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Sample records for plant pfp safety

  1. Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) [SEC 1 THRU 11

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    ULLAH, M K

    2001-02-26

    The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) is located on the US Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site in south central Washington State. The DOE Richland Operations (DOE-RL) Project Hanford Management Contract (PHMC) is with Fluor Hanford Inc. (FH). Westinghouse Safety Management Systems (WSMS) provides management support to the PFP facility. Since 1991, the mission of the PFP has changed from plutonium material processing to preparation for decontamination and decommissioning (D and D). The PFP is in transition between its previous mission and the proposed D and D mission. The objective of the transition is to place the facility into a stable state for long-term storage of plutonium materials before final disposition of the facility. Accordingly, this update of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) reflects the current status of the buildings, equipment, and operations during this transition. The primary product of the PFP was plutonium metal in the form of 2.2-kg, cylindrical ingots called buttoms. Plutonium nitrate was one of several chemical compounds containing plutonium that were produced as an intermediate processing product. Plutonium recovery was performed at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF) and plutonium conversion (from a nitrate form to a metal form) was performed at the Remote Mechanical C (RMC) Line as the primary processes. Plutonium oxide was also produced at the Remote Mechanical A (RMA) Line. Plutonium processed at the PFP contained both weapons-grade and fuels-grade plutonium materials. The capability existed to process both weapons-grade and fuels-grade material through the PRF and only weapons-grade material through the RMC Line although fuels-grade material was processed through the line before 1984. Amounts of these materials exist in storage throughout the facility in various residual forms left from previous years of operations.

  2. The Integrated Safety Management System Verification Enhancement Review of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BRIGGS, C.R.

    2000-01-01

    The primary purpose of the verification enhancement review was for the DOE Richland Operations Office (RL) to verify contractor readiness for the independent DOE Integrated Safety Management System Verification (ISMSV) on the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). Secondary objectives included: (1) to reinforce the engagement of management and to gauge management commitment and accountability; (2) to evaluate the ''value added'' benefit of direct public involvement; (3) to evaluate the ''value added'' benefit of direct worker involvement; (4) to evaluate the ''value added'' benefit of the panel-to-panel review approach; and, (5) to evaluate the utility of the review's methodology/adaptability to periodic assessments of ISM status. The review was conducted on December 6-8, 1999, and involved the conduct of two-hour interviews with five separate panels of individuals with various management and operations responsibilities related to PFP. A semi-structured interview process was employed by a team of five ''reviewers'' who directed open-ended questions to the panels which focused on: (1) evidence of management commitment, accountability, and involvement; and, (2) consideration and demonstration of stakeholder (including worker) information and involvement opportunities. The purpose of a panel-to-panel dialogue approach was to better spotlight: (1) areas of mutual reinforcement and alignment that could serve as good examples of the management commitment and accountability aspects of ISMS implementation, and, (2) areas of potential discrepancy that could provide opportunities for improvement. In summary, the Review Team found major strengths to include: (1) the use of multi-disciplinary project work teams to plan and do work; (2) the availability and broad usage of multiple tools to help with planning and integrating work; (3) senior management presence and accessibility; (4) the institutionalization of worker involvement; (5) encouragement of self-reporting and self

  3. Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Safety Class and Safety Significant Commercial Grade Items (CGI) Critical Characteristic

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    THOMAS, R.J.

    2000-01-01

    This document specifies the critical characteristics for Commercial Grade Items (CGI) procured for use in the Plutonium Finishing Plant as required by HNF-PRO-268 and HNF-PRO-1819. These are the minimum specifications that the equipment must meet in order to properly perform its safety function. There may be several manufacturers or models that meet the critical characteristics of any one item

  4. Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) hazards assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Campbell, L.R.

    1998-01-01

    This report documents the hazards assessment for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) located on the US Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site. This hazards assessment was conducted to provide the emergency planning technical basis for the PFP. DOE Orders require an emergency planning hazards assessment for each facility that has the potential to reach or exceed the lowest level emergency classification

  5. Integrated Safety Management System Phase I Verification for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) [VOL 1 & 2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    SETH, S.S.

    2000-01-10

    U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Policy 450.4, Safety Management System Policy commits to institutionalizing an Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) throughout the DOE complex as a means of accomplishing its missions safely. DOE Acquisition Regulation 970.5204-2 requires that contractors manage and perform work in accordance with a documented safety management system.

  6. Integrated Safety Management System Phase I Verification for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) [VOL 1 and 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    SETH, S.S.

    2000-01-01

    U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Policy 450.4, Safety Management System Policy commits to institutionalizing an Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) throughout the DOE complex as a means of accomplishing its missions safely. DOE Acquisition Regulation 970.5204-2 requires that contractors manage and perform work in accordance with a documented safety management system

  7. Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Waste Composition and High Efficiency Particulate Air Filter Loading

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    ZIMMERMAN, B.D.

    2000-12-11

    This analysis evaluates the effect of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) waste isotopic composition on Tank Farms Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) accidents involving high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter failure in Double-Contained Receiver Tanks (DCRTs). The HEPA Filter Failure--Exposure to High Temperature or Pressure, and Steam Intrusion From Interfacing Systems accidents are considered. The analysis concludes that dose consequences based on the PFP waste isotopic composition are bounded by previous FSAR analyses. This supports USQD TF-00-0768.

  8. Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Standards/Requirements Identification Document (S/RID)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Maddox, B.S.

    1996-01-01

    This Standards/Requirements Identification Document (S/RID) sets forth the Environmental Safety and Health (ESH) standards/requirements for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). This S/RID is applicable to the appropriate life cycle phases of design, construction, operation, and preparation for decommissioning. These standards/requirements are adequate to ensure the protection of the health and safety of workers, the public, and the environment.

  9. Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Standards/Requirements Identification Document (S/RID)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maddox, B.S.

    1996-01-01

    This Standards/Requirements Identification Document (S/RID) sets forth the Environmental Safety and Health (ESH) standards/requirements for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). This S/RID is applicable to the appropriate life cycle phases of design, construction, operation, and preparation for decommissioning. These standards/requirements are adequate to ensure the protection of the health and safety of workers, the public, and the environment

  10. HANFORD PLUTONIUM FINISHG PLAN (PFP) COMPLETES PLUTONIUM STABILIZATION KEY SAFETY ISSUES CLOSED

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    GERBER, M.S.

    2004-01-01

    A long and intense effort to stabilize and repackage nearly 18 metric tons (MT) of plutonium-bearing leftovers from defense production and nuclear experiments concluded successfully in February, bringing universal congratulations to the Department of Energy's Hanford Site in southeast Washington State. The victorious stabilization and packaging endeavor at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP), managed and operated by prime contractor Fluor Hanford, Inc., finished ahead of all milestones in Hanford's cleanup agreement with regulators, and before deadlines set by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB), a part of the federal Executive Branch that oversees special nuclear materials. The PFP stabilization and packaging project also completed under budget for its four-year tenure, and has been nominated for a DOE Secretarial Award. It won the Project of the Year Award in the local chapter competition of the Project Management Institute, and is being considered for awards at the regional and national level

  11. Definition and means of maintaining the criticality detectors and alarms portion of the PFP safety envelope

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    White, W.F.

    1997-01-01

    The Criticality Alarm System (CAS) provides continuous detection for high radiation (criticality) events and automatically initiates an evacuation signal to affected personnel. The Safety Envelope (SE) for PFP includes the necessary equipment and the required procedures to ensure the CAS is capable of performing its intended function. This document provides the definition and means of maintaining the SE for PFP related to the CAS. This document also identifies and provides a justification for those portions of the CAS excluded from the PFP Safety Envelope

  12. Walkdown procedure: Seismic adequacy review of safety class 3 ampersand 4 commodities in 2736-Z ampersand ZB buildings at PFP facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ocoma, E.C.

    1995-01-01

    Seismic evaluation of existing safety class (SC) 3 and non-SC 4 commodities at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) is integrated into an area walkdown program. Field walkdowns of potential PFP seismic deficiencies associated with structural failure and falling will be performed using the DOE SQUG/EPRI methodology. Potential proximity interactions are also addressed. Objective of the walkdown is to qualify as much of the equipment as practical and to identify candidates for further evaluation

  13. Definition and Means of Maintaining the Criticality Prevention Design Features Portion of the PFP Safety Envelope

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    RAMBLE, A.L.

    2000-01-01

    The purpose of this document is to record the technical evaluation of the Operational Safety Requirements described in the Plutonium Finishing Plant Final (PFP) Operational Safety Requirements, WHC-SD-CP-OSR-010. Rev. 0-N , Section 3.1.1, ''Criticality Prevention System.'' This document, with its appendices, provides the following: (1) The results of a review of Criticality Safety Analysis Reports (CSAR), later called Criticality Safety Evaluation Reports (CSER), and Criticality Prevention Specifications (CPS) to determine which equipment or components analyzed in the CSER or CPS are considered as one of the two unlikely, independent, and concurrent changes before a criticality accident is possible. (2) Evaluations of equipment or components to determine the safety boundary for the system (Section 4). (3) A list of essential drawings that show the safety system or component (Appendix A). (4) A list of the safety envelope (SE) equipment (Appendix B). (5) Functional requirements for the individual safety envelope equipment (Sections 3 and 4). (6) A list of the operational and surveillance procedures necessary to maintain the system equipment within the safety envelope (Section 5)

  14. Plutonium Finishing Plant safety evaluation report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) previously known as the Plutonium Process and Storage Facility, or Z-Plant, was built and put into operation in 1949. Since 1949 PFP has been used for various processing missions, including plutonium purification, oxide production, metal production, parts fabrication, plutonium recovery, and the recovery of americium (Am-241). The PFP has also been used for receipt and large scale storage of plutonium scrap and product materials. The PFP Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) was prepared by WHC to document the hazards associated with the facility, present safety analyses of potential accident scenarios, and demonstrate the adequacy of safety class structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and operational safety requirements (OSRs) necessary to eliminate, control, or mitigate the identified hazards. Documented in this Safety Evaluation Report (SER) is DOE's independent review and evaluation of the PFP FSAR and the basis for approval of the PFP FSAR. The evaluation is presented in a format that parallels the format of the PFP FSAR. As an aid to the reactor, a list of acronyms has been included at the beginning of this report. The DOE review concluded that the risks associated with conducting plutonium handling, processing, and storage operations within PFP facilities, as described in the PFP FSAR, are acceptable, since the accident safety analyses associated with these activities meet the WHC risk acceptance guidelines and DOE safety goals in SEN-35-91

  15. Definition and means of maintaining the process vacuum liquid detection interlock systems portion of the PFP safety envelope

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    LINTHO, J.E.

    2003-01-01

    The purpose of this document is to record the technical evaluation of the Technical Safety Requirements described in the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Safety Technical Requirements, HNF-SD-CP-OSR-010/Rev.1, Section 3.1.1, ''Criticality Prevention System.'' This document also defines the Safety Envelope (SE) for the liquid detection interlock system in the Process Vacuum System. The SE is derived FR-om information in the Plutonium Finishing Plant Final Safety Analysis Report (PFP FSAR), HNF-SD-CP-SAR-021, Rev 4, and the Criticality Safety Analysis Report (CSAR) for the 26-inch Hg Vacuum System, WHC-SD-SQA-CSA-20159, Rev 0-A. This document, with its appendices, provides the following: (1) The system functional requirements for determining system operability (Section 3). (2) Evaluations of equipment to determine the safety envelope boundary for the system (Section 4 list of SE boundary drawings). (3) A list of the safety envelope equipment (Appendix B). (4) Functional requirements for the individual safety envelope equipment, including appropriate set points and process parameters (Section 4). (5) A list of the operational and surveillance procedures necessary to operate and maintain the system equipment within the safety envelope (Sections 5 and 6 and Appendix A)

  16. Definition and means of maintaining the criticality detectors and alarms portion of the PFP safety envelope

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    White, W.F.

    1997-05-13

    The purpose of this document is to provide the definition and means of maintaining the Safety Envelope (SE) related to the Criticality Alarm System (CAS). This document provides amplification of the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) described in the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Operational Safety Requirements (OSR), WHC-SD-CP-OSR-010, Rev. 0, 1994, Section 3.1.2, Criticality Detectors and Alarms. This document, with its appendices, provides the following: (1) System functional requirements for determining system operability (Section 3); (2) A list of annotated system block diagrams which indicate the safety envelope boundaries (Appendix C); (3) A list of the Safety Class 1 and 2 Safety Envelope (SC-1/2 SE) equipment for input into the Master Component Index (Appendix B); (4) Functional requirements for individual SC-1/2 SE components, including appropriate setpoints and process parameters (Section 6 and Appendix A); (5) A list of the operational, maintenance and surveillance procedures necessary to operate and maintain the SC-1/2 SE components as required by the LCO (Section 6 and Appendix A).

  17. Definition and means of maintaining the criticality detectors and alarms portion of the PFP safety envelope

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    White, W.F.

    1997-01-01

    The purpose of this document is to provide the definition and means of maintaining the Safety Envelope (SE) related to the Criticality Alarm System (CAS). This document provides amplification of the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) described in the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Operational Safety Requirements (OSR), WHC-SD-CP-OSR-010, Rev. 0, 1994, Section 3.1.2, Criticality Detectors and Alarms. This document, with its appendices, provides the following: (1) System functional requirements for determining system operability (Section 3); (2) A list of annotated system block diagrams which indicate the safety envelope boundaries (Appendix C); (3) A list of the Safety Class 1 and 2 Safety Envelope (SC-1/2 SE) equipment for input into the Master Component Index (Appendix B); (4) Functional requirements for individual SC-1/2 SE components, including appropriate setpoints and process parameters (Section 6 and Appendix A); (5) A list of the operational, maintenance and surveillance procedures necessary to operate and maintain the SC-1/2 SE components as required by the LCO (Section 6 and Appendix A)

  18. Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Criticality Alarm System Commercial Grade Item (CGI) Critical Characteristics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    WHITE, W.F.

    1999-01-01

    This document specifies the critical characteristics for Commercial Grade Items (CGI) procured for PFP's criticality alarm system as required by HNF-PRO-268 and HNF-PRO-1819. These are the minimum specifications that the equipment must meet in order to properly perform its safety function. There may be several manufacturers or models that meet the critical characteristics for any one item. PFP's Criticality Alarm System includes the nine criticality alarm system panels and their associated hardware. This includes all parts up to the first breaker in the electrical distribution system. Specific system boundaries and justifications are contained in HNF-SD-CP-SDD-003, ''Definition and Means of Maintaining the Criticality Detectors and Alarms Portion of the PFP Safety Envelope.'' The procurement requirements associated with the system necessitates procurement of some system equipment as Commercial Grade Items in accordance with HNF-PRO-268, ''Control of Purchased Items and Services.''

  19. Project Plan For Remove Special Nuclear Material (SNM) from Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BARTLETT, W.D.

    1999-01-01

    This plan presents the overall objectives, description, justification and planning for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Remove SNM Materials. The intent of this plan is to describe how this project will be managed and integrated with other facility stabilization and deactivation activities. This plan supplements the overall integrated plan presented in the Plutonium Finishing Plant Integrated Project Management Plan (IPMP), HNF-3617. This project plan is the top-level definitive project management document for the PFP Remove SNM Materials project. It specifies the technical, schedule, requirements and the cost baseline to manage the execution of the Remove SNM Materials project. Any deviation to the document must be authorized through the appropriate change control process. The Remove SNM Materials project provides the necessary support and controls required for DOE-HQ, DOE-RL, BWHC, and other DOE Complex Contractors the path forward to negotiate shipped/receiver agreements, schedule shipments, and transfer material out of PFP to enable final deactivation

  20. Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Treatment and Storage Unit Waste Analysis Plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    PRIGNANO, A.L.

    2000-01-01

    The purpose of this waste analysis plan (WAP) is to document waste analysis activities associated with the Plutonium Finishing Plant Treatment and Storage Unit (PFP Treatment and Storage Unit) to comply with Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 173-303-300(1), (2), (4)(a) and (5). The PFP Treatment and Storage Unit is an interim status container management unit for plutonium bearing mixed waste radiologically managed as transuranic (TRU) waste. TRU mixed (TRUM) waste managed at the PFP Treatment and Storage Unit is destined for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) and therefore is not subject to land disposal restrictions [WAC 173-303-140 and 40 CFR 268]. The PFP Treatment and Storage Unit is located in the 200 West Area of the Hanford Facility, Richland Washington (Figure 1). Because dangerous waste does not include source, special nuclear, and by-product material components of mixed waste, radionuclides are not within the scope of this documentation. The information on radionuclides is provided only for general knowledge

  1. Project plan remove special nuclear material from PFP project plutonium finishing plant; TOPICAL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BARTLETT, W.D.

    1999-01-01

    This plan presents the overall objectives, description, justification and planning for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Remove Special Nuclear Material (SNM) Materials. The intent of this plan is to describe how this project will be managed and integrated with other facility stabilization and deactivation activities. This plan supplements the overall integrated plan presented in the Plutonium Finishing Plant Integrated Project Management Plan (IPMP), HNF-3617,Rev. 0. This project plan is the top-level definitive project management document for PFP Remove SNM Materials project. It specifies the technical, schedule, requirements and the cost baselines to manage the execution of the Remove SNM Materials project. Any deviations to the document must be authorized through the appropriate change control process

  2. Project plan remove special nuclear material from PFP project plutonium finishing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BARTLETT, W.D.

    1999-01-01

    This plan presents the overall objectives, description, justification and planning for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Remove Special Nuclear Material (SNM) Materials. The intent of this plan is to describe how this project will be managed and integrated with other facility stabilization and deactivation activities. This plan supplements the overall integrated plan presented in the Plutonium Finishing Plant Integrated Project Management Plan (IPMP), HNF-3617, Rev. 0. This project plan is the top-level definitive project management document for PFP Remove SNM Materials project. It specifies the technical, schedule, requirements and the cost baselines to manage the execution of the Remove SNM Materials project. Any deviations to the document must be authorized through the appropriate change control process

  3. Plan for the Startup of HA-21I Furnace Operations at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    WILLIS, H.T.

    2000-01-01

    Achievement of Thermal Stabilization mission elements require the installation and startup of three additional muffle furnaces for the thermal stabilization of plutonium and plutonium bearing materials at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). The release to operate these additional furnaces will require an Activity Based Startup Review. The conduct of the Activity Based Startup Review (ABSR) was approved by Fluor Daniel Hanford on October 15, 1999. This plan has been developed with the objective of identifying those activities needed to guide the controlled startup of five furnaces from authorization to unrestricted operations by adding the HA-211 furnaces in an orderly and safe manner after the approval to Startup has been given. The Startup Plan provides a phased approach that bridges the activities between the completion of the Activity Based Startup Review authorizing the use of the three additional furnaces and the unrestricted operation of the five thermal stabilization muffle furnaces. The four phases are: (1) the initiation of five furnace operations using three empty (simulated full) boat charges from HA-211 and two full charges from HC-21C; (2) three furnace operations (one full charge from HA-211 and two full charges from HC-21C); (3) four furnace operations (two full charges from HA-211 and two full charges from HC-21C); and (4) integrated five furnace operations and unrestricted operations. Phase 1 of the Plan will be considered as the cold runs. This Plan also provides management oversight and administrative controls that are to be implemented until unrestricted operations are authorized. It also provides a formal review process for ensuring that all preparations needed for full five furnace operations are completed and formally reviewed prior to proceeding to the increased activity levels associated with five furnace operations. Specific objectives include: (1) To ensure that activities are conducted in a safe manner. (2) To provide supplemental

  4. System Design Description PFP Thermal Stabilization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    RISENMAY, H.R.

    2000-01-01

    The purpose of this document is to provide a system design description (SDD) and design basis for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Thermal Stabilization project. The chief objective of the SDD is to document the Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) that establish and maintain the facility Safety Envelope necessary for normal safe operation of the facility; as identified in the FSAR, the OSRs, and Safety Assessment Documents (SADs). This safety equipment documentation should satisfy guidelines for the SDD given in WHC-SD-CP-TI-18 1, Criteria for Identification and Control of Equipment Necessary for Preservation of the Safety Envelope and Safe Operation of PFP. The basis for operational, alarm response, maintenance, and surveillance procedures are also identified and justified in this document. This document and its appendices address the following elements of the PFP Thermal Stabilization project: Functional and design requirements; Design description; Safety Envelope Analysis; Safety Equipment Class; and Operational, maintenance and surveillance procedures

  5. Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) HVAC System Component Index; FINAL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DICK, J.D.

    1999-01-01

    This document identities the components, design media, procedures and defines the critical characteristics of Commercial Grade Items necessary to ensure the HVAC system provides these functions. This document lists safety class (SC) and safety significant (SS) components for the Heating Ventilation Air Conditioning (HVAC) and specifies the critical characteristics for Commercial Grade Items (CGI), as required by HNF-PRO-268 and HNF-PRO-1819. These are the minimum specifications that the equipment must meet in order to properly perform its safety function. There may be several manufacturers or models that meet the critical characteristics for any one item

  6. PLUTONIUM FINISHING PLANT (PFP) 241-Z LIQUID WASTE TREATMENT FACILITY DEACTIVATION AND DEMOLITION

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    JOHNSTON GA

    2008-01-15

    Fluor Hanford, Inc. (FH) is proud to submit the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) 241-Z liquid Waste Treatment Facility Deactivation and Demolition (D&D) Project for consideration by the Project Management Institute as Project of the Year for 2008. The decommissioning of the 241-Z Facility presented numerous challenges, many of which were unique with in the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex. The majority of the project budget and schedule was allocated for cleaning out five below-grade tank vaults. These highly contaminated, confined spaces also presented significant industrial safety hazards that presented some of the most hazardous work environments on the Hanford Site. The 241-Z D&D Project encompassed diverse tasks: cleaning out and stabilizing five below-grade tank vaults (also called cells), manually size-reducing and removing over three tons of process piping from the vaults, permanently isolating service utilities, removing a large contaminated chemical supply tank, stabilizing and removing plutonium-contaminated ventilation ducts, demolishing three structures to grade, and installing an environmental barrier on the demolition site . All of this work was performed safely, on schedule, and under budget. During the deactivation phase of the project between November 2005 and February 2007, workers entered the highly contaminated confined-space tank vaults 428 times. Each entry (or 'dive') involved an average of three workers, thus equaling approximately 1,300 individual confined -space entries. Over the course of the entire deactivation and demolition period, there were no recordable injuries and only one minor reportable skin contamination. The 241-Z D&D Project was decommissioned under the provisions of the 'Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order' (the Tri-Party Agreement or TPA), the 'Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976' (RCRA), and the 'Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and

  7. PLUTONIUM FINISHING PLANT (PFP) 241-Z LIQUID WASTE TREATMENT FACILITY DEACTIVATION AND DEMOLITION

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    JOHNSTON GA

    2008-01-01

    Fluor Hanford, Inc. (FH) is proud to submit the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) 241-Z liquid Waste Treatment Facility Deactivation and Demolition (D and D) Project for consideration by the Project Management Institute as Project of the Year for 2008. The decommissioning of the 241-Z Facility presented numerous challenges, many of which were unique with in the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex. The majority of the project budget and schedule was allocated for cleaning out five below-grade tank vaults. These highly contaminated, confined spaces also presented significant industrial safety hazards that presented some of the most hazardous work environments on the Hanford Site. The 241-Z D and D Project encompassed diverse tasks: cleaning out and stabilizing five below-grade tank vaults (also called cells), manually size-reducing and removing over three tons of process piping from the vaults, permanently isolating service utilities, removing a large contaminated chemical supply tank, stabilizing and removing plutonium-contaminated ventilation ducts, demolishing three structures to grade, and installing an environmental barrier on the demolition site . All of this work was performed safely, on schedule, and under budget. During the deactivation phase of the project between November 2005 and February 2007, workers entered the highly contaminated confined-space tank vaults 428 times. Each entry (or 'dive') involved an average of three workers, thus equaling approximately 1,300 individual confined -space entries. Over the course of the entire deactivation and demolition period, there were no recordable injuries and only one minor reportable skin contamination. The 241-Z D and D Project was decommissioned under the provisions of the 'Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order' (the Tri-Party Agreement or TPA), the 'Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976' (RCRA), and the 'Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980

  8. PLUTONIUM FINISHING PLANT (PFP) SUB-GRADE EE/CA EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVES: A NEW MODEL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    HOPKINS, A.M.

    2007-01-01

    An engineering evaluation/cost analysis (EE/CA) was performed at the Hanford Site's Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). The purpose of the EVCA was to identify the sub-grade items to be evaluated; determine the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) hazardous substances through process history and available data; evaluate these hazards; and as necessary, identify the available alternatives to reduce the risk associated with the contaminants. The sub-grade EWCA considered four alternatives for an interim removal action: (1) No Action; (2) Surveillance and Maintenance (S and M); (3) Stabilize and Leave in Place (Stabilization); and (4) Remove, Treat and Dispose (RTD). Each alternative was evaluated against the CERCLA criteria for effectiveness, implementability, and cost

  9. Total Measurement Uncertainty for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Segmented Gamma Scan Assay System

    CERN Document Server

    Fazzari, D M

    2001-01-01

    This report presents the results of an evaluation of the Total Measurement Uncertainty (TMU) for the Canberra manufactured Segmented Gamma Scanner Assay System (SGSAS) as employed at the Hanford Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). In this document, TMU embodies the combined uncertainties due to all of the individual random and systematic sources of measurement uncertainty. It includes uncertainties arising from corrections and factors applied to the analysis of transuranic waste to compensate for inhomogeneities and interferences from the waste matrix and radioactive components. These include uncertainty components for any assumptions contained in the calibration of the system or computation of the data. Uncertainties are propagated at 1 sigma. The final total measurement uncertainty value is reported at the 95% confidence level. The SGSAS is a gamma assay system that is used to assay plutonium and uranium waste. The SGSAS system can be used in a stand-alone mode to perform the NDA characterization of a containe...

  10. PFP Emergency Lighting Study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BUSCH, M.S.

    2000-01-01

    NFPA 101, section 5-9 mandates that, where required by building classification, all designated emergency egress routes be provided with adequate emergency lighting in the event of a normal lighting outage. Emergency lighting is to be arranged so that egress routes are illuminated to an average of 1.0 footcandle with a minimum at any point of 0.1 footcandle, as measured at floor level. These levels are permitted to drop to 60% of their original value over the required 90 minute emergency lighting duration after a power outage. The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) has two designations for battery powered egress lights ''Emergency Lights'' are those battery powered lights required by NFPA 101 to provide lighting along officially designated egress routes in those buildings meeting the correct occupancy requirements. Emergency Lights are maintained on a monthly basis by procedure ZSR-12N-001. ''Backup Lights'' are battery powered lights not required by NFPA, but installed in areas where additional light may be needed. The Backup Light locations were identified by PFP Safety and Engineering based on several factors. (1) General occupancy and type of work in the area. Areas occupied briefly during a shiftly surveillance do not require backup lighting while a room occupied fairly frequently or for significant lengths of time will need one or two Backup lights to provide general illumination of the egress points. (2) Complexity of the egress routes. Office spaces with a standard hallway/room configuration will not require Backup Lights while a large room with several subdivisions or irregularly placed rooms, doors, and equipment will require Backup Lights to make egress safer. (3) Reasonable balance between the safety benefits of additional lighting and the man-hours/exposure required for periodic light maintenance. In some plant areas such as building 236-Z, the additional maintenance time and risk of contamination do not warrant having Backup Lights installed in all rooms

  11. History and stabilization of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) complex, Hanford Site

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gerber, M.S., Fluor Daniel Hanford

    1997-02-18

    The 231-Z Isolation Building or Plutonium Metallurgy Building is located in the Hanford Site`s 200 West Area, approximately 300 yards north of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) (234-5 Building). When the Hanford Engineer Works (HEW) built it in 1944 to contain the final step for processing plutonium, it was called the Isolation Building. At that time, HEW used a bismuth phosphate radiochemical separations process to make `AT solution,` which was then dried and shipped to Los Alamos, New Mexico. (AT solution is a code name used during World War II for the final HEW product.) The process was carried out first in T Plant and the 224-T Bulk Reduction Building and B Plant and the 224-B Bulk Reduction Building. The 224-T and -B processes produced a concentrated plutonium nitrate stream, which then was sent in 8-gallon batches to the 231-Z Building for final purification. In the 231-Z Building, the plutonium nitrate solution underwent peroxide `strikes` (additions of hydrogen peroxide to further separate the plutonium from its carrier solutions), to form the AT solution. The AT solution was dried and shipped to the Los Alamos Site, where it was made into metallic plutonium and then into weapons hemispheres.` The 231-Z Building began `hot` operations (operations using radioactive materials) with regular runs of plutonium nitrate on January 16, 1945.

  12. PFP deactivation project management plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bogen, D.M.

    1997-01-01

    This document identifies the overall approach for deactivation of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Complex, excluding the vaults, and includes a draft set of End Point Criteria for all buildings being deactivated

  13. Nuclear criticality safety: general. 6. Application of Fixed Neutron Absorbers in the New Hanford PFP Horizontal Rack Design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lan, J.S.; Miller, E.M.; Toffer, H.; Mo, B.S.

    2001-01-01

    The Hanford Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) is currently in a waste cleanup and plutonium stabilization mode. Plutonium-bearing materials are processed through thermal treatment, creating forms of oxides suitable for long-term storage. Stabilized materials at PFP are stored in a variety of cans such as the bag-less transfer cans (BTCs), which are ultimately contained in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) 3013 can; both cans are larger than previously used plutonium storage containers and hold more plutonium. To compensate for the increased plutonium loadings, added engineered safety features were considered in the storage facilities. The vaults in PFP, subdivided into concrete-walled cubicles, will contain both new and older cans. The DOE 3013 and BTC cans may be loaded with up to 4.4 kg of plutonium as a compound (mostly oxide). New racks that store cans horizontally are being constructed to hold both new and older containers. The loading objective is to accommodate 70 kg of plutonium per cubicle. Two design analysis approaches for the new racks were considered. The first approach incorporated neutron absorption provided by the structural materials of the rack and the cans in determining a safe configuration. A rack loading arrangement was determined as shown in Fig. 1 and specified in Table I. This approach provides compliance with criticality control requirements; however, added administrative controls were needed to accommodate a sufficient number of cans in specific locations to achieve 70 kg of plutonium per cubicle. The 4.4-kg plutonium container can be placed only in predetermined locations. The second approach evaluated the addition of a fixed neutron absorber plate along the back wall of the cubicle (Fig. 1). The location of the special plate facilitates installation of the racks and provides additional criticality safety margin beyond the first approach. Its presence permits loading of racks with up to 4.4-kg plutonium cans in any storage locations

  14. PFP functional development planning guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    SINCLAIR, J.C.

    1999-01-01

    The PFP Functional Development Planning Guide presents the strategy and process used for the identification, development, and analysis of functions (activities) necessary to satisfy the requirements within the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) integrated project baseline. The functional analysis will provide the basis for the development of a function driven work breakdown structure. Future revisions to this document will include as attachments the results of the PFP Functional Analysis resulting from this approach. This document is intended be a Project-owned management tool. As such, the guide will periodically require revisions resulting from improvements of the information, processes, and techniques as now described

  15. CSER 00-003: Criticality Safety Evaluation report for PFP Magnesium Hydroxide Precipitation Process for Plutonium Stabilization Glovebox 3

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    LAN, J.S.

    2000-01-01

    This Criticality Safety Evaluation Report analyzes the stabilization of plutonium/uranium solutions in Glovebox 3 using the magnesium hydroxide precipitation process at PFP. The process covered are the receipt of diluted plutonium solutions into three precipitation tanks, the precipitation of plutonium from the solution, the filtering of the plutonium precipitate from the solution, the scraping of the precipitate from the filter into boats, and the initial drying of the precipitated slurry on a hot plate. A batch (up to 2.5 kg) is brought into the glovebox as plutonium nitrate, processed, and is then removed in boats for further processing. This CSER establishes limits for the magnesium hydroxide precipitation process in Glovebox 3 to maintain criticality safety while handling fissionable material

  16. PFP solution stabilization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aftanas, B.L.

    1996-01-01

    This Functional Design Criteria (FDC) addresses remediation of the plutonium-bearing solutions currently in inventory at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). The recommendation from the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is that the solutions be treated thermally and stabilized as a solid for long term storage. For solutions which are not discardable, the baseline plan is to utilize a denitration process to stabilize the solutions prior to packaging for storage

  17. PFP requirements development planning guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    SINCLAIR, J.C.

    1999-01-01

    The PFP Requirements Development Planning Guide presents the strategy and process used for the identification, allocation, and maintenance of requirements within the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) integrated project baseline. Future revisions to this document will be included as attachments (e.g., results of the PFP Requirements Analysis attributable to this approach). This document is intended be a Project-owned management tool. As such, this document will periodically require revisions resulting from improvements of the information, processes, and techniques as now described. Future updates may be made to this document by PFP management and final approval of the content will be accomplished in a Baseline Change Request as it impacts the Multi-Year Work Plan, or baseline information managed in the Hanford Site Systems Engineering Baseline

  18. Definition and means of maintaining the ventilation system confinement portion of the PFP safety envelope

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dick, J.D.; Grover, G.A.; O`Brien, P.M., Fluor Daniel Hanford

    1997-03-05

    The Plutonium Finishing Plant Heating Ventilation and Cooling system provides for the confinement of radioactive releases to the environment and provides for the confinement of radioactive contamination within designated zones inside the facility. This document identifies the components and procedures necessary to ensure the HVAC system provides these functions. Appendices E through J provide a snapshot of non-safety class HVAC equipment and need not be updated when the remainder of the document and Appendices A through D are updated.

  19. ALARA Design Review for the Resumption of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Cementation Process Project Activities

    CERN Document Server

    Dayley, L

    2000-01-01

    The requirements for the performance of radiological design reviews are codified in 10CFR835, Occupational Radiation Protection. The basic requirements for the performance of ALARA design reviews are presented in the Hanford Site Radiological Control Manual (HSRCM). The HSRCM has established trigger levels requiring radiological reviews of non-routine or complex work activities. These requirements are implemented in site procedures HNF-PRO-1622 and 1623. HNF-PRO-1622 Radiological Design Review Process requires that ''radiological design reviews [be performed] of new facilities and equipment and modifications of existing facilities and equipment''. In addition, HNF-PRO-1623 Radiological Work Planning Process requires a formal ALARA Review for planned activities that are estimated to exceed 1 person-rem total Dose Equivalent (DE). The purpose of this review is to validate that the original design for the PFP Cementation Process ensures that the principles of ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) were included...

  20. PFP supply fan motor starters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keck, R.D.

    1995-01-01

    The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) is currently stabilizing about 25 kg of Pu sludge; upon completion of this task, PFP will be maintained in a safe standby condition to await decision from the PFP NEPA review. It can take about 10 years to initiate and complete terminal cleanout after this; the facility will then be decommissioned and decontaminated. The 234-5Z ventilation system must continue to operate until terminal cleanout. Part of the ventilation system is the seismic fan shutdown system which shuts down the ventilation supply fans in case of strong earthquake. This document presents criteria for installing solid state, reduced voltage motor starters and isolation contactors for the 8 main ventilation supply fans. The isolation contactors will shutdown the supply fans in event of earthquake

  1. PFP dangerous waste training plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khojandi, J.

    1996-01-01

    This document establishes the minimum training requirements for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) personnel who are responsible for management of dangerous waste. The training plan outlines training requirements for handling of solid dangerous waste during generator accumulation and liquid dangerous waste during treatment and storage operations. The implementation of this training plan will ensure the PFP facility compliance with the training plan requirements of Dangerous Waste Regulation. Chapter 173-303-330. Washington Administrative Code (WAC). The requirements for such compliance is described in Section 11.0 of WHC-CM-7-5 Environmental Compliance Manual

  2. CSER 99-001: PFP LAB Dentirating calciner

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    MILLER, E.M.; DOBBIN, K.D.

    1999-01-01

    A criticality safety evaluation report was prepared for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) laboratory denigrating calciner, located in Glovebox 188-1, that converts Pu(NO 3 ) 4 solutions to the high fired stable oxide PuO 2 . Fissile mass limits and volume limits are set for the glovebox for testing operations and training operators using only nitric acid feed to a plutonium oxide bed in the calciner

  3. CSER 00-001 Criticality Safety Evaluation Report for Cementation Operations at the PFP

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    DOBBIN, K.D.

    2000-04-18

    Glovebox HA-20MB is located in Room 235B of the 234-5Z Building at the Plutonium Finishing Plant. This enclosure contains mixers, mixer bowls, a crusher unit, an isolated inoperable conveyor unit, plutonium residue feed cans, cemented cans, and a feedwater container. Plutonium residue, not conducive to other forms of stabilization, is prepared for storage and ultimate disposal by cementation. The feed residue material cans can have plutonium contents of only a few grams or up to 200 grams. This evaluation accommodates this wide range of container fissile concentrations.

  4. Water bath and air bath calorimeter qualification for measuring 3013 containers of plutonium oxide at the Hanford Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    WELSH, T.L.

    2003-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to present qualification data generated from water and air-bath calorimeters measuring radioactive decay heat from plutonium oxide in DOE STD-3013-2000 (3013) containers at the Hanford Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). Published data concerning air and water bath calorimeters and especially 3013-qualified calorimeters is minimal at best. This paper will address the data from the measurement/qualification test plan, the heat standards used, and the calorimeter precision and accuracy results. The 3013 package is physically larger than earlier plutonium oxide storage containers, thereby necessitating a larger measurement chamber. To accommodate the measurements of the 3013 containers at PFP, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) supplied a water bath dual-chambered unit and the Savannah River Technology Center (SRTC) provided two air-bath calorimeters. Both types of Calorimeters were installed in the analytical laboratory at PFP. The larger 3013 containers presented a new set of potential measurement problems: longer counting times, heat conductivity through a much larger container mass and wall thickness, and larger amounts of copper shot to assist sample thermal conductivity. These potential problems were addressed and included in the measurement/qualification test plan

  5. Definition and means of maintaining the supply ventilation system seismic shutdown portion of the PFP safety envelope. Revision 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keck, R.D.

    1995-01-01

    This report describes the modifications to the ventilation system for the Plutonium Finishing Plant. Topics discussed in this report include; system functional requirements, evaluations of equipment, a list of drawings showing the safety envelope boundaries; list of safety envelope equipment, functional requirements for individual safety envelope equipment, and a list of the operational, maintenance and surveillance procedures necessary to operate and maintain the system equipment

  6. Radioactive Air Emissions Notice of Construction for the Magnesium Hydroxide Precipitation Process at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    JANSKY, M.T.

    1999-01-01

    The following description and any attachments and references are provided to the Washington State Department of Health (WDOH), Division of Radiation Protection, Air Emissions and Defense Waste (WAC) 246-247, Radiation Protection-Air Emissions. The WAC 246-247-060, ''Applications, registration, and licensing'', states ''This section describes the information requirements for approval to construct, modify, and operate an emission unit. Any NOC requires the submittal of information listed in Appendix A.'' Appendix A (WAC 246-247-1 10) lists the requirements that must be addressed. Additionally, the following description, attachments and references are provided to the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as an NOC, in accordance with Title 40, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 61, ''National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants.'' The information required for submittal to the EPA is specified in 40 CFR 61.07. The potential emissions from this activity are estimated to provide greater than 0.1 millirem per year total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) to the hypothetical offsite maximally exposed individual (MEI), and commencement is needed within a short time. Therefore, this application also is intended to provide notification of the anticipated date of initial startup in accordance with the requirement listed in 40 CFR 61.09(a)(1), and it is requested that approval of this application also will constitute EPA acceptance of this initial startup notification. Written notification of the actual date of initial startup, in accordance with the requirement listed in 40 CFR 61.09(a)(2) will be provided at a later date. This NOC covers the activities associated with the Construction and operation activities involving the magnesium hydroxide precipitation process of plutonium solutions within the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP)

  7. PFP vault operations containers for Plutonium Handling and Storage Critical Characteristics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BONADIE, E.P.

    2000-01-01

    This document specifies the critical characteristics for containers procured for Plutonium Finishing Plant's (PFP's) Vault Operations system as required by HNF-PRO-268 and HNF-PRO-1819. These are the minimum specifications that the equipment must meet in order to perform its safety function

  8. Facility Effluent Monitoring Plan for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP); FINAL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    FRAZIER, T.P.

    1999-01-01

    A facility effluent monitoring plan is required by the U. S. Department of Energy in DOE Order 5400.1 for any operations that involve hazardous materials and radioactive substances that could impact employee or public safety or the environment. This facility effluent monitoring plan assesses effluent monitoring systems and evaluates whether these systems are adequate to ensure the public health and safety as specified in applicable federal, state, and local requirements. To ensure the long-range integrity of the effluent monitoring systems, an update to this facility effluent monitoring plan is required whenever a new process or operation introduces new hazardous materials or significant radioactive materials. This document is reviewed annually even if there are no operational changes, and is updated, at a minimum, every 3 years

  9. Evaluation of Need and Location for a Thermogravimetric Analyzer in the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Materials Stabilization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    WILLIS, H.T.

    2000-01-01

    This plan provides an analysis for locating a TGA to support PFP Thermal Stabilization processes. The scope of this document is to evaluate the need for, and location for, installation of a TGA system as a supplement to the SFE equipment for moisture measurement in pure oxides. A location assessment for the SFE equipment was previously performed (HNF 1999). Based on that assessment, co-location of the TGA system with the SFE system is the preferred option. This would enable thermally stabilized material to be analyzed for residual moisture by either the TGA system or SFE system or both This evaluation considers glovebox locations in the PFP 234-52 Building Analytical Laboratory or operating areas for the installation of the TGA system and it's supporting equipment. This evaluation considers using existing gloveboxes along with an alternative of adding a new glovebox to existing process lines. The location evaluation criteria focuses mainly on glovebox size, with qualitative consideration of relative cost and schedule impacts associated with system implementation, radiological control, and interaction with other laboratory operations and processes. In addition, the possible co-location of a TGA furnace system with the SFE system was considered

  10. PFP Wastewater Sampling Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hirzel, D.R.

    1995-01-01

    This test report documents the results obtained while conducting operational testing of the sampling equipment in the 225-WC building, the PFP Wastewater Sampling Facility. The Wastewater Sampling Facility houses equipment to sample and monitor the PFP's liquid effluents before discharging the stream to the 200 Area Treated Effluent Disposal Facility (TEDF). The majority of the streams are not radioactive and discharges from the PFP Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC). The streams that might be contaminated are processed through the Low Level Waste Treatment Facility (LLWTF) before discharging to TEDF. The sampling equipment consists of two flow-proportional composite samplers, an ultrasonic flowmeter, pH and conductivity monitors, chart recorder, and associated relays and current isolators to interconnect the equipment to allow proper operation. Data signals from the monitors are received in the 234-5Z Shift Office which contains a chart recorder and alarm annunciator panel. The data signals are also duplicated and sent to the TEDF control room through the Local Control Unit (LCU). Performing the OTP has verified the operability of the PFP wastewater sampling system. This Operability Test Report documents the acceptance of the sampling system for use

  11. PFP total operating efficiency calculation and basis of estimate

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    SINCLAIR, J.C.

    1999-01-01

    The purpose of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Total Operating Efficiency Calculation and Basis of Estimate document is to provide the calculated value and basis of estimate for the Total Operating Efficiency (TOE) for the material stabilization operations to be conducted in 234-52 Building. This information will be used to support both the planning and execution of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Stabilization and Deactivation Project's (hereafter called the Project) resource-loaded, integrated schedule

  12. Definition and means of maintaining the emergency notification and evacuation system portion of the plutonium finishing plant safety envelope

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    WHITE, W.F.

    1999-01-01

    The Emergency Evacuation and Notification System provides information to the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Building Emergency Director to assist in determining appropriate emergency response, notifies personnel of the required response, and assists in their response. The report identifies the equipment in the Safety Envelope (SE) for this System and the Administrative, Maintenance, and Surveillance Procedures used to maintain the SE Equipment

  13. Definition and means of maintaining the emergency notification and evacuation system portion of the plutonium finishing plant safety envelope; TOPICAL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    WHITE, W.F.

    1999-01-01

    The Emergency Evacuation and Notification System provides information to the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Building Emergency Director to assist in determining appropriate emergency response, notifies personnel of the required response, and assists in their response. The report identifies the equipment in the Safety Envelope (SE) for this System and the Administrative, Maintenance, and Surveillance Procedures used to maintain the SE Equipment

  14. Technical Basis Document for PFP Area Monitoring Dosimetry Program

    CERN Document Server

    Cooper, J R

    2000-01-01

    This document describes the phantom dosimetry used for the PFP Area Monitoring program and establishes the basis for the Plutonium Finishing Plant's (PFP) area monitoring dosimetry program in accordance with the following requirements: Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), part 835, ''Occupational Radiation Protection'' Part 835.403; Hanford Site Radiological Control Manual (HSRCM-1), Part 514; HNF-PRO-382, Area Dosimetry Program; and PNL-MA-842, Hanford External Dosimetry Technical Basis Manual.

  15. Technical Basis Document for PFP Area Monitoring Dosimetry Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    COOPER, J.R.

    2000-01-01

    This document describes the phantom dosimetry used for the PFP Area Monitoring program and establishes the basis for the Plutonium Finishing Plant's (PFP) area monitoring dosimetry program in accordance with the following requirements: Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), part 835, ''Occupational Radiation Protection'' Part 835.403; Hanford Site Radiological Control Manual (HSRCM-1), Part 514; HNF-PRO-382, Area Dosimetry Program; and PNL-MA-842, Hanford External Dosimetry Technical Basis Manual

  16. Engineering report (conceptual design) PFP solution stabilization

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Witt, J.B.

    1997-07-17

    This Engineering Report (Conceptual Design) addresses remediation of the plutonium-bearing solutions currently in inventory at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). The recommendation from the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is that the solutions be treated thermally and stabilized as a solid for long term storage. For solutions which are not discardable, the baseline plan is to utilize a denitration process to stabilize the solutions prior to packaging for storage.

  17. Engineering report (conceptual design) PFP solution stabilization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Witt, J.B.

    1997-01-01

    This Engineering Report (Conceptual Design) addresses remediation of the plutonium-bearing solutions currently in inventory at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). The recommendation from the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is that the solutions be treated thermally and stabilized as a solid for long term storage. For solutions which are not discardable, the baseline plan is to utilize a denitration process to stabilize the solutions prior to packaging for storage

  18. CSER 98-003: criticality safety evaluation report for PFP glovebox HC-21A with button can opening

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ERICKSON, D.G.

    1999-01-01

    Glovebox HC-21A is an enclosure where cans containing plutonium metal buttons or other plutonium bearing materials are prepared for thermal stabilization in the muffle furnaces. The Inert Atmosphere Confinement (IAC), a new feature added to Glovebox HC-21 A, allows the opening of containers suspected of containing hydrided plutonium metal. The argon atmosphere in the IAC prevents an adverse reaction between oxygen and the hydride. The hydride is then stabilized in a controlled manner to prevent glovebox over pressurization. After removal from the containers, the plutonium metal buttons or plutonium bearing materials will be placed into muffle furnace boats and then be sent to one of the muffle furnace gloveboxes for stabilization. The materials allowed to be brought into Glovebox HC-21A are limited to those with a hydrogen to fissile atom ratio (H/X) ≤ 20. Glovebox HC-21A is classified as a DRY glovebox, meaning it has no internal liquid lines, and no free liquids or solutions are allowed to be introduced. The double contingency principle states that designs shall incorporate sufficient factors of safety to require at least two unlikely, independent, and concurrent changes in process conditions before a criticality accident is possible. This criticality safety evaluation report (CSER) shows that the operations to be performed in this glovebox are safe from a criticality standpoint. No single identified event that causes criticality controls to be lost exceeded the criticality safety limit of k eff = 0.95 (including uncertainties). Therefore, this CSER meets the requirements for a criticality analysis contained in the Hanford Site Nuclear Criticality Safety Manual, HNF-PRO-334, and meets the double contingency principle

  19. CSER 98-003: Criticality safety evaluation report for PFP glovebox HC-21A with button can opening

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ERICKSON, D.G.

    1999-01-01

    Glovebox HC-21A is an enclosure where cans containing plutonium metal buttons or other plutonium bearing materials are prepared for thermal stabilization in the muffle furnaces. The Inert Atmosphere Confinement (IAC), a new feature added to Glovebox HC-21A, allows the opening of containers suspected of containing hydrided plutonium metal. The argon atmosphere in the IAC prevents an adverse reaction between oxygen and the hydride. The hydride is then stabilized in a controlled manner to prevent glovebox over pressurization. After removal from the containers, the plutonium metal buttons or plutonium bearing materials will be placed into muffle furnace boats and then be sent to one of the muffle furnace gloveboxes for stabilization. The materials allowed to be brought into GloveboxHC-21 A are limited to those with a hydrogen to fissile atom ratio (H/X) ≤ 20. Glovebox HC-21A is classified as a DRY glovebox, meaning it has no internal liquid lines, and no free liquids or solutions are allowed to be introduced. The double contingency principle states that designs shall incorporate sufficient factors of safety to require at least two unlikely, independent, and concurrent changes in process conditions before a criticality accident is possible. This criticality safety evaluation report (CSER) shows that the operations to be performed in this glovebox are safe from a criticality standpoint. No single identified event that causes criticality controls to be lost exceeded the criticality safety limit of k eff = 0.95. Therefore, this CSER meets the requirements for a criticality analysis contained in the Hanford Site Nuclear Criticality Safety Manual, HNF-PRO-334, and meets the double contingency principle

  20. Definition and means of maintaining the process vacuum liquid detection interlock systems portion of the PFP safety envelope

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    THOMAS, R.J.

    1999-01-01

    The Process Vacuum Liquid Detection interlock systems prevent intrusion of process liquids into the HEPA filters downstream of demisters No.6 and No.7 during Process Vacuum System operation. This prevents liquid intrusion into the filters, which could cause a criticality. The Safety Envelope (SE) includes the equipment, which detects the presence of liquids in the vacuum headers; isolates the filters; shuts down the vacuum pumps; and alarms the condition. This report identifies the equipment in the SE operating, maintenance, and surveillance procedures needed to maintain the SE equipment; and rationale for exclusion of some equipment and testing from the SE

  1. Anticipated Radiological Dose to Worker for Plutonium Stabilization and Handling at PFP - Project W-460

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    WEISS, E.V.

    2000-01-01

    This report provides estimates of the expected whole body and extremity radiological dose, expressed as dose equivalent (DE), to workers conducting planned plutonium (Pu) stabilization processes at the Hanford Site Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). The report is based on a time and motion dose study commissioned for Project W-460, Plutonium Stabilization and Handling, to provide personnel exposure estimates for construction work in the PFP storage vault area plus operation of stabilization and packaging equipment at PFP

  2. Anticipated Radiological Dose to Worker for Plutonium Stabilization and Handling at PFP - Project W-460

    CERN Document Server

    Weiss, E V

    2000-01-01

    This report provides estimates of the expected whole body and extremity radiological dose, expressed as dose equivalent (DE), to workers conducting planned plutonium (Pu) stabilization processes at the Hanford Site Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). The report is based on a time and motion dose study commissioned for Project W-460, Plutonium Stabilization and Handling, to provide personnel exposure estimates for construction work in the PFP storage vault area plus operation of stabilization and packaging equipment at PFP.

  3. System design description PFP thermal stabilization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    RISENMAY, H.R.

    1998-01-01

    The purpose of this document is to provide a system design description and design basis for the Plutonium Finishing P1ant (PFP) Thermal Stabilization project. The sources of material for this project are residues scraped from glovebox floors and materials already stored in vault storage that need further stabilizing to meet the 3013 storage requirements. Stabilizing this material will promote long term storage and reduced worker exposure. This document addresses: function design, equipment, and safety requirements for thermal stabilization of plutonium residues and oxides

  4. PFP issues/assumptions development and management planning guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    SINCLAIR, J.C.

    1999-01-01

    The PFP Issues/Assumptions Development and Management Planning Guide presents the strategy and process used for the identification, allocation, and maintenance of an Issues/Assumptions Management List for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) integrated project baseline. Revisions to this document will include, as attachments, the most recent version of the Issues/Assumptions Management List, both open and current issues/assumptions (Appendix A), and closed or historical issues/assumptions (Appendix B). This document is intended be a Project-owned management tool. As such, this document will periodically require revisions resulting from improvements of the information, processes, and techniques as now described. Revisions that suggest improved processes will only require PFP management approval

  5. PFP total process throughput calculation and basis of estimate

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    SINCLAIR, J.C.

