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Sample records for plutonium facility pleasanton

  1. Seismic risk analysis for General Electric Plutonium Facility, Pleasanton, California

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    This report presents the results of a seismic risk analysis that focuses on all possible sources of seismic activity, with the exception of the postulated Verona Fault. The best estimate curve indicates that the Vallecitos facility will experience 30% g with a return period of roughly 130 years and 60% g with a return period of roughly 700 years

  2. Seismic risk analysis for General Electric Plutonium Facility, Pleasanton, California. Final report, part II

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    This report is the second of a two part study addressing the seismic risk or hazard of the special nuclear materials (SNM) facility of the General Electric Vallecitos Nuclear Center at Pleasanton, California. The Part I companion to this report, dated July 31, 1978, presented the seismic hazard at the site that resulted from exposure to earthquakes on the Calaveras, Hayward, San Andreas and, additionally, from smaller unassociated earthquakes that could not be attributed to these specific faults. However, while this study was in progress, certain additional geologic information became available that could be interpreted in terms of the existance of a nearby fault. Although substantial geologic investigations were subsequently deployed, the existance of this postulated fault, called the Verona Fault, remained very controversial. The purpose of the Part II study was to assume the existance of such a capable fault and, under this assumption, to examine the loads that the fault could impose on the SNM facility. This report first reviews the geologic setting with a focus on specifying sufficient geologic parameters to characterize the postulated fault. The report next presents the methodology used to calculate the vibratory ground motion hazard. Because of the complexity of the fault geometry, a slightly different methodology is used here compared to the Part I report. This section ends with the results of the calculation applied to the SNM facility. Finally, the report presents the methodology and results of the rupture hazard calculation

  3. Plutonium metal burning facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hausburg, D.E.; Leebl, R.G.

    1977-01-01

    A glove-box facility was designed to convert plutonium skull metal or unburned oxide to an oxide acceptable for plutonium recovery and purification. A discussion of the operation, safety aspects, and electrical schematics are included

  4. Design of plutonium processing facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Derbyshire, W.; Sills, R.J.

    1982-01-01

    Five considerations for the design of plutonium processing facilities are identified. These are: Toxicity, Radiation, Criticality, Containment and Remote Operation. They are examined with reference to reprocessing spent nuclear fuel and application is detailed both for liquid and dry processes. (author)

  5. Ventilation design for new plutonium recovery facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oliver, A.J.; Amos, C.L.

    1975-01-01

    In 1972 the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) issued revised guidelines on ''Minimum Design Criteria for New Plutonium Facilities.'' With these criteria as guidelines, a new Plutonium Recovery Facility is being designed and constructed at the AEC Rocky Flats Plant. The methods by which the confinement of contamination and air treatment are being handled in this facility are described. (U.S.)

  6. Waste minimization at a plutonium processing facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1995-01-01

    As part of Los Alamos National Laboratory's (LANL) mission to reduce the nuclear danger throughout the world, the plutonium processing facility at LANL maintains expertise and skills in nuclear weapons technologies as well as leadership in all peaceful applications of plutonium technologies, including fuel fabrication for terrestrial and space reactors and heat sources and thermoelectric generators for space missions. Another near-term challenge resulted from two safety assessments performed by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and the U.S. Department of Energy during the past two years. These assessments have necessitated the processing and stabilization of plutonium contained in tons of residues so that they can be stored safely for an indefinite period. This report describes waste streams and approaches to waste reduction of plutonium management

  7. Confinement facilities for handling plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maraman, W.J.; McNeese, W.D.; Stafford, R.G.

    1975-01-01

    Plutonium handling on a multigram scale began in 1944. Early criteria, equipment, and techniques for confining contamination have been superseded by more stringent criteria and vastly improved equipment and techniques for in-process contamination control, effluent air cleaning and treatment of liquid wastes. This paper describes the evolution of equipment and practices to minimize exposure of workers and escape of contamination into work areas and into the environment. Early and current contamination controls are compared. (author)

  8. Radioactive waste shipments to Hanford Retrievable Storage from the General Electric Vallecitos Nuclear Center, Pleasanton, California

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vejvoda, E.J.; Pottmeyer, J.A.; DeLorenzo, D.S.; Weyns-Rollosson, M.I.; Duncan, D.R.

    1993-10-01

    During the next two decades the transuranic (TRU) wastes now stored in the burial trenches and storage facilities at the Hanford Site are to be retrieved, processed at the Waste Receiving and Processing Facility, and shipped to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant near Carlsbad, New Mexico for final disposal. Approximately 3.8% of the TRU waste to be retrieved for shipment to WIPP was generated at the General Electric (GE) Vallecitos Nuclear Center (VNC) in Pleasanton, California and shipped to the Hanford Site for storage. The purpose of this report is to characterize these radioactive solid wastes using process knowledge, existing records, and oral history interviews. The waste was generated almost exclusively from the activities, of the Plutonium Fuels Development Laboratory and the Plutonium Analytical Laboratory. Section 2.0 provides further details of the VNC physical plant, facility operations, facility history, and current status. The solid radioactive wastes were associated with two US Atomic Energy Commission/US Department of Energy reactor programs -- the Fast Ceramic Reactor (FCR) program, and the Fast Flux Test Reactor (FFTR) program. These programs involved the fabrication and testing of fuel assemblies that utilized plutonium in an oxide form. The types and estimated quantities of waste resulting from these programs are discussed in detail in Section 3.0. A detailed discussion of the packaging and handling procedures used for the VNC radioactive wastes shipped to the Hanford Site is provided in Section 4.0. Section 5.0 provides an in-depth look at this waste including the following: weight and volume of the waste, container types and numbers, physical description of the waste, radiological components, hazardous constituents, and current storage/disposal locations

  9. Radioactive waste shipments to Hanford Retrievable Storage from the General Electric Vallecitos Nuclear Center, Pleasanton, California

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vejvoda, E.J.; Pottmeyer, J.A.; DeLorenzo, D.S.; Weyns-Rollosson, M.I. [Los Alamos Technical Associates, Inc., NM (United States); Duncan, D.R. [Westinghouse Hanford Co., Richland, WA (United States)

    1993-10-01

    During the next two decades the transuranic (TRU) wastes now stored in the burial trenches and storage facilities at the Hanford Site are to be retrieved, processed at the Waste Receiving and Processing Facility, and shipped to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant near Carlsbad, New Mexico for final disposal. Approximately 3.8% of the TRU waste to be retrieved for shipment to WIPP was generated at the General Electric (GE) Vallecitos Nuclear Center (VNC) in Pleasanton, California and shipped to the Hanford Site for storage. The purpose of this report is to characterize these radioactive solid wastes using process knowledge, existing records, and oral history interviews. The waste was generated almost exclusively from the activities, of the Plutonium Fuels Development Laboratory and the Plutonium Analytical Laboratory. Section 2.0 provides further details of the VNC physical plant, facility operations, facility history, and current status. The solid radioactive wastes were associated with two US Atomic Energy Commission/US Department of Energy reactor programs -- the Fast Ceramic Reactor (FCR) program, and the Fast Flux Test Reactor (FFTR) program. These programs involved the fabrication and testing of fuel assemblies that utilized plutonium in an oxide form. The types and estimated quantities of waste resulting from these programs are discussed in detail in Section 3.0. A detailed discussion of the packaging and handling procedures used for the VNC radioactive wastes shipped to the Hanford Site is provided in Section 4.0. Section 5.0 provides an in-depth look at this waste including the following: weight and volume of the waste, container types and numbers, physical description of the waste, radiological components, hazardous constituents, and current storage/disposal locations.

  10. Accountability control system in plutonium fuel facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Naruki, Kaoru; Aoki, Minoru; Mizuno, Ohichi; Mishima, Tsuyoshi

    1979-01-01

    More than 30 tons of plutonium-uranium mixed-oxide fuel have been manufactured at the Plutonium Facility in PNC for JOYO, FUGEN and DCA (Deuterium Critical Assembly) and for the purpose of irradiation tests. This report reviews the nuclear material accountability control system adopted in the Plutonium Facility. Initially, the main objective of the system was the criticality control of fissible materials at various stages of fuel manufacturing. The first part of this report describes the functions and the structure of the control system. A flow chart is provided to show the various stages of material flow and their associated computer files. The system is composed of the following three sub-systems: procedures of nuclear material transfer; PIT (Physical Inventory Taking); data retrieval, report preparation and file maintenance. OMR (Optical Mark Reader) sheets are used to record the nuclear material transfer. The MUF (Materials Unaccounted For) are evaluated by PIT every three months through computer processing based on the OMR sheets. The MUF ratio of Pu handled in the facility every year from 1966 to 1977 are presented by a curve, indicating that the MUF ratio was kept well under 0.5% for every project (JOYO, FUGEN, and DCA). As for the Pu safeguards, the MBA (Material Balance Area) and the KMP (Key Measurement Point) in the facility of PNC are illustrated. The general idea of the projected PINC (Plutonium Inventory Control) system in PNC is also shortly explained. (Aoki, K.)

  11. Los Alamos Plutonium Facility Waste Management System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, K.; Montoya, A.; Wieneke, R.; Wulff, D.; Smith, C.; Gruetzmacher, K.

    1997-01-01

    This paper describes the new computer-based transuranic (TRU) Waste Management System (WMS) being implemented at the Plutonium Facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The Waste Management System is a distributed computer processing system stored in a Sybase database and accessed by a graphical user interface (GUI) written in Omnis7. It resides on the local area network at the Plutonium Facility and is accessible by authorized TRU waste originators, count room personnel, radiation protection technicians (RPTs), quality assurance personnel, and waste management personnel for data input and verification. Future goals include bringing outside groups like the LANL Waste Management Facility on-line to participate in this streamlined system. The WMS is changing the TRU paper trail into a computer trail, saving time and eliminating errors and inconsistencies in the process

  12. Guide to good practices at plutonium facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Faust, L.G.; Brackenbush, L.W.; Carter, L.A.; Endres, G.W.R.; Glenn, R.D.; Jech, J.J.; Selby, J.M.; Smith, R.C.; Waite, D.A.; Walsh, W.P.

    1977-09-01

    This manual establishes guidelines and principles for use in setting up a sound radiation protection program for work with plutonium. The guidance presented is based on the experiences of Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) contractors and those portions of private industry concerned with the operation of plutonium facilities, specifically with the fabrication of mixed oxide reactor fuel. The manual is directed primarily to those facilities which have as their sole purpose the handling of large quantities of plutonium for military or industrial uses. It is not intended for use by facilities engaged in reactor or chemical separation operations nor for partial or occasional use by analytical laboratories; while these facilities would find the manual beneficial, it would be incomplete for their needs. The manual addresses good practices that should be observed by management, staff and designers, since the benefits of a good radiation protection program are the result of their joint efforts. Methods for the diagnostic evaluation of internally deposited Pu are included

  13. Interim Storage of Plutonium in Existing Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Woodsmall, T.D.

    1999-01-01

    'In this era of nuclear weapons disarmament and nonproliferation treaties, among many problems being faced by the Department of Energy is the safe disposal of plutonium. There is a large stockpile of plutonium at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Center and it remains politically and environmentally strategic to relocate the inventory closer to a processing facility. Savannah River Site has been chosen as the final storage location, and the Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility (APSF) is currently under construction for this purpose. With the ability of APSF to receive Rocky Flats material an estimated ten years away, DOE has decided to use the existing reactor building in K-Area of SRS as temporary storage to accelerate the removal of plutonium from Rocky Flats. There are enormous cost savings to the government that serve as incentive to start this removal as soon as possible, and the KAMS project is scheduled to receive the first shipment of plutonium in January 2000. The reactor building in K-Area was chosen for its hardened structure and upgraded seismic qualification, both resulting from an effort to restart the reactor in 1991. The KAMS project has faced unique challenges from Authorization Basis and Safety Analysis perspectives. Although modifying a reactor building from a production facility to a storage shelter is not technically difficult, the nature of plutonium has caused design and safety analysis engineers to make certain that the design of systems, structures and components included will protect the public, SRS workers, and the environment. A basic overview of the KAMS project follows. Plutonium will be measured and loaded into DOT Type-B shipping packages at Rocky Flats. The packages are 35-gallon stainless steel drums with multiple internal containment boundaries. DOE transportation vehicles will be used to ship the drums to the KAMS facility at SRS. They will then be unloaded, stacked and stored in specific locations throughout the

  14. Facility model for the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coulter, C.A.; Thomas, K.E.; Sohn, C.L.; Yarbro, T.F.; Hench, K.W.

    1986-01-01

    The Los Alamos Plutonium Facility contains more than sixty unit processes and handles a large variety of nuclear materials, including many forms of plutonium-bearing scrap. The management of the Plutonium Facility is supporting the development of a computer model of the facility as a means of effectively integrating the large amount of information required for material control, process planning, and facility development. The model is designed to provide a flexible, easily maintainable facility description that allows the faciltiy to be represented at any desired level of detail within a single modeling framework, and to do this using a model program and data files that can be read and understood by a technically qualified person without modeling experience. These characteristics were achieved by structuring the model so that all facility data is contained in data files, formulating the model in a simulation language that provides a flexible set of data structures and permits a near-English-language syntax, and using a description for unit processes that can represent either a true unit process or a major subsection of the facility. Use of the model is illustrated by applying it to two configurations of a fictitious nuclear material processing line

  15. Recent trends of plutonium facilities and their control

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Muto, T [Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp., Tokai, Ibaraki (Japan). Tokai Works

    1974-02-01

    Much interest has been focussed on Pu recycle since the oil crisis because of an expected shortage of enriched uranium. Plutonium handling techniques and plutonium fuel fabricating facilities should be developed to meet the future demand of plutonium, but the radioactive property of plutonium to be reprocessed from spent fuel and recycled plutonium is remarkably different, and it has to be handled safely. Technical criteria for plutonium facilities are specified in the USAEC regulatory guides and other rules. Some of these criteria are location condition, quality of confinement, protection against accidents and so on. The control conditions for plutonium facilities are exposure control, criticality control, measurement control and new system of safeguard. These problems are under development to meet the future requirement for the safe handling of Pu material.

  16. Decommissioning and Decontamination Program: Battelle Plutonium Facility, Environmental assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-09-01

    This assessment describes the decontamination of Battelle-Columbus Plutonium Facility and removal from the site of all material contamination which was associated with or produced by the Plutonium Facility. Useable uncontaminated material will be disposed of by procedures normally employed in scrap declaration and transfer. Contaminated waste will be transported to approved radioactive waste storage sites. 5 refs., 1 fig

  17. Design of an integrated non-destructive plutonium assay facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moore, C.B.

    1984-01-01

    The Department of Energy requires improved technology for nuclear materials accounting as an essential part of new plutonium processing facilities. New facilities are being constructed at the Savannah River Plant by the Du Pont Company, Operating Contractor, to recover plutonium from scrap and waste material generated at SRP and other DOE contract processing facilities. This paper covers design concepts and planning required to incorporate state-of-the-art plutonium assay instruments developed at several national laboratories into an integrated, at-line nuclear material accounting facility operating in the production area. 3 figures

  18. Los Alamos DP West Plutonium Facility decontamination project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garde, R.; Cox, E.J.; Valentine, A.M.

    1982-01-01

    The DP West Plutonium Facility operated by the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, was decontaminated between April 1978 and April 1981. The facility was constructed in 1944 to 1945 to produce plutonium metal and fabricate parts for nuclear weapons. It was continually used as a plutonium processing and research facility until mid-1978. Decontamination operations included dismantling and removing gloveboxes and conveyor tunnels; removing process systems, utilities, and exhaust ducts; and decontaminating all remaining surfaces. This report describes glovebox and conveyor tunnel separations, decontamination techniques, health and safety considerations, waste management procedures, and costs of the operation

  19. Demolition of Building 12, an old plutonium filter facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Christensen, E.L.; Garde, R.; Valentine, A.M.

    1975-01-01

    This report discusses the decommissioning and disposal of a plutonium-contaminated air filter facility that provided ventilation for the main plutonium processing plant at Los Alamos from 1945 until 1973. The health physics, waste management, and environmental aspects of the demolition are also discussed

  20. Metering management at the plutonium research and development facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hirata, Masaru; Miyamoto, Fujio; Kurosawa, Makoto; Abe, Jiro; Sakai, Haruyuki; Suzuki, Tsuneo.

    1996-01-01

    Nuclear fuel research laboratory of the Oarai Research Laboratory of the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute is an R and D facility to treat with plutonium and processes various and versatile type samples in chemical and physical form for use of various experimental researches even though on much small amount. Furthermore, wasted and plutonium samples are often transported to other KMP and MBA such as radioactive waste management facility, nuclear reactor facility and so forth. As this facility is a place to treat plutonium important on the safeguards, it is a facility necessary for detection and allowance actions and for detail managements on the metering management data to report to government and IAEA in each small amount sample and different configuration. In this paper, metering management of internationally regulated matters and metering management system using a work station newly produced in such small scale facility were introduced. (G.K.)

  1. Seismic evaluation of the LLNL plutonium facility (Building 332)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hall, W.J.; Sozen, M.A.

    1982-03-01

    The expected performance of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Plutonium Facility (Building 332) subjected to earthquake ground motion has been evaluated. Anticipated behavior of the building, glove boxes, ventilation system and other systems critical for containment of plutonium is described for three severe postulated earthquake excitations. Based upon this evaluation, some damage to the building, glove boxes and ventilation system would be expected but no collapse of any structure is anticipated as a result of the postulated earthquake ground motions

  2. 233-S Plutonium Concentration Facility data quality objectives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Encke, D.B.

    1996-08-01

    This document is a summary of the decision-making associated with the Data Quality Objective process that pertains to the characterization activities in the 233-S Plutonium Concentration Facility at the Hanford Site in Richland, Washington. The 233-S Plutonium Concentration Facility is located adjacent to, and north of, the REDOX Plant. The facility was used to concentrate the plutonium nitrate product solution from the REDOX facility. The 233-S Pipe Gallery, Control Room, SWP Change Room, Toilet, Equipment Room and the Electrical Cubicle are currently scheduled for decontamination and cleanout to support future demolition (D and D). Identification of the radiological contamination and presence of hazardous materials is needed to allow for disposal of the D and D debris

  3. Passive neutron survey of the 233-S Plutonium Concentration Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-08-01

    A passive neutron survey was performed at the 233-S Plutonium Concentration Facility (located at the Hanford Site in Richland, Washington) during late 1994 and early 1995. Four areas were surveyed: an abandoned filter box and pipe trench, column laydown trench, load-out hood, and process hood. The primary purpose of the survey was to identify locations that had plutonium to help direct decontamination and decommissioning activities. A secondary purpose of the survey was to determine the quantity of material when its presence was identified

  4. A probabilistic risk assessment of the LLNL Plutonium facility's evaluation basis fire operational accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brumburgh, G.

    1994-01-01

    The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Plutonium Facility conducts numerous involving plutonium to include device fabrication, development of fabrication techniques, metallurgy research, and laser isotope separation. A Safety Analysis Report (SAR) for the building 332 Plutonium Facility was completed rational safety and acceptable risk to employees, the public, government property, and the environment. This paper outlines the PRA analysis of the Evaluation Basis Fire (EDF) operational accident. The EBF postulates the worst-case programmatic impact event for the Plutonium Facility

  5. Dismantlement and decontamination of a plutonium-238 facility at SRS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, R.H. Jr.; Hootman, H.E.

    1994-01-01

    There has been very little, documented decontamination and decommissioning (D ampersand D) experience on which to project cleanup costs and schedules for plutonium facilities at SRS and other DOE sites. A portion of the HB-Line, a plutonium-238 processing facility at SRS, has been undergoing D ampersand D intermittently since 1984. Although this cleanup effort was not originally intended to quantify results, some key data have been project has demonstrated effective methods of accumulated, and the performing D ampersand D work, and has demonstrated cleanup equipment and techniques under conditions of high contamination. Plutonium facilities where D ampersand D is already underway provide an opportunity for' timely field testing of characterization, size reduction, and decontamination techniques. Some data are presented here; however, more specific tests and data may be obtained during the remainder of this project. This project has been recommended as a candidate test facility for a DOE planned ''Integrated D ampersand D Demonstration'' managed by EM-50 to develop and demonstrate technology for D ampersand D and surplus facilities deactivation. Both the remainder of this project and the Integrated D ampersand D Demonstration Program can benefit from a joint effort, and the, overall costs should be reduced

  6. Los Alamos Plutonium Facility newly generated TRU waste certification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gruetzmacher, K.; Montoya, A.; Sinkule, B.; Maez, M.

    1997-01-01

    This paper presents an overview of the activities being planned and implemented to certify newly generated contact handled transuranic (TRU) waste produced by Los Alamos National Laboratory's (LANL's) Plutonium Facility. Certifying waste at the point of generation is the most important cost and labor saving step in the WIPP certification process. The pedigree of a waste item is best known by the originator of the waste and frees a site from expensive characterization activities such as those associated with legacy waste. Through a cooperative agreement with LANLs Waste Management Facility and under the umbrella of LANLs WIPP-related certification and quality assurance documents, the Plutonium Facility will be certifying its own newly generated waste. Some of the challenges faced by the Plutonium Facility in preparing to certify TRU waste include the modification and addition of procedures to meet WIPP requirements, standardizing packaging for TRU waste, collecting processing documentation from operations which produce TRU waste, and developing ways to modify waste streams which are not certifiable in their present form

  7. R.4. Innovative concept for plutonium finishing facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bertolotti, G.; Laguerie, I.V. de; Richter, R.; Gillet, B.

    1998-01-01

    After complete shutdown of the units of the previous UP2 plant, the new R4 facility will ensure the purification of Plutonium of the UP2-800 plant for the whole range of fuel to be reprocessed in the years to come. This facility features four main units: - Purification of plutonium nitrate; - Conversion into plutonium oxide; - PuO 2 conditioning into cans; Acid recovery. An extensive R and D program resulted in significant innovations. From a technological aspect the centrifugal extractor and the sub-critical tube bundle tank contributed to the reduction of the building dimensions. The extensive use of on-line analyses enables a more efficient follow-up of the process while minimizing the effluent production. On the other hand, the organization of the building which consists in grouping the rooms presenting the same risk of dispersal of nuclear materials also contributed to reduce the active zone volume. This facility, as any other facilities on the LA HAGUE site, will be remotely operated. (author)

  8. Seismic safety of the LLL plutonium facility (Building 332)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Torkarz, F.J.; Shaw, G.

    1980-01-01

    This report states the basis for the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory's assurance to the public that the plutonium operations at the Laboratory pose essentially no risk to anyone's health or safety, either under normal circumstances or in the event of an earthquake or a fire. The report is intended for a general audience, and so for the most part it is not highly technical. It summarizes the steps taken to ensure the seismic safety of the plutonium facility (Bldg. 332). It describes plutonium and its potential hazard and how the facility copes with that hazard. It recounts the geologic investigations and interpretations that led to the design-basis earthquake (DBE) for the Livermore site, and presents a summary analysis of the facility structure in relation to the DBE. An appendix presents a quantitative calculation of the health risk to the public associated with the worst-case hypothetical fire. The document supports the conclusions that the facility will continue to function safely after the maximum earthquake ground motion to which it may be subjected and that there is no evidence of a potential for surface offset under it

  9. Upgrade of the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility control system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pope, N.G.; Turner, W.J.; Brown, R.E.; Bibeau, R.A.; Davis, R.R.; Hogan, K.

    1996-01-01

    After 20 yrs service, the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility is undergoing an upgrade to its aging Facility Control System. The new system design includes a network of redundantly-paired programmable logic controllers that will interface with about 2200 field data points. The data communications network that has been designed includes a redundant, self-healing fiber optic data highway as well as a fiber optic ethernet. Commercially available human-machine interface software running on a UNIX-based system displays facility subsystem status operator X-terminals. Project design features, methods, costs, and schedule are discussed

  10. An autoradiographical method using an imaging plate for the analyses of plutonium contamination in a plutonium handling facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Takasaki, Koji; Sagawa, Naoki; Kurosawa, Shigeyuki; Mizuniwa, Harumi

    2011-01-01

    An autoradiographical method using an imaging plate (IP) was developed to analyze plutonium contamination in a plutonium handling facility. The IPs were exposed to ten specimens having a single plutonium particle. Photostimulated luminescence (PSL) images of the specimens were taken using a laser scanning machine. One relatively large spot induced by α-radioactivity from plutonium was observed in each PSL image. The plutonium-induced spots were discriminated by a threshold derived from background and the size of the spot. A good relationship between the PSL intensities of the spots and α-radioactivities measured using a radiation counter was obtained by least-square fitting, taking the fading effect into consideration. This method was applied to workplace monitoring in an actual uranium-plutonium mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. Plutonium contaminations were analyzed in ten other specimens having more than two plutonium spots. The α-radioactivities of plutonium contamination were derived from the PSL images and their relative errors were evaluated from exposure time. (author)

  11. Liquid waste treatment at plutonium fuels fabrication facility, 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matsumoto, Ken-ichi; Itoh, Ichiroh; Ohuchi, Jin; Miyo, Hiroaki

    1974-01-01

    The economics in the management of the radioactive liquid waste from Plutonium Fuels Fabrication Facility with sludge-blanket type flocculators has been evaluated. (1) Cost calculation: The cost of chemicals and electricity to treat 1 cubic meter of liquid waste is about 876 yen, while the total operating cost is 250 thousand yen per cubic meter in the case of 140 m 3 /year treatment. These figures are much higher than those for ordinary wastes, due to the particular operation against plutonium. (2) Proposal of the closed system for liquid waste treatment at PFFF: In the case of a closed system using evaporator, ion exchange column and rotary-kiln calciner, the operating cost is estimated at 40 thousand yen per cubic meter of liquid waste. Final radioactivity of treated liquid is below 10 -8 micro curies/ml. (Mori, K.)

  12. Nondestructive assay system development for a plutonium scrap recovery facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hsue, S.T.; Baker, M.P.

    1984-01-01

    A plutonium scrap recovery facility is being constructed at the Savannah River Plant (SRP). The safeguards groups of the Los Alamos National Laboratory have been working since the early design stage of the facility with SRP and other national laboratories to develop a state-of-the-art assay system for this new facility. Not only will the most current assay techniques be incorporated into the system, but also the various nondestructive assay (NDA) instruments are to be integrated with an Instrument Control Computer (ICC). This undertaking is both challenging and ambitious; an entire assay system of this type has never been done before in a working facility. This paper will describe, in particular, the effort of the Los Alamos Safeguards Assay Group in this endeavor. Our effort in this project can be roughly divided into three phases: NDA development, system integration, and integral testing. 6 references

  13. Facility effluent monitoring plan for the plutonium uranium extraction facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wiegand, D.L.

    1994-09-01

    A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438-01. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan shall ensure long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updated at a minimum of every three years.

  14. Facility effluent monitoring plan for the plutonium uranium extraction facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wiegand, D.L.

    1994-09-01

    A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438-01. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan shall ensure long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updated at a minimum of every three years

  15. Facility effluent monitoring plan for the Plutonium Uranium Extraction Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Greager, E.M.

    1997-01-01

    A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438-01. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether these systems are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan will ensure long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updated, at a minimum, every 3 years

  16. A probabilistic risk assessment of the LLNL Plutonium Facility's evaluation basis fire operational accident. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brumburgh, G.P.

    1995-01-01

    The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Plutonium Facility conducts numerous programmatic activities involving plutonium to include device fabrication, development of improved and/or unique fabrication techniques, metallurgy research, and laser isotope separation. A Safety Analysis Report (SAR) for the building 332 Plutonium Facility was completed in July 1994 to address operational safety and acceptable risk to employees, the public, government property, and the environmental. This paper outlines the PRA analysis of the Evaluation Basis Fire (EBF) operational accident. The EBF postulates the worst-case programmatic impact event for the Plutonium Facility

  17. Continuous Material Balance Reconciliation for a Modern Plutonium Processing Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    CLARK, THOMASG.

    2004-01-01

    This paper describes a safeguards approach that can be deployed at any modern plutonium processing facility to increase the level of safeguards assurance and significantly reduce the impact of safeguards on process operations. One of the most perplexing problems facing the designers of plutonium processing facilities is the constraint placed upon the limit of error of the inventory difference (LEID). The current DOE manual constrains the LEID for Category I and II material balance areas to 2 per cent of active inventory up to a Category II quantity of the material being processed. For 239Pu a Category II quantity is two kilograms. Due to the large material throughput anticipated for some of the modern plutonium facilities, the required LEID cannot be achieved reliably during a nominal two month inventory period, even by using state-of-the-science non-destructive assay (NDA) methods. The most cost-effective and least disruptive solution appears to be increasing the frequency of material balance closure and thus reducing the throughput being measured during each inventory period. Current inventory accounting practices and systems can already provide the book inventory values at any point in time. However, closing the material balance with measured values has typically required the process to be cleaned out, and in-process materials packaged and measured. This process requires one to two weeks of facility down time every two months for each inventory, thus significantly reducing productivity. To provide a solution to this problem, a non-traditional approach is proposed that will include using in-line instruments to provide measurement of the process materials on a near real-time basis. A new software component will be developed that will operate with the standard LANMAS application to provide the running material balance reconciliation, including the calculation of the inventory difference and variance propagation. The combined measurement system and software

  18. Plutonium Reclamation Facility incident response project progress report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Austin, B.A.

    1997-01-01

    This report provides status of Hanford activities in response to process deficiencies highlighted during and in response to the May 14, 1997, explosion at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility. This report provides specific response to the August 4, 1997, memorandum from the Secretary which requested a progress report, in 120 days, on activities associated with reassessing the known and evaluating new vulnerabilities (chemical and radiological) at facilities that have been shut down, are in standby, are being deactivated or have otherwise changed their conventional mode of operation in the last several years. In addition, this report is intended to provide status on emergency response corrective activities as requested in the memorandum from the Secretary on August 28, 1997. Status is also included for actions requested in the second August 28, 1997, memorandum from the Secretary, regarding timely notification of emergencies

  19. Plutonium Reclamation Facility incident response project progress report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Austin, B.A.

    1997-11-25

    This report provides status of Hanford activities in response to process deficiencies highlighted during and in response to the May 14, 1997, explosion at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility. This report provides specific response to the August 4, 1997, memorandum from the Secretary which requested a progress report, in 120 days, on activities associated with reassessing the known and evaluating new vulnerabilities (chemical and radiological) at facilities that have been shut down, are in standby, are being deactivated or have otherwise changed their conventional mode of operation in the last several years. In addition, this report is intended to provide status on emergency response corrective activities as requested in the memorandum from the Secretary on August 28, 1997. Status is also included for actions requested in the second August 28, 1997, memorandum from the Secretary, regarding timely notification of emergencies.

  20. Health physics manual of good practices for plutonium facilities. [Contains glossary

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Brackenbush, L.W.; Heid, K.R.; Herrington, W.N.; Kenoyer, J.L.; Munson, L.F.; Munson, L.H.; Selby, J.M.; Soldat, K.L.; Stoetzel, G.A.; Traub, R.J.

    1988-05-01

    This manual consists of six sections: Properties of Plutonium, Siting of Plutonium Facilities, Facility Design, Radiation Protection, Emergency Preparedness, and Decontamination and Decommissioning. While not the final authority, the manual is an assemblage of information, rules of thumb, regulations, and good practices to assist those who are intimately involved in plutonium operations. An in-depth understanding of the nuclear, physical, chemical, and biological properties of plutonium is important in establishing a viable radiation protection and control program at a plutonium facility. These properties of plutonium provide the basis and perspective necessary for appreciating the quality of control needed in handling and processing the material. Guidance in selecting the location of a new plutonium facility may not be directly useful to most readers. However, it provides a perspective for the development and implementation of the environmental surveillance program and the in-plant controls required to ensure that the facility is and remains a good neighbor. The criteria, guidance, and good practices for the design of a plutonium facility are also applicable to the operation and modification of existing facilities. The design activity provides many opportunities for implementation of features to promote more effective protection and control. The application of ''as low as reasonably achievable'' (ALARA) principles and optimization analyses are generally most cost-effective during the design phase. 335 refs., 8 figs., 20 tabs.

  1. OPEN AIR DEMOLITION OF FACILITIES HIGHLY CONTAMINATED WITH PLUTONIUM

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    LLOYD, E.R.

    2007-01-01

    The demolition of highly contaminated plutonium buildings usually is a long and expensive process that involves decontaminating the building to near free- release standards and then using conventional methods to remove the structure. It doesn't, however, have to be that way. Fluor has torn down buildings highly contaminated with plutonium without excessive decontamination. By removing the select source term and fixing the remaining contamination on the walls, ceilings, floors, and equipment surfaces; open-air demolition is not only feasible, but it can be done cheaper, better (safer), and faster. Open-air demolition techniques were used to demolish two highly contaminated buildings to slab-on-grade. These facilities on the Department of Energy's Hanford Site were located in, or very near, compounds of operating nuclear facilities that housed hundreds of people working on a daily basis. To keep the facilities operating and the personnel safe, the projects had to be creative in demolishing the structures. Several key techniques were used to control contamination and keep it within the confines of the demolition area: spraying fixatives before demolition; applying fixative and misting with a fine spray of water as the buildings were being taken down; and demolishing the buildings in a controlled and methodical manner. In addition, detailed air-dispersion modeling was done to establish necessary building and meteorological conditions and to confirm the adequacy of the proposed methods. Both demolition projects were accomplished without any spread of contamination outside the modest buffer areas established for contamination control. Furthermore, personnel exposure to radiological and physical hazards was significantly reduced by using heavy equipment rather than ''hands on'' techniques

  2. Improving aircraft accident forecasting for an integrated plutonium storage facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rock, J.C.; Kiffe, J.; McNerney, M.T.; Turen, T.A.

    1998-06-01

    Aircraft accidents pose a quantifiable threat to facilities used to store and process surplus weapon-grade plutonium. The Department of Energy (DOE) recently published its first aircraft accident analysis guidelines: Accident Analysis for Aircraft Crash into Hazardous Facilities. This document establishes a hierarchy of procedures for estimating the small annual frequency for aircraft accidents that impact Pantex facilities and the even smaller frequency of hazardous material released to the environment. The standard establishes a screening threshold of 10 -6 impacts per year; if the initial estimate of impact frequency for a facility is below this level, no further analysis is required. The Pantex Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement (SWEIS) calculates the aircraft impact frequency to be above this screening level. The DOE Standard encourages more detailed analyses in such cases. This report presents three refinements, namely, removing retired small military aircraft from the accident rate database, correcting the conversion factor from military accident rates (accidents per 100,000 hours) to the rates used in the DOE model (accidents per flight phase), and adjusting the conditional probability of impact for general aviation to more accurately reflect pilot training and local conditions. This report documents a halving of the predicted frequency of an aircraft impact at Pantex and points toward further reductions

  3. Design of an error-free nondestructive plutonium assay facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moore, C.B.; Steward, W.E.

    1987-01-01

    An automated, at-line nondestructive assay (NDA) laboratory is installed in facilities recently constructed at the Savannah River Plant. The laboratory will enhance nuclear materials accounting in new plutonium scrap and waste recovery facilities. The advantages of at-line NDA operations will not be realized if results are clouded by errors in analytical procedures, sample identification, record keeping, or techniques for extracting samples from process streams. Minimization of such errors has been a primary design objective for the new facility. Concepts for achieving that objective include mechanizing the administrative tasks of scheduling activities in the laboratory, identifying samples, recording and storing assay data, and transmitting results information to process control and materials accounting functions. These concepts have been implemented in an analytical computer system that is programmed to avoid the obvious sources of error encountered in laboratory operations. The laboratory computer exchanges information with process control and materials accounting computers, transmitting results information and obtaining process data and accounting information as required to guide process operations and maintain current records of materials flow through the new facility

  4. French en engineering and operation rules for plutonium facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bertolotti, G.; Drain, F.; Dubois, G.; Monnatte, J.; Mathieu, P.

    1998-01-01

    COGEMA is operating large size purifying and conditioning plutonium facilities at LA HAGUE and MOX fuels fabrication plant at Marcoule. A high safety standard is recognised for these facilities. It is mainly based on : - prevention of spreading of radioactive materials to workers and environment by physical barriers ensuring static containment and by a cascade of pressure differentials ensuring dynamic containment, - radiation shielding and remote controlled processes ensuring very low dose to workers, - prevention of criticality accident by criticality control methods and double contingency principle, - prevention of fire risks by control of ignition sources, adequate management of combustible materials, physical separation between zones where there is a risk of fire and the remainder of the facility. The facilities are operated while respecting safety requirements as described in the General Operating Rules. The equipment involved in safety functions are monitored and periodically checked. Continuous improvement by incorporation of feed back of safety experience results in: - effective decrease of exposure to operating staff; - reduction of solid waste, liquid and gaseous effluents; - no significant incident recorded. (author)

  5. Plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koelzer, W.

    1989-03-01

    This report contains with regard to 'plutonium' statements on chemistry, occurrence and reactions in the environment, handling procedures in the nuclear fuel cycle, radiation protection methods, biokinetics, toxicology and medical treatment to make available reliable data for the public discussion on plutonium especially its use in nuclear power plants and its radiological assessment. (orig.) [de

  6. Transuranic (Tru) waste volume reduction operations at a plutonium facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cournoyer, Michael E [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Nixon, Archie E [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Dodge, Robert L [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Fife, Keith W [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sandoval, Arnold M [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Garcia, Vincent E [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-01-01

    Programmatic operations at the Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility (TA 55) involve working with various amounts of plutonium and other highly toxic, alpha-emitting materials. The spread of radiological contamination on surfaces, airborne contamination, and excursions of contaminants into the operator's breathing zone are prevented through use of a variety of gloveboxes (the glovebox, coupled with an adequate negative pressure gradient, provides primary confinement). Size-reduction operations on glovebox equipment are a common activity when a process has been discontinued and the room is being modified to support a new customer. The Actin ide Processing Group at TA-55 uses one-meter-long glass columns to process plutonium. Disposal of used columns is a challenge, since they must be size-reduced to get them out of the glovebox. The task is a high-risk operation because the glass shards that are generated can puncture the bag-out bags, leather protectors, glovebox gloves, and the worker's skin when completing the task. One of the Lessons Learned from these operations is that Laboratory management should critically evaluate each hazard and provide more effective measures to prevent personnel injury. A bag made of puncture-resistant material was one of these enhanced controls. We have investigated the effectiveness of these bags and have found that they safely and effectively permit glass objects to be reduced to small pieces with a plastic or rubber mallet; the waste can then be easily poured into a container for removal from the glove box as non-compactable transuranic (TRU) waste. This size-reduction operation reduces solid TRU waste generation by almost 2% times. Replacing one-time-use bag-out bags with multiple-use glass crushing bags also contributes to reducing generated waste. In addition, significant costs from contamination, cleanup, and preparation of incident documentation are avoided. This effort contributes to the Los Alamos

  7. Transuranic (Tru) waste volume reduction operations at a plutonium facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cournoyer, Michael E.; Nixon, Archie E.; Dodge, Robert L.; Fife, Keith W.; Sandoval, Arnold M.; Garcia, Vincent E.

    2010-01-01

    Programmatic operations at the Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility (TA 55) involve working with various amounts of plutonium and other highly toxic, alpha-emitting materials. The spread of radiological contamination on surfaces, airborne contamination, and excursions of contaminants into the operator's breathing zone are prevented through use of a variety of gloveboxes (the glovebox, coupled with an adequate negative pressure gradient, provides primary confinement). Size-reduction operations on glovebox equipment are a common activity when a process has been discontinued and the room is being modified to support a new customer. The Actin ide Processing Group at TA-55 uses one-meter-long glass columns to process plutonium. Disposal of used columns is a challenge, since they must be size-reduced to get them out of the glovebox. The task is a high-risk operation because the glass shards that are generated can puncture the bag-out bags, leather protectors, glovebox gloves, and the worker's skin when completing the task. One of the Lessons Learned from these operations is that Laboratory management should critically evaluate each hazard and provide more effective measures to prevent personnel injury. A bag made of puncture-resistant material was one of these enhanced controls. We have investigated the effectiveness of these bags and have found that they safely and effectively permit glass objects to be reduced to small pieces with a plastic or rubber mallet; the waste can then be easily poured into a container for removal from the glove box as non-compactable transuranic (TRU) waste. This size-reduction operation reduces solid TRU waste generation by almost 2% times. Replacing one-time-use bag-out bags with multiple-use glass crushing bags also contributes to reducing generated waste. In addition, significant costs from contamination, cleanup, and preparation of incident documentation are avoided. This effort contributes to the Los Alamos National

  8. Transuranic (TRU) waste volume reduction operations at a plutonium facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cournoyer, Michael E.; Nixon, Archie E.; Fife, Keith W.; Sandoval, Arnold M.; Garcia, Vincent E.; Dodge, Robert L.

    2011-01-01

    Programmatic operations at the Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility (TA-55) involve working with various amounts of plutonium and other highly toxic, alpha-emitting materials. The spread of radiological contamination on surfaces, airborne contamination, and excursions of contaminants into the operator's breathing zone are prevented through use of a variety of gloveboxes (the glovebox, coupled with an adequate negative pressure gradient, provides primary confinement). Size-reduction operations on glovebox equipment are a common activity when a process has been discontinued and the room is being modified to support a new customer. The Actinide Processing Group at TA-55 uses one-meter or longer glass columns to process plutonium. Disposal of used columns is a challenge, since they must be size-reduced to get them out of the glovebox. The task is a high-risk operation because the glass shards that are generated can puncture the bag-out bags, leather protectors, glovebox gloves, and the worker's skin when completing the task. One of the Lessons Learned from these operations is that Laboratory management should critically evaluate each hazard and provide more effective measures to prevent personnel injury. A bag made of puncture-resistant material was one of these enhanced controls. We have investigated the effectiveness of these bags and have found that they safely and effectively permit glass objects to be reduced to small pieces with a plastic or rubber mallet; the waste can then be easily poured into a container for removal from the glovebox as non-compactable transuranic (TRU) waste. This size-reduction operation reduces solid TRU waste volume generation by almost 2½ times. Replacing one-time-use bag-out bags with multiple-use glass crushing bags also contributes to reducing generated waste. In addition, significant costs from contamination, cleanup, and preparation of incident documentation are avoided. This effort contributes to the Los Alamos

  9. Los Alamos DP West Plutonium Facility decontamination project, 1978-1981

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garde, R.; Cox, E.J.; Valentine, A.M.

    1982-09-01

    The DP West Plutonium Facility operated by the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico was decontaminated between April 1978 and April 1981. The facility was constructed in 1944 to 1945 to produce plutonium metal and fabricate parts for nuclear weapons. It was continually used as a plutonium processing and research facility until mid-1978. Decontamination operations included dismantling and removing gloveboxes and conveyor tunnels; removing process systems, utilities, and exhaust ducts; and decontaminating all remaining surfaces. This report describes glovebox and conveyor tunnel separations, decontamination techniques, health and safety considerations, waste management procedures, and costs of the operation

  10. Disposition of TA-33-21, a plutonium contaminated experimental facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cox, E.J.; Garde, R.; Valentine, A.M.

    1975-01-01

    The report discusses the decontamination, demolition and disposal of a plutonium contaminated experimental physics facility which housed physics experiments with plutonium from 1951 until 1960. The results of preliminary decontamination efforts in 1960 are reported along with health physics, waste management, and environmental aspects of final disposition work accomplished during 1974 and 1975. (auth)

  11. Plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Watson, G.M.

    1976-01-01

    Discovery of the neutron made it easy to create elements which do not exist in nature. One of these is plutonium, and its isotope with mass number 239 has nuclear properties which make it both a good fuel for nuclear power reactors and a good explosive for nuclear weapons. Since it was discovered during a war the latter characteristic was put to use, but it is now evident that use of plutonium in a particular kind of nuclear reactor, the fast breeder reactor, will allow the world's resources of uranium to last for millennia as a major source of energy. Plutonium is very radiotoxic, resembling radium in this respect. Therefore the widespread introduction of fast breeder reactors to meet energy demands can be contemplated only after assurances on two points; that adequate control of the radiological hazard resulting from the handling of very large amounts of plutonium can be guaranteed, and that diversion of plutonium to illicit use can be prevented. The problems exist to a lesser degree already, since all types of nuclear reactor produce some plutonium. Some plutonium has already been dispersed in the environment, the bulk of it from atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons. (author)

  12. Plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Miner, William N

    1964-01-01

    This pamphlet discusses plutonium from discovery to its production, separation, properties, fabrication, handling, and uses, including use as a reactor fuel and use in isotope power generators and neutron sources.

  13. Plutonium in the aquatic environment around the Rocky Flats facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thompson, M.A.

    1975-01-01

    The Rocky Flats Plant of the United States Energy Research and Development Administration has been fabricating and chemically recovering plutonium for over 20 years. During that time, small amounts of plutonium have been released with liquid process and sanitary waste discharges. The liquid waste flows through a series of holding ponds from which it is discharged into a creek that is part of a municipal drinking water supply. The water flows for about 1.5 km between the last holding pond and the municipal drinking water reservoir. In addition, liquid wastes containing high levels of chemical contaminants and plutonium concentrations less than allowable drinking water standards have been discharged to large evaporation ponds. The fate of the plutonium in both the surface and subsurface aquatic environment has been extensively monitored and studied. It has been found that plutonium does not move very far or very rapidly through subsurface water. The majority of the plutonium released through surface water has been contained in the sediments of the plant holding ponds. Small amounts of plutonium have also been found in the sediments of the draining creek and in the sediments of the receiving reservoir. Higher than normal amounts of plutonium were released from the waste treatment plants during times when suspended solids were high. Various biological species have been examined and plutonium concentration factors determined. Considerably less than 1% of the 210 mCi of plutonium released has been detected in biological systems including man. After more than 20 years of large scale operations, no health or environmental hazard has been identified due to the release of small amounts of plutonium. (author)

  14. Training and exercises of the Emergency Response Team at the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yearwood, D.D.

    1988-01-01

    The Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility has an active Emergency Response Team. The Emergency Response Team is composed of members of the operating and support groups within the Plutonium Facility. In addition to their initial indoctrination, the members are trained and certified in first-aid, CPR, fire and rescue, and the use of self-contained-breathing-apparatus. Training exercises, drills, are conducted once a month. The drills consist of scenarios which require the Emergency Response Team to apply CPR and/or first aid. The drills are performed in the Plutonium Facility, they are video taped, then reviewed and critiqued by site personnel. Through training and effective drills and the Emergency Response Team can efficiently respond to any credible accident which may occur at the Plutonium Facility. 3 tabs

  15. Plutonium production story at the Hanford site: processes and facilities history

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gerber, M.S., Westinghouse Hanford

    1996-06-20

    This document tells the history of the actual plutonium production process at the Hanford Site. It contains five major sections: Fuel Fabrication Processes, Irradiation of Nuclear Fuel, Spent Fuel Handling, Radiochemical Reprocessing of Irradiated Fuel, and Plutonium Finishing Operations. Within each section the story of the earliest operations is told, along with changes over time until the end of operations. Chemical and physical processes are described, along with the facilities where these processes were carried out. This document is a processes and facilities history. It does not deal with the waste products of plutonium production.

  16. Precautions for preventing criticality at plutonium fuel treatment facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Deworm, J.P.; Fieuw, G.; Cank, H. de

    1976-01-01

    Four criticality accidents took place between 1958 and 1964 at fuel processing plants using wet methods. So far accident of this type has taken place at production units where fissionable material is used. The prevention of criticality is one of the major concerns of the officials in charge of the plutonium fuel research laboratories operated at the Mol Nuclear Energy Study Centre by the SCK/CEN-Belgonucleaire Association. The means of preventing such an accident are of three types: introducing different types of treatment in well-defined work units; thorough analysis of planned experiments or fabrication programmes to determine the sub-criticality factors; application of technical and administrative procedures which ensure that the facilities are always sub-critical during the treatment and storage of fissionable materials. The installation includes a detection and warning system and provision is made for the immediate evacuation of staff should a crticality incident occur. The effects of a critical excursion on the building have been assessed. (author)

  17. Plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1995-01-01

    Plutonium, which was obtained and identified for the first time in 1941 by chemist Glenn Seaborg - through neutron irradiation of uranium 238 - is closely related to the history of nuclear energy. From the very beginning, because of the high radiotoxicity of plutonium, a tremendous amount of research work has been devoted to the study of the biological effects and the consequences on the environment. It can be said that plutonium is presently one of the elements, whose nuclear and physico-chemical characteristics are the best known. The first part of this issue is a survey of the knowledge acquired on the subject, which emphasizes the sanitary effects and transfer into the environment. Then the properties of plutonium related to energy generation are dealt with. Fissionable, like uranium 235, plutonium has proved a high-performance nuclear fuel. Originally used in breeder reactors, it is now being more and more widely recycled in light water reactors, in MOX fuel. Reprocessing, recycling and manufacturing of these new types of fuel, bound of become more and more widespread, are now part of a self-consistent series of operations, whose technical, economical, industrial and strategical aspects are reviewed. (author)

  18. Plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueller-Christiansen, K.; Wollesen, M.

    1979-01-01

    As emotions and fear of plutonium are neither useful for the non-professionals nor for the political decision makers and the advantages and disadvantages of plutonium can only put against each other under difficulties, the paper wants to present the most essential scientific data of plutonium in a generally understandable way. Each of the individual sections is concluded and they try to give an answer to the most discussed questions. In order to make understanding easier, the scientific facts are only brought at points where it cannot be done without for the correctness of the presentation. Many details were left out knowingly. On the other hand, important details are dealt with several times if it seems necessary for making the presentation correct. The graphical presentations and the figures in many cases contain more than said in the text. They give the interested reader hints to scientific-technical coherences. The total material is to enable the reader to form his own opinion on plutonium problems which are being discussed in public. (orig./HP) [de

  19. Decontamination of Battelle-Columbus' Plutonium Facility. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rudolph, A.; Kirsch, G.; Toy, H.L.

    1984-01-01

    The Plutonium Laboratory, owned and operated by Battelle Memorial Institute's Columbus Division, was located in Battelle's Nuclear Sciences area near West Jefferson, Ohio, approximately 17 miles west of Columbus, Ohio. Originally built in 1960 for plutonium research and processing, the Plutonium Laboratory was enlarged in 1964 and again in 1967. With the termination of the Advanced Fuel Program in March, 1977, the decision was made to decommission the Plutonium Laboratory and to decontaminate the building for unrestricted use. Decontamination procedures began in January, 1978. All items which had come into contact with radioactivity from the plutonium operations were cleaned or disposed of through prescribed channels, maintaining procedures to ensure that D and D operations would pose no risk to the public, the environment, or the workers. The entire program was conducted under the cognizance of DOE's Chicago Operations Office. The building which housed the Plutonium Laboratory has now been decontaminated to levels allowing it to house ordinary laboratory and office operations. A ''Finding of No Significant Impact'' (FNSI) was issued in May, 1980

  20. Technical report for generic site add-on facility for plutonium polishing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-06-01

    The purpose of this report is to provide environmental data and reference process information associated with incorporating plutonium polishing steps (dissolution, impurity removal, and conversion to oxide powder) into the genetic-site Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MOXFF). The incorporation of the plutonium polishing steps will enable the removal of undesirable impurities, such as gallium and americium, known to be associated with the plutonium. Moreover, unanticipated impurities can be removed, including those that may be contained in (1) poorly characterized feed materials, (2) corrosion products added from processing equipment, and (3) miscellaneous materials contained in scrap recycle streams. These impurities will be removed to the extent necessary to meet plutonium product purity specifications for MOX fuels. Incorporation of the plutonium polishing steps will mean that the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF) will need to produce a plutonium product that can be dissolved at the MOXFF in nitric acid at a suitable rate (sufficient to meet overall production requirements) with the minimal usage of hydrofluoric acid, and its complexing agent, aluminum nitrate. This function will require that if the PDCF product is plutonium oxide powder, that powder must be produced, stored, and shipped without exceeding a temperature of 600 C

  1. Review of operating experience at the Los Alamos Plutonium Electrorefining Facility, 1963-1977

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mullins, L.J.; Morgan, A.N.

    1981-12-01

    This report reviews the operation of the Los Alamos Plutonium Electrorefining Plant at Technical Area 21 for the period 1964 through 1977. During that period, approximately 1568 kg of plutonium metal, > 99.95% pure, was produced in 653 runs from 1930 kg of metal fabrication scrap, 99% pure. General considerations of the electrorefining process and facility operation and recommendations for further improvement of the process are discussed

  2. Development of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility decontamination room

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mosso, J.S.; Smith, F.E.; Owen, M.J.; Treadaway, W.A.

    1987-01-01

    For several years the Health Protection Group attempted to remedy the problem of a facility to adequately handle personnel plutonium contamination incidents. Through the efforts of our Quality Circle a presentation was made to management, which immediately appropriated space and funds for the construction of a complete decontamination facility. 9 refs

  3. A feasibility study for the storage of plutonium pits in non-partitioned warehouse facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    James, D.; Parameswaren, S.; Nagendran, S.

    1999-02-01

    It is projected that up to 20,000 plutonium pits will be stored at Pantex for up to 50 years. The proposed storage system has to meet longevity, safety and cost requirements. Thermal, mechanical, chemical, nuclear criticality and safety performance characteristics of any proposed plutonium container design need to be formally analyzed. Plutonium generates thermal energy as it decays. The generated thermal energy may cause excessive rise of temperature. For safety and other considerations, it is important that the plutonium temperature remains relatively constant and no hot spots develop. Plutonium containers should not be disassembled for routine monitoring and there are various reasons for the need to monitor the plutonium non-obtrusively. Therefore, accurate predictions of the temperature distribution within the storage container based upon external monitoring within the storage facility needs to be developed. A heat transfer analysis of the storage container is required. The heat transfer analysis, however, requires the knowledge of the temperature and velocity of the air circulating around the containers in order to determine the heat transferred to the air from the containers by convection. Therefore, a complete flow field analysis is required prior to performing the conduction analysis of each pit. The objective of this research is, therefore, to develop and validate a numerical model to predict the temperature distribution within the plutonium storage container as a function of the ambient air temperature within the warehouse

  4. Disposition of PUREX facility tanks D5 and E6 uranium and plutonium solutions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harty, D.P.

    1993-12-01

    Approximately 9 kilograms of plutonium and 5 metric tons of uranium in a 1 molar nitric acid solution are being stored in two PUREX facility vessels, tanks D5 and E6. The plutonium was accumulated during cleanup activities of the plutonium product area of the PUREX facility. Personnel at PUREX recently completed a formal presentation to the Surplus Materials Peer Panel (SMPP) regarding disposition of the material currently in these tanks. The peer panel is a group of complex-wide experts who have been chartered by EM-64 (Office of Site and Facility Transfer) to provide a third party independent review of disposition decisions. The information presented to the peer panel is provided in the first section of this report. The panel was generally receptive to the information provided at that time and the recommendations which were identified

  5. Site Selection for Surplus Plutonium Disposition Facilities at the Savannah River Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wike, L.D.

    2000-01-01

    A site selection study was conducted to evaluate locations for the proposed Surplus Plutonium Disposition Facilities. Facilities to be located include the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility, the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF), and the Plutonium Immobilization Project (PIP) facility. Objectives of the study include: (1) Confirm that the Department of Energy (DOE) selected locations for the MOX and PDCF were suitable based on selected siting criteria, (2) Recommend a site in the vicinity of F Area that is suitable for the PIP, and (3) Identify alternative suitable sites for one or more of these facilities in the event that further geotechnical characterization or other considerations result in disqualification of a currently proposed site

  6. Decontamination and decommissioning criteria for use in design of new plutonium facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Paschall, R.K.

