WorldWideScience

Sample records for plutonium disposition facilities

  1. Disposition of TA-33-21, a plutonium contaminated experimental facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cox, E.J.; Garde, R.; Valentine, A.M.

    1975-01-01

    The report discusses the decontamination, demolition and disposal of a plutonium contaminated experimental physics facility which housed physics experiments with plutonium from 1951 until 1960. The results of preliminary decontamination efforts in 1960 are reported along with health physics, waste management, and environmental aspects of final disposition work accomplished during 1974 and 1975. (auth)

  2. Disposition of PUREX facility tanks D5 and E6 uranium and plutonium solutions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harty, D.P.

    1993-12-01

    Approximately 9 kilograms of plutonium and 5 metric tons of uranium in a 1 molar nitric acid solution are being stored in two PUREX facility vessels, tanks D5 and E6. The plutonium was accumulated during cleanup activities of the plutonium product area of the PUREX facility. Personnel at PUREX recently completed a formal presentation to the Surplus Materials Peer Panel (SMPP) regarding disposition of the material currently in these tanks. The peer panel is a group of complex-wide experts who have been chartered by EM-64 (Office of Site and Facility Transfer) to provide a third party independent review of disposition decisions. The information presented to the peer panel is provided in the first section of this report. The panel was generally receptive to the information provided at that time and the recommendations which were identified

  3. Site Selection for Surplus Plutonium Disposition Facilities at the Savannah River Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wike, L.D.

    2000-01-01

    A site selection study was conducted to evaluate locations for the proposed Surplus Plutonium Disposition Facilities. Facilities to be located include the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility, the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF), and the Plutonium Immobilization Project (PIP) facility. Objectives of the study include: (1) Confirm that the Department of Energy (DOE) selected locations for the MOX and PDCF were suitable based on selected siting criteria, (2) Recommend a site in the vicinity of F Area that is suitable for the PIP, and (3) Identify alternative suitable sites for one or more of these facilities in the event that further geotechnical characterization or other considerations result in disqualification of a currently proposed site

  4. Plutonium Disposition by Immobilization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gould, T.; DiSabatino, A.; Mitchell, M.

    2000-01-01

    The ultimate goal of the Department of Energy (DOE) Immobilization Project is to develop, construct, and operate facilities that will immobilize between 17 to 50 tonnes (MT) of U.S. surplus weapons-usable plutonium materials in waste forms that meet the ''spent fuel'' standard and are acceptable for disposal in a geologic repository. Using the ceramic can-in-canister technology selected for immobilization, surplus plutonium materials will be chemically combined into ceramic forms which will be encapsulated within large canisters of high level waste (HLW) glass. Deployment of the immobilization capability should occur by 2008 and be completed within 10 years. In support of this goal, the DOE Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (MD) is conducting development and testing (D and T) activities at four DOE laboratories under the technical leadership of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The Savannah River Site has been selected as the site for the planned Plutonium Immobilization Plant (PIP). The D and T effort, now in its third year, will establish the technical bases for the design, construction, and operation of the U. S. capability to immobilize surplus plutonium in a suitable and cost-effective manner. Based on the D and T effort and on the development of a conceptual design of the PIP, automation is expected to play a key role in the design and operation of the Immobilization Plant. Automation and remote handling are needed to achieve required dose reduction and to enhance operational efficiency

  5. Evaluation of existing United States' facilities for use as a mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility for plutonium disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beard, C.A.; Buksa, J.J.; Chidester, K.; Eaton, S.L.; Motley, F.E.; Siebe, D.A.

    1995-01-01

    A number of existing US facilities were evaluated for use as a mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facility for plutonium disposition. These facilities include the Fuels Material Examination Facility (FMEF) at Hanford, the Washington Power Supply Unit 1 (WNP-1) facility at Hanford, the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP) at Barnwell, SC, the Fuel Processing Facility (FPF) at Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL), the Device Assembly Facility (DAF) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), and the P-reactor at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The study consisted of evaluating each facility in terms of available process space, available building support systems (i.e., HVAC, security systems, existing process equipment, etc.), available regional infrastructure (i.e., emergency response teams, protective force teams, available transportation routes, etc.), and ability to integrate the MOX fabrication process into the facility in an operationally-sound manner that requires a minimum amount of structural modifications

  6. Plutonium Disposition Now exclamation point

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Buckner, M.R.

    1995-01-01

    A means for use of existing processing facilities and reactors for plutonium disposition is described which requires a minimum capital investment and allows rapid implementation. The scenario includes interim storage and processing under IAEA control, and fabrication into MOX fuel in existing or planned facilities in Europe for use in operating reactors in the two home countries. Conceptual studies indicate that existing Westinghouse four-loop designs can safety dispose of 0.94 MT of plutonium per calendar year. Thus, it would be possible to consume the expected US excess stockpile of about 50 MT in two to three units of this type, and it is highly likely that a comparable amount of the FSU excess plutonium could be deposed of in a few VVER-1000's. The only major capital project for this mode of plutonium disposition would be the weapons-grade plutonium processing which could be done in a dedicated international facility or using existing facilities in the US and FSU under IAEA control. This option offers the potential for quick implementation at a very low cost to the governments of the two countries

  7. Repository and deep borehole disposition of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Halsey, W.G.

    1996-02-01

    Control and disposition of excess weapons plutonium is a growing issue as both the US and Russia retire a large number of nuclear weapons> A variety of options are under consideration to ultimately dispose of this material. Permanent disposition includes tow broad categories: direct Pu disposal where the material is considered waste and disposed of, and Pu utilization, where the potential energy content of the material is exploited via fissioning. The primary alternative to a high-level radioactive waste repository for the ultimate disposal of plutonium is development of a custom geologic facility. A variety of geologic facility types have been considered, but the concept currently being assessed is the deep borehole

  8. Surplus plutonium disposition draft environmental impact statement. Volume 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-07-01

    On May 22, 1997, DOE published a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the Federal Register (62 Federal Register 28009) announcing its decision to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) that would tier from the analysis and decisions reached in connection with the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic EIS (Storage and Disposition PEIS). DOE's disposition strategy allows for both the immobilization of surplus plutonium and its use as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in existing domestic, commercial reactors. The disposition of surplus plutonium would also involve disposal of the immobilized plutonium and MOX fuel (as spent nuclear fuel) in a geologic repository. The Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement analyzes alternatives that would use the immobilization approach (for some of the surplus plutonium) and the MOX fuel approach (for some of the surplus plutonium); alternatives that would immobilize all of the surplus plutonium; and the No Action Alternative. The alternatives include three disposition facilities that would be designed so that they could collectively accomplish disposition of up to 50 metric tons (55 tons) of surplus plutonium over their operating lives: (1) the pit disassembly and conversion facility would disassemble pits (a weapons component) and convert the recovered plutonium, as well as plutonium metal from other sources, into plutonium dioxide suitable for disposition; (2) the immobilization facility would include a collocated capability for converting nonpit plutonium materials into plutonium dioxide suitable for immobilization and would be located at either Hanford or SRS. DOE has identified SRS as the preferred site for an immobilization facility; (3) the MOX fuel fabrication facility would fabricate plutonium dioxide into MOX fuel. Volume 2 contains the appendices to the report and describe the following: Federal Register notices; contractor nondisclosure statement; adjunct melter

  9. Plutonium dispositioning in CANDU

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boczar, P.G.; Feinroth, H.; Luxat, J.C.

    1995-07-01

    Recently, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) sponsored Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) to evaluate salient technical, strategic, schedule, and cost-related parameters of using CANDU reactors for dispositioning of weapons-grade plutonium in the form of Mixed OXide (MOX) fuel. A study team, consisting of key staff from the CANDU reactor designers and researchers (AECL), operators (Ontario Hydro) and fuel suppliers, analyzed all significant factors involved in such application, with the objective of identifying an arrangement that would permit the burning of MOX in CANDU at the earliest date. One of Ontario Hydro's multi-unit stations, Bruce A nuclear generating station (4x769 MW(e)), was chosen as the reference for the study. The assessment showed that no significant modifications of reactor or process systems are necessary to operate with a full MOX core. Plant modifications would be limited to fuel handling and modifications necessary to accommodate enhanced security and safeguards requirements. No safety limitations were identified

  10. Surplus plutonium disposition draft environmental impact statement. Summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-07-01

    On May 22, 1997, DOE published a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the Federal Register (62 Federal Register 28009) announcing its decision to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) that would tier from the analysis and decisions reached in connection with the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic EIS (Storage and Disposition PEIS). DOE's disposition strategy allows for both the immobilization of surplus plutonium and its use as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in existing domestic, commercial reactors. The disposition of surplus plutonium would also involve disposal of the immobilized plutonium and MOX fuel (as spent nuclear fuel) in a geologic repository. The Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement analyzes alternatives that would use the immobilization approach (for some of the surplus plutonium) and the MOX fuel approach (for some of the surplus plutonium); alternatives that would immobilize all of the surplus plutonium; and the No Action Alternative. The alternatives include three disposition facilities that would be designed so that they could collectively accomplish disposition of up to 50 metric tons (55 tons) of surplus plutonium over their operating lives: (1) the pit disassembly and conversion facility would disassemble pits (a weapons component) and convert the recovered plutonium, as well as plutonium metal from other sources, into plutonium dioxide suitable for disposition; (2) the immobilization facility would include a collocated capability for converting nonpit plutonium materials into plutonium dioxide suitable for immobilization and would be located at either Hanford or SRS. DOE has identified SRS as the preferred site for an immobilization facility; (3) the MOX fuel fabrication facility would fabricate plutonium dioxide into MOX fuel

  11. Regulatory issues for deep borehole plutonium disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Halsey, W.G.

    1995-03-01

    As a result of recent changes throughout the world, a substantial inventory of excess separated plutonium is expected to result from dismantlement of US nuclear weapons. The safe and secure management and eventual disposition of this plutonium, and of a similar inventory in Russia, is a high priority. A variety of options (both interim and permanent) are under consideration to manage this material. The permanent solutions can be categorized into two broad groups: direct disposal and utilization. The deep borehole disposition concept involves placing excess plutonium deep into old stable rock formations with little free water present. Issues of concern include the regulatory, statutory and policy status of such a facility, the availability of sites with desirable characteristics and the technologies required for drilling deep holes, characterizing them, emplacing excess plutonium and sealing the holes. This white paper discusses the regulatory issues. Regulatory issues concerning construction, operation and decommissioning of the surface facility do not appear to be controversial, with existing regulations providing adequate coverage. It is in the areas of siting, licensing and long term environmental protection that current regulations may be inappropriate. This is because many current regulations are by intent or by default specific to waste forms, facilities or missions significantly different from deep borehole disposition of excess weapons usable fissile material. It is expected that custom regulations can be evolved in the context of this mission

  12. Characterizing Surplus US Plutonium for Disposition - 13199

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Allender, Jeffrey S. [Savannah River National Laboratory, Aiken SC 29808 (United States); Moore, Edwin N. [Moore Nuclear Energy, LLC, Savannah River Site, Aiken SC 29808 (United States)

    2013-07-01

    The United States (US) has identified 61.5 metric tons (MT) of plutonium that is permanently excess to use in nuclear weapons programs, including 47.2 MT of weapons-grade plutonium. Surplus inventories will be stored safely by the Department of Energy (DOE) and then transferred to facilities that will prepare the plutonium for permanent disposition. The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) operates a Feed Characterization program for the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (OFMD) of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the DOE Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM). SRNL manages a broad program of item tracking through process history, laboratory analysis, and non-destructive assay. A combination of analytical techniques allows SRNL to predict the isotopic and chemical properties that qualify materials for disposition through the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). The research also defines properties that are important for other disposition paths, including disposal to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) as transuranic waste (TRUW) or to high-level waste (HLW) systems. (authors)

  13. Waste forms for plutonium disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, S.G.; O'Holleran, T.P.; Frank, S.M.; Meyer, M.K.; Hanson, M.; Staples, B.A.; Knecht, D.A.; Kong, P.C.

    1997-01-01

    The field of plutonium disposition is varied and of much importance, since the Department of Energy has decided on the hybrid option for disposing of the weapons materials. This consists of either placing the Pu into mixed oxide fuel for reactors or placing the material into a stable waste form such as glass. The waste form used for Pu disposition should exhibit certain qualities: (1) provide for a suitable deterrent to guard against proliferation; (2) be of minimal volume, i.e., maximize the loading; and (3) be reasonably durable under repository-like conditions. This paper will discuss several Pu waste forms that display promising characteristics

  14. Plutonium metal burning facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hausburg, D.E.; Leebl, R.G.

    1977-01-01

    A glove-box facility was designed to convert plutonium skull metal or unburned oxide to an oxide acceptable for plutonium recovery and purification. A discussion of the operation, safety aspects, and electrical schematics are included

  15. Overview of surplus weapons plutonium disposition

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rudy, G.

    1996-05-01

    The safe disposition of surplus weapons useable plutonium is a very important and urgent task. While the functions of long term storage and disposition directly relate to the Department`s weapons program and the environmental management program, the focus of this effort is particularly national security and nonproliferation.

  16. Surplus plutonium disposition draft environmental impact statement. Volume 1, Part A

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-07-01

    On May 22, 1997, DOE published a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the Federal Register (62 Federal Register 28009) announcing its decision to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) that would tier from the analysis and decisions reached in connection with the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic EIS (Storage and Disposition PEIS). DOE's disposition strategy allows for both the immobilization of surplus plutonium and its use as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in existing domestic, commercial reactors. The disposition of surplus plutonium would also involve disposal of the immobilized plutonium and MOX fuel (as spent nuclear fuel) in a geologic repository. The Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement analyzes alternatives that would use the immobilization approach (for some of the surplus plutonium) and the MOX fuel approach (for some of the surplus plutonium); alternatives that would immobilize all of the surplus plutonium; and the No Action Alternative. The alternatives include three disposition facilities that would be designed so that they could collectively accomplish disposition of up to 50 metric tons (55 tons) of surplus plutonium over their operating lives: (1) the pit disassembly and conversion facility would disassemble pits (a weapons component) and convert the recovered plutonium, as well as plutonium metal from other sources, into plutonium dioxide suitable for disposition; (2) the immobilization facility would include a collocated capability for converting nonpit plutonium materials into plutonium dioxide suitable for immobilization and would be located at either Hanford or SRS. DOE has identified SRS as the preferred site for an immobilization facility; (3) the MOX fuel fabrication facility would fabricate plutonium dioxide into MOX fuel. This volume includes background information; purpose of and need for the proposed action; alternatives for disposition of surplus weapons useable plutonium; and

  17. Derivation of plutonium-239 materials disposition categories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brough, W.G.

    1995-01-01

    At this time, the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition within the DOE, is assessing alternatives for the disposition of excess fissile materials. To facilitate the assessment, the Plutonium-Bearing Materials Feed Report for the DOE Fissile Materials Disposition Program Alternatives report was written. The development of the material categories and the derivation of the inventory quantities associated with those categories is documented in this report

  18. Excess plutonium disposition using ALWR technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Phillips, A.; Buckner, M.R.; Radder, J.A.; Angelos, J.G.; Inhaber, H.

    1993-02-01

    The Office of Nuclear Energy of the Department of Energy chartered the Plutonium Disposition Task Force in August 1992. The Task Force was created to assess the range of practicable means of disposition of excess weapons-grade plutonium. Within the Task Force, working groups were formed to consider: (1) storage, (2) disposal,and(3) fission options for this disposition,and a separate group to evaluate nonproliferation concerns of each of the alternatives. As a member of the Fission Working Group, the Savannah River Technology Center acted as a sponsor for light water reactor (LWR) technology. The information contained in this report details the submittal that was made to the Fission Working Group of the technical assessment of LWR technology for plutonium disposition. The following aspects were considered: (1) proliferation issues, (2) technical feasibility, (3) technical availability, (4) economics, (5) regulatory issues, and (6) political acceptance

  19. Surplus plutonium disposition draft environmental impact statement. Volume 1, Part B

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-07-01

    On May 22, 1997, DOE published a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the Federal Register (62 Federal Register 28009) announcing its decision to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) that would tier from the analysis and decisions reached in connection with the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic EIS (Storage and Disposition PEIS). DOE's disposition strategy allows for both the immobilization of surplus plutonium and its use as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in existing domestic, commercial reactors. The disposition of surplus plutonium would also involve disposal of the immobilized plutonium and MOX fuel (as spent nuclear fuel) in a geologic repository. The Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement analyzes alternatives that would use the immobilization approach (for some of the surplus plutonium) and the MOX fuel approach (for some of the surplus plutonium); alternatives that would immobilize all of the surplus plutonium; and the No Action Alternative. The alternatives include three disposition facilities that would be designed so that they could collectively accomplish disposition of up to 50 metric tons (55 tons) of surplus plutonium over their operating lives: (1) the pit disassembly and conversion facility would disassemble pits (a weapons component) and convert the recovered plutonium, as well as plutonium metal from other sources, into plutonium dioxide suitable for disposition; (2) the immobilization facility would include a collocated capability for converting nonpit plutonium materials into plutonium dioxide suitable for immobilization and would be located at either Hanford or SRS. DOE has identified SRS as the preferred site for an immobilization facility; (3) the MOX fuel fabrication facility would fabricate plutonium dioxide into MOX fuel. This volume has chapters on environmental consequences; environmental regulations, permits, and consultations; a glossary; list of preparers; distribution list

  20. Excess plutonium disposition: The deep borehole option

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ferguson, K.L.

    1994-01-01

    This report reviews the current status of technologies required for the disposition of plutonium in Very Deep Holes (VDH). It is in response to a recent National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report which addressed the management of excess weapons plutonium and recommended three approaches to the ultimate disposition of excess plutonium: (1) fabrication and use as a fuel in existing or modified reactors in a once-through cycle, (2) vitrification with high-level radioactive waste for repository disposition, (3) burial in deep boreholes. As indicated in the NAS report, substantial effort would be required to address the broad range of issues related to deep bore-hole emplacement. Subjects reviewed in this report include geology and hydrology, design and engineering, safety and licensing, policy decisions that can impact the viability of the concept, and applicable international programs. Key technical areas that would require attention should decisions be made to further develop the borehole emplacement option are identified

  1. An alternative plutonium disposition method

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kueppers, C.

    2002-01-01

    This paper provides a feasibility study on vitrification of plutonium with high active waste concentrate, and fabrication of MOX fuel rods for direct final disposal. These are potential alternatives to the direct use of MOX fuel in a reactor. (author)

  2. Weapons-grade plutonium dispositioning. Volume 2: Comparison of plutonium disposition options

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Brownson, D.A.; Hanson, D.J.; Blackman, H.S. [and others

    1993-06-01

    The Secretary of Energy requested the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Committee on International Security and Arms Control to evaluate disposition options for weapons-grade plutonium. The Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) offered to assist the NAS in this evaluation by investigating the technical aspects of the disposition options and their capability for achieving plutonium annihilation levels greater than 90%. This report was prepared for the NAS to document the gathered information and results from the requested option evaluations. Evaluations were performed for 12 plutonium disposition options involving five reactor and one accelerator-based systems. Each option was evaluated in four technical areas: (1) fuel status, (2) reactor or accelerator-based system status, (3) waste-processing status, and (4) waste disposal status. Based on these evaluations, each concept was rated on its operational capability and time to deployment. A third rating category of option costs could not be performed because of the unavailability of adequate information from the concept sponsors. The four options achieving the highest rating, in alphabetical order, are the Advanced Light Water Reactor with plutonium-based ternary fuel, the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor with plutonium-based fuel, the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor with uranium-plutonium-based fuel, and the Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor with plutonium-based fuel. Of these four options, the Advanced Light Water Reactor and the Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor do not propose reprocessing of their irradiated fuel. Time constraints and lack of detailed information did not allow for any further ratings among these four options. The INEL recommends these four options be investigated further to determine the optimum reactor design for plutonium disposition.

  3. Weapons-grade plutonium dispositioning. Volume 2: Comparison of plutonium disposition options

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brownson, D.A.; Hanson, D.J.; Blackman, H.S.

    1993-06-01

    The Secretary of Energy requested the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Committee on International Security and Arms Control to evaluate disposition options for weapons-grade plutonium. The Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) offered to assist the NAS in this evaluation by investigating the technical aspects of the disposition options and their capability for achieving plutonium annihilation levels greater than 90%. This report was prepared for the NAS to document the gathered information and results from the requested option evaluations. Evaluations were performed for 12 plutonium disposition options involving five reactor and one accelerator-based systems. Each option was evaluated in four technical areas: (1) fuel status, (2) reactor or accelerator-based system status, (3) waste-processing status, and (4) waste disposal status. Based on these evaluations, each concept was rated on its operational capability and time to deployment. A third rating category of option costs could not be performed because of the unavailability of adequate information from the concept sponsors. The four options achieving the highest rating, in alphabetical order, are the Advanced Light Water Reactor with plutonium-based ternary fuel, the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor with plutonium-based fuel, the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor with uranium-plutonium-based fuel, and the Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor with plutonium-based fuel. Of these four options, the Advanced Light Water Reactor and the Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor do not propose reprocessing of their irradiated fuel. Time constraints and lack of detailed information did not allow for any further ratings among these four options. The INEL recommends these four options be investigated further to determine the optimum reactor design for plutonium disposition

  4. Fissile Material Disposition Program: Deep Borehole Disposal Facility PEIS data input report for direct disposal. Direct disposal of plutonium metal/plutonium dioxide in compound metal canisters. Version 3.0

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wijesinghe, A.M.; Shaffer, R.J.

    1996-01-15

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) is examining options for disposing of excess weapons-usable nuclear materials [principally plutonium (Pu) and highly enriched uranium (HEU)] in a form or condition that is substantially and inherently more difficult to recover and reuse in weapons production. This report is the data input report for the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS). The PEIS examines the environmental, safety, and health impacts of implementing each disposition alternative on land use, facility operations, and site infrastructure; air quality and noise; water, geology, and soils; biotic, cultural, and paleontological resources; socioeconomics; human health; normal operations and facility accidents; waste management; and transportation. This data report is prepared to assist in estimating the environmental effects associated with the construction and operation of a Deep Borehole Disposal Facility, an alternative currently included in the PEIS. The facility projects under consideration are, not site specific. This report therefore concentrates on environmental, safety, and health impacts at a generic site appropriate for siting a Deep Borehole Disposal Facility.

  5. Fissile Material Disposition Program: Deep Borehole Disposal Facility PEIS data input report for direct disposal. Direct disposal of plutonium metal/plutonium dioxide in compound metal canisters. Version 3.0

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wijesinghe, A.M.; Shaffer, R.J.

    1996-01-01

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) is examining options for disposing of excess weapons-usable nuclear materials [principally plutonium (Pu) and highly enriched uranium (HEU)] in a form or condition that is substantially and inherently more difficult to recover and reuse in weapons production. This report is the data input report for the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS). The PEIS examines the environmental, safety, and health impacts of implementing each disposition alternative on land use, facility operations, and site infrastructure; air quality and noise; water, geology, and soils; biotic, cultural, and paleontological resources; socioeconomics; human health; normal operations and facility accidents; waste management; and transportation. This data report is prepared to assist in estimating the environmental effects associated with the construction and operation of a Deep Borehole Disposal Facility, an alternative currently included in the PEIS. The facility projects under consideration are, not site specific. This report therefore concentrates on environmental, safety, and health impacts at a generic site appropriate for siting a Deep Borehole Disposal Facility

  6. Plutonium disposition via immobilization in ceramic or glass

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gray, L.W.; Kan, T.; Shaw, H.F.; Armantrout, A.

    1997-03-05

    The management of surplus weapons plutonium is an important and urgent task with profound environmental, national, and international security implications. In the aftermath of the Cold War, Presidential Policy Directive 13, and various analyses by renown scientific, technical, and international policy organizations have brought about a focused effort within the Department of Energy to identify and implement paths for the long term disposition of surplus weapons- usable plutonium. The central goal of this effort is to render surplus weapons plutonium as inaccessible and unattractive for reuse in nuclear weapons as the much larger and growing stock of plutonium contained in spent fuel from civilian reactors. One disposition option being considered for surplus plutonium is immobilization, in which the plutonium would be incorporated into a glass or ceramic material that would ultimately be entombed permanently in a geologic repository for high-level waste.

  7. progress on the U.S.-Russian excess weapons plutonium disposition program. Panel discussion

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Feinroth, Herb; Sicard, Bruno; Kudryavtsev, Evgeny; Sprankle, Kenneth A.; Nesbit, Steve; Gadsby, Robert; Aratani, Kiyonori

    2001-01-01

    Full text of publication follows: On September 1, 2000, the United States and Russia signed a historic agreement to each dispose of 34 tons of excess weapons plutonium by 2025, or sooner if possible. The agreement was conditional on international financing of the Russian program. The parties are now attempting to establish a specific program for disposition of the Russian plutonium and to secure commitments for international financing of the Russian program. In the United States, efforts are moving forward to design, license, and construct the necessary facilities for its disposition program. With the assistance of France and Germany, efforts are moving forward in Russia to plan and design appropriate reactor modifications as well as the needed facilities for plutonium conversion and mixed-oxide fabrication. Japan and Canada are also participants in the Russian disposition program. This panel session will review the status of actions taken to bring this agreement to fruition. (authors)

  8. Supplement to the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Draft Environmental Impact Statement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    On May 22, 1997, DOE published a Notice of Intent in the Federal Register (62 Federal Register 28009) announcing its decision to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) that would tier from the analysis and decisions reached in connection with the ''Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic EIS (Storage and Disposition PEIS)''. ''The Surplus Plutonium Disposition Draft Environmental Impact Statement'' (SPD Draft EIS) (DOWEIS-0283-D) was prepared in accordance with NEPA and issued in July 1998. It identified the potential environmental impacts of reasonable alternatives for the proposed siting, construction, and operation of three facilities for plutonium disposition. These three facilities would accomplish pit disassembly and conversion, immobilization, and MOX fuel fabrication. For the alternatives that included MOX fuel fabrication, the draft also described the potential environmental impacts of using from three to eight commercial nuclear reactors to irradiate MOX fuel. The potential impacts were based on a generic reactor analysis that used actual reactor data and a range of potential site conditions. In May 1998, DCE initiated a procurement process to obtain MOX fuel fabrication and reactor irradiation services. The request for proposals defined limited activities that may be performed prior to issuance of the SPD EIS Record of Decision (ROD) including non-site-specific work associated with the development of the initial design for the MOX fuel fabrication facility, and plans (paper studies) for outreach, long lead-time procurements, regulatory management, facility quality assurance, safeguards, security, fuel qualification, and deactivation. No construction on the proposed MOX facility would begin before an SPD EIS ROD is issued. In March 1999, DOE awarded a contract to Duke Engineering and Services; COGEMA, Inc.; and Stone and Webster (known as DCS) to provide the requested services. The procurement process

  9. Supplement to the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Draft Environmental Impact Statement

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    N/A

    1999-05-14

    On May 22, 1997, DOE published a Notice of Intent in the Federal Register (62 Federal Register 28009) announcing its decision to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) that would tier from the analysis and decisions reached in connection with the ''Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic EIS (Storage and Disposition PEIS)''. ''The Surplus Plutonium Disposition Draft Environmental Impact Statement'' (SPD Draft EIS) (DOWEIS-0283-D) was prepared in accordance with NEPA and issued in July 1998. It identified the potential environmental impacts of reasonable alternatives for the proposed siting, construction, and operation of three facilities for plutonium disposition. These three facilities would accomplish pit disassembly and conversion, immobilization, and MOX fuel fabrication. For the alternatives that included MOX fuel fabrication, the draft also described the potential environmental impacts of using from three to eight commercial nuclear reactors to irradiate MOX fuel. The potential impacts were based on a generic reactor analysis that used actual reactor data and a range of potential site conditions. In May 1998, DCE initiated a procurement process to obtain MOX fuel fabrication and reactor irradiation services. The request for proposals defined limited activities that may be performed prior to issuance of the SPD EIS Record of Decision (ROD) including non-site-specific work associated with the development of the initial design for the MOX fuel fabrication facility, and plans (paper studies) for outreach, long lead-time procurements, regulatory management, facility quality assurance, safeguards, security, fuel qualification, and deactivation. No construction on the proposed MOX facility would begin before an SPD EIS ROD is issued. In March 1999, DOE awarded a contract to Duke Engineering & Services; COGEMA, Inc.; and Stone & Webster (known as DCS) to provide the requested

  10. Weapons-grade plutonium dispositioning. Volume 1: Executive summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Parks, D.L.; Sauerbrun, T.J.

    1993-06-01

    The Secretary of Energy requested the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Committee on International Security and Arms Control to evaluate dispositioning options for weapons-grade plutonium. The Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) assisted NAS in this evaluation by investigating the technical aspects of the dispositioning options and their capability for achieving plutonium annihilation levels greater than 90%. Additionally, the INEL investigated the feasibility of using plutonium fuels (without uranium) for disposal in existing light water reactors and provided a preconceptual analysis for a reactor specifically designed for destruction of weapons-grade plutonium. This four-volume report was prepared for NAS to document the findings of these studies. Volume 2 evaluates 12 plutonium dispositioning options. Volume 3 considers a concept for a low-temperature, low-pressure, low-power-density, low-coolant-flow-rate light water reactor that quickly destroys plutonium without using uranium or thorium. This reactor concept does not produce electricity and has no other mission than the destruction of plutonium. Volume 4 addresses neutronic performance, fabrication technology, and fuel performance and compatibility issues for zirconium-plutonium oxide fuels and aluminum-plutonium metallic fuels. This volumes gives summaries of Volumes 2--4

  11. Decision model for evaluating reactor disposition of excess plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Edmunds, T.

    1995-02-01

    The US Department of Energy is currently considering a range of technologies for disposition of excess weapon plutonium. Use of plutonium fuel in fission reactors to generate spent fuel is one class of technology options. This report describes the inputs and results of decision analyses conducted to evaluate four evolutionary/advanced and three existing fission reactor designs for plutonium disposition. The evaluation incorporates multiple objectives or decision criteria, and accounts for uncertainty. The purpose of the study is to identify important and discriminating decision criteria, and to identify combinations of value judgments and assumptions that tend to favor one reactor design over another

  12. CANDU - a versatile reactor for plutonium disposition or actinide burning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chan, P.S.W.; Gagnon, M.J.N.; Boczar, P.G.; Ellis, R.J.; Verrall, R.A.

    1997-10-01

    High neutron economy, on-line refuelling, and a simple fuel-bundle design result in a high degree of versatility in the use of the CANDU reactor for the disposition of weapons-derived plutonium and for the annihilation of long-lived radioactive actinides, such as plutonium, neptunium, and americium isotopes, created in civilian nuclear power reactors. Inherent safety features are incorporated into the design of the bundles carrying the plutonium and actinide fuels. This approach enables existing CANDU reactors to operate with various plutonium-based fuel cycles without requiring major changes to the current reactor design. (author)

  13. Alternative technical summary report for direct disposition in deep boreholes: Direct disposal of plutonium metal/plutonium dioxide in compound canisters, Version 4.0. Fissile Materials Disposition Program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wijesinghe, A.M.

    1996-08-23

    This report summarizes and compares the Immobilized and Direct Beep Borehole Disposition Alternatives. The important design concepts, facility features and operational procedures are briefly described, and a discussion of the issues that affect the evaluation of each alternative against the programmatic assessment criteria that have been established for selecting the preferred alternatives for plutonium disposition.

  14. DOE Plutonium Disposition Study: Pu consumption in ALWRs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) has contracted with Asea Brown Boveri-Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE) to provide information on the capability of ABB-CE's System 80 + Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) to transform, through reactor burnup, 100 metric tonnes (MT) of weapons grade plutonium (Pu) into a form which is not readily useable in weapons. This information is being developed as part of DOE's Plutonium Disposition Study, initiated by DOE in response to Congressional action. This document, Volume 1, presents a technical description of the various elements of the System 80 + Standard Plant Design upon which the Plutonium Disposition Study was based. The System 80 + Standard Design is fully developed and directly suited to meeting the mission objectives for plutonium disposal. The bass U0 2 plant design is discussed here

  15. The disposition of weapon grade plutonium: costs and tradeoffs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Weida, W.J.

    1996-01-01

    This paper explores some of the economic issues surrounding a major area of expenditures now facing the nuclear powers: the disposition of weapon-grade plutonium either through 'burning' in nuclear reactors for power generation or by other means. Under the current budgeting philosophy in the United States, programs managed by the Department of Energy (DOE) tend to compete with one another for the total funds assigned to that agency. For example, in the FY1995 DOE budget a tradeoff was made between increased funding for nuclear weapons and reduced funding for site cleanup. No matter which disposition alternative is chosen, if disposition funds are controlled by the DOE in the US or by a government agency in any other country, disposition is likely to compete directly or indirectly with other alternatives for energy funding. And if they are subsidized by any government, research into plutonium as reactor fuel or the operations associated with such use are likely to consume funds that might otherwise be available to support sustainable energy alternatives. When all costs are considered, final waste disposal costs will be incurred whatever disposal option is taken. These costs could potentially be offset by doing something profitable with the plutonium prior to final storage, but this paper has shown that finding a profitable use for plutonium is unlikely. Thus, the more probable case is one where the costs of basic waste storage are increased by whatever costs are associated with the disposition option chosen. The factors most likely to significantly increase costs appear to arise from four areas: (1) The level of subsidization in the 'profitable' parts of the disposition program. (2) Those items (such as reprocessing) that increase the volume of waste and thus, the cost of waste disposal. (3) The cost of security and its direct relationship to the number of times plutonium is handled or moved. (4) The cost of research and development of new and unproven methods of

  16. Weapons-grade plutonium dispositioning. Volume 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sterbentz, J.W.; Olsen, C.S.; Sinha, U.P.

    1993-06-01

    This study is in response to a request by the Reactor Panel Subcommittee of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) to evaluate the feasibility of using plutonium fuels (without uranium) for disposal in existing conventional or advanced light water reactor (LWR) designs and in low temperature/pressure LWR designs that might be developed for plutonium disposal. Three plutonium-based fuel forms (oxides, aluminum metallics, and carbides) are evaluated for neutronic performance, fabrication technology, and material and compatibility issues. For the carbides, only the fabrication technologies are addressed. Viable plutonium oxide fuels for conventional or advanced LWRs include plutonium-zirconium-calcium oxide (PuO 2 -ZrO 2 -CaO) with the addition of thorium oxide (ThO 2 ) or a burnable poison such as erbium oxide (Er 2 O 3 ) or europium oxide (Eu 2 O 3 ) to achieve acceptable neutronic performance. Thorium will breed fissile uranium that may be unacceptable from a proliferation standpoint. Fabrication of uranium and mixed uranium-plutonium oxide fuels is well established; however, fabrication of plutonium-based oxide fuels will require further development. Viable aluminum-plutonium metallic fuels for a low temperature/pressure LWR include plutonium aluminide in an aluminum matrix (PuAl 4 -Al) with the addition of a burnable poison such as erbium (Er) or europium (Eu). Fabrication of low-enriched plutonium in aluminum-plutonium metallic fuel rods was initially established 30 years ago and will require development to recapture and adapt the technology to meet current environmental and safety regulations. Fabrication of high-enriched uranium plate fuel by the picture-frame process is a well established process, but the use of plutonium would require the process to be upgraded in the United States to conform with current regulations and minimize the waste streams

  17. DOE plutonium disposition study: Pu consumption in ALWRs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) has contracted with Asea Brown Boveri-Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE) to provide information on the capability of ABB-CE's System 80 + Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) to transform, through reactor burnup, 100 metric tonnes (MT) of weapons grade plutonium (Pu) into a form which is not readily useable in weapons. This information is being developed as part of DOE's Plutonium Disposition Study, initiated by DOE in response to Congressional action. This document Volume 2, provides a discussion of: Plutonium Fuel Cycle; Technology Needs; Regulatory Considerations; Cost and Schedule Estimates; and Deployment Strategy

  18. PRISM reactor. An option for plutonium disposition?

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fehlinger, Sebastian; Friess, Friederike; Kuett, Moritz [IANUS, Technische Universitaet Darmstadt (Germany)

    2015-07-01

    The Power Reactor Innovative Small Module (PRISM) is sodium cooled fast reactor model. The energy output depends on the core configuration, however with an energy output of approximately 300 MWe, the PRISM reactor belongs to the class of small modular reactors. Beside using the reactor as a breeder reactor or for the transmutation of nuclear waste, it might also be used as a burner reactor for separated plutonium. This includes for example U.S.-American excess weapon-grade plutonium as well as separated reactor-grade plutonium. Recently, there has been an ongoing discussion in GB to use the PRISM reactor to dispose their excess civilian plutonium. Depending on the task, the core configuration varies slightly. We will present different layouts and the matching MCNP models, these models can then be used to conduct depletion calculations. From these results, analysis of the change in the plutonium isotopics in the spent fuel, the amount of fissioned plutonium, and the possible annual plutonium throughputs is possible.

  19. Chemical Disposition of Plutonium in Hanford Site Tank Wastes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Delegard, Calvin H. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Jones, Susan A. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

    2015-05-07

    This report examines the chemical disposition of plutonium (Pu) in Hanford Site tank wastes, by itself and in its observed and potential interactions with the neutron absorbers aluminum (Al), cadmium (Cd), chromium (Cr), iron (Fe), manganese (Mn), nickel (Ni), and sodium (Na). Consideration also is given to the interactions of plutonium with uranium (U). No consideration of the disposition of uranium itself as an element with fissile isotopes is considered except tangentially with respect to its interaction as an absorber for plutonium. The report begins with a brief review of Hanford Site plutonium processes, examining the various means used to recover plutonium from irradiated fuel and from scrap, and also examines the intermediate processing of plutonium to prepare useful chemical forms. The paper provides an overview of Hanford tank defined-waste–type compositions and some calculations of the ratios of plutonium to absorber elements in these waste types and in individual waste analyses. These assessments are based on Hanford tank waste inventory data derived from separately published, expert assessments of tank disposal records, process flowsheets, and chemical/radiochemical analyses. This work also investigates the distribution and expected speciation of plutonium in tank waste solution and solid phases. For the solid phases, both pure plutonium compounds and plutonium interactions with absorber elements are considered. These assessments of plutonium chemistry are based largely on analyses of idealized or simulated tank waste or strongly alkaline systems. The very limited information available on plutonium behavior, disposition, and speciation in genuine tank waste also is discussed. The assessments show that plutonium coprecipitates strongly with chromium, iron, manganese and uranium absorbers. Plutonium’s chemical interactions with aluminum, nickel, and sodium are minimal to non-existent. Credit for neutronic interaction of plutonium with these absorbers

  20. Weapons grade plutonium disposition in PWR, CANDU and FR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Deplech, M.; Tommasi, J.; Zaetta, A.

    2000-01-01

    In the frame work of the AIDA/MOX phase I/I/ program (1994-1997) between France and Russia, the disposition of plutonium in reactors was studied. The LWR (Light Water Reactor), FR (Fast reactors), CANDU (Heavy Water Reactors), HTR (High Temperature Reactors) options for using excess dismantled weapons plutonium for peaceful commercial nuclear power generating purposes offer some advantages over the remaining options (storage). The AIDA/MOX phase 1 program covers different topics, among which are the neutronic aspects of loading reactors with weapons-grade plutonium. The conclusions are that the weapon plutonium consumption is similar in the different type of reactors. However, the use of inert matrices allows to increase the mass balance for a same denaturing level. The use of Thorium as a matrix or special isotopes to increase the proliferation resistance prove to be insufficient. (author)

  1. Design of plutonium processing facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Derbyshire, W.; Sills, R.J.

    1982-01-01

    Five considerations for the design of plutonium processing facilities are identified. These are: Toxicity, Radiation, Criticality, Containment and Remote Operation. They are examined with reference to reprocessing spent nuclear fuel and application is detailed both for liquid and dry processes. (author)

  2. Preventive arms control. Case study: plutonium disposition. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liebert, W.

    2001-01-01

    Plutonium stored in separated form poses a severe threat of nuclear weapons proliferation. While options for the disposition of military plutonium stockpiles have been studied for several years, similar work has hardly been undertaken for plutonium stockpiles in the civilian sector. In the framework of this project, the various options to dispose of stockpiles of separated plutonium in the civilian sector were to be investigated. The project was embedded in the FONAS-project network on Preventive Arms Control, and the findings of this study were to be considered for the development of a concept of Preventive Arms Control. As a first step, the internationally available information on different options for plutonium disposition (MOX-use, immobilization together with radioactive wastes, elimination) were collected and compiled to allow further assessment of the different options. For some of the options, technical questions were examined in more detail. For this purpose, neutron transport and fuel burnup calculations were performed. In particular, the analysis focused on concepts for the elimination of plutonium by the use of uranium-free fuel in existing light-water reactors, since they are particularly attractive from the point of view of non-proliferation. The calculations were performed for a reference fuel based on yttrium-stabilized zirconia, with parameters like the initial plutonium content or the use of burnable neutron poisons varying. A systematic and complete analysis of the performed calculations, however, could not be undertaken due to project time restrictions. On the basis of assessment criteria for Preventive Arms Control developed by the project network, a specific set of criteria for the assessment of the pros and cons of different plutonium disposition methods has been defined. These criteria may then be used as part of a concept of prospective technology assessment. The project findings present a starting base for a comprehensive assessment of the

  3. Joint U.S./Russian plutonium disposition study: Nonproliferation issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jaeger, C.; Erkkila, B.; Fearey, B.; Ehinger, M.; McAllister, S.; Chitaykin, V.; Ptashny, V.

    1996-01-01

    In an effort to establish joint activities in the disposition of fissile materials from nuclear materials, the US and Russia agreed to conduct joint work to develop consistent comparisons of various alternatives for the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium. Joint working groups were established for the analysis of alternatives for plutonium management for water reactors, fast reactors, storage, geological formations, immobilization and stabilization of solutions and other forms. In addition cross-cutting working groups were established for economic analysis and nonproliferation (NP). This paper reviews the activities of the NP working group in support of these studies. The NP working group provided integrated support in the area of nuclear NP to the other US/Russian Study teams. It involved both domestic safeguards and security and international safeguards. The analysis of NP involved consideration of the resistance to theft or diversion and resistance to retrieval, extraction or reuse

  4. Interim Storage of Plutonium in Existing Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Woodsmall, T.D.

    1999-01-01

    reactor building. The storage life is projected to be ten years to allow the preparation of APSF. DOE has stipulated that there be no credible release during storage, since there are no design features in place to mitigate a release of plutonium (i.e. HEPA filters, facility containment boundaries, etc.). This mandate has presented most of the significant challenges to the safety analysis team. The shipping packages are designed to withstand certain accidents and conditions, but in order to take credit for these the storage environment must be strictly controlled. Damages to the packages from exposure to fire, dropping, crushing and other impact accidents have been analyzed, and appropriate preventative design features have been incorporated. Other efforts include the extension of the shipping life (roughly two years) to a suitable storage life of ten years. These issues include the effects of internal pressure increases, seal degradation and the presence of impurities. A process known as the Container Qualification Program has been conducted to address these issues. The KAMS project will be ready to receive the first shipment from Rocky Flats in January 2000. No credible design basis scenarios resulting in the release of plutonium exist. This work has been useful in the effort to provide a safer disposition of plutonium, but also the lessons learned and techniques established by the team will help with the analysis of future facility modifications.'

  5. Life cycle costs for the domestic reactor-based plutonium disposition option

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Williams, K.A.

    1999-01-01

    Projected constant dollar life cycle cost (LCC) estimates are presented for the domestic reactor-based plutonium disposition program being managed by the US Department of Energy Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE/MD). The scope of the LCC estimate includes: design, construction, licensing, operation, and deactivation of a mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility (FFF) that will be used to purify and convert weapons-derived plutonium oxides to MOX fuel pellets and fabricate MOX fuel bundles for use in commercial pressurized-water reactors (PWRs); fuel qualification activities and modification of facilities required for manufacture of lead assemblies that will be used to qualify and license this MOX fuel; and modification, licensing, and operation of commercial PWRs to allow irradiation of a partial core of MOX fuel in combination with low-enriched uranium fuel. The baseline cost elements used for this document are the same as those used for examination of the preferred sites described in the site-specific final environmental impact statement and in the DOE Record of Decision that will follow in late 1999. Cost data are separated by facilities, government accounting categories, contract phases, and expenditures anticipated by the various organizations who will participate in the program over a 20-year period. Total LCCs to DOE/MD are projected at approximately $1.4 billion for a 33-MT plutonium disposition mission

  6. Safeguards and security requirements for weapons plutonium disposition in light water reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thomas, L.L.; Strait, R.S.

    1994-10-01

    This paper explores the issues surrounding the safeguarding of the plutonium disposition process in support of the United States nuclear weapons dismantlement program. It focuses on the disposition of the plutonium by burning mixed oxide fuel in light water reactors (LWR) and addresses physical protection, material control and accountability, personnel security and international safeguards. The S and S system needs to meet the requirements of the DOE Orders, NRC Regulations and international safeguards agreements. Experience has shown that incorporating S and S measures into early facility designs and integrating them into operations provides S and S that is more effective, more economical, and less intrusive. The plutonium disposition safeguards requirements with which the US has the least experience are the implementation of international safeguards on plutonium metal; the large scale commercialization of the mixed oxide fuel fabrication; and the transportation to and loading in the LWRs of fresh mixed oxide fuel. It is in these areas where the effort needs to be concentrated if the US is to develop safeguards and security systems that are effective and efficient

  7. LLNL MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    O'Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R.

    1998-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program's preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. The DOE Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD) has developed a dual-path strategy for disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. One of the paths is to disposition surplus plutonium through irradiation of MOX fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. MOX fuel consists of plutonium and uranium oxides (PuO 2 and UO 2 ), typically containing 95% or more UO 2 . DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. LLNL has proposed an LA MOX fuel fabrication approach that would be done entirely inside an S and S Category 1 area. This includes receipt and storage of PuO 2 powder, fabrication of MOX fuel pellets, assembly of fuel rods and bundles, and shipping of the packaged fuel to a commercial reactor site. Support activities will take place within a Category 1 area. Building 332 will be used to receive and store the bulk PuO 2 powder, fabricate MOX fuel pellets, and assemble fuel rods. Building 334 will be used to assemble, store, and ship fuel bundles. Only minor modifications would be required of Building 332. Uncontaminated glove boxes would need to be removed, petition walls would need to be removed, and minor modifications to the ventilation system would be required

  8. LLNL MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    O`Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R. [and others

    1998-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program`s preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. The DOE Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD) has developed a dual-path strategy for disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. One of the paths is to disposition surplus plutonium through irradiation of MOX fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. MOX fuel consists of plutonium and uranium oxides (PuO{sub 2} and UO{sub 2}), typically containing 95% or more UO{sub 2}. DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. LLNL has proposed an LA MOX fuel fabrication approach that would be done entirely inside an S and S Category 1 area. This includes receipt and storage of PuO{sub 2} powder, fabrication of MOX fuel pellets, assembly of fuel rods and bundles, and shipping of the packaged fuel to a commercial reactor site. Support activities will take place within a Category 1 area. Building 332 will be used to receive and store the bulk PuO{sub 2} powder, fabricate MOX fuel pellets, and assemble fuel rods. Building 334 will be used to assemble, store, and ship fuel bundles. Only minor modifications would be required of Building 332. Uncontaminated glove boxes would need to be removed, petition walls would need to be removed, and minor modifications to the ventilation system would be required.

  9. Plutonium disposition study phase 1b final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    This report provides the results of the Westinghouse activities performed as part of the Plutonium Disposition Study Phase 1b. These activities, which took place from May 16, 1993 to September 15, 1993, build upon the work completed in Phase 1a, which concluded on May 15, 1993. In Phase 1a, three Plutonium Disposal Reactor (PDR) options were developed for the disposal of excess weapons grade plutonium from returned and dismantled nuclear weapons. This report documents the results of several tasks that were performed to further knowledge in specific areas leading up to Phase 2 of the PDR Study. The Westinghouse activities for Phase 1b are summarized as follows: (1) resolved technical issues concerning reactor physics including equilibrium cycle calculations, use of gadolinium, moderator temperature coefficient, and others as documented in Section 2.0; (2) analyzed large Westinghouse commercial plants for plutonium disposal; (3) reactor safety issues including the steam line break were resolved, and are included in Section 2.0; (4) several tasks related to the PDR Fuel Cycle were examined; (5) cost and deployment options were examined to determine optimal configuration for both plutonium disposal and tritium production; (6) response to questions from DOE and National Academy of Scientists (NAS) reviewers concerning the PDR Phase 1a report are included in Appendix A

  10. History of the US weapons-usable plutonium disposition program leading to DOE's record of decision

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Spellman, D.J.; Thomas, J.F.; Bugos, R.G.

    1997-04-01

    This report highlights important events and studies concerning surplus weapons-usable plutonium disposition in the United States. Included are major events that led to the creation of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Fissile Materials Disposition in 1994 and to that DOE office issuing the January 1997 Record of Decision for the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Useable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement. Emphasis has been given to reactor-based plutonium disposition alternatives

  11. Reactor-Based Plutonium Disposition: Opportunities, Options, and Issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Greene, S.R.

    1999-01-01

    The end of the Cold War has created a legacy of surplus fissile materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) in the United States (U.S.) and the former Soviet Union. These materials pose a danger to national and international security. During the past few years, the U.S. and Russia have engaged in an ongoing dialog concerning the safe storage and disposition of surplus fissile material stockpiles. In January 1997, the Department of Energy (DOE) announced the U. S. would pursue a dual track approach to rendering approximately 50 metric tons of plutonium inaccessible for use in nuclear weapons. One track involves immobilizing the plutonium by combining it with high-level radioactive waste in glass or ceramic ''logs''. The other method, referred to as reactor-based disposition, converts plutonium into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for nuclear reactors. The U.S. and Russia are moving ahead rapidly to develop and demonstrate the technology required to implement the MOX option in their respective countries. U.S. MOX fuel research and development activities were started in the 1950s, with irradiation of MOX fuel rods in commercial light water reactors (LWR) from the 1960s--1980s. In all, a few thousand MOX fuel rods were successfully irradiated. Though much of this work was performed with weapons-grade or ''near'' weapons-grade plutonium--and favorable fuel performance was observed--the applicability of this data for licensing and use of weapons-grade MOX fuel manufactured with modern fuel fabrication processes is somewhat limited. The U.S. and Russia are currently engaged in an intensive research, development, and demonstration program to support implementation of the MOX option in our two countries. This paper focuses on work performed in the U.S. and provides a brief summary of joint U.S./Russian work currently underway

  12. Reactor-based plutonium disposition: Opportunities, options, and issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Greene, S.

    2000-01-01

    The end of the Cold War has created a legacy of surplus fissile materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) in the United States (U.S.) and the former Soviet Union. These materials pose a danger to national and international security. During the past few years, the U.S. and Russia have engaged in an ongoing dialog concerning the safe storage and disposition of surplus fissile material stockpiles. In January 1997, the Department of Energy (DOE) announced the U.S. would pursue a dual track approach to rendering approximately 50 metric tons of plutonium inaccessible for use in nuclear weapons. One track involves immobilizing the plutonium by combining it with high-level radioactive waste in glass or ceramic ''logs''. The other method, referred to as reactor-based disposition, converts plutonium into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for nuclear reactors. The U.S. and Russia are moving ahead rapidly to develop and demonstrate the technology required to implement the MOX option in their respective countries. U.S. MOX fuel research and development activities were started in the 1950s with irradiation of MOX fuel rods in commercial light water reactors (LWR) from the 1960s-1980s. In all, a few thousand MOX fuel rods were successfully irradiated. Though much of this work was performed with weapons-grade or ''near'' weapons-grade plutonium - and favorable fuel performance was observed - the applicability of this data for licensing and use of weapons-grade MOX fuel manufactured with modem fuel fabrication processes is somewhat limited. The U.S. and Russia are currently engaged in an intensive research, development, and demonstration program to support implementation of the MOX option in our two countries. This paper focuses on work performed in the U.S. and provides a brief summary of joint U.S./Russian work currently underway. (author)

  13. ANL-W MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    O'Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R.

    1997-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program's preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement (EIS). This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. The DOE Office of fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD) has developed a dual-path strategy for disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. One of the paths is to disposition surplus plutonium through irradiation of MOX fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. MOX fuel consists of plutonium and uranium oxides (PuO 2 and UO 2 ), typically containing 95% or more UO 2 . DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. The paper describes the following: Site map and the LA facility; process descriptions; resource needs; employment requirements; wastes, emissions, and exposures; accident analysis; transportation; qualitative decontamination and decommissioning; post-irradiation examination; LA fuel bundle fabrication; LA EIS data report assumptions; and LA EIS data report supplement

  14. ANL-W MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    O`Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R. [and others

    1997-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program`s preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement (EIS). This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. The DOE Office of fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD) has developed a dual-path strategy for disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. One of the paths is to disposition surplus plutonium through irradiation of MOX fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. MOX fuel consists of plutonium and uranium oxides (PuO{sub 2} and UO{sub 2}), typically containing 95% or more UO{sub 2}. DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. The paper describes the following: Site map and the LA facility; process descriptions; resource needs; employment requirements; wastes, emissions, and exposures; accident analysis; transportation; qualitative decontamination and decommissioning; post-irradiation examination; LA fuel bundle fabrication; LA EIS data report assumptions; and LA EIS data report supplement.

  15. Ventilation design for new plutonium recovery facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oliver, A.J.; Amos, C.L.

    1975-01-01

    In 1972 the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) issued revised guidelines on ''Minimum Design Criteria for New Plutonium Facilities.'' With these criteria as guidelines, a new Plutonium Recovery Facility is being designed and constructed at the AEC Rocky Flats Plant. The methods by which the confinement of contamination and air treatment are being handled in this facility are described. (U.S.)

  16. Optimization and implementation study of plutonium disposition using existing CANDU Reactors. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-09-01

    Since early 1994, the Department of Energy has been sponsoring studies aimed at evaluating the merits of disposing of surplus US weapons plutonium as Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel in existing commercial Canadian Pressurized Heavy Water reactors, known as CANDU's. The first report, submitted to DOE in July, 1994 (the 1994 Executive Summary is attached), identified practical and safe options for the consumption of 50 to 100 tons of plutonium in 25 years in some of the existing CANDU reactors operating the Bruce A generating station, on Lake Huron, about 300 km north east of Detroit. By designing the fuel and nuclear performance to operate within existing experience and operating/performance envelope, and by utilizing existing fuel fabrication and transportation facilities and methods, a low cost, low risk method for long term plutonium disposition was developed. In December, 1995, in response to evolving Mission Requirements, the DOE requested a further study of the CANDU option with emphasis on more rapid disposition of the plutonium, and retaining the early start and low risk features of the earlier work. This report is the result of that additional work

  17. Disposition of plutonium-239 via production of fission molybdenum-99

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mushtaq, A., E-mail: muahtaq_a1953@hotmail.co [Isotope Production Division, Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology, P.O. Nilore, Islamabad (Pakistan)

    2011-04-15

    A heritage of physical consequences of the U.S.-Soviet arms race has accumulated, the weapons-grade plutonium (WPu), which will become excess as a result of the dismantlement of the nuclear weapons under the arms reduction agreements. Disposition of Pu has been proposed by mixing WPu with high-level radioactive waste with subsequent vitrification into large, highly radioactive glass logs or fabrication into mixed oxide fuel with subsequent irradiation in existing light water reactors. A potential option may be the production of medical isotope molybdenum-99 by using Pu-239 targets.

  18. Disposition of excess plutonium using ''off-spec'' MOX pellets as a sintered ceramic waste form

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Armantrout, G.A.; Jardine, L.J.

    1996-02-01

    The authors describe a potential strategy for the disposition of excess weapons plutonium in a way that minimizes (1) technological risks, (2) implementation costs and completion schedules, and (3) requirements for constructing and operating new or duplicative Pu disposition facilities. This is accomplished by an optimized combination of (1) using existing nuclear power reactors to ''burn'' relatively pure excess Pu inventories as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and (2) using the same MOX fuel fabrication facilities to fabricate contaminated or impure excess Pu inventories into an ''off-spec'' MOX solid ceramic waste form for geologic disposition. Diversion protection for the SCWF to meet the ''spent fuel standard'' introduced by the National Academy of Sciences can be achieved in at least three ways. (1) One can utilize the radiation field from defense high-level nuclear waste by first packaging the SCWF pellets in 2- to 4-L cans that are subsequently encapsulated in radioactive glass in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) glass canisters (a ''can-in-canister'' approach). (2) One can add 137 Cs (recovered from defense wastes at Hanford and currently stored as CsCl in capsules) to an encapsulating matrix such as cement for the SCWF pellets in a small hot-cell facility and thus fabricate large monolithic forms. (3) The SCWF can be fabricated into reactor fuel-like pellets and placed in tubes similar to fuel assemblies, which can then be mixed in sealed repository containers with irradiated spent nuclear fuel for geologic disposition

  19. Getting the plutonium disposition job done: the concept of a joint-venture disposition enterprise financed by additional sales of highly enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bunn, M.

    1996-01-01

    The paper gives an outline of a concept which has the potential to provide both substantial financing needed for disposition of plutonium from excess nuclear weapons and the long-term management structure required to implement this effort. The three most important issues were underlined. First, it is urgent to modernize security and accounting systems for all weapon-usable nuclear materials, particularly from former Soviet Union. Second, excess plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) must be brought under international monitoring to ensure irreversibility of nuclear arms reduction. Third, quick move should be done towards actual disposition of excess plutonium and HEU. Technology already exists, but the key issues are how to get finance and manage this operation, particularly given its immense scope and controversial nature. An international joint venture 'Enterprise for nuclear Security' that would build and operate plutonium disposition facilities under stringent non-proliferation controls, financed through additional sales of HEU is a potentially promising approach to addressing the most difficult issues facing the disposition problem

  20. Fissile Material Disposition Program: Deep borehole disposal Facility PEIS date input report for immobilized disposal. Immobilized disposal of plutonium in coated ceramic pellets in grout with canisters. Version 3.0

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wijesinghe, A.M.; Shaffer, R.J.

    1996-01-01

    Following President Clinton's Non-Proliferation Initiative, launched in September, 1993, an Interagency Working Group (IWG) was established to conduct a comprehensive review of the options for the disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials from nuclear weapons dismantlement activities in the United States and the former Soviet Union. The IWG review process will consider technical, nonproliferation, environmental budgetary, and economic considerations in the disposal of plutonium. The IWG is co-chaired by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and the National Security Council. The Department of Energy (DOE) is directly responsible for the management, storage, and disposition of all weapons-usable fissile material. The Department of Energy has been directed to prepare a comprehensive review of long-term options for Surplus Fissile Material (SFM) disposition, taking into account technical, nonproliferation, environmental, budgetary, and economic considerations

  1. Fissile Material Disposition Program: Deep borehole disposal Facility PEIS date input report for immobilized disposal. Immobilized disposal of plutonium in coated ceramic pellets in grout with canisters. Version 3.0

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wijesinghe, A.M.; Shaffer, R.J.

    1996-01-15

    Following President Clinton`s Non-Proliferation Initiative, launched in September, 1993, an Interagency Working Group (IWG) was established to conduct a comprehensive review of the options for the disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials from nuclear weapons dismantlement activities in the United States and the former Soviet Union. The IWG review process will consider technical, nonproliferation, environmental budgetary, and economic considerations in the disposal of plutonium. The IWG is co-chaired by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and the National Security Council. The Department of Energy (DOE) is directly responsible for the management, storage, and disposition of all weapons-usable fissile material. The Department of Energy has been directed to prepare a comprehensive review of long-term options for Surplus Fissile Material (SFM) disposition, taking into account technical, nonproliferation, environmental, budgetary, and economic considerations.

  2. Development of a fresh MOX fuel transport package for disposition of weapons plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ludwig, S.B.; Pope, R.B.; Shappert, L.B.; Michelhaugh, R.D.; Chae, S.M.

