcination step - notably if the plutonium is to be incorporated into a fission product glass. It is important to weigh the advantages and drawbacks of all the possible options in terms of feasibility, safety and cost-effectiveness.

Plutonium in depleted uranium penetrators

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

McLaughlin, J.P.; Leon-Vintro, L.; Smith, K.; Mitchell, P.I.; Zunic, Z.S.

2002-01-01

Depleted Uranium (DU) penetrators used in the recent Balkan conflicts have been found to be contaminated with trace amounts of transuranic materials such as plutonium. This contamination is usually a consequence of DU fabrication being carried out in facilities also using uranium recycled from spent military and civilian nuclear reactor fuel. Specific activities of 239+240 Plutonium generally in the range 1 to 12 Bq/kg have been found to be present in DU penetrators recovered from the attack sites of the 1999 NATO bombardment of Kosovo. A DU penetrator recovered from a May 1999 attack site at Bratoselce in southern Serbia and analysed by University College Dublin was found to contain 43.7 +/- 1.9 Bq/kg of 239+240 Plutonium. This analysis is described. An account is also given of the general population radiation dose implications arising from both the DU itself and from the presence of plutonium in the penetrators. According to current dosimetric models, in all scenarios considered likely ,the dose from the plutonium is estimated to be much smaller than that due to the uranium isotopes present in the penetrators. (author)

Gas generation over plutonium oxides in the 94-1 shelf-life surveillance program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Berg, J.M.; Harradine, D.M.; Hill, D.D.; McFarlan, James T.; Padilla, D.D.; Prenger, F. Coyne; Veirs, D.K.; Worl, L.A.

2002-01-01

The Department of Energy (DOE) is embarking upon a program to store large quantities of plutonium-bearing materials for up to fifty years. The Los Alamos National Laboratory Shelf Life Project was established to bound the behavior of plutonium-bearing material meeting the DOE 3013 Standard. The shelf life study monitors temperature, pressure and gas composition over oxide materials in a limited number of large-scale 3013 inner containers and in many small-scale containers. For the large-scale study, baseline plutonium oxides, oxides exposed to high-humidity atmospheres, and oxides containing chloride salt impurities are planned. The first large-scale container represents a baseline and contains dry plutonium oxide prepared according to the 3013 Standard. This container has been observed for pressure, temperature and gas compositional changes for less than a year. Results indicate that no detectable changes in pressure and gas composition are observed.

Experience of management of plutonium-contaminated solid and liquid wastes at the Cadarache Nuclear Research Centre

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Marcaillou, J.; Faure, J.C.; Tourret, G.

1981-01-01

At Cadarache the principal sources of alpha-contaminated waste are the facilities of the plutonium fuel assembly fabrication complex. The chosen management scheme shows two points where it is possible to implement procedures to limit the activities released and to reduce the storage volumes of treated waste: (1) At the fabrication units, three categories of solid waste ('rich', 'poor' and 'special') are distinguished by sorting at the time of production and by γ,n counting of the drums. The rich and special wastes with a high plutonium content are stored while awaiting treatment for recycling of the plutonium. In the case of liquid waste, different circuits are used to separate contaminated effluents and thus to limit their production; (2) In the solid-waste treatment shops, the waste has so far been compacted and then coated with bituminous cement mortar. At the same time, a new incinerator facility has been installed. The preliminary studies dealt mainly with: waste preparation (crushing) to obtain a continuous and regular feed for the incinerator; combustion (pyrolysis followed by burning of the gases and unburnt matter in the presence of excess air); containment of the equipment. Further studies will be made to determine what is to be done with the ash (treatment for plutonium recovery and/or coating). At the Effluent Treatment Station some adjustments have had to be made in order to cope with the increase in volume activity due mainly to the presence of americium. At the same time, with a view to limiting the production of treatment residues with a high alpha-emitter content it has been decided to carry out a research and development programme on the separation of americium and the improvement of the recycling of the plutonium contained in the process effluents. (author)

Electronic structure, phase transitions and diffusive properties of elemental plutonium

Science.gov (United States)

Setty, Arun; Cooper, B. R.