    1975-01-01

    Decontamination and decommissioning (D and D) criteria were assembled for use in designing new plutonium facilities. These criteria were gathered from literature searches and visits to many plutonium facilities around the country. The recommendations of reports and experienced personnel were used. Since total D and D costs can be millions of dollars, improved designs to facilitate D and D will result in considerable savings in cost and time and will help to leave the site for unrestricted future use after D and D. Finally, better design will reduce hazards and improve safety during the D and D effort

  7. Waste minimization and the goal of an environmentally benign plutonium processing facility: A strategic plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1994-02-01

    To maintain capabilities in nuclear weapons technologies, the Department of Energy (DOE) has to maintain a plutonium processing facility that meets all the current and emerging standards of environmental regulations. A strategic goal to transform the Plutonium Processing Facility at Los Alamos into an environmentally benign operation is identified. A variety of technologies and systems necessary to meet this goal are identified. Two initiatives now in early stages of implementation are described in some detail. A highly motivated and trained work force and a systems approach to waste minimization and pollution prevention are necessary to maintain technical capabilities, to comply with regulations, and to meet the strategic goal

  8. Mortality among plutonium and other workers at a nuclear facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilkinson, G.S.; Voelz, G.L.; Acquavella, J.F.; Tietjen, G.L.; Reyes, M.; Brackbill, R.; Wiggs, L.

    1983-01-01

    Mortality among plutonium and other nuclear workers has been investigated to assess the effects of exposures to low levels of internal and external radiation. Standarized mortality ratios (SMRs) for white male workers employed at least two years from 1951 through 1977 were significantly lower than expected for all causes, all cancers, cancers of the respiratory system, and lung cancer. Benign neoplasms, all of which were intracranial tumors, were significantly elevated. No bone cancers were discovered and other radiogenic cancers did not differ significantly from expectation. Duration of employment and latency did not affect these results. SMRs for a subcohort of plutonium exposed workers were significantly low for all causes of deaths and all cancers. Estimates of relative risk for workers exposed to 2 or more nCi compared to unexposed workers were not significantly higher or lower than unity. These findings do not support the hypothesis of increased mortality among plutonium and other nuclear workers. The excess for benign and unspecified intracranial tumors is not consistent with previous studies on radiation induced brain tumors in terms of latency and exposure levels

  9. Design of ventilation and air cleaning systems for the new Los Alamos Plutonium Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mitchell, R.; DeField, J.; Stafford, R.; McNeese, W.; Eberhardt, W.; Laushkin, N.

    1975-01-01

    The Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory's new plutonium facility will conform to AECM Appendix 6301-Part II, Section H-Minimum Design Criteria for New Plutonium Facilities. The glove box process exhaust air is filtered through three or four stages of HEPA filters. The design of this multi-stage filter installation is shown with a method of in-place testing of each stage individually. A glove box filter holder and the in-place test procedure is described. General room air from plutonium work areas is recirculated at the rate of eight air changes per hour with a 10 percent fresh air make-up. The filter plenums for the recirculated air are designed to permit in-place testing of each of the two filter stages. (U.S.)

  10. Guide of good practices for occupational radiological protection in plutonium facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-06-01

    This Technical Standard (TS) does not contain any new requirements. Its purpose is to provide guides to good practice, update existing reference material, and discuss practical lessons learned relevant to the safe handling of plutonium. the technical rationale is given to allow US Department of Energy (DOE) health physicists to adapt the recommendations to similar situations throughout the DOE complex. Generally, DOE contractor health physicists will be responsible to implement radiation protection activities at DOE facilities and DOE health physicists will be responsible for oversight of those activities. This guidance is meant to be useful for both efforts. This TS replaces PNL-6534, Health Physics Manual of Good Practices for Plutonium Facilities, by providing more complete and current information and by emphasizing the situations that are typical of DOE`s current plutonium operations; safe storage, decontamination, and decommissioning (environmental restoration); and weapons disassembly.

  11. Options for converting excess plutonium to feed for the MOX fuel fabrication facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Watts, Joe A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Smith, Paul H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Psaras, John D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Jarvinen, Gordon D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Costa, David A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Joyce, Jr., Edward L [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01

    The storage and safekeeping of excess plutonium in the United States represents a multibillion-dollar lifecycle cost to the taxpayers and poses challenges to National Security and Nuclear Non-Proliferation. Los Alamos National Laboratory is considering options for converting some portion of the 13 metric tons of excess plutonium that was previously destined for long-term waste disposition into feed for the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). This approach could reduce storage costs and security ri sks, and produce fuel for nuclear energy at the same time. Over the course of 30 years of weapons related plutonium production, Los Alamos has developed a number of flow sheets aimed at separation and purification of plutonium. Flow sheets for converting metal to oxide and for removing chloride and fluoride from plutonium residues have been developed and withstood the test oftime. This presentation will address some potential options for utilizing processes and infrastructure developed by Defense Programs to transform a large variety of highly impure plutonium into feedstock for the MFFF.

  12. Sampling and Analysis Plan for the 233-S Plutonium Concentration Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mihalic, M.A.

    1998-02-01

    This Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP) provides the information and instructions to be used for sampling and analysis activities in the 233-S Plutonium Concentration Facility. The information and instructions herein are separated into three parts and address the Data Quality Objective (DQO) Summary Report, Quality Assurance Project Plan (QAP), and SAP

  13. Automatic chemical determination facility for plutonium and uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Benhamou, A.

    1980-01-01

    A proposal for a fully automated chemical determination system for uranium and plutonium in (U, Pu)O 2 mixed oxide fuel, from the solid sample weighing operation to the final result is described. The steps completed to data are described. These include: test sample preparation by weighing, potentiometer titration system, cleaning and drying of glassware after titration. The process uses a Mettler SR 10 Titrator System in conjunction with others automatized equipment in corse of realization. Precision may reach 0.02% and is generally better than 0.1%. Accuracy in within +-0.1% of manual determination results or titration standards [fr

  14. Evaluation of existing United States' facilities for use as a mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility for plutonium disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beard, C.A.; Buksa, J.J.; Chidester, K.; Eaton, S.L.; Motley, F.E.; Siebe, D.A.

    1995-01-01

    A number of existing US facilities were evaluated for use as a mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facility for plutonium disposition. These facilities include the Fuels Material Examination Facility (FMEF) at Hanford, the Washington Power Supply Unit 1 (WNP-1) facility at Hanford, the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP) at Barnwell, SC, the Fuel Processing Facility (FPF) at Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL), the Device Assembly Facility (DAF) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), and the P-reactor at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The study consisted of evaluating each facility in terms of available process space, available building support systems (i.e., HVAC, security systems, existing process equipment, etc.), available regional infrastructure (i.e., emergency response teams, protective force teams, available transportation routes, etc.), and ability to integrate the MOX fabrication process into the facility in an operationally-sound manner that requires a minimum amount of structural modifications

  15. Documentation of acceptable knowledge for Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility TRU waste stream

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Montoya, A.J.; Gruetzmacher, K.M.; Foxx, C.L.; Rogers, P.Z.

    1998-03-01

    Characterization of transuranic waste from the LANL Plutonium Facility for certification and transportation to WIPP includes the use of acceptable knowledge as specified in the WIPP Quality Assurance Program Plan. In accordance with a site specific procedure, documentation of acceptable knowledge for retrievably stored and currently generated transuranic waste streams is in progress at LANL. A summary overview of the TRU waste inventory is complete and documented in the Sampling Plan. This document also includes projected waste generation, facility missions, waste generation processes, flow diagrams, times, and material inputs. The second part of acceptable knowledge documentation consists of assembling more detailed acceptable knowledge information into auditable records and is expected to require several years to complete. These records for each waste stream must support final assignment of waste matrix parameters, EPA hazardous waste numbers, and radionuclide characterization. They must also include a determination whether waste streams are defense waste streams for compliance with the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act. The LANL Plutonium Facility's mission is primarily plutonium processing in basic special nuclear material (SNM) research activities to support national defense and energy programs. It currently has about 100 processes ranging from SNM recovery from residues to development of plutonium 238 heat sources for space applications. Its challenge is to characterize and certify waste streams from such diverse and dynamic operations using acceptable knowledge. This paper reports the progress on the certification of the first of these waste streams to the WIPP WAC

  16. Documentation of acceptable knowledge for LANL Plutonium Facility transuranic waste streams

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Montoya, A.J.; Gruetzmacher, K.; Foxx, C.; Rogers, P.S.Z.

    1998-01-01

    Characterization of transuranic waste from the LANL Plutonium Facility for certification and transportation to WIPP includes the use of acceptable knowledge as specified in the WIPP Quality Assurance Program Plan. In accordance with a site-specific procedure, documentation of acceptable knowledge for retrievably stored and currently generated transuranic waste streams is in progress at LANL. A summary overview of the transuranic waste inventory is complete and documented in the Sampling Plan. This document also includes projected waste generation, facility missions, waste generation processes, flow diagrams, times, and material inputs. The second part of acceptable knowledge documentation consists of assembling more detailed acceptable knowledge information into auditable records and is expected to require several years to complete. These records for each waste stream must support final assignment of waste matrix parameters, EPA hazardous waste numbers, and radionuclide characterization. They must also include a determination whether waste streams are defense waste streams for compliance with the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act. The LANL Plutonium Facility's mission is primarily plutonium processing in basic special nuclear material (SNM) research activities to support national defense and energy programs. It currently has about 100 processes ranging from SNM recovery from residues to development of plutonium 238 heat sources for space applications. Its challenge is to characterize and certify waste streams from such diverse and dynamic operations using acceptable knowledge. This paper reports the progress on the certification of the first of these waste streams to the WIPP WAC

  17. Measurement and instrumentation techniques for monitoring plutonium and uranium particulates released from nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nero, A.V. Jr.

    1976-08-01

    The purpose of this work has been an analysis and evaluation of the state-of-the-art of measurement and instrumentation techniques for monitoring plutonium and uranium particulates released from nuclear facilities. The occurrence of plutonium and uranium in the nuclear fuel cycle, the corresponding potential for releases, associated radiological protection standards and monitoring objectives are discussed. Techniques for monitoring via decay radiation from plutonium and uranium isotopes are presented in detail, emphasizing air monitoring, but also including soil sampling and survey methods. Additionally, activation and mass measurement techniques are discussed. The availability and prevalence of these various techniques are summarized. Finally, possible improvements in monitoring capabilities due to alterations in instrumentation, data analysis, or programs are presented

  18. An MCNP model of glove boxes in a plutonium processing facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dooley, D.E.; Kornreich, D.E.

    1998-01-01

    Nuclear material processing usually occurs simultaneously in several glove boxes whose primary purpose is to contain radioactive materials and prevent inhalation or ingestion of radioactive materials by workers. A room in the plutonium facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory has been slated for installation of a glove box for storing plutonium metal in various shapes during processing. This storage glove box will be located in a room containing other glove boxes used daily by workers processing plutonium parts. An MCNP model of the room and glove boxes has been constructed to estimate the neutron flux at various locations in the room for two different locations of the storage glove box and to determine the effect of placing polyethylene shielding around the storage glove box. A neutron dose survey of the room with sources dispersed as during normal production operations was used as a benchmark to compare the neutron dose equivalent rates calculated by the MCNP model

  19. Characterization of transuranic solid wastes from a plutonium processing facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mulkin, R.

    1975-06-01

    Transuranic-contaminated wastes generated in the processing areas of the Plutonium Chemistry and Metallurgy Group at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL) were studied in detail to identify their chemical and physical composition. Nondestructive Assay (NDA) equipment was developed to measure transuranic activity at the 10-nCi/g level in low-density residues typically found in room-generated waste. This information will supply the Waste Management Program with a more positive means of identifying concerns in waste storage and the challenge of optimizing the system of waste form, packaging, and environment of the storage area for 20-yr retrievable waste. A positive method of measuring transuranic activity in waste at the 10-nCi/g level will eliminate the need for administrative control in a sensitive area, and will provide the economic advantage of minimizing the volume of waste stored as retrievable waste. (U.S.)

  20. THE DEACTIVATION, DECONTAMINATION AND DECOMMISSIONING OF THE PLUTONIUM FINISHING PLANT, A FORMER PLUTONIUM PROCESSING FACILITY AT DOE'S HANFORD SITE

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    CHARBONEAU, S.L.

    2006-01-01

    The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) was constructed as part of the Manhattan Project during World War II. The Manhattan Project was developed to usher in the use of nuclear weapons to end the war. The primary mission of the PFP was to provide plutonium used as special nuclear material (SNM) for fabrication of nuclear devices for the war effort. Subsequent to the end of World War II, the PFP's mission expanded to support the Cold War effort through plutonium production during the nuclear arms race and later the processing of fuel grade mixed plutonium-uranium oxide to support DOE's breeder reactor program. In October 1990, at the close of the production mission for PFP, a shutdown order was prepared by the Department of Energy (DOE) in Washington,; DC--and issued to the Richland DOE field office. Subsequent to the shutdown order, a team from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) analyzed the hazards at PFP associated with the continued storage of certain forms of plutonium solutions and solids. The assessment identified many discrete actions that were required to stabilize the different plutonium forms into stable form and repackage the material in high integrity containers. These actions were technically complicated and completed as part of the PFP nuclear material stabilization project between 1995 and early 2005. The completion of the stabilization project was a necessary first step in deactivating PFP. During stabilization, DOE entered into negotiations with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the State of Washington and established milestones for the Deactivation and Decommissioning (DandD) of the PFP. The DOE and its contractor, Fluor Hanford (Fluor), have made great progress in deactivating, decontaminating and decommissioning the PFP at the Hanford Site as detailed in this paper. Background information covering the PFP DandD effort includes descriptions of negotiations with the State of Washington concerning consent

  1. Process control and safeguards system plutonium inventory conrol for MOX fuel facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mishima, T.; Aoki, M.; Muto, T.; Amanuma, T.

    1979-01-01

    The plutonium inventory control (PINC) system is a real-time material accountability control system that is expected to be applied to a new large-scale plutonium fuel production facility for both fast breeder reactor and heavy water reactor at the Power Reactor and Nuclear Development Corporation. The PINC is basically a system for material control but is expected to develop into a whole facility control system, including criticality control, process control, quality control, facility protection, and so forth. Under PINC, every process and storage area is divided into a unit area, which is the smallest unit for both accountability and process control. Item and material weight automatically are accounted for at every unit area, and data are simultaneously treated by a computer network system. Sensors necessary for the system are being developed. 9 figures

  2. PROJECT EXPERIENCE REPORT DEMOLITION OF HANFORDS 233-S PLUTONIUM CONCENTRATION FACILITY

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BERLIN, G.T.; ORGILL, T.K.

    2004-01-01

    This report provides a summary of the preparation, operations, innovative work practices, and lessons learned associated with demolition of the 2334 Plutonium Concentration Facility. This project represented the first open-air demolition of a highly-contaminated plutonium facility at the Hanford Site. This project may also represent the first plutonium facility in the US. Department of Energy (DOE) complex to have been demolished without first decontaminating surfaces to near ''free release'' standards. Demolition of plutonium contaminated structures, if not properly managed, can subject cleanup personnel and the environment to significant risk. However, with proper sequencing and innovative use of commercially available equipment, materials, and services, this project demonstrated that a plutonium processing facility can be demolished while avoiding the need to perform extensive decontamination or to construct large enclosures. This project utilized an excavator with concrete shears, diamond circular saws, water misting and fogging equipment, commercially available fixatives and dust suppressants, conventional mobile crane and rigging services, and near real-time modeling of meteorological and radiological conditions. Following a significant amount of preparation, actual demolition of the 233-S Facility began in October 2003 and was completed in late April 2004. The knowledge and experience gained on this project are important to the Hanford Site as additional plutonium processing facilities are scheduled for demolition in the near future. Other sites throughout the DOE Complex may also be faced with similar challenges. Numerous innovations and effective work practices were implemented on this project. Accordingly, a series of ''Lessons Learned and Innovative Practices Fact Sheets'' were developed and are included as an appendix to this report. This collection of fact sheets is not intended to capture every innovative work practice and lesson learned, but rather

  3. PROJECT EXPERIENCE REPORT DEMOLITION OF HANFORDS 233-S PLUTONIUM CONCENTRATION FACILITY

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BERLIN, G.T.

    2004-01-01

    This report provides a summary of the preparation, operations, innovative work practices, and lessons learned associated with demolition of the 2334 Plutonium Concentration Facility. This project represented the first open-air demolition of a highly-contaminated plutonium facility at the Hanford Site. This project may also represent the first plutonium facility in the US. Department of Energy (DOE) complex to have been demolished without first decontaminating surfaces to near ''free release'' standards. Demolition of plutonium contaminated structures, if not properly managed, can subject cleanup personnel and the environment to significant risk. However, with proper sequencing and innovative use of commercially available equipment, materials, and services, this project demonstrated that a plutonium processing facility can be demolished while avoiding the need to perform extensive decontamination or to construct large enclosures. This project utilized an excavator with concrete shears, diamond circular saws, water misting and fogging equipment, commercially available fixatives and dust suppressants, conventional mobile crane and rigging services, and near real-time modeling of meteorological and radiological conditions. Following a significant amount of preparation, actual demolition of the 2333 Facility began in October 2003 and was completed in late April 2004. The knowledge and experience gained on this project are important to the Hanford Site as additional plutonium processing facilities are scheduled for demolition in the near future. Other sites throughout the DOE Complex may also be faced with similar challenges. Numerous innovations and effective work practices were implemented on this project. Accordingly, a series of ''Lessons Learned and Innovative Practices Fact Sheets'' were developed and are included as an appendix to this report. This collection of fact sheets is not intended to capture every innovative work practice and lesson learned, but rather to

  4. Plutonium concentrations in arthropods at a nuclear facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bly, J A; Whicker, F W [Colorado State Univ., Fort Collins (USA). Dept. of Radiology and Radiation Biology

    1979-09-01

    Arthropods were collected for /sup 239/ /sup 240/Pu (/sup 239/Pu) and /sup 238/Pu analysis from three study plots in close proximity to the Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant and from a site 110 km N-NE of the plant. Mean /sup 239/Pu concentrations in arthropods were 265, 16, 0.7 and 0.5 dis/min g/sup -1/ at the three Rocky Flats study plots and at the control site, respectively. Arthropod /sup 239/Pu concentration data were statistically analyzed by season of collection, taxonomic group, and sampling site. Only the collection site differences were significant (..cap alpha.. = 0.01) and these were correlated with /sup 239/Pu concentrations in soil. The mean activity ratio of /sup 239/Pu to /sup 238/Pu in arthropods was 52, similar to the value of 51 obtained for soil. The mean ratio of /sup 239/Pu in arthropods to /sup 239/Pu in 0-3 cm soil at Rocky Flats was 9 x 10/sup -3/. Arthropod biomass and Pu concentration data indicated that only about 10/sup -8/ of the total plutonium inventory is in the arthropod component of the ecosystem. Leafhoppers, grasshoppers and spiders accounted for roughly 80% of the arthropod inventory of /sup 239/Pu.

  5. Plutonium concentrations in arthropods at a nuclear facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bly, J.A.; Whicker, F.W.

    1979-01-01

    Arthropods were collected for 239 240 Pu ( 239 Pu) and 238 Pu analysis from three study plots in close proximity to the Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant and from a site 110 km N-NE of the plant. Mean 239 Pu concentrations in arthropods were 265, 16, 0.7 and 0.5 dis/min g -1 at the three Rocky Flats study plots and at the control site, respectively. Arthropod 239 Pu concentration data were statistically analyzed by season of collection, taxonomic group, and sampling site. Only the collection site differences were significant (α = 0.01) and these were correlated with 239 Pu concentrations in soil. The mean activity ratio of 239 Pu to 238 Pu in arthropods was 52, similar to the value of 51 obtained for soil. The mean ratio of 239 Pu in arthropods to 239 Pu in 0-3 cm soil at Rocky Flats was 9 x 10 -3 . Arthropod biomass and Pu concentration data indicated that only about 10 -8 of the total plutonium inventory is in the arthropod component of the ecosystem. Leafhoppers, grasshoppers and spiders accounted for roughly 80% of the arthropod inventory of 239 Pu. (author)

  6. Review of Sodium and Plutonium related Technical Standards in Trans-Uranium Fuel Fabrication Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jang, Misuk; Jeon, Jong Seon; Kang, Hyun Sik; Kim, Seoung Rae

    2016-01-01

    In this paper, we would introduce and review technical standards related to sodium fire and plutonium criticality safety. This paper may be helpful to identify considerations in the development of equipment, standards, and etc., to meet the safety requirements in the design, construction and operating of TFFF, KAPF and SFR. The feasibility and conceptual designs are being examined on related facilities, for example, TRU Fuel Fabrication Facilities (TFFF), Korea Advanced Pyro-process Facility (KAPF), and Sodium Cooled Fast Reactor (SFR), in Korea. However, the safety concerns of these facilities have been controversial in part because of the Sodium fire accident and Plutonium related radiation safety caused by transport and handling accident. Thus, many researches have been performed to ensure safety and various documents including safety requirements have been developed. In separating and reducing the long-lived radioactive transuranic(TRU) in the spent nuclear fuel, reusing as the potential energy of uranium fuel resources and reducing the high level wastes, TFFF would be receiving the attention of many people. Thus, people would wonder whether compliance with technical standards that ensures safety. For new facility design, one of the important tasks is to review of technical standards, especially for sodium and Plutonium because of water related highly reactive characteristics and criticality hazard respectively. We have introduced and reviewed two important technical standards for TFFF, which are sodium fire and plutonium criticality safety, in this paper. This paper would provide a brief guidance, about how to start and what is important, to people who are responsible for the initial design to operation of TFFF

  7. Review of Sodium and Plutonium related Technical Standards in Trans-Uranium Fuel Fabrication Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jang, Misuk; Jeon, Jong Seon; Kang, Hyun Sik; Kim, Seoung Rae [NESS, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    In this paper, we would introduce and review technical standards related to sodium fire and plutonium criticality safety. This paper may be helpful to identify considerations in the development of equipment, standards, and etc., to meet the safety requirements in the design, construction and operating of TFFF, KAPF and SFR. The feasibility and conceptual designs are being examined on related facilities, for example, TRU Fuel Fabrication Facilities (TFFF), Korea Advanced Pyro-process Facility (KAPF), and Sodium Cooled Fast Reactor (SFR), in Korea. However, the safety concerns of these facilities have been controversial in part because of the Sodium fire accident and Plutonium related radiation safety caused by transport and handling accident. Thus, many researches have been performed to ensure safety and various documents including safety requirements have been developed. In separating and reducing the long-lived radioactive transuranic(TRU) in the spent nuclear fuel, reusing as the potential energy of uranium fuel resources and reducing the high level wastes, TFFF would be receiving the attention of many people. Thus, people would wonder whether compliance with technical standards that ensures safety. For new facility design, one of the important tasks is to review of technical standards, especially for sodium and Plutonium because of water related highly reactive characteristics and criticality hazard respectively. We have introduced and reviewed two important technical standards for TFFF, which are sodium fire and plutonium criticality safety, in this paper. This paper would provide a brief guidance, about how to start and what is important, to people who are responsible for the initial design to operation of TFFF.

  8. Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan for the Plutonium Finishing Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    FRAZIER, T.P.

    1999-01-01

    A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the U. S. Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether these systems are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. To ensure the long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems, an update to this facility effluent monitoring plan is required whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document is reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and is updated, at a minimum, every 3 years

  9. Stack released plutonium in the environment of a nuclear fuel reprocessing facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Horton, J.H.; Sanders, S.M.; Corey, J.C.

    1979-01-01

    Chemical separations facilities at the Savannah River Plant have released very small quantities of plutonium to the environment since 1955. Characterization studies of airborne particulates from the process stack show that the plutonium is nearly always attached to nonradioactive particles. The geometric mean diameter of plutonium-bearing particulates in the stack gas is 5.43 μm. Most of the particles contain less than 10 -15 Ci of 239 Pu. Studies with cascade impactors 1.1 m above the ground indicated that the average annual air concentration was 612 x 10 -18 Ci/m 3 (less than 0.1% of the maximum permissible concentration recommended by the ICRP). Cropping studies showed plutonium concentrations of 3 x 10 -3 pCi/g in wheat, 5.5 x 10 -4 in soybeans, and 1.7 x 10 -4 in corn. The 70-year dose-to-bone from ingesting 10 5 g of grain would be less than 1 mrem

  10. Plutonium reclamation facility (PRF, building 236-Z) layup plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ANDERSON, R.N.

    1999-01-01

    This document reviews each system inside PRF to determine the operation and maintenance requirements necessary to maintain safe and predictable system performance for facility systems needed to remain operational while minimizing the maintenance and surveillance being performed. Also covered are the actions required to place PRF in a safe layup configuration while minimizing hazards and taking into account the need for reactivation of certain equipment when cleanup work commences in the future

  11. Applications of inventory difference tool at Los Alamos Plutonium Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hench, K.W.; Longmire, V.; Yarbro, T.F.; Zardecki, A.

    1998-01-01

    A prototype computer program reads the inventory entries directly from the Microsoft Access database. Based on historical data, the program then displays temporal trends and constructs a library of rules that encapsulate the system behavior. The analysis of inventory data is illustrated using a combination of realistic and simulated facility examples. Potential payoffs of this methodology include a reduction in time and resources needed to perform statistical tests and a broad applicability to DOE needs such as treaty verification

  12. Inventory difference analysis at Los Alamos Plutonium Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zardecki, A.; Armstrong, J.M.; Longmire, V.; Strittmatter, R.B.

    1997-01-01

    The authors have developed a prototype computer program that reads directly the inventory entries from a Microsoft Access data base. Based on historical data, the program then displays temporal trends and constructs a library of rules that encapsulates the system behavior. The following analysis of inventory data is illustrated by using a combination of realistic and simulated facility examples. Potential payoffs of this methodology include a reduction in time and resources needed to perform statistical tests and broad applicability to Department of Energy needs--for example, treaty verification

  13. Containers for short-term storage of nuclear materials at the Los Alamos plutonium facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hagan, R.; Gladson, J.

    1997-01-01

    The Los Alamos Plutonium Facility for the past 18 yr has stored nuclear samples for archiving and in support of nuclear materials research and processing programs. In the past several years, a small number of storage containers have been found in a deteriorated condition. A failed plutonium container can cause personnel contamination exposure and expensive physical area decontamination. Containers are stored in a physically secure radiation area vault, making close inspection costly in the form of personnel radiation exposure and work time. A moderate number of these containers are used in support of plutonium processing and must withstand daily handling abuse. A 2-yr evaluation of failed containers and those that have shown no deterioration has been conducted. Based on that study, a program was established to formalize our packing methods and materials and standardize the size and shape of containers that are used for short-term use. A standardized set of containers was designed, evaluated, tested, and procured for use in the facility. This paper reviews our vault storage problems, shows some failed containers, and presents our planned solutions to provide safe and secure containment of nuclear materials

  14. Seismic qualification of equipment for the TA-55 Plutonium Processing Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pellette, P.R.; Endebrock, E.G.; Giles, P.M.; Shaw, R.H.

    1977-04-01

    The techniques employed by the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL) for the seismic qualification of internal equipment for the TA-55 Plutonium Facility are discussed. The structural analysis of the plutonium building and critical associated structures was performed by the Architect-Engineer (A-E), and the calculations were checked by LASL. The specifications and procedures used by LASL produced dramatic improvement in the responses by qualified vendors to the seismic requirements. There was an increase from about a 20% bid ratio to greater than 90% because prospective vendors could be competitive without having had previous seismic experience with their equipment. The equipment seismic qualification for TA-55 is in compliance with the Code of Federal Regulations, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Guides, Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) Manual Chapters and Appendices, and Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) Standard 344

  15. Installation places of criticality accident detectors in the plutonium conversion development facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanada, Yukihisa; Tsujimura, Norio; Shimizu, Yoshio; Izaki, Kenji; Furuta, Sadaaki

    2008-01-01

    At the Plutonium Conversion Development Facility (PCDF) in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Engineering Laboratories, the co-conversion technologies to purify the mixed plutonium and uranium nitrate solution discharged from a reprocessing plant have been developed. The probability of a criticality accident in PCDF is extremely low. However, the criticality accident alarm system (CAAS) has been in place since 1982 to reduce the radiation dose to workers in case of such a rare criticality accident. The CAAS contains criticality accident detector units (CADs), one unit consisting of three plastic scintillation detectors, and using the 2 out of 3 voting system for the purpose of high reliability. Currently, eight CADs are installed in PCDF evaluating the dose using a simple equation allowing for a safety margin. The purpose of this study is to show the determination procedures for the adequate relocation of the CADs which adequately ensures safety in PCDF. (author)

  16. Engineering evaluation/cost analysis for the 233-S Plutonium Concentration Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rugg, J.E.

    1996-08-01

    The 100, 200, 300 and 1100 Areas of the Hanford Site were placed on the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency's National Priorities List in November 1989 under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). Located in the 200 Area is the deactivated 233-S Plutonium Concentration Facility (used in the REDOX process). The facility has undergone severe degradation due to exposure to extreme weather conditions. An expedited response is proposed to ensure protection of human health and the environment. The Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL) in cooperation with the Washington State Department of Ecology, has prepared this Engineering Evaluation/Cost Analysis pursuant to CERCLA. Based on the evaluation, RL has determined that hazardous substances in the 233-S Facility may present a potential threat to human health or the environment, and that an expedited removal action is warranted for decommissioning of the facility

  17. Implementation of the DYMAC system at the new Los Alamos Plutonium Processing Facility. Phase II report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Malanify, J.J.; Amsden, D.C.

    1982-08-01

    The DYnamic Materials ACcountability System - called DYMAC - performs accountability functions at the new Los Alamos Plutonium Processing Facility where it began operation when the facility opened in January 1978. A demonstration program, DYMAC was designed to collect and assess inventory information for safeguards purposes. It accomplishes 75% of its design goals. DYMAC collects information about the physical inventory through deployment of nondestructive assay instrumentation and video terminals throughout the facility. The information resides in a minicomputer where it can be immediately sorted and displayed on the video terminals or produced in printed form. Although the capability now exists to assess the collected data, this portion of the program is not yet implemented. DYMAC in its present form is an excellent tool for process and quality control. The facility operator relies on it exclusively for keeping track of the inventory and for complying with accountability requirements of the US Department of Energy.

  18. Implementation of the DYMAC system at the new Los Alamos Plutonium Processing Facility. Phase II report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Malanify, J.J.; Amsden, D.C.

    1982-08-01

    The DYnamic Materials ACcountability System - called DYMAC - performs accountability functions at the new Los Alamos Plutonium Processing Facility where it began operation when the facility opened in January 1978. A demonstration program, DYMAC was designed to collect and assess inventory information for safeguards purposes. It accomplishes 75% of its design goals. DYMAC collects information about the physical inventory through deployment of nondestructive assay instrumentation and video terminals throughout the facility. The information resides in a minicomputer where it can be immediately sorted and displayed on the video terminals or produced in printed form. Although the capability now exists to assess the collected data, this portion of the program is not yet implemented. DYMAC in its present form is an excellent tool for process and quality control. The facility operator relies on it exclusively for keeping track of the inventory and for complying with accountability requirements of the US Department of Energy

  19. Safety analysis report upgrade program at the Plutonium Facility, Los Alamos National Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pan, P.Y.

    1993-01-01

    Plutonium research and development activities have resided at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) since 1943. The function of the Plutonium Facility (PF-4) has been to perform basic special nuclear materials research and development and to support national defense and energy programs. The original Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for PF-4 was approved by DOE in 1978. This FSAR analyzed design-basis and bounding accidents. In 1986, DOE/AL published DOE/AL Order 5481.1B, ''Safety Analysis and Review System'', as a requirement for preparation and review of safety analyses. To meet the new DOE requirements, the Facilities Management Group of the Nuclear Material Technology Division submitted a draft FSAR to DOE for approval in April 1991. This draft FSAR analyzed the new configurations and used a limited-scope probabilistic risk analysis for accident analysis. During the DOE review of the draft FSAR, DOE Order 5480.23 ''Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports'', was promulgated and was later officially released in April 1992. The new order significantly expands the scope, preparation, and maintenance efforts beyond those required in DOE/AL Order 5481.1B by requiring: description of institutional and human-factor safety programs; clear definitions of all facility-specific safety commitments; more comprehensive and detailed hazard assessment; use of new safety analysis methods; and annual updates of FSARs. This paper describes the safety analysis report (SAR) upgrade program at the Plutonium Facility in LANL. The SAR upgrade program is established to meet the requirements in DOE Order 5480.23. Described in this paper are the SAR background, authorization basis for operations, hazard classification, and technical program elements

  20. Results of Active Test of Uranium-Plutonium Co-denitration Facility at Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Numao, Teruhiko; Nakayashiki, Hiroshi; Arai, Nobuyuki; Miura, Susumu; Takahashi, Yoshiharu; Nakamura, Hironobu; Tanaka, Izumi

    2007-01-01

    In the U-Pu co-denitration facility at Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP), Active Test which composes of 5 steps was performed by using uranium-plutonium nitrate solution that was extracted from spent fuels. During Active Test, two kinds of tests were performed in parallel. One was denitration performance test in denitration ovens, and expected results were successfully obtained. The other was validation and calibration of non-destructive assay (NDA) systems, and expected performances were obtained and their effectiveness as material accountancy and safeguards system was validated. (authors)

  1. Upgrading a 1944 plutonium-extraction plant to a modern decontamination facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wills, C.E.; Millikin, R.M.; Cruz, E.A.

    1993-10-01

    The Hanford Site, located in south-central Washington State, is currently undergoing extensive modifications as its mission changes from defense material production to one of waste management and environmental restoration. Starting in World War II, Hanford's mission for over four decades was the production of plutonium for defense needs. With the removal of such defense requirements over the last several years, the Hanford Site has refocused its efforts on the issues of cleanup and safety. The T Plant Complex is the first of the existing facilities to begin conversion from the old mission to the new. This conversion process and associated problems are described

  2. Engineering evaluation/cost analysis for the 233-S Plutonium Concentration Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    The deactivated 233-S Plutonium Concentration Facility (233-S Facility) is located in the 200 Area. The facility has undergone severe degradation due to exposure to extreme weather conditions. A rapid freeze and thaw cycle occurred at the Hanford Site during February 1996, which caused cracking to occur on portions of the building's roof. This has resulted in significantly infiltration of water into the facility, which provides a pathway for potential release of radioactive material into the environment (air and/or ground). The weather caused several existing cracks in the concrete portions of the structure to lengthen, increasing the potential for failed confinement of the radioactive material in the building. Differential settlement has also occurred, causing portions of the facility to separate from the main building structure thus creating a potential for release of radioactive material t the environment. An expedited removal action is proposed to ensure that a release from the 233-S Facility does not occur. The US Department of Energy (DOE), Richland Operations Office (RL), in cooperation with the EPA, has prepared this Engineering Evaluation/Cost Analysis (EE/CA) pursuant to CERCLA. Based on the evaluation, RL has determined that hazardous substances in the 233-S Facility may present a potential threat to human health and/or the environment, and that an expedited removal action is warranted. The purpose of the EE/CA is to provide the framework for the evaluation and selection of a technology from a viable set of alternatives for a removal action

  3. Chemical and Radiochemical Composition of Thermally Stabilized Plutonium Oxide from the Plutonium Finishing Plant Considered as Alternate Feedstock for the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tingey, Joel M.; Jones, Susan A.

    2005-01-01

    Eighteen plutonium oxide samples originating from the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) on the Hanford Site were analyzed to provide additional data on the suitability of PFP thermally stabilized plutonium oxides and Rocky Flats oxides as alternate feedstock to the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). Radiochemical and chemical analyses were performed on fusions, acid leaches, and water leaches of these 18 samples. The results from these destructive analyses were compared with nondestructive analyses (NDA) performed at PFP and the acceptance criteria for the alternate feedstock. The plutonium oxide materials considered as alternate feedstock at Hanford originated from several different sources including Rocky Flats oxide, scrap from the Remote Mechanical C-Line (RMC) and the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF), and materials from other plutonium conversion processes at Hanford. These materials were received at PFP as metals, oxides, and solutions. All of the material considered as alternate feedstock was converted to PuO2 and thermally stabilized by heating the PuO2 powder at 950 C in an oxidizing environment. The two samples from solutions were converted to PuO2 by precipitation with Mg(OH)2. The 18 plutonium oxide samples were grouped into four categories based on their origin. The Rocky Flats oxide was divided into two categories, low- and high-chloride Rocky Flats oxides. The other two categories were PRF/RMC scrap oxides, which included scrap from both process lines and oxides produced from solutions. The two solution samples came from samples that were being tested at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory because all of the plutonium oxide from solutions at PFP had already been processed and placed in 3013 containers. These samples originated at the PFP and are from plutonium nitrate product and double-pass filtrate solutions after they had been thermally stabilized. The other 16 samples originated from thermal stabilization batches before canning at

  4. Current developments of fuel fabrication technologies at the plutonium fuel production facility, PFPF

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Asakura, K.; Aono, S.; Yamaguchi, T.; Deguchi, M.

    2000-01-01

    The Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute, JNC, designed, constructed and has operated the Plutonium Fuel Production Facility, PFPF, at the JNC Tokai Works to supply MOX fuels to the proto-type Fast Breeder Reactor, FBR, 'MONJU' and the experimental FBR 'JOYO' with 5 tonMOX/year of fabrication capability. Reduction of personal radiation exposure to a large amount of plutonium is one of the most important subjects in the development of MOX fabrication facility on a large scale. As the solution of this issue, the PFPF has introduced automated and/or remote controlled equipment in conjunction with computer controlled operation scheme. The PFPF started its operation in 1988 with JOYO reload fuel fabrication and has demonstrated MOX fuel fabrication on a large scale through JOYO and MONJU fuel fabrication for this decade. Through these operations, it has become obvious that several numbers of equipment initially installed in the PFPF need improvements in their performance and maintenance for commercial utilization of plutonium in the future. Furthermore, fuel fabrication of low density MOX pellets adopted in the MONJU fuel required a complete inspection because of difficulties in pellet fabrication compared with high density pellet for JOYO. This paper describes new pressing equipment with a powder recovery system, and pellet finishing and inspection equipment which has multiple functions, such as grinding measurements of outer diameter and density, and inspection of appearance to improve efficiency in the pellet finishing and inspection steps. Another development of technology concerning an annular pellet and an innovative process for MOX fuel fabrication are also described in this paper. (author)

  5. Rough order of magnitude cost estimate for immobilization of 18.2 MT of plutonium sharing existing facilities at Hanford with MOX fuel fabrication facility: alternative 4B

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DiSabatino, A.

    1998-01-01

    The purpose of this Cost Estimate Report is to identify preliminary capital and operating costs for a facility to immobilize 18.2 metric tons (nominal) of plutonium as a ceramic in an existing facility at Hanford, the Fuels and Materials Examination Facility (FMEF). The MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF), which is being costed in a separate report, will also be located in the FMEF in this co-location option

  6. Rough order of magnitude cost estimate for immobilization of 50 MT of plutonium sharing existing facilities at Hanford with pit disassembly and conversion facility: alternative 11

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DiSabatino, A.

    1998-01-01

    The purpose of this Cost Estimate Report is to identify preliminary capital and operating costs for a facility to immobilize 50 metric tons (nominal) of plutonium as a ceramic in an existing facility at Hanford, the Fuels and Materials Examination Facility (FMEF). The Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF), which is being costed in a separate report by LANL, will also be located in the FMEF in this co-location option

  7. Engineering study of generic site criteria for selected DOE plutonium facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kingsbury, R.J.; Greenwood, J.M.; Sandoval, M.D.

    1980-09-01

    The objectives of this study were to identify criteria that would be applied to selection of a site for plutonium facilities such as those at the Rocky Flats Plant, to establish the relative importance of these criteria, and to identify suitable areas within the United States for location of plutonium facilities with respect to these criteria. Sources of the site criteria identified include federal laws, federal agency regulations, state laws and regulations, and requirements associated with operations to be performed at the site. The criteria identified during the study were organized into 14 major categories. The relative importnace of each category and each criterion within the categories were established using group decision-making techniques. The major criteria categories, their assigned weight on a scale of 1 to 10, and their relative priority ranks are as follows: geology/seismicity; public safety; environmental impact; meteorology; hydrology; topography; transportation; utilities; personnel; safeguards/security; land area and availability; land use compatibility; and, public acceptance. A suitability analysis of the continental United States was performed using only those criteria that could be mapped at a national scale. Suitability was assessed with respect to each of these criteria, and individual suitability maps were prepared. A composite suitability map was generated using computerized overlay techniques. This map provides a starting point for identifying specific candidate sites if an actual site selection were to be conducted

  8. Independent Review of Siesmic Performance Assessments for the Plutonium Facility PF-4

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Whittaker, Andrew [State Univ. of New York (SUNY), Buffalo, NY (United States); Goen, Lawrence Kenneth [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Kennedy, Robert [RPK Structural Mechanics, San Diego, CA (United States); McDonald, Brian [Exponent, Los Angeles, CA (United States); Morgan, Troy [Exponent, Los Angeles, CA (United States); Wyllie, Loring [Degenkolb Engineers, San Francisco, CA (United States)

    2015-11-25

    The Plutonium Facility, designated PF-4, is located in Technical Area 55 at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The facility is a one-story rectangular structure above a complete basement; the building was constructed of cast-in-place reinforced concrete, with small interior frames of structural steel. The plan dimensions of the building are 265’×284’. The overall height of the building varies between 39’-0” at the north and south ends, and 40’-6” at the center ridge. The programmatic work performed in the building is vital to our national security and its functions and storage purposes are not replicated elsewhere in the United States Department of Energy (DOE).

  9. Final characterization report for the non-process areas of the 233-S Plutonium Concentration Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Encke, D.B.; Harris, R.A.

    1997-04-01

    This report addresses the 233-S Plutonium Concentration Facility characterization survey data collected from January 21, 1997 through February 3, 1997. The characterization activities evaluated the radiological status and identified the hazardous materials locations. The scope of this report is limited to the nonprocess areas in the facility, which include the special work permit (SWP) change room, toilet, equipment room, electrical cubicle, control room, and pipe gallery. A portion of the roof (excluding the roof over the process hood and viewing room) was also included. Information in this report will be used to identify waste streams, provide specific chemical and radiological data to aid in planning decontamination and demolition activities, and allow proper disposal of the demolition debris, as required by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980

  10. Rough order of magnitude cost estimate for immobilization of 50MT of plutonium using new facilities at the Savannah River site: alternative 12A

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DiSabatino, A.

    1998-01-01

    The purpose of this Cost Estimate Report is to identify preliminary capital and operating costs for a facility to immobilize 50 metric tons of plutonium using ceramic in a new facility at Savannah River Site (SRS)

  11. Rough order of magnitude cost estimate for immobilization of 50 MT of plutonium using existing facilities at the Savannah River site: alternative 12B

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DiSabatino, A.

    1998-01-01

    The purpose of this Cost Estimate Report is to identify preliminary capital and operating costs for a facility to immobilize 50 metric tons of plutonium using ceramic in an existing facility (221-F) at an Savannah River Site (SRS)

  12. Surveillance and Maintenance Plan for the Plutonium Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Woods, P.J.

    1998-05-01

    This document provides a plan for implementing surveillance and maintenance (S ampersand M) activities to ensure the Plutonium Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Facility is maintained in a safe, environmentally secure, and cost-effective manner until subsequent closure during the final disposition phase of decommissioning. This plan has been prepared in accordance with the guidelines provided in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Environmental Management (EM) Decommissioning Resource Manual (DOE/EM-0246) (DOE 1995), and Section 8.6 of TPA change form P-08-97-01 to the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) (Ecology, et al. 1996). Specific objectives of the S ampersand M program are: Ensure adequate containment of remaining radioactive and hazardous material. Provide security control for access into the facility and physical safety to surveillance personnel. Maintain the facility in a manner that will minimize potential hazards to the public, the environment, and surveillance personnel. Provide a plan for the identification and compliance with applicable environmental, safety, health, safeguards, and security requirements

  13. Facility effluent monitoring plan for the plutonium-uranium extraction facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nickels, J.M.; Geiger, J.L.

    1992-11-01

    A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. A facility effluent monitoring plan determination was performed during Calendar Year 1991 and the evaluation requires the need for a facility effluent monitoring plan. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified. in. A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements

  14. Systems work for Plutonium Fuel Production Facility (PFPF) near-real-time accounting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Picard, R.R.; Hafer, J.F.; Pillay, K.K.S.; Takahashi, S.; Ohtani, T.; Eguchi, K.; Seya, M.

    1990-01-01

    A joint effort by the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation of Japan examines materials accounting for the Plutonium Fuel Production Facility. A unique feature of the systems work is a sophisticated data generator. This software follows individual items throughout the process, creating detailed data files for variance propagation. The data generator deals with user-specified process operations and handles related accounting problems, such as the tracking of individual measurements through numerous blending and splitting procedure, frequent decay correction (important for large inventories), scrap recovery, and automated determination of static inventory. There is no need to rely on simplified assumptions regarding process operation and material measurement. Also, the joint study applies recent theoretical work on stratified inspection of nonhomogeneous inventories and sequential analysis of MUF -- D. 4 refs

  15. Plutonium contents of broadleaf vegetable crops grown near a nuclear fuel chemical separations facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McLeod, K W; Alberts, J J; Adriano, D C; Pinder, III, J E

    1984-02-01

    Among agricultural crops, broadleaf vegetables are particularly prone to intercept and retain aerially released contaminants. The plutonium concentration of four broadleaf crops (broccoli, cabbage, lettuce and turnip greens) was determined, when grown in close proximity to a nuclear-fuel chemical-separations facility. Concentrations varied among species, apparently influenced by the crop morphology, with Pu concentrations increasing in the sequence: cabbage < broccoli < turnip greens < lettuce. Washing of the crops significantly reduced the Pu concentration of lettuce, but had no effect on Pu concentration of broccoli and cabbage. The vast majority of Pu found in the crops was due to direct deposition of recently released Pu and resuspension of Pu-bearing soil particles, and was not due to root uptake. Resultant doses from consumption are small relative to the annual background dose.

  16. Comparison of neutron dose measured by Albedo TLD and etched tracks detector at PNC plutonium fuel facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tsujimura, N.; Momose, T.; Shinohara, K.; Ishiguro, H.

    1996-01-01

    Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC) has fabricated Plutonium and Uranium Mixed OXide (MOX) fuel for FBR MONJU at Tokai works. In this site, PNC/Panasonic albedo TLDs/1/ are used for personnel neutron monitoring. And a part of workers wore Etched Tracks Detector (ETD) combined with TLD in order to check the accuracy of the neutron dose estimated by albedo TLD. In this paper, the neutron dose measured by TLD and ETD in the routine monitoring is compared at PNC plutonium fuel facilities. (author)

  17. Facility effluent monitoring plan for the plutonium-uranium extraction facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lohrasbi, J.; Johnson, D.L.; De Lorenzo, D.S.

    1993-12-01

    A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438-01. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan shall ensure long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updated at a minimum of every three years

  18. Facility effluent monitoring plan for the plutonium-uranium extraction facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thompson, R.J.; Sontage, S.

    1991-11-01

    A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan is the first annual report. It shall ensure long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updated as a minimum every three years

  19. Facility effluent monitoring plan for the plutonium-uranium extraction facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lohrasbi, J.; Johnson, D.L. [Westinghouse Hanford Co., Richland, WA (United States); De Lorenzo, D.S. [Los Alamos Technical Associates, NM (United States)

    1993-12-01

    A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438-01. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan shall ensure long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updated at a minimum of every three years.

  20. Fire protection considerations in the design of plutonium handling and storage facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blanchard, A.

    2000-01-01

    Unwanted fire in a facility that handles plutonium must be addressed early in the facility design. Such fires have the potential for transporting radioactive contamination throughout the building and widespread downwind dispersal. Features that mitigate such events can be severely challenged during the fire. High temperatures can cause storage containers to burst; a very efficient dispersal mechanism for radioactive contamination. The fire will also establish ventilation patterns that cause the migration of smoke and radioactive contamination throughout the facility. The smoke and soot generated by the fire will enter the exhaust system and travel to the filtration system where it will deposit on the filters. The quantity of smoke generated during a typical multi-room fire is expected to blind most High Efficiency Particulate Airfilter (HEPA) media. The blinding can have two possible outcomes. (1) The air movement though the facility is reduced, compromising the negative pressure containment and allowing contamination to leave the building though doors and other openings; or (2) the filters collapse allowing the contamination to bypass the filtration media and exit the building through the filter plenum. HEPA filter blinding during severe fires can be prevented or mitigated. Increasing the face surface area of HEPA filters will increase the smoke filtration capacity of the system, thus preventing blinding. As an alternative sandfilters can be provided to mitigate the effects of the HEPA filter bypass. Both concepts have distinct advantages. This paper will explore these two design concepts and two others; it will describe the design requirements necessary for each concept to prevent unacceptable contamination spread. The intent is to allow the filter media selection to be based on a comprehensive understanding of the four different design concepts

  1. Success in behaviour-based safety at Los Alamos National Laboratory's plutonium facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wieneke, R.E.; Balkey, J.J.; Kleinsteuber, J.F.

    2001-01-01

    Los Alamos National Laboratory's (LANL's) Plutonium Facility is responsible for a wide variety of actinide processing operations in support of the United States Department of Energy's (DOE's) stockpile stewardship of the nation's nuclear arsenal. Both engineered and administrative controls are used to mitigate hazards inherent in these activities. Nuclear facilities have engineered safety systems that are extensively evaluated and documented, and are monitored regularly for operability and performance. Personnel undergo comprehensive training, including annual recertification of their operations. They must thoroughly understand the hazards involved in their work and the controls that are in place to mitigate those hazards. A series of hazard-control plans and work instructions are used to define and authorize the work that is done. Primary hazards associated with chemicals and radioactive materials are well controlled with minimal risk to the workforce and public. The majority of injuries are physical or ergonomic in nature. In an effort to increase safety awareness and to decrease accidents and incidents, a program focusing on the identification and elimination of unsafe behaviours was initiated. Workers are trained on how to conduct safety observations and given guidance on specific behaviours to note. Observations are structured to have minimal impact upon workload and are shared by the entire workforce. This program has effectively decreased a low accident rate and will make long-term sustainability possible. (author)

  2. Success in behaviour-based safety at Los Alamos National Laboratory's plutonium facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wieneke, R E [Los Alamos National Laboratory, NMT Division, Los Alamos, NM (United States); Balkey, J J; Kleinsteuber, J F [Los Alamos National Laboratory, NMT Division, Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2001-07-01

    Los Alamos National Laboratory's (LANL's) Plutonium Facility is responsible for a wide variety of actinide processing operations in support of the United States Department of Energy's (DOE's) stockpile stewardship of the nation's nuclear arsenal. Both engineered and administrative controls are used to mitigate hazards inherent in these activities. Nuclear facilities have engineered safety systems that are extensively evaluated and documented, and are monitored regularly for operability and performance. Personnel undergo comprehensive training, including annual recertification of their operations. They must thoroughly understand the hazards involved in their work and the controls that are in place to mitigate those hazards. A series of hazard-control plans and work instructions are used to define and authorize the work that is done. Primary hazards associated with chemicals and radioactive materials are well controlled with minimal risk to the workforce and public. The majority of injuries are physical or ergonomic in nature. In an effort to increase safety awareness and to decrease accidents and incidents, a program focusing on the identification and elimination of unsafe behaviours was initiated. Workers are trained on how to conduct safety observations and given guidance on specific behaviours to note. Observations are structured to have minimal impact upon workload and are shared by the entire workforce. This program has effectively decreased a low accident rate and will make long-term sustainability possible. (author)

  3. Evaluation of the seismic integrity of a plutonium-handling facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coats, D.W.

    1981-01-01

    Many studies have been made by and for the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) to ensure the seismic safety of its Plutonium Facility (Building 332). These studies have included seismological and geologic field investigations to define the actual seismic hazard existing at the Laboratory site as well as structural studies of the Facility itself. Because the basic seismic design criteria has undergone changes over the years, numerous structural studies and upgrades have been completed. The seismic criteria in use at the LLNL site is reviewed on a continuing basis as new information on the seismicity and geology of the Livermore Valley is obtained. At present, the Laboratory's Earth Sciences Division is conducting a multi-million dollar program to identify and characterize the geologic hazards at the Livermore site, with the primary emphasis on earthquake hazards in the Livermore Valley. This effort is undergoing an independent review by Woodward-Clyde Associates. Additionally, because of increased concerns over the seismic safety of Building 332, the Laboratory has initiated an independent structural review. This review effort will be monitored by the California Seismic Safety Commission to ensure its independence. Both of these studiies are in their early stages and results are not yet available

  4. Plutonium immobilization plant using ceramic in existing facilities at the Savannah River site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DiSabatino, A.

    1998-01-01

    The Plutonium Immobilization Plant (PIP) accepts plutonium (Pu) from pit conversion and from non-pit sources, and through a ceramic immobilization process converts the plutonium into an immobilized form that can be disposed of in a high level waste (HLW) repository. This immobilization process is shown conceptually in Figure 1-1. The objective is to make an immobilized form, suitable for geologic disposal, in which the plutonium is as inherently unattractive and inaccessible as the plutonium in spent fuel from commercial reactors. The ceramic immobilization alternative presented in this report consists of first converting the surplus material to an oxide, followed by incorporating the plutonium oxide into a titanate-based ceramic material that is placed in metal cans

  5. CONTAMINATED PROCESS EQUIPMENT REMOVAL FOR THE DECOMMISSIONG AND DECONTAMINATION OF THE 232-Z CONTAMINATED WASTE RECOVERY PROCESS FACILITY AT THE PLUTONIUM FINISHING PLANT

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    HOPKINS, A.M.; MINETTE, M.J.; KLOS, D.B.

    2007-01-01

    This paper describes the unique challenges encountered and subsequent resolutions to accomplish the deactivation and decontamination of a plutonium ash contaminated building. The 232-Z Contaminated Waste Recovery Process Facility at the Plutonium Finishing Plant was used to recover plutonium from process wastes such as rags, gloves, containers and other items by incinerating the items and dissolving the resulting ash. The incineration process resulted in a light-weight plutonium ash residue that was highly mobile in air. This light-weight ash coated the incinerator's process equipment, which included gloveboxes, blowers, filters, furnaces, ducts, and filter boxes. Significant airborne contamination (over 1 million derived air concentration hours [DAC]) was found in the scrubber cell of the facility. Over 1300 grams of plutonium held up in the process equipment and attached to the walls had to be removed, packaged and disposed. This ash had to be removed before demolition of the building could take place

  6. Potentiality of an accounting system for nuclear materials in the PNC plutonium fuel facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Muto, T.; Aoki, M.; Tsutsumi, M.; Akutsu, H.