    1999-01-01

    The PFP Process Throughput Calculation and Basis of Estimate document provides the calculated value and basis of estimate for process throughput associated with material stabilization operations conducted in 234-52 Building. The process throughput data provided reflects the best estimates of material processing rates consistent with experience at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) and other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) sites. The rates shown reflect demonstrated capacity during ''full'' operation. They do not reflect impacts of building down time. Therefore, these throughput rates need to have a Total Operating Efficiency (TOE) factor applied

  6. Technical Basis Document for PFP Area Monitoring Dosimetry Program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    COOPER, J.R.

    2000-04-17

    This document describes the phantom dosimetry used for the PFP Area Monitoring program and establishes the basis for the Plutonium Finishing Plant's (PFP) area monitoring dosimetry program in accordance with the following requirements: Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), part 835, ''Occupational Radiation Protection'' Part 835.403; Hanford Site Radiological Control Manual (HSRCM-1), Part 514; HNF-PRO-382, Area Dosimetry Program; and PNL-MA-842, Hanford External Dosimetry Technical Basis Manual.

  7. Nuclear power plant safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Otway, H.J.

    1974-01-01

    Action at the international level will assume greater importance as the number of nuclear power plants increases, especially in the more densely populated parts of the world. Predictions of growth made prior to October 1973 [9] indicated that, by 1980, 14% of the electricity would be supplied by nuclear plants and by the year 2000 this figure would be about 50%. This will make the topic of international co-operation and standards of even greater importance. The IAEA has long been active in providing assistance to Member States in the siting design and operation of nuclear reactors. These activities have been pursued through advisory missions, the publication of codes of practice, guide books, technical reports and in arranging meetings to promote information exchange. During the early development of nuclear power, there was no well-established body of experience which would allow formulation of internationally acceptable safety criteria, except in a few special cases. Hence, nuclear power plant safety and reliability matters often received an ad hoc approach which necessarily entailed a lack of consistency in the criteria used and in the levels of safety required. It is clear that the continuation of an ad hoc approach to safety will prove inadequate in the context of a world-wide nuclear power industry, and the international trade which this implies. As in several other fields, the establishment of internationally acceptable safety standards and appropriate guides for use by regulatory bodies, utilities, designers and constructors, is becoming a necessity. The IAEA is presently planning the development of a comprehensive set of basic requirements for nuclear power plant safety, and the associated reliability requirements, which would be internationally acceptable, and could serve as a standard frame of reference for nuclear plant safety and reliability analyses

  8. COLLABORATIVE NEGOTIATIONS A SUCCESSFUL APPROACH FOR NEGOTIATING COMPLIANCE MILESTONES FOR THE TRANSITION OF THE PLUTONIUM FINISHING PLANT (PFP), HANFORD NUCLEAR RESERVATION, AND HANFORD, WASHINGTON

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hebdon, J.; Yerxa, J.; Romine, L.; Hopkins, AM; Piippo, R.; Cusack, L.; Bond, R.; Wang, Oliver; Willis, D.

    2003-02-27

    The Hanford Nuclear Reservation is a former U. S. Department of Energy Defense Production Site. The site is currently listed on the National Priorities List of the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) and is undergoing cleanup and environmental restoration. The PFP is a former Plutonium metal production facility. The operating mission of the PFP ended with a DOE Headquarters shutdown letter in October of 1996. Generally, the receipt of a shutdown letter initiates the start of Transition (as the first step of Decommissioning) of a facility. The Hanford site is subject to the Hanford Federal Facilities Compliance Act and Consent Order (HFFCCO), an order on consent signed by the DOE, the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, (EPA) and the Washington Department of Ecology (WDOE). Under the HFFCCO, negotiations for transition milestones begin within six months after the issuance of a shutdown order. In the case of the PFP, the Nuclear Materials disposition and stabilization activities, a DOE responsibility, were necessary as precursor activities to Transition. This situation precipitated a crisis in the negotiations between the agencies, and formal negotiations initiated in 1997 ended in failure. The negotiations reached impasse on several key regulatory and operational issues. The 1997 negotiation was characterized by a strongly positional style. DOE and the regulatory personnel took hard lines early in the negotiations and were unable to move to resolution of key issues after a year and a half. This resulted in unhappy stakeholders, poor publicity and work delays as well as wounded relationships between DOE and the regulatory community. In the 2000-2001 PFP negotiations, a completely different approach was suggested and eventually initiated: Collaborative Negotiations. The collaborative negotiation style resulted in agreement between the agencies on all key issues within 6 months of initiation. All parties were very

  9. COLLABORATIVE NEGOTIATIONS A SUCCESSFUL APPROACH FOR NEGOTIATING COMPLIANCE MILESTONES FOR THE TRANSITION OF THE PLUTONIUM FINISHING PLANT (PFP), HANFORD NUCLEAR RESERVATION, AND HANFORD, WASHINGTON

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hebdon, J.; Yerxa, J.; Romine, L.; Hopkins, AM; Piippo, R.; Cusack, L.; Bond, R.; Wang, Oliver; Willis, D.

    2003-01-01

    The Hanford Nuclear Reservation is a former U. S. Department of Energy Defense Production Site. The site is currently listed on the National Priorities List of the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) and is undergoing cleanup and environmental restoration. The PFP is a former Plutonium metal production facility. The operating mission of the PFP ended with a DOE Headquarters shutdown letter in October of 1996. Generally, the receipt of a shutdown letter initiates the start of Transition (as the first step of Decommissioning) of a facility. The Hanford site is subject to the Hanford Federal Facilities Compliance Act and Consent Order (HFFCCO), an order on consent signed by the DOE, the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, (EPA) and the Washington Department of Ecology (WDOE). Under the HFFCCO, negotiations for transition milestones begin within six months after the issuance of a shutdown order. In the case of the PFP, the Nuclear Materials disposition and stabilization activities, a DOE responsibility, were necessary as precursor activities to Transition. This situation precipitated a crisis in the negotiations between the agencies, and formal negotiations initiated in 1997 ended in failure. The negotiations reached impasse on several key regulatory and operational issues. The 1997 negotiation was characterized by a strongly positional style. DOE and the regulatory personnel took hard lines early in the negotiations and were unable to move to resolution of key issues after a year and a half. This resulted in unhappy stakeholders, poor publicity and work delays as well as wounded relationships between DOE and the regulatory community. In the 2000-2001 PFP negotiations, a completely different approach was suggested and eventually initiated: Collaborative Negotiations. The collaborative negotiation style resulted in agreement between the agencies on all key issues within 6 months of initiation. All parties were very

  10. Reprocessing plants safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Davies, A.G.; Leighton, C.; Millington, D.

    1989-01-01

    The reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel at British Nuclear Fuels (BNFL) Sellafield site consists of a number of relatively self-contained activities carried out in separate plants across the site. The physical conditions and time scales applied in reprocessing and storage make it relatively benign. The potential for minor releases of radioactivity under fault conditioning is minimised by plant design definition of control procedures, training and supervision. The risks to both the general public and workforce are shown to be low with all the safety criteria being met. Normal operating conditions also have the potential for some occupational radiation exposure and the plant and workers are monitored continuously. Exposure levels have been reduced steadily and will continue to fall with plant improvements. (U.K.)

  11. The PBMR fuel plant: Proven technology in an advanced safety environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Braehler, G.; Froschauer, K.; Welbers, P.; Boyes, D.

    2008-01-01

    The PBMR Fuel Plant (PFP), to be constructed at the Pelindaba site near Johannesburg will fuel the first South African Pebble Bed Modular Reactor. The qualification of the PBMR fuel shall be based on past experience with fuel which was produced in the German NUKEM/HOBEG plant and irradiated in the German AVR reactor. Accordingly, the PFP must produce the same fuel as the German plant did, and consequently, the design of the PFP has in essence to be a copy of the NUKEM/HOBEG plant. As a reminder this plant had been operated in accordance with the German regulatory rules which were defined in the years 1970/80. Since then, the requirements with regard to radiological protection, criticality safety and emission control have been significantly tightened, and of course the PFP must be designed in accordance with the most advanced international norms and standards. The implications which follow from these two potentially conflicting requirements, as defined above, are highlighted, and technical solutions are presented. Hence, the change from administrative criticality safety control to technical control, i.e. the application of safe geometry as far as possible. and the introduction of technical solutions for the remaining safe mass regime will be described. A lot of equipment in the Kernel area and in the recycling areas needed to be redesigned in safe geometry. The sensitive processes for Kernel Calcining, for the Coating and the Over-coating remain under safe mass regime, but the safety against criticality is completely independent from staff activities and based on technical measures. A new concept for safe storage of large volumes of Uranium-containing liquids has been developed. Also, the change from relatively open handling of Uranium to the application of containment enclosures wherever release of radioactivity into the room atmosphere is possible, will be addressed. This change required redesign of all process steps requiring the handling of dry Uranium oxides

  12. Power plants and safety 1982

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-01-01

    The papers of this volume deal with the whole range of safety issues from planning and construction to the operation of power plants, and discuss also issues like availability and safety of power plants, protective clothes and their incommodating effect, alternatives for rendering hot-water generators safe and the safety philosophy in steam turbine engineering. (HAG) [de

  13. Industrial safety in power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    The proceedings of the VGB conference 'Industrial safety in power plants' held in the Gruga-Halle, Essen on January 21 and 22, 1987, contain the papers reporting on: Management responsibility for and legal consequences of industrial safety; VBG 2.0 Industrial Accident Prevention Regulation and the power plant operator; Operational experience gained with wet-type flue gas desulphurization systems; Flue gas desulphurization systems: Industrial-safety-related requirements to be met in planning and operation; the effects of the Hazardous Substances Ordinance on power plant operation; Occupational health aspects of heat-exposed jobs in power plants; Regulations of the Industrial Accident Insurance Associations concerning heat-exposed jobs and industrial medical practice; The new VBG 30 Accident Prevention Regulation 'Nuclear power plants'; Industrial safety in nuclear power plants; safe working on and within containers and confined spaces; Application of respiratory protection equipment in power plants. (HAG) [de

  14. Dukovany nuclear power plant safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    Presentation covers recommended safety issues for the Dukovany NPP which have been solved with satisfactory conclusions. Safety issues concerned include: radiation safety; nuclear safety; security; emergency preparedness; health protection at work; fire protection; environmental protection; chemical safety; technical safety. Quality assurance programs at all stages on NPP life time is described. Report includes description of NPP staff training provision, training simulator, emergency operating procedures, emergency preparedness, Year 2000 problem, inspections and life time management. Description of Dukovany Plant Safety Analysis Projects including integrity of the equipment, modernisation, equipment innovation and safety upgrading program show that this approach corresponds to the actual practice applied in EU countries, and fulfilment of current IAEA requirements for safety enhancement of the WWER 440/213 units in the course of MORAWA Equipment Upgrading program

  15. Collaborative Negotiations: A Successful Approach for Negotiation Compliance Milestones for the transition of the PFP Hanford Nuclear Reservation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    HOPKINS, A.M.

    2003-01-01

    The new approach to negotiations was termed collaborative (win-win) rather than positional (win-lose). Collaborative negotiations were conducted to establish milestones for the decommissioning of the Plutonium Finishing Plant, PFP

  16. Preliminary safety evaluation for the plutonium stabilization and packaging system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shapley, J.E.

    1997-01-01

    This Preliminary Safety Evaluation (PSE) describes and analyzes the installation and operation of the Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging System (SPS) at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). The SPS is a combination of components required to expedite the safe and timely storage of Plutonium (Pu) oxide. The SPS program will receive site Pu packages, process the Pu for storage, package the Pu into metallic containers, and safely store the containers in a specially modified storage vault. The location of the SPS will be in the 2736- ZB building and the storage vaults will be in the 2736-Z building of the PFP, as shown in Figure 1-1. The SPS will produce storage canisters that are larger than those currently used for Pu storage at the PFP. Therefore, the existing storage areas within the PFP secure vaults will require modification. Other modifications will be performed on the 2736-ZB building complex to facilitate the installation and operation of the SPS

  17. Tools for plant safety engineer

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fabic, S.

    1996-01-01

    This paper contains: - review of tools for monitoring plant safety equipment reliability and readiness, before and accident (performance indicators for monitoring the risk and reliability performance and for determining when degraded performance alert levels are achieved) - brief reviews of tools for use during an accident: Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs), Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), Reactor Safety Assessment System (RSAS), Computerized Accident Management Support

  18. Safety of industrial irradiation plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-01-01

    Radiation is nowadays used in many applications in industry and medicine; accidental exposure, however, can have grave consequences as large doses of radiation occur in the 600 accelerator or gamma source plants in use around the world. This film explains the operation of irradiation plants and the safety procedures that must be followed to prevent accidents and to ensure safe use

  19. Definition and means of maintaining the room continuous air monitors portion of the plutonium finishing plant (PFP) safety envelope

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    WHITE, W.F.

    1999-01-01

    Room Continuous Air Monitors (CAMs) are used in areas where there is potential for dispersible radioactive material. These CAMs provide audible and visual alarms to warn personnel of an increase in airborne radioactivity

  20. Process and plant safety

    CERN Document Server

    Hauptmanns, Ulrich

    2015-01-01

    Accidents in technical installations are random events. Hence they cannot be totally avoided. Only the probability of their occurrence may be reduced and their consequences be mitigated. The book proceeds from hazards caused by materials and process conditions to indicating technical and organizational measures for achieving the objectives of reduction and mitigation. Qualitative methods for identifying weaknesses of design and increasing safety as well as models for assessing accident consequences are presented. The quantitative assessment of the effectiveness of safety measures is explained. The treatment of uncertainties plays a role there. They stem from the random character of the accident and from lacks of knowledge on some of the phenomena to be addressed. The reader is acquainted with the simulation of accidents, safety and risk analyses and learns how to judge the potential and limitations of mathematical modelling. Risk analysis is applied amongst others to “functional safety” and the determinat...

  1. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  2. PFP Interface identification and management planning guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    SINCLAIR, J.C.

    1999-01-01

    The purpose of-this planning guide is to present the process used to identify, document, and control PFP Stabilization and Deactivation Project interfaces. Revisions to this document will include, as attachments, the most recent version of the Project Interface Management List. A preliminary Interface Management List is included in Appendix A. This document is intended be a Project owned management tool. As such, this document will periodically require revisions resulting from improvements of the information, processes, and techniques as now described. For most revisions that suggest improved processes, PFP management approval is all that will be required

  3. Robots and plant safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Christensen, P.

    1996-02-01

    The application of robots in the harsh environments in which TELEMAN equipment will have to operate has large benefits, but also some drawbacks. The main benefit is the ability gained to perform tasks where people cannot go, while there is a possibility of inflicting damage to the equipment handled by the robot, and the plant when mobile robots are involved. The paper describes the types of possible damage and the precautions to be taken in order to reduce the frequency of the damaging events. A literature study for the topic only gave some insight into examples, but no means for a systematic treatment of the topic. (au) 16 refs

  4. Safety in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koeberlein, K.

    1987-01-01

    In nuclear power plants large amounts of radioactive fission products ensue from the fission of uranium. In order to protect the environment, the radioactive material is confined in multiple 'activity barriers' (crystal matrix of the fuel, fuel cladding, coolant boundary, safety containment, reactor building). These barriers are protected by applying a defense-in-depth concept (high quality requirements, protection systems which recognize and terminate operational incidents, safety systems to cope with accidents). In spite of a favorable safety record of German nuclear power plants it is obvious - and became most evident by the Chernobyl accident - that absolute safety is not achievable. At Chernobyl, however, design disadvantages of that reactor type (like positive reactivity feedback of coolant voiding, missing safety containment) played an important role in accident initiation and progression. Such features of the Russian 'graphite-moderated pressure tube boiling water reactor' are different from those of light water reactors operating in western countries. The essential steps of the waste management of the nuclear fuel cycle ('Entsorgung') are the interim storage, the shipment, and the reprocessing of the spent fuel and the final repository of radioactive waste. Reprocessing means the separation of fossil material (uranium, plutonium) from radioactive waste. Legal requirements for radiological protection of the environment, which are identical for nuclear power plants and reprocessing plant, are complied with by means of comprehensive filter systems. Safety problems of a reprocessing plant are eased considerably by the fact that system pressures, process temperatures and energy densities are low. In order to confine the radioactive waste from the biosphere for a very long period of time, it is to be discarded after appropriate treatment into the deep geological underground of salt domes. (orig./HP) [de

  5. CSER 00-006 Storage of Plutonium Residue Containers in 55 Gallon Drums at the PFP

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    DOBBIN, K.D.

    2000-05-24

    This criticality safety evaluation report (CSER) provides the required limit set and controls for safe transit and storage of these drums in the 234-5Z Building at the PFP. A mass limit of 200 g of plutonium or fissile equivalent per drum is acceptable

  6. PFP Commercial Grade Food Pack Cans for Plutonium Handling and Storage Critical Characteristics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BONADIE, E.P.

    1999-01-01

    This document specifies the critical characteristics for Commercial Grade Items (CGI) procured for PFP's Vault Operations system as required by HNF-PRO-268 and HNF-PRO-1819. These are the minimum specifications that the equipment must meet in order to perform its safety function

  7. Nuclear plant safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1980-01-01

    The four-member New York Power Pool Panel concluded that, for a number of reasons, no nuclear power plant in New York State is prone to the type of accident that occurred at Three Mile Island (TMI). The Panel further concluded that changes in operating practices, both regulatory and voluntary, and heightened sensitivity to reactor-core-cooling requirements will substantially reduce the chances for another such accident anywhere. Panel members found that New York State utilities have taken a responsible attitude with regard to requirements set forth by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) as a result of the TMI accident. In a cover letter that accompanied the report to Federal and New York state officials, New York Power Pool Executive Committee Chairman Francis E. Drake, Jr. expressed hope that the report will alleviate public fears of nuclear reactors and promote wider acceptance of nuclear energy as an economic and safe means of power production. 17 references

  8. Plutonium Finishing Plant

    Data.gov (United States)

    Federal Laboratory Consortium — The Plutonium Finishing Plant, also known as PFP, represented the end of the line (the final procedure) associated with plutonium production at Hanford.PFP was also...

  9. Operating plant safety analysis needs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Young, M.Y.; Love, D.S.

    1992-01-01

    The primary objective for nuclear power station owners is to operate and manage their plants safely. However, there is also a need to provide economical electric power, which requires that the unit be operated as efficiently as possible, consistent with the safety requirements. The objectives cited above can be achieved through the identification and use of available margins inherent in the plant design. As a result of conservative licensing and analytical approaches taken in the past, many of these margins may be found in the safety analysis limits within which plants currently operate. Improvements in the accuracy of the safety analysis, and a more realistic treatment of plant initial and boundary conditions, can make this margin available for a variety of uses which enhance plant performance, help to reduce O and M costs, and may help to extend licensed operation. Opportunities for improvement exist in several areas in the accident analysis normally performed for Chapter 15 of the FSAR. For example, recent modifications to the ECCS rule, 10CFR50.46 and Appendix K, allow use of margins previously unavailable in the analysis of the Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). To take advantage of this regulatory change, new methods are being developed to analyze both the large and small break loss of coolant accident (LOCA). As this margin is used, enhancements in the analysis of other transients will become necessary. The paper discusses accident analysis methods, future development needs, and analysis margin utilization in specific accident scenarios

  10. Plant air systems safety study: Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-05-01

    The Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Air System facilities and operations are reviewed for potential safety problems not covered by standard industrial safety procedures. Information is presented under the following section headings: facility and process description (general); air plant equipment; air distribution system; safety systems; accident analysis; plant air system safety overview; and conclusion

  11. Operability test procedure for PFP wastewater sampling facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hirzel, D.R.

    1995-01-01

    Document provides instructions for performing the Operability Test of the 225-WC Wastewater Sampling Station which monitors the discharge to the Treated Effluent Disposal Facility from the Plutonium Finishing Plant. This Operability Test Procedure (OTP) has been prepared to verify correct configuration and performance of the PFP Wastewater sampling system installed in Building 225-WC located outside the perimeter fence southeast of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). The objective of this test is to ensure the equipment in the sampling facility operates in a safe and reliable manner. The sampler consists of two Manning Model S-5000 units which are rate controlled by the Milltronics Ultrasonic flowmeter at manhole No.C4 and from a pH measuring system with the sensor in the stream adjacent to the sample point. The intent of the dual sampling system is to utilize one unit to sample continuously at a rate proportional to the wastewater flow rate so that the aggregate tests are related to the overall flow and thereby eliminate isolated analyses. The second unit will only operate during a high or low pH excursion of the stream (hence the need for a pH control). The major items in this OTP include testing of the Manning Sampler System and associated equipment including the pH measuring and control system, the conductivity monitor, and the flow meter

  12. Safety assessment and verification for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    This publication supports the Safety Requirements on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. This Safety Guide was prepared on the basis of a systematic review of all the relevant publications including the Safety Fundamentals, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design, current and ongoing revisions of other Safety Guides, INSAG reports and other publications that have addressed the safety of nuclear power plants. This Safety Guide also provides guidance for Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety in meeting their obligations under Article 14 on Assessment and Verification of Safety. The Safety Requirements publication entitled Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design states that a comprehensive safety assessment and an independent verification of the safety assessment shall be carried out before the design is submitted to the regulatory body. This publication provides guidance on how this requirement should be met. This Safety Guide provides recommendations to designers for carrying out a safety assessment during the initial design process and design modifications, as well as to the operating organization in carrying out independent verification of the safety assessment of new nuclear power plants with a new or already existing design. The recommendations for performing a safety assessment are suitable also as guidance for the safety review of an existing plant. The objective of reviewing existing plants against current standards and practices is to determine whether there are any deviations which would have an impact on plant safety. The methods and the recommendations of this Safety Guide can also be used by regulatory bodies for the conduct of the regulatory review and assessment. Although most recommendations of this Safety Guide are general and applicable to all types of nuclear reactors, some specific recommendations and examples apply mostly to water cooled reactors. Terms such as 'safety assessment', 'safety analysis' and 'independent

  13. Safety of nuclear power plants: Operation. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The safety of a nuclear power plant is ensured by means of its proper siting, design, construction and commissioning, followed by the proper management and operation of the plant. In a later phase, proper decommissioning is required. This Safety Requirements publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which was issued in 1988 as Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1). The purpose of this revision was: to restructure Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1) in the light of the basic objectives, concepts and principles in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. To be consistent with the requirements of the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources. And to reflect current practice and new concepts and technical developments. Guidance on fulfillment of these Safety Requirements may be found in the appropriate Safety Guides relating to plant operation. The objective of this publication is to establish the requirements which, in the light of experience and the present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. These requirements are governed by the basic objectives, concepts and principles that are presented in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. This publication deals with matters specific to the safe operation of land based stationary thermal neutron nuclear power plants, and also covers their commissioning and subsequent decommissioning

  14. Safety of nuclear power plants: Operation. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The safety of a nuclear power plant is ensured by means of its proper siting, design, construction and commissioning, followed by the proper management and operation of the plant. In a later phase, proper decommissioning is required. This Safety Requirements publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which was issued in 1988 as Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1). The purpose of this revision was: to restructure Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1) in the light of the basic objectives, concepts and principles in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. To be consistent with the requirements of the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources. And to reflect current practice and new concepts and technical developments. Guidance on fulfillment of these Safety Requirements may be found in the appropriate Safety Guides relating to plant operation. The objective of this publication is to establish the requirements which, in the light of experience and the present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. These requirements are governed by the basic objectives, concepts and principles that are presented in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. This publication deals with matters specific to the safe operation of land based stationary thermal neutron nuclear power plants, and also covers their commissioning and subsequent decommissioning

  15. Safety of nuclear power plants: Operation. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The safety of a nuclear power plant is ensured by means of its proper siting, design, construction and commissioning, followed by the proper management and operation of the plant. In a later phase, proper decommissioning is required. This Safety Requirements publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which was issued in 1988 as Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1). The purpose of this revision was: to restructure Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1) in the light of the basic objectives, concepts and principles in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations; to be consistent with the requirements of the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources; and to reflect current practice and new concepts and technical developments. Guidance on fulfillment of these Safety Requirements may be found in the appropriate Safety Guides relating to plant operation. The objective of this publication is to establish the requirements which, in the light of experience and the present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. These requirements are governed by the basic objectives, concepts and principles that are presented in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. This publication deals with matters specific to the safe operation of land based stationary thermal neutron nuclear power plants, and also covers their commissioning and subsequent decommissioning

  16. Basic safety principles for nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zhang Shiguan

    1989-01-01

    To ensure the safety operation of nuclear power plant, one should strictly adhere to the implelmentation of safety codes and the establishment of nuclear safety code system, as well as the applicable basic safety principles of nuclear power plants. This article briefly introduce the importance of nuclear codes and its economic benefits and the implementation of basic safety principles to be accumulated in practice for many years by various countries

  17. Safety design of Qinshan Nuclear Power Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ouyang Yu; Zhang Lian; Du Shenghua; Zhao Jiayu

    1984-01-01

    Safety issues have been greatly emphasized through the design of the Qinshan Nuclear Power Plant. Reasonable safety margine has been taken into account in the plant design parameters, the design incorporated various safeguard systems, such as engineering safety feature systems, safety protection systems and the features to resist natural catastrophes, e. g. earthquake, hurricanes, tide and so on. Preliminary safety analysis and environmental effect assessment have been done and anti-accident provisions and emergency policy were carefully considered. Qinshan Nuclear Power Plant safety related systems are designed in accordance with the common international standards established in the late 70's, as well as the existing engineering standard of China

  18. Periodic safety reviews of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Toth, Csilla

    2009-01-01

    Operational nuclear power plants (NPPs) are generally subject to routine reviews of plant operation and special safety reviews following operational events. In addition, many Member States of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have initiated systematic safety reassessment, termed periodic safety review (PSR), to assess the cumulative effects of plant ageing and plant modifications, operating experience, technical developments, site specific, organizational and human aspects. These reviews include assessments of plant design and operation against current safety standards and practices. PSRs are considered an effective way of obtaining an overall view of actual plant safety, to determine reasonable and practical modifications that should be made in order to maintain a high level of safety throughout the plant's operating lifetime. PSRs can be used as a means to identify time limiting features of the plant. The trend is to use PSR as a condition for deciding whether to continue operation of the plant beyond the originally established design lifetime and for assessing the status of the plant for long term operation. To assist Member States in the implementation of PSR, the IAEA develops safety standards, technical documents and provides different services: training courses, workshops, technical meetings and safety review missions for the independent assessment of the PSR at NPPs, including the requirements for PSR, the review process and the PSR final reports. This paper describes the PSR's objectives, scopes, methods and the relationship of PSR with other plant safety related activities and recent experiences of Member States in implementation of PSRs at NPPs. (author)

  19. Design of plant safety model in plant enterprise engineering environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gabbar, Hossam A.; Suzuki, Kazuhiko; Shimada, Yukiyasu

    2001-01-01

    Plant enterprise engineering environment (PEEE) is an approach aiming to manage the plant through its lifecycle. In such environment, safety is considered as the common objective for all activities throughout the plant lifecycle. One approach to achieve plant safety is to embed safety aspects within each function and activity within such environment. One ideal way to enable safety aspects within each automated function is through modeling. This paper proposes a theoretical approach to design plant safety model as integrated with the plant lifecycle model within such environment. Object-oriented modeling approach is used to construct the plant safety model using OO CASE tool on the basis of unified modeling language (UML). Multiple views are defined for plant objects to express static, dynamic, and functional semantics of these objects. Process safety aspects are mapped to each model element and inherited from design to operation stage, as it is naturally embedded within plant's objects. By developing and realizing the plant safety model, safer plant operation can be achieved and plant safety can be assured

  20. Safety principles for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vuorinen, A.

    1993-01-01

    The role and purpose of safety principles for nuclear power plants are discussed. A brief information is presented on safety objectives as given in the INSAG documents. The possible linkage is discussed between the two mentioned elements of nuclear safety and safety culture. Safety culture is a rather new concept and there is more than one interpretation of the definition given by INSAG. The defence in depth is defined by INSAG as a fundamental principle of safety technology of nuclear power. Discussed is the overall strategy for safety measures, and features of nuclear power plants provided by the defence-in-depth concept. (Z.S.) 7 refs

  1. Safety analysis of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Selvatici, E.

    1981-01-01

    A study about the safety analysis of nuclear power plant, giving emphasis to how and why to do is presented. The utilization of the safety analysis aiming to perform the licensing requirements is discussed, and an example of the Angra 2 and 3 safety analysis is shown. Some presented tendency of the safety analysis are presented and examples are shown.(E.G.) [pt

  2. Safety of nuclear power plants: Design. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The present publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design (Safety Series No. 50-C-D (Rev. 1), issued in 1988). It takes account of developments relating to the safety of nuclear power plants since the Code on Design was last revised. These developments include the issuing of the Safety Fundamentals publication, The Safety of Nuclear Installations, and the present revision of various safety standards and other publications relating to safety. Requirements for nuclear safety are intended to ensure adequate protection of site personnel, the public and the environment from the effects of ionizing radiation arising from nuclear power plants. It is recognized that technology and scientific knowledge advance, and nuclear safety and what is considered adequate protection are not static entities. Safety requirements change with these developments and this publication reflects the present consensus. This Safety Requirements publication takes account of the developments in safety requirements by, for example, including the consideration of severe accidents in the design process. Other topics that have been given more detailed attention include management of safety, design management, plant ageing and wearing out effects, computer based safety systems, external and internal hazards, human factors, feedback of operational experience, and safety assessment and verification. This publication establishes safety requirements that define the elements necessary to ensure nuclear safety. These requirements are applicable to safety functions and the associated structures, systems and components, as well as to procedures important to safety in nuclear power plants. It is expected that this publication will be used primarily for land based stationary nuclear power plants with water cooled reactors designed for electricity generation or for other heat production applications (such as district heating or desalination). It is recognized that in the case of

  3. Safety of nuclear power plants: Design. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The present publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design (Safety Series No. 50-C-D (Rev. 1), issued in 1988). It takes account of developments relating to the safety of nuclear power plants since the Code on Design was last revised. These developments include the issuing of the Safety Fundamentals publication, The Safety of Nuclear Installations, and the present revision of various safety standards and other publications relating to safety. Requirements for nuclear safety are intended to ensure adequate protection of site personnel, the public and the environment from the effects of ionizing radiation arising from nuclear power plants. It is recognized that technology and scientific knowledge advance, and nuclear safety and what is considered adequate protection are not static entities. Safety requirements change with these developments and this publication reflects the present consensus. This Safety Requirements publication takes account of the developments in safety requirements by, for example, including the consideration of severe accidents in the design process. Other topics that have been given more detailed attention include management of safety, design management, plant ageing and wearing out effects, computer based safety systems, external and internal hazards, human factors, feedback of operational experience, and safety assessment and verification. This publication establishes safety requirements that define the elements necessary to ensure nuclear safety. These requirements are applicable to safety functions and the associated structures, systems and components, as well as to procedures important to safety in nuclear power plants. It is expected that this publication will be used primarily for land based stationary nuclear power plants with water cooled reactors designed for electricity generation or for other heat production applications (such as district heating or desalination). It is recognized that in the case of

  4. Safety culture in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Weihe, G. von; Pamme, H.

    2003-01-01

    Experience shows that German nuclear power plants have always been operated reliably and safely. Over the years, the safety level in these plants has been raised considerably so that they can stand any comparison with other countries. This is confirmed by the two reports published by the Federal Ministry for the Environment on the nuclear safety convention. Behind this, there must obviously stand countless appropriate 'good practices' and a safety management system in nuclear power plants. (orig.) [de

  5. Plutonium Finishing Plan (PFP) Treatment and Storage Unit Interim Status Closure Plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    PRIGNANO, A.L.

    2000-01-01

    This document describes the planned activities and performance standards for closing the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Treatment and Storage Unit. The PFP Treatment and Storage Unit is located within the 234-52 Building in the 200 West Area of the Hanford Facility. Although this document is prepared based upon Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 265, Subpart G requirements, closure of the unit will comply with Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 173-303-610 regulations pursuant to Section 5.3 of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) Action Plan (Ecology et al. 1996). Because the PFP Treatment and Storage Unit manages transuranic mixed (TRUM) waste, there are many controls placed on management of the waste. Based on the many controls placed on management of TRUM waste, releases of TRUM waste are not anticipated to occur in the PFP Treatment and Storage Unit. Because the intention is to clean close the PFP Treatment and Storage Unit, postclosure activities are not applicable to this closure plan. To clean close the unit, it will be demonstrated that dangerous waste has not been left onsite at levels above the closure performance standard for removal and decontamination. If it is determined that clean closure is not possible or is environmentally impractical, the closure plan will be modified to address required postclosure activities. The PFP Treatment and Storage Unit will be operated to immobilize and/or repackage plutonium-bearing waste in a glovebox process. The waste to be processed is in a solid physical state (chunks and coarse powder) and will be sealed into and out of the glovebox in closed containers. The containers of immobilized waste will be stored in the glovebox and in additional permitted storage locations at PFP. The waste will be managed to minimize the potential for spills outside the glovebox, and to preclude spills from reaching soil. Containment surfaces will be maintained to ensure

  6. Time and Temperature Test Results for PFP Thermal Stabilization Furnaces

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    COMPTON, J.A.

    2000-01-01

    The national standard for plutonium storage acceptability (standard DOE-STD-3013-99, generally known as ''the 3013 standard'') has been revised to clarify the requirement for processes that will produce acceptable storage materials. The 3013 standard (Reference 1) now states that ''Oxides shall be stabilized by heating the material in an oxidizing atmosphere to a Material Temperature of at least 950 C (1742 F) for not less than 2 hours.'' The process currently in use for producing stable oxides for storage at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) heats a furnace atmosphere to 1000 C and holds it there for 2 hours. The temperature of the material being stabilized is not measured directly during this process. The Plutonium Process Support Laboratories (PPSL) were requested to demonstrate that the process currently in use at PFP is an acceptable method of producing stable plutonium dioxide consistently. A spare furnace identical to the production furnaces was set up and tested under varying conditions with non-radioactive surrogate materials. Reference 2 was issued to guide the testing program. The process currently in use at the PFP for stabilizing plutonium-bearing powders was shown to heat all the material in the furnace to at least 950 C for at least 2 hours. The current process will work for (1) relatively pure plutonium dioxide, (2) dioxide powders mixed with up to 20 weight percent magnesium oxide, and (3) dioxide powders with up to 11 weight percent magnesium oxide and 20 weight percent magnesium nitrate hexahydrate. Time and temperature data were also consistent with a successful demonstration for a mixture containing 10 weight percent each of sodium and potassium chloride; however, the molten chloride salts destroyed the thermocouples in the powder and temperature data were unavailable for part of that run. These results assume that the current operating limits of no more than 2500 grams per furnace charge and a powder height of no more than 1.5 inches remain

  7. Safety assessment and verification for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA programme for safety standards for nuclear power plants. The present publication is a revision of the IAEA Safety Guide on Management of Nuclear Power Plants for Safe Operation issued in 1984. It supplements Section 2 of the Safety Requirements publication on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation. Nuclear power technology is different from the customary technology of power generation from fossil fuel and by hydroelectric means. One major difference between the management of nuclear power plants and that of conventional generating plants is the emphasis that should be placed on nuclear safety, quality assurance, the management of radioactive waste and radiological protection, and the accompanying national regulatory requirements. This Safety Guide highlights the important elements of effective management in relation to these aspects of safety. The attention to be paid to safety requires that the management recognize that personnel involved in the nuclear power programme should understand, respond effectively to, and continuously search for ways to enhance safety in the light of any additional requirements socially and legally demanded of nuclear energy. This will help to ensure that safety policies that result in the safe operation of nuclear power plants are implemented and that margins of safety are always maintained. The structure of the organization, management standards and administrative controls should be such that there is a high degree of assurance that safety policies and decisions are implemented, safety is continuously enhanced and a strong safety culture is promoted and supported. The objective of this publication is to guide Member States in setting up an operating organization which facilitates the safe operation of nuclear power plants to a high level internationally. The second objective is to provide guidance on the most important organizational elements in order to contribute to a strong safety

  8. Safety assessment and verification for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA programme for safety standards for nuclear power plants. The present publication is a revision of the IAEA Safety Guide on Management of Nuclear Power Plants for Safe Operation issued in 1984. It supplements Section 2 of the Safety Requirements publication on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation. Nuclear power technology is different from the customary technology of power generation from fossil fuel and by hydroelectric means. One major difference between the management of nuclear power plants and that of conventional generating plants is the emphasis that should be placed on nuclear safety, quality assurance, the management of radioactive waste and radiological protection, and the accompanying national regulatory requirements. This Safety Guide highlights the important elements of effective management in relation to these aspects of safety. The attention to be paid to safety requires that the management recognize that personnel involved in the nuclear power programme should understand, respond effectively to, and continuously search for ways to enhance safety in the light of any additional requirements socially and legally demanded of nuclear energy. This will help to ensure that safety policies that result in the safe operation of nuclear power plants are implemented and that margins of safety are always maintained. The structure of the organization, management standards and administrative controls should be such that there is a high degree of assurance that safety policies and decisions are implemented, safety is continuously enhanced and a strong safety culture is promoted and supported. The objective of this publication is to guide Member States in setting up an operating organization which facilitates the safe operation of nuclear power plants to a high level internationally. The second objective is to provide guidance on the most important organizational elements in order to contribute to a strong safety

  9. The critical safety functions and plant operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Corcoran, W.R.; Church, J.F.; Cross, M.T.; Guinn, W.M.; Porter, N.J.

    1981-01-01

    The operator's role in nuclear safety is outlined and the concept of ''safety functions'' introduced. Safety functions are a group of actions that prevent core melt or minimize radiation releases to the general public. They can be used to provide a hierarchy of practical plant protection that an operator should use. The plant safety evaluation uses four inputs in predicting the results of an event: the event initiator, the plant design, the initial plant conditions and setup, and the operator actions. If any of these inputs are not as assumed in the evaluation, confidence that the consequences will be as predicted is reduced. Based on the safety evaluation, the operator has three roles in assuring that the consequences of an event will be no worse than the predicted acceptable results: Maintain plant setup in readiness to properly respond. Operate the plant in a manner such that fewer, milder events minimize the frequency and the severity of adverse events. Monitor the plant to verify that the safety functions are accomplished. The operator needs a systematic approach to mitigating the consequences of an event. The concept of safety functions introduces this systematic approach and presents a hierarchy of protection. If the operator has difficulty identifying an event for any reason, the systematic safety function approach allows accomplishing the overall path of mitigating consequences. Ten functions designed to protect against core melt, preserve containment integrity, prevent indirect release of radioactivity, and maintain vital auxiliaries needed to support the other safety functions are identified

  10. Safety provisions of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Niehaus, F.

    1994-01-01

    Safety of nuclear power plants is determined by a deterministic approach complemented by probabilistic considerations. Much use has been made of the wealth of information from more than 6000 years of reactor operation. Design, construction and operation is governed by national and international safety standards and practices. The IAEA has prepared a set of Nuclear Safety Standards as recommendations to its Member States, covering the areas of siting, design, operations, quality assurance, and governmental organisations. In 1988 the IAEA published a report by the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group on Basic Safety Principles for Nuclear Power Plants, summarizing the underlying objectives and principles of excellence in nuclear safety and the way in which its aspects are interrelated. The paper will summarize some of the key safety principles and provisions, and results and uses of Probabilistic Safety Assessments. Some comments will be made on the safety of WWER 440/230 and WWER-1000 reactors which are operated on Bulgaria. 8 figs

  11. Safety assessment principles for nuclear plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-01-01

    The present Safety Assessment Principles result from the revision of those which were drawn up following a recommendation arising from the Sizewell-B enquiry. The principles presented here relate only to nuclear safety; there is a section on risks from normal operation and accident conditions and the standards against which those risks are assessed. A major part of the document deals with the principles that cover the design of nuclear plants. The revised Safety assessment principles are aimed primarily at the safety assessment of new nuclear plants but they will also be used in assessing existing plants. (UK)

  12. Effort on Nuclear Power Plants safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Prayoto.

    1979-01-01

    Prospects of nuclear power plant on designing, building and operation covering natural safety, technical safety, and emergency safety are discussed. Several problems and their solutions and nuclear energy operation in developing countries especially control and permission are also discussed. (author tr.)

  13. Criticality safety evaluation in Tokai Reprocessing Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shirai, Nobutoshi; Nakajima, Masayoshi; Takaya, Akikazu; Ohnuma, Hideyuki; Shirouzu, Hidetomo; Hayashi, Shinichiro; Yoshikawa, Koji; Suto, Toshiyuki

    2000-04-01

    Criticality limits for equipments in Tokai Reprocessing Plant which handle fissile material solution and are under shape and dimension control were reevaluated based on the guideline No.10 'Criticality safety of single unit' in the regulatory guide for reprocessing plant safety. This report presents criticality safety evaluation of each equipment as single unit. Criticality safety of multiple units in a cell or a room was also evaluated. The evaluated equipments were ones in dissolution, separation, purification, denitration, Pu product storage, and Pu conversion processes. As a result, it was reconfirmed that the equipments were safe enough from a view point of criticality safety of single unit and multiple units. (author)

  14. Safety standards and safety record of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Davis, A.B.

    1984-01-01

    This paper focuses on the use of standards and the measurement and enforcement of these standards to achieve safe operation of nuclear power plants. Since a discussion of the safety standards that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) uses to regulate the nuclear power industry can be a rather tedious subject, this discussion will provide you with not only a description of what safety standards are, but some examples of their application, and various indicators that provide an overall perspective on safety. These remarks are confined to the safety standards adopted by the NRC. There are other agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and the state regulatory agencies which impact on a nuclear power plant. The NRC has regulatory authority for the commercial use of the nuclear materials and facilities which are defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to assure that the public health and safety and national security are protected

  15. Modifications to nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA's programme for safety standards for nuclear power plants. It supplements Section 7 of the Safety Requirements publication on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which establishes the safety requirements for the modification of nuclear power plants. Reasons for carrying out modifications to nuclear power plants may include: (1) maintaining or strengthening existing safety provisions and thus maintaining consistency with or improving on the current design. (2) recovering from plant faults. (3) improving the thermal performance or increasing the power rating of the plant. (4) increasing the maintainability of the plant, reducing the radiation exposure of personnel or reducing the costs of plant maintenance. And (5) extending the design life of the plant. Most modifications, made on the basis of operating experience, are intended to improve on the design or to improve operational performance and flexibility. Some are rendered necessary by new regulatory requirements, ageing of the plant or obsolescence of equipment. However, the benefits of regularly updating the plant design can be jeopardized if modifications are not kept under rigorous control throughout the lifetime of the plant. The need to reduce costs and improve efficiency, in combination with changes to the structure of the electricity generation sector of the economy in many countries, has led many companies to make changes in the structure of the operating organization for nuclear power plants. Whatever the reason for such organizational changes, consideration should be given to the effects of those changes with the aim of ensuring that they would have no impacts that would compromise the safety of the plant. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance and recommendations on controlling activities relating to modifications at nuclear power plants in order to reduce risk and to ensure that the configuration of the plant is at all times under

  16. Modifications to nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA's programme for safety standards for nuclear power plants. It supplements Section 7 of the Safety Requirements publication on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which establishes the safety requirements for the modification of nuclear power plants. Reasons for carrying out modifications to nuclear power plants may include: (1) maintaining or strengthening existing safety provisions and thus maintaining consistency with or improving on the current design. (2) recovering from plant faults. (3) improving the thermal performance or increasing the power rating of the plant. (4) increasing the maintainability of the plant, reducing the radiation exposure of personnel or reducing the costs of plant maintenance. And (5) extending the design life of the plant. Most modifications, made on the basis of operating experience, are intended to improve on the design or to improve operational performance and flexibility. Some are rendered necessary by new regulatory requirements, ageing of the plant or obsolescence of equipment. However, the benefits of regularly updating the plant design can be jeopardized if modifications are not kept under rigorous control throughout the lifetime of the plant. The need to reduce costs and improve efficiency, in combination with changes to the structure of the electricity generation sector of the economy in many countries, has led many companies to make changes in the structure of the operating organization for nuclear power plants. Whatever the reason for such organizational changes, consideration should be given to the effects of those changes with the aim of ensuring that they would have no impacts that would compromise the safety of the plant. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance and recommendations on controlling activities relating to modifications at nuclear power plants in order to reduce risk and to ensure that the configuration of the plant is at all times under

  17. Nuclear power plant's safety and risk

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Franzen, L.F.

    1975-01-01

    Starting with a comprehensive safety strategy as evolved over the past years and the present legal provisions for the construction and operation of nuclear power plants, the risk of the intended operation, of accidents and unforeseen events is discussed. Owing to the excellent safety record of nuclear power plants, main emphasis in discussing accidents is given to the precautionary analysis within the framework of the licensing procedure. In this context, hypothetical accidents are mentioned only as having been utilized for general risk comparisons. The development of a comprehensive risk concept for a completely objective safety assessment of nuclear power plants remains as a final goal. (orig.) [de

  18. Project Management Plan to Maintain Safe and Compliant Conditions at the Plutonium Finishing Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    COX, G.J.

    1999-01-01

    This Project Management Plan presents the overall plan, description, mission, and workscope for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) maintain safe and compliant conditions project at PFP. This plan presents the overall description, mission, work scope, and planning for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Maintain Safe and Compliant Conditions Project at PFP. This project includes all tasks required to maintain the safety boundary for the PFP Complex, except for the 2736-2 Vault Complex and the 234-52 vaults and vault-type rooms. The intent of this plan is to describe how this project will be managed and integrated with the stabilization, and deactivation activities. This plan supplements the overall integrated plan presented in the Plutonium Finishing Plant Integrated Project Management Plan (IPMP), HNF-3617, Rev. 0. This is the top-level definitive project management document that specifies the technical (work scope), schedule, and cost baselines that will manage the execution of this project. It describes the organizational approach and roles/responsibilities implemented to execute the project. This plan is under configuration management and any deviations must be authorized by appropriate change control action

  19. Safety criteria of uranium enrichment plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nardocci, A.C.; Oliveira Neto, J.M. de

    1994-01-01

    The applicability of nuclear reactor safety criteria applied to uranium enrichment plants is discussed, and a new criterion based on the soluble uranium compounds and hexafluoride chemical toxicities is presented. (L.C.J.A.). 21 refs, 4 tabs

  20. Safety culture of nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zheng Beixin

    2008-01-01

    This paper is a summary on the basis of DNMC safety culture training material for managerial personnel. It intends to explain the basic contents of safety, design, management, enterprise culture, safety culture of nuclear power plant and the relationship among them. It explains especially the constituent elements of safety culture system, the basic requirements for the three levels of commitments: policy level, management level and employee level. It also makes some analyses and judgments for some typical safety culture cases, for example, transparent culture and habitual violation of procedure. (authors)

  1. PFP Commercial Grade Food Pack Cans for Plutonium Handling and Storage Critical Characteristics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BONADIE, E.P.

    1999-01-01

    This document specifies the critical characteristics for Commercial Grade Items (CGI) procured for PFP's Vault Operations system as required by HNF-PRO-268 and HNF-PRO-1819. These are the minimum specifications that the equipment must meet in order to perform its safety function. The changes in these specifications have no detrimental effect on the descriptions and parameters related to handling plutonium solids in the authorization basis. Because no parameters or sequences exceed the limits described in the authorization bases, no accident or abnormal conditions are affected. The specifications prescribed in this critical characteristics document do not represent an unreviewed safety question

  2. Barsebaeck power plant - safety and emergency measures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1981-01-01

    A Swedish-Danish Committee on safety at the Swedish nuclear power plant Barsebaeck was established in 1979 in order to evaluate the nuclear safety at Barsebaeck with a view to the reactor accident at the Three-Mile-Island nuclear power plant March 28, 1979. According to the committees mandate the investigations of the Kemeny Commission, the Rogouin investigation, investigations of the American Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Swedish report ''Safe nuclear power'' have been taken into consideration by the Committee. Furthermore, it has formed the basis for the Committees work that the authority responsibility for the safety at Barsebaeck lies with the Swedish authorities, and that these authorities have evaluated the safety aspects before the permissions for operation of the Barsebaeck power plant were given and hereafter currently in connection with the inspection of the power plant. The report prepared by the Commission treats aspects as: a) Nuclear safety at the Barsebaeck power plant, b) reactor safety and emergency provisions, c) common elements in the emergency provision situation in Sweden and Denmark, d) ongoing investigations on course of events during accidents and release limiting safety systems. (BP)

  3. Seismic safety of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Guerpinar, A.; Godoy, A.

    2001-01-01

    This paper summarizes the work performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency in the areas of safety reviews and applied research in support of programmes for the assessment and enhancement of seismic safety in Eastern Europe and in particular WWER type nuclear power plants during the past seven years. Three major topics are discussed; engineering safety review services in relation to external events, technical guidelines for the assessment and upgrading of WWER type nuclear power plants, and the Coordinated Research Programme on 'Benchmark study for the seismic analysis and testing of WWER type nuclear power plants'. These topics are summarized in a way to provide an overview of the past and present safety situation in selected WWER type plants which are all located in Eastern European countries. Main conclusion of the paper is that although there is now a thorough understanding of the seismic safety issues in these operating nuclear power plants, the implementation of seismic upgrades to structures, systems and components are lagging behind, particularly for those cases in which the re-evaluation indicated the necessity to strengthen the safety related structures or install new safety systems. (author)

  4. The safety of nuclear power plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1988-01-01

    Do nuclear power plants present an unjustifiable risk Can there be confidence in their safety The Uranium Institute invited a group of senior safety experts from eight different Western countries operating different types of reactors to provide an authoritative explanation for non-specialists of the basic principles of reactor safety, their application and their implications. The report presents the group's opinion on the level of safety achieved in the Western nuclear power plants with which the authors are directly familiar. Although many of the points made may well also be true for non-Western reactors, the report does not cover them except where specifically stated. It does describe and discuss the causes of the Chernobyl disaster. It does not compare nuclear power with other fuels, nor does it deal with its benefits, since however great the benefits from the peaceful use of nuclear power, and its own advantages over other fuels, they could not compensate for lack of safety. The conclusion reached is that the risk associated with electricity production at nuclear power plants can be kept very low. Proper use of the extensive knowledge available today can guarantee operation of nuclear power plants at very high safety levels, carrying very low risks, both to health and of contamination of the environment: risks that are continually lowered by upgrading existing plants and their operation, and by the design of future power plants. (author).

  5. Safety targets for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Herttrich, P.M.

    1985-01-01

    By taking as an example the safety targets of the American nuclear energy authority US-NRC, this paper explains what is meant by global, quantitative safety targets for nuclear power plants and what expectations are associated with the selecton of such safety targets. It is shown how probabilistic methods can be an appropriate completion of proven deterministic methods and what are the sectors where their application may become important in future. (orig./HP) [de

  6. Licensee responsibility for nuclear power plant safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schneider, Horst

    2010-01-01

    Simple sentences easy to grasp are desirable in regulations and bans. However, in a legal system, their meaning must be unambiguous. Article 6, Paragraph 1 of the EURATOM Directive on a community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear facilities of June 2009 states that 'responsibility for the nuclear safety of a nuclear facility is incumbent primarily on the licensee.' The draft 'Safety Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, Revision D, April 2009' of the German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety (BMU) (A Module 1, 'Safety Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants: Basic Safety Criteria' / '0 Principles' Paragraph 2) reads: 'Responsibility for ensuring safety rests with the licensee. He shall give priority to compliance with the safety goal over the achievement of other operational objectives.' In addition, the existing rules and regulations, whose rank is equivalent to that of international regulations, assign priority to the safety goal to be pursued by the licensee over all other objectives of the company. The operator's responsibility for nuclear safety can be required and achieved only on the basis of permits granted, which must meet legal requirements. The operator's proximity to plant operation is the reason for his 'primary responsibility.' Consequently, verbatim incorporation of Article 6, Paragraph 1 of the EURATOM Directive would only be a superscript added to existing obligations of the operator - inclusive of a safety culture designed as an incentive to further 'the spirit of safety-related actions' - without any new legal contents and consequences. In the reasons of the regulation, this would have to be clarified in addition to the cryptic wording of 'responsibility.. primarily,' at the same time expressing that operators and authorities work together in a spirit of openness and trust. (orig.)