2003-03-01

We present a SIC-LDA-LMTO based study of the electronic structure of the delta, alpha and gamma phases of plutonium, and also of the alpha and gamma phases of elemental cerium. We find excellent agreement with the experimental densities and magnetic properties [1]. Furthermore, detailed studies of the computational densities of states for delta plutonium, and comparison with the experimental photoemission spectrum [2], provide evidence for the existence of an unusual fluctuating valence state. Results regarding the vacancy formation and self-diffusion in delta plutonium will be presented. Furthermore, a study of interface diffusion between plutonium and steel (technologically relevant in the storage of spent fuel) or other technologically relevant alloys will be included. Preliminary results regarding gallium stabilization of delta plutonium, and of plutonium alloys will be presented. [1] M. Dormeval et al., private communication (2001). [2] A. J. Arko, J. J. Joyce, L. Morales, J. Wills, and J. Lashley et. al., Phys. Rev. B, 62, 1773 (2000). [3] B. R. Cooper et al, Phil. Mag. B 79, 683 (1999); B.R. Cooper, Los Alamos Science 26, 106 (2000)); B.R. Cooper, A.K. Setty and D.L.Price, to be published.

United Kingdom experience in plutonium transportation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-08-01

Plutonium has already been transported within the UK over a period of 20 years and to destinations overseas since the early 60's. Experience is recounted with regard to the forms of plutonium transported, regulations, insurance, container design, mode of transport, volume of traffic, physical protection, safety analysis and costs. It is concluded that this traffic could be expanded in the future without danger to the community or the environment

Plutonium in the aquatic environment around the Rocky Flats facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Thompson, M.A.

1975-01-01

The Rocky Flats Plant of the United States Energy Research and Development Administration has been fabricating and chemically recovering plutonium for over 20 years. During that time, small amounts of plutonium have been released with liquid process and sanitary waste discharges. The liquid waste flows through a series of holding ponds from which it is discharged into a creek that is part of a municipal drinking water supply. The water flows for about 1.5 km between the last holding pond and the municipal drinking water reservoir. In addition, liquid wastes containing high levels of chemical contaminants and plutonium concentrations less than allowable drinking water standards have been discharged to large evaporation ponds. The fate of the plutonium in both the surface and subsurface aquatic environment has been extensively monitored and studied. It has been found that plutonium does not move very far or very rapidly through subsurface water. The majority of the plutonium released through surface water has been contained in the sediments of the plant holding ponds. Small amounts of plutonium have also been found in the sediments of the draining creek and in the sediments of the receiving reservoir. Higher than normal amounts of plutonium were released from the waste treatment plants during times when suspended solids were high. Various biological species have been examined and plutonium concentration factors determined. Considerably less than 1% of the 210 mCi of plutonium released has been detected in biological systems including man. After more than 20 years of large scale operations, no health or environmental hazard has been identified due to the release of small amounts of plutonium. (author)

Criticality safety of transuranic storage arrays at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Boyd, W.A.; Fecteau, M.W.

1993-01-01

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility is designed to store transuranic waste that will consist mainly of surface contaminate articles and sludge. The fissile material in the waste is predominantly 239 Pu. The waste is grouped into two categories: contact-handled waste, which will be stored in 55-gal steel drums or in steel boxes, and remote-handled waste, which will be stored in specially designed cylindrical steel canisters. To show that criticality safety will be acceptable, criticality analyses were performed to demonstrate that a large number of containers with limiting loadings of fissile material could be stored at the site and meet a k eff limit of 0.95. Criticality analyses based on the classic worst-case moderated plutonium sphere approach would severely limit the capacity for storage of waste at the facility. Therefore, these analyses use realistic or credible worst-case assumptions to better represent the actual storage situation without compromising the margin of safety. Numerous sensitivity studies were performed to determine the importance of various parameters on the criticality of the configuration. It was determined that the plutonium loading has the dominant effect on the system reactivity. Nearly all other reactivity variations from the sensitivity studies were found to be relatively small. The analysis shows that criticality of the contact-handled waste storage drums and boxes and the remote-handled canisters is prevented by restrictions on maximum fissile loading per container and on the size of handling/storage areas