    1976-01-01

    The accounting system based on data filing and inquiry processing by the use of an optical mark reader (OMR) has been developed and operated satisfactorily for criticality control and accountancy of nuclear materials in the plutonium facilities of the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC). The OMR system has merits, especially compared with an old chit and punch-card system, such as low cost, abundance of the data included on a single sheet, universality of use for all kinds of material transfers, ease of data correction, and a large capacity. The OMR system is applied to the material transfer and also for physical inventory taking. This system, together with the use of an accurate automatic balance equipped at each glove box, which is generally designated as an accounting unit for the criticality control, generated a MUF of 0.43% for a fuel fabrication campaign of 119 assemblies for a fast reactor, which can be decreased further. In relation to the recent safeguarding situation and also to fitting in with an automatic fuel fabrication process, however, a further development of the present system will be necessary in the near future. This future system is discussed with reference to criticism of the current accountancy system by Rosenbaum and others, and its possible framework with the emphasis on the weighing and reading of numbered items is suggested. (author)

  7. Decontamination and decommissioning of the Argonne National Laboratory Building 350 Plutonium Fabrication Facility. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kline, W.H.; Moe, H.J.; Lahey, T.J.

    1985-02-01

    In 1973, Argonne National Laboratory began consolidating and upgrading its plutonium-handling operations with the result that the research fuel-fabrication facility located in Building 350 was shut down and declared surplus. Sixteen of the twenty-three gloveboxes which comprised the system were disassembled and relocated for reuse or placed into controlled storage during 1974 but, due to funding constraints, full-scale decommissioning did not start until 1978. Since that time the fourteen remaining contaminated gloveboxes, including all internal and external equipment as well as the associated ventilation systems, have been assayed for radioactive content, dismantled, size reduced to fit acceptable packaging and sent to a US Department of Energy (DOE) transuranic retrievable-storage site or to a DOE low-level nuclear waste burial ground. The project which was completed in 1983, required 5 years to accomplish, 32 man years of effort, produced some 540 m 3 (19,000 ft 3 ) of radioactive waste of which 60% was TRU, and cost 2.4 million dollars

  8. Hazards and accident analyses, an integrated approach, for the Plutonium Facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pan, P.Y.; Goen, L.K.; Letellier, B.C.; Sasser, M.K.

    1995-01-01

    This paper describes an integrated approach to perform hazards and accident analyses for the Plutonium Facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory. A comprehensive hazards analysis methodology was developed that extends the scope of the preliminary/process hazard analysis methods described in the AIChE Guidelines for Hazard Evaluations. Results fro the semi-quantitative approach constitute a full spectrum of hazards. For each accident scenario identified, there is a binning assigned for the event likelihood and consequence severity. In addition, each accident scenario is analyzed for four possible sectors (workers, on-site personnel, public, and environment). A screening process was developed to link the hazard analysis to the accident analysis. Specifically the 840 accident scenarios were screened down to about 15 accident scenarios for a more through deterministic analysis to define the operational safety envelope. The mechanics of the screening process in the selection of final scenarios for each representative accident category, i.e., fire, explosion, criticality, and spill, is described

  9. Experimental performance evaluation of two stack sampling systems in a plutonium facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Glissmeyer, J.A.

    1992-04-01

    The evaluation of two routine stack sampling systems at the Z-Plant plutonium facility operated by Rockwell International for USERDA is part of a larger study, sponsored by Rockwell and conducted by Battelle, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, of gaseous effluent sampling systems. The gaseous effluent sampling systems evaluated are located at the main plant ventilation stack (291-Z-1) and at a vessel vent stack (296-Z-3). A preliminary report, which was a paper study issued in April 1976, identified many deficiencies in the existing sampling systems and made recommendations for corrective action. The objectives of this experimental evaluation of those sampling systems were as follows: Characterize the radioactive aerosols in the stack effluents; Develop a tracer aerosol technique for validating particulate effluent sampling system performance; Evaluate the performance of the existing routine sampling systems and their compliance with the sponsor's criteria; and Recommend corrective action where required. The tracer aerosol approach to sampler evaluation was chosen because the low concentrations of radioactive particulates in the effluents would otherwise require much longer sampling times and thus more time to complete this evaluation. The following report describes the sampling systems that are the subject of this study and then details the experiments performed. The results are then presented and discussed. Much of the raw and finished data are included in the appendices

  10. PLUTONIUM FINISHING PLANT (PFP) 241-Z LIQUID WASTE TREATMENT FACILITY DEACTIVATION AND DEMOLITION

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    JOHNSTON GA

    2008-01-15

    Fluor Hanford, Inc. (FH) is proud to submit the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) 241-Z liquid Waste Treatment Facility Deactivation and Demolition (D&D) Project for consideration by the Project Management Institute as Project of the Year for 2008. The decommissioning of the 241-Z Facility presented numerous challenges, many of which were unique with in the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex. The majority of the project budget and schedule was allocated for cleaning out five below-grade tank vaults. These highly contaminated, confined spaces also presented significant industrial safety hazards that presented some of the most hazardous work environments on the Hanford Site. The 241-Z D&D Project encompassed diverse tasks: cleaning out and stabilizing five below-grade tank vaults (also called cells), manually size-reducing and removing over three tons of process piping from the vaults, permanently isolating service utilities, removing a large contaminated chemical supply tank, stabilizing and removing plutonium-contaminated ventilation ducts, demolishing three structures to grade, and installing an environmental barrier on the demolition site . All of this work was performed safely, on schedule, and under budget. During the deactivation phase of the project between November 2005 and February 2007, workers entered the highly contaminated confined-space tank vaults 428 times. Each entry (or 'dive') involved an average of three workers, thus equaling approximately 1,300 individual confined -space entries. Over the course of the entire deactivation and demolition period, there were no recordable injuries and only one minor reportable skin contamination. The 241-Z D&D Project was decommissioned under the provisions of the 'Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order' (the Tri-Party Agreement or TPA), the 'Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976' (RCRA), and the 'Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and

  11. PLUTONIUM FINISHING PLANT (PFP) 241-Z LIQUID WASTE TREATMENT FACILITY DEACTIVATION AND DEMOLITION

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    JOHNSTON GA

    2008-01-01

    Fluor Hanford, Inc. (FH) is proud to submit the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) 241-Z liquid Waste Treatment Facility Deactivation and Demolition (D and D) Project for consideration by the Project Management Institute as Project of the Year for 2008. The decommissioning of the 241-Z Facility presented numerous challenges, many of which were unique with in the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex. The majority of the project budget and schedule was allocated for cleaning out five below-grade tank vaults. These highly contaminated, confined spaces also presented significant industrial safety hazards that presented some of the most hazardous work environments on the Hanford Site. The 241-Z D and D Project encompassed diverse tasks: cleaning out and stabilizing five below-grade tank vaults (also called cells), manually size-reducing and removing over three tons of process piping from the vaults, permanently isolating service utilities, removing a large contaminated chemical supply tank, stabilizing and removing plutonium-contaminated ventilation ducts, demolishing three structures to grade, and installing an environmental barrier on the demolition site . All of this work was performed safely, on schedule, and under budget. During the deactivation phase of the project between November 2005 and February 2007, workers entered the highly contaminated confined-space tank vaults 428 times. Each entry (or 'dive') involved an average of three workers, thus equaling approximately 1,300 individual confined -space entries. Over the course of the entire deactivation and demolition period, there were no recordable injuries and only one minor reportable skin contamination. The 241-Z D and D Project was decommissioned under the provisions of the 'Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order' (the Tri-Party Agreement or TPA), the 'Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976' (RCRA), and the 'Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980

  12. Rough order of magnitude cost estimate for immobilization of 18.2 MT of plutonium using existing facilities at Hanford: alternatives 4A/8/10

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DiSabatino, A.

    1998-01-01

    The purpose of this Cost Estimate Report is to identify preliminary capital and operating costs for a facility to immobilize 18.2 metric tons (nominal) of plutonium as a ceramic in an existing facility, the Fuels and Materials Examination Facility (FMEF), at Hanford

  13. Rough order of magnitude cost estimate for immobilization of 50 MT of plutonium using existing facilities at Hanford: alternative 11B

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DiSabatino, A.

    1998-01-01

    The purpose of this Cost Estimate Report is to identify preliminary capital and operating costs for a facility to immobilize 50 metric tons (nominal) of plutonium as a ceramic in an existing facility at Hanford, the Fuels and Materials Examination Facility (FMEF)

  14. Progress on plutonium stabilization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hurt, D.

    1996-01-01

    The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has safety oversight responsibility for most of the facilities where unstable forms of plutonium are being processed and packaged for interim storage. The Board has issued recommendations on plutonium stabilization and has has a considerable influence on DOE's stabilization schedules and priorities. The Board has not made any recommendations on long-term plutonium disposition, although it may get more involved in the future if DOE develops plans to use defense nuclear facilities for disposition activities

  15. Natural hazards that may trigger a radiological release from a plutonium processing facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Selvidge, J. E.

    1977-04-28

    Calculations show the probability of a tornado striking a plutonium area at Rocky Flats is 2.2 x 10/sup -4/ per year. The source term (expected value of plutonium release) should such an event occur is calculated at 3.3 x 10/sup -7/ grams. The source term for high-velocity, downslope winds is higher--2.2 x 10/sup -3/ grams. The probability of a meteorite that weighs one or more pounds (453 grams) striking a plutonium area is estimated at 8.88 x 10/sup -7/ per year. Because of this small probability and the remote chance that a plutonium release would occur even if a meteorite hit occurred, the hazard from meteorite impact is considered negligible. Conservative assumptions result in all calculated frequencies being almost certainly too high. Empirical observations have indicated lower frequencies than those calculated.

  16. Natural hazards that may trigger a radiological release from a plutonium processing facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Selvidge, J.E.

    1977-01-01

    Calculations show the probability of a tornado striking a plutonium area at Rocky Flats is 2.2 x 10 -4 per year. The source term (expected value of plutonium release) should such an event occur is calculated at 3.3 x 10 -7 grams. The source term for high-velocity, downslope winds is higher--2.2 x 10 -3 grams. The probability of a meteorite that weighs one or more pounds (453 grams) striking a plutonium area is estimated at 8.88 x 10 -7 per year. Because of this small probability and the remote chance that a plutonium release would occur even if a meteorite hit occurred, the hazard from meteorite impact is considered negligible. Conservative assumptions result in all calculated frequencies being almost certainly too high. Empirical observations have indicated lower frequencies than those calculated

  17. The plutonium fuel cycles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pigford, T.H.; Ang, K.P.

    1975-01-01

    The quantities of plutonium and other fuel actinides have been calculated for equilibrium fuel cycles for 1000-MW water reactors fueled with slightly enriched uranium, water reactors fueled with plutonium and natural uranium, fast-breder reactors, gas-cooled reactors fueled with thorium and highly enriched uranium, and gas-cooled reactors fueled with thorium, plutonium and recycled uranium. The radioactivity quantities of plutonium, americium and curium processed yearly in these fuel cycles are greatest for the water reactors fueled with natural uranium and recycled plutonium. The total amount of actinides processed is calculated for the predicted future growth of the U.S. nuclear power industry. For the same total installed nuclear power capacity, the introduction of the plutonium breeder has little effect upon the total amount of plutonium in this century. The estimated amount of plutonium in the low-level process wastes in the plutonium fuel cycles is comparable to the amount of plutonium in the high-level fission product wastes. The amount of plutonium processed in the nuclear fuel cycles can be considerably reduced by using gas-cooled reactors to consume plutonium produced in uranium-fueled water reactors. These, and other reactors dedicated for plutonium utilization, could be co-located with facilities for fuel reprocessing ad fuel fabrication to eliminate the off-site transport of separated plutonium. (author)

  18. Dissolution of aerosol particles collected from nuclear facility plutonium production process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ning Xu; Martinez, Alex; Schappert, Michael; Montoya, D.P.; Martinez, Patrick; Tandon, Lav

    2016-01-01

    A simple, robust analytical chemistry method has been developed to dissolve plutonium containing particles in a complex matrix. The aerosol particles collected on Marple cascade impactor substrates were shown to be dissolved completely with an acid mixture of 12 M HNO 3 and 0.1 M HF. A pressurized closed vessel acid digestion technique was utilized to heat the samples at 130 deg C for 16 h to facilitate the digestion. The dissolution efficiency for plutonium particles was 99 %. The resulting particle digestate solution was suitable for trace elemental analysis and isotope composition determination, as well as radiochemistry measurements. (author)

  19. Assessment of plutonium storage safety issues at Department of Energy facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) mission for utilization and storage of nuclear materials has recently changed as a result of the end of the ''Cold War'' era. Past and current plutonium storage practices largely reflect a temporary, in-process, or in-use storage condition which must now be changed to accommodate longer-term storage. This report summarizes information concerning current plutonium metal and oxide storage practices which was presented at the Office of Defense programs (DP) workshop in Albuquerque, New Mexico on May 26-27, 1993 and contained in responses to questions by DP-62 from the field organizations

  20. Human factors aspects of the major upgrade to control systems at the Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Higgins, J.; Pope, N.

    1997-01-01

    The Plutonium Facility (TA-55) at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has been in operation for over 15 years. It handles projects such as: stockpile maintenance, surveillance, and dismantlement; pit rebuild; plutonium power source fabrication for long duration spacecraft missions (e.g., Cassini); nuclear materials technology research; nuclear materials storage; and remediation of nuclear waste. The Operations Center of TA-55 is the nerve center of the facility where operators are on duty around the clock and monitor several thousand data points using the Facility Control System (FCS). The FCS monitors, displays, alarms, and provides some limited control of the following systems; HVAC, fire detection and suppression, radiation detection, electrical, and other miscellaneous systems. The FCS was originally based on late 1970s digital technology, which is not longer supported by the vendors. Additionally, the equipment failure rates increased notably in the 1990s. Thus, plans were put into place to upgrade and replace the FCS hardware, software, and display components with modernized equipment. The process was complicated by the facts that: the facility was operational and could not be totally closed for the modifications; complete documentation was not available for the existing system; the Safety Analyses for the facility were in the process of being upgraded at the same time; and of course limited time and budgets. This paper will discuss the human factors aspects of the design, installation, and testing of the new FCS within the above noted constraints. Particular items to be discussed include the functional requirements definition, operating experience review, screen designs, test program, operator training, and phased activation of the new circuits in an operational facility

  1. Validation of the method for determination of plutonium isotopes in urine samples and its application in a nuclear facility at Otwock

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Rzemek Katarzyna

    2015-03-01

    Full Text Available The studies aimed at determining low activities of alpha radioactive elements are widely recognized as essential for the human health, because of their high radiotoxicity in case of internal contamination. Some groups of workers of nuclear facility at Otwock are potentially exposed to contamination with plutonium isotopes. For this reason, the method for determination of plutonium isotopes has been introduced and validated in Radiation Protection Measurements Laboratory (LPD of the National Centre for Nuclear Research (NCBJ. In this method the plutonium is isolated from a sample by coprecipitation with phosphates and separated on a AG 1-X2 Resin. After electrodeposition, the sample is measured by alpha spectrometry. Validation was performed in order to assess parameters such as: selectivity, accuracy (trueness and precision and linearity of the method. The results of plutonium determination in urine samples of persons potentially exposed to internal contamination are presented in this work.

  2. Automation of process accountability flow diagrams at Los Alamos National Laboratory's Plutonium Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Knepper, P.; Whiteson, R.; Strittmatter, R.; Mousseau, K.

    1999-01-01

    Many industrial processes (including reprocessing activities; nuclear fuel fabrication; and material storage, measurement and transfer) make use of process flow diagrams. These flows can be used for material accountancy and for data analysis. At Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), the Technical Area (TA)-55 Plutonium Facility is home to various research and development activities involving the use of special nuclear material (SNM). A facility conducting research and development (R and D) activities using SNM must satisfy material accountability guidelines. All processes involving SNM or tritium processing, at LANL, require a process accountability flow diagram (PAFD). At LANL a technique was developed to generate PAFDs that can be coupled to a relational database for use in material accountancy. These techniques could also be used for propagation of variance, measurement control, and inventory difference analysis. The PAFD is a graphical representation of the material flow during a specific process. PAFDs are currently stored as PowerPoint files. In the PowerPoint format, the data captured by the PAFD are not easily accessible. Converting the PAFDs to an accessible electronic format is desirable for several reasons. Any program will be able to access the data contained in the PAFD. For the PAFD data to be useful in applications such as an expert system for data checking, SNM accountability, inventory difference evaluation, measurement control, and other kinds of analysis, it is necessary to interface directly with the information contained within the PAFD. The PAFDs can be approved and distributed electronically, eliminating the paper copies of the PAFDs and ensuring that material handlers have the current PAFDs. Modifications to the PAFDs are often global. Storing the data in an accessible format would eliminate the need to manually update each of the PAFDs when a global change has occurred. The goal was to determine a software package that would store the

  3. GrayQbTM Single-Faced Version 2 (SF2) Hanford Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF) deployment report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Plummer, J. R. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States); Immel, D. M. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States); Serrato, M. G. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States); Dalmaso, M. J. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States); Shull, D. J. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States)

    2015-11-18

    The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) in partnership with CH2M Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) deployed the GrayQbTM SF2 radiation imaging device at the Hanford Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF) to assist in the radiological characterization of the canyon. The deployment goal was to locate radiological contamination hot spots in the PRF canyon, where pencil tanks were removed and decontamination/debris removal operations are on-going, to support the CHPRC facility decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) effort. The PRF canyon D&D effort supports completion of the CHPRC Plutonium Finishing Plant Decommissioning Project. The GrayQbTM SF2 (Single Faced Version 2) is a non-destructive examination device developed by SRNL to generate radiation contour maps showing source locations and relative radiological levels present in the area under examination. The Hanford PRF GrayQbTM Deployment was sponsored by CH2M Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) through the DOE Richland Operations Office, Inter-Entity Work Order (IEWO), DOE-RL IEWO- M0SR900210.

  4. Decontamination and demolition of a former plutonium processing facility's process exhaust system, firescreen, and filter plenum buildings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    LaFrate, P.J. Jr.; Stout, D.S.; Elliott, J.W.

    1996-01-01

    The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Decommissioning Project has decontaminated, demolished, and decommissioned a process exhaust system, two filter plenum buildings, and a firescreen plenum structure at Technical Area 21 (TA-2 1). The project began in August 1995 and was completed in January 1996. These high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter plenums and associated ventilation ductwork provided process exhaust to fume hoods and glove boxes in TA-21 Buildings 2 through 5 when these buildings were active plutonium and uranium processing and research facilities. This paper summarizes the history of TA-21 plutonium and uranium processing and research activities and provides a detailed discussion of integrated work process controls, characterize-as-you-go methodology, unique engineering controls, decontamination techniques, demolition methodology, waste minimization, and volume reduction. Also presented in detail are the challenges facing the LANL Decommissioning Project to safely and economically decontaminate and demolish surplus facilities and the unique solutions to tough problems. This paper also shows the effectiveness of the integrated work package concept to control work through all phases

  5. Decontamination and demolition of a former plutonium processing facility's process exhaust system, firescreen, and filter plenum buildings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    LaFrate, P.J. Jr.; Stout, D.S.; Elliott, J.W.

    1996-01-01

    The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Decommissioning Project has decontaminated, demolished, and decommissioned a process exhaust system, two filter plenum buildings, and a firescreen plenum structure at Technical Area 21 (TA-21). The project began in August 1995 and was completed in January 1996. These high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter plenums and associated ventilation ductwork provided process exhaust to fume hoods and glove boxes in TA-21 Buildings 2 through 5 when these buildings were active plutonium and uranium processing and research facilities. This paper summarizes the history of TA-21 plutonium and uranium processing and research activities and provides a detailed discussion of integrated work process controls, characterize-as-you-go methodology, unique engineering controls, decontamination techniques, demolition methodology, waste minimization, and volume reduction. Also presented in detail are the challenges facing the LANL Decommissioning Project to safely and economically decontaminate and demolish surplus facilities and the unique solutions to tough problems. This paper also shows the effectiveness of the integrated work package concept to control work through all phases

  6. Stop plutonium; Stop plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2003-02-01

    This press document aims to inform the public on the hazards bound to the plutonium exploitation in France and especially the plutonium transport. The first part is a technical presentation of the plutonium and the MOX (Mixed Oxide Fuel). The second part presents the installation of the plutonium industry in France. The third part is devoted to the plutonium convoys safety. The highlight is done on the problem of the leak of ''secret'' of such transports. (A.L.B.)

  7. Role of non-destructive examinations in leak testing of glove boxes for industrial scale plutonium handling at nuclear fuel fabrication facility along with case study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aher, Sachin

    2015-01-01

    Non Destructive Examinations has the prominent role at Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Facilities. Specifically NDE has contributed at utmost stratum in Leak Testing of Glove Boxes and qualifying them as a Class-I confinement for safe Plutonium handling at industrial scale. Advanced Fuel Fabrication Facility, BARC, Tarapur is engaged in fabrication of Plutonium based MOX (PuO 2 , DDUO 2 ) fuel with different enrichments for first core of PFBR reactor. Alpha- Leak Tight Glove Boxes along with HEPA Filters and dynamic ventilation form the promising engineering system for safe and reliable handling of plutonium bearing materials considering the radiotoxicity and risk associated with handling of plutonium. Leak Testing of Glove Boxes which involves the leak detection, leak rectification and leak quantifications is major challenging task. To accomplish this challenge, various Non Destructive Testing methods have assisted in promising way to achieve the stringent leak rate criterion for commissioning of Glove Box facilities for plutonium handling. This paper highlights the Role of various NDE techniques like Soap Solution Test, Argon Sniffer Test, Pressure Drop/Rise Test etc. in Glove Box Leak Testing along with procedure and methodology for effective rectification of leakage points. A Flow Chart consisting of Glove Box leak testing procedure starting from preliminary stage up to qualification stage along with a case study and observations are discussed in this paper. (author)

  8. Rough order of magnitude cost estimate for immobilization of 18.2 MT of plutonium using new facilities at the Savannah River site: alternatives 3A/5A/6A/6B/7A/9A

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DiSabatino, A.

    1998-01-01

    The purpose of this Cost Estimate Report is to identify preliminary capital and operating costs for a facility to immobilize 18.2 metric tons (nominal) of plutonium using ceramic in a new facility at Savannah River Site (SRS)

  9. Impact of receipt of coprocessed uranium/plutonium on advanced accountability concepts and fabrication facilities. Addendum 1 to application of advanced accountability concepts in mixed oxide fabrication

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bastin, J.J.; Jump, M.J.; Lange, R.A.; Randall, C.C.

    1977-11-01

    The Phase I study of the application of advanced accountability methods (DYMAC) in a uranium/plutonium mixed oxide facility was extended to assess the effect of coprocessed UO 2 --PuO 2 feed on the observations made in the original Phase I effort and on the proposed Phase II program. The retention of plutonium mixed with uranium throughout the process was also considered. This addendum reports that coprocessed feed would have minimal effect on the DYMAC program, except in the areas of material specifications, starting material delivery schedule, and labor requirements. Each of these areas is addressed, as are the impact of coprocessed feed at a large fuel fabrication facility and the changes needed in the dirty scrap recovery process to maintain the lower plutonium levels which may be required by future nonproliferation philosophy. An amended schedule for Phase II is included

  10. The impact of two Department of Energy orders on the design and cost of select plutonium facilities at Los Alamos National Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rey, V.C.

    1999-01-01

    The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is a research and development facility in northern New Mexico, owned by the federal government and operated for the US Department of Energy (DOE) by the University of California (UC). LANL conducts research and experiments in many arenas including plutonium. Its plutonium facilities are required to meet the facility design and safety criteria of applicable DOE orders as specified in the UC contract. Although DOE 420.1, Facility Safety, superseded DOE 6430.1A, General Design Criteria, the UC contract requires LANL to adhere to DOE 6430.1A, Division 13 in its special nuclear facilities. A comparison of costs and savings relative to installation of double-wall piping at two LANL plutonium facilities is demonstrated. DOE 6430.1A is prescriptive in its design criteria whereas DOE 420.1 is a performance-based directive. The differences in these orders impact time and design costs in nuclear construction projects. LANL's approach to integrated quality and conduct of operations for design, needs to be re-evaluated. In conclusion, there is a need for highly-technical, knowledgeable people and an integrated, quality/conduct of operations-based approach to assure that nuclear facilities are designed and constructed in a safe and cost-effective manner

  11. Coordinated safeguards for materials management in a uranium--plutonium nitrate-to-oxide coconversion facility: Coprecal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dayem, H.A.; Cobb, D.D.; Dietz, R.J.; Hakkila, E.A.; Kern, E.A.; Schelonka, E.P.; Shipley, J.P.; Smith, D.B.

    1979-02-01

    This report describes the conceptual design of an advanced materials-management system for safeguarding special nuclear materials in a uranium--plutonium nitrate-to-oxide coconversion facility based on the Coprecal process. Design concepts are presented for near real-time (dynamic) accountability by forming dynamic materials balances from information provided by chemical and nondestructive analyses and from process-control instrumentation. Modeling and simulation techniques are used to compare the sensitivities of proposed dynamic materials accounting strategies to both abrupt and protracted diversion. The safeguards implications of coconversion as well as some unique features of the reference process are discussed and design criteria are identified to improve the safeguardability of the Coprecal coconversion process

  12. Report of an investigation into deterioration of the Plutonium Fuel Form Fabrication Facility (PuFF) at the DOE Savannah River Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-10-01

    This investigations of the Savannah River Site's Plutonium Fuel Form fabrication facility located in Building 235-F was initiated in April 1991. The purpose of the investigation was to determine whether, as has been alleged, operation of the facility's argon inert gas system was terminated with the knowledge that continued inoperability of the argon system would cause accelerated corrosion damage to the equipment in the plutonium 238 processing cells. The investigation quickly established that the decision to discontinue operation of the argon system, by not repairing it, was merely one of the measures, and not the most important one, which led to the current deteriorated state of the facility. As a result, the scope of the investigation was broadened to more identify and assess those factors which contributed to the facility's current condition. This document discusses the backgrounds, results, and recommendations of this investigation

  13. Report of an investigation into deterioration of the Plutonium Fuel Form Fabrication Facility (PuFF) at the DOE Savannah River Site

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1991-10-01

    This investigations of the Savannah River Site's Plutonium Fuel Form fabrication facility located in Building 235-F was initiated in April 1991. The purpose of the investigation was to determine whether, as has been alleged, operation of the facility's argon inert gas system was terminated with the knowledge that continued inoperability of the argon system would cause accelerated corrosion damage to the equipment in the plutonium 238 processing cells. The investigation quickly established that the decision to discontinue operation of the argon system, by not repairing it, was merely one of the measures, and not the most important one, which led to the current deteriorated state of the facility. As a result, the scope of the investigation was broadened to more identify and assess those factors which contributed to the facility's current condition. This document discusses the backgrounds, results, and recommendations of this investigation.

  14. Storage for the Fast Flux Test Facility unirradiated fuel in the Plutonium Finishing Plant Complex, Hanford Site, Richland, Washington

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-01-01

    This Environmental Assessment evaluates the proposed action to relocate and store unirradiated Fast Flux Test Facility fuel in the Plutonium Finishing Plant Complex on the Hanford Site, Richland, Washington. The US Department of Energy has decided to cease fuel fabrication activities in the 308 Building in the 300 Area. This decision was based on a safety concern over the ability of the fuel fabrication portion of the 308 Building to withstand a seismic event. The proposed action to relocate and store the fuel is based on the savings that could be realized by consolidating security costs associated with storage of the fuel. While the 308 Building belowgrade fuel storage areas are not at jeopardy by a seismic event, the US Department of Energy is proposing to cease storage operations along with the related fabrication operations. The US Department of Energy proposes to remove the unirradiated fuel pins and fuel assemblies from the 308 Building and store them in Room 192A, within the 234-5Z Building, a part of the Plutonium Finishing Plant Complex, located in the 200 West Area. Minor modifications to Room 192A would be required to accommodate placement of the fuel. The US Department of Energy estimates that removing all of the fuel from the 308 Building would save $6.5 million annually in security expenditures for the Fast Flux Test Facility. Environmental impacts of construction, relocation, and operation of the proposed action and alternatives were evaluated. This evaluation concluded that the proposed action would have no significant impacts on the human environment

  15. The Challenges of Preserving Historic Resources During the Deactivation and Decommissioning of Highly Contaminated Historically Significant Plutonium Process Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hopkins, A.; Minette, M.; Sorenson, D.; Heineman, R.; Gerber, M.; Charboneau, S.; Bond, F.

    2006-01-01

    The Manhattan Project was initiated to develop nuclear weapons for use in World War II. The Hanford Engineer Works (HEW) was established in eastern Washington State as a production complex for the Manhattan Project. A major product of the HEW was plutonium. The buildings and process equipment used in the early phases of nuclear weapons development are historically significant because of the new and unique work that was performed. When environmental cleanup became Hanford's central mission in 1991, the Department of Energy (DOE) prepared for the deactivation and decommissioning of many of the old process facilities. In many cases, the process facilities were so contaminated, they faced demolition. The National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) requires federal agencies to evaluate the historic significance of properties under their jurisdiction for eligibility for inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places before altering or demolishing them so that mitigation through documentation of the properties can occur. Specifically, federal agencies are required to evaluate their proposed actions against the effect the actions may have on districts, sites, buildings or structures that are included or eligible for inclusion in the National Register. In an agreement between the DOE's Richland Operations Office (RL), the Washington State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP), the agencies concurred that the Hanford Site Historic District is eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic Places and that a Site-wide Treatment Plan would streamline compliance with the NHPA while allowing RL to manage the cleanup of the Hanford Site. Currently, many of the old processing buildings at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) are undergoing deactivation and decommissioning. RL and Fluor Hanford project managers at the PFP are committed to preserving historical artifacts of the plutonium production process. They

  16. Progress on plutonium stabilization

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hurt, D. [Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Washington, DC (United States)

    1996-05-01

    The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has safety oversight responsibility for most of the facilities where unstable forms of plutonium are being processed and packaged for interim storage. The Board has issued recommendations on plutonium stabilization and has has a considerable influence on DOE`s stabilization schedules and priorities. The Board has not made any recommendations on long-term plutonium disposition, although it may get more involved in the future if DOE develops plans to use defense nuclear facilities for disposition activities.

  17. Basic design study on plutonium electro-refining facility of oxide fuel pyroelectrochemical reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ogura, Kenji; Kondo, Naruhito; Kamoshida, Hiroshi; Omori, Takashi

    2001-02-01

    The test facility basic design, utility necessity and estimation cost of the Oxide Fuel Pyro-process for the use of Chemical Processing Facility (CPF) of JNC have been studied with the information of the previous year concept study and the additional conditions. Drastic down sizing design change or the building reconstruction is necessary to place the Oxide Fuel Pyro-process Facility in the laboratory ''C'', because it is not possible to reserve enough maintenance space and the weight of the facility is over the acceptable limit of the building. A further study such as facility down sizing, apparatus detail design and experiment detail process treatment has to be planned. (author)

  18. Extrinsic and intrinsic complexities of the Los Alamos plutonium processing facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bearse, R.C.; Roberts, N.J.; Longmire, V.L.

    1985-01-01

    Analysis of the data obtained in one year of plutonium accounting at Los Alamos reveals significant complexity. Much of this complexity arises from the complexity of the processes themselves. Additional complexity is induced by errors in the data entry process. It is important to note that there is no evidence that this complexity is adversely affecting the accounting in the plant. The authors have been analyzing transaction data from fiscal year 1983 processing. This study involved 62,595 transactions. The data have been analyzed using the relational database program INGRES on a VAX 11/780 computer. This software allows easy manipulation of the original data and subsets drawn from it. The authors have been attempting for several years to understand the global features of the TA-55 accounting data. This project has underscored several of the system's complexities

  19. Extrinsic and intrinsic complexities of the Los Alamos Plutonium Processing Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bearse, R.C.; Longmire, V.L.; Roberts, N.J.

    1985-01-01

    Analysis of the data obtained in one year of plutonium accounting at Los Alamos reveals significant complexity. Much of this complexity arises from the complexity of the processes themselves. Additional complexity is induced by errors in the data entry process. It is important to note that there is no evidence that this complexity is adversely affecting the accounting in the plant. We have been analyzing transaction data from fiscal year 1983 processing. This study involved 62,595 transactions. The data have been analyzed using the relational database program INGRES on a VAX 11/780 computer. This software allows easy manipulation of the original data and subsets drawn from it. We have been attempting for several years to understand the global features of the TA-55 accounting data. This project has underscored several of the system's complexities. Examples that will be reported here include audit trails, lot-name multiplicity, etc

  20. Developments in the treatment of solid alpha-bearing wastes at the PNC plutonium fuel facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ohtsuka, K.; Miyo, H.; Ohuchi, J.; Shiga, K.; Muto, T.

    1978-01-01

    Some results of experiments done in PNC are presented on volume reduction technics for alpha-bearing wastes. A pilot wood milling machine automatically mills the plywood frames of nipple connected HEPA filters, which result in fine sized wooden chips, two nipples and the filter components. The filter components are melted in an induction furnace to be homogeneous solids. These methods and incineration of wooden chips reduce the stored volume of HEPA filters to 1/50 -- 1/100. PVC and neoprene rubber are decomposed in concentrated sulfuric acid, followed by oxidation with nitric acid. The acid digestion process generates chlorine-rich gas, from which only chlorine is selectively absorbed in water. An alpha-bearing vessel and a glovebox are cut at their installed places without spread of plutonium contamination outside the greenhouses. (auth.)

  1. Safety aspects of reprocessing and plutonium fuel facilities in power reactor and nuclear fuel development corporation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sato, S.; Akutsu, H.; Nakajima, K.; Kono, K.; Muto, T.

    1977-01-01

    PNC completed the construction of the first Japanese reprocessing plant in 1974, and the startup is now under way. The plant will have a capacity of 0.7 metric tons of spent fuel per day. Various safety measures for earthquake, radiation, criticality, fire, explosion and leakage of radioactive materials are provided in the plant. 8,000 Ci of Kr-85 and 50 Ci of H-3 per day will be released from the plant to enviroment. Skin dose is conservatively estimated to be about 30 mrem per year. Liquid waste containing 0.7 Ci per day will be discharged into the sea. Whole body dose is conservatively estimated to be 10 mrem per year. R and D for removal of Kr-85 and reducing radioactivity released into the sea are being carried out. Developmental works for solidification of radioactive liquid waste are also being conducted. Safety control in plutonium handling work for both R and D and fuel fabrication has been successfully conducted without significant abnormal occurrence in these ten years. By ''zero-contamination control policy'', surface contamination and airborne contamination in operation rooms are maintained at the background level in usual operation. The intake of plutonium was found at the maximum about one-hundredths of the MPB. External exposure has been generally controlled below three-tenths rem for three months, by shielding and mechanization of process. The radioactivity concentration of exhaust air and liquid effluent disposal is ensured far below the regulation level. Nuclear material control is maintained by a computer system, and no criticality problem has occurred. The safeguard system and installation has been improved, and is sufficient to satisfy the IAEA regulation

  2. Environmental consequences of postulate plutonium releases from Atomics International's Nuclear Materials Development Facility (NMDF), Santa Susana, California, as a result of severe natural phenomena

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jamison, J.D.; Watson, E.C.

    1982-02-01

    Potential environmental consequences in terms of radiation dose to people are presented for postulated plutonium releases caused by severe natural phenomena at the Atomics International's Nuclear Materials Development Facility (NMDF), in the Santa Susana site, California. The severe natural phenomena considered are earthquakes, tornadoes, and high straight-line winds. Plutonium deposition values are given for significant locations around the site. All important potential exposure pathways are examined. The most likely 50-year committed dose equivalents are given for the maximum-exposed individual and the population within a 50-mile radius of the plant. The maximum plutonium deposition values likely to occur offsite are also given. The most likely calculated 50-year collective committed dose equivalents are all much lower than the collective dose equivalent expected from 50 years of exposure to natural background radiation and medical x-rays. The most likely maximum residual plutonium contamination estimated to be deposited offsite following the earthquake, and the 150-mph and 170-mph tornadoes are above the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) proposed guideline for plutonium in the general environment of 0.2 μCi/m 2 . The deposition values following the 110-mph and the 130-mph tornadoes are below the EPA proposed guideline

  3. Plutonium storage criteria

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chung, D. [Scientech, Inc., Germantown, MD (United States); Ascanio, X. [Dept. of Energy, Germantown, MD (United States)

    1996-05-01

    The Department of Energy has issued a technical standard for long-term (>50 years) storage and will soon issue a criteria document for interim (<20 years) storage of plutonium materials. The long-term technical standard, {open_quotes}Criteria for Safe Storage of Plutonium Metals and Oxides,{close_quotes} addresses the requirements for storing metals and oxides with greater than 50 wt % plutonium. It calls for a standardized package that meets both off-site transportation requirements, as well as remote handling requirements from future storage facilities. The interim criteria document, {open_quotes}Criteria for Interim Safe Storage of Plutonium-Bearing Solid Materials{close_quotes}, addresses requirements for storing materials with less than 50 wt% plutonium. The interim criteria document assumes the materials will be stored on existing sites, and existing facilities and equipment will be used for repackaging to improve the margin of safety.

  4. Recent developments in the Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility Waste Tracking System-automated data collection pilot project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Martinez, B.; Montoya, A.; Klein, W.

    1999-01-01

    The waste management and environmental compliance group (NMT-7) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory has initiated a pilot project for demonstrating the feasibility and utility of automated data collection as a solution for tracking waste containers at the Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility. This project, the Los Alamos Waste Tracking System (LAWTS), tracks waste containers during their lifecycle at the facility. LAWTS is a two-tiered system consisting of a server/workstation database and reporting engine and a hand-held data terminal-based client program for collecting data directly from tracked containers. New containers may be added to the system from either the client unit or from the server database. Once containers are in the system, they can be tracked through one of three primary transactions: Move, Inventory, and Shipment. Because LAWTS is a pilot project, it also serves as a learning experience for all parties involved. This paper will discuss many of the lessons learned in implementing a data collection system in the restricted environment. Specifically, the authors will discuss issues related to working with the PPT 4640 terminal system as the data collection unit. They will discuss problems with form factor (size, usability, etc.) as well as technical problems with wireless radio frequency functions. They will also discuss complications that arose from outdoor use of the terminal (barcode scanning failures, screen readability problems). The paper will conclude with a series of recommendations for proceeding with LAWTS based on experience to date

  5. Preliminary report of the comparison of multiple non-destructive assay techniques on LANL Plutonium Facility waste drums

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bonner, C.; Schanfein, M.; Estep, R.

    1999-01-01

    Prior to disposal, nuclear waste must be accurately characterized to identify and quantify the radioactive content. The DOE Complex faces the daunting task of measuring nuclear material with both a wide range of masses and matrices. Similarly daunting can be the selection of a non-destructive assay (NDA) technique(s) to efficiently perform the quantitative assay over the entire waste population. In fulfilling its role of a DOE Defense Programs nuclear User Facility/Technology Development Center, the Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility recently tested three commercially built and owned, mobile nondestructive assay (NDA) systems with special nuclear materials (SNM). Two independent commercial companies financed the testing of their three mobile NDA systems at the site. Contained within a single trailer is Canberra Industries segmented gamma scanner/waste assay system (SGS/WAS) and neutron waste drum assay system (WDAS). The third system is a BNFL Instruments Inc. (formerly known as Pajarito Scientific Corporation) differential die-away imaging passive/active neutron (IPAN) counter. In an effort to increase the value of this comparison, additional NDA techniques at LANL were also used to measure these same drums. These are comprised of three tomographic gamma scanners (one mobile unit and two stationary) and one developmental differential die-away system. Although not certified standards, the authors hope that such a comparison will provide valuable data for those considering these different NDA techniques to measure their waste as well as the developers of the techniques

  6. EIS Data Call Report: Plutonium immobilization plant using ceramic in new facilities at the Savannah River Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DiSabatino, A.

    1998-01-01

    The Plutonium Immobilization Plant (PIP) accepts plutonium (Pu) from pit conversion and from non-pit sources and, through a ceramic immobilization process, converts the plutonium into an immobilized form that can be disposed of in a high level waste (HLW) repository. This immobilization process is shown conceptually in Figure 1-1. The objective is to make an immobilized form, suitable for geologic disposal, in which the plutonium is as inherently unattractive and inaccessible as the plutonium in spent fuel from commercial reactors. The ceramic immobilization alternative presented in this report consists of first converting the surplus material to an oxide, followed by incorporating the plutonium oxide into a titanate-based ceramic material that is placed in metal cans

  7. Plutonium fires; Incendies de plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mestre, E.

    1959-06-23

    The author reports an information survey on accidents which occurred when handling plutonium. He first addresses accidents reported in documents. He indicates the circumstances and consequences of these accidents (explosion in glove boxes, fires of plutonium chips, plutonium fire followed by filter destruction, explosion during plutonium chip dissolution followed by chip fire). He describes hazards associated with plutonium fires: atmosphere and surface contamination, criticality. The author gives some advices to avoid plutonium fires. These advices concern electric installations, the use of flammable solvents, general cautions associated with plutonium handling, venting and filtration. He finally describes how to fight plutonium fires, and measures to be taken after the fire (staff contamination control, atmosphere control)

  8. Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP); FINAL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    FRAZIER, T.P.

    1999-01-01

    A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the U. S. Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether these systems are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. To ensure the long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems, an update to this facility effluent monitoring plan is required whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document is reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and is updated, at a minimum, every 3 years

  9. Ion exchange separation of plutonium and gallium (1) resource and inventory requirements, (2) waste, emissions, and effluent, and (3) facility size

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DeMuth, S.

    1997-01-01

    The following report summarizes an effort intended to estimate within an order-of-magnitude the (1) resource and inventory requirements, (2) waste, emissions, and effluent amounts, and (3) facility size, for ion exchange (IX) separation of plutonium and gallium. This analysis is based upon processing 3.5 MT-Pu/yr. The technical basis for this summary is detailed in a separate document, open-quotes Preconceptual Design for Separation of Plutonium and Gallium by Ion Exchangeclose quotes. The material balances of this separate document are based strictly on stoichiometric amounts rather than details of actual operating experience, in order to avoid classification as Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information. This approximation neglets the thermodynamics and kinetics which can significantly impact the amount of reagents required. Consequently, the material resource requirements and waste amounts presented here would normally be considered minimums for processing 3.5 MT-Pu/yr; however, the author has compared the inventory estimates presented with that of an actual operating facility and found them similar. Additionally, the facility floor space presented here is based upon actual plutonium processing systems and can be considered a nominal estimate

  10. Plutonium storage phenomenology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Szempruch, R.

    1995-12-01

    Plutonium has been produced, handled, and stored at Department of Energy (DOE) facilities since the 1940s. Many changes have occurred during the last 40 years in the sources, production demands, and end uses of plutonium. These have resulted in corresponding changes in the isotopic composition as well as the chemical and physical forms of the processed and stored plutonium. Thousands of ordinary food pack tin cans have been used successfully for many years to handle and store plutonium. Other containers have been used with equal success. This paper addressees the exceptions to this satisfactory experience. To aid in understanding the challenges of handling plutonium for storage or immobilization the lessons learned from past storage experience and the necessary countermeasures to improve storage performance are discussed

  11. Requalification of the 235-F Metallograph Facility gloveboxes for use in the 773-A plutonium immobilization demonstration

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hinds, S.S.; Hidlay, J.

    1997-01-01

    A concern has been identified regarding the viability of redesigning and requalifying existing glovebox lines for use as glovebox lines integral to future mission activities in the 773-A laboratory building at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The Bechtel Savannah River Inc. (BSRI) design engineering team has been requested to perform an evaluation which would investigate the reuse of these existing gloveboxes versus the procurement of completely new glovebox systems. The existing glovebox lines were manufactured for the Plutonium (Pu) Metallograph Facility, Project 3253, located in building 235-F at SRS. These gloveboxes were designed as independent, fully functional Pu 'metal' and Pu 'oxide' processing glovebox systems for this facility. These gloveboxes, although fully installed, have never processed radioactive material. The proposed use for these gloveboxes are: (1) to utilize the Pu 'metal' glovebox system for the primary containment associated with the Pre-Processing/Re-Processing Laboratory for obtaining radioactive glass compound viscometer analysis and (2) to utilize the Pu 'oxide' glovebox system for primary containment associated with the Pu 'Can in Can' Demonstration for proof of principle testing specific to long term Pu immobilization and storage technology. This report presents objective evidence that supports the engineering judgment indicating the existing gloveboxes can be requalified for the proposed uses indicated above. SRS has the ability to duplicate the test parameters, with site forces, that will meet or exceed the identical acceptance criteria established to qualify the existing gloveboxes. The qualification effort will be a documented procedure using the leak test criteria characteristic of the original glovebox purchase. Two equivalent tests will be performed, one for post modification leak test acceptance and one for post installation leak test acceptance. (Abstract Truncated)

  12. Stop plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-02-01

    This press document aims to inform the public on the hazards bound to the plutonium exploitation in France and especially the plutonium transport. The first part is a technical presentation of the plutonium and the MOX (Mixed Oxide Fuel). The second part presents the installation of the plutonium industry in France. The third part is devoted to the plutonium convoys safety. The highlight is done on the problem of the leak of ''secret'' of such transports. (A.L.B.)

  13. Design of the plutonium facility for animal experiments and its management experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koizumi, Akira; Fukuda, Satoshi

    1998-01-01

    Design and radiation control of authors' facility which was made as a nuclear fuel laboratory for animal experiments were described. Before construction, the animals thought to be used were rats, mice, beagle dogs and monkeys. 239 Pu and certain other radioisotopes were to be used. At present, 200 dogs and 1800 small animals can be maintained. The points for design were tolerability against quake, reduced-pressure management and permanent storage of waste containing Pu. The facility building composed from 2nd, 4th, and 6th laboratory floors and between them, from the so-called mechanical floors which are spaces for ducts. The latter floors are quite useful. The system for reduced pressure is of 3 patterns of rooms without hood, with ordinary hood and with air-curtain hood. For animal maintenance, there are 3 types of maintenance means: Glove box, hood and ordinary animal room. There are drainage equipment where Pu can be removed by precipitation and charcoal adsorption and incineration equipment which is necessary for reducing the waste volume. In the latter, HEPA filters are finally used for releasing the gas. There is no particular problem in the radiation control. For the personnel control, lung-monitoring is performed before and at the end of personnel registration. Environmental monitoring of Pu is optionally performed. Removal of Pu particles generated in the inhalation experiments could be attained by the use of ULPA and HEPA filters to the level less than 1/10 17 times the reference level. Keeping the technology level enough high for facility maintenance and management was considered to be important at present and in future. (K.H.)

  14. Nondestructive assay system for use in decommissioning a plutonium-handling facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Roche, C.T.; Vronich, J.J.; Bellinger, F.O.; Perry, R.B.

    1979-07-01

    Argonne National Laboratory is decommissioning a facility used to fabricate reactor fuel elements. The equipment is contaminated with alpha emitters at levels up to 10 12 dpm/100 cm 2 . The objective of decontamination is to reduce the TRU concentrations below 10 nCi/g of waste. A portable NDA procedure using NaI(T1) gamma-spectrometric techniques was selected to measure the residual Pu and 241 Am in the glove boxes. Assays were performed at different stages in the decontamination process to estimate the detection system sensitivity and the effectiveness of the cleaning efforts

  15. CHARACTERIZATION OF CURRENTLY GENERATED TRANUSRANIC WASTE AT THE LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY'S PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION FACILITY

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dodge, Robert L.; Montoya, Andy M.

    2003-01-01

    By the time the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) completes its Disposal Phase in FY 2034, the Department of Energy (DOE) will have disposed of approximately 109,378 cubic meters (m3) of Transuranic (TRU) waste in WIPP (1). If DOE adheres to its 2005 Pollution Prevention Goal of generating less than 141m3/yr of TRU waste, approximately 5000 m3 (4%) of that TRU waste will be newly generated (2). Because of the overwhelming majority (96%) of TRU waste destined for disposal at WIPP is legacy waste, the characterization and certification requirements were developed to resolve those issues related to legacy waste. Like many other DOE facilities Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has a large volume (9,010m3) of legacy Transuranic Waste in storage (3). Unlike most DOE facilities LANL will generate approximately 140m3 of newly generated TRU waste each year3. LANL's certification program was established to meet the WIPP requirements for legacy waste and does not take advantage of the fundamental differences in waste knowledge between newly generated and legacy TRU waste

  16. Automation of plutonium spectrophotometry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Perez, J.J.; Boisde, G.; Goujon de Beauvivier, M.; Chevalier, G.; Isaac, M.

    1980-01-01

    Instrumentation was designed and constructed for automatic control of plutonium by molecular absorption spectrophotometry, on behalf of the reprocessing facilities, to meet two objectives: on-line measurement, of the valency state of plutonium, on by-pass, with the measured concentration covering the process concentration range up to a few mg.l -1 ; laboratory measurement of plutonium adjusted to valency VI, with operation carried out using a preparative system meeting the required containment specifications. For this two objectives, the photometer, optical cell connections are made by optical fibers resistant to β, γ radiation. Except this characteristic the devices are different according to the quality required for result [fr

  17. Plutonium Vulnerability Management Plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-03-01

    This Plutonium Vulnerability Management Plan describes the Department of Energy's response to the vulnerabilities identified in the Plutonium Working Group Report which are a result of the cessation of nuclear weapons production. The responses contained in this document are only part of an overall, coordinated approach designed to enable the Department to accelerate conversion of all nuclear materials, including plutonium, to forms suitable for safe, interim storage. The overall actions being taken are discussed in detail in the Department's Implementation Plan in response to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 94-1. This is included as Attachment B

  18. Implementing waste minimization at an active plutonium processing facility: Successes and progress at technical area (TA) -55 of the Los Alamos National Laboratory

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Balkey, J.J.; Robinson, M.A.; Boak, J.

    1997-12-01

    The Los Alamos National Laboratory has ongoing national security missions that necessitate increased plutonium processing. The bulk of this activity occurs at Technical Area -55 (TA-55), the nations only operable plutonium facility. TA-55 has developed and demonstrated a number of technologies that significantly minimize waste generation in plutonium processing (supercritical CO{sub 2}, Mg(OH){sub 2} precipitation, supercritical H{sub 2}O oxidation, WAND), disposition of excess fissile materials (hydride-dehydride, electrolytic decontamination), disposition of historical waste inventories (salt distillation), and Decontamination & Decommissioning (D&D) of closed nuclear facilities (electrolytic decontamination). Furthermore, TA-55 is in the process of developing additional waste minimization technologies (molten salt oxidation, nitric acid recycle, americium extraction) that will significantly reduce ongoing waste generation rates and allow volume reduction of existing waste streams. Cost savings from reduction in waste volumes to be managed and disposed far exceed development and deployment costs in every case. Waste minimization is also important because it reduces occupational exposure to ionizing radiation, risks of transportation accidents, and transfer of burdens from current nuclear operations to future generations.

  19. Implementing waste minimization at an active plutonium processing facility: Successes and progress at technical area (TA) -55 of the Los Alamos National Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Balkey, J.J.; Robinson, M.A.; Boak, J.

    1997-01-01

    The Los Alamos National Laboratory has ongoing national security missions that necessitate increased plutonium processing. The bulk of this activity occurs at Technical Area -55 (TA-55), the nations only operable plutonium facility. TA-55 has developed and demonstrated a number of technologies that significantly minimize waste generation in plutonium processing (supercritical CO 2 , Mg(OH) 2 precipitation, supercritical H 2 O oxidation, WAND), disposition of excess fissile materials (hydride-dehydride, electrolytic decontamination), disposition of historical waste inventories (salt distillation), and Decontamination ampersand Decommissioning (D ampersand D) of closed nuclear facilities (electrolytic decontamination). Furthermore, TA-55 is in the process of developing additional waste minimization technologies (molten salt oxidation, nitric acid recycle, americium extraction) that will significantly reduce ongoing waste generation rates and allow volume reduction of existing waste streams. Cost savings from reduction in waste volumes to be managed and disposed far exceed development and deployment costs in every case. Waste minimization is also important because it reduces occupational exposure to ionizing radiation, risks of transportation accidents, and transfer of burdens from current nuclear operations to future generations

  20. Status of plutonium recycle from mixed oxide fuel fabrication wastes (U,Pu)O2 facility activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Quesada, Calixto A.; Adelfang, Pablo; Greiner, G.; Orlando, Oscar S.; Mathot, Sergio R.

    1999-01-01

    Within the specific subject of mixed oxides corresponding to the Fuel Cycle activities performed at CNEA, the recovery of plutonium from wastes originated during tests and pre-fabrication stages is performed. (author)

  1. An alpha particle detector based on a GPS mosaic scintillator plate for continuous air monitoring in plutonium handling facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kaneko, Junichi H.; Izaki, Kenji; Toui, Kouhei; Shimaoka, Takehiro; Morishita, Yuki; Tsubota, Youichi; Higuchi, Mikio

    2016-01-01

    An alpha particle detector was developed for continuous air monitoring of radioactive contamination in working chambers at plutonium handling facilities. A 5-cm-square Gd 2 Si 2 O 7 :Ce (cerium-doped gadolinium pyro-silicate, GPS:Ce) mosaic scintillator plate for alpha particle measurements was fabricated from GPS single-crystal grains of around 550 μm diameter; the GPS grains were made of a GPS polycrystalline body grown using a top seeded solution method. The scintillator layer thickness was approximately 100 μm. The surface filling rate of the GPS grains was ca. 62%. To suppress the influence of non-uniformity of pulse heights of a photomultiplier tube, a central part of ∅ 40 mm of a 76-mm-diameter photomultiplier tube was used. In addition, 3 mm thick high-transmission glass was used as a substrate of the scintillator plate. The detector achieved energy resolution of 13% for 5.5 MeV alpha particles, detection efficiency of 61% and a radon progeny nuclide reduction ratio of 64.5%. A new alpha particle detector was developed to achieve a high radon progeny nuclide reduction ratio approaching that of a silicon semiconductor detector, with high resistance to electromagnetic noise and corrosion. - Highlights: • An alpha particle detector was developed for continuous air monitoring. • The detector comprises a mosaic scintillator plate and a photomultiplier tube. • A 5-cm-square GPS mosaic scintillator plate was fabricated. • Its respective energy resolution and detection efficiency were 13 and 61%. • The radon progeny nuclide reduction ratio of the developed detector was 64.5%.

  2. Fissile Material Disposition Program: Deep Borehole Disposal Facility PEIS data input report for direct disposal. Direct disposal of plutonium metal/plutonium dioxide in compound metal canisters. Version 3.0

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wijesinghe, A.M.; Shaffer, R.J.

    1996-01-15

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) is examining options for disposing of excess weapons-usable nuclear materials [principally plutonium (Pu) and highly enriched uranium (HEU)] in a form or condition that is substantially and inherently more difficult to recover and reuse in weapons production. This report is the data input report for the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS). The PEIS examines the environmental, safety, and health impacts of implementing each disposition alternative on land use, facility operations, and site infrastructure; air quality and noise; water, geology, and soils; biotic, cultural, and paleontological resources; socioeconomics; human health; normal operations and facility accidents; waste management; and transportation. This data report is prepared to assist in estimating the environmental effects associated with the construction and operation of a Deep Borehole Disposal Facility, an alternative currently included in the PEIS. The facility projects under consideration are, not site specific. This report therefore concentrates on environmental, safety, and health impacts at a generic site appropriate for siting a Deep Borehole Disposal Facility.

  3. Fissile Material Disposition Program: Deep Borehole Disposal Facility PEIS data input report for direct disposal. Direct disposal of plutonium metal/plutonium dioxide in compound metal canisters. Version 3.0

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wijesinghe, A.M.; Shaffer, R.J.