    1998-01-01

    The US Department of Energy announced its Record of Decision on January 14, 1997, to embark on a dual-track approach for disposition of surplus weapons-usable plutonium using immobilization in glass or ceramics and burning plutonium as mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel in reactors. In support of the MOX fuel alternative, Oak Ridge National Laboratory initiated development of conceptual designs for a new package for transporting fresh (unirradiated) MOX fuel assemblies between the MOX fabrication facility and existing commercial light-water reactors in the US. This paper summarizes progress made in development of new MOX transport package conceptual designs. The development effort has included documentation of programmatic and technical requirements for the new package and development and analysis of conceptual designs that satisfy these requirements

  3. The US program for disposition of excess weapons plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bunn, M.

    1997-01-01

    After an exhaustive interagency study, the United States has declared that 52.7 tons of plutonium, over half of its stockpile, is excess to its military needs, and has decided to pursue a dual-track approach to eliminating this excess stockpile, burning some of it once-through as power-reactor fuel, and immobilizing the remainder with intensely radioactive fission products. This effort represents a significant step toward increasing the irreversibility of nuclear arms reductions and reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation. The United States expects to complete disposition of this material over the next 2-3 decades, at a net discounted present cost of approximately $1.5 billion. Intemational verification and stringent security and accounting for the material are planned for the entire program

  4. X-ray fluorescence spectroscopy for the elemental analysis of plutonium-bearing materials for the materials disposition program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Voit, S.L.; Boerigter, S.T.; Rising, T.L.

    1997-01-01

    The US Fissile Materials Disposition (MD) program will disposition about 50 MT of plutonium in the next century. Both of the alternative technologies for disposition, MOX Fuel and Immobilization require knowledge of the incoming composition to 1--5 wt%. Wavelength Dispersive X-Ray Fluorescence (WDXRF) systems, a common elemental analysis technology with a variety of industrial applications and commercial vendors, can readily achieve this level of characterization. Since much of the excess plutonium will be packaged in a long-term storage container as part of the DOE Environmental Management (DOE-EM) program to stabilize plutonium-bearing materials, the characterization system must be implemented during the packaging process. The authors describe a preliminary design for the integration of the WDXRF system into the packaging system to be used at the Rocky Flats site. The Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging System (PuSPS), coupled with the WDXRF characterization system will provide MD with stabilized plutonium-bearing excess material that can be more readily fed to an immobilization facility. The overall added expense to the MD program of obtaining analytical information after materials have been packaged in long-term storage containers could far exceed the expense of implementing XRF analysis during the packaging process

  5. A vitrification strategy for weapons-grade plutonium disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sylvester, K.B.; Simonson, S.A.

    1995-01-01

    Excess weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu) presents a complex but welcome challenge to decision makers. High security is a clear priority but a host of concerns will impact US actions. Making disposition decisions based on a rigid set of criteria designed to identify an 'optimum' technology given immediate objectives and available technologies may delay Russian processing and unnecessarily limit US options. Attention should be given to near-term, verifiable options that may not provide an acceptable level of security in the long-term but nonetheless provide a material barrier to direct theft and immediate use, buying time to evaluate potential disposition technologies. Vitrification of WGPu in borosilicate glass was examined as one such alternative. Rare earth diluents were examined (using MCNP) for their ability to increase the compressed critical mass of the mixture. Increased critical mass complicates weapon design and increases the quantity of material necessarily diverted. Europium was effective in this regard. As Pu-239 has a 24,000 yr half-life, reactivity control in the long-term could be an environmental safety issue should the glass be placed in a repository. Rare earths were investigated as criticality controllers due to their neutron absorption capabilities and insolubility in aqueous environments. Thorium (assumed as a Pu surrogate) and the rare earths Eu, Gd, and Sm were added to a standard frit (SRL-165) and formed into glass. Aqueous leach tests were performed (using MCC-1P guidelines) to measure rare earth leaching and determine the added element's effects on glass durability

  6. A comparative assessment of the economics of plutonium disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Williams, K.A.; Miller, J.W.; Reid, R.L.

    1997-01-01

    The US Department of Energy office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE/MD) has been evaluating three technologies for the disposition of approximately 50 metric tons of surplus plutonium from defense-related programs: reactors, immobilization, and deep boreholes. As part of the process supporting an early CY 1997 Record of Decision (ROD), a comprehensive assessment of technical viability, cost, and schedule has been conducted by DOE/MD and its national laboratory contractors. Oak Ridge National Laboratory has managed and coordinated the life-cycle cost (LCC) assessment effort for this program. This paper discusses the economic analysis methodology and the results prior to ROD. A secondary intent of the paper is to discuss major technical and economic issues that impact cost and schedule. To evaluate the economics of these technologies on an equitable basis, a set of cost-estimating guidelines and a common cost-estimating format were utilized by all three technology teams. This paper also includes the major economic analysis assumptions and the comparative constant-dollar and discounted-dollar LCCs

  7. LANL MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R.; Ludwig, S.B.

    1998-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program's preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. LANL has proposed an LA MOX fuel fabrication approach that would be done entirely inside an S and S Category 1 area. This includes receipt and storage of PuO 2 powder, fabrication of MOX fuel pellets, assembly of fuel rods and bundles, and shipping of the packaged fuel to a commercial reactor site. Support activities will take place within both Category 1 and 2 areas. Technical Area (TA) 55/Plutonium Facility 4 will be used to store the bulk PuO 2 powder, fabricate MOX fuel pellets, assemble rods, and store fuel bundles. Bundles will be assembled at a separate facility, several of which have been identified as suitable for that activity. The Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building (at TA-3) will be used for analytical chemistry support. Waste operations will be conducted in TA-50 and TA-54. Only very minor modifications will be needed to accommodate the LA program. These modifications consist mostly of minor equipment upgrades. A commercial reactor operator has not been identified for the LA irradiation. Postirradiation examination (PIE) of the irradiated fuel will take place at either Oak Ridge National Laboratory or ANL-W. The only modifications required at either PIE site would be to accommodate full-length irradiated fuel rods. Results from this program are critical to the overall plutonium distribution schedule

  8. LANL MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R.; Ludwig, S.B. [and others

    1998-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program`s preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. LANL has proposed an LA MOX fuel fabrication approach that would be done entirely inside an S and S Category 1 area. This includes receipt and storage of PuO{sub 2} powder, fabrication of MOX fuel pellets, assembly of fuel rods and bundles, and shipping of the packaged fuel to a commercial reactor site. Support activities will take place within both Category 1 and 2 areas. Technical Area (TA) 55/Plutonium Facility 4 will be used to store the bulk PuO{sub 2} powder, fabricate MOX fuel pellets, assemble rods, and store fuel bundles. Bundles will be assembled at a separate facility, several of which have been identified as suitable for that activity. The Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building (at TA-3) will be used for analytical chemistry support. Waste operations will be conducted in TA-50 and TA-54. Only very minor modifications will be needed to accommodate the LA program. These modifications consist mostly of minor equipment upgrades. A commercial reactor operator has not been identified for the LA irradiation. Postirradiation examination (PIE) of the irradiated fuel will take place at either Oak Ridge National Laboratory or ANL-W. The only modifications required at either PIE site would be to accommodate full-length irradiated fuel rods. Results from this program are critical to the overall plutonium distribution schedule.

  9. CANDU physics considerations for the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pitre, J.; Chan, P.; Dastur, A.

    1995-01-01

    At the request of the US Department of Energy AECL has examined the feasibility of using CANDU for the disposition of weapons grade plutonium. Utilizing existing CANDU technology, the feasibility of using MOX (mixed oxide) fuel in an existing CANDU reactor was studied. The results of this study indicate that the target disposition for disposal of weapons grade plutonium can be met without the requirement of any major modifications to existing plant design. (author). 3 refs., 4 tabs., 5 figs

  10. CANDU physics considerations for the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pitre, J; Chan, P; Dastur, A [Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., Mississauga, ON (Canada)

    1996-12-31

    At the request of the US Department of Energy AECL has examined the feasibility of using CANDU for the disposition of weapons grade plutonium. Utilizing existing CANDU technology, the feasibility of using MOX (mixed oxide) fuel in an existing CANDU reactor was studied. The results of this study indicate that the target disposition for disposal of weapons grade plutonium can be met without the requirement of any major modifications to existing plant design. (author). 3 refs., 4 tabs., 5 figs.

  11. The Optimum Plutonium Inert Matrix Fuel Form for Reactor-Based Plutonium Disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tulenko, J.S.; Wang, J.; Acosta, C.

    2004-01-01

    The University of Florida has underway an ongoing research program to validate the economic, operational and performance benefits of developing an inert matrix fuel (IMF) for the disposition of the U.S. weapons plutonium (Pu) and for the recycle of reprocessed Pu. The current fuel form of choice for Pu disposition for the Department of Energy is as a mixed oxide (MOX) (PuO2/UO2). We will show analyses that demonstrate that a Silicon Carbide (SiC) IMF offers improved performance capabilities as a fuel form for Pu recycle and disposition. The reason that UF is reviewing various materials to serve as an inert matrix fuel is that an IMF fuel form can offer greatly reduced Pu and transuranic isotope (TRU) production and also improved thermal performance characteristics. Our studies showed that the Pu content is reduced by an order of magnitude while centerline fuel temperatures are reduced approximately 380 degrees centigrade compared to MOX. These reduced temperatures result in reduced stored heat and thermal stresses in the pellet. The reduced stored heat reduces the consequences of the loss of coolant accident, while the reduced temperatures and thermal stresses yield greatly improved fuel performance. Silicon Carbide is not new to the nuclear industry, being a basic fuel material in gas cooled reactors

  12. Waste minimization at a plutonium processing facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1995-01-01

    As part of Los Alamos National Laboratory's (LANL) mission to reduce the nuclear danger throughout the world, the plutonium processing facility at LANL maintains expertise and skills in nuclear weapons technologies as well as leadership in all peaceful applications of plutonium technologies, including fuel fabrication for terrestrial and space reactors and heat sources and thermoelectric generators for space missions. Another near-term challenge resulted from two safety assessments performed by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and the U.S. Department of Energy during the past two years. These assessments have necessitated the processing and stabilization of plutonium contained in tons of residues so that they can be stored safely for an indefinite period. This report describes waste streams and approaches to waste reduction of plutonium management

  13. DOE plutonium disposition study: Analysis of existing ABB-CE Light Water Reactors for the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1994-06-01

    Core reactivity and basic fuel management calculations were conducted on the selected reactors (with emphasis on the System 80 units as being the most desirable choice). Methods used were identical to those reported in the Evolutionary Reactor Report. From these calculations, the basic mission capability was assessed. The selected reactors were studied for modification, such as the addition of control rod nozzles to increase rod worth, and internals and control system modifications that might also be needed. Other system modifications studied included the use of enriched boric acid as soluble poison, and examination of the fuel pool capacities. The basic geometry and mechanical characteristics, materials and fabrication techniques of the fuel assemblies for the selected existing reactors are the same as for System 80+. There will be some differences in plutonium loading, according to the ability of the reactors to load MOX fuel. These differences are not expected to affect licensability or EPA requirements. Therefore, the fuel technology and fuel qualification sections provided in the Evolutionary Reactor Report apply to the existing reactors. An additional factor, in that the existing reactor availability presupposes the use of that reactor for the irradiation of Lead Test Assemblies, is discussed. The reactor operating and facility licenses for the operating plants were reviewed. Licensing strategies for each selected reactor were identified. The spent fuel pool for the selected reactors (Palo Verde) was reviewed for capacity and upgrade requirements. Reactor waste streams were identified and assessed in comparison to uranium fuel operations. Cost assessments and schedules for converting to plutonium disposition were estimated for some of the major modification items. Economic factors (incremental costs associated with using weapons plutonium) were listed and where possible under the scope of work, estimates were made.

  14. DOE plutonium disposition study: Analysis of existing ABB-CE Light Water Reactors for the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    Core reactivity and basic fuel management calculations were conducted on the selected reactors (with emphasis on the System 80 units as being the most desirable choice). Methods used were identical to those reported in the Evolutionary Reactor Report. From these calculations, the basic mission capability was assessed. The selected reactors were studied for modification, such as the addition of control rod nozzles to increase rod worth, and internals and control system modifications that might also be needed. Other system modifications studied included the use of enriched boric acid as soluble poison, and examination of the fuel pool capacities. The basic geometry and mechanical characteristics, materials and fabrication techniques of the fuel assemblies for the selected existing reactors are the same as for System 80+. There will be some differences in plutonium loading, according to the ability of the reactors to load MOX fuel. These differences are not expected to affect licensability or EPA requirements. Therefore, the fuel technology and fuel qualification sections provided in the Evolutionary Reactor Report apply to the existing reactors. An additional factor, in that the existing reactor availability presupposes the use of that reactor for the irradiation of Lead Test Assemblies, is discussed. The reactor operating and facility licenses for the operating plants were reviewed. Licensing strategies for each selected reactor were identified. The spent fuel pool for the selected reactors (Palo Verde) was reviewed for capacity and upgrade requirements. Reactor waste streams were identified and assessed in comparison to uranium fuel operations. Cost assessments and schedules for converting to plutonium disposition were estimated for some of the major modification items. Economic factors (incremental costs associated with using weapons plutonium) were listed and where possible under the scope of work, estimates were made

  15. Fuel qualification issues and strategies for reactor-based surplus plutonium disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cowell, B.S.; Copeland, G.L.; Moses, D.L.

    1997-08-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) has proposed irradiation of mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel in existing commercial reactors as a disposition method for surplus plutonium from the weapons program. The burning of MOX fuel in reactors is supported by an extensive technology base; however, the infrastructure required to implement reactor-based plutonium disposition does not exist domestically. This report identifies and examines the actions required to qualify and license weapons-grade (WG) plutonium-based MOX fuels for use in domestic commercial light-water reactors (LWRs)

  16. Alternative technical summary report for immobilized disposition in deep boreholes: Immobilized disposal of plutonium in coated ceramic pellets in grout without canisters, Version 4.0. Fissile materials disposition program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wijesinghe, A.M.

    1996-08-23

    This paper summarizes and compares the immobilized and direct borehole disposition alternatives previously presented in the alternative technical summary. The important design concepts, facility features and operational procedures are first briefly described. This is followed by a discussion of the issues that affect the evaluation of each alternative against the programmatic assessment criteria that have been established for selecting the preferred alternatives for plutonium disposition.

  17. Alternative technical summary report for immobilized disposition in deep boreholes: Immobilized disposal of plutonium in coated ceramic pellets in grout without canisters, Version 4.0. Fissile materials disposition program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wijesinghe, A.M.

    1996-01-01

    This paper summarizes and compares the immobilized and direct borehole disposition alternatives previously presented in the alternative technical summary. The important design concepts, facility features and operational procedures are first briefly described. This is followed by a discussion of the issues that affect the evaluation of each alternative against the programmatic assessment criteria that have been established for selecting the preferred alternatives for plutonium disposition

  18. Disposition of plutonium as non-fertile fuel for water reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chidester, K.; Eaton, S.L.; Ramsey, K.B.

    1998-01-01

    This is the final report of a three-year, Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The original intent of this project was to investigate the possible use of a new fuel form as a means of dispositioning the declared surplus inventory of weapons-grade plutonium. The focus soon changed, however, to managing the larger and rapidly growing inventories of plutonium arising in commercial spent nuclear fuel through implementation of a new fuel form in existing nuclear reactors. LANL embarked on a parallel path effort to study fuel performance using advanced physics codes, while also demonstrating the ability to fabricate a new fuel form using standard processes in LANL's Plutonium Facility. An evolutionary fuel form was also examined which could provide enhanced performance over standard fuel forms, but which could be implemented in a much shorter time frame than a completely new fuel form. Recent efforts have focused on implementation of results into global energy models and development of follow-on funding to continue this research

  19. Progress on plutonium stabilization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hurt, D.

    1996-01-01

    The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has safety oversight responsibility for most of the facilities where unstable forms of plutonium are being processed and packaged for interim storage. The Board has issued recommendations on plutonium stabilization and has has a considerable influence on DOE's stabilization schedules and priorities. The Board has not made any recommendations on long-term plutonium disposition, although it may get more involved in the future if DOE develops plans to use defense nuclear facilities for disposition activities

  20. Confinement facilities for handling plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maraman, W.J.; McNeese, W.D.; Stafford, R.G.

    1975-01-01

    Plutonium handling on a multigram scale began in 1944. Early criteria, equipment, and techniques for confining contamination have been superseded by more stringent criteria and vastly improved equipment and techniques for in-process contamination control, effluent air cleaning and treatment of liquid wastes. This paper describes the evolution of equipment and practices to minimize exposure of workers and escape of contamination into work areas and into the environment. Early and current contamination controls are compared. (author)

  1. A strategy for weapons-grade plutonium disposition

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sylvester, K.W.B. [Iowa State Univ., Ames, IA (United States)

    1994-09-01

    A political as well as technical analysis was performed to determine the feasibility of glassification (vitrification) for weapons grade plutonium (WGPu) disposition. The political analysis provided the criteria necessary to compare alternative storage forms. The technical areas of weapon useability and environmental safety were then computationally and experimentally explored and a vitrification implementation strategy postulated. The Monte Carlo Neutron Photon (MCNP) computer code was used to model the effect of blending WGPu with reactor grade Pu (RGPu). A mixture of 30% RGPu and 70% WGPu more than doubled the surface flux from a bare sphere of the mixture which assumedly correlates to a significantly increased predetonation probability. Rare earth diluents were also examined (using MCNP) for their ability to increase the compressed critical mass of the WGPu mixture. The rare earths (notably Eu) were effective in this regard. As Pu-239 has a 24,100 year half life, reactivity control in the long term is an environmental safety issue. Rare earths were investigated as criticality controllers due to their neutron absorption capabilities and insolubility in aqueous environments. Thorium (a Pu surrogate) and the rare earths Eu, Gd, and Sm were added to two standard frits (ARM-1 and SRL-165) and formed into glass. Aqueous leach tests were performed (using MCC-1P guidelines) to measure rare earth leaching and determine the added elements` effects on glass durability. Europium was much more leach resistant than boron in the glasses tested. The elements had no negative effect on the environmental durability of the glasses tested at 90 C and minimal effect at room temperature. No fission product releases were detected in the ARM-1 compositions (which contained numerous simulated fission products).

  2. A strategy for weapons-grade plutonium disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sylvester, K.W.B.

    1994-09-01

    A political as well as technical analysis was performed to determine the feasibility of glassification (vitrification) for weapons grade plutonium (WGPu) disposition. The political analysis provided the criteria necessary to compare alternative storage forms. The technical areas of weapon useability and environmental safety were then computationally and experimentally explored and a vitrification implementation strategy postulated. The Monte Carlo Neutron Photon (MCNP) computer code was used to model the effect of blending WGPu with reactor grade Pu (RGPu). A mixture of 30% RGPu and 70% WGPu more than doubled the surface flux from a bare sphere of the mixture which assumedly correlates to a significantly increased predetonation probability. Rare earth diluents were also examined (using MCNP) for their ability to increase the compressed critical mass of the WGPu mixture. The rare earths (notably Eu) were effective in this regard. As Pu-239 has a 24,100 year half life, reactivity control in the long term is an environmental safety issue. Rare earths were investigated as criticality controllers due to their neutron absorption capabilities and insolubility in aqueous environments. Thorium (a Pu surrogate) and the rare earths Eu, Gd, and Sm were added to two standard frits (ARM-1 and SRL-165) and formed into glass. Aqueous leach tests were performed (using MCC-1P guidelines) to measure rare earth leaching and determine the added elements' effects on glass durability. Europium was much more leach resistant than boron in the glasses tested. The elements had no negative effect on the environmental durability of the glasses tested at 90 C and minimal effect at room temperature. No fission product releases were detected in the ARM-1 compositions (which contained numerous simulated fission products)

  3. Study of plutonium disposition using existing GE advanced Boiling Water Reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1994-06-01

    The end of the cold war and the resulting dismantlement of nuclear weapons has resulted in the need for the US to dispose of 50 to 100 metric tons of excess of plutonium in a safe and proliferation resistant manner. A number of studies, including the recently released National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study, have recommended conversion of plutonium into spent nuclear fuel with its high radiation barrier as the best means of providing permanent conversion and long-term diversion resistance to this material. The NAS study ``Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium identified Light Water Reactor spent fuel as the most readily achievable and proven form for the disposition of excess weapons plutonium. The study also stressed the need for a US disposition program which would enhance the prospects for a timely reciprocal program agreement with Russia. This summary provides the key findings of a GE study where plutonium is converted into Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel and a typical 1155 MWe GE Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) is utilized to convert the plutonium to spent fuel. A companion study of the Advanced BWR has recently been submitted. The MOX core design work that was conducted for the ABWR enabled GE to apply comparable fuel design concepts and consequently achieve full MOX core loading which optimize plutonium throughput for existing BWRs.

  4. Study of plutonium disposition using existing GE advanced Boiling Water Reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    The end of the cold war and the resulting dismantlement of nuclear weapons has resulted in the need for the US to dispose of 50 to 100 metric tons of excess of plutonium in a safe and proliferation resistant manner. A number of studies, including the recently released National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study, have recommended conversion of plutonium into spent nuclear fuel with its high radiation barrier as the best means of providing permanent conversion and long-term diversion resistance to this material. The NAS study ''Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium identified Light Water Reactor spent fuel as the most readily achievable and proven form for the disposition of excess weapons plutonium. The study also stressed the need for a US disposition program which would enhance the prospects for a timely reciprocal program agreement with Russia. This summary provides the key findings of a GE study where plutonium is converted into Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel and a typical 1155 MWe GE Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) is utilized to convert the plutonium to spent fuel. A companion study of the Advanced BWR has recently been submitted. The MOX core design work that was conducted for the ABWR enabled GE to apply comparable fuel design concepts and consequently achieve full MOX core loading which optimize plutonium throughput for existing BWRs

  5. Accountability control system in plutonium fuel facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Naruki, Kaoru; Aoki, Minoru; Mizuno, Ohichi; Mishima, Tsuyoshi

    1979-01-01

    More than 30 tons of plutonium-uranium mixed-oxide fuel have been manufactured at the Plutonium Facility in PNC for JOYO, FUGEN and DCA (Deuterium Critical Assembly) and for the purpose of irradiation tests. This report reviews the nuclear material accountability control system adopted in the Plutonium Facility. Initially, the main objective of the system was the criticality control of fissible materials at various stages of fuel manufacturing. The first part of this report describes the functions and the structure of the control system. A flow chart is provided to show the various stages of material flow and their associated computer files. The system is composed of the following three sub-systems: procedures of nuclear material transfer; PIT (Physical Inventory Taking); data retrieval, report preparation and file maintenance. OMR (Optical Mark Reader) sheets are used to record the nuclear material transfer. The MUF (Materials Unaccounted For) are evaluated by PIT every three months through computer processing based on the OMR sheets. The MUF ratio of Pu handled in the facility every year from 1966 to 1977 are presented by a curve, indicating that the MUF ratio was kept well under 0.5% for every project (JOYO, FUGEN, and DCA). As for the Pu safeguards, the MBA (Material Balance Area) and the KMP (Key Measurement Point) in the facility of PNC are illustrated. The general idea of the projected PINC (Plutonium Inventory Control) system in PNC is also shortly explained. (Aoki, K.)

  6. Multi-attribute evaluation and choice of alternatives for surplus weapons-usable plutonium disposition at uncertainty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kosterev, V.V.; Bolyatko, V.V.; Khajretdinov, S.I.; Averkin, A.N.

    2014-01-01

    The problem of surplus weapons-usable plutonium disposition is formalized as a multi-attribute problem of a choice of alternatives from a set of possible alternatives under fuzzy conditions. Evaluation and ordering of alternatives for the surplus weapons-usable plutonium disposition and sensitivity analysis are carried out at uncertainty [ru

  7. Surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. Public scoping meeting: Comment summary report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-09-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) issued a Record of Decision for the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (S ampersand D PEIS) (DOE/EIS-0229) on January 14, 1997. In that Record of Decision, DOE stated its decision to pursue a strategy for plutonium disposition that allows for immobilization of surplus weapons plutonium in glass or ceramic forms and irradiating the surplus plutonium as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in existing reactors, while reserving the option to immobilize all the surplus weapons plutonium. The Department also decided that the extent to which either or both of these disposition approaches would ultimately be deployed would depend in part upon future National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) review for surplus weapons plutonium disposition. On May 22, 1997, DOE published in the Federal Register (62 FR 28013) a Notice of Intent to prepare an environmental impact statement (tiered from the S ampersand D PEIS) on the disposition of United States' surplus weapons-usable plutonium. The purpose of the Notice of Intent was to describe DOE's proposed action, to solicit public input, and to announce the schedule for the public scoping meetings. During the public scoping period (May 22 - July 22, 1997), the public was invited to submit written comments by U.S. mail, fax, or through the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition's Website, as well as to provide oral comments by voicemail or by participating in public scoping meetings. Written and oral comments on the scope of the SPD EIS that were submitted during the formal comment period have been uniquely identified and have become part of the official record. This is the case whether the comments were submitted via U.S. mail, fax, website, toll-free telephone number, or through participation at a public scoping meeting

  8. Study of plutonium disposition using the GE Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1994-04-30

    The end of the cold war and the resulting dismantlement of nuclear weapons has resulted in the need for the U.S. to disposition 50 to 100 metric tons of excess of plutonium in parallel with a similar program in Russia. A number of studies, including the recently released National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study, have recommended conversion of plutonium into spent nuclear fuel with its high radiation barrier as the best means of providing long-term diversion resistance to this material. The NAS study {open_quotes}Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium{close_quotes} identified light water reactor spent fuel as the most readily achievable and proven form for the disposition of excess weapons plutonium. The study also stressed the need for a U.S. disposition program which would enhance the prospects for a timely reciprocal program agreement with Russia. This summary provides the key findings of a GE study where plutonium is converted into Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel and a 1350 MWe GE Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) is utilized to convert the plutonium to spent fuel. The ABWR represents the integration of over 30 years of experience gained worldwide in the design, construction and operation of BWRs. It incorporates advanced features to enhance reliability and safety, minimize waste and reduce worker exposure. For example, the core is never uncovered nor is any operator action required for 72 hours after any design basis accident. Phase 1 of this study was documented in a GE report dated May 13, 1993. DOE`s Phase 1 evaluations cited the ABWR as a proven technical approach for the disposition of plutonium. This Phase 2 study addresses specific areas which the DOE authorized as appropriate for more in-depth evaluations. A separate report addresses the findings relative to the use of existing BWRs to achieve the same goal.

  9. KEWB facilities decontamination and disposition. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ureda, B.F.

    1976-01-01

    The decontamination and disposition of the KEWB facilities, Buildings 073, 643, 123, and 793, are complete. All of the facility equipment, including reactor enclosure, reactor vessel, fuel handling systems, controls, radioactive waste systems, exhaust systems, electrical services, and protective systems were removed from the site. Buildings 643, 123, and 793 were completely removed, including foundations. The floor and portions of the walls of Building 073 were covered over by final grading. Results of the radiological monitoring and the final survey are presented. 9 tables, 19 figures

  10. Disposition of plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons: Fission options and comparisons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Omberg, R.P.; Walter, C.E.

    1993-01-01

    Over the next decade, the United States expects to recover about 50 Mg of excess weapon plutonium and the Republic of Russia expects to recover a similar amount. Ensuring that these large quantities of high-grade material are not reused in nuclear weapons has drawn considerable attention. In response to this problem, the US Department of Energy (DOE) chartered the Plutonium Disposition Task Force (PDTF), in the summer of 1992, to assess a range of practical means for disposition of excess US plutonium. This report summarizes and compares the ''Fission Options'' provided to the Fission Working Group Review Committee (the committee) of the PDTF. The review by the committee was based on preliminary information received as of December 4, 1992, and as such the results summarized in this report should also be considered preliminary. The committee concluded that irradiation of excess weapon plutonium in fission reactors in conjunction with the generation of electricity and storing the spent fuel is a fast, cost-effective, and environmentally acceptable method of addressing the safeguards (diversion) issue. When applied appropriately, this method is consistent with current nonproliferation policy. The principal effect of implementing the fission options is at most a moderate addition of plutonium to that existing in commercial spent fuel. The amount of plutonium in commercial spent fuel by the year 2000 is estimated to be 300 Mg. The addition of 50 Mg of excess weapon plutonium, in this context, is not a determining factor, moreover, several of the fission options achieve substantial annihilation of plutonium

  11. Disposition of excess weapon grade plutonium: Status of the Russian program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Diyakov, Anatoly [Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies, Moscow (Russian Federation)

    2015-07-01

    During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and United States produced huge quantities of plutonium for weapons. Substantial cuts in their nuclear arsenals released of huge amounts of weapon grade nuclear materials. This put into the agenda the problem what to do with the excess weapon materials. In 2000 Russia and the United States concluded a Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA), committing each to eliminate 34 tons of excess weapon plutonium. It was expected that the implementation of the PMDA Agreement will start in the second half of the year 2009 and the disposition programs finalized in 2025. But from the very beginning the practical implementation of the PMDA agreement met with substantial difficulties. After the consultations held in 2006-2007 the PMDA Agreement was modified. In compliance with the modified Agreement each side pledged to start the disposition of 34 tons of excess plutonium (25 tons in the form of metal and 9 tons in dioxide) in 2018 and to finalize the process in 15 years. Both sides were supposed to use the same disposition method through use in the MOX fuel and its subsequent irradiation in civil nuclear reactors: in light reactors for the USA and in fast neutron reactors for Russia. The presentation is going to provide the current status of the disposition program.

  12. Transportation requirements for the disposition of excess weapon plutonium by burning in fission reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hovingh, J.; Walter, C.E.

    1996-01-01

    Both the US and Russia are planning to dispose of about 50 Mg of excess weapon plutonium over a 25-year period. One option is to transfer the plutonium to Advanced Light Water (power) Reactors (ALWRs) for use as fuel. Subsequent disposal would then be considered commercial spent fuel. This disposition option, like others, involves the transportation of plutonium in various material forms as it proceeds through various points in the recovery operation. This paper examines both the disposition option and the issues surrounding the transportation of 50 Mg of excess plutonium within the US under current regulatory and infrastructure constraints. Transportation issues include criticality control, shielding, and containment of the contents. Allowable limits on each of these issues are specified by the applicable (or selected) regulation. The composition and form of the radioactive materials to be transported will determine, in part, the applicable portions of the regulations as well as the packaging design. The regulations and the packaging design, along with safeguard and security issues, will determine the quantity of plutonium or fuel assemblies per package as well as the number of packages per shipment and the type of highway carrier. For the disposition of 50 Mg of weapon plutonium using ALWRs in a 25-year campaign, the annual shipment rates are determined for the various types of carriers

  13. Los Alamos Plutonium Facility Waste Management System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, K.; Montoya, A.; Wieneke, R.; Wulff, D.; Smith, C.; Gruetzmacher, K.

    1997-01-01

    This paper describes the new computer-based transuranic (TRU) Waste Management System (WMS) being implemented at the Plutonium Facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The Waste Management System is a distributed computer processing system stored in a Sybase database and accessed by a graphical user interface (GUI) written in Omnis7. It resides on the local area network at the Plutonium Facility and is accessible by authorized TRU waste originators, count room personnel, radiation protection technicians (RPTs), quality assurance personnel, and waste management personnel for data input and verification. Future goals include bringing outside groups like the LANL Waste Management Facility on-line to participate in this streamlined system. The WMS is changing the TRU paper trail into a computer trail, saving time and eliminating errors and inconsistencies in the process

  14. A preliminary analysis of the reactor-based plutonium disposition alternative deployment schedules

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zurn, R.M.

    1997-09-01

    This paper discusses the preliminary analysis of the implementation schedules of the reactor-based plutonium disposition alternatives. These schedule analyses are a part of a larger process to examine the nine decision criteria used to determine the most appropriate method of disposing of U.S. surplus weapons plutonium. The preliminary analysis indicates that the mission durations for the reactor-based alternatives range from eleven years to eighteen years and the initial mission fuel assemblies containing surplus weapons-usable plutonium could be loaded into the reactors between nine and fourteen years after the Record of Decision

  15. DOE plutonium disposition study: Pu consumption in ALWRs. Volume 2, Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1993-05-15

    The Department of Energy (DOE) has contracted with Asea Brown Boveri-Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE) to provide information on the capability of ABB-CE`s System 80 + Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) to transform, through reactor burnup, 100 metric tonnes (MT) of weapons grade plutonium (Pu) into a form which is not readily useable in weapons. This information is being developed as part of DOE`s Plutonium Disposition Study, initiated by DOE in response to Congressional action. This document Volume 2, provides a discussion of: Plutonium Fuel Cycle; Technology Needs; Regulatory Considerations; Cost and Schedule Estimates; and Deployment Strategy.

  16. Guide to good practices at plutonium facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Faust, L.G.; Brackenbush, L.W.; Carter, L.A.; Endres, G.W.R.; Glenn, R.D.; Jech, J.J.; Selby, J.M.; Smith, R.C.; Waite, D.A.; Walsh, W.P.

    1977-09-01

    This manual establishes guidelines and principles for use in setting up a sound radiation protection program for work with plutonium. The guidance presented is based on the experiences of Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) contractors and those portions of private industry concerned with the operation of plutonium facilities, specifically with the fabrication of mixed oxide reactor fuel. The manual is directed primarily to those facilities which have as their sole purpose the handling of large quantities of plutonium for military or industrial uses. It is not intended for use by facilities engaged in reactor or chemical separation operations nor for partial or occasional use by analytical laboratories; while these facilities would find the manual beneficial, it would be incomplete for their needs. The manual addresses good practices that should be observed by management, staff and designers, since the benefits of a good radiation protection program are the result of their joint efforts. Methods for the diagnostic evaluation of internally deposited Pu are included

  17. Hanford MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    O'Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R.

    1998-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program's preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. Six initial site combinations were proposed: (1) Argonne National Laboratory-West (ANL-W) with support from Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), (2) Hanford, (3) Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) with support from Pantex, (4) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), (5) Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR), and (6) Savannah River Site (SRS). After further analysis by the sites and DOE-MD, five site combinations were established as possible candidates for producing MOX LAs: (1) ANL-W with support from INEEL, (2) Hanford, (3) LANL, (4) LLNL, and (5) SRS. Hanford has proposed an LA MOX fuel fabrication approach that would be done entirely inside an S and S Category 1 area. An alternate approach would allow fabrication of fuel pellets and assembly of fuel rods in an S and S Category 1 facility. In all, a total of three LA MOX fuel fabrication options were identified by Hanford that could accommodate the program. In every case, only minor modification would be required to ready any of the facilities to accept the equipment necessary to accomplish the LA program

  18. Hanford MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    O`Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R. [and others

    1998-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program`s preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. Six initial site combinations were proposed: (1) Argonne National Laboratory-West (ANL-W) with support from Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), (2) Hanford, (3) Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) with support from Pantex, (4) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), (5) Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR), and (6) Savannah River Site (SRS). After further analysis by the sites and DOE-MD, five site combinations were established as possible candidates for producing MOX LAs: (1) ANL-W with support from INEEL, (2) Hanford, (3) LANL, (4) LLNL, and (5) SRS. Hanford has proposed an LA MOX fuel fabrication approach that would be done entirely inside an S and S Category 1 area. An alternate approach would allow fabrication of fuel pellets and assembly of fuel rods in an S and S Category 1 facility. In all, a total of three LA MOX fuel fabrication options were identified by Hanford that could accommodate the program. In every case, only minor modification would be required to ready any of the facilities to accept the equipment necessary to accomplish the LA program.

  19. The disposition of civil plutonium in the UK

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sadnicki, M.J.; Barker, F.

    2001-01-01

    This paper quantifies the likely future stockpile of UK separated plutonium, and reviews current UK policy. The current strategy of storing plutonium oxide powder is shown to be inconsistent with passivity and disposability objectives. Analysis also shows that there is little potential for use on a commercial basis of Mixed-Oxide (MOX) fuel to reduce the stockpile. Four plutonium immobilisation options are defined, with particular reference to non-proliferation goals. The resource costs of implementing these options are quantified, together with the resource costs of a programme of Government-subsidized MOX use. Immobilisation may offer a more cost-effective solution than a MOX fuel route. (author)

  20. U.S. weapons-usable plutonium disposition policy: Implementation of the MOX fuel option

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Woods, A.L. [ed.] [Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium, TX (United States); Gonzalez, V.L. [Texas A and M Univ., College Station, TX (United States). Dept. of Political Science

    1998-10-01

    A comprehensive case study was conducted on the policy problem of disposing of US weapons-grade plutonium, which has been declared surplus to strategic defense needs. Specifically, implementation of the mixed-oxide fuel disposition option was examined in the context of national and international nonproliferation policy, and in contrast to US plutonium policy. The study reveals numerous difficulties in achieving effective implementation of the mixed-oxide fuel option including unresolved licensing and regulatory issues, technological uncertainties, public opposition, potentially conflicting federal policies, and the need for international assurances of reciprocal plutonium disposition activities. It is believed that these difficulties can be resolved in time so that the implementation of the mixed-oxide fuel option can eventually be effective in accomplishing its policy objective.

  1. U.S. weapons-useable plutonium disposition policy: Implementation of the MOX fuel option

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Woods, A.L.; Gonzalez, V.L.

    1998-10-01

    A comprehensive case study was conducted on the policy problem of disposing of US weapons-grade plutonium, which has been declared surplus to strategic defense needs. Specifically, implementation of the mixed-oxide fuel disposition option was examined in the context of national and international nonproliferation policy, and in contrast to US plutonium policy. The study reveals numerous difficulties in achieving effective implementation of the mixed-oxide fuel option including unresolved licensing and regulatory issues, technological uncertainties, public opposition, potentially conflicting federal policies, and the need for international assurances of reciprocal plutonium disposition activities. It is believed that these difficulties can be resolved in time so that the implementation of the mixed-oxide fuel option can eventually be effective in accomplishing its policy objective

  2. Disposition of excess weapons plutonium from dismantled weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jardine, L.J.

    1997-01-01

    With the end of the Cold War and the implementation of various nuclear arms reduction agreements, US and Russia have been actively dismantling tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. As a result,large quantities of fissile materials, including more than 100 (tonnes?) of weapons-grade Pu, have become excess to both countries' military needs. To meet nonproliferation goals and to ensure the irreversibility of nuclear arms reductions, this excess weapons Pu must be placed in secure storage and then, in timely manner, either used in nuclear reactors as fuel or discarded in geologic repositories as solid waste. This disposition in US and Russia must be accomplished in a safe, secure manner and as quickly as practical. Storage of this Pu is a prerequisite to any disposition process, but the length of storage time is unknown. Whether by use as fuel or discard as solid waste, disposition of that amount of Pu will require decades--and perhaps longer, if disposition operations encounter delays. Neither US nor Russia believes that long-term secure storage is a substitute for timely disposition of excess Pu, but long-term, safe, secure storage is a critical element of all excess Pu disposition activities

  3. Facility model for the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coulter, C.A.; Thomas, K.E.; Sohn, C.L.; Yarbro, T.F.; Hench, K.W.

    1986-01-01

    The Los Alamos Plutonium Facility contains more than sixty unit processes and handles a large variety of nuclear materials, including many forms of plutonium-bearing scrap. The management of the Plutonium Facility is supporting the development of a computer model of the facility as a means of effectively integrating the large amount of information required for material control, process planning, and facility development. The model is designed to provide a flexible, easily maintainable facility description that allows the faciltiy to be represented at any desired level of detail within a single modeling framework, and to do this using a model program and data files that can be read and understood by a technically qualified person without modeling experience. These characteristics were achieved by structuring the model so that all facility data is contained in data files, formulating the model in a simulation language that provides a flexible set of data structures and permits a near-English-language syntax, and using a description for unit processes that can represent either a true unit process or a major subsection of the facility. Use of the model is illustrated by applying it to two configurations of a fictitious nuclear material processing line

  4. Options For The Disposition Of UK Civil Plutonium Stocks

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Moore, R.G.; Zimmerman, C.H.; Scales, C.; Worrall, A.; Sims, H.E.; Fowler, L. [Nexia Solutions Ltd (United Kingdom)

    2008-07-01

    The UK Civil Pu Disposition project will identify and assess the viability of several technical options for dealing with the UK's civil separated Pu stockpile and the discriminators that will support technology option down-selection decisions. The overall aim will be to deliver feasible technical options and comprehensive information on political, economic, sociological, environmental and technical factors for each strategic option. This paper briefly describes the work completed to date to assess immobilisation and re-use technologies as disposition strategies and on the work that will identify discriminators to support technology down-selection. The Pu disposition project is anticipated to continue for several years while the necessary investigations are made to fully understand the various options. The work planned over this period is discussed. (authors)

  5. Options For The Disposition Of UK Civil Plutonium Stocks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moore, R.G.; Zimmerman, C.H.; Scales, C.; Worrall, A.; Sims, H.E.; Fowler, L.

    2008-01-01

    The UK Civil Pu Disposition project will identify and assess the viability of several technical options for dealing with the UK's civil separated Pu stockpile and the discriminators that will support technology option down-selection decisions. The overall aim will be to deliver feasible technical options and comprehensive information on political, economic, sociological, environmental and technical factors for each strategic option. This paper briefly describes the work completed to date to assess immobilisation and re-use technologies as disposition strategies and on the work that will identify discriminators to support technology down-selection. The Pu disposition project is anticipated to continue for several years while the necessary investigations are made to fully understand the various options. The work planned over this period is discussed. (authors)

  6. Recent trends of plutonium facilities and their control

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Muto, T [Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp., Tokai, Ibaraki (Japan). Tokai Works

    1974-02-01

    Much interest has been focussed on Pu recycle since the oil crisis because of an expected shortage of enriched uranium. Plutonium handling techniques and plutonium fuel fabricating facilities should be developed to meet the future demand of plutonium, but the radioactive property of plutonium to be reprocessed from spent fuel and recycled plutonium is remarkably different, and it has to be handled safely. Technical criteria for plutonium facilities are specified in the USAEC regulatory guides and other rules. Some of these criteria are location condition, quality of confinement, protection against accidents and so on. The control conditions for plutonium facilities are exposure control, criticality control, measurement control and new system of safeguard. These problems are under development to meet the future requirement for the safe handling of Pu material.

  7. LLNL Site plan for a MOX fuel lead assembly mission in support of surplus plutonium disposition

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bronson, M.C.

    1997-10-01

    The principal facilities that LLNL would use to support a MOX Fuel Lead Assembly Mission are Building 332 and Building 334. Both of these buildings are within the security boundary known as the LLNL Superblock. Building 332 is the LLNL Plutonium Facility. As an operational plutonium facility, it has all the infrastructure and support services required for plutonium operations. The LLNL Plutonium Facility routinely handles kilogram quantities of plutonium and uranium. Currently, the building is limited to a plutonium inventory of 700 kilograms and a uranium inventory of 300 kilograms. Process rooms (excluding the vaults) are limited to an inventory of 20 kilograms per room. Ongoing operations include: receiving SSTS, material receipt, storage, metal machining and casting, welding, metal-to-oxide conversion, purification, molten salt operations, chlorination, oxide calcination, cold pressing and sintering, vitrification, encapsulation, chemical analysis, metallography and microprobe analysis, waste material processing, material accountability measurements, packaging, and material shipping. Building 334 is the Hardened Engineering Test Building. This building supports environmental and radiation measurements on encapsulated plutonium and uranium components. Other existing facilities that would be used to support a MOX Fuel Lead Assembly Mission include Building 335 for hardware receiving and storage and TRU and LLW waste storage and shipping facilities, and Building 331 or Building 241 for storage of depleted uranium.

  8. LLNL Site plan for a MOX fuel lead assembly mission in support of surplus plutonium disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bronson, M.C.

    1997-01-01

    The principal facilities that LLNL would use to support a MOX Fuel Lead Assembly Mission are Building 332 and Building 334. Both of these buildings are within the security boundary known as the LLNL Superblock. Building 332 is the LLNL Plutonium Facility. As an operational plutonium facility, it has all the infrastructure and support services required for plutonium operations. The LLNL Plutonium Facility routinely handles kilogram quantities of plutonium and uranium. Currently, the building is limited to a plutonium inventory of 700 kilograms and a uranium inventory of 300 kilograms. Process rooms (excluding the vaults) are limited to an inventory of 20 kilograms per room. Ongoing operations include: receiving SSTS, material receipt, storage, metal machining and casting, welding, metal-to-oxide conversion, purification, molten salt operations, chlorination, oxide calcination, cold pressing and sintering, vitrification, encapsulation, chemical analysis, metallography and microprobe analysis, waste material processing, material accountability measurements, packaging, and material shipping. Building 334 is the Hardened Engineering Test Building. This building supports environmental and radiation measurements on encapsulated plutonium and uranium components. Other existing facilities that would be used to support a MOX Fuel Lead Assembly Mission include Building 335 for hardware receiving and storage and TRU and LLW waste storage and shipping facilities, and Building 331 or Building 241 for storage of depleted uranium

  9. Plutonium stabilization and disposition focus area, FY 1999 and FY 2000 multi-year program plan

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-03-01

    Consistent with the Environmental Management`s (EM`s) plan titled, ``Accelerating Cleanup: Paths to Closure``, and ongoing efforts within the Executive Branch and Congress, this Multi-Year Program Plan (MYPP) for the Plutonium Focus Area was written to ensure that technical gap projects are effectively managed and measured. The Plutonium Focus Area (PFA) defines and manages technology development programs that contribute to the effective stabilization of nuclear materials and their subsequent safe storage and final disposition. The scope of PFA activities includes the complete spectrum of plutonium materials, special isotopes, and other fissile materials. The PFA enables solutions to site-specific and complex-wide technology issues associated with plutonium remediation, stabilization, and preparation for disposition. The report describes the current technical activities, namely: Plutonium stabilization (9 studies); Highly enriched uranium stabilization (2 studies); Russian collaboration program (2 studies); Packaging and storage technologies (6 studies); and PFA management work package/product line (3 studies). Budget information for FY 1999 and FY 2000 is provided.

  10. Plutonium stabilization and disposition focus area, FY 1999 and FY 2000 multi-year program plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-03-01

    Consistent with the Environmental Management's (EM's) plan titled, ''Accelerating Cleanup: Paths to Closure'', and ongoing efforts within the Executive Branch and Congress, this Multi-Year Program Plan (MYPP) for the Plutonium Focus Area was written to ensure that technical gap projects are effectively managed and measured. The Plutonium Focus Area (PFA) defines and manages technology development programs that contribute to the effective stabilization of nuclear materials and their subsequent safe storage and final disposition. The scope of PFA activities includes the complete spectrum of plutonium materials, special isotopes, and other fissile materials. The PFA enables solutions to site-specific and complex-wide technology issues associated with plutonium remediation, stabilization, and preparation for disposition. The report describes the current technical activities, namely: Plutonium stabilization (9 studies); Highly enriched uranium stabilization (2 studies); Russian collaboration program (2 studies); Packaging and storage technologies (6 studies); and PFA management work package/product line (3 studies). Budget information for FY 1999 and FY 2000 is provided

  11. GLASS FABRICATION AND PRODUCT CONSISTENCY TESTING OF LANTHANIDE BOROSILICATE FRIT X COMPOSITION FOR PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Marra, J

    2006-11-15

    The Department of Energy Office of Environmental Management (DOE/EM) plans to conduct the Plutonium Disposition Project at the Savannah River Site (SRS) to disposition excess weapons-usable plutonium. A plutonium glass waste form is the preferred option for immobilization of the plutonium for subsequent disposition in a geologic repository. A reference glass composition (Lanthanide Borosilicate (LaBS) Frit B) was developed during the Plutonium Immobilization Program (PIP) to immobilize plutonium in the late 1990's. A limited amount of performance testing was performed on this baseline composition before efforts to further pursue Pu disposition via a glass waste form ceased. Recent FY05 studies have further investigated the LaBS Frit B formulation as well as development of a newer LaBS formulation denoted as LaBS Frit X. The objectives of this present task were to fabricate plutonium loaded LaBS Frit X glass and perform corrosion testing to provide near-term data that will increase confidence that LaBS glass product is suitable for disposal in the Yucca Mountain Repository. Specifically, testing was conducted in an effort to provide data to Yucca Mountain Project (YMP) personnel for use in performance assessment calculations. Plutonium containing LaBS glass with the Frit X composition with a 9.5 wt% PuO{sub 2} loading was prepared for testing. Glass was prepared to support Product Consistency Testing (PCT) at Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). The glass was thoroughly characterized using x-ray diffraction (XRD) and scanning electron microscopy coupled with energy dispersive spectroscopy (SEM/EDS) prior to performance testing. A series of PCTs were conducted at SRNL using quenched Pu Frit X glass with varying exposed surface areas. Effects of isothermal and can-in-canister heat treatments on the Pu Frit X glass were also investigated. Another series of PCTs were performed on these different heat-treated Pu Frit X glasses. Leachates from all these PCTs

  12. Disposition of plutonium from dismantled warheads: Belgonucleaire's proposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haas, D.; Vanderborck, Y.; Vandenberg, C.; Vliet, J. van

    1996-01-01

    Set up in 1957 by Union Miniere, Belgonucleaire (BN) has been working since its origin in the field of plutonium and has accumulated extensive experience in the design and fabrication of mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel, as well as in the fuel management and licensing of MOX cores for fast breeder reactors (FBRs), pressurized water reactors (PWRs), and boiling water reactors (BWRs). Although BN's MOX plant first went into operation in 1973 (it was used for FBRs and light water reactor (LWR) demonstration fuel fabrication), industrial production started in 1986. The MOX fuel produced (280 t heavy metal (HM) until the end of 1995) has been loaded in PWRs and BWRs in four countries in Europe: France, Germany, Switzerland, and Belgium. They propose the development of MOX plants as the means for disposal of plutonium from warhead disassembly

  13. SRS MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    O'Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R.

    1998-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program's preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. Six initial site combinations were proposed: (1) Argonne National Laboratory-West (ANL-W) with support from Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), (2) Hanford, (3) Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) with support from Pantex, (4) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), (5) Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR), and (6) Savannah River Site(SRS). After further analysis by the sites and DOE-MD, five site combinations were established as possible candidates for producing MOX LAs: (1) ANL-W with support from INEEL, (2) Hanford, (3) LANL, (4) LLNL, and (5) SRS. SRS has proposed an LA MOX fuel fabrication approach that would be done entirely inside an S and S Category 1 area. An alternate approach would allow fabrication of fuel pellets and assembly of fuel rods in an S and S Category 2 or 3 facility with storage of bulk PuO 2 and assembly, storage, and shipping of fuel bundles in an S and S Category 1 facility. The total Category 1 approach, which is the recommended option, would be done in the 221-H Canyon Building. A facility that was never in service will be removed from one area, and a hardened wall will be constructed in another area to accommodate execution of the LA fuel fabrication. The non-Category 1 approach would require removal of process equipment in the FB-Line metal production and packaging glove boxes, which requires work in a contamination area. The Immobilization Hot Demonstration Program

  14. SRS MOX fuel lead assemblies data report for the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    O`Connor, D.G.; Fisher, S.E.; Holdaway, R. [and others

    1998-08-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program`s preparation of the draft surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement. This is one of several responses to data call requests for background information on activities associated with the operation of the lead assembly (LA) mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. DOE-MD requested that the DOE Site Operations Offices nominate DOE sites that meet established minimum requirements that could produce MOX LAs. Six initial site combinations were proposed: (1) Argonne National Laboratory-West (ANL-W) with support from Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), (2) Hanford, (3) Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) with support from Pantex, (4) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), (5) Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR), and (6) Savannah River Site(SRS). After further analysis by the sites and DOE-MD, five site combinations were established as possible candidates for producing MOX LAs: (1) ANL-W with support from INEEL, (2) Hanford, (3) LANL, (4) LLNL, and (5) SRS. SRS has proposed an LA MOX fuel fabrication approach that would be done entirely inside an S and S Category 1 area. An alternate approach would allow fabrication of fuel pellets and assembly of fuel rods in an S and S Category 2 or 3 facility with storage of bulk PuO{sub 2} and assembly, storage, and shipping of fuel bundles in an S and S Category 1 facility. The total Category 1 approach, which is the recommended option, would be done in the 221-H Canyon Building. A facility that was never in service will be removed from one area, and a hardened wall will be constructed in another area to accommodate execution of the LA fuel fabrication. The non-Category 1 approach would require removal of process equipment in the FB-Line metal production and packaging glove boxes, which requires work in a contamination area. The Immobilization Hot Demonstration Program

  15. Decommissioning and Decontamination Program: Battelle Plutonium Facility, Environmental assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-09-01

    This assessment describes the decontamination of Battelle-Columbus Plutonium Facility and removal from the site of all material contamination which was associated with or produced by the Plutonium Facility. Useable uncontaminated material will be disposed of by procedures normally employed in scrap declaration and transfer. Contaminated waste will be transported to approved radioactive waste storage sites. 5 refs., 1 fig

  16. Disposition of weapons-grade plutonium in Westinghouse reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alsaed, A.A.; Adams, M.

    1998-03-01

    The authors have studied the feasibility of using weapons-grade plutonium in the form of mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel in existing Westinghouse reactors. They have designed three transition Cycles from an all LEU core to a partial MOX core. They found that four-loop Westinghouse reactors such as the Vogtle power plant are capable of handling up to 45 percent weapons-grade MOX loading without any modifications. The authors have also designed two kinds of weapons-grade MOX assemblies with three enrichments per assembly and four total enrichments. Wet annular burnable absorber (WABA) rods were used in all the MOX feed assemblies, some burned MOX assemblies, and some LEU feed assemblies. Integral fuel burnable absorber (IFBA) was used in the rest of the LEU feed assemblies. The average discharge burnup of MOX assemblies was over 47,000 MWD/MTM, which is more than enough to meet the open-quotes spent fuel standard.close quotes One unit is capable of consuming 0.462 MT of weapons-grade plutonium per year. Preliminary analyses showed that important reactor physics parameters for the three transitions cycles are comparable to those of LEU cores including boron levels, reactivity coefficients, peaking factors, and shutdown margins. Further transient analyses will need to be performed

  17. Disposition of already separated plutonium in Russia: Consideration of short- and long-term options

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Diakov, A.S.

    1995-01-01

    The plutonium stockpile presents a serious risk to national and international security. However, the utilization of already separated plutonium involves a complex set of political, technical, economical, and environmental problems. How Russia can best deal with all the problems associated with plutonium stockpiles is the subject of this paper. The official Russian concept of plutonium utilization views it as a valuable energy source. This concept entails the following two measures: (1) storage of both surplus weapons and civil plutonium; (2) fabrication of MOX fuel for future use in a different type of reactor: light-water reactors and fast-neutron reactors. To implement this concept, building four 800-Megawatt fast-neutron reactors and completing the construction of MOX plant is proposed. Technical and economical evaluations are being conducted on plutonium utilization in VVER-1000 reactors. When operating, these reactors (four BN-800 and seven VVER-1000) could dispose of about 9 tons of plutonium per year. But given Russia's current chaotic political and economic conditions, it seems unlikely that these plans will be carried out any time soon. Furthermore, the comparative economic analysis conducted for the different types of fuel cycles shows that due to several factors there is no economic motivation for Russia to use plutonium for fuel fabrication in the near future. These observations indicate that the real question that needs to be answered is what priority needs to be placed on short-, medium-, and long-term to identify and choose between different disposition options? This question is easily answered when one considers the currently turbulent political and economic situation in Russia. The priority that makes the most sense is to concentrate efforts on short-term options

  18. Fabrication of zircon for disposition of weapons plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, K.C.; Huang, J.Y.; Serrano, P.L.

    1997-01-01

    This is the final report of a one-year, Laboratory-Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). In an effort to address the problems of long term storage and nuclear waste minimization, zircon has been proposed as a host medium for plutonium and other actinides recovered from dismantled nuclear weapons. The objective of this work is to investigate the feasibility of large scale fabrication of Pu-bearing zircon. Since PuO 2 is thermodynamically less stable than ZrO 2 , it is expected that the process parameters determined for synthesizing ZrSiO 4 (zircon) would be applicable to those for PuSiO 4 (Pu-zircon). Furthermore, since the foremost concern in plutonium processing is the potential for contamination release, this work emphasizes the development of process parameters, using zircon first, to anticipate potential material problems in the containment system for reaction mixtures during processing. Stoichiometric mixtures of ZrO 2 and SiO 2 , in hundred-gram batches, have been subjected to hot isostatic pressing (HIP) at temperatures near 1,500 C and pressures approximately 10,000 psi. The product materials have been analyzed by x-ray powder diffraction, and are found to consist of zircon after approximately two hours of reaction time. From this work, it is clear that the fabrication of large quantities of Pu-zircon is feasible. The most notable result of this work is evidence for the existence of container problems. This result, in turn, suggests potential solutions to these problems. Experiments with the quartz inner container, the glass sealant, a sacrificial metal barrier, and a metal outer container are being investigated to mitigate these potential hazards

  19. GLASS FABRICATION AND PRODUCT CONSISTENCY TESTING OF LANTHANIDE BOROSHILICATE FRIT X COMPOSITION FOR PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Marra, J

    2006-11-21

    The Department of Energy Office of Environmental Management (DOE/EM) plans to conduct the Plutonium Disposition Project at the Savannah River Site (SRS) to disposition excess weapons-usable plutonium. A plutonium glass waste form is the preferred option for immobilization of the plutonium for subsequent disposition in a geologic repository. A reference glass composition (Lanthanide Borosilicate (LaBS) Frit B) was developed during the Plutonium Immobilization Program (PIP) to immobilize plutonium in the late 1990's. A limited amount of performance testing was performed on this baseline composition before efforts to further pursue Pu disposition via a glass waste form ceased. Recent FY05 studies have further investigated the LaBS Frit B formulation as well as development of a newer LaBS formulation denoted as LaBS Frit X. The objectives of this present task were to fabricate plutonium loaded LaBS Frit X glass and perform corrosion testing to provide near-term data that will increase confidence that LaBS glass product is suitable for disposal in the Yucca Mountain Repository. Specifically, testing was conducted in an effort to provide data to Yucca Mountain Project (YMP) personnel for use in performance assessment calculations. Plutonium containing LaBS glass with the Frit X composition with a 9.5 wt% PuO{sub 2} loading was prepared for testing. Glass was prepared to support Product Consistency Testing (PCT) at Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). The glass was thoroughly characterized using x-ray diffraction (XRD) and scanning electron microscopy coupled with energy dispersive spectroscopy (SEM/EDS) prior to performance testing. A series of PCTs were conducted at SRNL using quenched Pu Frit X glass with varying exposed surface areas. Effects of isothermal and can-in-canister heat treatments on the Pu Frit X glass were also investigated. Another series of PCTs were performed on these different heat-treated Pu Frit X glasses. Leachates from all these PCTs

  20. Design of an integrated non-destructive plutonium assay facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moore, C.B.

    1984-01-01

    The Department of Energy requires improved technology for nuclear materials accounting as an essential part of new plutonium processing facilities. New facilities are being constructed at the Savannah River Plant by the Du Pont Company, Operating Contractor, to recover plutonium from scrap and waste material generated at SRP and other DOE contract processing facilities. This paper covers design concepts and planning required to incorporate state-of-the-art plutonium assay instruments developed at several national laboratories into an integrated, at-line nuclear material accounting facility operating in the production area. 3 figures

  1. Options for converting excess plutonium to feed for the MOX fuel fabrication facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Watts, Joe A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Smith, Paul H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Psaras, John D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Jarvinen, Gordon D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Costa, David A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Joyce, Jr., Edward L [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01

    The storage and safekeeping of excess plutonium in the United States represents a multibillion-dollar lifecycle cost to the taxpayers and poses challenges to National Security and Nuclear Non-Proliferation. Los Alamos National Laboratory is considering options for converting some portion of the 13 metric tons of excess plutonium that was previously destined for long-term waste disposition into feed for the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). This approach could reduce storage costs and security ri sks, and produce fuel for nuclear energy at the same time. Over the course of 30 years of weapons related plutonium production, Los Alamos has developed a number of flow sheets aimed at separation and purification of plutonium. Flow sheets for converting metal to oxide and for removing chloride and fluoride from plutonium residues have been developed and withstood the test oftime. This presentation will address some potential options for utilizing processes and infrastructure developed by Defense Programs to transform a large variety of highly impure plutonium into feedstock for the MFFF.