Containment performance of transportable storage casks at 9m drop test

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Tobita, H. [Hitachi Zosen Corp., Osaka (Japan); Araki, K. [Hitachi Zosen Diesel and Engineering Co., Ltd., Tokyo (Japan)

2004-07-01

Spent fuel transportable storage casks usually have a double lid closure system, which consists of primary and secondary lids, and gaskets, to keep the containment function during transportation and storage, and to monitor a leakage or containment function during storage. Metal gasket is planning to be used not only during storage but transportation of both before and after storage. As metal gasket will degrade its containment function by creep during storage period of 50 years, relative displacement such as opening and slide displacement between the flange of the containment vessel and the lid should be restricted to a small range. To maintain the containment performance, we provisionally adopted the maximum opening limit of 0.1mm and the maximum slide displacement limit of 3.0mm in the full-scale cask design based on the report of the fundamental experiment on the metal gasket which examines the relation between leakage rate and sealing gap. The purpose of this study is to analyse the behaviour of the sealed parts (lid and vessel body) under 9m-drop impact test conditions and to establish some analytical method to evaluate this behaviour. In this study, the drop test of 1/3scale model of Hitz-B69 cask with the double lids closure system was carried out, the behaviours of the seal part were measured by displacement sensors, and they were compared with the result of the numerical analysis carried out separateley.

Waste minimization at a plutonium processing facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pillay, K.K.S.

1995-01-01

As part of Los Alamos National Laboratory's (LANL) mission to reduce the nuclear danger throughout the world, the plutonium processing facility at LANL maintains expertise and skills in nuclear weapons technologies as well as leadership in all peaceful applications of plutonium technologies, including fuel fabrication for terrestrial and space reactors and heat sources and thermoelectric generators for space missions. Another near-term challenge resulted from two safety assessments performed by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and the U.S. Department of Energy during the past two years. These assessments have necessitated the processing and stabilization of plutonium contained in tons of residues so that they can be stored safely for an indefinite period. This report describes waste streams and approaches to waste reduction of plutonium management

Recovery of plutonium from pyrolysis and incineration residues

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Isaacs, J.W.; McDonald, L.A.; Roberts, W.G.; Sutcliffe, P.W.; Wilkins, J.D.

1981-01-01

The effect of ashes prepared from typical plutonium-handling, glove box, combustible wastes on the dissolution of PuO 2 is described. Synthetic ashes have been prepared by doping inactively-prepared ashes with various plutonium-containing compounds, followed by heating at temperatures in the range 550-1200 0 C. The resulting ashes have been leach-tested in order to provide information on the relationship between leachability, the nature of the ashes, the type of plutonium contamination and temperature of thermal treatment. Optimum temperatures for the recovery of plutonium and for the production of inert ''slag'' -type residues have been identified. A furnace for producing model incinerator ashes and pyrolysis chars under carefully controlled conditions is described. Preliminary results on the leaching of these plutonium-active ashes and chars are discussed. (author)

Electrochemistry of plutonium in molten halides

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

McCurry, L.E.; Moy, G.M.M.; Bowersox, D.F.

1987-01-01

The electrochemistry of plutonium in molten halides is of technological importance as a method of purification of plutonium. Previous authors have reported that plutonium can be purified by electrorefining impure plutonium in various molten haldies. Work to eluciate the mechanism of the plutonium reduction in molten halides has been limited to a chronopotentiometric study in LiCl-KCl. Potentiometric studies have been carried out to determine the standard reduction potential for the plutonium (III) couple in various molten alkali metal halides. Initial cyclic voltammetric experiments were performed in molten KCL at 1100 K. A silver/silver chloride (10 mole %) in equimolar NaCl-KCl was used as a reference electrode. Working and counter electrodes were tungsten. The cell components and melt were contained in a quartz crucible. Background cyclic voltammograms of the KCl melt at the tungsten electrode showed no evidence of electroactive impurities in the melt. Plutonium was added to the melt as PuCl/sub 3/, which was prepared by chlorination of the oxide. At low concentrations of PuCl/sub 3/ in the melt (0.01-0.03 molar), no reduction wave due to the reduction of Pu(III) was observed in the voltammograms up to the potassium reduction limit of the melt. However on scan reversal after scanning into the potassium reduction limit a new oxidation wave was observed

Effect of containers on the quality of Chemlali olive oil during storage.