  7. Problems of nuclear power plant safety evaluation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suchomel, J.

    1977-01-01

    Nuclear power plant safety is discussed with regard to external effects on the containment and to the human factor. As for external effects, attention is focused on shock waves which may be due to explosions or accidents in flammable material transport and storage, to missiles, and to earthquake effects. The criteria for evaluating nuclear power plant safety in different countries are shown. Factors are discussed affecting the reliability of man with regard to his behaviour in a loss-of-coolant accident in the power plant. Different types of PWR containments and their functions are analyzed, mainly in case of accident. Views are discussed on the role of destructive accidents in the overall evaluation of fast reactor safety. Experiences are summed up gained with the operation of WWER reactors with respect to the environmental impact of the nuclear power plants. (Z.M.)

  8. Safety culture in nuclear power plants. Proceedings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-12-01

    As a consequence of the INSAG-4 report on 'safety culture', published by the IAEA in 1991, the Federal Commission for the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants (KSA) decided to hold a one-day seminar as a first step in this field. The KSA is an advisory body of the Federal Government and the Federal Department of Transport and Energy (EVED). It comments on applications for licenses, observes the operation of nuclear power plants, assists with the preparation of regulations, monitors the progress of research in the field of nuclear safety, and makes proposals for research tasks. The objective of this seminar was to familiarise the participants with the principles of 'safety culture', with the experiences made in Switzerland and abroad with existing concepts, as well as to eliminate existing prejudices. The main points dealt with at this seminar were: - safety culture from the point of view of operators, - safety culture from the point of view of the authorities, - safety culture: collaboration between power plants, the authorities and research organisations, - trends and developments in the field of safety culture. Invitations to attend this seminar were extended to the management boards of companies operating Swiss nuclear power plants, and to representatives of the Swiss authorities responsible for the safety of nuclear power plants. All these organisations were represented by a large number of executive and specialist staff. We would like to express our sincerest thanks to the Head of the Federal Department of Transport and Energy for his kind patronage of this seminar. (author) figs., tabs., refs

  9. Safety of uranium enrichment plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yonekawa, Shigeru; Morikami, Yoshio; Morita, Minoru; Takahashi, Tsukasa; Tokuyasu, Takashi.

    1991-01-01

    With respect to safety evaluation of the gas centrifuge enrichment facility, several characteristic problems are described as follows. Criticality safety in the cascade equipments can be obtained to maintain the enrichment of UF 6 below 5 %. External radiation dose equivalent rate of the 30B cylinder is low enough, the shield is not necessary. Penetration ratio of the two-stage HEPA filters for UF 6 aerosol is estimated at 10 -9 . From the experimental investigation, vacuum tightness is not damaged by destruction of gas centrifuge rotor. Carbon steel can be used for uranium enrichment equipments under the condition below 100degC. (author)

  10. Operational safety of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tanguy, P.

    1987-01-01

    The operational safety of nuclear power plants has become an important safety issue since the Chernobyl accident. A description is given of the various aspects of operational safety, including the importance of human factors, responsibility, the role and training of the operator, the operator-machine interface, commissioning and operating procedures, experience feedback, and maintenance. The lessons to be learnt from Chernobyl are considered with respect to operator errors and the management of severe accidents. Training of personnel, operating experience feedback, actions to be taken in case of severe accidents, and international cooperation in the field of operational safety, are also discussed. (U.K.)

  11. The critical safety functions and plant operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Corcoran, W.R.; Church, J.F.; Porter, N.J.; Cross, M.T.; Guinn, W.M.

    1981-01-01

    The paper outlines the operator's role in nuclear safety and introduces the concept of ''safety functions''. Safety functions are a group of actions that prevent core melt or minimize radiation releases to the general public. They can be used to provide a hierarchy of practical plant protection that an operator should use. ''An accident identical to that at Three Mile Island is not going to happen again'', said the Rogovin investigators. The concepts put forward in this paper are intended to help the operator avoid serious consequence from the next unexpected threat. On the basis of the safety evaluation, the operator has three roles in assuring that the consequences of an event will be no worse than the predicted acceptable results. These three operator roles are: first, maintain plant setup in readiness to properly respond; second, operate the plant in a manner such that fewer, milder events minimize the frequency and the severity of adverse events; third, the operator needs to monitor the plant to verify that the safety functions are accomplished. The operator needs a systematic approach to mitigating the consequences of an event. The concept of ''safety function'' introduces that systematic approach and prevents a hierarchy of protection. If the operator has difficulty in identifying an event for any reason, the systematic safety function approach allows ones to accomplish the overall path of mitigating consequences. There are ten identified functions designed to protect against core melt, preserve containment integrity, prevent indirect release of radioactivity, and maintain vital auxiliaries needed to support the other safety functions. The paper describes in detail the operator's role and the safety functions, and provides many examples of the use of alternative success paths to accomplish the safety function

  12. Definition and means of maintaining the emergency notification and evacuation system portion of the Plutonium Finishing Plant safety envelope

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    White, W.F.

    1997-01-01

    The Emergency Evacuation and Notification System provides information to the PFP Building Emergency Director to assist in determining appropriate emergency response, notifies personnel of the required response, and assists in their response. The report identifies the equipment in the Safety Envelope (SE) for this System and the Administrative, Maintenance, and Surveillance Procedures used to maintain the SE Equipment

  13. The role of probabilistic safety assessment and probabilistic safety criteria in nuclear power plant safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-01-01

    The purpose of this Safety Report is to provide guidelines on the role of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) and a range of associated reference points, collectively referred to as probabilistic safety criteria (PSC), in nuclear safety. The application of this Safety Report and the supporting Safety Practice publication should help to ensure that PSA methodology is used appropriately to assess and enhance the safety of nuclear power plants. The guidelines are intended for use by nuclear power plant designers, operators and regulators. While these guidelines have been prepared with nuclear power plants in mind, the principles involved have wide application to other nuclear and non-nuclear facilities. In Section 2 of this Safety Report guidelines are established on the role PSA can play as part of an overall safety assurance programme. Section 3 summarizes guidelines for the conduct of PSAs, and in Section 4 a PSC framework is recommended and guidance is provided for the establishment of PSC values

  14. Reviewing industrial safety in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-02-01

    This document contains guidance and reference materials for Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) experts, in addition to the OSART Guidelines (TECDOC-449), for use in the review of industrial safety activities at nuclear power plants. It sets out objectives for an excellent industrial safety programme, and suggests investigations which should be made in evaluating industrial safety programmes. The attributes of an excellent industrial safety programme are listed as examples for comparison. Practical hints for reviewing industrial safety are discussed, so that the necessary information can be obtained effectively through a review of documents and records, discussions with counterparts, and field observations. There are several annexes. These deal with major features of industrial safety programmes such as safety committees, reporting and investigation systems and first aid and medical facilities. They include some examples which are considered commendable. The document should be taken into account not only when reviewing management, organization and administration but also in the review of related areas, such as maintenance and operations, so that all aspects of industrial safety in an operating nuclear power plant are covered

  15. Safety goals for commercial nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Roe, J.W.

    1988-01-01

    In its official policy statement on safety goals for the operation of nuclear power plants, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) set two qualitative goals, supported by two quantitative objectives. These goals are that (1) individual members of the public should be provided a level of protection from the consequences of nuclear power plant operation such that individuals bear no significant additional risk to life and health; and (2) societal risks to life and health from nuclear power plant operation should be comparable to or less than the risks of generating electricity by viable competing technologies and should not be a significant addition to other societal risks. As an alternative, this study proposes four quantitative safety goals for nuclear power plants. It begins with an analysis of the NRC's safety-goal development process, a key portion of which was devoted to delineating criteria for evaluating goal-development methods. Based on this analysis, recommendations for revision of the NRC's basic benchmarks for goal development are proposed. Using the revised criteria, NRC safety goals are evaluated, and the alternative safety goals are proposed. To further support these recommendations, both the NRC's goals and the proposed goals are compared with the results of three major probabilistic risk assessment studies. Finally, the potential impact of these recommendations on nuclear safety is described

  16. Safety aspects of nuclear power plant ageing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-01-01

    The nuclear community is facing new challenges as commercial nuclear power plants (NPPs) of the first generation get older. At present, some of the plants are approaching or have even exceeded the end of their nominal design life. Experience with fossil fired power plants and in other industries shows that reliability of NPP components, and consequently general plant safety and reliability, may decline in the middle and later years of plant life. Thus, the task of maintaining operational safety and reliability during the entire plant life and especially, in its later years, is of growing importance. Recognizing the potential impact of ageing on plant safety, the IAEA convened a Working Group in 1985 to draft a report to stimulate relevant activities in the Member States. This report provided the basis for the preparation of the present document, which included a review in 1986 by a Technical Committee and the incorporation of relevant results presented at the 1987 IAEA Symposium on the Safety Aspects of the Ageing and Maintenance of NPPs and in available literature. The purpose of the present document is to increase awareness and understanding of the potential impact of ageing on plant safety; of ageing processes; and of the approach and actions needed to manage the ageing of NPP components effectively. Despite the continuing growth in knowledge on the subject during the preparation of this report it nevertheless contains much that will be of interest to a wide technical and managerial audience. Furthermore, more specific technical publications on the evaluation and management of NPP ageing and service life are being developed under the Agency's programme, which is based on the recommendations of its 1988 Advisory Group on NPP ageing. Refs, figs and tabs

  17. Safety upgrading at PAKS Nuclear Power Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bajsz, J.; Elter, J.

    2000-01-01

    The operation of Paks NPP has reached its half time. Until this time the plant fulfilled expectations raised before its construction: the four units have produced safely and reliably more than 200 TWh electricity. The production of the plant has been at the stable level since its construction and has provided 43-38 % of electricity consumed in Hungary. The annual production is around 14 TWh, which means a load factor higher than 85 %. Safety upgrading activities [1] at Paks had started in the late eighties, when the commissioning work of units 3 and 4 were carried out. That time the main emphases were put to lessons learned of the TMI and Chernobyl accidents. The international reviews hosted by our plant widened our review's scope. To systematize our approach a complete safety review, the AGNES (Advanced General Safety and New Evaluation of Safety) project was started in 1991. The goal of the project was to evaluate to what extent Paks NPP satisfied the current international safety expectations and to help in determining the priorities for safety enhancement and upgrading measures. The project completed in 1994 ranked our safety upgrading measures by safety significance, which became a basis for technical design work and financial scheduling. The other important outcome of the AGNES project was the introduction the Periodical Safety Review regime by our nuclear authority. These periodical reviews held after 10 years of operation offer the possibility - and obligation for the licensee - to perform a comprehensive assessment of the safety of the plant, to evaluate the integral effects of changes of circumstances happened during the review period. The goal of these reviews is to deal with cumulative effects of NPP ageing, modifications, operating experience and technical developments aimed at ensuring a high level of safety throughout plant service life. The execution of our safety-upgrading program is well advancing. For the whole program from 1996 to 2002 250

  18. Nuclear power plant safety in Brazil

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lederman, L.

    1980-01-01

    The Code of Practice for the Safe Operation of Nuclear Power Plants states that: 'In discharging its responsibility for public health and safety, the government should ensure that the operational safety of a nuclear reactor is subject to surveillance by a regulatory body independent of the operating organization'. In Brazil this task is being carried out by the Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear in accordance with the best international practice. (orig./RW)

  19. Safety prediction technique for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Henry, C.D. III; Anderson, R.T.

    1985-01-01

    This paper presents a safety prediction technique (SPT) developed by Reliability Technology Associates (RTA) for nuclear power plants. It is based on a technique applied by RTA to assess the flight safety of US Air Force aircraft. The purpose of SPT is to provide a computerized technique for objective measurement of the effect on nuclear plant safety of component failure or procedural, software, or human error. A quantification is determined, called criticality, which is proportional to the probability that a given component or procedural-human action will cause the plant to operate in a hazardous mode. A hazardous mode is characterized by the fact that there has been a failure/error and the plant, its operating crew, and the public are exposed to danger. Whether the event results in an accident, an incident, or merely the exposure to danger is dependent on the skill and reaction of the operating crew as well as external influences. There are three major uses of SPT: (a) to predict unsafe situations so that corrective action can be taken before accidents occur, (b) to quantify the impact of equipment malfunction or procedural, software, or human error on safety and thereby establish priorities for proposed modifications, and (c) to provide a means of evaluating proposed changes for their impact on safety prior to implementation and to provide a method of tracking implemented changes

  20. Nuclear power plant with a safety enclosure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keller, W.; Krueger, J.; Ropers, J.; Schabert, H.P.

    1976-01-01

    A nuclear power plant has a safety enclosure for a nuclear reactor. A fuel element storage basin is also located in this safety enclosure and a fuel element lock extends through the enclosure, with a cross-sectional size proportioned for the endwise passage of fuel elements, the lock including internal and external valves so that a fuel element may be locked endwise safely through the lock. The lock, including its valves, being of small size, does not materially affect the pressure resistance of the safety enclosure, and it is more easily operated than a lock large enough to pass people and fuel element transport vessels

  1. Safety related terms for advanced nuclear plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-12-01

    The terms considered in this document are in widespread current use without a universal consensus as to their meaning. Other safety related terms are already defined in national or international codes and standards as well as in IAEA's Nuclear Safety Standards Series. Most of the terms in those codes and standards have been defined and used for regulatory purposes, generally for application to present reactor designs. There is no intention to duplicate the description of such regulatory terms here, but only to clarify the terms used for advanced nuclear plants. The following terms are described in this paper: Inherent safety characteristics, passive component, active component, passive systems, active system, fail-safe, grace period, foolproof, fault-/error-tolerant, simplified safety system, transparent safety

  2. Safety related terms for advanced nuclear plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-09-01

    The terms considered in this document are in widespread current use without a universal consensus as to their meaning. Other safety related terms are already defined in national or international codes and standards as well as in IAEA's Nuclear Safety Standards Series. Most of the terms in those codes and standards have been defined and used for regulatory purposes, generally for application to present reactor designs. There is no intention to duplicate the description of such regulatory terms here, but only to clarify the terms used for advanced nuclear plants. The following terms are described in this paper: Inherent safety characteristics, passive component, active component, passive systems, active system, fail-safe, grace period, foolproof, fault-/error-tolerant, simplified safety system, transparent safety

  3. Westinghouse Advances in Passive Plant Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bruschi, H. J.; Manager, General; Gerstenhaber, E.

    1993-01-01

    On June 26, 1992, Westinghouse submitted the Ap600 Standard Safety Analysis Report and comprehensive PIRA results to the U. S. NRC for review as part of the Ap600 design certification program. This major milestone was met on time on a schedule set more than 3 years before submittal and is the result of the cooperative efforts of the U. S. Department of Energy (DOE), the Electric Power Requirements Program, and the Westinghouse Ap600 design team. These efforts were initiated in 1985 to develop a 600 MW advanced light water reactor plant design based on specific technical requirements established to provide the safety, simplicity, reliability, and economics necessary for the next generation of nuclear power plants. The Ap600 design achieves the ALRR safety requirements through ample design margins, simplified safety systems based on natural driving forces, and on a human-engineered man-machine interface system. Extensive Probabilistic Risk evolution, have recently shown that even if none of the active defense-in-depth safety systems are available, the passive systems alone meet safety goals. Furthermore, many tests in an extensive test program have begun or have been completed. Early tests show that passive safety perform well and meet design expectations

  4. Safety Assessment - Swedish Nuclear Power Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kjellstroem, B. [Luleaa Univ. of Technology (Sweden)

    1996-12-31

    After the reactor accident at Three Mile Island, the Swedish nuclear power plants were equipped with filtered venting of the containment. Several types of accidents can be identified where the filtered venting has no effect on the radioactive release. The probability for such accidents is hopefully very small. It is not possible however to estimate the probability accurately. Experiences gained in the last years, which have been documented in official reports from the Nuclear Power Inspectorate indicate that the probability for core melt accidents in Swedish reactors can be significantly larger than estimated earlier. A probability up to one in a thousand operating years can not be excluded. There are so far no indications that aging of the plants has contributed to an increased accident risk. Maintaining the safety level with aging nuclear power plants can however be expected to be increasingly difficult. It is concluded that the 12 Swedish plants remain a major threat for severe radioactive pollution of the Swedish environment despite measures taken since 1980 to improve their safety. Closing of the nuclear power plants is the only possibility to eliminate this threat. It is recommended that until this is done, quantitative safety goals, same for all Swedish plants, shall be defined and strictly enforced. It is also recommended that utilities distributing misleading information about nuclear power risks shall have their operating license withdrawn. 37 refs.

  5. Safety Assessment - Swedish Nuclear Power Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kjellstroem, B.

    1996-01-01

    After the reactor accident at Three Mile Island, the Swedish nuclear power plants were equipped with filtered venting of the containment. Several types of accidents can be identified where the filtered venting has no effect on the radioactive release. The probability for such accidents is hopefully very small. It is not possible however to estimate the probability accurately. Experiences gained in the last years, which have been documented in official reports from the Nuclear Power Inspectorate indicate that the probability for core melt accidents in Swedish reactors can be significantly larger than estimated earlier. A probability up to one in a thousand operating years can not be excluded. There are so far no indications that aging of the plants has contributed to an increased accident risk. Maintaining the safety level with aging nuclear power plants can however be expected to be increasingly difficult. It is concluded that the 12 Swedish plants remain a major threat for severe radioactive pollution of the Swedish environment despite measures taken since 1980 to improve their safety. Closing of the nuclear power plants is the only possibility to eliminate this threat. It is recommended that until this is done, quantitative safety goals, same for all Swedish plants, shall be defined and strictly enforced. It is also recommended that utilities distributing misleading information about nuclear power risks shall have their operating license withdrawn. 37 refs

  6. PFP Interface identification and management planning guide; TOPICAL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    SINCLAIR, J.C.

    1999-01-01

    The purpose of-this planning guide is to present the process used to identify, document, and control PFP Stabilization and Deactivation Project interfaces. Revisions to this document will include, as attachments, the most recent version of the Project Interface Management List. A preliminary Interface Management List is included in Appendix A. This document is intended be a Project owned management tool. As such, this document will periodically require revisions resulting from improvements of the information, processes, and techniques as now described. For most revisions that suggest improved processes, PFP management approval is all that will be required

  7. Safety assessment of plant food supplements (PFS)

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Berg, van den S.J.P.L.; Serra-Majem, L.; Coppens, P.; Rietjens, I.

    2011-01-01

    Botanicals and botanical preparations, including plant food supplements (PFS), are widely used in Western diets. The growing use of PFS is accompanied by an increasing concern because the safety of these PFS is not generally assessed before they enter the market. Regulatory bodies have become more

  8. Safety aspects of a fuel reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Donoghue, J.K.; Charlesworth, F.R.; Fairbairn, A.

    1977-01-01

    The establishment of the basic process must include the determination of the sensitivity of the process to operational errors or plant failures. The probability, and consequences of escapes of activity must be evaluated and emergency procedures set up to deal with accidents which might lead to such escapes. The administrative arrangements for safety should include a safety evaluation and advisory service independent of line management. A quality assurance strategy for the construction and commissioning stages is important. The design and construction of the plant must include: (i) Attention to plant reliability. Maintenance and inspection procedures to maintain reliability must be adopted and the design should include measures to facilitate in-service inspection of highly-active plant. (ii) Suitable and sufficient means of detection and prevention of malfunction, including criticality, bearing in mind both the timescale of development of the fault and its consequences. (iii) Measures for containment of activity. Penetrations from active into operating areas should be eliminated or minimised and maintenance should be separated from operational areas. Secondary containment beyond that provided for operations of a significant magnitude. A ventilation system with appropriate gas clean-up, monitoring and discharge facilities is required. (iv) Adequate shielding, with particular attention paid to multiple activities in a single operational area which might lead to an operator being exposed to radiation from operations which are beyond his control. (v) Means of accounting for active materials and for their recovery, transfer and disposal in the event of a forced shut down. (vi) Suitable methods for segregation and control of wastes within the plant and for their discharge. Solid or liquid wastes should be subject to delay and monitoring procedures before release. Facilities for storage of waste must be subject to the same safety principles as the plant itself. (vii) Final

  9. Safety strategy and safety analysis of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Franzen, L.F.

    1976-01-01

    The safety strategy for nuclear power plants is characterized by the fact that the high level of safety was attained not as a result of experience, but on the basis of preventive accident analyses and the finding derived from such analyses. Although, in these accident analyses, the deterministic approach is predominant, it is supplemented by reliability analyses. The accidents analyzed in nuclear licensing procedures cover a wide spectrum from minor incidents to the design basis accidents which determine the design of the safety devices. The initial and boundary conditions, which are essentail for accident analyses, and the determination of the loads occurring in various states during regular operation and in accidents flow into the design of the individual systems and components. The inevitable residual risk and its origins are discussed. (orig.) [de

  10. EDITORIAL: Safety aspects of fusion power plants

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kolbasov, B. N.

    2007-07-01

    This special issue of Nuclear Fusion contains 13 informative papers that were initially presented at the 8th IAEA Technical Meeting on Fusion Power Plant Safety held in Vienna, Austria, 10-13 July 2006. Following recommendation from the International Fusion Research Council, the IAEA organizes Technical Meetings on Fusion Safety with the aim to bring together experts to discuss the ongoing work, share new ideas and outline general guidance and recommendations on different issues related to safety and environmental (S&E) aspects of fusion research and power facilities. Previous meetings in this series were held in Vienna, Austria (1980), Ispra, Italy (1983), Culham, UK (1986), Jackson Hole, USA (1989), Toronto, Canada (1993), Naka, Japan (1996) and Cannes, France (2000). The recognized progress in fusion research and technology over the last quarter of a century has boosted the awareness of the potential of fusion to be a practically inexhaustible and clean source of energy. The decision to construct the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) represents a landmark in the path to fusion power engineering. Ongoing activities to license ITER in France look for an adequate balance between technological and scientific deliverables and complying with safety requirements. Actually, this is the first instance of licensing a representative fusion machine, and it will very likely shape the way in which a more common basis for establishing safety standards and policies for licensing future fusion power plants will be developed. Now that ITER licensing activities are underway, it is becoming clear that the international fusion community should strengthen its efforts in the area of designing the next generations of fusion power plants—demonstrational and commercial. Therefore, the 8th IAEA Technical Meeting on Fusion Safety focused on the safety aspects of power facilities. Some ITER-related safety issues were reported and discussed owing to their potential

  11. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Safety Analysis Report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-11-01

    The following provides a summary of the specific issues addressed in this FY-95 Annual Update as they relate to the CH TRU safety bases: Executive Summary; Site Characteristics; Principal Design and Safety Criteria; Facility Design and Operation; Hazards and Accident Analysis; Derivation of Technical Safety Requirements; Radiological and Hazardous Material Protection; Institutional Programs; Quality Assurance; and Decontamination and Decommissioning. The System Design Descriptions'' (SDDS) for the WIPP were reviewed and incorporated into Chapter 3, Principal Design and Safety Criteria and Chapter 4, Facility Design and Operation. This provides the most currently available final engineering design information on waste emplacement operations throughout the disposal phase up to the point of permanent closure. Also, the criteria which define the TRU waste to be accepted for disposal at the WIPP facility were summarized in Chapter 3 based on the WAC for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.'' This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) documents the safety analyses that develop and evaluate the adequacy of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Contact-Handled Transuranic Wastes (WIPP CH TRU) safety bases necessary to ensure the safety of workers, the public and the environment from the hazards posed by WIPP waste handling and emplacement operations during the disposal phase and hazards associated with the decommissioning and decontamination phase. The analyses of the hazards associated with the long-term (10,000 year) disposal of TRU and TRU mixed waste, and demonstration of compliance with the requirements of 40 CFR 191, Subpart B and 40 CFR 268.6 will be addressed in detail in the WIPP Final Certification Application scheduled for submittal in October 1996 (40 CFR 191) and the No-Migration Variance Petition (40 CFR 268.6) scheduled for submittal in June 1996. Section 5.4, Long-Term Waste Isolation Assessment summarizes the current status of the assessment

  12. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Safety Analysis Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-11-01

    The following provides a summary of the specific issues addressed in this FY-95 Annual Update as they relate to the CH TRU safety bases: Executive Summary; Site Characteristics; Principal Design and Safety Criteria; Facility Design and Operation; Hazards and Accident Analysis; Derivation of Technical Safety Requirements; Radiological and Hazardous Material Protection; Institutional Programs; Quality Assurance; and Decontamination and Decommissioning. The System Design Descriptions`` (SDDS) for the WIPP were reviewed and incorporated into Chapter 3, Principal Design and Safety Criteria and Chapter 4, Facility Design and Operation. This provides the most currently available final engineering design information on waste emplacement operations throughout the disposal phase up to the point of permanent closure. Also, the criteria which define the TRU waste to be accepted for disposal at the WIPP facility were summarized in Chapter 3 based on the WAC for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.`` This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) documents the safety analyses that develop and evaluate the adequacy of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Contact-Handled Transuranic Wastes (WIPP CH TRU) safety bases necessary to ensure the safety of workers, the public and the environment from the hazards posed by WIPP waste handling and emplacement operations during the disposal phase and hazards associated with the decommissioning and decontamination phase. The analyses of the hazards associated with the long-term (10,000 year) disposal of TRU and TRU mixed waste, and demonstration of compliance with the requirements of 40 CFR 191, Subpart B and 40 CFR 268.6 will be addressed in detail in the WIPP Final Certification Application scheduled for submittal in October 1996 (40 CFR 191) and the No-Migration Variance Petition (40 CFR 268.6) scheduled for submittal in June 1996. Section 5.4, Long-Term Waste Isolation Assessment summarizes the current status of the assessment.

  13. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Chinese Ed.)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  14. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (French Ed.)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  15. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Arabic Ed.)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  16. Basic safety principles for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-01-01

    Nuclear power plant safety requires a continuing quest for excellence. All individuals concerned should constantly be alert to opportunities to reduce risks to the lowest practicable level. The quest, however, is most likely to be fruitful if it is based on an understanding of the underlying objectives and principles of nuclear safety, and the way in which its aspects are interrelated. This report is an attempt to provide a logical framework for such an understanding. The proposed objectives and principles of nuclear safety are interconnected and must be taken as a whole; they do not constitute a menu from which selection can be made. The report takes account of current issues and developments. It includes the concept of safety objectives and the use of probabilistic safety assessment. Reliability targets for safety systems are discussed. The concept of a 'safety culture' is crucial. Attention has been paid to the need for planning for accident management. The report contains objectives and principles. The objectives state what is to be achieved; the principles state how to achieve it. In each case, the basic principle is stated as briefly as possible. The accompanying discussion comments on the reasons for the principle and its importance, as well as exceptions, the extent of coverage and any necessary clarification. The discussion is as important as the principle it augments. 4 figs

  17. Plant safety review from mass criticality accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Susanto, B.G.

    2000-01-01

    The review has been done to understand the resent status of the plant in facing postulated mass criticality accident. From the design concept of the plant all the components in the system including functional groups have been designed based on favorable mass/geometry safety principle. The criticality safety for each component is guaranteed because all the dimensions relevant to criticality of the components are smaller than dimensions of 'favorable mass/geometry'. The procedures covering all aspects affecting quality including the safety related are developed and adhered to at all times. Staff are indoctrinated periodically in short training session to warn the important of the safety in process of production. The plant is fully equipped with 6 (six) criticality detectors in strategic places to alert employees whenever the postulated mass criticality accident occur. In the event of Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, PT BATAN TEKNOLOGI has also proposed the organization structure how promptly to report the crisis to Nuclear Energy Control Board (BAPETEN) Indonesia. (author)

  18. Assessment of IAEA safety series no. 75-INSAG-3 - ''basic safety principles for nuclear power plants''

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency Safety Series No. 75-INSAG--3, 'Basic Safety Principles for Nuclear Power Plants' is reviewed in the light of the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety reports ACNS--2, 'Safety Objectives for Nuclear Activities in Canada', and ACNS--4, 'Recommended General Safety Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants'. The INSAG safety objectives are consistent with the safety objectives stated in ACNS--2 but are less general, applying only to nuclear power plants. The INSAG safety principles are, in general, consistent with the requirements stated in ACNS--4 but put more emphasis on 'safety culture'. They give little attention to reactor plant effluents, waste management, or decommissioning. (fig., 5 refs.)

  19. Bohunice Nuclear Power Plant Safety Upgrading Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Toth, A.; Fagula, L.

    1996-01-01

    Bohunice nuclear Power Plant generation represents almost 50% of the Slovak republic electric power production. Due to such high level of commitment to nuclear power in the power generation system, a special attention is given to safe and reliable operation of NPPs. Safety upgrading and operational reliability improvement of Bohunice V-1 NPP was carried out by the Bohunice staff continuously since the plant commissioning. In the 1990 - 1993 period extensive projects were realised. As a result of 'Small Reconstruction of the Bohunice V-1 NPP', the standards of both the nuclear safety and operational reliability have been significantly improved. The implementation of another modifications that will take place gradually during extended refuelling outages and overhauls in the course of 1996 through 1999, is referred to as the Gradual Reconstruction of the Bohunice V-1 Plant. The general goal of the V-1 NPP safety upgrading is the achievement of internationally acceptable level of nuclear safety. Extensive and financially demanding modification process of Bohunice V-2 NPP is likely to be implemented after a completion of the Gradual Reconstruction of the Bohunice V-1 NPP, since the year 1999. With this in mind, a first draft of the strategy of the Bohunice V-2 NPP upgrading program based on Probabilistic Safety assessment consideration was developed. A number of actions with a general effect on Bohunice site safety is evident. All these activities are aimed at reaching the essential objective of Bohunice NPP Management - to ensure a safe, reliable and effective electric energy and heat generation at the Bohunice site. (author)

  20. Organizational processes and nuclear power plant safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Landy, F.J.; Jacobs, R.R.; Mathieu, J.

    1991-01-01

    The paper describes the effects organizational factors have on the risk associated with the operation of nuclear power plants. The described research project addresses three methods for identifying the organizational factors that impact safety. The first method consists of an elaborate theory-based protocol dealing with decision making procedures, interdepartmental coordination of activities, and communications. The second, known as goals/means/measures protocol, deals with identifying safey related goals. The third method is known as behaviorally anchored rating scale development. The paper discusses the importance of the convergence of these three methods to identify organizational factors essential to reactor safety

  1. Special safety requirements applied to Brazilian nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lepecki, W.P.S.; Hamel, H.J.E.; Koenig, N.; Vieira, P.C.R.; Fritzsche, J.C.

    1981-01-01

    Some safety aspects of the Angra 2 and 3 nuclear power plants are presented. An analysis of the civil and mechanical project of these nuclear power plant having in view a safety analysis is done. (E.G.) [pt

  2. Code on the safety of nuclear power plants: Siting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-01-01

    This Code provides criteria and procedures that are recommended for safety in nuclear power plant siting. It forms part of the Agency's programme for establishing Codes and Safety Guides relating to land based stationary thermal neutron power plants

  3. A PIP chart for nuclear plant safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suzuki, Tatsujiro; Yamaoka, Taiji

    1992-01-01

    While it is known that social and political aspects of nuclear safety issues are important, little study has been done on identifying the breadth of stakeholders whose policies have important influences over nuclear plant safety in a comprehensive way. The objectives of this study are to develop a chart that visually identifies important stakeholders and their policies and illustrates these influences in a hierarchical representation so that the relationship between stakeholders and nuclear safety will be better understood. This study is based on a series of extensive interviews with major stakeholders, such as nuclear plant managers, corporate planning vice presidents, state regulators, news media, and public interest groups, and focuses on one US nuclear power plant. Based on the interview results, the authors developed a conceptual policy influence paths (PIP) chart. The PIP chart illustrates the hierarchy of influence among stakeholders. The PIP chart is also useful in identifying possible stakeholders who can be easily overlooked without the PIP chart. In addition, it shows that influence flow is circular rather than linear in one direction

  4. The German nuclear power plant safety study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    With this study a new approach has been chosen, taking nuclear power plants as an example to assess and to describe the risks arising from the use of modern technology, including those hazards emanating from the rather hypothetical possibility of occurrence of very serious accidents. Following the definition of basic concepts and methods to be applied in risk assessment studied, as well as a brief account of the design and operating mode of nuclear power plants with PWRs', accidents and failures to be considered in a safety study are described. Using the course-of-event and fault tree analysis, the probability of fission product release as a consequence of failures in safety systems or of core meltdown is evaluated. Subsequently, the theoretical model for assessment of reactor accident consequences is presented, discussing such aspects as the dispersion of radioactivity in the atmosphere, the radiation dose model, safety and countermeasures, the model for the evaluation of health hazards as well as methods and calculations for estimating the reliability of risk assessments together with the remaining uncertainties. In an appendix to this study, the analyses presented in the study are discussed in the light of the TMI-2 event. This safety study showing the possibilities of detecting, keeping in check and minimizing harmful effects, can be regarded as a contribution to a better understanding of our modern, highly industrialised society, and eventually to an improvement of the quality of life. (GL) 891 GL/GL 892 MB [de

  5. Safety and licensing of nuclear heating plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Snell, V.G.; Hilborn, J.W.; Lynch, G.F.; McAuley, S.J.

    1989-09-01

    World attention continues to focus on nuclear district heating, a low-cost energy from a non-polluting fuel. It offers long-term security for countries currently dependent on fossil fuels, and can reduce the burden of fossil fuel transportation on railways and roads. Current initiatives encompass large, centralized heating plants and small plants supplying individual institutions. The former are variants of their power reactor cousins but with enhanced safety features. The latter face the safety and licensing challenges of urban siting and remotely monitored operation, through use of intrinsic safety features such as passive decay heat removal, low stored energy and limited reactivity speed and depth in the control systems. Small heating reactor designs are compared, and the features of the SLOWPOKE Energy System, in the forefront of these designs, are summarized. The challenge of public perception must be met by clearly presenting the characteristics of small heating reactors in terms of scale and transparent safety in design and operation, and by explaining the local benefits

  6. 46. The goals of safety engineering department of the plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ivanov, A.V.

    1993-01-01

    The goals of safety engineering department of the plant, including elaboration of instructions on safety engineering on all specialities, safety engineering training of all labours working on the plant and control for abidance by the instructions on safety engineering were discussed.

  7. Safety criteria for nuclear chemical plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ball, P.W.; Curtis, L.M.

    1983-01-01

    Safety measures have always been required to limit the hazards due to accidental release of radioactive substances from nuclear power plants and chemical plants. The risk associated with the discharge of radioactive substances during normal operation has also to be kept acceptably low. BNFL (British Nuclear Fuels Ltd.) are developing risk criteria as targets for safe plant design and operation. The numerical values derived are compared with these criteria to see if plants are 'acceptably safe'. However, the criteria are not mandatory and may be exceeded if this can be justified. The risk assessments are subject to independent review and audit. The Nuclear Installations Inspectorate also has to pass the plants as safe. The assessment principles it uses are stated. The development of risk criteria for a multiplant site (nuclear chemical plants tend to be sited with many others which are related functionally) is discussed. This covers individual members of the general public, societal risks, risks to the workforce and external hazards. (U.K.)

  8. Organization and safety in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marcus, A.A.; Nichols, M.L.; Bromiley, P.; Olson, J.; Osborn, R.N.; Scott, W.; Pelto, P.; Thurber, J.

    1990-05-01

    Perspectives from industry, academe, and the NRC are brought together in this report and used to develop a logical framework that links management and organization factors and safety in nuclear power plant performance. The framework focuses on intermediate outcomes which can be predicted by organizational and management factors, and which are subsequently linked to safety. The intermediate outcomes are efficiency, compliance, quality, and innovation. The organization and management factors can be classified in terms of environment, context, organizational governance, organizational design, and emergent processes. Initial empirical analyses were conducted on a limited set of hypotheses derived from the framework. One set of hypotheses concerned the relationships between one of the intermediate outcome variables, efficiency, as measured by critical hours and outage rate, and safety, as measured by 5 NRC indicators. Results of the analysis suggest that critical hours and outage rates and safety, as measured in this study, are not related to each other. Hypotheses were tested concerning the effects on safety and efficiency of utility financial resources and the lagged recognition and correction of problems that accompanies the reporting of major violations and licensee event reports. The analytical technique employed was regression using polynomial distributed lags. Results suggest that both financial resources and organizational problem solving/learning have significant effects on the outcome variables when time is properly taken into account. Conclusions are drawn which point to this being a promising direction to proceed, though with some care, due to the current limitations of the study. 138 refs., 36 figs., 9 tabs

  9. Organizational factors and nuclear power plant safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haber, S.B.

    1995-01-01

    There are many organizations in our society that depend on human performance to avoid incidents involving significant adverse consequences. As our culture and technology have become more sophisticated, the management of risk on a broad basis has become more and more critical. The safe operation of military facilities, chemical plants, airlines, and mass transit, to name a few, are substantially dependent on the performance of the organizations that operate those facilities. The nuclear power industry has, within the past 15 years, increased the attention given to the influence of human performance in the safe operation of nuclear power plants (NPP). While NPPs have been designed through engineering disciplines to intercept and mitigate events that could cause adverse consequences, it has been clear from various safety-related incidents that human performance also plays a dominant role in preventing accidents. Initial efforts following the 1979 Three Mile Island incident focused primarily on ergonomic factors (e.g., the best design of control rooms for maximum performance). Greater attention was subsequently directed towards cognitive processes involved in the use of NPP decision support systems and decision making in general, personnel functions such as selection systems, and the influence of work scheduling and planning on employees' performance. Although each of these approaches has contributed to increasing the safety of NPPS, during the last few years, there has been a growing awareness that particular attention must be paid to how organizational processes affect NPP personnel performance, and thus, plant safety. The direct importance of organizational factors on safety performance in the NPP has been well-documented in the reports on the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents as well as numerous other events, especially as evaluated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

  10. Safety classification of items in Tianwan Nuclear Power Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sun Yongbin

    2005-01-01

    The principle of integrality, moderation and equilibrium should be considered in the safety classification of items in nuclear power plant. The basic ways for safety classification of items is to classify the safety function based on the effect of the outside enclosure damage of the items (parts) on the safety. Tianwan Nuclear Power Plant adopts Russian VVER-1000/428 type reactor, it safety classification mainly refers to Russian Guidelines and standards. The safety classification of the electric equipment refers to IEEE-308(80) standard, including 1E and Non 1E classification. The safety classification of the instrumentation and control equipment refers to GB/T 15474-1995 standard, including safety 1E, safety-related SR and NC non-safety classification. The safety classification of Tianwan Nuclear Power Plant has to be approved by NNSA and satisfy Chinese Nuclear Safety Guidelines. (authors)

  11. Safety goals for nuclear power plant operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-05-01

    This report presents and discusses the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's, Policy Statement on Safety Goals for the Operation of Nuclear Power Plants. The safety goals have been formulated in terms of qualitative goals and quantitative design objectives. The qualitative goals state that the risk to any individual member of the public from nuclear power plant operation should not be a significant contributor to that individual's risk of accidental death or injury and that the societal risks should be comparable to or less than those of viable competing technologies. The quantitative design objectives state that the average risks to individual and the societal risks of nuclear power plant operation should not exceed 0.1% of certain other risks to which members of the US population are exposed. A subsidiary quantitative design objective is established for the frequency of large-scale core melt. The significance of the goals and objectives, their bases and rationale, and the plan to evaluate the goals are provided. In addition, public comments on the 1982 proposed policy statement and responses to a series of questions that accompanied the 1982 statement are summarized

  12. Interface Control Document Between the Double Shell Tanks (DST) System and the Plutonium Finishing Plan (PFP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    MAY, T.H.

    1999-01-01

    This document identifies the requirements and responsibilities for all parties to support waste transfer from the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) facility to the Double-Shell Tank (DST) System of the River Protection Project (RPP). This Interface Control Document (ICD) will not attempt to control the physical portion of this interface because the physical equipment making up this interface, and any associated interface requirements, are already in place, operational and governed by existing operating specifications and other documentation. The PFP and DST Systems have a direct physical interface (the waste transfer pipeline) that travels between the 241-2 Building (TK-D5) and DST SY-102 via 244-TX double-contained receiver tank (DCRT). The purpose of the ICD process is to formalize working agreements between the RPP DST System and organization/companies internal and external to RPP. This ICD has been developed as part of the requirements basis for design of the DST System to support the Phase I Privatization effort

  13. Safety culture in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tanguy, P.Y.

    1996-01-01

    The development of a good safety culture within the organisation and for the individual poses a sine qua non condition for the operator in the cause of the functioning of his plant. This task must be understood as a linking of the human into a daily management of the safety and quality. Everyone has his role to play at the level of his accountability and his field of responsibility in routine operations and in crisis situations. However, success depends on how management has understood, on the one hand, to convince the staff of the importance of the efforts and the usefulness of the measures taken within the organisation and, on the other hand, to keep this same staff applied to the carrying out of these measures and thus to take account of the anxieties and proposals in the spirit of responsibility and transparency. (author)

  14. Selecting safety standards for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1981-01-01

    Today, many thousands of documents are available describing the requirements, guidelines, and industrial standards which can be used as bases for a nuclear power plant programme. Many of these documents relate to nuclear safety which is currently the focus of world-wide attention. The multitude of documents available on the subject, and their varying status and emphasis, make the processes of selection and implementation very important. Because nuclear power plants are technically intricate and advanced, particularly in relation to the technological status of many developing countries, these processes are also complicated. These matters were the subject of a seminar held at the Agency's headquarters in Vienna last December. The IAEA Nuclear Safety Standards (NUSS) programme was outlined and explained at the Seminar. The five areas of the NUSS programme for nuclear power plants cover, governmental organization, siting, design; operation; quality assurance. In each area the Agency has issued Codes of Practice and is developing Safety Guides. These provide regulatory agencies with a framework for safety. The Seminar recognized that the NUSS programme should enable developing countries to identify priorities in their work, particularly the implementation of safety standards. The ISO activities in the nuclear field are carried out in the framework of its Technical Committee 85 (ISO/TC85). The work is distributed in sub-committees. Seminar on selection and implementation of safety standards for nuclear power plants, jointly organized by the IAEA and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), and held in Vienna from 15 to 18 December 1980 concerned with: terminology, definitions, units and symbols (SC-1), radiation protection (SC-2), power reactor technology (SC-3), nuclear fuel technology (SC-5). There was general agreement that the ISO standards are complementary to the NUSS codes and guides. ISO has had close relations with the IAEA for several years

  15. Safety and security aspects in design of digital safety I and C in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ding, Yongjian; Waedt, Karl

    2016-01-01

    The paper describes a safety objective oriented systematic design approach of digital (computerized) safety I and C in modern nuclear power plants which considers the plant safety requirements as well as cybersecurity needs. The defence in depth philosophy is applied by using different defence lines in the I and C architecture and protection zones in the plant IT environment.

  16. Safety and security aspects in design of digital safety I and C in nuclear power plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ding, Yongjian [University of Applied Sciences Magdeburg-Stendal, Magdeburg (Germany). Inst. of Electrical Engineering; Waedt, Karl [Areva GmbH, Erlangen (Germany). PEAS-G

    2016-05-15

    The paper describes a safety objective oriented systematic design approach of digital (computerized) safety I and C in modern nuclear power plants which considers the plant safety requirements as well as cybersecurity needs. The defence in depth philosophy is applied by using different defence lines in the I and C architecture and protection zones in the plant IT environment.

  17. CSER 94-014: Storage of metal-fuel loaded EBR-II casks in concrete vault on PFP grounds

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hess, A.L.

    1994-01-01

    A criticality safety evaluation is presented to permit EBR-2 spent fuel casks loaded with metallic fuel rods to be stored in an 8-ft diameter, cylindrical concrete vault inside the PFP security perimeter. The specific transfer of three casks with Pu alloy fuel from the Los Alamos Molten Plutonium Reactor Experiment from the burial grounds to the vault is thus covered. Up to seven casks may be emplaced in the casing with 30 inches center to center spacing. Criticality safety is assured by definitive packaging rules which keep the fissile medium dry and at a low effective volumetric density

  18. THE DEACTIVATION, DECONTAMINATION AND DECOMMISSIONING OF THE PLUTONIUM FINISHING PLANT, A FORMER PLUTONIUM PROCESSING FACILITY AT DOE'S HANFORD SITE

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    CHARBONEAU, S.L.

    2006-01-01

    The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) was constructed as part of the Manhattan Project during World War II. The Manhattan Project was developed to usher in the use of nuclear weapons to end the war. The primary mission of the PFP was to provide plutonium used as special nuclear material (SNM) for fabrication of nuclear devices for the war effort. Subsequent to the end of World War II, the PFP's mission expanded to support the Cold War effort through plutonium production during the nuclear arms race and later the processing of fuel grade mixed plutonium-uranium oxide to support DOE's breeder reactor program. In October 1990, at the close of the production mission for PFP, a shutdown order was prepared by the Department of Energy (DOE) in Washington,; DC--and issued to the Richland DOE field office. Subsequent to the shutdown order, a team from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) analyzed the hazards at PFP associated with the continued storage of certain forms of plutonium solutions and solids. The assessment identified many discrete actions that were required to stabilize the different plutonium forms into stable form and repackage the material in high integrity containers. These actions were technically complicated and completed as part of the PFP nuclear material stabilization project between 1995 and early 2005. The completion of the stabilization project was a necessary first step in deactivating PFP. During stabilization, DOE entered into negotiations with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the State of Washington and established milestones for the Deactivation and Decommissioning (DandD) of the PFP. The DOE and its contractor, Fluor Hanford (Fluor), have made great progress in deactivating, decontaminating and decommissioning the PFP at the Hanford Site as detailed in this paper. Background information covering the PFP DandD effort includes descriptions of negotiations with the State of Washington concerning consent

  19. Safety in Swiss nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cederqvist, H.

    1992-01-01

    Safety-related facilities and equipment are continuously backfitted in Swiss nuclear power plants. In the Beznau-1 and -2 nuclear generating units, the measures taken under the heading of 'Backfitting of Emergency Systems' included provisions to enhance the protection against earthquakes, airplane crash, and fire; in addition, the emergency power system was upgraded. In Muehleberg, the stack exhaust air monitoring system was optimized. The containment pressure suppression system of the plant has been designed to withstand a hypothetical accident exceeding the design basis. The BKM-Crud computer simulation model simulates steps taken to reduce radiation exposure. The power of Swiss nuclear power stations will be raised by 4% to 15% within the 'Energy 2000' action program. (orig.) [de

  20. Nuclear power plant safety under military threats

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stritar, A.; Mavko, B.

    1993-01-01

    The Krsko nuclear power plant in Slovenia was probably the first in the world that found itself in the middle of a war region. A number of preventive measures performed during and immediately after the war in summer 1991 by the plant personnel as well as some of related activities of the Reactor Engineering Division of the 'Jozef Stefan' Institute are described. All efforts were aimed at the minimization of the possible public radiological consequences during a military attack. The critical safety functions in such conditions were checked. Concern was further devoted to maintenance of the core cooling in the core and to integrity of the spent fuel pit. The cold shutdown mode was found to be the most appropriate option. After selecting the cold shutdown mode as a most suitable operational state of the plant, further studies of the vulnerability were done. In addition to possible direct damage to structures, that would cause release of radioactivity, two important subjects were considered: AC and DC power supply and the ultimate heat sink. A quick analysis during the crisis has shown that the consequences of a military attack against the plant by jet fighters could be serious, but with the proper preventive measures and preparedness the environmental consequences could be minimized. (Z.S.) 1 fig., 1 ref

  1. Plant control impact on IFR power plant passive safety response

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vilim, R.B.

    1993-01-01

    A method is described for optimizing the closed-loop plant control strategy with respect to safety margins sustained in the unprotected upset response of a liquid metal reactor. The optimization is performed subject to the normal requirements for reactor startup, load change and compensation for reactivity changes over the cycle. The method provides a formal approach to the process of exploiting the innate self-regulating property of a metal fueled reactor to make it less dependent on operator action and less vulnerable to automatic control system fault and/or operator error

  2. Plutonium finishing plant safety systems and equipment list

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bergquist, G.G.

    1995-01-01

    The Safety Equipment List (SEL) supports Analysis Report (FSAR), WHC-SD-CP-SAR-021 and the Plutonium Finishing Plant Operational Safety Requirements (OSRs), WHC-SD-CP-OSR-010. The SEL is a breakdown and classification of all Safety Class 1, 2, and 3 equipment, components, or system at the Plutonium Finishing Plant complex

  3. PFP MICON DCS computer software documentation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Silvan, G.R.

    1996-03-26

    This document contains the complete printout of the MICON A/S system configuration used in the Plutonium Finishing Plant. The document is divided into several volumes. Volume 1 covers the workstation display and configuration. All other volumes contain the controller configurations, or programs.

  4. PFP MICON DCS computer software documentation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silvan, G.R.

    1996-01-01

    This document contains the complete printout of the MICON A/S system configuration used in the Plutonium Finishing Plant. The document is divided into several volumes. Volume 1 covers the workstation display and configuration. All other volumes contain the controller configurations, or programs

  5. Technical Safety Appraisal of the Pinellas Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-01-01

    This report presents the Technical Safety Appraisal (TSA) of the Pinellas Plant in Pinellas County, Florida. The plant is owned and controlled by the US Department of Energy and operated by General Electric Neutron Devices (GEND). The TSA was performed during the period January 15--31, 1989, in support of a Tiger Team Assessment which occurred during the period January 15 to February 2, 1989. The TSA provided the Safety and Health Subteam input to the Tiger Team Assessment. The completion of the assessment process includes: (1) submission of the Team's preliminary findings and concerns, in a Draft Report, to the Manager, Albuquerque Operations Office and to the site contractors at the conclusion of the onsite assessment; (2) review of the Draft Report for technical and factual accuracy; incorporation of the appropriate review comments, suggested changes, and modifications, as well as input from all interested Program Secretarial Offices; preparation of a draft Action Plan by the Albuquerque Operations Office to address the Concerns, and submittal of that Action Plan through the Program Office to ES ampersand H for their review and comment. The Secretary approved the final Action Plan on December 16, 1990, and directed its implementation. The comments and suggestions of the Program Secretarial Offices, the Operations Office, and the site contractor have been incorporated, as appropriate, in this report prior to its publication

  6. Selection and verification of safety parameters in safety parameter display system for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zhang Yuangfang

    1992-02-01

    The method and results for safety parameter selection and its verification in safety parameter display system of nuclear power plants are introduced. According to safety analysis, the overall safety is divided into six critical safety functions, and a certain amount of safety parameters which can represent the integrity degree of each function and the causes of change are strictly selected. The verification of safety parameter selection is carried out from the view of applying the plant emergency procedures and in the accident man oeuvres on a full scale nuclear power plant simulator

  7. PFP MICON maintenance manual. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silvan, G.R.

    1995-01-01

    This manual covers the use of maintenance displays, maintenance procedures, system alarms and common system failures. This manual is intended to supplement the MICON maintenance training not replace it. It also assumes that the user is familiar with the normal operation of the MICON A/S system. The MICON system is a distributed control computer and, among other things, controls the HVAC system for the Plutonium Finishing Plant

  8. Safety principles and design management of Chashma Nuclear Power Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Geng Qirui; Cheng Pingdong

    1997-01-01

    The basic safety consideration and detailed design principles in the design of Chashma Nuclear Power Plant is elaborated. The management within the frame setting up by 'safety culture' and 'quality culture'

  9. The safety of future nuclear power plants in France

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Queniart, D.

    1988-10-01

    The present paper concerns certain personal thoughts on the safety of future French power plants, which will come into operation at the beginning of the next century. These reflections, which are made on the author's own behalf and, under no circumstances, implicate at this stage the official views of the French safety authorities, are aimed at defining some directions for the improvement of safety in these future plants as compared with that of plants presently in operation or under construction

  10. The safety of the new reprocessing plants of La Hague

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Devillers, C.; Dubois, G.