  2. A Mixed-Oxide Assembly Design for Rapid Disposition of Weapons Plutonium in Pressurized Water Reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alonso, Gustavo; Adams, Marvin L.

    2002-01-01

    We have created a new mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel assembly design for standard pressurized water reactors (PWRs). Design goals were to maximize the plutonium throughput while introducing the lowest perturbation possible to the control and safety systems of the reactor. Our assembly design, which we call MIX-33, offers some advantages for the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium; it increases the disposition rate by 8% while increasing the worth of control material, compared to a previous Westinghouse design. The MIX-33 design is based upon two ideas: the use of both uranium and plutonium fuel pins in the same assembly, and the addition of water holes in the assembly. The main result of this paper is that both of these ideas are effective at increasing Pu throughput and increasing the worth of control material. With this new design, according to our analyses, we can transition smoothly from a full low-enriched-uranium (LEU) core to a full MIX-33 core while meeting the operational and safety requirements of a standard PWR. Given an interruption of the MOX supply, we can transition smoothly back to full LEU while meeting safety margins and using standard LEU assemblies with uniform pinwise enrichment distribution. If the MOX supply is interrupted for only one cycle, the transition back to a full MIX-33 core is not as smooth; high peaking could cause power to be derated by a few percent for a few weeks at the beginning of one transition cycle

  3. Los Alamos DP West Plutonium Facility decontamination project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garde, R.; Cox, E.J.; Valentine, A.M.

    1982-01-01

    The DP West Plutonium Facility operated by the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, was decontaminated between April 1978 and April 1981. The facility was constructed in 1944 to 1945 to produce plutonium metal and fabricate parts for nuclear weapons. It was continually used as a plutonium processing and research facility until mid-1978. Decontamination operations included dismantling and removing gloveboxes and conveyor tunnels; removing process systems, utilities, and exhaust ducts; and decontaminating all remaining surfaces. This report describes glovebox and conveyor tunnel separations, decontamination techniques, health and safety considerations, waste management procedures, and costs of the operation

  4. Demolition of Building 12, an old plutonium filter facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Christensen, E.L.; Garde, R.; Valentine, A.M.

    1975-01-01

    This report discusses the decommissioning and disposal of a plutonium-contaminated air filter facility that provided ventilation for the main plutonium processing plant at Los Alamos from 1945 until 1973. The health physics, waste management, and environmental aspects of the demolition are also discussed

  5. Progress on plutonium stabilization

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hurt, D. [Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Washington, DC (United States)

    1996-05-01

    The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has safety oversight responsibility for most of the facilities where unstable forms of plutonium are being processed and packaged for interim storage. The Board has issued recommendations on plutonium stabilization and has has a considerable influence on DOE`s stabilization schedules and priorities. The Board has not made any recommendations on long-term plutonium disposition, although it may get more involved in the future if DOE develops plans to use defense nuclear facilities for disposition activities.

  6. OFFGAS GENERATION FROM THE DISPOSITION OF SCRAP PLUTONIUM BY VITRIFICATION SIMULANT TESTS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zamecnik, J; Patricia Toole, P; David Best, D; Timothy Jones, T; Donald02 Miller, D; Whitney Thomas, W; Vickie Williams, V

    2008-01-01

    The Department of Energy Office of Environmental Management is supporting R and D for the conceptual design of the Plutonium Disposition Project at the Savannah River Site in Aiken, SC to reduce the attractiveness of plutonium scrap by fabricating a durable plutonium oxide glass form and immobilizing this form within the high-level waste glass prepared in the Defense Waste Processing Facility. A glass formulation was developed that is capable of incorporating large amounts of actinides as well as accommodating many impurities that may be associated with impure Pu feed streams. The basis for the glass formulation was derived from commercial glasses that had high lanthanide loadings. A development effort led to a Lanthanide BoroSilicate (LaBS) glass that accommodated significant quantities of actinides, tolerated impurities associated with the actinide feed streams and could be processed using established melter technologies. A Cylindrical Induction Melter (CIM) was used for vitrification of the Pu LaBS glass. Induction melting for the immobilization of americium and curium (Am/Cm) in a glass matrix was first demonstrated in 1997. The induction melting system was developed to vitrify a non-radioactive Am/Cm simulant combined with a glass frit. Most of the development of the melter itself was completed as part of that work. This same melter system used for Am/Cm was used for the current work. The CIM system used consisted of a 5 inch (12.7 cm) diameter inductively heated platinum-rhodium (Pt-Rh) containment vessel with a control system and offgas characterization. Scrap plutonium can contain numerous impurities including significant amounts of chlorides, fluorides, sodium, potassium, lead, gallium, chromium, and nickel. Smaller amounts of additional elements can also be present. The amount of chlorides present is unusually high for a melter feed. In commercial applications there is no reason to have chloride at such high concentrations. Because the melter operates at

  7. MOX fuel: a contribution to disarmament. U.S. utilities' response to DOE's plutonium disposition decision

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wallace, M.

    1997-01-01

    The author is chairman of the Nuclear Energy Institute Plutonium Disposition Working Group, which includes 11 nuclear utilities, including Ontario Hydro, and all the European fabricators of mixed oxide (MOX) fuel. A feasibility study is going on, to see if Russian or other weapons grade plutonium made into MOX fuel can be used in US, Canadian, or other power reactors. The US nuclear power industry is going through a period of change, and its primary responsibility must be the safe, reliable and economic operation of its plants. There is no current US MOX capacity, but the Europeans have have manufactured and burned over 400 tons of MOX fuel since 1963. Canada may be involved, initially through a pilot-scale experiment in NRU reactor

  8. Physics studies of weapons plutonium disposition in the IFR closed fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hill, R.N.; Wade, D.C.; Liaw, J.R.; Fujita, E.K.

    1994-01-01

    The core performance impact of weapons plutonium introduction into the IFR closed fuel cycle is investigated by comparing three disposition scenarios: a power production mode, a moderate destruction mode, and a maximum destruction mode all at a constant heat rating of 840 MWt. For each scenario, two fuel cycle models are evaluated: cores using weapons material as the sole source of transuranics in a once-through mode, and recycle corns using weapons material only as required for a make-up feed. Calculated results include mass flows, detailed isotopic distributions, neutronic performance characteristics, and reactivity feedback coefficients. In general, it is shown that weapons plutonium feed does not have an adverse impact on IFR core performance characteristics

  9. Physics studies of weapons plutonium disposition in the Integral Fast Reactor closed fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hill, R.N.; Wade, D.C.; Liaw, J.R.; Fujita, E.K.

    1995-01-01

    The core performance impact of weapons plutonium introduction into the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) closed fuel cycle is investigated by comparing three disposition scenarios: a power production mode, a moderate destruction mode, and a maximum destruction mode, all at a constant heat rating of 840 MW(thermal). For each scenario, two fuel cycle models are evaluated: cores using weapons material as the sole source of transuranics in a once-through mode and recycle cores using weapons material only as required for a makeup feed. In addition, the impact of alternative feeds (recycled light water reactor or liquid-metal reactor transuranics) on burner core performance is assessed. Calculated results include mass flows, detailed isotopic distributions, neutronic performance characteristics, and reactivity feedback coefficients. In general, it is shown that weapons plutonium does not have an adverse effect on IFR core performance characteristics; also, favorable performance can be maintained for a wide variety of feed materials and fuel cycle strategies

  10. 75 FR 41850 - Amended Notice of Intent to Modify the Scope of the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-19

    ... and packaging capabilities, including direct metal oxidation, to fulfill plutonium storage..., disassemble nuclear weapons pits (a weapons component) and convert the plutonium metal to an oxide form for fabrication into mixed uranium-plutonium oxide (MOX) reactor fuel in the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility...

  11. Plutonium-bearing materials feed report for the DOE Fissile Materials Disposition Program alternatives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brough, W.G.; Boerigter, S.T.

    1995-01-01

    This report has identified all plutonium currently excess to DOE Defense Programs under current planning assumptions. A number of material categories win clearly fan within the scope of the MD (Materials Disposition) program, but the fate of the other categories are unknown at the present time. MD planning requires that estimates be made of those materials likely to be considered for disposition actions so that bounding cases for the PEIS (Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement) can be determined and so that processing which may be required can be identified in considering the various alternatives. A systematic analysis of the various alternatives in reachmg the preferred alternative requires an understanding of the possible range of values which may be taken by the various categories of feed materials. One table identifies the current total inventories excess to Defense Program planning needs and represents the bounding total of Pu which may become part of the MD disposition effort for all materials, except site return weapons. The other categories, principally irradiated fuel, rich scrap, and lean scrap, are discussed. Another table summarizes the ranges and expected quantities of Pu which could become the responsibility of the MD program. These values are to be used for assessing the impact of the various alternatives and for scaling operations to assess PEIS impact. Determination of the actual materials to be included in the disposition program will be done later

  12. Metering management at the plutonium research and development facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hirata, Masaru; Miyamoto, Fujio; Kurosawa, Makoto; Abe, Jiro; Sakai, Haruyuki; Suzuki, Tsuneo.

    1996-01-01

    Nuclear fuel research laboratory of the Oarai Research Laboratory of the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute is an R and D facility to treat with plutonium and processes various and versatile type samples in chemical and physical form for use of various experimental researches even though on much small amount. Furthermore, wasted and plutonium samples are often transported to other KMP and MBA such as radioactive waste management facility, nuclear reactor facility and so forth. As this facility is a place to treat plutonium important on the safeguards, it is a facility necessary for detection and allowance actions and for detail managements on the metering management data to report to government and IAEA in each small amount sample and different configuration. In this paper, metering management of internationally regulated matters and metering management system using a work station newly produced in such small scale facility were introduced. (G.K.)

  13. Nonproliferation and arms control assessment of weapons-usable fissile material storage and excess plutonium disposition alternatives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    This report has been prepared by the Department of Energy's Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (DOE-NN) with support from the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD). Its purpose is to analyze the nonproliferation and arms reduction implications of the alternatives for storage of plutonium and HEU, and disposition of excess plutonium, to aid policymakers and the public in making final decisions. While this assessment describes the benefits and risks associated with each option, it does not attempt to rank order the options or choose which ones are best. It does, however, identify steps which could maximize the benefits and mitigate any vulnerabilities of the various alternatives under consideration

  14. Initial data report in response to the surplus plutonium disposition environmental impact statement data call for the UO2 supply. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    White, V.S.; Cash, J.M.; Michelhaugh, R.D.

    1997-11-01

    The purpose of this document is to support the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program's preparation of the draft Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement. This is one of several responses to data calls generated to provide background information on activities associated with the operation of the Mixed-Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility. Urania feed for the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility may be either natural or depleted. Natural uranium typically contains 0.0057 wt% 234 U, 0.711 wt% 235 U, and the majority as 238 U. The fissile isotope is 235 U, and uranium is considered depleted if the total 235 U content is less than 0.711 wt% as found in nature. The average composition of 235 U in DOE's total depleted urania inventory is 0.20 wt%. The depleted uranium assay range proposed for use in this program is 0.2500--0.2509 wt%. Approximately 30% more natural uranium would be required than depleted uranium based on the importance of maintaining a specific fissile portion in the MOX fuel blend. If the uranium component constitutes a larger quantity of fissile material, less plutonium can be dispositioned on an annual basis. The percentage composition, referred to as assay, of low-enriched uranium necessary for controlled fission in commercial light-water nuclear power reactors is 1.8--5.0 wt% 235 U. This data report provides information on the schedule, acquisition, impacts, and conversion process for using uranium, derived from depleted uranium hexafluoride (UF 6 ), as the diluent for the weapons-grade plutonium declared as surplus. The case analyzed is use of depleted UF 6 in storage at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Piketon, Ohio, being transported to a representative UF 6 to uranium dioxide conversion facility (GE Nuclear Energy) for processing, and subsequently transported to the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility

  15. A comparative assessment of the economics of plutonium disposition including comparison with other nuclear fuel cycles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Williams, K.A.; Miller, J.W.; Reid, R.L.

    1997-01-01

    DOE has been evaluating three technologies for the disposition of approximately 50 metric tons of surplus plutonium from defense-related programs: reactors, immobilization, and deep boreholes. As part of the process supporting an early CY 1997 Record of Decision (ROD), a comprehensive assessment of technical viability, cost, and schedule has been conducted. Oak Ridge National Laboratory has managed and coordinated the life-cycle cost (LCC) assessment effort for this program. This paper discusses the economic analysis methodology and the results prior to ROD. Other objectives of the paper are to discuss major technical and economic issues that impact plutonium disposition cost and schedule. Also to compare the economics of a once-through weapons-derived MOX nuclear fuel cycle to other fuel cycles, such as those utilizing spent fuel reprocessing. To evaluate the economics of these technologies on an equitable basis, a set of cost estimating guidelines and a common cost-estimating format were utilized by all three technology teams. This paper also includes the major economic analysis assumptions and the comparative constant-dollar and discounted-dollar LCCs

  16. A Methodology for the Analysis and Selection of Alternative for the Disposition of Surplus Plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) - Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (OFMD) has announced a Record of Decision (ROD) selecting alternatives for disposition of surplus plutonium. A major objective of this decision was to further U.S. efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Other concerns that were addressed include economic, technical, institutional, schedule, environmental, and health and safety issues. The technical, environmental, and nonproliferation analyses supporting the ROD are documented in three DOE reports (DOE-TSR 96, DOE-PEIS 96, and DOE-NN 97, respectively). At the request of OFMD, a team of analysts from the Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium (ANRCP) provided an independent evaluation of the alternatives for plutonium that were considered during the evaluation effort. This report outlines the methodology used by the ANRCP team. This methodology, referred to as multiattribute utility theory (MAU), provides a structure for assembling results of detailed technical, economic, schedule, environment, and nonproliferation analyses for OFMD, DOE policy makers, other stakeholders, and the general public in a systematic way. The MAU methodology has been supported for use in similar situations by the National Research Council, an agency of the National Academy of Sciences.1 It is important to emphasize that the MAU process does not lead to a computerized model that actually determines the decision for a complex problem. MAU is a management tool that is one component, albeit a key component, of a decision process. We subscribe to the philosophy that the result of using models should be insights, not numbers. The MAU approach consists of four steps: (1) identification of alternatives, objectives, and performance measures, (2) estimation of the performance of the alternatives with respect to the objectives, (3) development of value functions and weights for the objectives, and (4) evaluation of the alternatives and sensitivity

  17. Development and implementation of attractiveness Level E criteria and the plutonium disposition methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Christensen, D.C.; Robinson, M.A.

    1998-03-01

    Historically, the Department of Energy used the Economic Discard Limits (EDLs), those Special Nuclear Material (SNM) concentrations in residue matrices below which production of new SNM was more economic than SNM recovery, as a basis for discard decisions. In 1994, a joint team from DOE Defense Programs (DP) and Environmental Management (EM) determined that the EDLs were no longer a valid discriminator and directed that SNM disposition consider instead 12 specific criteria, foremost of which are waste minimization, environmental impacts, safety, proliferation concerns, and cost. In response, the Los Alamos National Laboratory developed a technical basis for determining SNM bearing materials unattractive for proliferation purposes and a quantitative method for predicting materials disposition consequences as a basis for decision making called the plutonium disposition methodology. The objective of attractiveness Level E criteria is to insure that waste is unattractive for proliferation or terrorist purposes. Level E criteria is about 0.17 kg Pu per 208 liter drum (requiring diversion of a minimum of 54 drums, assuming 100% recovery efficiency)

  18. Seismic evaluation of the LLNL plutonium facility (Building 332)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hall, W.J.; Sozen, M.A.

    1982-03-01

    The expected performance of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Plutonium Facility (Building 332) subjected to earthquake ground motion has been evaluated. Anticipated behavior of the building, glove boxes, ventilation system and other systems critical for containment of plutonium is described for three severe postulated earthquake excitations. Based upon this evaluation, some damage to the building, glove boxes and ventilation system would be expected but no collapse of any structure is anticipated as a result of the postulated earthquake ground motions

  19. 233-S Plutonium Concentration Facility data quality objectives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Encke, D.B.

    1996-08-01

    This document is a summary of the decision-making associated with the Data Quality Objective process that pertains to the characterization activities in the 233-S Plutonium Concentration Facility at the Hanford Site in Richland, Washington. The 233-S Plutonium Concentration Facility is located adjacent to, and north of, the REDOX Plant. The facility was used to concentrate the plutonium nitrate product solution from the REDOX facility. The 233-S Pipe Gallery, Control Room, SWP Change Room, Toilet, Equipment Room and the Electrical Cubicle are currently scheduled for decontamination and cleanout to support future demolition (D and D). Identification of the radiological contamination and presence of hazardous materials is needed to allow for disposal of the D and D debris

  20. A Roadmap and Discussion of Issues for Physics Analyses Required to Support Plutonium Disposition in VVER-1000 Reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Primm, R.T.; Drischler, J.D.; Pavlovichev, A.M.; Styrine, Y.A.

    2000-01-01

    The purpose of this report is to document the physics analyses that must be performed to successfully disposition weapons-usable plutonium in VVER-1000 reactors in the Russian Federation. The report is a document to support programmatic and financial planning. It does not include documentation of the technical procedures by which physics analyses are performed, nor are the results of any analyses included

  1. A Roadmap and Discussion of Issues for Physics Analyses Required to Support Plutonium Disposition in VVER-1000 Reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Primm, R.T.; Drischler, J.D.; Pavlovichev, A.M. Styrine, Y.A.

    2000-06-01

    The purpose of this report is to document the physics analyses that must be performed to successfully disposition weapons-usable plutonium in VVER-1000 reactors in the Russian Federation. The report is a document to support programmatic and financial planning. It does not include documentation of the technical procedures by which physics analyses are performed, nor are the results of any analyses included.

  2. Towards a single host phase ceramic formulation for UK plutonium disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stennett, M. C.; Hyatt, N. C.; Gilbert, M.; Livens, F. R.; Maddrell, E. R.

    2008-01-01

    The UK has a considerable stockpile of separated plutonium; a legacy of over 50 years of civilian nuclear programmes. This material has been considered both as an asset for future energy generation and a liability due to the proliferation threat. A proportion of the PuO 2 stocks may be consumed by nuclear fission, in mixed oxide (MOx) or inert matrix (IMF) fuels but a quantity of waste PuO 2 will remain which is unsuitable for fuel manufacture and will require immobilisation. A research program is currently underway to investigate the potential of various single phase ceramic formulations for the immobilisation of this waste PuO 2 fraction. In this work a number of synthetic mineral systems have been considered including titanate, zirconate, phosphate and silicate based matrices. Although a wealth of information on plutonium disposition in some of the systems exists in the literature, the data is not always directly comparable which hinders comparison between different ceramic hosts. The crux of this research has been to compile a database of information on the proposed hosts to allow impartial comparison of the relative merits and shortcomings in each system. (authors)

  3. Evaluation of alternatives for the disposition of surplus weapons-usable plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dyer, J.S.; Butler, J.C.; Edmunds, T.

    1997-01-01

    The Department of Energy Record of Decision (ROD) selected alternatives for disposition of surplus, weapons grade plutonium. A major objective of this decision was to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Other concerns addressed included economic, technical, institutional, schedule, environmental, and health and safety issues. The analysis reported here was conducted in parallel with technical, environmental, and nonproliferation analyses; it uses multiattribute utility theory to combine these considerations in order to facilitate an integrated evaluation of alternatives. This analysis is intended to provide additional insight regarding alternative evaluation and to assist in understanding the rationale for the choice of alternatives recommended in the ROD. Value functions were developed for objectives of disposition, and used to rank alternatives. Sensitivity analyses indicated that the ranking of alternatives for the base case was relatively insensitive to changes in assumptions over reasonable ranges. The analyses support the recommendation of the ROD to pursue parallel development of the vitrification immobilization alternative and the use of existing light water reactors alternative. 27 refs., 109 figs., 20 tabs

  4. Weapons-grade plutonium dispositioning. Volume 3: A new reactor concept without uranium or thorium for burning weapons-grade plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ryskamp, J.M.; Schnitzler, B.G.; Fletcher, C.D.

    1993-06-01

    The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) requested that the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) examine concepts that focus only on the destruction of 50,000 kg of weapons-grade plutonium. A concept has been developed by the INEL for a low-temperature, low-pressure, low-power density, low-coolant-flow-rate light water reactor that destroys plutonium quickly without using uranium or thorium. This concept is very safe and could be designed, constructed, and operated in a reasonable time frame. This concept does not produce electricity. Not considering other missions frees the design from the paradigms and constraints used by proponents of other dispositioning concepts. The plutonium destruction design goal is most easily achievable with a large, moderate power reactor that operates at a significantly lower thermal power density than is appropriate for reactors with multiple design goals. This volume presents the assumptions and requirements, a reactor concept overview, and a list of recommendations. The appendices contain detailed discussions on plutonium dispositioning, self-protection, fuel types, neutronics, thermal hydraulics, off-site radiation releases, and economics

  5. The U.S.-Russian joint studies on using power reactors to disposition surplus weapons plutonium as spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chebeskov, A.; Kalashnikov, A.; Pavlovichev, A.

    1997-09-01

    In 1996, the US and the Russian Federation completed an initial joint study of the candidate options for the disposition of surplus weapons plutonium in both countries. The options included long term storage, immobilization of the plutonium in glass or ceramic for geologic disposal, and the conversion of weapons plutonium to spent fuel in power reactors. For the latter option, the US is only considering the use of existing light water reactors (LWRs) with no new reactor construction for plutonium disposition, or the use of Canadian deuterium uranium (CANDU) heavy water reactors. While Russia advocates building new reactors, the cost is high, and the continuing joint study of the Russian options is considering only the use of existing VVER-1000 LWRs in Russia and possibly Ukraine, the existing BN-60O fast neutron reactor at the Beloyarsk Nuclear Power Plant in Russia, or the use of the Canadian CANDU reactors. Six of the seven existing VVER-1000 reactors in Russia and the eleven VVER-1000 reactors in Ukraine are all of recent vintage and can be converted to use partial MOX cores. These existing VVER-1000 reactors are capable of converting almost 300 kg of surplus weapons plutonium to spent fuel each year with minimum nuclear power plant modifications. Higher core loads may be achievable in future years

  6. Innovative inert matrix-thoria fuels for in-reactor plutonium disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vettraino, F.; Padovani, E.; Luzzi, L.; Lombardi, C.; Thoresen, H.; Oberlander, B.; Iversen, G.; Espeland, M.

    1999-01-01

    The present leading option for plutonium disposition, either civilian or weapons Pu, is to burn it in LWRs after having converted it to MOX fuel. However, among the possible types of fuel which can be envisaged to burn plutonium in LWRs, innovative U-free fuels such as inert matrix and thoria fuel are novel concept in view of a more effective and ultimate solution from both security and safety standpoint. Inert matrix fuel is an non-fertile oxide fuel consisting of PuO 2 , either weapon-grade or reactor-grade, diluted in inert oxides such as for ex. stabilized ZrO 2 or MgAl 2 O 4 , its primary advantage consisting in no-production of new plutonium during irradiation, because it does not contain uranium (U-free fuel) whose U-238 isotope is the departure nuclide for breeding Pu-239. Some thoria addition in the matrix (thoria-doped fuel) may be required for coping with reactivity feedback needs. The full thoria-plutonia fuel though still a U-free variant cannot be defined non-fertile any more because the U-233 generation. The advantage of such a fuel option consisting basically on a remarkable already existing technological background and a potential acceleration in getting rid of the Pu stocks. All U-free fuels are envisaged to be operated under a once-through cycle scheme being the spent fuel outlooked to be sent directly to the final disposal in deep geological formations without requiring any further reprocessing treatment, thanks to the quality-poor residual Pu and a very high chemical stability under the current fuel reprocessing techniques. Besides, inert matrix-thoria fuel technology is suitable for in-reactor MAs transmutation. An additional interest in Th containing fuel refers to applicability in ADS, the innovative accelerated driven subcritical systems, specifically aimed at plutonium, minor actnides and long lived fission products transmutation in a Th-fuel cycle scheme which enables to avoid generations of new TRUs. A first common irradiation experiment

  7. Preliminary siting characterization Salt Disposition Facility - Site B

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wyatt, D.

    2000-01-01

    A siting and reconnaissance geotechnical program has been completed in S-Area at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. This program investigated the subsurface conditions for the area known as ''Salt Disposition Facility (SDF), Site B'' located northeast of H-Area and within the S-Area. Data acquired from the Site B investigation includes both field exploration and laboratory test data

  8. Passive neutron survey of the 233-S Plutonium Concentration Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-08-01

    A passive neutron survey was performed at the 233-S Plutonium Concentration Facility (located at the Hanford Site in Richland, Washington) during late 1994 and early 1995. Four areas were surveyed: an abandoned filter box and pipe trench, column laydown trench, load-out hood, and process hood. The primary purpose of the survey was to identify locations that had plutonium to help direct decontamination and decommissioning activities. A secondary purpose of the survey was to determine the quantity of material when its presence was identified

  9. A probabilistic risk assessment of the LLNL Plutonium facility's evaluation basis fire operational accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brumburgh, G.

    1994-01-01

    The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Plutonium Facility conducts numerous involving plutonium to include device fabrication, development of fabrication techniques, metallurgy research, and laser isotope separation. A Safety Analysis Report (SAR) for the building 332 Plutonium Facility was completed rational safety and acceptable risk to employees, the public, government property, and the environment. This paper outlines the PRA analysis of the Evaluation Basis Fire (EDF) operational accident. The EBF postulates the worst-case programmatic impact event for the Plutonium Facility

  10. Nonproliferation and arms control assessment of weapons-usable fissile material storage and excess plutonium disposition alternatives

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-01-01

    This report has been prepared by the Department of Energy`s Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (DOE-NN) with support from the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD). Its purpose is to analyze the nonproliferation and arms reduction implications of the alternatives for storage of plutonium and HEU, and disposition of excess plutonium, to aid policymakers and the public in making final decisions. While this assessment describes the benefits and risks associated with each option, it does not attempt to rank order the options or choose which ones are best. It does, however, identify steps which could maximize the benefits and mitigate any vulnerabilities of the various alternatives under consideration.

  11. Dismantlement and decontamination of a plutonium-238 facility at SRS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, R.H. Jr.; Hootman, H.E.

    1994-01-01

    There has been very little, documented decontamination and decommissioning (D ampersand D) experience on which to project cleanup costs and schedules for plutonium facilities at SRS and other DOE sites. A portion of the HB-Line, a plutonium-238 processing facility at SRS, has been undergoing D ampersand D intermittently since 1984. Although this cleanup effort was not originally intended to quantify results, some key data have been project has demonstrated effective methods of accumulated, and the performing D ampersand D work, and has demonstrated cleanup equipment and techniques under conditions of high contamination. Plutonium facilities where D ampersand D is already underway provide an opportunity for' timely field testing of characterization, size reduction, and decontamination techniques. Some data are presented here; however, more specific tests and data may be obtained during the remainder of this project. This project has been recommended as a candidate test facility for a DOE planned ''Integrated D ampersand D Demonstration'' managed by EM-50 to develop and demonstrate technology for D ampersand D and surplus facilities deactivation. Both the remainder of this project and the Integrated D ampersand D Demonstration Program can benefit from a joint effort, and the, overall costs should be reduced

  12. Assessment of the technical viability of reactor options for plutonium disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Primm, R.T. III.

    1996-01-01

    Various reactor concepts for the disposition of surplus Pu have been proposed by reactor vendors; not all have attained the same level of technical viability. Studies were performed to differentiate between reactor concepts by devising a quantitative index for technical viability. For a quantitative assessment, three issues required resolution: the definition of a technical maturity scale, the treatment of ''subjective'' factors which cannot be easily represented in a quantitative format, and the protocol for producing a single technical viability figure-of-merit for each alternative. Alternatives involving the use of foreign facilities were found to be the most technically viable

  13. Los Alamos Plutonium Facility newly generated TRU waste certification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gruetzmacher, K.; Montoya, A.; Sinkule, B.; Maez, M.

    1997-01-01

    This paper presents an overview of the activities being planned and implemented to certify newly generated contact handled transuranic (TRU) waste produced by Los Alamos National Laboratory's (LANL's) Plutonium Facility. Certifying waste at the point of generation is the most important cost and labor saving step in the WIPP certification process. The pedigree of a waste item is best known by the originator of the waste and frees a site from expensive characterization activities such as those associated with legacy waste. Through a cooperative agreement with LANLs Waste Management Facility and under the umbrella of LANLs WIPP-related certification and quality assurance documents, the Plutonium Facility will be certifying its own newly generated waste. Some of the challenges faced by the Plutonium Facility in preparing to certify TRU waste include the modification and addition of procedures to meet WIPP requirements, standardizing packaging for TRU waste, collecting processing documentation from operations which produce TRU waste, and developing ways to modify waste streams which are not certifiable in their present form

  14. R.4. Innovative concept for plutonium finishing facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bertolotti, G.; Laguerie, I.V. de; Richter, R.; Gillet, B.

    1998-01-01

    After complete shutdown of the units of the previous UP2 plant, the new R4 facility will ensure the purification of Plutonium of the UP2-800 plant for the whole range of fuel to be reprocessed in the years to come. This facility features four main units: - Purification of plutonium nitrate; - Conversion into plutonium oxide; - PuO 2 conditioning into cans; Acid recovery. An extensive R and D program resulted in significant innovations. From a technological aspect the centrifugal extractor and the sub-critical tube bundle tank contributed to the reduction of the building dimensions. The extensive use of on-line analyses enables a more efficient follow-up of the process while minimizing the effluent production. On the other hand, the organization of the building which consists in grouping the rooms presenting the same risk of dispersal of nuclear materials also contributed to reduce the active zone volume. This facility, as any other facilities on the LA HAGUE site, will be remotely operated. (author)

  15. Seismic safety of the LLL plutonium facility (Building 332)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Torkarz, F.J.; Shaw, G.

    1980-01-01

    This report states the basis for the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory's assurance to the public that the plutonium operations at the Laboratory pose essentially no risk to anyone's health or safety, either under normal circumstances or in the event of an earthquake or a fire. The report is intended for a general audience, and so for the most part it is not highly technical. It summarizes the steps taken to ensure the seismic safety of the plutonium facility (Bldg. 332). It describes plutonium and its potential hazard and how the facility copes with that hazard. It recounts the geologic investigations and interpretations that led to the design-basis earthquake (DBE) for the Livermore site, and presents a summary analysis of the facility structure in relation to the DBE. An appendix presents a quantitative calculation of the health risk to the public associated with the worst-case hypothetical fire. The document supports the conclusions that the facility will continue to function safely after the maximum earthquake ground motion to which it may be subjected and that there is no evidence of a potential for surface offset under it

  16. Upgrade of the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility control system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pope, N.G.; Turner, W.J.; Brown, R.E.; Bibeau, R.A.; Davis, R.R.; Hogan, K.

    1996-01-01

    After 20 yrs service, the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility is undergoing an upgrade to its aging Facility Control System. The new system design includes a network of redundantly-paired programmable logic controllers that will interface with about 2200 field data points. The data communications network that has been designed includes a redundant, self-healing fiber optic data highway as well as a fiber optic ethernet. Commercially available human-machine interface software running on a UNIX-based system displays facility subsystem status operator X-terminals. Project design features, methods, costs, and schedule are discussed

  17. Disposition of weapons-grade plutonium in LWRs - a utility perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Naughton, W.F.

    1996-01-01

    The optimal alternative for the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium (WPu) is to burn it in currently operating light water reactors (LWRs). There are three key aspects associated with the reactor burn option that lead to this conclusion. They are timeliness, acceptable solution, and equity or resource recovery. The National Academy of Sciences report on this subject has thoroughly covered the first two aspects by indicating that there is open-quotes a clear and present dangerclose quotes associated with WPu - the timeliness issue. Also, the report indicates that the spent-fuel standard is the acceptable long-term solution. Both of these aspects are met by the reactor burn option as it exists today; i.e., the reactor option is both timely and obviously meets the spent-fuel standard. The equity or resource recovery aspect is based on the fact that the resources for the development and use of this material as a nuclear deterrent for the past 50 yr was supplied by, in the U.S.'s case, the taxpayers. Only the reactor burn option offers an opportunity for the partial recovery of those resources in the form of electrical energy

  18. An autoradiographical method using an imaging plate for the analyses of plutonium contamination in a plutonium handling facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Takasaki, Koji; Sagawa, Naoki; Kurosawa, Shigeyuki; Mizuniwa, Harumi

    2011-01-01

    An autoradiographical method using an imaging plate (IP) was developed to analyze plutonium contamination in a plutonium handling facility. The IPs were exposed to ten specimens having a single plutonium particle. Photostimulated luminescence (PSL) images of the specimens were taken using a laser scanning machine. One relatively large spot induced by α-radioactivity from plutonium was observed in each PSL image. The plutonium-induced spots were discriminated by a threshold derived from background and the size of the spot. A good relationship between the PSL intensities of the spots and α-radioactivities measured using a radiation counter was obtained by least-square fitting, taking the fading effect into consideration. This method was applied to workplace monitoring in an actual uranium-plutonium mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. Plutonium contaminations were analyzed in ten other specimens having more than two plutonium spots. The α-radioactivities of plutonium contamination were derived from the PSL images and their relative errors were evaluated from exposure time. (author)

  19. A methodology for the analysis and selection of alternatives for the disposition of surplus plutonium. Quarterly technical progress report, April 1, 1995--June 30, 1995

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mulder, R.

    1995-01-01

    The Office of Fissile Materials Disposition is currently involved in the development of a comprehensive approach to the long-term storage and disposition of fissile materials. A major objective of this effort is to provide a framework for US efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This will entail both the elimination of excess highly enriched uranium and plutonium, and the insurance of the highest standards of safety, security, and international accountability. The Office of Fissile Materials Disposition is supporting an Interagency Working Group that has initiated a comprehensive review of alternatives for plutonium disposition which takes into account non-proliferation, economic, technical, institutional, schedule, environmental, and health and safety issues. These alternatives were identified by the development of screening criteria as a guide to the selection of alternatives that best achieve the fissile nuclear material long-term storage and disposition goals of the US Government

  20. Liquid waste treatment at plutonium fuels fabrication facility, 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matsumoto, Ken-ichi; Itoh, Ichiroh; Ohuchi, Jin; Miyo, Hiroaki

    1974-01-01

    The economics in the management of the radioactive liquid waste from Plutonium Fuels Fabrication Facility with sludge-blanket type flocculators has been evaluated. (1) Cost calculation: The cost of chemicals and electricity to treat 1 cubic meter of liquid waste is about 876 yen, while the total operating cost is 250 thousand yen per cubic meter in the case of 140 m 3 /year treatment. These figures are much higher than those for ordinary wastes, due to the particular operation against plutonium. (2) Proposal of the closed system for liquid waste treatment at PFFF: In the case of a closed system using evaporator, ion exchange column and rotary-kiln calciner, the operating cost is estimated at 40 thousand yen per cubic meter of liquid waste. Final radioactivity of treated liquid is below 10 -8 micro curies/ml. (Mori, K.)

  1. Nondestructive assay system development for a plutonium scrap recovery facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hsue, S.T.; Baker, M.P.

    1984-01-01

    A plutonium scrap recovery facility is being constructed at the Savannah River Plant (SRP). The safeguards groups of the Los Alamos National Laboratory have been working since the early design stage of the facility with SRP and other national laboratories to develop a state-of-the-art assay system for this new facility. Not only will the most current assay techniques be incorporated into the system, but also the various nondestructive assay (NDA) instruments are to be integrated with an Instrument Control Computer (ICC). This undertaking is both challenging and ambitious; an entire assay system of this type has never been done before in a working facility. This paper will describe, in particular, the effort of the Los Alamos Safeguards Assay Group in this endeavor. Our effort in this project can be roughly divided into three phases: NDA development, system integration, and integral testing. 6 references

  2. Far-Field Accumulation of Fissile Material From Waste Packages Containing Plutonium Disposition Waste Form

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    J.P. Nicot

    2000-01-01

    The objective of this calculation is to estimate the quantity of fissile material that could accumulate in fractures in the rock beneath plutonium-ceramic (Pu-ceramic) and Mixed-Oxide (MOX) waste packages (WPs) as they degrade in the potential monitored geologic repository at Yucca Mountain. This calculation is to feed another calculation (Ref. 31) computing the probability of criticality in the systems described in Section 6 and then ultimately to a more general report on the impact of plutonium on the performance of the proposed repository (Ref. 32), both developed concurrently to this work. This calculation is done in accordance with the development plan TDP-DDC-MD-000001 (Ref. 9), item 5. The original document described in item 5 has been split into two documents: this calculation and Ref. 4. The scope of the calculation is limited to only very low flow rates because they lead to the most conservative cases for Pu accumulation and more generally are consistent with the way the effluent from the WP (called source term in this calculation) was calculated (Ref. 4). Ref. 4 (''In-Drift Accumulation of Fissile Material from WPs Containing Plutonium Disposition Waste Forms'') details the evolution through time (breach time is initial time) of the chemical composition of the solution inside the WP as degradation of the fuel and other materials proceed. It is the chemical solution used as a source term in this calculation. Ref. 4 takes that same source term and reacts it with the invert; this calculation reacts it with the rock. In addition to reactions with the rock minerals (that release Si and Ca), the basic mechanisms for actinide precipitation are dilution and mixing with resident water as explained in Section 2.1.4. No other potential mechanism such as flow through a reducing zone is investigated in this calculation. No attempt was made to use the effluent water from the bottom of the invert instead of using directly the effluent water from the WP. This

  3. Far-Field Accumulation of Fissile Material From Waste Packages Containing Plutonium Disposition Waste Form

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    J.P. Nicot

    2000-09-29

    The objective of this calculation is to estimate the quantity of fissile material that could accumulate in fractures in the rock beneath plutonium-ceramic (Pu-ceramic) and Mixed-Oxide (MOX) waste packages (WPs) as they degrade in the potential monitored geologic repository at Yucca Mountain. This calculation is to feed another calculation (Ref. 31) computing the probability of criticality in the systems described in Section 6 and then ultimately to a more general report on the impact of plutonium on the performance of the proposed repository (Ref. 32), both developed concurrently to this work. This calculation is done in accordance with the development plan TDP-DDC-MD-000001 (Ref. 9), item 5. The original document described in item 5 has been split into two documents: this calculation and Ref. 4. The scope of the calculation is limited to only very low flow rates because they lead to the most conservative cases for Pu accumulation and more generally are consistent with the way the effluent from the WP (called source term in this calculation) was calculated (Ref. 4). Ref. 4 (''In-Drift Accumulation of Fissile Material from WPs Containing Plutonium Disposition Waste Forms'') details the evolution through time (breach time is initial time) of the chemical composition of the solution inside the WP as degradation of the fuel and other materials proceed. It is the chemical solution used as a source term in this calculation. Ref. 4 takes that same source term and reacts it with the invert; this calculation reacts it with the rock. In addition to reactions with the rock minerals (that release Si and Ca), the basic mechanisms for actinide precipitation are dilution and mixing with resident water as explained in Section 2.1.4. No other potential mechanism such as flow through a reducing zone is investigated in this calculation. No attempt was made to use the effluent water from the bottom of the invert instead of using directly the effluent water from the

  4. Discussions on JNC roles and issues on management and disposition of surplus plutonium from the dismantlement of nuclear warhead

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-04-01

    Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC) and Russian Federation are now promoting the collaborative project to use the fast breeder reactor of BN-600 for the Russian surplus plutonium under the framework of the bilateral agreement on peaceful use of atomic energy. Based upon this background, JNC organized a study group to survey the world aspect on surplus plutonium resulting in START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty). The study group, including technical experts and also experts on international affairs, made a report after their survey and gave wide range discussion on various issues. The surplus plutonium of Russian Federation was estimated to be 102 - 136 tones. There were shortages of back end technologies in Russian infrastructures for dismantling, reprocessing and disposition of the surplus plutonium. A supporting leadership of USA to Russian Federation met some difficulties due to the strategic gap between both countries. One of the examples is the temporal evolution of USA attitude toward the CANDU (thermal power reactors of Canadian design characterized by heavy water moderator, pressure tube construction, and on-power refuelling) option to use surplus plutonium as MOX (Mixed OXide) fuels. Additional supports from the G8 (Group of eight) countries except USA and Russian Federation came up to their expectation. For examples, the joint group of French, German and Russian is promoting DEMOX (Demonstration of MOX fuel) project but is on the way to discussion depending on various thoughts about mutual benefits. Many issues remained in joint project with CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), such as safeguard, nonproliferation, energy supply and demand, and environmental impacts. In addition, public opinions will give some impacts to policy makers, especially in USA. This report had analyzed many viewpoints for technical and political issues on surplus plutonium in the world, and pointed out consequences, merits and demerits after possible many

  5. Reactor based plutonium disposition - physics and fuel behaviour benchmark studies of an OECD/NEA experts group

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    D'Hondt, P.; Gehin, J.; Na, B.C.; Sartori, E.; Wiesenack, W.

    2001-01-01

    One of the options envisaged for disposing of weapons grade plutonium, declared surplus for national defence in the Russian Federation and Usa, is to burn it in nuclear power reactors. The scientific/technical know-how accumulated in the use of MOX as a fuel for electricity generation is of great relevance for the plutonium disposition programmes. An Expert Group of the OECD/Nea is carrying out a series of benchmarks with the aim of facilitating the use of this know-how for meeting this objective. This paper describes the background that led to establishing the Expert Group, and the present status of results from these benchmarks. The benchmark studies cover a theoretical reactor physics benchmark on a VVER-1000 core loaded with MOX, two experimental benchmarks on MOX lattices and a benchmark concerned with MOX fuel behaviour for both solid and hollow pellets. First conclusions are outlined as well as future work. (author)

  6. Potential role of ABC-assisted repositories in U.S. plutonium and high-level waste disposition

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Berwald, D.; Favale, A.; Myers, T. [Grumman Aerospace Corporation, Bethpage, NY (United States)] [and others

    1995-10-01

    This paper characterizes the issues involving deep geologic disposal of LWR spent fuel rods, then presents results of an investigation to quantify the potential role of Accelerator-Based Conversion (ABC) in an integrated national nuclear materials and high level waste disposition strategy. The investigation used the deep geological repository envisioned for Yucca Mt., Nevada as a baseline and considered complementary roles for integrated ABC transmutation systems. The results indicate that although a U.S. geologic waste repository will continue to be required, waste partitioning and accelerator transmutation of plutonium, the minor actinides, and selected long-lived fission products can result in the following substantial benefits: plutonium burndown to near zero levels, a dramatic reduction of the long term hazard associated with geologic repositories, an ability to place several-fold more high level nuclear waste in a single repository, electricity sales to compensate for capital and operating costs.

  7. Surveillance and Maintenance Plan for the Plutonium Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Woods, P.J.

    1998-05-01

    This document provides a plan for implementing surveillance and maintenance (S ampersand M) activities to ensure the Plutonium Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Facility is maintained in a safe, environmentally secure, and cost-effective manner until subsequent closure during the final disposition phase of decommissioning. This plan has been prepared in accordance with the guidelines provided in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Environmental Management (EM) Decommissioning Resource Manual (DOE/EM-0246) (DOE 1995), and Section 8.6 of TPA change form P-08-97-01 to the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) (Ecology, et al. 1996). Specific objectives of the S ampersand M program are: Ensure adequate containment of remaining radioactive and hazardous material. Provide security control for access into the facility and physical safety to surveillance personnel. Maintain the facility in a manner that will minimize potential hazards to the public, the environment, and surveillance personnel. Provide a plan for the identification and compliance with applicable environmental, safety, health, safeguards, and security requirements

  8. Facility effluent monitoring plan for the plutonium uranium extraction facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wiegand, D.L.

    1994-09-01

    A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438-01. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan shall ensure long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updated at a minimum of every three years.

  9. Facility effluent monitoring plan for the plutonium uranium extraction facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wiegand, D.L.

    1994-09-01

    A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438-01. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan shall ensure long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updated at a minimum of every three years

  10. Facility effluent monitoring plan for the Plutonium Uranium Extraction Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Greager, E.M.

    1997-01-01

    A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438-01. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether these systems are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan will ensure long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updated, at a minimum, every 3 years

  11. A probabilistic risk assessment of the LLNL Plutonium Facility's evaluation basis fire operational accident. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brumburgh, G.P.

    1995-01-01

    The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Plutonium Facility conducts numerous programmatic activities involving plutonium to include device fabrication, development of improved and/or unique fabrication techniques, metallurgy research, and laser isotope separation. A Safety Analysis Report (SAR) for the building 332 Plutonium Facility was completed in July 1994 to address operational safety and acceptable risk to employees, the public, government property, and the environmental. This paper outlines the PRA analysis of the Evaluation Basis Fire (EBF) operational accident. The EBF postulates the worst-case programmatic impact event for the Plutonium Facility

  12. Continuous Material Balance Reconciliation for a Modern Plutonium Processing Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    CLARK, THOMASG.

    2004-01-01

    This paper describes a safeguards approach that can be deployed at any modern plutonium processing facility to increase the level of safeguards assurance and significantly reduce the impact of safeguards on process operations. One of the most perplexing problems facing the designers of plutonium processing facilities is the constraint placed upon the limit of error of the inventory difference (LEID). The current DOE manual constrains the LEID for Category I and II material balance areas to 2 per cent of active inventory up to a Category II quantity of the material being processed. For 239Pu a Category II quantity is two kilograms. Due to the large material throughput anticipated for some of the modern plutonium facilities, the required LEID cannot be achieved reliably during a nominal two month inventory period, even by using state-of-the-science non-destructive assay (NDA) methods. The most cost-effective and least disruptive solution appears to be increasing the frequency of material balance closure and thus reducing the throughput being measured during each inventory period. Current inventory accounting practices and systems can already provide the book inventory values at any point in time. However, closing the material balance with measured values has typically required the process to be cleaned out, and in-process materials packaged and measured. This process requires one to two weeks of facility down time every two months for each inventory, thus significantly reducing productivity. To provide a solution to this problem, a non-traditional approach is proposed that will include using in-line instruments to provide measurement of the process materials on a near real-time basis. A new software component will be developed that will operate with the standard LANMAS application to provide the running material balance reconciliation, including the calculation of the inventory difference and variance propagation. The combined measurement system and software

  13. Plutonium Reclamation Facility incident response project progress report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Austin, B.A.

    1997-01-01

    This report provides status of Hanford activities in response to process deficiencies highlighted during and in response to the May 14, 1997, explosion at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility. This report provides specific response to the August 4, 1997, memorandum from the Secretary which requested a progress report, in 120 days, on activities associated with reassessing the known and evaluating new vulnerabilities (chemical and radiological) at facilities that have been shut down, are in standby, are being deactivated or have otherwise changed their conventional mode of operation in the last several years. In addition, this report is intended to provide status on emergency response corrective activities as requested in the memorandum from the Secretary on August 28, 1997. Status is also included for actions requested in the second August 28, 1997, memorandum from the Secretary, regarding timely notification of emergencies

  14. Plutonium Reclamation Facility incident response project progress report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Austin, B.A.

    1997-11-25

    This report provides status of Hanford activities in response to process deficiencies highlighted during and in response to the May 14, 1997, explosion at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility. This report provides specific response to the August 4, 1997, memorandum from the Secretary which requested a progress report, in 120 days, on activities associated with reassessing the known and evaluating new vulnerabilities (chemical and radiological) at facilities that have been shut down, are in standby, are being deactivated or have otherwise changed their conventional mode of operation in the last several years. In addition, this report is intended to provide status on emergency response corrective activities as requested in the memorandum from the Secretary on August 28, 1997. Status is also included for actions requested in the second August 28, 1997, memorandum from the Secretary, regarding timely notification of emergencies.

  15. Health physics manual of good practices for plutonium facilities. [Contains glossary

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Brackenbush, L.W.; Heid, K.R.; Herrington, W.N.; Kenoyer, J.L.; Munson, L.F.; Munson, L.H.; Selby, J.M.; Soldat, K.L.; Stoetzel, G.A.; Traub, R.J.

    1988-05-01

    This manual consists of six sections: Properties of Plutonium, Siting of Plutonium Facilities, Facility Design, Radiation Protection, Emergency Preparedness, and Decontamination and Decommissioning. While not the final authority, the manual is an assemblage of information, rules of thumb, regulations, and good practices to assist those who are intimately involved in plutonium operations. An in-depth understanding of the nuclear, physical, chemical, and biological properties of plutonium is important in establishing a viable radiation protection and control program at a plutonium facility. These properties of plutonium provide the basis and perspective necessary for appreciating the quality of control needed in handling and processing the material. Guidance in selecting the location of a new plutonium facility may not be directly useful to most readers. However, it provides a perspective for the development and implementation of the environmental surveillance program and the in-plant controls required to ensure that the facility is and remains a good neighbor. The criteria, guidance, and good practices for the design of a plutonium facility are also applicable to the operation and modification of existing facilities. The design activity provides many opportunities for implementation of features to promote more effective protection and control. The application of ''as low as reasonably achievable'' (ALARA) principles and optimization analyses are generally most cost-effective during the design phase. 335 refs., 8 figs., 20 tabs.

  16. OPEN AIR DEMOLITION OF FACILITIES HIGHLY CONTAMINATED WITH PLUTONIUM

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    LLOYD, E.R.

    2007-01-01

    The demolition of highly contaminated plutonium buildings usually is a long and expensive process that involves decontaminating the building to near free- release standards and then using conventional methods to remove the structure. It doesn't, however, have to be that way. Fluor has torn down buildings highly contaminated with plutonium without excessive decontamination. By removing the select source term and fixing the remaining contamination on the walls, ceilings, floors, and equipment surfaces; open-air demolition is not only feasible, but it can be done cheaper, better (safer), and faster. Open-air demolition techniques were used to demolish two highly contaminated buildings to slab-on-grade. These facilities on the Department of Energy's Hanford Site were located in, or very near, compounds of operating nuclear facilities that housed hundreds of people working on a daily basis. To keep the facilities operating and the personnel safe, the projects had to be creative in demolishing the structures. Several key techniques were used to control contamination and keep it within the confines of the demolition area: spraying fixatives before demolition; applying fixative and misting with a fine spray of water as the buildings were being taken down; and demolishing the buildings in a controlled and methodical manner. In addition, detailed air-dispersion modeling was done to establish necessary building and meteorological conditions and to confirm the adequacy of the proposed methods. Both demolition projects were accomplished without any spread of contamination outside the modest buffer areas established for contamination control. Furthermore, personnel exposure to radiological and physical hazards was significantly reduced by using heavy equipment rather than ''hands on'' techniques

  17. Improving aircraft accident forecasting for an integrated plutonium storage facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rock, J.C.; Kiffe, J.; McNerney, M.T.; Turen, T.A.

    1998-06-01

    Aircraft accidents pose a quantifiable threat to facilities used to store and process surplus weapon-grade plutonium. The Department of Energy (DOE) recently published its first aircraft accident analysis guidelines: Accident Analysis for Aircraft Crash into Hazardous Facilities. This document establishes a hierarchy of procedures for estimating the small annual frequency for aircraft accidents that impact Pantex facilities and the even smaller frequency of hazardous material released to the environment. The standard establishes a screening threshold of 10 -6 impacts per year; if the initial estimate of impact frequency for a facility is below this level, no further analysis is required. The Pantex Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement (SWEIS) calculates the aircraft impact frequency to be above this screening level. The DOE Standard encourages more detailed analyses in such cases. This report presents three refinements, namely, removing retired small military aircraft from the accident rate database, correcting the conversion factor from military accident rates (accidents per 100,000 hours) to the rates used in the DOE model (accidents per flight phase), and adjusting the conditional probability of impact for general aviation to more accurately reflect pilot training and local conditions. This report documents a halving of the predicted frequency of an aircraft impact at Pantex and points toward further reductions

  18. Design of an error-free nondestructive plutonium assay facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moore, C.B.; Steward, W.E.

    1987-01-01

    An automated, at-line nondestructive assay (NDA) laboratory is installed in facilities recently constructed at the Savannah River Plant. The laboratory will enhance nuclear materials accounting in new plutonium scrap and waste recovery facilities. The advantages of at-line NDA operations will not be realized if results are clouded by errors in analytical procedures, sample identification, record keeping, or techniques for extracting samples from process streams. Minimization of such errors has been a primary design objective for the new facility. Concepts for achieving that objective include mechanizing the administrative tasks of scheduling activities in the laboratory, identifying samples, recording and storing assay data, and transmitting results information to process control and materials accounting functions. These concepts have been implemented in an analytical computer system that is programmed to avoid the obvious sources of error encountered in laboratory operations. The laboratory computer exchanges information with process control and materials accounting computers, transmitting results information and obtaining process data and accounting information as required to guide process operations and maintain current records of materials flow through the new facility

  19. French en engineering and operation rules for plutonium facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bertolotti, G.; Drain, F.; Dubois, G.; Monnatte, J.; Mathieu, P.

    1998-01-01

    COGEMA is operating large size purifying and conditioning plutonium facilities at LA HAGUE and MOX fuels fabrication plant at Marcoule. A high safety standard is recognised for these facilities. It is mainly based on : - prevention of spreading of radioactive materials to workers and environment by physical barriers ensuring static containment and by a cascade of pressure differentials ensuring dynamic containment, - radiation shielding and remote controlled processes ensuring very low dose to workers, - prevention of criticality accident by criticality control methods and double contingency principle, - prevention of fire risks by control of ignition sources, adequate management of combustible materials, physical separation between zones where there is a risk of fire and the remainder of the facility. The facilities are operated while respecting safety requirements as described in the General Operating Rules. The equipment involved in safety functions are monitored and periodically checked. Continuous improvement by incorporation of feed back of safety experience results in: - effective decrease of exposure to operating staff; - reduction of solid waste, liquid and gaseous effluents; - no significant incident recorded. (author)

  20. Opportunities for mixed oxide fuel testing in the advanced test reactor to support plutonium disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Terry, W.K.; Ryskamp, J.M.; Sterbentz, J.W.

    1995-08-01

    Numerous technical issues must be resolved before LWR operating licenses can be amended to allow the use of MOX fuel. These issues include the following: (1) MOX fuel fabrication process verification; (2) Whether and how to use burnable poisons to depress MOX fuel initial reactivity, which is higher than that of urania; (3) The effects of WGPu isotopic composition; (4) The feasibility of loading MOX fuel with plutonia content up to 7% by weight; (5) The effects of americium and gallium in WGPu; (6) Fission gas release from MOX fuel pellets made from WGPu; (7) Fuel/cladding gap closure; (8) The effects of power cycling and off-normal events on fuel integrity; (9) Development of radial distributions of burnup and fission products; (10) Power spiking near the interfaces of MOX and urania fuel assemblies; and (11) Fuel performance code validation. The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory possesses many advantages for performing tests to resolve most of the issues identified above. We have performed calculations to show that the use of hafnium shrouds can produce spectrum adjustments that will bring the flux spectrum in ATR test loops into a good approximation to the spectrum anticipated in a commercial LWR containing MOX fuel while allowing operation of the test fuel assemblies near their optimum values of linear heat generation rate. The ATR would be a nearly ideal test bed for developing data needed to support applications to license LWRs for operation with MOX fuel made from weapons-grade plutonium. The requirements for planning and implementing a test program in the ATR have been identified. The facilities at Argonne National Laboratory-West can meet all potential needs for pre- and post-irradiation examination that might arise in a MOX fuel qualification program

  1. Plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koelzer, W.

    1989-03-01

    This report contains with regard to 'plutonium' statements on chemistry, occurrence and reactions in the environment, handling procedures in the nuclear fuel cycle, radiation protection methods, biokinetics, toxicology and medical treatment to make available reliable data for the public discussion on plutonium especially its use in nuclear power plants and its radiological assessment. (orig.) [de

  2. Reactive spark plasma synthesis of CaZrTi2O7 zirconolite ceramics for plutonium disposition

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sun, Shi-Kuan; Stennett, Martin C.; Corkhill, Claire L.; Hyatt, Neil C.

    2018-03-01

    Near single phase zirconolite ceramics, prototypically CaZrTi2O7, were fabricated by reactive spark plasma sintering (RSPS), from commercially available CaTiO3, ZrO2 and TiO2 reagents, after processing at 1200 °C for only 1 h. Ceramics were of theoretical density and formed with a controlled mean grain size of 1.9 ± 0.6 μm. The reducing conditions of RSPS afforded the presence of paramagnetic Ti3+, as demonstrated by EPR spectroscopy. Overall, this study demonstrates the potential for RSPS to be a disruptive technology for disposition of surplus separated plutonium stockpiles in ceramic wasteforms, given its inherent advantage of near net shape products and rapid throughput.

  3. Cooperative Threat Reduction: Solid Rocket Motor Disposition Facility Project (D-2003-131)

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    2003-01-01

    .... DoD contracted with Lockheed Martin Advanced Environmental Systems for $52.4 million to design, develop, fabricate, and test a closed burn, solid rocket motor disposition facility for the Russian Federation in April 1997...

  4. Transuranic (Tru) waste volume reduction operations at a plutonium facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cournoyer, Michael E [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Nixon, Archie E [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Dodge, Robert L [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Fife, Keith W [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sandoval, Arnold M [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Garcia, Vincent E [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-01-01

    Programmatic operations at the Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility (TA 55) involve working with various amounts of plutonium and other highly toxic, alpha-emitting materials. The spread of radiological contamination on surfaces, airborne contamination, and excursions of contaminants into the operator's breathing zone are prevented through use of a variety of gloveboxes (the glovebox, coupled with an adequate negative pressure gradient, provides primary confinement). Size-reduction operations on glovebox equipment are a common activity when a process has been discontinued and the room is being modified to support a new customer. The Actin ide Processing Group at TA-55 uses one-meter-long glass columns to process plutonium. Disposal of used columns is a challenge, since they must be size-reduced to get them out of the glovebox. The task is a high-risk operation because the glass shards that are generated can puncture the bag-out bags, leather protectors, glovebox gloves, and the worker's skin when completing the task. One of the Lessons Learned from these operations is that Laboratory management should critically evaluate each hazard and provide more effective measures to prevent personnel injury. A bag made of puncture-resistant material was one of these enhanced controls. We have investigated the effectiveness of these bags and have found that they safely and effectively permit glass objects to be reduced to small pieces with a plastic or rubber mallet; the waste can then be easily poured into a container for removal from the glove box as non-compactable transuranic (TRU) waste. This size-reduction operation reduces solid TRU waste generation by almost 2% times. Replacing one-time-use bag-out bags with multiple-use glass crushing bags also contributes to reducing generated waste. In addition, significant costs from contamination, cleanup, and preparation of incident documentation are avoided. This effort contributes to the Los Alamos

  5. Transuranic (Tru) waste volume reduction operations at a plutonium facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cournoyer, Michael E.; Nixon, Archie E.; Dodge, Robert L.; Fife, Keith W.; Sandoval, Arnold M.; Garcia, Vincent E.

    2010-01-01

    Programmatic operations at the Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility (TA 55) involve working with various amounts of plutonium and other highly toxic, alpha-emitting materials. The spread of radiological contamination on surfaces, airborne contamination, and excursions of contaminants into the operator's breathing zone are prevented through use of a variety of gloveboxes (the glovebox, coupled with an adequate negative pressure gradient, provides primary confinement). Size-reduction operations on glovebox equipment are a common activity when a process has been discontinued and the room is being modified to support a new customer. The Actin ide Processing Group at TA-55 uses one-meter-long glass columns to process plutonium. Disposal of used columns is a challenge, since they must be size-reduced to get them out of the glovebox. The task is a high-risk operation because the glass shards that are generated can puncture the bag-out bags, leather protectors, glovebox gloves, and the worker's skin when completing the task. One of the Lessons Learned from these operations is that Laboratory management should critically evaluate each hazard and provide more effective measures to prevent personnel injury. A bag made of puncture-resistant material was one of these enhanced controls. We have investigated the effectiveness of these bags and have found that they safely and effectively permit glass objects to be reduced to small pieces with a plastic or rubber mallet; the waste can then be easily poured into a container for removal from the glove box as non-compactable transuranic (TRU) waste. This size-reduction operation reduces solid TRU waste generation by almost 2% times. Replacing one-time-use bag-out bags with multiple-use glass crushing bags also contributes to reducing generated waste. In addition, significant costs from contamination, cleanup, and preparation of incident documentation are avoided. This effort contributes to the Los Alamos National

  6. Transuranic (TRU) waste volume reduction operations at a plutonium facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cournoyer, Michael E.; Nixon, Archie E.; Fife, Keith W.; Sandoval, Arnold M.; Garcia, Vincent E.; Dodge, Robert L.