Science.gov (United States)

Gargouri, Boutheina; Zribi, Akram; Bouaziz, Mohamed

2015-04-01

This study is undertaken to determine the storage stability of Chemlali extra-virgin olive oil (EVOO) in different containers such as clear and dark glass bottles, polyethylene (PE) and tin containers. The different oil samples were stored under light at room temperature. Quality parameters monitored during a 6-month-storage period included: acidity, peroxide value (PV), spectrophotometric indices (K232 and K270), chlorophyll and carotene pigments, fatty acids and sterol compositions, total phenols, Rancimat induction time as well as sensory evaluation. Tin containers and dark glass bottles recorded the lowest oxidation values. In addition, oil packed in tin containers and dark glass bottles showed better physicochemical and organoleptic characteristics than that stored in clear glass bottles and PE containers. A significant decrease (p containers. Such results proved that the storage of oil in tin containers and dark glass bottles appeared most adequate, and showed a gradual loss of quality during storage, especially in PE containers and clear glass bottles. This study has shown that the best packaging materials for the commercial packing of Chemlali extra-virgin olive oil are tin containers and dark glass bottles.

The transport of civil plutonium by air

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1988-01-01

The paper presents the review entitled ''The Transport of Civil Plutonium by Air'' reported by the Advisory Committee on the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials (ACTRAM) 1988. The contents contain chapters on the following topics:- the reasons for air transport, the various regulations, packagings for plutonium transport, testing of the packagings, accidents, the consequences of a release, and emergency arrangements. (U.K.)

Anticipated Radiological Dose to Worker for Plutonium Stabilization and Handling at PFP - Project W-460

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

WEISS, E.V.

2000-01-01

This report provides estimates of the expected whole body and extremity radiological dose, expressed as dose equivalent (DE), to workers conducting planned plutonium (Pu) stabilization processes at the Hanford Site Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). The report is based on a time and motion dose study commissioned for Project W-460, Plutonium Stabilization and Handling, to provide personnel exposure estimates for construction work in the PFP storage vault area plus operation of stabilization and packaging equipment at PFP

Anticipated Radiological Dose to Worker for Plutonium Stabilization and Handling at PFP - Project W-460

CERN Document Server

Weiss, E V

2000-01-01

This report provides estimates of the expected whole body and extremity radiological dose, expressed as dose equivalent (DE), to workers conducting planned plutonium (Pu) stabilization processes at the Hanford Site Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). The report is based on a time and motion dose study commissioned for Project W-460, Plutonium Stabilization and Handling, to provide personnel exposure estimates for construction work in the PFP storage vault area plus operation of stabilization and packaging equipment at PFP.

Final generic environmental statement on the use of recycle plutonium in mixed oxide fuel in light water cooled reactors. Volume 3

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1976-08-01

An assessment is presented of the health, safety and environmental effects of the entire light water reactor fuel cycle, considering the comparative effects of three major alternatives: no recycle, recycle of uranium only, and recycle of both uranium and plutonium. The assessment covers the period from 1975 through the year 2000 and includes the cumulative effects for the entire period as well as projections for specific years. Topics discussed include: the light water reactor with plutonium recycle; mixed oxide fuel fabrication; reprocessing plant operations; supporting uranium fuel cycle; transportation of radioactive materials; radioactive waste management; storage of plutonium; radiological health assessment; extended spent fuel storage; and blending of plutonium and uranium at reprocessing plants

Accelerator-driven assembly for plutonium transformation (ADAPT)

Science.gov (United States)

Tuyle, Greorgy J. Van; Todosow, Michael; Powell, James; Schweitzer, Donald

1995-01-01

A particle accelerator-driven spallation target and corresponding blanket region are proposed for the ultimate disposition of weapons-grade plutonium being retired from excess nuclear weapons in the U.S. and Russia. The highly fissle plutonium is contained within .25 to .5 cm diameter silicon-carbide coated graphite beads, which are cooled by helium, within the slightly subcritical blanket region. Major advantages include very high one-pass burnup (over 90%), a high integrity waste form (the coated beads), and operation in a subcritical mode, thereby minimizing the vulnerability to the positive reativity feedbacks often associated with plutonium fuel.