    1996-01-01

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) is examining options for disposing of excess weapons-usable nuclear materials [principally plutonium (Pu) and highly enriched uranium (HEU)] in a form or condition that is substantially and inherently more difficult to recover and reuse in weapons production. This report is the data input report for the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS). The PEIS examines the environmental, safety, and health impacts of implementing each disposition alternative on land use, facility operations, and site infrastructure; air quality and noise; water, geology, and soils; biotic, cultural, and paleontological resources; socioeconomics; human health; normal operations and facility accidents; waste management; and transportation. This data report is prepared to assist in estimating the environmental effects associated with the construction and operation of a Deep Borehole Disposal Facility, an alternative currently included in the PEIS. The facility projects under consideration are, not site specific. This report therefore concentrates on environmental, safety, and health impacts at a generic site appropriate for siting a Deep Borehole Disposal Facility

  4. Plutonium controversy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richmond, C.R.

    1980-01-01

    The toxicity of plutonium is discussed, particularly in relation to controversies surrounding the setting of radiation protection standards. The sources, amounts of, and exposure pathways of plutonium are given and the public risk estimated

  5. Plutonium controversy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Richmond, C.R.

    1980-01-01

    The toxicity of plutonium is discussed, particularly in relation to controversies surrounding the setting of radiation protection standards. The sources, amounts of, and exposure pathways of plutonium are given and the public risk estimated. (ACR)

  6. Atmospheric deposition, resuspension and root uptake of plutonium in corn and other grain-producing agroecosystems near a nuclear fuel facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pinder, J.E. III; McLeod, K.W.; Adriano, D.C.; Corey, J.C.; Boni, A.L.

    1989-01-01

    Plutonium released to the environment may contribute to dose to humans through inhalation or ingestion of contaminated foodstuffs. Plutonium contamination of agricultural plants may result from interception and retention of atmospheric deposition, resuspension of Pu-bearing soil particles to plant surfaces, and root uptake and translocation to grain. Plutonium on vegetation surfaces may be transferred to grain surfaces during mechanical harvesting. Data obtained from corn grown near the US Department of Energy's H-Area nuclear fuel chemical separations facility on the Savannah River Site was used to estimated parameters of a simple model of Pu transport in agroecosystems. The parameter estimates for corn were compared to those previously obtained for wheat and soybeans. Despite some differences in parameter estimates among crops, the relative importances of atmospheric deposition, resuspension and root uptake were similar among crops. For even small deposition rates, the relative importances of processes for Pu contamination of corn grain should be: transfer of atmospheric deposition from vegetation surfaces to grain surfaces during combining > resuspension of soil to grain surfaces > root uptake. Approximately 3.9 x 10 -5 of a year's atmospheric deposition is transferred to grain. Approximately 6.2 x 10 -9 of the Pu inventory in the soil is resuspended to corn grain, and a further 7.3 x 10 -10 of the soil inventory is absorbed by roots and translocated to grains

  7. Plutonium safe handling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tvehlov, Yu.

    2000-01-01

    The abstract, prepared on the basis of materials of the IAEA new leadership on the plutonium safe handling and its storage (the publication no. 9 in the Safety Reports Series), aimed at presenting internationally acknowledged criteria on the radiation danger evaluation and summarizing the experience in the safe management of great quantities of plutonium, accumulated in the nuclear states, is presented. The data on the weapon-class and civil plutonium, the degree of its danger, the measures for provision of its safety, including the data on accident radiation consequences with the fission number 10 18 , are presented. The recommendations, making it possible to eliminate the super- criticality danger, as well as ignition and explosion, to maintain the tightness of the facility, aimed at excluding the radioactive contamination and the possibility of internal irradiation, to provide for the plutonium security, physical protection and to reduce irradiation are given [ru

  8. Rough order of magnitude cost estimate for immobilization of 18.2 MT of plutonium using existing facilities at the Savannah River site: alternatives 3B/5B/6C/6D/7B/9B

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DiSabatino, A.

    1998-01-01

    The purpose of this Cost Estimate Report is to identify preliminary capital and operating costs for a facility to immobilize 18.2 metric tons (nominal) of plutonium using ceramic in an existing facility (221-F) at Savannah River Site (SRS)

  9. Accident investigation board report on the May 14, 1997, chemical explosion at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility, Hanford Site,Richland, Washington - final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gerton, R.E.

    1997-01-01

    On May 14, 1997, at 7:53 p.m. (PDT), a chemical explosion occur-red in Tank A- 109 in Room 40 of the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (Facility) located in the 200 West Area of the Hanford Site, approximately 30 miles north of Richland, Washington. The inactive processing Facility is part of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). On May 16, 1997, Lloyd L. Piper, Deputy Manager, acting for John D. Wagoner, Manager, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Richland Operations Office (RL), formally established an Accident Investigation Board (Board) to investigate the explosion in accordance with DOE Order 225. 1, Accident Investigations. The Board commenced its investigation on May 15, 1997, completed the investigation on July 2, 1997, and submitted its findings to the RL Manager on July 26, 1997. The scope of the Board's investigation was to review and analyze the circumstances of the events that led to the explosion; to analyze facts and to determine the causes of the accident; and to develop conclusions and judgments of need that may help prevent a recurrence of the accident. The scope also included the application of lessons learned from similar accidents within DOE. In addition to this detailed report, a companion document has also been prepared that provides a concise summary of the facts and conclusions of this report, with an emphasis on management issues (DOE/RL-97-63)

  10. Addressing mixed waste in plutonium processing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Christensen, D.C.; Sohn, C.L.; Reid, R.A.

    1991-01-01

    The overall goal is the minimization of all waste generated in actinide processing facilities. Current emphasis is directed toward reducing and managing mixed waste in plutonium processing facilities. More specifically, the focus is on prioritizing plutonium processing technologies for development that will address major problems in mixed waste management. A five step methodological approach to identify, analyze, solve, and initiate corrective action for mixed waste problems in plutonium processing facilities has been developed

  11. Report on the control of the safety and security of nuclear facilities. Part 2: the reconversion of military plutonium stocks. The use of the helps given to central and eastern Europe countries and to the new independent states

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Birraux, C.

    2002-01-01

    This report deals with two different aspects of the safety and security of nuclear facilities. The first aspect concerns the reconversion of weapon grade plutonium stocks: the plutonium in excess, plutonium hazards and nuclear fuel potentialities, the US program, the Russian program, the actions of European countries (France, Germany), the intervention of other countries, the unanswered questions (political aspects, uncertainties), the solutions of the future (improvement of reactors, the helium-cooled high temperature reactor technology (gas-turbine modular helium reactor: GT-MHR), the Carlo Rubbia's project). The second aspect concerns the actions carried out by the European Union in favor of the civil nuclear facilities of central and eastern Europe: the European Union competencies through the Euratom treaty, the conclusions of the European audit office about the PHARE and TACIS nuclear programs, the status of committed actions, the coming planned actions, and the critical analysis of the policy adopted so far. (J.S.)

  12. Benchmark calculations for critical experiments at FKBN-M facility with uranium-plutonium-polyethylene systems using JENDL-3.2 and MVP Monte-Carlo code

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Obara, Toru; Morozov, A.G.; Kevrolev, V.V.; Kuznetsov, V.V.; Treschalin, S.A.; Lukin, A.V.; Terekhin, V.A.; Sokolov, Yu.A.; Kravchenko, V.G.

    2000-01-01

    Benchmark calculations were performed for critical experiments at FKBN-M facility in RFNC-VNIITF, Russia using JENDL-3.2 nuclear data library and continuous energy Monte-Carlo code MVP. The fissile materials were high-enriched uranium and plutonium. Polyethylene was used as moderator. The neutron spectrum was changed by changing the geometry. Calculation results by MVP showed some errors. Discussion was made by reaction rates and η values obtained by MVP. It showed the possibility that cross sections of U-235 had different trend of error in fast and thermal energy region respectively. It also showed the possibility of some error of cross section of Pu-239 in high energy region. (author)

  13. Accident investigation board report on the May 14, 1997, chemical explosion at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility, Hanford Site,Richland, Washington - summary report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gerton, R.E.

    1997-01-01

    This report is a summary of the Accident Investigation Board Report on the May 14, 1997, Chemical Explosion at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility, Hanford Site, Richland, Washington (DOE/RL-97-59). The referenced report provides a greater level of detail and includes a complete discussion of the facts identified, analysis of those facts, conclusions derived from the analysis, identification of the accident's causal factors, and recommendations that should be addressed through follow-up action by the U.S. Department of Energy and its contractors. This companion document provides a concise summary of that report, with emphasis on management issues. Evaluation of emergency and occupational health response to, and radiological and chemical releases from, this accident was not within the scope of this investigation, but is the subject of a separate investigation and report (see DOE/RL-97-62)

  14. Plutonium controversy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gofman, J.W.

    1976-01-01

    If the world chooses to seek a solution to the energy dilemma through nuclear energy, the element plutonium will become an article of commerce to be handled in quantities of thousands of tonnes annually. Plutonium is a uniquely potent inhalation carcinogen, the potential induction of lung cancer dwarfing other possible toxic effects. For reasons to be presented here, it is the author's opinion that plutonium's carcinogenicity has been very seriously underestimated. If one couples the corrected carcinogenicity with the probable degree of industrial containment of the plutonium, it appears that the commercialization of a plutonium-based energy economy is not an acceptable option for society. Sagan's statement that ''the experience of 30 years supports the contention that plutonium can be used safely'' is manifestly indefensible. No meaningful epidemiological study of plutonium-exposed workers for that 30-year period has ever been done. Since thousands of those possibly exposed have left the industry and are not even available to follow-up, it is doubtful that any meaningful study of ''the experience of 30 years'' will ever be accomplished

  15. Plutonium solubilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Puigdomnech, I.; Bruno, J.

    1991-02-01

    Thermochemical data has been selected for plutonium oxide, hydroxide, carbonate and phosphate equilibria. Equilibrium constants have been evaluated in the temperature range 0 to 300 degrees C at a pressure of 1 bar to T≤100 degrees C and at the steam saturated pressure at higher temperatures. Measured solubilities of plutonium that are reported in the literature for laboratory experiments have been collected. Solubility data on oxides, hydroxides, carbonates and phosphates have been selected. No solubility data were found at temperatures higher than 60 degrees C. The literature solubility data have been compared with plutonium solubilities calculated with the EQ3/6 geochemical modelling programs, using the selected thermodynamic data for plutonium. (authors)

  16. Safe handling of plutonium: a panel report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1974-01-01

    This guide results from a meeting of a Panel of Experts held by the International Atomic Energy Agency on 8 to 12 November 1971. It is directed to workers in research laboratories handling plutonium in gram amounts. Contents: aspects of the physical and chemical properties of plutonium; metabolic features of plutonium; facility design features for safe handling of plutonium (layout of facility, working zones, decontamination room, etc.); glove boxes; health surveillance (surveillance of environment and supervision of workers); emergencies; organization. Annexes: types of glove boxes; tables; mobile ..cap alpha.. air sampler; aerosol monitor; bio-assay limits of detection; examples of contamination control monitors.

  17. Post-remedial-action radiological survey report for the Plutonium Facility of the Battelle Memorial Institute, Columbus Division, West Jefferson Complex, West Jefferson, Ohio, April 1980-June 1982

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Flynn, K.F.; Justus, A.L.; Sholeen, C.M.; Smith, W.H.; Wynveen, R.A.

    1987-01-01

    The post-remedial-action surveys involved only the remaining, newer segment of the original Plutonium Facility and those outdoor environs at the former location of the buried autoclave and old holding tanks. The assessment activities conducted during the three surveys included determination of surface contamination levels, both fixed and removable, through direct instrument and smear surveys; measurement of ambient external penetrating radiation levels at 1-meter heights throughout the involved areas; measurement of the concentrations of radon, thoron, and actinon daughters and longer-lived radionuclides within air samples; and determination of concentrations of uranium, plutonium, americium, neptunium, the thorium-232 decay chain, and the radium-226 decay chain in soil and other material samples from the involved areas. The direct instrument and smear surveys were performed on all accessible floor, wall, and overhead surfaces and ductwork in the laboratory and corridor areas, mechanical room, and men's locker room, where the false ceiling, formerly at the 12-ft level, had been removed. In the office areas, the accessible floors, walls, and overheads were surveyed to the height of the existing 8-ft false ceiling. Although the office areas were adjacent to, not part of, the affected areas, it was possible that radioactive materials could have been carried by the ventilation system, spilled, or otherwise tracked into these adjacent areas. In some building areas, surfaces might hae been retiled, painted, or otherwise covered since the beginning of use of radioactive materials; however, the instruments used for the direct survey had some capability to detect beta-gamma activity on the underlying surfaces. 5 refs., 8 figs., 8 tabs

  18. Report on the emergency response to the event on May 14, 1997, at the plutonium reclamation facility, Hanford Site, Richland,Washington

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shoop, D.S.

    1997-01-01

    On the evening of May 14,1997, a chemical explosion Occurred at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF) in the 200 West Area(200-W) of the Hanford Site. The event warranted the declaration of an Alert emergency, activation of the Hanford Emergency Response Organization (BRO), and notification of offsite agencies. As a result of the emergency declaration, a subsequent evaluation was conducted to assess: 9 the performance of the emergency response organization o the occupational health response related to emergency activities o event notifications to offsite and environmental agencies. Additionally, the evaluation was designed to: 9 document the chronology of emergency and occupational health responses and environmental notifications connected with the explosion at the facility 0 assess the adequacy of the Hanford Site emergency preparedness activities; response readiness; and emergency management actions, occupational health, and environmental actions 0 provide an analysis of the causes of the deficiencies and weaknesses in the preparedness and response system that have been identified in the evaluation of the response a assign organizational responsibility to correct deficiencies and weaknesses a improve future performance 0 adjust elements of emergency implementing procedures and emergency preparedness activities

  19. Plutonium inventories for stabilization and stabilized materials

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Williams, A.K.

    1996-05-01

    The objective of the breakout session was to identify characteristics of materials containing plutonium, the need to stabilize these materials for storage, and plans to accomplish the stabilization activities. All current stabilization activities are driven by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 94-1 (May 26, 1994) and by the recently completed Plutonium ES&H Vulnerability Assessment (DOE-EH-0415). The Implementation Plan for accomplishing stabilization of plutonium-bearing residues in response to the Recommendation and the Assessment was published by DOE on February 28, 1995. This Implementation Plan (IP) commits to stabilizing problem materials within 3 years, and stabilizing all other materials within 8 years. The IP identifies approximately 20 metric tons of plutonium requiring stabilization and/or repackaging. A further breakdown shows this material to consist of 8.5 metric tons of plutonium metal and alloys, 5.5 metric tons of plutonium as oxide, and 6 metric tons of plutonium as residues. Stabilization of the metal and oxide categories containing greater than 50 weight percent plutonium is covered by DOE Standard {open_quotes}Criteria for Safe Storage of Plutonium Metals and Oxides{close_quotes} December, 1994 (DOE-STD-3013-94). This standard establishes criteria for safe storage of stabilized plutonium metals and oxides for up to 50 years. Each of the DOE sites and contractors with large plutonium inventories has either started or is preparing to start stabilization activities to meet these criteria.

  20. Surplus plutonium disposition draft environmental impact statement. Volume 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-07-01

    On May 22, 1997, DOE published a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the Federal Register (62 Federal Register 28009) announcing its decision to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) that would tier from the analysis and decisions reached in connection with the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic EIS (Storage and Disposition PEIS). DOE's disposition strategy allows for both the immobilization of surplus plutonium and its use as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in existing domestic, commercial reactors. The disposition of surplus plutonium would also involve disposal of the immobilized plutonium and MOX fuel (as spent nuclear fuel) in a geologic repository. The Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement analyzes alternatives that would use the immobilization approach (for some of the surplus plutonium) and the MOX fuel approach (for some of the surplus plutonium); alternatives that would immobilize all of the surplus plutonium; and the No Action Alternative. The alternatives include three disposition facilities that would be designed so that they could collectively accomplish disposition of up to 50 metric tons (55 tons) of surplus plutonium over their operating lives: (1) the pit disassembly and conversion facility would disassemble pits (a weapons component) and convert the recovered plutonium, as well as plutonium metal from other sources, into plutonium dioxide suitable for disposition; (2) the immobilization facility would include a collocated capability for converting nonpit plutonium materials into plutonium dioxide suitable for immobilization and would be located at either Hanford or SRS. DOE has identified SRS as the preferred site for an immobilization facility; (3) the MOX fuel fabrication facility would fabricate plutonium dioxide into MOX fuel. Volume 2 contains the appendices to the report and describe the following: Federal Register notices; contractor nondisclosure statement; adjunct melter

  1. Methods for developing seismic and extreme wind-hazard models for evaluating critical structures and equipment at US Department of Energy facilities and commercial plutonium facilities in the United States

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coats, D.W.; Murray, R.C.; Bernreuter, D.L.

    1981-01-01

    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is developing seismic and wind hazard models for the US Department of Energy (DOE). The work is part of a three-phase effort to establish building design criteria developed with a uniform methodology for seismic and wind hazards at the various DOE sites throughout the United States. In Phase 1, LLNL gathered information on the sites and their critical facilities, including nuclear reactors, fuel-reprocessing plants, high-level waste storage and treatment facilities, and special nuclear material facilities. Phase 2 - development of seismic and wind hazard models - is discussed in this paper, which summarizes the methodologies used by seismic and extreme-wind experts and gives sample hazard curves for the first sites to be modeled. These hazard models express the annual probability that the site will experience an earthquake (or windspeed) greater than some specified magnitude. In the final phase, the DOE will use the hazards models and LLNL-recommended uniform design criteria to evaluate critical facilities. The methodology presented in this paper also was used for a related LLNL study - involving the seismic assessment of six commercial plutonium fabrication plants licensed by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Details and results of this reassessment are documented in reference

  2. Plutonium Disposition by Immobilization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gould, T.; DiSabatino, A.; Mitchell, M.

    2000-01-01

    The ultimate goal of the Department of Energy (DOE) Immobilization Project is to develop, construct, and operate facilities that will immobilize between 17 to 50 tonnes (MT) of U.S. surplus weapons-usable plutonium materials in waste forms that meet the ''spent fuel'' standard and are acceptable for disposal in a geologic repository. Using the ceramic can-in-canister technology selected for immobilization, surplus plutonium materials will be chemically combined into ceramic forms which will be encapsulated within large canisters of high level waste (HLW) glass. Deployment of the immobilization capability should occur by 2008 and be completed within 10 years. In support of this goal, the DOE Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (MD) is conducting development and testing (D and T) activities at four DOE laboratories under the technical leadership of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The Savannah River Site has been selected as the site for the planned Plutonium Immobilization Plant (PIP). The D and T effort, now in its third year, will establish the technical bases for the design, construction, and operation of the U. S. capability to immobilize surplus plutonium in a suitable and cost-effective manner. Based on the D and T effort and on the development of a conceptual design of the PIP, automation is expected to play a key role in the design and operation of the Immobilization Plant. Automation and remote handling are needed to achieve required dose reduction and to enhance operational efficiency

  3. Plutonium Disposition Now exclamation point

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Buckner, M.R.

    1995-01-01

    A means for use of existing processing facilities and reactors for plutonium disposition is described which requires a minimum capital investment and allows rapid implementation. The scenario includes interim storage and processing under IAEA control, and fabrication into MOX fuel in existing or planned facilities in Europe for use in operating reactors in the two home countries. Conceptual studies indicate that existing Westinghouse four-loop designs can safety dispose of 0.94 MT of plutonium per calendar year. Thus, it would be possible to consume the expected US excess stockpile of about 50 MT in two to three units of this type, and it is highly likely that a comparable amount of the FSU excess plutonium could be deposed of in a few VVER-1000's. The only major capital project for this mode of plutonium disposition would be the weapons-grade plutonium processing which could be done in a dedicated international facility or using existing facilities in the US and FSU under IAEA control. This option offers the potential for quick implementation at a very low cost to the governments of the two countries

  4. Technological alternatives for plutonium transport

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-12-01

    This paper considers alternative transport modes (air, sea, road, rail) for moving (1) plutonium from a reprocessing plant to a store or a fuel fabrication facility, and (2) MOX fuel from the latter to a reactor. These transport modes and differing forms of plutonium are considered in terms of: their proliferation resistance and safeguards; environmental and safety aspects; and economic aspects. It is tentatively proposed that the transport of plutonium could continue by air or sea where long distances are involved and by road or rail over shorter distances; this would be acceptable from the non-proliferation, environmental impact and economic aspects - there may be advantages in protection if plutonium is transported in the form of mixed oxide

  5. CONVERSION OF PLUTONIUM TRIFLUORIDE TO PLUTONIUM TETRAFLUORIDE

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fried, S.; Davidson, N.R.

    1957-09-10

    A large proportion of the trifluoride of plutonium can be converted, in the absence of hydrogen fluoride, to the tetrafiuoride of plutonium. This is done by heating plutonium trifluoride with oxygen at temperatures between 250 and 900 deg C. The trifiuoride of plutonium reacts with oxygen to form plutonium tetrafluoride and plutonium oxide, in a ratio of about 3 to 1. In the presence of moisture, plutonium tetrafluoride tends to hydrolyze at elevated temperatures and therefore it is desirable to have the process take place under anhydrous conditions.

  6. Plutonium (Pu)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    This pedagogical document presents the properties and uses of plutonium: where does it come from, the history of its discovery, its uses and energy content, its recycling and reuse in MOX fuels, its half-life, toxicity and presence in the environment. (J.S.)

  7. Integrated five station nondestructive assay system for the support of decontamination and decommissioning of a former plutonium mixed oxide fuel fabrication facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Caldwell, J.T.; Bieri, J.M.; Hastings, R.D.; Horton, W.S.; Kuckertz, T.H.; Kunz, W.E.; Plettenberg, K.; Smith, L.D.

    1990-01-01

    The goal of a safe, efficient and economic decontamination and decommissioning of plutonium facilities can be greatly enhanced through the intelligent use of an integrated system of nondestructive assay equipment. We have designed and fabricated such a system utilizing five separate NDA stations integrated through a single data acquisition and management personal computer-based controller. The initial station utilizes a passive neutron measurement to determine item Pu inventory to the 0.1 gm level prior to insertion into the decontamination cell. A large active neutron station integrated into the cell is used to measure decontamination effectiveness at the 10 nci/gm level. Cell Pu buildup at critical points is monitored with passive neutron detectors. An active neutron station having better than 1 mg Pu assay sensitivity is used to quantify final compacted waste pucks outside the cell. Bulk Pu in various forms and isotopic enrichments is quantified in a combined passive neutron coincidence and high resolution gamma ray spectrometer station outside the cell. Item control and Pu inventory are managed with bar code labeling and a station integrating algorithm. Overall economy is achieved by multiple station use of the same expensive hardware such as the neutron generator

  8. International plutonium policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-12-01

    The need to distinguish between diversion by sub-national groups and by governments is clearly stated. The paper identifies the international safeguards measures which already exist for the handling of plutonium. It proposes that the implementation of Article XII A5 of the IAEA statute concerning the international storage of plutonium could be an important additional measure. The paper also mentions the concept of using confinement as a complimentary safeguards measure and identifies the PIPEX concept. In addition, greater use is proposed of containment and surveillance procedures. The multiplication of small reprocessing plants spread over many countries is perceived as a proliferation risk. Other means such as co-location of reprocessing and fuel fabrication facilities are relevant to diversion by sub-national groups

  9. Plutonium Equivalent Inventory for Belowground Radioactive Waste at the Los Alamos National Laboratory Technical Area 54, Area G Disposal Facility - Fiscal Year 2011

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    French, Sean B.; Shuman, Robert

    2012-01-01

    The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) generates radioactive waste as a result of various activities. Many aspects of the management of this waste are conducted at Technical Area 54 (TA-54); Area G plays a key role in these management activities as the Laboratory's only disposal facility for low-level radioactive waste (LLW). Furthermore, Area G serves as a staging area for transuranic (TRU) waste that will be shipped to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant for disposal. A portion of this TRU waste is retrievably stored in pits, trenches, and shafts. The radioactive waste disposed of or stored at Area G poses potential short- and long-term risks to workers at the disposal facility and to members of the public. These risks are directly proportional to the radionuclide inventories in the waste. The Area G performance assessment and composite analysis (LANL, 2008a) project long-term risks to members of the public; short-term risks to workers and members of the public, such as those posed by accidents, are addressed by the Area G Documented Safety Analysis (LANL, 2011a). The Documented Safety Analysis uses an inventory expressed in terms of plutonium-equivalent curies, referred to as the PE-Ci inventory, to estimate these risks. The Technical Safety Requirements for Technical Area 54, Area G (LANL, 2011b) establishes a belowground radioactive material limit that ensures the cumulative projected inventory authorized for the Area G site is not exceeded. The total belowground radioactive waste inventory limit established for Area G is 110,000 PE-Ci. The PE-Ci inventory is updated annually; this report presents the inventory prepared for 2011. The approach used to estimate the inventory is described in Section 2. The results of the analysis are presented in Section 3.

  10. Learning more about plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    This document offers chemical, metallurgical and economical information on the plutonium, a hard white radioelement. It deals also on the plutonium formation in the earth, the plutonium use in the nuclear industry, the plutonium in the environment and the plutonium toxicity. (A.L.B.)

  11. Plutonium in nature

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Madic, C.

    1994-01-01

    Plutonium in nature comes from natural sources and anthropogenic ones. Plutonium at the earth surface comes principally from anthropogenic sources. It is easily detectable in environment. The plutonium behaviour in environment is complex. It seems necessary for the future to reduce releases in environment, to improve predictive models of plutonium behaviour in geosphere, to precise biological impact of anthropogenic plutonium releases

  12. Provision of NDA instrumentation for the control of operations on plutonium finishing and waste plants at the Sellafield nuclear fuel reprocessing facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitehouse, K.R.; Orr, C.H.

    1995-01-01

    On BNFL's Sellafield site a significant number of major plants are involved in the handling, processing and storage of plutonium in various forms including nitrate, oxide and mixed oxide (MOX). Other plants in operation or under construction treat and prepare for storage, plutonium bearing wastes in the form of plutonium contaminated materials -- PCM (transuranic waste -- TRU) or low level waste. Concurrently, a number of old plutonium handling plants are being decommissioned. The safety and cost effectiveness of these widely varying operations has been ensured by the development and installation of a wide range of special radiometric instrumentation. These systems based on a range of neutron counting and high resolution gamma spectrometric techniques -- singly or in combination -- enable BNFL to maintain a detailed and comprehensive picture of the disposition of plutonium within each plant and across the site. This paper describes an overview of the range of plant and paper prove waste measurement systems in this context, highlighting the specific roles of the Plutonium Inventory Measurement System (PIMS) for real time accountancy and the Decommissioning In-Situ Plutonium Inventory Monitor (DISPIM) for material control during decommissioning

  13. Preventing pollution from plutonium processing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1993-01-01

    The plutonium processing facility at Los Alamos has adopted the strategic goal of becoming a facility that processes plutonium in a way that produces only environmentally benign waste streams. Pollution prevention through source reduction and environmentally sound recycling are being pursued. General approaches to waste reductions are administrative controls, modification of process technologies, and additional waste polishing. Recycling of waste materials, such as spent acids and salts, are technical possibilities and are being pursued to accomplish additional waste reduction. Liquid waste stream polishing to remove final traces of plutonium and hazardous chemical constituents is accomplished through (a) process modifications, (b) use of alternative chemicals and sorbents for residue removal, (c) acid recycling, and (d) judicious use of a variety of waste polishing technologies. Technologies that show promise in waste minimization and pollution prevention are identified. Working toward this goal of pollution prevention is a worthwhile endeavor, not only for Los Alamos, but for the Nuclear Complex of the future

  14. Preventing pollution from plutonium processing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1995-01-01

    The plutonium processing facility at Los Alamos has adopted the strategic goal of becoming a facility that processes plutonium in a way that produces only environmentally benign waste streams. Pollution prevention through source reduction and environmentally sound recycling are being pursued. General approaches to waste reductions are administrative controls, modification of process technologies, and additional waste polishing. Recycling of waste materials, such as spent acids and salts, are technical possibilities and are being pursued to accomplish additional waste reduction. Liquid waste stream polishing to remove final traces of plutonium and hazardous chemical constituents is accomplished through process modifications, use of alternative chemicals and sorbents for residue removal, acid recycling, and judicious use of a variety of waste polishing technologies. Technologies that show promise in waste minimization and pollution prevention are identified. Working toward this goal of pollution prevention is a worthwhile endeavor , not only for Los Alamos, but for the Nuclear Complex of the future. (author) 12 refs.; 2 figs

  15. Safeguarding the Plutonium Fuel Cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, S.J.; Lockwood, D.

    2013-01-01

    In developing a Safeguards Approach for a plutonium process facility, two general diversion and misuse scenarios must be addressed: 1) Unreported batches of undeclared nuclear material being processed through the plant and bypassing the accountancy measurement points, and 2) The operator removing plutonium at a rate that cannot be detected with confidence due to measurement uncertainties. This paper will look at the implementation of international safeguards at plutonium fuel cycle facilities in light of past lessons learned and current safeguards approaches. It will then discuss technical areas which are currently being addressed as future tools to improve on the efficiency of safeguards implementation, while maintaining its effectiveness. The discussion of new improvements will include: safeguards by design (SBD), process monitoring (PM), measurement and monitoring equipment, and data management. The paper is illustrated with the implementation of international safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant in Japan and its accountancy structure is detailed. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  16. TECHNICAL BASIS FOR DOE STANDARD 3013 EQUIVALENCY SUPPORTING REDUCED TEMPERATURE STABILIZATION OF OXALATE-DERIVED PLUTONIUM OXIDE PRODUCED BY THE HB-LINE FACILITY AT SAVANNAH RIVER SITE

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Duffey, J.; Livingston, R.; Berg, J.; Veirs, D.

    2012-07-02

    The HB-Line (HBL) facility at the Savannah River Site (SRS) is designed to produce high-purity plutonium dioxide (PuO{sub 2}) which is suitable for future use in production of Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel. The MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) requires PuO{sub 2} feed to be packaged per the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Standard 3013 (DOE-STD-3013) to comply with the facility's safety basis. The stabilization conditions imposed by DOE-STD-3013 for PuO{sub 2} (i.e., 950 C for 2 hours) preclude use of the HBL PuO{sub 2} in direct fuel fabrication and reduce the value of the HBL product as MFFF feedstock. Consequently, HBL initiated a technical evaluation to define acceptable operating conditions for production of high-purity PuO{sub 2} that fulfills the DOE-STD-3013 criteria for safe storage. The purpose of this document is to demonstrate that within the defined operating conditions, the HBL process will be equivalent for meeting the requirements of the DOE-STD-3013 stabilization process for plutonium-bearing materials from the DOE complex. The proposed 3013 equivalency reduces the prescribed stabilization temperature for high-purity PuO{sub 2} from oxalate precipitation processes from 950 C to 640 C and places a limit of 60% on the relative humidity (RH) at the lowest material temperature. The equivalency is limited to material produced using the HBL established flow sheet, for example, nitric acid anion exchange and Pu(IV) direct strike oxalate precipitation with stabilization at a minimum temperature of 640 C for four hours (h). The product purity must meet the MFFF acceptance criteria of 23,600 {micro}g/g Pu (i.e., 2.1 wt %) total impurities and chloride content less than 250 {micro}g/g of Pu. All other stabilization and packaging criteria identified by DOE-STD-3013-2012 or earlier revisions of the standard apply. Based on the evaluation of test data discussed in this document, the expert judgment of the authors supports packaging the HBL product under a 3013

  17. Plutonium finishing plant dangerous waste training plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ENTROP, G.E.

    1999-01-01

    This training plan describes general requirements, worker categories, and provides course descriptions for operation of the Plutonium Finish Plant (PFP) waste generation facilities, permitted treatment, storage and disposal (TSD) units, and the 90-Day Accumulation Areas

  18. Plutonium uniqueness

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silver, G.L.

    1984-01-01

    A standard is suggested against which the putative uniqueness of plutonium may be tested. It is common folklore that plutonium is unique among the chemical elements because its four common oxidation states can coexist in the same solution. Whether this putative uniqueness appears only during transit to equilibrium, or only at equilibrium, or all of the time, is not generally made clear. But while the folklore may contain some truth, it cannot be put to test until some measure of 'uniqueness' is agreed upon so that quantitative comparisons are possible. One way of measuring uniqueness is as the magnitude of the product of the mole fractions of the element at equilibrium. A 'coexistence index' is defined and discussed. (author)

  19. Plutonium story

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seaborg, G.T.

    1981-09-01

    The first nuclear synthesis and identification (i.e., the discovery) of the synthetic transuranium element plutonium (isotope 238 Pu) and the demonstration of its fissionability with slow neutrons (isotope 239 Pu) took place at the University of California, Berkeley, through the use of the 60-inch and 37-inch cyclotrons, in late 1940 and early 1941. This led to the development of industrial scale methods in secret work centered at the University of Chicago's Metallurgical Laboratory and the application of these methods to industrial scale production, at manufacturing plants in Tennessee and Washington, during the World War II years 1942 to 1945. The chemical properties of plutonium, needed to devise the procedures for its industrial scale production, were studied by tracer and ultramicrochemical methods during this period on an extraordinarily urgent basis. This work, and subsequent investigations on a worldwide basis, have made the properties of plutonium very well known. Its well studied electronic structure and chemical properties give it a very interesting position in the actinide series of inner transition elements

  20. Report on the control of the safety and security of nuclear facilities. Part 2: the reconversion of military plutonium stocks. The use of the helps given to central and eastern Europe countries and to the new independent states; Rapport sur le controle de la surete et de la securite des installations nucleaires. Deuxieme partie: la reconversion des stocks de plutonium militaire. L'utilisation des aides accordees aux pays d'Europe centrale et orientale et aux nouveaux etats independants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Birraux, C

    2002-07-01

    This report deals with two different aspects of the safety and security of nuclear facilities. The first aspect concerns the reconversion of weapon grade plutonium stocks: the plutonium in excess, plutonium hazards and nuclear fuel potentialities, the US program, the Russian program, the actions of European countries (France, Germany), the intervention of other countries, the unanswered questions (political aspects, uncertainties), the solutions of the future (improvement of reactors, the helium-cooled high temperature reactor technology (gas-turbine modular helium reactor: GT-MHR), the Carlo Rubbia's project). The second aspect concerns the actions carried out by the European Union in favor of the civil nuclear facilities of central and eastern Europe: the European Union competencies through the Euratom treaty, the conclusions of the European audit office about the PHARE and TACIS nuclear programs, the status of committed actions, the coming planned actions, and the critical analysis of the policy adopted so far. (J.S.)

  1. Report on the control of the safety and security of nuclear facilities. Part 2: the reconversion of military plutonium stocks. The use of the helps given to central and eastern Europe countries and to the new independent states; Rapport sur le controle de la surete et de la securite des installations nucleaires. Deuxieme partie: la reconversion des stocks de plutonium militaire. L'utilisation des aides accordees aux pays d'Europe centrale et orientale et aux nouveaux etats independants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Birraux, C

    2002-07-01

    This report deals with two different aspects of the safety and security of nuclear facilities. The first aspect concerns the reconversion of weapon grade plutonium stocks: the plutonium in excess, plutonium hazards and nuclear fuel potentialities, the US program, the Russian program, the actions of European countries (France, Germany), the intervention of other countries, the unanswered questions (political aspects, uncertainties), the solutions of the future (improvement of reactors, the helium-cooled high temperature reactor technology (gas-turbine modular helium reactor: GT-MHR), the Carlo Rubbia's project). The second aspect concerns the actions carried out by the European Union in favor of the civil nuclear facilities of central and eastern Europe: the European Union competencies through the Euratom treaty, the conclusions of the European audit office about the PHARE and TACIS nuclear programs, the status of committed actions, the coming planned actions, and the critical analysis of the policy adopted so far. (J.S.)

  2. Plutonium Immobilization Can Loading Conceptual Design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kriikku, E.

    1999-01-01

    'The Plutonium Immobilization Facility will encapsulate plutonium in ceramic pucks and seal the pucks inside welded cans. Remote equipment will place these cans in magazines and the magazines in a Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) canister. The DWPF will fill the canister with glass for permanent storage. This report discusses the Plutonium Immobilization can loading conceptual design and includes a process block diagram, process description, preliminary equipment specifications, and several can loading issues. This report identifies loading pucks into cans and backfilling cans with helium as the top priority can loading development areas.'

  3. Plutonium Immobilization Can Loading Conceptual Design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kriikku, E.

    1999-05-13

    'The Plutonium Immobilization Facility will encapsulate plutonium in ceramic pucks and seal the pucks inside welded cans. Remote equipment will place these cans in magazines and the magazines in a Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) canister. The DWPF will fill the canister with glass for permanent storage. This report discusses the Plutonium Immobilization can loading conceptual design and includes a process block diagram, process description, preliminary equipment specifications, and several can loading issues. This report identifies loading pucks into cans and backfilling cans with helium as the top priority can loading development areas.'

  4. Surplus plutonium disposition draft environmental impact statement. Summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-07-01

    On May 22, 1997, DOE published a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the Federal Register (62 Federal Register 28009) announcing its decision to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) that would tier from the analysis and decisions reached in connection with the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic EIS (Storage and Disposition PEIS). DOE's disposition strategy allows for both the immobilization of surplus plutonium and its use as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in existing domestic, commercial reactors. The disposition of surplus plutonium would also involve disposal of the immobilized plutonium and MOX fuel (as spent nuclear fuel) in a geologic repository. The Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement analyzes alternatives that would use the immobilization approach (for some of the surplus plutonium) and the MOX fuel approach (for some of the surplus plutonium); alternatives that would immobilize all of the surplus plutonium; and the No Action Alternative. The alternatives include three disposition facilities that would be designed so that they could collectively accomplish disposition of up to 50 metric tons (55 tons) of surplus plutonium over their operating lives: (1) the pit disassembly and conversion facility would disassemble pits (a weapons component) and convert the recovered plutonium, as well as plutonium metal from other sources, into plutonium dioxide suitable for disposition; (2) the immobilization facility would include a collocated capability for converting nonpit plutonium materials into plutonium dioxide suitable for immobilization and would be located at either Hanford or SRS. DOE has identified SRS as the preferred site for an immobilization facility; (3) the MOX fuel fabrication facility would fabricate plutonium dioxide into MOX fuel

  5. Cost Estimating for Decommissioning of a Plutonium Facility--Lessons Learned From The Rocky Flats Building 771 Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stevens, J. L.; Titus, R.; Sanford, P. C.

    2002-01-01

    The Rocky Flats Closure Site is implementing an aggressive approach in an attempt to complete Site closure by 2006. The replanning effort to meet this goal required that the life-cycle decommissioning effort for the Site and for the major individual facilities be reexamined in detail. As part of the overall effort, the cost estimate for the Building 771 decommissioning project was revised to incorporate both actual cost data from a recently-completed similar project and detailed planning for all activities. This paper provides a brief overview of the replanning process and the original estimate, and then discusses the modifications to that estimate to reflect new data, methods, and planning rigor. It provides the new work breakdown structure and discusses the reasons for the final arrangement chosen. It follows with the process used to assign scope, cost, and schedule elements within the new structure, and development of the new code of accounts. Finally, it describes the project control methodology used to track the project, and provides lessons learned on cost tracking in the decommissioning environment

  6. Assessment of the measurement control program for solution assay instruments at the Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldman, A.S.

    1985-05-01

    This report documents and reviews the measurement control program (MCP) over a 27-month period for four solution assay instruments (SAIs) Facility. SAI measurement data collected during the period January 1982 through March 1984 were analyzed. The sources of these data included computer listings of measurements emanating from operator entries on computer terminals, logbook entries of measurements transcribed by operators, and computer listings of measurements recorded internally in the instruments. Data were also obtained from control charts that are available as part of the MCP. As a result of our analyses we observed agreement between propagated and historical variances and concluded instruments were functioning properly from a precision aspect. We noticed small, persistent biases indicating slight instrument inaccuracies. We suggest that statistical tests for bias be incorporated in the MCP on a monthly basis and if the instrument bias is significantly greater than zero, the instrument should undergo maintenance. We propose the weekly precision test be replaced by a daily test to provide more timely detection of possible problems. We observed that one instrument showed a trend of increasing bias during the past six months and recommend a randomness test be incorporated to detect trends in a more timely fashion. We detected operator transcription errors during data transmissions and advise direct instrument transmission to the MCP to eliminate these errors. A transmission error rate based on those errors that affected decisions in the MCP was estimated as 1%. 11 refs., 10 figs., 4 tabs

  7. Radiological safety aspects of handling plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sundararajan, A.R.

    2016-01-01

    Department of Atomic Energy in its scheme of harnessing the nuclear energy for electrical power generation and strategic applications has given a huge role to utilization of plutonium. In the power production programme, fast reactors with plutonium as fuel are expected to play a major role. This would require establishing fuel reprocessing plants to handle both thermal and fast reactor fuels. So in the nuclear fuel cycle facilities variety of chemical, metallurgical, mechanical operations have to be carried out involving significant inventories of "2"3"9 Pu and associated radionuclides. Plutonium is the most radiotoxic radionuclide and therefore any facility handling it has to be designed and operated with utmost care. Two problems of major concern in the protection of persons working in plutonium handling facilities are the internal exposure to the operating personnel from uptake of plutonium and transplutonic nuclides as they are highly radiotoxic and the radiation exposure of hands and eye lens during fuel fabrication operations especially while handling recycled high burn up plutonium. In view of the fact that annual limit for intake is very small for "2"3"9Pu and its radiation emission characteristics are such that it is a huge challenge for the health physicists to detect Pu in air and in workers. This paper discusses the principles and practices followed in providing radiological surveillance to workers in plutonium handling areas. The challenges in protecting the workers from receiving exposures to hands and eye lens in handling high burn up plutonium are also discussed. The sites having Pu fuel cycle facilities should have trained medical staff to handle cases involving excessive intake of plutonium. (author)

  8. The radiological hazard of plutonium isotopes and specific plutonium mixtures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heindel, G.; Clow, J.; Inkret, W.; Miller, G.

    1995-11-01

    The US Department of Energy defines the hazard categories of its nuclear facilities based upon the potential for accidents to have significant effects on specific populations and the environment. In this report, the authors consider the time dependence of hazard category 2 (significant on-site effects) for facilities with inventories of plutonium isotopes and specific weapons-grade and heat-source mixtures of plutonium isotopes. The authors also define relative hazard as the reciprocal of the hazard category 2 threshold value and determine its time dependence. The time dependence of both hazard category 2 thresholds and relative hazards are determined and plotted for 10,000 years to provide useful information for planning long-term storage or disposal facilities

  9. Shielding calculational system for plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zimmerman, M.G.; Thomsen, D.H.

    1975-08-01

    A computer calculational system has been developed and assembled specifically for calculating dose rates in AEC plutonium fabrication facilities. The system consists of two computer codes and all nuclear data necessary for calculation of neutron and gamma dose rates from plutonium. The codes include the multigroup version of the Battelle Monte Carlo code for solution of general neutron and gamma shielding problems and the PUSHLD code for solution of shielding problems where low energy gamma and x-rays are important. The nuclear data consists of built in neutron and gamma yields and spectra for various plutonium compounds, an automatic calculation of age effects and all cross-sections commonly used. Experimental correlations have been performed to verify portions of the calculational system. (23 tables, 7 figs, 16 refs) (U.S.)

  10. PRODUCTION OF PLUTONIUM METAL

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lyon, W.L.; Moore, R.H.

    1961-01-17

    A process is given for producing plutonium metal by the reduction of plutonium chloride, dissolved in alkali metal chloride plus or minus aluminum chloride, with magnesium or a magnesium-aluminum alloy at between 700 and 800 deg C and separating the plutonium or plutonium-aluminum alloy formed from the salt.

  11. SEPARATION OF PLUTONIUM

    Science.gov (United States)

    Maddock, A.G.; Smith, F.

    1959-08-25

    A method is described for separating plutonium from uranium and fission products by treating a nitrate solution of fission products, uranium, and hexavalent plutonium with a relatively water-insoluble fluoride to adsorb fission products on the fluoride, treating the residual solution with a reducing agent for plutonium to reduce its valence to four and less, treating the reduced plutonium solution with a relatively insoluble fluoride to adsorb the plutonium on the fluoride, removing the solution, and subsequently treating the fluoride with its adsorbed plutonium with a concentrated aqueous solution of at least one of a group consisting of aluminum nitrate, ferric nitrate, and manganous nitrate to remove the plutonium from the fluoride.

  12. Fuel cycles using adulterated plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brooksbank, R.E.; Bigelow, J.E.; Campbell, D.O.; Kitts, F.G.; Lindauer, R.B.

    1978-01-01

    Adjustments in the U-Pu fuel cycle necessitated by decisions made to improve the nonproliferation objectives of the US are examined. The uranium-based fuel cycle, using bred plutonium to provide the fissile enrichment, is the fuel system with the highest degree of commercial development at the present time. However, because purified plutonium can be used in weapons, this fuel cycle is potentially vulnerable to diversion of that plutonium. It does appear that there are technologically sound ways in which the plutonium might be adulterated by admixture with 238 U and/or radioisotopes, and maintained in that state throughout the fuel cycle, so that the likelihood of a successful diversion is small. Adulteration of the plutonium in this manner would have relatively little effect on the operations of existing or planned reactors. Studies now in progress should show within a year or two whether the less expensive coprocessing scheme would provide adequate protection (coupled perhaps with elaborate conventional safeguards procedures) or if the more expensive spiked fuel cycle is needed as in the proposed civex pocess. If the latter is the case, it will be further necessary to determine the optimum spiking level, which could vary as much as a factor of a billion. A very basic question hangs on these determinations: What is to be the nature of the recycle fuel fabrication facilities. If the hot, fully remote fuel fabrication is required, then a great deal of further development work will be required to make the full cycle fully commercial

  13. Plutonium in depleted uranium penetrators

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McLaughlin, J.P.; Leon-Vintro, L.; Smith, K.; Mitchell, P.I.; Zunic, Z.S.

    2002-01-01

    Depleted Uranium (DU) penetrators used in the recent Balkan conflicts have been found to be contaminated with trace amounts of transuranic materials such as plutonium. This contamination is usually a consequence of DU fabrication being carried out in facilities also using uranium recycled from spent military and civilian nuclear reactor fuel. Specific activities of 239+240 Plutonium generally in the range 1 to 12 Bq/kg have been found to be present in DU penetrators recovered from the attack sites of the 1999 NATO bombardment of Kosovo. A DU penetrator recovered from a May 1999 attack site at Bratoselce in southern Serbia and analysed by University College Dublin was found to contain 43.7 +/- 1.9 Bq/kg of 239+240 Plutonium. This analysis is described. An account is also given of the general population radiation dose implications arising from both the DU itself and from the presence of plutonium in the penetrators. According to current dosimetric models, in all scenarios considered likely ,the dose from the plutonium is estimated to be much smaller than that due to the uranium isotopes present in the penetrators. (author)

  14. Feedback from the operation of the ISOCS in support to the plutonium facility decommissioning project at the Marcoule UP1 reprocessing plant (France) and possible gain for new projects with new CANBERRA systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dogny, S.; Toubon, H.

    2009-01-01

    After the decision was taken in 1998 to shut-down the operations of the UP1 reprocessing plant in Marcoule (France), where more than 19,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel have been reprocessed, decommissioning projects started in the various buildings, particularly in the Plutonium Facility. In this facility many glove boxes had to be decontaminated before dismantling. To have waste compatible with surface storage, the main objective was to prove that each glove box had on hold up of less than 37 GBq (about 10 g) and to determine the corresponding Pu isotopic composition. Historically the method used for such characterisation was based on smears and dose rate measurements to extrapolate the mass of Pu in the glove boxes with a very high uncertainty. In 1998 AREVA-NC decided to deploy new characterization tools to meet the performance goals of the Plutonium Facility Decommissioning Project. These tools consist on portable Germanium gamma spectrometer coupled with MGA Pu isotopic composition and ISOCS 3D modelling codes. (authors)

  15. Canyon Facilities

    Data.gov (United States)

    Federal Laboratory Consortium — B Plant, T Plant, U Plant, PUREX, and REDOX (see their links) are the five facilities at Hanford where the original objective was plutonium removal from the uranium...

  16. Plutonium-239

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ammerich, Marc; Frot, Patricia; Gambini, Denis-Jean; Gauron, Christine; Moureaux, Patrick; Herbelet, Gilbert; Lahaye, Thierry; Pihet, Pascal; Rannou, Alain

    2014-06-01

    This sheet belongs to a collection which relates to the use of radionuclides essentially in unsealed sources. Its goal is to gather on a single document the most relevant information as well as the best prevention practices to be implemented. These sheets are made for the persons in charge of radiation protection: users, radioprotection-skill persons, labor physicians. Each sheet treats of: 1 - the radio-physical and biological properties; 2 - the main uses; 3 - the dosimetric parameters; 4 - the measurement; 5 - the protection means; 6 - the areas delimitation and monitoring; 7 - the personnel classification, training and monitoring; 8 - the effluents and wastes; 9 - the authorization and declaration administrative procedures; 10 - the transport; and 11 - the right conduct to adopt in case of incident or accident. This sheet deals specifically with Plutonium-239

  17. Nondestructive analysis of plutonium contaminated soil

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, H.E.; Taylor, L.H.

    1977-01-01

    Plutonium contaminated soil is currently being removed from a covered liquid waste disposal trench near the Pu Processing facility on the Hanford Project. This soil with the plutonium is being mined using remote techniques and equipment. The mined soil is being packaged for placement into retrievable storage, pending possible recovery. To meet the requirements of criticality safety and materials accountability, a nondestructive analysis program has been developed to determine the quantity of plutonium in each packing-storage container. This paper describes the total measurement program: equipment systems, calibration techniques, matrix assumption, instrument control program and a review of laboratory operating experience

  18. ZPR-9 airborne plutonium monitoring system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rusch, G.K.; McDowell, W.P.; Knapp, W.G.

    1975-01-01

    An airborne plutonium monitoring system which is installed in the ZPR-9 (Zero Power Reactor No. 9) facility at Argonne National Laboratory is described. The design and operational experience are discussed. This monitoring system utilizes particle size and density discrimination, alpha particle energy discrimination, and a background-subtraction techique operating in cascade to separate airborne-plutonium activity from other, naturally occurring, airborne activity. Relatively high sensitivity and reliability are achieved

  19. Plutonium Round Robin Test

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dudder, G.B.; Herbillon, G.H.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The goal of nuclear forensics is to develop a preferred approach to illicit trafficking investigations. This approach must be widely understood and acceptable as credible. The principle objectives of the Round Robin Test are to prioritize the forensic techniques and methods, evaluate attribution capabilities, and examine the utility of database. The Plutonium Round Robin has made a tremendous contribution to fulfilling these goals through a collaborative learning experience that resulted from the outstanding efforts of the six participating international laboratories. A prioritize list of techniques and methods has been developed based on this exercise. Future work will focus on a Highly Enriched Round Robin and extent to which the techniques and methods can be generalized. The Plutonium Round Robin demonstrated a rather high level of capability to determine the important characteristics of the materials and processes using analytical methods. When this capability to was combined with the appropriate knowledge and database, it resulted in a demonstrated capability to attribute the source of the materials to a specific nuclear fuel, reactor, and reprocessing facility. A number of shortfalls were also identified in our current capabilities. These included alternative dating techniques. Light Water Reactor discrimination techniques, and the lack of a comprehensive network of data/knowledge bases. The result of the Round Robin will be used to develop guidelines or a 'recommended protocol' to be made available to the interested authorities and countries to use in real cases. The poster will present a summary of the results of the Plutonium Round Robin and describe the plans the subsequent Highly Enriched Uranium Round Robin Test. (author)

  20. International and institutional aspects of reprocessing and plutonium management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-09-01

    Various institutional alternatives applicable to reprocessing, plutonium management and recycle are considered, not as a definitive analysis but rather as a basis for identifying the institutional approaches and measures which the Working Group might wish to examine more thoroughly. Seven alternatives arrangements for reprocessing are presented. These range from suspending the operation of existing reprocessing plants through placing national facilities under safeguards to limiting reprocessing to a few large facilities subject to plutonium management, multinational or international control. Finally, the comprehensive alternative of an International Nuclear Fuel Authority with worldwide responsibility for reprocessing and plutonium management is considered. Plutonium management alternatives to complement the reprocessing options, are then outlined. These include national discretion on the separation and disposition of plutonium under safeguards, an agreed Code of Practice for plutonium management at national facilities and the international storage of plutonium. The advantages and disadvantages of the alternative are discussed tentatively. It is recognised that the alternatives are presented in a simplified form and that their elements can be combined or separated in many ways. Although strengthening the institutions relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is imperative and can contribute to non-proliferation, such arrangements might open other proliferation risks through the spread of sensitive materials, facilities and technology. While there are risks with any fuel cycle, where plutonium in quantity is separated these risks are of a high order. Although these can be mitigated, they will have to be set against the energy and economic case for reprocessing and alternatives other than plutonium considered

  1. Design-Only Conceptual Design Report: Plutonium Immobilization Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DiSabatino, A.; Loftus, D.

    1999-01-01

    This design-only conceptual design report was prepared to support a funding request by the Department of Energy Office of Fissile Materials Disposition for engineering and design of the Plutonium Immobilization Plant, which will be used to immobilize up to 50 tonnes of surplus plutonium. The siting for the Plutonium Immobilization Plant will be determined pursuant to the site-specific Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement in a Plutonium Deposition Record of Decision in early 1999. This document reflects a new facility using the preferred technology (ceramic immobilization using the can-in-canister approach) and the preferred site (at Savannah River). The Plutonium Immobilization Plant accepts plutonium from pit conversion and from non-pit sources and, through a ceramic immobilization process, converts the plutonium into mineral-like forms that are subsequently encapsulated within a large canister of high-level waste glass. The final immobilized product must make the plutonium as inherently unattractive and inaccessible for use in nuclear weapons as the plutonium in spent fuel from commercial reactors and must be suitable for geologic disposal. Plutonium immobilization at the Savannah River Site uses: (1) A new building, the Plutonium Immobilization Plant, which will convert non-pit surplus plutonium to an oxide form suitable for the immobilization process, immobilize plutonium in a titanate-based ceramic form, place cans of the plutonium-ceramic forms into magazines, and load the magazines into a canister; (2) The existing Defense Waste Processing Facility for the pouring of high-level waste glass into the canisters; and (3) The Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility to receive and store feed materials. The Plutonium Immobilization Plant uses existing Savannah River Site infra-structure for analytical laboratory services, waste handling, fire protection, training, and other support utilities and services. The Plutonium Immobilization Plant

  2. Plutonium Finishing Plant safety evaluation report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) previously known as the Plutonium Process and Storage Facility, or Z-Plant, was built and put into operation in 1949. Since 1949 PFP has been used for various processing missions, including plutonium purification, oxide production, metal production, parts fabrication, plutonium recovery, and the recovery of americium (Am-241). The PFP has also been used for receipt and large scale storage of plutonium scrap and product materials. The PFP Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) was prepared by WHC to document the hazards associated with the facility, present safety analyses of potential accident scenarios, and demonstrate the adequacy of safety class structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and operational safety requirements (OSRs) necessary to eliminate, control, or mitigate the identified hazards. Documented in this Safety Evaluation Report (SER) is DOE's independent review and evaluation of the PFP FSAR and the basis for approval of the PFP FSAR. The evaluation is presented in a format that parallels the format of the PFP FSAR. As an aid to the reactor, a list of acronyms has been included at the beginning of this report. The DOE review concluded that the risks associated with conducting plutonium handling, processing, and storage operations within PFP facilities, as described in the PFP FSAR, are acceptable, since the accident safety analyses associated with these activities meet the WHC risk acceptance guidelines and DOE safety goals in SEN-35-91

  3. Plutonium Immobilization Can Loading Concepts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kriikku, E.; Ward, C.; Stokes, M.; Randall, B.; Steed, J.; Jones, R.; Hamilton, L.; Rogers, L.; Fiscus, J.; Dyches, G.