    2011-01-01

    Programmatic operations at the Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility (TA-55) involve working with various amounts of plutonium and other highly toxic, alpha-emitting materials. The spread of radiological contamination on surfaces, airborne contamination, and excursions of contaminants into the operator's breathing zone are prevented through use of a variety of gloveboxes (the glovebox, coupled with an adequate negative pressure gradient, provides primary confinement). Size-reduction operations on glovebox equipment are a common activity when a process has been discontinued and the room is being modified to support a new customer. The Actinide Processing Group at TA-55 uses one-meter or longer glass columns to process plutonium. Disposal of used columns is a challenge, since they must be size-reduced to get them out of the glovebox. The task is a high-risk operation because the glass shards that are generated can puncture the bag-out bags, leather protectors, glovebox gloves, and the worker's skin when completing the task. One of the Lessons Learned from these operations is that Laboratory management should critically evaluate each hazard and provide more effective measures to prevent personnel injury. A bag made of puncture-resistant material was one of these enhanced controls. We have investigated the effectiveness of these bags and have found that they safely and effectively permit glass objects to be reduced to small pieces with a plastic or rubber mallet; the waste can then be easily poured into a container for removal from the glovebox as non-compactable transuranic (TRU) waste. This size-reduction operation reduces solid TRU waste volume generation by almost 2½ times. Replacing one-time-use bag-out bags with multiple-use glass crushing bags also contributes to reducing generated waste. In addition, significant costs from contamination, cleanup, and preparation of incident documentation are avoided. This effort contributes to the Los Alamos

  7. Los Alamos DP West Plutonium Facility decontamination project, 1978-1981

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garde, R.; Cox, E.J.; Valentine, A.M.

    1982-09-01

    The DP West Plutonium Facility operated by the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico was decontaminated between April 1978 and April 1981. The facility was constructed in 1944 to 1945 to produce plutonium metal and fabricate parts for nuclear weapons. It was continually used as a plutonium processing and research facility until mid-1978. Decontamination operations included dismantling and removing gloveboxes and conveyor tunnels; removing process systems, utilities, and exhaust ducts; and decontaminating all remaining surfaces. This report describes glovebox and conveyor tunnel separations, decontamination techniques, health and safety considerations, waste management procedures, and costs of the operation

  8. Plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Watson, G.M.

    1976-01-01

    Discovery of the neutron made it easy to create elements which do not exist in nature. One of these is plutonium, and its isotope with mass number 239 has nuclear properties which make it both a good fuel for nuclear power reactors and a good explosive for nuclear weapons. Since it was discovered during a war the latter characteristic was put to use, but it is now evident that use of plutonium in a particular kind of nuclear reactor, the fast breeder reactor, will allow the world's resources of uranium to last for millennia as a major source of energy. Plutonium is very radiotoxic, resembling radium in this respect. Therefore the widespread introduction of fast breeder reactors to meet energy demands can be contemplated only after assurances on two points; that adequate control of the radiological hazard resulting from the handling of very large amounts of plutonium can be guaranteed, and that diversion of plutonium to illicit use can be prevented. The problems exist to a lesser degree already, since all types of nuclear reactor produce some plutonium. Some plutonium has already been dispersed in the environment, the bulk of it from atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons. (author)

  9. Unconventional options for plutonium disposition. Proceedings of a technical committee meeting held in Obninsk, Russian Federation, 7-11 November 1994

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-11-01

    This publication summarizes discussions and presents selected papers from a Technical Committee meeting that the IAEA convened in Obninsk, near Moscow, Russia, 7-11 November 1994 at the invitation of the Ministry of the Russian Federation on Atomic Energy, and which was hosted by the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering. The meeting focused on the disposition of plutonium produced from the operation of nuclear power plants in areas related to the nuclear fuel cycle. Plutonium is formed in all existing nuclear power plants and the unconsumed part remaining in spent fuel is a generic by-product of nuclear power generation. Over the next 15 to 20 years, a significant amount of plutonium will be produced in nuclear power stations worldwide, adding to amounts already in storage. Additionally, the world`s plutonium stocks are being affected by decisions concerning the management and utilization of plutonium recovered from nuclear weapons which are being dismantled. In this context, national strategies are directed at reducing the stockpiles of separated plutonium worldwide, and in further developing technologies capable of safely and securely using and handling plutonium. The purpose of the IAEA`s Technical Committee meeting was to consider unconventional approaches for plutonium disposition, both from the points of view of the fuel cycle as a whole and the specific types of nuclear fuel being used. The aims were to obtain technical descriptions of these approaches, engineering judgements on their technological status and development, and reports on national experience in this field. The meeting`s results and conclusions are providing valuable guidance for future activities in this subject area. Refs, figs and tabs.

  10. Unconventional options for plutonium disposition. Proceedings of a technical committee meeting held in Obninsk, Russian Federation, 7-11 November 1994

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-11-01

    This publication summarizes discussions and presents selected papers from a Technical Committee meeting that the IAEA convened in Obninsk, near Moscow, Russia, 7-11 November 1994 at the invitation of the Ministry of the Russian Federation on Atomic Energy, and which was hosted by the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering. The meeting focused on the disposition of plutonium produced from the operation of nuclear power plants in areas related to the nuclear fuel cycle. Plutonium is formed in all existing nuclear power plants and the unconsumed part remaining in spent fuel is a generic by-product of nuclear power generation. Over the next 15 to 20 years, a significant amount of plutonium will be produced in nuclear power stations worldwide, adding to amounts already in storage. Additionally, the world's plutonium stocks are being affected by decisions concerning the management and utilization of plutonium recovered from nuclear weapons which are being dismantled. In this context, national strategies are directed at reducing the stockpiles of separated plutonium worldwide, and in further developing technologies capable of safely and securely using and handling plutonium. The purpose of the IAEA's Technical Committee meeting was to consider unconventional approaches for plutonium disposition, both from the points of view of the fuel cycle as a whole and the specific types of nuclear fuel being used. The aims were to obtain technical descriptions of these approaches, engineering judgements on their technological status and development, and reports on national experience in this field. The meeting's results and conclusions are providing valuable guidance for future activities in this subject area. Refs, figs and tabs

  11. Plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Miner, William N

    1964-01-01

    This pamphlet discusses plutonium from discovery to its production, separation, properties, fabrication, handling, and uses, including use as a reactor fuel and use in isotope power generators and neutron sources.

  12. Plutonium in the aquatic environment around the Rocky Flats facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thompson, M.A.

    1975-01-01

    The Rocky Flats Plant of the United States Energy Research and Development Administration has been fabricating and chemically recovering plutonium for over 20 years. During that time, small amounts of plutonium have been released with liquid process and sanitary waste discharges. The liquid waste flows through a series of holding ponds from which it is discharged into a creek that is part of a municipal drinking water supply. The water flows for about 1.5 km between the last holding pond and the municipal drinking water reservoir. In addition, liquid wastes containing high levels of chemical contaminants and plutonium concentrations less than allowable drinking water standards have been discharged to large evaporation ponds. The fate of the plutonium in both the surface and subsurface aquatic environment has been extensively monitored and studied. It has been found that plutonium does not move very far or very rapidly through subsurface water. The majority of the plutonium released through surface water has been contained in the sediments of the plant holding ponds. Small amounts of plutonium have also been found in the sediments of the draining creek and in the sediments of the receiving reservoir. Higher than normal amounts of plutonium were released from the waste treatment plants during times when suspended solids were high. Various biological species have been examined and plutonium concentration factors determined. Considerably less than 1% of the 210 mCi of plutonium released has been detected in biological systems including man. After more than 20 years of large scale operations, no health or environmental hazard has been identified due to the release of small amounts of plutonium. (author)

  13. Training and exercises of the Emergency Response Team at the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yearwood, D.D.

    1988-01-01

    The Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility has an active Emergency Response Team. The Emergency Response Team is composed of members of the operating and support groups within the Plutonium Facility. In addition to their initial indoctrination, the members are trained and certified in first-aid, CPR, fire and rescue, and the use of self-contained-breathing-apparatus. Training exercises, drills, are conducted once a month. The drills consist of scenarios which require the Emergency Response Team to apply CPR and/or first aid. The drills are performed in the Plutonium Facility, they are video taped, then reviewed and critiqued by site personnel. Through training and effective drills and the Emergency Response Team can efficiently respond to any credible accident which may occur at the Plutonium Facility. 3 tabs

  14. Implementing waste minimization at an active plutonium processing facility: Successes and progress at technical area (TA) -55 of the Los Alamos National Laboratory

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Balkey, J.J.; Robinson, M.A.; Boak, J.

    1997-12-01

    The Los Alamos National Laboratory has ongoing national security missions that necessitate increased plutonium processing. The bulk of this activity occurs at Technical Area -55 (TA-55), the nations only operable plutonium facility. TA-55 has developed and demonstrated a number of technologies that significantly minimize waste generation in plutonium processing (supercritical CO{sub 2}, Mg(OH){sub 2} precipitation, supercritical H{sub 2}O oxidation, WAND), disposition of excess fissile materials (hydride-dehydride, electrolytic decontamination), disposition of historical waste inventories (salt distillation), and Decontamination & Decommissioning (D&D) of closed nuclear facilities (electrolytic decontamination). Furthermore, TA-55 is in the process of developing additional waste minimization technologies (molten salt oxidation, nitric acid recycle, americium extraction) that will significantly reduce ongoing waste generation rates and allow volume reduction of existing waste streams. Cost savings from reduction in waste volumes to be managed and disposed far exceed development and deployment costs in every case. Waste minimization is also important because it reduces occupational exposure to ionizing radiation, risks of transportation accidents, and transfer of burdens from current nuclear operations to future generations.

  15. Implementing waste minimization at an active plutonium processing facility: Successes and progress at technical area (TA) -55 of the Los Alamos National Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Balkey, J.J.; Robinson, M.A.; Boak, J.

    1997-01-01

    The Los Alamos National Laboratory has ongoing national security missions that necessitate increased plutonium processing. The bulk of this activity occurs at Technical Area -55 (TA-55), the nations only operable plutonium facility. TA-55 has developed and demonstrated a number of technologies that significantly minimize waste generation in plutonium processing (supercritical CO 2 , Mg(OH) 2 precipitation, supercritical H 2 O oxidation, WAND), disposition of excess fissile materials (hydride-dehydride, electrolytic decontamination), disposition of historical waste inventories (salt distillation), and Decontamination ampersand Decommissioning (D ampersand D) of closed nuclear facilities (electrolytic decontamination). Furthermore, TA-55 is in the process of developing additional waste minimization technologies (molten salt oxidation, nitric acid recycle, americium extraction) that will significantly reduce ongoing waste generation rates and allow volume reduction of existing waste streams. Cost savings from reduction in waste volumes to be managed and disposed far exceed development and deployment costs in every case. Waste minimization is also important because it reduces occupational exposure to ionizing radiation, risks of transportation accidents, and transfer of burdens from current nuclear operations to future generations

  16. Plutonium production story at the Hanford site: processes and facilities history

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gerber, M.S., Westinghouse Hanford

    1996-06-20

    This document tells the history of the actual plutonium production process at the Hanford Site. It contains five major sections: Fuel Fabrication Processes, Irradiation of Nuclear Fuel, Spent Fuel Handling, Radiochemical Reprocessing of Irradiated Fuel, and Plutonium Finishing Operations. Within each section the story of the earliest operations is told, along with changes over time until the end of operations. Chemical and physical processes are described, along with the facilities where these processes were carried out. This document is a processes and facilities history. It does not deal with the waste products of plutonium production.

  17. Precautions for preventing criticality at plutonium fuel treatment facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Deworm, J.P.; Fieuw, G.; Cank, H. de

    1976-01-01

    Four criticality accidents took place between 1958 and 1964 at fuel processing plants using wet methods. So far accident of this type has taken place at production units where fissionable material is used. The prevention of criticality is one of the major concerns of the officials in charge of the plutonium fuel research laboratories operated at the Mol Nuclear Energy Study Centre by the SCK/CEN-Belgonucleaire Association. The means of preventing such an accident are of three types: introducing different types of treatment in well-defined work units; thorough analysis of planned experiments or fabrication programmes to determine the sub-criticality factors; application of technical and administrative procedures which ensure that the facilities are always sub-critical during the treatment and storage of fissionable materials. The installation includes a detection and warning system and provision is made for the immediate evacuation of staff should a crticality incident occur. The effects of a critical excursion on the building have been assessed. (author)

  18. Plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1995-01-01

    Plutonium, which was obtained and identified for the first time in 1941 by chemist Glenn Seaborg - through neutron irradiation of uranium 238 - is closely related to the history of nuclear energy. From the very beginning, because of the high radiotoxicity of plutonium, a tremendous amount of research work has been devoted to the study of the biological effects and the consequences on the environment. It can be said that plutonium is presently one of the elements, whose nuclear and physico-chemical characteristics are the best known. The first part of this issue is a survey of the knowledge acquired on the subject, which emphasizes the sanitary effects and transfer into the environment. Then the properties of plutonium related to energy generation are dealt with. Fissionable, like uranium 235, plutonium has proved a high-performance nuclear fuel. Originally used in breeder reactors, it is now being more and more widely recycled in light water reactors, in MOX fuel. Reprocessing, recycling and manufacturing of these new types of fuel, bound of become more and more widespread, are now part of a self-consistent series of operations, whose technical, economical, industrial and strategical aspects are reviewed. (author)

  19. Disposition of excess fissile materials in deep boreholes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Halsey, W.G.; Danker, W.; Morley, R.

    1995-09-01

    As a result of recent changes throughout the world, a substantial inventory of excess separated plutonium is expected to result from dismantlement of US nuclear weapons. The safe and secure management and eventual disposition of this plutonium, and of a similar inventory in Russia, is a high priority. A variety of options (both interim and permanent) are under consideration to manage this material. The permanent solutions can be categorized into two broad groups: direct disposal and utilization. Plutonium utilization options have in common the generation of high-level radioactive waste which will be disposed of in a mined geologic disposal system to be developed for spent reactor fuel and defense high level waste. Other final disposition forms, such as plutonium metal, plutonium oxide and plutonium immobilized without high-level radiation sources may be better suited to placement in a custom facility. This paper discusses a leading candidate for such a facility; deep (several kilometer) borehole disposition. The deep borehole disposition concept involves placing excess plutonium deep into old stable rock formations with little free water present. The safety argument centers around ancient groundwater indicating lack of migration, and thus no expected communication with the accessible environment until the plutonium has decayed

  20. Plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueller-Christiansen, K.; Wollesen, M.

    1979-01-01

    As emotions and fear of plutonium are neither useful for the non-professionals nor for the political decision makers and the advantages and disadvantages of plutonium can only put against each other under difficulties, the paper wants to present the most essential scientific data of plutonium in a generally understandable way. Each of the individual sections is concluded and they try to give an answer to the most discussed questions. In order to make understanding easier, the scientific facts are only brought at points where it cannot be done without for the correctness of the presentation. Many details were left out knowingly. On the other hand, important details are dealt with several times if it seems necessary for making the presentation correct. The graphical presentations and the figures in many cases contain more than said in the text. They give the interested reader hints to scientific-technical coherences. The total material is to enable the reader to form his own opinion on plutonium problems which are being discussed in public. (orig./HP) [de

  1. Decontamination of Battelle-Columbus' Plutonium Facility. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rudolph, A.; Kirsch, G.; Toy, H.L.

    1984-01-01

    The Plutonium Laboratory, owned and operated by Battelle Memorial Institute's Columbus Division, was located in Battelle's Nuclear Sciences area near West Jefferson, Ohio, approximately 17 miles west of Columbus, Ohio. Originally built in 1960 for plutonium research and processing, the Plutonium Laboratory was enlarged in 1964 and again in 1967. With the termination of the Advanced Fuel Program in March, 1977, the decision was made to decommission the Plutonium Laboratory and to decontaminate the building for unrestricted use. Decontamination procedures began in January, 1978. All items which had come into contact with radioactivity from the plutonium operations were cleaned or disposed of through prescribed channels, maintaining procedures to ensure that D and D operations would pose no risk to the public, the environment, or the workers. The entire program was conducted under the cognizance of DOE's Chicago Operations Office. The building which housed the Plutonium Laboratory has now been decontaminated to levels allowing it to house ordinary laboratory and office operations. A ''Finding of No Significant Impact'' (FNSI) was issued in May, 1980

  2. Technical report for generic site add-on facility for plutonium polishing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-06-01

    The purpose of this report is to provide environmental data and reference process information associated with incorporating plutonium polishing steps (dissolution, impurity removal, and conversion to oxide powder) into the genetic-site Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MOXFF). The incorporation of the plutonium polishing steps will enable the removal of undesirable impurities, such as gallium and americium, known to be associated with the plutonium. Moreover, unanticipated impurities can be removed, including those that may be contained in (1) poorly characterized feed materials, (2) corrosion products added from processing equipment, and (3) miscellaneous materials contained in scrap recycle streams. These impurities will be removed to the extent necessary to meet plutonium product purity specifications for MOX fuels. Incorporation of the plutonium polishing steps will mean that the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF) will need to produce a plutonium product that can be dissolved at the MOXFF in nitric acid at a suitable rate (sufficient to meet overall production requirements) with the minimal usage of hydrofluoric acid, and its complexing agent, aluminum nitrate. This function will require that if the PDCF product is plutonium oxide powder, that powder must be produced, stored, and shipped without exceeding a temperature of 600 C

  3. Review of operating experience at the Los Alamos Plutonium Electrorefining Facility, 1963-1977

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mullins, L.J.; Morgan, A.N.

    1981-12-01

    This report reviews the operation of the Los Alamos Plutonium Electrorefining Plant at Technical Area 21 for the period 1964 through 1977. During that period, approximately 1568 kg of plutonium metal, > 99.95% pure, was produced in 653 runs from 1930 kg of metal fabrication scrap, 99% pure. General considerations of the electrorefining process and facility operation and recommendations for further improvement of the process are discussed

  4. Development of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility decontamination room

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mosso, J.S.; Smith, F.E.; Owen, M.J.; Treadaway, W.A.

    1987-01-01

    For several years the Health Protection Group attempted to remedy the problem of a facility to adequately handle personnel plutonium contamination incidents. Through the efforts of our Quality Circle a presentation was made to management, which immediately appropriated space and funds for the construction of a complete decontamination facility. 9 refs

  5. Plutonium, power, and politics: international arrangements for the disposition of spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rochlin, G.I.

    1979-01-01

    In this study, Gene Rochlin, physicist and social scientist, explores the technical, political, and institutional aspects of international nuclear export and fuel-cycle policies. He categorizes existing proposals and suggests ways to develop new ones that better promote both national and international goals. Dr. Rochlin argues neither for nor against the future use of nuclear power or plutonium fuels. Rather, he addresses the question of how international arrangements could be reached that might jointly satisfy the objectives of the several key nations, yet not be too difficult to negotiate. He concludes that a major fault has been the tendency to improvise arrangements for specific technical or industrial operations. As a result, overall social and political goals have become the bargaining points for compromise. Yet, attempts to simultaneously resolve all problems are unlikely to prove fruitful. Dr. Rochlin suggests instead the formation of institutions organized around more-limited social, political, and technical objectives - even at the expense of excluding some nations, or omitting some aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. Only by so doing, he argues, can immediate agreements be reached that preserve the potential for more-comprehensive future arrangements without sacrificing industrial, environmental, or nonproliferation goals

  6. A feasibility study for the storage of plutonium pits in non-partitioned warehouse facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    James, D.; Parameswaren, S.; Nagendran, S.

    1999-02-01

    It is projected that up to 20,000 plutonium pits will be stored at Pantex for up to 50 years. The proposed storage system has to meet longevity, safety and cost requirements. Thermal, mechanical, chemical, nuclear criticality and safety performance characteristics of any proposed plutonium container design need to be formally analyzed. Plutonium generates thermal energy as it decays. The generated thermal energy may cause excessive rise of temperature. For safety and other considerations, it is important that the plutonium temperature remains relatively constant and no hot spots develop. Plutonium containers should not be disassembled for routine monitoring and there are various reasons for the need to monitor the plutonium non-obtrusively. Therefore, accurate predictions of the temperature distribution within the storage container based upon external monitoring within the storage facility needs to be developed. A heat transfer analysis of the storage container is required. The heat transfer analysis, however, requires the knowledge of the temperature and velocity of the air circulating around the containers in order to determine the heat transferred to the air from the containers by convection. Therefore, a complete flow field analysis is required prior to performing the conduction analysis of each pit. The objective of this research is, therefore, to develop and validate a numerical model to predict the temperature distribution within the plutonium storage container as a function of the ambient air temperature within the warehouse

  7. Phase I feasibility study for the Canyon disposition initiative (221-U facility)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-08-01

    The objective of the Phase I Feasibility Study (FS) presented in this document is to provide decision makers sufficient information on the remedial alternatives specific to the disposition of the 221-U Canyon Building (221-U Facility) located at the Hanford Site, and to determine which alternatives are viable for further detailed analysis

  8. SRS vitrification studies in support of the U.S. program for disposition of excess plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wicks, G.G.; McKibben, J.M.; Plodinec, M.J.; Ramsey, W.G.

    1995-01-01

    Many thousands of nuclear weapons are being retired in the U.S. and Russian as a result of nuclear disarmament activities. These efforts are expected to produce a surplus of about 50 MT of weapons grade plutonium (Pu) in each country. In addition to this inventory, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has more than 20 MT of Pu scrap, residue, etc., and Russian is also believed to have at least as much of this type of material. The entire surplus Pu inventories in the U.S. and Russian present a clear and immediate danger to national and international security. It is important that a solution be found to secure and manage this material effectively and that such an effort be implemented as quickly as possible. One option under consideration is vitrification of Pu into a safe, durable, accountable and proliferation-resistant form. As a result of decades to experience within the DOE community involving vitrification of a variety of hazardous and radioactive wastes, this existing technology can now be expanded to include mobilization of large amounts of Pu. This technology can then be implemented rapidly using the many existing resources currently available. An overall strategy to vitrify many different types of Pu will be already developed throughout the waste management community can be used in a staged Pu vitrification effort. This approach uses the flexible vitrification technology already available and can even be made portable so that it may be brought to the source and ultimately, used to produce a consistent and common borosilicate glass composition for the vitrified Pu. The final composition of this product can be made similar to nationally and internationally accepted HLW glasses

  9. Design-Only Conceptual Design Report: Plutonium Immobilization Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DiSabatino, A.; Loftus, D.

    1999-01-01

    This design-only conceptual design report was prepared to support a funding request by the Department of Energy Office of Fissile Materials Disposition for engineering and design of the Plutonium Immobilization Plant, which will be used to immobilize up to 50 tonnes of surplus plutonium. The siting for the Plutonium Immobilization Plant will be determined pursuant to the site-specific Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement in a Plutonium Deposition Record of Decision in early 1999. This document reflects a new facility using the preferred technology (ceramic immobilization using the can-in-canister approach) and the preferred site (at Savannah River). The Plutonium Immobilization Plant accepts plutonium from pit conversion and from non-pit sources and, through a ceramic immobilization process, converts the plutonium into mineral-like forms that are subsequently encapsulated within a large canister of high-level waste glass. The final immobilized product must make the plutonium as inherently unattractive and inaccessible for use in nuclear weapons as the plutonium in spent fuel from commercial reactors and must be suitable for geologic disposal. Plutonium immobilization at the Savannah River Site uses: (1) A new building, the Plutonium Immobilization Plant, which will convert non-pit surplus plutonium to an oxide form suitable for the immobilization process, immobilize plutonium in a titanate-based ceramic form, place cans of the plutonium-ceramic forms into magazines, and load the magazines into a canister; (2) The existing Defense Waste Processing Facility for the pouring of high-level waste glass into the canisters; and (3) The Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility to receive and store feed materials. The Plutonium Immobilization Plant uses existing Savannah River Site infra-structure for analytical laboratory services, waste handling, fire protection, training, and other support utilities and services. The Plutonium Immobilization Plant

  10. Decontamination and decommissioning criteria for use in design of new plutonium facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Paschall, R.K.

    1975-01-01

    Decontamination and decommissioning (D and D) criteria were assembled for use in designing new plutonium facilities. These criteria were gathered from literature searches and visits to many plutonium facilities around the country. The recommendations of reports and experienced personnel were used. Since total D and D costs can be millions of dollars, improved designs to facilitate D and D will result in considerable savings in cost and time and will help to leave the site for unrestricted future use after D and D. Finally, better design will reduce hazards and improve safety during the D and D effort

  11. Waste minimization and the goal of an environmentally benign plutonium processing facility: A strategic plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1994-02-01

    To maintain capabilities in nuclear weapons technologies, the Department of Energy (DOE) has to maintain a plutonium processing facility that meets all the current and emerging standards of environmental regulations. A strategic goal to transform the Plutonium Processing Facility at Los Alamos into an environmentally benign operation is identified. A variety of technologies and systems necessary to meet this goal are identified. Two initiatives now in early stages of implementation are described in some detail. A highly motivated and trained work force and a systems approach to waste minimization and pollution prevention are necessary to maintain technical capabilities, to comply with regulations, and to meet the strategic goal

  12. Mortality among plutonium and other workers at a nuclear facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilkinson, G.S.; Voelz, G.L.; Acquavella, J.F.; Tietjen, G.L.; Reyes, M.; Brackbill, R.; Wiggs, L.

    1983-01-01

    Mortality among plutonium and other nuclear workers has been investigated to assess the effects of exposures to low levels of internal and external radiation. Standarized mortality ratios (SMRs) for white male workers employed at least two years from 1951 through 1977 were significantly lower than expected for all causes, all cancers, cancers of the respiratory system, and lung cancer. Benign neoplasms, all of which were intracranial tumors, were significantly elevated. No bone cancers were discovered and other radiogenic cancers did not differ significantly from expectation. Duration of employment and latency did not affect these results. SMRs for a subcohort of plutonium exposed workers were significantly low for all causes of deaths and all cancers. Estimates of relative risk for workers exposed to 2 or more nCi compared to unexposed workers were not significantly higher or lower than unity. These findings do not support the hypothesis of increased mortality among plutonium and other nuclear workers. The excess for benign and unspecified intracranial tumors is not consistent with previous studies on radiation induced brain tumors in terms of latency and exposure levels

  13. Transportation and packaging issues involving the disposition of surplus plutonium as MOX fuel in commercial LWRs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ludwig, S.B.; Welch, D.E.; Best, R.E.; Schmid, S.P.

    1997-08-01

    This report provides a view of anticipated transportation, packaging, and facility handling operations that are expected to occur at mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication and commercial reactor facilities. This information is intended for use by prospective contractors to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) who plan to submit proposals to DOE to manufacture and irradiate MOX fuel assemblies in domestic commercial light-water reactors. The report provides data to prospective consortia regarding packaging and pickup of MOX nuclear fuel assemblies at a MOX fuel manufacturing plant and transport and delivery of the MOX assemblies to nuclear power plants. The report also identifies areas where data are incomplete either because of the status of development or lack of sufficient information and specificity regarding the nuclear power plant(s) where deliveries will take place

  14. Design of ventilation and air cleaning systems for the new Los Alamos Plutonium Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mitchell, R.; DeField, J.; Stafford, R.; McNeese, W.; Eberhardt, W.; Laushkin, N.

    1975-01-01

    The Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory's new plutonium facility will conform to AECM Appendix 6301-Part II, Section H-Minimum Design Criteria for New Plutonium Facilities. The glove box process exhaust air is filtered through three or four stages of HEPA filters. The design of this multi-stage filter installation is shown with a method of in-place testing of each stage individually. A glove box filter holder and the in-place test procedure is described. General room air from plutonium work areas is recirculated at the rate of eight air changes per hour with a 10 percent fresh air make-up. The filter plenums for the recirculated air are designed to permit in-place testing of each of the two filter stages. (U.S.)

  15. Guide of good practices for occupational radiological protection in plutonium facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-06-01

    This Technical Standard (TS) does not contain any new requirements. Its purpose is to provide guides to good practice, update existing reference material, and discuss practical lessons learned relevant to the safe handling of plutonium. the technical rationale is given to allow US Department of Energy (DOE) health physicists to adapt the recommendations to similar situations throughout the DOE complex. Generally, DOE contractor health physicists will be responsible to implement radiation protection activities at DOE facilities and DOE health physicists will be responsible for oversight of those activities. This guidance is meant to be useful for both efforts. This TS replaces PNL-6534, Health Physics Manual of Good Practices for Plutonium Facilities, by providing more complete and current information and by emphasizing the situations that are typical of DOE`s current plutonium operations; safe storage, decontamination, and decommissioning (environmental restoration); and weapons disassembly.

  16. Sampling and Analysis Plan for the 233-S Plutonium Concentration Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mihalic, M.A.

    1998-02-01

    This Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP) provides the information and instructions to be used for sampling and analysis activities in the 233-S Plutonium Concentration Facility. The information and instructions herein are separated into three parts and address the Data Quality Objective (DQO) Summary Report, Quality Assurance Project Plan (QAP), and SAP

  17. Automatic chemical determination facility for plutonium and uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Benhamou, A.

    1980-01-01

    A proposal for a fully automated chemical determination system for uranium and plutonium in (U, Pu)O 2 mixed oxide fuel, from the solid sample weighing operation to the final result is described. The steps completed to data are described. These include: test sample preparation by weighing, potentiometer titration system, cleaning and drying of glassware after titration. The process uses a Mettler SR 10 Titrator System in conjunction with others automatized equipment in corse of realization. Precision may reach 0.02% and is generally better than 0.1%. Accuracy in within +-0.1% of manual determination results or titration standards [fr

  18. DOE standard: Integration of environment, safety, and health into facility disposition activities. Volume 2: Appendices

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-05-01

    This volume contains the appendices that provide additional environment, safety, and health (ES and H) information to complement Volume 1 of this Standard. Appendix A provides a set of candidate DOE ES and H directives and external regulations, organized by hazard types that may be used to identify potentially applicable directives to a specific facility disposition activity. Appendix B offers examples and lessons learned that illustrate implementation of ES and H approaches discussed in Section 3 of Volume 1. Appendix C contains ISMS performance expectations to guide a project team in developing and implementing an effective ISMS and in developing specific performance criteria for use in facility disposition. Appendix D provides guidance for identifying potential Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate Requirements (ARARs) when decommissioning facilities fall under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, Liability Act (CERCLA) process. Appendix E discusses ES and H considerations for dispositioning facilities by privatization. Appendix F is an overview of the WSS process. Appendix G provides a copy of two DOE Office of Nuclear Safety Policy and Standards memoranda that form the bases for some of the guidance discussed within the Standard. Appendix H gives information on available hazard analysis techniques and references. Appendix I provides a supplemental discussion to Sections 3.3.4, Hazard Baseline Documentation, and 3.3.6, Environmental Permits. Appendix J presents a sample readiness evaluation checklist.

  19. DOE standard: Integration of environment, safety, and health into facility disposition activities. Volume 2: Appendices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-05-01

    This volume contains the appendices that provide additional environment, safety, and health (ES and H) information to complement Volume 1 of this Standard. Appendix A provides a set of candidate DOE ES and H directives and external regulations, organized by hazard types that may be used to identify potentially applicable directives to a specific facility disposition activity. Appendix B offers examples and lessons learned that illustrate implementation of ES and H approaches discussed in Section 3 of Volume 1. Appendix C contains ISMS performance expectations to guide a project team in developing and implementing an effective ISMS and in developing specific performance criteria for use in facility disposition. Appendix D provides guidance for identifying potential Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate Requirements (ARARs) when decommissioning facilities fall under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, Liability Act (CERCLA) process. Appendix E discusses ES and H considerations for dispositioning facilities by privatization. Appendix F is an overview of the WSS process. Appendix G provides a copy of two DOE Office of Nuclear Safety Policy and Standards memoranda that form the bases for some of the guidance discussed within the Standard. Appendix H gives information on available hazard analysis techniques and references. Appendix I provides a supplemental discussion to Sections 3.3.4, Hazard Baseline Documentation, and 3.3.6, Environmental Permits. Appendix J presents a sample readiness evaluation checklist

  20. Plutonium immobilization program - Cold pour Phase 1 test results

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hamilton, L.

    2000-01-01

    The Plutonium Immobilization Project will disposition excess weapons grade plutonium. It uses the can-in-canister approach that involves placing plutonium-ceramic pucks in sealed cans that are then placed into Defense Waste Processing Facility canisters. These canisters are subsequently filled with high-level radioactive waste glass. This process puts the plutonium in a stable form and makes it unattractive for reuse. A cold (non-radioactive) glass pour program was performed to develop and verify the baseline design for the canister and internal hardware. This paper describes the Phase 1 scoping test results

  1. Plutonium Immobilization Program - Cold pour Phase 1 test results

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hamilton, L.

    2000-01-01

    The Plutonium Immobilization Project will disposition excess weapons grade plutonium. It uses the can-in-canister approach that involves placing plutonium-ceramic pucks in sealed cans that are then placed into Defense Waste Processing Facility canisters. These canisters are subsequently filled with high-level radioactive waste glass. This process puts the plutonium in a stable form and makes it unattractive for reuse. A cold (non-radioactive) glass pour program was performed to develop and verify the baseline design for the canister and internal hardware. This paper describes the Phase 1 scoping test results

  2. Documentation of acceptable knowledge for Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility TRU waste stream

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Montoya, A.J.; Gruetzmacher, K.M.; Foxx, C.L.; Rogers, P.Z.

    1998-03-01

    Characterization of transuranic waste from the LANL Plutonium Facility for certification and transportation to WIPP includes the use of acceptable knowledge as specified in the WIPP Quality Assurance Program Plan. In accordance with a site specific procedure, documentation of acceptable knowledge for retrievably stored and currently generated transuranic waste streams is in progress at LANL. A summary overview of the TRU waste inventory is complete and documented in the Sampling Plan. This document also includes projected waste generation, facility missions, waste generation processes, flow diagrams, times, and material inputs. The second part of acceptable knowledge documentation consists of assembling more detailed acceptable knowledge information into auditable records and is expected to require several years to complete. These records for each waste stream must support final assignment of waste matrix parameters, EPA hazardous waste numbers, and radionuclide characterization. They must also include a determination whether waste streams are defense waste streams for compliance with the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act. The LANL Plutonium Facility's mission is primarily plutonium processing in basic special nuclear material (SNM) research activities to support national defense and energy programs. It currently has about 100 processes ranging from SNM recovery from residues to development of plutonium 238 heat sources for space applications. Its challenge is to characterize and certify waste streams from such diverse and dynamic operations using acceptable knowledge. This paper reports the progress on the certification of the first of these waste streams to the WIPP WAC

  3. Documentation of acceptable knowledge for LANL Plutonium Facility transuranic waste streams

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Montoya, A.J.; Gruetzmacher, K.; Foxx, C.; Rogers, P.S.Z.

    1998-01-01

    Characterization of transuranic waste from the LANL Plutonium Facility for certification and transportation to WIPP includes the use of acceptable knowledge as specified in the WIPP Quality Assurance Program Plan. In accordance with a site-specific procedure, documentation of acceptable knowledge for retrievably stored and currently generated transuranic waste streams is in progress at LANL. A summary overview of the transuranic waste inventory is complete and documented in the Sampling Plan. This document also includes projected waste generation, facility missions, waste generation processes, flow diagrams, times, and material inputs. The second part of acceptable knowledge documentation consists of assembling more detailed acceptable knowledge information into auditable records and is expected to require several years to complete. These records for each waste stream must support final assignment of waste matrix parameters, EPA hazardous waste numbers, and radionuclide characterization. They must also include a determination whether waste streams are defense waste streams for compliance with the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act. The LANL Plutonium Facility's mission is primarily plutonium processing in basic special nuclear material (SNM) research activities to support national defense and energy programs. It currently has about 100 processes ranging from SNM recovery from residues to development of plutonium 238 heat sources for space applications. Its challenge is to characterize and certify waste streams from such diverse and dynamic operations using acceptable knowledge. This paper reports the progress on the certification of the first of these waste streams to the WIPP WAC

  4. Measurement and instrumentation techniques for monitoring plutonium and uranium particulates released from nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nero, A.V. Jr.

    1976-08-01

    The purpose of this work has been an analysis and evaluation of the state-of-the-art of measurement and instrumentation techniques for monitoring plutonium and uranium particulates released from nuclear facilities. The occurrence of plutonium and uranium in the nuclear fuel cycle, the corresponding potential for releases, associated radiological protection standards and monitoring objectives are discussed. Techniques for monitoring via decay radiation from plutonium and uranium isotopes are presented in detail, emphasizing air monitoring, but also including soil sampling and survey methods. Additionally, activation and mass measurement techniques are discussed. The availability and prevalence of these various techniques are summarized. Finally, possible improvements in monitoring capabilities due to alterations in instrumentation, data analysis, or programs are presented

  5. An MCNP model of glove boxes in a plutonium processing facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dooley, D.E.; Kornreich, D.E.

    1998-01-01

    Nuclear material processing usually occurs simultaneously in several glove boxes whose primary purpose is to contain radioactive materials and prevent inhalation or ingestion of radioactive materials by workers. A room in the plutonium facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory has been slated for installation of a glove box for storing plutonium metal in various shapes during processing. This storage glove box will be located in a room containing other glove boxes used daily by workers processing plutonium parts. An MCNP model of the room and glove boxes has been constructed to estimate the neutron flux at various locations in the room for two different locations of the storage glove box and to determine the effect of placing polyethylene shielding around the storage glove box. A neutron dose survey of the room with sources dispersed as during normal production operations was used as a benchmark to compare the neutron dose equivalent rates calculated by the MCNP model

  6. Characterization of transuranic solid wastes from a plutonium processing facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mulkin, R.

    1975-06-01

    Transuranic-contaminated wastes generated in the processing areas of the Plutonium Chemistry and Metallurgy Group at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL) were studied in detail to identify their chemical and physical composition. Nondestructive Assay (NDA) equipment was developed to measure transuranic activity at the 10-nCi/g level in low-density residues typically found in room-generated waste. This information will supply the Waste Management Program with a more positive means of identifying concerns in waste storage and the challenge of optimizing the system of waste form, packaging, and environment of the storage area for 20-yr retrievable waste. A positive method of measuring transuranic activity in waste at the 10-nCi/g level will eliminate the need for administrative control in a sensitive area, and will provide the economic advantage of minimizing the volume of waste stored as retrievable waste. (U.S.)

  7. THE DEACTIVATION, DECONTAMINATION AND DECOMMISSIONING OF THE PLUTONIUM FINISHING PLANT, A FORMER PLUTONIUM PROCESSING FACILITY AT DOE'S HANFORD SITE

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    CHARBONEAU, S.L.

    2006-01-01

    The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) was constructed as part of the Manhattan Project during World War II. The Manhattan Project was developed to usher in the use of nuclear weapons to end the war. The primary mission of the PFP was to provide plutonium used as special nuclear material (SNM) for fabrication of nuclear devices for the war effort. Subsequent to the end of World War II, the PFP's mission expanded to support the Cold War effort through plutonium production during the nuclear arms race and later the processing of fuel grade mixed plutonium-uranium oxide to support DOE's breeder reactor program. In October 1990, at the close of the production mission for PFP, a shutdown order was prepared by the Department of Energy (DOE) in Washington,; DC--and issued to the Richland DOE field office. Subsequent to the shutdown order, a team from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) analyzed the hazards at PFP associated with the continued storage of certain forms of plutonium solutions and solids. The assessment identified many discrete actions that were required to stabilize the different plutonium forms into stable form and repackage the material in high integrity containers. These actions were technically complicated and completed as part of the PFP nuclear material stabilization project between 1995 and early 2005. The completion of the stabilization project was a necessary first step in deactivating PFP. During stabilization, DOE entered into negotiations with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the State of Washington and established milestones for the Deactivation and Decommissioning (DandD) of the PFP. The DOE and its contractor, Fluor Hanford (Fluor), have made great progress in deactivating, decontaminating and decommissioning the PFP at the Hanford Site as detailed in this paper. Background information covering the PFP DandD effort includes descriptions of negotiations with the State of Washington concerning consent

  8. Process control and safeguards system plutonium inventory conrol for MOX fuel facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mishima, T.; Aoki, M.; Muto, T.; Amanuma, T.

    1979-01-01

    The plutonium inventory control (PINC) system is a real-time material accountability control system that is expected to be applied to a new large-scale plutonium fuel production facility for both fast breeder reactor and heavy water reactor at the Power Reactor and Nuclear Development Corporation. The PINC is basically a system for material control but is expected to develop into a whole facility control system, including criticality control, process control, quality control, facility protection, and so forth. Under PINC, every process and storage area is divided into a unit area, which is the smallest unit for both accountability and process control. Item and material weight automatically are accounted for at every unit area, and data are simultaneously treated by a computer network system. Sensors necessary for the system are being developed. 9 figures

  9. PROJECT EXPERIENCE REPORT DEMOLITION OF HANFORDS 233-S PLUTONIUM CONCENTRATION FACILITY

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BERLIN, G.T.; ORGILL, T.K.

    2004-01-01

    This report provides a summary of the preparation, operations, innovative work practices, and lessons learned associated with demolition of the 2334 Plutonium Concentration Facility. This project represented the first open-air demolition of a highly-contaminated plutonium facility at the Hanford Site. This project may also represent the first plutonium facility in the US. Department of Energy (DOE) complex to have been demolished without first decontaminating surfaces to near ''free release'' standards. Demolition of plutonium contaminated structures, if not properly managed, can subject cleanup personnel and the environment to significant risk. However, with proper sequencing and innovative use of commercially available equipment, materials, and services, this project demonstrated that a plutonium processing facility can be demolished while avoiding the need to perform extensive decontamination or to construct large enclosures. This project utilized an excavator with concrete shears, diamond circular saws, water misting and fogging equipment, commercially available fixatives and dust suppressants, conventional mobile crane and rigging services, and near real-time modeling of meteorological and radiological conditions. Following a significant amount of preparation, actual demolition of the 233-S Facility began in October 2003 and was completed in late April 2004. The knowledge and experience gained on this project are important to the Hanford Site as additional plutonium processing facilities are scheduled for demolition in the near future. Other sites throughout the DOE Complex may also be faced with similar challenges. Numerous innovations and effective work practices were implemented on this project. Accordingly, a series of ''Lessons Learned and Innovative Practices Fact Sheets'' were developed and are included as an appendix to this report. This collection of fact sheets is not intended to capture every innovative work practice and lesson learned, but rather

  10. PROJECT EXPERIENCE REPORT DEMOLITION OF HANFORDS 233-S PLUTONIUM CONCENTRATION FACILITY

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BERLIN, G.T.

    2004-01-01

    This report provides a summary of the preparation, operations, innovative work practices, and lessons learned associated with demolition of the 2334 Plutonium Concentration Facility. This project represented the first open-air demolition of a highly-contaminated plutonium facility at the Hanford Site. This project may also represent the first plutonium facility in the US. Department of Energy (DOE) complex to have been demolished without first decontaminating surfaces to near ''free release'' standards. Demolition of plutonium contaminated structures, if not properly managed, can subject cleanup personnel and the environment to significant risk. However, with proper sequencing and innovative use of commercially available equipment, materials, and services, this project demonstrated that a plutonium processing facility can be demolished while avoiding the need to perform extensive decontamination or to construct large enclosures. This project utilized an excavator with concrete shears, diamond circular saws, water misting and fogging equipment, commercially available fixatives and dust suppressants, conventional mobile crane and rigging services, and near real-time modeling of meteorological and radiological conditions. Following a significant amount of preparation, actual demolition of the 2333 Facility began in October 2003 and was completed in late April 2004. The knowledge and experience gained on this project are important to the Hanford Site as additional plutonium processing facilities are scheduled for demolition in the near future. Other sites throughout the DOE Complex may also be faced with similar challenges. Numerous innovations and effective work practices were implemented on this project. Accordingly, a series of ''Lessons Learned and Innovative Practices Fact Sheets'' were developed and are included as an appendix to this report. This collection of fact sheets is not intended to capture every innovative work practice and lesson learned, but rather to

  11. Plutonium concentrations in arthropods at a nuclear facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bly, J A; Whicker, F W [Colorado State Univ., Fort Collins (USA). Dept. of Radiology and Radiation Biology

    1979-09-01

    Arthropods were collected for /sup 239/ /sup 240/Pu (/sup 239/Pu) and /sup 238/Pu analysis from three study plots in close proximity to the Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant and from a site 110 km N-NE of the plant. Mean /sup 239/Pu concentrations in arthropods were 265, 16, 0.7 and 0.5 dis/min g/sup -1/ at the three Rocky Flats study plots and at the control site, respectively. Arthropod /sup 239/Pu concentration data were statistically analyzed by season of collection, taxonomic group, and sampling site. Only the collection site differences were significant (..cap alpha.. = 0.01) and these were correlated with /sup 239/Pu concentrations in soil. The mean activity ratio of /sup 239/Pu to /sup 238/Pu in arthropods was 52, similar to the value of 51 obtained for soil. The mean ratio of /sup 239/Pu in arthropods to /sup 239/Pu in 0-3 cm soil at Rocky Flats was 9 x 10/sup -3/. Arthropod biomass and Pu concentration data indicated that only about 10/sup -8/ of the total plutonium inventory is in the arthropod component of the ecosystem. Leafhoppers, grasshoppers and spiders accounted for roughly 80% of the arthropod inventory of /sup 239/Pu.

  12. Plutonium concentrations in arthropods at a nuclear facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bly, J.A.; Whicker, F.W.

    1979-01-01

    Arthropods were collected for 239 240 Pu ( 239 Pu) and 238 Pu analysis from three study plots in close proximity to the Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant and from a site 110 km N-NE of the plant. Mean 239 Pu concentrations in arthropods were 265, 16, 0.7 and 0.5 dis/min g -1 at the three Rocky Flats study plots and at the control site, respectively. Arthropod 239 Pu concentration data were statistically analyzed by season of collection, taxonomic group, and sampling site. Only the collection site differences were significant (α = 0.01) and these were correlated with 239 Pu concentrations in soil. The mean activity ratio of 239 Pu to 238 Pu in arthropods was 52, similar to the value of 51 obtained for soil. The mean ratio of 239 Pu in arthropods to 239 Pu in 0-3 cm soil at Rocky Flats was 9 x 10 -3 . Arthropod biomass and Pu concentration data indicated that only about 10 -8 of the total plutonium inventory is in the arthropod component of the ecosystem. Leafhoppers, grasshoppers and spiders accounted for roughly 80% of the arthropod inventory of 239 Pu. (author)

  13. Technical considerations and policy requirements for plutonium management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Christensen, D.C.; Dinehart, S.M.; Yarbro, S.L.

    1995-01-01

    The goals for plutonium management have changed dramatically over the past few years. Today, the challenge is focused on isolating plutonium from the environment and preparing it for permanent disposition. In parallel, the requirements for managing plutonium are rapidly changing. For example, there is a significant increase in public awareness on how facilities operate, increased attention to environmental safety and health (ES and H) concerns, greater interest in minimizing waste, more emphasis on protecting material from theft, providing materials for international inspection, and a resurgence of interest in using plutonium as an energy source. Of highest concern, in the immediate future, is protecting plutonium from theft or diversion, while the national policy on disposition is debated. These expanded requirements are causing a broadening of responsibilities within the Department of Energy (DOE) to include at least seven organizations. An unavoidable consequence is the divergence in approach and short-term goals for managing similar materials within each organization. The technology base does exist, properly, safely, and cost effectively to extract plutonium from excess weapons, residues, waste, and contaminated equipment and facilities, and to properly stabilize it. Extracting the plutonium enables it to be easily inventoried, packaged, and managed to minimize the risk of theft and diversion. Discarding excess plutonium does not sufficiently reduce the risk of diversion, and as a result, long-term containment of plutonium from the environment may not be able to be proven to the satisfaction of the public

  14. Technical considerations and policy requirements for plutonium management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Christensen, D.C.; Dinehart, S.M.; Yarbro, S.L.

    1996-01-01

    The goals for plutonium management have changed dramatically over the past few years. Today, the challenge is focused on isolating plutonium from the environment and preparing it for permanent disposition. In parallel, the requirements for managing plutonium are rapidly changing. For example, there is a significant increase in public awareness on how facilities operate, increased attention to environmental safety and health (ES and H) concerns, greater interest in minimizing waste, more emphasis on protecting material from theft, providing materials for international inspection, and a resurgence of interest in using plutonium as an energy source. Of highest concern, in the immediate future, is protecting plutonium from theft or diversion, while the national policy on disposition is debated. These expanded requirements are causing a broadening of responsibilities within the Department of Energy (DOE) to include at least seven organizations. An unavoidable consequence is the divergence in approach and short-term goals for managing similar materials within each organization. The technology base does exist, properly, safely, and cost effectively to extract plutonium from excess weapons, residues, waste, and contaminated equipment and facilities, and to properly stabilize it. Extracting the plutonium enables it to be easily inventoried, packaged, and managed to minimize the risk of theft and diversion. Discarding excess plutonium does not sufficient reduce the risk of diversion, and as a result, long-term containment of plutonium from the environment may not be able to be proven to the satisfaction of the public

  15. Review of Sodium and Plutonium related Technical Standards in Trans-Uranium Fuel Fabrication Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jang, Misuk; Jeon, Jong Seon; Kang, Hyun Sik; Kim, Seoung Rae

    2016-01-01

    In this paper, we would introduce and review technical standards related to sodium fire and plutonium criticality safety. This paper may be helpful to identify considerations in the development of equipment, standards, and etc., to meet the safety requirements in the design, construction and operating of TFFF, KAPF and SFR. The feasibility and conceptual designs are being examined on related facilities, for example, TRU Fuel Fabrication Facilities (TFFF), Korea Advanced Pyro-process Facility (KAPF), and Sodium Cooled Fast Reactor (SFR), in Korea. However, the safety concerns of these facilities have been controversial in part because of the Sodium fire accident and Plutonium related radiation safety caused by transport and handling accident. Thus, many researches have been performed to ensure safety and various documents including safety requirements have been developed. In separating and reducing the long-lived radioactive transuranic(TRU) in the spent nuclear fuel, reusing as the potential energy of uranium fuel resources and reducing the high level wastes, TFFF would be receiving the attention of many people. Thus, people would wonder whether compliance with technical standards that ensures safety. For new facility design, one of the important tasks is to review of technical standards, especially for sodium and Plutonium because of water related highly reactive characteristics and criticality hazard respectively. We have introduced and reviewed two important technical standards for TFFF, which are sodium fire and plutonium criticality safety, in this paper. This paper would provide a brief guidance, about how to start and what is important, to people who are responsible for the initial design to operation of TFFF

  16. Review of Sodium and Plutonium related Technical Standards in Trans-Uranium Fuel Fabrication Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jang, Misuk; Jeon, Jong Seon; Kang, Hyun Sik; Kim, Seoung Rae [NESS, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    In this paper, we would introduce and review technical standards related to sodium fire and plutonium criticality safety. This paper may be helpful to identify considerations in the development of equipment, standards, and etc., to meet the safety requirements in the design, construction and operating of TFFF, KAPF and SFR. The feasibility and conceptual designs are being examined on related facilities, for example, TRU Fuel Fabrication Facilities (TFFF), Korea Advanced Pyro-process Facility (KAPF), and Sodium Cooled Fast Reactor (SFR), in Korea. However, the safety concerns of these facilities have been controversial in part because of the Sodium fire accident and Plutonium related radiation safety caused by transport and handling accident. Thus, many researches have been performed to ensure safety and various documents including safety requirements have been developed. In separating and reducing the long-lived radioactive transuranic(TRU) in the spent nuclear fuel, reusing as the potential energy of uranium fuel resources and reducing the high level wastes, TFFF would be receiving the attention of many people. Thus, people would wonder whether compliance with technical standards that ensures safety. For new facility design, one of the important tasks is to review of technical standards, especially for sodium and Plutonium because of water related highly reactive characteristics and criticality hazard respectively. We have introduced and reviewed two important technical standards for TFFF, which are sodium fire and plutonium criticality safety, in this paper. This paper would provide a brief guidance, about how to start and what is important, to people who are responsible for the initial design to operation of TFFF.

  17. Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan for the Plutonium Finishing Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    FRAZIER, T.P.

    1999-01-01

    A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the U. S. Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether these systems are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. To ensure the long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems, an update to this facility effluent monitoring plan is required whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document is reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and is updated, at a minimum, every 3 years

  18. Implementation of safeguards and security for fissile materials disposition reactor alternative facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jaeger, C.D.; Duggan, R.A.; Tolk, K.M.

    1995-01-01

    A number of different disposition alternatives are being considered and include facilities which provide for long-ten-n and interim storage, convert and stabilize fissile materials for other disposition alternatives, immobilize fissile material in glass and/or ceramic material, fabricate fissile material into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for reactors, use reactor based technologies to convert material into spent fuel, and dispose of fissile material using a number of geologic alternatives. Particular attention will be given to the reactor alternatives which include existing, partially completed, advanced or evolutionary LWRs and CANDU reactors. The various reactor alternatives are all very similar and include processing which converts Pu to a usable form for fuel fabrication, a MOX fuel fab facility located in either the US or in Europe, US LWRs or the CANDU reactors and ultimate disposal of spent fuel in a geologic repository. This paper focuses on how the objectives of reducing security risks and strengthening arms reduction and nonproliferation will be accomplished and the possible impacts of meeting these objectives on facility operations and design. Some of the areas in this paper include: (1) domestic and international safeguards requirements, (2) non-proliferation criteria and measures, (3) the threat, and (4) potential proliferation risks, the impacts on the facilities, and safeguards and security issues unique to the presence of Category 1 or strategic special nuclear material

  19. Seismic risk analysis for General Electric Plutonium Facility, Pleasanton, California

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    This report presents the results of a seismic risk analysis that focuses on all possible sources of seismic activity, with the exception of the postulated Verona Fault. The best estimate curve indicates that the Vallecitos facility will experience 30% g with a return period of roughly 130 years and 60% g with a return period of roughly 700 years

  20. Stack released plutonium in the environment of a nuclear fuel reprocessing facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Horton, J.H.; Sanders, S.M.; Corey, J.C.

    1979-01-01

    Chemical separations facilities at the Savannah River Plant have released very small quantities of plutonium to the environment since 1955. Characterization studies of airborne particulates from the process stack show that the plutonium is nearly always attached to nonradioactive particles. The geometric mean diameter of plutonium-bearing particulates in the stack gas is 5.43 μm. Most of the particles contain less than 10 -15 Ci of 239 Pu. Studies with cascade impactors 1.1 m above the ground indicated that the average annual air concentration was 612 x 10 -18 Ci/m 3 (less than 0.1% of the maximum permissible concentration recommended by the ICRP). Cropping studies showed plutonium concentrations of 3 x 10 -3 pCi/g in wheat, 5.5 x 10 -4 in soybeans, and 1.7 x 10 -4 in corn. The 70-year dose-to-bone from ingesting 10 5 g of grain would be less than 1 mrem

  1. Plutonium reclamation facility (PRF, building 236-Z) layup plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ANDERSON, R.N.

    1999-01-01

    This document reviews each system inside PRF to determine the operation and maintenance requirements necessary to maintain safe and predictable system performance for facility systems needed to remain operational while minimizing the maintenance and surveillance being performed. Also covered are the actions required to place PRF in a safe layup configuration while minimizing hazards and taking into account the need for reactivation of certain equipment when cleanup work commences in the future

  2. Applications of inventory difference tool at Los Alamos Plutonium Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hench, K.W.; Longmire, V.; Yarbro, T.F.; Zardecki, A.

    1998-01-01

    A prototype computer program reads the inventory entries directly from the Microsoft Access database. Based on historical data, the program then displays temporal trends and constructs a library of rules that encapsulate the system behavior. The analysis of inventory data is illustrated using a combination of realistic and simulated facility examples. Potential payoffs of this methodology include a reduction in time and resources needed to perform statistical tests and a broad applicability to DOE needs such as treaty verification

  3. Inventory difference analysis at Los Alamos Plutonium Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zardecki, A.; Armstrong, J.M.; Longmire, V.; Strittmatter, R.B.

    1997-01-01

    The authors have developed a prototype computer program that reads directly the inventory entries from a Microsoft Access data base. Based on historical data, the program then displays temporal trends and constructs a library of rules that encapsulates the system behavior. The following analysis of inventory data is illustrated by using a combination of realistic and simulated facility examples. Potential payoffs of this methodology include a reduction in time and resources needed to perform statistical tests and broad applicability to Department of Energy needs--for example, treaty verification

  4. Disposition of Uranium -233 (sup 233U) in Plutonium Metal and Oxide at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Freiboth, Cameron J.; Gibbs, Frank E.

    2000-01-01

    This report documents the position that the concentration of Uranium-233 ( 233 U) in plutonium metal and oxide currently stored at the DOE Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS) is well below the maximum permissible stabilization, packaging, shipping and storage limits. The 233 U stabilization, packaging and storage limit is 0.5 weight percent (wt%), which is also the shipping limit maximum. These two plutonium products (metal and oxide) are scheduled for processing through the Building 371 Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging System (PuSPS). This justification is supported by written technical reports, personnel interviews, and nuclear material inventories, as compiled in the ''History of Uranium-233 ( 233 U) Processing at the Rocky Flats Plant In Support of the RFETS Acceptable Knowledge Program'' RS-090-056, April 1, 1999. Relevant data from this report is summarized for application to the PuSPS metal and oxide processing campaigns

  5. Containers for short-term storage of nuclear materials at the Los Alamos plutonium facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hagan, R.; Gladson, J.

    1997-01-01

    The Los Alamos Plutonium Facility for the past 18 yr has stored nuclear samples for archiving and in support of nuclear materials research and processing programs. In the past several years, a small number of storage containers have been found in a deteriorated condition. A failed plutonium container can cause personnel contamination exposure and expensive physical area decontamination. Containers are stored in a physically secure radiation area vault, making close inspection costly in the form of personnel radiation exposure and work time. A moderate number of these containers are used in support of plutonium processing and must withstand daily handling abuse. A 2-yr evaluation of failed containers and those that have shown no deterioration has been conducted. Based on that study, a program was established to formalize our packing methods and materials and standardize the size and shape of containers that are used for short-term use. A standardized set of containers was designed, evaluated, tested, and procured for use in the facility. This paper reviews our vault storage problems, shows some failed containers, and presents our planned solutions to provide safe and secure containment of nuclear materials

  6. International and institutional aspects of reprocessing and plutonium management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-09-01

    Various institutional alternatives applicable to reprocessing, plutonium management and recycle are considered, not as a definitive analysis but rather as a basis for identifying the institutional approaches and measures which the Working Group might wish to examine more thoroughly. Seven alternatives arrangements for reprocessing are presented. These range from suspending the operation of existing reprocessing plants through placing national facilities under safeguards to limiting reprocessing to a few large facilities subject to plutonium management, multinational or international control. Finally, the comprehensive alternative of an International Nuclear Fuel Authority with worldwide responsibility for reprocessing and plutonium management is considered. Plutonium management alternatives to complement the reprocessing options, are then outlined. These include national discretion on the separation and disposition of plutonium under safeguards, an agreed Code of Practice for plutonium management at national facilities and the international storage of plutonium. The advantages and disadvantages of the alternative are discussed tentatively. It is recognised that the alternatives are presented in a simplified form and that their elements can be combined or separated in many ways. Although strengthening the institutions relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is imperative and can contribute to non-proliferation, such arrangements might open other proliferation risks through the spread of sensitive materials, facilities and technology. While there are risks with any fuel cycle, where plutonium in quantity is separated these risks are of a high order. Although these can be mitigated, they will have to be set against the energy and economic case for reprocessing and alternatives other than plutonium considered

  7. Seismic qualification of equipment for the TA-55 Plutonium Processing Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pellette, P.R.; Endebrock, E.G.; Giles, P.M.; Shaw, R.H.