    1987-09-01

    In this document the authors show the main guiding lines on which is based the safety of the new reprocessing plant of La Hague. They are: - the objectives: to limit the impacts on workers and environment - the methods: safety analysis based on the checking and evaluation of significant risks. - the means: to make a safety plant by the use of quality assurance in the conception and in the plant construction [fr

  11. Systematic safety evaluation of old nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dredemis, G.; Fourest, B.

    1984-01-01

    The French safety authorities have undertaken a systematic evaluation of the safety of old nuclear power plants. Apart from a complete revision of safety documents (safety analysis report, general operating rules, incident and accident procedures, internal emergency plan, quality organisation manual), this examination consisted of analysing the operating experience of systems frequently challenged and a systematic examination of the safety-related systems. This paper is based on an exercise at the Ardennes Nuclear Power Plant which has been in operation for 15 years. This paper also summarizes the main surveys and modifications relating to this power plant. (orig.)

  12. Code on the safety of nuclear power plants: Design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-01-01

    This Code is a compilation of nuclear safety principles aimed at defining the essential requirements necessary to ensure nuclear safety. These requirements are applicable to structures, systems and components, and procedures important to safety in nuclear power plants embodying thermal neutron reactors, with emphasis on what safety requirements shall be met rather than on specifying how these requirements can be met. It forms part of the Agency's programme for establishing Codes and Safety Guides relating to land based stationary thermal neutron power plants. The document should be used by organizations designing, manufacturing, constructing and operating nuclear power plants as well as by regulatory bodies

  13. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-1, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. It establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in the design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  14. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Russian Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-1, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. It establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in the design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  15. Nuclear safety at the Paks Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bajsz, Jozsef; Vamos, Gabor

    1991-01-01

    The Paks Nuclear Power Plant is located on the Danube river 114 km south of Budapest. It consists of four PWR units of the Soviet VVER-440 design. These are of the second generation design VVER 440 (model 213) with safety features as of 1975. It should be emphasized that these are two different generations of VVER 440 units. This is not always clear, not only to the general public, but sometimes even to people working in the nuclear industry. The widespread criticism of the first generation type 230 reactors is often extended to model 213 reactors, as the differences between the two models are often not sufficiently emphasized. In this situation it is very important to provide balanced information about the advantages and disadvantages of this reactor type. This paper attempts to do that. (author)

  16. Safety of WWER type nuclear power plants - viewing from Hungary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Voeroess, L.

    1991-01-01

    An evaluation of WWER type nuclear power plants operating in Hungary is given, relative to the safety requirements accepted internationally; how safe can they be regarded and what can be done to assure a high level of safety in all case. After an overview of general safety criteria, an overall description of WWER-440 type nuclear reactors is presented. Design safety, operational safety issues are treated in detail. Safety inspection and safety-related research and development is discussed. Regarding the future, five different issues associated with nuclear reactor safety should be considered. (R.P.) 20 refs.; 12 figs.; 3 tabs

  17. Plant designer's view of the operator's role in nuclear plant safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Corcoran, W.R.; Church, J.F.; Cross, M.T.; Porter, N.J.

    1981-01-01

    The nuclear plant operator's role supports the design assumptions and equipment with four functional tasks. He must set up th plant for predictable response to disturbances, operate the plant so as to minimize the likelihood and severity of event initiators, assist in accomplishing the safety functions, and feed back operating experiences to reinforce or redefine the safety analyses' assumptions. The latter role enhances the operator effectiveness in the former three roles. The Safety Level Concept offers a different perspective that enables the operator to view his roles in nuclear plant safety. This paper outlines the operator's role in nuclear safety and classifies his tasks using the Safety Level Concept

  18. Safety guide on fire protection in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1976-01-01

    The purpose of the Safety Guide is to give specific design and operational guidance for protection from fire and explosion in nuclear power plants, based on the general guidance given in the relevant sections of the 'Safety Code of Practice - Design' and the 'Safety Code of Practice - Operation' of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The guide will confine itself to fire protection of safety systems and items important to safety, leaving the non-safety matters of fire protection in nuclear power plants to be decided upon the basis of the various available national and international practices and regulations. (HP) [de

  19. Evaluation of the Magnesium Hydroxide Treatment Process for Stabilizing PFP Plutonium/Nitric Acid Solutions

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gerber, Mark A.; Schmidt, Andrew J.; Delegard, Calvin H.; Silvers, Kurt L.; Baker, Aaron B.; Gano, Susan R.; Thornton, Brenda M.

    2000-09-28

    This document summarizes an evaluation of the magnesium hydroxide [Mg(OH)2] process to be used at the Hanford Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) for stabilizing plutonium/nitric acid solutions to meet the goal of stabilizing the plutonium in an oxide form suitable for storage under DOE-STD-3013-99. During the treatment process, nitric acid solutions bearing plutonium nitrate are neutralized with Mg(OH)2 in an air sparge reactor. The resulting slurry, containing plutonium hydroxide, is filtered and calcined. The process evaluation included a literature review and extensive laboratory- and bench-scale testing. The testing was conducted using cerium as a surrogate for plutonium to identify and quantify the effects of key processing variables on processing time (primarily neutralization and filtration time) and calcined product properties.

  20. Plan for the Initiation of HA-211 Furnace Operations at the Plutonium Finishing Plan (PFP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    WILLIS, H.T.

    2000-01-01

    This plan provides a phased approach authorizing the use of three additional muffle furnaces for thermal stabilization. Achievement of Thermal Stabilization mission elements require the installation and startup of three additional muffle furnaces for the thermal stabilization of plutonium and plutonium bearing materials at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). The release to operate these additional furnaces will require an Activity Based Startup Review. The conduct of the Activity Based Startup Review (ABSR) was approved by Fluor Daniel Hanford on October 15, 1999. This plan has been developed with the objective of identifying those activities needed to guide the controlled startup of five furnaces from authorization to unrestricted operations by adding the HA-211 furnaces in an orderly and safe manner after the approval to Startup has been given

  1. Safety assessment, safety performance indicators at the Paks Nuclear Power Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baji, C.; Vamos, G.; Toth, J.

    2001-01-01

    The Paks Nuclear Power Plant has been using different methods of safety assessment (event analysis, self-assessment, probabilistic safety analysis), including performance indicators characterizing both operational and safety performance since the early years of operation of the plant. Regarding the safety performance, the indicators include safety system performance, number of scrams, release of radioactive materials, number of safety significant events, industrial safety indicator, etc. The Paks NPP also reports a set of ten indicators to WANO Performance Indicator Programme which, among others, include safety related indicators as well. However, a more systematic approach to structuring and trending safety indicators is needed so that they can contribute to the enhancement of the operational safety. A more comprehensive set of indicators and a systematic evaluation process was introduced in 1996. The performance indicators framework proposed by the IAEA was adapted to Paks in this year to further improve the process. Safety culture assessment and characterizing safety culture is part of the assessment process. (author)

  2. Improving plant state information for better operational safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Girard, C.; Olivier, E.; Grimaldi, X.

    1994-01-01

    Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) safety is strongly dependent on components' reliability and particularly on plant state information reliability. This information, used by the plant operators in order to produce appropriate actions, have to be of a high degree of confidence, especially in accidental conditions where safety is threatened. In this perspective, FRAMATOME, EDF and CEA have started a joint research program to prospect different solutions aiming at a better reliability for critical information needed to safety operate the plant. This paper gives the main results of this program and describes the developments that have been made in order to assess reliability of different information systems used in a Nuclear Power Plant. (Author)

  3. Nuclear power plants: a unique challenge to fire safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nowlen, S.P.

    1992-01-01

    The evaluation of fire safety in a nuclear power plant must include the consideration of the impact of a fire on the operability of plant safety equipment and systems. This issue is not typical of the life safety and property protection issues which dominate traditional fire safety concerns. This paper provides a general discussion of the issue of nuclear power plant fire safety as it currently exists in the USA. Included is a discussion of the past history of nuclear power plant fire events, the development of nuclear industry specific fire safety guidelines, the adverse experience associated with the inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems, and the anticipated direction of fire safety requirements for future reactor designs in the USA. (Author)

  4. Safety problems in decommissioning nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Auler, I.; Bardtenschlager, R.; Gasch, A.; Majohr, N.

    1975-12-01

    The safety problems at decommissioning are illustrated by the example of a LWR with 1300 MW electric power after 40 years of specified normal operation. For such a facility the radioactivity in the form of activation and contamination one year after being finally taken out of service is in the order of magnitude of 10 7 Ci, not counting the fuel assemblies. The dose rates occurring during work on the reactor vessel at nozzle level may amount to some 10 4 rem/h. After a rough estimation the accumulated dose for the decommissioning personnel during total dismantling will be about 1200 rem. During performance of the decommissioning activities the problems are mainly caused by direct radiation of the active components and systems and by the release of radioactive particles, aerosols and liquids if these components are crushed. The extent of later dismantling problems may be reduced by selecting appropriate materials as well as considering the requirements for dismantling in design and arrangement of the components already in the design stage of new facilities. Apart from plant design also the concept for the disposal of the radioactive waste from decommissioning will provide important boundary conditions. E.g. the maximum size of the pieces to be stored in the ultimate storage place will very much influence the dose expenditure for handling these parts. For complete dismantling of nuclear power plants an ultimate store must be available where large amounts of bulky decommissioning waste, containing relatively low activity, can be stored. The problems and also the cost for decommissioning may be considerably reduced by delaying complete disposal of the radioactive material >= 40 years and during this period, keeping the radioactivity enclosed within the plant in the form of a safe containment. (orig./HP) [de

  5. Safety analysis of Oi nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    The transient phenomena in Oi nuclear power plant were analyzed, especially on the water level fluctuation and the capability of natural circulation in the primary loop, under the assumptions that the feed water for steam generators is totally lost, and the relief valve on the pressurizer, which is actuated due to the pressure rise in the primary system, is stuck and kept open. These assumptions are related to the TMI accident. The analysing conditions are 1) the main feed water flow is totally lost suddenly during the rated power operation of the reactor, 2) two motor-driven auxiliary feed water pumps are started manually fifteen minutes after the accident initiation, 3) one relief valve on the pressurizer is opened fifteen seconds after the accident initiation and kept open, 4) the reactor is scrammed thirty three seconds after the accident initiation, 5) the turbine is tripped 33.5 seconds after the accident initiation, etc. Two cases were analysed, namely 3,800 seconds and 1,200 seconds after the accident initiation. The analytical code RELEP4/Mod5/U2/J1 was utilized for this analysis. The level fluctuation in the pressurizer after the accident initiation, the flow rate fluctuation through the pressurizer relief valve, especially that of steam, liquid single phase and two phase flows, the water level in the upper plenum in the pressure vessel, the change of flow rate at core inlet, the average pressure in the core, and the temperature fluctuation of coolant in the core, the variation of void fraction in the core, and the change of surface temperature of fuel rods are presented as the analysis results, and they are evaluated. It is recognized that the plant safety is kept under the assumed accident conditions in the Oi nuclear power plant. (Nakai, Y.)

  6. Deterministic Safety Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants. Specific Safety Guide (Russian Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide harmonized guidance to designers, operators, regulators and providers of technical support on deterministic safety analysis for nuclear power plants. It provides information on the utilization of the results of such analysis for safety and reliability improvements. The Safety Guide addresses conservative, best estimate and uncertainty evaluation approaches to deterministic safety analysis and is applicable to current and future designs. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Grouping of initiating events and associated transients relating to plant states; 3. Deterministic safety analysis and acceptance criteria; 4. Conservative deterministic safety analysis; 5. Best estimate plus uncertainty analysis; 6. Verification and validation of computer codes; 7. Relation of deterministic safety analysis to engineering aspects of safety and probabilistic safety analysis; 8. Application of deterministic safety analysis; 9. Source term evaluation for operational states and accident conditions; References

  7. General design safety principles for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-01-01

    This Safety Guide provides the safety principles and the approach that have been used to implement the Code in the Safety Guides. These safety principles and the approach are tied closely to the safety analyses needed to assist the design process, and are used to verify the adequacy of nuclear power plant designs. This Guide also provides a framework for the use of other design Safety Guides. However, although it explains the principles on which the other Safety Guides are based, the requirements for specific applications of these principles are mostly found in the other Guides

  8. Safety criteria for design of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    In Finland the general safety requirements for nuclear power plants are presented in the Council of State Decision (395/91). In this guide, safety principles which supplement the Council of State Decision and which are to be used in the design of nuclear power plants are defined

  9. Code on the safety of nuclear power plants: Governmental organization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-01-01

    This Code recommends requirements for a regulatory body responsible for regulating the siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants for safety. It forms part of the Agency's programme for establishing Codes and Safety Guides relating to land based stationary thermal neutron power plants

  10. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-2, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, and has been extended to cover the commissioning stage. It describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. Over recent years there have been developments in areas such as long term operation, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis and risk informed decision making processes. It became necessary to revise the IAEA's safety requirements in these areas and to correct and/or improve the publication on the basis of feedback from its application by both the IAEA and its Member States. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the Fundamental Safety Principles. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Safety objectives and principles; 3. The management and organizational structure of the operating organization; 4. Management of operational safety; 5. Operational safety programmes; 6. Plant commissioning; 7. Plant operations; 8. Maintenance, testing, surveillance and inspection; 9. Preparation for decommissioning.

  11. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-2, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, and has been extended to cover the commissioning stage. It describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. Over recent years there have been developments in areas such as long term operation, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis and risk informed decision making processes. It became necessary to revise the IAEA's safety requirements in these areas and to correct and/or improve the publication on the basis of feedback from its application by both the IAEA and its Member States. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the Fundamental Safety Principles. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Safety objectives and principles; 3. The management and organizational structure of the operating organization; 4. Management of operational safety; 5. Operational safety programmes; 6. Plant commissioning; 7. Plant operations; 8. Maintenance, testing, surveillance and inspection; 9. Preparation for decommissioning.

  12. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Arabic Edition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-2, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, and has been extended to cover the commissioning stage. It describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. Over recent years there have been developments in areas such as long term operation, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis and risk informed decision making processes. It became necessary to revise the IAEA's safety requirements in these areas and to correct and/or improve the publication on the basis of feedback from its application by both the IAEA and its Member States. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the Fundamental Safety Principles. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Safety objectives and principles; 3. The management and organizational structure of the operating organization; 4. Management of operational safety; 5. Operational safety programmes; 6. Plant commissioning; 7. Plant operations; 8. Maintenance, testing, surveillance and inspection; 9. Preparation for decommissioning.

  13. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-2, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, and has been extended to cover the commissioning stage. It describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. Over recent years there have been developments in areas such as long term operation, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis and risk informed decision making processes. It became necessary to revise the IAEA's safety requirements in these areas and to correct and/or improve the publication on the basis of feedback from its application by both the IAEA and its Member States. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the Fundamental Safety Principles. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Safety objectives and principles; 3. The management and organizational structure of the operating organization; 4. Management of operational safety; 5. Operational safety programmes; 6. Plant commissioning; 7. Plant operations; 8. Maintenance, testing, surveillance and inspection; 9. Preparation for decommissioning.

  14. Test plan for N2 HEPA filters assembly shop stock used on PFP E4 exhaust system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DICK, J.D.

    1999-01-01

    At Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) and Plutonium Reclamation Facility (PRF) Self-contained HEPA filters, encased in wooden frames and boxes, are installed in the E4 Exhaust Ventilation System to provide confinement of radioactive releases to the environment and confinement of radioactive contamination within designated zones inside the facility. Recently during the routine testing in-leakage was discovered downstream of the Self-contained HEPA filters boxes. This Test Plan describes the approach to conduct investigation of the root causes for the in-leakage of HEPA filters

  15. Discussion of important safety requirements for new nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zhang Lin; Jia Xiang; Yan Tianwen; Li Wenhong; Li Chun

    2014-01-01

    This paper presents the analysis of several important safety requirements and improvement direction. Technical view of security goals on site safety evaluation, internal and external events fortification, serious accident prevention and mitigation, as well as the core, containment system and instrument control system design and engineering optimization, and etc are indicated. It will be useful for new plant design, construction and safety improvement. (authors)

  16. Method of safety evaluation in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuraszkiewicz, P.; Zahn, P.

    1988-01-01

    A novel quantitative technique for evaluating safety of subsystems of nuclear power plants based on expert estimations is presented. It includes methods of mathematical psychology recognizing the effect of subjective factors in the expert estimates and, consequently, contributes to further objectification of evaluation. It may be applied to complementing probabilistic safety assessment. As a result of such evaluations a characteristic 'safety of nuclear power plants' is obtained. (author)

  17. Strengthening of nuclear power plant construction safety management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yu Jun

    2012-01-01

    The article describes the warning of the Fukushima nuclear accident, and analyzes the major nuclear safety issues in nuclear power development in China, problems in nuclear power plants under construction, and how to strengthen supervision and management in nuclear power construction. It also points out that the development of nuclear power must attach great importance to the safety, and nuclear power plant construction should strictly implement the principle of 'safety first and quality first'. (author)

  18. Probabilistic safety assessment in nuclear power plant management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Holloway, N.J.

    1989-06-01

    Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) techniques have been widely used over the past few years to assist in understanding how engineered systems respond to abnormal conditions, particularly during a severe accident. The use of PSAs in the design and operation of such systems thus contributes to the safety of nuclear power plants. Probabilistic safety assessments can be maintained to provide a continuous up-to-date assessment (Living PSA), supporting the management of plant operations and modifications

  19. 1999 Annual Cathodic Protection Survey Report for PFP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BOWMAN, T.J.

    2000-01-01

    This cathodic protection (CP) report documents the results of the 1999 annual CP survey of the underground piping within PFP property. An annual survey of CP systems is required by Washington Administrative Code (WAC). A spreadsheet to document the 1999 annual survey polarization data is included in this report. Graphs are included to trend the cathodic voltages and the polarization voltages at each test station on PFP property. The trending spans from 1994 to 1999. Graphs are also included to trend voltage and amperage outputs of each rectifier during the annual surveys. During the annual survey, resistance testing between the underground piping was conducted at each test station. The testing showed that all piping (with test leads into the test stations) was continuous with every pipe represented in the test stations. The resistance data is not documented in this report but can be accessed in work package 22-99-01003. During the annual survey, the wiring configurations of anode junction boxes AJB(R45-1) and AJB(45-1) were documented. The sketches can be accessed from the JCS work record of work package 22-99-01003. Analysis, conclusions, and recommendations of the 1999 annual CP survey results are included in this report

  20. Instrumentation and control systems important to safety in nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA programme for establishing safety standards for nuclear power plants. It supplements Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-1: Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design (the Requirements for Design), which establishes the design requirements for ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants. This Safety Guide describes how the requirements should be met for instrumentation and control (I and C) systems important to safety. This publication is a revision and combination of two previous Safety Guides: Safety Series Nos 50-SG-D3 and 50-SG-D8, which are superseded by this new Safety Guide. The revision takes account of developments in I and C systems important to safety since the earlier Safety Guides were published in 1980 and 1984, respectively. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance on the design of I and C systems important to safety in nuclear power plants, including all I and C components, from the sensors allocated to the mechanical systems to the actuated equipment, operator interfaces and auxiliary equipment. This Safety Guide deals mainly with design requirements for those I and C systems that are important to safety. It expands on paragraphs of Ref in the area of I and C systems important to safety. This publication is intended for use primarily by designers of nuclear power plants and also by owners and/or operators and regulators of nuclear power plants. This Safety Guide provides general guidance on I and C systems important to safety which is broadly applicable to many nuclear power plants. More detailed requirements and limitations for safe operation specific to a particular plant type should be established as part of the design process. The present guidance is focused on the design principles for systems important to safety that warrant particular attention, and should be applied to both the design of new I and C systems and the modernization of existing systems. Guidance is provided on how design

  1. PFP: Automated prediction of gene ontology functional annotations with confidence scores using protein sequence data.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hawkins, Troy; Chitale, Meghana; Luban, Stanislav; Kihara, Daisuke

    2009-02-15

    Protein function prediction is a central problem in bioinformatics, increasing in importance recently due to the rapid accumulation of biological data awaiting interpretation. Sequence data represents the bulk of this new stock and is the obvious target for consideration as input, as newly sequenced organisms often lack any other type of biological characterization. We have previously introduced PFP (Protein Function Prediction) as our sequence-based predictor of Gene Ontology (GO) functional terms. PFP interprets the results of a PSI-BLAST search by extracting and scoring individual functional attributes, searching a wide range of E-value sequence matches, and utilizing conventional data mining techniques to fill in missing information. We have shown it to be effective in predicting both specific and low-resolution functional attributes when sufficient data is unavailable. Here we describe (1) significant improvements to the PFP infrastructure, including the addition of prediction significance and confidence scores, (2) a thorough benchmark of performance and comparisons to other related prediction methods, and (3) applications of PFP predictions to genome-scale data. We applied PFP predictions to uncharacterized protein sequences from 15 organisms. Among these sequences, 60-90% could be annotated with a GO molecular function term at high confidence (>or=80%). We also applied our predictions to the protein-protein interaction network of the Malaria plasmodium (Plasmodium falciparum). High confidence GO biological process predictions (>or=90%) from PFP increased the number of fully enriched interactions in this dataset from 23% of interactions to 94%. Our benchmark comparison shows significant performance improvement of PFP relative to GOtcha, InterProScan, and PSI-BLAST predictions. This is consistent with the performance of PFP as the overall best predictor in both the AFP-SIG '05 and CASP7 function (FN) assessments. PFP is available as a web service at http://dragon.bio.purdue.edu/pfp

  2. The operating organization for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA programme for safety standards for nuclear power plants. The present publication is a revision of the IAEA Safety Guide on Management of Nuclear Power Plants for Safe Operation issued in 1984. It supplements Section 2 of the Safety Requirements publication on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation. Nuclear power technology is different from the customary technology of power generation from fossil fuel and by hydroelectric means. One major difference between the management of nuclear power plants and that of conventional generating plants is the emphasis that should be placed on nuclear safety, quality assurance, the management of radioactive waste and radiological protection, and the accompanying national regulatory requirements. This Safety Guide highlights the important elements of effective management in relation to these aspects of safety. The attention to be paid to safety requires that the management recognize that personnel involved in the nuclear power programme should understand, respond effectively to, and continuously search for ways to enhance safety in the light of any additional requirements socially and legally demanded of nuclear energy. This will help to ensure that safety policies that result in the safe operation of nuclear power plants are implemented and that margins of safety are always maintained. The structure of the organization, management standards and administrative controls should be such that there is a high degree of assurance that safety policies and decisions are implemented, safety is continuously enhanced and a strong safety culture is promoted and supported. The objective of this publication is to guide Member States in setting up an operating organization which facilitates the safe operation of nuclear power plants to a high level internationally. The second objective is to provide guidance on the most important organizational elements in order to contribute to a strong safety

  3. The operating organization for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA programme for safety standards for nuclear power plants. The present publication is a revision of the IAEA Safety Guide on Management of Nuclear Power Plants for Safe Operation issued in 1984. It supplements Section 2 of the Safety Requirements publication on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation. Nuclear power technology is different from the customary technology of power generation from fossil fuel and by hydroelectric means. One major difference between the management of nuclear power plants and that of conventional generating plants is the emphasis that should be placed on nuclear safety, quality assurance, the management of radioactive waste and radiological protection, and the accompanying national regulatory requirements. This Safety Guide highlights the important elements of effective management in relation to these aspects of safety. The attention to be paid to safety requires that the management recognize that personnel involved in the nuclear power programme should understand, respond effectively to, and continuously search for ways to enhance safety in the light of any additional requirements socially and legally demanded of nuclear energy. This will help to ensure that safety policies that result in the safe operation of nuclear power plants are implemented and that margins of safety are always maintained. The structure of the organization, management standards and administrative controls should be such that there is a high degree of assurance that safety policies and decisions are implemented, safety is continuously enhanced and a strong safety culture is promoted and supported. The objective of this publication is to guide Member States in setting up an operating organization which facilitates the safe operation of nuclear power plants to a high level internationally. The second objective is to provide guidance on the most important organizational elements in order to contribute to a strong safety

  4. The operating organization for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA programme for safety standards for nuclear power plants. The present publication is a revision of the IAEA Safety Guide on Management of Nuclear Power Plants for Safe Operation issued in 1984. It supplements Section 2 of the Safety Requirements publication on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation. Nuclear power technology is different from the customary technology of power generation from fossil fuel and by hydroelectric means. One major difference between the management of nuclear power plants and that of conventional generating plants is the emphasis that should be placed on nuclear safety, quality assurance, the management of radioactive waste and radiological protection, and the accompanying national regulatory requirements. This Safety Guide highlights the important elements of effective management in relation to these aspects of safety. The attention to be paid to safety requires that the management recognize that personnel involved in the nuclear power programme should understand, respond effectively to, and continuously search for ways to enhance safety in the light of any additional requirements socially and legally demanded of nuclear energy. This will help to ensure that safety policies that result in the safe operation of nuclear power plants are implemented and that margins of safety are always maintained. The structure of the organization, management standards and administrative controls should be such that there is a high degree of assurance that safety policies and decisions are implemented, safety is continuously enhanced and a strong safety culture is promoted and supported. The objective of this publication is to guide Member States in setting up an operating organization which facilitates the safe operation of nuclear power plants to a high level internationally. The second objective is to provide guidance on the most important organizational elements in order to contribute to a strong safety

  5. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Specific Safety Requirements (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. It takes into account developments in areas such as long term operation of nuclear power plants, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis and risk informed decision making processes. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication.

  6. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Specific Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. It takes into account developments in areas such as long term operation of nuclear power plants, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis and risk informed decision making processes. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication

  7. Domestic Regulation for Periodic Safety Review of Nuclear Power Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Daesik; Ahn, Seunghoon; Auh, Geunsun; Lee, Jonghyeok

    2015-01-01

    The so-called Periodic Safety Review (PSR) has been carried out such safety assessment throughout its life, on a periodic basis. In January 2001, the Atomic Energy Act and related regulations were amended to adopt the PSR institutional scheme from IAEA Nuclear Safety Guide 50-SG-O12. At that time the safety assessment was made to review the plant safety on 10 safety factors, such as aging management and emergency planning, where the safety factor indicates the important aspects of safety of an operating NPP to be addressed in the PSR. According to this legislation, the domestic utility, the KHNP has conducted the PSR for the operating NPP of 10 years coming up from operating license date, starting since May 2000. Some revisions in the PSR rule were made to include the additional safety factors last year. This paper introduces the current status of the PSR review and regulation, in particular new safety factors and updated technical regulation. Comprehensive safety assessment for Korea Nuclear Power Plants have performed a reflecting design and procedure changes and considering the latest technology every 10 years. This paper also examined the PSR system changes in Korea. As of July 2015, reviews for PSR of 18 units have been completed, with 229 nuclear safety improvement items. And implementation have been completed for 165 of them. PSR system has been confirmed that it has contributed to improvement of plant safety. In addition, this paper examined the PSR system change in Korea

  8. Seismic safety of Paks nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Katona, T.

    1993-01-01

    An extensive program is underway at Paks NPP for evaluation of the seismic safety and for development of the necessary safety increasing measures. This program includes the following five measures: investigation of methods, regulations and techniques utilized for reassessment of seismic safety of operating NPPs and promoting safety; investigation of earthquake hazards; development of concepts for creating the seismic safety location of earthquake warning system; determination of dynamic features of systems and facilities determined by the concept, and preliminary evaluation of the seismic safety

  9. Planning and evaluation of plant under safety aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strnad, H.

    1985-01-01

    Plant denotes a technical product characterized as being structured, complex, comprising the use of energy, and that of measuring, automatic control and monitoring systems to keep track of present, control and monitor processes. Particular attention is paid to methods of developing plant concepts, measures to exclude or detect risks, integration of safety engineering into the course of planning, safety concept and ergonomics in plant design. (DG) [de

  10. Plutonium vulnerability issues at Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Feldt, E.; Templeton, D.W.; Tholen, E.

    1995-01-01

    The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) at the Hanford, Washington Site was operated to produce plutonium (Pu) metal and oxide for national defense purposes. Due to the production requirements and methods utilized to meet national needs and the abrupt shutdown of the plant in the late 1980s, the plant was left in a condition that poses a risk of radiation exposure to plant workers, of accidental radioactive material release to the environment, and of radiation exposure to the public. In early 1994, an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to determine the best methods for cleaning out and stabilizing Pu materials in the PFP was started. While the EIS is being prepared, a number of immediate actions have been completed or are underway to significantly reduce the greatest hazards in the PFP. Recently, increased attention his been paid to Pu risks at Department of Energy (DOE) facilities resulting in the Department-wide Plutonium Vulnerability Assessment and a recommendation by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) for DOE to develop integrated plans for managing its nuclear materials

  11. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The safety of a nuclear power plant is ensured by means of proper site selection, design, construction and commissioning, and the evaluation of these, followed by proper management, operation and maintenance of the plant. In a later phase, a proper transition to decommissioning is required. The organization and management of plant operations ensures that a high level of safety is achieved through the effective management and control of operational activities. This publication is a revision of the Safety Requirements publication Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which was issued in 2000 as IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-2. The purpose of this revision was to restructure Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-2 in the light of new operating experience and new trends in the nuclear industry; to introduce new requirements that were not included in Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-2 on the operation of nuclear power plants; and to reflect current practices, new concepts and technical developments. This update also reflects feedback on the use of the standards, both from Member States and from the IAEA's safety related activities. The publication is presented in the new format for Safety Requirements publications. The present publication reflects the safety principles of the Fundamental Safety Principles. It has been harmonized with IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-3 on The Management System for Facilities and Activities. Guidance on the fulfilment of the safety requirements is provided in supporting Safety Guides. The terminology used in this publication is defined and explained in the IAEA Safety Glossary. The objective of this publication is to establish the requirements which, in the light of experience and the present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. These requirements are governed by the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the Fundamental Safety Principles. This

  12. Good safety culture maintenance at Leningrad nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ardanov, A.

    1996-01-01

    The evidence in favour of the Leningrad NPP commitment to safety tasks, as the case is in the international practice, is The Safety Policy Statement document where safety is declared to be more significant than the power generation related issues, with the entire responsibility for the safety provision taken over by the operating utility. To avoid the situation when the stated safety tasks and policy remain only a declaration, the organizational structure of the operating utility was expanded to include The Safety Control Department and The Quality Control Department whose tasks encompass the control of the achieved safety level, development of recommendations, measures and actions aimed at the safety culture improvement, assessment and revision of the criteria and requirements to the personnel and management. Each individual at LNPP whose activity affects the plant safety has been familiarized with The Safety Policy Statement document

  13. Good safety culture maintenance at Leningrad nuclear power plant

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ardanov, A [Safety Control Dept., Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant, Leningrad (Russian Federation)

    1997-12-31

    The evidence in favour of the Leningrad NPP commitment to safety tasks, as the case is in the international practice, is The Safety Policy Statement document where safety is declared to be more significant than the power generation related issues, with the entire responsibility for the safety provision taken over by the operating utility. To avoid the situation when the stated safety tasks and policy remain only a declaration, the organizational structure of the operating utility was expanded to include The Safety Control Department and The Quality Control Department whose tasks encompass the control of the achieved safety level, development of recommendations, measures and actions aimed at the safety culture improvement, assessment and revision of the criteria and requirements to the personnel and management. Each individual at LNPP whose activity affects the plant safety has been familiarized with The Safety Policy Statement document.

  14. Safety culture in the maintenance of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    Safety culture is the complexity of beliefs, shared values and behaviour reflected in making decisions and performing work in a nuclear power plant or nuclear facility. The definition of safety culture and the related concepts presented in the IAEA literature are widely known to experts. Since the publication of Safety Culture, issued by the IAEA as INSAG-4 in 1991, the IAEA has produced a number of publications on strengthening the safety culture in organizations that operate nuclear power plants and nuclear facilities. However, until now the focus has been primarily on the area of operations. Apart from operations, maintenance in plants and nuclear facilities is an aspect that deserves special attention, as maintenance activities can have both a direct and an indirect effect on equipment reliability. Adverse safety effects can arise, depending upon the level of skill of the personnel involved, safety awareness and the complexity of the work process. Any delayed effects resulting from challenges to maintenance can cause interruptions in operation, and hence affect the safety of a plant or facility. Building upon earlier IAEA publications on this topic, this Safety Report reviews how challenges to the maintenance of nuclear power plants can affect safety culture. It also highlights indications of a weakening safety culture. The challenges described are in areas such as maintenance management; human resources management; plant condition assessment and the business environment. The steps that some Member States have taken to address safety culture aspects are detailed and singled out as good practices, with a view to disseminating and exchanging experiences and lessons learned. Although this report is primarily directed at plant maintenance organizations, the subject matter is applicable to a wider audience, including plant contracting organizations and regulatory authorities

  15. Safety philosophy for nuclear power plants in egypt

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mervat, S.A.; Hammad, F.H.

    1988-01-01

    This work establishes the basic principles of a safety philosophy for nuclear power plants in egypt. A number of deterministic requirements stemming the multiple barriers and the defense-in-depth concept are emphasised. other requirements in the areas of siting, operational safety, safety analysis, special issues, and experience feedback are also identified. The role of international cooperation in nuclear safety technology-transfer and nuclear emergencies is highlighted. In addition probabilistic ally based guidelines are set for acceptable risk and dose limits

  16. Safety aspects and operating experience of LWR plants in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aoki, S.; Yoshioka, T.; Toyota, M.; Hinoki, M.

    1977-01-01

    To develop nuclear power generation for the future, it is necessary to put further emphasis on safety assurance and to endeavour to devise measures to improve plant availability, based on the careful analysis of causes that reduce plant availability. The paper discusses the results of studies on the following items from such viewpoints: (1) Safety and operating experience of LWR nuclear power plants in Japan: operating experience with LWRs; improvements in LWR design during the past ten years; analysis of the factors affecting plant availability; (2) Assurance of safety and measures to increase availability: measures for safety and environmental protection; measures to reduce radiation exposure of employees; appropriateness of maintenance and inspection work; measures to increase plant availability; measures to improve reliability of equipment and components; (3) Future technical problems. (author)

  17. Safety performance indicators used by the Russian Safety Regulatory Authority in its practical activities on nuclear power plant safety regulation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khazanov, A.L.

    2005-01-01

    The Sixth Department of the Nuclear, Industrial and Environmental Regulatory Authority of Russia, Scientific and Engineering Centre for Nuclear and Radiation Safety process, analyse and use the information on nuclear power plants (NPPs) operational experience or NPPs safety improvement. Safety performance indicators (SPIs), derived from processing of information on operational violations and analysis of annual NPP Safety Reports, are used as tools to determination of trends towards changing of characteristics of operational safety, to assess the effectiveness of corrective measures, to monitor and evaluate the current operational safety level of NPPs, to regulate NPP safety. This report includes a list of the basic SPIs, those used by the Russian safety regulatory authority in regulatory activity. Some of them are absent in list of IAEA-TECDOC-1141 ('Operational safety performance indicators for nuclear power plants'). (author)

  18. Safety/security interface assessments at commercial nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Byers, K.R.; Brown, P.J.; Norderhaug, L.R.

    1985-01-01

    The findings of the Haynes Task Force Committee (NUREG-0992) are used as the basis for defining safety/security assessment team activities at commercial nuclear power plants in NRC Region V. A safety/security interface assessment outline and the approach used for making the assessments are presented along with the composition of team members. As a result of observing simulated plant emergency conditions during scheduled emergency preparedness exercises, examining security and operational response procedures, and interviewing plant personnel, the team has identified instances where safety/security conflicts can occur

  19. Safety/security interface assessments at commercial nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Byers, K.R.; Brown, P.J.; Norderhaug, L.R.

    1985-07-01

    The findings of the Haynes Task Force Committee (NUREG-0992) are used as the basis for defining safety/security assessment team activities at commercial nuclear power plants in NRC Region V. A safety/security interface assessment outline and the approach used for making the assessments are presented along with the composition of team members. As a result of observing simulated plant emergency conditions during scheduled emergency preparedness exercises, examining security and operational response procedures, and interviewing plant personnel, the team has identified instances where safety/security conflicts can occur. 2 refs

  20. Key asset - inherent safety of LMFBR Pool Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marchaterre, J.F.; Sevy, R.H.; Lancet, R.T.; Mills, J.C.

    1984-04-01

    The safety approach used in the design of the Large Pool Plant emphasizes use of the intrinsic characteristics of Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactors to incorporate a high degree of safety in the design and reduce cost by providing simpler (more reliable) dedicated safety systems. Correspondingly, a goal was not to require the action of active systems to prevent significant core damage and/or provide large grace periods for all anticipated transients. The key safety features of the plant are presented and the analysis of representative flow and power transients are presented to show that the design goal has been satisfied

  1. Key asset--Inherent safety of LFMBR pool plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marchaterre, J.F.; Lancet, R.T.; Mills, J.C.; Sevy, R.H.

    1984-01-01

    The safety approach used in the design of the Large Pool Plant emphasizes use of the intrinsic characteristics of Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactors to incorporate a high degree of safety in the design and reduce cost by providing simpler (more reliable) dedicated safety systems. Correspondingly, a goal was not to require the action of active systems to prevent significant core damage and/or provide large grace periods for all anticipated transients. The key safety features of the plant are presented and the analysis of representative flow and power transients are presented to show that the design goal has been satisfied

  2. Standardized safety management of AP1000 nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Li Xingwen; Cao Zhiqiang; Cong Jiuyuan

    2011-01-01

    In 2002, China published and implemented the Law of the People's Republic of China on Work Safety and promulgated a series of guidelines and policies, which strengthened the safety management supervision. Standardization of safety, as another important step on safety supervision, comes after safety assesment and safety production licensing system, is also a permanent solution. Standardization of safety is a strategic, long term and fundamental work, which is also the basic access to achieving scientific safety management and increasing the inherent safety of an enterprise. Haiyang AP1000 nuclear power plant, adopting the modularized, 'open-top' and parallel construction means, overturned the traditional construction theory of installation work comes after the civil work and greatly shorten the construction period. At the same time, the notable increase of oversize module transportation and lifting and parallel construction raises higher demands for safety management. This article combines the characteristics and difficulties of safety management for Haiyang AP1000 nuclear power plant, puts forward ideas and methods for standardized safety management, and could also serve as reference to the safety management for other AP1000 projects. (authors)

  3. Operational characteristics of nuclear power plants - modelling of operational safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Studovic, M.

    1984-01-01

    By operational experience of nuclear power plants and realize dlevel of availability of plant, systems and componenst reliabiliuty, operational safety and public protection, as a source on nature of distrurbances in power plant systems and lessons drawn by the TMI-2, in th epaper are discussed: examination of design safety for ultimate ensuring of safe operational conditions of the nuclear power plant; significance of the adequate action for keeping proess parameters in prescribed limits and reactor cooling rquirements; developed systems for measurements detection and monitoring all critical parameters in the nuclear steam supply system; contents of theoretical investigation and mathematical modeling of the physical phenomena and process in nuclear power plant system and components as software, supporting for ensuring of operational safety and new access in staff education process; program and progress of the investigation of some physical phenomena and mathematical modeling of nuclear plant transients, prepared at faculty of mechanical Engineering in Belgrade. (author)

  4. Plant assessment system and safety culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chun, Chuyoung

    1996-01-01

    The government, upon these events, keenly felt the necessity for developing the safety culture which was already forwarded in nuclear industries and started taking actions to propagate it to all parts of society. The government established a social safety director position under the Prime Minister's jurisdiction and also established a Safety Culture Promotion Headquarters in which 7 ministries and other organizations, such as Korea Economic Council, Federation of Korea Trade Union and Women's Federation Council were participating. In accordance with the government's strong will to enhance the safety consciousness of people, safety campaigns are being developed voluntarily in the private sector. The formation of non-governmental organizations, such as People's Central Council of Safety Culture Promotion, shows a good example of such movement

  5. Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) safety in Brazil

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lederman, L.

    1980-01-01

    The multidisciplinary aspects of the activities involved in the nuclear power plant (NPP) licensing, are presented. The activities of CNEN's technical staff in the licensing of Angra-1 and Angra-2 power plants are shown. (E.G.) [pt

  6. [Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP), Safety Management

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hasan, S M [Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP), Karachi (Pakistan)

    1997-12-01

    The present regime for CANDU safety management in Pakistan has evolved in line with contemporary international practice, and is essential adequate to ensure the continued safety of KANUPP and other future CANDU reactors, as confirmed by international reviews as well. But the small size of Pakistan nuclear power program poses limitations in developing - expert judgment in analysis of in-service inspection data; and own methodology for CANDU safety analysis.

  7. [Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP), Safety Management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hasan, S.M.

    1997-01-01

    The present regime for CANDU safety management in Pakistan has evolved in line with contemporary international practice, and is essential adequate to ensure the continued safety of KANUPP and other future CANDU reactors, as confirmed by international reviews as well. But the small size of Pakistan nuclear power program poses limitations in developing - expert judgment in analysis of in-service inspection data; and own methodology for CANDU safety analysis

  8. Safety in waste management plants: An Indian perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shekhar, P.; Ozarde, P.D.; Gandhi, P.M.

    2000-01-01

    Assurance of safety of public and plant workers and protection of the environment are prime objectives in the design and construction of Waste Management Plants. In India, waste management principles and strategies have been evolved in accordance with national and international regulations and standards for radiation protection. The regulations governing radiation protection have a far-reaching impact on the management of the radioactive waste. The wastes arise at each stages of the fuel cycle with varying chemical nature, generation rate and specific activity levels depending upon the type of the facility. Segregation of waste based on its chemical nature and specific activity levels is an essential feature, as its aids in selection of treatment and conditioning process. Selection of the process, equipment and materials in the plant, are governed by safety consideration alongside factors like efficiency and simplicity. The plant design considerations like physical separation, general arrangement, ventilation zoning, access control, remote handling, process piping routing, decontamination etc. have major role in realizing waste safety. Stringent quality control measures during all stages of construction have helped in achieving the design intended safety. These aspects together with operating experience gained form basis for the improved safety features in the design and construction of waste management plants. The comprehensive safety is derived from adoption of waste management strategies and appropriate plant design considerations. The paper briefly brings safety in waste management programme in India, in its current perspective. (author)

  9. Seismic safety of Paks nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Katona, T.

    1995-01-01

    This paper contains an overview of the results concerning the following activities: investigation of methods, regulations and techniques for reassessment of seismic safety of operating NPPs and upgrading of safety; investigation of earthquake hazards; development of concept for creation of the seismic safety location of earthquake warning system; determination of dynamic features of systems and facilities determined by the concept and preliminary evaluation of the seismic safety. It is limited on investigation of dynamic features of building structures, the building dynamical experiments and experimental investigation of the equipment

  10. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Specific Safety Requirements (Arabic Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    This publication is a revision of IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-2, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, and has been extended to cover the commissioning stage. It describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe commissioning, operation, and transition from operation to decommissioning of nuclear power plants. Over recent years there have been developments in areas such as long term operation of nuclear power plants, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis review and risk informed decision making processes. It became necessary to revise the IAEA’s Safety Requirements in these areas and to correct and/or improve the publication on the basis of feedback from its application by both the IAEA and its Member States. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles. A review of Safety Requirements publications, initiated in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan, revealed no significant areas of weakness but resulted in a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation. These are contained in the present publication.

  11. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Specific Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    This publication is a revision of IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-2, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, and has been extended to cover the commissioning stage. It describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe commissioning, operation, and transition from operation to decommissioning of nuclear power plants. Over recent years there have been developments in areas such as long term operation of nuclear power plants, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis review and risk informed decision making processes. It became necessary to revise the IAEA’s Safety Requirements in these areas and to correct and/or improve the publication on the basis of feedback from its application by both the IAEA and its Member States. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles. A review of Safety Requirements publications, initiated in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan, revealed no significant areas of weakness but resulted in a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation. These are contained in the present publication.

  12. Disposal of TRU Waste from the PFP in pipe overpack containers to WIPP Including New Security Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    HOPKINS, A.M.

    2003-01-01

    The Department of Energy is responsible for the safe management and cleanup of the DOE complex. As part of the cleanup and closure of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) located on the Hanford site, the nuclear material inventory was reviewed to determine the appropriate disposition path. Based on the nuclear material characteristics, the material was designated for stabilization and packaging for long term storage and transfer to the Savannah River Site, or a decision for discard was made. The discarded material was designated as waste material and slated for disposal to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Prior to preparing any residue wastes for disposal at the WIPP, several major activities need to be completed. As detailed a processing history as possible of the material including origin of the waste must be researched and documented. A technical basis for termination of safeguards on the material must be prepared and approved. Utilizing process knowledge and processing history, the material must be characterized, sampling requirements determined, acceptable knowledge package and waste designation completed prior to disposal. All of these activities involve several organizations including the contractor, DOE, state representatives and other regulators such as EPA. At PFP, a process has been developed for meeting the many, varied requirements and successfully used to prepare several residue waste streams including Rocky Flats incinerator ash, hanford incinerator ash and Sand, Slag and Crucible (SS and C) material for disposal. These waste residues are packed into Pipe Overpack Containers for shipment to the WIPP

  13. The safety of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Berg, J.O.

    1980-01-01

    A general presentation is given of reactor safety philosophy and risk analysis. The Rasmussen report (WASH-1400) is discussed and also the Lewis Commission's evaluation of that report. The future developments in reactor safety technology are outlined with emphasis on quality assurance. (JIW)

  14. Plant safety and performance indicators for regulatory use

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ferjancic, M.; Nemec, T.; Cimesa, S.

    2004-01-01

    Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration (SNSA) supervises nuclear and radiological safety of Krsko NPP. This SNSA supervision is performed through inspections, safety evaluations of plant modifications and event analyses as well as with the safety and performance indicators (SPI) which are a valuable data source for plant safety monitoring. In the past SNSA relied on the SPI provided by Krsko NPP and did not have a set of SPI which would be more appropriate for regulatory use. In 2003 SNSA started with preparation of a new set of SPI which would be more suitable for performing the regulatory oversight of the plant. New internal SNSA procedure which is under preparation will define use and evaluation of SPI and will include definitions for the proposed set of SPI. According to the evaluation of SPI values in comparison with the limiting values and/or trending, the procedure will define SNSA response and actions. (author)

  15. Safety classification of nuclear power plant systems, structures and components

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-01-01

    The Safety Classification principles used for the systems, structures and components of a nuclear power plant are detailed in the guide. For classification, the nuclear power plant is divided into structural and operational units called systems. Every structure and component under control is included into some system. The Safety Classes are 1, 2 and 3 and the Class EYT (non-nuclear). Instructions how to assign each system, structure and component to an appropriate safety class are given in the guide. The guide applies to new nuclear power plants and to the safety classification of systems, structures and components designed for the refitting of old nuclear power plants. The classification principles and procedures applying to the classification document are also given

  16. Safety upgrading of the PAKS Nuclear Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vamos, G.; Vigassy, J.

    1993-01-01

    In the last several years the net electricity from the Paks NPP represents almost half of the Hungarian total. The 4 units of Paks belong to the latest generation of the VVER-440 units, the small-sized Russian designed PWRs. Reviewing the main design features of them, the safety merits and safety concerns are summarized. Due to the conservative design and the extensive operating experience the safety merits appear to be more significant than generally believed. The VVER-440 type has two models, the 230 and 213, which have a large number of distinctive safety features. These are highlighted in the section comparisons. A quality assurance program was initiated in Paks very early. A long-term safety upgrading program was also initiated, originating from vendor recommendations, regulatory decisions, in-house operating experience and safety concerns, and independent reviews. The main areas and some examples of the measures are described. This program, like all other activities related to nuclear safety, has been under regulatory control. The specific features of the Hungarian regulatory system are described. For advanced, general and new evaluation of the safety of the units in Paks in accordance with the internationally recommended criteria of the 90's, the project AGNES has been launched with international participation. The scope of this project is summarized. International efforts as the IAEA Regional Project on safety assessment of VVER-440/213 and VVER-440/230 units are underway. Since safety is not only a question of design, but it can be significantly influenced by operations and maintenance practices, the Paks NPP has invited LAEA's OSART and ASSET missions, WANO's Pilot Peer Review

  17. Development of safety review advisory system for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, M. W.; Lee, H. C.; Park, S. O.; Park, W. J.; Lee, J. I.; Hur, K. Y.; Choi, S. S.; Lee, S. J.; Kang, C. M.

    2001-01-01

    For the development of an expert system supporting the safety review of nuclear power plants, the application program was implemented after gathering necessary theoretical background and practical requirements. The general and the detail functional specifications were established, and they were investigated by the safety review experts at KINS. Safety Review Advisory System (SRAS), the windows application on client-server environment was developed according to the above specifications. Reviewers can do their safety reviewing regardless of speciality or reviewing experiences because SRAS is operated by the safety review plans which are converted to standardized format. When the safety reviewing is carried out by using SRAS, the results of safety reviewing are accumulated in the database and may be utilized later usefully, and we can grasp safety reviewing progress. Users of SRAS are categorized into three groups, administrator, project manager, and reviewer. Each user group has appropriate access capability. The function and some screen shots of SRAS are described in this paper

  18. Results of research into nuclear power plant safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Polak, V.; Hladky, E.; Moravek, J.; Suchomel, J.; Stehlik, J.

    1976-01-01

    A survey is given of computer programmes for the safety analysis of nuclear power plants with WWER type reactors and with fast breeder reactors. The programmes solve accidents in the core, the primary circuit and the containment. A comparison is made of Czechoslovak and foreign computer programmes and their agreement proved. Also studied is the problem of radiation safety of nuclear power plants with regard to the leakage of radioactive isotopes and their detection. (J.B.)

  19. Safety criteria for siting a nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    The guide sets forth requirements for safety of the population and the environment in nuclear power plant siting. It also sets out the general basis for procedures employed by other competent authorities when they issue regulations or grant licences. On request STUK (Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority of Finland) issues case-specific statements about matters relating to planning and about other matters relating to land use in the environment of nuclear power plants

  20. General view about reactor safety nuclear power plants in Brazil

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gasparian, A.E.; Silva, D.E.; Salvatore, J.E.L.; Lima, J.M. de

    1991-01-01

    In this paper the authors describe the principles and goals that have guided, as well as the methods that have been used by the National Commission of Nuclear Energy (CNEN) to set forth measures aiming at providing safety to the Brazilian nuclear power plants. The status of the licensing process of these power plants is shown. The performance and the results obtained so far in relation to the nuclear safety are also described. (author)

  1. Trends in safety objectives for nuclear district heating plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Brogli, R [Paul Scherrer Inst., Villigen (Switzerland)

    1997-09-01

    Safety objectives for dedicated nuclear heating plants are strongly influenced on the one hand by what is accepted for electricity nuclear stations, and on the other hand by the requirement that for economical reasons heating reactors have to be located close to population centers. The paper discusses the related trends and comes to the conclusion that on account of the specific technical characteristics of nuclear heating plants adequate safety can be provided even for highly populated sites. (author). 8 refs.

  2. Safety improvement of Paks nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vamos, G.

    1999-01-01

    Safety upgrading completed in the early nineties at the Paks NPP include: replacement of steam generator safety valves and control valves; reliability improvement of the electrical supply system; modification of protection logic; enhancement of the fire protection; construction of full scope Training Simulator. Design safety upgrading measures achieved in recent years were concerned with: relocation of steam generator emergency feed-water supply; emergency gas removal from the primary coolant system; hydrogen management in the containment; protection against sumps; preventing of emergency core cooling system tanks from refilling. Increasing seismic resistance, containment assessment, refurbishment of reactor protection system, improving reliability of emergency electrical supply, analysis of internal hazards are now being implemented. Safety upgrading measures which are being prepared include: bleed and feed procedures; reactor over-pressurisation protection in cold state; treatment of steam generator primary to secondary leak accidents. Operational safety improvements are dealing with safety culture, training measures and facilities; symptom based emergency operating procedures; in-service inspection; fire protection. The significance of international cooperation is emphasised in view of achieving nuclear safety standards recognised in EU

  3. Seismic safety of nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gurpinar, A.; Godoy, A.

    1995-01-01

    This paper summarizes the work performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency in the areas of safety reviews and applied research in support of programmes for the assessment and enhancement of seismic safety in WWER type nuclear power plants during the past five years. Three major topics are discussed; engineering safety review services in relation to external events, technical guidelines for the assessment and upgrading of WWER type nuclear power plants, and the Coordinated Research Programme on B enchmark study for the seismic analysis and testing of WWER type nuclear power plants . These topics are summarized in a way to provide an overview of the past and present safety situation in selected WWER type plants which are all located in Eastern European countries. Main conclusion of the paper is that although there is now a thorough understanding of the seismic safety issues in these operating nuclear power plants, the implementation of seismic upgrades to structures, systems and components are lagging behind, particularly for those cases in which the re-evaluation indicated the necessity to strengthen the safety related structures or install new safety systems. (author)

  4. Holistic safety analysis for advanced nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alvarenga, M.A.B.; Guimaraes, A.C.F.

