Tank safety screening data quality objective. Revision 1

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Hunt, J.W.

1995-04-27

The Tank Safety Screening Data Quality Objective (DQO) will be used to classify 149 single shell tanks and 28 double shell tanks containing high-level radioactive waste into safety categories for safety issues dealing with the presence of ferrocyanide, organics, flammable gases, and criticality. Decision rules used to classify a tank as ``safe`` or ``not safe`` are presented. Primary and secondary decision variables used for safety status classification are discussed. The number and type of samples required are presented. A tabular identification of each analyte to be measured to support the safety classification, the analytical method to be used, the type of sample, the decision threshold for each analyte that would, if violated, place the tank on the safety issue watch list, and the assumed (desired) analytical uncertainty are provided. This is a living document that should be evaluated for updates on a semiannual basis. Evaluation areas consist of: identification of tanks that have been added or deleted from the specific safety issue watch lists, changes in primary and secondary decision variables, changes in decision rules used for the safety status classification, and changes in analytical requirements. This document directly supports all safety issue specific DQOs and additional characterization DQO efforts associated with pretreatment and retrieval. Additionally, information obtained during implementation can assist in resolving assumptions for revised safety strategies, and in addition, obtaining information which will support the determination of error tolerances, confidence levels, and optimization schemes for later revised safety strategy documentation.

Interim criteria for Organic Watch List tanks at the Hanford Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Babad, S.; Turner, D.A.

1993-09-01

This document establishes interim criteria for identifying single-shell radioactive waste storage tanks at the Hanford Site that contain organic chemicals mixed with nitrate/nitrite salts in potentially hazardous concentrations. These tanks are designated as ''organic Watch List tanks.'' Watch List tanks are radioactive waste storage tanks that have the potential for release of high-level waste as a result of uncontrolled increases in temperature or pressure. Organic Watch List tanks are those Watch List tanks that contain relatively high concentrations of organic chemicals. Because of the potential for release of high-level waste resulting from uncontrolled increases in temperature or pressure, the organic Watch List tanks (collectively) constitute a Hanford Site radioactive waste storage tank ''safety issue.''

Organic analysis of the headspace in Hanford waste tanks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lucke, R.B.; McVeety, B.D.; Clauss, T.W.; Fruchter, J.S.; Goheen, S.C.

1994-01-01

Before radioactive mixed waste in Hanford waste tanks can be isolated and permanently stored, several safety issues need to be addressed. The headspace vapors in Hanford Tank 103-C raise two issues: (1) the potential flammability of the vapor and aerosol, and (2) the potential worker health and safety hazards associated with the toxicity of the constituents. As a result, the authors have implemented organic analysis methods to characterize the headspace vapors in Hanford waste tanks. To address the flammability issue, they have used OSHA versatile sampling (OVS) tubes as the sampling method followed by solvent extraction and GC/MS analysis. For analyzing volatile organics and organic air toxins, they have implemented SUMMA trademark canisters as the collection device followed by cryogenic trapping and GC/MS analysis. Strategies for modifying existing NIOSH and EPA methods to make them applicable to vapors in Hanford waste tanks are discussed. Identification and quantification results of volatile and semivolatile organics are presented

Screening for organic solvents in Hanford waste tanks using organic vapor concentrations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Huckaby, J.L.; Sklarew, D.S.

1997-09-01

The potential ignition of organic liquids stored in the Hanford Site high-level radioactive waste tanks has been identified as a safety issue because expanding gases could potentially affect tank dome integrity. Organic liquid waste has been found in some of the waste tanks, but most are thought to contain only trace amounts. Due to the inhomogeneity of the waste, direct sampling of the tank waste to locate organic liquids may not conclusively demonstrate that a given tank is free of risk. However, organic vapors present above the organic liquid waste can be detected with a high degree of confidence and can be used to identify problem tanks. This report presents the results of a screening test that has been applied to 82 passively ventilated high-level radioactive waste tanks at the Hanford Site to identify those that might contain a significant amount of organic liquid waste. It includes seven tanks not addressed in the previous version of this report, Screening for Organic Solvents in Hanford Waste Tanks Using Total Non-Methane Organic Compound Vapor Concentrations. The screening test is based on a simple model of the tank headspace that estimates the effective surface area of semivolatile organic liquid waste in a tank. Analyses indicate that damage to the tank dome is credible only if the organic liquid burn rate is above a threshold value, and this can occur only if the surface area of organic liquid in a tank is above a corresponding threshold value of about one square meter. Thirteen tanks were identified as potentially containing at least that amount of semivolatile organic liquid based on conservative estimates. Most of the tanks identified as containing potentially significant quantities of organic liquid waste are in the 241-BY and 241-C tank farms, which agrees qualitatively with the fact that these tank farms received the majority of the PUREX process organic wash waste and waste organic liquids

Tank 241-C-103 tank characterization plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schreiber, R.D.

1994-01-01

The data quality objective (DQO) process was chosen as a tool to be used to identify the sampling analytical needs for the resolution of safety issues. A Tank Characterization Plant (TCP) will be developed for each double shell tank (DST) and single-shell tank (SST) using the DQO process. There are four Watch list tank classifications (ferrocyanide, organic salts, hydrogen/flammable gas, and high heat load). These classifications cover the six safety issues related to public and worker health that have been associated with the Hanford Site underground storage tanks. These safety issues are as follows: ferrocyanide, flammable gas, organic, criticality, high heat, and vapor safety issues. Tank C-103 is one of the twenty tanks currently on the Organic Salts Watch List. This TCP will identify characterization objectives pertaining to sample collection, hot cell sample isolation, and laboratory analytical evaluation and reporting requirements in accordance with the appropriate DQO documents. In addition, the current contents and status of the tank are projected from historical information. The relevant safety issues that are of concern for tanks on the Organic Salts Watch List are: the potential for an exothermic reaction occurring from the flammable mixture of organic materials and nitrate/nitrite salts that could result in a release of radioactive material and the possibility that other safety issues may exist for the tank

High organic containing tanks: Assessing the hazard potential

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hill, R.C.P.; Babad, H.

1991-09-01

Eight Hanford Site tanks contain organic chemicals at concentrations believed to be greater than 10 mole percent sodium acetate equivalent mixed with the oxidizing salts sodium nitrate/sodium nitrite. Also, three of the hydrogen and ferrocyanide tanks appear on the organic tank list. Concentrations of organics that may be present in some tanks could cause an exothermic reaction given a sufficient driving force, such as high temperatures. However, the difference between ignition temperatures and actual tank temperatures measured is so large that the probability of such a reaction is considered very low. The consequences of the postulated reaction are about the same as the scenarios for an explosion in a ''burping'' hydrogen tank. Although work on this issue is just beginning, consideration of hazards associated with heating nitrate-nitrite mixtures containing organic materials is an integral part of both the hydrogen and ferrocyanide tank efforts. High concentrations of organic compounds have been inferred (from tank transfer, flow sheet records, and limited analytical data) in eight single-shell tanks. Many organic chemicals, if present in concentrations above 10 dry weight percent (sodium acetate equivalent), have the potential to react with nitrate-nitrites constituents at temperatures above 200 degree C (392 degree F) in an exothermic manner. The concentrations of organic materials in the listed single-shell tanks, and their chemical identity, is not accurately known at present. A tank sampling program has been planned to provide more information on the contents of these tanks and to serve as a basis for laboratory testing and safety evaluations. 2 refs., 1 fig., 2 tabs

Hanford Site organic waste tanks: History, waste properties, and scientific issues

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Strachan, D.M.; Schulz, W.W.; Reynolds, D.A.

1993-01-01

Eight Hanford single-shell waste tanks are included on a safety watch list because they are thought to contain significant concentrations of various organic chemical. Potential dangers associated with the waste in these tanks include exothermic reaction, combustion, and release of hazardous vapors. In all eight tanks the measured waste temperatures are in the range 16 to 46 degree C, far below the 250 to 380 degree C temperatures necessary for onset of rapid exothermic reactions and initiation of deflagration. Investigation of the possibility of vapor release from Tank C-103 has been elevated to a top safety priority. There is a need to obtain an adequate number of truly representative vapor samples and for highly sensitive and capable methods and instruments to analyze these samples. Remaining scientific issues include: an understanding of the behavior and reaction of organic compounds in existing underground tank environments knowledge of the types and amounts of organic compounds in the tanks knowledge of selected physical and chemical properties of organic compounds source, composition, quality, and properties of the presently unidentified volatile organic compound(s) apparently evolving from Tank C-103

Speciation of organic carbon in Hanford waste storage tanks: Part 1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carlson, C.D.

1997-02-01

This report is the first in a series to report on speciation of organic carbon in Hanford waste storage tanks. The comparison of the existing total organic carbon with oxalate and limited analyses of other organic species (acetate, formate, and normal paraffin hydrocarbons [NPH]) are reported. All of the data have been previously reported by the Grout and Characterization programs; the information includes all of the publicly available data through October 1996. Oxalate data were reported for 33 tanks, TOC data were reported for 82 tanks, and both oxalate and TOC data were available for 27 tanks. Of these 27 tanks, seven were found to have greater than 80% of the TOC identified as oxalate: 241-BY-104, 241-BY-105, 241-BY-106, 241-BY-110, 241-S-109, and 241-SX-108. Eighty percent accountability has been tentatively established as a minimum goal of the Organic Safety Program for speciation of TOC. Accountability of TOC through speciation will allow more accurate estimate of the potential energy content of the wastes as currently stored. Of the remaining 19 tanks, seven had between 40 and 80% of the TOC identified as oxalate, and eleven had less than 35% of the TOC identified. Of these, only five tanks had segment results that were greater than 1% TOC, and none was above 2%. Since the cur-rent safety criterion outlined in the Safety Analysis is 4.5% TOC, it may be determined that the further analyses of these tank wastes are not necessary. If additional analyses are deemed necessary, minimal work may be required, possibly limited to ion chromatography (IC), ion pair chromatography and capillary zone electrophoresis (CZE). Additional speciation work is planned for this fiscal year in both the Organic Tanks Safety and Characterization programs. The Characterization program reports acetate and formate data in addition to the oxalate data for all the tank cores it processes

Organic tanks safety program FY96 waste aging studies

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Camaioni, D.M.; Samuels, W.D.; Linehan, J.C.; Clauss, S.A.; Sharma, A.K.; Wahl, K.L.; Campbell, J.A.

1996-10-01

Uranium and plutonium production at the Hanford Site produced large quantities of radioactive by-products and contaminated process chemicals, which are stored in underground tanks awaiting treatment and disposal. Having been made strongly alkaline and then subjected to successive water evaporation campaigns to increase storage capacity, the wastes now exist in the physical forms of salt cakes, metal oxide sludges, and partially saturated aqueous brine solutions. The tanks that contain organic process chemicals mixed with nitrate/nitrite salt wastes may be at risk for fuel- nitrate combustion accidents. The purpose of the Waste Aging Task is to elucidate how chemical and radiological processes will have aged or degraded the organic compounds stored in the tanks. Ultimately, the task seeks to develop quantitative measures of how aging changes the energetic properties of the wastes. This information will directly support efforts to evaluate the hazard as well as to develop potential control and mitigation strategies

Ferrocyanide Safety Program: Safety criteria for ferrocyanide watch list tanks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Postma, A.K.; Meacham, J.E.; Barney, G.S.

1994-01-01

This report provides a technical basis for closing the ferrocyanide Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) at the Hanford Site. Three work efforts were performed in developing this technical basis. The efforts described herein are: 1. The formulation of criteria for ranking the relative safety of waste in each ferrocyanide tank. 2. The current classification of tanks into safety categories by comparing available information on tank contents with the safety criteria; 3. The identification of additional information required to resolve the ferrocyanide safety issue

Environmental Assessment: Waste Tank Safety Program, Hanford Site, Richland, Washington

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-02-01

The US Department of Energy (DOE) needs to take action in the near-term, to accelerate resolution of waste tank safety issues at the Hanford Site near the City of Richland, Washington, and reduce the risks associated with operations and management of the waste tanks. The DOE has conducted nuclear waste management operations at the Hanford Site for nearly 50 years. Operations have included storage of high-level nuclear waste in 177 underground storage tanks (UST), both in single-shell tank (SST) and double-shell tank configurations. Many of the tanks, and the equipment needed to operate them, are deteriorated. Sixty-seven SSTs are presumed to have leaked a total approximately 3,800,000 liters (1 million gallons) of radioactive waste to the soil. Safety issues associated with the waste have been identified, and include (1) flammable gas generation and episodic release; (2) ferrocyanide-containing wastes; (3) a floating organic solvent layer in Tank 241-C-103; (4) nuclear criticality; (5) toxic vapors; (6) infrastructure upgrades; and (7) interim stabilization of SSTs. Initial actions have been taken in all of these areas; however, much work remains before a full understanding of the tank waste behavior is achieved. The DOE needs to accelerate the resolution of tank safety concerns to reduce the risk of an unanticipated radioactive or chemical release to the environment, while continuing to manage the wastes safely

Screening for organic solvents in Hanford waste tanks using total non- methane organic compound vapor concentrations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Huckaby, J.L.; Glissmeyer, J.A.; Sklarew, D.S.

1997-02-01

The potential ignition of organic liquids stored in the Hanford high-level radioactive waste tanks is a safety issue because expanding gases could affect tank dome integrity. This report presents results of a screening test that was applied to 75 passively ventilated waste tanks at Hanford to determine those that might contain a significant amount of organic liquid waste. The screening test is based on a simple model of tank headspace, headspace organic vapor concentrations, and certain tank physical parameters. Analyses indicate that damage to the tank dome is credible only if the organic liquid burn rate is above a threshold value, and this can occur only if the surface area of organic liquid in a tank is above a corresponding threshold value of about one square meter. Twelve tanks were identified as potentially containing at least that amount of semivolatile organic liquid based on conservative estimates. Tank head space organic vapor concentrations and physical parameters required by the screening test have been compiled and are presented for each of the tanks studied. Estimates of the ventilation rates of the waste tanks were revised to reflect recent information obtained from hydrogen monitoring data. A simple analysis of the uncertainty in the test results suggests that the largest current uncertainty in the estimation of organic liquid surface area is that associated with knowledge of the tank ventilation rate. The uncertainty analysis is applied to determine 95% confidence limits for the estimated organic waste surface area in each tank

Organic tanks safety program FY95 waste aging studies

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Camaioni, D.M.; Samuels, W.D.; Clauss, S.A.; Lenihan, B.D.; Wahl, K.L.; Campbell, J.A.; Shaw, W.J.

1995-09-01

This report gives the second year's findings of a study of how thermal and radiological processes may change the composition of organic compounds in the underground tanks at Hanford. Efforts were focused on the global reaction kinetics in a simulated waste exposed to γ rays and the reactions of organic radicals with nitrite ion. The gas production is predominantly radiolytic. Decarboxylation of carboxylates is probably an aging pathway. TBP was totaly consumed in almost every run. Radiation clearly accelerated consumption of the other compounds. EDTA is more reactive than citrate. Oximes and possibly organic nitro compounds are key intermediates in the radiolytic redox reactions of organic compounds with nitrate/nitrite. Observations are consistent with organic compounds being progressively degraded to compounds with greater numbers of C-O bonds and fewer C-H and C-C bonds, resulting in an overall lower energy content. If the radwaste tanks are adequately ventilated and continually dosed by radioactivity, their total energy content should have declined. Level of risk depends on how rapidly carboxylate salts of moderate energy content (including EDTA fragments) degrade to low energy oxalate and formate

SAFETY ANALYSIS APPROACH TO TANK 241-SY-101 REMEDIATION ACTIVITIES

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

RYAN, G.W.

2000-01-01

An Unreviewed Safety Question was declared related to the unexplained waste surface level growth in high-level radioactive waste storage Tank 241-SY-101 at the Hanford Site in Richland, Washington. Because the waste surface level in Tank 241-SY-101 was growing in a manner inconsistent with previous behavior, the following issues of concern were recognized: (1) The continually rising surface level had the potential to reach physical encumbrances or limits within the tank (e.g., instrumentation, cameras, established Authorization Basis limits, and the double containment boundary) and the potential to significantly change the consequences of previously analyzed accidents (e.g., flammable gas deflagrations). (2) The presence of new hazards because of significant quantities of flammable gas retained in the crust (e.g., crust collapse gas-release events). (3) The potential to inhibit information gathering related to the existing hazards in the tank (e.g., unable to determine surface level to assess the potential for large gas releases). In response to this situation, a Contractor Project Team, which included Department of Energy representation, was formed to constructively address the issue. The team was responsible for developing and evaluating remediation options and executing the chosen option for remediating the surface level rise issue for Tank 241-SY-101. From an Authorization Basis perspective, the following important aspects will be discussed in this paper: (1) The integrated nature of the Project Team. The team consisted of all the organizations necessary to ensure that the time available to remediate Tank 241-SY-101 was effectively used. Most notable is the connectivity of the Nuclear Safety and Licensing organization with the Engineering, Design, and Operations organizations. (2) The ability of the safety analysis support to adjust to and address evolving Project Team goals and dynamic tank conditions. (3) Due to the urgency to mitigate this developing issue

Safety evaluation of interim stabilization of non-stabilized single-shell watch list tanks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stahl, S.M.

1994-01-01

This report provides results of a review of recently completed safety analyses related to hazards associated with Interim Stabilization of Single analyses related to hazards included oh the Hanford Site Waste Tank-Watch Shell Tanks (SSTs) that are included on the Hanford List. The purpose of the review was to identify and summarize conclusions regarding the safety of interim stabilization of Watch List SSTs, and to highlight applicable limitations, restrictions, and controls. The scope of this review was restricted to SSTs identified List in the categories of flammable gas ferrocyanide, and organic salts. High heat tanks were not included in the scope. A Watch List tank is defined as an underground storage tank containing waste that requires special safety precautions because it may have a serious potential for release of high level radioactive waste because of uncontrolled increases in temperature or pressure. Special restrictions have been placed on these tanks

Organic tanks safety program, FY97 waste aging studies. Revision 1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Camaioni, D.M.; Samuels, W.D.; Linehan, J.C.; Sharma, A.K.; Hogan, M.O.; Lilga, M.A.; Clauss, S.A.; Wahl, K.L.; Campbell, J.A.

1998-02-01

To model tank waste aging and interpret tank waste speciation results, the authors began measuring the reactivity of organic complexants and related compounds towards radiation-induced oxidation reactions. Because of the high efficiency of scavenging of the primary radicals of water radiolysis by nitrate and nitrite ion, the major radiolytically-generated radicals in these solutions, and in Hanford tank wastes, are NO 2 , NO and O - . Prior to this effort, little quantitative information existed for the reactions of these radicals with organic compounds such as those that were used in Hanford processes. Therefore, modeling of actual waste aging, or even simulated waste aging, was not feasible without measuring reactivities and determining reaction paths. The authors have made the first rate measurements of complexant aging and determined some of their degradation products

Criticality Safety Evaluation of Hanford Tank Farms Facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

WEISS, E.V.

2000-12-15

Data and calculations from previous criticality safety evaluations and analyses were used to evaluate criticality safety for the entire Tank Farms facility to support the continued waste storage mission. This criticality safety evaluation concludes that a criticality accident at the Tank Farms facility is an incredible event due to the existing form (chemistry) and distribution (neutron absorbers) of tank waste. Limits and controls for receipt of waste from other facilities and maintenance of tank waste condition are set forth to maintain the margin subcriticality in tank waste.

Criticality Safety Evaluation of Hanford Tank Farms Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

WEISS, E.V.

2000-01-01

Data and calculations from previous criticality safety evaluations and analyses were used to evaluate criticality safety for the entire Tank Farms facility to support the continued waste storage mission. This criticality safety evaluation concludes that a criticality accident at the Tank Farms facility is an incredible event due to the existing form (chemistry) and distribution (neutron absorbers) of tank waste. Limits and controls for receipt of waste from other facilities and maintenance of tank waste condition are set forth to maintain the margin subcriticality in tank waste

Characterization strategy report for the organic safety issues

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Goheen, S.C.; Campbell, J.A.; Fryxell, G.E.

1997-08-01

This report describes a logical approach to resolving potential safety issues resulting from the presence of organic components in hanford tank wastes. The approach uses a structured logic diagram (SLD) to provide a pathway for quantifying organic safety issue risk. The scope of the report is limited to selected organics (i.e., solvents and complexants) that were added to the tanks and their degradation products. The greatest concern is the potential exothermic reactions that can occur between these components and oxidants, such as sodium nitrate, that are present in the waste tanks. The organic safety issue is described in a conceptual model that depicts key modes of failure-event reaction processes in tank systems and phase domains (domains are regions of the tank that have similar contents) that are depicted with the SLD. Applying this approach to quantify risk requires knowing the composition and distribution of the organic and inorganic components to determine (1) how much energy the waste would release in the various domains, (2) the toxicity of the region associated with a disruptive event, and (3) the probability of an initiating reaction. Five different characterization options are described, each providing a different level of quality in calculating the risks involved with organic safety issues. Recommendations include processing existing data through the SLD to estimate risk, developing models needed to link more complex characterization information for the purpose of estimating risk, and examining correlations between the characterization approaches for optimizing information quality while minimizing cost in estimating risk

Safety evaluation of interim stabilization of non-stabilized single-shell watch list tanks

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Stahl, S.M.

1994-12-30

The report provides a summation of the status of safety issues associated with interim stabilization of Watch List SSTs (organic, ferrocyanide, and flammable gas), as extracted from recent safety analyses, including the Tank Farms Accelerated Safety Analysis efforts.

Safety evaluation of interim stabilization of non-stabilized single-shell watch list tanks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stahl, S.M.

1994-01-01

The report provides a summation of the status of safety issues associated with interim stabilization of Watch List SSTs (organic, ferrocyanide, and flammable gas), as extracted from recent safety analyses, including the Tank Farms Accelerated Safety Analysis efforts

Tank 241-BY-108 tank characterization plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carpenter, B.C.

1994-01-01

The sampling and analytical needs associated with the 51 Hanford Site underground storage tanks classified on one or more of the four Watch Lists (ferrocyanide, organic, flammable gas, and high heat), and the safety screening of all 177 tanks have been identified through the Data Quality Objective (DQO) process. DQOs identity information needed by a program group in the Tank Waste Remediation System concerned with safety issues, regulatory requirements, or the transporting and processing of tank waste. This Tank Characterization Plan will identify characterization objectives for tank BY-108 pertaining to sample collection, sample preparation and analysis, and laboratory analytical evaluation and reporting requirements. In addition, an estimate of the current contents and status of the tank is given. Single-shell tank BY-108 is classified as a Ferrocyanide Watch List tank. The tank was declared an assumed leaker and removed from service in 1972; interim stabilized was completed in February 1985. Although not officially an Organic Watch List tank, restrictions have been placed on intrusive operations by Standing Order number-sign 94-16 (dated 09/08/94) since the tank is suspected to contain or to have contained a floating organic layer

Organic tanks safety program waste aging studies. Final report, Revision 1

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Camaioni, D.M.; Samuels, W.D.; Linehan, J.C. [and others

1998-09-01

Uranium and plutonium production at the Hanford Site produced large quantities of radioactive byproducts and contaminated process chemicals that are stored in underground tanks awaiting treatment and disposal. Having been made strongly alkaline and then subjected to successive water evaporation campaigns to increase storage capacity, the wastes now exist in the physical forms of saltcakes, metal oxide sludges, and aqueous brine solutions. Tanks that contain organic process chemicals mixed with nitrate/nitrite salt wastes might be at risk for fuel-nitrate combustion accidents. This project started in fiscal year 1993 to provide information on the chemical fate of stored organic wastes. While historical records had identified the organic compounds originally purchased and potentially present in wastes, aging experiments were needed to identify the probable degradation products and evaluate the current hazard. The determination of the rates and pathways of degradation have facilitated prediction of how the hazard changes with time and altered storage conditions. Also, the work with aged simulated waste contributed to the development of analytical methods for characterizing actual wastes. Finally, the results for simulants provide a baseline for comparing and interpreting tank characterization data.