    1977-04-01

    The techniques employed by the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL) for the seismic qualification of internal equipment for the TA-55 Plutonium Facility are discussed. The structural analysis of the plutonium building and critical associated structures was performed by the Architect-Engineer (A-E), and the calculations were checked by LASL. The specifications and procedures used by LASL produced dramatic improvement in the responses by qualified vendors to the seismic requirements. There was an increase from about a 20% bid ratio to greater than 90% because prospective vendors could be competitive without having had previous seismic experience with their equipment. The equipment seismic qualification for TA-55 is in compliance with the Code of Federal Regulations, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Guides, Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) Manual Chapters and Appendices, and Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) Standard 344

  8. Installation places of criticality accident detectors in the plutonium conversion development facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanada, Yukihisa; Tsujimura, Norio; Shimizu, Yoshio; Izaki, Kenji; Furuta, Sadaaki

    2008-01-01

    At the Plutonium Conversion Development Facility (PCDF) in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Engineering Laboratories, the co-conversion technologies to purify the mixed plutonium and uranium nitrate solution discharged from a reprocessing plant have been developed. The probability of a criticality accident in PCDF is extremely low. However, the criticality accident alarm system (CAAS) has been in place since 1982 to reduce the radiation dose to workers in case of such a rare criticality accident. The CAAS contains criticality accident detector units (CADs), one unit consisting of three plastic scintillation detectors, and using the 2 out of 3 voting system for the purpose of high reliability. Currently, eight CADs are installed in PCDF evaluating the dose using a simple equation allowing for a safety margin. The purpose of this study is to show the determination procedures for the adequate relocation of the CADs which adequately ensures safety in PCDF. (author)

  9. Engineering evaluation/cost analysis for the 233-S Plutonium Concentration Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rugg, J.E.

    1996-08-01

    The 100, 200, 300 and 1100 Areas of the Hanford Site were placed on the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency's National Priorities List in November 1989 under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). Located in the 200 Area is the deactivated 233-S Plutonium Concentration Facility (used in the REDOX process). The facility has undergone severe degradation due to exposure to extreme weather conditions. An expedited response is proposed to ensure protection of human health and the environment. The Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL) in cooperation with the Washington State Department of Ecology, has prepared this Engineering Evaluation/Cost Analysis pursuant to CERCLA. Based on the evaluation, RL has determined that hazardous substances in the 233-S Facility may present a potential threat to human health or the environment, and that an expedited removal action is warranted for decommissioning of the facility

  10. Implementation of the DYMAC system at the new Los Alamos Plutonium Processing Facility. Phase II report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Malanify, J.J.; Amsden, D.C.

    1982-08-01

    The DYnamic Materials ACcountability System - called DYMAC - performs accountability functions at the new Los Alamos Plutonium Processing Facility where it began operation when the facility opened in January 1978. A demonstration program, DYMAC was designed to collect and assess inventory information for safeguards purposes. It accomplishes 75% of its design goals. DYMAC collects information about the physical inventory through deployment of nondestructive assay instrumentation and video terminals throughout the facility. The information resides in a minicomputer where it can be immediately sorted and displayed on the video terminals or produced in printed form. Although the capability now exists to assess the collected data, this portion of the program is not yet implemented. DYMAC in its present form is an excellent tool for process and quality control. The facility operator relies on it exclusively for keeping track of the inventory and for complying with accountability requirements of the US Department of Energy.

  11. Implementation of the DYMAC system at the new Los Alamos Plutonium Processing Facility. Phase II report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Malanify, J.J.; Amsden, D.C.

    1982-08-01

    The DYnamic Materials ACcountability System - called DYMAC - performs accountability functions at the new Los Alamos Plutonium Processing Facility where it began operation when the facility opened in January 1978. A demonstration program, DYMAC was designed to collect and assess inventory information for safeguards purposes. It accomplishes 75% of its design goals. DYMAC collects information about the physical inventory through deployment of nondestructive assay instrumentation and video terminals throughout the facility. The information resides in a minicomputer where it can be immediately sorted and displayed on the video terminals or produced in printed form. Although the capability now exists to assess the collected data, this portion of the program is not yet implemented. DYMAC in its present form is an excellent tool for process and quality control. The facility operator relies on it exclusively for keeping track of the inventory and for complying with accountability requirements of the US Department of Energy

  12. Safety analysis report upgrade program at the Plutonium Facility, Los Alamos National Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pan, P.Y.

    1993-01-01

    Plutonium research and development activities have resided at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) since 1943. The function of the Plutonium Facility (PF-4) has been to perform basic special nuclear materials research and development and to support national defense and energy programs. The original Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for PF-4 was approved by DOE in 1978. This FSAR analyzed design-basis and bounding accidents. In 1986, DOE/AL published DOE/AL Order 5481.1B, ''Safety Analysis and Review System'', as a requirement for preparation and review of safety analyses. To meet the new DOE requirements, the Facilities Management Group of the Nuclear Material Technology Division submitted a draft FSAR to DOE for approval in April 1991. This draft FSAR analyzed the new configurations and used a limited-scope probabilistic risk analysis for accident analysis. During the DOE review of the draft FSAR, DOE Order 5480.23 ''Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports'', was promulgated and was later officially released in April 1992. The new order significantly expands the scope, preparation, and maintenance efforts beyond those required in DOE/AL Order 5481.1B by requiring: description of institutional and human-factor safety programs; clear definitions of all facility-specific safety commitments; more comprehensive and detailed hazard assessment; use of new safety analysis methods; and annual updates of FSARs. This paper describes the safety analysis report (SAR) upgrade program at the Plutonium Facility in LANL. The SAR upgrade program is established to meet the requirements in DOE Order 5480.23. Described in this paper are the SAR background, authorization basis for operations, hazard classification, and technical program elements

  13. Site Selection for the Salt Disposition Facility at the Savannah River Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gladden, J.B.; Rueter, K.J.; Morin, J.P.

    2000-01-01

    A site selection study was conducted to identify a suitable location for the construction and operation of a new Salt Disposition Facility (SDF) at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The facility to be sited is a single processing facility and support buildings that could house either of three technology alternatives being developed by the High Level Waste Systems Engineering Team: Small Tank Tetraphenylborate Precipitation, Crystalline Silicotitanate Non-Elutable Ion Exchange or Caustic Side Solvent Extraction. A fourth alternative, Direct Disposal in grout, is not part of the site selection study because a location has been identified that is unique to this technology (i.e., Z-Area). Facility site selection at SRS is a formal, documented process that seeks to optimize siting of new facilities with respect to facility-specific engineering requirements, sensitive environmental resources, and applicable regulatory requirements. In this manner, the prime objectives of cost minimization, environmental protection, and regulatory compliance are achieved. The results from this geotechnical characterization indicated that continued consideration be given to Site B for the proposed SDF. Suitable topography, the lack of surface hydrology and floodplain issues, no significant groundwater contamination, the presence of minor soft zones along the northeast portion of footprint, and no apparent geological structure in the Gordon Aquitard support this recommendation

  14. Proliferation resistance criteria for fissile material disposition issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rutherford, D.A.; Fearey, B.L.; Markin, J.T.; Close, D.A.; Tolk, K.M.; Mangan, D.L.; Moore, L.

    1995-01-01

    The 1994 National Acdaemy of Sciences study ''Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium'' defined options for reducing the national and international proliferation risks of materials declared excess to the nuclear weapons program. This paper proposes criteria for assessing the proliferation resistance of these options as well defining the ''Standards'' from the report. The criteria are general, encompassing all stages of the disposition process from storage through intermediate processing to final disposition including the facilities, processing technologies and materials, the level of safeguards for these materials, and the national/subnational threat to the materials

  15. Results of Active Test of Uranium-Plutonium Co-denitration Facility at Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Numao, Teruhiko; Nakayashiki, Hiroshi; Arai, Nobuyuki; Miura, Susumu; Takahashi, Yoshiharu; Nakamura, Hironobu; Tanaka, Izumi

    2007-01-01

    In the U-Pu co-denitration facility at Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP), Active Test which composes of 5 steps was performed by using uranium-plutonium nitrate solution that was extracted from spent fuels. During Active Test, two kinds of tests were performed in parallel. One was denitration performance test in denitration ovens, and expected results were successfully obtained. The other was validation and calibration of non-destructive assay (NDA) systems, and expected performances were obtained and their effectiveness as material accountancy and safeguards system was validated. (authors)

  16. Upgrading a 1944 plutonium-extraction plant to a modern decontamination facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wills, C.E.; Millikin, R.M.; Cruz, E.A.

    1993-10-01

    The Hanford Site, located in south-central Washington State, is currently undergoing extensive modifications as its mission changes from defense material production to one of waste management and environmental restoration. Starting in World War II, Hanford's mission for over four decades was the production of plutonium for defense needs. With the removal of such defense requirements over the last several years, the Hanford Site has refocused its efforts on the issues of cleanup and safety. The T Plant Complex is the first of the existing facilities to begin conversion from the old mission to the new. This conversion process and associated problems are described

  17. Engineering evaluation/cost analysis for the 233-S Plutonium Concentration Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    The deactivated 233-S Plutonium Concentration Facility (233-S Facility) is located in the 200 Area. The facility has undergone severe degradation due to exposure to extreme weather conditions. A rapid freeze and thaw cycle occurred at the Hanford Site during February 1996, which caused cracking to occur on portions of the building's roof. This has resulted in significantly infiltration of water into the facility, which provides a pathway for potential release of radioactive material into the environment (air and/or ground). The weather caused several existing cracks in the concrete portions of the structure to lengthen, increasing the potential for failed confinement of the radioactive material in the building. Differential settlement has also occurred, causing portions of the facility to separate from the main building structure thus creating a potential for release of radioactive material t the environment. An expedited removal action is proposed to ensure that a release from the 233-S Facility does not occur. The US Department of Energy (DOE), Richland Operations Office (RL), in cooperation with the EPA, has prepared this Engineering Evaluation/Cost Analysis (EE/CA) pursuant to CERCLA. Based on the evaluation, RL has determined that hazardous substances in the 233-S Facility may present a potential threat to human health and/or the environment, and that an expedited removal action is warranted. The purpose of the EE/CA is to provide the framework for the evaluation and selection of a technology from a viable set of alternatives for a removal action

  18. Chemical and Radiochemical Composition of Thermally Stabilized Plutonium Oxide from the Plutonium Finishing Plant Considered as Alternate Feedstock for the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tingey, Joel M.; Jones, Susan A.

    2005-01-01

    Eighteen plutonium oxide samples originating from the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) on the Hanford Site were analyzed to provide additional data on the suitability of PFP thermally stabilized plutonium oxides and Rocky Flats oxides as alternate feedstock to the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). Radiochemical and chemical analyses were performed on fusions, acid leaches, and water leaches of these 18 samples. The results from these destructive analyses were compared with nondestructive analyses (NDA) performed at PFP and the acceptance criteria for the alternate feedstock. The plutonium oxide materials considered as alternate feedstock at Hanford originated from several different sources including Rocky Flats oxide, scrap from the Remote Mechanical C-Line (RMC) and the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF), and materials from other plutonium conversion processes at Hanford. These materials were received at PFP as metals, oxides, and solutions. All of the material considered as alternate feedstock was converted to PuO2 and thermally stabilized by heating the PuO2 powder at 950 C in an oxidizing environment. The two samples from solutions were converted to PuO2 by precipitation with Mg(OH)2. The 18 plutonium oxide samples were grouped into four categories based on their origin. The Rocky Flats oxide was divided into two categories, low- and high-chloride Rocky Flats oxides. The other two categories were PRF/RMC scrap oxides, which included scrap from both process lines and oxides produced from solutions. The two solution samples came from samples that were being tested at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory because all of the plutonium oxide from solutions at PFP had already been processed and placed in 3013 containers. These samples originated at the PFP and are from plutonium nitrate product and double-pass filtrate solutions after they had been thermally stabilized. The other 16 samples originated from thermal stabilization batches before canning at

  19. Current developments of fuel fabrication technologies at the plutonium fuel production facility, PFPF

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Asakura, K.; Aono, S.; Yamaguchi, T.; Deguchi, M.

    2000-01-01

    The Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute, JNC, designed, constructed and has operated the Plutonium Fuel Production Facility, PFPF, at the JNC Tokai Works to supply MOX fuels to the proto-type Fast Breeder Reactor, FBR, 'MONJU' and the experimental FBR 'JOYO' with 5 tonMOX/year of fabrication capability. Reduction of personal radiation exposure to a large amount of plutonium is one of the most important subjects in the development of MOX fabrication facility on a large scale. As the solution of this issue, the PFPF has introduced automated and/or remote controlled equipment in conjunction with computer controlled operation scheme. The PFPF started its operation in 1988 with JOYO reload fuel fabrication and has demonstrated MOX fuel fabrication on a large scale through JOYO and MONJU fuel fabrication for this decade. Through these operations, it has become obvious that several numbers of equipment initially installed in the PFPF need improvements in their performance and maintenance for commercial utilization of plutonium in the future. Furthermore, fuel fabrication of low density MOX pellets adopted in the MONJU fuel required a complete inspection because of difficulties in pellet fabrication compared with high density pellet for JOYO. This paper describes new pressing equipment with a powder recovery system, and pellet finishing and inspection equipment which has multiple functions, such as grinding measurements of outer diameter and density, and inspection of appearance to improve efficiency in the pellet finishing and inspection steps. Another development of technology concerning an annular pellet and an innovative process for MOX fuel fabrication are also described in this paper. (author)

  20. Rough order of magnitude cost estimate for immobilization of 18.2 MT of plutonium sharing existing facilities at Hanford with MOX fuel fabrication facility: alternative 4B

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DiSabatino, A.

    1998-01-01

    The purpose of this Cost Estimate Report is to identify preliminary capital and operating costs for a facility to immobilize 18.2 metric tons (nominal) of plutonium as a ceramic in an existing facility at Hanford, the Fuels and Materials Examination Facility (FMEF). The MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF), which is being costed in a separate report, will also be located in the FMEF in this co-location option

  1. Rough order of magnitude cost estimate for immobilization of 50 MT of plutonium sharing existing facilities at Hanford with pit disassembly and conversion facility: alternative 11

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DiSabatino, A.

    1998-01-01

    The purpose of this Cost Estimate Report is to identify preliminary capital and operating costs for a facility to immobilize 50 metric tons (nominal) of plutonium as a ceramic in an existing facility at Hanford, the Fuels and Materials Examination Facility (FMEF). The Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF), which is being costed in a separate report by LANL, will also be located in the FMEF in this co-location option

  2. Safeguardability of the vitrification option for disposal of plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pillay, K.K.S. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)

    1996-05-01

    Safeguardability of the vitrification option for plutonium disposition is rather complex and there is no experience base in either domestic or international safeguards for this approach. In the present treaty regime between the US and the states of the former Soviet Union, bilaterial verifications are considered more likely with potential for a third-party verification of safeguards. There are serious technological limitations to applying conventional bulk handling facility safeguards techniques to achieve independent verification of plutonium in borosilicate glass. If vitrification is the final disposition option chosen, maintaining continuity of knowledge of plutonium in glass matrices, especially those containing boron and those spike with high-level wastes or {sup 137}Cs, is beyond the capability of present-day safeguards technologies and nondestructive assay techniques. The alternative to quantitative measurement of fissile content is to maintain continuity of knowledge through a combination of containment and surveillance, which is not the international norm for bulk handling facilities.

  3. Engineering study of generic site criteria for selected DOE plutonium facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kingsbury, R.J.; Greenwood, J.M.; Sandoval, M.D.

    1980-09-01

    The objectives of this study were to identify criteria that would be applied to selection of a site for plutonium facilities such as those at the Rocky Flats Plant, to establish the relative importance of these criteria, and to identify suitable areas within the United States for location of plutonium facilities with respect to these criteria. Sources of the site criteria identified include federal laws, federal agency regulations, state laws and regulations, and requirements associated with operations to be performed at the site. The criteria identified during the study were organized into 14 major categories. The relative importnace of each category and each criterion within the categories were established using group decision-making techniques. The major criteria categories, their assigned weight on a scale of 1 to 10, and their relative priority ranks are as follows: geology/seismicity; public safety; environmental impact; meteorology; hydrology; topography; transportation; utilities; personnel; safeguards/security; land area and availability; land use compatibility; and, public acceptance. A suitability analysis of the continental United States was performed using only those criteria that could be mapped at a national scale. Suitability was assessed with respect to each of these criteria, and individual suitability maps were prepared. A composite suitability map was generated using computerized overlay techniques. This map provides a starting point for identifying specific candidate sites if an actual site selection were to be conducted

  4. Independent Review of Siesmic Performance Assessments for the Plutonium Facility PF-4

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Whittaker, Andrew [State Univ. of New York (SUNY), Buffalo, NY (United States); Goen, Lawrence Kenneth [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Kennedy, Robert [RPK Structural Mechanics, San Diego, CA (United States); McDonald, Brian [Exponent, Los Angeles, CA (United States); Morgan, Troy [Exponent, Los Angeles, CA (United States); Wyllie, Loring [Degenkolb Engineers, San Francisco, CA (United States)

    2015-11-25

    The Plutonium Facility, designated PF-4, is located in Technical Area 55 at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The facility is a one-story rectangular structure above a complete basement; the building was constructed of cast-in-place reinforced concrete, with small interior frames of structural steel. The plan dimensions of the building are 265’×284’. The overall height of the building varies between 39’-0” at the north and south ends, and 40’-6” at the center ridge. The programmatic work performed in the building is vital to our national security and its functions and storage purposes are not replicated elsewhere in the United States Department of Energy (DOE).

  5. Final characterization report for the non-process areas of the 233-S Plutonium Concentration Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Encke, D.B.; Harris, R.A.

    1997-04-01

    This report addresses the 233-S Plutonium Concentration Facility characterization survey data collected from January 21, 1997 through February 3, 1997. The characterization activities evaluated the radiological status and identified the hazardous materials locations. The scope of this report is limited to the nonprocess areas in the facility, which include the special work permit (SWP) change room, toilet, equipment room, electrical cubicle, control room, and pipe gallery. A portion of the roof (excluding the roof over the process hood and viewing room) was also included. Information in this report will be used to identify waste streams, provide specific chemical and radiological data to aid in planning decontamination and demolition activities, and allow proper disposal of the demolition debris, as required by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980

  6. Integrated development and testing plan for the plutonium immobilization project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kan, T.

    1998-01-01

    This integrated plan for the DOE Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (MD) describes the technology development and major project activities necessary to support the deployment of the immobilization approach for disposition of surplus weapons-usable plutonium. The plan describes details of the development and testing (D and T) tasks needed to provide technical data for design and operation of a plutonium immobilization plant based on the ceramic can-in-canister technology (''Immobilization Fissile Material Disposition Program Final Immobilization Form Assessment and Recommendation'', UCRL-ID-128705, October 3, 1997). The plan also presents tasks for characterization and performance testing of the immobilization form to support a repository licensing application and to develop the basis for repository acceptance of the plutonium form. Essential elements of the plant project (design, construction, facility activation, etc.) are described, but not developed in detail, to indicate how the D and T results tie into the overall plant project. Given the importance of repository acceptance, specific activities to be conducted by the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (RW) to incorporate the plutonium form in the repository licensing application are provided in this document, together with a summary of how immobilization D and T activities provide input to the license activity. The ultimate goal of the Immobilization Project is to develop, construct, and operate facilities that will immobilize from about 18 to 50 tonnes (MT) of U.S. surplus weapons usable plutonium materials in a manner that meets the ''spent fuel'' standard (Fissile Materials Storage and Disposition Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement Record of Decision, ''Storage and Disposition Final PEIS'', issued January 14, 1997, 62 Federal Register 3014) and is acceptable for disposal in a geologic repository. In the can-in-canister technology, this is accomplished by encapsulating the

  7. Rough order of magnitude cost estimate for immobilization of 50MT of plutonium using new facilities at the Savannah River site: alternative 12A

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DiSabatino, A.

    1998-01-01

    The purpose of this Cost Estimate Report is to identify preliminary capital and operating costs for a facility to immobilize 50 metric tons of plutonium using ceramic in a new facility at Savannah River Site (SRS)

  8. Rough order of magnitude cost estimate for immobilization of 50 MT of plutonium using existing facilities at the Savannah River site: alternative 12B

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DiSabatino, A.

    1998-01-01

    The purpose of this Cost Estimate Report is to identify preliminary capital and operating costs for a facility to immobilize 50 metric tons of plutonium using ceramic in an existing facility (221-F) at an Savannah River Site (SRS)

  9. Options for the disposition of current inventory of Rocky Flats Plant residues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chang, Lychin.

    1994-01-01

    With the end of the Cold War, much concern has been directed towards the accumulation of special nuclear material resulting from the dismantlement of a large number of nuclear weapons. This concern has opened up a debate over the final disposition of the large inventory of weapons-capable plutonium. Technologies for the conversion of plutonium into acceptable forms will need to be assessed and evaluated. Candidate strategies for interim and final disposition include a variety of immobilization techniques (vitrification in glass, ceramic, or metal), conversion to reactor fuel, or direct discard as waste. The selected disposition strategy will be chosen based upon a range of decision metric such as expected conversion costs, equipment requirements, and waste generation. To this end, a systems analysis approach is necessary for the evaluation and comparison of the different disposition strategies. Current data on inventory of plutonium, such as that at the Rocky Flats Plant (RFP), may be useful for the evaluation and selection of candidate disposition technologies. A preliminary analysis of the residues of scrap at Rocky Flats was performed to establish a foundation for comparison of candidate strategies. About 3 metric tons of plutonium and 270 metric tons of other wastes remain in the inventory at Rocky Flats. Estimates on the equipment, facility, manpower, and cost requirements to process this inventory over a proposed 10-year cleanup campaign will provide a benchmark for comparison and assessment of proposed disposition technologies

  10. Options for the disposition of current inventory of Rocky Flats Plant residues. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chang, L.

    1994-01-01

    With the end of the Cold War, much concern has been directed towards the accumulation of special nuclear material resulting from the dismantlement of a large number of nuclear weapons. This concern has opened up a debate over the final disposition of the large inventory of weapons-capable plutonium. Technologies for the conversion of plutonium into acceptable forms will need to be assessed and evaluated. Candidate strategies for interim and final disposition include a variety of immobilization techniques (vitrification in glass, ceramic, or metal), conversion to reactor fuel, or direct discard as waste. The selected disposition strategy will be chosen based upon a range of decision metrics such as expected conversion costs, equipment requirements, and waste generation. To this end, a systems analysis approach is necessary for the evaluation and comparison of the different disposition strategies. Current data on inventory of plutonium, such as that at the Rocky Flats Plant (RFP), may be useful for the evaluation and selection of candidate disposition technologies. A preliminary analysis of the residues of scrap at Rocky Flats was performed to establish a foundation for comparison of candidate strategies. About 3 metric tons of plutonium and 270 metric tons of other wastes remain in the inventory at Rocky Flats. Estimates on the equipment, facility, manpower, and cost requirements to process this inventory over a proposed 10-year cleanup campaign will provide a benchmark for comparison and assessment of proposed disposition technologies

  11. Facility effluent monitoring plan for the plutonium-uranium extraction facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nickels, J.M.; Geiger, J.L.

    1992-11-01

    A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. A facility effluent monitoring plan determination was performed during Calendar Year 1991 and the evaluation requires the need for a facility effluent monitoring plan. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified. in. A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements

  12. Systems work for Plutonium Fuel Production Facility (PFPF) near-real-time accounting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Picard, R.R.; Hafer, J.F.; Pillay, K.K.S.; Takahashi, S.; Ohtani, T.; Eguchi, K.; Seya, M.

    1990-01-01

    A joint effort by the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation of Japan examines materials accounting for the Plutonium Fuel Production Facility. A unique feature of the systems work is a sophisticated data generator. This software follows individual items throughout the process, creating detailed data files for variance propagation. The data generator deals with user-specified process operations and handles related accounting problems, such as the tracking of individual measurements through numerous blending and splitting procedure, frequent decay correction (important for large inventories), scrap recovery, and automated determination of static inventory. There is no need to rely on simplified assumptions regarding process operation and material measurement. Also, the joint study applies recent theoretical work on stratified inspection of nonhomogeneous inventories and sequential analysis of MUF -- D. 4 refs

  13. Plutonium contents of broadleaf vegetable crops grown near a nuclear fuel chemical separations facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McLeod, K W; Alberts, J J; Adriano, D C; Pinder, III, J E

    1984-02-01

    Among agricultural crops, broadleaf vegetables are particularly prone to intercept and retain aerially released contaminants. The plutonium concentration of four broadleaf crops (broccoli, cabbage, lettuce and turnip greens) was determined, when grown in close proximity to a nuclear-fuel chemical-separations facility. Concentrations varied among species, apparently influenced by the crop morphology, with Pu concentrations increasing in the sequence: cabbage < broccoli < turnip greens < lettuce. Washing of the crops significantly reduced the Pu concentration of lettuce, but had no effect on Pu concentration of broccoli and cabbage. The vast majority of Pu found in the crops was due to direct deposition of recently released Pu and resuspension of Pu-bearing soil particles, and was not due to root uptake. Resultant doses from consumption are small relative to the annual background dose.

  14. System Definition Document: Reactor Data Necessary for Modeling Plutonium Disposition in Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ellis, R.J.

    2000-01-01

    The US Department of Energy (USDOE) has contracted with Duke Engineering and Services, Cogema, Inc., and Stone and Webster (DCS) to provide mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication and reactor irradiation services in support of USDOE's mission to dispose of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. The nuclear station units currently identified as mission reactors for this project are Catawba Units 1 and 2 and McGuire Units 1 and 2. This report is specific to Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2, but the details and materials for the McGuire reactors are very similar. The purpose of this document is to present a complete set of data about the reactor materials and components to be used in modeling the Catawba reactors to predict reactor physics parameters for the Catawba site. Except where noted, Duke Power Company or DCS documents are the sources of these data. These data are being used with the ORNL computer code models of the DCS Catawba (and McGuire) pressurized-water reactors

  15. Comparison of neutron dose measured by Albedo TLD and etched tracks detector at PNC plutonium fuel facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tsujimura, N.; Momose, T.; Shinohara, K.; Ishiguro, H.

    1996-01-01

    Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC) has fabricated Plutonium and Uranium Mixed OXide (MOX) fuel for FBR MONJU at Tokai works. In this site, PNC/Panasonic albedo TLDs/1/ are used for personnel neutron monitoring. And a part of workers wore Etched Tracks Detector (ETD) combined with TLD in order to check the accuracy of the neutron dose estimated by albedo TLD. In this paper, the neutron dose measured by TLD and ETD in the routine monitoring is compared at PNC plutonium fuel facilities. (author)

  16. Facility effluent monitoring plan for the plutonium-uranium extraction facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lohrasbi, J.; Johnson, D.L.; De Lorenzo, D.S.

    1993-12-01

    A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438-01. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan shall ensure long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updated at a minimum of every three years

  17. Facility effluent monitoring plan for the plutonium-uranium extraction facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thompson, R.J.; Sontage, S.

    1991-11-01

    A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan is the first annual report. It shall ensure long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updated as a minimum every three years

  18. Facility effluent monitoring plan for the plutonium-uranium extraction facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lohrasbi, J.; Johnson, D.L. [Westinghouse Hanford Co., Richland, WA (United States); De Lorenzo, D.S. [Los Alamos Technical Associates, NM (United States)

    1993-12-01

    A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the US Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This document is prepared using the specific guidelines identified in A Guide for Preparing Hanford Site Facility Effluent Monitoring Plans, WHC-EP-0438-01. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether they are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. This facility effluent monitoring plan shall ensure long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems by requiring an update whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document must be reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and it must be updated at a minimum of every three years.

  19. Preparations for decontamination and disposition of the Sodium Reactor Experiment (SRE) and other ERDA facilities at AI

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heine, W.F.; Graves, A.W.

    1975-01-01

    The program plan for the decontamination and disposition of facilities at the Sodium Reactor Experiment and other ERDA-owned, AI-operated, radioactive facilities is described. The program objective along with a description of each of the subject facilities is presented. A description of the organizational structure within supporting the program is given. The elements of planning required to prepare for the task are detailed, including the requirements for cost and schedule control. Progress to date and the future plans are presented. The available technology utilized in the program is described

  20. Noneconomic factors influencing scrap metal disposition decisions at DOE and NRC-licensed nuclear facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ewen, M.D.; Robinson, L.A.

    1997-02-01

    The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is currently developing radiation protection standards for scrap metal, which will establish criteria for the unconditional clearance of scrap from nuclear facilities. In support of this effort, Industrial Economics, Incorporated is assessing the costs and benefits attributable to the rulemaking. The first step in this analysis is to develop an in-depth understanding of the factors influencing scrap disposition decisions, so that one can predict current and future practices under existing requirements and compare them to the potential effects of EPA`s rulemaking. These baseline practices are difficult to predict due to a variety of factors. First, because decommissioning activities are just beginning at many sites, current practices do not necessarily provide an accurate indicator of how these practices may evolve as site managers gain experience with related decisions. Second, a number of different regulations and policies apply to these decisions, and the interactive effects of these requirements can be difficult to predict. Third, factors other than regulatory constraints and costs may have a significant effect on related decisions, such as concerns about public perceptions. In general, research suggests that these factors tend to discourage the unconditional clearance of scrap metal.

  1. Remediation Approach for the Integrated Facility Disposition Project at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kirk, P.G.; Stephens, Jr.J.M.

    2009-01-01

    The Integrated Facility Disposition Project (IFDP) is a multi-billion-dollar remediation effort being conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The scope of the IFDP encompasses remedial actions related to activities conducted over the past 65 years at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12). Environmental media and facilities became contaminated as a result of operations, leaks, spills, and past waste disposal practices. ORNL's mission includes energy, environmental, nuclear security, computational, and materials research and development. Remediation activities will be implemented at ORNL as part of IFDP scope to meet remedial action objectives established in existing and future decision documents. Remedial actions are necessary (1) to comply with environmental regulations to reduce human health and environmental risk and (2) to release strategic real estate needed for modernization initiatives at ORNL. The scope of remedial actions includes characterization, waste management, transportation and disposal, stream restoration, and final remediation of contaminated soils, sediments, and groundwater. Activities include removal of at or below-grade substructures such as slabs, underground utilities, underground piping, tanks, basins, pits, ducts, equipment housings, manholes, and concrete-poured structures associated with equipment housings and basement walls/floors/columns. Many interim remedial actions involving groundwater and surface water that have not been completed are included in the IFDP remedial action scope. The challenges presented by the remediation of Bethel Valley at ORNL are formidable. The proposed approach to remediation endeavors to use the best available technologies and technical approaches from EPA and other federal agencies and lessons learned from previous cleanup efforts. The objective is to minimize cost, maximize remedial

  2. Provision of NDA instrumentation for the control of operations on plutonium finishing and waste plants at the Sellafield nuclear fuel reprocessing facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitehouse, K.R.; Orr, C.H.

    1995-01-01

    On BNFL's Sellafield site a significant number of major plants are involved in the handling, processing and storage of plutonium in various forms including nitrate, oxide and mixed oxide (MOX). Other plants in operation or under construction treat and prepare for storage, plutonium bearing wastes in the form of plutonium contaminated materials -- PCM (transuranic waste -- TRU) or low level waste. Concurrently, a number of old plutonium handling plants are being decommissioned. The safety and cost effectiveness of these widely varying operations has been ensured by the development and installation of a wide range of special radiometric instrumentation. These systems based on a range of neutron counting and high resolution gamma spectrometric techniques -- singly or in combination -- enable BNFL to maintain a detailed and comprehensive picture of the disposition of plutonium within each plant and across the site. This paper describes an overview of the range of plant and paper prove waste measurement systems in this context, highlighting the specific roles of the Plutonium Inventory Measurement System (PIMS) for real time accountancy and the Decommissioning In-Situ Plutonium Inventory Monitor (DISPIM) for material control during decommissioning

  3. Fire protection considerations in the design of plutonium handling and storage facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blanchard, A.

    2000-01-01

    Unwanted fire in a facility that handles plutonium must be addressed early in the facility design. Such fires have the potential for transporting radioactive contamination throughout the building and widespread downwind dispersal. Features that mitigate such events can be severely challenged during the fire. High temperatures can cause storage containers to burst; a very efficient dispersal mechanism for radioactive contamination. The fire will also establish ventilation patterns that cause the migration of smoke and radioactive contamination throughout the facility. The smoke and soot generated by the fire will enter the exhaust system and travel to the filtration system where it will deposit on the filters. The quantity of smoke generated during a typical multi-room fire is expected to blind most High Efficiency Particulate Airfilter (HEPA) media. The blinding can have two possible outcomes. (1) The air movement though the facility is reduced, compromising the negative pressure containment and allowing contamination to leave the building though doors and other openings; or (2) the filters collapse allowing the contamination to bypass the filtration media and exit the building through the filter plenum. HEPA filter blinding during severe fires can be prevented or mitigated. Increasing the face surface area of HEPA filters will increase the smoke filtration capacity of the system, thus preventing blinding. As an alternative sandfilters can be provided to mitigate the effects of the HEPA filter bypass. Both concepts have distinct advantages. This paper will explore these two design concepts and two others; it will describe the design requirements necessary for each concept to prevent unacceptable contamination spread. The intent is to allow the filter media selection to be based on a comprehensive understanding of the four different design concepts

  4. Success in behaviour-based safety at Los Alamos National Laboratory's plutonium facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wieneke, R.E.; Balkey, J.J.; Kleinsteuber, J.F.

    2001-01-01

    Los Alamos National Laboratory's (LANL's) Plutonium Facility is responsible for a wide variety of actinide processing operations in support of the United States Department of Energy's (DOE's) stockpile stewardship of the nation's nuclear arsenal. Both engineered and administrative controls are used to mitigate hazards inherent in these activities. Nuclear facilities have engineered safety systems that are extensively evaluated and documented, and are monitored regularly for operability and performance. Personnel undergo comprehensive training, including annual recertification of their operations. They must thoroughly understand the hazards involved in their work and the controls that are in place to mitigate those hazards. A series of hazard-control plans and work instructions are used to define and authorize the work that is done. Primary hazards associated with chemicals and radioactive materials are well controlled with minimal risk to the workforce and public. The majority of injuries are physical or ergonomic in nature. In an effort to increase safety awareness and to decrease accidents and incidents, a program focusing on the identification and elimination of unsafe behaviours was initiated. Workers are trained on how to conduct safety observations and given guidance on specific behaviours to note. Observations are structured to have minimal impact upon workload and are shared by the entire workforce. This program has effectively decreased a low accident rate and will make long-term sustainability possible. (author)

  5. Success in behaviour-based safety at Los Alamos National Laboratory's plutonium facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wieneke, R E [Los Alamos National Laboratory, NMT Division, Los Alamos, NM (United States); Balkey, J J; Kleinsteuber, J F [Los Alamos National Laboratory, NMT Division, Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2001-07-01

    Los Alamos National Laboratory's (LANL's) Plutonium Facility is responsible for a wide variety of actinide processing operations in support of the United States Department of Energy's (DOE's) stockpile stewardship of the nation's nuclear arsenal. Both engineered and administrative controls are used to mitigate hazards inherent in these activities. Nuclear facilities have engineered safety systems that are extensively evaluated and documented, and are monitored regularly for operability and performance. Personnel undergo comprehensive training, including annual recertification of their operations. They must thoroughly understand the hazards involved in their work and the controls that are in place to mitigate those hazards. A series of hazard-control plans and work instructions are used to define and authorize the work that is done. Primary hazards associated with chemicals and radioactive materials are well controlled with minimal risk to the workforce and public. The majority of injuries are physical or ergonomic in nature. In an effort to increase safety awareness and to decrease accidents and incidents, a program focusing on the identification and elimination of unsafe behaviours was initiated. Workers are trained on how to conduct safety observations and given guidance on specific behaviours to note. Observations are structured to have minimal impact upon workload and are shared by the entire workforce. This program has effectively decreased a low accident rate and will make long-term sustainability possible. (author)

  6. Evaluation of the seismic integrity of a plutonium-handling facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coats, D.W.

    1981-01-01

    Many studies have been made by and for the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) to ensure the seismic safety of its Plutonium Facility (Building 332). These studies have included seismological and geologic field investigations to define the actual seismic hazard existing at the Laboratory site as well as structural studies of the Facility itself. Because the basic seismic design criteria has undergone changes over the years, numerous structural studies and upgrades have been completed. The seismic criteria in use at the LLNL site is reviewed on a continuing basis as new information on the seismicity and geology of the Livermore Valley is obtained. At present, the Laboratory's Earth Sciences Division is conducting a multi-million dollar program to identify and characterize the geologic hazards at the Livermore site, with the primary emphasis on earthquake hazards in the Livermore Valley. This effort is undergoing an independent review by Woodward-Clyde Associates. Additionally, because of increased concerns over the seismic safety of Building 332, the Laboratory has initiated an independent structural review. This review effort will be monitored by the California Seismic Safety Commission to ensure its independence. Both of these studiies are in their early stages and results are not yet available

  7. New glass material oxidation and dissolution system facility: Direct conversion of surplus fissile materials, spent nuclear fuel, and other material to high-level-waste glass. Storage and disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials programmatic environmental impact statement data report: Predecisional draft

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Forsberg, C.W.; Elam, K.R.; Reich, W.J.

    1995-01-01

    With the end of the Cold War, countries have excess plutonium and other materials from the reductions in inventories of nuclear weapons. It has been recommended that these surplus fissile materials (SFMs) be processed so that they are no more accessible than plutonium in spent nuclear fuel (SNF). This SNF standard, if adopted worldwide, would prevent rapid recovery of SFMs for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. This report provides for the PEIS the necessary input data on a new method for the disposition of SFMs: the simultaneous conversion of SFMs, SNF, and other highly radioactive materials into high-level-waste (HLW) glass. The SFMs include plutonium, neptunium, americium, and 233 U. The primary SFM is plutonium. The preferred SNF is degraded SNF, which may require processing before it can be accepted by a geological repository for disposal. The primary form of this SNF is Hanford-N SNF with preirradiation uranium enrichments between 0.95 and 1.08%. The final product is a plutonium, low-enriched-uranium, HLW, borosilicate glass for disposition in a geological repository. The proposed conversion process is the Glass Material Oxidation and Dissolution System (GMODS), which is a new process. The initial analysis of the GMODS process indicates that a MODS facility for this application would be similar in size and environmental impact to the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) at the Savannah River Site. Because of this, the detailed information available on DWPF was used as the basis for much of the GMODS input into the SFMs PEIS

  8. Plutonium immobilization plant using ceramic in existing facilities at the Savannah River site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DiSabatino, A.

    1998-01-01

    The Plutonium Immobilization Plant (PIP) accepts plutonium (Pu) from pit conversion and from non-pit sources, and through a ceramic immobilization process converts the plutonium into an immobilized form that can be disposed of in a high level waste (HLW) repository. This immobilization process is shown conceptually in Figure 1-1. The objective is to make an immobilized form, suitable for geologic disposal, in which the plutonium is as inherently unattractive and inaccessible as the plutonium in spent fuel from commercial reactors. The ceramic immobilization alternative presented in this report consists of first converting the surplus material to an oxide, followed by incorporating the plutonium oxide into a titanate-based ceramic material that is placed in metal cans

  9. CONTAMINATED PROCESS EQUIPMENT REMOVAL FOR THE DECOMMISSIONG AND DECONTAMINATION OF THE 232-Z CONTAMINATED WASTE RECOVERY PROCESS FACILITY AT THE PLUTONIUM FINISHING PLANT

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    HOPKINS, A.M.; MINETTE, M.J.; KLOS, D.B.

    2007-01-01

    This paper describes the unique challenges encountered and subsequent resolutions to accomplish the deactivation and decontamination of a plutonium ash contaminated building. The 232-Z Contaminated Waste Recovery Process Facility at the Plutonium Finishing Plant was used to recover plutonium from process wastes such as rags, gloves, containers and other items by incinerating the items and dissolving the resulting ash. The incineration process resulted in a light-weight plutonium ash residue that was highly mobile in air. This light-weight ash coated the incinerator's process equipment, which included gloveboxes, blowers, filters, furnaces, ducts, and filter boxes. Significant airborne contamination (over 1 million derived air concentration hours [DAC]) was found in the scrubber cell of the facility. Over 1300 grams of plutonium held up in the process equipment and attached to the walls had to be removed, packaged and disposed. This ash had to be removed before demolition of the building could take place

  10. Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) [SEC 1 THRU 11

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    ULLAH, M K

    2001-02-26

    The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) is located on the US Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site in south central Washington State. The DOE Richland Operations (DOE-RL) Project Hanford Management Contract (PHMC) is with Fluor Hanford Inc. (FH). Westinghouse Safety Management Systems (WSMS) provides management support to the PFP facility. Since 1991, the mission of the PFP has changed from plutonium material processing to preparation for decontamination and decommissioning (D and D). The PFP is in transition between its previous mission and the proposed D and D mission. The objective of the transition is to place the facility into a stable state for long-term storage of plutonium materials before final disposition of the facility. Accordingly, this update of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) reflects the current status of the buildings, equipment, and operations during this transition. The primary product of the PFP was plutonium metal in the form of 2.2-kg, cylindrical ingots called buttoms. Plutonium nitrate was one of several chemical compounds containing plutonium that were produced as an intermediate processing product. Plutonium recovery was performed at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF) and plutonium conversion (from a nitrate form to a metal form) was performed at the Remote Mechanical C (RMC) Line as the primary processes. Plutonium oxide was also produced at the Remote Mechanical A (RMA) Line. Plutonium processed at the PFP contained both weapons-grade and fuels-grade plutonium materials. The capability existed to process both weapons-grade and fuels-grade material through the PRF and only weapons-grade material through the RMC Line although fuels-grade material was processed through the line before 1984. Amounts of these materials exist in storage throughout the facility in various residual forms left from previous years of operations.

  11. Potentiality of an accounting system for nuclear materials in the PNC plutonium fuel facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Muto, T.; Aoki, M.; Tsutsumi, M.; Akutsu, H.

    1976-01-01

    The accounting system based on data filing and inquiry processing by the use of an optical mark reader (OMR) has been developed and operated satisfactorily for criticality control and accountancy of nuclear materials in the plutonium facilities of the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC). The OMR system has merits, especially compared with an old chit and punch-card system, such as low cost, abundance of the data included on a single sheet, universality of use for all kinds of material transfers, ease of data correction, and a large capacity. The OMR system is applied to the material transfer and also for physical inventory taking. This system, together with the use of an accurate automatic balance equipped at each glove box, which is generally designated as an accounting unit for the criticality control, generated a MUF of 0.43% for a fuel fabrication campaign of 119 assemblies for a fast reactor, which can be decreased further. In relation to the recent safeguarding situation and also to fitting in with an automatic fuel fabrication process, however, a further development of the present system will be necessary in the near future. This future system is discussed with reference to criticism of the current accountancy system by Rosenbaum and others, and its possible framework with the emphasis on the weighing and reading of numbered items is suggested. (author)

  12. Decontamination and decommissioning of the Argonne National Laboratory Building 350 Plutonium Fabrication Facility. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kline, W.H.; Moe, H.J.; Lahey, T.J.

    1985-02-01

    In 1973, Argonne National Laboratory began consolidating and upgrading its plutonium-handling operations with the result that the research fuel-fabrication facility located in Building 350 was shut down and declared surplus. Sixteen of the twenty-three gloveboxes which comprised the system were disassembled and relocated for reuse or placed into controlled storage during 1974 but, due to funding constraints, full-scale decommissioning did not start until 1978. Since that time the fourteen remaining contaminated gloveboxes, including all internal and external equipment as well as the associated ventilation systems, have been assayed for radioactive content, dismantled, size reduced to fit acceptable packaging and sent to a US Department of Energy (DOE) transuranic retrievable-storage site or to a DOE low-level nuclear waste burial ground. The project which was completed in 1983, required 5 years to accomplish, 32 man years of effort, produced some 540 m 3 (19,000 ft 3 ) of radioactive waste of which 60% was TRU, and cost 2.4 million dollars

  13. Hazards and accident analyses, an integrated approach, for the Plutonium Facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pan, P.Y.; Goen, L.K.; Letellier, B.C.; Sasser, M.K.

    1995-01-01

    This paper describes an integrated approach to perform hazards and accident analyses for the Plutonium Facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory. A comprehensive hazards analysis methodology was developed that extends the scope of the preliminary/process hazard analysis methods described in the AIChE Guidelines for Hazard Evaluations. Results fro the semi-quantitative approach constitute a full spectrum of hazards. For each accident scenario identified, there is a binning assigned for the event likelihood and consequence severity. In addition, each accident scenario is analyzed for four possible sectors (workers, on-site personnel, public, and environment). A screening process was developed to link the hazard analysis to the accident analysis. Specifically the 840 accident scenarios were screened down to about 15 accident scenarios for a more through deterministic analysis to define the operational safety envelope. The mechanics of the screening process in the selection of final scenarios for each representative accident category, i.e., fire, explosion, criticality, and spill, is described

  14. Experimental performance evaluation of two stack sampling systems in a plutonium facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Glissmeyer, J.A.

    1992-04-01

    The evaluation of two routine stack sampling systems at the Z-Plant plutonium facility operated by Rockwell International for USERDA is part of a larger study, sponsored by Rockwell and conducted by Battelle, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, of gaseous effluent sampling systems. The gaseous effluent sampling systems evaluated are located at the main plant ventilation stack (291-Z-1) and at a vessel vent stack (296-Z-3). A preliminary report, which was a paper study issued in April 1976, identified many deficiencies in the existing sampling systems and made recommendations for corrective action. The objectives of this experimental evaluation of those sampling systems were as follows: Characterize the radioactive aerosols in the stack effluents; Develop a tracer aerosol technique for validating particulate effluent sampling system performance; Evaluate the performance of the existing routine sampling systems and their compliance with the sponsor's criteria; and Recommend corrective action where required. The tracer aerosol approach to sampler evaluation was chosen because the low concentrations of radioactive particulates in the effluents would otherwise require much longer sampling times and thus more time to complete this evaluation. The following report describes the sampling systems that are the subject of this study and then details the experiments performed. The results are then presented and discussed. Much of the raw and finished data are included in the appendices

  15. PLUTONIUM FINISHING PLANT (PFP) 241-Z LIQUID WASTE TREATMENT FACILITY DEACTIVATION AND DEMOLITION

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    JOHNSTON GA

    2008-01-15

    Fluor Hanford, Inc. (FH) is proud to submit the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) 241-Z liquid Waste Treatment Facility Deactivation and Demolition (D&D) Project for consideration by the Project Management Institute as Project of the Year for 2008. The decommissioning of the 241-Z Facility presented numerous challenges, many of which were unique with in the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex. The majority of the project budget and schedule was allocated for cleaning out five below-grade tank vaults. These highly contaminated, confined spaces also presented significant industrial safety hazards that presented some of the most hazardous work environments on the Hanford Site. The 241-Z D&D Project encompassed diverse tasks: cleaning out and stabilizing five below-grade tank vaults (also called cells), manually size-reducing and removing over three tons of process piping from the vaults, permanently isolating service utilities, removing a large contaminated chemical supply tank, stabilizing and removing plutonium-contaminated ventilation ducts, demolishing three structures to grade, and installing an environmental barrier on the demolition site . All of this work was performed safely, on schedule, and under budget. During the deactivation phase of the project between November 2005 and February 2007, workers entered the highly contaminated confined-space tank vaults 428 times. Each entry (or 'dive') involved an average of three workers, thus equaling approximately 1,300 individual confined -space entries. Over the course of the entire deactivation and demolition period, there were no recordable injuries and only one minor reportable skin contamination. The 241-Z D&D Project was decommissioned under the provisions of the 'Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order' (the Tri-Party Agreement or TPA), the 'Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976' (RCRA), and the 'Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and

  16. PLUTONIUM FINISHING PLANT (PFP) 241-Z LIQUID WASTE TREATMENT FACILITY DEACTIVATION AND DEMOLITION

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    JOHNSTON GA

    2008-01-01

    Fluor Hanford, Inc. (FH) is proud to submit the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) 241-Z liquid Waste Treatment Facility Deactivation and Demolition (D and D) Project for consideration by the Project Management Institute as Project of the Year for 2008. The decommissioning of the 241-Z Facility presented numerous challenges, many of which were unique with in the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex. The majority of the project budget and schedule was allocated for cleaning out five below-grade tank vaults. These highly contaminated, confined spaces also presented significant industrial safety hazards that presented some of the most hazardous work environments on the Hanford Site. The 241-Z D and D Project encompassed diverse tasks: cleaning out and stabilizing five below-grade tank vaults (also called cells), manually size-reducing and removing over three tons of process piping from the vaults, permanently isolating service utilities, removing a large contaminated chemical supply tank, stabilizing and removing plutonium-contaminated ventilation ducts, demolishing three structures to grade, and installing an environmental barrier on the demolition site . All of this work was performed safely, on schedule, and under budget. During the deactivation phase of the project between November 2005 and February 2007, workers entered the highly contaminated confined-space tank vaults 428 times. Each entry (or 'dive') involved an average of three workers, thus equaling approximately 1,300 individual confined -space entries. Over the course of the entire deactivation and demolition period, there were no recordable injuries and only one minor reportable skin contamination. The 241-Z D and D Project was decommissioned under the provisions of the 'Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order' (the Tri-Party Agreement or TPA), the 'Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976' (RCRA), and the 'Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980

  17. Rough order of magnitude cost estimate for immobilization of 18.2 MT of plutonium using existing facilities at Hanford: alternatives 4A/8/10

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DiSabatino, A.

    1998-01-01

    The purpose of this Cost Estimate Report is to identify preliminary capital and operating costs for a facility to immobilize 18.2 metric tons (nominal) of plutonium as a ceramic in an existing facility, the Fuels and Materials Examination Facility (FMEF), at Hanford

  18. Rough order of magnitude cost estimate for immobilization of 50 MT of plutonium using existing facilities at Hanford: alternative 11B

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DiSabatino, A.

    1998-01-01

    The purpose of this Cost Estimate Report is to identify preliminary capital and operating costs for a facility to immobilize 50 metric tons (nominal) of plutonium as a ceramic in an existing facility at Hanford, the Fuels and Materials Examination Facility (FMEF)

  19. Natural hazards that may trigger a radiological release from a plutonium processing facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Selvidge, J. E.

    1977-04-28

    Calculations show the probability of a tornado striking a plutonium area at Rocky Flats is 2.2 x 10/sup -4/ per year. The source term (expected value of plutonium release) should such an event occur is calculated at 3.3 x 10/sup -7/ grams. The source term for high-velocity, downslope winds is higher--2.2 x 10/sup -3/ grams. The probability of a meteorite that weighs one or more pounds (453 grams) striking a plutonium area is estimated at 8.88 x 10/sup -7/ per year. Because of this small probability and the remote chance that a plutonium release would occur even if a meteorite hit occurred, the hazard from meteorite impact is considered negligible. Conservative assumptions result in all calculated frequencies being almost certainly too high. Empirical observations have indicated lower frequencies than those calculated.

  20. Natural hazards that may trigger a radiological release from a plutonium processing facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Selvidge, J.E.

    1977-01-01

    Calculations show the probability of a tornado striking a plutonium area at Rocky Flats is 2.2 x 10 -4 per year. The source term (expected value of plutonium release) should such an event occur is calculated at 3.3 x 10 -7 grams. The source term for high-velocity, downslope winds is higher--2.2 x 10 -3 grams. The probability of a meteorite that weighs one or more pounds (453 grams) striking a plutonium area is estimated at 8.88 x 10 -7 per year. Because of this small probability and the remote chance that a plutonium release would occur even if a meteorite hit occurred, the hazard from meteorite impact is considered negligible. Conservative assumptions result in all calculated frequencies being almost certainly too high. Empirical observations have indicated lower frequencies than those calculated

  1. The plutonium fuel cycles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pigford, T.H.; Ang, K.P.

    1975-01-01

    The quantities of plutonium and other fuel actinides have been calculated for equilibrium fuel cycles for 1000-MW water reactors fueled with slightly enriched uranium, water reactors fueled with plutonium and natural uranium, fast-breder reactors, gas-cooled reactors fueled with thorium and highly enriched uranium, and gas-cooled reactors fueled with thorium, plutonium and recycled uranium. The radioactivity quantities of plutonium, americium and curium processed yearly in these fuel cycles are greatest for the water reactors fueled with natural uranium and recycled plutonium. The total amount of actinides processed is calculated for the predicted future growth of the U.S. nuclear power industry. For the same total installed nuclear power capacity, the introduction of the plutonium breeder has little effect upon the total amount of plutonium in this century. The estimated amount of plutonium in the low-level process wastes in the plutonium fuel cycles is comparable to the amount of plutonium in the high-level fission product wastes. The amount of plutonium processed in the nuclear fuel cycles can be considerably reduced by using gas-cooled reactors to consume plutonium produced in uranium-fueled water reactors. These, and other reactors dedicated for plutonium utilization, could be co-located with facilities for fuel reprocessing ad fuel fabrication to eliminate the off-site transport of separated plutonium. (author)

  2. Excess Weapons Plutonium Immobilization in Russia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jardine, L.; Borisov, G.B.

    2000-01-01

    The joint goal of the Russian work is to establish a full-scale plutonium immobilization facility at a Russian industrial site by 2005. To achieve this requires that the necessary engineering and technical basis be developed in these Russian projects and the needed Russian approvals be obtained to conduct industrial-scale immobilization of plutonium-containing materials at a Russian industrial site by the 2005 date. This meeting and future work will provide the basis for joint decisions. Supporting R and D projects are being carried out at Russian Institutes that directly support the technical needs of Russian industrial sites to immobilize plutonium-containing materials. Special R and D on plutonium materials is also being carried out to support excess weapons disposition in Russia and the US, including nonproliferation studies of plutonium recovery from immobilization forms and accelerated radiation damage studies of the US-specified plutonium ceramic for immobilizing plutonium. This intriguing and extraordinary cooperation on certain aspects of the weapons plutonium problem is now progressing well and much work with plutonium has been completed in the past two years. Because much excellent and unique scientific and engineering technical work has now been completed in Russia in many aspects of plutonium immobilization, this meeting in St. Petersburg was both timely and necessary to summarize, review, and discuss these efforts among those who performed the actual work. The results of this meeting will help the US and Russia jointly define the future direction of the Russian plutonium immobilization program, and make it an even stronger and more integrated Russian program. The two objectives for the meeting were to: (1) Bring together the Russian organizations, experts, and managers performing the work into one place for four days to review and discuss their work with each other; and (2) Publish a meeting summary and a proceedings to compile reports of all the

  3. DOE standard: Integration of environment, safety, and health into facility disposition activities. Volume 1 of 2: Technical standard

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-05-01

    This Department of Energy (DOE) technical standard (referred to as the Standard) provides guidance for integrating and enhancing worker, public, and environmental protection during facility disposition activities. It provides environment, safety, and health (ES and H) guidance to supplement the project management requirements and associated guidelines contained within DOE O 430.1A, Life-Cycle Asset Management (LCAM), and amplified within the corresponding implementation guides. In addition, the Standard is designed to support an Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS), consistent with the guiding principles and core functions contained in DOE P 450.4, Safety Management System Policy, and discussed in DOE G 450.4-1, Integrated Safety Management System Guide. The ISMS guiding principles represent the fundamental policies that guide the safe accomplishment of work and include: (1) line management responsibility for safety; (2) clear roles and responsibilities; (3) competence commensurate with responsibilities; (4) balanced priorities; (5) identification of safety standards and requirements; (6) hazard controls tailored to work being performed; and (7) operations authorization. This Standard specifically addresses the implementation of the above ISMS principles four through seven, as applied to facility disposition activities

  4. Multi-site risk-based project planning, optimization, sequencing, & budgeting process and tool for the integrated facility disposition project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nelson, J.G.; Castillo, C.; Huntsman, J.; Killoy, S.; Lucek, H.; Marks, T.C.

    2011-01-01

    Faced with the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex Transformation, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) was tasked with developing an integrated plan for the decommissioning of over 400 facilities and 300 environmental remediation units, as well as the many reconfiguration and modernization projects at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Y-12 Complex. Manual scheduling of remediation activities is time-consuming and inherently introduces bias of the scheduler or organization into the process. Clearly a well-defined process, quantitative risk-based tool was needed to develop an objective, unbiased baseline sequence and schedule with a sound technical foundation for the Integrated Facility Disposition Project (IFDP). Faced with limited available data, innovation was needed to extrapolate intelligent relative data for key risk parameters based on known data elements. The IFDP Supermodel was customized and expanded to provide this capability for conceptual planning of diverse project portfolios and multiple sites. (author)

  5. Remote material handling in the Plutonium Immobilization Project. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brault, J.R.

    2000-01-01

    With the downsizing of the US and Russian nuclear stockpiles, large quantities of weapons-usable plutonium in the US are being declared excess and will be disposed of by the Department of Energy Fissile Materials Disposition Program. To implement this program, DOE has selected the Savannah River Site (SRS) for the construction and operation of three new facilities: pit disassembly and conversion; mixed oxide fuel fabrication; and plutonium immobilization. The Plutonium Immobilization Project (PIP) will immobilize a portion of the excess plutonium in a hybrid ceramic and glass form containing high level waste for eventual disposal in a geologic repository. The PIP is divided into three distinct operating areas: Plutonium Conversion, First Stage Immobilization, and Second Stage Immobilization. Processing technology for the PIP is being developed jointly by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Westinghouse Savannah River Company. This paper will discuss development of the automated unpacking and sorting operations in the conversion area, and the automated puck and tray handling operations in the first stage immobilization area. Due to the high radiation levels and toxicity of the materials to be disposed of, the PIP will utilize automated equipment in a contained (glovebox) facility. Most operations involving plutonium-bearing materials will be performed remotely, separating personnel from the radiation source. Source term materials will be removed from the operations during maintenance. Maintenance will then be performed hands on within the containment using glove ports

  6. Dissolution of aerosol particles collected from nuclear facility plutonium production process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ning Xu; Martinez, Alex; Schappert, Michael; Montoya, D.P.; Martinez, Patrick; Tandon, Lav

    2016-01-01

    A simple, robust analytical chemistry method has been developed to dissolve plutonium containing particles in a complex matrix. The aerosol particles collected on Marple cascade impactor substrates were shown to be dissolved completely with an acid mixture of 12 M HNO 3 and 0.1 M HF. A pressurized closed vessel acid digestion technique was utilized to heat the samples at 130 deg C for 16 h to facilitate the digestion. The dissolution efficiency for plutonium particles was 99 %. The resulting particle digestate solution was suitable for trace elemental analysis and isotope composition determination, as well as radiochemistry measurements. (author)

  7. Assessment of plutonium storage safety issues at Department of Energy facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) mission for utilization and storage of nuclear materials has recently changed as a result of the end of the ''Cold War'' era. Past and current plutonium storage practices largely reflect a temporary, in-process, or in-use storage condition which must now be changed to accommodate longer-term storage. This report summarizes information concerning current plutonium metal and oxide storage practices which was presented at the Office of Defense programs (DP) workshop in Albuquerque, New Mexico on May 26-27, 1993 and contained in responses to questions by DP-62 from the field organizations

  8. Cost-effective facility disposition planning with safety and health lessons learned and good practices from the Oak Ridge Decontamination and Decommissioning Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-05-01

    An emphasis on transition and safe disposition of DOE excess facilities has brought about significant challenges to managing worker, public, and environmental risks. The transition and disposition activities involve a diverse range of hazardous facilities that are old, poorly maintained, and contain radioactive and hazardous substances, the extent of which may be unknown. In addition, many excess facilities do not have historical facility documents such as operating records, plant and instrumentation diagrams, and incident records. The purpose of this report is to present an overview of the Oak Ridge Decontamination and Decommissioning (D and D) Program, its safety performance, and associated safety and health lessons learned and good practices. Illustrative examples of these lessons learned and good practices are also provided. The primary focus of this report is on the safety and health activities and implications associated with the planning phase of Oak Ridge facility disposition projects. Section 1.0 of this report provides the background and purpose of the report. Section 2.0 presents an overview of the facility disposition activities from which the lessons learned and good practices discussed in Section 3.0 were derived

  9. Human factors aspects of the major upgrade to control systems at the Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Higgins, J.; Pope, N.