New developments in the air transport of plutonium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Andersen, J.A.

1978-01-01

A new package for the air transport of plutonium has been developed in response to a United States Public Law which restricts the US air transport of plutonium except for small medical devices. This new package, called PAT-1 for plutonium air transportable package model 1, is the result of the NRC-sponsored PARC (plutonium accident resistant container) project at Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque. The PAT-1 package is designed to meet or exceed new criteria specified in NUREG-0360. These include a severe test sequence of impact (greater than 250 KTS) on an unyielding target, crush, puncture, slash, a large JP-4 fire for 1 hour, followed by water immersion, with stringent acceptance standards on plutonium release, nuclear shielding, and nuclear criticality. The PAT-1 package design features a high energy absorption capability with high-level fire protection. It weighs approximately 227 kg (500 lb) when loaded with 2 kg PuO 2 , and can accommodate up to 25 watts thermal energy from the plutonium load

Study of plutonium recycling physics in light water reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Reuss, Paul

1979-10-01

A stock of plutonium from the reprocessing of thermal neutron reactor fuel is likely to appear in the next few years. The use of this plutonium as fuel replacing 235 U in thermal reactors is probably more interesting than simple stock-piling storage: immobilization of a capital which moreover would deteriorate by radioactive decay of isotope 241 also fissile and present to an appreciable extend in plutonium from reprocessing (half-life 15 years); recycling, on the other hand, will supply energy without complete degradation of the stock for fast neutron reactor loads, the burned matter having been partially renewed by conversion; furthermore the use of plutonium will meet the needs created by a temporary pressure on the naturel and/or enriched uranium market. For these two reasons the recycling of plutonium in thermal neutron reactors is being considered seriously today. The present work is confined to neutronic aspects and centres mainly on pressurized water-moderated reactors, the most highly developed at present in France. Four aspects of the problem are examined: 1. the physics of a plutonium-recycling reactor special features of neutronic phenomena with respect to the 'conventional' scheme of the 235 U burning reactor; 2. calculation of a plutonium-recycling reactor: adaptation of standard methods; 3. qualification of these calculations from the viewpoint of both data and inevitable approximations; 4. the fuel cycle and particularly the equivalence of fissile matters [fr

The role of troublesome components in plutonium vitrification

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Li, Hong; Vienna, J.D.; Peeler, D.K.; Hrma, P.; Schweiger, M.J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab., Richland, WA (United States)

1996-05-01

One option for immobilizing surplus plutonium is vitrification in a borosilicate glass. Two advantages of the glass form are (1) high tolerance to feed variability and, (2) high solubility of some impurity components. The types of plutonium-containing materials in the United States inventory include: pits, metals, oxides, residues, scrap, compounds, and fuel. Many of them also contain high concentrations of carbon, chloride, fluoride, phosphate, sulfate, and chromium oxide. To vitrify plutonium-containing scrap and residues, it is critical to understand the impact of each component on glass processing and chemical durability of the final product. This paper addresses glass processing issues associated with these troublesome components. It covers solubility limits of chlorine, fluorine, phosphate, sulfate, and chromium oxide in several borosilicate based glasses, and the effect of each component on vitrification (volatility, phase segregation, crystallization, and melt viscosity). Techniques (formulation, pretreatment, removal, and/or dilution) to mitigate the effect of these troublesome components are suggested.

Annotated bibliography of literature relating to wind transport of plutonium-contaminated soils at the Nevada Test Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lancaster, N.; Bamford, R.