Organic tanks safety program waste aging studies. Final report, Revision 1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Camaioni, D.M.; Samuels, W.D.; Linehan, J.C.

1998-09-01

Uranium and plutonium production at the Hanford Site produced large quantities of radioactive byproducts and contaminated process chemicals that are stored in underground tanks awaiting treatment and disposal. Having been made strongly alkaline and then subjected to successive water evaporation campaigns to increase storage capacity, the wastes now exist in the physical forms of saltcakes, metal oxide sludges, and aqueous brine solutions. Tanks that contain organic process chemicals mixed with nitrate/nitrite salt wastes might be at risk for fuel-nitrate combustion accidents. This project started in fiscal year 1993 to provide information on the chemical fate of stored organic wastes. While historical records had identified the organic compounds originally purchased and potentially present in wastes, aging experiments were needed to identify the probable degradation products and evaluate the current hazard. The determination of the rates and pathways of degradation have facilitated prediction of how the hazard changes with time and altered storage conditions. Also, the work with aged simulated waste contributed to the development of analytical methods for characterizing actual wastes. Finally, the results for simulants provide a baseline for comparing and interpreting tank characterization data

Organic carbon in Hanford single-shell tank waste

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Toth, J.J.; Willingham, C.E.; Heasler, P.G.; Whitney, P.D.

1994-07-01

This report documents an analysis performed by Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) involving the organic carbon laboratory measurement data for Hanford single-shell tanks (SSTS) obtained from a review of the laboratory analytical data. This activity was undertaken at the request of Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC). The objective of this study is to provide a best estimate, including confidence levels, of total organic carbon (TOC) in each of the 149 SSTs at Hanford. The TOC analyte information presented in this report is useful as part of the criteria to identify SSTs for additional measurements or monitoring for the organic safety program. This report is a precursor to an investigation of TOC and moisture in Hanford SSTS, in order to provide best estimates for each together in one report. Measured laboratory data were obtained for 75 of the 149 SSTS. The data represent a thorough investigation of data from 224 tank characterization datasets, including core-sampling and process laboratory data. Liquid and solid phase TOC values were investigated by examining selected tanks with both reported TOC values in solid and liquid phases. Some relationships were noted, but there was no clustering of data or significance between the solid and liquid phases. A methodology was developed for estimating the distribution and levels of TOC in SSTs using a logarithmic scale and an analysis of variance (ANOVA) technique. The methodology grouped tanks according to waste type using the Sort On Radioactive Waste Type (SORWT) grouping method. The SORWT model categorizes Hanford SSTs into groups of tanks expected to exhibit similar characteristics based on major waste types and processing histories. The methodology makes use of laboratory data for the particular tank and information about the SORWT group of which the tank is a member. Recommendations for a simpler tank grouping strategy based on organic transfer records were made

Performance Analysis of Multi Stage Safety Injection Tank

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shin, Soo Jai; Kim, Young In; Bae, Youngmin; Kang, Han-Ok; Kim, Keung Koo

2015-01-01

In general the integral reactor has such characteristics, the integral reactor requires a high flow rate of coolant safety injection at the initial stage of the accident in which the core level is relatively fast decreased, A medium flow rate of coolant safety injection at the early and middle stages of the accident in which the coolant discharge flow rate is relatively large due to a high internal pressure of the reactor vessel, and a low flow rate of coolant safety injection is required at the middle and late stages of the accident in which the coolant discharge flow rate is greatly reduced due to a decreased pressure of the reactor vessel. It is noted that a high flow rate of the integral reactor is quite smaller compared to a flow rate required in the commercial loop type reactor. However, a nitrogen pressurized safety injection tank has been typically designed to quickly inject a high flow rate of coolant when the internal pressure of the reactor vessel is rapidly decreased, and a core makeup tank has been designed to safely inject at a single mode flow rate due to a gravitational head of water subsequent to making a pressure balance between the reactor vessel and core makeup tank. As a result, in order to compensate such a disadvantage, various type systems are used in a complicated manner in a reactor according to the required characteristic of safety injection during an accident. In the present study, we have investigated numerically the performance of the multi stage safety injection tank. A parameter study has performed to understand the characteristics of the multi stage safety injection tank. The performance of the multi stage safety injection tank has been investigated numerically. When an accident occurs, the coolant in the multi stage safety injection tank is injected into a reactor vessel by a gravitational head of water subsequent to making a pressure balance between the reactor and tank. At the early stages of the accident, the high flow rate of

Performance Analysis of Multi Stage Safety Injection Tank

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Shin, Soo Jai; Kim, Young In; Bae, Youngmin; Kang, Han-Ok; Kim, Keung Koo [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2015-10-15

In general the integral reactor has such characteristics, the integral reactor requires a high flow rate of coolant safety injection at the initial stage of the accident in which the core level is relatively fast decreased, A medium flow rate of coolant safety injection at the early and middle stages of the accident in which the coolant discharge flow rate is relatively large due to a high internal pressure of the reactor vessel, and a low flow rate of coolant safety injection is required at the middle and late stages of the accident in which the coolant discharge flow rate is greatly reduced due to a decreased pressure of the reactor vessel. It is noted that a high flow rate of the integral reactor is quite smaller compared to a flow rate required in the commercial loop type reactor. However, a nitrogen pressurized safety injection tank has been typically designed to quickly inject a high flow rate of coolant when the internal pressure of the reactor vessel is rapidly decreased, and a core makeup tank has been designed to safely inject at a single mode flow rate due to a gravitational head of water subsequent to making a pressure balance between the reactor vessel and core makeup tank. As a result, in order to compensate such a disadvantage, various type systems are used in a complicated manner in a reactor according to the required characteristic of safety injection during an accident. In the present study, we have investigated numerically the performance of the multi stage safety injection tank. A parameter study has performed to understand the characteristics of the multi stage safety injection tank. The performance of the multi stage safety injection tank has been investigated numerically. When an accident occurs, the coolant in the multi stage safety injection tank is injected into a reactor vessel by a gravitational head of water subsequent to making a pressure balance between the reactor and tank. At the early stages of the accident, the high flow rate of

Electrochemical organic destruction in support of Hanford tank waste pretreatment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lawrence, W.E.; Surma, J.E.; Gervais, K.L.; Buehler, M.F.; Pillay, G.; Schmidt, A.J.

1994-10-01

The US Department of Energy's Hanford Site in Richland, Washington, has 177 underground storage tanks that contain approximately 61 million gallons of radioactive waste. The current cleanup strategy is to retrieve the waste and separate components into high-level and low-level waste. However, many of the tanks contain organic compounds that create concerns associated with tank safety and efficiency of anticipated separation processes. Therefore, a need exists for technologies that can safely and efficiently destroy organic compounds. Laboratory-scale studies conducted during FY 93 have shown proof-of-principle for electrochemical destruction of organics. Electrochemical oxidation is an inherently safe technology and shows promise for treating Hanford complexant concentrate aqueous/ slurry waste. Therefore, in support of Hanford tank waste pretreatment needs, the development of electrochemical organic destruction (ECOD) technology has been undertaken. The primary objective of this work is to develop an electrochemical treatment process for destroying organic compounds, including tank waste complexants. Electroanalytical analyses and bench-scale flow cell testing will be conducted to evaluate the effect of anode material and process operating conditions on the rate of organic destruction. Cyclic voltammetry will be used to identify oxygen overpotentials for the anode materials and provide insight into reaction steps for the electrochemical oxidation of complexants. In addition, a bench-scale flow cell evaluation will be conducted to evaluate the influence of process operating conditions and anode materials on the rate and efficiency of organic destruction using the nonradioactive a Hanford tank waste simulant

Tank 241-C-103 organic vapor and liquid characterization and supporting activities, Hanford Site, Richland, Washington

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1993-01-01

The action proposed is to sample the vapor space and liquid waste and perform other supporting activities in Tank 241-C-103 located in the 241-C Tank Farm on the Hanford Site. Operations at Tank 241-C-103 are curtailed because of an unreviewed safety question (USQ) concerning flammability issues of the organic waste in the tank. This USQ must be resolved before normal operation and surveillance of the tank can resume. In addition to the USQ, Tank 241-C-103 is thought to be involved in several cases of exposure of individuals to noxious vapors. This safety issue requires the use of supplied air for workers in the vicinity of the tank. Because of the USQ, the US Department of Energy proposes to characterize the waste in the vapor space and the organic and aqueous layers, to determine the volume of the organic layer. This action is needed to: (1) assess potential risks to workers, the public, and the environment from continued routine tank operations and (2) provide information on the waste material in the tank to facilitate a comprehensive safety analysis of this USQ. The information would be used to determine if a flammable condition within the tank is credible. This information would be used to prevent or mitigate an accident during continued waste storage and future waste characterization. Alternatives to the proposed activities have been considered in this analysis

High-heat tank safety issue resolution program plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wang, O.S.

1993-12-01

The purpose of this program plan is to provide a guide for selecting corrective actions that will mitigate and/or remediate the high-heat waste tank safety issue for single-shell tank (SST) 241-C-106. This program plan also outlines the logic for selecting approaches and tasks to mitigate and resolve the high-heat safety issue. The identified safety issue for high-heat tank 241-C-106 involves the potential release of nuclear waste to the environment as the result of heat-induced structural damage to the tank's concrete, if forced cooling is interrupted for extended periods. Currently, forced ventilation with added water to promote thermal conductivity and evaporation cooling is used to cool the waste. At this time, the only viable solution identified to resolve this safety issue is the removal of heat generating waste in the tank. This solution is being aggressively pursued as the permanent solution to this safety issue and also to support the present waste retrieval plan. Tank 241-C-106 has been selected as the first SST for retrieval. The program plan has three parts. The first part establishes program objectives and defines safety issues, drivers, and resolution criteria and strategy. The second part evaluates the high-heat safety issue and its mitigation and remediation methods and alternatives according to resolution logic. The third part identifies major tasks and alternatives for mitigation and resolution of the safety issue. Selected tasks and best-estimate schedules are also summarized in the program plan

Low temperature hydrothermal destruction of organics in Hanford tank wastes

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Orth, R.J.; Elmore, M.R.; Zacher, A.H.; Neuenschwander, G.G.; Schmidt, A.J.; Jones, E.O.; Hart, T.R.; Poshusta, J.C.

1994-08-01

The objective of this work is to evaluate and develop a low temperature hydrothermal process (HTP) for the destruction of organics that are present wastes temporarily stored in underground tanks at the Hanford Site. Organic compounds contribute to tank waste safety issues, such as hydrogen generation. Some organic compounds act as complexants, promoting the solubility of radioactive constituents such as 90 Sr and 241 Am, which is undesirable for waste pretreatment processing. HTP is thermal-chemical autogenous processing method that is typically operated between 250 degrees C and 375 degrees C and approximately 200 atm. Testing with simulated tank waste, containing a variety of organics has been performed. The distribution of strontium, cesium and bulk metals between the supernatant and solid phases as a function of the total organic content of the waste simulant will be presented. Test results using simulant will be compared with similar tests conducted using actual radioactive waste

Systems engineering study: tank 241-C-103 organic skimming,storage, treatment and disposal options

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Klem, M.J.

1996-10-23

This report evaluates alternatives for pumping, storing, treating and disposing of the separable phase organic layer in Hanford Site Tank 241-C-103. The report provides safety and technology based preferences and recommendations. Two major options and several varations of these options were identified. The major options were: 1) transfer both the organic and pumpable aqueous layers to a double-shell tank as part of interim stabilization using existing salt well pumping equipment or 2) skim the organic to an above ground before interim stabilization of Tank 241-C-103. Other options to remove the organic were considered but rejected following preliminary evaluation.

Tank farm health and safety plan. Revision 2

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mickle, G.D.

1995-01-01

This Tank Farm Health and Safety Plan (HASP) for the conduct of all operations and work activities at the Hanford Site 200 Area Tank Farms is provided in order to minimize health and safety risks to workers and other onsite personnel. The HASP accomplishes this objective by establishing requirements, providing general guidelines, and conveying farm and facility-specific hazard communication information. The HASP, in conjunction with the job-specific information required by the HASP, is provided also as a reference for use during the planning of work activities at the tank farms. This HASP applies to Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC), other prime contractors to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and subcontractors to WHC who may be involved in tank farm work activities. This plan is intended to be both a requirements document and a useful reference to aid tank farm workers in understanding the safety and health issues that are encountered in routine and nonroutine work activities. The HASP defines the health and safety responsibilities of personnel working at the tank farms. It has been prepared in recognition of and is consistent with National Institute of Safety and Health (NIOSH), and Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)/Unlimited State Coast Guard (USCG)/U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Occupational Safety and Health Guidance Manual for Hazardous Waste Site Activities (NIOSH 1985); WHC-CM-4-3, Industrial Safety Manual, Volume 4, open-quotes Health and Safety Programs for Hazardous Waste Operations;close quotes 29 CFR 1910.120, Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response; WHC-CM-1-1, Management Policies; and WHC-CM-1-3, Management Requirements and Procedures. When differences in governing regulations or policies exist, the more stringent requirements shall apply until the discrepancy can be resolved

Tank farm health and safety plan. Revision 2

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Mickle, G.D.

1995-03-29

This Tank Farm Health and Safety Plan (HASP) for the conduct of all operations and work activities at the Hanford Site 200 Area Tank Farms is provided in order to minimize health and safety risks to workers and other onsite personnel. The HASP accomplishes this objective by establishing requirements, providing general guidelines, and conveying farm and facility-specific hazard communication information. The HASP, in conjunction with the job-specific information required by the HASP, is provided also as a reference for use during the planning of work activities at the tank farms. This HASP applies to Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC), other prime contractors to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and subcontractors to WHC who may be involved in tank farm work activities. This plan is intended to be both a requirements document and a useful reference to aid tank farm workers in understanding the safety and health issues that are encountered in routine and nonroutine work activities. The HASP defines the health and safety responsibilities of personnel working at the tank farms. It has been prepared in recognition of and is consistent with National Institute of Safety and Health (NIOSH), and Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)/Unlimited State Coast Guard (USCG)/U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Occupational Safety and Health Guidance Manual for Hazardous Waste Site Activities (NIOSH 1985); WHC-CM-4-3, Industrial Safety Manual, Volume 4, {open_quotes}Health and Safety Programs for Hazardous Waste Operations;{close_quotes} 29 CFR 1910.120, Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response; WHC-CM-1-1, Management Policies; and WHC-CM-1-3, Management Requirements and Procedures. When differences in governing regulations or policies exist, the more stringent requirements shall apply until the discrepancy can be resolved.

Tank 241-BY-111 tank characterization plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Homi, C.S.

1994-01-01

The sampling and analytical needs associated with the 51 Hanford Site underground storage tanks classified on one or more of the four Watch Lists (ferrocyanide, organic, flammable gas, and high heat), and the safety screening of all 177 tanks have been identified through the Data Quality Objective (DQO) process. DQO's identify information needed by a program group in the Tank Waste Remediation System concerned with safety issues, regulatory requirements, or the transporting and processing of tank waste. This Tank Characterization Plan will identify characterization objectives for Tank BY-111 pertaining to sample collection, sample preparation and analysis, and laboratory analytical evaluation and reporting requirements. In addition, an estimate of the current contents and status of the tank is given

Electrochemical destruction of organics and nitrates in simulated and actual radioactive Hanford tank waste

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Elmore, M.R.; Lawrence, W.E.

1996-09-01

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory has conducted an evaluation of electrochemical processing for use in radioactive tank waste cleanup activities. An electrochemical organic destruction (ECOD) process was evaluated, with the main focus being the destruction of organic compounds (especially organic complexants of radionuclides) in simulated and actual radioactive Hanford tank wastes. A primary reason for destroying the organic species in the complexant concentrate tank waste is to decomplex/defunctionalize species that chelate radionuclides. the separations processes required to remove the radionuclides are much less efficient when chelators are present. A second objective, the destruction of nitrates and nitrites in the wastes, was also assessed. Organic compounds, nitrates, and nitrites may affect waste management and safety considerations, not only at Hanford but at other US Department of Energy sites that maintain high- level waste storage tanks

Organic carbon in Hanford single-shell tank waste

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Toth, J.J.; Willingham, C.E.; Heasler, P.G.; Whitney, P.D.

1994-04-01

Safety of Hanford single-shell tanks (SSTs) containing organic carbon is a concern because the carbon in the presence of oxidizers (NO 3 or NO 2 ) is combustible when sufficiently concentrated and exposed to elevated temperatures. A propagating chemical reaction could potentially occur at high temperature (above 200 C). The rapid increase in temperature and pressure within a tank might result in the release of radioactive waste constituents to the environment. The purpose of this study is to gather available laboratory information about the organic carbon waste inventories stored in the Hanford SSTs. Specifically, the major objectives of this investigation are: Review laboratory analytical data and measurements for SST composite core and supernatant samples for available organic data; Assess the correlation of organic carbon estimated utilizing the TRAC computer code compared to laboratory measurements; and From the laboratory analytical data, estimate the TOC content with confidence levels for each of the 149 SSTs

Data quality objective to support resolution of the organic fuel rich tank safety issue

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Buckley, L.L.

1995-01-01

During years of Hanford process history, large quantities of complexants used in waste management operations as well as an unknown quantity of degradation products of the solvents used in fuel reprocessing and metal recovery were added to man of the 149 single-shell tanks. These waste tanks also contain a presumed stoichiometric excess of sodium nitrate/nitrite oxidizers, sufficient to exothermically oxidize the organic compounds if suitably initiated. This DQO identifies the questions that must be answered to appropriately disposition organic watchlist tanks, identifies a strategy to deal with false positive or negative judgements associated with analytical uncertainty, and list the analytes of concern to support dealing with organic watchlist concerns. Uncertainties associated with both assay limitations and matrix effects complicate selection of analytes. This results in requiring at least two independent measures of potential fuel reactivity

Assessment of concentration mechanisms for organic wastes in underground storage tanks at Hanford

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gerber, M.A.; Burger, L.L.; Nelson, D.A.; Ryan, J.L.; Zollars, R.L.

1992-09-01

Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) has conducted an initial conservative evaluation of physical and chemical processes that could lead to significant localized concentrations of organic waste constituents in the Hanford underground storage tanks (USTs). This evaluation was part of ongoing studies at Hanford to assess potential safety risks associated with USTs containing organics. Organics in the tanks could pose a potential problem if localized concentrations are high enough to propagate combustion and are in sufficient quantity to produce a large heat and/or gas release if in contact with a suitable oxidant. The major sources of oxidants are oxygen in the overhead gas space of the tanks and sodium nitrate and nitrite either as salt cake solids or dissolved in the supernatant and interstitial liquids

Assessment of concentration mechanisms for organic wastes in underground storage tanks at Hanford

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Gerber, M.A.; Burger, L.L.; Nelson, D.A.; Ryan, J.L. (Pacific Northwest Lab., Richland, WA (United States)); Zollars, R.L. (Washington State Univ., Pullman, WA (United States))

1992-09-01

Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) has conducted an initial conservative evaluation of physical and chemical processes that could lead to significant localized concentrations of organic waste constituents in the Hanford underground storage tanks (USTs). This evaluation was part of ongoing studies at Hanford to assess potential safety risks associated with USTs containing organics. Organics in the tanks could pose a potential problem if localized concentrations are high enough to propagate combustion and are in sufficient quantity to produce a large heat and/or gas release if in contact with a suitable oxidant. The major sources of oxidants are oxygen in the overhead gas space of the tanks and sodium nitrate and nitrite either as salt cake solids or dissolved in the supernatant and interstitial liquids.

Analysis of organic carbon and moisture in Hanford single-shell tank waste

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Toth, J.J.; Heasler, P.G.; Lerchen, M.E.; Hill, J.G.; Whitney, P.D.

1995-05-01

This report documents a revised analysis performed by Pacific Northwest Laboratory involving the organic carbon laboratory measurement data for Hanford single-shell tanks (SSTs) obtained from a review of the laboratory analytical data. This activity has as its objective to provide a best-estimate, including confidence levels, of total organic carbon (TOC) and moisture in each of the 149 SSTs at Hanford. The TOC and moisture information presented in this report is useful as part of the criteria to identify SSTs for additional measurements, or monitoring for the Organic Safety Program. In April 1994, an initial study of the organic carbon in Hanford single-shell tanks was completed at PNL. That study reflected the estimates of TOC based on tank characterizations datasets that were available at the time. Also in that study, estimation of dry basis TOC was based on generalized assumptions pertaining to the moisture of the tank wastes. The new information pertaining to tank moisture and TOC data that has become available from the current study influences the best estimates of TOC in each of the SSTs. This investigation of tank TOC and moisture has resulted in improved estimates based on waste phase: saltcake, sludge, or liquid. This report details the assumptions and methodologies used to develop the estimates of TOC and moisture in each of the 149 SSTs at Hanford.

Analysis of organic carbon and moisture in Hanford single-shell tank waste

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Toth, J.J.; Heasler, P.G.; Lerchen, M.E.; Hill, J.G.; Whitney, P.D.

1995-05-01

This report documents a revised analysis performed by Pacific Northwest Laboratory involving the organic carbon laboratory measurement data for Hanford single-shell tanks (SSTs) obtained from a review of the laboratory analytical data. This activity has as its objective to provide a best-estimate, including confidence levels, of total organic carbon (TOC) and moisture in each of the 149 SSTs at Hanford. The TOC and moisture information presented in this report is useful as part of the criteria to identify SSTs for additional measurements, or monitoring for the Organic Safety Program. In April 1994, an initial study of the organic carbon in Hanford single-shell tanks was completed at PNL. That study reflected the estimates of TOC based on tank characterizations datasets that were available at the time. Also in that study, estimation of dry basis TOC was based on generalized assumptions pertaining to the moisture of the tank wastes. The new information pertaining to tank moisture and TOC data that has become available from the current study influences the best estimates of TOC in each of the SSTs. This investigation of tank TOC and moisture has resulted in improved estimates based on waste phase: saltcake, sludge, or liquid. This report details the assumptions and methodologies used to develop the estimates of TOC and moisture in each of the 149 SSTs at Hanford

High-heat tank safety issue resolution program plan. Revision 2

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wang, O.S.

1994-12-01

The purpose of this program plan is to provide a guide for selecting corrective actions that will mitigate and/or remediate the high-heat waste tank safety issue for single-shell tank 241-C-106. The heat source of approximately 110,000 Btu/hr is the radioactive decay of the stored waste material (primarily 90 Sr) inadvertently transferred into the tank in the later 1960s. Currently, forced ventilation, with added water to promote thermal conductivity and evaporation cooling, is used for heat removal. The method is very effective and economical. At this time, the only viable solution identified to permanently resolve this safety issue is the removal of heat-generating waste in the tank. This solution is being aggressively pursued as the only remediation method to this safety issue, and tank 241-C-106 has been selected as the first single-shell tank for retrieval. The current cooling method and other alternatives are addressed in this program as means to mitigate this safety issue before retrieval. This program plan has three parts. The first part establishes program objectives and defines safety issue, drivers, and resolution criteria and strategy. The second part evaluates the high-heat safety issue and its mitigation and remediation methods and other alternatives according to resolution logic. The third part identifies major tasks and alternatives for mitigation and resolution of the safety issue. A table of best-estimate schedules for the key tasks is also included in this program plan

Hanford Tank Safety Project: Minutes of the Tank Waste Science Panel meeting, February 7--8, 1991

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Strachan, D.M. [comp.