    1998-05-01

    The Plutonium Immobilization Facility will encapsulate plutonium in ceramic pucks and seal the pucks inside welded cans. Remote equipment will place these cans in magazines and the magazines in a Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) canister. The DWPF will fill the canister with glass for permanent storage. This report discusses five can loading conceptual designs and the lists the advantages and disadvantages for each concept. This report identifies loading pucks into cans and backfilling cans with helium as the top priority can loading development areas. The can loading welder and cutter are very similar to the existing Savannah River Site (SRS) FB-Line bagless transfer welder and cutter and thus they are a low priority development item

  4. Plutonium economy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Traube, K.

    1984-01-01

    The author expresses his opinion on the situation, describes the energy-economic setting, indicates the alternatives: fuel reprocessing or immediate long-term storage, and investigates the prospects for economic utilization of the breeder reactors. All the facts suggest that the breeder reactor will never be able to stand economic competition with light-water reactors. However, there is no way to prove the future. It is naive to think that every doubt could and must be removed before stopping the development of breeder reactors - and thus also the reprocessing of the fuel of light-water reactors. On the basis of the current state of knowledge an unbiased cost-benefit-analysis can only lead to the recommendation to stop construction immediately. But can 'experts', who for years or even decades have called for and supported the development of breeder reactors be expected to make an unbiased analysis. Klaus Traube strikes the balance of the state Germany's nuclear economy is in: although there is no chance of definitively abandoning that energy-political cul-de-sac, no new adventures must be embarked upon. Responsible handling of currently used nuclear technology means to give up breeder technology and waive plutonium economy. It is no supreme technology with the aid of which structural unemployment or any other economic problem could be solved. (orig.) [de

  5. Plutonium Finishing Plant

    Data.gov (United States)

    Federal Laboratory Consortium — The Plutonium Finishing Plant, also known as PFP, represented the end of the line (the final procedure) associated with plutonium production at Hanford.PFP was also...

  6. Plutonium biokinetics in humans

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Popplewell, D.; Ham, G.; McCarthy, W.; Lands, C.

    1994-01-01

    By using an 'unusual' isotope it is possible to carry out experiments with plutonium in volunteers at minimal radiation dose levels. Measurements have been made of the gut transfer factor and the urinary excretion of plutonium after intravenous injection. (author)

  7. Plutonium in uranium deposits

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Curtis, D.; Fabryka-Martin, J.; Aguilar, R.; Attrep, M. Jr.; Roensch, F.

    1992-01-01

    Plutonium-239 (t 1/2 , 24,100 yr) is one of the most persistent radioactive constituents of high-level wastes from nuclear fission power reactors. Effective containment of such a long-lived constituent will rely heavily upon its containment by the geologic environment of a repository. Uranium ore deposits offer a means to evaluate the geochemical properties of plutonium under natural conditions. In this paper, analyses of natural plutonium in several ores are compared to calculated plutonium production rates in order to evaluate the degree of retention of plutonium by the ore. The authors find that current methods for estimating production rates are neither sufficiently accurate nor precise to provide unambiguous measures of plutonium retention. However, alternative methods for evaluating plutonium mobility are being investigated, including its measurement in natural ground waters. Preliminary results are reported and establish the foundation for a comprehensive characterization of plutonium geochemistry in other natural environments

  8. Plutonium Training Opportunities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Balatsky, Galya Ivanovna [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Wolkov, Benjamin [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2015-03-26

    This report was created to examine the current state of plutonium training in the United States and to discover ways in which to ensure that the next generation of plutonium workers are fully qualified.

  9. Optimization and plutonium equilibrium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silver, G.L.

    1976-01-01

    The sequential simplex method has been used to estimate the extent of disproportionation of tetravalent plutonium in dilute acid. A method for simulating potentiometric titrations is proposed, and this method suggests that the stoichiometric end point and the inflection point may not always correspond in the potentiometric titration of plutonium. A possible characteristic equation for the nitrite-plutonium reaction is illustrated, and the method of proportional equations is extended to the iron-plutonium reaction

  10. The Plutonium Temperature Effect Experimental Program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Haeck, Wim; Leclaire, Nicolas; Letang, Eric [IRSN, Fontenay-aux-Roses (France); Girault, Emmanuel; Fouillaud, Patrick [CEA, VALDUC (France)

    2008-07-01

    Various theoretical studies have shown that highly diluted plutonium solutions could have a positive temperature effect but (up to now) no experimental program has confirmed this effect. The main goal of the French Plutonium Temperature Effect Experimental Program (or PU+ in short) is to effectively show that such a positive temperature effect exists for diluted plutonium solutions. The experiments were conducted in the 'Apparatus B' facility at the CEA Valduc research centre in France and involved several sub-critical approach type of experiments using plutonium nitrate solutions with concentrations of 14.3, 15 and 20 g/l at temperatures ranging from 20 to 40 deg. C. A total number of 14 phase I experiments (consisting of independent subcritical approaches) have been performed (5 at 20 g/l, 4 at 15 g/l and 5 at 14.3 g/l) between 2006 and 2007. The impact of the uncertainties on the solution acidity and the plutonium concentration makes it difficult to clearly demonstrate the positive temperature effect, requiring an additional phase II experiment (in which the use of the same plutonium solution was ensured) from 22 to 28 deg. C performed in July 2007. This experiment has shown the existence of a positive temperature effect approx +2 pcm/deg. C (from 22 to 28 deg. C for a plutonium concentration of 14.3 g/l). (authors)

  11. Cigarette smoke and plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Filipy, R.E.

    1985-01-01

    Autoradiographic techniques with liquid photographic emulsion and cellulose nitrate track-etch film are being used to investigate the spatial distribution of inhaled plutonium in the lungs of beagle dogs exposed to cigarette smoke or to the plutonium aerosol only. More plutonium than expected was detected on the inner surfaces of bronchi, and particles were observed beneath the bronchial mucosa. 2 figures, 2 tables

  12. Optimizing Plutonium stock management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Niquil, Y.; Guillot, J.

    1997-01-01

    Plutonium from spent fuel reprocessing is reused in new MOX assemblies. Since plutonium isotopic composition deteriorates with time, it is necessary to optimize plutonium stock management over a long period, to guarantee safe procurement, and contribute to a nuclear fuel cycle policy at the lowest cost. This optimization is provided by the prototype software POMAR

  13. Treatment of plutonium contaminations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lafuma, J.

    1983-01-01

    Three kinds of plutonium contaminations were considered: skin contamination; contaminated wounds; contamination by inhalation. The treatment of these contaminations was studied for insoluble (oxide and metal forms) and soluble plutonium (complexes). The use of DTPA and therapeutic problems encountered with stable plutonium complexes were analyzed. The new possibilities of internal decontamination using Puchel and LICAM were evaluated [fr

  14. Plutonium, nuclear fuel; Le plutonium, combustible nucleaire

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Grison, E [Commissariat a l' Energie Atomique, Fontenay aux Roses (France). Centre d' Etudes Nucleaires, Saclay

    1960-07-01

    A review of the physical properties of metallic plutonium, its preparation, and the alloys which it forms with the main nuclear metals. Appreciation of its future as a nuclear fuel. (author) [French] Apercu sur les proprietes physiques du plutonium metallique, sa preparation, ses alliages avec les principaux metaux nucleaires. Consideration sur son avenir en tant que combustible nucleaire. (auteur)

  15. Plutonium economy. Plutonium-Wirtschaft

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Traube, K

    1984-01-01

    The author expresses his opinion on the situation, describes the energy-economic setting, indicates the alternatives: fuel reprocessing or immediate long-term storage, and investigates the prospects for economic utilization of the breeder reactors. All the facts suggest that the breeder reactor will never be able to stand economic competition with light-water reactors. However, there is no way to prove the future. It is naive to think that every doubt could and must be removed before stopping the development of breeder reactors - and thus also the reprocessing of the fuel of light-water reactors. On the basis of the current state of knowledge an unbiased cost-benefit-analysis can only lead to the recommendation to stop construction immediately. But can 'experts', who for years or even decades have called for and supported the development of breeder reactors be expected to make an unbiased analysis. Klaus Traube strikes the balance of the state Germany's nuclear economy is in: although there is no chance of definitively abandoning that energy-political cul-de-sac, no new adventures must be embarked upon. Responsible handling of currently used nuclear technology means to give up breeder technology and waive plutonium economy. It is no supreme technology with the aid of which structural unemployment or any other economic problem could be solved.

  16. A vision for environmentally conscious plutonium processing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Avens, L.R.; Eller, P.G.; Christensen, D.C.; Miller, W.L.

    1998-01-01

    Regardless of individual technical and political opinions about the uses of plutonium, it is virtually certain that plutonium processing will continue on a significant global scale for many decades for the purposes of national defense, nuclear power, and remediation. An unavoidable aspect of plutonium processing is that radioactively contaminated gas, liquid, and solid waste streams are generated. These streams need to be handled in a manner that not only is in full compliance with today's laws but also will be considered environmentally and economically responsible now and in the future. In this regard, it is indeed ironic that the multibillion dollar and multidecade radioactive cleanup mortgage that the US Department of Energy (and its Russian counterpart) now owns resulted from waste management practices that were at the time in full legal compliance. It is now abundantly evident that in the long run, these practices have proven to be neither environmentally nor economically sound. Recent dramatic advances in actinide science and technology now make it possible to drastically minimize or even eliminate the problematic waste streams of traditional plutonium processing operations. Advanced technology thereby provides the means to avoid passing on to children and grandchildren significant environmental and economic legacies that traditional processing inevitably produces. The authors describe such a vision for plutonium processing that could be implemented fully within 5 yr at a facility such as the Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility (TA55). As a significant bonus, even on this short timescale, the initial technology investment is handsomely returned in avoided waste management costs

  17. A vision for environmentally conscious plutonium processing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Avens, L.R.; Eller, P.G.; Christensen, D.C.; Miller, W.L.

    1998-01-01

    Regardless of individual technical and political opinions about the uses of plutonium, it is virtually certain that plutonium processing will continue on a significant global scale for many decades for the purposes of national defense, nuclear power and remediation. An unavoidable aspect of plutonium processing is that radioactive contaminated gas, liquid, and solid streams are generated. These streams need to be handled in a manner that is not only in full compliance with today's laws,but also will be considered environmentally and economically responsible now and in the future. In this regard, it is indeed ironic that the multibillion dollar and multidecade radioactive cleanup mortgage that the US Department of Energy (and its Russian counterpart) now owns resulted from waste management practices that were at the time in full legal compliance. The theme of this paper is that recent dramatic advances in actinide science and technology now make it possible to drastically minimize or even eliminate the problematic waste streams of traditional plutonium processing operations. Advanced technology thereby provides the means to avoid passing on to our children and grandchildren significant environmental and economic legacies that traditional processing inevitably produces. This paper will describe such a vision for plutonium processing that could be implemented fully within five years at a facility such as the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility (TA55). As a significant bonus, even on this short time scale, the initial technology investment is handsomely returned in avoided waste management costs

  18. Plutonium use - Present status and prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dievoet, J. van; Fossoul, E.; Jonckheere, E.; Bemden, E. van den

    1977-01-01

    The use of plutonium in thermal and fast reactors is a demonstrated, if not proven, technology. Moreover, plutonium is being produced in increasing quantities. Evaluation of this production on a world scale shows that it would be theoretically possible to construct numerous breeders and thus to make the best use of plutonium, while considerably reducing uranium consumption. This source of plutonium is nevertheless dependent on the reprocessing of irradiated fuel. Long delays in installing and adequate world reprocessing capacity are weakening the prospects for introducing breeders. Furthermore, the critical situation regarding reprocessing may delay the development of complementary reprocessing methods for fuels with a high plutonium content and high burnup. The recycling of plutonium is now a well-known technique and any objections to it hardly bear analysis. Utilization of plutonium offers an appreciable saving in terms of uranium and separative work units; and it can also be shown that immediate reprocessing of the recycling fuel is not essential for the economics of the concept. Temporary storage of recycled fuel is a particularly safe form of concentrating plutonium, namely in irradiated plutonium-bearing fuel assemblies. Finally, recycling offers such flexibility that it represents no obstacle to fuel management at power plants with light-water reactors. These strategic considerations imply that the technology of using plutonium for fabricating thermal or fast reactor fuels is both technically reliable and economically viable. The methods used in industrial facilities are fully reassuring in this respect. Although various unsolved problems exist, none seems likely to impede current developments, while the industrial experience gained has enabled the economics and reliability of the methods to be improved appreciably. Apart from the techno-economic aspects, the plutonium industry must face extremely important problems in connection with the safety of personnel

  19. Plutonium working group report on environmental, safety and health vulnerabilities associated with the Department's plutonium storage. Volume I: Summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-11-01

    At the conclusion of the Cold War, the Department of Energy (DOE) stopped plutonium processing for nuclear weapons production. Facilities used for that purpose now hold significant quantities of plutonium in various forms. Unless properly stored and handled, plutonium can present environment, safety and health (ES ampersand H) hazards. Improperly stored plutonium poses a variety of hazards. When containers or packaging fail to fully protect plutonium metal from exposure to air, oxidation can occur and cause packaging failures and personnel contamination. Contamination can also result when plutonium solutions leak from bottles, tanks or piping. Plutonium in the form of scrap or residues generated by weapons production are often very corrosive, chemically reactive and difficult to contain. Buildings and equipment that are aging, poorly maintained or of obsolete design contribute to the overall problem. Inadvertent accumulations of plutonium of any form in sufficient quantities within facilities can result in nuclear criticality events that could emit large amounts of radiation locally. Contamination events and precursors of criticality events are causing safety and health concerns for workers at the Department's plutonium facilities. Contamination events also potentially threaten the public and the surrounding environment

  20. International shipment of plutonium by air

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mercado, J.E.; McGrogan, J.P.

    1995-05-01

    In support of the United States (US) Government's decision to place excess plutonium oxide at the US Department of Energy's (DOE) Hanford Site under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, the Department of State notified the Congress that a plutonium storage vault at the Plutonium Finishing Plant at the Hanford Site would be added to the eligible facilities list. As part of the preparations to transfer the plutonium oxide under IAEA safeguards, samples of the powder were taken from the inventory to be shipped to the IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Austria, for laboratory analysis. The analysis of these samples was of high priority, and the IAEA requested that the material be shipped by aircraft, the most expeditious method

  1. Plutonium vulnerability issues at Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Feldt, E.; Templeton, D.W.; Tholen, E.

    1995-01-01

    The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) at the Hanford, Washington Site was operated to produce plutonium (Pu) metal and oxide for national defense purposes. Due to the production requirements and methods utilized to meet national needs and the abrupt shutdown of the plant in the late 1980s, the plant was left in a condition that poses a risk of radiation exposure to plant workers, of accidental radioactive material release to the environment, and of radiation exposure to the public. In early 1994, an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to determine the best methods for cleaning out and stabilizing Pu materials in the PFP was started. While the EIS is being prepared, a number of immediate actions have been completed or are underway to significantly reduce the greatest hazards in the PFP. Recently, increased attention his been paid to Pu risks at Department of Energy (DOE) facilities resulting in the Department-wide Plutonium Vulnerability Assessment and a recommendation by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) for DOE to develop integrated plans for managing its nuclear materials

  2. The plutonium society

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mez, L.; Richter, M.

    1981-01-01

    The lectures of an institute are reported on, which took place between 25th and 27th January 1980 in Berlin. The subsequent public panel discussion with representations from the political parties is then documentated in a few press-reports. The themes of the 8 lectures are: views and facts on plutonium, plutonium as an energy resource, military aspects of the production of plutonium, economic aspects of the plutonium economy, the position of the trade unions on the industrial reconversion, the alleged inevitability of a plutonium society and the socio-political alternatives and perspectives of nuclear waste disposal. (UA) [de

  3. The use of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marshall, W.

    1980-01-01

    The use of plutonium as a vital energy source producing maximum economic benefit with minimum proliferation risks is discussed. Having considered the production of plutonium, several possible plutonium fuel cycle options are identified and the economic value to be attached to plutonium for each examined. It is shown how the use of plutonium in fast reactors gives an opportunity for a non-proliferation policy not available when plutonium is used only in thermal reactors. From the technical considerations reviewed concerning plutonium and fast reactors it is shown that an economic regime involving international trade in spent thermal reactor fuel is possible which benefits equally those countries with fast reactors and those without and also assists in avoiding the proliferation of nuclear weapons. (U.K.)

  4. Plutonium production in a remote cell

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maddux, E.P.; Purcell, J.A.

    1987-01-01

    Production of 239 Pu metal has traditionally been carried out in glovebox enclosures for protection of operating personnel and the environment. With the advent of more stringent federal regulations for protecting personnel, the environment, and security of special nuclear materials, it is proposed that plutonium be processed in a totally remote environment using automated work stations and robotic materials transfer and equipment maintenance. At the Savannah River Plant, the existing plutonium production facility is a batch-type glovebox operation built in the 1950s. A viable alternative to restoration of the existing glovebox operation is to provide a facility that uses remote cell operation

  5. Repository and deep borehole disposition of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Halsey, W.G.

    1996-02-01

    Control and disposition of excess weapons plutonium is a growing issue as both the US and Russia retire a large number of nuclear weapons> A variety of options are under consideration to ultimately dispose of this material. Permanent disposition includes tow broad categories: direct Pu disposal where the material is considered waste and disposed of, and Pu utilization, where the potential energy content of the material is exploited via fissioning. The primary alternative to a high-level radioactive waste repository for the ultimate disposal of plutonium is development of a custom geologic facility. A variety of geologic facility types have been considered, but the concept currently being assessed is the deep borehole

  6. Plutonium immobilization program - Cold pour Phase 1 test results

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hamilton, L.

    2000-01-01

    The Plutonium Immobilization Project will disposition excess weapons grade plutonium. It uses the can-in-canister approach that involves placing plutonium-ceramic pucks in sealed cans that are then placed into Defense Waste Processing Facility canisters. These canisters are subsequently filled with high-level radioactive waste glass. This process puts the plutonium in a stable form and makes it unattractive for reuse. A cold (non-radioactive) glass pour program was performed to develop and verify the baseline design for the canister and internal hardware. This paper describes the Phase 1 scoping test results

  7. Plutonium Immobilization Program - Cold pour Phase 1 test results

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hamilton, L.

    2000-01-01

    The Plutonium Immobilization Project will disposition excess weapons grade plutonium. It uses the can-in-canister approach that involves placing plutonium-ceramic pucks in sealed cans that are then placed into Defense Waste Processing Facility canisters. These canisters are subsequently filled with high-level radioactive waste glass. This process puts the plutonium in a stable form and makes it unattractive for reuse. A cold (non-radioactive) glass pour program was performed to develop and verify the baseline design for the canister and internal hardware. This paper describes the Phase 1 scoping test results

  8. Plutonium in nature; Le plutonium dans la nature

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Madic, C.

    1994-12-31

    Plutonium in nature comes from natural sources and anthropogenic ones. Plutonium at the earth surface comes principally from anthropogenic sources. It is easily detectable in environment. The plutonium behaviour in environment is complex. It seems necessary for the future to reduce releases in environment, to improve predictive models of plutonium behaviour in geosphere, to precise biological impact of anthropogenic plutonium releases.

  9. Facility design: introduction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Unger, W.E.

    1980-01-01

    The design of shielded chemical processing facilities for handling plutonium is discussed. The TRU facility is considered in particular; its features for minimizing the escape of process materials are listed. 20 figures

  10. Computerized plutonium laboratory-stack monitoring system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stafford, R.G.; DeVore, R.K.

    1977-01-01

    The Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory has recently designed and constructed a Plutonium Research and Development Facility to meet design criteria imposed by the United States Energy Research and Development Administration. A primary objective of the design criteria is to assure environmental protection and to reliably monitor plutonium effluent via the ventilation exhaust systems. A state-of-the-art facility exhaust air monitoring system is described which establishes near ideal conditions for evaluating plutonium activity in the stack effluent. Total and static pressure sensing manifolds are incorporated to measure average velocity and integrated total discharge air volume. These data are logged at a computer which receives instrument data through a multiplex scanning system. A multipoint isokinetic sampling assembly with associated instrumentation is described. Continuous air monitors have been designed to sample from the isokinetic sampling assembly and transmit both instantaneous and integrated stack effluent concentration data to the computer and various cathode ray tube displays. The continuous air monitors also serve as room air monitors in the plutonium facility with the primary objective of timely evacuation of personnel if an above tolerance airborne plutonium concentration is detected. Several continuous air monitors are incorporated in the ventilation system to assist in identification of release problem areas

  11. Technical considerations and policy requirements for plutonium management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Christensen, D.C.; Dinehart, S.M.; Yarbro, S.L.

    1995-01-01

    The goals for plutonium management have changed dramatically over the past few years. Today, the challenge is focused on isolating plutonium from the environment and preparing it for permanent disposition. In parallel, the requirements for managing plutonium are rapidly changing. For example, there is a significant increase in public awareness on how facilities operate, increased attention to environmental safety and health (ES and H) concerns, greater interest in minimizing waste, more emphasis on protecting material from theft, providing materials for international inspection, and a resurgence of interest in using plutonium as an energy source. Of highest concern, in the immediate future, is protecting plutonium from theft or diversion, while the national policy on disposition is debated. These expanded requirements are causing a broadening of responsibilities within the Department of Energy (DOE) to include at least seven organizations. An unavoidable consequence is the divergence in approach and short-term goals for managing similar materials within each organization. The technology base does exist, properly, safely, and cost effectively to extract plutonium from excess weapons, residues, waste, and contaminated equipment and facilities, and to properly stabilize it. Extracting the plutonium enables it to be easily inventoried, packaged, and managed to minimize the risk of theft and diversion. Discarding excess plutonium does not sufficiently reduce the risk of diversion, and as a result, long-term containment of plutonium from the environment may not be able to be proven to the satisfaction of the public

  12. Technical considerations and policy requirements for plutonium management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Christensen, D.C.; Dinehart, S.M.; Yarbro, S.L.

    1996-01-01

    The goals for plutonium management have changed dramatically over the past few years. Today, the challenge is focused on isolating plutonium from the environment and preparing it for permanent disposition. In parallel, the requirements for managing plutonium are rapidly changing. For example, there is a significant increase in public awareness on how facilities operate, increased attention to environmental safety and health (ES and H) concerns, greater interest in minimizing waste, more emphasis on protecting material from theft, providing materials for international inspection, and a resurgence of interest in using plutonium as an energy source. Of highest concern, in the immediate future, is protecting plutonium from theft or diversion, while the national policy on disposition is debated. These expanded requirements are causing a broadening of responsibilities within the Department of Energy (DOE) to include at least seven organizations. An unavoidable consequence is the divergence in approach and short-term goals for managing similar materials within each organization. The technology base does exist, properly, safely, and cost effectively to extract plutonium from excess weapons, residues, waste, and contaminated equipment and facilities, and to properly stabilize it. Extracting the plutonium enables it to be easily inventoried, packaged, and managed to minimize the risk of theft and diversion. Discarding excess plutonium does not sufficient reduce the risk of diversion, and as a result, long-term containment of plutonium from the environment may not be able to be proven to the satisfaction of the public

  13. Excess Weapons Plutonium Immobilization in Russia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jardine, L.; Borisov, G.B.

    2000-01-01

    The joint goal of the Russian work is to establish a full-scale plutonium immobilization facility at a Russian industrial site by 2005. To achieve this requires that the necessary engineering and technical basis be developed in these Russian projects and the needed Russian approvals be obtained to conduct industrial-scale immobilization of plutonium-containing materials at a Russian industrial site by the 2005 date. This meeting and future work will provide the basis for joint decisions. Supporting R and D projects are being carried out at Russian Institutes that directly support the technical needs of Russian industrial sites to immobilize plutonium-containing materials. Special R and D on plutonium materials is also being carried out to support excess weapons disposition in Russia and the US, including nonproliferation studies of plutonium recovery from immobilization forms and accelerated radiation damage studies of the US-specified plutonium ceramic for immobilizing plutonium. This intriguing and extraordinary cooperation on certain aspects of the weapons plutonium problem is now progressing well and much work with plutonium has been completed in the past two years. Because much excellent and unique scientific and engineering technical work has now been completed in Russia in many aspects of plutonium immobilization, this meeting in St. Petersburg was both timely and necessary to summarize, review, and discuss these efforts among those who performed the actual work. The results of this meeting will help the US and Russia jointly define the future direction of the Russian plutonium immobilization program, and make it an even stronger and more integrated Russian program. The two objectives for the meeting were to: (1) Bring together the Russian organizations, experts, and managers performing the work into one place for four days to review and discuss their work with each other; and (2) Publish a meeting summary and a proceedings to compile reports of all the

  14. Surplus plutonium disposition draft environmental impact statement. Volume 1, Part A

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-07-01

    On May 22, 1997, DOE published a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the Federal Register (62 Federal Register 28009) announcing its decision to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) that would tier from the analysis and decisions reached in connection with the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic EIS (Storage and Disposition PEIS). DOE's disposition strategy allows for both the immobilization of surplus plutonium and its use as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in existing domestic, commercial reactors. The disposition of surplus plutonium would also involve disposal of the immobilized plutonium and MOX fuel (as spent nuclear fuel) in a geologic repository. The Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement analyzes alternatives that would use the immobilization approach (for some of the surplus plutonium) and the MOX fuel approach (for some of the surplus plutonium); alternatives that would immobilize all of the surplus plutonium; and the No Action Alternative. The alternatives include three disposition facilities that would be designed so that they could collectively accomplish disposition of up to 50 metric tons (55 tons) of surplus plutonium over their operating lives: (1) the pit disassembly and conversion facility would disassemble pits (a weapons component) and convert the recovered plutonium, as well as plutonium metal from other sources, into plutonium dioxide suitable for disposition; (2) the immobilization facility would include a collocated capability for converting nonpit plutonium materials into plutonium dioxide suitable for immobilization and would be located at either Hanford or SRS. DOE has identified SRS as the preferred site for an immobilization facility; (3) the MOX fuel fabrication facility would fabricate plutonium dioxide into MOX fuel. This volume includes background information; purpose of and need for the proposed action; alternatives for disposition of surplus weapons useable plutonium; and

  15. Properties of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ahn, Jin Su; Yoon, Hwan Ki; Min, Kyung Sik; Kim, Hyun Tae; Ahn, Jong Sung; Kwag, Eon Ho; Ryu, Keon Joong

    1996-03-01

    Plutonium has unique chemical and physical properties. Its uniqueness in use has led to rare publications, in Korea. This report covers physical aspects of phase change of metal plutonium, mechanical properties, thermal conductivity, etc, chemical aspects of corrosion, oxidation, how to produce plutonium from spent fuels by describing various chemical treatment methods, which are currently used and were used in the past. It also contains characteristics of the purex reprocessing process which is the most widely used nowadays. And show processes to purify and metalize from recovered plutonium solution. Detection and analysis methods are introduced with key pints for handling, critical safety, toxicity, and effects on peoples. This report gives not only a general idea on what plutonium is, rather than deep technical description, but also basic knowledge on plutonium production and safeguards diversion from the view point of nonproliferation. 18 refs. (Author) .new

  16. Civil plutonium management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sicard, B.; Zaetta, A.

    2004-01-01

    During 1960 and 1970 the researches on the plutonium recycling in fast neutrons reactors were stimulated by the fear of uranium reserves diminishing. At the beginning of 1980, the plutonium mono-recycling for water cooled reactors is implementing. After 1990 the public opinion concerning the radioactive wastes management and the consequences of the disarmament agreements between Russia and United States, modified the context. This paper presents the today situation and technology associated to the different options and strategical solutions of the plutonium management: the plutonium use in the world, the neutronic characteristics, the plutonium effect on the reactors characteristics, the MOX behavior in the reactors, the MOX fabrication and treatment, the possible improvements to the plutonium use, the concepts performance in a nuclear park. (A.L.B.)

  17. Properties of plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ahn, Jin Su; Yoon, Hwan Ki; Min, Kyung Sik; Kim, Hyun Tae; Ahn, Jong Sung; Kwag, Eon Ho; Ryu, Keon Joong [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daeduk (Korea, Republic of)

    1996-03-01

    Plutonium has unique chemical and physical properties. Its uniqueness in use has led to rare publications, in Korea. This report covers physical aspects of phase change of metal plutonium, mechanical properties, thermal conductivity, etc, chemical aspects of corrosion, oxidation, how to produce plutonium from spent fuels by describing various chemical treatment methods, which are currently used and were used in the past. It also contains characteristics of the purex reprocessing process which is the most widely used nowadays. And show processes to purify and metalize from recovered plutonium solution. Detection and analysis methods are introduced with key pints for handling, critical safety, toxicity, and effects on peoples. This report gives not only a general idea on what plutonium is, rather than deep technical description, but also basic knowledge on plutonium production and safeguards diversion from the view point of nonproliferation. 18 refs. (Author) .new.

  18. World status report: plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dircks, W.

    1992-01-01

    In a recent speech in Japan, the Deputy Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said that the economic case for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel had been severely eroded. An edited version of the speech is given. The changed prospects for nuclear energy is given as the reason why the demand for plutonium has declined sharply. The oil crisis of the 1970s reduced the demand for electric power and the economic justification for the use of recycled plutonium. The stockpile of isolated plutonium is growing rapidly giving rise to worries about its security. From this point of view, isolated plutonium is best kept in reactor fuel not separated out. In this connection the IAEA has offered to help in the storage of plutonium so that vigorous safety and security requirements are met. In Japan there is a debate about the plutonium which is dependent on the future of the fast breeder reactor programme. (UK)

  19. PLUTONIUM-ZIRCONIUM ALLOYS

    Science.gov (United States)

    Schonfeld, F.W.; Waber, J.T.

    1960-08-30

    A series of nuclear reactor fuel alloys consisting of from about 5 to about 50 at.% zirconium (or higher zirconium alloys such as Zircaloy), balance plutonium, and having the structural composition of a plutonium are described. Zirconium is a satisfactory diluent because it alloys readily with plutonium and has desirable nuclear properties. Additional advantages are corrosion resistance, excellent fabrication propenties, an isotropie structure, and initial softness.

  20. Cigarette smoke and plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Filipy, R.E.

    1983-01-01

    The major objective of this project is to obtain experimental data that are directly applicable to resolving the question of whether cigarette smokers are at greater risk than nonsmokers to potential health effects of inhaled plutonium. Because cigarette smokers constitute a large fraction of the population, a synergistic effect of plutonium and cigarette smoke might influence estimates of the health risk for plutonium and other transuranics released to the environment

  1. Perspective on plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sun, L.S.

    1993-01-01

    This paper is intended as a brief overview on the element plutonium. Plutonium is the first primarily man-made element to play a significant role not only in technological development, but also in the economic growth of many countries. The importance of plutonium centers around its enormous energy making it ideal for wide-scale use in reactors, while the nuclear industry continues to work toward improving safety and efficiency of plutonium as a reactor fuel politicians and the public still debate over the safety and benefits of nuclear power. (30 refs.)

  2. Analog subsystem for the plutonium protection system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Arlowe, H.D.

    1978-12-01

    An analog subsystem is described which monitors certain functions in the Plutonium Protection System. Rotary and linear potentiometer output signals are digitized, as are the outputs from thermistors and container ''bulge'' sensors. This work was sponsored by the Department of Energy/Office of Safeguards and Security (DOE/OSS) as part of the overall Sandia Fixed Facility Physical Protection Program

  3. Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) hazards assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Campbell, L.R.

    1998-01-01

    This report documents the hazards assessment for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) located on the US Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site. This hazards assessment was conducted to provide the emergency planning technical basis for the PFP. DOE Orders require an emergency planning hazards assessment for each facility that has the potential to reach or exceed the lowest level emergency classification

  4. Appraisal of BWR plutonium burners for energy centers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Williamson, H.E.

    1976-01-01

    The design of BWR cores with plutonium loadings beyond the self-generation recycle (SGR) level is investigated with regard to their possible role as plutonium burners in a nuclear energy center. Alternative plutonium burner approaches are also examined including the substitution of thorium for uranium as fertile material in the BWR and the use of a high-temperature gas reactor (HTGR) as a plutonium burner. Effects on core design, fuel cycle facility requirements, economics, and actinide residues are considered. Differences in net fissile material consumption among the various plutonium-burning systems examined were small in comparison to uncertainties in HTGR, thorium cycle, and high plutonium-loaded LWR technology. Variation in the actinide content of high-level wastes is not likely to be a significant factor in determining the feasibility of alternate systems of plutonium utilization. It was found that after 10,000 years the toxicity of actinide high-level wastes from the plutonium-burning fuel cycles was less than would have existed if the processed natural ores had not been used for nuclear fuel. The implications of plutonium burning and possible future fuel cycle options on uranium resource conservation are examined in the framework of current ERDA estimates of minable uranium resources

  5. Surplus plutonium disposition draft environmental impact statement. Volume 1, Part B

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-07-01

    On May 22, 1997, DOE published a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the Federal Register (62 Federal Register 28009) announcing its decision to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) that would tier from the analysis and decisions reached in connection with the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic EIS (Storage and Disposition PEIS). DOE's disposition strategy allows for both the immobilization of surplus plutonium and its use as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in existing domestic, commercial reactors. The disposition of surplus plutonium would also involve disposal of the immobilized plutonium and MOX fuel (as spent nuclear fuel) in a geologic repository. The Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement analyzes alternatives that would use the immobilization approach (for some of the surplus plutonium) and the MOX fuel approach (for some of the surplus plutonium); alternatives that would immobilize all of the surplus plutonium; and the No Action Alternative. The alternatives include three disposition facilities that would be designed so that they could collectively accomplish disposition of up to 50 metric tons (55 tons) of surplus plutonium over their operating lives: (1) the pit disassembly and conversion facility would disassemble pits (a weapons component) and convert the recovered plutonium, as well as plutonium metal from other sources, into plutonium dioxide suitable for disposition; (2) the immobilization facility would include a collocated capability for converting nonpit plutonium materials into plutonium dioxide suitable for immobilization and would be located at either Hanford or SRS. DOE has identified SRS as the preferred site for an immobilization facility; (3) the MOX fuel fabrication facility would fabricate plutonium dioxide into MOX fuel. This volume has chapters on environmental consequences; environmental regulations, permits, and consultations; a glossary; list of preparers; distribution list

  6. Cigarette smoke and plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1981-01-01

    The overall objective of this study is to determine whether cigarette smoking increases the probability of plutonium-induced lung cancer. Initial experiments, designed to characterize the effect of chronic cigarette smoke exposure on pulmonary clearance of plutonium aerosols, are described

  7. Plutonium valence state distributions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silver, G.L.

    1974-01-01

    A calculational method for ascertaining equilibrium valence state distributions of plutonium in acid solutions as a function of the plutonium oxidation number and the solution acidity is illustrated with an example. The method may be more practical for manual use than methods based upon polynomial equations. (T.G.)

  8. The toxicity of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Crouse, P.L.

    1994-01-01

    Shipments of plutonium occasionally pass around the Cape coastal waters on its way to Japan from Europe. This invariably leads to a great deal of speculation of the dangers involved and of the extreme toxicity of plutonium, with the media and environmental groups claiming that (a) plutonium is the most toxic substance known to man, and that (b) a few kilograms of plutonium ground finely and dispersed in the atmosphere could kill every human being on earth. Comparisons with other poisons are drawn, e.g. common inorganic chemicals and biological agents. The original scare around the extraordinary toxicity of Pu seems to have started in 1974 with the claims of Tamplin and Cochran's hot particle theory about plutonium lodging in the sensitive portions of the lungs in small concentrated aggregates where they are much more effective in producing cancers. This theory, however, is regarded as thoroughly discredited by the experts in the field of radiotoxicity. 8 refs

  9. Plutonium roundtable discussion

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Penneman, R.A.

    1982-01-01

    The roundtable discussion began with remarks by the chairman who pointed out the complicated nature of plutonium chemistry. Judging from the papers presented at this symposium, he noticed a pattern which indicated to him the result of diminished funding for investigation of basic plutonium chemistry and funding focused on certain problem areas. Dr. G.L. silver pointed to plutonium chemists' erroneous use of a simplified summary equation involving the disproportionation of Pu(EV) and their each of appreciation of alpha coefficients. To his appreciation of alpha coefficients. To his charges, Dr. J.T. Bell spoke in defense of the chemists. This discussion was followed by W.W. Schulz's comments on the need for experimental work to determine solubility data for plutonium in its various oxidation states under geologic repository conditions. Discussion then turned to plutonium pyrachemical process with Dana C. Christensen as the main speaker. This paper presents edited versions of participants' written version

  10. Regulatory issues for deep borehole plutonium disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Halsey, W.G.

    1995-03-01

    As a result of recent changes throughout the world, a substantial inventory of excess separated plutonium is expected to result from dismantlement of US nuclear weapons. The safe and secure management and eventual disposition of this plutonium, and of a similar inventory in Russia, is a high priority. A variety of options (both interim and permanent) are under consideration to manage this material. The permanent solutions can be categorized into two broad groups: direct disposal and utilization. The deep borehole disposition concept involves placing excess plutonium deep into old stable rock formations with little free water present. Issues of concern include the regulatory, statutory and policy status of such a facility, the availability of sites with desirable characteristics and the technologies required for drilling deep holes, characterizing them, emplacing excess plutonium and sealing the holes. This white paper discusses the regulatory issues. Regulatory issues concerning construction, operation and decommissioning of the surface facility do not appear to be controversial, with existing regulations providing adequate coverage. It is in the areas of siting, licensing and long term environmental protection that current regulations may be inappropriate. This is because many current regulations are by intent or by default specific to waste forms, facilities or missions significantly different from deep borehole disposition of excess weapons usable fissile material. It is expected that custom regulations can be evolved in the context of this mission

  11. The future of plutonium - an overview

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Larson, C.E.

    1975-01-01

    Plutonium is the underpinning of the nuclear industry. Without it it is estimated that the fuel will run out not long after the turn of the century. With plutonium in fast breeders nuclear reactors can be operated for tens of thousands of years and the depleted uranium now available can be utilized The fuel cycle contemplated is similar to that of the light water reactor with some important differences at least partially related to the greater radioactivity of the resulting mixture of plutonium isotopes. The regulatory program does recognize the problems, including those of toxicity, safeguards and transportation. The concept of an integrated fuel cycle facility at a single location must be seriously considered. (author)

  12. Chemical characterization of local and stratospheric plutonium in Ohio soils

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Muller, R.N.

    1978-01-01

    The chemical nature of plutonium derived from stratospheric fallout and industrial sources was studied in three agricultural soils. The majority of the soil plutonium was associated with a reductant-soluble, hydrous oxide phase that, under most conditions of terrestrial ecosystems, remains essentially immobile. The proportion of plutonium associated with organic matter (0.1N NaOH-extractable) varied among soils, and increased with decreasing particle size in the same soil. In a soil containing 238 Pu from a local fabrication facility and 239 , 240 Pu from stratospheric fallout, isotopic ratios between the NaOH-extractable and residual phases were essentially constant, indicating that, in these soils, plutonium from both sources behaves similarly. The distribution of soil plutonium with particle size appears to be most directly related to the mass of the soil particle

  13. 75 FR 41850 - Amended Notice of Intent to Modify the Scope of the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-19

    ... and packaging capabilities, including direct metal oxidation, to fulfill plutonium storage..., disassemble nuclear weapons pits (a weapons component) and convert the plutonium metal to an oxide form for fabrication into mixed uranium-plutonium oxide (MOX) reactor fuel in the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility...

  14. Long-term plutonium storage: Design concepts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilkey, D.D.; Wood, W.T.; Guenther, C.D.

    1994-01-01

    An important part of the Department of Energy (DOE) Weapons Complex Reconfiguration (WCR) Program is the development of facilities for long-term storage of plutonium. The WCR design goals are to provide storage for metals, oxides, pits, and fuel-grade plutonium, including material being held as part of the Strategic Reserve and excess material. Major activities associated with plutonium storage are sorting the plutonium inventory, material handling and storage support, shipping and receiving, and surveillance of material in storage for both safety evaluations and safeguards and security. A variety of methods for plutonium storage have been used, both within the DOE weapons complex and by external organizations. This paper discusses the advantages and disadvantages of proposed storage concepts based upon functional criteria. The concepts discussed include floor wells, vertical and horizontal sleeves, warehouse storage on vertical racks, and modular storage units. Issues/factors considered in determining a preferred design include operational efficiency, maintenance and repair, environmental impact, radiation and criticality safety, safeguards and security, heat removal, waste minimization, international inspection requirements, and construction and operational costs

  15. Toxicology of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bair, W.J.

    1974-01-01

    Data are reviewed from studies on the toxicity of Pu in experimental animals. Of the several plutonium isotopes, only 238 Pu and 239 Pu have been studied well. Sufficient results have been obtained to show that the behavior of 238 Pu in biological systems and the resulting biological effects cannot be precisely predicted from studies of 239 Pu. This probably applies also to other radiologically important plutonium isotopes which have half-lives ranging from 45 days to 10 7 years and decay by β-emission, electron capture, and spontaneous fission, as well as by emission of α-particles. All the biological effects of plutonium described in this review are attributed to alpha-particle radiation emitted by the plutonium. However, since plutonium is a chemically active heavy metal, one cannot ignore the possibility of chemical toxicity of the low-specific-activity isotopes, 239 Pu, 242 Pu, and 244 Pu. The preponderance of our knowledge of plutonium toxicology has come from short-term studies of relatively high dosage levels in several animal species. The consequences of high-level internal exposures can be predicted with confidence in experimental animals and probably also in man. However, considering the care with which plutonium is handled in the nuclear industry, a high-level contamination event is unlikely. Considerably less is known about the long-term effects of low levels of contamination. (250 references) (U.S.)

  16. Treatment of plutonium contaminated ashes by electrogenerated Ag(II): a new, simple and efficient process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Madic, C.; Saulze, J.L.; Bourges, J.; Lecomte, M.; Koehly, G.

    1990-01-01

    Incineration is a very attractive technique for managing plutonium contaminated solid wastes, allowing for large volume and mass reduction factors. After waste incineration, the plutonium is concentrated in the ashes and an efficient method must be designed for its recovery. To achieve this goal, a process based on the dissolution of plutonium in nitric solution under the agressive action of electrogenerated Ag(II) was developed. This process is very simple, requiring very few steps. Plutonium recovery yields up to 98% can be obtained and, in addition, the plutonium bearing solutions generated by the treatment can be processed by the PUREX technique for plutonium recovery. This process constitutes the basis for the development of industrial facilities: 1) a pilot facility is being built in MARCOULE (COGEMA, UP1 plant), to treat active ash in 1990; 2) an industrial facility will be built in the MELOX plant under construction at MARCOULE (COGEMA plant)

  17. A performance indicator for reduction in vulnerability through stabilization of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marchese, A.R.; Neogy, P.; Azarm, M.A.

    1997-01-01

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) is currently storing several metric tons of plutonium in various forms in a variety of facilities throughout the DOE complex. Since the cessation of weapons production in 1990, many of these facilities with plutonium in storage have not operated. Since the shutdown was regarded as temporary, little attempt was made at that time to empty the process lines of plutonium, or to place the plutonium in containers or packages that would provide safe storage for extended periods of time. As a result, the packages and containers providing interim storage are vulnerable to failure through leakage, rupture and other modes, and pose potential hazards to facility workers, the public and the environment. Here, an approach to measuring and tracking the reduction in vulnerabilities resulting from stabilizing and repackaging plutonium is developed and presented. The approach utilizes results obtained by the DOE Working Group on the vulnerabilities associated with plutonium storage

  18. The plutonium danger

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ruiter, W. de

    1983-01-01

    Nobody can ignore the fact that plutonium is potentially very dangerous and the greatest danger concerning it lies in the spreading of nuclear weapons via nuclear energy programmes. The following seven different attitudes towards this problem are presented and discussed: 1) There is no connection between peaceful and military applications; 2) The problem cannot be prevented; 3) A technical solution must be found; 4) plutonium must be totally inaccessible to countries involved in acquiring nuclear weapons; 5) The use of plutonium for energy production should only occur in one multinational centre; 6) Dogmas in the nuclear industry must be enfeebled; 7) All developments in this area should stop. (C.F.)

  19. Plutonium Plant, Trombay

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yadav, J.S.; Agarwal, K.

    2017-01-01

    The journey of Indian nuclear fuel reprocessing started with the commissioning of Plutonium Plant (PP) at Trombay on 22"n"d January, 1965 with an aim to reprocess the spent fuel from research reactor CIRUS. The basic process chosen for the plant was Plutonium Uranium Reduction EXtraction (PUREX) process. In seventies, the plant was subjected to major design modifications and replacement of hardware, which later met the additional demand from research reactor DHRUVA. The augmented plutonium plant has been operating since 1983. Experience gained from this plant was very much helpful to design future reprocessing plant in the country

  20. Cigarette smoke and plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Filipy, R.E.

    1982-01-01

    The major objective of this project is to obtain experimental data that are directly applicable to resolving the question of whether cigarette smokers are at greater risk than nonsmokers to potential health effects of inhaled plutonium. Progress was made on two fronts during the past year. The autoradiographic technique developed from detection of plutonium on the interior surface of pulmonary airways (Annual Report, 1978) has been adapted to routine use in examining tracheas and bronchi of rats. Also, dogs exposed to cigarette smoke for over a year after inhalation of plutonium were killed and necropsied

  1. Estimated airborne release of plutonium from Atomics International's Nuclear Materials Development Facility in the Santa Susana site, California, as a result of postulated damage from severe wind and earthquake hazard

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mishima, J.; Ayer, J.E.

    1981-09-01

    The potential mass of airborne releases of plutonium (source term) that could result from wind and seismic damage is estimated for the Atomics International Company's Nuclear Materials Development Facility (NMDF) at the Santa Susana site in California. The postulated source terms will be useful as the basis for estimating the potential dose to the maximum exposed individual by inhalation and to the total population living within a prescribed radius of the site. The respirable fraction of airborne particles is thus the principal concern. The estimated source terms are based on the damage ratio, and the potential airborne releases if all enclosures suffer particular levels of damage. In an attempt to provide a realistic range of potential source terms that include most of the normal processing conditions, a best estimate bounded by upper and lower limits is provided. The range of source terms is calculated by combining a high best estimate and a low damage ratio, based on a fraction of enclosures suffering crush or perforation, with the airborne release from enclosures based upon an upper limit, average, and lower limit inventory of dispersible materials at risk. Two throughput levels are considered. The factors used to evaluate the fractional airborne release of materials and the exchange rates between enclosed and exterior atmospheres are discussed. The postulated damage and source terms are discussed for wind and earthquake hazard scenarios in order of their increasing severity

  2. Plutonium spectrophotometric analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Esteban, A.; Cassaniti, P.; Orosco, E.H.

    1990-01-01

    Plutonium ions in solution have absorption spectra so different that it is possible to use them for analytical purposes. Detailed studies have been performed in nitric solutions. Some very convenient methods for the determination of plutonium and its oxidation states, especially the ratios Pu(III):Pu(IV) and Pu(IV):Pu(VI) in a mixture of both, have been developed. These methods are described in this paper, including: a) Absorption spectra for plutonium (III), (IV), (VI) and mixtures. b) Relative extinction coefficients for the above mentioned species. c) Dependences of the relative extinction coefficients on the nitric acid concentration and the plutonium VI deviation from the Beer-Lambert law. The developed methods are simple and rapid and then, suitable in process control. Accuracy is improved when relative absorbance measurements are performed or controlled the variables which have effect on the spectra and extinction coefficients. (Author) [es

  3. French plutonium management program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Greneche, D.

    2002-01-01

    The French plutonium management program is summarized in this paper. The program considers nuclear generation as a major component of national electric power supply and includes the reprocessing of the spent fuel. (author)

  4. Learning more about plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    This digest brochure explains what plutonium is, where it comes from, how it is used, its recycling into Mox fuel, its half life, historical discovery, its presence in the environment, toxicity and radioactivity. (J.S.)

  5. Determination of plutonium in pure plutonium nitrate solutions - Gravimetric method

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    This International Standard specifies a precise and accurate gravimetric method for determining the concentration of plutonium in pure plutonium nitrate solutions and reference solutions, containing between 100 and 300 g of plutonium per litre, in a nitric acid medium. The weighed portion of the plutonium nitrate is treated with sulfuric acid and evaporated to dryness. The plutonium sulfate is decomposed and formed to oxide by heating in air. The oxide is ignited in air at 1200 to 1250 deg. C and weighed as stoichiometric plutonium dioxide, which is stable and non-hygroscopic

  6. Plutonium in coniferous forests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rantavaara, A.; Kostiainen, E.

    2002-01-01

    Our aim was to study the uptake of plutonium by trees, undervegetation and some wild foods. The ratio of 238 Pu/ 239,240 Pu in soil samples was determined for comparisons of the fallout origin. In twelve years the Chernobyl derived plutonium has not reached the mineral soil. This refers to a very slow downward migration in podsolic soil. The study confirmed also the low Pu uptake by vegetation and an insignificant contribution to human doses through wild foods. (au)

  7. Plutonium--uranium partitioning; alternate flowsheet Plutonium Reclamation Facility. [SEPHIS

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fort, L.A.

    1975-12-01

    The SEPHIS computer program was used to predict the transient and steady-state concentrations in a stage-wise scheme for the Pu reclamation solvent extraction system. With the aid of the computer an alternative flowsheet for Pu--U partitioning was constructed. The goal of the alternative program is to reduce Pu losses from the initial stripping column and reduce the quantity of Pu-bearing wastes from the solvent extraction system. (JSR)

  8. Bulging of cans containing plutonium residues. Summary report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Van Konynenburg, R.A.; Wood, D.H.; Condit, R.H.; Shikany, S.D.

    1996-03-01

    In 1994, two cans in the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Plutonium Facility were found to be bulging as a result of the generation of gases form the plutonium ash residues contained in the cans. This report describes the chronology of this discovery, the response actions that revealed other pressurized cans, the analysis of the causes, the short-term remedial action, a followup inspection of the short-term storage packages, and a review of proposed long-term remedial options

  9. Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) [SEC 1 THRU 11

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    ULLAH, M K

    2001-02-26

    The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) is located on the US Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site in south central Washington State. The DOE Richland Operations (DOE-RL) Project Hanford Management Contract (PHMC) is with Fluor Hanford Inc. (FH). Westinghouse Safety Management Systems (WSMS) provides management support to the PFP facility. Since 1991, the mission of the PFP has changed from plutonium material processing to preparation for decontamination and decommissioning (D and D). The PFP is in transition between its previous mission and the proposed D and D mission. The objective of the transition is to place the facility into a stable state for long-term storage of plutonium materials before final disposition of the facility. Accordingly, this update of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) reflects the current status of the buildings, equipment, and operations during this transition. The primary product of the PFP was plutonium metal in the form of 2.2-kg, cylindrical ingots called buttoms. Plutonium nitrate was one of several chemical compounds containing plutonium that were produced as an intermediate processing product. Plutonium recovery was performed at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF) and plutonium conversion (from a nitrate form to a metal form) was performed at the Remote Mechanical C (RMC) Line as the primary processes. Plutonium oxide was also produced at the Remote Mechanical A (RMA) Line. Plutonium processed at the PFP contained both weapons-grade and fuels-grade plutonium materials. The capability existed to process both weapons-grade and fuels-grade material through the PRF and only weapons-grade material through the RMC Line although fuels-grade material was processed through the line before 1984. Amounts of these materials exist in storage throughout the facility in various residual forms left from previous years of operations.

  10. Smart unattended systems for plutonium safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Menlove, H.O.; Abhold, M.; Eccleston, G.; Puckett, J.M.

    1996-01-01

    During the past decade, IAEA inspectors, national inspectors, and facility operators have used neutron coincidence counters and gamma-ray isotopics measurements extensively to measure the plutonium content of various forms of nuclear materials in the fuel cycle. Large automated facilities for fabricating plutonium fuel present both difficulties and challenges for improved accounting of nuclear materials. The traditional methods of sample measurements, requiring the transfer of the sample from the production line to the assay measurement station, are not possible in automated facilities. A bilateral safeguards agreement between the US Department of Energy (DOE) and Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC) in Japan was signed to develop and implement nondestructive assay (NDA) systems to provide continuous safeguards measurements for material accountancy in the robot-automated Plutonium Fuel Fabrication Facility (PFFF). The PFFF assay systems were required to operate in unattended mode with a size and fuel mass capability to match the robotics fuel manipulators. Unattended assay systems reduce the requirement for inspector''s oversight of measurement operations, reduce the inspector''s workload, and improve inspection efficiencies. In addition, unattended measurements become essential when facility constraints limit the access of inspectors to the operations area during material processing. Authentication techniques were incorporated into the NDA systems so that data obtained form unattended assays could be used by independent inspectors such as the IAEA. The standardized containers and robot-controlled fuel movements in automated facilities enable more accurate nondestructive assay (NDA) measurements than are possible in conventional nonautomated facilities. The NDA instrumentation can be custom designed and optimized for the particular measurement goal in the automated facility

  11. Plutonium-236 traces determination in plutonium-238 by α spectrometry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Acena, M.L.; Pottier, R.; Berger, R.