1993-12-01

During the period from 1954 through 1963, a number of tests were conducted on the Nevada Test Site (NTS) and Tonopah Test Range (TTR) to determine the safety of nuclear devices with respect to storage, handling, transport, and accidents. These tests were referred to as ''safety shots.'' ''Safety'' in this context meant ''safety against fission reaction.'' The safety tests were comprised of chemical high explosive detonations with components of nuclear devices. The conduct of these tests resulted in the dispersion of plutonium, and some americium over areas ranging from several tens to several hundreds of hectares. Of the various locations used for safety tests, the site referred to as ''Plutonium Valley'' was subject to a significant amount of plutonium contamination. Plutonium Valley is located in Area 11 on the eastern boundary of the NTS at an elevation of about 1036 m (3400 ft). Plutonium Valley was the location of four safety tests (A,B,C, and D) conducted during 1956. A major environmental, health, and safety concern is the potential for inhalation of Pu 239,240 by humans as a result of airborne dust containing Pu particles. Thus, the wind transport of Pu 239,240 particles has been the subject of considerable research. This annotated bibliography was created as a reference guide to assist in the better understanding of the environmental characteristics of Plutonium Valley, the safety tests performed there, the processes and variables involved with the wind transport of dust, and as an overview of proposed clean-up procedures

PLUTONIUM PURIFICATION PROCESS EMPLOYING THORIUM PYROPHOSPHATE CARRIER

Science.gov (United States)

King, E.L.

1959-04-28

The separation and purification of plutonium from the radioactive elements of lower atomic weight is described. The process of this invention comprises forming a 0.5 to 2 M aqueous acidffc solution containing plutonium fons in the tetravalent state and elements with which it is normally contaminated in neutron irradiated uranium, treating the solution with a double thorium compound and a soluble pyrophosphate compound (Na/sub 4/P/sub 2/O/sub 7/) whereby a carrier precipitate of thorium A method is presented of reducing neptunium and - trite is advantageous since it destroys any hydrazine f so that they can be removed from solutions in which they are contained is described. In the carrier precipitation process for the separation of plutonium from uranium and fission products including zirconium and columbium, the precipitated blsmuth phosphate carries some zirconium, columbium, and uranium impurities. According to the invention such impurities can be complexed and removed by dissolving the contaminated carrier precipitate in 10M nitric acid, followed by addition of fluosilicic acid to about 1M, diluting the solution to about 1M in nitric acid, and then adding phosphoric acid to re-precipitate bismuth phosphate carrying plutonium.

Plutonium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Watson, G.M.

1976-01-01

Discovery of the neutron made it easy to create elements which do not exist in nature. One of these is plutonium, and its isotope with mass number 239 has nuclear properties which make it both a good fuel for nuclear power reactors and a good explosive for nuclear weapons. Since it was discovered during a war the latter characteristic was put to use, but it is now evident that use of plutonium in a particular kind of nuclear reactor, the fast breeder reactor, will allow the world's resources of uranium to last for millennia as a major source of energy. Plutonium is very radiotoxic, resembling radium in this respect. Therefore the widespread introduction of fast breeder reactors to meet energy demands can be contemplated only after assurances on two points; that adequate control of the radiological hazard resulting from the handling of very large amounts of plutonium can be guaranteed, and that diversion of plutonium to illicit use can be prevented. The problems exist to a lesser degree already, since all types of nuclear reactor produce some plutonium. Some plutonium has already been dispersed in the environment, the bulk of it from atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons. (author)

Disposal of Surplus Weapons Grade Plutonium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Alsaed, H.; Gottlieb, P.

2000-01-01

The Office of Fissile Materials Disposition is responsible for disposing of inventories of surplus US weapons-usable plutonium and highly enriched uranium as well as providing, technical support for, and ultimate implementation of, efforts to obtain reciprocal disposition of surplus Russian plutonium. On January 4, 2000, the Department of Energy issued a Record of Decision to dispose of up to 50 metric tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium using two methods. Up to 17 metric tons of surplus plutonium will be immobilized in a ceramic form, placed in cans and embedded in large canisters containing high-level vitrified waste for ultimate disposal in a geologic repository. Approximately 33 metric tons of surplus plutonium will be used to fabricate MOX fuel (mixed oxide fuel, having less than 5% plutonium-239 as the primary fissile material in a uranium-235 carrier matrix). The MOX fuel will be used to produce electricity in existing domestic commercial nuclear reactors. This paper reports the major waste-package-related, long-term disposal impacts of the two waste forms that would be used to accomplish this mission. Particular emphasis is placed on the possibility of criticality. These results are taken from a summary report published earlier this year

An MS-DOS-based program for analyzing plutonium gamma-ray spectra

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ruhter, W.D.; Buckley, W.M.