1991-06-01

The Tank Waste Science Panel met February 7--8, 1991, to review the latest data from the analyses of the October 24, 1990, gas release from Tank 241-SY-101 (101-SY) at Hanford; discuss the results of work being performed in support of the Hanford Tank Safety Project; and be briefed on the ferrocyanide issues included in the expanded scope of the Science Panel. The shapes of the gas release curves from the past three events are similar and correlate well with changes in waste level, but the correlation between the released volume of gas and the waste height is not as good. An analysis of the kinetics of gas generation from waste height measurements in Tank 101-SY suggests that the reaction giving rise to the gases in the tank is independent of the gas pressure and independent of the physical processes that give rise to the episodic release of the gases. Tank waste height data were also used to suggest that a floating crust formed early in the history of the tank and that the current crust is being made thicker in the eastern sector of the tank by repeated upheaval of waste slurry onto the surface. The correlation between the N{sub 2}O and N{sub 2} generated in the October release appears to be 1:1, suggesting a single mechanistic pathway. Analysis of other gas generation ratios, however, suggests that H{sub 2} and N{sub 2}O are evolved together, whereas N{sub 2} is from the air. If similar ratios are observed in planned radiolysis experiments are Argonne National Laboratory, radiolysis would appear to be generating most of the gases in Tank 101-SY. Data from analysis of synthetic waste crust using a dynamic x-ray diffractometer suggest that, in air, organics are being oxidized and liberating CO{sub 2} and NO{sub x}. Experiments at Savannah River Laboratory indicate that irradiation of solutions containing NO{sub 3} and organics can produce N{sub 2}O.

Criticality Safety Evaluation of Hanford Site High Level Waste Storage Tanks

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

ROGERS, C.A.

2000-02-17

This criticality safety evaluation covers operations for waste in underground storage tanks at the high-level waste tank farms on the Hanford site. This evaluation provides the bases for criticality safety limits and controls to govern receipt, transfer, and long-term storage of tank waste. Justification is provided that a nuclear criticality accident cannot occur for tank farms operations, based on current fissile material and operating conditions.

Criticality Safety Evaluation of Hanford Site High-Level Waste Storage Tanks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ROGERS, C.A.

2000-01-01

This criticality safety evaluation covers operations for waste in underground storage tanks at the high-level waste tank farms on the Hanford site. This evaluation provides the bases for criticality safety limits and controls to govern receipt, transfer, and long-term storage of tank waste. Justification is provided that a nuclear criticality accident cannot occur for tank farms operations, based on current fissile material and operating conditions

Ferrocyanide Safety Program rationale for removing six tanks from the safety watch list

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Borsheim, G.L.

1993-09-01

This report documents an in-depth study of single-shell tanks containing ferrocyanide wastes. Topics include: safety assessments, tank histories, supportive documentation about interim stabilization and planned remedial activities

Criticality safety analysis of Hanford Waste Tank 241-101-SY

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Perry, R.T.; Sapir, J.L.; Krohn, B.J.

1993-01-01

As part of a safety assessment for proposed pump mixing operations to mitigate episodic gas releases in Tank 241-101-SY at the Hanford Site, Richland, Washington, a criticality safety analysis was made using the Sn transport code ONEDANT. The tank contains approximately one million gallons of waste and an estimated 910 G of plutonium. the criticality analysis considers reconfiguration and underestimation of plutonium content. The results indicate that Tank SY-101 does not present a criticality hazard. These methods are also used in criticality analyses of other Hanford tanks

CHANGING THE SAFETY CULTURE IN HANFORD TANK FARMS

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

BERRIOCHOA MV; ALCALA LJ

2009-01-06

In 2000 the Hanford Tank Farms had one of the worst safety records in the Department of Energy Complex. By the end of FY08 the safety performance of the workforce had turned completely around, resulting in one of the best safety records in the DOE complex for operations of its kind. This paper describes the variety of programs and changes that were put in place to accomplish such a dramatic turn-around. The U.S. Department of Energy's 586-square-mile Hanford Site in Washington State was established during World War II as part of the Manhattan Project to develop nuclear materials to end the war. For the next several decades it continued to produce plutonium for the nation's defense, leaving behind vast quantities of radioactive and chemical waste. Much of this waste, 53,000,000 gallons, remains stored in 149 aging single-shell tanks and 28 newer double-shell tanks. One of the primary objectives at Hanford is to safely manage this waste until it can be prepared for disposal, but this has not always been easy. These giant underground tanks, many of which date back to the beginning of the Manhattan Project, range in size from 55,000 gallons up to 1.1 million gallons, and are buried beneath 10 feet of soil near the center of the site. Up to 67 of the older single-shell tanks have leaked as much as one million gallons into the surrounding soil. Liquids from the single-shell tanks were removed by 2003 but solids remain in the form of saltcake, sludges and a hardened heel at the bottom of some tanks. The Department of Energy's Office of River Protection was established to safely manage this waste until it could be prepared for disposal. For most of the last seven years the focus has been on safely retrieving waste from the 149 aging single-shell and moving it to the newer double-shell tanks. Removing waste from the tanks is a difficult and complex task. The tanks were made to put waste in, not take it out. Because of the toxic nature of the waste, both

Preliminary study on functional performance of compound type multistage safety injection tank

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bae, Youngmin; Kim, Young In; Kim, Keung Koo

2015-01-01

Highlights: • Functional performance of compound type multistage safety injection tanks is studied. • Effects of key design parameters are scrutinized. • Distinctive flow features in compound type safety injection tanks are explored. - Abstract: A parametric study is carried out to evaluate the functional performance of a compound type multistage safety injection tank that would be considered one of the components for the passive safety injection systems in nuclear power plants. The effects of key design parameters such as the initial volume fraction and charging pressure of gas, tank elevation, vertical location of a sparger, resistance coefficient, and operating condition on the injection flow rate are scrutinized along with a discussion of the relevant flow features. The obtained results indicate that the compound type multistage safety injection tank can effectively control the injection flow rate in a passive manner, by switching the driving force for the safety injection from gas pressure to gravity during the refill and reflood phases, respectively

Organic Tank Safety Project: Effect of water partial pressure on the equilibrium water content of waste samples from Hanford Tank 241-U-105

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Scheele, R.D.; Bredt, P.R.; Sell, R.L.

1997-09-01

Water content plays a crucial role in the strategy developed by Webb et al. to prevent propagating or sustainable chemical reactions in the organic-bearing wastes stored in the 20 Organic Tank Watch List tanks at the U.S. Department of Energy''s Hanford Site. Because of water''s importance in ensuring that the organic-bearing wastes continue to be stored safely, Duke Engineering and Services Hanford commissioned the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to investigate the effect of water partial pressure (P H2O ) on the water content of organic-bearing or representative wastes. Of the various interrelated controlling factors affecting the water content in wastes, P H2O is the most susceptible to being controlled by the and Hanford Site''s environmental conditions and, if necessary, could be managed to maintain the water content at an acceptable level or could be used to adjust the water content back to an acceptable level. Of the various waste types resulting from weapons production and waste-management operations at the Hanford Site, determined that saltcake wastes are the most likely to require active management to maintain the wastes in a Conditionally Safe condition. Webb et al. identified Tank U-105 as a Conditionally Safe saltcake tank. A Conditionally Safe waste is one that is currently safe based on waste classification criteria but could, if dried, be classified as open-quotes Unsafe.close quotes To provide information on the behavior of organic-bearing wastes, the Westinghouse Hanford Company provided us with four waste samples taken from Tank 241-U-105 (U-105) to determine the effect of P H2O on their equilibrium water content

Ferrocyanide tank safety program: Cesium uptake capacity of simulated ferrocyanide tank waste. Final report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Burgeson, I.E.; Bryan, S.A.

1995-07-01

The objective of this project is to determine the capacity for 137 Cs uptake by mixed metal ferrocyanides present in Hanford Site waste tanks, and to assess the potential for aggregation of these 137 Cs-exchanged materials to form ''hot-spots'' in the tanks. This research, performed at Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) for Westinghouse Hanford Company, stems from concerns regarding possible localized radiolytic heating within the tanks. After ferrocyanide was added to 18 high-level waste tanks in the 1950s, some of the ferrocyanide tanks received considerable quantities of saltcake waste that was rich in 137 Cs. If radioactive cesium was exchanged and concentrated by the nickel ferrocyanide present in the tanks, the associated heating could cause tank temperatures to rise above the safety limits specified for the ferrocyanide-containing tanks, especially if the supernate in the tanks is pumped out and the waste becomes drier

Organic tank safety project: Effect of water partial pressure on the equilibrium water contents of waste samples from Hanford Tank 241-BY-108

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Scheele, R.D.; Bredt, P.R.; Sell, R.L.

1997-02-01

Water content plays a crucial role in the strategy developed by Webb et al. to prevent propagating or sustainable chemical reactions in the organic-bearing wastes stored in the 20 Organic Tank Watch List tanks at the US Department of Energy's Hanford Site. Because of water's importance in ensuring that the organic-bearing wastes continue to be stored safely, Duke Engineering and Services Hanford commissioned the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to investigate the effect of water partial pressure (P H2O ) on the water content of organic-bearing or representative wastes. Of the various interrelated controlling factors affecting the water content in wastes, P H2O is the most susceptible to being controlled by the and Hanford Site's environmental conditions and, if necessary, could be managed to maintain the water content at an acceptable level or could be used to adjust the water content back to an acceptable level. Of the various waste types resulting from weapons production and waste-management operations at the Hanford Site, Webb et al. determined that saltcake wastes are the most likely to require active management to maintain the wastes in a Conditionally Safe condition. A Conditionally Safe waste is one that satisfies the waste classification criteria based on water content alone or a combination of water content and either total organic carbon (TOC) content or waste energetics. To provide information on the behavior of saltcake wastes, two waste samples taken from Tank 241-BY-108 (BY-108) were selected for study, even though BY-108 is not on the Organic Tanks Watch List because of their ready availability and their similarity to some of the organic-bearing saltcakes

Safety considerations on LPG storage tanks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Paff, R.

1993-01-01

The safety of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) storage tanks, in refineries, petrochemicals plants, or distribution storage, is an important concern. Some serious accidents in recent years, have highlighted the need for a good safety policy for such equipment. Accidents in LPG storage are mainly due to losses of containment of the LPG. Formation of a cloud can lead to a ''Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion'' (UVCE). Liquid leakage can lead to pool fires in the retention area. In some circumstances the heat input of the tank, combined with the loss of mechanical resistance of the steel under high temperature, can lead to a BLEVE ''Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion''. It is obvious that such equipment needs a proper design, maintenance and operating policy. The details to be considered are set out. (4 figures). (Author)

Transient performance analysis of pressurized safety injection tank with a partition

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bae, Youngmin; Kim, Young In; Kim, Keung Koo

2015-01-01

Highlights: • Functional performance of safety injection tanks with a partition is evaluated. • Effects of key design parameters are scrutinized. • Distinctive features of the flow in multi-unit safety injection tanks are explored. - Abstract: A parametric study has been performed to evaluate the functional performance of a pressurized multi-unit safety injection tank, which would be considered as one of the candidates for a passive safety injection system in a nuclear power plant. The influences of key design parameters including the orifice size, initial gas fraction, and resistance coefficients and operating condition on the injection flow rate are scrutinized with a discussion of the relevant flow features such as the choked flow of gas through an orifice and two interconnected regions of differing gaseous pressure. The obtained results indicate that a multi-unit safety injection tank can passively control the injection flow rate and provide a stable safety injection over a relatively long period even in the case of drastic depressurization of a reactor coolant system

Tank 241-AW-101 tank characterization plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sathyanarayana, P.

1994-01-01

The first section gives a summary of the available information for Tank AW-101. Included in the discussion are the process history and recent sampling events for the tank, as well as general information about the tank such as its age and the risers to be used for sampling. Tank 241-AW-101 is one of the 25 tanks on the Flammable Gas Watch List. To resolve the Flammable Gas safety issue, characterization of the tanks, including intrusive tank sampling, must be performed. Prior to sampling, however, the potential for the following scenarios must be evaluated: the potential for ignition of flammable gases such as hydrogen-air and/or hydrogen-nitrous oxide; and the potential for secondary ignition of organic-nitrate/nitrate mixtures in crust layer initiated by the burning of flammable gases or by a mechanical in-tank energy source. The characterization effort applicable to this Tank Characterization Plan is focused on the resolution of the crust burn flammable gas safety issue of Tank AW-101. To evaluate the potential for a crust burn of the waste material, calorimetry tests will be performed on the waste. Differential Scanning Calorimetry (DSC) will be used to determine whether an exothermic reaction exists

Tank 241-B-103 tank characterization plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carpenter, B.C.

1995-01-01

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) has advised the US Department of Energy (DOE) to concentrate the near-term sampling and analysis activities on identification and resolution of safety issues. The data quality objective (DQO) process was chosen as a tool to be used to identify sampling and analytical needs for the resolution of safety issues. As a result, a revision in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement or TPA) milestone M-44-00 has been made, which states that ''A Tank Characterization Plan (TCP) will also be developed for each double-shell tank (DST) and single-shell tank (SST) using the DQO process... Development of TCPs by the DQO process is intended to allow users (e.g., Hanford Facility user groups, regulators) to ensure their needs will be met and that resources are devoted to gaining only necessary information.'' This document satisfies that requirement for Tank 241-B-103 (B-103) sampling activities. Tank B-103 was placed on the Organic Watch List in January 1991 due to review of TRAC data that predicts a TOC content of 3.3 dry weight percent. The tank was classified as an assumed leaker of approximately 30,280 liters (8,000 gallons) in 1978 and declared inactive. Tank B-103 is passively ventilated with interim stabilization and intrusion prevention measures completed in 1985

Ferrocyanide Safety Program: Data interpretation report for tank 241-T-107 core samples

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sasaki, L.M.; Valenzuela, B.D.

1994-08-01

Between November 1992 and March 1993, three core samples were obtained from tank 241-T-107. Analyses were performed on these core samples to support the Ferrocyanide Safety Program and the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Ecology et al. 1994) Milestone M-10-00. This document summarizes and evaluates those analytical results that are pertinent to the Ferrocyanide Safety Issue. This document compares the analytical results with the data requirements for ferrocyanide tanks as documented in Data Requirements of the Ferrocyanide Safety Issue Developed Through the Data Quality Objectives Process (Meacham et al. 1994) and provides an assessment of the safety condition of the tank. Analytes not listed in the Data Quality Objectives (DQO) document (Meacham et al. 1994) or not pertinent to the Ferrocyanide Safety Issue are not discussed in this report. Complete documentation of the analytical results can be found in the data package for the tank 241-T-107 cores (Svancara and Pool 1993). A more complete evaluation of the analytical results and an estimate of the tank inventory will be provided in a forthcoming tank characterization report for tank 241-T-107

Organic tank safety project: Equilibrium moisture determination task. FY 1998 annual progress report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Scheele, R.D.; Bredt, P.R.; Sell, R.L.

1998-08-01

During fiscal year 1998, PNNL investigated the effect of P H 2 O at or near maximum tank waste surface temperatures on the equilibrium water content of selected Hanford waste samples. These studies were performed to determine how dry organic-bearing wastes will become if exposed to environmental Hanford water partial pressures. The samples tested were obtained from Organic Watch List Tanks. At 26 C, the lowest temperature used, the water partial pressures ranged from 2 to 22 torr. At 41 C, the highest temperature used, the water partial pressures ranged from 3.5 to 48 torr. When the aliquots exposed to the lowest and highest water partial pressures reached their equilibrium or near-equilibrium water contents, they were exchanged to determine if hysteresis occurred. In some experiments, once equilibrated, aliquots not used in the hysteresis experiments were allowed to equilibrate at room temperature (23 C) until the hysteresis experiments ended; this provides a measure of the effect of temperature

Analysis of tank safety with propane-butane on LPG distribution station

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Krzysiak Zbigniew

2017-12-01

Full Text Available An analysis of the risk of failure in the safety valve – tank with propane-butane (LPG system has been conducted. An uncontrolled outflow of liquid LPG, caused by a failure of the above mentioned system has been considered as a threat. The main research goal of the study is the hazardous analysis of propane-butane gas outflow for the safety valve – LPG tank system. The additional goal is the development of an useful method to fast identify the hazard of a mismatched safety valve. The results of the research analysis have confirmed that safety valves are basic protection of the installation (tank against failures that can lead to loss of life, material damage and further undesired costs of their unreliability. That is why a new, professional computer program has been created that allows for the selection of safety valves or for the verification of a safety valve selection in installations where any technical or technological changes have been made.

45-Day safety screen results for Tank 241-C-101, auger sample 95-AUG-019

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sasaki, L.M.

1995-01-01

One auger sample from Tank 241-C-101 was received by the 222-S Laboratory and underwent safety screening analyses--differential scanning calorimetry (DSC), thermogravimetric analysis (TGA), and total alpha analysis--in accordance with the tank characterization plan. Analytical results for the TGA on the crust sample (the uppermost portion of the auger sample) (sample number S95T000823) were less than the safety screening notification limit of 17 weight percent water. Verbal and written notifications were made on May 3, 1995. No exotherms were observed in the DSC analyses and the total alpha results were well below the safety screening notification limit. This report includes the primary safety screening results obtained from the analyses and copies of all DSC and TGA raw data scans as requested per the TCP. Although not included in this report, a photograph of the extruded sample was taken and is available. This report also includes bulk density measurements required by Characterization Plant Engineering. Additional analyses (pH, total organic carbon, and total inorganic carbon) are being performed on the drainable liquid at the request of Characterization Process Control; these analyses will be reported at a later date in a final report for this auger sample. Tank C-101 is not part of any of the four Watch Lists

Tank Farms Technical Safety Requirements. Volume 1 and 2

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

CASH, R.J.

2000-01-01

The Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) define the acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, basis thereof, and controls to ensure safe operation during authorized activities, for facilities within the scope of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)

Tank Farms Technical Safety Requirements [VOL 1 and 2

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

CASH, R.J.

2000-12-28

The Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) define the acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, basis thereof, and controls to ensure safe operation during authorized activities, for facilities within the scope of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).

DOE high-level waste tank safety program Final report, Task 002

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

The overall objective of the work on Task 002 was to provide LANL with support to the DOE High-Level Waste Tank Safety program. The objective of the work was to develop safety documentation in support of the unsafe tank mitigation activities at Hanford. The work includes the development of safety assessment and an environmental assessment. All tasks which were assigned under this Task Order were completed. Descriptions of the objectives of each task and effort performed to complete each objective are provided. The two tasks were: Task 2.1--safety assessment for instrumentation insertion; and Task 2.2--environmental assessment

Technical safety appraisal of the Hanford Tank Farm Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Brinkerhoff, L.C.

1989-05-01

This report presents the results of one in a series of TSAs being conducted at DOE nuclear operations by the Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety, and Health, Office of Safety Appraisals. TSAs are one of the initiatives announced by the Secretary of Energy on September 18, 1985, to enhance the DOE environment, safety and health program. This report provides the results of a TSA of the Tank Farm in the 200 East and 200 West Areas located on the Hanford site. The appraisal was conducted by a team of experts assembled by the DOE Office of Safety Appraisals and was conducted during onsite visits of March 20--24 and April 3--14, 1989. At the Tank Farm, the processing of spent reactor fuels to recover the useful radioactive products is accompanied by the production of radioactive waste. Because many of these wastes will retain radioactivity for many years, they must be safely handled, contained, and disposed with regard to protection of the environment, employees, and the public. Dilute low-level waste and five year ''cooled'' aging wastes are pumped to an evaporator for concentration. The radioactive liquid and solid wastes are stored in underground carbon steel tanks ranging in capacity from 55,000 to over one million gallons

Status of test results of electrochemical organic oxidation of a tank 241-SY-101 simulated waste

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Colby, S.A.

1994-06-01

This report presents scoping test results of an electrochemical waste pretreatment process to oxidize organic compounds contained in the Hanford Site's radioactive waste storage tanks. Electrochemical oxidation was tested on laboratory scale to destroy organics that are thought to pose safety concerns, using a nonradioactive, simulated tank waste. Minimal development work has been applied to alkaline electrochemical organic destruction. Most electrochemical work has been directed towards acidic electrolysis, as in the metal purification industry, and silver catalyzed oxidation. Alkaline electrochemistry has traditionally been associated with the following: (1) inefficient power use, (2) electrode fouling, and (3) solids handling problems. Tests using a laboratory scale electrochemical cell oxidized surrogate organics by applying a DC electrical current to the simulated tank waste via anode and cathode electrodes. The analytical data suggest that alkaline electrolysis oxidizes the organics into inorganic carbonate and smaller carbon chain refractory organics. Electrolysis treats the waste without adding chemical reagents and at ambient conditions of temperature and pressure. Cell performance was not affected by varying operating conditions and supplemental electrolyte additions

Think Tanks as Policy Brokers in Partially Organized Fields

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Garsten, Christina; Sörbom, Adrienne

a theoretical account of how relationships organized by transnational think tanks may be analyzed. In the report we are drawing on empirical findings from the World Economic Forum (WEF), seen as a transnational think tank addressing a non-national audience. We are suggesting that think-tank experts are engaged....... This allows think tanks to maintain a degree of flexibility, whilst gaining control of valuable resources. In the case of the WEF the report show that the combination of a small core of complete organization with a larger environment of only partial organizing essentially allows the WEF to be bigger than...

Probabilistic safety assessment for high-level waste tanks at Hanford

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sullivan, L.H.; MacFarlane, D.R.; Stack, D.W.

1996-01-01

Los Alamos National Laboratory has performed a comprehensive probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), including consideration of external events, for the 18 tank farms at the Hanford Tank Farm (HTF). This work was sponsored by the Department of Energy/Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Division (DOE/EM)

Data quality objective to support resolution of the organic complexant safety issue

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Turner, D.A.; Babad, H.; Buckley, L.L.; Meacham, J.E.

1995-01-01

This document records the data quality objectives (DQO) process applied to the organic complexant safety issue at the Hanford Site. Two important outputs of this particular DQO application were the following: (1) decision rules for categorizing organic tanks; and (2) analytical requirements that feed into the tank-specific characterization plans. The decision rules developed in this DQO allow the organic tanks to be categorized as safe, conditionally safe, or unsafe based on fuel and moisture concentrations. Then analytical requirements from this DQO process fall into two groups, primary and secondary. The primary data requirements are always applied, while the secondary requirements are only necessary on those half segment samples that violate the fuel and moisture decision rules or that propagate during adiabatic calorimetry testing

Generalized railway tank car safety design optimization for hazardous materials transport: Addressing the trade-off between transportation efficiency and safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Saat, Mohd Rapik; Barkan, Christopher P.L.

2011-01-01

North America railways offer safe and generally the most economical means of long distance transport of hazardous materials. Nevertheless, in the event of a train accident releases of these materials can pose substantial risk to human health, property or the environment. The majority of railway shipments of hazardous materials are in tank cars. Improving the safety design of these cars to make them more robust in accidents generally increases their weight thereby reducing their capacity and consequent transportation efficiency. This paper presents a generalized tank car safety design optimization model that addresses this tradeoff. The optimization model enables evaluation of each element of tank car safety design, independently and in combination with one another. We present the optimization model by identifying a set of Pareto-optimal solutions for a baseline tank car design in a bicriteria decision problem. This model provides a quantitative framework for a rational decision-making process involving tank car safety design enhancements to reduce the risk of transporting hazardous materials.