    1992-01-01

    This paper reviews the basic methodology of safety analysis used in the ANGRA-I and ANGRA-II nuclear power plants, its weaknesses, the problems with public acceptance of the risks, the future of the nuclear energy in Brazil, as well as recommends a new methodology, HOLISTIC SAFETY ANALYSIS, to be used both in the design and licensing phases, for advanced reactors. (author)

  5. Radiation safety and protection on the nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nosovskij, A.V.; Bogorad, V.I.; Vasil'chenko, V.N.; Klyuchnikov, A.A.; Litvinskaya, T.V.; Slepchenko, A.Yu.

    2008-01-01

    The main issues of the radiation safety and protection provision on the nuclear power plants are considered in this monograph. The description of the basic sources of the radiation danger on NPPs, the principles, the methods and the means of the safety and radiation monitoring provision are shown. The special attention is paid to the issues of the ionizing radiation regulation

  6. Nuclear power plants. Electrical equipment of the safety system. Qualification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    This International Standard applies to electrical parts of safety systems employed at nuclear power plants, including components and equipment of any interface whose failure could affect unfavourably properties of the safety system. The standard also applies to non-electrical safety-related interfaces. Furthermore, the standard describes the generic process of qualification certification procedures and methods of qualification testing and related documentation. (P.A.)

  7. Definitive closure of nuclear power plants. Aspects concerning physical safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodriguez, C.; Puntarulo, L.; Canibano, J.

    1988-01-01

    This paper analyzes the various safety requirements that must be fulfilled by nuclear power plants for their operation without restrictions, such as safeguards, nuclear safety and physical protection. Physical protection, the subject most extensively dealt by the authors, is defined as safety measures aimed at providing protection against deliberate hostile deeds, such as robberies or non-authorized transport of radioactive materials or sabotage in nuclear facilities, performed either by individuals or by groups of individuals. (Author)

  8. An engineer-constructor's view of nuclear power plant safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Landis, J.W.; Jacobs, S.B.

    1984-01-01

    At SWEC we have been involved in the development of safety features of nuclear power plants ever since we served as the engineer-constructur for the first commerical nuclear power station at Shippingport, Pennsylvania, in the 1950s. Our personnel have pioneered a number of safety innovations and improvements. Among these innovations is the subatmospheric containment for pressurized water reactor (PWR) power plants. This type of containment is designed so that leakage will terminate within 1 to 2 hours of the worst postulated loss of coolant accident. Other notable contributions include first use of reinforced-concrete atmospheric containments for PWR power plants and of reinforced-concrete, vapor-suppression containments for boiling water reactor (BWR) power plants. Both concepts meet rigorous U.S. safety requirements. SWEC has performed a substantial amount of work on developing standardized plant designs and has developed standardized engineering and construction techniques and procedures. Standardization concepts are being developed in Canada, France, USSR, and Germany, as well as in the United States. The West German convoy concept, which involves developing a number of standardized plants in a common effort, has been quite successful. We believe standardization contributes to safety in a number of ways. Use of standardized designs, procedures, techniques, equipment, and methods increases efficiency and results in higher quality. Standardization also reduces the design variations with which plant operators, emergency teams, and regulatory personnel must be familiar, thus increasing operator capability, and permits specialized talents to be focused on important safety considerations. (orig./RW)

  9. Empirical analysis of selected nuclear power plant maintenance factors and plant safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Olson, J.; Osborn, R.N.; Thurber, J.A.; Sommers, P.E.; Jackson, D.H.

    1985-07-01

    This report contains a statistical analysis of the relationship between selected aspects of nuclear power plant maintenance programs and safety related performance. The report identifies a large number of maintenance resources which can be expected to influence maintenance performance and subsequent plant safety performance. The resources for which data were readily available were related statistically to two sets of performance indicators: maintenance intermediate safety indicators and final safety performance indicators. The results show that the administrative structure of the plant maintenance program is a significant predictor of performance on both sets of indicators

  10. Nuclear power plant's safety and risk (requirements of safety and reliability)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Franzen, L.F.

    1977-01-01

    Starting out from the given safety objectives as they have evolved during the past few years and from the present legal and regulatory provisions for the construction and operation of nuclear power plants, the hazards involved in regular operation, accidents and emergency situations are discussed. In compliance with the positive safety balance of nuclear power plants in the FRG, special attention is focused on the preventive safety analysis within the frame of the nuclear licensing procedure. Reference is made to the beginnings of a comprehensive hazard concept for an unbiased plant assessment. Emergency situations are discussed from the point of view of general hazard comparisons. (orig.) [de

  11. IAEA Completes Safety Review at Czech Nuclear Power Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    Full text: An international team of nuclear safety experts, led by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), today completed a review of safety practices at Temelin Nuclear Power Station in the Czech Republic. The team highlighted the Power Plant's good practices and also recommended improvements to some safety measures. At the request of the Government of the Czech Republic, the IAEA assembled a team of nuclear installation safety experts to send an Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) to the Power Plant, and the mission was conducted from 5 to 22 November 2012. The team was comprised of experts from Brazil, Hungary, Slovakia, South Africa, Sweden, Ukraine and the United Kingdom. An OSART mission is designed as a review of programmes and activities essential to operational safety. It is not a regulatory inspection, nor is it a design review or a substitute for an exhaustive assessment of the Plant's overall safety status. The team at Temelin conducted an in-depth review of the functions essential to the safe operation of the Power Plant, which are under the responsibility of the site's management. The review covered the areas of management, organization and administration; operations; maintenance; technical support; operating experience; radiation protection; chemistry; and severe accident management. The conclusions of the review are based on the IAEA's Safety Standards and proven good international practices. The OSART team has identified good plant practices, which will be shared with the rest of the nuclear industry for consideration of potential application elsewhere. Examples include the following: - The Power Plant has adopted effective computer software to improve the efficiency of the plant to prepare and isolate equipment for maintenance; - The Power Plant undertakes measures to control precisely the chemical parameters that limit corrosion in the reactor's coolant system, which in turn reduce radiation exposure to the workforce; and - The Temelin

  12. Study on 'Safety qualification of process computers used in safety systems of nuclear power plants'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bertsche, K.; Hoermann, E.

    1991-01-01

    The study aims at developing safety standards for hardware and software of computer systems which are increasingly used also for important safety systems in nuclear power plants. The survey of the present state-of-the-art of safety requirements and specifications for safety-relevant systems and, additionally, for process computer systems has been compiled from national and foreign rules. In the Federal Republic of Germany the KTA safety guides and the BMI/BMU safety criteria have to be observed. For the design of future computer-aided systems in nuclear power plants it will be necessary to apply the guidelines in [DIN-880] and [DKE-714] together with [DIN-192]. With the aid of a risk graph the various functions of a system, or of a subsystem, can be evaluated with regard to their significance for safety engineering. (orig./HP) [de

  13. Safety aspects and operating experience of LWR plants in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aoki, S.; Hinoki, M.

    1977-01-01

    From the outset of nuclear power development in Japan, major emphasis has been placed on the safety of the nuclear power plants. There are now twelve nuclear power plants in operation with a total output of 6600 MWe. Their operating records were generally satisfactory, but in the 1974 to 1975 period, they experienced somewhat declined availability due to the repair work under the specific circumstances. After investigation of causes of troubles and the countermeasures thereof were made to ensure safety, they are now keeping good performance. In Japan, nuclear power plants are strictly subject to sufficient and careful inspection in compliance with the safety regulation, and are placed under stringent radiation control of employees. Under the various circumstances, however, the period of annual inspection tends to be prolonged more than originally planned, and this consequently is considered to be one of the causes of reduced availability. In order to develop nuclear power generation for the future, it is necessary to put further emphasis on the assurance of safety and to endeavor to devise measures to improve availability of the plants, based on the careful analysis of causes which reduce plant availability. This paper discusses the results of studies made for the following items from such viewpoints: (1) Safety and Operating Experience of LWR Nuclear Power Plants in Japan; a) Operating experience with light water reactors b) Improvements in design of light water reactors during the past ten years c) Analysis of the factors which affect plant availability; 2) Assurance of Safety and Measures to Increase Availability a) Measures for safety and environmental protection b) Measures to reduce radiation exposure of employees c) Appropriateness of maintenance and inspection work d) Measures to increase plant availability e) Measures to improve reliability of equipments and components; and 3) Future Technical Problems

  14. Applying artificial intelligence to safety and maintenance (in nuclear plants)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1987-01-01

    Under contract from the US DoE, Odetics Inc. is developing a prototype advisory expert system which may eventually be used for the maintenance and safety of a nuclear plant. The objective of the system will be to determine off-normal conditions and to help operations personnel through a course of action which would lead to a stable plant. (UK)

  15. Safety goals for nuclear power plants: a discussion paper

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-02-01

    This report includes a proposed policy statement on safety goals for nuclear power plants published by the Commission for public comment and a supporting discussion paper. Proposed qualitative goals and associated numerical guidelines for nuclear power-plant accident risks are presented. The significance of the goals and guidelines, their bases and rationale, and their proposed mode of implementation are discussed

  16. Safety-related occurrences at the Finnish nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reponen, H.; Viitasaari, O.

    1985-04-01

    This report contains detailed descriptions of operating incidents and other safety-related matters at the Finnish nuclear power plants regarded as significant by the regulatory authority, the Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety. In this connection, an account is given of the practical actions caused by the incidents, and their significance to reactor safety is evaluated. The main features of the incidents are also described in the general Quartely Report for this period, Operation of Finnish Nuclear Power Plants (STUK-B-YTO 7), which is supplemented by this report intended for experts. (author)

  17. Safety-related occurrences at the Finnish nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Viitasaari, O.; Rantavaara, A.

    1984-03-01

    This report contains detailed descriptions of operating incidents and other safety-related matters at the Finnish nuclear power plants regarded as significant by the regulatory authority, the Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety. In this connection, an account is given of the practical actions caused by the incidents, and their significance to reactor safety is evaluated. The main features of the incidents are also described in the general Quartely Report for this period, Operation of Finnish Nuclear Power Plants (STL-B-RTO-83/7), which is supplemented by this report intended principally for experts. (author)

  18. Safety-related incidents at the Finnish nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lehtinen, P.

    1985-01-01

    This report contains detailed descriptions of operating incidents and other safety-related matters at the Finnish nuclear power plants regarded as significant by the regulatory authority, the Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety. In this connection, an account is given of the practical actions caused by the incidents, and their significance to reactor safety is evaluated. The main features of the incidents are also described in the general Quartely Reports, Operation of Finnish Nuclear Power Plants, which are supplemented by this report intended for experts. (author)

  19. Safety-related incidents at the Finnish nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lehtinen, P.

    1986-03-01

    This report contains detailed descriptions of operating incidents and other safety-related matters at the Finnish nuclear power plants regarded as significant by the regulatory authority, the Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety. In this connection, an account is given of the practical actions caused by the incidents, and their significance to reactor safety is evaluated. The main features of the incidents are also described in the general Quartely Reports, Operation of Finnish Nuclear Power Plants, which are supplemented by this report intended for experts. (author)

  20. Fire hazard analysis for Plutonium Finishing Plant complex

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    MCKINNIS, D.L.

    1999-01-01

    A fire hazards analysis (FHA) was performed for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Complex at the Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford site. The scope of the FHA focuses on the nuclear facilities/structures in the Complex. The analysis was conducted in accordance with RLID 5480.7, [DOE Directive RLID 5480.7, 1/17/94] and DOE Order 5480.7A, ''Fire Protection'' [DOE Order 5480.7A, 2/17/93] and addresses each of the sixteen principle elements outlined in paragraph 9.a(3) of the Order. The elements are addressed in terms of the fire protection objectives stated in paragraph 4 of DOE 5480.7A. In addition, the FHA also complies with WHC-CM-4-41, Fire Protection Program Manual, Section 3.4 [1994] and WHC-SD-GN-FHA-30001, Rev. 0 [WHC, 1994]. Objectives of the FHA are to determine: (1) the fire hazards that expose the PFP facilities, or that are inherent in the building operations, (2) the adequacy of the fire safety features currently located in the PFP Complex, and (3) the degree of compliance of the facility with specific fire safety provisions in DOE orders, related engineering codes, and standards

  1. Fire hazard analysis for Plutonium Finishing Plant complex

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    MCKINNIS, D.L.

    1999-02-23

    A fire hazards analysis (FHA) was performed for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Complex at the Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford site. The scope of the FHA focuses on the nuclear facilities/structures in the Complex. The analysis was conducted in accordance with RLID 5480.7, [DOE Directive RLID 5480.7, 1/17/94] and DOE Order 5480.7A, ''Fire Protection'' [DOE Order 5480.7A, 2/17/93] and addresses each of the sixteen principle elements outlined in paragraph 9.a(3) of the Order. The elements are addressed in terms of the fire protection objectives stated in paragraph 4 of DOE 5480.7A. In addition, the FHA also complies with WHC-CM-4-41, Fire Protection Program Manual, Section 3.4 [1994] and WHC-SD-GN-FHA-30001, Rev. 0 [WHC, 1994]. Objectives of the FHA are to determine: (1) the fire hazards that expose the PFP facilities, or that are inherent in the building operations, (2) the adequacy of the fire safety features currently located in the PFP Complex, and (3) the degree of compliance of the facility with specific fire safety provisions in DOE orders, related engineering codes, and standards.

  2. Social contention about safety of nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nemoto, Kazuyasu

    1978-01-01

    In Japan, the contentions and arguments on the safety of nuclear power generation have been active since its first introduction, and these are greatly influenced by the nation's experiences of atomic bombs in Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Bikini. As the result, the attitude of peoples toward the acceptance of nuclear power plants is significantly different from that in other countries. The situation in Japan of social contentions about nuclear power safety is explained in two aspects: acceptance of the safety, by peoples and Japanese pattern of safety contentions. In both upstream and downstream of nuclear power generation, not only the safety but also the right or wrong for nuclear power generation itself is discussed. The problem of nuclear power safety has gone into the region beyond the technological viewpoint. The pattern of safety contentions in Japan is the entanglement of three sectors; i.e. local people, labor unions and political parties, enterprises and administration, and intellectuals. (Mori, K.)

  3. Evolution of the future plants operation for a better safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Papin, B.; Malvache, P.

    1994-01-01

    This paper describes a coordinated research project of the french CEA, addressing to the evolutions in plant operation apt to bring perceptible and assessable improvement in the operational safety. This program has been scheduled for the 1992-1996 period, with a global 40 men/year effort. The present status of the two main parts of the project is presented: ESCRIME (program aiming at defining the optimal share of tasks between humans and computers in plant operation), IMAGIN (research in the domain of plant information management, in order to ensure the global coherence of the image of the plant, used by the different actors in plant operation). (authors). 3 refs., 4 figs

  4. Nitrogen-system safety study: Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-07-01

    The Department of Energy has primary responsibility for the safety of operations at DOE-owned nuclear facilities. The guidelines for the analysis of credible accidents are outlined in DOE Order 5481.1. DOE has requested that existing plant facilities and operations be reviewed for potential safety problems not covered by standard industrial safety procedures. This review is being conducted by investigating individual facilities and documenting the results in Safety Study Reports which will be compiled to form the Existing Plant Final Safety Analysis Report which is scheduled for completion in September, 1984. This Safety Study documents the review of the Plant Nitrogen System facilities and operations and consists of Section 4.0, Facility and Process Description, and Section 5.0, Accident Analysis, of the Final Safety Analysis Report format. The existing nitrogen system consists of a Superior Air Products Company Type D Nitrogen Plant, nitrogen storage facilities, vaporization facilities and a distribution system. The system is designed to generate and distribute nitrogen gas used in the cascade for seal feed, buffer systems, and for servicing equipment when exceptionally low dew points are required. Gaseous nitrogen is also distributed to various process auxiliary buildings. The average usage is approximately 130,000 standard cubic feet per day

  5. A New Property of Conjugated Polymer PFP: Catalytic Degradation of Methylene Blue Aqueous Solution

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    2005-01-01

    A new property of conjugated polymer poly(furancarbinol-co-phenol)(PFP) was studied.The target copolymer was used as a catalyst after proper heating treatment. And dye methylene blue (MB) could be fully degraded and largely mineralized on PFP, under natural light or even in dark, in a few minutes. Furthermore, the catalytic activity could be preserved after several runs and the catalyst was readily separated. The effect of calcination temperature was also observed.

  6. Improving Chemical Plant Safety Training Using Virtual Reality

    OpenAIRE

    Nasios, Konstantinos

    2002-01-01

    The chemical engineering industry often requires people to work in hazardous environments and to operate complicated equipment which often limits the type of training that be carried out on site. The daily job of chemical plant operators is becoming more demanding due to the increasing plant complexity together with increasing requirements on plant safety, production capacity, product quality and cost effectiveness. The importance of designing systems and environments that are as safe as poss...

  7. Safety-related decision making at a nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vaurio, J.K.

    1998-01-01

    The decision making environment of an operating nuclear power plant is presented. The organizations involved, their roles and interactions as well as the main influencing factors and decision criteria are described. The focus is on safety-related decisions, and the framework is based on the situation at Loviisa power station. The role of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) is illustrated with decisions concerning plant modifications, optimization, acceptance of temporary configurations and extended repair times. Suggestions are made for rational and flexible risk-based control of allowed times to operate the plant with some components out of service. (orig.)

  8. Safety and operation of the Stade nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Salcher, H.

    1991-01-01

    The concept of PreussenElektra is to continuously increase the existing safety standard of the Stade nuclear power station using experience gained from faults and operation in nuclear power stations and the progressive state of the art. Modifications to achieve the most gentle operation of the plant have been completed and other are on-going. To do so instruments were attached to those components which are susceptible to fatigue to record the transients and extensive calculatory records were kept. Although the plant has almost 20 years successful operation behind it, it can still stand up well to comparisons with more recent plants as far as safety aspects are concerned. 6 figs

  9. Evaluation of seismic hazards for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The main objective of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations on how to determine the ground motion hazards for a plant at a particular site and the potential for surface faulting, which could affect the feasibility of construction and safe operation of a plant at that site. The guidelines and procedures presented in this Safety Guide can appropriately be used in evaluations of site suitability and seismic hazards for nuclear power plants in any seismotectonic environment. The probabilistic seismic hazard analysis recommended in this Safety Guide also addresses the needs for seismic hazard analysis of external event PSAs conducted for nuclear power plants. Many of the methods and processes described may also be applicable to nuclear facilities other than power plants. Other phenomena of permanent ground displacement (liquefaction, slope instability, subsidence and collapse) as well as the topic of seismically induced flooding are treated in Safety Guides relating to foundation safety and coastal flooding. Recommendations of a general nature are given in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the acquisition of a database containing the information needed to evaluate and address all hazards associated with earthquakes. Section 4 covers the use of this database for construction of a seismotectonic model. Sections 5 and 6 review ground motion hazards and evaluations of the potential for surface faulting, respectively. Section 7 addresses quality assurance in the evaluation of seismic hazards for nuclear power plants

  10. Improving the safety of LWR power plants. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-04-01

    This report documents the results of the Study to identify current, potential research issues and efforts for improving the safety of Light Water Reactor (LWR) power plants. This final report describes the work accomplished, the results obtained, the problem areas, and the recommended solutions. Specifically, for each of the issues identified in this report for improving the safety of LWR power plants, a description is provided in detail of the safety significance, the current status (including information sources, status of technical knowledge, problem solution and current activities), and the suggestions for further research and development. Further, the issues are ranked for action into high, medium, and low priority with respect to primarily (a) improved safety (e.g. potential reduction in public risk and occupational exposure), and secondly (b) reduction in safety-related costs

  11. Software for computer based systems important to safety in nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    Computer based systems are of increasing importance to safety in nuclear power plants as their use in both new and older plants is rapidly increasing. They are used both in safety related applications, such as some functions of the process control and monitoring systems, as well as in safety critical applications, such as reactor protection or actuation of safety features. The dependability of computer based systems important to safety is therefore of prime interest and should be ensured. With current technology, it is possible in principle to develop computer based instrumentation and control systems for systems important to safety that have the potential for improving the level of safety and reliability with sufficient dependability. However, their dependability can be predicted and demonstrated only if a systematic, fully documented and reviewable engineering process is followed. Although a number of national and international standards dealing with quality assurance for computer based systems important to safety have been or are being prepared, internationally agreed criteria for demonstrating the safety of such systems are not generally available. It is recognized that there may be other ways of providing the necessary safety demonstration than those recommended here. The basic requirements for the design of safety systems for nuclear power plants are provided in the Requirements for Design issued in the IAEA Safety Standards Series.The IAEA has issued a Technical Report to assist Member States in ensuring that computer based systems important to safety in nuclear power plants are safe and properly licensed. The report provides information on current software engineering practices and, together with relevant standards, forms a technical basis for this Safety Guide. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance on the collection of evidence and preparation of documentation to be used in the safety demonstration for the software for computer based

  12. Software for computer based systems important to safety in nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    Computer based systems are of increasing importance to safety in nuclear power plants as their use in both new and older plants is rapidly increasing. They are used both in safety related applications, such as some functions of the process control and monitoring systems, as well as in safety critical applications, such as reactor protection or actuation of safety features. The dependability of computer based systems important to safety is therefore of prime interest and should be ensured. With current technology, it is possible in principle to develop computer based instrumentation and control systems for systems important to safety that have the potential for improving the level of safety and reliability with sufficient dependability. However, their dependability can be predicted and demonstrated only if a systematic, fully documented and reviewable engineering process is followed. Although a number of national and international standards dealing with quality assurance for computer based systems important to safety have been or are being prepared, internationally agreed criteria for demonstrating the safety of such systems are not generally available. It is recognized that there may be other ways of providing the necessary safety demonstration than those recommended here. The basic requirements for the design of safety systems for nuclear power plants are provided in the Requirements for Design issued in the IAEA Safety Standards Series.The IAEA has issued a Technical Report to assist Member States in ensuring that computer based systems important to safety in nuclear power plants are safe and properly licensed. The report provides information on current software engineering practices and, together with relevant standards, forms a technical basis for this Safety Guide. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance on the collection of evidence and preparation of documentation to be used in the safety demonstration for the software for computer based

  13. Software for computer based systems important to safety in nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    Computer based systems are of increasing importance to safety in nuclear power plants as their use in both new and older plants is rapidly increasing. They are used both in safety related applications, such as some functions of the process control and monitoring systems, as well as in safety critical applications, such as reactor protection or actuation of safety features. The dependability of computer based systems important to safety is therefore of prime interest and should be ensured. With current technology, it is possible in principle to develop computer based instrumentation and control systems for systems important to safety that have the potential for improving the level of safety and reliability with sufficient dependability. However, their dependability can be predicted and demonstrated only if a systematic, fully documented and reviewable engineering process is followed. Although a number of national and international standards dealing with quality assurance for computer based systems important to safety have been or are being prepared, internationally agreed criteria for demonstrating the safety of such systems are not generally available. It is recognized that there may be other ways of providing the necessary safety demonstration than those recommended here. The basic requirements for the design of safety systems for nuclear power plants are provided in the Requirements for Design issued in the IAEA Safety Standards Series.The IAEA has issued a Technical Report to assist Member States in ensuring that computer based systems important to safety in nuclear power plants are safe and properly licensed. The report provides information on current software engineering practices and, together with relevant standards, forms a technical basis for this Safety Guide. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance on the collection of evidence and preparation of documentation to be used in the safety demonstration for the software for computer based

  14. Nuclear safety in fuel-reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hennies, H.H.; Koerting, K.

    1976-01-01

    The danger potential of nuclear power and fuel reprocessing plants in normal operation is compared. It becomes obvious that there are no basic differences. The analysis of possible accidents - blow-up of an evaporator for highly active wastes, zircaloy burning, cooling failure in self-heating process solutions, burning of a charged solvent, criticality accidents - shows that they are kept under control by the plant layout. (HP) [de

  15. Floating nuclear power plant safety assurance principles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zvonarev, B.M.; Kuchin, N.L.; Sergeev, I.V.

    1993-01-01

    In the north regions of the Russian federation and low density population areas, there is a real necessity for ecological clean energy small power sources. For this purpose, floating nuclear power plants, designed on the basis of atomic ship building engineering, are being conceptualized. It is possible to use the ship building plants for the reactor purposes. Issues such as radioactive waste management are described

  16. The safety of RBMK nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Holloway, N.J.

    1993-01-01

    The accident at Chernobyl coincided with the beginning of the era of ''perestroika'' and ''glasnost'' in the USSR. The accident provoked unprecedented openness between the USSR and the West, with Britain playing a large part in the exchanges because of its experience, albeit in separate reactor types, of large on-load fuelled graphite moderated reactor systems and pressure tube technologies. The Research and Development Institute of Power Engineering (RDIPE) had always been responsible for the design, development and safety analysis of the RBMK reactors. Since the accident it has therefore played the leading role in investigations of what went wrong and in developing the programme of RBMK safety improvements. (author)

  17. Safety evaluation of the nuclear power plant at Cattenom

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1987-01-01

    This is a systematic compilation of the material which was dealt with at the level of the German-French Commission (on questions of the safety of nuclear installations) in this discussions about the nuclear power plant at Cattenom. As a supplement to the report published already in 1982, the Commission has officially released its deliberation results on the subjects constructive safety measures, radiological effects, and precautions in case of an emergency. The allegations according to which the installation is wanting in safety are countered by the joint statement of the chairmen of GPR (Permanent Group on Reactors) and RSK (German Commission on Reactor Safety) of August 29, 1986. (HSCH) [de

  18. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication.

  19. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Russian Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication.

  20. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Arabic Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication.

  1. Safety analysis report for packaging (onsite) transuranic performance demonstration program sample packaging

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mccoy, J.C.

    1997-01-01

    The Transuranic Performance Demonstration Program (TPDP) sample packaging is used to transport highway route controlled quantities of weapons grade (WG) plutonium samples from the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) to the Waste Receiving and Processing (WRAP) facility and back. The purpose of these shipments is to test the nondestructive assay equipment in the WRAP facility as part of the Nondestructive Waste Assay PDP. The PDP is part of the U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) National TRU Program managed by the U. S. Department of Energy, Carlsbad Area Office, Carlsbad, New Mexico. Details of this program are found in CAO-94-1045, Performance Demonstration Program Plan for Nondestructive Assay for the TRU Waste Characterization Program (CAO 1994); INEL-96/0129, Design of Benign Matrix Drums for the Non-Destructive Assay Performance Demonstration Program for the National TRU Program (INEL 1996a); and INEL-96/0245, Design of Phase 1 Radioactive Working Reference Materials for the Nondestructive Assay Performance Demonstration Program for the National TRU Program (INEL 1996b). Other program documentation is maintained by the national TRU program and each DOE site participating in the program. This safety analysis report for packaging (SARP) provides the analyses and evaluations necessary to demonstrate that the TRU PDP sample packaging meets the onsite transportation safety requirements of WHC-CM-2-14, Hazardous Material Packaging and Shipping, for an onsite Transportation Hazard Indicator (THI) 2 packaging. This SARP, however, does not include evaluation of any operations within the PFP or WRAP facilities, including handling, maintenance, storage, or operating requirements, except as they apply directly to transportation between the gate of PFP and the gate of the WRAP facility. All other activities are subject to the requirements of the facility safety analysis reports (FSAR) of the PFP or WRAP facility and requirements of the PDP

  2. A study on safety climate at nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fukui, Hirokazu; Yoshida, Michio; Yoshiyama, Naohiro

    2001-01-01

    factors as the rating scales of the safety climate. In order to study the characteristics of the safety climate at nuclear power plants, we used a causal model with safety confirmation/report' as the result and other factors as forecasting factors. As a result of the covariance structure analysis using the causal model, it was found that 'safety confirmation/report' is an action based on confidence in knowledge and skill', and is supported by 'attitude of supervisors' and 'clarity of tasks.' The analytical results also indicate that 'safety education in workplace' plays an important role in promoting the sharing of information as a medium factor. As described, 'attitude of supervisors,' 'clarity of tasks' and 'safety education in workplace,' all of which are organizational environment factors, are important forecasting factors that influence individuals' safety actions and hence considered as constituents of the safety climate. (author)

  3. Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    A brief account of activities carried out by the Nuclear power plants Jaslovske Bohunice in 1997 is presented. These activities are reported under the headings: (1) Nuclear safety; (2) Industrial and health safety; (3) Radiation safety; and Fire protection

  4. Decommissioning of nuclear power plants and research reactors. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    Radioactive waste is produced in the generation of nuclear power and the use of radioactive materials in industry, research and medicine. The importance of the safe management of radioactive waste for the protection of human health and the environment has long been recognized, and considerable experience has been gained in this field. The IAEA's Radioactive Waste Safety Standards Programme aimed at establishing a coherent and comprehensive set of principles and requirements for the safe management of waste and formulating the guidelines necessary for their application. This is accomplished within the IAEA Safety Standards Series in an internally consistent set of publications that reflect an international consensus. The publications will provide Member States with a comprehensive series of internationally agreed publications to assist in the derivation of, and to complement, national criteria, standards and practices. The Safety Standards Series consists of three categories of publications: Safety Fundamentals, Safety Requirements and Safety Guides. With respect to the Radioactive Waste Safety Standards Programme, the set of publications is currently undergoing review to ensure a harmonized approach throughout the Safety Standards Series. This Safety Guide addresses the subject of decommissioning of nuclear power plants and research reactors. It is intended to provide guidance to national authorities and operating organizations for the planning and safe management of the decommissioning of such installations. This Safety Guide has been prepared through a series of Consultants and Technical Committee meetings. It supersedes former Safety Series publications Nos 52, 74 and 105

  5. Decommissioning of nuclear power plants and research reactors. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    Radioactive waste is produced in the generation of nuclear power and the use of radioactive materials in industry, research and medicine. The importance of the safe management of radioactive waste for the protection of human health and the environment has long been recognized, and considerable experience has been gained in this field. The IAEA's Radioactive Waste Safety Standards Programme aimed at establishing a coherent and comprehensive set of principles and requirements for the safe management of waste and formulating the guidelines necessary for their application. This is accomplished within the IAEA Safety Standards Series in an internally consistent set of publications that reflect an international consensus. The publications will provide Member States with a comprehensive series of internationally agreed publications to assist in the derivation of, and to complement, national criteria, standards and practices. The Safety Standards Series consists of three categories of publications: Safety Fundamentals, Safety Requirements and Safety Guides. With respect to the Radioactive Waste Safety Standards Programme, the set of publications is currently undergoing review to ensure a harmonized approach throughout the Safety Standards Series. This Safety Guide addresses the subject of decommissioning of nuclear power plants and research reactors. It is intended to provide guidance to national authorities and operating organizations for the planning and safe management of the decommissioning of such installations. This Safety Guide has been prepared through a series of Consultants and Technical Committee meetings. It supersedes former Safety Series publications Nos 52, 74 and 105

  6. Decommissioning of nuclear power plants and research reactors. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    Radioactive waste is produced in the generation of nuclear power and the use of radioactive materials in industry, research and medicine. The importance of the safe management of radioactive waste for the protection of human health and the environment has long been recognized, and considerable experience has been gained in this field. The IAEA's Radioactive Waste Safety Standards Programme aimed at establishing a coherent and comprehensive set of principles and requirements for the safe management of waste and formulating the guidelines necessary for their application. This is accomplished within the IAEA Safety Standards Series in an internally consistent set of publications that reflect an international consensus. The publications will provide Member States with a comprehensive series of internationally agreed publications to assist in the derivation of, and to complement, national criteria, standards and practices. The Safety Standards Series consists of three categories of publications: Safety Fundamentals, Safety Requirements and Safety Guides. With respect to the Radioactive Waste Safety Standards Programme, the set of publications is currently undergoing review to ensure a harmonized approach throughout the Safety Standards Series. This Safety Guide addresses the subject of decommissioning of nuclear power plants and research reactors. It is intended to provide guidance to national authorities and operating organizations for the planning and safe management of the decommissioning of such installations. This Safety Guide has been prepared through a series of Consultants and Technical Committee meetings. It supersedes former Safety Series publications Nos 52, 74 and 105

  7. A study on safety assessment methodology for a vitrification plant

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Seo, Y. C.; Lee, G. S.; Choi, Y. C.; Kim, G. H. [Yonsei Univ., Seoul (Korea, Republic of)

    2002-03-15

    In this study, the technical and regulatory status of radioactive waste vitrification technologies in foreign and domestic plants is investigated and analyzed, and then significant factors are suggested which must be contained in the final technical guideline or standard for the safety assessment of vitrification plants. Also, the methods to estimate the stability of vitrified waste forms are suggested with property analysis of them. The contents and scope of the study are summarized as follows : survey of the status on radioactive waste vitrification technologies in foreign and domestic plants, survey of the characterization methodology for radioactive waste form, analysis of stability for vitrified waste forms, survey and analysis of technical standards and regulations concerned with them in foreign and domestic plants, suggestion of significant factors for the safety assessment of vitrification plants, submission of regulated technical standard on radioactive waste vitrification plats.

  8. Upgrading the safety assessment of exported nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rosen, M.

    1978-01-01

    An examination of the safety aspects of exported nuclear power plants demonstrates that additional and somewhat special considerations exist for these plants, and thus that some new approaches may be required to insure their safety. In view of the generally small regulatory staffs of importing countries, suggestions are given for measures which should be taken by the various organizations involved in the export and import of nuclear power facilities to raise the level of the very essential safety assessment. These include the upgrading of the 'export edition' of the traditionally supplied safety documentation by use of a Supplementary Information Report, written specifically for the needs of a smaller and/or less technically qualified staff, which highlights the differences that exist between the facility to be constructed and the supposedly similar reference plant of the supplier country; by improvement of supporting safety documentation to allow for adequate understanding of significant safety parameters; and by attention to the needs of smaller countries in the critical Operating Regulations (Technical Specifications for Operation). Consideration is also given to upgrading the regulatory effort and to the obligations of principal organizations involved with exported nuclear plants, including national and international, for insuring the importing countries' technical readiness and the adequacy of the regulatory effort. Special attention is directed towards the project contract as a means of implementing programmes to achieve these goals. (author)

  9. Surveillance of items important to safety in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-01-01

    The Guide was prepared as part of the IAEA's programme, referred to as the NUSS Programme, for establishing Codes and Safety Guides relating to nuclear power plants. THe Guide supplements the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, IAEA Safety Series No. 50-C-O(Rev.1). The operating organization has overall responsibility for the safe operation of the nuclear power plant. Therefore, it shall ensure that adequate surveillance activities are carried out in order to verify that the plant is operated within the prescribed operational limits and conditions, and to detect in time any deterioration of structures, systems and components as well as any adverse trend that could lead to an unsafe condition. These activities can be classified as: Monitoring plant parameters and system status; Checking and calibrating instrumentation; Testing and inspecting structures, systems and components. This Safety Guide provides guidance and recommendations on surveillance activities to ensure that structures, systems and components important to safety are available to perform their functions in accordance with design intent and assumptions

  10. Safety goals for future nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Todreas, Neil E.

    2001-01-01

    This talk presents technology goals developed for Generation IV nuclear energy systems that can be made available to the market by 2030 or earlier. These goals are defined in the broad areas of sustainability, safety and reliability, and economics. Sustainability goals focus on fuel utilization, waste management, and proliferation resistance. Safety and reliability goals focus on safe and reliable operation, investment protection, and essentially eliminating the need for emergency response. Economics goals focus on competitive life cycle and energy production costs and financial risk. Future reactors fall in three categories - those which are: Certified or derivatives; Designed to a reasonable extent and based on available technology; In conceptual form only with potential to most fully satisfy the GENIV goals

  11. Safety assessment in plant layout design using indexing approach: Implementing inherent safety perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tugnoli, Alessandro; Khan, Faisal; Amyotte, Paul; Cozzani, Valerio

    2008-01-01

    Layout planning plays a key role in the inherent safety performance of process plants since this design feature controls the possibility of accidental chain-events and the magnitude of possible consequences. A lack of suitable methods to promote the effective implementation of inherent safety in layout design calls for the development of new techniques and methods. In the present paper, a safety assessment approach suitable for layout design in the critical early phase is proposed. The concept of inherent safety is implemented within this safety assessment; the approach is based on an integrated assessment of inherent safety guideword applicability within the constraints typically present in layout design. Application of these guidewords is evaluated along with unit hazards and control devices to quantitatively map the safety performance of different layout options. Moreover, the economic aspects related to safety and inherent safety are evaluated by the method. Specific sub-indices are developed within the integrated safety assessment system to analyze and quantify the hazard related to domino effects. The proposed approach is quick in application, auditable and shares a common framework applicable in other phases of the design lifecycle (e.g. process design). The present work is divided in two parts: Part 1 (current paper) presents the application of inherent safety guidelines in layout design and the index method for safety assessment; Part 2 (accompanying paper) describes the domino hazard sub-index and demonstrates the proposed approach with a case study, thus evidencing the introduction of inherent safety features in layout design

  12. Planning and architectural safety considerations in designing nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Konsowa, Ahmed A.

    2009-01-01

    To achieve optimum safety and to avoid possible hazards in nuclear power plants, considering architectural design fundamentals and all operating precautions is mandatory. There are some planning and architectural precautions should be considered to achieve a high quality design and construction of nuclear power plant with optimum safety. This paper highlights predicted hazards like fire, terrorism, aircraft crash attacks, adversaries, intruders, and earthquakes, proposing protective actions against these hazards that vary from preventing danger to evacuating and sheltering people in-place. For instance; using safeguards program to protect against sabotage, theft, and diversion. Also, site and building well design focusing on escape pathways, emergency exits, and evacuation zones, and the safety procedures such as; evacuation exercises and sheltering processes according to different emergency classifications. In addition, this paper mentions some important codes and regulations that control nuclear power plants design, and assessment methods that evaluate probable risks. (author)

  13. [Safety assessment of foods derived from genetically modified plants].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pöting, A; Schauzu, M

    2010-06-01

    The placing of genetically modified plants and derived food on the market falls under Regulation (EC) No. 1829/2003. According to this regulation, applicants need to perform a safety assessment according to the Guidance Document of the Scientific Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), which is based on internationally agreed recommendations. This article gives an overview of the underlying legislation as well as the strategy and scientific criteria for the safety assessment, which should generally be based on the concept of substantial equivalence and carried out in relation to an unmodified conventional counterpart. Besides the intended genetic modification, potential unintended changes also have to be assessed with regard to potential adverse effects for the consumer. All genetically modified plants and derived food products, which have been evaluated by EFSA so far, were considered to be as safe as products derived from the respective conventional plants.

  14. Survey of numerical safety targets for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kelley, A.P. Jr.; Buttemer, D.R.

    1981-04-01

    The construction of a nuclear power plant implies, as does the construction of any major public work, the acceptance of a finite degree of risk. This risk can be reduced by an increased investment in engineered safeguards. However, at some level of risk, overinvestment in safety can render the project uneconomical. Because of the desirability of fixing safety standards on an absolute basis, there has long been an interest in establishing numerical risk criteria for the design, construction, and operation of nuclear power plants. Interest in the subject of numerical safety goals has recently been intensified by the Three Mile Island Action Plan. The USNRC has been directed by Congress to develop a national safety goal for reactor regulation. This report summarizes actions which have been historically, and are currently, taking place toward establishing national numerical risk targets for reactor regulation. Emphasis is placed upon actions taken, or currently being taken, by federal regulatory agencies and directly associated advisory bodies

  15. Uranium isotope separation by gaseous diffusion and plant safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simeon, Claude; Dumas, Maurice.

    1980-07-01

    This report constitutes a safety guide for operators of uranium isotope separation plants, and includes both aspects of safety and protection. Taking into account the complexity of safety problems raised at design and during operation of plants which require specialized guides, this report mainly considers both the protection of man, the environment and goods, and the principles of occupational safety. It does not claim to be comprehensive, but intends to state the general principles, the particular points related to the characteristics of the basic materials and processes, and to set forth a number of typical solutions suitable for various human and technical environments. It is based on the French experience gained during the last fifteen years [fr

  16. IAEA Leads Operational Safety Mission to Muehleberg Nuclear Power Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    Full text: An international team of nuclear safety experts led by the International Atomic Energy Agency today concluded a review of the safety practices at the Muehleberg Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) near Bern in Switzerland. The team noted a series of good practices and made recommendations and suggestions to reinforce them. The IAEA assembled the Operational Safety Review Team at the request of the Swiss government. The team, led by the IAEA's Division of Nuclear Installation Safety, performed an in-depth operational safety review from 8 to 25 October 2012. The team comprised experts from Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Slovakia, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States as well as experts from the IAEA. The team conducted an in-depth review of the aspects essential to the safe operation of the Muehleberg NPP. The conclusions of the review are based on the IAEA's Safety Standards and proven good international practices. The review covered the areas of Management, Organization and Administration; Training; Operations; Maintenance; Technical Support; Operating Experience; Radiation Protection; Chemistry, Emergency Planning and Preparedness, Severe Accident Management and Long-Term Operation. The OSART team made 10 recommendations and 11 suggestions related to areas where operations of Muehleberg NPP could be further improved, for example: - Plant management could improve the operating experience program and methods throughout the plant to ensure corrective actions are taken in a timely manner; - In the area of Long-Term Operation, the ageing management review for some systems and components is not complete and the environmental qualification of originally installed safety cables has not yet been revalidated for long-term operation; and - The plant provisions for the protection of persons on the site during an emergency with radioactive release can be improved to minimize health risks to plant personnel. The team also identified 10 good

  17. The safety of nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hoehn, J.; Niehaus, F.

    1997-01-01

    Nuclear power plant operators and nuclear organizations from the West and from the East cooperate at many levels. The G7 and G24 nations have taken it upon themselves to improve the safety of Eastern nuclear power plants. The European Union has launched support programs, i.e. Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (Tacis) and Pologne-Hangrie: Aide a la Reconstruction Economique (Phare), and founded the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe operate nuclear power plants equipped with VVER-type pressurized water reactors and those equipped with RBMK-type reactors. The safety of these two types of plants is judged very differently. Among the VVER plants, a distinction is made between the older and the more recent 440 MWe lines and the 1000 MWe line. Especially the RBMK plants (Chernobyl-type plants) differ greatly as a function of location and year of construction. Even though they do not meet Western safety standards and at best can be backfitted up to a certain level, it must yet be assumed that they will remain in operation to the end of their projected service lives for economic reasons. (orig.) [de

  18. Safety aspects of gas centrifuge enrichment plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hansen, A.H.

    1987-01-01

    Uranium enrichment by gas centrifuge is a commercially proven, viable technology. Gas centrifuge enrichment plant operations pose hazards that are also found in other industries as well as unique hazards as a result of processing and handling uranium hexafluoride and the handling of enriched uranium. Hazards also found in other industries included those posed by the use of high-speed rotating equipment and equipment handling by use of heavy-duty cranes. Hazards from high-speed rotating equipment are associated with the operation of the gas centrifuges themselves and with the operation of the uranium hexafluoride compressors in the tail withdrawal system. These and related hazards are discussed. It is included that commercial gas centrifuge enrichment plants have been designed to operate safely

  19. Quality assurance and nuclear power plant safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mullan, J.V.

    1983-01-01

    Quality assurance in the nuclear industry was born in the late 1960s. Atomic Energy Control Board staff began its regulatory practice on quality assurance during that period. In this presentation the author traces the circumstances that first led to the establishment of Canadian nuclear power plant quality assurance programmes, summarizes progress over the last decade and a half, and outlines the current regulatory approach and what has been learned so far

  20. Adapting a reactor safety assessment system for specific plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ballard, T.L.; Cordes, G.A.

    1991-01-01

    The Reactor Safety Assessment System (RSAS) is an expert system being developed by the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, the University of Maryland (UofM) and US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for use in the NRC Operations center. RSAS is designed to help the Reactor Safety Team monitor and project core status during an emergency at a licensed nuclear power plant. Analysis uses a hierarchical plant model based on equipment availability and automatically input parametric plant information. There are 3 families of designs of pressurized water reactors and 75 plants using modified versions of the basic design. In order to make an RSAS model for each power plant, a generic model for a given plant type is used with differences being specified by plant specific files. Graphical displays of this knowledge are flexible enough to handle any plant configuration. A variety of tools have been implemented to make it easy to modify a design to fit a given plant while minimizing chance for error. 3 refs., 4 figs

  1. Safety problems in fuel reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Amaury, P.; Jouannaud, C.; Niezborala, F.

    1979-01-01

    The document first situates the reprocessing in the fuel cycle as a whole. It shows that a large reprocessing plant serves a significant number of reactors (50 for a plant of 1500 tonnes per annum). It then assesses the potential risks with respect to the environment as well as with respect to the operating personnel. The amounts of radioactive matter handled are very significant and their easily dispersible physical form represents very important risks. But the low potential energy likely to bring about this dispersion and the very severe and plentiful confinement arrangements are such that the radioactive risks are very small, both with respect to the environment and the operating personnel. The problems of the interventions for maintenance or repairs are mentioned. The intervention techniques in a radioactive environment are perfected, but they represent the main causes of operating personnel irradiation. The design principle applied in the new plants take this fact into account, involving a very significant effort to improve the reliability of the equipment and ensuring the provision of devices enabling the failing components to be replaced without causing irradiation of the personnel [fr

  2. Mathematical Safety Assessment Approaches for Thermal Power Plants

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Zong-Xiao Yang

    2014-01-01

    Full Text Available How to use system analysis methods to identify the hazards in the industrialized process, working environment, and production management for complex industrial processes, such as thermal power plants, is one of the challenges in the systems engineering. A mathematical system safety assessment model is proposed for thermal power plants in this paper by integrating fuzzy analytical hierarchy process, set pair analysis, and system functionality analysis. In the basis of those, the key factors influencing the thermal power plant safety are analyzed. The influence factors are determined based on fuzzy analytical hierarchy process. The connection degree among the factors is obtained by set pair analysis. The system safety preponderant function is constructed through system functionality analysis for inherence properties and nonlinear influence. The decision analysis system is developed by using active server page technology, web resource integration, and cross-platform capabilities for applications to the industrialized process. The availability of proposed safety assessment approach is verified by using an actual thermal power plant, which has improved the enforceability and predictability in enterprise safety assessment.

  3. Recommended general safety requirements for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-06-01

    This report presents recommendations for a set of general safety requirements that could form the basis for the licensing of nuclear power plants by the Atomic Energy Control Board. In addition to a number of recommended deterministic requirements the report includes criteria for the acceptability of the design of such plants based upon the calculated probability and consequence (in terms of predicted radiation dose to members of the public) of potential fault sequences. The report also contains a historical review of nuclear safety principles and practices in Canada

  4. Safety and regulatory requirements of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kumar, S.V.; Bhardwaj, S.A.

    2000-01-01

    A pre-requisite for a nuclear power program in any country is well established national safety and regulatory requirements. These have evolved for nuclear power plants in India with participation of the regulatory body, utility, research and development (R and D) organizations and educational institutions. Prevailing international practices provided a useful base to develop those applicable to specific system designs for nuclear power plants in India. Their effectiveness has been demonstrated in planned activities of building up the nuclear power program as well as with unplanned activities, like those due to safety related incidents etc. (author)

  5. Safety assessment of emergency power systems for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-01-01

    This publication is intended to assist the safety assessor within a regulatory body, or one working as a consultant, in assessing the safety of a given design of the emergency power systems (EPS) for a nuclear power plant. The present publication refers closely to the NUSS Safety Guide 50-SG-D7 (Rev. 1), Emergency Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants. It covers therefore exactly the same technical subject as that Safety Guide. In view of its objective, however, it attempts to help in the evaluation of possible technical solutions which are intended to fulfill the safety requirements. Section 2 clarifies the scope further by giving an outline of the assessment steps in the licensing process. After a general outline of the assessment process in relation to the licensing of a nuclear power plant, the publication is divided into two parts. First, all safety issues are presented in the form of questions that have to be answered in order for the assessor to be confident of a safe design. The second part presents the same topics in tabulated form, listing the required documentation which the assessor has to consult and those international and national technical standards pertinent to the topics. An extensive reference list provides information on standards. 1 tab

  6. Regulatory supervision of safety indicators; experience with radiation safety indicators in Dukovany nuclear power plant performance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Urbancik, L.; Kulich, V.

    2004-01-01

    The State Office for Nuclear Safety uses three sets of indicators describing the following aspects of a favourable nuclear power plant operation: smooth operation in normal circumstances, low risk to the population, and operation with a positive safety attitude. These are three safety-related areas for assessment. Each area has its own set of indicators. Overall operational safety performance indicators were identified for each attribute. From this point, a level of strategic indicators was developed, and finally, a set of specific indicators was set up. While neither the overall indicators nor the strategic indicators are directly measurable, the specific indicators are directly measurable and are targeted during inspection. (author)

  7. Safety provision for nuclear power plants during remaining running time

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rossnagel, Alexander; Hentschel, Anja

    2012-01-01

    With the phasing-out of the industrial use of nuclear energy for the power generation, the risk of the nuclear power plants has not been eliminated in principle, but only for a limited period of time. Therefore, the remaining nine nuclear power plants must also be used for the remaining ten years according to the state of science and technology. Regulatory authorities must substantiate the safety requirements for each nuclear power plant and enforce these requirements by means of various regulatory measures. The consequences of Fukushima must be included in the assessment of the safety level of nuclear power plants in Germany. In this respect, the regulatory authorities have the important tasks to investigate and assess the security risks as well as to develop instructions and orders.

  8. Nuclear accidents and safety measures of domestic nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Song Zurong; Che Shuwei; Pan Xiang

    2012-01-01

    Based on the design standards for the safety of nuclear and radiation in nuclear power plants, the three accidents in the history of nuclear power are analyzed. And the main factors for these accidents are found out, that is, human factors and unpredicted natural calamity. By combining the design and operation parameters of domestic nuclear plants, the same accidents are studied and some necessary preventive schemes are put forward. In the security operation technology of domestic nuclear power plants nowadays, accidents caused by human factors can by prevented completely. But the safety standards have to be reconsidered for the unpredicted neutral disasters. How to reduce the hazard of nuclear radiation and leakage to the level that can be accepted by the government and public when accidents occur under extreme conditions during construction and operation of nuclear power plants must be considered adequately. (authors)

  9. Management and organization in nuclear power plant safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Osborn, R.N.

    1983-08-01

    In the immediate aftermath of the Three Mile Island accident, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission-sponsored investigations of the relation between human issues and safety tended to focus on individual and, at most, group level phenomena. This initial bottom up view of organizational safety has continued to be investigated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, as evidence by the four previous papers. Recently, however, work has begun which adopts a top down management/organization approach to nuclear power plant safety. This paper reports on the research, to date, on this focus

  10. Upgrading safety documentation for exported nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rosen, M.

    1978-01-01

    In view of the generally small regulatory staffs of importing countries, suggestions are given for upgrading the ''export edition'' of the traditionally supplied safety documentation by use of a Supplementary Information Report, written specifically for the needs of a smaller and/or less technically qualified staff, which would highlight the differences that exist between the facility to be constructed and the supposedly similar reference plant of the supplier country; by improvement of supporting safety documentation to allow for adequate understanding of significant safety parameters; and by attention to the needs of smaller countries in the critical operating regulations (Technical Specifications for Operation). (author)

  11. Software important to safety in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    The report provides guidance on current practices, documenting their strengths and weaknesses for dealing with the important issues of software engineering that nuclear power plant system designers, software producers and regulators are facing. The focus of the report is on safety critical applications of general purpose processors controlled by custom developed software; however, it should also have application in safety related applications and for other types of computers. In addition to system designers, software producers and regulators, the intended readership of this report includes users of software based systems, who should be aware of the relevant issues in specifying and obtaining software for systems important to safety. Refs, 1 fig., tabs

  12. Safety aspects of nuclear plants coupled with seawater desalination units

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-08-01

    The purpose of this publication is to address the safety and licensing aspects of nuclear power plants for which a significant portion of the heat energy produced by the reactor is intended for use in heat utilization applications. Although intended to cover the broad spectrum of nuclear heat applications, the focus of the discussion will be the desalination of sea water using nuclear power plants as the energy source for the desalination process

  13. The reliability of nuclear power plant safety systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Susnik, J.

    1978-01-01

    A criterion was established concerning the protection that nuclear power plant (NPP) safety systems should afford. An estimate of the necessary or adequate reliability of the total complex of safety systems was derived. The acceptable unreliability of auxiliary safety systems is given, provided the reliability built into the specific NPP safety systems (ECCS, Containment) is to be fully utilized. A criterion for the acceptable unreliability of safety (sub)systems which occur in minimum cut sets having three or more components of the analysed fault tree was proposed. A set of input MTBF or MTTF values which fulfil all the set criteria and attain the appropriate overall reliability was derived. The sensitivity of results to input reliability data values was estimated. Numerical reliability evaluations were evaluated by the programs POTI, KOMBI and particularly URSULA, the last being based on Vesely's kinetic fault tree theory. (author)

  14. Complementary assessment of the safety of French nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Camarcat, N.; Pouget-Abadie, X.