    1997-01-01

    The Plutonium Facility (TA-55) at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has been in operation for over 15 years. It handles projects such as: stockpile maintenance, surveillance, and dismantlement; pit rebuild; plutonium power source fabrication for long duration spacecraft missions (e.g., Cassini); nuclear materials technology research; nuclear materials storage; and remediation of nuclear waste. The Operations Center of TA-55 is the nerve center of the facility where operators are on duty around the clock and monitor several thousand data points using the Facility Control System (FCS). The FCS monitors, displays, alarms, and provides some limited control of the following systems; HVAC, fire detection and suppression, radiation detection, electrical, and other miscellaneous systems. The FCS was originally based on late 1970s digital technology, which is not longer supported by the vendors. Additionally, the equipment failure rates increased notably in the 1990s. Thus, plans were put into place to upgrade and replace the FCS hardware, software, and display components with modernized equipment. The process was complicated by the facts that: the facility was operational and could not be totally closed for the modifications; complete documentation was not available for the existing system; the Safety Analyses for the facility were in the process of being upgraded at the same time; and of course limited time and budgets. This paper will discuss the human factors aspects of the design, installation, and testing of the new FCS within the above noted constraints. Particular items to be discussed include the functional requirements definition, operating experience review, screen designs, test program, operator training, and phased activation of the new circuits in an operational facility

  10. SLUDGE TREATMENT PROJECT KOP DISPOSITION - THERMAL AND GAS ANALYSIS FOR THE COLD VACUUM DRYING FACILITY

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Swenson, J.A.; Crowe, R.D.; Apthorpe, R.; Plys, M.G.

    2010-01-01

    The purpose of this document is to present conceptual design phase thermal process calculations that support the process design and process safety basis for the cold vacuum drying of K Basin KOP material. This document is intended to demonstrate that the conceptual approach: (1) Represents a workable process design that is suitable for development in preliminary design; and (2) Will support formal safety documentation to be prepared during the definitive design phase to establish an acceptable safety basis. The Sludge Treatment Project (STP) is responsible for the disposition of Knock Out Pot (KOP) sludge within the 105-K West (KW) Basin. KOP sludge consists of size segregated material (primarily canister particulate) from the fuel and scrap cleaning process used in the Spent Nuclear Fuel process at K Basin. The KOP sludge will be pre-treated to remove fines and some of the constituents containing chemically bound water, after which it is referred to as KOP material. The KOP material will then be loaded into a Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO), dried at the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (CVDF) and stored in the Canister Storage Building (CSB). This process is patterned after the successful drying of 2100 metric tons of spent fuel, and uses the same facilities and much of the same equipment that was used for drying fuel and scrap. Table ES-l present similarities and differences between KOP material and fuel and between MCOs loaded with these materials. The potential content of bound water bearing constituents limits the mass ofKOP material in an MCO load to a fraction of that in an MCO containing fuel and scrap; however, the small particle size of the KOP material causes the surface area to be significantly higher. This relatively large reactive surface area represents an input to the KOP thermal calculations that is significantly different from the calculations for fuel MCOs. The conceptual design provides for a copper insert block that limits the volume available to

  11. SLUDGE TREATMENT PROJECT KOP DISPOSITION - THERMAL AND GAS ANALYSIS FOR THE COLD VACUUM DRYING FACILITY

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    SWENSON JA; CROWE RD; APTHORPE R; PLYS MG

    2010-03-09

    The purpose of this document is to present conceptual design phase thermal process calculations that support the process design and process safety basis for the cold vacuum drying of K Basin KOP material. This document is intended to demonstrate that the conceptual approach: (1) Represents a workable process design that is suitable for development in preliminary design; and (2) Will support formal safety documentation to be prepared during the definitive design phase to establish an acceptable safety basis. The Sludge Treatment Project (STP) is responsible for the disposition of Knock Out Pot (KOP) sludge within the 105-K West (KW) Basin. KOP sludge consists of size segregated material (primarily canister particulate) from the fuel and scrap cleaning process used in the Spent Nuclear Fuel process at K Basin. The KOP sludge will be pre-treated to remove fines and some of the constituents containing chemically bound water, after which it is referred to as KOP material. The KOP material will then be loaded into a Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO), dried at the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (CVDF) and stored in the Canister Storage Building (CSB). This process is patterned after the successful drying of 2100 metric tons of spent fuel, and uses the same facilities and much of the same equipment that was used for drying fuel and scrap. Table ES-l present similarities and differences between KOP material and fuel and between MCOs loaded with these materials. The potential content of bound water bearing constituents limits the mass ofKOP material in an MCO load to a fraction of that in an MCO containing fuel and scrap; however, the small particle size of the KOP material causes the surface area to be significantly higher. This relatively large reactive surface area represents an input to the KOP thermal calculations that is significantly different from the calculations for fuel MCOs. The conceptual design provides for a copper insert block that limits the volume available to

  12. Savannah River Site's H-Canyon Facility: Impacts of Foreign Obligations on Special Nuclear Material Disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Magoulas, Virginia

    2013-01-01

    The US has a non-proliferation policy to receive foreign and domestic research reactor returns of spent fuel materials of US origin. These spent fuel materials are returned to the Department of Energy (DOE) and placed in storage in the L-area spent fuel basin at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The foreign research reactor returns fall subject to the 123 agreements for peaceful cooperation. These ''123 agreements'' are named after section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and govern the conditions of nuclear cooperation with foreign partners. The SRS management of these foreign obligations while planning material disposition paths can be a challenge.

  13. Validation of the method for determination of plutonium isotopes in urine samples and its application in a nuclear facility at Otwock

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Rzemek Katarzyna

    2015-03-01

    Full Text Available The studies aimed at determining low activities of alpha radioactive elements are widely recognized as essential for the human health, because of their high radiotoxicity in case of internal contamination. Some groups of workers of nuclear facility at Otwock are potentially exposed to contamination with plutonium isotopes. For this reason, the method for determination of plutonium isotopes has been introduced and validated in Radiation Protection Measurements Laboratory (LPD of the National Centre for Nuclear Research (NCBJ. In this method the plutonium is isolated from a sample by coprecipitation with phosphates and separated on a AG 1-X2 Resin. After electrodeposition, the sample is measured by alpha spectrometry. Validation was performed in order to assess parameters such as: selectivity, accuracy (trueness and precision and linearity of the method. The results of plutonium determination in urine samples of persons potentially exposed to internal contamination are presented in this work.

  14. Automation of process accountability flow diagrams at Los Alamos National Laboratory's Plutonium Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Knepper, P.; Whiteson, R.; Strittmatter, R.; Mousseau, K.

    1999-01-01

    Many industrial processes (including reprocessing activities; nuclear fuel fabrication; and material storage, measurement and transfer) make use of process flow diagrams. These flows can be used for material accountancy and for data analysis. At Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), the Technical Area (TA)-55 Plutonium Facility is home to various research and development activities involving the use of special nuclear material (SNM). A facility conducting research and development (R and D) activities using SNM must satisfy material accountability guidelines. All processes involving SNM or tritium processing, at LANL, require a process accountability flow diagram (PAFD). At LANL a technique was developed to generate PAFDs that can be coupled to a relational database for use in material accountancy. These techniques could also be used for propagation of variance, measurement control, and inventory difference analysis. The PAFD is a graphical representation of the material flow during a specific process. PAFDs are currently stored as PowerPoint files. In the PowerPoint format, the data captured by the PAFD are not easily accessible. Converting the PAFDs to an accessible electronic format is desirable for several reasons. Any program will be able to access the data contained in the PAFD. For the PAFD data to be useful in applications such as an expert system for data checking, SNM accountability, inventory difference evaluation, measurement control, and other kinds of analysis, it is necessary to interface directly with the information contained within the PAFD. The PAFDs can be approved and distributed electronically, eliminating the paper copies of the PAFDs and ensuring that material handlers have the current PAFDs. Modifications to the PAFDs are often global. Storing the data in an accessible format would eliminate the need to manually update each of the PAFDs when a global change has occurred. The goal was to determine a software package that would store the

  15. GrayQbTM Single-Faced Version 2 (SF2) Hanford Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF) deployment report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Plummer, J. R. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States); Immel, D. M. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States); Serrato, M. G. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States); Dalmaso, M. J. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States); Shull, D. J. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States)

    2015-11-18

    The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) in partnership with CH2M Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) deployed the GrayQbTM SF2 radiation imaging device at the Hanford Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF) to assist in the radiological characterization of the canyon. The deployment goal was to locate radiological contamination hot spots in the PRF canyon, where pencil tanks were removed and decontamination/debris removal operations are on-going, to support the CHPRC facility decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) effort. The PRF canyon D&D effort supports completion of the CHPRC Plutonium Finishing Plant Decommissioning Project. The GrayQbTM SF2 (Single Faced Version 2) is a non-destructive examination device developed by SRNL to generate radiation contour maps showing source locations and relative radiological levels present in the area under examination. The Hanford PRF GrayQbTM Deployment was sponsored by CH2M Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) through the DOE Richland Operations Office, Inter-Entity Work Order (IEWO), DOE-RL IEWO- M0SR900210.

  16. Decontamination and demolition of a former plutonium processing facility's process exhaust system, firescreen, and filter plenum buildings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    LaFrate, P.J. Jr.; Stout, D.S.; Elliott, J.W.

    1996-01-01

    The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Decommissioning Project has decontaminated, demolished, and decommissioned a process exhaust system, two filter plenum buildings, and a firescreen plenum structure at Technical Area 21 (TA-2 1). The project began in August 1995 and was completed in January 1996. These high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter plenums and associated ventilation ductwork provided process exhaust to fume hoods and glove boxes in TA-21 Buildings 2 through 5 when these buildings were active plutonium and uranium processing and research facilities. This paper summarizes the history of TA-21 plutonium and uranium processing and research activities and provides a detailed discussion of integrated work process controls, characterize-as-you-go methodology, unique engineering controls, decontamination techniques, demolition methodology, waste minimization, and volume reduction. Also presented in detail are the challenges facing the LANL Decommissioning Project to safely and economically decontaminate and demolish surplus facilities and the unique solutions to tough problems. This paper also shows the effectiveness of the integrated work package concept to control work through all phases

  17. Decontamination and demolition of a former plutonium processing facility's process exhaust system, firescreen, and filter plenum buildings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    LaFrate, P.J. Jr.; Stout, D.S.; Elliott, J.W.

    1996-01-01

    The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Decommissioning Project has decontaminated, demolished, and decommissioned a process exhaust system, two filter plenum buildings, and a firescreen plenum structure at Technical Area 21 (TA-21). The project began in August 1995 and was completed in January 1996. These high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter plenums and associated ventilation ductwork provided process exhaust to fume hoods and glove boxes in TA-21 Buildings 2 through 5 when these buildings were active plutonium and uranium processing and research facilities. This paper summarizes the history of TA-21 plutonium and uranium processing and research activities and provides a detailed discussion of integrated work process controls, characterize-as-you-go methodology, unique engineering controls, decontamination techniques, demolition methodology, waste minimization, and volume reduction. Also presented in detail are the challenges facing the LANL Decommissioning Project to safely and economically decontaminate and demolish surplus facilities and the unique solutions to tough problems. This paper also shows the effectiveness of the integrated work package concept to control work through all phases

  18. Fissile material disposition and proliferation risk

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dreicer, J.S.; Rutherford, D.A. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States). NIS Div.

    1996-05-01

    The proliferation risk of a facility is dependent on the material attractiveness, level of safeguards, and physical protection applied to the material in conjunction with an assessment of the impact of the socioeconomic circumstances and threat environment. Proliferation risk is a complementary extension of proliferation resistance. The authors believe a better determination of nuclear material proliferation can be achieved by establishing the proliferation risk for facilities that contain nuclear material. Developing a method that incorporates the socioeconomic circumstances and threat environment inherent to each country enables a global proliferation assessment. In order to effectively reduce the nuclear danger, a broadly based set of criteria is needed that provides the capability to relatively assess a wide range of disposition options/facilities in different countries and still ensure a global decrease in proliferation risk for plutonium.

  19. Fissile material disposition and proliferation risk

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dreicer, J.S.; Rutherford, D.A.

    1996-01-01

    The proliferation risk of a facility is dependent on the material attractiveness, level of safeguards, and physical protection applied to the material in conjunction with an assessment of the impact of the socioeconomic circumstances and threat environment. Proliferation risk is a complementary extension of proliferation resistance. The authors believe a better determination of nuclear material proliferation can be achieved by establishing the proliferation risk for facilities that contain nuclear material. Developing a method that incorporates the socioeconomic circumstances and threat environment inherent to each country enables a global proliferation assessment. In order to effectively reduce the nuclear danger, a broadly based set of criteria is needed that provides the capability to relatively assess a wide range of disposition options/facilities in different countries and still ensure a global decrease in proliferation risk for plutonium

  20. Survey of Worldwide Light Water Reactor Experience with Mixed Uranium-Plutonium Oxide Fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cowell, B.S.; Fisher, S.E.

    1999-02-01

    The US and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) have recently declared quantities of weapons materials, including weapons-grade (WG) plutonium, excess to strategic requirements. One of the leading candidates for the disposition of excess WG plutonium is irradiation in light water reactors (LWRs) as mixed uranium-plutonium oxide (MOX) fuel. A description of the MOX fuel fabrication techniques in worldwide use is presented. A comprehensive examination of the domestic MOX experience in US reactors obtained during the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s is also presented. This experience is described by manufacturer and is also categorized by the reactor facility that irradiated the MOX fuel. A limited summary of the international experience with MOX fuels is also presented. A review of MOX fuel and its performance is conducted in view of the special considerations associated with the disposition of WG plutonium. Based on the available information, it appears that adoption of foreign commercial MOX technology from one of the successful MOX fuel vendors will minimize the technical risks to the overall mission. The conclusion is made that the existing MOX fuel experience base suggests that disposition of excess weapons plutonium through irradiation in LWRs is a technically attractive option.

  1. Survey of Worldwide Light Water Reactor Experience with Mixed Uranium-Plutonium Oxide Fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cowell, B.S.; Fisher, S.E.

    1999-01-01

    The US and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) have recently declared quantities of weapons materials, including weapons-grade (WG) plutonium, excess to strategic requirements. One of the leading candidates for the disposition of excess WG plutonium is irradiation in light water reactors (LWRs) as mixed uranium-plutonium oxide (MOX) fuel. A description of the MOX fuel fabrication techniques in worldwide use is presented. A comprehensive examination of the domestic MOX experience in US reactors obtained during the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s is also presented. This experience is described by manufacturer and is also categorized by the reactor facility that irradiated the MOX fuel. A limited summary of the international experience with MOX fuels is also presented. A review of MOX fuel and its performance is conducted in view of the special considerations associated with the disposition of WG plutonium. Based on the available information, it appears that adoption of foreign commercial MOX technology from one of the successful MOX fuel vendors will minimize the technical risks to the overall mission. The conclusion is made that the existing MOX fuel experience base suggests that disposition of excess weapons plutonium through irradiation in LWRs is a technically attractive option

  2. The US plutonium materials conversion program in Russia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zygmunt, S.J.; Mason, C.F.V.; Hahn, W.K.

    2000-01-01

    Progress has been made in Russia towards the conversion of weapons-grade plutonium (w-Pu) into plutonium oxide (PuO 2 ) suitable for further manufacture into mixed oxide (MOX) fuels. This program was started in 1998 in response to US proliferation concerns and the acknowledged international need to decrease the available weapons-grade Pu. A similar agenda is being followed in the US to address disposition of US surplus weapons-grade Pu. In Russia a conversion process has been selected and a site proposed. This paper discusses the present state of the program in support of this future operating facility that will process up to 5 metric tons of plutonium a year. (authors)

  3. Stop plutonium; Stop plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2003-02-01

    This press document aims to inform the public on the hazards bound to the plutonium exploitation in France and especially the plutonium transport. The first part is a technical presentation of the plutonium and the MOX (Mixed Oxide Fuel). The second part presents the installation of the plutonium industry in France. The third part is devoted to the plutonium convoys safety. The highlight is done on the problem of the leak of ''secret'' of such transports. (A.L.B.)

  4. Non-proliferation, safeguards, and security for the fissile materials disposition program immobilization alternatives

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Duggan, R.A.; Jaeger, C.D.; Tolk, K.M. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Moore, L.R. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)

    1996-05-01

    The Department of Energy is analyzing long-term storage and disposition alternatives for surplus weapons-usable fissile materials. A number of different disposition alternatives are being considered. These include facilities for storage, conversion and stabilization of fissile materials, immobilization in glass or ceramic material, fabrication of fissile material into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for reactors, use of reactor based technologies to convert material into spent fuel, and disposal of fissile material using geologic alternatives. This paper will focus on how the objectives of reducing security and proliferation risks are being considered, and the possible facility impacts. Some of the areas discussed in this paper include: (1) domestic and international safeguards requirements, (2) non-proliferation criteria and measures, (3) the threats, and (4) potential proliferation, safeguards, and security issues and impacts on the facilities. Issues applicable to all of the possible disposition alternatives will be discussed in this paper. However, particular attention is given to the plutonium immobilization alternatives.

  5. Role of non-destructive examinations in leak testing of glove boxes for industrial scale plutonium handling at nuclear fuel fabrication facility along with case study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aher, Sachin

    2015-01-01

    Non Destructive Examinations has the prominent role at Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Facilities. Specifically NDE has contributed at utmost stratum in Leak Testing of Glove Boxes and qualifying them as a Class-I confinement for safe Plutonium handling at industrial scale. Advanced Fuel Fabrication Facility, BARC, Tarapur is engaged in fabrication of Plutonium based MOX (PuO 2 , DDUO 2 ) fuel with different enrichments for first core of PFBR reactor. Alpha- Leak Tight Glove Boxes along with HEPA Filters and dynamic ventilation form the promising engineering system for safe and reliable handling of plutonium bearing materials considering the radiotoxicity and risk associated with handling of plutonium. Leak Testing of Glove Boxes which involves the leak detection, leak rectification and leak quantifications is major challenging task. To accomplish this challenge, various Non Destructive Testing methods have assisted in promising way to achieve the stringent leak rate criterion for commissioning of Glove Box facilities for plutonium handling. This paper highlights the Role of various NDE techniques like Soap Solution Test, Argon Sniffer Test, Pressure Drop/Rise Test etc. in Glove Box Leak Testing along with procedure and methodology for effective rectification of leakage points. A Flow Chart consisting of Glove Box leak testing procedure starting from preliminary stage up to qualification stage along with a case study and observations are discussed in this paper. (author)

  6. Rough order of magnitude cost estimate for immobilization of 18.2 MT of plutonium using new facilities at the Savannah River site: alternatives 3A/5A/6A/6B/7A/9A

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DiSabatino, A.

    1998-01-01

    The purpose of this Cost Estimate Report is to identify preliminary capital and operating costs for a facility to immobilize 18.2 metric tons (nominal) of plutonium using ceramic in a new facility at Savannah River Site (SRS)

  7. Impact of receipt of coprocessed uranium/plutonium on advanced accountability concepts and fabrication facilities. Addendum 1 to application of advanced accountability concepts in mixed oxide fabrication

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bastin, J.J.; Jump, M.J.; Lange, R.A.; Randall, C.C.

    1977-11-01

    The Phase I study of the application of advanced accountability methods (DYMAC) in a uranium/plutonium mixed oxide facility was extended to assess the effect of coprocessed UO 2 --PuO 2 feed on the observations made in the original Phase I effort and on the proposed Phase II program. The retention of plutonium mixed with uranium throughout the process was also considered. This addendum reports that coprocessed feed would have minimal effect on the DYMAC program, except in the areas of material specifications, starting material delivery schedule, and labor requirements. Each of these areas is addressed, as are the impact of coprocessed feed at a large fuel fabrication facility and the changes needed in the dirty scrap recovery process to maintain the lower plutonium levels which may be required by future nonproliferation philosophy. An amended schedule for Phase II is included

  8. Alternatives for the disposition of PUREX organic solution

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nelson, D.W.

    1995-01-01

    This Supporting Document submits options and recommendations for final management of Tank 40 Plutonium-Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Plant organic solution per Tri-Party Agreement Milestorm Number M-80-00-T03. Hanford is deactivating the PUREX Plant for the US DOE. One the key element of this Deactivation is disposition of approximately 81,300 liters (21,500 gallons) of slightly radioactively contaminated organic solution to reduce risk to the environment, reduce cost of long-term storage, and assure regulatory compliance. An announcement in the Commerce Business Daily (CBD) on October 14, 1994 has resulted in the submission of proposals from two facilities capabLe of receiving and thermally destroying the solution. Total decomposition by thermal destruction is the recommended option for the disposition of the PUREX organic solution and WHC is evaluating the proposals from the two facilities

  9. The impact of two Department of Energy orders on the design and cost of select plutonium facilities at Los Alamos National Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rey, V.C.

    1999-01-01

    The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is a research and development facility in northern New Mexico, owned by the federal government and operated for the US Department of Energy (DOE) by the University of California (UC). LANL conducts research and experiments in many arenas including plutonium. Its plutonium facilities are required to meet the facility design and safety criteria of applicable DOE orders as specified in the UC contract. Although DOE 420.1, Facility Safety, superseded DOE 6430.1A, General Design Criteria, the UC contract requires LANL to adhere to DOE 6430.1A, Division 13 in its special nuclear facilities. A comparison of costs and savings relative to installation of double-wall piping at two LANL plutonium facilities is demonstrated. DOE 6430.1A is prescriptive in its design criteria whereas DOE 420.1 is a performance-based directive. The differences in these orders impact time and design costs in nuclear construction projects. LANL's approach to integrated quality and conduct of operations for design, needs to be re-evaluated. In conclusion, there is a need for highly-technical, knowledgeable people and an integrated, quality/conduct of operations-based approach to assure that nuclear facilities are designed and constructed in a safe and cost-effective manner

  10. Coordinated safeguards for materials management in a uranium--plutonium nitrate-to-oxide coconversion facility: Coprecal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dayem, H.A.; Cobb, D.D.; Dietz, R.J.; Hakkila, E.A.; Kern, E.A.; Schelonka, E.P.; Shipley, J.P.; Smith, D.B.

    1979-02-01

    This report describes the conceptual design of an advanced materials-management system for safeguarding special nuclear materials in a uranium--plutonium nitrate-to-oxide coconversion facility based on the Coprecal process. Design concepts are presented for near real-time (dynamic) accountability by forming dynamic materials balances from information provided by chemical and nondestructive analyses and from process-control instrumentation. Modeling and simulation techniques are used to compare the sensitivities of proposed dynamic materials accounting strategies to both abrupt and protracted diversion. The safeguards implications of coconversion as well as some unique features of the reference process are discussed and design criteria are identified to improve the safeguardability of the Coprecal coconversion process

  11. Report of an investigation into deterioration of the Plutonium Fuel Form Fabrication Facility (PuFF) at the DOE Savannah River Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-10-01

    This investigations of the Savannah River Site's Plutonium Fuel Form fabrication facility located in Building 235-F was initiated in April 1991. The purpose of the investigation was to determine whether, as has been alleged, operation of the facility's argon inert gas system was terminated with the knowledge that continued inoperability of the argon system would cause accelerated corrosion damage to the equipment in the plutonium 238 processing cells. The investigation quickly established that the decision to discontinue operation of the argon system, by not repairing it, was merely one of the measures, and not the most important one, which led to the current deteriorated state of the facility. As a result, the scope of the investigation was broadened to more identify and assess those factors which contributed to the facility's current condition. This document discusses the backgrounds, results, and recommendations of this investigation

  12. Report of an investigation into deterioration of the Plutonium Fuel Form Fabrication Facility (PuFF) at the DOE Savannah River Site

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1991-10-01

    This investigations of the Savannah River Site's Plutonium Fuel Form fabrication facility located in Building 235-F was initiated in April 1991. The purpose of the investigation was to determine whether, as has been alleged, operation of the facility's argon inert gas system was terminated with the knowledge that continued inoperability of the argon system would cause accelerated corrosion damage to the equipment in the plutonium 238 processing cells. The investigation quickly established that the decision to discontinue operation of the argon system, by not repairing it, was merely one of the measures, and not the most important one, which led to the current deteriorated state of the facility. As a result, the scope of the investigation was broadened to more identify and assess those factors which contributed to the facility's current condition. This document discusses the backgrounds, results, and recommendations of this investigation.

  13. Using existing European MOX fabrication plants for the disposal of plutonium from dismantled Russian warheads

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schaper, A.

    1995-01-01

    One of the disposition options for excess weapons plutonium which is favored by the study of the American National Academy of Sciences is the fabrication and use as fuel, without reprocessing, in existing or modified nuclear reactors. An important criterion for reducing the proliferation risks is minimizing the time during which the plutonium is stored in forms readily usable for nuclear weapons. The study recommends to either modify an almost completed facility for experimental fast reactors or to construct a new fuel fabrication capability. The estimated time for siting, building, and licensing is a decade or more

  14. Storage for the Fast Flux Test Facility unirradiated fuel in the Plutonium Finishing Plant Complex, Hanford Site, Richland, Washington

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-01-01

    This Environmental Assessment evaluates the proposed action to relocate and store unirradiated Fast Flux Test Facility fuel in the Plutonium Finishing Plant Complex on the Hanford Site, Richland, Washington. The US Department of Energy has decided to cease fuel fabrication activities in the 308 Building in the 300 Area. This decision was based on a safety concern over the ability of the fuel fabrication portion of the 308 Building to withstand a seismic event. The proposed action to relocate and store the fuel is based on the savings that could be realized by consolidating security costs associated with storage of the fuel. While the 308 Building belowgrade fuel storage areas are not at jeopardy by a seismic event, the US Department of Energy is proposing to cease storage operations along with the related fabrication operations. The US Department of Energy proposes to remove the unirradiated fuel pins and fuel assemblies from the 308 Building and store them in Room 192A, within the 234-5Z Building, a part of the Plutonium Finishing Plant Complex, located in the 200 West Area. Minor modifications to Room 192A would be required to accommodate placement of the fuel. The US Department of Energy estimates that removing all of the fuel from the 308 Building would save $6.5 million annually in security expenditures for the Fast Flux Test Facility. Environmental impacts of construction, relocation, and operation of the proposed action and alternatives were evaluated. This evaluation concluded that the proposed action would have no significant impacts on the human environment

  15. The Challenges of Preserving Historic Resources During the Deactivation and Decommissioning of Highly Contaminated Historically Significant Plutonium Process Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hopkins, A.; Minette, M.; Sorenson, D.; Heineman, R.; Gerber, M.; Charboneau, S.; Bond, F.

    2006-01-01

    The Manhattan Project was initiated to develop nuclear weapons for use in World War II. The Hanford Engineer Works (HEW) was established in eastern Washington State as a production complex for the Manhattan Project. A major product of the HEW was plutonium. The buildings and process equipment used in the early phases of nuclear weapons development are historically significant because of the new and unique work that was performed. When environmental cleanup became Hanford's central mission in 1991, the Department of Energy (DOE) prepared for the deactivation and decommissioning of many of the old process facilities. In many cases, the process facilities were so contaminated, they faced demolition. The National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) requires federal agencies to evaluate the historic significance of properties under their jurisdiction for eligibility for inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places before altering or demolishing them so that mitigation through documentation of the properties can occur. Specifically, federal agencies are required to evaluate their proposed actions against the effect the actions may have on districts, sites, buildings or structures that are included or eligible for inclusion in the National Register. In an agreement between the DOE's Richland Operations Office (RL), the Washington State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP), the agencies concurred that the Hanford Site Historic District is eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic Places and that a Site-wide Treatment Plan would streamline compliance with the NHPA while allowing RL to manage the cleanup of the Hanford Site. Currently, many of the old processing buildings at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) are undergoing deactivation and decommissioning. RL and Fluor Hanford project managers at the PFP are committed to preserving historical artifacts of the plutonium production process. They

  16. Basic design study on plutonium electro-refining facility of oxide fuel pyroelectrochemical reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ogura, Kenji; Kondo, Naruhito; Kamoshida, Hiroshi; Omori, Takashi

    2001-02-01

    The test facility basic design, utility necessity and estimation cost of the Oxide Fuel Pyro-process for the use of Chemical Processing Facility (CPF) of JNC have been studied with the information of the previous year concept study and the additional conditions. Drastic down sizing design change or the building reconstruction is necessary to place the Oxide Fuel Pyro-process Facility in the laboratory ''C'', because it is not possible to reserve enough maintenance space and the weight of the facility is over the acceptable limit of the building. A further study such as facility down sizing, apparatus detail design and experiment detail process treatment has to be planned. (author)

  17. Extrinsic and intrinsic complexities of the Los Alamos plutonium processing facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bearse, R.C.; Roberts, N.J.; Longmire, V.L.

    1985-01-01

    Analysis of the data obtained in one year of plutonium accounting at Los Alamos reveals significant complexity. Much of this complexity arises from the complexity of the processes themselves. Additional complexity is induced by errors in the data entry process. It is important to note that there is no evidence that this complexity is adversely affecting the accounting in the plant. The authors have been analyzing transaction data from fiscal year 1983 processing. This study involved 62,595 transactions. The data have been analyzed using the relational database program INGRES on a VAX 11/780 computer. This software allows easy manipulation of the original data and subsets drawn from it. The authors have been attempting for several years to understand the global features of the TA-55 accounting data. This project has underscored several of the system's complexities

  18. Extrinsic and intrinsic complexities of the Los Alamos Plutonium Processing Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bearse, R.C.; Longmire, V.L.; Roberts, N.J.

    1985-01-01

    Analysis of the data obtained in one year of plutonium accounting at Los Alamos reveals significant complexity. Much of this complexity arises from the complexity of the processes themselves. Additional complexity is induced by errors in the data entry process. It is important to note that there is no evidence that this complexity is adversely affecting the accounting in the plant. We have been analyzing transaction data from fiscal year 1983 processing. This study involved 62,595 transactions. The data have been analyzed using the relational database program INGRES on a VAX 11/780 computer. This software allows easy manipulation of the original data and subsets drawn from it. We have been attempting for several years to understand the global features of the TA-55 accounting data. This project has underscored several of the system's complexities. Examples that will be reported here include audit trails, lot-name multiplicity, etc

  19. Developments in the treatment of solid alpha-bearing wastes at the PNC plutonium fuel facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ohtsuka, K.; Miyo, H.; Ohuchi, J.; Shiga, K.; Muto, T.

    1978-01-01

    Some results of experiments done in PNC are presented on volume reduction technics for alpha-bearing wastes. A pilot wood milling machine automatically mills the plywood frames of nipple connected HEPA filters, which result in fine sized wooden chips, two nipples and the filter components. The filter components are melted in an induction furnace to be homogeneous solids. These methods and incineration of wooden chips reduce the stored volume of HEPA filters to 1/50 -- 1/100. PVC and neoprene rubber are decomposed in concentrated sulfuric acid, followed by oxidation with nitric acid. The acid digestion process generates chlorine-rich gas, from which only chlorine is selectively absorbed in water. An alpha-bearing vessel and a glovebox are cut at their installed places without spread of plutonium contamination outside the greenhouses. (auth.)

  20. Safety aspects of reprocessing and plutonium fuel facilities in power reactor and nuclear fuel development corporation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sato, S.; Akutsu, H.; Nakajima, K.; Kono, K.; Muto, T.

    1977-01-01

    PNC completed the construction of the first Japanese reprocessing plant in 1974, and the startup is now under way. The plant will have a capacity of 0.7 metric tons of spent fuel per day. Various safety measures for earthquake, radiation, criticality, fire, explosion and leakage of radioactive materials are provided in the plant. 8,000 Ci of Kr-85 and 50 Ci of H-3 per day will be released from the plant to enviroment. Skin dose is conservatively estimated to be about 30 mrem per year. Liquid waste containing 0.7 Ci per day will be discharged into the sea. Whole body dose is conservatively estimated to be 10 mrem per year. R and D for removal of Kr-85 and reducing radioactivity released into the sea are being carried out. Developmental works for solidification of radioactive liquid waste are also being conducted. Safety control in plutonium handling work for both R and D and fuel fabrication has been successfully conducted without significant abnormal occurrence in these ten years. By ''zero-contamination control policy'', surface contamination and airborne contamination in operation rooms are maintained at the background level in usual operation. The intake of plutonium was found at the maximum about one-hundredths of the MPB. External exposure has been generally controlled below three-tenths rem for three months, by shielding and mechanization of process. The radioactivity concentration of exhaust air and liquid effluent disposal is ensured far below the regulation level. Nuclear material control is maintained by a computer system, and no criticality problem has occurred. The safeguard system and installation has been improved, and is sufficient to satisfy the IAEA regulation

  1. Environmental consequences of postulate plutonium releases from Atomics International's Nuclear Materials Development Facility (NMDF), Santa Susana, California, as a result of severe natural phenomena

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jamison, J.D.; Watson, E.C.

    1982-02-01

    Potential environmental consequences in terms of radiation dose to people are presented for postulated plutonium releases caused by severe natural phenomena at the Atomics International's Nuclear Materials Development Facility (NMDF), in the Santa Susana site, California. The severe natural phenomena considered are earthquakes, tornadoes, and high straight-line winds. Plutonium deposition values are given for significant locations around the site. All important potential exposure pathways are examined. The most likely 50-year committed dose equivalents are given for the maximum-exposed individual and the population within a 50-mile radius of the plant. The maximum plutonium deposition values likely to occur offsite are also given. The most likely calculated 50-year collective committed dose equivalents are all much lower than the collective dose equivalent expected from 50 years of exposure to natural background radiation and medical x-rays. The most likely maximum residual plutonium contamination estimated to be deposited offsite following the earthquake, and the 150-mph and 170-mph tornadoes are above the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) proposed guideline for plutonium in the general environment of 0.2 μCi/m 2 . The deposition values following the 110-mph and the 130-mph tornadoes are below the EPA proposed guideline

  2. Using Modeling and Simulation to Analyze Application and Network Performance at the Radioactive Waste and Nuclear Material Disposition Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    LIFE, ROY A.; MAESTAS, JOSEPH H.; BATEMAN, DENNIS B.

    2003-01-01

    Telecommunication services customers at the Radioactive Waste and Nuclear Material Disposition Facility (RWNMDF) have endured regular service outages that seem to be associated with a custom Microsoft Access Database. In addition, the same customers have noticed periods when application response times are noticeably worse than at others. To the customers, the two events appear to be correlated. Although many network design activities can be accomplished using trial-and-error methods, there are as many, if not more occasions where computerized analysis is necessary to verify the benefits of implementing one design alternative versus another. This is particularly true when network design is performed with application flows and response times in mind. More times than not, it is unclear whether upgrading certain aspects of the network will provide sufficient benefit to justify the corresponding costs, and network modeling tools can be used to help staff make these decisions. This report summarizes our analysis of the situation at the RWNMDF, in which computerized analysis was used to accomplish four objectives: (1) identify the source of the problem; (2) identify areas where improvements make the most sense; (3) evaluate various scenarios ranging from upgrading the network infrastructure, installing an additional fiber trunk as a way to improve local network performance, and re-locating the RWNMDF database onto corporate servers; and (4) demonstrate a methodology for network design using actual application response times to predict, select, and implement the design alternatives that provide the best performance and cost benefits

  3. Plutonium storage criteria

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chung, D. [Scientech, Inc., Germantown, MD (United States); Ascanio, X. [Dept. of Energy, Germantown, MD (United States)

    1996-05-01

    The Department of Energy has issued a technical standard for long-term (>50 years) storage and will soon issue a criteria document for interim (<20 years) storage of plutonium materials. The long-term technical standard, {open_quotes}Criteria for Safe Storage of Plutonium Metals and Oxides,{close_quotes} addresses the requirements for storing metals and oxides with greater than 50 wt % plutonium. It calls for a standardized package that meets both off-site transportation requirements, as well as remote handling requirements from future storage facilities. The interim criteria document, {open_quotes}Criteria for Interim Safe Storage of Plutonium-Bearing Solid Materials{close_quotes}, addresses requirements for storing materials with less than 50 wt% plutonium. The interim criteria document assumes the materials will be stored on existing sites, and existing facilities and equipment will be used for repackaging to improve the margin of safety.

  4. Viability of Sharing Facilities for the Disposition of Spent Fuel and Nuclear Waste. An Assessment of Recent Proposals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    For a long time, ideas have been put forward and initiatives launched regarding cooperation in the nuclear fuel cycle, including both regional and multilateral approaches, to dealing with reprocessing, storage of spent fuel or, more recently, disposal of radioactive waste. The rationale behind the multinational disposal concepts ranges from concerns about the capability of some countries to implement safe national nuclear waste management programmes in a timely fashion, to questions about the availability of suitable geological formations; and, of course, the economies of scale in repository implementation are a major driver. In addition to these issues of cost, environmental and safety considerations, other benefits of such approaches for storage and underground disposal are security and non-proliferation advantages, which have become increasingly important after recent terrorist events worldwide. The IAEA has supported, since the 1970s, multilateral initiatives that seek to reduce access to weapons usable nuclear material technologies. Among different cooperation concepts, the sharing of facilities for dealing with radioactive waste management was proposed and developed through conferences and expert group meetings, as well as technical publications. The experience gained in other international frameworks, such as groupings in the European Union, was also reviewed. It was concluded that the scenarios and approaches proposed in earlier IAEA publications require further consideration regarding the conditions for their implementation, their viability, and the benefits and challenges inherent in the alternatives proposed. It is useful to consider the wider issue of spent fuel disposition (reprocessing/encapsulation, storage and disposal) when discussing the option of shared repositories for the disposal of spent fuel and high level waste from reprocessing. This proper account to be taken of new initiatives and technologies in predisposal activities and their impact

  5. Recent developments in the Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility Waste Tracking System-automated data collection pilot project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Martinez, B.; Montoya, A.; Klein, W.

    1999-01-01

    The waste management and environmental compliance group (NMT-7) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory has initiated a pilot project for demonstrating the feasibility and utility of automated data collection as a solution for tracking waste containers at the Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility. This project, the Los Alamos Waste Tracking System (LAWTS), tracks waste containers during their lifecycle at the facility. LAWTS is a two-tiered system consisting of a server/workstation database and reporting engine and a hand-held data terminal-based client program for collecting data directly from tracked containers. New containers may be added to the system from either the client unit or from the server database. Once containers are in the system, they can be tracked through one of three primary transactions: Move, Inventory, and Shipment. Because LAWTS is a pilot project, it also serves as a learning experience for all parties involved. This paper will discuss many of the lessons learned in implementing a data collection system in the restricted environment. Specifically, the authors will discuss issues related to working with the PPT 4640 terminal system as the data collection unit. They will discuss problems with form factor (size, usability, etc.) as well as technical problems with wireless radio frequency functions. They will also discuss complications that arose from outdoor use of the terminal (barcode scanning failures, screen readability problems). The paper will conclude with a series of recommendations for proceeding with LAWTS based on experience to date

  6. Preliminary report of the comparison of multiple non-destructive assay techniques on LANL Plutonium Facility waste drums

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bonner, C.; Schanfein, M.; Estep, R.

    1999-01-01

    Prior to disposal, nuclear waste must be accurately characterized to identify and quantify the radioactive content. The DOE Complex faces the daunting task of measuring nuclear material with both a wide range of masses and matrices. Similarly daunting can be the selection of a non-destructive assay (NDA) technique(s) to efficiently perform the quantitative assay over the entire waste population. In fulfilling its role of a DOE Defense Programs nuclear User Facility/Technology Development Center, the Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility recently tested three commercially built and owned, mobile nondestructive assay (NDA) systems with special nuclear materials (SNM). Two independent commercial companies financed the testing of their three mobile NDA systems at the site. Contained within a single trailer is Canberra Industries segmented gamma scanner/waste assay system (SGS/WAS) and neutron waste drum assay system (WDAS). The third system is a BNFL Instruments Inc. (formerly known as Pajarito Scientific Corporation) differential die-away imaging passive/active neutron (IPAN) counter. In an effort to increase the value of this comparison, additional NDA techniques at LANL were also used to measure these same drums. These are comprised of three tomographic gamma scanners (one mobile unit and two stationary) and one developmental differential die-away system. Although not certified standards, the authors hope that such a comparison will provide valuable data for those considering these different NDA techniques to measure their waste as well as the developers of the techniques

  7. EIS Data Call Report: Plutonium immobilization plant using ceramic in new facilities at the Savannah River Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DiSabatino, A.

    1998-01-01

    The Plutonium Immobilization Plant (PIP) accepts plutonium (Pu) from pit conversion and from non-pit sources and, through a ceramic immobilization process, converts the plutonium into an immobilized form that can be disposed of in a high level waste (HLW) repository. This immobilization process is shown conceptually in Figure 1-1. The objective is to make an immobilized form, suitable for geologic disposal, in which the plutonium is as inherently unattractive and inaccessible as the plutonium in spent fuel from commercial reactors. The ceramic immobilization alternative presented in this report consists of first converting the surplus material to an oxide, followed by incorporating the plutonium oxide into a titanate-based ceramic material that is placed in metal cans

  8. Burning weapons-grade plutonium in reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Newman, D.F.

    1993-06-01

    As a result of massive reductions in deployed nuclear warheads, and their subsequent dismantlement, large quantities of surplus weapons- grade plutonium will be stored until its ultimate disposition is achieved in both the US and Russia. Ultimate disposition has the following minimum requirements: (1) preclude return of plutonium to the US and Russian stockpiles, (2) prevent environmental damage by precluding release of plutonium contamination, and (3) prevent proliferation by precluding plutonium diversion to sub-national groups or nonweapons states. The most efficient and effective way to dispose of surplus weapons-grade plutonium is to fabricate it into fuel and use it for generation of electrical energy in commercial nuclear power plants. Weapons-grade plutonium can be used as fuel in existing commercial nuclear power plants, such as those in the US and Russia. This recovers energy and economic value from weapons-grade plutonium, which otherwise represents a large cost liability to maintain in safeguarded and secure storage. The plutonium remaining in spent MOX fuel is reactor-grade, essentially the same as that being discharged in spent UO 2 fuels. MOX fuels are well developed and are currently used in a number of LWRs in Europe. Plutonium-bearing fuels without uranium (non-fertile fuels) would require some development. However, such non-fertile fuels are attractive from a nonproliferation perspective because they avoid the insitu production of additional plutonium and enhance the annihilation of the plutonium inventory on a once-through fuel cycle

  9. Plutonium fires; Incendies de plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mestre, E.

    1959-06-23

    The author reports an information survey on accidents which occurred when handling plutonium. He first addresses accidents reported in documents. He indicates the circumstances and consequences of these accidents (explosion in glove boxes, fires of plutonium chips, plutonium fire followed by filter destruction, explosion during plutonium chip dissolution followed by chip fire). He describes hazards associated with plutonium fires: atmosphere and surface contamination, criticality. The author gives some advices to avoid plutonium fires. These advices concern electric installations, the use of flammable solvents, general cautions associated with plutonium handling, venting and filtration. He finally describes how to fight plutonium fires, and measures to be taken after the fire (staff contamination control, atmosphere control)

  10. Plutonium working group report on environmental, safety and health vulnerabilities associated with the Department's plutonium storage. Volume II, part 2: Hanford working group assessment team report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-09-01

    In a memorandum dated January 24, 1994, the Secretary of Energy initiated a department-wide assessment of current plutonium-related safety and environmental vulnerabilities at Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear facilities. In a March 15, 1994 memorandum, the Secretary directed the Office of Environment, Safety and Health (ES ampersand H) to take the lead in coordinating this assessment, which will help to establish the plutonium portion of the foundation for decision making related to the ES ampersand H aspects of national surplus fissile material disposition efforts. This DOE-wide plutonium vulnerability assessment is intended to provide the information base needed to identify and prioritize interim corrective actions for the safe management of these materials

  11. Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP); FINAL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    FRAZIER, T.P.

    1999-01-01

    A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the U. S. Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether these systems are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. To ensure the long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems, an update to this facility effluent monitoring plan is required whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document is reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and is updated, at a minimum, every 3 years

  12. Dispositional logic

    Science.gov (United States)

    Le Balleur, J. C.

    1988-01-01

    The applicability of conventional mathematical analysis (based on the combination of two-valued logic and probability theory) to problems in which human judgment, perception, or emotions play significant roles is considered theoretically. It is shown that dispositional logic, a branch of fuzzy logic, has particular relevance to the common-sense reasoning typical of human decision-making. The concepts of dispositionality and usuality are defined analytically, and a dispositional conjunctive rule and dispositional modus ponens are derived.

  13. Ion exchange separation of plutonium and gallium (1) resource and inventory requirements, (2) waste, emissions, and effluent, and (3) facility size

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DeMuth, S.

    1997-01-01

    The following report summarizes an effort intended to estimate within an order-of-magnitude the (1) resource and inventory requirements, (2) waste, emissions, and effluent amounts, and (3) facility size, for ion exchange (IX) separation of plutonium and gallium. This analysis is based upon processing 3.5 MT-Pu/yr. The technical basis for this summary is detailed in a separate document, open-quotes Preconceptual Design for Separation of Plutonium and Gallium by Ion Exchangeclose quotes. The material balances of this separate document are based strictly on stoichiometric amounts rather than details of actual operating experience, in order to avoid classification as Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information. This approximation neglets the thermodynamics and kinetics which can significantly impact the amount of reagents required. Consequently, the material resource requirements and waste amounts presented here would normally be considered minimums for processing 3.5 MT-Pu/yr; however, the author has compared the inventory estimates presented with that of an actual operating facility and found them similar. Additionally, the facility floor space presented here is based upon actual plutonium processing systems and can be considered a nominal estimate

  14. Plutonium storage phenomenology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Szempruch, R.

    1995-12-01

    Plutonium has been produced, handled, and stored at Department of Energy (DOE) facilities since the 1940s. Many changes have occurred during the last 40 years in the sources, production demands, and end uses of plutonium. These have resulted in corresponding changes in the isotopic composition as well as the chemical and physical forms of the processed and stored plutonium. Thousands of ordinary food pack tin cans have been used successfully for many years to handle and store plutonium. Other containers have been used with equal success. This paper addressees the exceptions to this satisfactory experience. To aid in understanding the challenges of handling plutonium for storage or immobilization the lessons learned from past storage experience and the necessary countermeasures to improve storage performance are discussed

  15. Requalification of the 235-F Metallograph Facility gloveboxes for use in the 773-A plutonium immobilization demonstration

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hinds, S.S.; Hidlay, J.

    1997-01-01

    A concern has been identified regarding the viability of redesigning and requalifying existing glovebox lines for use as glovebox lines integral to future mission activities in the 773-A laboratory building at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The Bechtel Savannah River Inc. (BSRI) design engineering team has been requested to perform an evaluation which would investigate the reuse of these existing gloveboxes versus the procurement of completely new glovebox systems. The existing glovebox lines were manufactured for the Plutonium (Pu) Metallograph Facility, Project 3253, located in building 235-F at SRS. These gloveboxes were designed as independent, fully functional Pu 'metal' and Pu 'oxide' processing glovebox systems for this facility. These gloveboxes, although fully installed, have never processed radioactive material. The proposed use for these gloveboxes are: (1) to utilize the Pu 'metal' glovebox system for the primary containment associated with the Pre-Processing/Re-Processing Laboratory for obtaining radioactive glass compound viscometer analysis and (2) to utilize the Pu 'oxide' glovebox system for primary containment associated with the Pu 'Can in Can' Demonstration for proof of principle testing specific to long term Pu immobilization and storage technology. This report presents objective evidence that supports the engineering judgment indicating the existing gloveboxes can be requalified for the proposed uses indicated above. SRS has the ability to duplicate the test parameters, with site forces, that will meet or exceed the identical acceptance criteria established to qualify the existing gloveboxes. The qualification effort will be a documented procedure using the leak test criteria characteristic of the original glovebox purchase. Two equivalent tests will be performed, one for post modification leak test acceptance and one for post installation leak test acceptance. (Abstract Truncated)

  16. Global plutonium management: A security option

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sylvester, K.W.B.

    1998-01-01

    The US surplus plutonium disposition program was created to reduce the proliferation risk posed by the fissile material from thousands of retired nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy has decided to process its Put into a form as secure as Pu in civilian spent fuel. While implementation issues have been considered, a major one (Russian reciprocity) remains unresolved. Russia has made disposition action conditional on extracting the fuel value of its Pu but lacks the infrastructure to do so. Assistance in the construction of the required facilities would conflict with official US policy opposing the development of a Pu fuel cycle. The resulting stagnation provides impetus for a reevaluation of US nonproliferation objectives and Pu disposition options. A strategy for satisfying Russian fuel value concerns and reducing the proliferation risk posed by surplus weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu) is proposed. The effectiveness of material alteration (e.g., isotopic, chemical, etc.hor-ellipsis) at reducing the desire, ability and opportunity for proliferation is assessed. Virtually all the security benefits attainable by material processing can be obtained by immobilizing Pu in large unit size/mass monoliths without a radiation barrier. Russia would be allowed to extract the Pu at a future date for use as fuel in a verifiable manner. Remote tracking capability, if proven feasible, would further improve safeguarding capability. As an alternate approach, the US could compensate Russia for its Pu, allowing it to be disposed of or processed elsewhere. A market based method for pricing Pu is proposed. Surplus Pu could represent access to nuclear fuel at a fixed price at a future date. This position can be replicated in the uranium market and priced using derivative theory. The proposed strategy attempts to meet nonproliferation objectives by recognizing technical limitations and satisfying political constraints

  17. Stop plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-02-01

    This press document aims to inform the public on the hazards bound to the plutonium exploitation in France and especially the plutonium transport. The first part is a technical presentation of the plutonium and the MOX (Mixed Oxide Fuel). The second part presents the installation of the plutonium industry in France. The third part is devoted to the plutonium convoys safety. The highlight is done on the problem of the leak of ''secret'' of such transports. (A.L.B.)

  18. Seismic risk analysis for General Electric Plutonium Facility, Pleasanton, California. Final report, part II

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    This report is the second of a two part study addressing the seismic risk or hazard of the special nuclear materials (SNM) facility of the General Electric Vallecitos Nuclear Center at Pleasanton, California. The Part I companion to this report, dated July 31, 1978, presented the seismic hazard at the site that resulted from exposure to earthquakes on the Calaveras, Hayward, San Andreas and, additionally, from smaller unassociated earthquakes that could not be attributed to these specific faults. However, while this study was in progress, certain additional geologic information became available that could be interpreted in terms of the existance of a nearby fault. Although substantial geologic investigations were subsequently deployed, the existance of this postulated fault, called the Verona Fault, remained very controversial. The purpose of the Part II study was to assume the existance of such a capable fault and, under this assumption, to examine the loads that the fault could impose on the SNM facility. This report first reviews the geologic setting with a focus on specifying sufficient geologic parameters to characterize the postulated fault. The report next presents the methodology used to calculate the vibratory ground motion hazard. Because of the complexity of the fault geometry, a slightly different methodology is used here compared to the Part I report. This section ends with the results of the calculation applied to the SNM facility. Finally, the report presents the methodology and results of the rupture hazard calculation

  19. Design of the plutonium facility for animal experiments and its management experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koizumi, Akira; Fukuda, Satoshi

    1998-01-01

    Design and radiation control of authors' facility which was made as a nuclear fuel laboratory for animal experiments were described. Before construction, the animals thought to be used were rats, mice, beagle dogs and monkeys. 239 Pu and certain other radioisotopes were to be used. At present, 200 dogs and 1800 small animals can be maintained. The points for design were tolerability against quake, reduced-pressure management and permanent storage of waste containing Pu. The facility building composed from 2nd, 4th, and 6th laboratory floors and between them, from the so-called mechanical floors which are spaces for ducts. The latter floors are quite useful. The system for reduced pressure is of 3 patterns of rooms without hood, with ordinary hood and with air-curtain hood. For animal maintenance, there are 3 types of maintenance means: Glove box, hood and ordinary animal room. There are drainage equipment where Pu can be removed by precipitation and charcoal adsorption and incineration equipment which is necessary for reducing the waste volume. In the latter, HEPA filters are finally used for releasing the gas. There is no particular problem in the radiation control. For the personnel control, lung-monitoring is performed before and at the end of personnel registration. Environmental monitoring of Pu is optionally performed. Removal of Pu particles generated in the inhalation experiments could be attained by the use of ULPA and HEPA filters to the level less than 1/10 17 times the reference level. Keeping the technology level enough high for facility maintenance and management was considered to be important at present and in future. (K.H.)

  20. Nondestructive assay system for use in decommissioning a plutonium-handling facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Roche, C.T.; Vronich, J.J.; Bellinger, F.O.; Perry, R.B.

    1979-07-01

    Argonne National Laboratory is decommissioning a facility used to fabricate reactor fuel elements. The equipment is contaminated with alpha emitters at levels up to 10 12 dpm/100 cm 2 . The objective of decontamination is to reduce the TRU concentrations below 10 nCi/g of waste. A portable NDA procedure using NaI(T1) gamma-spectrometric techniques was selected to measure the residual Pu and 241 Am in the glove boxes. Assays were performed at different stages in the decontamination process to estimate the detection system sensitivity and the effectiveness of the cleaning efforts

  1. CHARACTERIZATION OF CURRENTLY GENERATED TRANUSRANIC WASTE AT THE LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY'S PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION FACILITY

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dodge, Robert L.; Montoya, Andy M.

    2003-01-01

    By the time the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) completes its Disposal Phase in FY 2034, the Department of Energy (DOE) will have disposed of approximately 109,378 cubic meters (m3) of Transuranic (TRU) waste in WIPP (1). If DOE adheres to its 2005 Pollution Prevention Goal of generating less than 141m3/yr of TRU waste, approximately 5000 m3 (4%) of that TRU waste will be newly generated (2). Because of the overwhelming majority (96%) of TRU waste destined for disposal at WIPP is legacy waste, the characterization and certification requirements were developed to resolve those issues related to legacy waste. Like many other DOE facilities Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has a large volume (9,010m3) of legacy Transuranic Waste in storage (3). Unlike most DOE facilities LANL will generate approximately 140m3 of newly generated TRU waste each year3. LANL's certification program was established to meet the WIPP requirements for legacy waste and does not take advantage of the fundamental differences in waste knowledge between newly generated and legacy TRU waste

  2. Automation of plutonium spectrophotometry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Perez, J.J.; Boisde, G.; Goujon de Beauvivier, M.; Chevalier, G.; Isaac, M.

    1980-01-01

    Instrumentation was designed and constructed for automatic control of plutonium by molecular absorption spectrophotometry, on behalf of the reprocessing facilities, to meet two objectives: on-line measurement, of the valency state of plutonium, on by-pass, with the measured concentration covering the process concentration range up to a few mg.l -1 ; laboratory measurement of plutonium adjusted to valency VI, with operation carried out using a preparative system meeting the required containment specifications. For this two objectives, the photometer, optical cell connections are made by optical fibers resistant to β, γ radiation. Except this characteristic the devices are different according to the quality required for result [fr

  3. Plutonium Vulnerability Management Plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-03-01

    This Plutonium Vulnerability Management Plan describes the Department of Energy's response to the vulnerabilities identified in the Plutonium Working Group Report which are a result of the cessation of nuclear weapons production. The responses contained in this document are only part of an overall, coordinated approach designed to enable the Department to accelerate conversion of all nuclear materials, including plutonium, to forms suitable for safe, interim storage. The overall actions being taken are discussed in detail in the Department's Implementation Plan in response to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 94-1. This is included as Attachment B

  4. Strategy for the future use and disposition of Uranium-233: History, inventories, storage facilities, and potential future uses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bereolos, P.J.; Lewis, L.C.

    1998-06-01

    This document provides background information on the man-made radioisotope 233 U. It is one of a series of four reports that map out potential national strategies for the future use and disposition of 233 U pending action under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The scope of this report is separated 233 U, where separated refers to nonwaste 233 U or 233 U that has been separated from fission products. Information on other 233 U, such as that in spent nuclear fuel (SNF), is included only to recognize that it may be separated at a later date and then fall under the scope of this report. The background information in this document includes the historical production and current inventory of 233 U, the uses of 233 U, and a discussion of the available facilities for storing 233 U. The considerations for what fraction of the current inventory should be preserved for future use depend on several issues. First, 233 U always contains a small amount of the contaminant isotope 232 U. The decay products of 232 U are highly radioactive and require special handling. The current inventory has a variety of qualities with regard to 232 U content, ranging from 1 to about 200 ppm (on a total uranium basis). It is preferable to use 233 U with the minimum amount of 232 U in all applications. The second issue pertains to other isotopes of uranium mixed in with the 233 U, specifically 235 U and 238 U. A large portion of the inventory has a high quantity of 235 U associated with it. The presence of bulk amounts of 235 U complicates storage because of the added volume needing safeguards and criticality controls. Isotopic dilution using DU may remove safeguards and criticality concerns, but it increases the overall mass and may limit applications that depend on the fissile nature of 233 U. The third issue concerns the packaging of the material. There is no standard packaging (although one is being developed); consequently, the inventory exists in a variety of packages. For some

  5. Status of plutonium recycle from mixed oxide fuel fabrication wastes (U,Pu)O2 facility activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Quesada, Calixto A.; Adelfang, Pablo; Greiner, G.; Orlando, Oscar S.; Mathot, Sergio R.

    1999-01-01

    Within the specific subject of mixed oxides corresponding to the Fuel Cycle activities performed at CNEA, the recovery of plutonium from wastes originated during tests and pre-fabrication stages is performed. (author)

  6. Disposition Options for Uranium-233

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beahm, E.C.; Dole, L.R.; Forsberg, C.W.; Icenhour, A.S.; Storch, S.N.

    1999-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program (MD), in support of the U.S. arms-control and nonproliferation policies, has initiated a program to disposition surplus weapons-usable fissile material by making it inaccessible and unattractive for use in nuclear weapons. Weapons-usable fissile materials include plutonium, high-enriched uranium (HEU), and uranium-233 (sup 233)U. In support of this program, Oak Ridge National Laboratory led DOE's contractor efforts to identify and characterize options for the long-term storage and disposal of excess (sup 233)U. Five storage and 17 disposal options were identified and are described herein

  7. Multi-site risk-based project planning, optimization, sequencing and budgeting process and tool for the integrated facility disposition project - 59394

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nelson, Jerel; Castillo, Carlos; Huntsman, Julie; Lucek, Heather; Marks, Tim

    2012-01-01

    Document available in abstract form only. Full text of publication follows: Faced with the DOE Complex Transformation, NNSA was tasked with developing an integrated plan for the decommissioning of over 400 facilities and 300 environmental remediation units, as well as the many reconfiguration and modernization projects at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Y-12 Complex. Manual scheduling of remediation activities is time-consuming, labor intensive, and inherently introduces bias and unaccounted for aspects of the scheduler or organization in the process. Clearly a tool was needed to develop an objective, unbiased baseline optimized project sequence and schedule with a sound technical foundation for the Integrated Facility Disposition Project (IFDP). In generating an integrated disposition schedule, each project (including facilities, environmental sites, and remedial action units) was identified, characterized, then ranked relative to other projects. Risk matrices allowed for core project data to be extrapolated into probable contamination levels, relative risks to the public, and other technical and risk parameters to be used in the development of an overall ranking. These matrices ultimately generated a complete data set that were used in the Ranking and Sequencing Model (RSM), commonly referred to as the SUPER model, for its numerous abilities to support D and D planning, prioritization, and sequencing

  8. An alpha particle detector based on a GPS mosaic scintillator plate for continuous air monitoring in plutonium handling facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kaneko, Junichi H.; Izaki, Kenji; Toui, Kouhei; Shimaoka, Takehiro; Morishita, Yuki; Tsubota, Youichi; Higuchi, Mikio

    2016-01-01

    An alpha particle detector was developed for continuous air monitoring of radioactive contamination in working chambers at plutonium handling facilities. A 5-cm-square Gd 2 Si 2 O 7 :Ce (cerium-doped gadolinium pyro-silicate, GPS:Ce) mosaic scintillator plate for alpha particle measurements was fabricated from GPS single-crystal grains of around 550 μm diameter; the GPS grains were made of a GPS polycrystalline body grown using a top seeded solution method. The scintillator layer thickness was approximately 100 μm. The surface filling rate of the GPS grains was ca. 62%. To suppress the influence of non-uniformity of pulse heights of a photomultiplier tube, a central part of ∅ 40 mm of a 76-mm-diameter photomultiplier tube was used. In addition, 3 mm thick high-transmission glass was used as a substrate of the scintillator plate. The detector achieved energy resolution of 13% for 5.5 MeV alpha particles, detection efficiency of 61% and a radon progeny nuclide reduction ratio of 64.5%. A new alpha particle detector was developed to achieve a high radon progeny nuclide reduction ratio approaching that of a silicon semiconductor detector, with high resistance to electromagnetic noise and corrosion. - Highlights: • An alpha particle detector was developed for continuous air monitoring. • The detector comprises a mosaic scintillator plate and a photomultiplier tube. • A 5-cm-square GPS mosaic scintillator plate was fabricated. • Its respective energy resolution and detection efficiency were 13 and 61%. • The radon progeny nuclide reduction ratio of the developed detector was 64.5%.