Organic reactivity analysis in Hanford single-shell tanks: Experimental and modeling basis for an expanded safety criterion

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fauske, H.; Grigsby, J.M.; Turner, D.A.; Babad, H.; Meacham, J.E.

1996-01-01

De-spite demonstrated safe storage in terms of chemical stability of the Hanford high level waste for many decades, including decreasing waste temperatures and continuing aging of chemicals to less energetic states, concerns continue relative to assurance of long-term safe storage. Review of potential chemical safety hazards has been of particular recent interest in response to serious incidents within the Nuclear Weapons Complexes in the former Soviet Union (the 1957 Kyshtym and the 1993 Tomsk-7 incidents). Based upon an evaluation of the extensive new information and understanding that have developed over the last few years, it is concluded that the Hanford waste is stored safely and that concerns related to potential chemical safety hazards are not warranted. Spontaneous bulk runaway reactions of the Kyshtym incident type and other potential condensed-phase propagating reactions can be ruled out by assuring appropriate tank operating controls are in place and by limiting tank intrusive activities. This paper summarizes the technical basis for this position

Tank farms criticality safety manual

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

FORT, L.A.

2003-01-01

This document defines the Tank Farms Contractor (TFC) criticality safety program, as required by Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR-), Subpart 830.204(b)(6), ''Documented Safety Analysis'' (10 CFR- 830.204 (b)(6)), and US Department of Energy (DOE) 0 420.1A, Facility Safety, Section 4.3, ''Criticality Safety.'' In addition, this document contains certain best management practices, adopted by TFC management based on successful Hanford Site facility practices. Requirements in this manual are based on the contractor requirements document (CRD) found in Attachment 2 of DOE 0 420.1A, Section 4.3, ''Nuclear Criticality Safety,'' and the cited revisions of applicable standards published jointly by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the American Nuclear Society (ANS) as listed in Appendix A. As an informational device, requirements directly imposed by the CRD or ANSI/ANS Standards are shown in boldface. Requirements developed as best management practices through experience and maintained consistent with Hanford Site practice are shown in italics. Recommendations and explanatory material are provided in plain type

Probabilistic safety assessment for Hanford high-level waste tanks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

MacFarlane, D.R.; Stack, D.S.; Kindinger, J.P.; Deremer, R.K.

1995-01-01

This paper gives results from the first comprehensive level-3 probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), including consideration of external events, for the Hanford tank farm (HTF). This work was sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy/Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Division (DOE/EM). At the HTF, there are 177 underground tanks in 18 separate tank farms containing accumulated liquid/sludge/saltcake radioactive wastes from 50 yr of weapons materials production activities. The total waste volume is ∼60 million gal, containing ∼200 million Ci of radioactivity

Planning exercise for the resolution of high level waste tank safety issues

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bunting, J.; Saveland, J.

1992-01-01

Several conditions have been found to exist within high level radioactive waste storage tanks at the Hanford site which could lead to uncontrolled exothermic reactions and/or to the release of tank contents into the environment. These conditions have led to the establishment of four priority 1 safety issues for the Hanford tanks. Resolution of these safety issues will require the coordinated efforts of professionals in chemical, nuclear, operations, safety, and other technical areas. A coordinated and integrated approach is necessary in order to achieve resolution in the shortest possible time, while ensuring that the steps taken do not complicate the later jobs of vitrification and ultimate disposal. This paper describes the purpose, process, and results of an effort to develop a suggested approach. (author)

Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessment for Tank 38H Salt Dissolution

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Davis, P.L.

1996-01-01

This assessment report of sample results of the accumulating insoluble solids from Tank 38H demonstrates that an inherent subcritical condition for nuclear criticality safety exists during saltcake dissolution. This report also defines criteria for future sampling of Tank 38H for continued verification of the inherent subcritical condition as saltcake dissolution proceeds

System Safety Program Plan for Project W-314, tank farm restoration and safe operations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Boos, K.A.

1996-01-01

This System Safety Program Plan (SSPP) outlines the safety analysis strategy for project W-314, ''Tank Farm Restoration and Safe Operations.'' Project W-314 will provide capital improvements to Hanford's existing Tank Farm facilities, with particular emphasis on infrastructure systems supporting safe operation of the double-shell activities related to the project's conceptual Design Phase, but is planned to be updated and maintained as a ''living document'' throughout the life of the project to reflect the current safety analysis planning for the Tank Farm Restoration and Safe Operations upgrades. This approved W-314 SSPP provides the basis for preparation/approval of all safety analysis documentation needed to support the project

Probabilistic safety assessment for Hanford high-level waste tank 241-SY-101

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

MacFarlane, D.R.; Bott, T.F.; Brown, L.F.; Stack, D.W. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Kindinger, J.; Deremer, R.K.; Medhekar, S.R.; Mikschl, T.J. [PLG, Inc., Newport Beach, CA (United States)

1994-05-01

Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos) is performing a comprehensive probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), which will include consideration of external events for the 18 tank farms at the Hanford Site. This effort is sponsored by the Department of Energy (DOE/EM, EM-36). Even though the methodology described herein will be applied to the entire tank farm, this report focuses only on the risk from the weapons-production wastes stored in tank number 241-SY-101, commonly known as Tank 101-SY, as configured in December 1992. This tank, which periodically releases ({open_quotes}burps{close_quotes}) a gaseous mixture of hydrogen, nitrous oxide, ammonia, and nitrogen, was analyzed first because of public safety concerns associated with the potential for release of radioactive tank contents should this gas mixture be ignited during one of the burps. In an effort to mitigate the burping phenomenon, an experiment is being conducted in which a large pump has been inserted into the tank to determine if pump-induced circulation of the tank contents will promote a slow, controlled release of the gases. At the Hanford Site there are 177 underground tanks in 18 separate tank farms containing accumulated liquid/sludge/salt cake radioactive wastes from 50 yr of weapons materials production activities. The total waste volume is about 60 million gal., which contains approximately 120 million Ci of radioactivity.

Probabilistic safety assessment for Hanford high-level waste tank 241-SY-101

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

MacFarlane, D.R.; Bott, T.F.; Brown, L.F.; Stack, D.W.; Kindinger, J.; Deremer, R.K.; Medhekar, S.R.; Mikschl, T.J.

1994-05-01

Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos) is performing a comprehensive probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), which will include consideration of external events for the 18 tank farms at the Hanford Site. This effort is sponsored by the Department of Energy (DOE/EM, EM-36). Even though the methodology described herein will be applied to the entire tank farm, this report focuses only on the risk from the weapons-production wastes stored in tank number 241-SY-101, commonly known as Tank 101-SY, as configured in December 1992. This tank, which periodically releases (open-quotes burpsclose quotes) a gaseous mixture of hydrogen, nitrous oxide, ammonia, and nitrogen, was analyzed first because of public safety concerns associated with the potential for release of radioactive tank contents should this gas mixture be ignited during one of the burps. In an effort to mitigate the burping phenomenon, an experiment is being conducted in which a large pump has been inserted into the tank to determine if pump-induced circulation of the tank contents will promote a slow, controlled release of the gases. At the Hanford Site there are 177 underground tanks in 18 separate tank farms containing accumulated liquid/sludge/salt cake radioactive wastes from 50 yr of weapons materials production activities. The total waste volume is about 60 million gal., which contains approximately 120 million Ci of radioactivity

Hydrothermal processing of Hanford tank waste. Organic destruction technology development task annual report -- FY 1993

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Orth, R.J.; Schmidt, A.J.; Zacher, A.H.

1993-09-01

Low-temperature hydrothermal processing (HTP) is a thermal-chemical autogenous processing method that can be used to destroy organics and ferrocyanide in Hanford tank waste at temperatures from 250 C to 400 C. With HTP, organics react with oxidants, such as nitrite and nitrate, already present in the waste. Ferrocyanides and free cyanide will hydrolyze at similar temperatures and may also react with nitrates or other oxidants in the waste. No air or oxygen or additional chemicals need to be added to the autogenous HTP system. However, enhanced kinetics may be realized by air addition, and, if desired, chemical reductants can be added to the system to facilitate complete nitrate/nitrate destruction. Tank waste can be processed in a plug-flow, tubular reactor, or a continuous-stirred tank reactor system designed to accommodate the temperature, pressure, gas generation, and heat release associated with decomposition of the reactive species. The work described in this annual report was conducted in FY 1993 for the Organic Destruction Technology Development Task of Hanford's Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS). This task is part of an overall program to develop organic destruction technologies originally funded by TWRS to meet tank safety and waste form disposal criteria and condition the feed for further pretreatment. During FY 1993 the project completed seven experimental test plans, a 30-hr pilot-scale continuous run, over 200 hr of continuous bench-scale HTP testing, and 20 batch HTP tests; two contracts were established with commercial vendors, and a commercial laboratory reactor was procured and installed in a glovebox for HTP testing with actual Hanford tank waste

Analysis of Organic Samples from the 5-H and 3-F Pump Tanks and Waste Tank 38H

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Swingle, R.F. II

1999-01-01

Analyses for organic materials in aqueous and surface floating samples taken from the 5-H Pump Tank and Waste Tank 38H and in vapor samples taken from the 5-H and 3-F Pump Tanks have been completed. The results indicate that the concentration of organic materials is extremely low in all samples. This report documents the development of sampling and analysis techniques for this sampling as well as the results of the analyses of vapor samples pulled from Pump Tanks 5-H and 3-F and liquid samples pulled from Waste Tank 38H and Pump Tank 5-H

Program plan for evaluation of the Ferrocyanide Waste Tank safety issue at the Hanford Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Borsheim, G.L.; Meacham, J.E.; Cash, R.J.; Dukelow, G.T.

1994-03-01

This document describes the background, priorities, strategy and logic, and task descriptions for the Ferrocyanide Waste Tank Safety Program. The Ferrocyanide Safety Program was established in 1990 to provide resolution of a major safety issue identified for 24 high-level radioactive waste tanks at the Hanford Site

Safety issue resolution strategy plan for inactive miscellaneous underground storage tanks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wang, O.S.; Powers, T.B.

1994-09-01

The purpose of this strategy plan is to identify, confirm, and resolve safely issues associated with inactive miscellaneous underground storage tanks (MUSTs) using a risk-based priority approach. Assumptions and processes to assess potential risks and operational concerns are documented in this report. Safety issue priorities are ranked based on a number of considerations including risk ranking and cost effectiveness. This plan specifies work scope and recommends schedules for activities related to resolving safety issues, such as collecting historical data, searching for authorization documents, performing Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) screening and evaluation, identifying safety issues, imposing operational controls and monitoring, characterizing waste contents, mitigating and resolving safety issues, and fulfilling other remediation requirements consistent with the overall Tank Waste Remediation System strategy. Recommendations for characterization and remediation are also recommended according to the order of importance and practical programmatic consideration

Safety evaluation for packaging for 1720-DR sodium-filled tank

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mercado, M.S.

1996-01-01

Preparations are under way to sell the sodium stored in the 1720-DR tank in the 1720-DR building. This will require that the tank, as well as the 1720-DR facility, be moved to the 300 Area, so that the sodium may be melted and transferred into a railroad tanker car. Because the sodium is a hazardous material and is being shipped in a nonspecification packaging, a safety evaluation for packaging (SEP) is required. This SEP approves the sodium-filled tank for a single shipment from the 105-DR area to the 300 Area

Safety evaluation for packaging transport of LSA-II liquids in MC-312 cargo tanks

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Carlstrom, R.F.

1996-09-11

This safety evaluation for packaging authorizes the onsite transfer of bulk LSA-II radioactive liquids in the 222-S Laboratory Cargo Tank and Liquid Effluent Treatment Facility Cargo Tanks (which are U.S. Department of Transportation MC-312 specification cargo tanks) from their operating facilities to tank farm facilities.

Reactor design and safety approach for a tank-type fast reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Davies, S.M.; Yamaki, Hideo; Goodman, L.

1984-06-01

A tank type plant has been designed that offers compactness, high reliability under seismic and thermal transients, and a safety design approach that provides a balance between public safety and plant availability. This report provides a description of the design philosophy and safety features of the reactor

Hanford Site Tank Waste Remediation System

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1993-05-01

The US Department of Energy's (DOE) Hanford Site in southeastern Washington State has the most diverse and largest amount of highly radioactive waste of any site in the US. High-level radioactive waste has been stored in large underground tanks since 1944. A Tank Waste Remediation System Program has been established within the DOE to safely manage and immobilize these wastes in anticipation of permanent disposal in a geologic repository. The Hanford Site Tank Waste Remediation System Waste Management 1993 Symposium Papers and Viewgraphs covered the following topics: Hanford Site Tank Waste Remediation System Overview; Tank Waste Retrieval Issues and Options for their Resolution; Tank Waste Pretreatment - Issues, Alternatives and Strategies for Resolution; Low-Level Waste Disposal - Grout Issue and Alternative Waste Form Technology; A Strategy for Resolving High-Priority Hanford Site Radioactive Waste Storage Tank Safety Issues; Tank Waste Chemistry - A New Understanding of Waste Aging; Recent Results from Characterization of Ferrocyanide Wastes at the Hanford Site; Resolving the Safety Issue for Radioactive Waste Tanks with High Organic Content; Technology to Support Hanford Site Tank Waste Remediation System Objectives

SAFETY EVALUATION OF OXALIC ACID WASTE RETRIEVAL IN SINGLE SHELL TANK (SST) 241-C-106

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

SHULTZ, M.V.

2003-01-01

This report documents the safety evaluation of the process of retrieving sludge waste from single-shell tank 241-C-106 using oxalic acid. The results of the HAZOP, safety evaluation, and control allocation/decision are part of the report. This safety evaluation considers the use of oxalic acid to recover residual waste in single-shell tank (SST) 241-C-106. This is an activity not addressed in the current tank farm safety basis. This evaluation has five specific purposes: (1) Identifying the key configuration and operating assumptions needed to evaluate oxalic acid dissolution in SST 241-C-106. (2) Documenting the hazardous conditions identified during the oxalic acid dissolution hazard and operability study (HAZOP). (3) Documenting the comparison of the HAZOP results to the hazardous conditions and associated analyzed accident currently included in the safety basis, as documented in HNF-SD-WM-TI-764, Hazard Analysis Database Report. (4) Documenting the evaluation of the oxalic acid dissolution activity with respect to: (A) Accident analyses described in HNF-SD-WM-SAR-067, Tank Farms Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), and (B) Controls specified in HNF-SD-WM-TSR-006, Tank Farms Technical Safety Requirements (TSR). (5) Documenting the process and results of control decisions as well as the applicability of preventive and/or mitigative controls to each oxalic acid addition hazardous condition. This safety evaluation is not intended to be a request to authorize the activity. Authorization issues are addressed by the unreviewed safety question (USQ) evaluation process. This report constitutes an accident analysis

Tank waste remediation system nuclear criticality safety program management review

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

BRADY RAAP, M.C.

1999-01-01

This document provides the results of an internal management review of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) criticality safety program, performed in advance of the DOE/RL assessment for closure of the TWRS Nuclear Criticality Safety Issue, March 1994. Resolution of the safety issue was identified as Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) Milestone M-40-12, due September 1999

Safety evaluation for packaging 222-S laboratory cargo tank for onetime type B material shipment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nguyen, P.M.

1994-01-01

The purpose of this Safety Evaluation for Packaging (SEP) is to evaluate and document the safety of the onetime shipment of bulk radioactive liquids in the 222-S Laboratory cargo tank (222-S cargo tank). The 222-S cargo tank is a US Department of Transportation (DOT) MC-312 specification (DOT 1989) cargo tank, vehicle registration number HO-64-04275, approved for low specific activity (LSA) shipments in accordance with the DOT Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). In accordance with the US Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL) Order 5480.1A, Chapter III (RL 1988), an equivalent degree of safety shall be provided for onsite shipments as would be afforded by the DOT shipping regulations for a radioactive material package. This document demonstrates that this packaging system meets the onsite transportation safety criteria for a onetime shipment of Type B contents

FFTF railroad tank car Safety Evaluation for Packaging

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carlstrom, R.F.

1995-01-01

This Safety Evaluation for Packaging (SEP) provides evaluations considered necessary to approve transfer of the 8,000 gallon Liquid Waste Tank Car (LWTC) from Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) to the 200 Areas. This SEP will demonstrate that the transfer of the LWTC will provide an equivalent degree of safety as would be provided by packages meeting U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) requirements. This fulfills onsite transportation requirements implemented in the Hazardous Material Packaging and Shipping, WHC-CM-2-14

Initial laboratory studies into the chemical and radiological aging of organic materials in underground storage tanks at the Hanford Complex

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Samuels, W.D.; Camaioni, D.M.; Babad, H.

1994-01-01

The underground storage tanks at the Hanford Complex contain wastes generated over many years from plutonium production and recovery processes, and mixed wastes from radiological degradation processes. The chemical changes of the organic materials used in the extraction processes have a direct bearing on several specific safety issues, including potential energy releases from these tanks. The major portion of organic materials that have been added to the tanks consists of tributyl phosphate, dibutyl phosphate, butyl alcohol, hexone (methyl isobutyl ketone), normal paraffin hydrocarbons (NPH), ethylenediaminetetraacetic acid (EDTA), hydroxyethylethylenediaminetriadetic acid (HEDTA), other complexants, and lesser quantities of ion exchange polymers and minor organic compounds. A study of how thermal and radiological processes that may have changed the composition of organic tanks constituents has been initiated after a review of the open literature revealed little information was available about the rates and products of these processes under basic pH conditions. This paper will detail the initial findings as they relate to gas generation, e.g. H 2 , CO, NH 3 , CH 4 , and to changes in the composition of the organic and inorganic components brought about by ''Aging'' processes

Tank waste remediation system nuclear criticality safety inspection and assessment plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

VAIL, T.S.

1999-01-01

This plan provides a management approved procedure for inspections and assessments of sufficient depth to validate that the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) facility complies with the requirements of the Project Hanford criticality safety program, NHF-PRO-334, ''Criticality Safety General, Requirements''

Safety evaluation for packaging (Onsite) transport of LSA-II liquids in MC-312 cargo tanks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carlstrom, R.F.

1996-01-01

This safety evaluation for packaging authorizes the onsite transfer of bulk LSA-II radioactive liquids in the 222-S Laboratory Cargo Tank and Liquid Effluent Treatment Facility Cargo Tanks (which are U.S. Department of Transportation MC-312 specification cargo tanks) from their operating facilities to tank farm facilities

CFD Analysis of the Safety Injection Tank and Fluidic Device

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Cho, Jai Oan; Nietiadi, Yohanes Setiawan; Lee, Jeong Ik [KAIST, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Addad, Yacine [KUSTAR, Abu Dhabi (United Arab Emirates)

2016-05-15

One of the most important components in the ECCS is the safety injection tank (SIT). Inside the SIT, a fluidic device is installed, which passively controls the mass flow of the safety injection and eliminates the need for low pressure safety injection pumps. As more passive safety mechanisms are being pursued, it has become more important to understand flow structure and the loss mechanism within the fluidic device. Current computational fluid dynamics (CFD) calculations have had limited success in predicting the fluid flow accurately. This study proposes to find a more exact result using CFD and more realistic modeling to predict the performance during accident scenarios more accurately. The safety injection tank with fluidic device was analyzed thoroughly using CFD. The preliminary calculation used 60,000 meshes for the initial test calculation. The results fit the experimental results surprisingly despite its coarse grid. Nonetheless, the mesh resolution was increased to capture the vortex in the fluidic device precisely. Once a detailed CFD computation is finished, a small-scale experiment will be conducted for the given conditions. Using the experimental results and the CFD model, physical models can be improved to fit the results more accurately.

Resolution of the ferrocyanide safety issue for the Hanford site high-level waste tanks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cash, R.J.

1996-01-01

This paper describes the approach used to resolve the ferrocyanide safety issue, a process that began in 1990 after heightened concern was expressed by various government agencies about the safety of Hanford site high-level waste tanks. At the time, little was known about ferrocyanide-nitrate/nitrite reactions and the potential for offsite releases of radioactivity from the Hanford Site. Recent studies have shown that the combined effects of temperature, radiation, and pH during more than 38 years of storage have destroyed most of the ferrocyanide originally added to tanks. This has been proven in the laboratory using flowsheet-derived waste simulants and confirmed by waste samples obtained from the ferrocyanide tanks. The resulting tank waste sludges are too dilute to support a sustained exothermic reaction, even if dried out and heated to temperatures of at least 250 C. The US Department of Energy (DOE) has been requested to close the ferrocyanide safety issue

Status report on resolution of Waste Tank Safety Issues at the Hanford Site. Revision 1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dukelow, G.T.; Hanson, G.A.

1995-05-01

The purpose of this report is to provide and update the status of activities supporting the resolution of waste tank safety issues and system deficiencies at the Hanford Site. This report provides: (1) background information on safety issues and system deficiencies; (2) a description of the Tank Waste Remediation System and the process for managing safety issues and system deficiencies; (3) changes in safety issue description, prioritization, and schedules; and (4) a summary of the status, plans, order of magnitude, cost, and schedule for resolving safety issues and system deficiencies

77 FR 62224 - Hanford Tank Farms Flammable Gas Safety Strategy

Science.gov (United States)

2012-10-12

... (Board) believes that current operations at the Hanford Tank Farms require safety- significant active... administrative control in lieu of an engineered feature is also contrary to DOE's established hierarchy of...

Investigation of the organic matter in inactive nuclear tank liquids

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schenley, R.L.; Griest, W.H.

1990-08-01

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) methodology for regulatory organics fails to account for the organic matter that is suggested by total organic carbon (TOC) analysis in the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) inactive nuclear waste-tank liquids and sludges. Identification and measurement of the total organics are needed to select appropriate waste treatment technologies. An initial investigation was made of the nature of the organics in several waste-tank liquids. This report details the analysis of ORNL wastes

Closure of the condensed-phase organic-nitrate reaction unreviewed safety question at Hanford site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

COWLEY, W.L.

1999-01-01

A discovery Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) was declared on the underground waste storage tanks at the Hanford Site in May 1996. The USQ was for condensed-phase organic-nitrate reactions (sometimes called organic complexant reactions) in the tanks. This paper outlines the steps taken to close the USQ, and resolve the related safety issue. Several processes were used at the Hanford Site to extract and/or process plutonium. These processes resulted in organic complexants (for chelating multivalent cations) and organic extraction solvents being sent to the underground waste storage tanks. This paper addresses the organic complexant hazard. The organic complexants are in waste matrices that include inert material, diluents, and potential oxidizers. In the presence of oxidizing material, the complexant salts can be made to react exothermically by heating to high temperatures or by applying an external ignition source of sufficient energy. The first organic complexant hazard assessments focused on determining whether a hulk runaway reaction could occur, similar to the 1957 accident at Kyshtm (a reprocessing plant in the former U.S.S.R.). Early analyses (1977 through 1994) examined organic-nitrate reaction onset temperatures and concluded that a bulk runaway reaction could not occur at the Hanford Site because tank temperatures were well below that necessary for bulk runaway. Therefore, it was believed that organic-nitrate reactions were adequately described in the then current Authorization Basis (AB). Subsequent studies examined a different accident scenario, propagation resulting from an external ignition source (e.g., lightning or welding slag) that initiates a combustion front that propagates through the organic waste. A USQ evaluation determined that localized high energy ignition sources were credible, and that point source ignition of organic complexant waste was not adequately addressed i n the then existing AB. Consequently, the USQ was declared on the

Tank 241-AZ-101 tank characterization plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schreiber, R.D.