    2011-01-01

    As an immediate consequence of the Fukushima accident the French nuclear safety Authority (ASN) asked EDF to perform a complementary safety assessment for each nuclear power plant dealing with 3 points: 1) the consequences of exceptional natural disasters, 2) the consequences of total loss of electrical power, and 3) the management of emergency situations. The safety margin has to be assessed considering 3 main points: first a review of the conformity to the initial safety requirements, secondly the resistance to events overdoing what the facility was designed to stand for, and the feasibility of any modification susceptible to improve the safety of the facility. This article details the specifications of such assessment, the methodology followed by EDF, the task organization and the time schedule. (A.C.)

  15. Summary report on safety objectives in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-01-01

    The special Task Force on Safety Objectives of the Commission of the European Communities (CEC) Working Group on the Safety of Light Water Reactors reported in May 1983 on its review of existing overall safety objectives in nuclear power plants. Since then much relevant worlwide activity has taken place. This report reviews those activities that have taken place since 1983 in European Community Member States, including more recent Members, as well as in Sweden and Finland. The report confines itself to issues related to probabilistic safety objectives, and concludes that significant progress has been made in many areas. Mutual understanding of safety objectives is leading to a convergence of views and approaches, but it is noted that much work remains to be completed

  16. A concept of safety indicator system for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lehtinen, E.

    1995-12-01

    The fundamental principle in the safety technology of nuclear power is embodied in the strategy of defence in depth. The defence lines of the strategy, completed with a PSA logic model and structure, are considered to provide an appropriate framework for identification and structuring of the operational safety performance areas for nuclear power plants. Once these areas are identified the safety indicators can be defined. Based on this approach a concept of safety indicator system was outlined. About one hundred indicator specifications have been collected, refined and related to the performance areas. The specifications enable the utilities and authorities to check the coverage of their indicators set from the operational safety point of view and select or refine indicators for testing and routine use. Finally various statistical approaches and methods for using indicators in performance evaluation are presented. (orig.) (16 refs., 2 figs., 2 tabs.)

  17. Thermophysics of safety of Nuclear Power Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Klyuchnikov, A.A.; Sharaevskij, I.G.; Fialko, N.M.; Zimin, L.B.; Sharaevskij, G.I.

    2010-01-01

    This monograph presents the basic critical analysis of the vapor phase generation process and the heat exchange crisis with respect to conditions of involuntary movement of heat carrier in the steam generating core channels of the nuclear powerful reactors, as well as modern understanding on the most important current heat hydraulic peculiarities under these conditions the two-phase flows. It was suggested the series of original methods, physics mathematical models and algorithms for enhancement of thermohydraulic computation codes - the component of great importance for operational safety providing system of nuclear power units, and for giving the possibility of automatic identification for these systems in real time of nominal and pre-emergency modes of vapor-water flows current.

  18. RATU - Nuclear power plant structural safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hedner, G.; Schultz, H.; Unneberg, L.

    1992-12-01

    The evaluation group is of the opinion that the work performed under the RATU programme is generally of high quality, in some areas, especially those related to water chemistry of excellent quality. The personnel gives the impression of being dedicated and enthusiastic, and the administration seems to be very effective. It is obvious that the RATU programme has taken advantage of related contracts and projects funded by different sources. It is the opinion of the valuation group that the investment and human capital have been brought to work very efficiently in all projects. The objectives of the programme and the different projects are formulated in a broad sense. The areas selected for work are however of high relevance to nuclear safety. In some projects not all aspects are addressed by the ongoing work, and further activities may be necessary to meet with the requirements of the authorities. (orig.)

  19. IR-360 nuclear power plant safety functions and component classification

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yousefpour, F., E-mail: fyousefpour@snira.co [Management of Nuclear Power Plant Construction Company (MASNA) (Iran, Islamic Republic of); Shokri, F.; Soltani, H. [Management of Nuclear Power Plant Construction Company (MASNA) (Iran, Islamic Republic of)

    2010-10-15

    The IR-360 nuclear power plant as a 2-loop PWR of 360 MWe power generation capacity is under design in MASNA Company. For design of the IR-360 structures, systems and components (SSCs), the codes and standards and their design requirements must be determined. It is a prerequisite to classify the IR-360 safety functions and safety grade of structures, systems and components correctly for selecting and adopting the suitable design codes and standards. This paper refers to the IAEA nuclear safety codes and standards as well as USNRC standard system to determine the IR-360 safety functions and to formulate the principles of the IR-360 component classification in accordance with the safety philosophy and feature of the IR-360. By implementation of defined classification procedures for the IR-360 SSCs, the appropriate design codes and standards are specified. The requirements of specific codes and standards are used in design process of IR-360 SSCs by design engineers of MASNA Company. In this paper, individual determination of the IR-360 safety functions and definition of the classification procedures and roles are presented. Implementation of this work which is described with example ensures the safety and reliability of the IR-360 nuclear power plant.

  20. Status of safety issues at licensed power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-05-01

    As part of ongoing US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) efforts to ensure the quality and accountability of safety issue information, a program has been established whereby an annual NUREG report will be published on the status of licensee implementation and NRC verification of safety issues in major NRC requirement areas. This report, the second volume of a three-volume series, addresses the status of unresolved safety issues (USIs) at licensed plants. The data contained in these NUREG reports are a product of the NRC's Safety Issues Management System (SIMS) database, which is maintained by the Project Management Staff in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and by NRC regional personnel. The purpose of this report is to provide a comprehensive description of the status of implementation and verification of the 27 safety issues designated as USIs and to make this information available to other interested parties, including the public. A corollary purpose of this NUREG report is to serve as a follow-on to NUREG-0933, ''A Prioritization of Generic Safety Issues,'' which tracks safety issues up until requirements are approved for imposition at licensed plants. 3 figs., 4 tabs

  1. IR-360 nuclear power plant safety functions and component classification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yousefpour, F.; Shokri, F.; Soltani, H.

    2010-01-01

    The IR-360 nuclear power plant as a 2-loop PWR of 360 MWe power generation capacity is under design in MASNA Company. For design of the IR-360 structures, systems and components (SSCs), the codes and standards and their design requirements must be determined. It is a prerequisite to classify the IR-360 safety functions and safety grade of structures, systems and components correctly for selecting and adopting the suitable design codes and standards. This paper refers to the IAEA nuclear safety codes and standards as well as USNRC standard system to determine the IR-360 safety functions and to formulate the principles of the IR-360 component classification in accordance with the safety philosophy and feature of the IR-360. By implementation of defined classification procedures for the IR-360 SSCs, the appropriate design codes and standards are specified. The requirements of specific codes and standards are used in design process of IR-360 SSCs by design engineers of MASNA Company. In this paper, individual determination of the IR-360 safety functions and definition of the classification procedures and roles are presented. Implementation of this work which is described with example ensures the safety and reliability of the IR-360 nuclear power plant.

  2. Research on fuzzy comprehensive assessment method of nuclear power plant safety culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Xiang Yuanyuan; Chen Xukun; Xu Rongbin

    2012-01-01

    Considering the traits of safety culture in nuclear plant, 38 safety culture assessment indexes are established from 4 aspects such as safety values, safety institution, safety behavior and safety sub- stances. Based on it, a comprehensive assessment method for nuclear power plant safety culture is constructed by using AHP (Analytic Hierarchy Process) approach and fuzzy mathematics. The comprehensive assessment method has the quality of high precision and high operability, which can support the decision making of safety culture development. (authors)

  3. Safety Evaluation Approach with Security Controls for Safety I and C Systems on Nuclear Power Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, D. H.; Jeong, S. Y.; Kim, Y. M.; Park, H. S.; Lee, M. S.; Kim, T. H.

    2016-01-01

    This paper addresses concepts of safety and security and relations between them for assessing effects of security features in safety systems. Also, evaluation approach for avoiding confliction with safety requirements and cyber security features which may be adopted in safety-related digital I and C system will be described. In this paper, safety-security life cycle model based confliction avoidance method was proposed to evaluate the effects when the cyber security control features are implemented in the safety I and C system. Also, safety effect evaluation results using the proposed evaluation method were described. In case of technical security controls, many of them are expected to conflict with safety requirements, otherwise operational and managerial controls are not relatively. Safety measures and cyber security measures for nuclear power plants should be implemented not to conflict with one another. Where safety function and security features are both required within the systems, and also where security features are implemented within safety systems, they should be justified

  4. Safety Evaluation Approach with Security Controls for Safety I and C Systems on Nuclear Power Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, D. H.; Jeong, S. Y.; Kim, Y. M.; Park, H. S. [KINS, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Lee, M. S.; Kim, T. H. [Formal Works Inc., Seoul (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-05-15

    This paper addresses concepts of safety and security and relations between them for assessing effects of security features in safety systems. Also, evaluation approach for avoiding confliction with safety requirements and cyber security features which may be adopted in safety-related digital I and C system will be described. In this paper, safety-security life cycle model based confliction avoidance method was proposed to evaluate the effects when the cyber security control features are implemented in the safety I and C system. Also, safety effect evaluation results using the proposed evaluation method were described. In case of technical security controls, many of them are expected to conflict with safety requirements, otherwise operational and managerial controls are not relatively. Safety measures and cyber security measures for nuclear power plants should be implemented not to conflict with one another. Where safety function and security features are both required within the systems, and also where security features are implemented within safety systems, they should be justified.

  5. IAEA Leads Operational Safety Mission to Armenian Nuclear Power Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    Full text: An international team of nuclear installation safety experts, led by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has reviewed the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant (ANPP) near Metsamor for its safety practices and has noted a series of good practices, as well as recommendations to reinforce them. The IAEA assembled an international team of experts at the request of the Government of the Republic of Armenia to conduct an Operational Safety Review (OSART) of the NPP. Under the leadership of the IAEA's Division of Nuclear Installation Safety, the OSART team performed an in-depth operational safety review from 16 May to 2 June 2011. The team was made up of experts from Finland, France, Lithuania, Hungary, Netherlands, Slovakia, UK, USA, EC and the IAEA. An OSART mission is designed as a review of programmes and activities essential to operational safety. It is not a regulatory inspection, nor is it a design review or a substitute for an exhaustive assessment of the plant's overall safety status. Experts participating in the IAEA's June 2010 International Conference on Operational Safety of Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) reviewed the experience of the OSART programme and concluded: In OSART missions NPPs are assessed against IAEA safety standards which reflect the current international consensus on what constitutes a high level of safety; and OSART recommendations and suggestions are of utmost importance for operational safety improvement of NPPs. Armenia is commended for openness to the international nuclear community and for actively inviting IAEA safety review missions to submit their activities to international scrutiny. Examples of IAEA safety reviews include: Design Safety Review in 2003; Review of Probabilistic Safety Assessment in 2007; and Assessment of Seismic Safety Re-Evaluation in 2009. The team at ANPP conducted an in-depth review of the aspects essential to the safe operation of the plant, which is largely under the control of the site management

  6. Nuclear power plant safety related pump issues

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Colaccino, J.

    1996-12-01

    This paper summarizes of a number of pump issues raised since the Third NRC/ASME Symposium on Valve and Pump Testing in 1994. General issues discussed include revision of NRC Inspection Procedure 73756, issuance of NRC Information Notice 95-08 on ultrasonic flow meter uncertainties, relief requests for tests that are determined by the licensee to be impractical, and items in the ASME OM-1995 Code, Subsection ISTB, for pumps. The paper also discusses current pump vibration issues encountered in relief requests and plant inspections - which include smooth running pumps, absolute vibration limits, and vertical centrifugal pump vibration measurement requirements. Two pump scope issues involving boiling water reactor waterlog and reactor core isolation cooling pumps are also discussed. Where appropriate, NRC guidance is discussed.

  7. Nuclear power plant safety related pump issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Colaccino, J.

    1996-01-01

    This paper summarizes of a number of pump issues raised since the Third NRC/ASME Symposium on Valve and Pump Testing in 1994. General issues discussed include revision of NRC Inspection Procedure 73756, issuance of NRC Information Notice 95-08 on ultrasonic flow meter uncertainties, relief requests for tests that are determined by the licensee to be impractical, and items in the ASME OM-1995 Code, Subsection ISTB, for pumps. The paper also discusses current pump vibration issues encountered in relief requests and plant inspections - which include smooth running pumps, absolute vibration limits, and vertical centrifugal pump vibration measurement requirements. Two pump scope issues involving boiling water reactor waterlog and reactor core isolation cooling pumps are also discussed. Where appropriate, NRC guidance is discussed

  8. New requirements on safety of nuclear power plants according to the IAEA safety standards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Misak, J.

    2005-01-01

    In this presentation author presents new requirements on safety of nuclear power plants according to the IAEA safety standards. It is concluded that: - New set of IAEA Safety Standards is close to completion: around 40 standards for NPPs; - Different interpretation of IAEA Safety Standards at present: best world practices instead of previous 'minimum common denominator'; - A number of safety improvements required for NPPs; - Requirements related to BDBAs and severe accidents are the most demanding due to degradation of barriers: hardware modifications and accident management; - Large variety between countries in implementation of accident management programmes: from minimum to major hardware modifications; -Distinction between existing and new NPPs is essential from the point of view of the requirements; WWER 440 reactors have potential to reflect IAEA Safety Standards for existing NPPs; relatively low reactor power offers broader possibilities

  9. South Ukraine NPP: Safety improvements through Plant Computer upgrade

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brenman, O.; Chernyshov, M. A.; Denning, R. S.; Kolesov, S. A.; Balakan, H. H.; Bilyk, B. I.; Kuznetsov, V. I.; Trosman, G.

    2006-01-01

    This paper summarizes some results of the Plant Computer upgrade at the Units 2 and 3 of South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). A Plant Computer, which is also called the Computer Information System (CIS), is one of the key safety-related systems at VVER-1000 nuclear plants. The main function of the CIS is information support for the plant operators during normal and emergency operational modes. Before this upgrade, South Ukraine NPP operated out-of-date and obsolete systems. This upgrade project wax founded by the U.S. DOE in the framework of the International Nuclear Safety Program (INSP). The most efficient way to improve the quality and reliability of information provided to the plant operator is to upgrade the Human-System Interface (HSI), which is the Upper Level (UL) CIS. The upgrade of the CIS data-acquisition system (DAS), which is the Lower Level (LL) CIS, would have less effect on the unit safety. Generally speaking, the lifetime of the LL CIS is much higher than one of the UL CIS. Unlike Plant Computers at the Western-designed plants, the functionality of the WER-1000 CISs includes a control function (Centralized Protection Testing) and a number of the plant equipment monitoring functions, for example, Protection and Interlock Monitoring and Turbo-Generator Temperature Monitoring. The new system is consistent with a historical migration of the format by which information is presented to the operator away from the traditional graphic displays, for example, Piping and Instrument Diagrams (P and ID's), toward Integral Data displays. The cognitive approach to information presentation is currently limited by some licensing issues, but is adapted to a greater degree with each new system. The paper provides some lessons learned on the management of the international team. (authors)

  10. Standard model for safety analysis report of fuel fabrication plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-09-01

    A standard model for a safety analysis report of fuel fabrication plants is established. This model shows the presentation format, the origin, and the details of the minimal information required by CNEN (Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear) aiming to evaluate the requests of construction permits and operation licenses made according to the legislation in force. (E.G.) [pt

  11. Standard model for safety analysis report of fuel reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-12-01

    A standard model for a safety analysis report of fuel reprocessing plants is established. This model shows the presentation format, the origin, and the details of the minimal information required by CNEN (Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear) aiming to evaluate the requests of construction permits and operation licenses made according to the legislation in force. (E.G.) [pt

  12. Safety assessment standards for modern plants in the UK

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harbison, S.A.; Hannaford, J.

    1993-01-01

    The NII has revised its safety assessment principles (SAPs). This paper discusses the revised SAPs and their links with international standards. It considers the licensing of foreign designs of plant - a matter under active consideration in the UK -and discusses how the SAPs and the licensing process cater for that possibility. (author)

  13. Slovenske elektrarne, Mochovce nuclear power plant. Safety strategy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    In this leaflet the Management's declaration is presented. This declaration contains: operation management and quality assurance, plant commissioning, maintenance and repairs, reactor physics, radiation protection, surveillance programmes, events analyses and experience feed-back, accident management procedures and training, emergency planning and preparedness review of safety performance, human resources, and personnel responsibility

  14. Operational safety performance indicators for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-05-01

    Since the late 1980s, the IAEA has been actively sponsoring work in the area of indicators to monitor nuclear power plant (NPP) operational safety performance. The early activities were mainly focused on exchanging ideas and good practices in the development and use of these indicators at nuclear power plants. Since 1995 efforts have been directed towards the elaboration of a framework for the establishment of an operational safety performance indicator programme. The result of this work, compiled in this publication, is intended to assist NPPs in developing and implementing a monitoring programme, without overlooking the critical aspects related to operational safety performance. The framework proposed in this report was presented at two IAEA workshops on operational safety performance indicators held in Ljubljana, Slovenia, in September 1998 and at the Daya Bay NPP, Szenzhen, China, in December 1998. During these two workshops, the participants discussed and brainstormed on the indicator framework presented. These working sessions provided very useful insights and ideas which where used for the enhancement of the framework proposed. The IAEA is acknowledging the support and contribution of all the participants in these two activities. The programme development was enhanced by pilot plant studies. Four plants from different countries with different designs participated in this study with the objective of testing the applicability, usefulness and viability of this approach

  15. Comparative safety assessment of plant-derived foods

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Kok, E.J.; Keijer, J.; Kleter, G.A.; Kuiper, H.A.

    2008-01-01

    The second generation of genetically modified (GM) plants that are moving towards the market are characterized by modifications that may be more complex and traits that more often are to the benefit of the consumer. These developments will have implications for the safety assessment of the resulting

  16. The problem of licensing and safety of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silva, R.A. da.

    1987-01-01

    The historical evolution of licensing process of nuclear power plants is presented. The designs carried out by FURNAS for constructing Angra-1 reactor and its contribution to the Brazilian CNEN in de licensing process, are evaluated. The aims of FURNAS Research Programs are determined and the safety goals are established. (M.C.K.) [pt

  17. Licensing and safety of nuclear power plants in Canada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boyd, F.C.

    1981-09-01

    An overview of the regulatory framework and licensing process for nuclear power plants in Canada is given along with an outline of the evolution of the safety philosophy followed and some comments on how this philosophy and process could be applied by a country embarking on a nuclear power program

  18. Pretension construction of safety shell in Chashma nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gong Zhenbin; Li Yinong; Ni Shaowen

    1999-01-01

    19T16 post-tension grouped anchor system is applied to the safety shell pretension in Chashma Nuclear Power Plant. The stretching force of each bundle is about 3800 kN and the prestressed reinforcement is stretched in five stages. The double-control measurement of stress controlling and extension checking is applied in strict accordance with the principle of symmetrical construction

  19. A proposal of safety indicators aggregation to assess the safety management effectiveness of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carvalho, Jose Antonio B.; Saldanha, Pedro L.C.; Melo, Paulo F.F. Frutuoso e

    2009-01-01

    Safety management has changed with the evolution of management methods, named Quality Systems, moving from Quality Control, where the focus was the product, passing through Quality Assurance, which takes care of the whole manufacturing process and reaching the Total Quality Management, where policies and goals are established. Nowadays, there is a trend towards Management Systems, which integrate all different aspects related to the management of an organization (safety, environment, security, quality, costs and, etc), but it is necessary to have features to establish and assure that safety overrides the remaining aspects. The most usual way to reach this goal is to establish a policy where safety is a priority, but its implementation and the assessment of its effectiveness are no so simple. Nuclear power plants usually have over a hundred safety indicators in many processes dedicated to prevent and detect problems, although a lot of them do not evaluate these indicators in an integrated manner or point out degradation trends of organizational aspects, which can affect the plant safety. This work develops an aggregation of proactive and reactive safety indicators in order to evaluate the effectiveness of nuclear power plant safety management and to detect, at early stages, signs of process degradation or activities used to establish, maintain and assure safety conditions. The aggregation integrates indicators of the usual processes and is based on the manner the management activities have been developed in the last decades, that is: Planning, Doing, Checking and Acting - known as PDCA cycle - plus a fifth element related to the capability of those who perform safety activities. The proposed aggregation is in accordance to Brazilian standards and international recommendations and constitutes a friendly link between the top management level and the daily aspects of the organization. (author)

  20. A proposal of safety indicators aggregation to assess the safety management effectiveness of nuclear power plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Carvalho, Jose Antonio B.; Saldanha, Pedro L.C. [Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear (CNEN), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil). Coordenacao-Geral de Reatores e Ciclo Combustivel], e-mail: jantonio@cnen.gov.br, e-mail: saldanha@cnen.gov.br; Melo, Paulo F.F. Frutuoso e [Coordenacao dos Programas de Pos-graduacao de Engenharia (COPPE/UFRJ), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil). Programa de Engenharia Nuclear], e-mail: frutuoso@con.ufrj.br

    2009-07-01

    Safety management has changed with the evolution of management methods, named Quality Systems, moving from Quality Control, where the focus was the product, passing through Quality Assurance, which takes care of the whole manufacturing process and reaching the Total Quality Management, where policies and goals are established. Nowadays, there is a trend towards Management Systems, which integrate all different aspects related to the management of an organization (safety, environment, security, quality, costs and, etc), but it is necessary to have features to establish and assure that safety overrides the remaining aspects. The most usual way to reach this goal is to establish a policy where safety is a priority, but its implementation and the assessment of its effectiveness are no so simple. Nuclear power plants usually have over a hundred safety indicators in many processes dedicated to prevent and detect problems, although a lot of them do not evaluate these indicators in an integrated manner or point out degradation trends of organizational aspects, which can affect the plant safety. This work develops an aggregation of proactive and reactive safety indicators in order to evaluate the effectiveness of nuclear power plant safety management and to detect, at early stages, signs of process degradation or activities used to establish, maintain and assure safety conditions. The aggregation integrates indicators of the usual processes and is based on the manner the management activities have been developed in the last decades, that is: Planning, Doing, Checking and Acting - known as PDCA cycle - plus a fifth element related to the capability of those who perform safety activities. The proposed aggregation is in accordance to Brazilian standards and international recommendations and constitutes a friendly link between the top management level and the daily aspects of the organization. (author)

  1. Some aspects of nuclear power plant safety under war conditions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stritar, A.; Mavko, B.; Susnik, J.; Sarler, B.

    1993-01-01

    In the summer of 1991, the Krsko nuclear power plant in Slovenia found itself in an area of military operations. This was probably the first commercial nuclear power plant to have been threatened by an attack by fighter jets. A number of never-before-asked questions had to be answered by the operating staff and supporting organizations. Some aspects of nuclear power plant safety under war conditions are described, such as the selection of the best plant operating state before the attack and the determination of plant system vulnerability and dose releases from the potentially damaged spent fuel in the spent-fuel pit. The best operating mode to which the plant should be brought before the attack is cold shutdown, and radiological consequences to the environment after the spent fuel is damaged and the water in the pit is lost are not very high. The problem of nuclear power plant safety under war conditions should be addressed in more detail in the future

  2. Probabilistic safety assessment of nuclear power plants: a monograph

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Solanki, R.B.; Prasad, Mahendra

    2007-11-01

    This monograph on probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) is addressed to the wide community of professionals engaged in the nuclear industry and concerned with the safety issues of nuclear power plants (NPPs). While the monograph describes PSA of NPPs, the principles described in this monograph can be extended to other facilities like spent fuel storage, fuel reprocessing plants and non-nuclear facilities like chemical plants, refineries etc. as applicable. The methodology for risk assessment in chemical plants or refineries is generally known as quantitative risk analysis (QRA). The fundamental difference between NPP and chemical plant is that in NPPs the hazardous material (fuel and fission products) are contained at a single location (i.e. inside containment), whereas in a chemical plant and reprocessing plants, the hazardous material is present simultaneously at many places, like pipelines, reaction towers, storage tanks, etc. Also unlike PSA, QRA does not deal with levels; it uses an integrated approach combining all the levels. The monograph covers the areas of broad interest in the field of PSA such as historical perspective, fundamentals of PSA, strengths and weaknesses of PSA, applications of PSA, role of PSA in the regulatory decision making and issues for advancement of PSA

  3. The reevaluation of seismic safety of existing nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kitagawa, Hiroshi; Tominaga, Shohei; Kumagai, Chiyoshi; Koshiba, Koremutsu; Kono, Tomonori; Agawa, Kazuyoshi; Kuwata, Kenichiro

    2003-01-01

    We have carried out additional geological surveys in order to enrich our database on geological faults in the vicinity of Shimane Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). Prior to additional geological surveys, given the social importance of nuclear power plants, we hypothetically assumed that almost the whole length of an area covered by surveys would be an active fault that must be considered in seismic design, and tried to reevaluate the seismic safety of the NPP by applying an input earthquake ground motion larger than the level at the design stage. As a result, we have confirmed that seismic safety of the NPP can be maintained. This paper describes the method that we employed to reevaluate the seismic safety of Shimane NPP. (author)

  4. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant safety analysis report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-03-01

    The United States Department of Energy (DOE) was authorized by Public Law 96-164 to provide a research and development facility for demonstrating the safe permanent disposal of transuranic (TRU) wastes from national defense activities and programs of the United States exempted from regulations by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), located in southeastern New Mexico near Carlsbad, was constructed to determine the efficacy of an underground repository for disposal of TRU wastes. In accordance with the 1981 and 1990 Records of Decision (ROD), the development of the WIPP was to proceed with a phased approach. Development of the WIPP began with a siting phase, during which several sites were evaluated and the present site selected based on extensive geotechnical research, supplemented by testing. The site and preliminary design validation phase (SPDV) followed the siting phase, during which two shafts were constructed, an underground testing area was excavated, and various geologic, hydrologic, and other geotechnical features were investigated. The construction phase followed the SPDV phase during which surface structures for receiving waste were built and underground excavations were completed for waste emplacement

  5. Self-assessment of operational safety for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-12-01

    Self-assessment processes have been continuously developed by nuclear organizations, including nuclear power plants. Currently, the nuclear industry and governmental organizations are showing an increasing interest in the implementation of this process as an effective way for improving safety performance. Self-assessment involves the use of different types of tools and mechanisms to assist the organizations in assessing their own safety performance against given standards. This helps to enhance the understanding of the need for improvements, the feeling of ownership in achieving them and the safety culture as a whole. Although the primary beneficiaries of the self-assessment process are the plant and operating organization, the results of the self-assessments are also used, for example, to increase the confidence of the regulator in the safe operation of an installation, and could be used to assist in meeting obligations under the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Such considerations influence the form of assessment, as well as the type and detail of the results. The concepts developed in this report present the basic approach to self-assessment, taking into consideration experience gained during Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) missions, from organizations and utilities which have successfully implemented parts of a self-assessment programme and from meetings organized to discuss the subject. This report will be used in IAEA sponsored workshops and seminars on operational safety that include the topic of self-assessment

  6. Fire safety study of Dodewaard and Borssele nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-03-01

    From the nuclear and conventional fire safety audits of both Dutch nuclear power plants performed under supervision of the Nuclear Safety Inspectorate and the Inspectorate for the Fire Services it turns out that the fire safety is sufficient however amenable for improvement. Besides a detailed description of the method of examination, the study 'Fire Safety' contains the results of the audit and 14 respectively 15 recommendations for improvement of the fire safety in Dodewaard and Borssele. The suggested recommendations which are applicable to both power plants are the following: fire fighting training for operators and guards, a complete emergency ventilation system of the control room, increase in the number of detectors and alarms, an increase in the quantity of water available for high-pressure fire fighting, improvement of fire barriers between several redundancies of nuclear safety systems, an investigation and possible improvement of the heat and radiation protection offered by presently used fire fighting suits. For Dodewaard a closed emergency staircase in the reactor building (secondary containment) is deemed necessary for personnel emergency escape routes and continued fire fighting if required

  7. IAEA Concludes Safety Review at Gravelines Nuclear Power Plant, France

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    Full text: An IAEA-led international team of nuclear safety experts noted a series of good practices and made recommendations to reinforce some safety measures during a review of operational safety at France's Gravelines Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) that concluded today. The Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) was assembled at the French Government's request. The in-depth review, which began 12 November 2012, focused on aspects essential to the safe operation of the NPP. The team was composed of experts from Bulgaria, China, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Romania, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Ukraine and the IAEA. The review covered the areas of management, organization and administration; training and qualification; operations; maintenance; technical support; operating experience; radiation protection; chemistry; emergency planning and preparedness; and severe accident management. The conclusions of the review are based on the IAEA's Safety Standards. The OSART team has identified good plant practices, which will be shared with the rest of the nuclear industry for consideration of their possible use elsewhere. Examples include the following: - The Power Plant uses a staff-skills mapping process that significantly enhances knowledge of the facility's collective and individual skills and provides proactive management to address the loss of such skills; - As a measure to reduce the risk of workers' radiation exposure, the Power Plant uses a system to ensure that dose rate measurements are carried out at a precise distance from the source of radiation; and - Flood protection of the Power Plant is supported by special technical guidance documents and associated arrangements. The team identified a number of proposals for improvements to operational safety at Gravelines NPP. Examples include the following: - The Power Plant should reinforce its measures to prevent foreign objects from entering plant systems; - The Power Plant should ensure the 24-hour presence of an operator

  8. Views on safety culture at Swedish and Finnish nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hammar, L.; Wahlstroem, B.; Kettunen, J.

    2000-02-01

    The report presents the results of interviews about safety culture at Swedish and Finnish nuclear power plants. The aim is to promote the safety work and increase the debate about safety in nuclear power plants, by showing that the safety culture is an important safety factor. The interviews point out different threats, which may become real. It is therefor necessary that the safety aspects get support from of the society and the power plant owners. (EHS)

  9. The safety approach in the operation of EDF power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bertron, L.; Mira, J.J.

    1988-01-01

    To get a view on what is involved in maintaining a high level of safety in the operation of EdF nuclear power plants, it may be recalled that in 1987, 76 % of the EdF production was nuclear. The nuclear plants include thirty-four standard PWR 900 plants, fourteen PWR 1300 plants, the 305 MW SENA PWR, the four 500 MW GCR: CHINON A3 plant, St-LAURENT A1 (390 MW), A2 (450 MW) and BUGEY 1 (540 MW), the 233 MW PHENIX fast breeder reactor and the CREYS-MALVILLE 1200 MW fast breeder reactor, now being prepared for a new startup after the 1987 incident. So the importance of a safe operation of this investment is considerable for EdF, which is the designer, owner, industrial architect and operator. According to the French regulations, EdF is responsible for the safe operation of its power plants. A considerable human component is also at stake, as the safe operation of plants implies all the personnel to varying degrees. There are 15,000 such employees, all of whom have to be trained, competent and motivated. The operation of this system for 340 reactor-years has to-date resulted in no incident of any significant impact on the environment. Right from the start, safety in operation has always been an essential and clearly stated priority. Among other lessons the Three-Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents have reinforced the conviction that the human factors, the man-machine interface, and the safety culture were determining elements. With forty-eigh PWR plants in service, the problem is to maintain safe operation of a system now running at cruising speed, but also including some units (particularly the GCRs) that must be prepared for decommissioning. In addition EDF has to demonstrate the safe operations of CREYS MALVILLE, fast breeder reactor

  10. Safety review on unit testing of safety system software of nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liu Le; Zhang Qi

    2013-01-01

    Software unit testing has an important place in the testing of safety system software of nuclear power plants, and in the wider scope of the verification and validation. It is a comprehensive, systematic process, and its documentation shall meet the related requirements. When reviewing software unit testing, attention should be paid to the coverage of software safety requirements, the coverage of software internal structure, and the independence of the work. (authors)

  11. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Russian Edition); Bezopasnost' atomnykh ehlektrostantsij: proektirovanie. Konkretnye trebovaniya bezopasnosti

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2012-04-15

    This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-1, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. It establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in the design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  12. Nuclear power plant safety, the merits of separation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Helander, L.I.; Tiren, L.I.

    1977-01-01

    The United States AEC General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants are used worldwide as a basis for the assessment of nuclear plant safety. Several of these criteria require redundancy of safety systems, separation of protection and control systems, consideration of natural phenomena, etc. All these criteria point in one particular direction: the necessity for physically separating the various safety-related systems of a nuclear power plant, particularly with regard to single occurrences that may yield a multiple failure. Requirements in this regard have been amplified by the United States NRC Regulatory Guides and by IEEE Standards. The single occurrence that yields a multiple failure may be, for example, fire, pipe whip, missiles, flooding, hurricanes, or lightning. The paper discusses protection, against the quoted events and others, obtained through applying criteria regarding redundancy and separation of safety-related structures, systems and components. Such criteria affect nuclear plant design in many areas, such as building lay-out, arrangements for fire protection and ventilation, separation of mechanical systems and components, in particular emergency cooling systems, and separation of electric equipment and cables. Implementation of the ensuing design criteria for a BWR power plant is described. This design involves the separation of Emergency Cooling Systems into four 50% Capacity Systems which are independent and separated, including the distribution network for electric power from on-site standby diesel generators and the circuitry for the reactor protection system. The plant is subdivided into a number of fire zones each with its own independent ventilation system. The fire zones are further subdivided into a multitude of fire cells such that redundant subsystems are housed in separate cells. These design precautions with regard to fire are complemented by extensive fire fighting systems

  13. Plant functional modelling as a basis for assessing the impact of management on plant safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rasmussen, Birgitte; Petersen, Kurt E.

    1999-01-01

    A major objective of the present work is to provide means for representing a chemical process plant as a socio-technical system, so as to allow hazard identification at a high level in order to identify major targets for safety development. The main phases of the methodology are: (1) preparation of a plant functional model where a set of plant functions describes coherently hardware, software, operations, work organization and other safety related aspects. The basic principle is that any aspect of the plant can be represented by an object based upon an Intent and associated with each Intent are Methods, by which the Intent is realized, and Constraints, which limit the Intent. (2) Plant level hazard identification based on keywords/checklists and the functional model. (3) Development of incident scenarios and selection of hazardous situation with different safety characteristics. (4) Evaluation of the impact of management on plant safety through interviews. (5) Identification of safety critical ways of action in the management system, i.e. identification of possible error- and violation-producing conditions

  14. Safety indicators as a tool for operational safety evaluation of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Araujo, Jefferson Borges; Melo, Paulo Fernando Ferreira Frutuoso e; Schirru, Roberto

    2009-01-01

    Performance indicators have found a wide use in the conventional and nuclear industries. For the conventional industry, the goal is to optimize production, reducing loss of time with accidents, human error and equipment downtimes. In the nuclear industry, nuclear safety is an additional goal. This paper presents a general methodology to the establishment, selection and use of safety indicators for a two loop PWR plant, as Angra 1. The use of performance indicators is not new. The NRC has its own methodology and the IAEA presents methodology suggestions, but there is no detailed documentation about indicators selection, criteria and bases used. Additionally, only the NRC methodology performs a limited integrated evaluation. The study performed identifies areas considered critical for the plant operational safety. For each of these areas, strategic sub-areas are defined. For each strategic sub-area, specific safety indicators are defined. These proposed Safety Indicators are based on the contribution to risk considering a quantitative risk analysis. For each safety indicator, a goal, a bounded interval and proper bases are developed, to allow for a clear and comprehensive individual behavior evaluation. On the establishment of the intervals and boundaries, a probabilistic safety study, operational experience, international and national standards and technical specifications were used. Additionally, an integrated evaluation of the indicators, using expert systems, was done to obtain an overview of the plant general safety. This evaluation uses well-defined and clear rules and weights for each indicator to be considered. These rules were implemented by means of a computational language, on a friendly interface, so that it is possible to obtain a quick response about operational safety. This methodology can be used to identify situations where the plant safety is challenged, by giving a general overview of the plant operational condition. Additionally, this study can

  15. Integrated Plant Safety Assessment, Systematic Evaluation Program, Palisades Plant (Docket No. 50-255)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-11-01

    This report documents the review completed under the SEP for those issues that required refined engineering evaluations or the continuation of ongoing evaluations after the Final IPSAR for the Palisades Plant was issued. The review has provided for (1) an assessment of the significance of differences between current technical positions on selected safety issues and those that existed when the Palisades Plant was licensed, (2) a basis for deciding on how these differences should be resolved in an integrated plant review, and (3) a documented evaluation of plant safety when the supplement to the Final IPSAR and the Safety Evaluation Report for converting the license from a provisional to a full-term license have been issued. The Final IPSAR and its supplement will form part of the bases for considering the conversion of the provisional operating license to a full-term operating license

  16. High temperature reactor module power plant. Plant and safety concept June 1986 - 38.07126.2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1986-06-15

    The modular HTR power plant is a universally applicable energy source for the co-generation of electricity, process steam or district heating. The modular HTR concept is characterized by the fact that standardized reactor units with power ratings of 200 MJ/s (so-called modules) can be combined to form power plants with a higher power rating. Consequently the special safety features of small high-temperature reactors (HTR) are also available at higher power plant ratings. The safety features, the technical design and the mode of operation are briefly described in the following, taking a power plant with two HTR-Modules for the co-generation of electricity and process steam as an example. Due to its universal applicability and excellent safety features, the modular HTR power plant is suitable for erection on any site, but particularly on sites near other industrial plants or in densely populated areas. The co-generation of electricity and process steam or district heating with a modular HTR power plant as described here is primarily tailored to the requirements of industrial and communal consumers. The site for such a plant is a typical industrial one. The anticipated features of such sites were taken into consideration in the design of the modular HTR power plant.

  17. High temperature reactor module power plant. Plant and safety concept June 1986 - 38.07126.2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-06-01

    The modular HTR power plant is a universally applicable energy source for the co-generation of electricity, process steam or district heating. The modular HTR concept is characterized by the fact that standardized reactor units with power ratings of 200 MJ/s (so-called modules) can be combined to form power plants with a higher power rating. Consequently the special safety features of small high-temperature reactors (HTR) are also available at higher power plant ratings. The safety features, the technical design and the mode of operation are briefly described in the following, taking a power plant with two HTR-Modules for the co-generation of electricity and process steam as an example. Due to its universal applicability and excellent safety features, the modular HTR power plant is suitable for erection on any site, but particularly on sites near other industrial plants or in densely populated areas. The co-generation of electricity and process steam or district heating with a modular HTR power plant as described here is primarily tailored to the requirements of industrial and communal consumers. The site for such a plant is a typical industrial one. The anticipated features of such sites were taken into consideration in the design of the modular HTR power plant

  18. A study on safety climate at nuclear power plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fukui, Hirokazu [Institute of Nuclear Safety System Inc., Mihama, Fukui (Japan); Yoshida, Michio; Yoshiyama, Naohiro [Japan Institute for Group Dynamics, Fukuoka (Japan)

    2001-09-01

    education in workplace' and 'clarity of tasks.' Hence, we have decided to use these three organizational environment factors as the rating scales of the safety climate. In order to study the characteristics of the safety climate at nuclear power plants, we used a causal model with safety confirmation/report' as the result and other factors as forecasting factors. As a result of the covariance structure analysis using the causal model, it was found that 'safety confirmation/report' is an action based on confidence in knowledge and skill', and is supported by 'attitude of supervisors' and 'clarity of tasks.' The analytical results also indicate that 'safety education in workplace' plays an important role in promoting the sharing of information as a medium factor. As described, 'attitude of supervisors,' 'clarity of tasks' and 'safety education in workplace,' all of which are organizational environment factors, are important forecasting factors that influence individuals' safety actions and hence considered as constituents of the safety climate. (author)

  19. Status of safety issues at licensed power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-06-01

    As part of ongoing US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) efforts to ensure the quality and accountability of safety issue information, a program has been established whereby an annual NUREG report will be published on the status of licensee implementation and NRC verification of safety issues in major NRC requirement areas. This report, the third volume of a three-volume series, addresses the status of generic safety issues (GSIs) at licensed plants. Volume 1 addressed the status of Three Mile Island Action Plan requirements and was published in March 1991. Volume 2 addressed the status of implementation and verification of unresolved safety issues and was published in May 1991. The annual NUREG report will combine these three areas in a single volume to be published in late 1991. The data contained in these NUREG reports are a product of the NRC's Safety Issues Management System (SIMS) database, which is maintained by the Project Management Staff in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and by NRC regional personnel. The purpose of this report is to provide a comprehensive description of the status of implementation and verification of the 34 GSIs and sub-issues that have been resolved by the NRC and involve implementation of an action or actions by licensees. This NUREG report also serves as a follow-on to NUREG-0933, ''A Prioritization of Generic Safety Issues,'' which tracks safety issues up until a request for action by licensees is issued by NRC. 3 figs., 6 tabs

  20. Qualification of safety-critical software for digital reactor safety system in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kwon, Kee-Choon; Park, Gee-Yong; Kim, Jang-Yeol; Lee, Jang-Soo

    2013-01-01

    This paper describes the software qualification activities for the safety-critical software of the digital reactor safety system in nuclear power plants. The main activities of the software qualification processes are the preparation of software planning documentations, verification and validation (V and V) of the software requirements specifications (SRS), software design specifications (SDS) and codes, and the testing of the integrated software and integrated system. Moreover, the software safety analysis and software configuration management are involved in the software qualification processes. The V and V procedure for SRS and SDS contains a technical evaluation, licensing suitability evaluation, inspection and traceability analysis, formal verification, software safety analysis, and an evaluation of the software configuration management. The V and V processes for the code are a traceability analysis, source code inspection, test case and test procedure generation. Testing is the major V and V activity of the software integration and system integration phases. The software safety analysis employs a hazard operability method and software fault tree analysis. The software configuration management in each software life cycle is performed by the use of a nuclear software configuration management tool. Through these activities, we can achieve the functionality, performance, reliability, and safety that are the major V and V objectives of the safety-critical software in nuclear power plants. (author)

  1. Safety implications of computerized process control in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-02-01

    Modern nuclear power plants are making increasing use of computerized process control because of the number of potential benefits that accrue. This practice not only applies to new plants but also to those in operation. Here, the replacement of both conventional process control systems and outdated computerized systems is seen to be of benefit. Whilst this contribution is obviously of great importance to the viability of nuclear electricity generation, it must be recognized that there are major safety concerns in taking this route. However, there is the potential for enhancing the safety of nuclear power plants if the full power of microcomputers and the associated electronics is applied correctly through well designed, engineered, installed and maintained systems. It is essential that areas where safety can be improved be identified and that the pitfalls are clearly marked so that they can be avoided. The deliberations of this Technical Committee Meeting are a step on the road to this goal of improved safety through computerized process control. This report also contains the papers presented at the technical committee meeting by participants. A separate abstract was prepared for each of these 15 presentations. Refs, figs and tabs

  2. Safety Second: the NRC and America's nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Adato, M.; MacKenzie, J.; Pollard, R.; Weiss, E.

    1987-01-01

    In 1975, Congress created the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Its primary responsibility was to be the regulation of the nuclear power industry in order to maintain public health and safety. On March 28, 1979, in the worst commercial nuclear accident in US history, the plant at Three Mile Island began to leak radioactive material. How was Three Mile Island possible? Where was the NRC? This analysis by the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) of the NRC's first decade, points specifically to the factors that contributed to the accident at Three Mile Island. The NRC, created as a watchdog of the nuclear power industry, suffers from problems of mindset, says the UCS. The commission's problems are political, not technical; it repeatedly ranks special interests above the interest of public safety. This book critiques the NRC's performance in four specific areas. It charges that the agency has avoided tackling the most pervasive safety issues; has limited public participation in decision making and power plant licensing; has failed to enforce safety standards or conduct adequate regulation investigations; and, finally, has maintained a fraternal relationship with the industry it was created to regulate, serving as its advocate rather than it adversary. The final chapter offers recommendations for agency improvement that must be met if the NRC is to fulfill its responsibility for safety first

  3. Risk-based safety performance indicators for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chakraborty, S.; Prohaska, G.; Flodin, Y.; Grint, G.; Habermacher, H.; Hallman, A.; Isasia, R.; Melendez, E.; Verduras, E.; Karsa, Z.; Khatib-Rahbar, M.; Koeberlein, K.; Schwaeger, C.; Matahri, N.; Moravcik, I.; Tkac, M.; Preston, J.

    2003-01-01

    In a Concerted Action (CA), sponsored by the European Commission within its 5th Framework Program, a consortium of eleven partners from eight countries has reviewed and evaluated the application of Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs), which - in combination with other tools - can be used to monitor and improve the safety of nuclear power plants. The project was aimed at identification of methods that can be used in a risk-informed regulatory system and environment, and to exploit PSA techniques for the development and use of meaningful additional/alternative SPIs. The CA included the review of existing indicator systems, and the collection of information on the experience from indicator systems by means of a specific questionnaire. One of the most important and challenging issues for nuclear plant owners and/or regulators is to recognize early signs of deterioration in safety performance, caused by influences from management, organization and safety culture (MOSC), before actual events and/or mishaps take place. Most of the existing SPIs as proposed by various organizations are considered as 'lagging' indicators, that is, they are expected to show an impact only when a downward trend has already started. Furthermore, most of the available indicators are at a relatively high level, such that they will not provide useful information on fundamental weaknesses causing the problem in the first place. Regulators' and utilities' views on the use of a Safety Performance Indicator System have also been a part of the development of the CA. (author)

  4. Update on the Department of Energy's 1994 plutonium vulnerability assessment for the plutonium finishing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    HERZOG, K.R.

    1999-01-01

    A review of the environmental, safety, and health vulnerabilities associated with the continued storage of PFP's inventory of plutonium bearing materials and other SNM. This report re-evaluates the five vulnerabilities identified in 1994 at the PFP that are associated with SNM storage. This new evaluation took a more detailed look and applied a risk ranking process to help focus remediation efforts

  5. The minimum attention plant inherent safety through LWR simplification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Turk, R.S.; Matzie, R.A.

    1987-01-01

    The Minimum Attention Plant (MAP) is a unique small LWR that achieves greater inherent safety, improved operability, and reduced costs through design simplification. The MAP is a self-pressurized, indirect-cycle light water reactor with full natural circulation primary coolant flow and multiple once-through steam generators located within the reactor vessel. A fundamental tenent of the MAP design is its complete reliance on existing LWR technology. This reliance on conventional technology provides an extensive experience base which gives confidence in judging the safety and performance aspects of the design

  6. Application of meteorology to safety at nuclear plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1968-01-01

    This report was prepared on behalf of the International Atomic Energy Agency by an international panel of experts who met at the Agency's headquarters from 10 to 14 April 1967. The application of meteorology to safety at nuclear plants is discussed in connection with site selection, design and construction, operation, and emergency planning and action. The final chapter considers the training to be given to operators and health and safety personnel on meteorology problems. The appendix gives a simple method for computing air concentration values at ground level. An extensive bibliography is also included.

  7. Maintenance implementation plan for the Plutonium Finishing Plant. Revision 3

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meldrom, C.A.

    1996-03-01

    This document outlines the Maintenance Implementation Plan (MIP) for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) located at the Hanford site at Richland, Washington. This MIP describes the PFP maintenance program relative to DOE order 4330.4B. The MIP defines the key actions needed to meet the guidelines of the Order to produce a cost-effective and efficient maintenance program. A previous report identified the presence of significant quantities of Pu-bearing materials within PFP that pose risks to workers. PFP's current mission is to develop, install and operate processes which will mitigate these risks. The PFP Maintenance strategy is to equip the facility with systems and equipment able to sustain scheduled PFP operations. The current operating run is scheduled to last seven years. Activities following the stabilization operation will involve an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to determine future plant activities. This strategy includes long-term maintenance of the facility for safe occupancy and material storage. The PFP maintenance staff used the graded approach to dictate the priorities of the improvement and upgrade actions identified in Chapter 2 of this document. The MIP documents PFP compliance to the DOE 4330.4B Order. Chapter 2 of the MIP follows the format of the Order in addressing the eighteen elements. As this revision is a total rewrite, no sidebars are included to highlight changes

  8. Aspects of nuclear safety at power plants and fuel cycle plants in the USSR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kozlov, N.I.; Efimov, E.; Dubovskij, B.G.; Dikarev, V.; Lyubchenko, V.; Kruglov, A.K.

    1977-01-01

    The paper discusses the problems of organizing inspection monitoring of power plants including the development of some regulations and norms and the interaction between the USSR State Nuclear Safety Organization, scientific and designing organizations and power plants. The principles of computer use to work out advice for operational staff and warning signals and commands for the reactor control and protection system are discussed. Some attention is turned to the importance of using high-speed computers to calculate prompt reactivity values and to determine impurity concentrations in the coolant and margins to permissible operational limits. In particular, reactimeters are considered as signal generators in monitor and protection systems. Some problems of nuclear safety inspection, the issue and inculcation of some regulations and operational documents on nuclear safety, and instrumentation of plants reprocessing or processing fuel elements are presented. Methods of determining the critical parameters of technological units are described, together with the fundamental principles of fuel cycle plant nuclear safety, providing margin coefficients, accounting for deviations from the normal operational process and other problems, as well as methods of keeping the restrictions on nuclear safety requirements at fuel cycle plants. (author)

  9. Safety in nuclear power plant siting. A code of practice

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    This publication is brought out within the framework of establishing Codes of Practice and Safety Guides for nuclear power plants: NUSS programme. The scope of the document encompasses site and site-plant interaction factors related to operational states and accident conditions. The purpose of the Code is to give criteria and procedures to be applied as appropriate to operational states and accident conditions, including those which could lead to emergency situations. This Code is mainly concerned with severe events of low probability which relate to the siting of nuclear power plants and have to be considered in designing a particular nuclear power plant. Annex: Examples of natural and man-made events relevant for design basis evaluation

  10. Assessment of the Plutonium Finishing Plant Criticality Alarm System U.S. Department of Energy Richland Operations Office

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    NIRIDER, L.T.

    2002-01-01

    At the request of the Assistant Manager for Safety and Engineering, the U.S. Department of Energy Richland Operations Office (RL) Engineering Support Division, performed an oversight review of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) nuclear Criticality Alarm System (CAS). The review was conducted to satisfy requirements and agreements associated with Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 2000-2, ''Vital Safety Systems.'' The PFP is managed by Fluor Hanford, Inc. for RL. The field assessment and staff interviews were conducted August 12 through August 19,2002. This was a limited scope assessment that consisted of a review of the nuclear CAS operations, maintenance, and compliance with National Consensus Standards Requirements. The main purpose of the assessment was to determine the adequacy of the existing alarm system and its associated infrastructure to support the PFP facility mission through the remaining facility lifetime. The Review Plan was modeled upon Criteria and Review Approach Documents (CRAD) developed for DNFSB Recommendation 2000-2 reviews conducted across the Hanford Site. Concerns regarding component degradation and failure, increasing numbers of occurrence reports associated with the alarm system, and reliability issues were addressed. Additionally, RL performed a review of the engineering aspects of the CAS including the functions of design authorities and aspects of systems engineering. However, the focus of the assessment was on operations, maintenance, and reliability of the CAS, associated procurement practices, adequacy of safety and engineering policies and procedures, safety documentation, and fundamental engineering practices including training, qualification, and systems engineering. This assessment revealed that the PFP CAS and its associated infrastructure, administrative procedures, and conduct of operations are generally effective. There are no imminent criticality safety issues associated with the operation of the

  11. Plutonium finishing plant dangerous waste training plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ENTROP, G.E.

    1999-01-01

    This training plan describes general requirements, worker categories, and provides course descriptions for operation of the Plutonium Finish Plant (PFP) waste generation facilities, permitted treatment, storage and disposal (TSD) units, and the 90-Day Accumulation Areas

  12. Safety aspects of nuclear plant licensing in Canada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jennekens, J.H.F.