1989-01-01

A plutonium gamma-ray analysis system that operates on MS-DOS-based computers has been developed for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to perform in-field analysis of plutonium gamma-ray spectra for plutonium isotopics. The program titled IAEAPU consists of three separate applications: a data-transfer application for transferring spectral data from a CICERO multichannel analyzer to a binary data file, a data-analysis application to analyze plutonium gamma-ray spectra, for plutonium isotopic ratios and weight percents of total plutonium, and a data-quality assurance application to check spectral data for proper data-acquisition setup and performance. Volume 3 contains the software listings for these applications

EDF research scenarios for closing the Plutonium cycle

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Le Mer, Joël; Garzenne, Claude; Lemasson, David

2013-01-01

Conclusion: → There are various solutions to plutonium fuel closure; → Natural uranium consumption is reduced: • Full generation IV fleet is obviously the most efficient; • Symbiotic fleet makes a better use of its advanced reactors. → Plutonium inventory reaches an equilibrium between 700 tons and 1150 tons. • The multi-recycling of spent MOX fuel must be a long term solution in order to reduce significantly the plutonium inventory. → Spent fuel storage is reduced when MOX spent fuel are reprocessed but sodium pools are challenging. → Fast reactors are not the only solution to use MOX spent fuel: • HCPWR is a roundabout solution: – the reduction of natural uranium is limited; – the high level waste production is high. – The reprocessing plant capacity must be increased during deployment phase → R&D must be continued to improve HCPWR design

Concerning temporary method for return transport of plutonium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1990-01-01

One of the urgent matters under deliberation in the Working Group for Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Atomic Energy Comission of Japan, is to develop a method for smooth and safe transport of plutonium to be returned from Britain and France, where spent fuel sent from Japan is reprocessed by contract. Return transport of plutonium from these nations will start in 1992. Preparatory work has been conducted in Japan for air transport of plutonium, which is to be used by Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation. For this, efforts have been made since 1984 to develop containers for air transport of plutonium. Though the corporation will continue research, it will take considerable time until practical containers are developed, so the material have to be transported by sea for the time being. The corporation should play the leading role in conducting the return transport operation in cooperation with other organizations concerned including power companies. To achieve this, the corporation should be active in making preparations including the development of transport plans. (N.K.)

Remote material handling in the Plutonium Immobilization Project. Revision 1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Brault, J.R.

2000-01-01

With the downsizing of the US and Russian nuclear stockpiles, large quantities of weapons-usable plutonium in the US are being declared excess and will be disposed of by the Department of Energy Fissile Materials Disposition Program. To implement this program, DOE has selected the Savannah River Site (SRS) for the construction and operation of three new facilities: pit disassembly and conversion; mixed oxide fuel fabrication; and plutonium immobilization. The Plutonium Immobilization Project (PIP) will immobilize a portion of the excess plutonium in a hybrid ceramic and glass form containing high level waste for eventual disposal in a geologic repository. The PIP is divided into three distinct operating areas: Plutonium Conversion, First Stage Immobilization, and Second Stage Immobilization. Processing technology for the PIP is being developed jointly by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Westinghouse Savannah River Company. This paper will discuss development of the automated unpacking and sorting operations in the conversion area, and the automated puck and tray handling operations in the first stage immobilization area. Due to the high radiation levels and toxicity of the materials to be disposed of, the PIP will utilize automated equipment in a contained (glovebox) facility. Most operations involving plutonium-bearing materials will be performed remotely, separating personnel from the radiation source. Source term materials will be removed from the operations during maintenance. Maintenance will then be performed hands on within the containment using glove ports