1995-01-01

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has advised the DOE to concentrate the near-term sampling and analysis activities on identification and resolution of safety issues. The Data Quality Objective (DQO) process was chosen as a tool to be used in the resolution of safety issues. As a result, A revision in the Federal Facilities Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) milestone M-44 has been made, which states that ''A Tank Characterization Plan (TCP) will also be developed for each double-shell tank (DST) and single-shell tank (SST) using the DQO process. Development of TCPs by the DQO process is intended to allow users to ensure their needs will be met and that resources are devoted to gaining only necessary information''. This document satisfies that requirement for Tank 241-AZ-101 (AZ-101) sampling activities. Tank AZ-101 is currently a non-Watch List tank, so the only DQOs applicable to this tank are the safety screening DQO and the compatibility DQO, as described below. The contents of Tank AZ-101, as of October 31, 1994, consisted of 3,630 kL (960 kgal) of dilute non-complexed waste and aging waste from PUREX (NCAW, neutralized current acid waste). Tank AZ-101 is expected to have two primary layers. The bottom layer is composed of 132 kL of sludge, and the top layer is composed of 3,500 kL of supernatant, with a total tank waste depth of approximately 8.87 meters

Tank 244A tank characterization plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schreiber, R.D.

1994-01-01

The Double-Shell Tank (DST) System currently receives waste from the Single-Shell Tank (SST) System in support of SST stabilization efforts or from other on-site facilities which generate or store waste. Waste is also transferred between individual DSTs. The mixing or commingling of potentially incompatible waste types at the Hanford Site must be addressed prior to any waste transfers into the DSTs. The primary goal of the Waste Compatibility Program is to prevent the formation of an Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) as a result of improper waste management. Tank 244A is a Double Contained Receiver Tank (DCRT) which serves as any overflow tank for the East Area Farms. Waste material is able to flow freely between the underground storage tanks and tank 244A. Therefore, it is necessary to test the waste in tank 244A for compatibility purposes. Two issues related to the overall problem of waste compatibility must be evaluated: Assurance of continued operability during waste transfer and waste concentration and Assurance that safety problems are not created as a result of commingling wastes under interim storage. The results of the grab sampling activity prescribed by this Tank Characterization Plan shall help determine the potential for four kinds of safety problems: criticality, flammable gas accumulation, energetics, and corrosion and leakage

Qualification of Raman analysis on Hanford tank waste

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Crawford, B.A.

1997-01-01

Chemical characterization is often required for the Hanford tanks in order to support safety assessments, compatibility between tank contents and operations activities such as sluicing and material transfer. Safety drivers include monitoring of organic chemical and oxidizer levels to better assess indicators that may point to problems from such factors as reactivity of tank contents and flammability from gas generation. Monitoring is also being recognized as a useful in support of operations in tank contents retrieval and storage of material before treatment. Important operations aspects which benefit from additional monitoring and characterization include formation of gels, foaming and fouling of transfer lines during material transfer

Flammable gas tank safety program: Technical basis for gas analysis and monitoring

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Estey, S.D.

1998-01-01

Several Hanford waste tanks have been observed to exhibit periodic releases of significant quantities of flammable gases. Because potential safety issues have been identified with this type of waste behavior, applicable tanks were equipped with instrumentation offering the capability to continuously monitor gases released from them. This document was written to cover three primary areas: (1) describe the current technical basis for requiring flammable gas monitoring, (2) update the technical basis to include knowledge gained from monitoring the tanks over the last three years, (3) provide the criteria for removal of Standard Hydrogen Monitoring System(s) (SHMS) from a waste tank or termination of other flammable gas monitoring activities in the Hanford Tank farms

Final characterization and safety screen report of double shell tank 241-AP-104 for 242-A evaporator, campaign 96-1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Miller, G.L.

1996-01-01

This data package satisfies the requirement for a format IV, final report. It is a follow-up to the 45-day safety screen report for tank AP-104. Evaporator candidate feed from tank 241-AP-104 (hereafter referred to as AP-104) was characterized for physical, inorganic, organic and radiochemical parameters by the Westinghouse Hanford Company, 222-S Laboratory, and by the Battelle Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Analytical Chemistry Laboratory (ACL) as directed by the Tank Sample and Analysis Plan (TSAP), References 1 through 4. Preliminary data in the form of summary analytical tables were provided to the project in advance of this final report to enable early estimation of evaporator operational parameters, using the Predict modeling program. Laboratory analyses at ACL Laboratory was performed according to the TSAP. Analyses were performed at the 222-S Laboratory as defined and specified in the TSAP and the Laboratory's Quality Assurance Plan, References 5 and 6. Any deviations from the instructions documented in the TSAP are discussed in this narrative and are supported with additional documentation. SAMPLING The TSAP, section 2, provided sampling information for waste samples collected from tank AP-104. The bottle-on-a-string method was used to collect liquid grab samples from the tank. Each glass sample bottle was amber, precleaned, and contained approximately 100 milliliters. Each bottle was closed with a teflon seal cap (or teflon septum for volatile organic analysis samples). Field blank samples were prepared by placing deionized water into sampling bottles, lowering the unclosed bottles into the riser for a period of time, retrieving them from the riser, and then closing the bottles with the same types of caps used for the tank samples. None of the samples were preserved by acidification. Upon receipt, the sample bottles destined for organic analyses were placed in a refrigerator. No attempt was made during sampling to assure the complete

Tank 241-AZ-102 tank characterization plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schreiber, R.D.

1995-01-01

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has advised the DOE to concentrate the near-term sampling and analysis activities on identification and resolution of safety issues. The Data Quality Objective (DQO) process was chosen as a tool to be used in the resolution of safety issues. As a result, a revision in the Federal Facilities Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) milestone M-44 has been made, which states that ''A Tank Characterization Plan (TCP) will also be developed for each double-shell tank (DST) and single-shell tank (SST) using the DQO process ... Development of TCPs by the DQO process is intended to allow users to ensure their needs will be met and that resources are devoted to gaining only necessary information''. This document satisfies that requirement for tank 241-AZ-102 (AZ-102) sampling activities. Tank AZ-102 is currently a non-Watch List tank, so the only DQOs applicable to this tank are the safety screening DQO and the compatibility DQO, as described below. The current contents of Tank AZ-102, as of October 31, 1994, consisted of 3,600 kL (950 kgal) of dilute non-complexed waste and aging waste from PUREX (NCAW, neutralized current acid waste). Tank AZ-102 is expected to have two primary layers. The bottom layer is composed of 360 kL of sludge, and the top layer is composed of 3,240 kL of supernatant, with a total tank waste depth of approximately 8.9 meters

Accelerated safety analyses - structural analyses Phase I - structural sensitivity evaluation of single- and double-shell waste storage tanks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Becker, D.L.

1994-11-01

Accelerated Safety Analyses - Phase I (ASA-Phase I) have been conducted to assess the appropriateness of existing tank farm operational controls and/or limits as now stipulated in the Operational Safety Requirements (OSRs) and Operating Specification Documents, and to establish a technical basis for the waste tank operating safety envelope. Structural sensitivity analyses were performed to assess the response of the different waste tank configurations to variations in loading conditions, uncertainties in loading parameters, and uncertainties in material characteristics. Extensive documentation of the sensitivity analyses conducted and results obtained are provided in the detailed ASA-Phase I report, Structural Sensitivity Evaluation of Single- and Double-Shell Waste Tanks for Accelerated Safety Analysis - Phase I. This document provides a summary of the accelerated safety analyses sensitivity evaluations and the resulting findings

Preliminary conceptual design for the destruction of organic/ferrocyanide constituents in the Hanford tank waste with low-temperature hydrothermal processing

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schmidt, A.J.; Jones, E.O.; Orth, R.J.; Cox, J.L.; Elmore, M.E.; Neuenschwander, G.G.; Hart, T.R.; Meng, C.D.

1993-05-01

Hydrothermal processing (HTP) is a thermal-chemical processing method that can be employed to destroy organic and ferrocyanide constituents in Hanford tank waste by using the abundant existing oxidants in the tank waste such as nitrite and nitrate. Use-temperature HTP effectively destroys organics at temperatures from 250 degree C to 400 degree C to eliminate safety hazards and improve further processing. This proposal describes a conceptual design of a low-temperature HTP system (including a preliminary flow diagram and plot plan, equipment descriptions and sizes, utility requirements, and costs); the experimental work supporting this effort at Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL); the reaction chemistry and kinetics; the technical maturity of the process; and a preliminary assessment of maintenance, operation, and safety of a system. Nitrate destruction using organic reductants is also described. The low-temperature hydrothermal program at PNL was initiated in January 1993. It is part of an overall program to develop organic destruction technologies, which was originally funded by Hanford's Tank Waste Remediation System program and then was transferred to the Initial Pretreatment (IPM) project. As described in the document, low-temperature HTP (1) meets or exceeds system requirements in organic, ferrocyanide, and nitrate destruction, and processing rate; (2) is technically mature with little additional technology development required; (3) is a simple process with good operational reliability; (4) is flexible and can be easily integrated in the system; (5) has reasonable costs and utility requirements; and (6) is safe and environmentally-benign

Sea cucumbers reduce chromophoric dissolved organic matter in aquaculture tanks.

Science.gov (United States)

Sadeghi-Nassaj, Seyed Mohammad; Catalá, Teresa S; Álvarez, Pedro A; Reche, Isabel

2018-01-01

Mono-specific aquaculture effluents contain high concentrations of nutrients and organic matter, which affect negatively the water quality of the recipient ecosystems. A fundamental feature of water quality is its transparency. The fraction of dissolved organic matter that absorbs light is named chromophoric dissolved organic matter (CDOM). A sustainable alternative to mono-specific aquaculture is the multitrophic aquaculture that includes species trophically complementary named "extractive" species that uptake the waste byproducts. Sea cucumbers are recognized as efficient extractive species due to the consumption of particulate organic matter (POM). However, the effects of sea cucumbers on CDOM are still unknown. During more than one year, we monitored CDOM in two big-volume tanks with different trophic structure. One of the tanks (-holothurian) only contained around 810 individuals of Anemonia sulcata , whereas the other tank (+holothurian) also included 90 individuals of Holothuria tubulosa and Holothuria forskali . We routinely analyzed CDOM absorption spectra and determined quantitative (absorption coefficients at 325 nm) and qualitative (spectral slopes) optical parameters in the inlet waters, within the tanks, and in their corresponding effluents. To confirm the time-series results, we also performed three experiments. Each experiment consisted of two treatments: +holothurians (+H) and -holothurians (-H). We set up three +H tanks with 80 individuals of A. sulcata and 10 individuals of H. tubulosa in each tank and four -H tanks that contained only 80 individuals of A. sulcata . In the time-series, absorption coefficients at 325 nm ( a 325 ) and spectral slopes from 275 to 295 nm ( S 275-295 ) were significantly lower in the effluent of the +holothurian tank (average: 0.33 m -1 and 16 µm -1 , respectively) than in the effluent of the -holothurian tank (average: 0.69 m -1 and 34 µm -1 , respectively), the former being similar to those found in the inlet

Stratification of living organisms in ballast tanks: how do organism concentrations vary as ballast water is discharged?

Science.gov (United States)

First, Matthew R; Robbins-Wamsley, Stephanie H; Riley, Scott C; Moser, Cameron S; Smith, George E; Tamburri, Mario N; Drake, Lisa A

2013-05-07

Vertical migrations of living organisms and settling of particle-attached organisms lead to uneven distributions of biota at different depths in the water column. In ballast tanks, heterogeneity could lead to different population estimates depending on the portion of the discharge sampled. For example, concentrations of organisms exceeding a discharge standard may not be detected if sampling occurs during periods of the discharge when concentrations are low. To determine the degree of stratification, water from ballast tanks was sampled at two experimental facilities as the tanks were drained after water was held for 1 or 5 days. Living organisms ≥50 μm were counted in discrete segments of the drain (e.g., the first 20 min of the drain operation, the second 20 min interval, etc.), thus representing different strata in the tank. In 1 and 5 day trials at both facilities, concentrations of organisms varied among drain segments, and the patterns of stratification varied among replicate trials. From numerical simulations, the optimal sampling strategy for stratified tanks is to collect multiple time-integrated samples spaced relatively evenly throughout the discharge event.

Summary of tank information relating salt well pumping to flammable gas safety issues

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Caley, S.M.; Mahoney, L.A.; Gauglitz, P.A.

1996-09-01

The Hanford Site has 149 single-shell tanks (SSTs) containing radioactive wastes that are complex mixes of radioactive and chemical products. Active use of these SSTs was phased out completely by November 1980, and the first step toward final disposal of the waste in the SSTs is interim stabilization, which involves removing essentially all of the drainable liquid from the tank. Stabilization can be achieved administratively, by jet pumping to remove drainable interstitial liquid, or by supernatant pumping. To date, 116 tanks have been declared interim stabilized; 44 SSTs have had drainable liquid removed by salt well jet pumping. Of the 149 SSTs, 19 are on the Flammable Gas Watch List (FGWL) because the waste in these tanks is known or suspected, in all but one case, to generate and retain mixtures of flammable gases, including; hydrogen, nitrous oxide, and ammonia. Salt well pumping to remove the drainable interstitial liquid from these SSTs is expected to cause the release of much of the retained gas, posing a number of safety concerns. The scope of this work is to collect and summarize information, primarily tank data and observations, that relate salt well pumping to flammable gas safety issues. While the waste within FGWL SSTs is suspected offering flammable gases, the effect of salt well pumping on the waste behavior is not well understood. This study is being conducted for the Westinghouse Hanford Company as part of the Flammable Gas Project at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). Understanding the historical tank behavior during and following salt well pumping will help to resolve the associated safety issues

Sea cucumbers reduce chromophoric dissolved organic matter in aquaculture tanks

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Seyed Mohammad Sadeghi-Nassaj

2018-02-01

Full Text Available Background Mono-specific aquaculture effluents contain high concentrations of nutrients and organic matter, which affect negatively the water quality of the recipient ecosystems. A fundamental feature of water quality is its transparency. The fraction of dissolved organic matter that absorbs light is named chromophoric dissolved organic matter (CDOM. A sustainable alternative to mono-specific aquaculture is the multitrophic aquaculture that includes species trophically complementary named “extractive” species that uptake the waste byproducts. Sea cucumbers are recognized as efficient extractive species due to the consumption of particulate organic matter (POM. However, the effects of sea cucumbers on CDOM are still unknown. Methods During more than one year, we monitored CDOM in two big-volume tanks with different trophic structure. One of the tanks (−holothurian only contained around 810 individuals of Anemonia sulcata, whereas the other tank (+holothurian also included 90 individuals of Holothuria tubulosa and Holothuria forskali. We routinely analyzed CDOM absorption spectra and determined quantitative (absorption coefficients at 325 nm and qualitative (spectral slopes optical parameters in the inlet waters, within the tanks, and in their corresponding effluents. To confirm the time-series results, we also performed three experiments. Each experiment consisted of two treatments: +holothurians (+H and –holothurians (−H. We set up three +H tanks with 80 individuals of A. sulcata and 10 individuals of H. tubulosa in each tank and four –H tanks that contained only 80 individuals of A. sulcata. Results In the time-series, absorption coefficients at 325 nm (a325 and spectral slopes from 275 to 295 nm (S275−295 were significantly lower in the effluent of the +holothurian tank (average: 0.33 m−1 and 16 µm−1, respectively than in the effluent of the −holothurian tank (average: 0.69 m−1 and 34 µm−1, respectively, the former

Super Phenix 1: in Service inspection of main and safety tanks weldments

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Asty, Michel; Vertut, Jean; Argous, J.P.

1980-05-01

In service inspection of the main tank of the Super Phenix 1 reactor is a new demand as compared to Phenix: the authorities have asked that surface and internal defects could be detected and their evolution monitored in the future. The presence of thermal baffles inside the main tank precludes the access on that side: the distance between the main and safety tanks takes into account the room needed for an In Service Inspection module. An inspection vehicle is presently under development, which includes ultrasonic examination (focussed probes) and visual examination (TV cameras) capabilities. We briefly describe the techniques that have been selected for ultrasonic testing and also for the vehicle and its guidance between the tanks

Super Phenix 1: In-service inspection of main and safety tanks weldments

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Asty, M [DTech/STA, Centre d' Etudes Nucleaires de Saclay (France); Vertut, J [DPR/STEP, Centre d' Etudes Nucleaires de Saclay (France); Argous, J P [DRNR/STRS, Centre d' Etudes Nucleaires de Cadarache (France)

1980-11-01

In Service Inspection of the main tank of the Super Phenix 1 reactor is a new demand compared to Phenix: the authorities have asked that surface and internal defects be detected and their evolution monitored in the future. The presence of thermal baffles inside the main tank precludes the access on that side: the distance between the main and safety tanks takes into account the room needed for an In Service Inspection module. An inspection vehicle is presently under development, which includes ultrasonic examination (focussed probes) and visual examination (TV cameras) capabilities. We briefly describe the techniques that have been selected for ultrasonic testing and also for the vehicle and its guidance between the tanks. (author)

Super Phenix 1: In-service inspection of main and safety tanks weldments

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Asty, M.; Vertut, J.; Argous, J.P.

1980-01-01

In Service Inspection of the main tank of the Super Phenix 1 reactor is a new demand compared to Phenix: the authorities have asked that surface and internal defects be detected and their evolution monitored in the future. The presence of thermal baffles inside the main tank precludes the access on that side: the distance between the main and safety tanks takes into account the room needed for an In Service Inspection module. An inspection vehicle is presently under development, which includes ultrasonic examination (focussed probes) and visual examination (TV cameras) capabilities. We briefly describe the techniques that have been selected for ultrasonic testing and also for the vehicle and its guidance between the tanks. (author)

Tank characterization report for double-shell Tank 241-AP-107

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

DeLorenzo, D.S.; Simpson, B.C.

1994-01-01

The purpose of this tank characterization report is to describe and characterize the waste in Double-Shell Tank 241-AP-107 based on information gathered from various sources. This report summarizes the available information regarding the waste in Tank 241-AP-107, and arranges it in a useful format for making management and technical decisions concerning this particular waste tank. In addition, conclusion and recommendations based on safety and further characterization needs are given. Specific objectives reached by the sampling and characterization of the waste in Tank 241-AP-107 are: Contribute toward the fulfillment of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) Milestone M-44-05 concerning the characterization of Hanford Site high-level radioactive waste tanks; Complete safety screening of the contents of Tank 241-AP-107 to meet the characterization requirements of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety board (DNFSB) Recommendation 93-5; and Provide tank waste characterization to the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Program Elements in accordance with the TWRS Tank Waste Analysis Plan

Tank Vapor Characterization Project: Headspace vapor characterization of Hanford waste tank 241-S-101: Results from samples collected on 06/06/96

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Thomas, B.L.; Evans, J.C.; Pool, K.H.; Olsen, K.B.; Fruchter, J.S.; Silvers, K.L.

1997-01-01

This report describes the analytical results of vapor samples taken from the headspace of the waste storage tank 241-S-101. The results described in this report were obtained to characterize the vapors present in the tank headspace and to support safety evaluations and tank farm operations. The results include air concentrations of selected inorganic and organic analytes and grouped compounds from samples obtained. Analyte concentrations were based on analytical results and sample volumes provided by WHC. A summary of the inorganic analytes, permanent gases, and total non-methane organic compounds is listed

Microbial penetration and utilization of organic aircraft fuel-tank coatings.

Science.gov (United States)

Crum, M G; Reynolds, R J; Hedrick, H G

1967-11-01

Microorganisms have been found as contaminants in various types of aircraft fuel tanks. Their presence introduces problems in the operation of the aircraft, including destruction of components such as the organic coatings used as protective linings in the fuel tanks. Microbial penetration and utilization of the currently used organic coatings, EC 776, DV 1180, PR 1560, and DeSoto 1080, were determined by changes in electrical resistances of the coatings; mycelial weight changes; growth counts of the bacteria; and manometric determinations on Pseudomonas aeruginosa (GD-FW B-25) and Cladosporium resinae (QMC-7998). The results indicate EC 776 and DV 1180 to be less resistant to microbial degradation than the other coatings. Organic coatings, serving as a source of nutrition, would be conducive to population buildups in aircraft fuel tanks.

Mass spectrometry analysis of tank wastes at the Hanford Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Campbell, J.A.; Mong, G.M.; Clauss, S.A.

1995-01-01

Twenty-five of the 177 high-level waste storage tanks at the Hanford Site in southeastern Washington are being watched closely because of the possibility that flammable gas mixtures may be produced from the mixed wastes contained in the storage tanks. One tank in particular, Tank 241-SY-101 (Tank 101-SY), has exhibited episodic releases of flammable gas mixtures since its final filling in the early 1980s. It has been postulated that the organic compounds present in the waste may be precursors to the production of hydrogen. Mass spectrometry has proven to be an invaluable tool for the identification of organic components in wastes from Tank 101-SY and C-103. A suite of physical and chemical analyses has been performed in support of activities directed toward the resolution of an Unresolved Safety Question concerning the potential for a floating organic layer in Hanford Waste Tank 241-C-103 to sustain a pool fire. The aqueous layer underlying the floating organic material was also analyzed for organic components

THESEUS - a research project to improve the safety standard of tank vehicles for dangerous goods

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Guenther, B.

1992-01-01

A research project reffered to as THESEUS was initiated by the Federal Ministry of Research and Technology of Germany. The intent of the investigation is to generate measures designed to enhance the safety standard of commercial transports of dangerous goods in tank vehicles. Hereby, the analysis of real accidents by teams within the project will provide the relevant parameters for the experimental and theoretical investigation of vehicles, tank components and safety devices. The project started in summer 1990. This paper will focus main features and the work done so far. Special consideration will be made to the failure behaviour of tank components as the authors field of activity. (orig.)

Tank characterization report for double-shell tank 241-AP-105

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

DeLorenzo, D.S.; Simpson, B.C.

1994-01-01

Double-Shell Tank 241-AP-105 is a radioactive waste tank most recently sampled in March of 1993. Sampling and characterization of the waste in Tank 241-AP-105 contributes toward the fulfillment of Milestone M-44-05 of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Ecology, EPA, and DOE, 1993). Characterization is also needed tot evaluate the waste's fitness for safe processing through an evaporator as part of an overall waste volume reduction program. Tank 241-AP-105, located in the 200 East Area AP Tank Farm, was constructed and went into service in 1986 as a dilute waste receiver tank; Tank 241AP-1 05 was considered as a candidate tank for the Grout Treatment Facility. With the cancellation of the Grout Program, the final disposal of the waste in will be as high- and low-level glass fractions. The tank has an operational capacity of 1,140,000 gallons, and currently contains 821,000 gallons of double-shell slurry feed. The waste is heterogeneous, although distinct layers do not exist. Waste has been removed periodically for processing and concentration through the 242-A Evaporator. The tank is not classified as a Watch List tank and is considered to be sound. There are no Unreviewed Safety Questions associated with Tank 241-AP-105 at this time. The waste in Tank 241-AP-105 exists as an aqueous solution of metallic salts and radionuclides, with limited amounts of organic complexants. The most prevalent soluble analytes include aluminum, potassium, sodium, hydroxide, carbonate, nitrate, and nitrite. The calculated pH is greater than the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act established limit of 12.5 for corrosivity. In addition, cadmium, chromium, and lead concentrations were found at levels greater than their regulatory thresholds. The major radionuclide constituent is 137 Cs, while the few organic complexants present include glycolate and oxalate. Approximately 60% of the waste by weight is water

45-Day safety screen results for tank 241-U-202, push mode, cores 75 and 78

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jo, J.