    1975-01-01

    The legislative authority is laid down in the Atomic Energy Control Act, 1946, declaring atomic energy a matter of national interest and establishing the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) as the competent body for regulating all aspects of atomic energy. The Act also vests a Minister designated by the Government with research and exploitation functions; thus, by Ministerial order, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited was established in 1952 as a State-owned company. The Nuclear Liability Act, 1970, channels all liability for nuclear damage to the operator of a nuclear installation and requires him to obtain insurance in the amount of $75 million, part of which may be re-insured by the Government. The licensing requirements comprise the issuance of a site approval, a construction licence and an operating licence. The AECB is assisted in its licensing functions by its Nuclear Plant Licensing Directorate and by the Reactor Safety Advisory Committee co-operating with each other in making extensive safety assessments of a licence application. A site evaluation report, a preliminary safety report and a final safety report are required in relation to the siting, construction and operation of a nuclear power plant. The Canadian reactor safety philosophy is based on the concept of defence in depth, implemented through a multi-step approach, which includes avoidance of malfunctions, provision of special safety systems, periodic inspection and testing, and avoidance of human errors. Specific criteria and principles have evolved in applying this basic safety philosophy and radiation protection standards are derived from international recommendations. Stringent control is exercised over the management of radioactive waste and management facilities must meet the engineering and procedural requirements of AECB before they can be placed in operation. (author)

  13. Technical safety appraisal of the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-05-01

    On June 27, 1989, Secretary of Energy, Admiral James D. Watkins, US Navy (Retired), announced a 10-point initiative to strengthen environment, safety, and health (ES ampersand H) programs and waste management operations in the Department of Energy (DOE). One of the initiatives involved conducting independent Tiger Team Assessments (TTA) at DOE operating facilities. A TTA of the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) was performed during June and July 1991. Technical Safety Appraisals (TSA) were conducted in conjunction with the TTA as its Safety and Health portion. However, because of operational constraints the the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP), operated for the DOE by Westinghouse Idaho Nuclear Company, Inc. (WINCO), was not included in the Safety and Health Subteam assessment at that time. This TSA, conducted April 12 - May 8, 1992, was performed by the DOE Office of Performance Assessment to complete the normal scope of the Safety and Health portion of the Tiger Team Assessment of the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. The purpose of TSAs is to evaluate and strengthen DOE operations by verifying contractor compliance with DOE Orders, to assure that lessons learned from commercial operations are incorporated into facility operations, and to stimulate and encourage pursuit of excellence; thus, the appraisal addresses more issues than would be addressed in a strictly compliance-oriented appraisal. A total of 139 Performance Objectives have been addressed by this appraisal in 19 subject areas. These 19 areas are: organization and administration, quality verification, operations, maintenance, training and certification, auxiliary systems, emergency preparedness, technical support, packaging and transportation, nuclear criticality safety, safety/security interface, experimental activities, site/facility safety review, radiological protection, worker safety and health compliance, personnel protection, fire protection, medical services and natural

  14. Aging of safety class 1E transformers in safety systems of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Roberts, E.W.; Edson, J.L.; Udy, A.C.

    1996-02-01

    This report discusses aging effects on safety-related power transformers in nuclear power plants. It also evaluates maintenance, testing, and monitoring practices with respect to their effectiveness in detecting and mitigating the effects of aging. The study follows the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) Nuclear Plant-Aging Research approach. It investigates the materials used in transformer construction, identifies stressors and aging mechanisms, presents operating and testing experience with aging effects, analyzes transformer failure events reported in various databases, and evaluates maintenance practices. Databases maintained by the nuclear industry were analyzed to evaluate the effects of aging on the operation of nuclear power plants

  15. Aging of safety class 1E transformers in safety systems of nuclear power plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Roberts, E.W.; Edson, J.L.; Udy, A.C. [Lockheed Idaho Technologies Co., Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

    1996-02-01

    This report discusses aging effects on safety-related power transformers in nuclear power plants. It also evaluates maintenance, testing, and monitoring practices with respect to their effectiveness in detecting and mitigating the effects of aging. The study follows the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission`s (NRC`s) Nuclear Plant-Aging Research approach. It investigates the materials used in transformer construction, identifies stressors and aging mechanisms, presents operating and testing experience with aging effects, analyzes transformer failure events reported in various databases, and evaluates maintenance practices. Databases maintained by the nuclear industry were analyzed to evaluate the effects of aging on the operation of nuclear power plants.

  16. Personnel Safety for Future Magnetic Fusion Power Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee Cadwallader

    2009-07-01

    The safety of personnel at existing fusion experiments is an important concern that requires diligence. Looking to the future, fusion experiments will continue to increase in power and operating time until steady state power plants are achieved; this causes increased concern for personnel safety. This paper addresses four important aspects of personnel safety in the present and extrapolates these aspects to future power plants. The four aspects are personnel exposure to ionizing radiation, chemicals, magnetic fields, and radiofrequency (RF) energy. Ionizing radiation safety is treated well for present and near-term experiments by the use of proven techniques from other nuclear endeavors. There is documentation that suggests decreasing the annual ionizing radiation exposure limits that have remained constant for several decades. Many chemicals are used in fusion research, for parts cleaning, as use as coolants, cooling water cleanliness control, lubrication, and other needs. In present fusion experiments, a typical chemical laboratory safety program, such as those instituted in most industrialized countries, is effective in protecting personnel from chemical exposures. As fusion facilities grow in complexity, the chemical safety program must transition from a laboratory scale to an industrial scale program that addresses chemical use in larger quantity. It is also noted that allowable chemical exposure concentrations for workers have decreased over time and, in some cases, now pose more stringent exposure limits than those for ionizing radiation. Allowable chemical exposure concentrations have been the fastest changing occupational exposure values in the last thirty years. The trend of more restrictive chemical exposure regulations is expected to continue into the future. Other issues of safety importance are magnetic field exposure and RF energy exposure. Magnetic field exposure limits are consensus values adopted as best practices for worker safety; a typical

  17. Personnel Safety for Future Magnetic Fusion Power Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cadwallader, Lee

    2009-01-01

    The safety of personnel at existing fusion experiments is an important concern that requires diligence. Looking to the future, fusion experiments will continue to increase in power and operating time until steady state power plants are achieved; this causes increased concern for personnel safety. This paper addresses four important aspects of personnel safety in the present and extrapolates these aspects to future power plants. The four aspects are personnel exposure to ionizing radiation, chemicals, magnetic fields, and radiofrequency (RF) energy. Ionizing radiation safety is treated well for present and near-term experiments by the use of proven techniques from other nuclear endeavors. There is documentation that suggests decreasing the annual ionizing radiation exposure limits that have remained constant for several decades. Many chemicals are used in fusion research, for parts cleaning, as use as coolants, cooling water cleanliness control, lubrication, and other needs. In present fusion experiments, a typical chemical laboratory safety program, such as those instituted in most industrialized countries, is effective in protecting personnel from chemical exposures. As fusion facilities grow in complexity, the chemical safety program must transition from a laboratory scale to an industrial scale program that addresses chemical use in larger quantity. It is also noted that allowable chemical exposure concentrations for workers have decreased over time and, in some cases, now pose more stringent exposure limits than those for ionizing radiation. Allowable chemical exposure concentrations have been the fastest changing occupational exposure values in the last thirty years. The trend of more restrictive chemical exposure regulations is expected to continue into the future. Other issues of safety importance are magnetic field exposure and RF energy exposure. Magnetic field exposure limits are consensus values adopted as best practices for worker safety; a typical

  18. IAEA Leads Operational Safety Mission to Smolensk Nuclear Power Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    Full text: An international team of nuclear safety experts led by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reviewed the Smolensk Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) near Desnogorsk, in Russia's Smolensk region, for its safety practices and has noted a series of good practices as well as recommendations and suggestions to reinforce them. The IAEA assembled the team at the request of the Government of the Russian Federation to conduct an Operational Safety Review (OSART) of the NPP. Under the leadership of the IAEA's Division of Nuclear Installation Safety, the OSART team performed an in-depth operational safety review from 5 to 22 September 2011. The team was made up of experts from China, India, Lithuania, Slovakia, South Africa, Sweden, UK, USA, the World Association of Nuclear Operators and the IAEA. The team conducted an in-depth review of the aspects essential to the safe operation of the Smolensk NPP. The conclusions of the review are based on the IAEA's Safety Standards and proven good international practices. The review covered the areas of Management, Organization and Administration; Training; Operations; Maintenance; Technical Support; Operating Experience; Radiation Protection; and Chemistry. Throughout the review, the exchange of information between the OSART experts and plant personnel was very open, professional and productive. The plant's staff were found to be motivated, well trained, knowledgeable and experienced. The OSART team has identified good plant practices which will be shared with the rest of the nuclear industry for consideration of their application. Examples include the following: Illuminated hot-spot wire to identify higher radiation levels is used in the radiation-controlled area to reduce exposures when working in the controlled area; Modern and state-of-the-art training infrastructure and facilities are available at the plant. These include: maintenance training centre; multimedia simulator for the refueling machine; and safety

  19. Safety studies on Korean fusion DEMO plant using integrated safety assessment methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oh, Kyemin; Kang, Myoung-suk; Heo, Gyunyoung; Kim, Hyoung-chan

    2014-01-01

    Highlights: •The purpose of this paper is to suggest methodology that can investigate safety issues and provides a case study for Korean fusion DEMO plant. •The concepts of integrated safety assessment methodology (ISAM) that can be applied in addressing regulatory requirements and recognizing safety issues for K-DEMO were emphasized. •Phenomena identification and ranking table (PIRT) was proposed. It can recognize vulnerabilities of systems and identify the gaps in technical areas requiring additional researches. •This work is expected to contribute on the conceptual design of safety features for K-DEMO to design engineers and the guidance for regulatory requirements to licensers. -- Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to suggest methodology that can investigate safety issues and provides a case study for Korean fusion DEMO plant (K-DEMO) as a part of R and D program through the National Fusion Research Institute of Korea. Even though nuclear regulation and licensing framework is well setup due to the operating and design experience of Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) since 1970s, the regulatory authority of South Korea has concerns on the challenge of facing new nuclear facilities including K-DEMO due to the differences in systems, materials, and inherent safety feature from conventional PWRs. Even though the follow-up of the ITER license process facilitates to deal with significant safety issues of fusion facilities, a licensee as well as a licenser should identify the gaps between ITER and DEMO in terms of safety issues. First we reviewed the methods of conducting safety analysis for unprecedented nuclear facilities such as Generation IV reactors, particularly very high temperature reactor (VHTR), which is called as integrated safety assessment methodology (ISAM). Second, the analysis for the conceptual design of K-DEMO on the basis of ISAM was conducted. The ISAM consists of five analytical tools to develop the safety requirements from licensee

  20. Safety studies on Korean fusion DEMO plant using integrated safety assessment methodology

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Oh, Kyemin; Kang, Myoung-suk [Kyung Hee University, Youngin-si, Gyeonggi-do 446-701 (Korea, Republic of); Heo, Gyunyoung, E-mail: gheo@khu.ac.kr [Kyung Hee University, Youngin-si, Gyeonggi-do 446-701 (Korea, Republic of); Kim, Hyoung-chan [National Fusion Research Institute, Daejeon-si 305-333 (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-10-15

    Highlights: •The purpose of this paper is to suggest methodology that can investigate safety issues and provides a case study for Korean fusion DEMO plant. •The concepts of integrated safety assessment methodology (ISAM) that can be applied in addressing regulatory requirements and recognizing safety issues for K-DEMO were emphasized. •Phenomena identification and ranking table (PIRT) was proposed. It can recognize vulnerabilities of systems and identify the gaps in technical areas requiring additional researches. •This work is expected to contribute on the conceptual design of safety features for K-DEMO to design engineers and the guidance for regulatory requirements to licensers. -- Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to suggest methodology that can investigate safety issues and provides a case study for Korean fusion DEMO plant (K-DEMO) as a part of R and D program through the National Fusion Research Institute of Korea. Even though nuclear regulation and licensing framework is well setup due to the operating and design experience of Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) since 1970s, the regulatory authority of South Korea has concerns on the challenge of facing new nuclear facilities including K-DEMO due to the differences in systems, materials, and inherent safety feature from conventional PWRs. Even though the follow-up of the ITER license process facilitates to deal with significant safety issues of fusion facilities, a licensee as well as a licenser should identify the gaps between ITER and DEMO in terms of safety issues. First we reviewed the methods of conducting safety analysis for unprecedented nuclear facilities such as Generation IV reactors, particularly very high temperature reactor (VHTR), which is called as integrated safety assessment methodology (ISAM). Second, the analysis for the conceptual design of K-DEMO on the basis of ISAM was conducted. The ISAM consists of five analytical tools to develop the safety requirements from licensee

  1. Nuclear power plant ageing and life extension: Safety aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Novak, S.; Podest, M.

    1987-01-01

    Experience with large fossil-fired electrical generating units, as well as in all process industries, shows that plants begin to deteriorate with age after approximately 10 years of operation. Similar phenomena will prevail for nuclear plants, and it is reasonable to postulate that their availability will be affected, as will their safety, if appropriate measures are not taken. It is evident that the average age of power reactors in the IAEA's Member States is increasing. By 2000, more than 50 nuclear plants will have been providing electricity for 25 years or longer. Most nuclear power plants have operating lifetimes of between 20 and 40 years. Ageing is defined as a continuing time-dependent degradation of material due to service conditions, including normal operation and transient conditions. It is common experience that over long periods of time, there is a gradual change in the properties of materials. These changes can affect the capability of engineered components, systems, or structures to perform their required function. Not all changes are deleterious, but it is commonly observed that ageing processes normally involve a gradual reduction in performance capability. All materials in a nuclear power plant can suffer from ageing and can partially or totally lose their designed function. Ageing is not only of concern for active components (for which the probability of malfunction increases with time) but also for passive ones, since the safety margin is being reduced towards the lowest allowable level

  2. Plant design and safety concept of the HTR-module

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reutler, H.

    1987-01-01

    The new KWU/Interatom concept of a modular High Temperature Reactor is characterized by the fact that several standardized nuclear heat production units, each having a power output up to 200 MW(th), are connected into parallel to obtain a power plant of any desired output for the production of process steam and electricity for the application in district heating and for the direct application of process heat. The safety concept of the modular reactor is such that the reactor plant shall stay in a predictable state and shall not release an excessive amount of fission products into the environment even for hypothetical accidents. (author)

  3. Plant design and safety concept of the HTR-module

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reutler, H.

    1988-01-01

    The new KWU/Interatom concept of a modular High Temperature Reactor is characterized by the fact that several standardized nuclear heat production units, each having a power output up to 200 MW(th), are connected into parallel to obtain a power plant of any desired output for the production of process steam and electricity for the application in district heating and for the direct application of process heat. The safety concept of the modular reactor is such that the reactor plant shall stay in a predictable state and shall not release an excessive amount of fission products into the environment even for hypothetical accidents. (orig.)

  4. Design data and safety features of commerical nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heddleson, F.A.

    1976-06-01

    Design data, safety features, and site characteristics are summarized for 34 nuclear power units in 17 power stations in the United States. Six pages of data are presented for each plant, consisting of thermal-hydraulic and nuclear factors, containment features, emergency-core-cooling systems, site features, circulating water system data, and miscellaneous factors. An aerial perspective is also presented for each plant. This volume covers Light Water Reactors (LWRs) with dockets 50-508 through 50-549, four HTGRs--50-171, 50-267, 50-450/451, 50-463/464, the Atlantic Floating Station 50-477/478, and the Clinch River Breeder 50-537

  5. Safety of nuclear power plants in the 21st century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kovacs, Z.; Novakova, H.; Rydzi, S.

    2012-01-01

    Discussing the disaster of March 2011 which had a destroying effect on the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant, the article presents an overview of the impacts of the earthquake and tsunami on the nuclear power plants in the region, outlines the defence-in-depth concept, and describes the design of the affected BWR type reactors and the accident event sequences leading to the reactor core damage and radioactivity release into the environment. The proposed measures for enhancing nuclear reactor safety in the 21st century are highlighted. (orig.)

  6. Radiological safety of nuclear power plants in India

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sathish, A.V.

    2015-01-01

    Safety in nuclear power plants (NPPs) is often less understood and more talked about, thus the author wanted to share the facts to clear the myths. Safety is accorded overriding priority in all the activities. All nuclear facilities are sited, designed, constructed, commissioned and operated in accordance with strict quality and safety standards. Principles of defence in depth, redundancy and diversity are followed in the design of all nuclear facilities and their systems/components. PPs in India are not only safe but are also well regulated, have proper radiological protection of workers and the public, regular surveillance, approved standard operating and maintenance procedures, a well-defined waste management methodology, periodically rehearsed emergency preparedness and disaster management plans. The regulatory framework in the country is robust, with the independent Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) having powers to frame the policies, laying down safety standards, monitoring and enforcing all the safety provisions. As a result, India's safety record has been excellent in over 400 reactor years of operation of power reactors

  7. Technical Safety Appraisal of the Rocky Flats Plant

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Brown, Blake P.

    1989-01-01

    This report provides the results of a Technical Safety Appraisal (TSA) of the Rocky Flats Plant (RFP) conducted November 14 to 18 and November 28 to December 9, 1988. This appraisal covered the effectiveness and improvements in the RFP safety program across the site, evaluating progress to date against standards of accepted practice. The appraisal included coverage of the timeliness and effectiveness of actions taken in response to the recommendations/concerns in three previous Technical Safety Appraisals (TSAs) of RFP Bldg. 707 conducted in July 1986, Bldgs. 771/774 conducted in October/November 1986, and Bldgs. 776/777 conducted in January/February 1988. Results of this appraisal are given in Section IV for each of 14 technical safety areas at RFP. These results include a discussion, conclusions and any new safety concerns for each technical safety area. Appendix A contains a description of the system for categorizing concerns, and the concerns are tabulated in Appendix B. Appendix C reports on the evaluation of the contractor's actions and the current status of each of the 230 recommendations and concerns contained in the three previous TSA reports.

  8. Safety related requirements on future nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Niehaus, F.

    1991-01-01

    Nuclear power has the potential to significantly contribute to the future energy supply. However, this requires continuous improvements in nuclear safety. Technological advancements and implementation of safety culture will achieve a safety level for future reactors of the present generation of a probability of core-melt of less than 10 -5 per year, and less than 10 -6 per year for large releases of radioactive materials. There are older reactors which do not comply with present safety thinking. The paper reviews findings of a recent design review of WWER 440/230 plants. Advanced evolutionary designs might be capable of reducing the probability of significant off-site releases to less than 10 -7 per year. For such reactors there are inherent limitations to increase safety further due to the human element, complexity of design and capability of the containment function. Therefore, revolutionary designs are being explored with the aim of eliminating the potential for off-site releases. In this context it seems to be advisable to explore concepts where the ultimate safety barrier is the fuel itself. (orig.) [de

  9. Ensuring the operational safety of finnish nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vuorinen, A.

    1991-01-01

    The Finnish nuclear energy programme has been successful both from the safety and economical point of view. These achievements are based on different factors which are discussed in the paper. Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety (STUK) has specified the technical requirements and procedures to be followed in the design, construction, commissioning and operation of NPPs in a series of guides. The guides are quite demanding and latest results of safety research and technical development are taken into account. Regulatory supervision of Finnish NPPs is comprehensive. As an example of this the regulatory inspection program for operational phase is presented. An important way to ensure operational safety of a NPP is to define a set of limits and conditions to identify limiting safety envelope for plant operation. Practices in Finland are reviewed in the paper. The strategy of Defence in Depth is amongst the fundamental principles of nuclear safety. Two corollary principles of defence of depth are accident prevention and accident mitigation. Means used in following these principles are discussed. (author)

  10. Remote-Reading Safety and Safeguards Surveillance System for 3013 Containers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lechelt, W. M.; Skorpik, J. R.; Silvers, K. L.; Szempruch, R. W.; Douglas, D. G.; Fein, K. O.

    2002-01-01

    At Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP), plutonium oxide is being loaded into stainless steel containers for long-term storage on the Hanford Site. These containers consist of two weld-sealed stainless steel cylinders nested one within the other. A third container holds the plutonium within the inner cylinder. This design meets the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) storage standard, DOE-STD- 3013-2000, which anticipates a 50-year storage lifetime. The 3013 standard also requires a container surveillance program to continuously monitor pressure and to assure safeguards are adequate. However, the configuration of the container system makes using conventional measurement and monitoring methods difficult. To better meet the 3013 monitoring requirements, a team from Fluor Hanford (who manages the PFP), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), and Vista Engineering Technologies, LLC, developed a safer, cost-efficient, remote PFP 3013 container surveillance system. This new surveillance system is a combination of two successfully deployed technologies: (1) a magnetically coupled pressure gauge developed by Vista Engineering and (2) a radio frequency (RF) tagging device developed by PNNL. This system provides continuous, 100% monitoring of critical parameters with the containers in place, as well as inventory controls. The 3013 container surveillance system consists of three main elements: (1) an internal magnetic pressure sensor package, (2) an instrument pod (external electronics package), and (3) a data acquisition storage and display computer. The surveillance system described in this paper has many benefits for PFP and DOE in terms of cost savings and reduced personnel exposure. In addition, continuous safety monitoring (i.e., internal container pressure and temperature) of every container is responsible nuclear material stewardship and fully meets and exceeds DOE's Integrated Surveillance Program requirements

  11. Draft report on compilation of generic safety issues for light water reactor nuclear power plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-07-01

    A generally accepted approach to characterizing the safety concerns in nuclear power plants is to express them as safety issues which need to be resolved. When such safety issues are applicable to a generation of plants of a particular design or to a family of plants of similar design, they are termed generic safety issues. Examples of generic safety issues are those related to reactor vessel embrittlement, control rod insertion reliability or strainer clogging. The safety issues compiled in this document are based on broad international experience. This compilation is one element in the framework of IAEA activities to assist Member States in reassessing the safety of operating nuclear power plants. Refs.

  12. Draft report on compilation of generic safety issues for light water reactor nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-07-01

    A generally accepted approach to characterizing the safety concerns in nuclear power plants is to express them as safety issues which need to be resolved. When such safety issues are applicable to a generation of plants of a particular design or to a family of plants of similar design, they are termed generic safety issues. Examples of generic safety issues are those related to reactor vessel embrittlement, control rod insertion reliability or strainer clogging. The safety issues compiled in this document are based on broad international experience. This compilation is one element in the framework of IAEA activities to assist Member States in reassessing the safety of operating nuclear power plants. Refs

  13. IAEA Operational Safety Team Reviews Cattenom Nuclear Power Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    Full text: An international team of nuclear installation safety experts led by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reviewed operational safety at France's Cattenom Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) noting a series of good practices as well as recommendations and suggestions to reinforce them. The IAEA assembled an international team of experts at the request of the Government of France to conduct an Operational Safety Review (OSART) of Cattenom NPP. Under the leadership of the IAEA's Division of Nuclear Installation Safety in Vienna, the OSART team performed an in-depth operational safety review of the plant from 14 November to 1 December 2011. The team was made up of experts from Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Russia, Slovakia, South Africa, Sweden, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the IAEA. The team at Cattenom conducted an in-depth review of the aspects essential to the safe operation of the NPP, which is largely under the control of the site management. The conclusions of the review are based on the IAEA's Safety Standards. The review covered the areas of Management, Organization and Administration; Training and Qualification; Operations; Maintenance; Technical Support; Operating Experience; Radiation Protection; Chemistry; Emergency Planning and Preparedness; and Severe Accident Management. Cattenom is the first plant in Europe to voluntarily undertake a Severe Accident Management review during an OSART review. The OSART team has identified good plant practices, which will be shared with the rest of the nuclear industry for consideration of their application. Examples include: Sheets are displayed in storage areas where combustible material is present - these sheets are updated readily and accurately by the area owner to ensure that the fire limits are complied with; A simple container is attached to the neutron source handling device to ensure ease and safety of operations and reduce possible radiation exposure during use

  14. [Storage of plant protection products in farms: minimum safety requirements].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dutto, Moreno; Alfonzo, Santo; Rubbiani, Maristella

    2012-01-01

    Failure to comply with requirements for proper storage and use of pesticides in farms can be extremely hazardous and the risk of accidents involving farm workers, other persons and even animals is high. There are still wide differences in the interpretation of the concept of "securing or making safe", by workers in this sector. One of the critical points detected, particularly in the fruit sector, is the establishment of an adequate storage site for plant protection products. The definition of "safe storage of pesticides" is still unclear despite the recent enactment of Legislative Decree 81/2008 regulating health and work safety in Italy. In addition, there are no national guidelines setting clear minimum criteria for storage of plant protection products in farms. The authors, on the basis of their professional experience and through analysis of recent legislation, establish certain minimum safety standards for storage of pesticides in farms.

  15. Basic safety principles of KLT-40C reactor plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beliaev, V.; Polunichev, V.

    2000-01-01

    The KLT-40 NSSS has been developed for a floating power block of a nuclear heat and power station on the basis of ice-breaker-type NSSS (Nuclear Steam Supply System) with application of shipbuilding technologies. Basic reactor plant components are pressurised water reactor, once-through coil-type steam generator, primary coolant pump, emergency protection rod drive mechanisms of compensate group-electromechanical type. Basic RP components are incorporated in a compact steam generating block which is arranged within metal-water shielding tank's caissons. Domestic regulatory documents on safety were used for the NSSS design. IAEA recommendations were also taken into account. Implementation of basic safety principles adopted presently for nuclear power allowed application of the KLT-40C plant for a floating power unit of a nuclear co-generation station. (author)

  16. Safety improvement plant modifications at Forsmark 3, 1986-1995

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kjellander, M. [Kaernkraftsaekerhet och utbildning, Nykoeping (Sweden)

    1998-10-01

    All important plant modifications implemented in safety-related equipment or software at Forsmark 3 are compiled in this report. The report covers the period from the start of commercial operation in 1985 up to and including 1995. The plant modifications, which were carried out by different suppliers during the guarantee period, are not included in the report since they have not been administered by the Forsmark organisation. The report contains references to relevant modification notices and to files and file divider numbers. These data refer to the Safety Department central archives. The report is based on Forsmark 3 Technical Specifications (STF) which means that Chapter 3 is divided into the same sections as in the STF. Modifications, which cannot be directly attributed to any specific STF chapter, and major modifications are described separately

  17. Safety aspects of nuclear power plants nearby urban areas

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kroeger, W.

    1986-01-01

    According to the Environmental Experts Council smaller reactors would correspond best to the heat demand of the Federal Republic of Germany. The study discusses and investigates into the present safety concepts and site selection criteria, trends towards power plant sites nearby urban areas, site-dependent parameters and their influence on the extent of damage, protective aims, compatibility of the protective aims proposed, and the protective measures required. (DG) [de

  18. Safety Evaluation for Packaging (onsite) T Plant Canyon Items

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    OBRIEN, J.H.

    2000-01-01

    This safety evaluation for packaging (SEP) evaluates and documents the ability to safely ship mostly unique inventories of miscellaneous T Plant canyon waste items (T-P Items) encountered during the canyon deck clean off campaign. In addition, this SEP addresses contaminated items and material that may be shipped in a strong tight package (STP). The shipments meet the criteria for onsite shipments as specified by Fluor Hanford in HNF-PRO-154, Responsibilities and Procedures for all Hazardous Material Shipments

  19. Health protection and industrial safety. Nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-03-01

    The standard applies to components of the primary circuit including its auxiliary facilities, and of the secondary circuit of nuclear power plants with pressurized water reactors; to lifting gear and load take-ups for the transport of nuclear fuel and primary circuit components; to elevators within the containment, electrical installations, and piping and valves of radiation protection monitoring equipment. Part 1 defines the terms and specifies engineered safety requirements

  20. Safety assessment of UP3-A reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mercier, J.P.; Guezenec, J.Y.; Poirier, M.C.

    1992-02-01

    This presentation describes how the safety assessment was made of UP3-A plant of the La Hague establishment for the building permit and operating license within the context of French nuclear regulations and the national debate on the need for reprocessing. Other factors discussed are how the public was involved, how the regulations were improved in the process and what the different stages of commissioning consisted of. (author)

  1. Safety evaluation of the Laguna Verde nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Delgado G, J.L.

    1991-01-01

    The present work describe the licensing process for the first nuclear power plant built in Mexico, it presents the difficulties found during the several years of construction and tests until the phrase a level of safety equivalent to that of the country of origin of the nuclear steam supply system could be applicable to Laguna Verde, at least from the point of view of the mexican regulatory body, and also that this statement could be signed for the inspectors of international organizations. (author)

  2. Safety Evaluation for Packaging (onsite) T Plant Canyon Items

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    OBRIEN, J.H.

    2000-07-14

    This safety evaluation for packaging (SEP) evaluates and documents the ability to safely ship mostly unique inventories of miscellaneous T Plant canyon waste items (T-P Items) encountered during the canyon deck clean off campaign. In addition, this SEP addresses contaminated items and material that may be shipped in a strong tight package (STP). The shipments meet the criteria for onsite shipments as specified by Fluor Hanford in HNF-PRO-154, Responsibilities and Procedures for all Hazardous Material Shipments.

  3. Safety review for seismic qualification on nuclear power plant equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fang Qingxian

    1995-01-01

    The standards and requirements for seismic qualification of nuclear power plant's component have been fully addressed, including the scope of seismic qualification, the approach and the method of common seismic qualification, the procedure of the seismic tests, and the criteria for the seismic qualification review. The problems discovered in the safety review and the solution for these problems and some other issues are also discussed

  4. Reactor safety study applied to the Forsmark 3 Power Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ericsson, G.; Tiren, L.I.

    1978-01-01

    A reactor safety study of the Forsmark 3 BWR power plant has been carried out for the purpose of calculating core melt probabilities using WASH-1400 methods. A sensitivity analysis shows that the calculated core melt probability is changed by approximately a factor of 10 depending on assumptions made with respect to the probability of human error. The importance of the availability of off-site power and the influence of common cause failure is also discussed. (author)

  5. Analysis of societal recognition about domestic nuclear power plant safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, S. H.; Kim, J. W.; Kang, C. S.

    2003-01-01

    The public acceptance to risk from a new technology depends on not only perceived risk but also many conditional factors. Though nuclear energy has many benefits, it is unreasonably perceived to be more dangerous than real. Hence, it is necessary to estimate the public recognition of safety of nuclear power and to study the social aspects relevant to the subject. To achieve the purpose, poll survey was carried out for the public and expert group. Through the poll survey, it has been found that many crucial differences exist between the quantitative risk and the perceived risk of the public. The results of this study are used as the reference data for establishing the social standards and formulating the safety philosophy for the safety of nuclear power plants hereafter

  6. Experience gained in enhancing operational safety at ComEd`s nuclear power plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Elias, D [Commonwealth Edison Co. (United States)

    1997-09-01

    The following aspects of experience gained in enhancing operational safety at Comed`s nuclear power plants are discussed: nuclear safety policy; centralization/decentralization; typical nuclear operating organization; safety review boards; human performance enhancement; elements of effective nuclear oversight.

  7. Experience gained in enhancing operational safety at ComEd's nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Elias, D.

    1997-01-01

    The following aspects of experience gained in enhancing operational safety at Comed's nuclear power plants are discussed: nuclear safety policy; centralization/decentralization; typical nuclear operating organization; safety review boards; human performance enhancement; elements of effective nuclear oversight

  8. Regulatory practices and safety standards for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-01-01

    The International Symposium on Regulatory Practices and Safety Standards for Nuclear Power Plants was jointly organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany with the objective of providing an international forum for the exchange of information on regulatory practices and safety standards for nuclear power plants. The Symposium was held in Munich, Federal Republic of Germany, from 7 to 10 November 1988. It was attended by 201 experts from some 32 Member States and 4 international organizations. Fifty-one papers from 19 Member States and 2 international organizations were presented and discussed in 5 technical sessions covering the following subjects: National Regulatory Practices and Safety Standards (14 papers); Implementation of Regulatory Practices - Technical Issues (8 papers); Implementation of Regulatory Practices - Operational Aspects (8 papers); Developments and Trends in Safety Standards and Practices (11 papers); International Aspects (10 papers). A separate abstract was prepared for each of these papers. Refs, figs and tabs

  9. Upgrading of fire safety in Indian nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Agarwal, N.K.

    1998-01-01

    Indian nuclear power programme started with the installation of 2 nos. of Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) at Tarapur (TAPS I and II) of 210 MWe each commissioned in the year 1996. The Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor (PHWR) programme in the country started with the installation of 2x220 MWe stations at Rawatbhatta near Kota (RAPS I and II) in the State of Rajasthan in the sixties. At the present moment, the country has 10 stations in operation. Construction is going on for 4 more units of 220 MWe where as work on two more 500 MWe units is going to start soon. Fire safety systems for the earlier units were engineered as per the state-of-art knowledge available then. The need for review of fire protection systems in the Indian nuclear power plants has also been felt since long almost after Brown's Ferry fire in 1975 itself. Task forces consisting of fire experts, systems design engineers, O and M personnel as well as the Fire Protection engineers at the plant were constituted for each plant to review the existing fire safety provisions in details and highlight the upgradation needed for meeting the latest requirements as per the national as well as international practices. The recommendations made by three such task forces for the three plants are proposed to be reviewed in this paper. The paper also highlights the recommendations to be implemented immediately as well as on long-term basis over a period of time

  10. Properties of the malarial proteins Pf2, Pf9 and PfP0, which support ...

    Indian Academy of Sciences (India)

    Properties of the malarial proteins Pf2, Pf9 and PfP0, which support their roles as immune targets. Antibodies raised to each of these proteins (or purified from immune adults) inhibit the growth of Plasmodium falciparum at the red cell invasion step. The proteins are localized on the parasite cell surface. Each protein is ...

  11. The value of peer reviews to nuclear plant safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Subalusky, W.T. Jr.

    1994-01-01

    On a global basis, the nuclear utility industry has clearly demonstrated the value of peer reviews for improving nuclear safety and overall plant performance. Peer reviews are conducted by small teams of technical experts who review various aspects of plant operation, recognize strengths and recommend improvements, thereby stimulating a positive response to the recommendations. U.S. nuclear utilities initiated the operator-to-operator peer review process first through the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO). Now, voluntary peer reviews are an important activity of the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO). Formed just five years ago. WANO has made significant progress in its key activities of the operator-to-operator exchanges, operating experience exchange, monitoring of plant performance indicators and sharing of good practices worldwide. A fifth activity, peer review on a strictly voluntary basis, is pertinent to this paper

  12. Measures for reinforcing safety at the Ohma Nuclear Power Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ishikawa, Hiroyasu; Iwata, Kichisa; Koga, Kaoru

    2013-01-01

    Electric Power Development Co., Ltd. ('J-POWER') has been moving ahead with the Ohma Nuclear Power Project at Ohma-machi, Shimokita-gun in Aomori Prefecture and commenced the construction of an Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) in May 2008. In light of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Incident, J-POWER has undertaken an investigation of various measures for reinforcing safety at the Ohma nuclear power plant. These measures include a range of anti-tsunami measures, measures to ensure emergency power sources and ultimate heat removal functions, and responses for severe accidents. While consistently and properly reflecting the necessary measures, J-POWER will continue to ensure the creation of a safe power plant. J-POWER intends to appropriately reflect at all times new standards of technology established by the Nuclear Regulation Authority and makes concerted efforts to build a safe nuclear power plant in which the local community can have confidence. (author)

  13. Safety and Radiation Protection at Swedish Nuclear Power Plants 2007

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    The safety level of the plants is maintained at an acceptable level. SKI has in its regulatory supervision not found any known deficiencies in the barriers which could result in release of radioactive substances in excess of the permitted levels. SKI considers that improvements have been implemented during the year in the management, control and following up of safety work at the plants. In some cases, however, SKI has imposed requirements that improvements be made. Extensive measures are under way at the nuclear power plants to comply with the safety requirements in SKI's regulations, SKIFS 2004:2 concerning the design and construction of nuclear power reactors, and the stricter requirements regarding physical protection. Concurrently preparations are underway at eight of the ten units for thermal power increases. At the Forsmark plant considerable efforts have been during the year to correct the deficiencies in the safety culture and quality assurance system that became apparent in 2006. A programme to improve the execution of activities has been established in accordance with SKI's decision. SKI considers that the plant has developed in a positive direction but that there are further possibilities for improvement with regard to internal control. This is amongst other things concerns the areas internal auditing, independent safety review function, and working methods. SKI has had special supervision of the plant since 28 September, 2006. At the Oskarshamn plant work has been carried out to improve the organisation and routines in several areas. The plant has established routines which provide the basis to ensure that decisions are taken in a stringent manner. The quality assurance system has a clearer structure and there is a better defined division of work. Some measures remain however to be dealt with in 2008. The Ringhals plant has also worked with attitudes to routines and internal control. SKI considers that the measures have good prerequisites to provide a

  14. Safety and Radiation Protection at Swedish Nuclear Power Plants 2007

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    2008-07-01

    The safety level of the plants is maintained at an acceptable level. SKI has in its regulatory supervision not found any known deficiencies in the barriers which could result in release of radioactive substances in excess of the permitted levels. SKI considers that improvements have been implemented during the year in the management, control and following up of safety work at the plants. In some cases, SKI has imposed requirements that improvements be made. Extensive measures are under way at the nuclear power plants to comply with the safety requirements in SKI's regulations, SKIFS 2004:2 concerning the design and construction of nuclear power reactors, and the stricter requirements regarding physical protection. Concurrently preparations are underway at eight of the ten units for thermal power increases. At the Forsmark plant considerable efforts have been during the year to correct the deficiencies in the safety culture and quality assurance system that became apparent in 2006. A programme to improve the execution of activities has been established in accordance with SKI's decision. SKI considers that the plant has developed in a positive direction but that there are further possibilities for improvement with regard to internal control. This is amongst other things concerns the areas internal auditing, independent safety review function, and working methods. SKI has had special supervision of the plant since 28 September, 2006. At the Oskarshamn plant work has been carried out to improve the organisation and routines in several areas. The plant has established routines which provide the basis to ensure that decisions are taken in a stringent manner. The quality assurance system has a clearer structure and there is a better defined division of work. Some measures remain to be dealt with in 2008. The Ringhals plant has also worked with attitudes to routines and internal control. SKI considers that the measures have good prerequisites to provide a

  15. The working of RVNRL pilot plant of Rubber Board and it's safety devices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Britto, I.J.; Thomas, E.V.

    1996-01-01

    A pilot plant for producing radiation vulcanized natural rubber latex (RVNRL) was established at Rubber Board, India in 1992. Irradiation is done by a batch process in the plant. The plant has a versatile safety system for safety of operators and people working in and around the plant

  16. Latest developments on safety analysis methodologies at the Juzbado plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zurron-Cifuentes, Oscar; Ortiz-Trujillo, Diego; Blanco-Fernandez, Luis A.

    2010-01-01

    Over the last few years the Juzbado Plant has developed and implemented several analysis methodologies to cope with specific issues regarding safety management. This paper describes the three most outstanding of them, so as to say, the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) project, the adaptation of the MARSSIM methodology for characterization surveys of radioactive contamination spots, and the programme for the Systematic Review of the Operational Conditions of the Safety Systems (SROCSS). Several reasons motivated the decision to implement such methodologies, such as Regulator requirements, operational experience and of course, the strong commitment of ENUSA to maintain the highest standards of nuclear industry on all the safety relevant activities. In this context, since 2004 ENUSA is undertaking the ISA project, which consists on a systematic examination of plant's processes, equipment, structures and personnel activities to ensure that all relevant hazards that could result in unacceptable consequences have been adequately evaluated and the appropriate protective measures have been identified. On the other hand and within the framework of a current programme to ensure the absence of radioactive contamination spots on unintended areas, the MARSSIM methodology is being applied as a tool to conduct the radiation surveys and investigation of potentially contaminated areas. Finally, the SROCSS programme was initiated earlier this year 2009 to assess the actual operating conditions of all the systems with safety relevance, aiming to identify either potential non-conformities or areas for improvement in order to ensure their high performance after years of operation. The following paragraphs describe the key points related to these three methodologies as well as an outline of the results obtained so far. (authors)

  17. Safety evaluation of Tokai reprocessing plant (TRP). Report of safety evaluation of Tokai reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yamauchi, Takamichi; Maki, Akira; Nojiri, Ichiro

    1999-02-01

    The fire and explosion incident of the bituminization facility happened in March 1997 although JNC had taken enough care of the safety of TRP. JNC reflected on it and decided to evaluate the safety of TRP voluntarily. This evaluation has included five activities, that is, (1) confirmation of the structure and organization of TRP, (2) research of the data for operation, radiation and maintenance of TRP, (3) research of reflection of the accidents and troubles which have happened at the past, (4) evaluation on the prevention system, (5) evaluation on the mitigation system. We publish this report to contribute to inheritance of accumulated knowledge and techniques from generation to generation, and remind us of lesson from the fire and explosion incident of the bituminization. (author)

  18. Safety requirements for a nuclear power plant electric power system

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fouad, L F; Shinaishin, M A

    1988-06-15

    This work aims at identifying the safety requirements for the electric power system in a typical nuclear power plant, in view of the UNSRC and the IAEA. Description of a typical system is provided, followed by a presentation of the scope of the information required for safety evaluation of the system design and performance. The acceptance and design criteria that must be met as being specified by both regulatory systems, are compared. Means of implementation of such criteria as being described in the USNRC regulatory guides and branch technical positions on one hand and in the IAEA safety guides on the other hand are investigated. It is concluded that the IAEA regulations address the problems that may be faced with in countries having varying grid sizes ranging from large stable to small potentially unstable ones; and that they put emphasis on the onsite standby power supply. Also, in this respect the Americans identify the grid as the preferred power supply to the plant auxiliaries, while the IAEA leaves the possibility that the preferred power supply could be either the grid or the unit main generator depending on the reliability of each. Therefore, it is found that it is particularly necessary in this area of electric power supplies to deal with the IAEA and the American sets of regulations as if each complements and not supplements the other. (author)

  19. ESRS guidelines for software safety reviews. Reference document for the organization and conduct of Engineering Safety Review Services (ESRS) on software important to safety in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The IAEA provides safety review services to assist Member States in the application of safety standards and, in particular, to evaluate and facilitate improvements in nuclear power plant safety performance. Complementary to the Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) and the International Regulatory Review Team (IRRT) services are the Engineering Safety Review Services (ESRS), which include reviews of siting, external events and structural safety, design safety, fire safety, ageing management and software safety. Software is of increasing importance to safety in nuclear power plants as the use of computer based equipment and systems, controlled by software, is increasing in new and older plants. Computer based devices are used in both safety related applications (such as process control and monitoring) and safety critical applications (such as reactor protection). Their dependability can only be ensured if a systematic, fully documented and reviewable engineering process is used. The ESRS on software safety are designed to assist a nuclear power plant or a regulatory body of a Member State in the review of documentation relating to the development, application and safety assessment of software embedded in computer based systems important to safety in nuclear power plants. The software safety reviews can be tailored to the specific needs of the requesting organization. Examples of such reviews are: project planning reviews, reviews of specific issues and reviews prior final acceptance. This report gives information on the possible scope of ESRS software safety reviews and guidance on the organization and conduct of the reviews. It is aimed at Member States considering these reviews and IAEA staff and external experts performing the reviews. The ESRS software safety reviews evaluate the degree to which software documents show that the development process and the final product conform to international standards, guidelines and current practices. Recommendations are

  20. Evaluation of the safety of the operating nuclear power plants built to earlier standards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Menteseoglu, S.

    2001-01-01

    The objective of this paper is to provide practical assistance on judging the safety of a nuclear power plant, on the basis of a comparison with current safety standards and operational practices. For nuclear power plants built to earlier standards for which there are questions about the adequacy of the maintenance of the plant design and operational practices, a safety review against current standards and practices can be considered a high priority. The objective of reviewing nuclear power plants built to earlier standards against current standards and practices is to determine whether there are any deviations which would have an impact on plant safety. The safety significance of the issues identified should be judged according to their implications for plant design and operation in terms of basic safety concepts such as defence in depth and safety culture. In addition, this paper provides assistance on the prioritization of corrective measures and their implementation so as to approach an acceptable level of safety

  1. Operating procedure automation to enhance safety of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Husseiny, A.A.; Sabri, Z.A.; Adams, S.K.; Rodriguez, R.J.; Packer, D.; Holmes, J.W.

    1989-01-01

    Use of logic statements and computer assist are explored as means for automation and improvement on design of operating procedures including those employed in abnormal and emergency situations. Operating procedures for downpower and loss of forced circulation are used for demonstration. Human-factors analysis is performed on generic emergency operating procedures for three strategies of control; manual, semi-automatic and automatic, using standard emergency operating procedures. Such preliminary analysis shows that automation of procedures is feasible provided that fault-tolerant software and hardware become available for design of the controllers. Recommendations are provided for tests to substantiate the promise of enhancement of plant safety. Adequate design of operating procedures through automation may alleviate several major operational problems of nuclear power plants. Also, automation of procedures is necessary for partial or overall automatic control of plants. Fully automatic operations are needed for space applications while supervised automation of land-based and offshore plants may become the thrust of new generation of nulcear power plants. (orig.)

  2. Upgrading instrumentation and control systems for plant safety and operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Martin, M.; Prehler, H.J.; Schramm, W.

    1997-01-01

    Upgrading the electrical systems and instrumentation and control systems has become increasingly more important in the past few years for nuclear power plants currently in operation. As the requirements to be met in terms of plant safety and availability have become more stringent in the past few years, Western plants built in the sixties and seventies have been the subject of manifold backfitting and upgrading measures in the past. In the meantime, however, various nuclear power plants are facing much more thorough upgrading phases because of the difficulties in obtaining spare parts for older equipment systems. As digital technology has become widespread in many areas because of its advantages, and as applications are continuously expanding, conventional equipment and systems are losing more and more ground as a consequence of decreasing demand. Merely because of the pronounced decline in demand for conventional electronic components it is possible for equipment manufacturers to guarantee spare parts deliveries for older systems only for specific future periods of time. In addition, one-off manufacture entails high costs in purchases of spare parts. As a consequence of current thinking more and more focusing on availability and economy, upgrading of electrical systems and instrumentation and control systems is becoming a more and more topical question, for older plants even to ensure completion of full service life. (orig.) [de

  3. Safety evaluation of nuclear power plant against the virtual tsunami

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chin, S. B.; Imamura, Fumihiko

    2004-01-01

    The main scope of this study is the numerical analysis of virtual tsunami event near the Ulchin Nuclear Power Plants. In the numerical analysis, the maximum run-up height and draw-down are estimated at the Ulchin Nuclear Power Plants. The computer program developed in this study describes the propagation and associated run-up process of tsunamis by solving linear and nonlinear shallow-water equations with finite difference methods. It can be used to check the safety of a nuclear power plant against tsunami attacks. The program can also be used to calculate run-up height of wave and provide proper design criteria for coastal facilities and structures. A maximum inundation zone along the coastline can be developed by using the moving boundary condition. As a result, it is predicted that the Ulchin Nuclear Power Plants might be safe against the virtual tsunami event. Although the Ulchin Nuclear Power Plants are safe against the virtual tsunami event, the occurrence of a huge tsunami in the seismic gap should be investigated in detail. Furthermore, the possibility of nearshore tsunamis around the Korean Peninsula should also be studied and monitored continuously

  4. Studies on environment safety and application of advanced reactor for inland nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wei, L.; Jie, L.

    2014-01-01

    To study environment safety assessment of inland nuclear power plants (NPPs), the impact of environment safety under the normal operation was researched and the environment risk of serious accidents was analyzed. Moreover, the requirements and relevant provisions of site selection between international nuclear power plant and China's are comparatively studied. The conclusion was that the environment safety assessment of inland and coastal nuclear power plant have no essential difference; the advanced reactor can meet with high criteria of environment safety of inland nuclear power plants. In this way, China is safe and feasible to develop inland nuclear power plant. China's inland nuclear power plants will be as big market for advanced reactor. (author)

  5. Development of a dynamical systems model of plant programmatic performance on nuclear power plant safety risk

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hess, Stephen M.; Albano, Alfonso M.; Gaertner, John P.

    2005-01-01

    Application of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) techniques to model nuclear power plant accident sequences has provided a significant contribution to understanding the potential initiating events, equipment failures and operator errors that can lead to core damage accidents. Application of the lessons learned from these analyses has resulted in significant improvements in plant operation and safety. However, this approach has not been nearly as successful in addressing the impact of plant processes and management effectiveness on the risks of plant operation. The research described in this paper presents an alternative approach to addressing this issue. In this paper we propose a dynamical systems model that describes the interaction of important plant processes on nuclear safety risk. We discuss development of the mathematical model including the identification and interpretation of significant inter-process interactions. Next, we review the techniques applicable to analysis of nonlinear dynamical systems that are utilized in the characterization of the model. This is followed by a preliminary analysis of the model that demonstrates that its dynamical evolution displays features that have been observed at commercially operating plants. From this analysis, several significant insights are presented with respect to the effective control of nuclear safety risk. As an important example, analysis of the model dynamics indicates that significant benefits in effectively managing risk are obtained by integrating the plant operation and work management processes such that decisions are made utilizing a multidisciplinary and collaborative approach. We note that although the model was developed specifically to be applicable to nuclear power plants, many of the insights and conclusions obtained are likely applicable to other process industries

  6. Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    This annual report of the Senior Inspector for the Nuclear Safety, analyses the nuclear safety at EDF for the year 1999 and proposes twelve subjects of consideration to progress. Five technical documents are also provided and discussed concerning the nuclear power plants maintenance and safety (thermal fatigue, vibration fatigue, assisted control and instrumentation of the N4 bearing, 1300 MW reactors containment and time of life of power plants). (A.L.B.)

  7. Inherent safety features in balance-of-plant layout

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wattelet, P.L.; Green, K.J.

    1992-01-01

    Future nuclear units must be more economical to construct and operate, and, at the same time, clearly incorporate advances in safety over the current generation of light water reactors. To achieve these goals, the root causes of safety issues must be addressed. In this way, global, cost-effective solutions can be implemented. With simple, direct design approaches, the licensing risk is minimized and configuration control is enhanced. With proper planning in the early stages of plant design, postulated accidents and events can often be mitigated by passive features inherent in the basic structure and layout, eliminating expensive added protective structures and components often found in current designs. Korea Electric Power Corporation's Yonggwang (YGN) Units 3 and 4, shown in an artist's rendering in Figure 1, are now under construction in Korea. Engineering is more than 85% complete, and Unit 3 construction is more than 50% complete. Significant steps toward design simplification and safety enhancement have been made by addressing safety concerns very early in the design effort. The tools used to achieve this were improved symmetry and separation, isolation of potential hazards, and an improved design process

  8. Safety and Radiation Protection at Swedish Nuclear Power Plants 2004

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-05-01

    In 2004, no severe events occurred which challenged the safety at Swedish nuclear power plants. Two events were classified as Level 1 events on the 7-point International Nuclear Event Scale. The events are described in the chapter Operating Experience. During the year, relatively little new degradation and deficiencies were detected in the reactor barriers. The number of fuel defects is constantly decreasing. The same applies to the number of defects in the pressure-bearing systems. On the other hand, SKI has observed that damage is beginning to occur in the reactor containment. Applied control programmes are effective and capture most of the damage at an early stage before safety is affected. However, individual defects have been detected in material where such degradation was not anticipated and which is currently not regularly checked. SKI will follow up these observations thoroughly in order to judge whether there is a need for increased inspections. During the year, two defects found in the reactor containment were reported. The damage and degradation that occurred indicate that the causes were mainly due to defects during construction, or during subsequent plant modification. Taking into account the difficulty of inspecting the reactor containments and other vital building structures reliably, it is important for the licensees to continue to study possible ageing and degradation mechanisms that can affect the integrity and safety of the components. SKI continuously follows the progress of the degradation in the mechanical devices and building structures that form the plant barriers and defence-in-depth system. This includes both overall evaluations of the progress of degradation as a whole and the progress of degradation in each facility. Furthermore, the occurrence of different degradation mechanisms is followed. The power companies have intensified the rate of investment in nuclear power plants. Modernization work and safety reviews stipulated by the

  9. Periodic safety review of operational nuclear power plants. A publication within the NUSS programme

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    This Safety Guide which supplements the IAEA Safety Fundamentals: The Safety of Nuclear Installations and the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, forms part of the Agency's programme, referred to as the NUSS programme, for establishing Codes and Guides relating to nuclear power plants. A list of NUSS publications is given at the end of this book. This Guide was drafted on the basis of a systematic review approach that was endorsed by the IAEA Conference on the Safety of Nuclear Power: Strategy for the Future. The purpose of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance on the conduct of Periodic Safety Reviews (PSRs) for an operational nuclear power plant. The Guide is directed at both owners/operators and regulators. This Safety Guide deals with the PSR of an operational nuclear power plant. A PSR is a comprehensive safety review addressing all important aspects of safety, carried out at regular intervals. 22 refs, 4 figs

  10. Safety assessment for the passive system of the nuclear power plants (NPPs) using safety margin estimation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Woo, Tae-Ho; Lee, Un-Chul

    2010-01-01

    The probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) for gas-cooled nuclear power plants has been investigated where the operational data are deficient, because there is not any commercial gas-cooled nuclear power plant. Therefore, it is necessary to use the statistical data for the basic event constructions. Several estimations for the safety margin are introduced for the quantification of the failure frequency in the basic event, which is made by the concept of the impact and affordability. Trend of probability of failure (TPF) and fuzzy converter (FC) are introduced using the safety margin, which shows the simplified and easy configurations for the event characteristics. The mass flow rate in the natural circulation is studied for the modeling. The potential energy in the gravity, the temperature and pressure in the heat conduction, and the heat transfer rate in the internal stored energy are also investigated. The values in the probability set are compared with those of the fuzzy set modeling. Non-linearity of the safety margin is expressed by the fuzziness of the membership function. This artificial intelligence analysis of the fuzzy set could enhance the reliability of the system comparing to the probabilistic analysis.