  9. Plutonium Immobilization Program cold pour tests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hovis, G.L.; Stokes, M.W.; Smith, M.E.; Wong, J.W.

    1999-01-01

    The Plutonium Immobilization Program (PIP) is a joint venture between the Savannah River Site, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to carry out the disposition of excess weapons-grade plutonium. This program uses the can-in-canister (CIC) approach. CIC involves encapsulating plutonium in ceramic forms (or pucks), placing the pucks in sealed stainless steel cans, placing the cans in long cylindrical magazines, latching the magazines to racks inside Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) canisters, and filling the DWPF canisters with high-level waste glass. This process puts the plutonium in a stable form and makes it attractive for reuse. At present, the DWPF pours glass into empty canisters. In the CIC approach, the addition of a stainless steel rack, magazines, cans, and ceramic pucks to the canisters introduces a new set of design and operational challenges: All of the hardware installed in the canisters must maintain structural integrity at elevated (molten-glass) temperatures. This suggests that a robust design is needed. However, the amount of material added to the DWPF canister must be minimized to prevent premature glass cooling and excessive voiding caused by a large internal thermal mass. High metal temperatures, minimizing thermal mass, and glass flow paths are examples of the types of technical considerations of the equipment design process. To determine the effectiveness of the design in terms of structural integrity and glass-flow characteristics, full-scale testing will be conducted. A cold (nonradioactive) pour test program is planned to assist in the development and verification of a baseline design for the immobilization canister to be used in the PIP process. The baseline design resulting from the cold pour test program and CIC equipment development program will provide input to Title 1 design for second-stage immobilization. The cold pour tests will be conducted in two

  10. Safety aspects with regard to plutonium vitrification techniques

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gray, L.W.; Kan, T.

    1995-01-01

    Substantial inventories of excess plutonium are expected to result from dismantling US and Russian nuclear weapons. Disposition of this material should be a high priority in both countries. Various disposition options are under consideration. One option is to vitrify the plutonium with the addition of 137 Cs or high-level waste to act as a deterrent to proliferation. The primary safety problem associated with vitrification of plutonium is to avoid criticality in form fabrication and in the final repository over geologic time. Recovery should be as difficult (costly) as the recovery of plutonium from spent fuel

  11. Plutonium controversy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richmond, C.R.

    1980-01-01

    The toxicity of plutonium is discussed, particularly in relation to controversies surrounding the setting of radiation protection standards. The sources, amounts of, and exposure pathways of plutonium are given and the public risk estimated

  12. Plutonium controversy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Richmond, C.R.

    1980-01-01

    The toxicity of plutonium is discussed, particularly in relation to controversies surrounding the setting of radiation protection standards. The sources, amounts of, and exposure pathways of plutonium are given and the public risk estimated. (ACR)

  13. Atmospheric deposition, resuspension and root uptake of plutonium in corn and other grain-producing agroecosystems near a nuclear fuel facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pinder, J.E. III; McLeod, K.W.; Adriano, D.C.; Corey, J.C.; Boni, A.L.

    1989-01-01

    Plutonium released to the environment may contribute to dose to humans through inhalation or ingestion of contaminated foodstuffs. Plutonium contamination of agricultural plants may result from interception and retention of atmospheric deposition, resuspension of Pu-bearing soil particles to plant surfaces, and root uptake and translocation to grain. Plutonium on vegetation surfaces may be transferred to grain surfaces during mechanical harvesting. Data obtained from corn grown near the US Department of Energy's H-Area nuclear fuel chemical separations facility on the Savannah River Site was used to estimated parameters of a simple model of Pu transport in agroecosystems. The parameter estimates for corn were compared to those previously obtained for wheat and soybeans. Despite some differences in parameter estimates among crops, the relative importances of atmospheric deposition, resuspension and root uptake were similar among crops. For even small deposition rates, the relative importances of processes for Pu contamination of corn grain should be: transfer of atmospheric deposition from vegetation surfaces to grain surfaces during combining > resuspension of soil to grain surfaces > root uptake. Approximately 3.9 x 10 -5 of a year's atmospheric deposition is transferred to grain. Approximately 6.2 x 10 -9 of the Pu inventory in the soil is resuspended to corn grain, and a further 7.3 x 10 -10 of the soil inventory is absorbed by roots and translocated to grains

  14. Foucaults Dispositive

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Raffnsøe, Sverre; Gudmand-Høyer, Marius T.; Thaning, Morten Sørensen

    2016-01-01

    While Foucault’s work has had a crucial impact on organizational research, the analytical potential of the dispositive has not been sufficiently developed. The purpose of this article is to reconstruct the notion of the dispositive as a key conception in Foucault’s thought, particularly in his...

  15. Representing dispositions

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Röhl Johannes

    2011-08-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Dispositions and tendencies feature significantly in the biomedical domain and therefore in representations of knowledge of that domain. They are not only important for specific applications like an infectious disease ontology, but also as part of a general strategy for modelling knowledge about molecular interactions. But the task of representing dispositions in some formal ontological systems is fraught with several problems, which are partly due to the fact that Description Logics can only deal well with binary relations. The paper will discuss some of the results of the philosophical debate about dispositions, in order to see whether the formal relations needed to represent dispositions can be broken down to binary relations. Finally, we will discuss problems arising from the possibility of the absence of realizations, of multi-track or multi-trigger dispositions and offer suggestions on how to deal with them.

  16. Plutonium safe handling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tvehlov, Yu.

    2000-01-01

    The abstract, prepared on the basis of materials of the IAEA new leadership on the plutonium safe handling and its storage (the publication no. 9 in the Safety Reports Series), aimed at presenting internationally acknowledged criteria on the radiation danger evaluation and summarizing the experience in the safe management of great quantities of plutonium, accumulated in the nuclear states, is presented. The data on the weapon-class and civil plutonium, the degree of its danger, the measures for provision of its safety, including the data on accident radiation consequences with the fission number 10 18 , are presented. The recommendations, making it possible to eliminate the super- criticality danger, as well as ignition and explosion, to maintain the tightness of the facility, aimed at excluding the radioactive contamination and the possibility of internal irradiation, to provide for the plutonium security, physical protection and to reduce irradiation are given [ru

  17. Rough order of magnitude cost estimate for immobilization of 18.2 MT of plutonium using existing facilities at the Savannah River site: alternatives 3B/5B/6C/6D/7B/9B

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DiSabatino, A.

    1998-01-01

    The purpose of this Cost Estimate Report is to identify preliminary capital and operating costs for a facility to immobilize 18.2 metric tons (nominal) of plutonium using ceramic in an existing facility (221-F) at Savannah River Site (SRS)

  18. Accident investigation board report on the May 14, 1997, chemical explosion at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility, Hanford Site,Richland, Washington - final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gerton, R.E.

    1997-01-01

    On May 14, 1997, at 7:53 p.m. (PDT), a chemical explosion occur-red in Tank A- 109 in Room 40 of the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (Facility) located in the 200 West Area of the Hanford Site, approximately 30 miles north of Richland, Washington. The inactive processing Facility is part of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). On May 16, 1997, Lloyd L. Piper, Deputy Manager, acting for John D. Wagoner, Manager, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Richland Operations Office (RL), formally established an Accident Investigation Board (Board) to investigate the explosion in accordance with DOE Order 225. 1, Accident Investigations. The Board commenced its investigation on May 15, 1997, completed the investigation on July 2, 1997, and submitted its findings to the RL Manager on July 26, 1997. The scope of the Board's investigation was to review and analyze the circumstances of the events that led to the explosion; to analyze facts and to determine the causes of the accident; and to develop conclusions and judgments of need that may help prevent a recurrence of the accident. The scope also included the application of lessons learned from similar accidents within DOE. In addition to this detailed report, a companion document has also been prepared that provides a concise summary of the facts and conclusions of this report, with an emphasis on management issues (DOE/RL-97-63)

  19. Plutonium working group report on environmental, safety and health vulnerabilities associated with the department's plutonium storage. Volume II, part 11: Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory working group assessment team report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-09-01

    President Clinton has directed an Interagency Working Group to initiate a comprehensive review of long-term options for the disposition of surplus plutonium. As part of this initiative, Secretary of Energy, Hazel O'Leary, has directed that a Department of Energy project be initiated to develop options and recommendations for the safe storage of these materials in the interim. A step in the process is a plutonium vulnerability assessment of facilities throughout the Department. The Plutonium Vulnerability Working Group was formed to produce the Project and Assessment Plans, to manage the assessments and to produce a final report for the Secretary by September 30, 1994. The plans established the approach and methodology for the assessment. The Project Plan specifies a Working Group Assessment Team (WGAT) to examine each of the twelve DOE sites with significant holdings of plutonium. The Assessment Plan describes the methodology that the Site Assessment Team (SAT) used to report on the plutonium holdings for each specific site.This report provides results of the assessment of the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory

  20. Addressing mixed waste in plutonium processing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Christensen, D.C.; Sohn, C.L.; Reid, R.A.

    1991-01-01

    The overall goal is the minimization of all waste generated in actinide processing facilities. Current emphasis is directed toward reducing and managing mixed waste in plutonium processing facilities. More specifically, the focus is on prioritizing plutonium processing technologies for development that will address major problems in mixed waste management. A five step methodological approach to identify, analyze, solve, and initiate corrective action for mixed waste problems in plutonium processing facilities has been developed

  1. Fissile material disposition program final immobilization form assessment and recommendation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cochran, S.G.; Dunlop, W.H.; Edmunds, T.A.; MacLean, L.M.; Gould, T.H.

    1997-01-01

    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), in its role as the lead laboratory for the development of plutonium immobilization technologies for the Department of Energy's Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (MD), has been requested by MD to recommend an immobilization technology for the disposition of surplus weapons- usable plutonium. The recommendation and supporting documentation was requested to be provided by September 1, 1997. This report addresses the choice between glass and ceramic technologies for immobilizing plutonium using the can-in-canister approach. Its purpose is to provide a comparative evaluation of the two candidate technologies and to recommend a form based on technical considerations

  2. Future role of plutonium technology in society

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Christensen, D.C.; Matthews, R.B.; Trapp, T.J.

    1995-01-01

    Until the fall of the Berlin Wall, there was a very clear programmatic use of plutonium: supporting the nuclear deterrent. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, bilateral agreements concerning the cessation of nuclear testing and the dismantlement of large portions of the nuclear weapon stockpiles by the United States and the states of the former Soviet Union have resulted in new requirements concerning the management and disposition of nuclear materials. This report describes current issues pertaining to the requirements for plutonium management

  3. Direct vitrification of plutonium-containing materials (PCM`s) with the glass material oxidation and dissolution system (GMODS)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Forsberg, C.W. Beahm, E.C.; Parker, G.W.; Rudolph, J.C.; Haas, P.A.; Malling, G.F.; Elam, K.; Ott, L.

    1995-10-30

    The end of the cold war has resulted in excess PCMs from nuclear weapons and associated production facilities. Consequently, the US government has undertaken studies to determine how best to manage and dispose of this excess material. The issues include (a) ensurance of domestic health, environment, and safety in handling, storage, and disposition, (b) international arms control agreements with Russia and other countries, and (c) economics. One major set of options is to convert the PCMs into glass for storage or disposal. The chemically inert characteristics of glasses make them a desirable chemical form for storage or disposal of radioactive materials. A glass may contain only plutonium, or it may contain plutonium along with other radioactive materials and nonradioactive materials. GMODS is a new process for the direct conversion of PCMs (i.e., plutonium metal, scrap, and residues) to glass. The plutonium content of these materials varies from a fraction of a percent to pure plutonium. GMODS has the capability to also convert other metals, ceramics, and amorphous solids to glass, destroy organics, and convert chloride-containing materials into a low-chloride glass and a secondary clean chloride salt strewn. This report is the initial study of GMODS for vitrification of PCMs as input to ongoing studies of plutonium management options. Several tasks were completed: initial analysis of process thermodynamics, initial flowsheet analysis, identification of equipment options, proof-of-principle experiments, and identification of uncertainties.

  4. An Opportunity to Immobilize 1.6 MT or More of Weapons-Grade Plutonium at the Mayak and Krasnoyarsk-26 Sites

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jardine, L J; Borisov, G B; Rovny, S I; Kudinov, K G; Shvedov, A A

    2001-01-01

    The Mayak Production Association (PA Mayak), an industrial site in Russia, will be assigned multiple new plutonium disposition missions in order to implement the ''Agreement Between The Government Of The United States Of America And The Government Of Russian Federation Concerning The Management And Disposition Of Plutonium Designated As No Longer Required For Defense Purposes And Related Cooperation'' signed September 1, 2000, by Gore and Kasyanov, In addition, the mission of industrial-scale mixed-oxide (MOX) fabrication will be assigned to either the Mining Chemical Combine (MCC) industrial site at Krasnoyarsk-26 (K-26) or PA Mayak. Over the next decades, these new missions will generate radioactive wastes containing weapons-grade plutonium. The existing Mayak and K-26 onsite facilities and infrastructures cannot currently treat and immobilize these Pu-containing wastes for storage and disposal. However, the wastes generated under the Agreement must be properly immobilized, treated, and managed. New waste treatment and immobilization missions at Mayak may include operating facilities for plutonium metal-to-oxide conversion processes, industrial-scale MOX fuel fabrication, BN-600 PAKET hybrid core MOX fuel fabrication, and a plutonium conversion demonstration process. The MCC K-26 site, if assigned the industrial-scale MOX fuel fabrication mission, would also need to add facilities to treat and immobilize the Pu-containing wastes. This paper explores the approach and cost of treatment and immobilization facilities at both Mayak and K-26. The current work to date at Mayak and MCC K-26 indicates that the direct immobilization of 1.6 MT of weapons-grade plutonium is a viable and cost-effective alternative

  5. Report on the control of the safety and security of nuclear facilities. Part 2: the reconversion of military plutonium stocks. The use of the helps given to central and eastern Europe countries and to the new independent states

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Birraux, C.

    2002-01-01

    This report deals with two different aspects of the safety and security of nuclear facilities. The first aspect concerns the reconversion of weapon grade plutonium stocks: the plutonium in excess, plutonium hazards and nuclear fuel potentialities, the US program, the Russian program, the actions of European countries (France, Germany), the intervention of other countries, the unanswered questions (political aspects, uncertainties), the solutions of the future (improvement of reactors, the helium-cooled high temperature reactor technology (gas-turbine modular helium reactor: GT-MHR), the Carlo Rubbia's project). The second aspect concerns the actions carried out by the European Union in favor of the civil nuclear facilities of central and eastern Europe: the European Union competencies through the Euratom treaty, the conclusions of the European audit office about the PHARE and TACIS nuclear programs, the status of committed actions, the coming planned actions, and the critical analysis of the policy adopted so far. (J.S.)

  6. Disposing of the world's excess plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McCormick, J.M.; Bullen, D.B.

    1998-01-01

    The authors undertake three key objectives in addressing the issue of plutonium disposition at the end of the Cold War. First, the authors estimate the total global inventory of plutonium both from weapons dismantlement and civil nuclear power reactors. Second, they review past and current policy toward handling this metal by the US, Russia, and other key countries. Third, they evaluate the feasibility of several options (but especially the vitrification and mixed oxide fuel options announced by the Clinton administration) for disposing of the increasing amounts of plutonium available today. To undertake this analysis, the authors consider both the political and scientific problems confronting policymakers in dealing with this global plutonium issue. Interview data with political and technical officials in Washington and at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, Austria, and empirical inventory data on plutonium from a variety of sources form the basis of their analysis

  7. Mission Need Statement: Calcine Disposition Project Major Systems Acquisition Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    J. T. Beck

    2007-01-01

    This document identifies the need to establish the Calcine Disposition Project to determine and implement the final disposition of calcine including characterization, retrieval, treatment (if necessary), packaging, loading, onsite interim storage pending shipment to a repository or interim storage facility, and disposition of related facilities

  8. Benchmark calculations for critical experiments at FKBN-M facility with uranium-plutonium-polyethylene systems using JENDL-3.2 and MVP Monte-Carlo code

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Obara, Toru; Morozov, A.G.; Kevrolev, V.V.; Kuznetsov, V.V.; Treschalin, S.A.; Lukin, A.V.; Terekhin, V.A.; Sokolov, Yu.A.; Kravchenko, V.G.

    2000-01-01

    Benchmark calculations were performed for critical experiments at FKBN-M facility in RFNC-VNIITF, Russia using JENDL-3.2 nuclear data library and continuous energy Monte-Carlo code MVP. The fissile materials were high-enriched uranium and plutonium. Polyethylene was used as moderator. The neutron spectrum was changed by changing the geometry. Calculation results by MVP showed some errors. Discussion was made by reaction rates and η values obtained by MVP. It showed the possibility that cross sections of U-235 had different trend of error in fast and thermal energy region respectively. It also showed the possibility of some error of cross section of Pu-239 in high energy region. (author)

  9. Accident investigation board report on the May 14, 1997, chemical explosion at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility, Hanford Site,Richland, Washington - summary report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gerton, R.E.

    1997-01-01

    This report is a summary of the Accident Investigation Board Report on the May 14, 1997, Chemical Explosion at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility, Hanford Site, Richland, Washington (DOE/RL-97-59). The referenced report provides a greater level of detail and includes a complete discussion of the facts identified, analysis of those facts, conclusions derived from the analysis, identification of the accident's causal factors, and recommendations that should be addressed through follow-up action by the U.S. Department of Energy and its contractors. This companion document provides a concise summary of that report, with emphasis on management issues. Evaluation of emergency and occupational health response to, and radiological and chemical releases from, this accident was not within the scope of this investigation, but is the subject of a separate investigation and report (see DOE/RL-97-62)

  10. Plutonium controversy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gofman, J.W.

    1976-01-01

    If the world chooses to seek a solution to the energy dilemma through nuclear energy, the element plutonium will become an article of commerce to be handled in quantities of thousands of tonnes annually. Plutonium is a uniquely potent inhalation carcinogen, the potential induction of lung cancer dwarfing other possible toxic effects. For reasons to be presented here, it is the author's opinion that plutonium's carcinogenicity has been very seriously underestimated. If one couples the corrected carcinogenicity with the probable degree of industrial containment of the plutonium, it appears that the commercialization of a plutonium-based energy economy is not an acceptable option for society. Sagan's statement that ''the experience of 30 years supports the contention that plutonium can be used safely'' is manifestly indefensible. No meaningful epidemiological study of plutonium-exposed workers for that 30-year period has ever been done. Since thousands of those possibly exposed have left the industry and are not even available to follow-up, it is doubtful that any meaningful study of ''the experience of 30 years'' will ever be accomplished

  11. Plutonium solubilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Puigdomnech, I.; Bruno, J.

    1991-02-01

    Thermochemical data has been selected for plutonium oxide, hydroxide, carbonate and phosphate equilibria. Equilibrium constants have been evaluated in the temperature range 0 to 300 degrees C at a pressure of 1 bar to T≤100 degrees C and at the steam saturated pressure at higher temperatures. Measured solubilities of plutonium that are reported in the literature for laboratory experiments have been collected. Solubility data on oxides, hydroxides, carbonates and phosphates have been selected. No solubility data were found at temperatures higher than 60 degrees C. The literature solubility data have been compared with plutonium solubilities calculated with the EQ3/6 geochemical modelling programs, using the selected thermodynamic data for plutonium. (authors)

  12. Safe handling of plutonium: a panel report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1974-01-01

    This guide results from a meeting of a Panel of Experts held by the International Atomic Energy Agency on 8 to 12 November 1971. It is directed to workers in research laboratories handling plutonium in gram amounts. Contents: aspects of the physical and chemical properties of plutonium; metabolic features of plutonium; facility design features for safe handling of plutonium (layout of facility, working zones, decontamination room, etc.); glove boxes; health surveillance (surveillance of environment and supervision of workers); emergencies; organization. Annexes: types of glove boxes; tables; mobile ..cap alpha.. air sampler; aerosol monitor; bio-assay limits of detection; examples of contamination control monitors.

  13. Disposal of Surplus Weapons Grade Plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alsaed, H.; Gottlieb, P.

    2000-01-01

    The Office of Fissile Materials Disposition is responsible for disposing of inventories of surplus US weapons-usable plutonium and highly enriched uranium as well as providing, technical support for, and ultimate implementation of, efforts to obtain reciprocal disposition of surplus Russian plutonium. On January 4, 2000, the Department of Energy issued a Record of Decision to dispose of up to 50 metric tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium using two methods. Up to 17 metric tons of surplus plutonium will be immobilized in a ceramic form, placed in cans and embedded in large canisters containing high-level vitrified waste for ultimate disposal in a geologic repository. Approximately 33 metric tons of surplus plutonium will be used to fabricate MOX fuel (mixed oxide fuel, having less than 5% plutonium-239 as the primary fissile material in a uranium-235 carrier matrix). The MOX fuel will be used to produce electricity in existing domestic commercial nuclear reactors. This paper reports the major waste-package-related, long-term disposal impacts of the two waste forms that would be used to accomplish this mission. Particular emphasis is placed on the possibility of criticality. These results are taken from a summary report published earlier this year

  14. Design-only conceptual design report for pit disassembly and conversion facility. Rev 0

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zygmunt, S.; Christensen, L.; Richardson, C.

    1997-01-01

    This design-only conceptual design report (DOCDR) was prepared to support a funding request by the Department of Energy (DOE)-Office of Fissile Material Disposition (OFMD) for engineering design of the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF) Project No. 99-D-141. The PDCF will be used to disassemble the nation's inventory of surplus nuclear weapons pits and convert the plutonium recovered from those pits into a form suitable for storage, international inspection, and final disposition. The PDCF is a complex consisting of a hardened building that will contain the plutonium processes in a safe and secure manner, and conventional buildings and structures that will house support personnel, systems, and equipment. The PDCF uses the Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES), a low waste, modular pyroprocessing system to convert pits to plutonium oxide. The PDCF project consists of engineering and design, and construction of the buildings and structures, and engineering and design, procurement, installation, testing and start-up of equipment to disassemble pits and convert plutonium in pits to oxide form. The facility is planned to operate for 10 years, averaging 3.5 metric tons (3.86 tons) of plutonium metal per year. On conclusion of operations, the PDCF will be decontaminated and decommissioned

  15. Design-only conceptual design report for pit disassembly and conversion facility. Rev 0

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Zygmunt, S.; Christensen, L.; Richardson, C.

    1997-12-12

    This design-only conceptual design report (DOCDR) was prepared to support a funding request by the Department of Energy (DOE)-Office of Fissile Material Disposition (OFMD) for engineering design of the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF) Project No. 99-D-141. The PDCF will be used to disassemble the nation`s inventory of surplus nuclear weapons pits and convert the plutonium recovered from those pits into a form suitable for storage, international inspection, and final disposition. The PDCF is a complex consisting of a hardened building that will contain the plutonium processes in a safe and secure manner, and conventional buildings and structures that will house support personnel, systems, and equipment. The PDCF uses the Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES), a low waste, modular pyroprocessing system to convert pits to plutonium oxide. The PDCF project consists of engineering and design, and construction of the buildings and structures, and engineering and design, procurement, installation, testing and start-up of equipment to disassemble pits and convert plutonium in pits to oxide form. The facility is planned to operate for 10 years, averaging 3.5 metric tons (3.86 tons) of plutonium metal per year. On conclusion of operations, the PDCF will be decontaminated and decommissioned.

  16. The plutonium challenge for the future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gray, L.W.

    2000-01-01

    In this paper author deal with the weapons-usable plutonium and with the possibilities of their managing. Russia has not disclosed the amount of plutonium produced, but various estimates indicate that the production was about 130 tonnes. Production has been curtailed in Russia; three dual-purpose reactors still produce weapons-grade plutonium - two at Tomsk-7 (renamed Seversk) and one at Krasnoyarsk-26 (renamed Zheleznogorsk Mining and Chemical Combine). In a 1994 United States-Russian agreement that has yet to enter into force, Russia agreed to close the remaining operating reactors by the year 2000. Treaties between the United States and Russia have already cut the number of nuclear warheads from more than 10,000 to about 6,000 under START 1, which has been ratified, and to about 3,500 under START 2, which still awaits approval. If Russia and the United States conclude START 3, that number could drop to between 2,000 and 2,500. On September 2, 1998, the Presidents of the United States and Russia signed the 'Joint statement of principles for Management and Disposition of Plutonium, Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes.' In this joint statement the Presidents affirm the intention of each country to remove by stages approximately 50 metric tons of plutonium and to convert the nuclear weapons programs, and to convert this material so that it can never be used in nuclear weapons. These 100 tonne of plutonium must be managed in proper way such that it becomes neither a proliferation for an environmental risk. The United States has proposed that it manage it's 50 tonnes by a dual approach-once through MOX burning of a portion of the plutonium and immobilization in a ceramic matrix followed by en- casement in high level waste glass. Russia has proposed that it manage its full 50 tonnes by burning in a reactor. The MOX program in the United States would bum the cleaner plutonium metal and residues. Weapons components would be converted to plutonium oxide

  17. Post-remedial-action radiological survey report for the Plutonium Facility of the Battelle Memorial Institute, Columbus Division, West Jefferson Complex, West Jefferson, Ohio, April 1980-June 1982

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Flynn, K.F.; Justus, A.L.; Sholeen, C.M.; Smith, W.H.; Wynveen, R.A.

    1987-01-01

    The post-remedial-action surveys involved only the remaining, newer segment of the original Plutonium Facility and those outdoor environs at the former location of the buried autoclave and old holding tanks. The assessment activities conducted during the three surveys included determination of surface contamination levels, both fixed and removable, through direct instrument and smear surveys; measurement of ambient external penetrating radiation levels at 1-meter heights throughout the involved areas; measurement of the concentrations of radon, thoron, and actinon daughters and longer-lived radionuclides within air samples; and determination of concentrations of uranium, plutonium, americium, neptunium, the thorium-232 decay chain, and the radium-226 decay chain in soil and other material samples from the involved areas. The direct instrument and smear surveys were performed on all accessible floor, wall, and overhead surfaces and ductwork in the laboratory and corridor areas, mechanical room, and men's locker room, where the false ceiling, formerly at the 12-ft level, had been removed. In the office areas, the accessible floors, walls, and overheads were surveyed to the height of the existing 8-ft false ceiling. Although the office areas were adjacent to, not part of, the affected areas, it was possible that radioactive materials could have been carried by the ventilation system, spilled, or otherwise tracked into these adjacent areas. In some building areas, surfaces might hae been retiled, painted, or otherwise covered since the beginning of use of radioactive materials; however, the instruments used for the direct survey had some capability to detect beta-gamma activity on the underlying surfaces. 5 refs., 8 figs., 8 tabs

  18. From Russian weapons grade plutonium to MOX fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Braehler, G.; Kudriavtsev, E.G.; Seyve, C.

    1997-01-01

    The April 1996, G7 Moscow Summit on nuclear matters provided a political framework for one of the most current significant challenges: ensuring a consistent answer to the weapons grade fissile material disposition issue resulting from the disarmament effort engaged by both the USA and Russia. International technical assessments have showed that the transformation of Weapons grade Plutonium in MOX fuel is a very efficient, safe, non proliferant and economically effective solution. In this regard, COGEMA and SIEMENS, have set up a consistent technical program properly addressing incineration of weapons grade plutonium in MOX fuels. The leading point of this program would be the construction of a Weapons grade Plutonium dedicated MOX fabrication plant in Russia. Such a plant would be based on the COGEMA-SIEMENS industrial capabilities and experience. This facility would be operated by MINATOM which is the partner for COGEMA-SIEMENS. MINATOM is in charge of coordination of the activity of the Russian research and construction institutes. The project take in account international standards for non-proliferation, safety and waste management. France and Germany officials reasserted this position during their last bilateral summits held in Fribourg in February and in Dijon in June 1996. MINATOM and the whole Russian nuclear community have already expressed their interest to cooperate with COGEMA-SIEMENS in the MOX field. This follows governmental-level agreements signed in 1992 by French, German and Russian officials. For years, Russia has been dealing with research and development on MOX fabrication and utilization. So, the COGEMA-SIEMENS MOX proposal gives a realistic answer to the management of weapons grade plutonium with regard to the technical, industrial, cost and schedule factors. (author)

  19. Report on the emergency response to the event on May 14, 1997, at the plutonium reclamation facility, Hanford Site, Richland,Washington

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shoop, D.S.

    1997-01-01

    On the evening of May 14,1997, a chemical explosion Occurred at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF) in the 200 West Area(200-W) of the Hanford Site. The event warranted the declaration of an Alert emergency, activation of the Hanford Emergency Response Organization (BRO), and notification of offsite agencies. As a result of the emergency declaration, a subsequent evaluation was conducted to assess: 9 the performance of the emergency response organization o the occupational health response related to emergency activities o event notifications to offsite and environmental agencies. Additionally, the evaluation was designed to: 9 document the chronology of emergency and occupational health responses and environmental notifications connected with the explosion at the facility 0 assess the adequacy of the Hanford Site emergency preparedness activities; response readiness; and emergency management actions, occupational health, and environmental actions 0 provide an analysis of the causes of the deficiencies and weaknesses in the preparedness and response system that have been identified in the evaluation of the response a assign organizational responsibility to correct deficiencies and weaknesses a improve future performance 0 adjust elements of emergency implementing procedures and emergency preparedness activities

  20. Design impacts of safeguards and security requirements for a US MOX fuel fabrication facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Erkkila, B.H.; Rinard, P.M.; Thomas, K.E.; Zack, N.R.; Jaeger, C.D.

    1998-01-01

    The disposition of plutonium that is no longer required for the nation's defense is being structured to mitigate risks associated with the material's availability. In the 1997 Record of Decision, the US Government endorsed a dual-track approach that could employ domestic commercial reactors to effect the disposition of a portion of the plutonium in the form of mixed oxide (MOX) reactor fuels. To support this decision, the Office of Materials Disposition requested preparation of a document that would review US requirements for safeguards and security and describe their impact on the design of a MOX fuel fabrication facility. The intended users are potential bidders for the construction and operation of the facility. The document emphasizes the relevant DOE Orders but also considers the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements. Where they are significantly different, the authors have highlighted this difference and provided guidance on the impact to the facility design. Finally, the impacts of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on facility design are discussed. Security and materials control and accountability issues that influence facility design are emphasized in each area of discussion. This paper will discuss the prepared report and the issues associated with facility design for implementing practical, modern safeguards and security systems into a new MOX fuel fabrication facility

  1. Plutonium inventories for stabilization and stabilized materials

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Williams, A.K.

    1996-05-01

    The objective of the breakout session was to identify characteristics of materials containing plutonium, the need to stabilize these materials for storage, and plans to accomplish the stabilization activities. All current stabilization activities are driven by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 94-1 (May 26, 1994) and by the recently completed Plutonium ES&H Vulnerability Assessment (DOE-EH-0415). The Implementation Plan for accomplishing stabilization of plutonium-bearing residues in response to the Recommendation and the Assessment was published by DOE on February 28, 1995. This Implementation Plan (IP) commits to stabilizing problem materials within 3 years, and stabilizing all other materials within 8 years. The IP identifies approximately 20 metric tons of plutonium requiring stabilization and/or repackaging. A further breakdown shows this material to consist of 8.5 metric tons of plutonium metal and alloys, 5.5 metric tons of plutonium as oxide, and 6 metric tons of plutonium as residues. Stabilization of the metal and oxide categories containing greater than 50 weight percent plutonium is covered by DOE Standard {open_quotes}Criteria for Safe Storage of Plutonium Metals and Oxides{close_quotes} December, 1994 (DOE-STD-3013-94). This standard establishes criteria for safe storage of stabilized plutonium metals and oxides for up to 50 years. Each of the DOE sites and contractors with large plutonium inventories has either started or is preparing to start stabilization activities to meet these criteria.

  2. Methods for developing seismic and extreme wind-hazard models for evaluating critical structures and equipment at US Department of Energy facilities and commercial plutonium facilities in the United States

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coats, D.W.; Murray, R.C.; Bernreuter, D.L.

    1981-01-01

    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is developing seismic and wind hazard models for the US Department of Energy (DOE). The work is part of a three-phase effort to establish building design criteria developed with a uniform methodology for seismic and wind hazards at the various DOE sites throughout the United States. In Phase 1, LLNL gathered information on the sites and their critical facilities, including nuclear reactors, fuel-reprocessing plants, high-level waste storage and treatment facilities, and special nuclear material facilities. Phase 2 - development of seismic and wind hazard models - is discussed in this paper, which summarizes the methodologies used by seismic and extreme-wind experts and gives sample hazard curves for the first sites to be modeled. These hazard models express the annual probability that the site will experience an earthquake (or windspeed) greater than some specified magnitude. In the final phase, the DOE will use the hazards models and LLNL-recommended uniform design criteria to evaluate critical facilities. The methodology presented in this paper also was used for a related LLNL study - involving the seismic assessment of six commercial plutonium fabrication plants licensed by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Details and results of this reassessment are documented in reference

  3. Disposition of nuclear waste using subcritical accelerator-driven systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Venneri, F.; Li, N.; Williamson, M.; Houts, M.; Lawrence, G.

    1998-01-01

    Studies have shown that the repository long-term radiological risk is from the long-lived transuranics and the fission products Tc-99 and I-129, thermal loading concerns arise mainly form the short-lived fission products Sr-90 and Cs-137. In relation to the disposition of nuclear waste, ATW is expected to accomplish the following: (1) destroy over 99.9% of the actinides; (2) destroy over 99.9% of the Tc and I; (3) separate Sr and Cs (short half-life isotopes); (4) separate uranium; (5) produce electricity. In the ATW concept, spent fuel would be shipped to a ATW site where the plutonium, other transuranics and selected long-lived fission products would be destroyed by fission or transmutation in their only pass through the facility. This approach contrasts with the present-day reprocessing practices in Europe and Japan, during which high purity plutonium is produced and used in the fabrication of fresh mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) that is shipped off-site for use in light water reactors

  4. Technological alternatives for plutonium transport

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-12-01

    This paper considers alternative transport modes (air, sea, road, rail) for moving (1) plutonium from a reprocessing plant to a store or a fuel fabrication facility, and (2) MOX fuel from the latter to a reactor. These transport modes and differing forms of plutonium are considered in terms of: their proliferation resistance and safeguards; environmental and safety aspects; and economic aspects. It is tentatively proposed that the transport of plutonium could continue by air or sea where long distances are involved and by road or rail over shorter distances; this would be acceptable from the non-proliferation, environmental impact and economic aspects - there may be advantages in protection if plutonium is transported in the form of mixed oxide

  5. SLIGHTLY IRRADIATED FUEL (SIF) INTERIM DISPOSITION PROJECT

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Norton, S.H.

    2010-01-01

    CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CH2M HILL PRC) is proud to submit the Slightly Irradiated Fuel (SIF) Interim Disposition Project for consideration by the Project Management Institute as Project of the Year for 2010. The SIF Project was a set of six interrelated sub-projects that delivered unique stand-alone outcomes, which, when integrated, provided a comprehensive and compliant system for storing high risk special nuclear materials. The scope of the six sub-projects included the design, construction, testing, and turnover of the facilities and equipment, which would provide safe, secure, and compliant Special Nuclear Material (SNM) storage capabilities for the SIF material. The project encompassed a broad range of activities, including the following: Five buildings/structures removed, relocated, or built; Two buildings renovated; Structural barriers, fencing, and heavy gates installed; New roadways and parking lots built; Multiple detection and assessment systems installed; New and expanded communication systems developed; Multimedia recording devices added; and A new control room to monitor all materials and systems built. Project challenges were numerous and included the following: An aggressive 17-month schedule to support the high-profile Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) decommissioning; Company/contractor changeovers that affected each and every project team member; Project requirements that continually evolved during design and construction due to the performance- and outcome-based nature ofthe security objectives; and Restrictions imposed on all communications due to the sensitive nature of the projects In spite of the significant challenges, the project was delivered on schedule and $2 million under budget, which became a special source of pride that bonded the team. For years, the SIF had been stored at the central Hanford PFP. Because of the weapons-grade piutonium produced and stored there, the PFP had some of the tightest security on the Hanford

  6. SLIGHTLY IRRADIATED FUEL (SIF) INTERIM DISPOSITION PROJECT

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NORTON SH

    2010-02-23

    CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CH2M HILL PRC) is proud to submit the Slightly Irradiated Fuel (SIF) Interim Disposition Project for consideration by the Project Management Institute as Project of the Year for 2010. The SIF Project was a set of six interrelated sub-projects that delivered unique stand-alone outcomes, which, when integrated, provided a comprehensive and compliant system for storing high risk special nuclear materials. The scope of the six sub-projects included the design, construction, testing, and turnover of the facilities and equipment, which would provide safe, secure, and compliant Special Nuclear Material (SNM) storage capabilities for the SIF material. The project encompassed a broad range of activities, including the following: Five buildings/structures removed, relocated, or built; Two buildings renovated; Structural barriers, fencing, and heavy gates installed; New roadways and parking lots built; Multiple detection and assessment systems installed; New and expanded communication systems developed; Multimedia recording devices added; and A new control room to monitor all materials and systems built. Project challenges were numerous and included the following: An aggressive 17-month schedule to support the high-profile Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) decommissioning; Company/contractor changeovers that affected each and every project team member; Project requirements that continually evolved during design and construction due to the performance- and outcome-based nature ofthe security objectives; and Restrictions imposed on all communications due to the sensitive nature of the projects In spite of the significant challenges, the project was delivered on schedule and $2 million under budget, which became a special source of pride that bonded the team. For years, the SIF had been stored at the central Hanford PFP. Because of the weapons-grade piutonium produced and stored there, the PFP had some of the tightest security on the Hanford

  7. CONVERSION OF PLUTONIUM TRIFLUORIDE TO PLUTONIUM TETRAFLUORIDE

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fried, S.; Davidson, N.R.

    1957-09-10

    A large proportion of the trifluoride of plutonium can be converted, in the absence of hydrogen fluoride, to the tetrafiuoride of plutonium. This is done by heating plutonium trifluoride with oxygen at temperatures between 250 and 900 deg C. The trifiuoride of plutonium reacts with oxygen to form plutonium tetrafluoride and plutonium oxide, in a ratio of about 3 to 1. In the presence of moisture, plutonium tetrafluoride tends to hydrolyze at elevated temperatures and therefore it is desirable to have the process take place under anhydrous conditions.

  8. Plutonium (Pu)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    This pedagogical document presents the properties and uses of plutonium: where does it come from, the history of its discovery, its uses and energy content, its recycling and reuse in MOX fuels, its half-life, toxicity and presence in the environment. (J.S.)

  9. Integrated five station nondestructive assay system for the support of decontamination and decommissioning of a former plutonium mixed oxide fuel fabrication facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Caldwell, J.T.; Bieri, J.M.; Hastings, R.D.; Horton, W.S.; Kuckertz, T.H.; Kunz, W.E.; Plettenberg, K.; Smith, L.D.

    1990-01-01

    The goal of a safe, efficient and economic decontamination and decommissioning of plutonium facilities can be greatly enhanced through the intelligent use of an integrated system of nondestructive assay equipment. We have designed and fabricated such a system utilizing five separate NDA stations integrated through a single data acquisition and management personal computer-based controller. The initial station utilizes a passive neutron measurement to determine item Pu inventory to the 0.1 gm level prior to insertion into the decontamination cell. A large active neutron station integrated into the cell is used to measure decontamination effectiveness at the 10 nci/gm level. Cell Pu buildup at critical points is monitored with passive neutron detectors. An active neutron station having better than 1 mg Pu assay sensitivity is used to quantify final compacted waste pucks outside the cell. Bulk Pu in various forms and isotopic enrichments is quantified in a combined passive neutron coincidence and high resolution gamma ray spectrometer station outside the cell. Item control and Pu inventory are managed with bar code labeling and a station integrating algorithm. Overall economy is achieved by multiple station use of the same expensive hardware such as the neutron generator

  10. Beating plutonium swords into electrical plowshares

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ofte, D.

    1993-01-01

    After decades of producing large quantities of weapons-grade plutonium, the United States and the Confederation of Independent States are faced with an unanticipated dilemma of a growing surplus of that material. This circumstance could not have been anticipated just a few years ago after living with a weapons program that from its inception in the United States was characterized by a chronic tight supply situation. The rapid drawdown of the nuclear weapons stockpile presents a near-term problem of storage capacity in the system until the United States makes a disposition decision for what may be in excess of 50 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium

  11. Crystalline ceramics: Waste forms for the disposal of weapons plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ewing, R.C.; Lutze, W.; Weber, W.J.

    1995-05-01

    At present, there are three seriously considered options for the disposition of excess weapons plutonium: (i) incorporation, partial burn-up and direct disposal of MOX-fuel; (ii) vitrification with defense waste and disposal as glass ''logs''; (iii) deep borehole disposal (National Academy of Sciences Report, 1994). The first two options provide a safeguard due to the high activity of fission products in the irradiated fuel and the defense waste. The latter option has only been examined in a preliminary manner, and the exact form of the plutonium has not been identified. In this paper, we review the potential for the immobilization of plutonium in highly durable crystalline ceramics apatite, pyrochlore, monazite and zircon. Based on available data, we propose zircon as the preferred crystalline ceramic for the permanent disposition of excess weapons plutonium

  12. International plutonium policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-12-01

    The need to distinguish between diversion by sub-national groups and by governments is clearly stated. The paper identifies the international safeguards measures which already exist for the handling of plutonium. It proposes that the implementation of Article XII A5 of the IAEA statute concerning the international storage of plutonium could be an important additional measure. The paper also mentions the concept of using confinement as a complimentary safeguards measure and identifies the PIPEX concept. In addition, greater use is proposed of containment and surveillance procedures. The multiplication of small reprocessing plants spread over many countries is perceived as a proliferation risk. Other means such as co-location of reprocessing and fuel fabrication facilities are relevant to diversion by sub-national groups

  13. Plutonium Equivalent Inventory for Belowground Radioactive Waste at the Los Alamos National Laboratory Technical Area 54, Area G Disposal Facility - Fiscal Year 2011

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    French, Sean B.; Shuman, Robert

    2012-01-01

    The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) generates radioactive waste as a result of various activities. Many aspects of the management of this waste are conducted at Technical Area 54 (TA-54); Area G plays a key role in these management activities as the Laboratory's only disposal facility for low-level radioactive waste (LLW). Furthermore, Area G serves as a staging area for transuranic (TRU) waste that will be shipped to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant for disposal. A portion of this TRU waste is retrievably stored in pits, trenches, and shafts. The radioactive waste disposed of or stored at Area G poses potential short- and long-term risks to workers at the disposal facility and to members of the public. These risks are directly proportional to the radionuclide inventories in the waste. The Area G performance assessment and composite analysis (LANL, 2008a) project long-term risks to members of the public; short-term risks to workers and members of the public, such as those posed by accidents, are addressed by the Area G Documented Safety Analysis (LANL, 2011a). The Documented Safety Analysis uses an inventory expressed in terms of plutonium-equivalent curies, referred to as the PE-Ci inventory, to estimate these risks. The Technical Safety Requirements for Technical Area 54, Area G (LANL, 2011b) establishes a belowground radioactive material limit that ensures the cumulative projected inventory authorized for the Area G site is not exceeded. The total belowground radioactive waste inventory limit established for Area G is 110,000 PE-Ci. The PE-Ci inventory is updated annually; this report presents the inventory prepared for 2011. The approach used to estimate the inventory is described in Section 2. The results of the analysis are presented in Section 3.

  14. Learning more about plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    This document offers chemical, metallurgical and economical information on the plutonium, a hard white radioelement. It deals also on the plutonium formation in the earth, the plutonium use in the nuclear industry, the plutonium in the environment and the plutonium toxicity. (A.L.B.)

  15. Plutonium in nature

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Madic, C.

    1994-01-01

    Plutonium in nature comes from natural sources and anthropogenic ones. Plutonium at the earth surface comes principally from anthropogenic sources. It is easily detectable in environment. The plutonium behaviour in environment is complex. It seems necessary for the future to reduce releases in environment, to improve predictive models of plutonium behaviour in geosphere, to precise biological impact of anthropogenic plutonium releases

  16. Non-proliferation issues with weapons-usable plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gray, L.W.

    2000-01-01

    In this paper author deals with the plutonium produced in power reactors and with their using. Excess plutonium, mineralized in a ceramic matrix and incised in HLW glass, is a less attractive target for terrorist groups than either aged, irradiated weapons grade MOX fuel, or aged, U oxide spent fuel. This is especially true after the Russian and United States' Pu Disposition Programs have been completed, until the material (spent MOX fuel or the immobilized form) is stored in a sealed, repository. (authors)

  17. Recovery of weapon plutonium as feed material for reactor fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Armantrout, G.A.; Bronson, M.A.; Choi, Jor-Shan

    1994-01-01

    This report presents preliminary considerations for recovering and converting weapon plutonium from various US weapon forms into feed material for fabrication of reactor fuel elements. An ongoing DOE study addresses the disposition of excess weapon plutonium through its use as fuel for nuclear power reactors and subsequent disposal as spent fuel. The spent fuel would have characteristics similar to those of commercial power spent fuel and could be similarly disposed of in a geologic repository

  18. Update to the Fissile Materials Disposition program SST/SGT transportation estimation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    John Didlake

    1999-01-01

    This report is an update to ''Fissile Materials Disposition Program SST/SGT Transportation Estimation,'' SAND98-8244, June 1998. The Department of Energy Office of Fissile Materials Disposition requested this update as a basis for providing the public with an updated estimation of the number of transportation loads, load miles, and costs associated with the preferred alternative in the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)

  19. Technical challenges in support of the plutonium materials conversion program in Russia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mason, C.F.V.; Zygmunt, S.J.; Hahn, W.K.; James, C.A.; Costa, D.A.; Smith, W.H.; Yarbro, S.L.

    2000-01-01

    The Department of Energy's Plutonium Materials Conversion Program for Russia is designed to assist Russia in defining a path for the destruction of weapons grade plutonium. A similar program is currently defining a program for destruction of US weapons grade plutonium. These two sister programs arose from the September 1998 meeting between President Yeltsin and President Clinton, after which they issued a 'Joint statement of principles for management and disposition of plutonium designated as no longer required for defense purposes'. The US and Russia have each committed to convert 50 metric tons of plutonium from nuclear weapons programs to forms which are unusable for weapons

  20. Preventing pollution from plutonium processing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1993-01-01

    The plutonium processing facility at Los Alamos has adopted the strategic goal of becoming a facility that processes plutonium in a way that produces only environmentally benign waste streams. Pollution prevention through source reduction and environmentally sound recycling are being pursued. General approaches to waste reductions are administrative controls, modification of process technologies, and additional waste polishing. Recycling of waste materials, such as spent acids and salts, are technical possibilities and are being pursued to accomplish additional waste reduction. Liquid waste stream polishing to remove final traces of plutonium and hazardous chemical constituents is accomplished through (a) process modifications, (b) use of alternative chemicals and sorbents for residue removal, (c) acid recycling, and (d) judicious use of a variety of waste polishing technologies. Technologies that show promise in waste minimization and pollution prevention are identified. Working toward this goal of pollution prevention is a worthwhile endeavor, not only for Los Alamos, but for the Nuclear Complex of the future

  1. Preventing pollution from plutonium processing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1995-01-01

    The plutonium processing facility at Los Alamos has adopted the strategic goal of becoming a facility that processes plutonium in a way that produces only environmentally benign waste streams. Pollution prevention through source reduction and environmentally sound recycling are being pursued. General approaches to waste reductions are administrative controls, modification of process technologies, and additional waste polishing. Recycling of waste materials, such as spent acids and salts, are technical possibilities and are being pursued to accomplish additional waste reduction. Liquid waste stream polishing to remove final traces of plutonium and hazardous chemical constituents is accomplished through process modifications, use of alternative chemicals and sorbents for residue removal, acid recycling, and judicious use of a variety of waste polishing technologies. Technologies that show promise in waste minimization and pollution prevention are identified. Working toward this goal of pollution prevention is a worthwhile endeavor , not only for Los Alamos, but for the Nuclear Complex of the future. (author) 12 refs.; 2 figs

  2. Safeguarding the Plutonium Fuel Cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, S.J.; Lockwood, D.

    2013-01-01

    In developing a Safeguards Approach for a plutonium process facility, two general diversion and misuse scenarios must be addressed: 1) Unreported batches of undeclared nuclear material being processed through the plant and bypassing the accountancy measurement points, and 2) The operator removing plutonium at a rate that cannot be detected with confidence due to measurement uncertainties. This paper will look at the implementation of international safeguards at plutonium fuel cycle facilities in light of past lessons learned and current safeguards approaches. It will then discuss technical areas which are currently being addressed as future tools to improve on the efficiency of safeguards implementation, while maintaining its effectiveness. The discussion of new improvements will include: safeguards by design (SBD), process monitoring (PM), measurement and monitoring equipment, and data management. The paper is illustrated with the implementation of international safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant in Japan and its accountancy structure is detailed. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  3. TECHNICAL BASIS FOR DOE STANDARD 3013 EQUIVALENCY SUPPORTING REDUCED TEMPERATURE STABILIZATION OF OXALATE-DERIVED PLUTONIUM OXIDE PRODUCED BY THE HB-LINE FACILITY AT SAVANNAH RIVER SITE

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Duffey, J.; Livingston, R.; Berg, J.; Veirs, D.

    2012-07-02

    The HB-Line (HBL) facility at the Savannah River Site (SRS) is designed to produce high-purity plutonium dioxide (PuO{sub 2}) which is suitable for future use in production of Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel. The MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) requires PuO{sub 2} feed to be packaged per the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Standard 3013 (DOE-STD-3013) to comply with the facility's safety basis. The stabilization conditions imposed by DOE-STD-3013 for PuO{sub 2} (i.e., 950 C for 2 hours) preclude use of the HBL PuO{sub 2} in direct fuel fabrication and reduce the value of the HBL product as MFFF feedstock. Consequently, HBL initiated a technical evaluation to define acceptable operating conditions for production of high-purity PuO{sub 2} that fulfills the DOE-STD-3013 criteria for safe storage. The purpose of this document is to demonstrate that within the defined operating conditions, the HBL process will be equivalent for meeting the requirements of the DOE-STD-3013 stabilization process for plutonium-bearing materials from the DOE complex. The proposed 3013 equivalency reduces the prescribed stabilization temperature for high-purity PuO{sub 2} from oxalate precipitation processes from 950 C to 640 C and places a limit of 60% on the relative humidity (RH) at the lowest material temperature. The equivalency is limited to material produced using the HBL established flow sheet, for example, nitric acid anion exchange and Pu(IV) direct strike oxalate precipitation with stabilization at a minimum temperature of 640 C for four hours (h). The product purity must meet the MFFF acceptance criteria of 23,600 {micro}g/g Pu (i.e., 2.1 wt %) total impurities and chloride content less than 250 {micro}g/g of Pu. All other stabilization and packaging criteria identified by DOE-STD-3013-2012 or earlier revisions of the standard apply. Based on the evaluation of test data discussed in this document, the expert judgment of the authors supports packaging the HBL product under a 3013

  4. Plutonium finishing plant dangerous waste training plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ENTROP, G.E.

    1999-01-01

    This training plan describes general requirements, worker categories, and provides course descriptions for operation of the Plutonium Finish Plant (PFP) waste generation facilities, permitted treatment, storage and disposal (TSD) units, and the 90-Day Accumulation Areas

  5. Stabilization and immobilization of military plutonium: A non-proliferation perspective

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Leventhal, P. [Nuclear Control Institute, Washington, DC (United States)

    1996-05-01

    The Nuclear Control Institute welcomes this DOE-sponsored technical workshop on stabilization and immobilization of weapons plutonium (W Pu) because of the significant contribution it can make toward the ultimate non-proliferation objective of eliminating weapons-usable nuclear material, plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU), from world commerce. The risk of theft or diversion of these materials warrants concern, as only a few kilograms in the hands of terrorists or threshold states would give them the capability to build nuclear weapons. Military plutonium disposition questions cannot be addressed in isolation from civilian plutonium issues. The National Academy of Sciences has urged that {open_quotes}further steps should be taken to reduce the proliferation risks posed by all of the world`s plutonium stocks, military and civilian, separated and unseparated...{close_quotes}. This report discusses vitrification and a mixed oxide fuels option, and the effects of disposition choices on civilian plutonium fuel cycles.

  6. Plutonium uniqueness

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silver, G.L.

    1984-01-01

    A standard is suggested against which the putative uniqueness of plutonium may be tested. It is common folklore that plutonium is unique among the chemical elements because its four common oxidation states can coexist in the same solution. Whether this putative uniqueness appears only during transit to equilibrium, or only at equilibrium, or all of the time, is not generally made clear. But while the folklore may contain some truth, it cannot be put to test until some measure of 'uniqueness' is agreed upon so that quantitative comparisons are possible. One way of measuring uniqueness is as the magnitude of the product of the mole fractions of the element at equilibrium. A 'coexistence index' is defined and discussed. (author)

  7. Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium quarterly technical progress report, August 1, 1997--October 31, 1997

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-12-31

    This report summarizes activities of the Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium during the quarter. The report describes the Electronic Resource Library; DOE support activities; current and future environmental health and safety programs; pollution prevention and pollution avoidance; communication, education, training, and community involvement programs; and nuclear and other material studies, including plutonium storage and disposition studies.

  8. Plutonium story

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seaborg, G.T.

    1981-09-01

    The first nuclear synthesis and identification (i.e., the discovery) of the synthetic transuranium element plutonium (isotope 238 Pu) and the demonstration of its fissionability with slow neutrons (isotope 239 Pu) took place at the University of California, Berkeley, through the use of the 60-inch and 37-inch cyclotrons, in late 1940 and early 1941. This led to the development of industrial scale methods in secret work centered at the University of Chicago's Metallurgical Laboratory and the application of these methods to industrial scale production, at manufacturing plants in Tennessee and Washington, during the World War II years 1942 to 1945. The chemical properties of plutonium, needed to devise the procedures for its industrial scale production, were studied by tracer and ultramicrochemical methods during this period on an extraordinarily urgent basis. This work, and subsequent investigations on a worldwide basis, have made the properties of plutonium very well known. Its well studied electronic structure and chemical properties give it a very interesting position in the actinide series of inner transition elements

  9. Report on the control of the safety and security of nuclear facilities. Part 2: the reconversion of military plutonium stocks. The use of the helps given to central and eastern Europe countries and to the new independent states; Rapport sur le controle de la surete et de la securite des installations nucleaires. Deuxieme partie: la reconversion des stocks de plutonium militaire. L'utilisation des aides accordees aux pays d'Europe centrale et orientale et aux nouveaux etats independants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Birraux, C

    2002-07-01

    This report deals with two different aspects of the safety and security of nuclear facilities. The first aspect concerns the reconversion of weapon grade plutonium stocks: the plutonium in excess, plutonium hazards and nuclear fuel potentialities, the US program, the Russian program, the actions of European countries (France, Germany), the intervention of other countries, the unanswered questions (political aspects, uncertainties), the solutions of the future (improvement of reactors, the helium-cooled high temperature reactor technology (gas-turbine modular helium reactor: GT-MHR), the Carlo Rubbia's project). The second aspect concerns the actions carried out by the European Union in favor of the civil nuclear facilities of central and eastern Europe: the European Union competencies through the Euratom treaty, the conclusions of the European audit office about the PHARE and TACIS nuclear programs, the status of committed actions, the coming planned actions, and the critical analysis of the policy adopted so far. (J.S.)

  10. Report on the control of the safety and security of nuclear facilities. Part 2: the reconversion of military plutonium stocks. The use of the helps given to central and eastern Europe countries and to the new independent states; Rapport sur le controle de la surete et de la securite des installations nucleaires. Deuxieme partie: la reconversion des stocks de plutonium militaire. L'utilisation des aides accordees aux pays d'Europe centrale et orientale et aux nouveaux etats independants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Birraux, C

    2002-07-01

    This report deals with two different aspects of the safety and security of nuclear facilities. The first aspect concerns the reconversion of weapon grade plutonium stocks: the plutonium in excess, plutonium hazards and nuclear fuel potentialities, the US program, the Russian program, the actions of European countries (France, Germany), the intervention of other countries, the unanswered questions (political aspects, uncertainties), the solutions of the future (improvement of reactors, the helium-cooled high temperature reactor technology (gas-turbine modular helium reactor: GT-MHR), the Carlo Rubbia's project). The second aspect concerns the actions carried out by the European Union in favor of the civil nuclear facilities of central and eastern Europe: the European Union competencies through the Euratom treaty, the conclusions of the European audit office about the PHARE and TACIS nuclear programs, the status of committed actions, the coming planned actions, and the critical analysis of the policy adopted so far. (J.S.)

  11. Plutonium working group report on environmental, safety and health vulnerabilities associated with the department's plutonium storage. Volume II, part 6: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory working group assessment team report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-09-01

    President Clinton directed an Interagency Working Group to initiate a comprehensive review of long-term options for the disposition of surplus plutonium. As part of this initiative, Secretary of Energy Hazel O'Leary directed the Department of Energy to develop options and plans for the interim safe storage of these materials. One step in this direction is a plutonium vulnerability assessment of DOE facilities by a open-quotes Plutonium Vulnerability Working Group.close quotes In this effort, the working group developed a Project Plan and an Assessment Plan which basically laid out the approach and methodology for the assessments. The plans were issued on April 25, 1994. The Project Plan specifies a WGAT for each site with significant holdings of plutonium. Also, the plan requires that each site form a Site Assessment Team (SAT) to provide the self assessment for the project. Additionally, the working group was tasked with managing the assessments at each site, and providing the results in a final report for the Secretary by September 30, 1994

  12. Status of the pit disassembly and conversion facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wood, Warren T.; Christensen, Lowell T.

    2000-01-01

    A planned new facility, the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF), will be used to disassemble the nation's inventory of surplus nuclear weapons pits and convert the plutonium from those pits into a form suitable for storage, international inspection, and final disposition. Sized to handle 35 metric tons of plutonium from pits and other sources over its 10-year operating life, the PDCF will apply the Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES) technology. ARIES process technology has been developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), and an integrated system is being demonstrated at LANL. The Los Alamos National Laboratory is the lead for technical design oversight of the PDCF. Technical data gained from the ARIES demonstrations is integral for the proper design of the PDCF

  13. Plutonium Immobilization Can Loading Conceptual Design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kriikku, E.