1995-01-01

This document is a report of the analytical results for samples collected from the radioactive wastes in Tank 241-U-202 at the Hanford Reservation. Core samples were collected from the solid wastes in the tank and underwent safety screening analyses including differential scanning calorimetry, thermogravimetric analysis, and total alpha analysis. Results indicate that no safety screening notification limits were exceeded

Calculation of combustible waste fraction (CWF) estimates used in organics safety issue screening

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Heasler, P.G.; Gao, F.; Toth, J.J.

1998-08-01

This report describes how in-tank measurements of moisture (H 2 O) and total organic carbon (TOC) are used to calculate combustible waste fractions (CWF) for 138 of the 149 Hanford single shell tanks. The combustible waste fraction of a tank is defined as that proportion of waste that is capable of burning when exposed to an ignition source. These CWF estimates are used to screen tanks for the organics complexant safety issue. Tanks with a suitably low fraction of combustible waste are classified as safe. The calculations in this report determine the combustible waste fractions in tanks under two different moisture conditions: under current moisture conditions, and after complete dry out. The first fraction is called the wet combustible waste fraction (wet CWF) and the second is called the dry combustible waste fraction (dry CWF). These two fractions are used to screen tanks into three categories: if the wet CWF is too high (above 5%), the tank is categorized as unsafe; if the wet CWF is low but the dry CWF is too high (again, above 5%), the tank is categorized as conditionally safe; finally, if both the wet and dry CWF are low, the tank is categorized as safe. Section 2 describes the data that was required for these calculations. Sections 3 and 4 describe the statistical model and resulting fit for dry combustible waste fractions. Sections 5 and 6 present the statistical model used to estimate wet CWF and the resulting fit. Section 7 describes two tests that were performed on the dry combustible waste fraction ANOVA model to validate it. Finally, Section 8 presents concluding remarks. Two Appendices present results on a tank-by-tank basis

The solubilities of significant organic compounds in HLW tank supernate solutions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Barney, G.S.

1994-08-01

Large quantities of organic chemicals used in reprocessing spent nuclear-fuels at the Hanford Site have accumulated in underground high-level radioactive waste tanks. The organic content of these tanks must he known so that the potential for hazardous reactions between organic components and sodium nitrate/nitrite salts in the waste can he evaluated. The solubilities of organic compounds described in this report will help determine if they are present in the solid phases (salt cake and sludges) as well as the liquid phase (interstitial liquor/supernate) in the tanks. The solubilities of five significant sodium salts of carboxylic acids and aminocarboxylic acids [sodium oxalate, formate, citrate, nitrilotriacetate (NTA) and ethylendiaminetetraacetate (EDTA)] were measured in a simulated supernate solution at 25 degrees C, 30 degrees C, 40 degrees C, and 50 degrees C

Analysis of floating organic samples from waste Tanks 26F and 33F - Fall 1999

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Swingle, R.F. II

2000-01-01

Organics analyses of floating material taken from Tanks 26F and 33F indicate that the concentration of organic materials is extremely low. With the exception of small amounts of some organosilicon compounds, no quantifiable organics were found in the either the Tank 26F or Tank 33F floating organic samples. These organosilicon compounds may actually be present in the tanks (e.g., from organosilicon-based lubricants or antifoaming agents) or may be artifacts of the solid phase extraction (SPE) disks used in sampling. The SPE disks are comprised in large part of organosilicon compounds. Though quantification of the concentrations of the compounds in the tanks is not possible because of the sampling method, the results indicate that the concentrations are low. These results are consistent with other tank organic analyses and continue to confirm very low organic content of High Level Waste supernate

Safety evaluation for the interim stabilization of Tank 241-C-103

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Geschke, G.R.

1995-03-01

This document provides the basis for interim stabilization of tank 241-C-103. The document covers the removal of the organic liquid layer and the aqueous supernatant from tank 241-C-103. Hazards are identified, consequences are calculated and controls to mitigate or prevent potential accidents are developed.

Safety evaluation for the interim stabilization of Tank 241-C-103

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Geschke, G.R.

1995-03-01

This document provides the basis for interim stabilization of tank 241-C-103. The document covers the removal of the organic liquid layer and the aqueous supernatant from tank 241-C-103. Hazards are identified, consequences are calculated and controls to mitigate or prevent potential accidents are developed

Ferrocyanide safety program: FY 1995 report on Mossbauer spectroscopy tank activities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Riedel, F.R.

1995-01-01

This report summarizes FY 1995 activities on the Mossbauer Spectroscopy task. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration has developed a miniaturized Mossbauer spectrometer that is small enough to perform elevation scans in the Hanford Site waste tank liquid observation wells. Mossbauer spectroscopy is a sensitive and selective method that can detect and distinguish between different iron-based compounds in many types of chemical environments. Iron is major constituent of ferrocyanide waste and information about its location and composition in the tanks supports interim safe storage of the waste and final resolution of the Ferrocyanide Safety Issue. Results obtained from studies of ferrocyanide waste simulants and those from the first test in a hot cell environment using radioactive tank waste are presented

Waste tank vapor project: Vapor space characterization of waste tank 241-BY-104: Results from samples collected on June 24, 1994

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Clauss, T.W.; Ligotke, M.W.; McVeety, B.D.; Pool, K.H.; Lucke, R.B.; Fruchter, J.S.; Goheen, S.C.

1994-11-01

This report describes results of the analyses of tank-headspace samples taken from Hanford waste Tank 241-BY-104 (referred to as Tank BY-104) on June 24, 1994. The Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) contracted with Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) to provide sampling devices and analyze inorganic and organic samples collected from the tank headspace. The sample job was designated S4019 and was performed by WHC on June 24, 1994 using the vapor sampling system (VSS). The results of the analyses are expected to be used in the determination of safety and toxicological issues related to the tank-headspace gas as described in the WHC report entitled Data Quality Objectives for Generic In-Tank Health and Safety Vapor Issue Resolution, WHC-SD-WM-DQO-002, Rev. 0. Sampling devices, including 16 sorbent trains (for inorganic analyses), and 5 SUMMA trademark canisters (for organic analyses), were supplied to the WHC sampling staff on June 20, 1994. Samples were taken (by WHC) on June 24. The samples were returned from the field on June 27. The inorganic samples delivered to PNL on chain-of-custody (COC) 006893 included 16 sorbent trains as described in Tables 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4. Additional inorganic blank spikes were obtained from related sample jobs. SUMMA trademark samples delivered to PNL on COC 006896 included one ambient air sample, one ambient-air sample through the sampling system, and three tank-headspace SUMMA trademark canister samples. The samples were inspected upon delivery to the 326/23B laboratory and logged into PNL laboratory record book 55408. Custody of the sorbent trains was transferred to PNL personnel performing the inorganic analysis and stored at refrigerated (≤10 degrees C) temperature until the time of analysis. Access to the 326/23B laboratory is limited to PNL personnel working on the waste-tank safety program

Removal of floating organic in Hanford Waste Tank 241-C-103 restart plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wilson, T.R.; Hanson, C.

1994-01-01

The decision whether or not to remove the organic layer from Waste Tank 241-C-103 was deferred until May, 1995. The following restart plan was prepared for removal of the organic if the decision is to remove the organic from the waste tank 241-C-103

Removal of floating organic in Hanford Waste Tank 241-C-103 restart plan

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Wilson, T.R.; Hanson, C.

1994-10-03

The decision whether or not to remove the organic layer from Waste Tank 241-C-103 was deferred until May, 1995. The following restart plan was prepared for removal of the organic if the decision is to remove the organic from the waste tank 241-C-103.

Analysis on Dangerous Source of Large Safety Accident in Storage Tank Area

Science.gov (United States)

Wang, Tong; Li, Ying; Xie, Tiansheng; Liu, Yu; Zhu, Xueyuan

2018-01-01

The difference between a large safety accident and a general accident is that the consequences of a large safety accident are particularly serious. To study the tank area which factors directly or indirectly lead to the occurrence of large-sized safety accidents. According to the three kinds of hazard source theory and the consequence cause analysis of the super safety accident, this paper analyzes the dangerous source of the super safety accident in the tank area from four aspects, such as energy source, large-sized safety accident reason, management missing, environmental impact Based on the analysis of three kinds of hazard sources and environmental analysis to derive the main risk factors and the AHP evaluation model is established, and after rigorous and scientific calculation, the weights of the related factors in four kinds of risk factors and each type of risk factors are obtained. The result of analytic hierarchy process shows that management reasons is the most important one, and then the environmental factors and the direct cause and Energy source. It should be noted that although the direct cause is relatively low overall importance, the direct cause of Failure of emergency measures and Failure of prevention and control facilities in greater weight.

Running scenarios using the Waste Tank Safety and Operations Hanford Site model

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stahlman, E.J.

1995-11-01

Management of the Waste Tank Safety and Operations (WTS ampersand O) at Hanford is a large and complex task encompassing 177 tanks and having a budget of over $500 million per year. To assist managers in this task, a model based on system dynamics was developed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The model simulates the WTS ampersand O at the Hanford Tank Farms by modeling the planning, control, and flow of work conducted by Managers, Engineers, and Crafts. The model is described in Policy Analysis of Hanford Tank Farm Operations with System Dynamics Approach (Kwak 1995b) and Management Simulator for Hanford Tank Farm Operations (Kwak 1995a). This document provides guidance for users of the model in developing, running, and analyzing results of management scenarios. The reader is assumed to have an understanding of the model and its operation. Important parameters and variables in the model are described, and two scenarios are formulated as examples

FY 1997 Progress report on tube propagation testing of tank waste using the PRSST

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bechtold, D.B.

1997-01-01

The subject of this FY 1997 progress report is tube propagation tests of actual, dried tank waste to verify the contact temperature ignition (CTI) criterion for point-source ignition in the Hanford Site waste tanks. Testing is in support of the Organic Tanks Safety Project and will help resolve safety issues with waste containing organic constituents. In FY 1997, improvements were made to the laboratory apparatus and procedures for conducting the testing, and the final testing strategy was formulated. The strategy lays out details of the tests to be performed, samples to be tested, and modes of reporting results

Organic tank safety project: Preliminary results of energetics and thermal behavior studies of model organic nitrate and/or nitrite mixtures and a simulated organic waste

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Scheele, R.D.; Sell, R.L.; Sobolik, J.L.; Burger, L.L.

1995-08-01

As a result of years of production and recovery of nuclear defense materials and subsequent waste management at the Hanford Site, organic-bearing radioactive high-level wastes (HLW) are currently stored in large (up to 3. ML) single-shell storage tanks (SSTs). Because these wastes contain both fuels (organics) and the oxidants nitrate and nitrite, rapid energetic reactions at certain conditions could occur. In support of Westinghouse Hanford Company's (WHC) efforts to ensure continued safe storage of these organic- and oxidant-bearing wastes and to define the conditions necessary for reactions to occur, we measured the thermal sensitivities and thermochemical and thermokinetic properties of mixtures of selected organics and sodium nitrate and/or nitrite and a simulated Hanford organic-bearing waste using thermoanalytical technologies. These thermoanalytical technologies are used by chemical reactivity hazards evaluation organizations within the chemical industry to assess chemical reaction hazards

Organic tank safety project: Preliminary results of energetics and thermal behavior studies of model organic nitrate and/or nitrite mixtures and a simulated organic waste

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Scheele, R.D.; Sell, R.L.; Sobolik, J.L.; Burger, L.L.

1995-08-01

As a result of years of production and recovery of nuclear defense materials and subsequent waste management at the Hanford Site, organic-bearing radioactive high-level wastes (HLW) are currently stored in large (up to 3. ML) single-shell storage tanks (SSTs). Because these wastes contain both fuels (organics) and the oxidants nitrate and nitrite, rapid energetic reactions at certain conditions could occur. In support of Westinghouse Hanford Company`s (WHC) efforts to ensure continued safe storage of these organic- and oxidant-bearing wastes and to define the conditions necessary for reactions to occur, we measured the thermal sensitivities and thermochemical and thermokinetic properties of mixtures of selected organics and sodium nitrate and/or nitrite and a simulated Hanford organic-bearing waste using thermoanalytical technologies. These thermoanalytical technologies are used by chemical reactivity hazards evaluation organizations within the chemical industry to assess chemical reaction hazards.

Tank 241-C-107 tank characterization plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schreiber, R.D.

1995-01-01

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) has advised the US Department of Energy (DOE) to concentrate the near-term sampling and analysis activities on identification and resolution of safety issues. The data quality objective (DQO) process was chosen as a tool to be used to identify sampling and analytical needs for the resolution of safety issues. As a result, a revision in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement or TPA) milestone M-44-00 has been made, which states that ''A Tank Characterization Plan (TCP) will also be developed for each double-shell tank (DST) and single-shell tank (SST) using the DQO process... Development of TCPs by the DQO process is intended to allow users (e.g., Hanford Facility user groups, regulators) to ensure their needs will be met and that resources are devoted to gaining only necessary information.'' This document satisfies that requirement for the Tank 241-C-107 (C-107) sampling activities. Currently tank C-107 is categorized as a sound, low-heat load tank with partial isolation completed in December 1982. The tank is awaiting stabilization. Tank C-107 is expected to contain three primary layers of waste. The bottom layer should contain a mixture of the following wastes: ion exchange, concentrated phosphate waste from N-Reactor, Hanford Lab Operations, strontium semi-works, Battelle Northwest, 1C, TBP waste, cladding waste, and the hot semi-works. The middle layer should contain strontium recovery supernate. The upper layer should consist of non-complexed waste

The solubilities of significant organic compounds in HLW tank supernate solutions -- FY 1995 progress report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Barney, G.S.

1996-01-01

At the Hanford Site organic compounds were measured in tank supernate simulant solutions during FY 1995. This solubility information will be used to determine if these organic salts could exist in solid phases (saltcake or sludges) in the waste where they might react violently with the nitrate or nitrite salts present in the tanks. Solubilities of sodium glycolate, succinate, and caproate salts; iron and aluminum and butylphosphate salts; and aluminum oxalate were measured in simulated waste supernate solutions at 25 degree C, 30 degree C, 40 degree C, and 50 degree C. The organic compounds were selected because they are expected to exist in relatively high concentrations in the tanks. The solubilities of sodium glycolate, succinate, caproate, and butylphosphate in HLW tank supernate solutions were high over the temperature and sodium hydroxide concentration ranges expected in the tanks. High solubilities will prevent solid sodium salts of these organic acids from precipitating from tank supernate solutions. The total organic carbon concentrations (YOC) of actual tank supernates are generally much lower than the TOC ranges for simulated supernate solutions saturated (at the solubility limit) with the organic salts. This is so even if all the dissolved carbon in a given tank and supernate is due to only one of these eight soluble compounds (an unlikely situation). Metal ion complexes of and butylphosphate and oxalate in supernate solutions were not stable in the presence of the hydroxide concentrations expected in most tanks. Iron and aluminum dibutylphosphate compounds reacted with hydroxide to form soluble sodium dibutylphosphate and precipitated iron and aluminum hydroxides. Aluminum oxalate complexes were also not stable in the basic simulated supernate solutions. Solubilities of all the organic salts decrease with increasing sodium hydroxide concentration because of the common ion effect of Na+. Increasing temperatures raised the solubilities of the organic

Improving the design of higher-capacity railway tank cars for hazardous materials transport: Optimizing the trade-off between weight and safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Barkan, Christopher P.L.

2008-01-01

As with many aspects of modern industrial society, decision-makers face trade-offs in considering hazardous materials transportation equipment and practices. Tank cars used for transport of hazardous materials can be made more resistant to damage in accidents through use of a thicker steel tank and other protective features. However, the additional weight of these features reduces the car's capacity and thus its efficiency as a transportation vehicle. In this paper the problem of tank car safety versus weight is developed as a multi-attribute decision problem. North American railroads recently developed specifications for higher capacity tank cars for transportation of hazardous materials including enhanced safety design features. A group of tank car safety design features or 'risk reduction options' (RROs) were analyzed with regard to their effect on the conditional probability of release in an accident, and their incremental effect on tank car weight. All possible combinations of these RROs were then analyzed in terms of the reduced release probability per unit of weight increase and the Pareto optimal set of options identified. This set included the combinations of RROs that provided the greatest improvement in safety with the least amount of additional weight for any desired level of tank car weight increase. The analysis was conducted for both non-insulated and insulated tank cars and used two objective functions, minimization of conditional probability of release, and minimization of expected quantity lost, given that a car was derailed in an accident. Sensitivity analyses of the effect of tank car size and use of different objective functions were conducted and the optimality results were found to be robust. The results of this analysis were used by the Association of American Railroads Tank Car Committee to develop new specifications for higher capacity non-insulated and insulated, non-pressure tank cars resulting in an estimated 32% and 24% respective

Criticality safety of high-level tank waste

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rogers, C.A.

1995-01-01

Radioactive waste containing low concentrations of fissile isotopes is stored in underground storage tanks on the Hanford Site in Washington State. The goal of criticality safety is to ensure that this waste remains subcritical into the indefinite future without supervision. A large ratio of solids to plutonium provides an effective way of ensuring a low plutonium concentration. Since the first waste discharge, a program of audits and appraisals has ensured that operations are conducted according to limits and controls applied to them. In addition, a program of surveillance and characterization maintains watch over waste after discharge

EXPECTED IMPACT OF HANFORD PROCESSING ORGANICS OF PLUTONIUM DURING TANK WASTE SLUDGE RETRIEVAL

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

TROYER, G.L.; WINTERS, W.I.

2004-01-01

This document evaluates the potential for extracting plutonium from Hanford waste tanks into residual organic solvents and how this process may have an impact on criticality specifications during the retrieval of wastes. The two controlling factors for concentrating plutonium are the solubility of the plutonium in the wastes and the extraction efficiency of the potential organic extractants that may be found in these wastes. Residual Hanford tank sludges contain plutonium in solid forms that are expected to be primarily insoluble Pu(IV) hydroxides. Evaluation of thermodynamic Pourbaix diagrams, documentation on solubility studies of various components in waste tank matrices, and actual analysis of plutonium in tank supernates all indicate that the solubility of Pu in the alkaline waste is on the order of 10 -6 M. Based on an upper limit plutonium solubility of 10 -5 M in high pH and a conservative distribution coefficient for organic extractants of a 0 for plutonium in 30% TBP at 0.07 M HNO 3 ), the estimated concentration for plutonium in the organic phase would be -7 M. This is well below the process control criteria. A significant increase in plutonium solubility or the E a o would have to occur to raise this concentration to the 0.01 M concern level for organics. Measured tank chemical component values, expected operating conditions, and the characteristics of the expected chemistry and extraction mechanisms indicate that concentration of plutonium from Hanford tank residual sludges to associated process organic extractants is significantly below levels of concern

Waste tank safety program annual status report for FY 1993, Task 5: Toxicology and epidemiology

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mahlum, D.D.; Young, J.Y.

1993-09-01

A toxicology team independently reviewed analytical data and provided advice concerning potential health effects associated with exposure to tank-vapor constituents at the Hanford site. Most of the emphasis was directed toward Tank 241-C-103, but a preliminary assessment was also made of the toxicologic implication of the cyanide levels in the headspace of Tank 241-C-108. The objectives of this program are to (1) review procedures used for sampling vapors from various tanks, (2) identify constituents in tank-vapor samples that could be related to symptoms reported by waste-tank workers, (3) evaluate the toxicologic implications of those constituents by comparison to established toxicologic data bases, (4) provide advice for additional analytical efforts, and (5) support other activities as requested by the project manager and the cognizant Westinghouse Hanford Company Tank Vapor Issues Safety Resolution Manager

78 FR 66326 - Hazardous Materials: Rail Petitions and Recommendations To Improve the Safety of Railroad Tank...

Science.gov (United States)

2013-11-05

...: Rail Petitions and Recommendations To Improve the Safety of Railroad Tank Car Transportation (RRR) AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), DOT. ACTION: Advance Notice of... DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 49 CFR Parts...

Tank 50H Tetraphenylborate Destruction Results

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Peters, T.B.

2003-01-01

We conducted several scoping tests with both Tank 50H surrogate materials (KTPB and phenol) as well as with actual Tank 50H solids. These tests examined whether we could destroy the tetraphenylborate in the surrogates or actual Tank 50H material either by use of Fenton's Reagent or by hydrolysis (in Tank 50H conditions at a maximum temperature of 50 degrees C) under a range of conditions. The results of these tests showed that destruction of the solids occurred only under a minority of conditions. (1)Using Fenton's Reagent and KTPB as the Tank 50H surrogate, no reaction occurred at pH ranges greater than 9. (2)Using Fenton's Reagent and phenol as the Tank 50H surrogate, no reaction occurred at a pH of 14. (3)Using Fenton's Reagent and actual Tank 50H slurry, a reaction occurred at a pH of 9.5 in the presence of ECC additives. (4)Using Fenton's Reagent and actual Tank 50H slurry, after a thirty three day period, all attempts at hydrolysis (at pH 14) were too slow to be viable. This happened even in the case of higher temperature (50 degrees C) and added (100 ppm) copper. Tank 50H is scheduled to return to HLW Tank Farm service with capabilities of transferring and receiving salt supernate solutions to and from the Tank Farms and staging feed for the Saltstone Facility. Before returning Tank 50H to Tank Farm service as a non-organic tank, less than 5 kg of TPB must remain in Tank 50H. Recently, camera inspections in Tank 50H revealed two large mounds of solid material, one in the vicinity of the B5 Riser Transfer Pump and the other on the opposite side of the tank. Personnel sampled and analyzed this material to determine its composition. The sample analysis indicated presence of a significant quantity of organics in the solid material. This quantity of organic material exceeds the 5 kg limit for declaring only trace amounts of organic material remain in Tank 50H. Additionally, these large volumes of solids, calculated as approximately 61K gallons, present other

Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-S-104

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

DiCenso, A.T.; Simpson, B.C.

1994-01-01

In July and August 1992, Single-Shell Tank 241-S-104 was sampled as part of the overall characterization effort directed by the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Sampling was also performed to determine proper handling of the waste, to address corrosivity and compatibility issues, and to comply with requirements of the Washington Administrative Code. This Tank Characterization Report presents an overview of that tank sampling and analysis effort, and contains observations regarding waste characteristics. It also presents expected concentration and bulk inventory data for the waste contents based on this latest sampling data and background historical and surveillance tank information. Finally, this report makes recommendations and conclusions regarding operational safety. The purpose of this report is to describe the characteristics the waste in Single-Shell Tank 241-S-104 (hereafter, Tank 241-S-104) based on information obtained from a variety of sources. This report summarizes the available information regarding the chemical and physical properties of the waste in Tank 241-S-104, and using the historical information to place the analytical data in context, arranges this information in a format useful for making management and technical decisions concerning waste tank safety and disposal issues. In addition, conclusions and recommendations are presented based on safety issues and further characterization needs

Tank 241-S-106, cores 183, 184 and 187 analytical results for the final report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Esch, R.A.

1997-01-01

This document is the final laboratory report for tank 241-S-106 push mode core segments collected between February 12, 1997 and March 21, 1997. The segments were subsampled and analyzed in accordance with the Tank Push Mode Core Sampling and Analysis Plan (TSAP), the Tank Safety Screening Data Quality Objective (Safety DQO), the Historical Model Evaluation Data Requirements (Historical DQO) and the Data Quality Objective to Support Resolution of the Organic Complexant Safety Issue (Organic DQO). The analytical results are included in Table 1. Six of the twenty-four subsamples submitted for the differential scanning calorimetry (DSC) analysis exceeded the notification limit of 480 Joules/g stated in the DQO. Appropriate notifications were made. Total Organic Carbon (TOC) analyses were performed on all samples that produced exotherms during the DSC analysis. All results were less than the notification limit of three weight percent TOC. No cyanide analysis was performed, per agreement with the Tank Safety Program. None of the samples submitted for Total Alpha Activity exceeded notification limits as stated in the TSAP. Statistical evaluation of results by calculating the 95% upper confidence limit is not performed by the 222-S Laboratory and is not considered in this report. No core composites were created because there was insufficient solid material from any of the three core sampling events to generate a composite that would be representative of the tank contents

Organic analysis of the headspace of Hanford waste Tank 241-C-103

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Goheen, S.C.; McVeety, B.D.; Clauss, T.W.; Lucke, R.B.; Ligotke, M.W.; Edwards, J.A.; Fruchter, J.S.