  11. Safety demonstration test on solvent fire in fuel reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nishio, Gunji; Hashimoto, Kazuichiro

    1989-03-01

    This report summarizes a fundamental of results obtained in the Reprocessing Plant Safety Demonstration Test Program which was performed under the contract between the Science and Technology Agency of Japan and the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute. In this test program, a solvent fire was hypothesized, and such data were obtained as fire behavior, smoke behavior and integrity of exhaust filters in the ventilation system. Through the test results, it was confirmed that under the fire condition in hypothetical accident, the integrity of the cell and the cell ventilation system were maintained, and the safety function of the exhaust filters was maintained against the smoke loading. Analytical results by EVENT code agreed well with the present test data on the thermofluid flow in a cell ventilation system. (author)

  12. The safety of the reprocessing plant of Cogema La Hague

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ledermann, P.

    1997-01-01

    The risks associated to the operation of a reprocessing plant come from the important quantities of radioactive matter. To insure the reprocessing safety consists in keeping, in any circumstance, the containment of radioactive matter. That this objective that leads the safety at any step of the factory life. Three risks families are listed: the risks from nuclear origin, associated to the specific physico-chemical behaviours of radioactive matter (dispersion and criticality, thermal risks and risks bound to the hydrogen production); the second family is the group of internal risks resulting from the industrial activity (chemical risks, fire risks, dysfunctions of electric installations or falls of loads); the last family is the group of external risks resulting from the impact of events reaching the site where are established the installations (risks associated to climatic conditions, risks associated to surrounding activities such explosions, fires, impact resulting from the fall of a tourism plane or road transport of hazardous matter). (N.C.)

  13. Institutional implications of establishing safety goals for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Morris, F.A.; Hooper, R.L.

    1983-07-01

    The purpose of this project is to anticipate and address institutional problems that may arise from the adoption of NRC's proposed Policy Statement on Safety Goals for Nuclear Power Plants. The report emphasizes one particular category of institutional problems: the possible use of safety goals as a basis for legal challenges to NRC actions, and the resolution of such challenges by the courts. Three types of legal issues are identified and analyzed. These are, first, general legal issues such as access to the legal system, burden of proof, and standard of proof. Second is the particular formulation of goals. Involved here are such questions as sustainable rationale, definitions, avoided issues, vagueness of time and space details, and degree of conservatism. Implementation brings up the third set of issues which include interpretation and application, linkage to probabilistic risk assessment, consequences as compared to events, and the use of results

  14. Status of safety issues at licensed power plants: TMI action plan requirements, unresolved safety issues, generic safety issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-12-01

    As part of ongoing US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) efforts to ensure the quality and accountability of safety issue information, a program was established whereby an annual NUREG report would be published on the status of licensee implementation and NRC verification of safety issues in major NRC requirements areas. This information was compiled and reported in three NUREG volumes. Volume 1, published in March 1991, addressed the status of of Three Mile Island (TMI) Action Plan Requirements. Volume 2, published in May 1991, addressed the status of unresolved safety issues (USIs). Volume 3, published in June 1991, addressed the implementation and verification status of generic safety issues (GSIs). This annual NUREG report combines these volumes into a single report and provides updated information as of September 30, 1991. The data contained in these NUREG reports are a product of the NRC's Safety Issues Management System (SIMS) database, which is maintained by the Project Management Staff in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and by NRC regional personnel. This report is to provide a comprehensive description of the implementation and verification status of TMI Action Plan Requirements, safety issues designated as USIs, and GSIs that have been resolved and involve implementation of an action or actions by licensees. This report makes the information available to other interested parties, including the public. An additional purpose of this NUREG report is to serve as a follow-on to NUREG-0933, ''A Prioritization of Generic Safety Issues,'' which tracks safety issues up until requirements are approved for imposition at licensed plants or until the NRC issues a request for action by licensees

  15. Health protection and industrial safety. Nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-03-01

    The standard applies to primary circuit components including its auxiliary facilities, and of the secondary circuit of nuclear power plants with pressurized water reactors; to lifting gear and load take-ups for the transport of nuclear fuel and primary circuit components; to elevators within the containment, and to electrical installations. Part 3 specifies the behaviour of workers in conformity with safety provisions during operation, inspection, lifetime surveillance, functional testing, and maintenance. Special demands are made on the water regime and on elevators, lifting gear, and load take-ups

  16. Nuclear power plants: Results of recent safety analyses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Steinmetz, E.

    1987-01-01

    The contributions deal with the problems posed by low radiation doses, with the information currently available from analyses of the Chernobyl reactor accident, and with risk assessments in connection with nuclear power plant accidents. Other points of interest include latest results on fission product release from reactor core or reactor building, advanced atmospheric dispersion models for incident and accident analyses, reliability studies on safety systems, and assessment of fire hazard in nuclear installations. The various contributions are found as separate entries in the database. (DG) [de

  17. Numerical indicators of nuclear power plant safety performance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-04-01

    The workshop was attended by representatives from twenty-two Member States operating nuclear power plants (NPP). The current status of the development and use of numerical indicators of NPP safety performance was presented. A consensus on the benefits of use of numerical indicators was reached. The Technical Committee Meeting reviewed the progress in the development and use of performance indicators and identified them as the most appropriate ones for international use. The purpose of this document is to summarize the discussions held and conclusions reached in both meetings. Lists of participants and all the papers of both meetings are presented

  18. IMPLEMENTING CHANGES TO AN APPROVED AND IN-USE DOCUMENTED SAFETY ANALYSIS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    KING JP

    2008-01-01

    The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) has refined a process to ensure a comprehensive and complete DSA/TSR change implementation. Successful Nuclear Facility Safety Basis implementation is essential to avoid creating a Potential Inadequacy in Safety Analysis (PISA) situation, or implementing a facility into a non-compliance that can result in a TSR violation. Once past initial implementation, additional changes to Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) are often needed due to needed requirement clarifications, operating experience indicating that Conditions/Required Actions/Surveillance Requirements could be improved, changes in facility conditions, or changes in facility mission etc. An effective change implementation process is essential to ensuring compliance with 10 CFR 830.202(a), 'The contractor responsible for a hazard category 1,2, or 3 DOE nuclear facility must establish and maintain the safety basis for the facility'

  19. Different aspects of safety in Nuclear Fuel Plant at Pitesti, Romania

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ivana, T.; Epure, Gh.

    2009-01-01

    Nuclear Fuel Plant (FCN) is a facility that produces fuel bundles of CANDU-6 type for the CANDU nuclear power plant. Only natural and depleted uranium in bulk and itemized form are present as nuclear materials in this facility. Uranium and wastes from the plant are handled, processed, treated and stored throughout the entire facility. The nuclear materials with natural and depleted uranium are entirely under nuclear safeguards. The amount of uranium present in the plant in different forms and activities together with zircaloy, beryllium and other hazardous substances, wastes, explosive materials at high temperatures, etc. lead to special measures undertaken by Nuclear Safety Department (DNS) to ensure nuclear safety. Different aspects of safety are continuously monitored in the plant: operational safety, industrial safety, radiological safety, labour safety, informational safety. The emergency preparedness and response, physical protection and the security of the plant and of the transportation of radioactive materials are contributing to cover the multitude of safety aspects. The safety culture of workers built directly on the safety components completes this activity in the plant. In addition the aspects of safety, security and safeguards are in permanent synergy, parts of the three components being included in each other. In the future the policy of FCN will be focused so that any improvement of one of the safety components will be reflected in improving the other safety aspects. (authors)

  20. Evaluation of fire probabilistic safety assessment for a PWR plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wu, C.H.; Lin, T.J.; Kao, T.M.

    2001-01-01

    The internal fire analysis of the level 1 power operation probability safety assessment (PSA) for Maanshan (PWR) Nuclear Power Plant (MNPP) was updated. The fire analysis adopted a scenario-based PSA approach to systematically evaluate fire and smoke hazards and their associated risk impact to MNPP. The result shows that the core damage frequency (CDF) due to fire is about six times lower than the previous one analyzed by the Atomic Energy Council (AEC), Republic of China in 1987. The plant model was modified to reflect the impact of human events and recovery actions during fire. Many tabulated EXCEL spread-sheets were used for evaluation of the fire risk. The fire-induced CDF for MNPP is found to be 2.1 E-6 per year in this study. The relative results of the fire analysis will provide the bases for further risk-informed fire protection evaluation in the near future. (author)

  1. Probabilistic analysis of safety in industrial irradiation plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alderete, F.; Elechosa, C.

    2006-01-01

    The Argentinean Nuclear Regulatory Authority is carrying out the Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) of the two industrial irradiation plants existent in the country. The objective of this presentation is to show from the regulatory point of view, the advantages of applying this tool, as well as the appeared difficulties; for it will be made a brief description of the facilities, of the method and of the normative one. Both plants are multipurpose facilities classified as 'industrial irradiator category IV' (panoramic irradiator with source deposited in pool). Basically, the execution of an APS consists of the following stages: 1. Identification of initiating events. 2. Modeling of Accidental Sequences (Event Trees). 3. Analysis of Systems (Fault trees). 4. Quantification of Accidental Sequences. The argentine normative doesn't demand to these facilities the realization of an APS, however the basic standard of Radiological Safety establishes that in the design of this type of facilities in the cases that is justified, should make sure that the annual probability of occurrence of an accidental sequence and the resulting dose in a person gives as result an radiological risk inferior to the risk limit adopted as acceptance criteria. On the other hand the design standard specifies for these irradiators it demands a maximum fault rate of 10 -2 for the related components with the systems of radiological safety. In our case, the possible initiating events have been identified that carried out to not wanted situations (about people exposure, radioactive contamination). Then, for each one of the significant initiating events, the corresponding accidental sequences were modeled and the safety systems that intervene in this sequences by means of fault trees were analyzed, for then to determine the fault probabilities of the same ones. At the moment they are completing these fault trees, but the difficulty resides in the impossibility of obtaining real data of the reliability

  2. High knee abduction moments are common risk factors for patellofemoral pain (PFP) and anterior cruciate ligament (ACL) injury in girls: is PFP itself a predictor for subsequent ACL injury?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Myer, Gregory D; Ford, Kevin R; Di Stasi, Stephanie L; Foss, Kim D Barber; Micheli, Lyle J; Hewett, Timothy E

    2015-01-01

    Identifying risk factors for knee pain and anterior cruciate ligament (ACL) injury can be an important step in the injury prevention cycle. We evaluated two unique prospective cohorts with similar populations and methodologies to compare the incidence rates and risk factors associated with patellofemoral pain (PFP) and ACL injury. The 'PFP cohort' consisted of 240 middle and high school female athletes. They were evaluated by a physician and underwent anthropometric assessment, strength testing and three-dimensional landing biomechanical analyses prior to their basketball season. 145 of these athletes met inclusion for surveillance of incident (new) PFP by certified athletic trainers during their competitive season. The 'ACL cohort' included 205 high school female volleyball, soccer and basketball athletes who underwent the same anthropometric, strength and biomechanical assessment prior to their competitive season and were subsequently followed up for incidence of ACL injury. A one-way analysis of variance was used to evaluate potential group (incident PFP vs ACL injured) differences in anthropometrics, strength and landing biomechanics. Knee abduction moment (KAM) cut-scores that provided the maximal sensitivity and specificity for prediction of PFP or ACL injury risk were also compared between the cohorts. KAM during landing above 15.4 Nm was associated with a 6.8% risk to develop PFP compared to a 2.9% risk if below the PFP risk threshold in our sample. Likewise, a KAM above 25.3 Nm was associated with a 6.8% risk for subsequent ACL injury compared to a 0.4% risk if below the established ACL risk threshold. The ACL-injured athletes initiated landing with a greater knee abduction angle and a reduced hamstrings-to-quadriceps strength ratio relative to the incident PFP group. Also, when comparing across cohorts, the athletes who suffered ACL injury also had lower hamstring/quadriceps ratio than the players in the PFP sample (p15 Nm of knee abduction load

  3. Nuclear power plant safety - the risk of accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Higson, D.; Crancher, D.W.

    1975-08-01

    Although it is physically impossible for any nuclear plant to explode like an atom bomb, an accidental release of radioactive material into the environment is conceivable. Three factors reduce the probability of such releases, in dangerous quantities, to an extremely low level. Firstly, there are many safety features built into the plant including a leaktight containment building to prevent the escape of such material. Secondly, the quality of engineering and standards used are far more demanding than in conventional power engineering. Thirdly, strict government licensing and regulatory control is enforced at all phases from design through construction to operation. No member of the general public is known to have been injured or died as a result of any accident to a commercial nuclear power plant. Ten workers have died as a result of over-exposure to radiation from experimental reactors and laboratory work connected with the development of nuclear plant since 1945. Because of this excellent safety record the risk of serious accidents can only be estimated. On the basis of such estimates, the chance of an accident in a nuclear power reactor which could cause a detectable increase in the incidence of radiation-induced illnesses would be less than one chance in a million per year. In a typical highly industrialised society, such as the USA, the estimated risk of an individual being killed by such accidents, from one hundred operating reactors, is no greater than one chance in sixteen million per year. There are undoubtedly risks from reactor accidents but estimates of these risks show that they are considerably less than from other activities which are accepted by society. (author)

  4. Safety assessment in plant layout design using indexing approach: Implementing inherent safety perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tugnoli, Alessandro; Khan, Faisal; Amyotte, Paul; Cozzani, Valerio

    2008-01-01

    The design of layout plans requires adequate assessment tools for the quantification of safety performance. The general focus of the present work is to introduce an inherent safety perspective at different points of the layout design process. In particular, index approaches for safety assessment and decision-making in the early stages of layout design are developed and discussed in this two-part contribution. Part 1 (accompanying paper) of the current work presents an integrated index approach for safety assessment of early plant layout. In the present paper (Part 2), an index for evaluation of the hazard related to the potential of domino effects is developed. The index considers the actual consequences of possible escalation scenarios and scores or ranks the subsequent accident propagation potential. The effects of inherent and passive protection measures are also assessed. The result is a rapid quantification of domino hazard potential that can provide substantial support for choices in the early stages of layout design. Additionally, a case study concerning selection among various layout options is presented and analyzed. The case study demonstrates the use and applicability of the indices developed in both parts of the current work and highlights the value of introducing inherent safety features early in layout design

  5. Development and Application of Level 2 Probabilistic Safety Assessment for Nuclear Power Plants. Specific Safety Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations for meeting the IAEA safety requirements in performing or managing a level 2 probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) project for a nuclear power plant; thus it complements the Safety Guide on level 1 PSA. One of the aims of this Safety Guide is to promote a standard framework, standard terms and a standard set of documents for level 2 PSAs to facilitate regulatory and external peer review of their results. It describes all elements of the level 2 PSA that need to be carried out if the starting point is a fully comprehensive level 1 PSA. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. PSA project management and organization; 3. Identification of design aspects important to severe accidents and acquisition of information; 4. Interface with level 1 PSA: Grouping of sequences; 5. Accident progression and containment analysis; 6. Source terms for severe accidents; 7. Documentation of the analysis: Presentation and interpretation of results; 8. Use and applications of the PSA; Annex I: Example of a typical schedule for a level 2 PSA; Annex II: Computer codes for simulation of severe accidents; Annex III: Sample outline of documentation for a level 2 PSA study.

  6. Application of probabilistic safety assessment to Rokkasho reprocessing plant, (2)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miyata, Takashi; Takebe, Kazumi; Tamauchi, Yoshikazu

    2008-01-01

    A probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) is made on the boiling accident of a highly active liquid waste tank, which may result in significant consequences, in accordance with the procedure for PSA developed for nuclear power plants. Obtained as results are the frequency of boiling accident of a certain tank of 2.0x10 -8 /y (frequency of boiling accident of any tank of 4.1x10 0-8 /y), its error factor of approx. 6, and information on the relative risk importance based on the FV index and RAW for various components, systems and activities of personnel and on the sensitivity of key parameters. Furthermore, the effect of the time required for repairing failed instruments on the frequency of accident, how to deal with the common cause of failure of the duplicated dynamic components, one of which is at least in operation, and conservative exposure dose in the event of an accident are examined. The database for the Rokkasho reprocessing plant has not been established yet, but the PSA results utilizing available failure rate databases of existing nuclear power plants and reprocessing plants in Japan and abroad can be used effectively to optimize operations and maintenance, if they are interpreted properly and some uncertainties are taken into account. (author)

  7. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Safety Analysis Report. Volume 5

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-01-01

    This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) has been prepared by the US Department of Energy (DOE) to support the construction and operation of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in southeastern New Mexico. The WIPP facility is designed to receive, inspect, emplace, and store unclassified defense-generated transuranic wastes in a retrievable fashion in an underground salt medium and to conduct studies and perform experiments in salt with high-level wastes. Upon the successful completion of these studies and experiments, WIPP is designed to serve as a permanent facility. The first chapter of this report provides a summary of the location and major design features of WIPP. Chapters 2 through 5 describe the site characteristics, design criteria, and design bases used in the design of the plant and the plant operations. Chapter 6 discusses radiation protection; Chapters 7 and 8 present an accident analysis of the plant and an assessment of the long-term waste isolation at WIPP. The conduct of operations and operating controls and limits are discussed in Chapters 9 and 10. The quality assurance programs are described in Chapter 11

  8. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Safety Analysis Report. Volume 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-01-01

    This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) has been prepared by the US Department of Energy (DOE) to support the construction and operation of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in southeastern New Mexico. The WIPP facility is designed to receive, inspect, emplace, and store unclassified defense-generated transuranic wastes in a retrievable fashion in an underground salt medium and to conduct studies and perform experiments in salt with high-level wastes. Upon the successful completion of these studies and experiments, WIPP is designed to serve as a permanent facility. The first chapter of this report provides a summary of the location and major design features of WIPP. Chapters 2 through 5 describe the site characteristics, design criteria, and design bases used in the design of the plant and the plant operations. Chapter 6 discusses radiation protection: Chapters 7 and 8 present an accident analysis of the plant and an assessment of the long-term waste isolation at WIPP. The conduct of operations and operating control and limits are discussed in Chapters 9 and 10. The quality assurance programs are described in Chapter 11

  9. Criticality safety philosophy for the Sellafield MOX plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Edge, Jane; Gulliford, Jim

    2003-01-01

    The Sellafield MOX Plant (SMP) has been operational since 2001, blending plutonium dioxide from THORP reprocessing operations, with uranium dioxide to produce Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel elements. In handling the quantities of fuel associated with a commercial fuel fabrication plant, it is necessary to impose criticality controls. Plutonium dioxide (PuO 2 ), uranium dioxide (UO 2 ) and recycled MOX are mixed together in batches. An Engineered Protection System (EPS) prevents the production of MOX powder in excess of 20w/o Pu(fissile)/(Pu+U), achieved through the combination of a weight-based' system and a diverse 'neutron monitoring' radiometric system. The 'neutron monitoring' component of the EPS determines the fissile enrichment of the batch of MOX powder, based on pessimistic isotopic requirements of the PuO 2 feedstock powder. Guaranteeing the maximum MOX enrichment of 20w/o Pu(fissile)/(Pu + U) at an early stage of the fuel manufacturing process enables the criticality safety assessor to demonstrate that normal operations are deterministically safe. This paper describes in detail the EPS at the front end of plant and the engineered and operational protection in downstream areas. In addition plant operational experience in producing the first fuel assemblies is discussed. (author)

  10. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Safety Analysis Report. Volume 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-01-01

    This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) has been prepared by the US Department of Energy (DOE) to support the construction and operation of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in southeastern New Mexico. The WIPP facility is designed to receive, inspect, emplace, and store unclassified defense-generated transuranic wastes in a retrievable fashion in an underground salt medium and to conduct studies and perform experiments in salt with high-level wastes. Upon the successful completion of these studies and experiments, WIPP is designed to serve as a permanent facility. The first chapter of this report provides a summary of the location and major design features of WIPP. Chapters 2 through 5 describe the site characteristics, design criteria, and design bases used in the design of the plant and the plant operations. Chapter 6 discusses radiation protection; Chapters 7 and 8 present an accident analysis of the plant and an assessment of the long-term waste isolation at WIPP. The conduct of operations and operating controls and limits are discussed in Chapters 9 and 10. The quality assurance programs are described in Chapter 11

  11. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Safety Analysis Report. Volume 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-01-01

    This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) has been prepared by the US Department of Energy (DOE) to support the construction and operation of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in southeastern New Mexico. The WIPP facility is designed to receive, inspect, emplace, and store unclassified defense-generated transuranic wastes in a retrievable fashion in an underground salt medium and to conduct studies and perform experiments in salt with high-level wastes. Upon the successful completion of these studies and experiments, WIPP is designed to serve as a permanent facility. The first chapter of this report provides a summary of the location and major design features of WIPP. Chapters 2 through 5 describe the site characteristics, design criteria, and design bases used in the design of the plant and the plant operations. Chapter 6 discusses radiation protection; Chapters 7 and 8 present an accident analysis of the plant and an assessment of the long-term waste isolation at WIPP. The conduct of operations and operating controls and limits are discussed in Chapters 9 and 10. The quality assurance programs are described in Chapter 11

  12. RATU - Nuclear power plant structural safety research programme

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rintamaa, R.

    1992-07-01

    Studies on the structural materials in nuclear power plants create the experimental data and background information necessary for the structural integrity assessments of mechanical components. The research is carried out by developing experimental fracture mechanics methods including statistical analysis methods of materials property data, and by studying material ageing and, in particular, mechanisms of material deterioration due to neutron irradiation, corrosion and water chemistry. Besides material studies, new testing methods and sensors for measurement of loading and water chemistry parameters have been developed. The monitoring data obtained in real power plants has been used to simulate more precisely the real environment during laboratory tests. The research on structural analysis has focused on extending and verifying the analysis capabilities for structural assessments of nuclear power plants. A widely applicable system including various computational fracture assessment methods has been created with which different structural problems can be solved reliably and effectively. Research on reliability assessment of maintenance in nuclear power plants is directed to practical case studies on components and structures of safety importance, and to the development of models for maintenance related decision support. A systematic analysis of motor-operated valve has been performed

  13. Nuclear power plant safety. The merits of separation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Helander, L.I.; Tiren, L.I.

    1977-01-01

    The paper illustrates how the physical separation of safety-related structures, systems and components can improve the protection of a nuclear power plant against multiple failures that may be caused by events such as fire, pipe-whip, missiles, flooding, hurricanes, lightning etc. Criteria for redundancy and separation requirements affect nuclear plant design in many areas such as building layout, arrangements for fire protection and ventilation, separation of mechanical systems and components, in particular emergency cooling systems, separation of electric equipment and cables. The implementation of the ensuing design criteria for a BWR power plant is described. This design involves the separation of emergency cooling systems into four 50% capacity systems, which are independent and separated, including the distribution network for electric power from on-site standby diesel generators and the circuitry for the reactor protection system. The plant is subdivided into a number of fire zones, each with its own independent ventilation system. The fire zones are further subdivided into a multitude of fire cells such that redundant subsystems are housed in separate cells. These design precautions with regard to fire are complemented by extensive fire fighting systems. (author)

  14. Nuclear power plant systems, structures and components and their safety classification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The assurance of a nuclear power plant's safety is based on the reliable functioning of the plant as well as on its appropriate maintenance and operation. To ensure the reliability of operation, special attention shall be paid to the design, manufacturing, commissioning and operation of the plant and its components. To control these functions the nuclear power plant is divided into structural and functional entities, i.e. systems. A systems safety class is determined by its safety significance. Safety class specifies the procedures to be employed in plant design, construction, monitoring and operation. The classification document contains all documentation related to the classification of the nuclear power plant. The principles of safety classification and the procedures pertaining to the classification document are presented in this guide. In the Appendix of the guide, examples of systems most typical of each safety class are given to clarify the safety classification principles

  15. The safety evaluation guide for laboratories and plants a tool for enhancing safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lhomme, Veronique; Daubard, Jean-Paul

    2013-01-01

    The Institute for Radioprotection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) acts as technical support for the French government Authorities competent in nuclear safety and radiation protection for civil and defence activities. In this frame, the Institute's performs safety assessments of the safety cases submitted by operators to these Authorities for each stage in the life cycle of a nuclear facility, including dismantling operations, which is subjected to a licensing procedure. In the fuel cycle field, this concerns a large variety of facilities. Very often, depending on facilities and on safety cases, safety assessment to be performed is multidisciplinary and involves the supervisor in charge of the facility and several safety experts, particularly to cover the whole set of risks (criticality, exposure to radiation, fire, handling, containment, human and organisational factors...) encountered during facility's operations. Taking these into account, and in order to formalize the assessment process of the fuel cycle facilities, laboratories, irradiators, particle accelerators, under-decommissioning reactors and radioactive waste management, the 'Plants, Laboratories, Transports and Waste Safety' Division of IRSN has developed an internal guide, as a tool: - To present the methodological framework, and possible specificities, for the assessment according to the 'Defence in Depth Concept' (Part 1); - To provide key questions associated to the necessary contradictory technical review of the safety cases (Part 2); - To capitalise on experience on the basis of technical examples (coming from incident reports, previous safety assessments...) demonstrating the questioning (Part 3). The guide is divided in chapters, each dedicated to a type of risk (dissemination of radioactive material, external or internal exposure from ionising radiation, criticality, radiolysis mechanisms, handling operations, earthquake, human or organisational factors...) or to a type

  16. Integrated safety assessment report, Haddam Neck Plant (Docket No. 50-213): Integrated Safety Assessment Program: Draft report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-07-01

    The integrated assessment is conducted on a plant-specific basis to evaluate all licensing actions, licensee initiated plant improvements and selected unresolved generic/safety issues to establish implementation schedules for each item. Procedures allow for a periodic updating of the schedules to account for licensing issues that arise in the future. The Haddam Neck Plant is one of two plants being reviewed under the pilot program. This report indicates how 82 topics selected for review were addressed, and presents the staff's recommendations regarding the corrective actions to resolve the 82 topics and other actions to enhance plant safety. 135 refs., 4 figs., 5 tabs

  17. Addendum 2 to CSER 79-002: Extension of the 150 gram fissile limit used in room 187 of PFP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Friar, D.E.

    1994-01-01

    The PFP operating organization requests that the limit set permitting 150 grams fissile be extended to the Hoods 4 and 5 of Room 187. The request for the limit change is explained in the attached request for analysis

  18. Transportable nuclear power plant TEC-M with two reactor plants of improved safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ogloblin, B.G.; Sazonov, A.G.; Svishchev, A.M.; Gromov, B.F.; Zelensky, V.N.; Komkova, O.I.; Sidorov, V.I.; Tolstopyatov, V.P.; Toshinsky, G.I.

    1993-01-01

    Liquid metals are the best to meet the requirements of inherently safety nuclear power plants among the coolants used. A great experience has been gained in lead coolant power plant development and operation as applied to transportable power set-ups. Low chemical activity of this coolant with respect to air-water interaction is a determining factor for this coolant. The transportable nuclear power plant is described. It is intended to generate electric power for populated areas placed a long distance from the main electric power supply sources where it is difficult or not economical to deliver the conventional types of fuel. There are several remote areas in Siberia, Kamchatka in need of this type of power plant

  19. Analysis of effect of safety classification on DCS design in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gou Guokai; Li Guomin; Wang Qunfeng

    2011-01-01

    By analyzing the safety classification for the systems and functions of nuclear power plants based on the general design requirements for nuclear power plants, especially the requirement of availability and reliability of I and C systems, the characteristics of modem DCS technology and I and C products currently applied in nuclear power field are interpreted. According to the requirements on the safety operation of nuclear power plants and the regulations for safety audit, the effect of different safety classifications on DCS design in nuclear power plants is analyzed, by considering the actual design process of different DCS solutions in the nuclear power plants under construction. (authors)

  20. Concept of system safety on operating nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miyano, Hiroshi; Yamaguchi, Akira; Demachi, Kazuyuki; Takata, Takashi; Arai, Shigeki; Sugiyama, Naoki

    2015-01-01

    The total system design on Nuclear Plant ensures 'Nuclear safety' with making practically achievable efforts to prevent and mitigate nuclear and radiological accidents. The performance based system design with 'Defence in depth (D-I-D)' has been laid out as the key means in 'preventing accidents', 'controlling escalation to serious consequences', and 'preventing harmful consequences to the public'. D-I-D is extended to the management of severe accidents, and is an approach intended to provide protection against the development of a wide variety of events by means of redundant, diverse and independent protective barriers. It is crucial to maintain plant integrity with mass quantity of radioactive material present in reactor core, against potential consequences (risk) on people and the environment caused by external hazards, particularly, earthquake and tsunami. The fundamental approach on D-I-D is to address uncertainties by means of successive measures, so that if one measure fails, other, or subsequent measure will be available to ensure safety. Risk analysis should be conducted to validate and enhance reliability of the defence barriers against consequences on people and the environment. (author)

  1. Periodic Safety Review of Nuclear Power Plants: Experience of Member States

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-04-01

    Routine reviews of nuclear power plant operation (including modifications to hardware and procedures, operating experience, plant management and personnel competence) and special reviews following major events of safety significance are the primary means of safety verification. In addition, many Member States of the IAEA have initiated systematic safety reassessments, termed periodic safety reviews, of nuclear power plants, to assess the cumulative effects of plant ageing and plant modifications, operating experience, technical developments and siting aspects. The reviews include an assessment of plant design and operation against current safety standards and practices, and they have the objective of ensuring a high level of safety throughout the plant's operating lifetime. They are complementary to the routine and special safety reviews and do not replace them. Periodic safety reviews of nuclear power plants are considered an effective way to obtain an overall view of actual plant safety, and to determine reasonable and practical modifications that should be made in order to maintain a high level of safety. They can be used as a means of identifying time limiting features of the plant in order to determine nuclear power plant operation beyond the designed lifetime. The periodic safety review process can be used to support the decision making process for long term operation or licence renewal. Since 1994, the use of periodic safety reviews by Member States has substantially broadened and confirmed its benefits. Periodic safety review results have, for example, been used by some Member States to help provide a basis for continued operation beyond the current licence term, to communicate more effectively with stakeholders regarding nuclear power plant safety, and to help identify changes to plant operation that enhance safety. This IAEA-TECDOC is intended to assist Member States in the implementation of a periodic safety review. This publication complements the

  2. To improve nuclear plant safety by learning from accident's experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matsumoto, Hidezo; Kida, Masanori; Kato, Hiroyuki; Hara, Shin-ichi

    1994-01-01

    The ultimate goal of this study is to produce an expert system that enables the experience (records and information) gained from accidents to be put to use towards improving nuclear plant safety. A number of examples have been investigated, both domestic and overseas, in which experience gained from accidents was utilized by utilities in managing and operating their nuclear power stations to improve safety. The result of investigation has been used to create a general 'basic flow' to make the best use of experience. The ultimate goal is achieved by carrying out this 'basic flow' with artificial intelligence (AI). To do this, it is necessary (1) to apply language analysis to process the source information (primary data base; domestic and overseas accident's reports) into the secondary data base, and (2) to establish an expert system for selecting (screening) significant events from the secondary data base. In the processing described in item (1), a multi-lingual thesaurus for nuclear-related terms become necessary because the source information (primary data bases) itself is multi-lingual. In the work described in item (2), the utilization of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), for example, is a candidate method for judging the significance of events. Achieving the goal thus requires developing various new techniques. As the first step of the above long-term study project, this report proposes the 'basic flow' and presents the concept of how the nuclear-related AI can be used to carry out this 'basic flow'. (author)

  3. Safety aspects of nuclear power plant component aging

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Conte, M.; Deletre, G.; Henry, J.Y.

    1988-01-01

    The safety of nuclear plants depends on the capacity of the systems they are composed to perform the functions they were designed for. The identification and understanding of phenomena liable to degrade this operational capacity thus constitute one of the safety problems for which allowance must be made at the earliest stage of a project. Aging, a natural and hence unavoidable process affecting all the components of an installation, was identified at a very early stage as being one of these phenomena. The investigation and implementation of solutions to the safety problems associated to aging make it necessary to: defining the domain in which the consequences of aging are to be evaluated, identifying the parameters involved, identifying the components sensitive to these parameters, understanding the mechanisms which govern its evolution. The results of qualification tests, and of tests and checks carried out at different stages of construction and operation, as well as allowance for operating experience, constitute the necessary basis for establishing or improving the regulatory requirements. The procedures for validating components and systems of the installation are also drawn up on the basis of these tests. Finally, the actions initiated within the scope of research and development programmes supply the additional data necessary for such validation, and provide the indispensable support for knowledge improvement

  4. Finnish research programmes on nuclear power plant safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Puska, E. K.

    2010-01-01

    The current Finnish national research programme on nuclear power plant safety SAFIR2010 for the years 2007-2010 as well as the coming SAFIR2014 programme for the years 2011-2014 are based on the chapter 7a, 'Ensuring expertise', of the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act. The objective of this chapter is realised in the research work and education of experts in the projects of these research programmes. SAFIR2010 research programme is divided in eight research areas that are Organisation and human, Automation and control room, Fuel and reactor physics, Thermal hydraulics, Severe accidents, Structural safety of reactor circuit, Construction safety, and Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA). All the research areas include both projects in their own area and interdisciplinary co-operational projects. Research projects of the programme are chosen on the basis of annual call for proposals. In 2010 research is carried out in 33 projects in SAFIR2010. VTT is the responsible research organisation in 26 of these projects and VTT is also the coordination unit of SAFIR2010 and SAFIR2014. In 2007-2009 SAFIR2010 produced 497 Specified research results (Deliverables), 618 Publications, and 33 Academic degrees. SAFIR2010 programme covers approximately half of the reactor safety research volume in Finland currently. In 2010 the programme volume is EUR 7.1 million and 47 person years. The major funding partners are VYR with EUR 2.96 million, VTT with EUR 2.66 million, Fortum with EUR 0.28 million, TVO with EUR 0.19 million, NKS with EUR 0.15 million, EU with only EUR 0.03 million and other partners with EUR 0.85 million. The new decisions-in-principle on Olkiluoto unit 4 for Teollisuuden Voima and new nuclear power plant for Fennovoima ratified by the Finnish Parliament on 1 July 2010 increase the annual funding collected according to the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act from Fennovoima, Fortum and Teollisuuden Voima for the SAFIR2014 programme to EUR 5.2 million from the current level of EUR 3

  5. Safety system in a heavy water detritiation plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Balteanu, O.; Stefan, I.; Retevoi, C.

    2003-01-01

    In a CANDU 6 type reactor a quantity of 55·10 15 Bq/year of tritium is generated, 95% being in the D 2 O moderator which can achieve a radioactivity of 2.5-3.5·10 12 Bq/kg. Tritium in heavy water contributes with 30-50% to the doses received by operation personnel and up to 20% to the radioactivity released in the environment. The large quantity of heavy water used in this type of reactors (500 tones) make storage very difficult, especially for environment. The extraction of tritium from tritiated heavy water of CANDU reactors solve the following problems: the radiation level in the operation area, the costs of maintenance and repair reduction due to reduction of personnel protection measures, the increase of NPP utilisation factor by shutdown time reduction for maintenance and repair, use the extracted tritium for fusion reactors and not for the last, lower costs and risk for storage heavy water waste. Heavy water detritiation methods, which currently are used in the industrial or experimental plant, are based on catalytic isotope exchange or electrolysis followed cryogenic distillation or permeation. The technology developed at Institute of Cryogenics and Isotope Separation is based upon catalytic exchange between tritiated water and deuterium, followed by cryogenic distillation of hydrogen isotopes. The nature of the fluids that are processed in detritiation requires the operation of the plant in safety conditions. The paper presents the safety system solution chose in order to solve this task, as well as a simulation of an incident and safety system response. The application software is using LabView platform that is specialised on control and factory automation applications. (author)

  6. 78 FR 25488 - Qualification Tests for Safety-Related Actuators in Nuclear Power Plants

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-05-01

    ... Nuclear Power Plants AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Draft regulatory guide; request for... regulatory guide (DG), DG-1235, ``Qualification Tests for Safety-Related Actuators in Nuclear Power Plants... entitled ``Qualification Tests for Safety-Related Actuators in Nuclear Power Plants'' is temporarily...

  7. Upgrading of fire safety in nuclear power plants. Proceedings of an International Symposium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-04-01

    The document includes 40 papers presented at the International Symposium on Upgrading of Fire Safety in Nuclear Power Plants held in Vienna between 18-21 November 1997. The symposium presentations were grouped in 6 sessions: Fire safety reviews (5 papers), Fire safety analysis - Methodology (6 papers), Fire safety analysis - Applications (3 papers), Panel 1 - Identification of deficiencies in fire safety in nuclear power plants - Operational experience and data (7 papers), Panel 2 - Experience based data in fire safety assessment - Fire safety regulations and licensing (7 papers), Upgrading programmes (10 papers), and a closing session (2 papers). A separate abstract was prepared for each paper Refs, figs, tabs

  8. Upgrading of fire safety in nuclear power plants. Proceedings of an International Symposium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-04-01

    The document includes 40 papers presented at the International Symposium on Upgrading of Fire Safety in Nuclear Power Plants held in Vienna between 18-21 November 1997. The symposium presentations were grouped in 6 sessions: Fire safety reviews (5 papers), Fire safety analysis - Methodology (6 papers), Fire safety analysis - Applications (3 papers), Panel 1 - Identification of deficiencies in fire safety in nuclear power plants - Operational experience and data (7 papers), Panel 2 - Experience based data in fire safety assessment - Fire safety regulations and licensing (7 papers), Upgrading programmes (10 papers), and a closing session (2 papers). A separate abstract was prepared for each paper

  9. Improving nuclear power plant safety through operator aids

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-12-01

    In October 1986, the IAEA convened a one-week Technical Committee Meeting on Improving Nuclear Power Plant Safety Through Operator Aids. The term ''operator aid'' or more formally ''operator support system'' refers to a class of devices designed to be added to a nuclear power plant control station to assist an operator in performing his job and thereby decrease the probability of operator error. The addition of a carefully planned and designed operator aid should result in an increase in nuclear power plant safety and reliability. Operator aids encompass a wide range of devices from the very simple, such as color coding a display to distinguish it out of a group of similar displays, to the very complex, such as a computer-generated video display which concentrates a number of scattered indicator readings located around a control room into a concise display in front of the operator. This report provides guidelines and information to help make a decision as to whether an operator aid is needed, what kinds of operator aids are available and whether it should be purchased or developed by the utility. In addition, a discussion is presented on advanced operator aids to provide information on what may become available in the future. The broad scope of these guidelines makes it most suitable for use by a multi-disciplinary team. The document consists of two parts. The recommendations and results of the meeting discussions are given in the first part. The second part is the annex where the papers presented at the Technical Committee Meeting are printed. A separate abstract was prepared for each of the 10 papers. Refs, figs and tabs

  10. Design of integrated passive safety system (IPSS) for ultimate passive safety of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chang, Soon Heung; Kim, Sang Ho; Choi, Jae Young

    2013-01-01

    Highlights: • We newly propose the design concept of integrated passive safety system (IPSS). • It has five safety functions for decay heat removal and severe accident mitigation. • Simulations for IPSS show that core melt does not occur in accidents with SBO. • IPSS can achieve the passive in-vessel retention and ex-vessel cooling strategy. • The applicability of IPSS is high due to the installation outside the containment. -- Abstract: The design concept of integrated passive safety system (IPSS) which can perform various passive safety functions is proposed in this paper. It has the various functions of passive decay heat removal system, passive safety injection system, passive containment cooling system, passive in-vessel retention and cavity flooding system, and filtered venting system with containment pressure control. The objectives of this paper are to propose the conceptual design of an IPSS and to estimate the design characters of the IPSS with accident simulations using MARS code. Some functions of the IPSS are newly proposed and the other functions are reviewed with the integration of the functions. Consequently, all of the functions are modified and integrated for simplicity of the design in preparation for beyond design based accidents (BDBAs) focused on a station black out (SBO). The simulation results with the IPSS show that the decay heat can be sufficiently removed in accidents that occur with a SBO. Also, the molten core can be retained in a vessel via the passive in-vessel retention strategy of the IPSS. The actual application potential of the IPSS is high, as numerous strong design characters are evaluated. The installation of the IPSS into the original design of a nuclear power plant requires minimal design change using the current penetrations of the containment. The functions are integrated in one or two large tanks outside the containment. Furthermore, the operation time of the IPSS can be increased by refilling coolant from the

  11. B plant/WESF integrated annual safety appraisal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anderson, J.K.

    1990-12-01

    This report provides the results of the Fiscal Year 1990 Annual Integrated Safety Appraisal of the B Plant and Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility in the Hanford Site 200 East Area. The appraisal was conducted in August and September 1990, by the Defense Waste Disposal Safety group, in conjunction with Health Physics and Emergency Preparedness. Reports of these three organizations for their areas of responsibility are presented. The purpose of the appraisal was to determine if the areas being appraised meet US Department of Energy (DOE) and Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) requirements and current industry standards of good practice. A further purpose was to identify areas in which program effectiveness could be improved. In accordance with the guidance of WHC Management Requirements and Procedures 5.6, previously identified deficiencies which are being resolved by line management were not repeated as Findings or Observations unless progress or intended disposition was considered to be unsatisfactory. The overall assessment is that there are no major safety problems associated with current operations. Programs are in place to provide the necessary safety controls, evaluations, overviews, and support. In most respects these programs are being implemented effectively. However, there are a number of deficiencies in details of program design and implementation. The appraisal identified a total of 23 Findings and 27 Observations of deficiencies. All Observations are Seriousness Category 3. Fifteen Findings were Category 2 and 8 were Category 3. Most of the Category 2 Findings were so categorized on the basis of noncompliance with mandatory DOE Orders or WHC policies and procedures, rather than potential risk to personnel

  12. Design of the reactor coolant system and associated systems in nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA programme for establishing safety standards for nuclear power plants. The basic requirements for the design of safety systems for nuclear power plants are established in the Safety Requirements publication, Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-1 on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design, which it supplements. This Safety Guide describes how the requirements for the design of the reactor coolant system (RCS) and associated systems in nuclear power plants should be met. 1.2. This publication is a revision and combination of two previous Safety Guides, Safety Series No. 50-SG-D6 on Ultimate Heat Sink and Directly Associated Heat Transport Systems for Nuclear Power Plants (1981), and Safety Series No. 50-SG-D13 on Reactor Coolant and Associated Systems in Nuclear Power Plants (1986), which are superseded by this new Safety Guide. 1.3. The revision takes account of developments in the design of the RCS and associated systems in nuclear power plants since the earlier Safety Guides were published in 1981 and 1986, respectively. The other objectives of the revision are to ensure consistency with Ref., issued in 2000, and to update the technical content. In addition, an appendix on pressurized heavy water reactors (PHWRs) has been included

  13. Safety problems in decommissioning of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1975-12-01

    The safety problems in decommissioning are presented by the example of light water reactors with an electric power of 1300 MW and 40 years of preceding specified operation. In such a plant the radioactivity in the form of activation and contamination is of the order of 10 7 Ci one year after final shut-down. The fuel elements are not taken into account. During the work at the reactor vessel dose rates of some 10 4 rem/h may occur at the flange level. According to a rough estimation the dose accumulated by the decommissioning personnel during dismantling of the radioactive components amounts to 1200 rem. During the decommissioning work the problems are caused predominantly by the direct radiation from the radioactive components and systems as well as from the release of radioactive particles, aerosols and liquids on cutting them up. In designing new plants the extent of later decommissioning problems can be reduced above all by selection of suitable materials and by decommissioning-minded design and arrangement of the components and parts of the plant. (orig./RW) [de

  14. Artificial intelligence and distance learning philosophy in support of PfP mandate

    OpenAIRE

    Antoliš, Krunoslav

    2003-01-01

    Computers have long been utilised in the legal environment. The main use of computers however, has merely been to automate office tasks. More exciting is the prospect of using artificial intelligence (AI) technology to create computers that can emulate the substantive legal jobs performed by lawyers, to create computers that can autonomously reason with the law to determine legal solutions, for example: structuring and support of Partnership for Peace (PfP) mandate. Such attempts have not bee...

  15. Safety and Radiation Protection at Swedish Nuclear Power Plants 2005

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-05-01

    In 2005, no severe events occurred which challenged the safety at the Swedish nuclear power plants. However, some events have been given a special focus. The 'Gudrun' storm, which occurred in January 2005, affected the operation of the reactors at Ringhals and Barsebaeck 2. At Ringhals, the switchyards were affected by salt deposits and, at Barsebaeck, the 400kV grid was subjected to interruptions. The long-term trend is that the total number of fuel defects in Swedish reactors is decreasing. The damage that occurs nowadays has mainly been caused by small objects entering the fuel via the coolant and fretting holes in the cladding. To reduce the number of defects of this type, fuel with filters is successively being introduced to prevent debris from entering the fuel assemblies and cyclone filters in the facility which cleans the coolant. Since the mid-nineties, the pressurised water reactors, Ringhals 2, 3 and 4, have had problems with fuel rod bowing in excess of the safety analysis calculations. Ringhals AB (RAB) has adopted measures to rectify the bowing. Follow-up work shows that the fuel rod bowing is decreasing. The followup in 2005 of damaged tubes in the Ringhals 4 steam generators indicates a continued slow damage propagation. Tubes with defects of such a limited extent that there are adequate margins to rupture and loosening have been kept in operation. Damaged tubes with insufficient margins have plugged. During the year, previously observed minor leakage from the reactor containment in Ringhals 2 was investigated in greater detail and repaired. The investigations showed extensive corrosion attack caused by deficiencies in connection with containment construction. The ageing of electrical cables and other equipment in the I-C systems has been examined by SKI. Regulatory supervision has so far shown that these issues are largely handled in a satisfactory manner by the licensees but that certain supplementary investigations and other measures need to be

  16. Safety and Radiation Protection at Swedish Nuclear Power Plants 2005

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2006-05-15

    In 2005, no severe events occurred which challenged the safety at the Swedish nuclear power plants. However, some events have been given a special focus. The 'Gudrun' storm, which occurred in January 2005, affected the operation of the reactors at Ringhals and Barsebaeck 2. At Ringhals, the switchyards were affected by salt deposits and, at Barsebaeck, the 400kV grid was subjected to interruptions. The long-term trend is that the total number of fuel defects in Swedish reactors is decreasing. The damage that occurs nowadays has mainly been caused by small objects entering the fuel via the coolant and fretting holes in the cladding. To reduce the number of defects of this type, fuel with filters is successively being introduced to prevent debris from entering the fuel assemblies and cyclone filters in the facility which cleans the coolant. Since the mid-nineties, the pressurised water reactors, Ringhals 2, 3 and 4, have had problems with fuel rod bowing in excess of the safety analysis calculations. Ringhals AB (RAB) has adopted measures to rectify the bowing. Follow-up work shows that the fuel rod bowing is decreasing. The followup in 2005 of damaged tubes in the Ringhals 4 steam generators indicates a continued slow damage propagation. Tubes with defects of such a limited extent that there are adequate margins to rupture and loosening have been kept in operation. Damaged tubes with insufficient margins have plugged. During the year, previously observed minor leakage from the reactor containment in Ringhals 2 was investigated in greater detail and repaired. The investigations showed extensive corrosion attack caused by deficiencies in connection with containment construction. The ageing of electrical cables and other equipment in the I-C systems has been examined by SKI. Regulatory supervision has so far shown that these issues are largely handled in a satisfactory manner by the licensees but that certain supplementary investigations and other measures

  17. Engineering work plan for PFP criticality alarm panel first unit re-build

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Clem, W.E.

    1994-01-01

    This document describes the first step in increasing the quality, reliability, and ease of maintenance of the nine Criticality Alarm Panels (CAP) at PFP. Development control practices and guidelines of WHC-CM-6-1, EP-2.4 and WHC-IP-1026, EPG-2.4 are applied to develop a prototype of a replacement Criticality Alarm Panel (CAP) with facility-use potential. During the development of the prototype CAP, the design requirements of all of PFP's nine CAPs are considered to develop standardized hardware and detailed design drawings that are tailored to PFP maintenance needs. Increased quality and reliability is achieved through quality hardware, proven technology and design techniques, and the use of the Class 1E workmanship standards of WHC-CM-8-1. The end result of the work described by this work plan is a verified/read-to-install replacement for CAP Z4 and verified/released H-2 drawings that are formatted such that they can easily be replicated when producing design drawings for the other eight CAPs

  18. Alternative off-site power supply improves nuclear power plant safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gjorgiev, Blaže; Volkanovski, Andrija; Kančev, Duško; Čepin, Marko

    2014-01-01

    Highlights: • Additional power supply for mitigation of the station blackout event in NPP is used. • A hydro power plant is considered as an off-site alternative power supply. • An upgrade of the probabilistic safety assessment from its traditional use is made. • The obtained results show improvement of nuclear power plant safety. - Abstract: A reliable power system is important for safe operation of the nuclear power plants. The station blackout event is of great importance for nuclear power plant safety. This event is caused by the loss of all alternating current power supply to the safety and non-safety buses of the nuclear power plant. In this study an independent electrical connection between a pumped-storage hydro power plant and a nuclear power plant is assumed as a standpoint for safety and reliability analysis. The pumped-storage hydro power plant is considered as an alternative power supply. The connection with conventional accumulation type of hydro power plant is analysed in addition. The objective of this paper is to investigate the improvement of nuclear power plant safety resulting from the consideration of the alternative power supplies. The safety of the nuclear power plant is analysed through the core damage frequency, a risk measure assess by the probabilistic safety assessment. The presented method upgrades the probabilistic safety assessment from its common traditional use in sense that it considers non-plant sited systems. The obtained results show significant decrease of the core damage frequency, indicating improvement of nuclear safety if hydro power plant is introduced as an alternative off-site power source

  19. PFP up-right lift UL-20/26 manlifts

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Morley, J.M.

    1994-11-09

    This Technical Evaluation of Equipment Maintenance (TEEM) is provided principally to document vendor suggested maintenance requirements and deviations from vendor suggested requirements, and provide documentation to support PM procedures. As additional maintenance activities are identified, they will be documented in later revisions. This TEEM is applicable to four single-person manlifts. The report documents preventive maintenance evaluations, semi-annual checks, safety rules before the use of the manlifts, and routine service checks.

  20. PFP up-right lift UL-20/26 manlifts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Morley, J.M.

    1994-01-01

    This Technical Evaluation of Equipment Maintenance (TEEM) is provided principally to document vendor suggested maintenance requirements and deviations from vendor suggested requirements, and provide documentation to support PM procedures. As additional maintenance activities are identified, they will be documented in later revisions. This TEEM is applicable to four single-person manlifts. The report documents preventive maintenance evaluations, semi-annual checks, safety rules before the use of the manlifts, and routine service checks