    1969-01-01

    Two methods are described in this report for the determination of plutonium-236 traces in plutonium-238 by a spectrometry using semi-conductor detectors. The first method involves a direct comparison of the areas under the peaks of the α spectra of plutonium-236 and plutonium-238. The electrolytic preparation of the sources is carried out after preliminary purification of the plutonium. The second method makes it possible to determine the 236 Pu/ 238 Pu ratio by comparing the areas of the α peaks of uranium-232 and uranium-234, which are the decay products of the two plutonium isotopes respectively. The uranium in the source, also deposited by electrolysis, is separated from a 1 mg amount of plutonium either by a T.L.A. extraction, or by the use of ion-exchange resins. The report ends with a discussion of the results obtained with plutonium of two different origins. (authors) [fr

  12. Automated amperometric plutonium assay system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Burt, M.C.

    1985-01-01

    The amperometric titration for plutonium assay has been used in the nuclear industry for over twenty years and has been in routine use at the Hanford Engineering Development Laboratory since 1976 for the analysis of plutonium oxide and mixed oxide fuel material for the Fast Flux Test Facility. It has proven itself to be an accurate and reliable method. The method may be used as a direct end point titration or an excess of titrant may be added and a back titration performed to aid in determination of the end point. Due to the slowness of the PuVI-FeII reaction it is difficult to recognize when the end point is being approached and is very time consuming if the current is allowed to decay to the residual value after each titrant addition. For this reason the back titration in which the rapid FeII-CrVI reaction occurs is used by most laboratories. The back titration is performed by the addition of excess ferrous solution followed by two measured aliquots of standard dichromate with measurement of cell current after each addition

  13. In search of plutonium: A nonproliferation journey

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hecker, Siegfried

    2010-02-01

    In February 1992, I landed in the formerly secret city of Sarov, the Russian Los Alamos, followed a few days later by a visit to Snezhinsk, their Livermore. The briefings we received of the Russian nuclear weapons program and tours of their plutonium, reactor, explosives, and laser facilities were mind boggling considering the Soviet Union was dissolved only two months earlier. This visit began a 17-year, 41 journey relationship with the Russian nuclear complex dedicated to working with them in partnership to protect and safeguard their weapons and fissile materials, while addressing the plight of their scientists and engineers. In the process, we solved a forty-year disagreement about the plutonium-gallium phase diagram and began a series of fundamental plutonium science workshops that are now in their tenth year. At the Yonbyon reprocessing facility in January 2004, my North Korean hosts had hoped to convince me that they have a nuclear deterrent. When I expressed skepticism, they asked if I wanted to see their ``product.'' I asked if they meant the plutonium; they replied, ``Well, yes.'' Thus, I wound up holding 200 grams of North Korean plutonium (in a sealed glass jar) to make sure it was heavy and warm. So began the first of my six journeys to North Korea to provide technical input to the continuing North Korean nuclear puzzle. In Trombay and Kalpakkam a few years later I visited the Indian nuclear research centers to try to understand how India's ambitious plans for nuclear power expansion can be accomplished safely and securely. I will describe these and other attempts to deal with the nonproliferation legacy of the cold war and the new challenges ahead. )

  14. 2015 In-Situ Gamma-Ray Assay of the West Cell Line in the 235-F Plutonium Fuel Form Facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Brand, A. D. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States). Savannah River National Lab. (SRNL); Aucott, T. J. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States). Savannah River National Lab. (SRNL); DiPrete, D. P. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States). Savannah River National Lab. (SRNL)

    2016-02-01

    In November and December 2015, scientists from SRNL took a series of in-situ gamma-ray measurements through the windows in front of Cells 6-9 on the west line of the PuFF facility using a shielded, 120% high-purity germanium detector. The detector efficiency was estimated using a combination of MCNP simulations and empirical measurements. Where possible, the distribution of the Pu-238 in the cells was determined using the Germanium Gamma-ray Imager (GeGI). This distribution was then fed into the MCNP model to quantify the Pu-238 in each cell. Data analysis was performed using three gamma rays emitted by Pu-238 (99.85 keV, 152.7 keV, and 766.4 keV) providing three independent estimates of the mass of Pu-238 holdup in each of the cells.

  15. Conversion of metal plutonium to plutonium dioxide by pyrochemical method

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Panov, A.V.; Subbotin, V.G. [Russian Federal Nuclear Center, ALL-Russian Science and Research Institute of Technical Physics, Snezhinsk (Russian Federation); Mashirev, V.P. [ALL-Russian Science and Research Institute of Chemical Technology, Moscow (Russian Federation)

    2000-07-01

    Report contains experimental results on metal plutonium of weapon origin samples conversion to plutonium dioxide by pyrochemical method. Circuits of processes are described. Their advantages and shortcomings are shown. Parameters of plutonium dioxide powders (phase and fraction compositions, poured density) manufactured by pyrochemical method in RFNC-VNIITF are shown as well. (authors)

  16. In-line measurement of plutonium and americium in mixed solutions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Li, T.K.

    1981-01-01

    A solution assay instrument (SAI) has been developed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory and installed in the plutonium purification and americium recovery process area in the Los Alamos Plutonium Processing Facility. The instrument is designed for accurate, timely, and simultaneous nondestructive analysis of plutonium and americium in process solutions that have a wide range of concentrations and Am/Pu ratios. For a 25-mL sample, the assay precision is 5 g/L within a 2000-s count time

  17. METHOD OF PRODUCING PLUTONIUM TETRAFLUORIDE

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tolley, W.B.; Smith, R.C.

    1959-12-15

    A process is presented for preparing plutonium tetrafluoride from plutonium(IV) oxalate. The oxalate is dried and decomposed at about 300 deg C to the dioxide, mixed with ammonium bifluoride, and the mixture is heated to between 50 and 150 deg C whereby ammonium plutonium fluoride is formed. The ammonium plutonium fluoride is then heated to about 300 deg C for volatilization of ammonium fluoride. Both heating steps are preferably carried out in an inert atmosphere.

  18. Plutonium assemblies in reload 1 of the Dodewaard Reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bairiot, H.; Deramaix, P.; Vandenberg, C.; Leenders, L.; Mostert, P.

    1977-01-01

    Since 1963, Belgonucleaire has been developing the design of plutonium assemblies of the island type (i.e., plutonium rods inserted in the control zone of the assembly and enriched uranium rods at the periphery) for light water reactors. The application to boiling water reactors (BWRs) led to the introduction, in April 1971, of two prototype plutonium island assemblies in the Dodewaard BWR (The Netherlands): Those assemblies incorporating plutonium in 42 percent of the rods are interchangeable with standard uranium assemblies of the same reload. Their design, which had to meet these criteria, was performed using the routine order in use at Belgonucleaire; experimental checks included a mock-up configuration simulated in the VENUS critical facility at Mol and open-vessel cold critical experiments performed in the Dodewaard core. The pelleted plutonium rods were fabricated and controlled by Belgonucleaire following the manufacturing procedures developed at the production plant. In one of the assemblies, three vibrated plutonium fuel rods with a lower fuel density were introduced in the three most highly rated positions to reduce the power rating. Those plutonium assemblies experienced peak pellet ratings up to 535 W/cm and were discharged in April 1974 after having reached a mean burnup of approximately 21,000 MWd/MT. In-core instrumentation during operation, visual examinations, and reactivity substitution experiments during reactor shutdown did not indicate any special feature for those assemblies compared to the standard uranium assemblies, thereby demonstrating their interchangeability

  19. Studies on persons exposed to plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Voelz, G.L.; Stebbings, J.H.; Hempelmann, L.H.; Haxton, L.K.; York, D.A.

    1978-01-01

    The results of four studies of persons exposed, or potentially exposed, to plutonium are summarized. The studies are: a five-year update on clinical examinations and health experience of 26 Manhattan District workers heavily exposed at Los Alamos in 1944 to 1945; a 30-year mortality follow-up of 224 white male workers with plutonium body burdens of 10 nCi or more; a review of cancer mortality rates between 1950 and 1969 among Los Alamos County, New Mexico, male residents, all of whom have worked in or have lived within a few kilometers of a major plutonium plant and other nuclear facilities; and a review of cancer incidence rates between 1969 and 1974 in male residents of Los Alamos County. No excess of mortality due to any cause was observed in the 224 male subjects with the highest plutonium exposures at Los Alamos. Clinical examinations of the Manhattan District workers, whose average age in 1976 was 56 years, show them to be active persons with diseases that are not unusual for their ages. The two deaths in this group over the past 30 years have not been due to cancer. Mortality and incidence data indicate no excess of lung cancer in Los Alamos County males

  20. Aqueous Solution Chemistry of Plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Clark, David L. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2014-01-28

    Things I have learned working with plutonium: Chemistry of plutonium is complex; Redox equilibria make Pu solution chemistry particularly challenging in the absence of complexing ligands; Understanding this behavior is key to successful Pu chemistry experiments; There is no suitable chemical analog for plutonium.

  1. Evaluation technology for burnup and generated amount of plutonium by measurement of Xenon isotopic ratio in dissolver off-gas at reprocessing facility (Joint research)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Okano, Masanori; Kuno, Takehiko; Shirouzu, Hidetomo; Yamada, Keiji; Sakai, Toshio; Takahashi, Ichiro; Charlton, William S.; Wells, Cyndi A.; Hemberger, Philip H.

    2006-12-01

    The amount of Pu in the spent fuel was evaluated from Xe isotopic ratio in off-gas in reprocessing facility, is related to burnup. Six batches of dissolver off-gas (DOG) at spent fuel dissolution process were sampled from the main stack in Tokai Reprocessing Plant (TRP) during BWR fuel (approx. 30GWD/MTU) reprocessing campaign. Xenon isotopic ratio was determined with Gas Chromatography/Mass Spectrometry. Burnup and generated amount of Pu were evaluated with Noble Gas Environmental Monitoring Application code (NOVA), developed by Los Alamos National Laboratory. Inferred burnup evaluated by Xe isotopic measurements and NOVA were in good agreement with those of the declared burnup in the range from -3.8% to 7.1%. Also, the inferred amount of Pu in spent fuel was in good agreed with those of the declared amount of Pu calculated by ORIGEN code in the range from -0.9% to 4.7%. The evaluation technique is applicable for both burnup credit to achieve efficient criticality safety control and a new measurement method for safeguards inspection. (author)

  2. Physics of plutonium recycling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The commercial recycling of plutonium as PuO 2 /UO 2 mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel is an established practice in pressurised water reactors (PWRs) in several countries, the main motivation being the consumption of plutonium arising from spent fuel reprocessing. Although the same motivating factors apply in the case of boiling water reactors (BWRs), they have lagged behind PWRs for various reasons, and MOX utilisation in BWRs has been implemented in only a few reactors to date. One of the reasons is that the nuclear design of BWR MOX assemblies (or bundles) is more complex than that of PWR assemblies. Recognizing the need and the timeliness to address this issue at the international level, the OECD/NEA Working Party on the Physics of Plutonium Fuels and Innovative Fuel Cycles (WPPR) conducted a physics code benchmark test for a BWR assembly. This volume reports on the benchmark results and conclusions that can be drawn from it. (authors)

  3. Remote handling in the Plutonium Immobilization Project: Puck handling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brault, J.R.

    2000-01-01

    Since the break up of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War, the US and Russia have been negotiating ways to reduce their nuclear stockpiles. Economics is one of the reasons behind this, but another important reason is safeguarding these materials from unstable organizations and countries. With the downsizing of the nuclear stockpiles, large quantities of plutonium are being declared excess and must be safely disposed of. The Savannah River Site (SRS) has been selected as the site where the immobilization facility will be located. Conceptual design and process development commenced in 1998. SRS will immobilize excess plutonium in a ceramic waste form and encapsulate it in vitrified high level waste in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) canister. These canisters will then be interred in the national repository at Yucca Mountain, New Mexico. The facility is divided into three distinct operating areas: Plutonium Conversion, First Stage Immobilization, and Second Stage Immobilization. This paper will discuss the first two operations

  4. Remote material handling in the Plutonium Immobilization Project. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brault, J.R.

    2000-01-01

    With the downsizing of the US and Russian nuclear stockpiles, large quantities of weapons-usable plutonium in the US are being declared excess and will be disposed of by the Department of Energy Fissile Materials Disposition Program. To implement this program, DOE has selected the Savannah River Site (SRS) for the construction and operation of three new facilities: pit disassembly and conversion; mixed oxide fuel fabrication; and plutonium immobilization. The Plutonium Immobilization Project (PIP) will immobilize a portion of the excess plutonium in a hybrid ceramic and glass form containing high level waste for eventual disposal in a geologic repository. The PIP is divided into three distinct operating areas: Plutonium Conversion, First Stage Immobilization, and Second Stage Immobilization. Processing technology for the PIP is being developed jointly by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Westinghouse Savannah River Company. This paper will discuss development of the automated unpacking and sorting operations in the conversion area, and the automated puck and tray handling operations in the first stage immobilization area. Due to the high radiation levels and toxicity of the materials to be disposed of, the PIP will utilize automated equipment in a contained (glovebox) facility. Most operations involving plutonium-bearing materials will be performed remotely, separating personnel from the radiation source. Source term materials will be removed from the operations during maintenance. Maintenance will then be performed hands on within the containment using glove ports

  5. Plutonium microstructures. Part 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cramer, E.M.; Bergin, J.B.

    1981-09-01

    This report is the first of three parts in which Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory metallographers exhibit a consolidated set of illustrations of inclusions that are seen in plutonium metal as a consequence of inherent and tramp impurities, alloy additions, and thermal or mechanical treatments. This part includes illustrations of nonmetallic and intermetallic inclusions characteristic of major impurity elements as an aid to identifying unknowns. It also describes historical aspects of the increased purity of laboratory plutonium samples, and it gives the composition of the etchant solutions and describes the etching procedure used in the preparation of each illustrated sample. 25 figures

  6. Potentiometric titration of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silver, G.L.

    1978-01-01

    In the potentiometric titration of plutonium(III), it has been customary to take the equivalence point as the inflection point on a plot of potential vs. volume of titrant. It have not been, however, demonstrated, that the stoichiometric end point corresponds to the inflection point. Suggestions are made according to which these points may not correspond in the potentiometric titration of plutonium(III), as these titrations are ordinarily concluded in a period of time which is short compared to the time required for valence state rearrangement through disproportionation. (T.G.)

  7. Precipitation of plutonium (III) oxalate and calcination to plutonium oxide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Esteban, A.; Orosco, E.H.; Cassaniti, P.; Greco, L.; Adelfang, P.

    1989-01-01

    The plutonium based fuel fabrication requires the conversion of the plutonium nitrate solution from nuclear fuel reprocessing into pure PuO2. The conversion method based on the precipitation of plutonium (III) oxalate and subsequent calcination has been studied in detail. In this procedure, plutonium (III) oxalate is precipitated, at room temperature, by the slow addition of 1M oxalic acid to the feed solution, containing from 5-100 g/l of plutonium in 1M nitric acid. Before precipitation, the plutonium is adjusted to trivalent state by addition of 1M ascorbic acid in the presence of an oxidation inhibitor such as hydrazine. Finally, the precipitate is calcinated at 700 deg C to obtain PuO2. A flowsheet is proposed in this paper including: a) A study about the conditions to adjust the plutonium valence. b) Solubility data of plutonium (III) oxalate and measurements of plutonium losses to the filtrate and wash solution. c) Characterization of the obtained products. Plutonium (III) oxalate has several potential advantages over similar conversion processes. These include: 1) Formation of small particle sizes powder with good pellets fabrication characteristics. 2) The process is rather insensitive to most process variables, except nitric acid concentration. 3) Ambient temperature operations. 4) The losses of plutonium to the filtrate are less than in other conversion processes. (Author) [es

  8. Plutonium contents of field crops in the southeastern US

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Adriano, D.C.; Corey, J.C.; Dahlman, R.C.

    1980-01-01

    Agricultural crops were grown at the US Department of Energy Savannah River Plant (SRP) and at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) on soils at field sites containing plutonium concentrations above background levels from nuclear weapon tests. Major US grain crops were grown adjacent to a reprocessing facility at SRP, which releases low chronic levels of plutonium through an emission stack. Major vegetable crops were grown at the ORNL White Oak Creek floodplain, which received plutonium effluent wastes in 1944 from the Manhattan Project weapon development. In general, the concentration ratios of vegetative parts of crops at SRP were approximately one order of magnitude higher than those at ORNL, which indicates the influence of aerial deposition of plutonium at the SRP site

  9. Plutonium isotopes in the environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Holm, E.

    1977-12-01

    Determination of plutonium and americium by ion exchange and alpha-spectrometry. Deposition of global fall-out and accumulated area-content of 238 Pu, 239 Pu, 240 Pu, 241 Pu, 242 Pu and 241 Am in central Sweden (62.3 deg N, 12.4 deg E), by using the lichen species Cladonia alpestris as bioindicator. Retention and distribution of plutonium in carpets of lichen and soil. Transfer of plutonium from lichen to reindeer and man. Absorbed dose in reindeer and man from plutonium. Basic studies of plutonium and americium in the western Mediterranean surface waters, with emphases on particulate form of the transuranics. (author)

  10. LLNL Site plan for a MOX fuel lead assembly mission in support of surplus plutonium disposition

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bronson, M.C.

    1997-10-01

    The principal facilities that LLNL would use to support a MOX Fuel Lead Assembly Mission are Building 332 and Building 334. Both of these buildings are within the security boundary known as the LLNL Superblock. Building 332 is the LLNL Plutonium Facility. As an operational plutonium facility, it has all the infrastructure and support services required for plutonium operations. The LLNL Plutonium Facility routinely handles kilogram quantities of plutonium and uranium. Currently, the building is limited to a plutonium inventory of 700 kilograms and a uranium inventory of 300 kilograms. Process rooms (excluding the vaults) are limited to an inventory of 20 kilograms per room. Ongoing operations include: receiving SSTS, material receipt, storage, metal machining and casting, welding, metal-to-oxide conversion, purification, molten salt operations, chlorination, oxide calcination, cold pressing and sintering, vitrification, encapsulation, chemical analysis, metallography and microprobe analysis, waste material processing, material accountability measurements, packaging, and material shipping. Building 334 is the Hardened Engineering Test Building. This building supports environmental and radiation measurements on encapsulated plutonium and uranium components. Other existing facilities that would be used to support a MOX Fuel Lead Assembly Mission include Building 335 for hardware receiving and storage and TRU and LLW waste storage and shipping facilities, and Building 331 or Building 241 for storage of depleted uranium.

  11. LLNL Site plan for a MOX fuel lead assembly mission in support of surplus plutonium disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bronson, M.C.

    1997-01-01

    The principal facilities that LLNL would use to support a MOX Fuel Lead Assembly Mission are Building 332 and Building 334. Both of these buildings are within the security boundary known as the LLNL Superblock. Building 332 is the LLNL Plutonium Facility. As an operational plutonium facility, it has all the infrastructure and support services required for plutonium operations. The LLNL Plutonium Facility routinely handles kilogram quantities of plutonium and uranium. Currently, the building is limited to a plutonium inventory of 700 kilograms and a uranium inventory of 300 kilograms. Process rooms (excluding the vaults) are limited to an inventory of 20 kilograms per room. Ongoing operations include: receiving SSTS, material receipt, storage, metal machining and casting, welding, metal-to-oxide conversion, purification, molten salt operations, chlorination, oxide calcination, cold pressing and sintering, vitrification, encapsulation, chemical analysis, metallography and microprobe analysis, waste material processing, material accountability measurements, packaging, and material shipping. Building 334 is the Hardened Engineering Test Building. This building supports environmental and radiation measurements on encapsulated plutonium and uranium components. Other existing facilities that would be used to support a MOX Fuel Lead Assembly Mission include Building 335 for hardware receiving and storage and TRU and LLW waste storage and shipping facilities, and Building 331 or Building 241 for storage of depleted uranium

  12. Investigation of plutonium (4) hydroxoformates

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Andryushin, V.G.; Belov, V.A.; Galaktionov, S.V.; Kozhevnikov, P.B.; Matyukha, V.A.; Shmidt, V.S.

    1982-01-01

    Deposition processes of plutonium (4) hydroxoformates in the system Pu(NO 3 ) 4 -HNO 3 -HCoOH-N6 4 OH-H 2 O have been studied in pH range 0.2-10.7 at total plutonium concentration in the system 100 g/l. It is shown that under the conditions plutonium (4) hydrolysis takes place with the formation of hydroxoformates. A local maximum of plutonium (4) hydroxoformate solubility in the range pH=3.8-4.8, which is evidently conditioned by the formation of soluble formate complex of plutonium in the region, is pointed out. The basic plutonium (4) formates of the composition PuOsub(x)(OH)sub(y)(COOH)sub(4-2x-y)xnHsub(2)O, where 1,3 >=x >= 0.7, 1.7 >= y >= 1.0 and n=1.5-7.0, are singled out, their thermal stability being studied. Density of the crystals and plutonium dioxide, formed during their thermal decomposition, is measured. It is established that for plutonium (4) hydroxoformates common regularities of the influence of salt composition (OH - -, CHOO - - and H 2 O-group numbers in the mulecule) on position of temperature decomposition effects and on the density of compounds, which have been previously found during the study of thorium and plutonium hydroxosalts are observed. It is shown that the density of plutonium dioxide decreases with the increase of hydration and hydrolysis degree of the initial plutonium hydroxoformate

  13. International plutonium policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-02-01

    As any other fissile material, the plutonium raises several utilization problems, particularly as far as diversion by sub-national groups or proliferation are concerned. The purpose of this paper is to show that these problems can be given reasonable solutions avoiding over penalties on energy production

  14. Plutonium safety training course

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moe, H.J.

    1976-03-01

    This course seeks to achieve two objectives: to provide initial safety training for people just beginning work with plutonium, and to serve as a review and reference source for those already engaged in such work. Numerous references have been included to provide information sources for those wishing to pursue certain topics more fully. The first part of the course content deals with the general safety approach used in dealing with hazardous materials. Following is a discussion of the four properties of plutonium that lead to potential hazards: radioactivity, toxicity, nuclear properties, and spontaneous ignition. Next, the various hazards arising from these properties are treated. The relative hazards of both internal and external radiation sources are discussed, as well as the specific hazards when plutonium is the source. Similarly, the general hazards involved in a criticality, fire, or explosion are treated. Comments are made concerning the specific hazards when plutonium is involved. A brief summary comparison between the hazards of the transplutonium nuclides relative to 239 Pu follows. The final portion deals with control procedures with respect to contamination, internal and external exposure, nuclear safety, and fire protection. The philosophy and approach to emergency planning are also discussed

  15. Atomic spectrum of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blaise, J.; Fred, M.; Gutmacher, R.G.

    1984-08-01

    This report contains plutonium wavelengths, energy level classifications, and other spectroscopic data accumulated over the past twenty years at Laboratoire Aime Cotton (LAC) Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The primary purpose was term analysis: deriving the energy levels in terms of quantum numbers and electron configurations, and evaluating the Slater-Condon and other parameters from the levels

  16. Plutonium: An introduction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Condit, R.H.

    1993-10-01

    This report is a summary of the history and properties of plutonium. It presents information on the atoms, comparing chemical and nuclear properties. It looks at the history of the atom, including its discovery and production methods. It summarizes the metallurgy and chemistry of the element. It also describes means of detecting and measuring the presence and quantity of the element

  17. Plutonium cores of zenith

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Barclay, F R; Cameron, I R; Drageset, A; Freemantle, R G; Wilson, D J

    1965-03-15

    The report describes a series of experiments carried out with plutonium fuel in the heated zero power reactor ZENITH, with the aim of testing current theoretical methods, with particular reference to excess reactivity, temperature coefficients, differential spectrum and reaction rate distributions. Two cores of widely different fissile/moderator atom ratios were loaded in order to test the theory under significantly varied spectrum conditions.

  18. Plutonium and textbooks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silver, G.L.

    2008-01-01

    Chemical equilibrium is not characterized by equilibrium constants alone. At least one conservation principle is necessary. Textbook descriptions of plutonium chemistry that are based on two-reaction-product disproportionation equations, or do not recognize the conservation principles, are incomplete and potentially misleading. (author)

  19. Japan's plutonium economy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hecht, M.M.

    1994-01-01

    Japan's plutonium economy is based on the most efficient use of nuclear energy, as envisioned under the Atoms for Peace program of the 1950s and 1960s. The nuclear pioneers assumed that all nations would want to take full advantage of atomic energy, recycling waste into new fuel to derive as much energy as possible from this resource

  20. Transport of plutonium nitrate

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-02-01

    This leaflet discusses the subject under the headings: why do we need plutonium; why must we transport it; what action is carried out; how is it moved; what are the risks. The transport of the material in specially designed containers, from Dounreay in Caithness by road and sea to Sellafield in Cumbria, is described. (U.K.)

  1. Characterizing Surplus US Plutonium for Disposition - 13199

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Allender, Jeffrey S. [Savannah River National Laboratory, Aiken SC 29808 (United States); Moore, Edwin N. [Moore Nuclear Energy, LLC, Savannah River Site, Aiken SC 29808 (United States)

    2013-07-01

    The United States (US) has identified 61.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium that is permanently excess to use in nuclear weapons programs, including 47.2 MT of weapons-grade plutonium. Surplus inventories will be stored safely by the Department of Energy (DOE) and then transferred to facilities that will prepare the plutonium for permanent disposition. The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) operates a Feed Characterization program for the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (OFMD) of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the DOE Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM). SRNL manages a broad program of item tracking through process history, laboratory analysis, and non-destructive assay. A combination of analytical techniques allows SRNL to predict the isotopic and chemical properties that qualify materials for disposition through the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). The research also defines properties that are important for other disposition paths, including disposal to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) as transuranic waste (TRUW) or to high-level waste (HLW) systems. (authors)

  2. Smart unattended systems for plutonium safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Menlove, H.O.; Abhold, M.; Eccleston, G.; Puckett, J.M.

    1996-01-01

    Large automated facilities for fabricating plutonium fuel present both difficulties and challenges for improved accounting of nuclear materials. The traditional methods of sample measurements, requiring the transfer of the sample from the production line to the assay measurement station, are not possible in automated facilities. The robotics used for automation require special containers for nuclear material that cannot be easily removed from the production line. Safety and radiation protection considerations also require that the assay instrumentation be installed in the fuel production lines because, in general, personnel cannot be in the fuel-handling area with nuclear material during operations. Such operational constraints are common in many of the modern facilities that have been designed for fabricating and processing plutonium fuel. A bilateral safeguards agreement between the US Department of Energy (DOE) and Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC) in Japan was signed to develop and implement nondestructive assay (NDA) systems to provide continuous safeguards measurements for material accountancy in the robot-automated Plutonium Fuel Fabrication Facility (PFFF). The PFFF assay systems were required to operate in unattended mode with a size and fuel mass capability to match the robotics fuel manipulators. Unattended assay systems reduce the requirement for inspector's oversight of measurement operations, reduce the inspector's workload, and improve inspection efficiencies. In addition, unattended measurements become essential when facility constraints limit the access of inspectors to the operations area during material processing. Authentication techniques were incorporated into the NDA systems so that data obtained from unattended assays could be used by independent inspectors such as the IAEA

  3. Detection and measurement of gamma-ray self-attenuation in plutonium residues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Prettyman, T.H.; Foster, L.A.; Estep, R.J.

    1996-01-01

    A new method to correct for self-attenuation in gamma-ray assays of plutonium is presented. The underlying assumptions of the technique are based on a simple but accurate physical model of plutonium residues, particularly pyrochemical salts, in which it is assumed that the plutonium is divided into two portions, each of which can be treated separately from the standpoint of gamma-ray analysis: a portion that is in the form of plutonium metal shot; and a dilute portion that is mixed with the matrix. The performance of the technique is evaluated using assays of plutonium residues by tomographic gamma scanning at the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility. The ability of the method to detect saturation conditions is examined

  4. PFPF canister counter for foreign plutonium (PCAS-3) hardware operations and procedures manual

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Menlove, H.O.; Baca, J.; Kroncke, K.E.; Miller, M.C.; Takahashi, S.; Seki, S.; Inose, S.; Yamamoto, T.

    1993-01-01

    A neutron coincidence counter has been designed for the measurement of plutonium powder contained in tall storage canisters. The counter was designed for installation in the Plutonium Fuel Production Facility fabrication plant. Each canister contains from one to five cans of PuO 2 . The neutron counter measures the spontaneous-fission rate from the plutonium and, when this is combined with the plutonium isotopic ratios, the plutonium mass is determined. The system can accommodate plutonium loadings up to 12 kg, with 10 kg being a typical loading. Software has been developed to permit the continuous operation of the system in an unattended mode. Authentication techniques have been developed for the system. This manual describes the system and its operation and gives performance and calibration parameters for typical applications

  5. Uranium, plutonium and co

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sauerbrey, Roland; Joehnk, Peter

    2016-01-01

    To date there is no repository facility for highly radioactive and heat-generating waste in Germany. This politically ''hot'' topic is undeniably a very big, urgent problem in our society. The Helmholtz Association of German Research Centers is dedicated to developing scientific solutions for such issues. It looks back on 20 years of history: In 1995 the loosely organized collective bearing the name ''Working Association of Large-Scale Research Institutes'' (Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Grossforschungseinrichtungen) became an association of now 18 research centers. These centers collectively work in a total of six research areas. While the HZDR has only belonged to the largest research association in Germany since 2011, repository research was already on the agenda way back when the Rossendorf research center established itself in 1992 after the fall of the Berlin Wall. A good enough reason to examine the results from about 20 years of repository research in Dresden in more detail. In this issue of ''discovered'' we will take an inside look at radiochemical, radiogeological, and microbiological labs, look over the shoulders of researchers using the ''Rossendorf Beamline'' at the European Synchrotron Radiation Facility in Grenoble, and descend hundreds of meters into Finnish, Swedish, and Swiss research labs. How do ''uranium, plutonium, and co.'' react with mineral surfaces in environments that are low in oxygen or watery? How do they interact with microorganisms deep underground? And how can host rock or other materials be used as technical barriers to prevent the spread of radioactive substances? In order to answer these and further questions, the researchers of the HZDR use a wide range of spectroscopic methods. They expose test samples to lasers, infrared light, and X-rays or use the fluorescent properties of certain compounds to learn about the behavior of actinides

  6. Uranium, plutonium and co

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sauerbrey, Roland; Joehnk, Peter (eds.)

    2016-04-15

    To date there is no repository facility for highly radioactive and heat-generating waste in Germany. This politically ''hot'' topic is undeniably a very big, urgent problem in our society. The Helmholtz Association of German Research Centers is dedicated to developing scientific solutions for such issues. It looks back on 20 years of history: In 1995 the loosely organized collective bearing the name ''Working Association of Large-Scale Research Institutes'' (Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Grossforschungseinrichtungen) became an association of now 18 research centers. These centers collectively work in a total of six research areas. While the HZDR has only belonged to the largest research association in Germany since 2011, repository research was already on the agenda way back when the Rossendorf research center established itself in 1992 after the fall of the Berlin Wall. A good enough reason to examine the results from about 20 years of repository research in Dresden in more detail. In this issue of ''discovered'' we will take an inside look at radiochemical, radiogeological, and microbiological labs, look over the shoulders of researchers using the ''Rossendorf Beamline'' at the European Synchrotron Radiation Facility in Grenoble, and descend hundreds of meters into Finnish, Swedish, and Swiss research labs. How do ''uranium, plutonium, and co.'' react with mineral surfaces in environments that are low in oxygen or watery? How do they interact with microorganisms deep underground? And how can host rock or other materials be used as technical barriers to prevent the spread of radioactive substances? In order to answer these and further questions, the researchers of the HZDR use a wide range of spectroscopic methods. They expose test samples to lasers, infrared light, and X-rays or use the fluorescent properties of certain compounds to learn about the behavior of actinides

  7. Use of plutonium for power production

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1965-01-01

    The panel reviewed available information on various aspects of plutonium utilization, such as physics of plutonium, technology of plutonium fuels in thermal and fast reactors, behaviour of plutonium fuel under reactor irradiation, technological and economic aspects of plutonium fuel cycle. Refs, figs and tabs

  8. Plutonium Finishing Plant. Interim plutonium stabilization engineering study

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sevigny, G.J.; Gallucci, R.H.; Garrett, S.M.K.; Geeting, J.G.H.; Goheen, R.S.; Molton, P.M.; Templeton, K.J.; Villegas, A.J. [Pacific Northwest Lab., Richland, WA (United States); Nass, R. [Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (United States)

    1995-08-01

    This report provides the results of an engineering study that evaluated the available technologies for stabilizing the plutonium stored at the Plutonium Finishing Plant located at the hanford Site in southeastern Washington. Further processing of the plutonium may be required to prepare the plutonium for interim (<50 years) storage. Specifically this document provides the current plutonium inventory and characterization, the initial screening process, and the process descriptions and flowsheets of the technologies that passed the initial screening. The conclusions and recommendations also are provided. The information contained in this report will be used to assist in the preparation of the environmental impact statement and to help decision makers determine which is the preferred technology to process the plutonium for interim storage.

  9. Plutonium Finishing Plant. Interim plutonium stabilization engineering study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sevigny, G.J.; Gallucci, R.H.; Garrett, S.M.K.; Geeting, J.G.H.; Goheen, R.S.; Molton, P.M.; Templeton, K.J.; Villegas, A.J.; Nass, R.

    1995-08-01

    This report provides the results of an engineering study that evaluated the available technologies for stabilizing the plutonium stored at the Plutonium Finishing Plant located at the hanford Site in southeastern Washington. Further processing of the plutonium may be required to prepare the plutonium for interim (<50 years) storage. Specifically this document provides the current plutonium inventory and characterization, the initial screening process, and the process descriptions and flowsheets of the technologies that passed the initial screening. The conclusions and recommendations also are provided. The information contained in this report will be used to assist in the preparation of the environmental impact statement and to help decision makers determine which is the preferred technology to process the plutonium for interim storage

  10. Plutonium focus area: Technology summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-03-01

    To ensure research and development programs focus on the most pressing environmental restoration and waste management problems at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the Assistant Secretary for the Office of Environmental Management (EM) established a working group in August 1993 to implement a new approach to research and technology development. As part of this approach, EM developed a management structure and principles that led to creation of specific focus areas. These organizations were designed to focus scientific and technical talent throughout DOE and the national scientific community on major environmental restoration and waste management problems facing DOE. The focus area approach provides the framework for inter-site cooperation and leveraging of resources on common problems. After the original establishment of five major focus areas within the Office of Technology Development (EM-50), the Nuclear Materials Stabilization Task Group (NMSTG, EM-66) followed EM-50's structure and chartered the Plutonium Focus Area (PFA). NMSTG's charter to the PFA, described in detail later in this book, plays a major role in meeting the EM-66 commitments to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB). The PFA is a new program for FY96 and as such, the primary focus of revision 0 of this Technology Summary is an introduction to the Focus Area; its history, development, and management structure, including summaries of selected technologies being developed. Revision 1 to the Plutonium Focus Area Technology Summary is slated to include details on all technologies being developed, and is currently planned for release in August 1996. The following report outlines the scope and mission of the Office of Environmental Management, EM-60, and EM-66 organizations as related to the PFA organizational structure

  11. Safeguardability of the vitrification option for disposal of plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pillay, K.K.S. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)

    1996-05-01

    Safeguardability of the vitrification option for plutonium disposition is rather complex and there is no experience base in either domestic or international safeguards for this approach. In the present treaty regime between the US and the states of the former Soviet Union, bilaterial verifications are considered more likely with potential for a third-party verification of safeguards. There are serious technological limitations to applying conventional bulk handling facility safeguards techniques to achieve independent verification of plutonium in borosilicate glass. If vitrification is the final disposition option chosen, maintaining continuity of knowledge of plutonium in glass matrices, especially those containing boron and those spike with high-level wastes or {sup 137}Cs, is beyond the capability of present-day safeguards technologies and nondestructive assay techniques. The alternative to quantitative measurement of fissile content is to maintain continuity of knowledge through a combination of containment and surveillance, which is not the international norm for bulk handling facilities.

  12. Remote handling in the Plutonium Immobilization Project: Plutonium conversion and first stage immobilization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brault, J.R.

    2000-01-01

    Since the break up of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia have been negotiating ways to reduce their nuclear stockpiles. Economics is one of the reasons behind this, but another important reason is safeguarding these materials from unstable organizations and countries. With the downsizing of the nuclear stockpiles, large quantities of plutonium are being declared excess and must be safely disposed of. The Savannah River Site (SRS) has been selected as the site where the immobilization facility will be located. Conceptual design and process development commenced in 1998. SRS will immobilize excess plutonium in a ceramic waste form and encapsulate it in vitrified high level waste in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) canister. These canisters will then be interred in the national repository at Yucca Mountain, New Mexico. The facility is divided into three distinct operating areas: Plutonium Conversion, First Stage Immobilization, and Second Stage Immobilization. This paper will discuss the first two operations

  13. Chemistry of plutonium revealed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Connick, R.E.

    1992-01-01

    In 1941 one goal of the Manhattan Project was to unravel the chemistry of the synthetic element plutonium as rapidly as possible. In this paper the work carried out at Berkeley from the spring of 1942 to the summer of 1945 is described briefly. The aqueous chemistry of plutonium is quite remarkable. Important insights were obtained from tracer experiments, but the full complexity was not revealed until macroscopic amounts (milligrams) became available. Because processes for separation from fission products were based on aqueous solutions, such solution chemistry was emphasized, particularly precipitation and oxidation-reduction behavior. The latter turned out to be unusually intricate when it was discovered that two more oxidation states existed in aqueous solution than had previously been suspected. Further, an equilibrium was rapidly established among the four aqueous oxidation states, while at the same time any three were not in equilibrium. These and other observations made while doing a crash study of a previously unknown element are reported

  14. Strategies for the plutonium utilization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zouain, D.M.; Lima, J.O.V.; Sakamoto, L.H.

    1981-11-01

    A review of the activities involving plutonium (its recycle, utilization and technological status and perspectives) is done. These informations are useful for an economic viability study for the plutonium utilization in thermal reactors (recycling) and in fast breeders reactor (FBR), trying to collect the major number of informations about these subjects. The initial phase describes the present status and projections of plutonium accumulation and requirements. Then, the technological process are described and some strategies are analyzed. (E.G.) [pt

  15. Plutonium in the environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kudo, A.

    2001-01-01

    The first volume of the new series, Radioactivity in the Environment, focuses on the environmental occurrence, the speciation, the behaviour, the fate, the applications and the health consequences of that much-feared and much-publicised element, plutonium. Featuring a collection of selected, peer-reviewed, up-to-date papers by leading researchers in the field, this work provides a state-of-the-art description of plutonium in the environment. This title helps to explain where present frontiers are drawn in our continuing efforts to understand the science of environmental plutonium and will help to place widespread concerns into perspective. As a whole this new book series on environmental radioactivity addresses, at academic research level, the key aspects of this socially important and complex interdisciplinary subject. Presented objectively and with the ultimate authority gained from the many contributions by the world's leading experts, the negative and positive consequences of having a radioactive world around us will be documented and given perspective. refs

  16. F. Biological hazards of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1976-01-01

    Plutonium is an unavoidable result of present nuclear power programmes. Its predominant isotopes are extremely long-lived and very toxic if absorbed in the body. In view of the increasing potential for plutonium and man to come into contact, the consequences of any plutonium release into the environment should be scientifically examined. This report is an attempt to place in one document a fully referenced account of the on-going work in many areas. There are three sections. Part 1 deals with the amounts of plutonium available in the fuel cycle, its properties and the probability of routine or accidental release. Part 2 examines the ways in which plutonium can reach man, in particular through food chains or inhalation. Part 3 details the biological effects of plutonium once it is absorbed into the body, assesses the amounts likely to be harmful and discusses the adequacy of present standards for plutonium burdens. There are two appendices. The likely differences between Pu-239, the most studied isotope, and other plutonium isotopes or transuranic nuclides are outlined in Appendix A. Appendix B contains a fuller account of the ways in which the fate of ingested or inhaled plutonium have been determined

  17. Plutonium in the marine environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jarvis, N.V.; Linder, P.W.; Wade, P.W.

    1994-01-01

    The shipping of plutonium from Europe to Japan around the Cape is a contentious issue which has raised public concern that South Africa may be at risk to plutonium exposure should an accident occur. The paper describes the containers in which the plutonium (in the form of plutonium oxide, PuO 2 ) is housed and consequences of the unlikely event of these becoming ruptured. Wind-borne pollution is considered not to be a likely scenario, with the plutonium oxide particles more likely to remain practically insoluble and sediment. Plutonium aqueous and environmental chemistry is briefly discussed. Some computer modelling whereby plutonium oxide is brought into contact with seawater has been performed and the results are presented. The impact on marine organisms is discussed in terms of studies performed at marine dump sites and after the crash of a bomber carrying nuclear warheads in Thule, Greenland in 1968. Various pathways from the sea to land are considered in the light of studies done at Sellafield, a reprocessing plant in the United Kingdom. Some recent debates in the popular scientific press, such as that on the leukemia cluster at Sellafield, are described. Plutonium biochemistry and toxicity are discussed as well as medical histories of workers exposed to plutonium. 35 refs., 2 tabs., 1 fig

  18. Plutonium scrap processing at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nixon, A.E.; McKerley, B.J.; Christensen, E.L.

    1980-01-01

    The Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory currently has the newest plutonium handling facility in the nation. Los Alamos has been active in the processing of plutonium almost since the discovery of this man-made element in 1941. One of the functions of the new facility is the processing of plutonium scrap generated at LASL and other sites. The feed for the scrap processing program is extremely varied, and a wide variety of contaminants are often encountered. Depending upon the scrap matrix and contaminants present, the majority of material receives a nitric acid/hydrofluoric acid or nitric acid/calcium fluoride leach. The plutonium nitrate solutions are then loaded onto an anion exchange column charged with DOWEX 1 x 4, 50 to 100 mesh, nitrate form resin. The column is eluted with 0.48 M hydroxyl amine nitrate. The Pu(NO 3 ) 3 is then precipitated as plutonium III oxalate which is calcined at 450 to 500 0 C to yield a purified PuO 2 product

  19. ALARA review for the 202-S plutonium loadout hood stabilization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Patch, R.F.

    2000-01-01

    This as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) review provides a description of the engineering and administrative controls used to manage personnel exposures, control contamination levels, and control airborne radioactivity concentrations while conducting stabilization of the Reduction-Oxidation (REDOX) Facility plutonium loadout hood and associated piping, and the isolation of the ER-8 ventilation system

  20. Televison assessment and identification system for the plutonium protection system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Greenwoll, D.A.

    1979-02-01

    This report covers the selection, description, and use of the components comprising the Television Assessment and Identification System in the Hanford Plutonium Protection System. This work was sponsored by the Department of Energy/Office of Safeguards and Security (DOE/OSS) as part of the overall Sandia Fixed Facility Physical Protection Program

  1. HB-Line Plutonium Oxide Data Collection Strategy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Watkins, R. [Savannah River Nuclear Solutions; Varble, J. [Savannah River Nuclear Solutions; Jordan, J. [Savannah River Nuclear Solutions

    2015-05-26

    HB-Line and H-Canyon will handle and process plutonium material to produce plutonium oxide for feed to the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). However, the plutonium oxide product will not be transferred to the MFFF directly from HB-Line until it is packaged into a qualified DOE-STD-3013-2012 container. In the interim, HB-Line will load plutonium oxide into an inner, filtered can. The inner can will be placed in a filtered bag, which will be loaded into a filtered outer can. The outer can will be loaded into a certified 9975 with getter assembly in compliance with onsite transportation requirement, for subsequent storage and transfer to the K-Area Complex (KAC). After DOE-STD-3013-2012 container packaging capabilities are established, the product will be returned to HB-Line to be packaged into a qualified DOE-STD-3013-2012 container. To support the transfer of plutonium oxide to KAC and then eventually to MFFF, various material and packaging data will have to be collected and retained. In addition, data from initial HB-Line processing operations will be needed to support future DOE-STD-3013-2012 qualification as amended by the HB-Line DOE Standard equivalency. As production increases, the volume of data to collect will increase. The HB-Line data collected will be in the form of paper copies and electronic media. Paper copy data will, at a minimum, consist of facility procedures, nonconformance reports (NCRs), and DCS print outs. Electronic data will be in the form of Adobe portable document formats (PDFs). Collecting all the required data for each plutonium oxide can will be no small effort for HB-Line, and will become more challenging once the maximum annual oxide production throughput is achieved due to the sheer volume of data to be collected. The majority of the data collected will be in the form of facility procedures, DCS print outs, and laboratory results. To facilitate complete collection of this data, a traveler form will be developed which

  2. Plutonium, proliferation, and the price of reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gilinsky, V.

    1978-01-01

    France and Britain disagree with the US on whether deferring fuel reprocessing that provides plutonium for export can help contain proliferation. The US has veto power over reprocessing of US-supplied fuels for non-EURATOM countries, but exceptions will be made for movement within the EURATOM community. Political issues will be influenced by the magnitude of the financial investments, however, and commercial considerations have until recently dominated and complicated international safeguards. The author notes that US policy was reversed by the gradual acknowledgment that the same international inspection of plutonium stockpiles would not work as it had for low-enriched fuel and that economic interests must have a lower priority to avoiding proliferation. He cites the combination of sudden policy shifts, failure to prove that present reactors are best, and long-term distrust of US economic motives as failing to persuade either the French or British, who feel the best safeguard is provided by their high-security reprocessing facilities. Still to be resolved are the conditions under which plutonium must be returned to its owners, a problem that must determine safe international transport and storage and international management. Technical fixes, such as the CIVEX process, cannot contribute to the solution for several decades, while reprocessing is no longer considered a first step in waste disposal and would be more expensive and complicated than present waste disposal procedures. The author concedes merit in President Carter's requirement of separating ''the legitimate and necessary use of uranium'' and nuclear fuels that are also explosives

  3. Plutonium Immobilization Project - Robotic canister loading

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hamilton, R.L.

    2000-01-01

    The Plutonium Immobilization Program (PIP) is a joint venture between the Savannah River Site (SRS), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). When operational in 2008, the PIP will fulfill the nation's nonproliferation commitment by placing surplus weapons-grade plutonium in a permanently stable ceramic form and making it unattractive for reuse. Since there are significant radiation and security concerns, the program team is developing novel and unique technology to remotely perform plutonium immobilization tasks. The remote task covered in this paper employs a jointed arm robot to load seven 3.5 inch diameter, 135-pound cylinders (magazines) through the 4 inch diameter neck of a stainless steel canister. Working through the narrow canister neck, the robot secures the magazines into a specially designed rack pre-installed in the canister. To provide the deterrent effect, the canisters are filled with a mixture of high-level waste and glass at the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF)

  4. Summary of the last step of active test at separation facility and purification facility in Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuroishi, Yuuki; Iseki, Tadahiro; Mitani, Akira; Takahashi, Naoki; Tsujimura, Akino; Sato, Nobuharu; Inaba, Makoto; Itagaki, Takashi

    2008-01-01

    During the last step of Active Test (AT) at Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP), the performance of the Separation Facility, mainly for pulsed columns and mixer-settlers were tested; Diluent washing efficiency, Plutonium extraction and stripping efficiency, Decontamination factors of fission products and Uranium and plutonium losses into wastes. Also, those of the Plutonium purification unit in the Purification Facility have been checked; Diluent washing efficiency, Plutonium extraction and stripping efficiency and Plutonium losses into wastes. Test results were equivalent to or better than expected values. (author)

  5. Plutonium oxides and uranium and plutonium mixed oxides. Carbon determination

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    Determination of carbon in plutonium oxides and uranium plutonium mixed oxides, suitable for a carbon content between 20 to 3000 ppm. The sample is roasted in oxygen at 1200 0 C, the carbon dioxide produced by combustion is neutralized by barium hydroxide generated automatically by coulometry [fr

  6. Plutonium Immobilization Program cold pour tests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hovis, G.L.; Stokes, M.W.; Smith, M.E.; Wong, J.W.

    1999-01-01

    The Plutonium Immobilization Program (PIP) is a joint venture between the Savannah River Site, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to carry out the disposition of excess weapons-grade plutonium. This program uses the can-in-canister (CIC) approach. CIC involves encapsulating plutonium in ceramic forms (or pucks), placing the pucks in sealed stainless steel cans, placing the cans in long cylindrical magazines, latching the magazines to racks inside Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) canisters, and filling the DWPF canisters with high-level waste glass. This process puts the plutonium in a stable form and makes it attractive for reuse. At present, the DWPF pours glass into empty canisters. In the CIC approach, the addition of a stainless steel rack, magazines, cans, and ceramic pucks to the canisters introduces a new set of design and operational challenges: All of the hardware installed in the canisters must maintain structural integrity at elevated (molten-glass) temperatures. This suggests that a robust design is needed. However, the amount of material added to the DWPF canister must be minimized to prevent premature glass cooling and excessive voiding caused by a large internal thermal mass. High metal temperatures, minimizing thermal mass, and glass flow paths are examples of the types of technical considerations of the equipment design process. To determine the effectiveness of the design in terms of structural integrity and glass-flow characteristics, full-scale testing will be conducted. A cold (nonradioactive) pour test program is planned to assist in the development and verification of a baseline design for the immobilization canister to be used in the PIP process. The baseline design resulting from the cold pour test program and CIC equipment development program will provide input to Title 1 design for second-stage immobilization. The cold pour tests will be conducted in two

  7. High-temperature enthalpies of plutonium monocarbide and plutonium sesquicarbide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oetting, F.L.

    1979-01-01

    The high-temperature enthalpies of plutonium monocarbide and plutonium sesquicarbide have been determined with a copper-block calorimeter of the isoperibol type. The experimental enthalpy data, which was measured relative to 298 K, covered the temperature range from 400 to 1500 K. The calculation of the temperature rise of the calorimeter takes into account the added heat evolution from the radioactive decay of the plutonium samples. These enthalpy results, combined with the heat capacity and entropy of the respective carbide at 298 K available from the literature, has made it possible to generate tables of thermodynamic functions for the plutonium carbides. The behavior of the heat capacity of both of the plutonium carbides, i.e., a relatively steep increase in the heat capacity as the temperature increases, may be attributed to a premelting effect with the formation of vacancies within the crystal lattice although a theoretical treatment of this phenomenon is not given

  8. A portable concentrator for processing plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chamberlain, D.B.; Conner, C.; Chen, L.

    1995-01-01

    A horizontal, agitated film concentrator designed to concentrate liquid streams to a high solid content slurry is briefly described. The Rototherm unit is being studied for use at US Department of Energy facilities to handle large quantities of aqueous plutonium solutions. Capabilities for evaporating more than 98% of the water present in a single pass have been demonstrated. Decontamination factors of 10 6 to 10 7 are expected. The unit may also be useful for recycling aqueous waste treatment reagents from the decontamination of gaseous diffusion plants

  9. Environmental Monitoring Plan, Nevada Test Site and support facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-11-01

    This Operational Area Monitoring Plan for environmental monitoring, is for EG ampersand G Energy Measurements, Inc. (EG ampersand G/EM) which operates several offsite facilities in support of activities at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). These facilities include: (1) Amador Valley Operations (AVO), Pleasanton, California; (2) Kirtland Operations (KO), Kirtland Air Force base, Albuquerque, New Mexico (KAFB); (3) Las Vegas Area Operations (LVAO), Remote Sensing Laboratory (RSL), and North Las Vegas (NLV) Complex at Nellis Air Force Base (NAFB), North Las Vegas, Nevada; (4) Los Alamos Operations (LAO), Los Alamos, New Mexico; (5) Santa Barbara Operations (SBO), Goleta, California; (6) Special Technologies Laboratory (STL), Santa Barbara, California; (7) Washington Aerial Measurements Department (WAMD), Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland; and, (8) Woburn Cathode Ray Tube Operations (WCO), Woburn, Massachusetts. Each of these facilities has an individual Operational Area Monitoring Plan, but they have been consolidated herein to reduce redundancy

  10. Compositions of airborne plutonium-bearing particles from a plutonium finishing operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, S.M. Jr.

    1976-11-01

    The elemental composition of 111 plutonium-bearing particles was determined (using an electron microprobe) as part of a program to investigate the origin and behavior of the long-lived transuranic radionuclides released from fuel reprocessing facilities at the Savannah River Plant. These particles, collected from wet-cabinet and room-air exhausts from the plutonium finishing operation (JB-Line), were between 0.4 and 36 μm in diameter. Ninety-nine of the particles were found to be aggregates of various minerals and metals, six were quartz, and six were small (less than 2-μm-diameter) pieces of iron oxide. Collectively, these particles contained less minerals and more metals than natural dusts contain. The metallic constituents included elements normally not found in dusts, e.g., chromium, nickel, copper, and zinc. Concentrations of aluminum and iron exceeded those normally found in minerals. Elemental concentrations in individual particles covered a wide range: one 2-μm-diameter particle contained 97 percent NiO, a 9-μm-diameter particle contained 72 percent Cr 2 O 3 . Although the particles were selected because they produced plutonium fission tracks, the plutonium concentration was too low to be estimated by microprobe analysis in all but a 1-μm-diameter particle. This plutonium-bearing particle contained 73 percent PuO 2 by weight in combination with Fe 2 O 3 and mica; its activity was estimated at 0.17 pCi of 239 Pu

  11. Determination of plutonium in environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sakanoue, Masanobu

    1978-01-01

    Past and present methods of determining the amount of plutonium in the environment are summarized. Determination of the amount of plutonium in uranium ore began in 1941. Plutonium present in polluted environments due to nuclear explosions, nuclear power stations, etc. was measured in soil and sand in Nagasaki in 1951 and in ash in Bikini in 1954. Analytical methods of measuring the least amount of plutonium in the environment were developed twenty years later. Many studies on and reviews of these methods have been reported all over the world, and a standard analytical procedure has been adopted. A basic analytical method of measurement was drafted in Japan in 1976. The yield, treatment of samples, dissolution, separation, control of measurable ray sources determination by α spectrometry, cross-check determination, and treatment of samples containing hardly soluble plutonium were examined. At present, the amount of plutonium can be determined by all of these methods. The presence of plutonium was studied further, and the usefulness of determination of the plutonium isotope ratio is discussed. (Kumagai, S.)

  12. Work surface for soluble plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silver, G.L.

    2005-01-01

    A three-dimensional work surface for aqueous plutonium is illustrated. It is constructed by means of estimating work as a function of the ambient pH and redox potential in a plutonium solution. The surface is useful for illustrating the chemistry of disproportionation reactions. Work expressions are easier to use than work integrals. (author)

  13. The economics of plutonium recycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    James, R.A.

    1977-11-01

    The individual cost components and the total fuel cycle costs for natural uranium and uranium-plutonium mixed oxide fuel cycles for CANDU-PHW reactors are discussed. A calculation is performed to establish the economic conditions under which plutonium recycle would be economically attractive. (auth)

  14. International management and storage of plutonium and spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-09-01

    The first part of this study discusses certain questions that may arise from the disseminated production and storage of plutonium and, in the light of the relevant provisions of the Agency's Statute, examines possible arrangements for the storage of separated plutonium under international auspices and its release to meet energy or research requirements. The second part of the study deals similarly with certain problems presented by growing accumulations of spent fuel from light-water reactors in various countries and examines possible solutions, including the establishment of regional or multinational spent fuel storage facilities

  15. Calibration for plutonium-238 lung counting at Mound Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tomlinson, F.K.

    1976-01-01

    The lung counting facility at Mound Laboratory was calibrated for making plutonium-238 lung deposition assessments in the fall of 1969. Phoswich detectors have been used since that time; however, the technique of calibration has improved considerably. The current technique of calibrating the lung counter is described as well as the method of error analysis and determination of the minimum detectable activity. A Remab hybrid phantom is used along with an attenuation curve which is derived from plutonium loaded lungs and ground beef absorber measurements. The errors that are included in an analysis as well as those that are excluded are described. The method of calculating the minimum detectable activity is also included

  16. Solvent anode for plutonium purification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bowersox, D.F.; Fife, K.W.; Christensen, D.C.

    1986-01-01

    The purpose of this study is to develop a technique to allow complete oxidation of plutonium from the anode during plutonium electrorefining. This will eliminate the generation of a ''spent'' anode heel which requires further treatment for recovery. Our approach is to employ a solvent metal in the anode to provide a liquid anode pool throughout electrorefining. We use molten salts and metals in ceramic crucibles at 700 0 C. Our goal is to produce plutonium metal at 99.9% purity with oxidation and transfer of more than 98% of the impure plutonium feed metal from the anode into the salt and product phases. We have met these criteria in experiments on the 100 to 1000 g scale. We plan to scale our operations to 4 kg of feed plutonium and to optimize the process parameters

  17. Using Biomolecules to Separate Plutonium

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gogolski, Jarrod

    Used nuclear fuel has traditionally been treated through chemical separations of the radionuclides for recycle or disposal. This research considers a biological approach to such separations based on a series of complex and interdependent interactions that occur naturally in the human body with plutonium. These biological interactions are mediated by the proteins serum transferrin and the transferrin receptor. Transferrin to plutonium in vivo and can deposit plutonium into cells after interacting with the transferrin receptor protein at the cell surface. Using cerium as a non-radioactive surrogate for plutonium, it was found that cerium(IV) required multiple synergistic anions to bind in the N-lobe of the bilobal transferrin protein, creating a conformation of the cerium-loaded protein that would be unable to interact with the transferrin receptor protein to achieve a separation. The behavior of cerium binding to transferrin has contributed to understanding how plutonium(IV)-transferrin interacts in vivo and in biological separations.