1996-01-01

Organic species from the headspace of one Hanford radioactive waste tank are described. Samples were collected either using a sorbent trap or a SUMMA TM canister and were analyzed by gas chromatography and mass spectrometry. The headspace contained several organic components, including alkanes, alkanes, ketones, aldehydes, organic nitriles, and chlorinated hydrocarbons. Sorbent trap samples were designed to collect only normal paraffin hydrocarbons (NPHs). A comparison of NPH data from sorbent traps and SUMMA TM cans revealed results of 693 and 1320 mg/m 3 , NPH respectively. Significant differences were observed in NPH values when samples were collected at different times, or at different locations in the tank. These data suggest either the time of collection, or the position of the sampling device are important variables in the analysis of organic species from Hanford tanks. (author). 16 refs., 3 figs., 2 tabs

Waste Tank Vapor Program: Vapor space characterization of Waste Tank 241-T-107. Results from samples collected on January 18, 1995

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pool, K.H.; Lucke, R.B.; McVeety, B.D.

1995-06-01

This report describes inorganic and organic analyses results from samples obtained from the headspace of the Hanford waste storage Tank 241-T-107 (referred to as Tank T-107). The results described here were obtained to support safety and toxicological evaluations. A summary of the results for inorganic and organic analytes is listed in Table 1. Detailed descriptions of the results appear in the text. Quantitative results were obtained for the inorganic compounds ammonia (NH 3 ), nitrogen dioxide (NO 2 ), nitric oxide (NO), and water (H 2 O). Sampling for hydrogen cyanide (HCN) and sulfur oxides (SO x ) was not requested. In addition, quantitative results were obtained for the 39 TO-14 compounds plus an additional 14 analytes. Of these, I was observed above the 5-ppbv reporting cutoff. Six organic tentatively identified compounds (TICs) were observed above the reporting cutoff of (ca.) 10 ppbv and are reported with concentrations that are semiquantitative estimates based on internal-standard response factors. The estimated concentration of all 7 organic analytes observed in the tank headspace are listed in Table I and account for approximately 100% of the total organic components in Tank T-107. Two permanent gases, carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) and nitrous oxide (N 2 O), were also detected in the tank-headspace samples

76 FR 79192 - Patient Safety Organizations: Voluntary Relinquishment From HSMS Patient Safety Organization

Science.gov (United States)

2011-12-21

... Organizations: Voluntary Relinquishment From HSMS Patient Safety Organization AGENCY: Agency for Healthcare... voluntary relinquishment from the HSMS Patient Safety Organization of its status as a Patient Safety Organization (PSO). The Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 (Patient Safety Act), Public Law 109...

Operating watch list tanks: A study in control

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ohl, P.; Hamrick, D.; Marchetti, S.

1991-01-01

The paper will present the controls and processes by which Westinghouse Hanford Company manages the characterization and maintenance of tanks that are considered unresolved safety questions. Cultural as well as management changes will be discussed. First, processes by which safe and disciplined actions around potentially hazardous high-activity Hanford waste tanks can be instilled in our work force will be examined. Our success in changing our work practices will be discussed in tangible terms. Second, the dual challenge of upgrading personnel skills while addressing the upgrades for antiquated equipment and control systems with limited financial growth will be examined. This represents one of the primary management challenges of the Waste Tank Operations organization. Reorganization of groups to improve plant maintenance efficiencies, their tracking and prioritization will be addressed. This includes the establishment of unique internal review committee of line managers and operators to prioritize maintenance activities. Finally a means of enhancing the ability of plant forces to respond to anomalies in monitoring data or other tank related event will be discussed. The innovative use of a open-quotes Joint Test Groupclose quotes structure (e.g., on call teams of representatives from all affected and authorizing organizations) to assure that all activities on open-quotes watch list tanksclose quotes in the Tank Farm remain within the defined safety envelope will be discussed

49 CFR 238.423 - Fuel tanks.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-10-01

... 49 Transportation 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Fuel tanks. 238.423 Section 238.423 Transportation....423 Fuel tanks. (a) External fuel tanks. Each type of external fuel tank must be approved by FRA's Associate Administrator for Safety upon a showing that the fuel tank provides a level of safety at least...

Organic analysis of ambient samples collected near Tank 241-C-103: Results from samples collected on May 12, 1994

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Clauss, T.W.; Ligotke, M.W.; McVeety, B.D.; Lucke, R.B.; Young, J.S.; McCulloch, M.; Fruchter, J.S.; Goheen, S.C.

1995-06-01

This report describes organic analyses results from ambient samples collected both upwind and through the vapor sampling system (VSS) near Hanford waste storage Tank 241-C-103 (referred to as Tank C-103). The results described here were obtained to support safety and toxicological evaluations. A summary of the results for inorganic and organic analytes is listed. Quantitative results were obtained for organic compounds. Five organic tentatively identified compounds (TICS) were observed above the detection limit of (ca.) 10 ppbv, but standards for most of these were not available at the time of analysis, and the reported concentrations are semiquantitative estimates. In addition, we looked for the 40 standard TO-14 analytes. We observed 39. Of these, only one was observed above the 2-ppbv calibrated instrument detection limit. Dichloromethane was above the detection limits using both methods, but the result from the TO-14 method is traceable to a standard gas mixture and is considered more accurate. Organic analytes were found only in the sample collected through the VSS, suggesting that these compounds were residual contamination from a previous sampling job. Detailed descriptions of the results appear in the text

Analysis of samples from pump tank 3F for organics -- December 1999

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Swingle, R.F. II

2000-01-01

Analyses for organic materials in aqueous dip and variable depth samples and a floating sample taken from Pump Tank 3F in December 1999 have been completed. The results indicate that the concentration of organic materials is extremely low in all samples. A small amount of amount of tri-n-butyl phosphate (TBP - 1.3 mg/L) was found in the dip sample taken from Pump Tank 3F. A somewhat larger amount of TBP (230 mg/L) along with some normal paraffin hydrocarbons (NPH - 77 mg/L) were found in the variable depth sample from the pump tank. No other detectable volatile or semivolatile organics were found. Small amounts of three different organosilicon compounds were found on the floating sample solid phase extraction (SPE) disk as well as a trace of xylenes (3 mg/disk) and a trace of ammonia (120 mg/disk). No other volatile or semivolatile organic compound was detected

Test plan for Fauske and Associates to perform tube propagation experiments with simulated Hanford tank wastes

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carlson, C.D.; Babad, H.

1996-05-01

This test plan, prepared at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory for Westinghouse Hanford Company, provides guidance for performing tube propagation experiments on simulated Hanford tank wastes and on actual tank waste samples. Simulant compositions are defined and an experimental logic tree is provided for Fauske and Associates (FAI) to perform the experiments. From this guidance, methods and equipment for small-scale tube propagation experiments to be performed at the Hanford Site on actual tank samples will be developed. Propagation behavior of wastes will directly support the safety analysis (SARR) for the organic tanks. Tube propagation may be the definitive tool for determining the relative reactivity of the wastes contained in the Hanford tanks. FAI have performed tube propagation studies previously on simple two- and three-component surrogate mixtures. The simulant defined in this test plan more closely represents actual tank composition. Data will be used to support preparation of criteria for determining the relative safety of the organic bearing wastes

Developing a model for moisture in saltcake waste tanks: Progress report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Simmons, C.S.; Aimo, N.; Fayer, M.J.; White, M.D.

1997-07-01

This report describes a modeling effort to provide a computer simulation capability for estimating the distribution and movement of moisture in the saltcake-type waste contained in Hanford's single-shell radioactive waste storage tanks. This moisture model goes beyond an earlier version because it describes water vapor movement as well as the interstitial liquid held in a saltcake waste. The work was performed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to assist Duke Engineering and Services Hanford with the Organic Tank Safety Program. The Organic Tank Safety Program is concerned whether saltcake waste, when stabilized by jet pumping, will retain sufficient moisture near the surface to preclude any possibility of an accidental ignition and propagation of burning. The nitrate/nitrite saltcake, which might also potentially include combustible organic chemicals might not always retain enough moisture near the surface to preclude any such accident. Draining liquid from a tank by pumping, coupled with moisture evaporating into a tank's head space, may cause a dry waste surface that is not inherently safe. The moisture model was devised to help examine this safety question. The model accounts for water being continually cycled by evaporation into the head space and returned to the waste by condensation or partly lost through venting to the external atmosphere. Water evaporation occurs even in a closed tank, because it is driven by the transfer to the outside of the heat load generated by radioactivity within the waste. How dry a waste may become over time depends on the particular hydraulic properties of a saltcake, and the model uses those properties to describe the capillary flow of interstitial liquid as well as the water vapor flow caused by thermal differences within the porous waste

Tank Vapor Characterization Project: Headspace vapor characterization of Hanford Tank 241-S-107: Results from samples collected on 06/18/96

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pool, K.H.; Evans, J.C.; Thomas, B.L.

1997-01-01

This report describes the analytical results of vapor samples taken from the headspace of the waste storage tank 241-S-107 (Tank S-107) at the Hanford Site in Washington State. The results described in this report were obtained to characterize the vapors present in the tank headspace and to support safety evaluations and tank farm operations. The results include air concentrations of selected inorganic and organic analytes and grouped compounds from samples obtained by Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) and provided for analysis to Pacific Northwest National. Laboratory (PNNL). Analyses were performed by the Vapor Analytical Laboratory (VAL) at PNNL. Analyte concentrations were based on analytical results and, where appropriate, on sample volumes provided by WHC. A summary of the inorganic analytes, permanent gases, and total non-methane organic compounds is listed in Table S.1. Detailed descriptions of the analytical results appear in the appendices

45-Day safety screening report for grab samples from Tank 241-AP-107

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Miller, G.L.

1995-01-01

Three samples; 107-AP-1C, 107-AP-2c and 107-AP-3C; were received at 222-S Laboratory for analysis of DSC, TGA and visual appearance. Four additional samples; 107-AP-1D, 107-AP-2D, 107-AP-3D and 107-AP-6; were received for visual appearance only. No results exceeded the safety screen notification criteria. This report compiles the analytical results. Tank 241-AP-107 is a double-shell tank which is not on any of the four Watch Lists

Investigation of thermolytic hydrogen generation rate of tank farm simulated and actual waste

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Martino, C. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States). Savannah River National Lab. (SRNL); Newell, D. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States). Savannah River National Lab. (SRNL); Woodham, W. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States). Savannah River National Lab. (SRNL); Pareizs, J. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States). Savannah River National Lab. (SRNL); Edwards, T. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States). Savannah River National Lab. (SRNL); Howe, A. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States). Savannah River National Lab. (SRNL)

2017-11-15

To support resolution of Potential Inadequacies in the Safety Analysis for the Savannah River Site (SRS) Tank Farm, Savannah River National Laboratory conducted research to determine the thermolytic hydrogen generation rate (HGR) with simulated and actual waste. Gas chromatography methods were developed and used with air-purged flow systems to quantify hydrogen generation from heated simulated and actual waste at rates applicable to the Tank Farm Documented Safety Analysis (DSA). Initial simulant tests with a simple salt solution plus sodium glycolate demonstrated the behavior of the test apparatus by replicating known HGR kinetics. Additional simulant tests with the simple salt solution excluding organics apart from contaminants provided measurement of the detection and quantification limits for the apparatus with respect to hydrogen generation. Testing included a measurement of HGR on actual SRS tank waste from Tank 38. A final series of measurements examined HGR for a simulant with the most common SRS Tank Farm organics at temperatures up to 140 °C. The following conclusions result from this testing.

Tank 241-TX-105 vapor sampling and analysis tank characterization report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Huckaby, J.L.

1995-01-01

Tank 241-TX-105 headspace gas and vapor samples were collected and analyzed to help determine the potential risks to tank farm workers due to fugitive emissions from the tank. The drivers and objectives of waste tank headspace sampling and analysis are discussed in open-quotes Program Plan for the Resolution of Tank Vapor Issues.close quotes Tank 241-TX-105 was vapor sampled in accordance with open-quotes Data Quality Objectives for Generic In-Tank Health and Safety Issue Resolution.close quotes

Tank 241-BY-107 vapor sampling and analysis tank characterization report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Huckaby, J.L.

1995-01-01

Tank 241-BY-107 headspace gas and vapor samples were collected and analyzed to help determine the potential risks to tank farm workers due to fugitive emissions from the tank. The drivers and objectives of waste tank headspace sampling and analysis are discussed in open-quotes Program Plan for the Resolution of Tank Vapor Issuesclose quotes. Tank 241-BY-107 was vapor sampled in accordance with open-quotes Data Quality Objectives for Generic In-Tank Health and Safety Issue Resolutionclose quotes

Tank 241-BY-111 vapor sampling and analysis tank characterization report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Huckaby, J.L.

1995-01-01

Tank 241-BY-111 headspace gas and vapor samples were collected and analyzed to help determine the potential risks to tank farm workers due to fugitive emissions from the tank. The drivers and objectives of waste tank headspace sampling and analysis are discussed in open-quotes Program Plan for the Resolution of Tank Vapor Issues.close quotes Tank 241-BY-111 was vapor sampled in accordance with open-quotes Data Quality Objectives for Generic In-Tank Health and Safety Issue Resolution.close quotes

Tank 241-C-108 vapor sampling and analysis tank characterization report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Huckaby, J.L.

1995-01-01

Tank 241-C-108 headspace gas and vapor samples were collected and analyzed to help determine the potential risks to tank farm workers due to fugitive emissions from the tank. The drivers and objectives of waste tank headspace sampling and analysis are discussed in Program Plan for the Resolution of Tank Vapor Issues (Osborne and Huckaby 1994). Tank 241-C-108 was vapor sampled in accordance with Data Quality Objectives for Generic In-Tank Health and Safety Issue Resolution (Osborne et al., 1994)

Tank 241-TX-118 vapor sampling and analysis tank characterization report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Huckaby, J.L.

1995-01-01

Tank 241-TX-118 headspace gas and vapor samples were collected and analyzed to help determine the potential risks to tank farm workers due to fugitive emissions from the tank. The drivers and objectives of waste tank headspace sampling and analysis are discussed in open-quotes Program Plan for the Resolution of Tank Vapor Issues.close quotes Tank 241-TX-118 was vapor sampled in accordance with open-quotes Data Quality Objectives for Generic In-Tank Health and Safety Issue Resolution.close quotes

Tank 241-BY-112 vapor sampling and analysis tank characterization report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Huckaby, J.L.

1995-01-01

Tank 241-BY-112 headspace gas and vapor samples were collected and analyzed to help determine the potential risks to tank farm workers due to fugitive emissions from the tank. The drivers and objectives of waste tank headspace sampling and analysis are discussed in open-quotes Program Plan for the Resolution of Tank Vapor Issues.close quotes Tank 241-BY-112 was vapor sampled in accordance with open-quotes Data Quality Objectives for Generic In-Tank Health and Safety Issue Resolution.close quotes

Tank 241-C-104 vapor sampling and analysis tank characterization report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Huckaby, J.L.

1995-01-01

Tank 241-C-104 headspace gas and vapor samples were collected and analyzed to help determine the potential risks to tank farm workers due to fugitive emissions from the tank. The drivers and objectives of waste tank headspace sampling and analysis are discussed in open-quotes Program Plan for the Resolution of Tank Vapor Issues.close quotes Tank 241-C-104 was vapor sampled in accordance with open-quotes Data Quality Objectives for Generic In-Tank Health and Safety Issue Resolution.close quotes

Tank 241-BY-103 vapor sampling and analysis tank characterization report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Huckaby, J.L.

1995-01-01

Tank 241-BY-103 headspace gas and vapor samples were collected and analyzed to help determine the potential risks to tank farm workers due to fugitive emissions from the tank. The drivers and objectives of waste tank headspace sampling and analysis are discussed in open-quotes Program Plan for the Resolution of Tank Vapor Issues.close quotes Tank 241-BY-103 was vapor sampled in accordance with open-quotes Data Quality Objectives for Generic In-Tank Health and Safety Issue Resolution.close quotes

Tank 241-U-107 vapor sampling and analysis tank characterization report

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Huckaby, J.L.

1995-05-31

Tank 241-U-107 headspace gas and vapor samples were collected and analyzed to help determine the potential risks to tank farm workers due to fugitive emissions from the tank. The drivers and objectives of waste tank headspace sampling and analysis are discussed in {open_quotes}Program Plan for the Resolution of Tank Vapor Issues.{close_quotes} Tank 241-U-107 was vapor sampled in accordance with {open_quotes}Data Quality Objectives for Generic In-Tank Health and Safety Issue Resolution.{close_quotes}

Status of tank 241-SY-101 data analyses

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anantatmula, R.P.

1992-09-01

The Waste Tank Flammable Gas Stabilization Program was established in 1990 to provide for resolution of a major safety issue identified for 23 of the high-level waste tanks at the Hanford Site. The safety issue involves the production, accumulation, and periodic release from these tanks of flammable gases in concentrations exceeding the lower flammability limits. This document deals primarily with tank 241-SY-101 from the SY Tank Farm. The flammable gas condition has existed for this tank since the tank was first filled in the time period from 1977 to 1980. During a general review of waste tank chemical stability in 1988--1989, this situation was re-examined and, in March 1990, the condition was declared to be an unreviewed safety question. Tank 241-SY-101 was placed under special operating restrictions, and a program of investigation was begun to evaluate the condition and determine appropriate courses of action. This report summarizes the data that have become available on tank 241-SY-101 since it was declared as an unreviewed safety question and updates the information reported in an earlier document (WHC-EP-0517). The report provides a technical basis for use in the evaluation of safety risks of the tank and subsequent resolution of the unreviewed safety question

Tank characterization report for double-shell tank 241-AP-102

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

LAMBERT, S.L.

1999-01-01

In April 1993, Double-Shell Tank 241-AP-102 was sampled to determine waste feed characteristics for the Hanford Grout Disposal Program. This Tank Characterization Report presents an overview of that tank sampling and analysis effort, and contains observations regarding waste characteristics, expected bulk inventory, and concentration data for the waste contents based on this latest sampling data and information on the history of the tank. Finally, this report makes recommendations and conclusions regarding tank operational safety issues

Tank Vapor Characterization Project: Headspace vapor characterization of Hanford Tank 241-TY-102: Results from samples collected on 04/12/96

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Evans, J.C.; Pool, K.H.; Thomas, B.L.

1997-01-01

This report describes the analytical results of vapor samples taken from the headspace of the waste storage tank 241-TY-102 (Tank TY-102) at the Hanford Site in Washington State. The results described in this report were obtained to'characterize the vapors present in the tank headspace and to support safety evaluations and tank farm operations. The results include air concentrations of selected inorganic and organic analytes, and grouped compounds from samples obtained by Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) and provided for analysis to Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). Analyses were performed by the Vapor Analytical Laboratory (VAL) at PNNL. Analyte concentrations were based on analytical results and, where appropriate, sample volumes provided by WHC. A summary of the inorganic analytes, permanent gases, and total non-methane organic compounds is listed in Table S.1. The three highest concentration analytes detected in SUMMA trademark canister and triple sorbent trap samples are also listed in Table S.1. Detailed descriptions of the analytical results appear in the appendices

Tank Vapor Characterization Project: Headspace vapor characterization of Hanford Tank 241-B-105: Results from samples collected on 07/30/96

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pool, K.H.; Evans, J.C.; Thomas, B.L.

1997-01-01

This report describes the analytical results of vapor samples taken from the headspace of the waste storage tank 241-B-105 (Tank B-105) at the Hanford Site in Washington State. The results described in this report were obtained to characterize the vapors present in the tank headspace and to support safety evaluations and tank farm operations. The results include air concentrations of selected inorganic and organic analytes and grouped compounds from samples obtained by Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) and provided for analysis to Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). Analyses were performed by the Vapor Analytical Laboratory (VAL) at PNNL. Analyte concentrations were based on analytical results and, where appropriate, sample volumes provided by WHC. A summary of the inorganic analytes, permanent gases, and total non-methane organic compounds is listed in Table S.1. The three highest concentration analytes detected in SUMMA trademark canister and triple sorbent trap samples are also listed in Table S.1. Detailed descriptions of the analytical results appear in the appendices

Tank 241-U-106, cores 147 and 148, analytical results for the final report

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Steen, F.H.

1996-09-27

This document is the final report deliverable for tank 241-U-106 push mode core segments collected between May 8, 1996 and May 10, 1996 and received by the 222-S Laboratory between May 14, 1996 and May 16, 1996. The segments were subsampled and analyzed in accordance with the Tank 241-U-106 Push Mode Core Sampling and analysis Plan (TSAP), the Historical Model Evaluation Data Requirements (Historical DQO), Data Quality Objective to Support Resolution of the Organic Complexant Safety Issue (Organic DQO) and the Safety Screening Data Quality Objective (DQO). The analytical results are included in Table 1.

Final characterization and safety screen report of double shell tank 241-AP-105 for evaporator campaign 97-1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Miller, G.L.

1997-01-01

Evaporator candidate feed from tank 241-AP-105 (hereafter referred to as AP-105) was characterized for physical, inorganic, organic and radiochemical parameters by the 222-S Laboratory as directed by the Tank Sample and Analysis Plan (TSAP), References 1 through 4, and Engineering Change Notice, number 635332, Reference 5. This data package satisfies the requirement for a format IV, final report as described in Reference 1. This data package is also a follow-up to the 45-Day safety screen results for tank AP-105, Reference 8, which was issued on November 5, 1996, and is attached as Section II to this report. Preliminary data in the form of summary analytical tables were provided to the project in advance of this final report to enable early estimation of evaporator operational parameters, using the Predict modeling program. Analyses were performed at the 222-S Laboratory as defined and specified in the TSAP and the Laboratory's Quality Assurance P1an, References 6 and 7. Any deviations from the instructions documented in the TSAP are discussed in this narrative and are supported with additional documentation

Tank waste compositions and atmospheric dispersion coefficients for use in accelerated safety analysis consequence assessments. Revision 1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Savino, A.V.

1995-11-01

This topical report contains technical support information used to determine accident consequences for the Tank Farms Accelerated Safety Analysis (ASA) Interim Chapter 3, Hazard and Accident Analysis: Potential for Releases and Required Mitigation and Prevention and the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) environmental impact statement (EIS) accident consequence report. It does not determine accident consequences or describe specific accident scenarios, but instead provides generic information used to calculate radiological and toxic chemical consequences for postulated tank farms accident releases

A safety equipment list for rotary mode core sampling systems operation in single shell flammable gas tanks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

SMALLEY, J.L.