    1999-01-01

    'The Plutonium Immobilization Facility will encapsulate plutonium in ceramic pucks and seal the pucks inside welded cans. Remote equipment will place these cans in magazines and the magazines in a Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) canister. The DWPF will fill the canister with glass for permanent storage. This report discusses the Plutonium Immobilization can loading conceptual design and includes a process block diagram, process description, preliminary equipment specifications, and several can loading issues. This report identifies loading pucks into cans and backfilling cans with helium as the top priority can loading development areas.'

  14. Plutonium Immobilization Can Loading Conceptual Design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kriikku, E.

    1999-05-13

    'The Plutonium Immobilization Facility will encapsulate plutonium in ceramic pucks and seal the pucks inside welded cans. Remote equipment will place these cans in magazines and the magazines in a Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) canister. The DWPF will fill the canister with glass for permanent storage. This report discusses the Plutonium Immobilization can loading conceptual design and includes a process block diagram, process description, preliminary equipment specifications, and several can loading issues. This report identifies loading pucks into cans and backfilling cans with helium as the top priority can loading development areas.'

  15. Dispositional greed.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Seuntjens, Terri G; Zeelenberg, Marcel; van de Ven, Niels; Breugelmans, Seger M

    2015-06-01

    Greed is an important motive: it is seen as both productive (a source of ambition; the motor of the economy) and destructive (undermining social relationships; the cause of the late 2000s financial crisis). However, relatively little is known about what greed is and does. This article reports on 5 studies that develop and test the 7-item Dispositional Greed Scale (DGS). Study 1 (including 4 separate samples from 2 different countries, total N = 6092) provides evidence for the construct and discriminant validity of the DGS in terms of positive correlations with maximization, self-interest, envy, materialism, and impulsiveness, and negative correlations with self-control and life satisfaction. Study 2 (N = 290) presents further evidence for discriminant validity, finding that the DGS predicts greedy behavioral tendencies over and above materialism. Furthermore, the DGS predicts economic behavior: greedy people allocate more money to themselves in dictator games (Study 3, N = 300) and ultimatum games (Study 4, N = 603), and take more in a resource dilemma (Study 5, N = 305). These findings shed light on what greed is and does, how people differ in greed, and how greed can be measured. In addition, they show the importance of greed in economic behavior and provide directions for future studies. (c) 2015 APA, all rights reserved).

  16. Accelerator-driven assembly for plutonium transformation (ADAPT)

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tuyle, Greorgy J. Van; Todosow, Michael; Powell, James; Schweitzer, Donald

    1995-01-01

    A particle accelerator-driven spallation target and corresponding blanket region are proposed for the ultimate disposition of weapons-grade plutonium being retired from excess nuclear weapons in the U.S. and Russia. The highly fissle plutonium is contained within .25 to .5 cm diameter silicon-carbide coated graphite beads, which are cooled by helium, within the slightly subcritical blanket region. Major advantages include very high one-pass burnup (over 90%), a high integrity waste form (the coated beads), and operation in a subcritical mode, thereby minimizing the vulnerability to the positive reativity feedbacks often associated with plutonium fuel.

  17. Cost Estimating for Decommissioning of a Plutonium Facility--Lessons Learned From The Rocky Flats Building 771 Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stevens, J. L.; Titus, R.; Sanford, P. C.

    2002-01-01

    The Rocky Flats Closure Site is implementing an aggressive approach in an attempt to complete Site closure by 2006. The replanning effort to meet this goal required that the life-cycle decommissioning effort for the Site and for the major individual facilities be reexamined in detail. As part of the overall effort, the cost estimate for the Building 771 decommissioning project was revised to incorporate both actual cost data from a recently-completed similar project and detailed planning for all activities. This paper provides a brief overview of the replanning process and the original estimate, and then discusses the modifications to that estimate to reflect new data, methods, and planning rigor. It provides the new work breakdown structure and discusses the reasons for the final arrangement chosen. It follows with the process used to assign scope, cost, and schedule elements within the new structure, and development of the new code of accounts. Finally, it describes the project control methodology used to track the project, and provides lessons learned on cost tracking in the decommissioning environment

  18. Assessment of the measurement control program for solution assay instruments at the Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldman, A.S.

    1985-05-01

    This report documents and reviews the measurement control program (MCP) over a 27-month period for four solution assay instruments (SAIs) Facility. SAI measurement data collected during the period January 1982 through March 1984 were analyzed. The sources of these data included computer listings of measurements emanating from operator entries on computer terminals, logbook entries of measurements transcribed by operators, and computer listings of measurements recorded internally in the instruments. Data were also obtained from control charts that are available as part of the MCP. As a result of our analyses we observed agreement between propagated and historical variances and concluded instruments were functioning properly from a precision aspect. We noticed small, persistent biases indicating slight instrument inaccuracies. We suggest that statistical tests for bias be incorporated in the MCP on a monthly basis and if the instrument bias is significantly greater than zero, the instrument should undergo maintenance. We propose the weekly precision test be replaced by a daily test to provide more timely detection of possible problems. We observed that one instrument showed a trend of increasing bias during the past six months and recommend a randomness test be incorporated to detect trends in a more timely fashion. We detected operator transcription errors during data transmissions and advise direct instrument transmission to the MCP to eliminate these errors. A transmission error rate based on those errors that affected decisions in the MCP was estimated as 1%. 11 refs., 10 figs., 4 tabs

  19. Plutonium research and related activities at the Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hartley, R.S.; Beard, C.A.; Barnes, D.L.

    1998-01-01

    With the end of the Cold War, the US and Russia are reducing their nuclear weapons stockpiles. What to do with the materials from thousands of excess nuclear weapons is an important international challenge. How to handle the remaining US stockpile to ensure safe storage and reliability, in light of the aging support infrastructure, is an important national challenge. To help address these challenges and related issues, the Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium is working on behalf of the State of Texas with the US Department of Energy (DOE). The center directs three major programs that address the key aspects of the plutonium management issue: (1) the Communications, Education, Training and Community Involvement Program, which focuses on informing the public about plutonium and providing technical education at all levels; (2) the Environmental, Safety, and Health (ES and H) Program, which investigates the key ES and H impacts of activities related to the DOE weapons complex in Texas; and (3) the Nuclear and Other Materials Program, which is aimed at minimizing safety and proliferation risks by helping to develop and advocate safe stewardship, storage, and disposition of nuclear weapons materials. This paper provides an overview of the center's nuclear activities described in four broad categories of international activities, materials safety, plutonium storage, and plutonium disposition

  20. Immobilization as a route to surplus fissile materials disposition. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gray, L.W.; Kan, T.; McKibben, J.M.

    1996-01-01

    The safe management of surplus weapons plutonium is a very important and urgent task with profound environmental, national and international security implications. In the aftermath of the Cold War, Presidential Police Directive 13 and various analysis by renown scientific, technical and international policy organizations have brought about a focused effort within the Department of Energy to identify and implement paths forward for the long term disposition of surplus weapons usable plutonium. The central, overarching goal is to render surplus weapons plutonium as inaccessible and unattractive for reuse in nuclear weapons, as the much larger and growing stock of plutonium contained in civilian spent reactor fuel. One disposition alternative considered for surplus Pu is immobilization, in which plutonium would be emplaced in glass, ceramic or glass-bonded zeolite. This option, along with some of the progress over the last year is discussed

  1. Equipping a glovebox for waste form testing and characterization of plutonium bearing materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Noy, M.; Johnson, S.G.; Moschetti, T.L.

    1997-01-01

    The recent decision by the Department of Energy to pursue a hybrid option for the disposition of weapons plutonium has created the need for additional facilities that can examine and characterize waste forms that contain Pu. This hybrid option consists of the placement of plutonium into stable waste forms and also into mixed oxide fuel for commercial reactors. Glass and glass-ceramic waste forms have a long history of being effective hosts for containing radionuclides, including plutonium. The types of tests necessary to characterize the performance of candidate waste forms include: static leaching experiments on both monolithic and crushed waste forms, microscopic examination, and density determination. Frequently, the respective candidate waste forms must first be produced using elevated temperatures and/or high pressures. The desired operations in the glovebox include, but are not limited to the following: (1) production of vitrified/sintered samples, (2) sampling of glass from crucibles or other vessels, (3) preparing samples for microscopic inspection and monolithic and crushed static leach tests, and (4) performing and analyzing leach tests in situ. This paper will describe the essential equipment and modifications that are necessary to successfully accomplish the goal of outfitting a glovebox for these functions

  2. Radiological safety aspects of handling plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sundararajan, A.R.

    2016-01-01

    Department of Atomic Energy in its scheme of harnessing the nuclear energy for electrical power generation and strategic applications has given a huge role to utilization of plutonium. In the power production programme, fast reactors with plutonium as fuel are expected to play a major role. This would require establishing fuel reprocessing plants to handle both thermal and fast reactor fuels. So in the nuclear fuel cycle facilities variety of chemical, metallurgical, mechanical operations have to be carried out involving significant inventories of "2"3"9 Pu and associated radionuclides. Plutonium is the most radiotoxic radionuclide and therefore any facility handling it has to be designed and operated with utmost care. Two problems of major concern in the protection of persons working in plutonium handling facilities are the internal exposure to the operating personnel from uptake of plutonium and transplutonic nuclides as they are highly radiotoxic and the radiation exposure of hands and eye lens during fuel fabrication operations especially while handling recycled high burn up plutonium. In view of the fact that annual limit for intake is very small for "2"3"9Pu and its radiation emission characteristics are such that it is a huge challenge for the health physicists to detect Pu in air and in workers. This paper discusses the principles and practices followed in providing radiological surveillance to workers in plutonium handling areas. The challenges in protecting the workers from receiving exposures to hands and eye lens in handling high burn up plutonium are also discussed. The sites having Pu fuel cycle facilities should have trained medical staff to handle cases involving excessive intake of plutonium. (author)

  3. Plutonium dioxide dissolution in glass

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vienna, J.D.; Alexander, D.L.; Li, Hong [and others

    1996-09-01

    In the aftermath of the Cold War, the U.S. Department of Energy`s (DOE) Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (OFMD) is charged with providing technical support for evaluation of disposition options for excess fissile materials manufactured for the nation`s defense. One option being considered for the disposition of excess plutonium (Pu) is immobilization by vitrification. The vitrification option entails immobilizing Pu in a host glass and waste package that are criticality-safe (immune to nuclear criticality), proliferation-resistant, and environmentally acceptable for long-term storage or disposal. To prove the technical and economic feasibility of candidate vitrification options it is necessary to demonstrate that PuO{sub 2} feedstock can be dissolved in glass in sufficient quantity. The OFMD immobilization program has set a Pu solubility goal of 10 wt% in glass. The life cycle cost of the vitrification options are strongly influenced by the rate at which PUO{sub 2} dissolves in glass. The total number of process lines needed for vitrification of 50 t of Pu in 10 years is directly dependent upon the time required for Pu dissolution in glass. The objective of this joint Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) - Savannah River Technology Center (SRTC) study was to demonstrate a high Pu solubility in glass and to identify on a rough scale the time required for Pu dissolution in the glass. This study was conducted using a lanthanide borosilicate (LaBS) glass composition designed at the SRTC for the vitrification of actinides.

  4. Plutonium dioxide dissolution in glass

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vienna, J.D.; Alexander, D.L.; Li, Hong

    1996-09-01

    In the aftermath of the Cold War, the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (OFMD) is charged with providing technical support for evaluation of disposition options for excess fissile materials manufactured for the nation's defense. One option being considered for the disposition of excess plutonium (Pu) is immobilization by vitrification. The vitrification option entails immobilizing Pu in a host glass and waste package that are criticality-safe (immune to nuclear criticality), proliferation-resistant, and environmentally acceptable for long-term storage or disposal. To prove the technical and economic feasibility of candidate vitrification options it is necessary to demonstrate that PuO 2 feedstock can be dissolved in glass in sufficient quantity. The OFMD immobilization program has set a Pu solubility goal of 10 wt% in glass. The life cycle cost of the vitrification options are strongly influenced by the rate at which PUO 2 dissolves in glass. The total number of process lines needed for vitrification of 50 t of Pu in 10 years is directly dependent upon the time required for Pu dissolution in glass. The objective of this joint Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) - Savannah River Technology Center (SRTC) study was to demonstrate a high Pu solubility in glass and to identify on a rough scale the time required for Pu dissolution in the glass. This study was conducted using a lanthanide borosilicate (LaBS) glass composition designed at the SRTC for the vitrification of actinides

  5. The radiological hazard of plutonium isotopes and specific plutonium mixtures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heindel, G.; Clow, J.; Inkret, W.; Miller, G.

    1995-11-01

    The US Department of Energy defines the hazard categories of its nuclear facilities based upon the potential for accidents to have significant effects on specific populations and the environment. In this report, the authors consider the time dependence of hazard category 2 (significant on-site effects) for facilities with inventories of plutonium isotopes and specific weapons-grade and heat-source mixtures of plutonium isotopes. The authors also define relative hazard as the reciprocal of the hazard category 2 threshold value and determine its time dependence. The time dependence of both hazard category 2 thresholds and relative hazards are determined and plotted for 10,000 years to provide useful information for planning long-term storage or disposal facilities

  6. Shielding calculational system for plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zimmerman, M.G.; Thomsen, D.H.

    1975-08-01

    A computer calculational system has been developed and assembled specifically for calculating dose rates in AEC plutonium fabrication facilities. The system consists of two computer codes and all nuclear data necessary for calculation of neutron and gamma dose rates from plutonium. The codes include the multigroup version of the Battelle Monte Carlo code for solution of general neutron and gamma shielding problems and the PUSHLD code for solution of shielding problems where low energy gamma and x-rays are important. The nuclear data consists of built in neutron and gamma yields and spectra for various plutonium compounds, an automatic calculation of age effects and all cross-sections commonly used. Experimental correlations have been performed to verify portions of the calculational system. (23 tables, 7 figs, 16 refs) (U.S.)

  7. PRODUCTION OF PLUTONIUM METAL

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lyon, W.L.; Moore, R.H.

    1961-01-17

    A process is given for producing plutonium metal by the reduction of plutonium chloride, dissolved in alkali metal chloride plus or minus aluminum chloride, with magnesium or a magnesium-aluminum alloy at between 700 and 800 deg C and separating the plutonium or plutonium-aluminum alloy formed from the salt.

  8. Proliferation resistance criteria for fissile material disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Close, D.A.; Fearey, B.L.; Markin, J.T.; Rutherford, D.A.; Duggan, R.A.; Jaeger, C.D.; Mangan, D.L.; Moya, R.W.; Moore, L.R.; Strait, R.S.

    1995-04-01

    The 1994 National Academy of Sciences study open-quotes Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutoniumclose quotes defined options for reducing the national and international proliferation risks of materials declared excess to the nuclear weapons program. This report proposes criteria for assessing the proliferation resistance of these options. The criteria are general, encompassing all stages of the disposition process from storage through intermediate processing to final disposition including the facilities, processing technologies and materials, the level of safeguards for these materials, and the national/subnational threat to the materials

  9. SEPARATION OF PLUTONIUM

    Science.gov (United States)

    Maddock, A.G.; Smith, F.

    1959-08-25

    A method is described for separating plutonium from uranium and fission products by treating a nitrate solution of fission products, uranium, and hexavalent plutonium with a relatively water-insoluble fluoride to adsorb fission products on the fluoride, treating the residual solution with a reducing agent for plutonium to reduce its valence to four and less, treating the reduced plutonium solution with a relatively insoluble fluoride to adsorb the plutonium on the fluoride, removing the solution, and subsequently treating the fluoride with its adsorbed plutonium with a concentrated aqueous solution of at least one of a group consisting of aluminum nitrate, ferric nitrate, and manganous nitrate to remove the plutonium from the fluoride.

  10. Plutonium Finishing Plant transition project function analysis report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lund, D.P.

    1995-09-01

    The document contains the functions, function definitions, function interfaces, function interface definitions, Input Computer Automated Manufacturing Definition (IDEFO) diagrams, and function hierarchy charts that describe what needs to be performed to deactivate PFP and to continue safe storage, treatment and disposition of Plutonium and High Enriched Uranium

  11. Plutonium Consumption Program, CANDU Reactor Project final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1994-07-31

    DOE is investigating methods for long term dispositioning of weapons grade plutonium. One such method would be to utilize the plutonium in Mixed OXide (MOX) fuel assemblies in existing CANDU reactors. CANDU (Canadian Deuterium Uranium) reactors are designed, licensed, built, and supported by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), and currently use natural uranium oxide as fuel. The MOX spent fuel assemblies removed from the reactor would be similar to the spent fuel currently produced using natural uranium fuel, thus rendering the plutonium as unattractive as that in the stockpiles of commercial spent fuel. This report presents the results of a study sponsored by the DOE for dispositioning the plutonium using CANDU technology. Ontario Hydro`s Bruce A was used as reference. The fuel design study defined the optimum parameters to disposition 50 tons of Pu in 25 years (or 100 tons). Two alternate fuel designs were studied. Safeguards, security, environment, safety, health, economics, etc. were considered. Options for complete destruction of the Pu were also studied briefly; CANDU has a superior ability for this. Alternative deployment options were explored and the potential impact on Pu dispositioning in the former Soviet Union was studied. An integrated system can be ready to begin Pu consumption in 4 years, with no changes required to the reactors other than for safe, secure storage of new fuel.

  12. Plutonium Consumption Program, CANDU Reactor Project final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    DOE is investigating methods for long term dispositioning of weapons grade plutonium. One such method would be to utilize the plutonium in Mixed OXide (MOX) fuel assemblies in existing CANDU reactors. CANDU (Canadian Deuterium Uranium) reactors are designed, licensed, built, and supported by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), and currently use natural uranium oxide as fuel. The MOX spent fuel assemblies removed from the reactor would be similar to the spent fuel currently produced using natural uranium fuel, thus rendering the plutonium as unattractive as that in the stockpiles of commercial spent fuel. This report presents the results of a study sponsored by the DOE for dispositioning the plutonium using CANDU technology. Ontario Hydro's Bruce A was used as reference. The fuel design study defined the optimum parameters to disposition 50 tons of Pu in 25 years (or 100 tons). Two alternate fuel designs were studied. Safeguards, security, environment, safety, health, economics, etc. were considered. Options for complete destruction of the Pu were also studied briefly; CANDU has a superior ability for this. Alternative deployment options were explored and the potential impact on Pu dispositioning in the former Soviet Union was studied. An integrated system can be ready to begin Pu consumption in 4 years, with no changes required to the reactors other than for safe, secure storage of new fuel

  13. Fuel cycles using adulterated plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brooksbank, R.E.; Bigelow, J.E.; Campbell, D.O.; Kitts, F.G.; Lindauer, R.B.

    1978-01-01

    Adjustments in the U-Pu fuel cycle necessitated by decisions made to improve the nonproliferation objectives of the US are examined. The uranium-based fuel cycle, using bred plutonium to provide the fissile enrichment, is the fuel system with the highest degree of commercial development at the present time. However, because purified plutonium can be used in weapons, this fuel cycle is potentially vulnerable to diversion of that plutonium. It does appear that there are technologically sound ways in which the plutonium might be adulterated by admixture with 238 U and/or radioisotopes, and maintained in that state throughout the fuel cycle, so that the likelihood of a successful diversion is small. Adulteration of the plutonium in this manner would have relatively little effect on the operations of existing or planned reactors. Studies now in progress should show within a year or two whether the less expensive coprocessing scheme would provide adequate protection (coupled perhaps with elaborate conventional safeguards procedures) or if the more expensive spiked fuel cycle is needed as in the proposed civex pocess. If the latter is the case, it will be further necessary to determine the optimum spiking level, which could vary as much as a factor of a billion. A very basic question hangs on these determinations: What is to be the nature of the recycle fuel fabrication facilities. If the hot, fully remote fuel fabrication is required, then a great deal of further development work will be required to make the full cycle fully commercial

  14. Plutonium in depleted uranium penetrators

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McLaughlin, J.P.; Leon-Vintro, L.; Smith, K.; Mitchell, P.I.; Zunic, Z.S.

    2002-01-01

    Depleted Uranium (DU) penetrators used in the recent Balkan conflicts have been found to be contaminated with trace amounts of transuranic materials such as plutonium. This contamination is usually a consequence of DU fabrication being carried out in facilities also using uranium recycled from spent military and civilian nuclear reactor fuel. Specific activities of 239+240 Plutonium generally in the range 1 to 12 Bq/kg have been found to be present in DU penetrators recovered from the attack sites of the 1999 NATO bombardment of Kosovo. A DU penetrator recovered from a May 1999 attack site at Bratoselce in southern Serbia and analysed by University College Dublin was found to contain 43.7 +/- 1.9 Bq/kg of 239+240 Plutonium. This analysis is described. An account is also given of the general population radiation dose implications arising from both the DU itself and from the presence of plutonium in the penetrators. According to current dosimetric models, in all scenarios considered likely ,the dose from the plutonium is estimated to be much smaller than that due to the uranium isotopes present in the penetrators. (author)

  15. Feedback from the operation of the ISOCS in support to the plutonium facility decommissioning project at the Marcoule UP1 reprocessing plant (France) and possible gain for new projects with new CANBERRA systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dogny, S.; Toubon, H.

    2009-01-01

    After the decision was taken in 1998 to shut-down the operations of the UP1 reprocessing plant in Marcoule (France), where more than 19,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel have been reprocessed, decommissioning projects started in the various buildings, particularly in the Plutonium Facility. In this facility many glove boxes had to be decontaminated before dismantling. To have waste compatible with surface storage, the main objective was to prove that each glove box had on hold up of less than 37 GBq (about 10 g) and to determine the corresponding Pu isotopic composition. Historically the method used for such characterisation was based on smears and dose rate measurements to extrapolate the mass of Pu in the glove boxes with a very high uncertainty. In 1998 AREVA-NC decided to deploy new characterization tools to meet the performance goals of the Plutonium Facility Decommissioning Project. These tools consist on portable Germanium gamma spectrometer coupled with MGA Pu isotopic composition and ISOCS 3D modelling codes. (authors)

  16. A Program to Stabilize Nuclear Materials as Managed by the Plutonium Focus Area

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kenley, B.; Scott, B.; Seidel, B.; Knecht, D.; Southworth, F.; Osborne, K.; Chipman, N.; Creque, T.

    1999-01-01

    This paper describes the program to stabilize nuclear materials, consistent with the Department of Energy Office of Environmental Management (EM) plan, Accelerating Cleanup: Paths to Closure. The program is managed by the Plutonium Stabilization and Disposition Focus Area, which defines and manages technology development programs to stabilize nuclear materials and assure their subsequent safe storage and final disposition. The scope of the Plutonium Stabilization and Disposition Focus Area (PFA) activities includes non-weapons plutonium materials, special isotopes, and other fissile materials. The PFA provides solutions to site-specific and complex wide technology issues associated with plutonium remediation, stabilization, and preparation for disposition. Our paper describes an important programmatic function of the Department of Energy nuclear materials stabilization program, including the tie-in of policy to research needs and funding for the nuclear materials disposition area. The PFA uses a rigorous systems engineering determination of technology needs and gaps, under the guidance of a Technical Advisory Panel, consisting of complex-wide experts. The Research and Development planning provides an example for other waste areas and should be of interest to Research and Development managers. The materials disposition maps developed by the PFA and described in this paper provide an evaluation of research needs, data gaps and subsequent guidance for the development of technologies for nuclear materials disposition. This paper also addresses the PFA prioritization methodology and its ability to forecast actual time to implementation

  17. Canyon Facilities

    Data.gov (United States)

    Federal Laboratory Consortium — B Plant, T Plant, U Plant, PUREX, and REDOX (see their links) are the five facilities at Hanford where the original objective was plutonium removal from the uranium...

  18. The Dispositions Improvement Process

    Science.gov (United States)

    Brewer, Robin D.; Lindquist, Cynthia; Altemueller, Lisa

    2011-01-01

    Globally, teacher dispositions along with knowledge and skills continue to be the focal point of teacher education programs. Teachers influence children's development and therefore dispositions are a universal concern. For the past 20 years in the United States, teacher education programs have assessed dispositions. We, however, must now also use…

  19. The contribution of civilian industry to military Pu disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Montalembert, J.A. de

    2000-01-01

    Weapon-grade plutonium must be disposed of in a safe and secure manner. Disposition programs should start as soon as possible and be properly monitored to achieve disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. Finally, for obvious economic and environmental reasons, such programs should make use, as much as possible, of proven processes and technology as well as of available equipment and existing sites. The more advanced - and readily available - solution is the fabrication of plutonium into MOX fuel and its irradiation existing Light Water Reactors. This solution also has the obvious advantage of burning some of the plutonium (30 to 40 %) and degrading the remaining portion of it, while generating electricity. In the longer term, the burning of plutonium new types of dedicated reactors, like High Temperature Reactor or Fast Neutron Reactor, can be envisaged, but the time and costs associated with deploying such reactors and their fuel cycle must be taken to account. (authors)

  20. Plutonium-239

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ammerich, Marc; Frot, Patricia; Gambini, Denis-Jean; Gauron, Christine; Moureaux, Patrick; Herbelet, Gilbert; Lahaye, Thierry; Pihet, Pascal; Rannou, Alain

    2014-06-01

    This sheet belongs to a collection which relates to the use of radionuclides essentially in unsealed sources. Its goal is to gather on a single document the most relevant information as well as the best prevention practices to be implemented. These sheets are made for the persons in charge of radiation protection: users, radioprotection-skill persons, labor physicians. Each sheet treats of: 1 - the radio-physical and biological properties; 2 - the main uses; 3 - the dosimetric parameters; 4 - the measurement; 5 - the protection means; 6 - the areas delimitation and monitoring; 7 - the personnel classification, training and monitoring; 8 - the effluents and wastes; 9 - the authorization and declaration administrative procedures; 10 - the transport; and 11 - the right conduct to adopt in case of incident or accident. This sheet deals specifically with Plutonium-239

  1. Nondestructive analysis of plutonium contaminated soil

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, H.E.; Taylor, L.H.

    1977-01-01

    Plutonium contaminated soil is currently being removed from a covered liquid waste disposal trench near the Pu Processing facility on the Hanford Project. This soil with the plutonium is being mined using remote techniques and equipment. The mined soil is being packaged for placement into retrievable storage, pending possible recovery. To meet the requirements of criticality safety and materials accountability, a nondestructive analysis program has been developed to determine the quantity of plutonium in each packing-storage container. This paper describes the total measurement program: equipment systems, calibration techniques, matrix assumption, instrument control program and a review of laboratory operating experience

  2. Highly enriched uranium (HEU) storage and disposition program plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Arms, W.M.; Everitt, D.A.; O'Dell, C.L.

    1995-01-01

    Recent changes in international relations and other changes in national priorities have profoundly affected the management of weapons-usable fissile materials within the United States (US). The nuclear weapon stockpile reductions agreed to by the US and Russia have reduced the national security requirements for these fissile materials. National policies outlined by the US President seek to prevent the accumulation of nuclear weapon stockpiles of plutonium (Pu) and HEU, and to ensure that these materials are subjected to the highest standards of safety, security and international accountability. The purpose of the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Storage and Disposition Program Plan is to define and establish a planned approach for storage of all HEU and disposition of surplus HEU in support of the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Material Disposition Program. Elements Of this Plan, which are specific to HEU storage and disposition, include program requirements, roles and responsibilities, program activities (action plans), milestone schedules, and deliverables

  3. ZPR-9 airborne plutonium monitoring system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rusch, G.K.; McDowell, W.P.; Knapp, W.G.

    1975-01-01

    An airborne plutonium monitoring system which is installed in the ZPR-9 (Zero Power Reactor No. 9) facility at Argonne National Laboratory is described. The design and operational experience are discussed. This monitoring system utilizes particle size and density discrimination, alpha particle energy discrimination, and a background-subtraction techique operating in cascade to separate airborne-plutonium activity from other, naturally occurring, airborne activity. Relatively high sensitivity and reliability are achieved

  4. Plutonium Round Robin Test

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dudder, G.B.; Herbillon, G.H.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The goal of nuclear forensics is to develop a preferred approach to illicit trafficking investigations. This approach must be widely understood and acceptable as credible. The principle objectives of the Round Robin Test are to prioritize the forensic techniques and methods, evaluate attribution capabilities, and examine the utility of database. The Plutonium Round Robin has made a tremendous contribution to fulfilling these goals through a collaborative learning experience that resulted from the outstanding efforts of the six participating international laboratories. A prioritize list of techniques and methods has been developed based on this exercise. Future work will focus on a Highly Enriched Round Robin and extent to which the techniques and methods can be generalized. The Plutonium Round Robin demonstrated a rather high level of capability to determine the important characteristics of the materials and processes using analytical methods. When this capability to was combined with the appropriate knowledge and database, it resulted in a demonstrated capability to attribute the source of the materials to a specific nuclear fuel, reactor, and reprocessing facility. A number of shortfalls were also identified in our current capabilities. These included alternative dating techniques. Light Water Reactor discrimination techniques, and the lack of a comprehensive network of data/knowledge bases. The result of the Round Robin will be used to develop guidelines or a 'recommended protocol' to be made available to the interested authorities and countries to use in real cases. The poster will present a summary of the results of the Plutonium Round Robin and describe the plans the subsequent Highly Enriched Uranium Round Robin Test. (author)

  5. Disposition of surplus fissile materials via immobilization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gray, L.W.; Kan, T.; Sutcliffe, W.G.; McKibben, J.M.; Danker, W.

    1995-01-01

    In the Cold War aftermath, the US and Russia have agreed to large reductions in nuclear weapons. To aid in the selection of long-term management options, the USDOE has undertaken a multifaceted study to select options for storage and disposition of surplus plutonium (Pu). One disposition alternative being considered is immobilization. Immobilization is a process in which surplus Pu would be embedded in a suitable material to produce an appropriate form for ultimate disposal. To arrive at an appropriate form, we first reviewed published information on HLW immobilization technologies to identify forms to be prescreened. Surviving forms were screened using multi-attribute utility analysis to determine promising technologies for Pu immobilization. We further evaluated the most promising immobilization families to identify and seek solutions for chemical, chemical engineering, environmental, safety, and health problems; these problems remain to be solved before we can make technical decisions about the viability of using the forms for long-term disposition of Pu. All data, analyses, and reports are being provided to the DOE Office of Fissile Materials Disposition to support the Record of Decision that is anticipated in Summer of 1996

  6. Plutonium Finishing Plant safety evaluation report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) previously known as the Plutonium Process and Storage Facility, or Z-Plant, was built and put into operation in 1949. Since 1949 PFP has been used for various processing missions, including plutonium purification, oxide production, metal production, parts fabrication, plutonium recovery, and the recovery of americium (Am-241). The PFP has also been used for receipt and large scale storage of plutonium scrap and product materials. The PFP Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) was prepared by WHC to document the hazards associated with the facility, present safety analyses of potential accident scenarios, and demonstrate the adequacy of safety class structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and operational safety requirements (OSRs) necessary to eliminate, control, or mitigate the identified hazards. Documented in this Safety Evaluation Report (SER) is DOE's independent review and evaluation of the PFP FSAR and the basis for approval of the PFP FSAR. The evaluation is presented in a format that parallels the format of the PFP FSAR. As an aid to the reactor, a list of acronyms has been included at the beginning of this report. The DOE review concluded that the risks associated with conducting plutonium handling, processing, and storage operations within PFP facilities, as described in the PFP FSAR, are acceptable, since the accident safety analyses associated with these activities meet the WHC risk acceptance guidelines and DOE safety goals in SEN-35-91

  7. Plutonium stabilization and storage research in the DNFSB 94-1 core technology program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eller, P.G.; Avens, L.R.; Roberson, G.D.

    1998-04-01

    Recommendation 94-1 of the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board (DNFSB) addresses legacy actinide materials left in the US nuclear defense program pipeline when the production mission ended in 1989. The Department of Energy (DOE) Implementation Plan responding to this recommendation instituted a Core Technology program to augment the knowledge base about general chemical and physical processing and storage behavior and to assure safe interim nuclear material storage, until disposition policies are formulated. The Core Technology program focuses on plutonium, in concert with a complex-wide applied R/D program administered by Los Alamos National Laboratory. This paper will summarize the Core Technology program's first two years, describe the research program for FY98, and project the overall direction of the program in the future

  8. Plutonium Immobilization Can Loading Concepts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kriikku, E.; Ward, C.; Stokes, M.; Randall, B.; Steed, J.; Jones, R.; Hamilton, L.; Rogers, L.; Fiscus, J.; Dyches, G.

    1998-05-01

    The Plutonium Immobilization Facility will encapsulate plutonium in ceramic pucks and seal the pucks inside welded cans. Remote equipment will place these cans in magazines and the magazines in a Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) canister. The DWPF will fill the canister with glass for permanent storage. This report discusses five can loading conceptual designs and the lists the advantages and disadvantages for each concept. This report identifies loading pucks into cans and backfilling cans with helium as the top priority can loading development areas. The can loading welder and cutter are very similar to the existing Savannah River Site (SRS) FB-Line bagless transfer welder and cutter and thus they are a low priority development item

  9. Plutonium economy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Traube, K.

    1984-01-01

    The author expresses his opinion on the situation, describes the energy-economic setting, indicates the alternatives: fuel reprocessing or immediate long-term storage, and investigates the prospects for economic utilization of the breeder reactors. All the facts suggest that the breeder reactor will never be able to stand economic competition with light-water reactors. However, there is no way to prove the future. It is naive to think that every doubt could and must be removed before stopping the development of breeder reactors - and thus also the reprocessing of the fuel of light-water reactors. On the basis of the current state of knowledge an unbiased cost-benefit-analysis can only lead to the recommendation to stop construction immediately. But can 'experts', who for years or even decades have called for and supported the development of breeder reactors be expected to make an unbiased analysis. Klaus Traube strikes the balance of the state Germany's nuclear economy is in: although there is no chance of definitively abandoning that energy-political cul-de-sac, no new adventures must be embarked upon. Responsible handling of currently used nuclear technology means to give up breeder technology and waive plutonium economy. It is no supreme technology with the aid of which structural unemployment or any other economic problem could be solved. (orig.) [de

  10. Plutonium Finishing Plant

    Data.gov (United States)

    Federal Laboratory Consortium — The Plutonium Finishing Plant, also known as PFP, represented the end of the line (the final procedure) associated with plutonium production at Hanford.PFP was also...

  11. Plutonium biokinetics in humans

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Popplewell, D.; Ham, G.; McCarthy, W.; Lands, C.

    1994-01-01

    By using an 'unusual' isotope it is possible to carry out experiments with plutonium in volunteers at minimal radiation dose levels. Measurements have been made of the gut transfer factor and the urinary excretion of plutonium after intravenous injection. (author)

  12. Plutonium in uranium deposits

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Curtis, D.; Fabryka-Martin, J.; Aguilar, R.; Attrep, M. Jr.; Roensch, F.

    1992-01-01

    Plutonium-239 (t 1/2 , 24,100 yr) is one of the most persistent radioactive constituents of high-level wastes from nuclear fission power reactors. Effective containment of such a long-lived constituent will rely heavily upon its containment by the geologic environment of a repository. Uranium ore deposits offer a means to evaluate the geochemical properties of plutonium under natural conditions. In this paper, analyses of natural plutonium in several ores are compared to calculated plutonium production rates in order to evaluate the degree of retention of plutonium by the ore. The authors find that current methods for estimating production rates are neither sufficiently accurate nor precise to provide unambiguous measures of plutonium retention. However, alternative methods for evaluating plutonium mobility are being investigated, including its measurement in natural ground waters. Preliminary results are reported and establish the foundation for a comprehensive characterization of plutonium geochemistry in other natural environments

  13. Plutonium Training Opportunities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Balatsky, Galya Ivanovna [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Wolkov, Benjamin [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2015-03-26

    This report was created to examine the current state of plutonium training in the United States and to discover ways in which to ensure that the next generation of plutonium workers are fully qualified.

  14. Optimization and plutonium equilibrium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silver, G.L.

    1976-01-01

    The sequential simplex method has been used to estimate the extent of disproportionation of tetravalent plutonium in dilute acid. A method for simulating potentiometric titrations is proposed, and this method suggests that the stoichiometric end point and the inflection point may not always correspond in the potentiometric titration of plutonium. A possible characteristic equation for the nitrite-plutonium reaction is illustrated, and the method of proportional equations is extended to the iron-plutonium reaction

  15. The Plutonium Temperature Effect Experimental Program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Haeck, Wim; Leclaire, Nicolas; Letang, Eric [IRSN, Fontenay-aux-Roses (France); Girault, Emmanuel; Fouillaud, Patrick [CEA, VALDUC (France)

    2008-07-01

    Various theoretical studies have shown that highly diluted plutonium solutions could have a positive temperature effect but (up to now) no experimental program has confirmed this effect. The main goal of the French Plutonium Temperature Effect Experimental Program (or PU+ in short) is to effectively show that such a positive temperature effect exists for diluted plutonium solutions. The experiments were conducted in the 'Apparatus B' facility at the CEA Valduc research centre in France and involved several sub-critical approach type of experiments using plutonium nitrate solutions with concentrations of 14.3, 15 and 20 g/l at temperatures ranging from 20 to 40 deg. C. A total number of 14 phase I experiments (consisting of independent subcritical approaches) have been performed (5 at 20 g/l, 4 at 15 g/l and 5 at 14.3 g/l) between 2006 and 2007. The impact of the uncertainties on the solution acidity and the plutonium concentration makes it difficult to clearly demonstrate the positive temperature effect, requiring an additional phase II experiment (in which the use of the same plutonium solution was ensured) from 22 to 28 deg. C performed in July 2007. This experiment has shown the existence of a positive temperature effect approx +2 pcm/deg. C (from 22 to 28 deg. C for a plutonium concentration of 14.3 g/l). (authors)

  16. Plutonium working group report on environmental, safety and health vulnerabilities associated with the Department's plutonium storage. Volume 2, Appendix B, Part 4: Savannah River Site site assessment team report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-09-01

    The Plutonium Environmental, Safety, and Health (ES and H) Vulnerability Assessment is being conducted by the DOE Office of Environment, Safety, and Health (DOE-EH) to evaluate the ES and H vulnerabilities arising from the Department's storage and handling of its holdings of plutonium and other transuranic isotopes. This report on Savannah River Site (SRS) facilities and materials provides the results of a self-assessment for the purpose of identifying issues as potential vulnerabilities. The report provides data and analyses for the DOE-EH and independent Working Group Assessment Team, which will make the final determination as to ES and H vulnerabilities at SRS. The term ES and H vulnerabilities is defined for the purpose of this assessment to mean conditions that could lead to unnecessary or increased radiation exposure of workers, release of radioactive materials to the environment, or radiation exposure of the public. The self-assessment identifies and prioritizes candidate or potential vulnerabilities and issues for consideration by the Working Group Assessment Team, and will serve as an information base for identifying interim corrective actions and options for the safe management of fissile materials. It will also establish a foundation for decision making regarding the safe management and disposition of DOE plutonium

  17. Cigarette smoke and plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Filipy, R.E.

    1985-01-01

    Autoradiographic techniques with liquid photographic emulsion and cellulose nitrate track-etch film are being used to investigate the spatial distribution of inhaled plutonium in the lungs of beagle dogs exposed to cigarette smoke or to the plutonium aerosol only. More plutonium than expected was detected on the inner surfaces of bronchi, and particles were observed beneath the bronchial mucosa. 2 figures, 2 tables

  18. Optimizing Plutonium stock management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Niquil, Y.; Guillot, J.

    1997-01-01

    Plutonium from spent fuel reprocessing is reused in new MOX assemblies. Since plutonium isotopic composition deteriorates with time, it is necessary to optimize plutonium stock management over a long period, to guarantee safe procurement, and contribute to a nuclear fuel cycle policy at the lowest cost. This optimization is provided by the prototype software POMAR

  19. Treatment of plutonium contaminations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lafuma, J.

    1983-01-01

    Three kinds of plutonium contaminations were considered: skin contamination; contaminated wounds; contamination by inhalation. The treatment of these contaminations was studied for insoluble (oxide and metal forms) and soluble plutonium (complexes). The use of DTPA and therapeutic problems encountered with stable plutonium complexes were analyzed. The new possibilities of internal decontamination using Puchel and LICAM were evaluated [fr

  20. Plutonium, nuclear fuel; Le plutonium, combustible nucleaire

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Grison, E [Commissariat a l' Energie Atomique, Fontenay aux Roses (France). Centre d' Etudes Nucleaires, Saclay

    1960-07-01

    A review of the physical properties of metallic plutonium, its preparation, and the alloys which it forms with the main nuclear metals. Appreciation of its future as a nuclear fuel. (author) [French] Apercu sur les proprietes physiques du plutonium metallique, sa preparation, ses alliages avec les principaux metaux nucleaires. Consideration sur son avenir en tant que combustible nucleaire. (auteur)

  1. Plutonium focus area. Technology summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-09-01

    The Assistant Secretary for the Office of Environmental Management (EM) at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) chartered the Plutonium Focus Area (PFA) in October 1995. The PFA open-quotes...provides for peer and technical reviews of research and development in plutonium stabilization activities...close quotes In addition, the PFA identifies and develops relevant research and technology. The purpose of this document is to focus attention on the requirements used to develop research and technology for stabilization, storage, and preparation for disposition of nuclear materials. The PFA Technology Summary presents the approach the PFA uses to identify, recommend, and review research. It lists research requirements, research being conducted, and gaps where research is needed. It also summarizes research performed by the PFA in the traditional research summary format. This document encourages researchers and commercial enterprises to do business with PFA by submitting research proposals or open-quotes white papers.close quotes In addition, it suggests ways to increase the likelihood that PFA will recommend proposed research to the Nuclear Materials Stabilization Task Group (NMSTG) of DOE

  2. Plutonium economy. Plutonium-Wirtschaft

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Traube, K

    1984-01-01

    The author expresses his opinion on the situation, describes the energy-economic setting, indicates the alternatives: fuel reprocessing or immediate long-term storage, and investigates the prospects for economic utilization of the breeder reactors. All the facts suggest that the breeder reactor will never be able to stand economic competition with light-water reactors. However, there is no way to prove the future. It is naive to think that every doubt could and must be removed before stopping the development of breeder reactors - and thus also the reprocessing of the fuel of light-water reactors. On the basis of the current state of knowledge an unbiased cost-benefit-analysis can only lead to the recommendation to stop construction immediately. But can 'experts', who for years or even decades have called for and supported the development of breeder reactors be expected to make an unbiased analysis. Klaus Traube strikes the balance of the state Germany's nuclear economy is in: although there is no chance of definitively abandoning that energy-political cul-de-sac, no new adventures must be embarked upon. Responsible handling of currently used nuclear technology means to give up breeder technology and waive plutonium economy. It is no supreme technology with the aid of which structural unemployment or any other economic problem could be solved.

  3. A vision for environmentally conscious plutonium processing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Avens, L.R.; Eller, P.G.; Christensen, D.C.; Miller, W.L.

    1998-01-01

    Regardless of individual technical and political opinions about the uses of plutonium, it is virtually certain that plutonium processing will continue on a significant global scale for many decades for the purposes of national defense, nuclear power, and remediation. An unavoidable aspect of plutonium processing is that radioactively contaminated gas, liquid, and solid waste streams are generated. These streams need to be handled in a manner that not only is in full compliance with today's laws but also will be considered environmentally and economically responsible now and in the future. In this regard, it is indeed ironic that the multibillion dollar and multidecade radioactive cleanup mortgage that the US Department of Energy (and its Russian counterpart) now owns resulted from waste management practices that were at the time in full legal compliance. It is now abundantly evident that in the long run, these practices have proven to be neither environmentally nor economically sound. Recent dramatic advances in actinide science and technology now make it possible to drastically minimize or even eliminate the problematic waste streams of traditional plutonium processing operations. Advanced technology thereby provides the means to avoid passing on to children and grandchildren significant environmental and economic legacies that traditional processing inevitably produces. The authors describe such a vision for plutonium processing that could be implemented fully within 5 yr at a facility such as the Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility (TA55). As a significant bonus, even on this short timescale, the initial technology investment is handsomely returned in avoided waste management costs

  4. A vision for environmentally conscious plutonium processing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Avens, L.R.; Eller, P.G.; Christensen, D.C.; Miller, W.L.

    1998-01-01

    Regardless of individual technical and political opinions about the uses of plutonium, it is virtually certain that plutonium processing will continue on a significant global scale for many decades for the purposes of national defense, nuclear power and remediation. An unavoidable aspect of plutonium processing is that radioactive contaminated gas, liquid, and solid streams are generated. These streams need to be handled in a manner that is not only in full compliance with today's laws,but also will be considered environmentally and economically responsible now and in the future. In this regard, it is indeed ironic that the multibillion dollar and multidecade radioactive cleanup mortgage that the US Department of Energy (and its Russian counterpart) now owns resulted from waste management practices that were at the time in full legal compliance. The theme of this paper is that recent dramatic advances in actinide science and technology now make it possible to drastically minimize or even eliminate the problematic waste streams of traditional plutonium processing operations. Advanced technology thereby provides the means to avoid passing on to our children and grandchildren significant environmental and economic legacies that traditional processing inevitably produces. This paper will describe such a vision for plutonium processing that could be implemented fully within five years at a facility such as the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility (TA55). As a significant bonus, even on this short time scale, the initial technology investment is handsomely returned in avoided waste management costs

  5. Plutonium use - Present status and prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dievoet, J. van; Fossoul, E.; Jonckheere, E.; Bemden, E. van den

    1977-01-01

    The use of plutonium in thermal and fast reactors is a demonstrated, if not proven, technology. Moreover, plutonium is being produced in increasing quantities. Evaluation of this production on a world scale shows that it would be theoretically possible to construct numerous breeders and thus to make the best use of plutonium, while considerably reducing uranium consumption. This source of plutonium is nevertheless dependent on the reprocessing of irradiated fuel. Long delays in installing and adequate world reprocessing capacity are weakening the prospects for introducing breeders. Furthermore, the critical situation regarding reprocessing may delay the development of complementary reprocessing methods for fuels with a high plutonium content and high burnup. The recycling of plutonium is now a well-known technique and any objections to it hardly bear analysis. Utilization of plutonium offers an appreciable saving in terms of uranium and separative work units; and it can also be shown that immediate reprocessing of the recycling fuel is not essential for the economics of the concept. Temporary storage of recycled fuel is a particularly safe form of concentrating plutonium, namely in irradiated plutonium-bearing fuel assemblies. Finally, recycling offers such flexibility that it represents no obstacle to fuel management at power plants with light-water reactors. These strategic considerations imply that the technology of using plutonium for fabricating thermal or fast reactor fuels is both technically reliable and economically viable. The methods used in industrial facilities are fully reassuring in this respect. Although various unsolved problems exist, none seems likely to impede current developments, while the industrial experience gained has enabled the economics and reliability of the methods to be improved appreciably. Apart from the techno-economic aspects, the plutonium industry must face extremely important problems in connection with the safety of personnel

  6. Plutonium working group report on environmental, safety and health vulnerabilities associated with the Department's plutonium storage. Volume I: Summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-11-01

    At the conclusion of the Cold War, the Department of Energy (DOE) stopped plutonium processing for nuclear weapons production. Facilities used for that purpose now hold significant quantities of plutonium in various forms. Unless properly stored and handled, plutonium can present environment, safety and health (ES ampersand H) hazards. Improperly stored plutonium poses a variety of hazards. When containers or packaging fail to fully protect plutonium metal from exposure to air, oxidation can occur and cause packaging failures and personnel contamination. Contamination can also result when plutonium solutions leak from bottles, tanks or piping. Plutonium in the form of scrap or residues generated by weapons production are often very corrosive, chemically reactive and difficult to contain. Buildings and equipment that are aging, poorly maintained or of obsolete design contribute to the overall problem. Inadvertent accumulations of plutonium of any form in sufficient quantities within facilities can result in nuclear criticality events that could emit large amounts of radiation locally. Contamination events and precursors of criticality events are causing safety and health concerns for workers at the Department's plutonium facilities. Contamination events also potentially threaten the public and the surrounding environment

  7. Unallocated Off-Specification Highly Enriched Uranium: Recommendations for Disposition

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bridges, D. N.; Boeke, S. G.; Tousley, D. R.; Bickford, W.; Goergen, C.; Williams, W.; Hassler, M.; Nelson, T.; Keck, R.; Arbital, J.

    2002-02-27

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has made significant progress with regard to disposition planning for 174 metric tons (MTU) of surplus Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). Approximately 55 MTU of this 174 MTU are ''offspec'' HEU. (''Off-spec'' signifies that the isotopic or chemical content of the material does not meet the American Society for Testing and Materials standards for commercial nuclear reactor fuel.) Approximately 33 of the 55 MTU have been allocated to off-spec commercial reactor fuel per an Interagency Agreement between DOE and the Tennessee Valley Authority (1). To determine disposition plans for the remaining {approx}22 MTU, the DOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (OFMD) and the DOE Office of Environmental Management (EM) co-sponsored this technical study. This paper represents a synopsis of the formal technical report (NNSA/NN-0014). The {approx} 22 MTU of off-spec HEU inventory in this study were divided into two main groupings: one grouping with plutonium (Pu) contamination and one grouping without plutonium. This study identified and evaluated 26 potential paths for the disposition of this HEU using proven decision analysis tools. This selection process resulted in recommended and alternative disposition paths for each group of HEU. The evaluation and selection of these paths considered criteria such as technical maturity, programmatic issues, cost, schedule, and environment, safety and health compliance. The primary recommendations from the analysis are comprised of 7 different disposition paths. The study recommendations will serve as a technical basis for subsequent programmatic decisions as disposition of this HEU moves into the implementation phase.

  8. International shipment of plutonium by air

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mercado, J.E.; McGrogan, J.P.

    1995-05-01

    In support of the United States (US) Government's decision to place excess plutonium oxide at the US Department of Energy's (DOE) Hanford Site under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, the Department of State notified the Congress that a plutonium storage vault at the Plutonium Finishing Plant at the Hanford Site would be added to the eligible facilities list. As part of the preparations to transfer the plutonium oxide under IAEA safeguards, samples of the powder were taken from the inventory to be shipped to the IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Austria, for laboratory analysis. The analysis of these samples was of high priority, and the IAEA requested that the material be shipped by aircraft, the most expeditious method

  9. Plutonium vulnerability issues at Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Feldt, E.; Templeton, D.W.; Tholen, E.

    1995-01-01

    The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) at the Hanford, Washington Site was operated to produce plutonium (Pu) metal and oxide for national defense purposes. Due to the production requirements and methods utilized to meet national needs and the abrupt shutdown of the plant in the late 1980s, the plant was left in a condition that poses a risk of radiation exposure to plant workers, of accidental radioactive material release to the environment, and of radiation exposure to the public. In early 1994, an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to determine the best methods for cleaning out and stabilizing Pu materials in the PFP was started. While the EIS is being prepared, a number of immediate actions have been completed or are underway to significantly reduce the greatest hazards in the PFP. Recently, increased attention his been paid to Pu risks at Department of Energy (DOE) facilities resulting in the Department-wide Plutonium Vulnerability Assessment and a recommendation by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) for DOE to develop integrated plans for managing its nuclear materials

  10. The plutonium society

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mez, L.; Richter, M.

    1981-01-01

    The lectures of an institute are reported on, which took place between 25th and 27th January 1980 in Berlin. The subsequent public panel discussion with representations from the political parties is then documentated in a few press-reports. The themes of the 8 lectures are: views and facts on plutonium, plutonium as an energy resource, military aspects of the production of plutonium, economic aspects of the plutonium economy, the position of the trade unions on the industrial reconversion, the alleged inevitability of a plutonium society and the socio-political alternatives and perspectives of nuclear waste disposal. (UA) [de

  11. Non-proliferation issues for the disposition of fissile materials using reactor alternatives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jaeger, C.D.; Duggan, R.A.; Tolk, K.M.

    1996-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) is analyzing long-term storage on options for excess weapons-usable fissile materials. A number of the disposition alternatives are being considered which involve the use of reactors. The various reactor alternatives are all very similar and include front-end processes that could convert plutonium to a usable form for fuel fabrication, a MOX fuel fab facility, reactors to bum the MOX fuel and ultimate disposal of spent fuel in some geologic repository. They include existing, partially completed, advanced or evolutionary light water reactors and Canadian deuterium uranium (CANDU) reactors. In addition to the differences in the type of reactors, other variants on these alternatives are being evaluated to include the location and number of the reactors, the location of the mixed oxide (MOX) fabrication facility, the ownership of the facilities (private or government) and the colocation and/or separation of these facilities. All of these alternatives and their variants must be evaluated with respect to non-proliferation resistance. Both domestic and international safeguards support are being provided to DOE's Fissile Materials Disposition Program (FMDP) and includes such areas as physical protection, nuclear materials accountability and material containment and surveillance. This paper will focus on how the non-proliferation objective of reducing security risks and strengthening arms reduction will be accomplished and what some of the nonproliferation issues are for the reactor alternatives. Proliferation risk has been defined in terms of material form, physical environment, and the level of security and safeguards that is applied to the material. Metrics have been developed for each of these factors. The reactor alternatives will be evaluated with respect to these proliferation risk factors at each of the unit process locations in the alternative

  12. Non-proliferation issues for the disposition of fissile materials using reactor alternatives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jaeger, C.D.; Duggan, R.A.; Tolk, K.M.

    1996-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) is analyzing long-term storage imposition options for excess weapons-usable fissile materials. A number of the disposition alternatives are being considered which involve the use of reactors. The various reactor alternatives are all very similar and include front-end processes that could convert plutonium to a usable form for fuel fabrication, a MOX fuel fab facility, reactors to burn the MOX fuel and ultimate disposal of spent fuel in some geologic repository. They include existing, partially completed, advanced or evolutionary light water reactors and Canadian deuterium uranium (CANDU) reactors. In addition to the differences in the type of reactors, other variants on these alternatives are being evaluated to include the location and number of the reactors, the location of the mixed oxide (MOX) fabrication facility, the ownership of the facilities (private or government) and the colocation and/or separation of these facilities. All of these alternatives and their variants must be evaluated with respect to non-proliferation resistance. Both domestic and international safeguards support are being provided to DOE's Fissile Materials Disposition Program (FMDP) and includes such areas as physical protection, nuclear materials accountability and material containment and surveillance. This paper will focus on how the non-proliferation objective of reducing security risks and strengthening arms reduction will be accomplished and what some of the non-proliferation issues are for the reactor alternatives. Proliferation risk has been defined in terms of material form, physical environment, and the level of security and safeguards that is applied to the material. Metrics have been developed for each of these factors. The reactor alternatives will be evaluated with respect to these proliferation risk factors at each of the unit process locations in the alternative

  13. Development of the plutonium oxide vitrification system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marshall, K.M.; Marra, J.C.; Coughlin, J.T.; Calloway, T.B.; Schumacher, R.F.; Zamecnik, J.R.; Pareizs, J.M.

    1998-01-01

    Repository disposal of plutonium in a suitable, immobilized form is being considered as one option for the disposition of surplus weapons-usable plutonium. Accelerated development efforts were completed in 1997 on two potential immobilization forms to facilitate downselection to one form for continued development. The two forms studied were a crystalline ceramic based on Synroc technology and a lanthanide borosilicate (LaBS) glass. As part of the glass development program, melter design activities and component testing were completed to demonstrate the feasibility of using glass as an immobilization medium. A prototypical melter was designed and built in 1997. The melter vessel and drain tube were constructed of a Pt/Rh alloy. Separate induction systems were used to heat the vessel and drain tube. A Pt/Rh stirrer was incorporated into the design to facilitate homogenization of the melt. Integrated powder feeding and off-gas systems completed the overall design. Concurrent with the design efforts, testing was conducted using a plutonium surrogate LaBS composition in an existing (near-scale) melter to demonstrate the feasibility of processing the LaBS glass on a production scale. Additionally, the drain tube configuration was successfully tested using a plutonium surrogate LaBS glass

  14. The use of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marshall, W.

    1980-01-01

    The use of plutonium as a vital energy source producing maximum economic benefit with minimum proliferation risks is discussed. Having considered the production of plutonium, several possible plutonium fuel cycle options are identified and the economic value to be attached to plutonium for each examined. It is shown how the use of plutonium in fast reactors gives an opportunity for a non-proliferation policy not available when plutonium is used only in thermal reactors. From the technical considerations reviewed concerning plutonium and fast reactors it is shown that an economic regime involving international trade in spent thermal reactor fuel is possible which benefits equally those countries with fast reactors and those without and also assists in avoiding the proliferation of nuclear weapons. (U.K.)

  15. Plutonium production in a remote cell

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maddux, E.P.; Purcell, J.A.

    1987-01-01

    Production of 239 Pu metal has traditionally been carried out in glovebox enclosures for protection of operating personnel and the environment. With the advent of more stringent federal regulations for protecting personnel, the environment, and security of special nuclear materials, it is proposed that plutonium be processed in a totally remote environment using automated work stations and robotic materials transfer and equipment maintenance. At the Savannah River Plant, the existing plutonium production facility is a batch-type glovebox operation built in the 1950s. A viable alternative to restoration of the existing glovebox operation is to provide a facility that uses remote cell operation

  16. Plutonium in nature; Le plutonium dans la nature

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Madic, C.

    1994-12-31

    Plutonium in nature comes from natural sources and anthropogenic ones. Plutonium at the earth surface comes principally from anthropogenic sources. It is easily detectable in environment. The plutonium behaviour in environment is complex. It seems necessary for the future to reduce releases in environment, to improve predictive models of plutonium behaviour in geosphere, to precise biological impact of anthropogenic plutonium releases.

  17. High-temperature vacuum distillation separation of plutonium waste salts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garcia, E.

    1996-01-01

    In this task, high-temperature vacuum distillation separation is being developed for residue sodium chloride-potassium chloride salts resulting from past pyrochemical processing of plutonium. This process has the potential of providing clean separation of the salt and the actinides with minimal amounts of secondary waste generation. The process could produce chloride salt that could be discarded as low-level waste (LLW) or low actinide content transuranic (TRU) waste, and a concentrated actinide oxide powder that would meet long-term storage standards (DOE-DTD-3013-94) until a final disposition option for all surplus plutonium is chosen

  18. Facility design: introduction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Unger, W.E.

    1980-01-01

    The design of shielded chemical processing facilities for handling plutonium is discussed. The TRU facility is considered in particular; its features for minimizing the escape of process materials are listed. 20 figures

  19. Computerized plutonium laboratory-stack monitoring system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stafford, R.G.; DeVore, R.K.

    1977-01-01

    The Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory has recently designed and constructed a Plutonium Research and Development Facility to meet design criteria imposed by the United States Energy Research and Development Administration. A primary objective of the design criteria is to assure environmental protection and to reliably monitor plutonium effluent via the ventilation exhaust systems. A state-of-the-art facility exhaust air monitoring system is described which establishes near ideal conditions for evaluating plutonium activity in the stack effluent. Total and static pressure sensing manifolds are incorporated to measure average velocity and integrated total discharge air volume. These data are logged at a computer which receives instrument data through a multiplex scanning system. A multipoint isokinetic sampling assembly with associated instrumentation is described. Continuous air monitors have been designed to sample from the isokinetic sampling assembly and transmit both instantaneous and integrated stack effluent concentration data to the computer and various cathode ray tube displays. The continuous air monitors also serve as room air monitors in the plutonium facility with the primary objective of timely evacuation of personnel if an above tolerance airborne plutonium concentration is detected. Several continuous air monitors are incorporated in the ventilation system to assist in identification of release problem areas

  20. Fissile materials from nuclear arms reductions: A question of disposition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sutcliffe, W.G.

    1991-01-01

    This Session, 35T-2, of the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) was held on February 18, 1991. The papers presented during this session covered a variety of issues and technologies concerning the disposition of the highly enriched uranium and plutonium salvaged from retired nuclear warheads. However, circumstances, including the amount of time available for the session, imposed limitations on the number and breadth of these papers. A comprehensive study of this topic should include a broader range of papers. This session included a paper on molten salt reactors designed to use highly enriched uranium or plutonium as fuel. Other options for the disposal of plutonium, such as transmutation using accelerators and underground vitrification using nuclear explosions, were not discussed during this session, but need to be considered. Individual papers are indexed separately