  18. Cycle downstream: the plutonium question

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zask, G.; Rome, M.; Delpech, M.

    1998-01-01

    This day, organized by the SFEN, took place at Paris the 4 june 1998. Nine papers were presented. They take stock on the plutonium physics and its utilization as a nuclear fuel. This day tried to bring information to answer the following questions: do people have to keep the plutonium in the UOX fuel or in the MOX fuel in order to use it for future fast reactors? Do people have to continue obstinately the plutonium reprocessing in the MOX for the PWR type reactors? Will it be realized a underground disposal? Can it be technically developed plutonium incinerators and is it economically interesting? The plutonium physics, the experimental programs and the possible solutions are presented. (A.L.B.)

  19. Plutonium storage study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    This Spanish study gives a more detailed analysis of a possible store for plutonium oxide. The capacity of the store is assumed to be 30 t Pu and the minimum storage time 2 years. The study includes a general description of the store and its design philosophy; comments on the quality and properties of the material stored; a detailed criticality study and comments on gas and heat generation and shielding requirements; and a brief cost evaluation. Costs are estimated to be about $110/kg PuO 2 /year

  20. HANFORD PLUTONIUM FINISHG PLAN (PFP) COMPLETES PLUTONIUM STABILIZATION KEY SAFETY ISSUES CLOSED

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    GERBER, M.S.

    2004-01-01

    A long and intense effort to stabilize and repackage nearly 18 metric tons (MT) of plutonium-bearing leftovers from defense production and nuclear experiments concluded successfully in February, bringing universal congratulations to the Department of Energy's Hanford Site in southeast Washington State. The victorious stabilization and packaging endeavor at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP), managed and operated by prime contractor Fluor Hanford, Inc., finished ahead of all milestones in Hanford's cleanup agreement with regulators, and before deadlines set by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB), a part of the federal Executive Branch that oversees special nuclear materials. The PFP stabilization and packaging project also completed under budget for its four-year tenure, and has been nominated for a DOE Secretarial Award. It won the Project of the Year Award in the local chapter competition of the Project Management Institute, and is being considered for awards at the regional and national level

  1. Seismic analysis of plutonium glovebox by MSC/NASTRAN

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hirata, Masaru; Ishikawa, Kazuya; Korosawa, Makoto; Fukushima, Susumu; Hoshina, Hirofumi.

    1993-01-01

    Seismic analysis of the structural strength of gloveboxes is important for plutonium confinement evaluation. However, the analytical methods must be developed for evaluating the mutual displacement between the window frame and acrylic resin window panel with regard to plutonium confinement during an earthquake. Therefore, seismic analysis for a standard glovebox in Plutonium Fuel Research Facility at Oarai Research Establishment of JAERI has been conducted by FEM (Finite Element Method) computer code MSC/NASTRAN (MacNeal-Schwendler Corporation NASA Structural Analysis). Modelling of glovebox window frame has been investigated from the results of natural frequency analysis and static analysis. After the acquisition of a suitable model, displacement around the window frame and glovebox structural strength have been evaluated in detail by use of floor response spectrum analysis and time-history (transient response) analysis. (author)

  2. The US plutonium materials conversion program in Russia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zygmunt, S.J.; Mason, C.F.V.; Hahn, W.K.

    2000-01-01

    Progress has been made in Russia towards the conversion of weapons-grade plutonium (w-Pu) into plutonium oxide (PuO 2 ) suitable for further manufacture into mixed oxide (MOX) fuels. This program was started in 1998 in response to US proliferation concerns and the acknowledged international need to decrease the available weapons-grade Pu. A similar agenda is being followed in the US to address disposition of US surplus weapons-grade Pu. In Russia a conversion process has been selected and a site proposed. This paper discusses the present state of the program in support of this future operating facility that will process up to 5 metric tons of plutonium a year. (authors)

  3. National Plutonium Workers' Study: considerations and preliminary results

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Acquavella, J.F.; Wilkinson, G.S.

    1983-03-01

    The National Plutonium Workers' Study developed from the clinical follow-up of workers with body burdens in excess of 10 nCi. The importance of plutonium to energy and weapons development and the uncertainty about its biological effects motivated the formation of an epidemiologic study of more than 125,000 workers at six Department of Energy facilities. This report reviews recent results from The National Plutonium Workers' Study, including an analysis of cancer mortality among workers at the Rocky Flats Plant and a study of malignant melanoma among employees at Los Alamos National Laboratory. The problems inherent in large-scale epidemiologic studies, as well as the future directions for the study, are discussed

  4. The toxicity of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ramsden, D.; Johns, T.F.

    1977-01-01

    Reference is made to recent publications concerned with the radiotoxicity of inhaled insoluble Pu compounds. The publications are a paper by Thorne and Vennart (Nature 263:555 (1976)), a report entitled 'The Toxicity of Plutonium', (London (HMSO), 1975), and the 'Sixth Report of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution', (Cmnd. 6618, London (HMSO), 1976). Thorne and Vennart concluded that the previously accepted value for the maximum permissible annual intake (MPAI) of such compounds may be too high by a factor of about five, and a similar conclusion was reached in the other two publications. It is thought by the present authors that the methods which have been used to suggest new values for the MPAI are unduly pessimistic for high-fired PuO 2 ; calculations have been based on the lung model of ICRP Publication 19 'The Metabolism of Compounds of Plutonium and the Other Actinides', (International Commission of Radiological Protection, 1972). This involves concluding that the risks to bone and liver are comparable to those for lung. This is discussed and it is thought that the previously established idea that the lung is the critical organ remains substantially correct for the case of high-fired PuO 2 . (U.K.)

  5. Plutonium oxide dissolution

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gray, J.H.

    1992-01-01

    Several processing options for dissolving plutonium oxide (PuO 2 ) from high-fired materials have been studied. The scoping studies performed on these options were focused on PuO 2 typically generated by burning plutonium metal and PuO 2 produced during incineration of alpha contaminated waste. At least two processing options remain applicable for dissolving high-fired PuO 2 in canyon dissolvers. The options involve solid solution formation of PuO 2 With uranium oxide (UO 2 ) and alloying incinerator ash with aluminum. An oxidative dissolution process involving nitric acid solutions containing a strong oxidizing agent, such as cerium (IV), was neither proven nor rejected. This uncertainty was due to difficulty in regenerating cerium (IV) ions during dissolution. However, recent work on silver-catalyzed dissolution of PuO 2 with persulfate has demonstrated that persulfate ions regenerate silver (II). Use of persulfate to regenerate cerium (IV) or bismuth (V) ions during dissolution of PuO 2 materials may warrant further study

  6. Stabilizing plutonium materials at Hanford: systems engineering for PFP transition project effort on DNFSB 94-1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Huber, T.E., Westinghouse Hanford

    1996-07-02

    This report discusses the basic objectives of the stabilization and packaging activities at the Plutonium Finishing Plant that satisfy the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board Recommendation 94-1 by transforming the plutonium materials at hanford into forms or conditions which are suitable for safe storage to appropriate storage criteria; or discard that meets appropriate waste acceptance criteria.

  7. Safely disposing and controlling the various forms of excess military plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Albright, D.

    1991-01-01

    The growing surplus of plutonium will continue to pose safety, health, and verification problems. Although long term storage and disposal of plutonium seems technically feasible, or at least comparable in technical difficulty to commercial spent fuel disposal, significant political obstacles within the government and the public, may make it difficult to solve this problem. Although options to build verifiable warhead dismantlement facilities or to recycle plutonium in reactors and thus convert separated plutonium into irradiated fuel are straight forward concepts, their realization remains difficult for economic and political reasons. The plutonium recycle option also raises additional proliferation concerns about its impact on civilian nuclear programs. In the absence of a long term solution, the United States can implement various storage or interim disposal options that involve minimal processing, but that ease verification problems and provide adequate safety and protection of public health

  8. Materials control and accountability challenges associated with plutonium inventories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Crawford, D.W.

    1996-01-01

    There are currently many initiatives underway within the Department of Energy (DOE) to safely and securely manage large plutonium inventories arising from weapons dismantlement, changing missions and facility operations. Plutonium inventory information is increasingly accessible to the public as a result of the secretary of energy's openness initiative. As a result, knowledge of these inventories and levels to which the department has accounted for and controlled these inventories, will be under increased scrutiny from a variety of interest groups. The quality of this accountability data and what this data means will greatly influence the public's perception of how the US is protecting its plutonium inventories. In addition, the department's safeguards program provides an essential basis for the application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards that, in addition to possibly other international control regimes, will be in place over a large portion of these future inventories. The capability and functionality of the department's nuclear safeguards program will be important contributors to the success of US programs for the responsible stewardship of these vast plutonium inventories. This paper discusses some of the challenges, in terms of specific issues relating to one part of the department's safeguards program--materials control and accountability (MC and A)--to meet the growing domestic and international requirements and expectations associated with these plutonium inventories

  9. Materials control and accountability challenges associated with plutonium inventories

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Crawford, D.W. [USDOE Office of Safeguards and Security, Washington, DC (United States)

    1996-07-01

    There are currently many initiatives underway within the Department of Energy (DOE) to safely and securely manage large plutonium inventories arising from weapons dismantlement, changing missions and facility operations. Plutonium inventory information is increasingly accessible to the public as a result of the secretary of energy`s openness initiative. As a result, knowledge of these inventories and levels to which the department has accounted for and controlled these inventories, will be under increased scrutiny from a variety of interest groups. The quality of this accountability data and what this data means will greatly influence the public`s perception of how the US is protecting its plutonium inventories. In addition, the department`s safeguards program provides an essential basis for the application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards that, in addition to possibly other international control regimes, will be in place over a large portion of these future inventories. The capability and functionality of the department`s nuclear safeguards program will be important contributors to the success of US programs for the responsible stewardship of these vast plutonium inventories. This paper discusses some of the challenges, in terms of specific issues relating to one part of the department`s safeguards program--materials control and accountability (MC and A)--to meet the growing domestic and international requirements and expectations associated with these plutonium inventories.

  10. Integrated development and testing plan for the plutonium immobilization project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kan, T.

    1998-01-01

    This integrated plan for the DOE Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (MD) describes the technology development and major project activities necessary to support the deployment of the immobilization approach for disposition of surplus weapons-usable plutonium. The plan describes details of the development and testing (D and T) tasks needed to provide technical data for design and operation of a plutonium immobilization plant based on the ceramic can-in-canister technology (''Immobilization Fissile Material Disposition Program Final Immobilization Form Assessment and Recommendation'', UCRL-ID-128705, October 3, 1997). The plan also presents tasks for characterization and performance testing of the immobilization form to support a repository licensing application and to develop the basis for repository acceptance of the plutonium form. Essential elements of the plant project (design, construction, facility activation, etc.) are described, but not developed in detail, to indicate how the D and T results tie into the overall plant project. Given the importance of repository acceptance, specific activities to be conducted by the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (RW) to incorporate the plutonium form in the repository licensing application are provided in this document, together with a summary of how immobilization D and T activities provide input to the license activity. The ultimate goal of the Immobilization Project is to develop, construct, and operate facilities that will immobilize from about 18 to 50 tonnes (MT) of U.S. surplus weapons usable plutonium materials in a manner that meets the ''spent fuel'' standard (Fissile Materials Storage and Disposition Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement Record of Decision, ''Storage and Disposition Final PEIS'', issued January 14, 1997, 62 Federal Register 3014) and is acceptable for disposal in a geologic repository. In the can-in-canister technology, this is accomplished by encapsulating the

  11. Hazards of plutonium and fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Watson, G.M.

    1978-01-01

    Apart from the possibility that civil plutonium may be diverted to military use the main argument against the introduction of a plutonium economy seems to be the supposedly unmanageable biological risk attached to plutonium itself. The author points out weaknesses in many of the opponents' arguments against the increased use of plutonium and argues that current safety practices are more than adequate in handling plutonium and other radioactive materials

  12. Recovery of plutonium by pyroredox processing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McNeese, J.A.; Bowersox, D.F.; Christensen, D.C.

    1985-09-01

    Using pyrochemical oxidation and reduction, we have developed a process to recover the plutonium in impure scrap with less than 95% plutonium. This plutonium metal was further purified by pyrochemical electrorefining. During development of the procedures, depleted electrorefining anodes were processed, and over 80% of the plutonium was recovered as high-purity metal in one electrorefining cycle. Over 40 kg of plutonium has been recovered from 55 kg of impure anodes with our procedures. 6 refs., 7 figs., 4 tabs

  13. Recovery of plutonium by pyroredox processing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McNeese, J.A.; Bowersox, D.F.; Christensen, D.C.

    1985-01-01

    Using pyrochemical oxidation and reduction, we have developed a process to recover the plutonium in impure scrap with less than 95% plutonium. This plutonium metal was further purified by pyrochemical electrorefining. During development of the procedures, depleted electrorefining anodes were processed, and over 80% of the plutonium was recovered as high-purity metal in one electrorefining cycle. Over 40 kg of plutonium has been recovered from 55 kg of impure anodes with our procedures. 6 refs., 2 figs., 5 tabs

  14. Capabilities required to conduct the LLNL plutonium mission

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kass, J.; Bish, W.; Copeland, A.; West, J.; Sack, S.; Myers, B.

    1991-01-01

    This report outlines the LLNL plutonium related mission anticipated over the next decade and defines the capabilities required to meet that mission wherever the Plutonium Facility is located. If plutonium work is relocated to a place where the facility is shared, then some capabilities can be commonly used by the sharing parties. However, it is essential that LLNL independently control about 20000 sq ft of net lab space, filled with LLNL controlled equipment, and staffed by LLNL employees. It is estimated that the cost to construct this facility should range from $140M to $200M. Purchase and installation of equipment to replace that already in Bldg 332 along with additional equipment identified as being needed to meet the mission for the next ten to fifteen years, is estimated to cost $118M. About $29M of the equipment could be shared. The Hardened Engineering Test Building (HETB) with its additional 8000 sq ft of unique test capability must also be replaced. The fully equipped replacement cost is estimated to be about $10M. About 40000 sq ft of setup and support space are needed along with office and related facilities for a 130 person resident staff. The setup space is estimated to cost $8M. The annual cost of a 130 person resident staff (100 programmatic and 30 facility operation) is estimated to be $20M

  15. The transports in the French Plutonium Industry. A high risk activity

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2003-02-01

    This study throws light on the scale of transport of plutonium in France nuclear industry, an activity involving quantities of high risk materials often unknown to the public. The study is a significantly extended update of the one carried out by WISE-Paris in 1995 for the Plutonium Forum. It was motivated by important developments in the French plutonium industry and the publication of numerous data concerning transport activities since 1995. The 2003 study presents, in particular, all of the flows of plutonium crossing France every year, as well as analysis of the risks associated with this particular transport activity. Putting these data into perspective in terms of a rapidly and permanently changing political and industrial context, and a description of the regulatory framework within which shipments of plutonium take place, serve as a guide and source of reference to help readers better understand the issues. The importance of transport in the plutonium ''chain'', i.e. the stages corresponding to various industrial processes, is often under-estimated, even by the nuclear industry itself. Transport is, in fact, the activity which involves the greatest quantities of plutonium in the entire nuclear chain. Plutonium, produced during the fission reactions in the cores of nuclear reactors, is transported, contained in the irradiated fuel, to the facilities at La Hague where reprocessing separates it from the other radioactive components of the spent fuel. Part of the plutonium, now isolated in powder form, is then shipped to one of the three plants able to produce the fuel known as MOX. These are located at Cadarache and Marcoule, in France, and at Dessel in Belgium. Once in the MOX form, this plutonium has to be re-transported to reactor sites to be used. Once irradiated, the spent MOX will return to the La Hague installations to be stored for an unknown period; the plutonium contained in the spent MOX is not, at present, destined to be re

  16. The transports in the French Plutonium Industry. A high risk activity

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-02-01

    This study throws light on the scale of transport of plutonium in France nuclear industry, an activity involving quantities of high risk materials often unknown to the public. The study is a significantly extended update of the one carried out by WISE-Paris in 1995 for the Plutonium Forum. It was motivated by important developments in the French plutonium industry and the publication of numerous data concerning transport activities since 1995. The 2003 study presents, in particular, all of the flows of plutonium crossing France every year, as well as analysis of the risks associated with this particular transport activity. Putting these data into perspective in terms of a rapidly and permanently changing political and industrial context, and a description of the regulatory framework within which shipments of plutonium take place, serve as a guide and source of reference to help readers better understand the issues. The importance of transport in the plutonium ''chain'', i.e. the stages corresponding to various industrial processes, is often under-estimated, even by the nuclear industry itself. Transport is, in fact, the activity which involves the greatest quantities of plutonium in the entire nuclear chain. Plutonium, produced during the fission reactions in the cores of nuclear reactors, is transported, contained in the irradiated fuel, to the facilities at La Hague where reprocessing separates it from the other radioactive components of the spent fuel. Part of the plutonium, now isolated in powder form, is then shipped to one of the three plants able to produce the fuel known as MOX. These are located at Cadarache and Marcoule, in France, and at Dessel in Belgium. Once in the MOX form, this plutonium has to be re-transported to reactor sites to be used. Once irradiated, the spent MOX will return to the La Hague installations to be stored for an unknown period; the plutonium contained in the spent MOX is not, at present, destined to be re-used. (author)

  17. Probing phonons in plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wong, Joe; Krisch, M.; Farber, D.; Occelli, F.; Schwartz, A.; Chiang, T.C.; Wall, M.; Boro, C.; Xu, Ruqing

    2010-01-01

    Plutonium (Pu) is well known to have complex and unique physico-chemical properties. Notably, the pure metal exhibits six solid-state phase transformations with large volume expansions and contractions along the way to the liquid state: α → β → γ → (delta) → (delta)(prime) → (var e psilon) → liquid. Unalloyed Pu melts at a relatively low temperature ∼640 C to yield a higher density liquid than that of the solid from which it melts, (Figure 1). Detailed understanding of the properties of plutonium and plutonium-based alloys is critical for the safe handling, utilization, and long-term storage of these important, but highly toxic materials. However, both technical and and safety issues have made experimental observations extremely difficult. Phonon dispersion curves (PDCs) are key experimenta l data to the understanding of the basic properties of Pu materials such as: force constants, sound velocities, elastic constants, thermodynamics, phase stability, electron-phonon coupling, structural relaxation, etc. However, phonon dispersion curves (PDCs) in plutonium (Pu) and its alloys have defied measurement for the past few decades since the discovery of this element in 1941. This is due to a combination of the high thermal-neutron absorption cross section of plutonium and the inability to grow the large single crystals (with dimensions of a few millimeters) necessary for inelastic neutron scattering. Theoretical simulations of the Pu PDC continue to be hampered by the lack of suitable inter -atomic potentials. Thus, until recently the PDCs for Pu and its alloys have remained unknown experimentally and theoretically. The experimental limitations have recently been overcome by using a tightly focused undulator x-ray micro-beam scattered from single -grain domains in polycrystalline specimens. This experimental approach has been applied successfully to map the complete PDCs of an fcc d-Pu-Ga alloy using the high resolution inelastic x-ray scattering (HRIXS

  18. A method for the gravimetric determination of plutonium in pure plutonium nitrate concentrate solution

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mair, M.A.; Savage, D.J.

    1986-12-01

    Plutonium nitrate solution is treated with sulphuric acid before being heated and finally ignited. The stoichiometric plutonium dioxide so formed is weighed and hence the plutonium content is calculated. (author)

  19. Plutonium contaminated materials research programme

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Higson, S.G.

    1986-01-01

    The paper is a progress report for 1985 from the Plutonium Contaminated Materials Working Party (PCMWP). The PCMWP co-ordinates research and development on a national basis in the areas of management, treatment and immobilisation of plutonium contaminated materials, for the purpose of waste management. The progress report contains a review of the development work carried out in eight areas, including: reduction of arisings, plutonium measurement, sorting and packaging, washing of shredded combustible PCM, decommissioning and non-combustible PCM treatment, PCM immobilisation, treatment of alpha bearing liquid wastes, and engineering objectives. (UK)

  20. Plutonium again (smuggling and movements)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1994-01-01

    A link is discounted between nuclear proliferation and the recently discovered smuggled plutonium from the former Soviet Union at Munich airport and other places in Germany. It is argued that governments wishing to obtain nuclear materials to develop a weapons programme would not arrange to have it smuggled in a suitcase. Instead, it is speculated that a link exists between the plutonium smuggling incidents and the desire to promote the production of mixed oxide (MOX) fuel. Such incidents, by further raising public anxiety, may be intended to turn public opinion in favour of MOX fuel production as a sensible way of getting rid of surplus plutonium. (UK)

  1. Learning more about plutonium; En savoir plus sur le plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2008-07-01

    This digest brochure explains what plutonium is, where it comes from, how it is used, its recycling into Mox fuel, its half life, historical discovery, its presence in the environment, toxicity and radioactivity. (J.S.)

  2. The generation of denatured reactor plutonium by different options of the fuel cycle

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Broeders, C.H.M.; Kessler, G. [Inst. for Neutron Physics and Reactor Technology, Research Center Karlsruhe (Germany)

    2006-11-15

    Denatured (proliferation resistant) reactor plutonium can be generated in a number of different fuel cycle options. First denatured reactor plutonium can be obtained if, instead of low enriched U-235 PWR fuel, re-enriched U-235/U-236 from reprocessed uranium is used (fuel type A). Also the envisaged existing 2,500 t of reactor plutonium (being generated world wide up to the year 2010), mostly stored in intermediate fuel storage facilities at present, could be converted during a transition phase into denatured reactor plutonium by the options fuel type B and D. Denatured reactor plutonium could have the same safeguards standard as present low enriched (<20% U-235) LWR fuel. It could be incinerated by recycling once or twice in PWRs and subsequently by multi-recycling in FRs (CAPRA type or IFRs). Once denatured, such reactor plutonium could remain denatured during multiple recycling. In a PWR, e.g., denatured reactor plutonium could be destroyed at a rate of about 250 kg/GWey. While denatured reactor plutonium could be recycled and incinerated under relieved IAEA safeguards, neptunium would still have to be monitored by the IAEA in future for all cases in which considerable amounts of neptunium are produced. (orig.)

  3. Facility effluent monitoring plan determinations for the 200 Area facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nickels, J.M.

    1991-11-01

    The following facility effluent monitoring plan determinations document the evaluations conducted for the Westinghouse Hanford Company 200 Area facilities (chemical processing, waste management, 222-S Laboratory, and laundry) on the Hanford Site in south central Washington State. These evaluations determined the need for facility effluent monitoring plans for the 200 Area facilities. The facility effluent monitoring plan determinations have been prepared in accordance with A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438 (WHC 1991). The Plutonium/Uranium Extraction Plant and UO 3 facility effluent monitoring plan determinations were prepared by Los Alamos Technical Associates, Richland, Washington. The Plutonium Finishing Plant, Transuranic Waste Storage and Assay Facility, T Plant, Tank Farms, Low Level Burial Grounds, and 222-S Laboratory determinations were prepared by Science Applications International Corporation of Richland, Washington. The B Plant Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan Determination was prepared by ERCE Environmental Services of Richland, Washington

  4. Plutonium waste container identification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schmierer, T.J.

    1979-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to define the parameters of a method for identifying plutonium waste containers. This information will form the basis for a permanent committee to develop a complete identification program for use throughout the world. Although a large portion of the information will be on handwritten notebooks and may not be as extensive as is desired, it will all be helpful. The final information will be programmed into computer language and be available to all interested parties as well as a central control committee which will have the expertise to provide each government with advice on the packaging, storage, and measurement of the waste for which it is responsible. As time progresses, this central control committee should develop permanent storage sites and establish a system of records which will last for hundreds of years

  5. Uranium plutonium oxide fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cox, C.M.; Leggett, R.D.; Weber, E.T.

    1981-01-01

    Uranium plutonium oxide is the principal fuel material for liquid metal fast breeder reactors (LMFBR's) throughout the world. Development of this material has been a reasonably straightforward evolution from the UO 2 used routinely in the light water reactor (LWR's); but, because of the lower neutron capture cross sections and much lower coolant pressures in the sodium cooled LMFBR's, the fuel is operated to much higher discharge exposures than that of a LWR. A typical LMFBR fuel assembly is shown. Depending on the required power output and the configuration of the reactor, some 70 to 400 such fuel assemblies are clustered to form the core. There is a wide variation in cross section and length of the assemblies where the increasing size reflects a chronological increase in plant size and power output as well as considerations of decreasing the net fuel cycle cost. Design and performance characteristics are described

  6. The plutonium ban

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1977-01-01

    'Nuclear Power Issues and Choices' is the title of a recent report which has been performed by a study group sponsored by the Ford Foundation and administered by the MITRE Corporation. The main concern of this study is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Since the reprocessing of spent fuel elements yields among others plutonium of bomb quality, the report of the Ford Foundation comes to the conclusion that the USA should defer the closing of the fuel cycle, defer the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, deposit the spent fuel elemenets as a whole, and defer the breeder which can not run without fuel reprocessing. The German attitude however is that we can not relinquish on reprocessing and recycling of nuclear fuel because we are lacking such rich resources of coal, oil and uranium as the USA have. Furthermore, the deposition of spent fuel elements may be more dangerous than the deposition of the radioactive waste from reprocessing plants. (orig.) [de

  7. Summary of plutonium terrestrial research studies in the vicinity of a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Corey, J.C.; Boni, A.L.; Andriano, D.C.; Pinder, J.F.; McLeod, K.W.

    1978-01-01

    This paper reports plutonium concentrations of wheat, soybeans, and corn grown (a) on a field adjacent to one of the nuclear reprocessing facilities at the Savannah River Plant (SRP), (b) in a glasshouse, and (c) offsite. The crops on SRP were grown on a field that has been receiving both fallout plutonium and plutonium emitted at low chronic levels from an air exhaust stack since 1955. The crops grown in the glasshouse were raised on soil from the onsite agricultural field. The offsite field has received only fallout plutonium. The crop data indicate that the dose to an individual from ingesting grain grown on the field, although higher than from ingesting grain grown offsite, is still small (the 70-year dose-to-bone from eating 2 X 10 5 g (440 lb) of wheat in a year would be less than one mrem). Crop data from the field and the glasshouse experiment indicate that less than 10% of the total contamination of field-grown crops adjacent to a reprocessing facility was contributed by root uptake, the remainder by deposition on the plant surfaces. The plutonium content of the grain was generally 10 to 100 times less than that of the vegetation, again suggesting that deposition from stack emissions vegetation, again suggesting that deposition from stack emissions on the vegetation increased the plutonium content; whereas the grain, particularly corn and soybeans, was protected by thehusk or pod and contained principally plutonium from the root uptake pathway

  8. In-situ dismantling of plutonium-contaminated glove box

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Numata, Koji; Watanabe, Hisashi; Ishikawa, Hisashi; Miyo, Hiroaki; Ohtsuka, Katsuyuki

    1980-01-01

    A plutonium-contaminated glove box was dismantled along with the development of the treatment techniques for plutonium-bearing wastes. The objectives of this in-situ dismantling of the glove box are to reuse the Plutonium Fuel Fabrication Facility more efficiently, to reduce the volume of wastes generated during the dismantling, and to acquire dismantling techniques for decommissioning the Plutonium Fuel Fabrication Facility in the future. Prior to the dismantling works, a greenhouse for decontamination was installed, and the decontamination with surfactants was performed. Unremovable contamination was coated with paint. After this greenhouse was removed, the main greenhouse for dismantling and three greenhouses for contamination control were assembled. The main workers wearing protective devices engaged in dismantling works in the greenhouse. As the protective devices, anorak type PVC suits with air line masks, Howell type pressurized suits, and respirators were used. The tools used for the dismantling are a plasma cutter, an electric nibbler, an electric disk grinder, an electric circular saw and an electric jig saw. The results of the dismantling in-situ were compared with two previous cases of dismantling carried out by different procedures. In the case of in-situ dismantling, the volume of wastes was 1.6 - 1.8 m 3 /m 3 of glove box, and considerable reduction was realized. (Kako, I.)

  9. Acid-digestion treatment of plutonium-containing waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wieczorek, H.; Kemmler, G.; Krause, H.

    1981-01-01

    The Radioactive Acid-Digestion Test Unit (RADTU) has been constructed at Hanford to demonstrate the application of the acid-digestion process for treating combustible transuranic wastes and scrap materials. The RADTU, with its original tray digestion vessel, has recently completed a six-month campaign processing potentially contaminated non-glovebox wastes from a Hanford plutonium facility. During this campaign, it processed 2100 kg largely cellulosic wastes at an average sustained processing rate of 3 kg/h as limited by the acid-waste contact and the water boil-off rate from the acid feeds. The on-line operating efficiency was nearly 50% on a twelve-hour day, five-day week basis. Following this campaign, a new annular high-rate digester has been installed for testing. In preliminary tests with simulated wastes, the new digester demonstrated a sustained capacity of 10 kg/h with greatly improved intimacy of contact between the digestion acid and the waste. The new design also doubles the heat-transfer surface, which is expected to provide at least twice the water boil-off rate of the previous tray digester design. Following shakedown testing with simulated and low-level wastes, the new unit will be used to process combustible plutonium scrap and waste from Hanford plutonium facilities for the purposes of volume reduction, plutonium recovery, and stabilization of the final waste form. (author)

  10. Ultratrace analysis of uranium and plutonium by mass spectrometry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wogman, N.A.; Wacker, J.F.; Olsen, K.B.; Petersen, S.L.; Farmer, O.T.; Kelley, J.M.; Eiden, G.C.; Maiti, T.C.

    2002-01-01

    femtogram detection limits for the TIMS analysis of plutonium in environmental samples. This talk will present an overview of the TIMS and ICPMS methods used at PNNL to measure actinide elements at the ultratrace level in environmental samples. Included will be a discussion comparing the requirements for measuring plutonium and uranium in the environment. Results from several recent studies will also be presented. These studies include a thorough characterization of the worldwide composition of global fallout, as well as environmental studies at United States nuclear production facilities. (author)

  11. Differential spectrophotometric determination of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lecat, J.

    1980-01-01

    Differential spectrophotometric method is used for determination of plutonium reduced to oxydation state III+ by ascorbic acid, at 560 nm. Concentration of solutions is 4 g/l and accuracy of the method is better than 0,3% [fr

  12. The first milligrams of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldschmidt, B.

    1996-01-01

    This paper relates the discovery of the different plutonium chemical extraction processes in their historical context. The first experiments started during the second world war in 1942 with the American ''Metallurgical Laboratory'' project which brought together Arthur Compton, Enrico Fermi and Glenn Seaborg. During the same period, a competitive English-Canadian project, the ''Montreal Project'', was carried out to test different plutonium solvent extraction techniques. The author participated in both projects and joined the CEA in 1946, where he was in charge of the uranium and plutonium chemistry. By the end of 1949, his team could isolate the first milligrams of French plutonium from uranium oxide pellets of the ZOE reactor. In the beginning of 1952 he developed with his team the PUREX process. (J.S.)

  13. Plutonium helps probe protein, superconductor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1990-01-01

    Scientists are finding that plutonium can be a useful research tool that may help them answer important questions in fields as diverse as biochemistry and solid-state physics. This paper reports that U.S. research involving plutonium is confined to the Department of Energy's national laboratories and centers around nuclear weapons technology, waste cleanup and disposal, and health effects. But at Los Alamos National Laboratory, scientists also are using plutonium to probe the biochemical behavior of calmodulin, a key calcium-binding protein that mediates calcium-regulated processes in biological systems. At Argonne National Laboratory, another team is trying to learn how a superconductor's properties are affected by the 5f electrons of an actinide like plutonium

  14. An alternative plutonium disposition method

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kueppers, C.

    2002-01-01

    This paper provides a feasibility study on vitrification of plutonium with high active waste concentrate, and fabrication of MOX fuel rods for direct final disposal. These are potential alternatives to the direct use of MOX fuel in a reactor. (author)

  15. Chloride removal from plutonium alloy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Holcomb, H.P.

    1983-01-01

    SRP is evaluating a program to recover plutonium from a metallic alloy that will contain chloride salt impurities. Removal of chloride to sufficiently low levels to prevent damaging corrosion to canyon equipment is feasible as a head-end step following dissolution. Silver nitrate and mercurous nitrate were each successfully used in laboratory tests to remove chloride from simulated alloy dissolver solution containing plutonium. Levels less than 10 ppM chloride were achieved in the supernates over the precipitated and centrifuged insoluble salts. Also, less than 0.05% loss of plutonium in the +3, +4, or +6 oxidation states was incurred via precipitate carrying. These results provide impetus for further study and development of a plant-scale process to recover plutonium from metal alloy at SRP

  16. Matrix Characterization of Plutonium Residues by Alpha-Particle Self-Interrogation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Prettyman, T.H.; Foster, L.A.; Staples, P.

    1998-01-01

    Legacy plutonium residues often have inadequate item descriptions. Nondestructive characterization can help segregate these items for reprocessing or provide information needed for disposal or storage. Alpha particle-induced gamma-ray spectra contain a wealth of information that can be used for matrix characterization. We demonstrate how this information can be used for item identification. Gamma-ray spectra were recorded at the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility from a variety of legacy, plutonium-processing residues and product materials. The comparison and analysis of these spectra are presented

  17. Human health issues for plutonium inhalation: Perspectives from laboratory animal studies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Muggenburg, B.A.; Hahn, F.F.; Guilmette, R.A.

    1997-01-01

    Since the first production of plutonium in the 1940s, potential health effects from plutonium have been a concern for humans. The few people exposed to plutonium and the relatively small intakes that have occurred, at least in the Western world, have resulted in very little direct information from human population studies. The Manhattan Project workers have been followed for decades, and few health effects have been observed. The situation is similar for the population of workers at the Rocky Flats facility. Some information is now being released from the former Soviet Union on selected worker populations who show biological effects, primarily pulmonary fibrosis and some increase in lung cancers

  18. Fluid bed direct denitration process for plutonium nitrate to oxide conversion

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Souply, K.R.; Neal, D.H.

    1977-01-01

    The fluid bed direct-denitration process appears feasible for reprocessing Light Water Reactor fuel. Considerable experience with the fluid bed process exists in the denitration of uranyl nitrate and it shows promise for use in the denitration of plutonium nitrate. The process will require some development work before it can be used in a production-size facility. This report describes a fluid bed direct-denitration process for converting plutonium nitrate to plutonium oxide, and the information should be used when making comparisons of alternative processes or as a basis for further detailed studies

  19. Inhaled plutonium oxide in dogs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1981-01-01

    This project is concerned with long-term experiments to determine the life-span dose-effect relationships of inhaled 239 PuO 2 and 238 PuO 2 in beagles. The data will be used to estimate the health effects of inhaled transuranics. The tissue distribution of plutonium, radiation effects in the lung and hematologic changes in plutonium-exposed beagles with lung tumors were evaluated

  20. Plutonium contamination in italian population

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cave-Bondi, G.; Merli, S.; Rogo, M.; Sgarbazzini, M.; Clemente, G.F.; Mancini, L.; Santori, G.; Tardella, Q.

    1983-01-01

    The literature data concerning the biological and the chemical physical characteristics of plutonium are summarized in the first part of the paper. The experimental results of the plutonium concentration in complete diets, single food items and some human autopsy tissues, regarding the Italian situation, are then presented and discussed. Our experimental data are in good agreement with similar data reported in several studies carried out in some countries of the north emisphere

  1. Plutonium: real and false problems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bemden, E. van den

    1981-01-01

    This paper deals with technical and technological state of the possibilities of using plutonium as fuel in the thermal and fast reactors. It also describes the political blockage restraining its use and the reasons for it. The accent is put on some fundamental lacks of international coordination and on some problems of commercial policy, which impede, in a certain way, the industrial use of plutonium as a fuel. (author)

  2. Monitoring the risks of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Holliday, B.

    1978-01-01

    The difficulties in monitoring the environment in work areas where plutonium is handled are identified and both continuous and personal air sampling techniques considered. Methods of estimating the amounts of plutonium retained in the body are: (1) Direct external counting over the chest of the 'soft' low energy X-rays and gamma rays emitted by the plutonium deposited in the lungs. (2) Measuring plutonium excreted in urine. (3) Analysing faeces soon after a suspected contamination. Limitation of these techniques are discussed and it is shown that estimating the amount of plutonium in the body, or a specific organ, is extremely difficult, both because of the lack of sensitivity of the measuring techniques (especially chest scanning) and because of the problems in interpreting data, stemming from a lack of knowledge of crucial characteristics of the inhaled plutonium (such as particle size and solubility). Nevertheless it is felt that the judicious integration of all the options creates a level of certainty that no individual technique can possibly inspire. (U.K.)

  3. Atomic energy policy of Japan, especially plutonium utilization policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moriguchi, Y.

    1993-01-01

    The necessity of plutonium use in Japan is discussed. Basic policy regarding plutonium use and future plutonium utilization programme is described including such an aspect as management of plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons

  4. Plutonium re-cycle in HTR

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Desoisa, J. A.

    1974-03-15

    The study of plutonium cycles in HTRs using reprocessed plutonium from Magnox and AGR fuel cycles has shown that full core plutonium/uranium loadings are in general not feasible, burn-up is limited due the need for lower loadings of plutonium to meet reload core reactivity limits, on-line refueling is not practicable due to the need for higher burnable poison loadings, and low conversion rates in the plutonium-uranium cycles cannot be mitigated by axial loading schemes so that fissile make-up is needed if HTR plutonium recycle is desired.

  5. Erosional losses of fallout plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Foster, G.R.; Hakonson, T.E.

    1987-01-01

    Plutonium from fallout after atmospheric explosion of nuclear weapons in the 1950's and 1960s is being redistributed over the landscape by soil erosion and carried on sediment by streams to oceans. Erosion rates computed with the Universal Soil Loss Equation for more than 200,000 sample points on nonfederal land across the US were used to estimate plutonium removal rates by soil erosion. On the average, only about 4% of the eroded sediment reaches the outlet of a major river. The remaining sediment is deposited en route, and because deposition is a selective process, the sediment is enriched in fine particles having the highest concentration of plutonium because of the element's strong association with clay and silt-sized sediment. Estimated enrichment ratios, sediment delivery ratios, and erosion rates were used to estimate annual delivery of fallout plutonium. These estimates ranged from 0.002% of the initial fallout plutonium inventory for the Savannah River basin to 0.01% for the Columbia River basin, to 0.02% for the Hudson and Rio Grande River basins, to 0.08% for the Mississippi River basin. If the deposition of plutonium had been uniformly 1 mCi/km 2 , the estimated plutonium activity on suspended sediment would range from about 7 fCi/g of sediment of the Savannah River basin, to 9 fCi/g for the Mississippi River basin, to 12 fCi/g for the Hudson River basin, to 14 fCi/g for the Columbia and Rio Grande River basins. 45 references, 2 figures, 17 tables

  6. Treatment of radioactive wastes containing plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Orlando, O.S.; Aparicio, G.; Greco, L.; Orosco, E.H.; Cassaniti, P.; Salguero, D.; Toubes, B.; Perez, A.E.; Menghini, J.E.; Esteban, A.; Adelfang, P.

    1987-01-01

    The radioactive wastes generated in the process of manufacture and control of experimental fuel rods of mixed oxides, (U,Pu)O 2 , require an specific treatment due to the plutonium content. The composition of liquid wastes, mostly arising from chemical checks, is variable. The salt content, the acidity, and the plutonium and uranium content are different, which makes necessary a chemical treatment before the inclusion in concrete. The solid waste, such as neoprene gloves, PVC sleeves, filter paper, disposable or broken laboratory material, etc. are also included in concrete. In this report the methods used to dispose of wastes at Alpha Facility are described. With regard to the liquid wastes, the glove box built to process them is detailed, as well as the applied chemical treatment, including neutralization, filtration and later solidification. As for the solid wastes, it is described the cementation method consisting in introducing them into an expanded metal matrix, of the basket type, that contains as a concentric drum of 200 liter capacity which is smaller than the matrix, and the filling with wet cement mortar. (Author)

  7. Fissile Material Disposition Program: Deep borehole disposal Facility PEIS date input report for immobilized disposal. Immobilized disposal of plutonium in coated ceramic pellets in grout with canisters. Version 3.0

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wijesinghe, A.M.; Shaffer, R.J.

    1996-01-01

    Following President Clinton's Non-Proliferation Initiative, launched in September, 1993, an Interagency Working Group (IWG) was established to conduct a comprehensive review of the options for the disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials from nuclear weapons dismantlement activities in the United States and the former Soviet Union. The IWG review process will consider technical, nonproliferation, environmental budgetary, and economic considerations in the disposal of plutonium. The IWG is co-chaired by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and the National Security Council. The Department of Energy (DOE) is directly responsible for the management, storage, and disposition of all weapons-usable fissile material. The Department of Energy has been directed to prepare a comprehensive review of long-term options for Surplus Fissile Material (SFM) disposition, taking into account technical, nonproliferation, environmental, budgetary, and economic considerations

  8. Fissile Material Disposition Program: Deep borehole disposal Facility PEIS date input report for immobilized disposal. Immobilized disposal of plutonium in coated ceramic pellets in grout with canisters. Version 3.0

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wijesinghe, A.M.; Shaffer, R.J.

    1996-01-15

    Following President Clinton`s Non-Proliferation Initiative, launched in September, 1993, an Interagency Working Group (IWG) was established to conduct a comprehensive review of the options for the disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials from nuclear weapons dismantlement activities in the United States and the former Soviet Union. The IWG review process will consider technical, nonproliferation, environmental budgetary, and economic considerations in the disposal of plutonium. The IWG is co-chaired by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and the National Security Council. The Department of Energy (DOE) is directly responsible for the management, storage, and disposition of all weapons-usable fissile material. The Department of Energy has been directed to prepare a comprehensive review of long-term options for Surplus Fissile Material (SFM) disposition, taking into account technical, nonproliferation, environmental, budgetary, and economic considerations.

  9. LITERATURE REVIEW FOR OXALATE OXIDATION PROCESSES AND PLUTONIUM OXALATE SOLUBILITY

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nash, C.

    2012-02-03

    A literature review of oxalate oxidation processes finds that manganese(II)-catalyzed nitric acid oxidation of oxalate in precipitate filtrate is a viable and well-documented process. The process has been operated on the large scale at Savannah River in the past, including oxidation of 20 tons of oxalic acid in F-Canyon. Research data under a variety of conditions show the process to be robust. This process is recommended for oxalate destruction in H-Canyon in the upcoming program to produce feed for the MOX facility. Prevention of plutonium oxalate precipitation in filtrate can be achieved by concentrated nitric acid/ferric nitrate sequestration of oxalate. Organic complexants do not appear practical to sequester plutonium. Testing is proposed to confirm the literature and calculation findings of this review at projected operating conditions for the upcoming campaign. H Canyon plans to commence conversion of plutonium metal to low-fired plutonium oxide in 2012 for eventual use in the Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX) Facility. The flowsheet includes sequential operations of metal dissolution, ion exchange, elution, oxalate precipitation, filtration, and calcination. All processes beyond dissolution will occur in HB-Line. The filtration step produces an aqueous filtrate that may have as much as 4 M nitric acid and 0.15 M oxalate. The oxalate needs to be removed from the stream to prevent possible downstream precipitation of residual plutonium when the solution is processed in H Canyon. In addition, sending the oxalate to the waste tank farm is undesirable. This report addresses the processing options for destroying the oxalate in existing H Canyon equipment.

  10. Plutonium focus area

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-08-01

    To ensure research and development programs focus on the most pressing environmental restoration and waste management problems at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the Assistant Secretary for the Office of Environmental Management (EM) established a working group in August 1993 to implement a new approach to research and technology development. As part of this new approach, EM developed a management structure and principles that led to the creation of specific Focus Areas. These organizations were designed to focus the scientific and technical talent throughout DOE and the national scientific community on the major environmental restoration and waste management problems facing DOE. The Focus Area approach provides the framework for intersite cooperation and leveraging of resources on common problems. After the original establishment of five major Focus Areas within the Office of Technology Development (EM-50, now called the Office of Science and Technology), the Nuclear Materials Stabilization Task Group (EM-66) followed the structure already in place in EM-50 and chartered the Plutonium Focus Area (PFA). The following information outlines the scope and mission of the EM, EM-60, and EM-66 organizations as related to the PFA organizational structure

  11. Plutonium solution analyzer

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Burns, D.A.

    1994-09-01

    A fully automated analyzer has been developed for plutonium solutions. It was assembled from several commercially available modules, is based upon segmented flow analysis, and exhibits precision about an order of magnitude better than commercial units (0.5%-O.05% RSD). The system was designed to accept unmeasured, untreated liquid samples in the concentration range 40-240 g/L and produce a report with sample identification, sample concentrations, and an abundance of statistics. Optional hydraulics can accommodate samples in the concentration range 0.4-4.0 g/L. Operating at a typical rate of 30 to 40 samples per hour, it consumes only 0.074 mL of each sample and standard, and generates waste at the rate of about 1.5 mL per minute. No radioactive material passes through its multichannel peristaltic pump (which remains outside the glovebox, uncontaminated) but rather is handled by a 6-port, 2-position chromatography-type loop valve. An accompanying computer is programmed in QuickBASIC 4.5 to provide both instrument control and data reduction. The program is truly user-friendly and communication between operator and instrument is via computer screen displays and keyboard. Two important issues which have been addressed are waste minimization and operator safety (the analyzer can run in the absence of an operator, once its autosampler has been loaded)

  12. Plutonium oxide shipment report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    While following procedures for unloading shipping containers containing plutonium oxide, SRP personnel experienced problems. While using a pipe cutter to cut through the wall of the inner container, the pipe section fell to the floor. Three empty food cans in the bottom of the inner canister also fell to the floor and a puff of smoke was observed. Personnel were evacuated and contamination was detected in the room. As a result of the investigations conducted by Westinghouse and SRP, thermal effects, food can coatings, and fuel volatiles were eliminated as the cause of the problem. Helium used to leak test the RL070 shipping container seals entered the inner canister through two weld defects resulting in a pressurization of the contents. When the end cap was removed, the inner canister vented rapidly, the food cans did not, thus creating a differential pressure across the food cans. This caused the food cans to swell. It was recommended that a dye penetrant test of all inner container welds be added. Additional unloading procedures were also recommended

  13. Plutonium solution analyzer

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Burns, D.A.

    1994-09-01

    A fully automated analyzer has been developed for plutonium solutions. It was assembled from several commercially available modules, is based upon segmented flow analysis, and exhibits precision about an order of magnitude better than commercial units (0.5%-O.05% RSD). The system was designed to accept unmeasured, untreated liquid samples in the concentration range 40-240 g/L and produce a report with sample identification, sample concentrations, and an abundance of statistics. Optional hydraulics can accommodate samples in the concentration range 0.4-4.0 g/L. Operating at a typical rate of 30 to 40 samples per hour, it consumes only 0.074 mL of each sample and standard, and generates waste at the rate of about 1.5 mL per minute. No radioactive material passes through its multichannel peristaltic pump (which remains outside the glovebox, uncontaminated) but rather is handled by a 6-port, 2-position chromatography-type loop valve. An accompanying computer is programmed in QuickBASIC 4.5 to provide both instrument control and data reduction. The program is truly user-friendly and communication between operator and instrument is via computer screen displays and keyboard. Two important issues which have been addressed are waste minimization and operator safety (the analyzer can run in the absence of an operator, once its autosampler has been loaded).

  14. Plutonium dispositioning in CANDU

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boczar, P.G.; Feinroth, H.; Luxat, J.C.

    1995-07-01

    Recently, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) sponsored Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) to evaluate salient technical, strategic, schedule, and cost-related parameters of using CANDU reactors for dispositioning of weapons-grade plutonium in the form of Mixed OXide (MOX) fuel. A study team, consisting of key staff from the CANDU reactor designers and researchers (AECL), operators (Ontario Hydro) and fuel suppliers, analyzed all significant factors involved in such application, with the objective of identifying an arrangement that would permit the burning of MOX in CANDU at the earliest date. One of Ontario Hydro's multi-unit stations, Bruce A nuclear generating station (4x769 MW(e)), was chosen as the reference for the study. The assessment showed that no significant modifications of reactor or process systems are necessary to operate with a full MOX core. Plant modifications would be limited to fuel handling and modifications necessary to accommodate enhanced security and safeguards requirements. No safety limitations were identified

  15. Nondestructive assay instrument for measurement of plutonium in solutions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shirk, D.G.; Hsue, F.; Li, T.K.; Canada, T.R.

    1979-01-01

    A nondestructive assay (NDA) instrument that measures the 239 Pu content in solutions, using a passive gamma-ray spectroscopy technique, has been developed and installed in the LASL Plutonium Processing Facility. A detailed evaluation of this instrument has been performed. The results show that the instrument can routinely determine 239 Pu concentrations of 1 to 500 g/l with accuracies of 1 to 5% and assay times of 1 to 2 x 10 3 s

  16. The influence of plutonium concentration and solution flow rate on the effective capacity of macroporous anion exchange resin

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marsh, S.F.; Gallegos, T.D.

    1987-07-01

    The principal aqueous process used to recover and purify plutonium at the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility is anion exchange in nitric acid. Previous studies with gel-type anion exchange resin have shown an inverse relationship between plutonium concentration in the feed solution and the optimum flow rate for this process. Because gel-type resin has been replaced with macroporous resin at Los Alamos, the relationship between plutonium concentration and solution flow rate was reexamined with the selected Lewatit MP-500-FK resin using solutions of plutonium in nitric acid and in nitric acid with high levels of added nitrate salts. Our results with this resin differ significantly from previous data obtained with gel-type resin. Flow-rate variation from 10 to 80 liters per hour had essentially no effect on the measured quantities of plutonium sorbed by the macroporous resin. However, the effect of plutonium concentration in the feed solutions was pronounced, as feed solutions that contained the highest concentrations of plutonium also produced the highest resin loadings. The most notable effect of high concentrations of dissolved nitrate salts in these solutions was an increased resin capacity for plutonium at low flow rates. 16 refs., 7 figs., 2 tabs

  17. Assessment of plutonium in the Savannah River Site environment. Revision 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Carlton, W.H.; Evans, A.G.; Geary, L.A.; Murphy, C.E. Jr.; Pinder, J.E.; Strom, R.N.

    1992-12-31

    Plutonium in the Savannah River Site Environment is published as a part of the Radiological Assessment Program (RAP). It is the fifth in a series of eight documents on individual radioisotopes released to the environment as a result of Savannah River Site (SRS) operations. These are living documents, each to be revised and updated on a two-year schedule. This document describes the sources of plutonium in the environment, its release from SRS, environmental transport and ecological concentration of plutonium, and the radiological impact of SRS releases to the environment. Plutonium exists in the environment as a result of above-ground nuclear weapons tests, the Chernobyl accident, the destruction of satellite SNAP 9-A, plane crashes involving nuclear weapons, and small releases from reactors and reprocessing plants. Plutonium has been produced at SRS during the operation of five production reactors and released in small quantities during the processing of fuel and targets in chemical separations facilities. Approximately 0.6 Ci of plutonium was released into streams and about 12 Ci was released to seepage basins, where it was tightly bound by clay in the soil. A smaller quantity, about 3.8 Ci, was released to the atmosphere. Virtually all releases have occurred in F- and H-Area separation facilities. Plutonium concentration and transport mechanisms for the atmosphere, surface water, and ground water releases have been extensively studied by Savannah River Technology Center (SRTC) and ecological mechanisms have been studied by Savannah River Ecology Laboratory (SREL). The overall radiological impact of SRS releases to the offsite maximum individual can be characterized by a total dose of 15 mrem (atmospheric) and 0.18 mrem (liquid), compared with the dose of 12,960 mrem from non-SRS sources during the same period of time (1954--1989). Plutonium releases from SRS facilities have resulted in a negligible impact to the environment and the population it supports.

  18. Licensed fuel facility status report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-04-01

    NRC is committed to the periodic publication of licensed fuel facilities inventory difference data, following agency review of the information and completion of any related NRC investigations. Information in this report includes inventory difference data for active fuel fabrication facilities possessing more than one effective kilogram of high enriched uranium, low enriched uranium, plutonium, or uranium-233

  19. Licensed fuel facility status report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Joy, D.; Brown, C.

    1993-04-01

    NRC is committed to the periodic publication of licensed fuel facilities inventory difference data, following agency review of the information and completion of any related NRC investigations. Information in this report includes inventory difference data for active fuel fabrication facilities possessing more than one effective kilogram of high enriched uranium, low enriched uranium, plutonium, or uranium-233

  20. Safe handling, transport and storage of plutonium. Proceedings of a technical committee meeting held in Vienna, 18-21 October 1993

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-10-01

    Plutonium inventories and utilization rates worldwide are growing. It is important for nuclear power programmes everywhere that no incidents or accidents with plutonium occur. It is therefore important that all who deal with plutonium, do so safely. All those who deal with plutonium should have available the best information on safety handling and storage. Several countries have mature plutonium programmes. However, information exchange on plutonium has been limited. This has precluded the development until now of consensus documentation on safe handling and storage of plutonium. The Technical Committee has been established to address these problems and this Technical Document is the first product in this process. The purpose of the meeting was to bring together experts with significant experience in handling, transporting and storing plutonium; to exchange information and experiences dealing with plutonium at their facilities; to describe their practices (guidelines, procedures, regulations, etc.) for safely dealing with plutonium; to assess the need to develop and publish a consensus plutonium safety practices document(s), and to recommend possible future IAEA activities in this technical area. Refs, figs and tabs

  1. Long time contamination from plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fueloep, M.; Patzeltova, N.; Ragan, P.; Matel, L.

    1995-01-01

    Plutonium isotopes in the organism of the patient (who had participated in the liquidation works after the Chernobyl accident; for three month he had stayed in the epicenter, where he acted as a chauffeur driving a radioactive material to the place of destination) from urine were determined. For determination of the concentration of Pu-239, Pu-240 in urine a modified radiochemical method was used. After mineralization the sample was separated as an anion-nitrate complex with contact by the anion form of the resin in the column. The resin was washed by 8 M HNO 3 , the 8 M HCl with 0.3 M HNO 3 for removing the other radionuclides. The solution 0.36 M HCl with 0.01 M HF was used for the elution of plutonium. Using the lanthanum fluoride technique the sample was filtrated through a membrane filter. The plutonium was detected in the dry sample. The Pu-239 tracer was used for the evaluation of the plutonium separation efficiency. The alpha spectrometric measurements were carried out with a large area silicon detector. The samples were measured and evaluated in the energy region 4.98-5.18 MeV. The detection limit of alpha spectrometry measurements has been 0.01 Bq dm -3 . The concentration of plutonium in the 24-hour urine was determined three times in the quarter year intervals. The results are: 54 mBq, 63.2 mBq, 53 mBq, with average 56,7 mBq. From the results of the analyses of plutonium depositions calculated according to ICRP 54 the intake of this radionuclide for the patient was 56.7 kBq. To estimate a committed effective dose (50 years) from the intake of plutonium was used a conversion factor 6.8.10 -5 Sv.Bq -1 (class W). So the expressed committed effective dose received from the plutonium intake is 3.8 Sv. This number is relatively high and all the effective dose will be higher, because the patient was exposed to the other radionuclides too. For example the determination of the rate radionuclides Am-241/Pu-239,Pu-240 was 32-36 % in the fallout after the Chernobyl

  2. Double shell tanks plutonium inventory assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tusler, L.A.

    1995-01-01

    This report provides an evaluation that establishes plutonium inventory estimates for all DSTs based on known tank history information, the DST plutonium inventory tracking system, tank characterization measurements, tank transfer records, and estimated average concentration values for the various types of waste. These estimates use data through December 31, 1994, and give plutonium estimates as of January 1, 1995. The plutonium inventory values for the DSTs are given in Section 31. The plutonium inventory estimate is 224 kg for the DSTs and 854 kg for the SSTs for a total of 1078 kg. This value compares favorably with the total plutonium inventory value of 981 kg obtained from the total plutonium production minus plutonium recovery analysis estimates

  3. Oxidation-state maxima in plutonium chemistry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silver, G.L.

    2013-01-01

    Maxima in the fractions of the trivalent and hexavalent oxidation states of plutonium are inherent in the algebra of its disproportionation reactions. The maxima do not support overall disproportionation equations as satisfactory representations of aqueous plutonium. (author)

  4. Recovery studies for plutonium machining oil coolant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Navratil, J.D.; Baldwin, C.E.

    1977-01-01

    Lathe coolant oil, contaminated with plutonium and having a carbon tetrachloride diluent, is generated in plutonium machining areas at Rocky Flats. A research program was initiated to determine the nature of plutonium in this mixture of oil and carbon tetrachloride. Appropriate methods then could be developed to remove the plutonium and to recycle the oil and carbon tetrachloride. Studies showed that the mixtures of spent oil and carbon tetrachloride contained particulate plutonium and plutonium species that are soluble in water or in oil and carbon tetrachloride. The particulate plutonium was removed by filtration; the nonfilterable plutonium was removed by adsorption on various materials. Laboratory-scale tests indicated the lathe-coolant oil mixture could be separated by distilling the carbon tetrachloride to yield recyclable products

  5. Plutonium and americium separation from salts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hagan, P.G.; Miner, F.J.

    1976-01-01

    Salts or materials containing plutonium and americium are dissolved in hydrochloric acid, heated, and contacted with an alkali metal carbonate solution to precipitate plutonium and americium carbonates which are thereafter readily separable from the solution

  6. Plutonium-238 and plutonium-239 metabolism in dairy cows following ingestion of mixed oxides

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Patzer, R.G.; Mullen, A.A.; Sutton, W.W.; Potter, G.D.; Mosley, R.E.; Efurd, D.W.; Stalnaker, N.D.

    1985-01-01

    Dairy cows were given oral dosage of plutonium-238 and plutonium-239 dioxide particles in a study to determine the relative gastrointestinal absorption and tissue distribution of the nuclides. Two cows were given particles in which the two isotopes were homogeneously mixed within the particles. A third cow was given two batches of particles which contained either plutonium-238 or plutonium-239. Results indicate that, when the two isotopes of plutonium are homogeneous within the particles, there is no difference between plutonium-238 and plutonium-239 in the relative gastrointestinal absorption and tissue distribution

  7. Selecting a plutonium vitrification process

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jouan, A. [Centre d`Etudes de la Vallee du Rhone, Bagnols sur Ceze (France)

    1996-05-01

    Vitrification of plutonium is one means of mitigating its potential danger. This option is technically feasible, even if it is not the solution advocated in France. Two situations are possible, depending on whether or not the glass matrix also contains fission products; concentrations of up to 15% should be achievable for plutonium alone, whereas the upper limit is 3% in the presence of fission products. The French continuous vitrification process appears to be particularly suitable for plutonium vitrification: its capacity is compatible with the required throughout, and the compact dimensions of the process equipment prevent a criticality hazard. Preprocessing of plutonium metal, to convert it to PuO{sub 2} or to a nitric acid solution, may prove advantageous or even necessary depending on whether a dry or wet process is adopted. The process may involve a single step (vitrification of Pu or PuO{sub 2} mixed with glass frit) or may include a prior calcination step - notably if the plutonium is to be incorporated into a fission product glass. It is important to weigh the advantages and drawbacks of all the possible options in terms of feasibility, safety and cost-effectiveness.

  8. A World made of Plutonium?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Broda, E.

    1976-01-01

    This lecture by Engelbert Broda was written for the 26th Pugwash Conference in Mühlhausen, Germany, 26 – 31 August 1976: Public doubts about nuclear energy are generally directed at the problems of routine emissions of radionuclides, of catastrophic accidents, and of terminal waste disposal. Curiously, the most important problem is not being given sufficient attention: The use of plutonium from civilian reactors fpr weapons production. According to current ideas about a nuclear future, 5000 tons (order of magnitude) of plutonium are to be made annually by year 2000, and about 10 000 tons will all the time be in circulation (transport, reprocessing, reproduction of fuel elements, etc.). It is a misconception that plutonium from power reactors is unsuitable as a nuclear explosive. 5000 tons are enough for several hundred thousand (!) of bombs, Nagasaki type. By the year 2000 maybe 40 – 50 countries will have home-made plutonium. Plutonium production and proliferation are the most serious problems in a nuclear world. (author)

  9. Plutonium determination by isotope dilution

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lucas, M.

    1980-01-01

    The principle is to add to a known amount of the analysed solution a known amount of a spike solution consisting of plutonium 242. The isotopic composition of the resulting mixture is then determined by surface ionization mass spectrometry, and the plutonium concentration in the solution is deduced, from this measurement. For irradiated fuels neutronic studies or for fissile materials balance measurements, requiring the knowledge of the ratio U/Pu or of concentration both uranium and plutonium, it is better to use the double spike isotope dilution method, with a spike solution of known 233 U- 242 Pu ratio. Using this method, the ratio of uranium to plutonium concentration in the irradiated fuel solution can be determined without any accurate measurement of the mixed amounts of sample and spike solutions. For fissile material balance measurements, the uranium concentration is determined by using single isotope dilution, and the plutonium concentration is deduced from the ratio Pu/U and U concentration. The main advantages of isotope dilution are its selectivity, accuracy and very high sensitivity. The recent improvements made to surface ionization mass spectrometers have considerably increased the precision of the measurements; a relative precision of about 0.2% to 0.3% is obtained currently, but it could be reduced to 0.1%, in the future, with a careful control of the experimental procedures. The detection limite is around 0.1 ppb [fr

  10. Airborne release fractions/rates and respirable fractions for nonreactor nuclear facilities. Volume 2, Appendices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-12-01

    This document contains compiled data from the DOE Handbook on Airborne Release Fractions/Rates and Respirable Fractions for Nonreactor Nuclear facilities. Source data and example facilities utilized, such as the Plutonium Recovery Facility, are included

  11. Production of Plutonium Metal from Aqueous Solutions

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Orth, D.A.

    2003-01-16

    The primary separation of plutonium from irradiated uranium by the Purex solvent extraction process at the Savannah River Plant produces a dilute plutonium solution containing residual fission products and uranium. A cation exchange process is used for concentration and further decontamination of the plutonium, as the first step in the final preparation of metal. This paper discusses the production of plutonium metal from the aqueous solutions.

  12. Plutonium Proliferation: The Achilles Heel of Disarmament

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leventhal, Paul

    2001-01-01

    Plutonium is a byproduct of nuclear fission, and it is produced at the rate of about 70 metric tons a year in the world's nuclear power reactors. Concerns about civilian plutonium ran high in the 1970s and prompted enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 to give the United States a veto over separating plutonium from U.S.-supplied uranium fuel. Over the years, however, so-called reactor-grade plutonium has become the orphan issue of nuclear non-proliferation, largely as a consequence of pressures from plutonium-separating countries. The demise of the fast breeder reactor and the reluctance of utilities to introduce plutonium fuel in light-water reactors have resulted in large surpluses of civilian, weapons-usable plutonium, which now approach in size the 250 tons of military plutonium in the world. Yet reprocessing of spent fuel for recovery and use of plutonium proceeds apace outside the United States and threatens to overwhelm safeguards and security measures for keeping this material out of the hands of nations and terrorists for weapons. A number of historical and current developments are reviewed to demonstrate that plutonium commerce is undercutting efforts both to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and to work toward eliminating existing nuclear arsenals. These developments include the breakdown of U.S. anti-plutonium policy, the production of nuclear weapons by India with Atoms-for-Peace plutonium, the U.S.-Russian plan to introduce excess military plutonium as fuel in civilian power reactors, the failure to include civilian plutonium and bomb-grade uranium in the proposed Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, and the perception of emerging proliferation threats as the rationale for development of a ballistic missile defense system. Finally, immobilization of separated plutonium in high-level waste is explored as a proliferation-resistant and disarmament-friendly solution for eliminating excess stocks of civilian and military plutonium.

  13. Sludge stabilization at the Plutonium Finishing Plant, Hanford Site, Richland, Washington

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-10-01

    This Environmental Assessment evaluates the proposed action to operate two laboratory-size muffle furnaces in glovebox HC-21C, located in the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP), Hanford Site, Richland, Washington. The muffle furnaces would be used to stabilize chemically reactive sludges that contain approximately 25 kilograms (55 pounds) of plutonium by heating to approximately 500 to 1000 degrees C (900 to 1800 degrees F). The resulting stable powder, mostly plutonium oxide with impurities, would be stored in the PFP vaults. The presence of chemically reactive plutonium-bearing sludges in the process gloveboxes poses a risk to workers from radiation exposure and limits the availability of storage space for future plant cleanup. Therefore, there is a need to stabilize the material into a form suitable for long-term storage. This proposed action would be an interim action, which would take place prior to completion of an Environmental Impact Statement for the PFP which would evaluate stabilization of all plutonium-bearing materials and cleanout of the facility. However, only 10 percent of the total quantity of plutonium in reactive materials is in the sludges, so this action will not limit the choice of reasonable alternatives or prejudice the Record of Decision of the Plutonium Finishing Plant Environmental Impact Statement

  14. Characterization of airborne plutonium-bearing particles from a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, S.M. Jr.

    1977-11-01

    The elemental compositions, sizes, structures, and 239 Pu contents were determined for 299 plutonium-bearing particles isolated from airborne particles collected at various locations in the exhaust from a nuclear fuel reprocessing facility. These data were compared with data from natural aerosol particles. Most of the collected particles were composed of aggregates of crustal materials. Seven percent of the particles were organic and 3% were metallic, viz., iron, chromium, and nickel. High enrichment factors for titanium, manganese, chromium, nickel, zinc, and copper were evidence of the anthropic nature of some of the particles. The amount of plutonium in most particles was very small (less than one femtocurie of 239 Pu). Plutonium concentrations were determined by the fission track counting method. Only one particle contained sufficient plutonium for detection by electron microprobe analysis. This was a 1-μm-diameter particle containing 73% PuO 2 by weight (estimated to be 170 fCi of 239 Pu) in combination with Fe 2 O 3 and mica. The plutonium-bearing particles were generally larger than natural aerosols. The geometric mean diameter of those collected from the mechanical line exhaust point where plutonium is converted to the metal was larger than that of particles collected from the wet cabinet exhaust (13.7 μm vs. 4.6 μm). Particles from the mechanical line also contained more plutonium per particle than those from the wet cabinets

  15. Plutonium Oxide Process Capability Work Plan

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Meier, David E. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Tingey, Joel M. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

    2014-02-28

    Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has been tasked to develop a Pilot-scale Plutonium-oxide Processing Unit (P3U) providing a flexible capability to produce 200g (Pu basis) samples of plutonium oxide using different chemical processes for use in identifying and validating nuclear forensics signatures associated with plutonium production. Materials produced can also be used as exercise and reference materials.

  16. Civil plutonium amounts in the world

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Naudet, G.

    1994-01-01

    The experience of plutonium reprocessing in water reactors is positive and today the use of this nuclear fuel is at industrial level. Plutonium quantities in spent fuel go on increasing, plutonium stock coming from reprocessing can be controlled: according to conjuncture, it will evolve by stabilization or decreasing at the beginning of next century

  17. The use of calorimetry for plutonium assay

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mason, J.A.

    1982-12-01

    Calorimetry is a technique for measuring the thermal power of heat-producing substances. The technique may be applied to the measurement of plutonium-bearing materials which evolve heat as a result of alpha and beta decay. A calorimetric measurement of the thermal power of a plutonium sample, combined with a knowledge or measurement of the plutonium isotopic mass ratios of the sample provides a convenient and accurate, non-destructive measure of the total plutonium mass of the sample. The present report provides a description, and an assessment of the calorimetry technique applied to the assay of plutonium-bearing materials. Types and characteristics of plutonium calorimeters are considered, as well as calibration and operating procedures. The instrumentation used with plutonium calorimeters is described and the use of computer control for calorimeter automation is discussed. A critical review and assessment of plutonium calorimetry literature since 1970 is presented. Both fuel element and plutonium-bearing material calorimeters are considered. The different types of plutonium calorimeters are evaluated and their relative merits are discussed. A combined calorimeter and gamma-ray measurement assay system is considered. The design principles of plutonium assay calorimeters are considered. An automatic, computer-based calorimeter control system is proposed in conjunction with a general plutonium assay calorimeter design. (author)

  18. Tabulated Neutron Emission Rates for Plutonium Oxide

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Shores, Erik Frederick [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2017-07-24

    This work tabulates neutron emission rates for 80 plutonium oxide samples as reported in the literature. Plutonium-­238 and plutonium-­239 oxides are included and such emission rates are useful for scaling tallies from Monte Carlo simulations and estimating dose rates for health physics applications.

  19. Technological alternatives for plutonium storage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-12-01

    This paper discusses the problems of large long term storage since stores at fabrication plants may depend on the form of plutonium ultimately chosen for transport. The paper's conclusion includes: MOX can be regarded as more proliferation resistant than PUO 2 but no experience of long term storage is available, therefore further R and D is required; co-location of the store with reprocessing plants (and fuel fabrication plant) would appear to have advantages in non-proliferation, safeguards implementation, environmental protection and economic aspects; there are strong non-proliferation and security arguments for not moving plutonium away from the site where it was separated until there is an identifiable and scheduled end use. The design of the store, the form in which plutonium should be stored, particularly as MOX, and the costs and further R and D required are considered. The possible location of stores is also discussed and institutional questions briefly considered

  20. Plutonium and U-233 mines

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Milgram, M.S.

    1983-08-01

    A comparison is made among second generation reactor systems fuelled primarily with fissile plutonium and/or U-233 in uranium or thorium. This material is obtained from irradiated fuel from first generation CANDU reactors fuelled by natural or enriched uranium and thorium. Except for plutonium-thorium reactors, second generation reactors demand similar amounts of reprocessing throughput, but the most efficient plutonium burning systems require a large prior allocation of uranium. Second generation reactors fuelled by U-233 make more efficient use of resources and lead to more flexible fuelling strategies, but require development of first generation once-through thorium cycles and early demonstration of the commercial viability of thorium fuel reprocessing. No early implementation of reprocessing technology is required for these cycles

  1. Political influences in plutonium recycling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Patak, H.N.

    1982-01-01

    The history of plutonium safeguards is one of political error and misunderstandings, as well as a lack of technical knowledge. Although there was widespread support for preventing the proliferation of nuclear explosives, with over 100 nations signing the Nonproliferation Treaty of 1969, India's 1974 nuclear test brought renewed political activity to prevent another such occurrence. Opposition has been directed only at how to pursue this goal, but the status of four major experiments aimed at minimizing weapons proliferation is one of failure, intensified by a weakening of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). If the link between plutonium power and weapons production can be broken through on-site reprocessing, the situation could improve. One course would be for the nuclear power industry to adopt its own system for safe guarding plutonium

  2. Plutonium and latent nuclear proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Quester, G.H.

    1992-01-01

    A country producing nuclear electric power acquires an ability to produce atomic bombs quite easily and without taking many steps beyond that which would be perfectly normal for civilian purposes. The role of plutonium in the three fold list of the gains that must be sought in arms control formulated by Schelling and Halpevin are discussed. On the first, that we should seek to reduce the likelihood of war, it can be argued that plutonium reduces the likelihood in some cases. The second, that we should seek to reduce the destruction in war, is made worse by plutonium. On the third criterion, that we should seek to reduce the burdens in peacetime of everyone's being prepared for war, the situation is confusing and depends on the prospects for nuclear electrical power. It is concluded that latent capability to produce nuclear weapons may be sufficient without the need for actual detonations and deployment of bombs. (UK)

  3. Plutonium accident resistant container project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Andersen, J.A.

    1978-09-01

    The PARC (plutonium accident resistant container) project resulted in the design, development, and certification testing of a crashworthy air-transportable plutonium package (shipping container) for certification by the USNRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission). This PAT-1 (plutonium air transportable) package survives a very severe sequential test program of impact, crush, puncture, slash, burn, and water immersion. There is also an individual hydrostatic pressure test. The package has a payload mass capacity of 2 kg of PuO 2 and a thermal capacity of 25 watts. The design rationale for very high energy absorption (impact, crush, puncture, and slash protection) with residual high-level fire protection, resulted in a reasonably small air-transportable package, advancing the packaging state-of-art. Optimization design iterations were utilized in the areas of impact energy absorption and stress and thermal analysis. Package test results are presented in relation to radioactive materials containment acceptance criteria, shielding and criticality standards

  4. Plutonium accident resistant container project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Andersen, J.A.

    1978-05-01

    The PARC (plutonium accident resistant container) project resulted in the design, development, and certification testing of a crashworthy air-transportable plutonium package (shipping container) for certification by the USNRC. This PAT-1 (plutonium air transportable) package survives a very severe sequential test program of impact, crush, puncture, slash, burn, and water immersion. There is also an individual hydrostatic pressure test. The package has a payload mass capacity of 2 kg of PuO2 and a thermal capacity of 25 watts. The design rationale for very high energy absorption (impact, crush, puncture, and slash protection) with residual high-level fire protection, resulted in a reasonalby small air-transportable package, advancing the packaging state-of-art. Optimization design iterations were utilized in the areas of impact energy absorption and stress and thermal analysis. Package test results are presented in relation to radioactive materials containment acceptance criteria, shielding and criticality standards

  5. Nukem's plutonium hitches a ride

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1988-01-01

    The European repercussions of a scandal involving the illegal movement of plutonium and cobalt 60 in canisters in which it was claimed there was only low-level radioactive waste, from West Germany to the reprocessing centre at Mol, Belgium are considered. Large bribes were paid to employees of the nuclear industry and government inspectors to allow this illicit transport to carry on over a number of years. It is not yet clear where the plutonium came from or where it was going. The suggestion that it may have been sold to Libya or Pakistan for nuclear weapons is very damaging to the nuclear safety argument. Even if the plutonium was being disposed of because it could not be accounted for, the safeguard procedures do not give confidence to the European public more aware of nuclear safety than ever. (UK)

  6. Plutonium-238 Decision Analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brown, Mike; Lechel, David J.; Leigh, C.D.

    1999-01-01

    Five transuranic (TRU) waste sites in the Department of Energy (DOE) complex, collectively, have more than 2,100 cubic meters of Plutonium-238 (Pu-238) TRU waste that exceed the wattage restrictions of the Transuranic Package Transporter-II (TRUPACT-11). The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is being developed by the DOE as a repository for TRU waste. With the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) opening in 1999, these sites are faced with a need to develop waste management practices that will enable the transportation of Pu-238 TRU waste to WIPP for disposal. This paper describes a decision analysis that provided a logical framework for addressing the Pu-238 TRU waste issue. The insights that can be gained by performing a formalized decision analysis are multifold. First and foremost, the very process. of formulating a decision tree forces the decision maker into structured, logical thinking where alternatives can be evaluated one against the other using a uniform set of criteria. In the process of developing the decision tree for transportation of Pu-238 TRU waste, several alternatives were eliminated and the logical order for decision making was discovered. Moreover, the key areas of uncertainty for proposed alternatives were identified and quantified. The decision analysis showed that the DOE can employ a combination approach where they will (1) use headspace gas analyses to show that a fraction of the Pu-238 TRU waste drums are no longer generating hydrogen gas and can be shipped to WIPP ''as-is'', (2) use drums and bags with advanced filter systems to repackage Pu-238 TRU waste drums that are still generating hydrogen, and (3) add hydrogen getter materials to the inner containment vessel of the TRUPACT-11to relieve the build-up of hydrogen gas during transportation of the Pu-238 TRU waste drums

  7. An environmentally benign plutonium processing future at Los Alamos

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1993-01-01

    In recent years, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has elevated environmental restoration and waste management to major mission areas, and it has established the reduction of wastes from DOE facilities as a major objective. The DOE facilities must now comply with all environmental regulations, including special regulations required of federal facilities. In recognition of this shift in philosophy, the plutonium processing facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has adopted the goal of becoming a facility that processes plutonium in a way that produces only environmentally benign waste. Becoming a facility with zero radionuclide and mixed-waste discharge is an extremely challenging goal and one that requires the technical contributions of a multidisciplinary team of experts. While all the technologies necessary to achieve this goal are not yet available, an extensive knowledge base does exist that can be applied to solving the remaining problems. Working toward this goal is a worthwhile endeavor, not only for LANL, but for the nuclear complex of the future

  8. Plutonium in a grassland ecosystem

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Little, C.A.

    1976-01-01

    This study was concerned with plutonium contamination of grassland at the U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration Rocky Flats plant northwest of Denver, Colorado. Of interest were: the definition of major plutonium-containing ecosystem compartments; the relative amounts in those compartments; how those values related to studies done in other geogrphical areas; whether or not the predominant isotopes, 238 Pu and 239 Pu, behaved differently; and what mechanisms might have allowed for the observed patterns of contamination. Samples of soil, litter, vegetation, arthropods, and small mammals were collected for plutonium analysis and mass determination from each of two macroplots. Small aliquots (5 g or less) were analyzed by a rapid liquid scintillation technique and by alpha spectrometry. Of the compartments sampled, greater than 99% of the total plutonium was contained in the soil. The concentrations of plutonium in soil were significantly inversely correlated with distance from the contamination source, depth of the sample, and particle size of the sieved soil samples. The soil data suggested that the distribution of contamination largely resulted from physical transport processes. A mechanism of agglomerated submicron plutonium oxide particles and larger (1-500 μm) host soil particles was proposed. Concentrations of Pu in litter and vegetation were inversely correlated to distance from the source and directly correlated to soil concentrations at the same location. Comparatively high concentration ratios of vegetation to soil suggested wind resuspension of contamination as an important transport mechanism. Arthropod and small mammal samples were highly skewed, kurtotic, and quite variable, having coefficients of variation (standard deviation/mean) as high as 600%. Bone Pu concentrations were lower than other tissues. Hide, GI, and lung were generally not higher in Pu than kidney, liver and muscle

  9. Plutonium stabilization and packaging system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-01-01

    This document describes the functional design of the Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging System (Pu SPS). The objective of this system is to stabilize and package plutonium metals and oxides of greater than 50% wt, as well as other selected isotopes, in accordance with the requirements of the DOE standard for safe storage of these materials for 50 years. This system will support completion of stabilization and packaging campaigns of the inventory at a number of affected sites before the year 2002. The package will be standard for all sites and will provide a minimum of two uncontaminated, organics free confinement barriers for the packaged material

  10. Long time contamination from plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fueloep, M; Patzeltova, N; Ragan, P [Inst. of Preventive and Clinical Medicine, Bratislava (Slovakia); Matel, L [Comenius Univ., Bratislava (Slovakia). Department of Nuclear Chemistry

    1996-12-31

    Plutonium isotopes in the organism of the patient (who had participated in the liquidation works after the Chernobyl accident; for three month he had stayed in the epicenter, where he acted as a chauffeur driving a radioactive material to the place of destination) from urine were determined. For determination of the concentration of Pu-239, Pu-240 in urine a modified radiochemical method was used. After mineralization the sample was separated as an anion-nitrate complex with contact by the anion form of the resin in the column. The resin was washed by 8 M HNO{sub 3}, the 8 M HCl with 0.3 M HNO{sub 3} for removing the other radionuclides. The solution 0.36 M HCl with 0.01 M HF was used for the elution of plutonium. Using the lanthanum fluoride technique the sample was filtrated through a membrane filter. The plutonium was detected in the dry sample. The Pu-239 tracer was used for the evaluation of the plutonium separation efficiency. The alpha spectrometric measurements were carried out with a large area silicon detector. The samples were measured and evaluated in the energy region 4.98-5.18 MeV. The detection limit of alpha spectrometry measurements has been 0.01 Bq dm{sup -3}. The concentration of plutonium in the 24-hour urine was determined three times in the quarter year intervals. The results are: 54 mBq, 63.2 mBq, 53 mBq, with average 56,7 mBq. From the results of the analyses of plutonium depositions calculated according to ICRP 54 the intake of this radionuclide for the patient was 56.7 kBq. To estimate a committed effective dose (50 years) from the intake of plutonium was used a conversion factor 6.8.10{sup -5} Sv.Bq{sup -1} (class W). So the expressed committed effective dose received from the plutonium intake is 3.8 Sv. This number is relatively high and all the effective dose will be higher, because the patient was exposed to the other radionuclides too. (Abstract Truncated)

  11. Separation Techniques for Uranium and Plutonium at Trace Levels for the Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometric Determination

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suh, M. Y.; Han, S. H.; Kim, J. G.; Park, Y. J.; Kim, W. H.

    2005-12-01

    This report describes the state of the art and the progress of the chemical separation and purification techniques required for the thermal ionization mass spectrometric determination of uranium and plutonium in environmental samples at trace or ultratrace levels. Various techniques, such as precipitation, solvent extraction, extraction chromatography, and ion exchange chromatography, for separation of uranium and plutonium were evaluated. Sample preparation methods and dissolution techniques for environmental samples were also discussed. Especially, both extraction chromatographic and anion exchange chromatographic procedures for uranium and plutonium in environmental samples, such as soil, sediment, plant, seawater, urine, and bone ash were reviewed in detail in order to propose some suitable methods for the separation and purification of uranium and plutonium from the safeguards environmental or swipe samples. A survey of the IAEA strengthened safeguards system, the clean room facility of IAEA's NWAL(Network of Analytical Laboratories), and the analytical techniques for safeguards environmental samples was also discussed here

  12. Design safety features of containments used for handling plutonium in Reprocessing Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aherwal, P.; Achuthan, P.V.

    2016-01-01

    The plutonium present in spent fuel is separated from the associated uranium and fission products using solvent extraction cycles in process cells. Product plutonium nitrate solution containing trace concentrations of uranium and fission products is treated in the reconversion facility through a precipitation-calcination route and converted to sinterable grade plutonium oxide (PuO 2 ). All chemical operations involving materials with high plutonium content, both in solid and solution forms are carried out in glove boxes. Glove box provides an effective isolation from radioactive materials handled and acts as a barrier between the operator and the source of radiation. These glove boxes are interconnected for sequential operations and the interconnected glove box trains are installed within secondary enclosures called double skin which provides double barrier protection to operators

  13. An improved, computer-based, on-line gamma monitor for plutonium anion exchange process control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pope, N.G.; Marsh, S.F.

    1987-06-01

    An improved, low-cost, computer-based system has replaced a previously developed on-line gamma monitor. Both instruments continuously profile uranium, plutonium, and americium in the nitrate anion exchange process used to recover and purify plutonium at the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility. The latest system incorporates a personal computer that provides full-feature multichannel analyzer (MCA) capabilities by means of a single-slot, plug-in integrated circuit board. In addition to controlling all MCA functions, the computer program continuously corrects for gain shift and performs all other data processing functions. This Plutonium Recovery Operations Gamma Ray Energy Spectrometer System (PROGRESS) provides on-line process operational data essential for efficient operation. By identifying abnormal conditions in real time, it allows operators to take corrective actions promptly. The decision-making capability of the computer will be of increasing value as we implement automated process-control functions in the future. 4 refs., 6 figs

  14. Separation Techniques for Uranium and Plutonium at Trace Levels for the Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometric Determination

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Suh, M. Y.; Han, S. H.; Kim, J. G.; Park, Y. J.; Kim, W. H

    2005-12-15

    This report describes the state of the art and the progress of the chemical separation and purification techniques required for the thermal ionization mass spectrometric determination of uranium and plutonium in environmental samples at trace or ultratrace levels. Various techniques, such as precipitation, solvent extraction, extraction chromatography, and ion exchange chromatography, for separation of uranium and plutonium were evaluated. Sample preparation methods and dissolution techniques for environmental samples were also discussed. Especially, both extraction chromatographic and anion exchange chromatographic procedures for uranium and plutonium in environmental samples, such as soil, sediment, plant, seawater, urine, and bone ash were reviewed in detail in order to propose some suitable methods for the separation and purification of uranium and plutonium from the safeguards environmental or swipe samples. A survey of the IAEA strengthened safeguards system, the clean room facility of IAEA's NWAL(Network of Analytical Laboratories), and the analytical techniques for safeguards environmental samples was also discussed here.

  15. Determination of plutonium-238 in plutonium by alpha spectrometry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aggarwal, S.K.; Jain, H.C.; Mathews, C.K.; Ramaniah, M.V.

    1975-01-01

    A method is presented for the determination of 238 Pu in plutonium samples by alpha spectrometry. Various factors attributing towards the energy degradation, a problem usually encountered in alpha spectrometry, are discussed. A computer programme is given for the evaluation of peak areas when the alpha spectrum is degraded. The results are compared with those obtained by mass spectrometry. (author)

  16. Plutonium Speciation, Solubilization and Migration in Soils

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Neu, M.; Runde, W.

    1999-01-01

    This report summarizes research completed in the first half of a three-year project. As outlined in the authors' proposal they are focusing on (1) characterizing the plutonium at an actinide contaminated site, RFETS, including determining the origin, dispersion, and speciation of the plutonium, (2) studying environmentally important plutonium complexes, primarily hydroxides and carbonates, and (3) examining the interactions of plutonium species with manganese minerals. In the first year the authors focused on site based studies. This year they continue to characterize samples from the RFETS, study the formation and structural and spectroscopic features of environmentally relevant Pu species, and begin modeling the environmental behavior of plutonium

  17. Plutonium recovery from carbonate wash solutions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gray, J.H.; Reif, D.J.; Chostner, D.F.; Holcomb, H.P.

    1991-01-01

    540Periodically higher than expected levels of plutonium are found in carbonate solutions used to wash second plutonium cycle solvent. The recent accumulation of plutonium in carbonate wash solutions has led to studies to determine the cause of that plutonium accumulation, to evaluate the quality of all canyon solvents, and to develop additional criteria needed to establish when solvent quality is acceptable. Solvent from three canyon solvent extraction cycles was used to evaluate technology required to measure tributyl phosphate (TBP) degradation products and was used to evaluate solvent quality criteria during the development of plutonium recovery processes. 1 fig

  18. Burning weapons-grade plutonium in reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Newman, D.F.

    1993-06-01

    As a result of massive reductions in deployed nuclear warheads, and their subsequent dismantlement, large quantities of surplus weapons- grade plutonium will be stored until its ultimate disposition is achieved in both the US and Russia. Ultimate disposition has the following minimum requirements: (1) preclude return of plutonium to the US and Russian stockpiles, (2) prevent environmental damage by precluding release of plutonium contamination, and (3) prevent proliferation by precluding plutonium diversion to sub-national groups or nonweapons states. The most efficient and effective way to dispose of surplus weapons-grade plutonium is to fabricate it into fuel and use it for generation of electrical energy in commercial nuclear power plants. Weapons-grade plutonium can be used as fuel in existing commercial nuclear power plants, such as those in the US and Russia. This recovers energy and economic value from weapons-grade plutonium, which otherwise represents a large cost liability to maintain in safeguarded and secure storage. The plutonium remaining in spent MOX fuel is reactor-grade, essentially the same as that being discharged in spent UO 2 fuels. MOX fuels are well developed and are currently used in a number of LWRs in Europe. Plutonium-bearing fuels without uranium (non-fertile fuels) would require some development. However, such non-fertile fuels are attractive from a nonproliferation perspective because they avoid the insitu production of additional plutonium and enhance the annihilation of the plutonium inventory on a once-through fuel cycle

  19. The first weighing of plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1967-09-10

    The following text, transcribed from the remarks of those scientists who gathered at the University of Chicago on September 10, 1967, to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the first weighing of plutonium, tells an important part of the story of this fascinating new element that is destined to play an increasingly significant role in the future of man.

  20. Spectrographic analysis of plutonium (1960)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Artaud, J.; Chaput, M.; Robichet, J.

    1960-01-01

    Various possibilities for the spectrographic determination of impurities in plutonium are considered. The application of the 'copper spark' method, of sparking on graphite and of fractional distillation in the arc are described and discussed in some detail (apparatus, accessories, results obtained). (author) [fr

  1. Plutonium waste incineration using pyrohydrolysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meyer, M.L.

    1991-01-01

    Waste generated by Savannah River Site (SRS) plutonium operations includes a contaminated organic waste stream. A conventional method for disposing of the organic waste stream and recovering the nuclear material is by incineration. When the organic material is burned, the plutonium remains in the incinerator ash. Plutonium recovery from incinerator ash is highly dependent on the maximum temperature to which the oxide is exposed. Recovery via acid leaching is reduced for a high fired ash (>800 degree C), while plutonium oxides fired at lower decomposition temperatures (400--800 degrees C) are more soluble at any given acid concentration. To determine the feasibility of using a lower temperature process, tests were conducted using an electrically heated, controlled-air incinerator. Nine nonradioactive, solid, waste materials were batch-fed and processed in a top-heated cylindrical furnace. Waste material processing was completed using a 19-liter batch over a nominal 8-hour cycle. A processing cycle consisted of 1 hour for heating, 4 hours for reacting, and 3 hours for chamber cooling. The water gas shift reaction was used to hydrolyze waste materials in an atmosphere of 336% steam and 4.4% oxygen. Throughput ranged from 0.14 to 0.27 kg/hr depending on the variability in the waste material composition and density

  2. The first weighing of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1967-01-01

    The following text, transcribed from the remarks of those scientists who gathered at the University of Chicago on September 10, 1967, to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the first weighing of plutonium, tells an important part of the story of this fascinating new element that is destined to play an increasingly significant role in the future of man

  3. Safe disposal of surplus plutonium

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gong, W. L.; Naz, S.; Lutze, W.; Busch, R.; Prinja, A.; Stoll, W.

    2001-06-01

    About 150 tons of weapons grade and weapons usable plutonium (metal, oxide, and in residues) have been declared surplus in the USA and Russia. Both countries plan to convert the metal and oxide into mixed oxide fuel for nuclear power reactors. Russia has not yet decided what to do with the residues. The US will convert residues into a ceramic, which will then be over-poured with highly radioactive borosilicate glass. The radioactive glass is meant to provide a deterrent to recovery of plutonium, as required by a US standard. Here we show a waste form for plutonium residues, zirconia/boron carbide (ZrO 2/B 4C), with an unprecedented combination of properties: a single, radiation-resistant, and chemically durable phase contains the residues; billion-year-old natural analogs are available; and criticality safety is given under all conceivable disposal conditions. ZrO 2/B 4C can be disposed of directly, without further processing, making it attractive to all countries facing the task of plutonium disposal. The US standard for protection against recovery can be met by disposal of the waste form together with used reactor fuel.

  4. On plutonium, journalism and ethics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rundo, J.

    1994-01-01

    This editorial comments on the furore resulting from three lay articles published by E. Welsome in the Albuquerque Tribune for 15 November 1993, concerning the injection of plutonium into humans in the 1940s, and discusses the ethics of administration of radioactive materials with and without informed consent. (Author)

  5. Management of Russian military plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zaleski, C.P.

    1996-01-01

    The objective of this paper is to propose and discuss a solution which enables storing as quickly as possible all weapons-grade plutonium from Russian military program in a way which would prevent diversion. Two main conditions apply to this solution. First, it should be achieved in a manner acceptable to Russian government, notably by preserving plutonium for possible future energy production, and second, the economics of the total system should be good enough to ensure no charge or limited charge for the storage of plutonium. A proposal is made to store plutonium in a specially designed fast reactor or specially designed reactor core. This solution could be favorable in comparison to other solutions applying the above mentioned goal and conditions. Additionally the proposed solution would have the following side advantages: utilizing available personnel and installations of the Russian nuclear complex; providing possible basis for decommissioning of older and less safe Russian reactors; giving experience of construction and operation of a series of sodium-cooled fast reactors. The major problem however is the need for large capital investment with the risk of getting no adequate return on investment due to difficult political and economic situation in Russia

  6. Active test of purification facility at Rokkasho reprocessing plant

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ishio, Takahiro; Sato, Nobuharu; Inaba, Makoto; Itagaki, Takashi [Purification Section, Plant Operation Department, Reprocessing Plant, Reprocessing Business Division, Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited, 4-108, Aza Okitsuke, Oaza Obuchi, Rokkasho-mura, Kamikita-gun, Aomori-ken (Japan)

    2009-06-15

    I. Introduction: At RRP, following the completion of Water Test, Chemical Test (CT) and Uranium Test (UT), the Active Test (AT) with actual spent fuel assemblies has been performed since March of 2006. This paper deals with the AT of the plutonium purification unit at RRP. II. Outline of plutonium purification unit: The plutonium purification unit purifies plutonium nitrate sent from the Separation Facility, and it has 5 pulsed columns and 4 mixer-settlers. Plutonium valence is adjusted to Pu{sup 4+} in plutonium nitrate sent from the Separation Facility, and then plutonium is extracted into organic phase (tri-butyl phosphate: TBP) in the extraction column. At this time, most of fission products remain in aqueous phase (nitric acid solution), which is discharged as raffinate through the diluent washing column. The fission products still contained in loaded organic solvent are removed in the FP scrubbing column, and then plutonium is stripped with nitric acid solution including hydroxylamine nitrate (HAN) as reducer. After TBP contained in purified plutonium nitrate solution is removed in the diluent washing bank with n-dodecane, it is sent to the plutonium concentration unit. Organic solvent used in the stripping column is sent to the plutonium barrier bank in order to remove remaining plutonium with uranous nitrate and hydrazine nitrate solution, and organic solvent is sent to the solvent regeneration unit. III. Active test results: The main purpose of the AT on the plutonium purification unit is (1) checking the performance of plutonium extraction and stripping, (2) checking the efficiency of diluent washing. III.A. Plutonium Extraction and Stripping performances: As a result of the neutron monitor profile on the extraction column during the representative operation, extraction was completed at the upper part of the column. As for the neutron monitor profile on the stripping column, stripping was performed at the lower part of the column. Plutonium concentration

  7. Literature review for oxalate oxidation processes and plutonium oxalate solubility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nash, C. A. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States). Savannah River National Lab. (SRNL)

    2015-10-01

    A literature review of oxalate oxidation processes finds that manganese(II)-catalyzed nitric acid oxidation of oxalate in precipitate filtrate is a viable and well-documented process. The process has been operated on the large scale at Savannah River in the past, including oxidation of 20 tons of oxalic acid in F-Canyon. Research data under a variety of conditions show the process to be robust. This process is recommended for oxalate destruction in H-Canyon in the upcoming program to produce feed for the MOX facility. Prevention of plutonium oxalate precipitation in filtrate can be achieved by concentrated nitric acid/ferric nitrate sequestration of oxalate. Organic complexants do not appear practical to sequester plutonium. Testing is proposed to confirm the literature and calculation findings of this review at projected operating conditions for the upcoming campaign.

  8. Cost-benefit analysis of unfired PuO2 pellets as an alternative plutonium shipping form

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mishima, J.; Brackenbush, L.W.; Libby, R.A.; Soldat, K.L.; White, G.D.

    1983-10-01

    A limited cost-benefit evaluation was performed concerning use of unfired plutonium dioxide pellets as a shipping form. Two specific processing operations are required for this use, one to form the pellet (pelletizing) and a second to reconstitute an acceptable powder upon receipt (reconstitution). The direct costs for the pelletizing operation are approximately $208,000 for equipment and its installation and $122 per kg of plutonium processed (based upon a 20-kg plutonium/day facility). The direct costs for reconstitution are approximately $90,000 for equipment and its installation and $81 per kg of plutonium processed. The indirect cost considered was personnel exposure from these operations. Whole body exposures ranged from 0.04 man-rem per 100 kg of low-exposure plutonium reconstituted to 0.9 man-rem per 100 kg of average-exposure plutonium pelletized. Hand exposures were much higher - 17 man-rem power 100 kg of low-exposure plutonium reconstituted to 67 man-rem per 100 kg of average plutonium pelletized. The principal benefit is a potential twentyfold reduction of airborne release in the event of an accident. An experimental plan is outlined to fill the data gaps uncovered during this study in the areas of pelletizing and reconstitution process parameters and pellet response behavior to accident-generated stresses. A study to enhance the containment potential of the inner packaging used during shipment is also outlined

  9. Water Solubility of Plutonium and Uranium Compounds and Residues at TA-55

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reilly, Sean Douglas; Smith, Paul Herrick; Jarvinen, Gordon D.; Prochnow, David Adrian; Schulte, Louis D.; DeBurgomaster, Paul Christopher; Fife, Keith William; Rubin, Jim; Worl, Laura Ann

    2016-01-01

    Understanding the water solubility of plutonium and uranium compounds and residues at TA-55 is necessary to provide a technical basis for appropriate criticality safety, safety basis and accountability controls. Individual compound solubility was determined using published solubility data and solution thermodynamic modeling. Residue solubility was estimated using a combination of published technical reports and process knowledge of constituent compounds. The scope of materials considered includes all compounds and residues at TA-55 as of March 2016 that contain Pu-239 or U-235 where any single item in the facility has more than 500 g of nuclear material. This analysis indicates that the following materials are not appreciably soluble in water: plutonium dioxide (IDC=C21), plutonium phosphate (IDC=C66), plutonium tetrafluoride (IDC=C80), plutonium filter residue (IDC=R26), plutonium hydroxide precipitate (IDC=R41), plutonium DOR salt (IDC=R42), plutonium incinerator ash (IDC=R47), uranium carbide (IDC=C13), uranium dioxide (IDC=C21), U 3 O 8 (IDC=C88), and uranium filter residue (IDC=R26). This analysis also indicates that the following materials are soluble in water: plutonium chloride (IDC=C19) and uranium nitrate (IDC=C52). Equilibrium calculations suggest that PuOCl is water soluble under certain conditions, but some plutonium processing reports indicate that it is insoluble when present in electrorefining residues (R65). Plutonium molten salt extraction residues (IDC=R83) contain significant quantities of PuCl 3 , and are expected to be soluble in water. The solubility of the following plutonium residues is indeterminate due to conflicting reports, insufficient process knowledge or process-dependent composition: calcium salt (IDC=R09), electrorefining salt (IDC=R65), salt (IDC=R71), silica (IDC=R73) and sweepings/screenings (IDC=R78). Solution thermodynamic modeling also indicates that fire suppression water buffered with a commercially-available phosphate

  10. Water Solubility of Plutonium and Uranium Compounds and Residues at TA-55

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Reilly, Sean Douglas [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States; Smith, Paul Herrick [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States; Jarvinen, Gordon D. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States; Prochnow, David Adrian [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States; Schulte, Louis D. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States; DeBurgomaster, Paul Christopher [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States; Fife, Keith William [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States; Rubin, Jim [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States; Worl, Laura Ann [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States

    2016-06-13

    Understanding the water solubility of plutonium and uranium compounds and residues at TA-55 is necessary to provide a technical basis for appropriate criticality safety, safety basis and accountability controls. Individual compound solubility was determined using published solubility data and solution thermodynamic modeling. Residue solubility was estimated using a combination of published technical reports and process knowledge of constituent compounds. The scope of materials considered includes all compounds and residues at TA-55 as of March 2016 that contain Pu-239 or U-235 where any single item in the facility has more than 500 g of nuclear material. This analysis indicates that the following materials are not appreciably soluble in water: plutonium dioxide (IDC=C21), plutonium phosphate (IDC=C66), plutonium tetrafluoride (IDC=C80), plutonium filter residue (IDC=R26), plutonium hydroxide precipitate (IDC=R41), plutonium DOR salt (IDC=R42), plutonium incinerator ash (IDC=R47), uranium carbide (IDC=C13), uranium dioxide (IDC=C21), U3O8 (IDC=C88), and uranium filter residue (IDC=R26). This analysis also indicates that the following materials are soluble in water: plutonium chloride (IDC=C19) and uranium nitrate (IDC=C52). Equilibrium calculations suggest that PuOCl is water soluble under certain conditions, but some plutonium processing reports indicate that it is insoluble when present in electrorefining residues (R65). Plutonium molten salt extraction residues (IDC=R83) contain significant quantities of PuCl3, and are expected to be soluble in water. The solubility of the following plutonium residues is indeterminate due to conflicting reports, insufficient process knowledge or process-dependent composition: calcium salt (IDC=R09), electrorefining salt (IDC=R65), salt (IDC=R71), silica (IDC=R73) and sweepings/screenings (IDC=R78). Solution thermodynamic modeling also indicates that fire suppression water buffered with a

  11. PLUTONIUM LOADING CAPACITY OF REILLEX HPQ ANION EXCHANGE COLUMN - AFS-2 PLUTONIUM FLOWSHEET FOR MOX

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kyser, E.; King, W.; O' Rourke, P.

    2012-07-26

    Radioactive plutonium (Pu) anion exchange column experiments using scaled HB-Line designs were performed to investigate the dependence of column loading performance on the feed composition in the H-Canyon dissolution process for plutonium oxide (PuO{sub 2}) product shipped to the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). These loading experiments show that a representative feed solution containing {approx}5 g Pu/L can be loaded onto Reillex{trademark} HPQ resin from solutions containing 8 M total nitrate and 0.1 M KF provided that the F is complexed with Al to an [Al]/[F] molar ratio range of 1.5-2.0. Lower concentrations of total nitrate and [Al]/[F] molar ratios may still have acceptable performance but were not tested in this study. Loading and washing Pu losses should be relatively low (<1%) for resin loading of up to 60 g Pu/L. Loading above 60 g Pu/L resin is possible, but Pu wash losses will increase such that 10-20% of the additional Pu fed may not be retained by the resin as the resin loading approaches 80 g Pu/L resin.

  12. PRTR/309 building nuclear facility preliminary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cornwell, B.C.

    1994-01-01

    The hazard classification of the Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor (PRTR)/309 building as a ''Radiological Facility'' and the office portions as ''Other Industrial Facility'' are documented by this report. This report provides: a synopsis of the history and facility it's uses; describes major area of the facility; and assesses the radiological conditions for the facility segments. The assessment is conducted using the hazard category threshold values, segmentation methodology, and graded approach guidance of DOE-STD-1027-92

  13. Physics of Plutonium Recycling in Thermal Reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kinchin, G.H.

    1967-01-01

    A substantial programme of experimental reactor physics work with plutonium fuels has been carried out in the UK; the purpose of this paper is to review the experimental and theoretical work, with emphasis on plutonium recycling in thermal reactors. Although the main incentive for some of the work may have been to study plutonium build-up in uranium-fuelled reactors, it is nevertheless relevant to plutonium recycling and no distinction is drawn between build-up and enrichment studies. A variety of techniques have been for determining reactivity, neutron spectrum and reaction rates in simple assemblies of plutonium-aluminium fuel with water, graphite and beryllia moderators. These experiments give confidence in the basic data and methods of calculation for near-homogeneous mixtures of plutonium and moderator. In the practical case of plutonium recycling it is necessary to confirm that satisfactory predictions can be made for heterogeneous lattices enriched with plutonium. In this field, experiments have been carried out with plutonium-uranium metal and oxide-cluster fuels in graphite-moderated lattices and in SGHW lattices, and the effects of 240 Pu have been studied by perturbation measurements with single fuel elements. The exponential and critical experiments have used tonne quantities of fuel with plutonium contents ranging from 0.25 to 1.2% and the perturbation experiments have extended both the range of plutonium contents and the range of isotopic compositions of plutonium. In addition to reactivity and reactivity coefficients, such as the temperature coefficients, attention has been concentrated on relative reaction rate distributions which provide evidence for variations of neutron spectrum. .Theoretical comparisons, together with similar comparisons for non-uniform lattices, establish the validity of methods of calculation which have been used to study the feasibility of plutonium recycling in thermal reactors. (author)

  14. Physics of Plutonium Recycling in Thermal Reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kinchin, G. H. [Atomic Energy Establishment, Winfrith, Dorchester, Dorset (United Kingdom)

    1967-09-15

    A substantial programme of experimental reactor physics work with plutonium fuels has been carried out in the UK; the purpose of this paper is to review the experimental and theoretical work, with emphasis on plutonium recycling in thermal reactors. Although the main incentive for some of the work may have been to study plutonium build-up in uranium-fuelled reactors, it is nevertheless relevant to plutonium recycling and no distinction is drawn between build-up and enrichment studies. A variety of techniques have been for determining reactivity, neutron spectrum and reaction rates in simple assemblies of plutonium-aluminium fuel with water, graphite and beryllia moderators. These experiments give confidence in the basic data and methods of calculation for near-homogeneous mixtures of plutonium and moderator. In the practical case of plutonium recycling it is necessary to confirm that satisfactory predictions can be made for heterogeneous lattices enriched with plutonium. In this field, experiments have been carried out with plutonium-uranium metal and oxide-cluster fuels in graphite-moderated lattices and in SGHW lattices, and the effects of {sup 240}Pu have been studied by perturbation measurements with single fuel elements. The exponential and critical experiments have used tonne quantities of fuel with plutonium contents ranging from 0.25 to 1.2% and the perturbation experiments have extended both the range of plutonium contents and the range of isotopic compositions of plutonium. In addition to reactivity and reactivity coefficients, such as the temperature coefficients, attention has been concentrated on relative reaction rate distributions which provide evidence for variations of neutron spectrum. .Theoretical comparisons, together with similar comparisons for non-uniform lattices, establish the validity of methods of calculation which have been used to study the feasibility of plutonium recycling in thermal reactors. (author)

  15. Global plutonium management: A security option

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sylvester, K.W.B.

    1998-01-01

    The US surplus plutonium disposition program was created to reduce the proliferation risk posed by the fissile material from thousands of retired nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy has decided to process its Put into a form as secure as Pu in civilian spent fuel. While implementation issues have been considered, a major one (Russian reciprocity) remains unresolved. Russia has made disposition action conditional on extracting the fuel value of its Pu but lacks the infrastructure to do so. Assistance in the construction of the required facilities would conflict with official US policy opposing the development of a Pu fuel cycle. The resulting stagnation provides impetus for a reevaluation of US nonproliferation objectives and Pu disposition options. A strategy for satisfying Russian fuel value concerns and reducing the proliferation risk posed by surplus weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu) is proposed. The effectiveness of material alteration (e.g., isotopic, chemical, etc.hor-ellipsis) at reducing the desire, ability and opportunity for proliferation is assessed. Virtually all the security benefits attainable by material processing can be obtained by immobilizing Pu in large unit size/mass monoliths without a radiation barrier. Russia would be allowed to extract the Pu at a future date for use as fuel in a verifiable manner. Remote tracking capability, if proven feasible, would further improve safeguarding capability. As an alternate approach, the US could compensate Russia for its Pu, allowing it to be disposed of or processed elsewhere. A market based method for pricing Pu is proposed. Surplus Pu could represent access to nuclear fuel at a fixed price at a future date. This position can be replicated in the uranium market and priced using derivative theory. The proposed strategy attempts to meet nonproliferation objectives by recognizing technical limitations and satisfying political constraints

  16. Shuffler calibration and measurement of mixtures of uranium and plutonium TRU-waste in a plant environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hurd, J.R.

    1998-01-01

    The active-passive shuffler installed and certified a few years ago in Los Alamos National Laboratory's plutonium facility has now been calibrated for different matrices to measure Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)-destined transuranic (TRU)-waste. Little or no data presently exist for these types of measurements in plant environments where there may be sudden large changes in the neutron background radiation which causes distortions in the results. Measurements and analyses of twenty-two 55-gallon drums, consisting of mixtures of varying quantities of uranium and plutonium, have been recently completed at the plutonium facility. The calibration and measurement techniques, including the method used to separate out the plutonium component, will be presented and discussed. Particular attention will be directed to those problems identified as arising from the plant environment. The results of studies to quantify the distortion effects in the data will be presented. Various solution scenarios will be indicated, along with those adopted here

  17. progress on the U.S.-Russian excess weapons plutonium disposition program. Panel discussion

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Feinroth, Herb; Sicard, Bruno; Kudryavtsev, Evgeny; Sprankle, Kenneth A.; Nesbit, Steve; Gadsby, Robert; Aratani, Kiyonori

    2001-01-01

    Full text of publication follows: On September 1, 2000, the United States and Russia signed a historic agreement to each dispose of 34 tons of excess weapons plutonium by 2025, or sooner if possible. The agreement was conditional on international financing of the Russian program. The parties are now attempting to establish a specific program for disposition of the Russian plutonium and to secure commitments for international financing of the Russian program. In the United States, efforts are moving forward to design, license, and construct the necessary facilities for its disposition program. With the assistance of France and Germany, efforts are moving forward in Russia to plan and design appropriate reactor modifications as well as the needed facilities for plutonium conversion and mixed-oxide fabrication. Japan and Canada are also participants in the Russian disposition program. This panel session will review the status of actions taken to bring this agreement to fruition. (authors)

  18. Simulation and analysis of the plutonium oxide/metal storage containers subject to various loading conditions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gong, C.; Miller, R.F.

    1995-05-01

    The structural and functional requirements of the Plutonium Oxide/Metal Storage Containers are specified in the Report ''Complex 21 Plutonium Storage Facility Material Containment Team Technical Data Report'' [Complex 21, 1993]. There are no existing storage containers designed for long term storage of plutonium and current codes, standards or regulations do not adequately cover this case. As there is no extensive experience with the long term (50+ years) storage of plutonium, the design of high integrity storage containers must address many technical considerations. This analysis discusses a few potential natural phenomena that could theoretically adversely affect the container integrity over time. The plutonium oxide/metal storage container consists of a primary containment vessel (the outer container), a bagless transfer can (the inner container), two vertical plates on top of the primary containment vessel, a circular plate (the flange) supported by the two plates, tube for gas sampling operations mounted at the center of the primary containment vessel top and a spring system being inserted in the cavity between the primary containment vessel and the cap of the bagless transfer can. The dimensions of the plutonium oxide/metal storage container assembly can be found in Figure 2-1. The primary container, the bagless transfer can, and all the attached components are made of Type 304L stainless steel

  19. Bibliography on plutonium and its compounds; Bibliographie sur le plutonium et ses composes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dirian, J; Choquet, J [Commissariat a l' Energie Atomique, Saclay (France). Centre d' Etudes Nucleaires

    1958-07-01

    Collection of bibliographical references on plutonium and its principal compounds from 1942 to end of 1957. (author) [French] Compilation de references bibliographiques sur le plutonium et ses principaux composes de 1942 a fin 1957. (auteur)

  20. Plutonium in the environment: key factors related to impact assessment in case of an accidental atmospheric release

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Guetat, P. [CEA Valduc, 21 - Is-sur-Tille (France); Moulin, V.; Reiller, P. [CEA Saclay, 91 (FR)] (and others)

    2009-07-01

    This paper deals with plutonium and key factors related to impact assessment. It is based on recent work performed by CEA which summarize the main features of plutonium behaviour from sources inside installations to the environment and man, and to report current knowledge on the different parameters used in models for environmental and radiological impact assessment. These key factors are illustrated through a case study based on an accidental atmospheric release of Pu in a nuclear facility. (orig.)