1999-01-01

This document identifies all interim safety equipment to be used for rotary mode core sampling of single-shell flammable gas tanks utilizing Rotary Mode Core Sampling systems (RMCS). This document provides the safety equipment for RMCS trucks HO-68K-4600, HO-68K-4647, trucks three and four respectively, and associated equipment. It is not intended to replace or supersede WHC-SD-WM-SEL-023, (Kelly 1991), or WHC-SD-WM-SEL-032, (Corbett 1994), which classifies 80-68K-4344 and HO-68K-4345 respectively. The term ''safety equipment'' refers to safety class (SC) and safety significant (SS) equipment, where equipment refers to structures, systems and components (SSC's). The identification of safety equipment in this document is based on the credited design safety features and analysis contained in the Authorization Basis (AB) for rotary mode core sampling operations in single-shell flammable gas tanks. This is an interim safety classification since the AB is interim. This document will be updated to reflect the final RMCS equipment safety classification designations upon completion of a final AB which will be implemented with the release of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)

Independent safety organization

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kato, W.Y.; Weinstock, E.V.; Carew, J.F.; Cerbone, R.J.; Guppy, J.G.; Hall, R.E.; Taylor, J.H.

1985-01-01

Brookhaven National Laboratory has conducted a study on the need and feasibility of an independent organization to investigate significant safety events for the Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, USNRC. The study consists of three parts: the need for an independent organization to investigate significant safety events, alternative organizations to conduct investigations, and legislative requirements. The determination of need was investigated by reviewing current NRC investigation practices, comparing aviation and nuclear industry practices, and interviewing a spectrum of representatives from the nuclear industry, the regulatory agency, and the public sector. The advantages and disadvantages of alternative independent organizations were studied, namely, an Office of Nuclear Safety headed by a director reporting to the Executive Director for Operations (EDO) of NRC; an Office of Nuclear Safety headed by a director reporting to the NRC Commissioners; a multi-member NTSB-type Nuclear Safety Board independent of the NRC. The costs associated with operating a Nuclear Safety Board were also included in the study. The legislative requirements, both new authority and changes to the existing NRC legislative authority, were studied. 134 references

76 FR 58812 - Patient Safety Organizations: Delisting for Cause of Patient Safety Organization One, Inc.

Science.gov (United States)

2011-09-22

... Organizations: Delisting for Cause of Patient Safety Organization One, Inc. AGENCY: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), HHS. ACTION: Notice of Delisting. SUMMARY: Patient Safety Organization One, Inc.: AHRQ has delisted Patient Safety Organization One, Inc. as a Patient Safety Organization (PSO...

Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-U-110

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Brown, T.M.; Jensen, L.

1993-04-01

This report investigates the nature of the waste in tank U-110 using historical and current information. When characterizing tank waste, several important properties are considered. First, the physical characteristics of the waste are presented, including waste appearance, density, and size of waste particles. The existence of any exotherms in the tank that may present a safety concern is investigated. Finally, the radiological and chemical composition of the tank are presented

The role of quantitative uncertainty in the safety analysis of flammable gas accidents in Hanford waste tanks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bratzel, D.R.

1998-01-01

Following a 1990 investigation into flammable gas generation, retention, and release mechanisms within the Hanford Site high-level waste tanks, personnel concluded that the existing Authorization Basis documentation did not adequately evaluate flammable gas hazards. The US Department of Energy Headquarters subsequently declared the flammable gas hazard as an unresolved safety issue. Although work scope has been focused on resolution of the issue, it has yet to be resolved due to considerable uncertainty regarding essential technical parameters and associated risk. Resolution of the Flammable Gas Safety Issue will include the identification of a set of controls for the Authorization Basis for the tanks which will require a safety analysis of flammable gas accidents. A traditional nuclear facility safety analysis is based primarily on the analysis of a set of bounding accidents to represent the risks of the possible accidents and hazardous conditions at a facility. While this approach may provide some indication of the bounding consequences of accidents for facilities, it does not provide a satisfactory basis for identification of facility risk or safety controls when there is considerable uncertainty associated with accident phenomena and/or data as is the case with potential flammable gas accidents at the Hanford Site. This is due to the difficulties in identifying the bounding case and reaching consensus among safety analysts, facility operations and engineering, and the regulator on the implications of the safety analysis results. In addition, the bounding cases are frequently based on simplifying assumptions that make the analysis results insensitive to variations among facilities or the impact of alternative safety control strategies. The existing safety analysis of flammable gas accidents for the Tank Waste Remediation system (TWRS) at the Hanford Site has these difficulties. However, Hanford Site personnel are developing a refined safety analysis approach

Tank Vapor Characterization Project. Headspace vapor characterization of Hanford Waste Tank AX-102: Results from samples collected on June 27, 1995

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Clauss, T.W.; Pool, K.H.; Evans, J.C.; McVeety, B.D.; Thomas, B.L.; Olsen, K.B.; Fruchter, J.S.; Ligotke, M.W.

1995-11-01

This report describes the analytical results of vapor samples taken from the headspace of the waste storage tank 241-AX-102 (Tank AX-102) at the Hanford Site in Washington State. The results described in this report were obtained to characterize the vapors present in the tank headspace and to support safety evaluations and tank-farm operations. The results include air concentrations of selected inorganic and organic analytes and grouped compounds from samples obtained by Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) and provided for analysis to Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL). Analyses were performed by the Vapor Analytical Laboratory (VAL) at PNL. Analyte concentrations were based on analytical results and, where appropriate, sample volumes provided by WHC. Detailed descriptions of the analytical results appear in the text

CSER 94-09: Implications of the heat anomaly in Tank 106-C to criticality safety

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Rogers, C.A.

1994-10-01

Water is periodically added to Tank C-106 to cool its waste. In March 1994 addition of water was temporarily discontinued to determine if the tank could be adequately cooled at a lower water level. Following an addition of water, a temperature fluctuation was observed on one of the thermocouple trees. This Criticality Safety Evaluation Report (CSER) explains why the anomalous temperature measurements could not have been caused by nuclear criticality. Waste in Tank C-106 was discharged from processing facilities under controls designed to ensure that the contents of the tank would remain well subcritical under all credible conditions. The observed temperature profile does not fit the profile expected from a criticality event. In addition, there has been no indication of any significant increase in the rate of water evaporation.

Tank Vapor Characterization Project: Headspace vapor characterization of Hanford Waste Tank 241-C-204: Results from samples collected on 07/02/96

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Thomas, B.L.; Evans, J.C.; Pool, K.H.

1997-01-01

This report describes the analytical results of vapor samples taken from the headspace of the waste storage tank 241-C-204 (Tank C-204) at the Hanford Site in Washington State. The results described in this report were obtained to characterize the vapors present in the tank headspace and to support safety evaluations and tank farm operations. The results include air concentrations of selected inorganic and organic analytes and grouped compounds from samples obtained by Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) and provided for analysis to Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). Analyses were performed by the Vapor Analytical Laboratory (VAL) at PNNL. Analyte concentrations were based on analytical results and, where appropriate, sample volumes provided by WHC. A summary of the inorganic analytes, permanent gases, and total non-methane organic compounds is listed in Table S.1. The three highest concentration analytes detected in SUMMA trademark canister and triple sorbent trap samples are also listed in Table S.1. Detailed descriptions of the analytical results appear in the appendices

Tank Vapor Characterization Project: Headspace vapor characterization of Hanford Waste Tank 241-S-103: Results from samples collected on 06/12/96

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Evans, J.C.; Pool, K.H.; Thomas, B.L.

1997-01-01

This report describes the analytical results of vapor samples taken from the headspace of the waste storage tank 241-S-103 (Tank S-103) at the Hanford Site in Washington State. The results described in this report were obtained to characterize the vapors present in the tank headspace and to support safety evaluations and tank farm operations. The results include air concentrations of selected inorganic and organic analytes and grouped compounds from samples obtained by Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) and provided for analysis to Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). Analyses were performed by the Vapor Analytical Laboratory (VAL) at PNNL. Analyte concentrations were based on analytical results and, where appropriate, sample volumes provided by WHC. A summary of the inorganic analytes, permanent gases, and total non-methane organic compounds is listed in Table S.1. The three highest concentration analytes detected in SUMMA trademark canister and triple sorbent trap samples are also listed in Table S.1. Detailed descriptions of the analytical results appear in the appendices

Chemical and chemically-related considerations associated with sluicing tank C-106 waste to tank AY-102

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Reynolds, D.A.

1997-01-01

New data on tank 241-C-106 were obtained from grab sampling and from compatibility testing of tank C-106 and tank AY-102 wastes. All chemistry-associated and other compatibility Information compiled in this report strongly suggests that the sluicing of the contents of tank C-106, in accord with appropriate controls, will pose no unacceptable risk to workers, public safety, or the environment. In addition, it is expected that the sluicing operation will successfully resolve the High-Heat Safety Issue for tank C-106

Tank farm nuclear criticality review

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bratzel, D.R.

1996-01-01

The technical basis for the nuclear criticality safety of stored wastes at the Hanford Site Tank Farm Complex was reviewed by a team of senior technical personnel whose expertise covered all appropriate aspects of fissile materials chemistry and physics. The team concluded that the detailed and documented nucleonics-related studies underlying the waste tanks criticality safety basis were sound. The team concluded that, under current plutonium inventories and operating conditions, a nuclear criticality accident is incredible in any of the Hanford single-shell tanks (SST), double-shell tanks (DST), or double-contained receiver tanks (DCRTS) on the Hanford Site

FY 1993 Ferrocyanide Tank Safety Project: Effects of Aging on Ferrocyanide Wastes test plan for the remainder of FY 1993

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lilga, M.A.; Schiefelbein, G.F.

1993-06-01

Researchers in the Hanford Ferrocyanide Task Team are studying safety issues associated with ferrocyanide precipitates in single shell waste storage tanks (SST). Ferrocyanide is a stable complex of ferrous, ion and cyanide ion that is considered nontoxic because it does not dissociate readily in aqueous solutions. However, in the laboratory at temperatures in excess of 180 degrees C and in the presence of oxidizers such as nitrates and nitrites, dry ferrocyanide and ferrocyanide waste stimulants can be made to react exothermically. The Ferrocyanide Safety Project at the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) is part of the Waste Tank Safety Program at Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC). The purpose of the WHC program is to (1) maintain the ferrocyanide tanks with minimal risk of an accident, (2) select one or more strategies to assure safe storage, and (3) close out the unreviewed safety question (USQ). Tank ferrocyanide wastes were exposed to highly alkaline wastes from subsequent processing operations. Chemical reactions with caustic may have changed the ferrocyanide materials during 40 years of storage in the SSTs. Research in the open-quotes Effects of Aging on Ferrocyanide Wastesclose quotes task is targeted at studying aging of ferrocyanide tank simulants and other ferrocyanide materials to obtain a better understanding of how tank materials may have changed over the years. The research objective in this project is to determine the solubility and hydrolysis characteristics of simulated ferrocyanide tank wastes in alkaline media. The behavior of ferrocyanide simulant wastes is being determined by performing chemical reactions under conditions that might mimic the potential ranges in SST environments. Experiments are conducted at high pH, at high ionic strength, and in the presence of gamma radiation. Verification of simulant study findings by comparison with results with actual waste will also be required

A discussion on the safety classification of the tank 241-SY-101 mixer pump

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Van Vleet, R.J.

1997-01-01

An analysis, consistent with the methodology used in the draft TWRS FSAR (HNF-SD-WM-SAR-067), is presented to show that the classification of the mixer pump in tank 241-SY-101 should be safety significant

Technical safety requirements for the South Tank Farm remediation project, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Platfoot, J.H.

1999-01-01

The South Tank Farm (STF) is a series of six, 170,000-gal underground, domed storage tanks that were placed into service in 1943. The tanks were constructed of a concrete mixture known as gunite. They were used as a portion of the Liquid LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW) System for the collection, neutralization, storage, and transfer of the aqueous portion of the radioactive and/or hazardous chemical wastes produced as part of normal facility operations at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). Although the last of the tanks was taken out of service in 1986, they have been shown by structural analysis to continue to be structurally sound. An attempt was made in 1983 to empty the tanks; however, removal of all the sludge from the tanks was not possible with the equipment and schedule available. Since removal of the liquid waste in 1983, liquid continues to accumulate within the tanks. The in-leakage is believed to be the result of groundwater dripping into the tanks around penetrations in the domes. The tanks are currently being maintained under a Surveillance and Maintenance Program, which includes activities such as level monitoring, vegetation control, High Efficiency Particulate Air filter leakage requirement testing/replacement, sign erection/repair, pump-out of excess liquids, and instrument calibration/maintenance. A technique known as confined sluicing, which uses a high-pressure, low-volume water jet integrated with a jet pump, will be used to remove the sludge. The Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) are those operational requirements that specify the operating limits and surveillance requirements, the basis thereof, safety boundaries, and the management of administrative controls necessary to ensure the safe operation of the STF remediation project. Effective implementation of TSRs will limit to acceptable levels the risks to the public and workers from uncontrolled releases of radioactive or other hazardous material

Tank 241-AX-103, cores 212 and 214 analytical results for the final report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Steen, F.H.

1998-01-01

This document is the analytical laboratory report for tank 241-AX-103 push mode core segments collected between July 30, 1997 and August 11, 1997. The segments were subsampled and analyzed in accordance with the Tank 241-AX-103 Push Mode Core Sampling and Analysis Plan (TSAP) (Comer, 1997), the Safety Screening Data Quality Objective (DQO) (Dukelow, et al., 1995) and the Data Quality Objective to Support Resolution of the Organic Complexant Safety Issue (Organic DQO) (Turner, et al., 1995). The analytical results are included in the data summary table (Table 1). None of the samples submitted for Differential Scanning Calorimetry (DSC), Total Alpha Activity (AT), plutonium 239 (Pu239), and Total Organic Carbon (TOC) exceeded notification limits as stated in the TSAP (Conner, 1997). The statistical results of the 95% confidence interval on the mean calculations are provided by the Tank Waste Remediation Systems Technical Basis Group in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding (Schreiber, 1997) and not considered in this report

78 FR 59036 - Patient Safety Organizations: Voluntary Relinquishment From Cogent Patient Safety Organization, Inc.

Science.gov (United States)

2013-09-25

... Organizations: Voluntary Relinquishment From Cogent Patient Safety Organization, Inc. AGENCY: Agency for... for the formation of Patient Safety Organizations (PSOs), which collect, aggregate, and analyze... Cogent Patient Safety Organization, Inc. of its status as a PSO, and has delisted the PSO accordingly...

76 FR 9350 - Patient Safety Organizations: Voluntary Delisting From Rocky Mountain Patient Safety Organization

Science.gov (United States)

2011-02-17

... Organizations: Voluntary Delisting From Rocky Mountain Patient Safety Organization AGENCY: Agency for Healthcare... Organization: AHRQ has accepted a notification of voluntary relinquishment from Rocky Mountain Patient Safety Organization, a component entity of Colorado Hospital Association, of its status as a Patient Safety...

Tank Vapor Characterization Project: Vapor space characterization of waste Tank A-101, Results from samples collected on June 8, 1995

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pool, K.H.; Clauss, T.W.; McVeety, B.D.; Evans, J.C.; Thomas, B.L.; Olsen, K.B.; Fruchter, J.S.; Ligotke, M.W.

1995-11-01

This report describes the analytical results of vapor samples taken from the headspace of the waste storage tank 241-A-101 (Tank A-101) at the Hanford Site in Washington State. The results described in this report were obtained to characterize the vapors present in the tank headspace and to support safety evaluations and tank-farm operations. The results include air concentrations of selected inorganic and organic analytes and grouped compounds from samples obtained by Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) and provided for analysis to Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNL). Analyses were performed by the Vapor Analytical Laboratory (VAL) at PNL. Analyte concentrations were based on analytical results and, where appropriate, sample volumes provided by WHC. A summary of the results is listed in Table 1. Detailed descriptions of the analytical results appear in the text

Investigation of flammable gas and thermal safety issues for retrieval of waste from Tank 241-AN-105

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Caley, S.M.; Stewart, C.W.; Antoniak, Z.I.; Cuta, J.M.; Mahoney, L.A.; Panisko, F.E.

1998-09-01

The primary purpose of this report is to identify and resolve some of the flammable gas and thermal safety issues potentially associated with the retrieval of waste from Tank 241-AN-105 (AN-105), which is the first double-shell tank scheduled for waste retrieval at Hanford. The planned retrieval scenario includes the following steps in AN-105: (1) degas the tank using two submerged mixing pumps, (2) turn off the mixer pump(s) and allow any suspended solids to settle, (3) decant the supernatant to the intermediate feed staging tank(s) (IFSTs) (AP-102 and/or AP-104) using water/caustic dilution at the transfer pump inlet, (4) add the remaining dilution water/caustic to the slurry remaining in AN-105, (5) mix the tank with the mixer pump(s) until the soluble solids dissolve, (6) turn off the mixer pump(s) and let the insoluble solids settle, and (7) decant the new supernatant to the IFST(s), leaving the insoluble solids behind. Three waste retrieval safety issues are addressed in this report. They are (1) the controlled degassing of AN-105 to ensure that the headspace remains <25% of the lower flammability limit (LFL), (2) an assessment of how dissolved gas (mainly ammonia) released during the transfer of the supernatant in AN-105 to the IFSTs and the water/caustic dilution of the remaining slurry in AN-105 will affect the flammability in these tanks; and (3) an assessment of the maximum waste temperatures that might occur in AN-105 during retrieval operations.

Investigation of flammable gas and thermal safety issues for retrieval of waste from Tank 241-AN-105

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Caley, S.M.; Stewart, C.W.; Antoniak, Z.I.; Cuta, J.M.; Mahoney, L.A.; Panisko, F.E.

1998-09-01

The primary purpose of this report is to identify and resolve some of the flammable gas and thermal safety issues potentially associated with the retrieval of waste from Tank 241-AN-105 (AN-105), which is the first double-shell tank scheduled for waste retrieval at Hanford. The planned retrieval scenario includes the following steps in AN-105: (1) degas the tank using two submerged mixing pumps, (2) turn off the mixer pump(s) and allow any suspended solids to settle, (3) decant the supernatant to the intermediate feed staging tank(s) (IFSTs) (AP-102 and/or AP-104) using water/caustic dilution at the transfer pump inlet, (4) add the remaining dilution water/caustic to the slurry remaining in AN-105, (5) mix the tank with the mixer pump(s) until the soluble solids dissolve, (6) turn off the mixer pump(s) and let the insoluble solids settle, and (7) decant the new supernatant to the IFST(s), leaving the insoluble solids behind. Three waste retrieval safety issues are addressed in this report. They are (1) the controlled degassing of AN-105 to ensure that the headspace remains <25% of the lower flammability limit (LFL), (2) an assessment of how dissolved gas (mainly ammonia) released during the transfer of the supernatant in AN-105 to the IFSTs and the water/caustic dilution of the remaining slurry in AN-105 will affect the flammability in these tanks; and (3) an assessment of the maximum waste temperatures that might occur in AN-105 during retrieval operations

Feed tank transfer requirements

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Freeman-Pollard, J.R.

1998-09-16

This document presents a definition of tank turnover. Also, DOE and PC responsibilities; TWRS DST permitting requirements; TWRS Authorization Basis (AB) requirements; TWRS AP Tank Farm operational requirements; unreviewed safety question (USQ) requirements are presented for two cases (i.e., tank modifications occurring before tank turnover and tank modification occurring after tank turnover). Finally, records and reporting requirements, and documentation which will require revision in support of transferring a DST in AP Tank Farm to a privatization contractor are presented.

Feed tank transfer requirements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Freeman-Pollard, J.R.

1998-01-01

This document presents a definition of tank turnover. Also, DOE and PC responsibilities; TWRS DST permitting requirements; TWRS Authorization Basis (AB) requirements; TWRS AP Tank Farm operational requirements; unreviewed safety question (USQ) requirements are presented for two cases (i.e., tank modifications occurring before tank turnover and tank modification occurring after tank turnover). Finally, records and reporting requirements, and documentation which will require revision in support of transferring a DST in AP Tank Farm to a privatization contractor are presented

Tank 241-C-108 vapor sampling and analysis tank characterization report. Revision 1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Huckaby, J.L.

1995-01-01

Tank 241-C-108 headspace gas and vapor samples were collected and analyzed to help determine the potential risks to tank farm workers due to fugitive emissions from the tank. The drivers and objectives of waste tank headspace sampling and analysis are discussed in open-quotes Program Plan for the Resolution of Tank Vapor Issues.close quotes Tank 241-C-108 was vapor sampled in accordance with open-quotes Data Quality Objectives for Generic In-Tank Health and Safety Issue Resolution.close quotes

Tank 241-BY-107 vapor sampling and analysis tank characterization report. Revision 1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Huckaby, J.L.

1995-01-01

Tank 241-BY-107 headspace gas and vapor samples were collected and analyzed to help determine the potential risks to tank farm workers due to fugitive emissions from the tank. The drivers and objectives of waste tank headspace sampling and analysis are discussed in open-quotes Program Plan for the Resolution of Tank Vapor Issues.close quotes Tank 241-BY-107 was vapor sampled in accordance with open-quotes Data Quality Objectives for Generic In-Tank Health and Safety Issue Resolution.close quotes

Tank 241-BY-108 vapor sampling and analysis tank characterization report. Revision 1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Huckaby, J.L.

1995-01-01

Tank 241-BY-108 headspace gas and vapor samples were collected and analyzed to help determine the potential risks to tank farm workers due to fugitive emissions from the tank. The drivers and objectives of waste tank headspace sampling and analysis are discussed in ''Program Plan for the Resolution of Tank Vapor Issues'' (Osborne and Huckaby 1994). Tank 241-BY-108 was vapor sampled in accordance with ''Data Quality Objectives for Generic In-Tank Health and Safety Issue Resolution (Osborne et al., 1994)

Tank 241-BY-106 vapor sampling and analysis tank characterization report. Revision 1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Huckaby, J.L.

1995-01-01

Tank 241-BY-106 headspace gas and vapor samples were collected and analyzed to help determine the potential risks to tank farm workers due to fugitive emissions from the tank. The drivers and objectives of waste tank headspace sampling and analysis are discussed in open-quotes Program Plan for the Resolution of Tank Vapor Issues.close quotes Tank 241-BY-106 was vapor sampled in accordance with open-quotes Data Quality Objectives for Generic In-Tank Health and Safety Issue Resolution.close quotes

A safety equipment list for rotary mode core sampling systems operation in single shell flammable gas tanks; TOPICAL

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

SMALLEY, J.L.

1999-01-01

This document identifies all interim safety equipment to be used for rotary mode core sampling of single-shell flammable gas tanks utilizing Rotary Mode Core Sampling systems (RMCS). This document provides the safety equipment for RMCS trucks HO-68K-4600, HO-68K-4647, trucks three and four respectively, and associated equipment. It is not intended to replace or supersede WHC-SD-WM-SEL-023, (Kelly 1991), or WHC-SD-WM-SEL-032, (Corbett 1994), which classifies 80-68K-4344 and HO-68K-4345 respectively. The term ''safety equipment'' refers to safety class (SC) and safety significant (SS) equipment, where equipment refers to structures, systems and components (SSC's). The identification of safety equipment in this document is based on the credited design safety features and analysis contained in the Authorization Basis (AB) for rotary mode core sampling operations in single-shell flammable gas tanks. This is an interim safety classification since the AB is interim. This document will be updated to reflect the final RMCS equipment safety classification designations upon completion of a final AB which will be implemented with the release of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)

Technology development activities supporting tank waste remediation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bonner, W.F.; Beeman, G.H.

1994-06-01

This document summarizes work being conducted under the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Technology Development (EM-50) in support of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Program. The specific work activities are organized by the following categories: safety, characterization, retrieval, barriers, pretreatment, low-level waste, and high-level waste. In most cases, the activities presented here were identified as supporting tank remediation by EM-50 integrated program or integrated demonstration lead staff and the selections were further refined by contractor staff. Data sheets were prepared from DOE-HQ guidance to the field issued in September 1993. Activities were included if a significant portion of the work described provides technology potentially needed by TWRS; consequently, not all parts of each description necessarily support tank remediation

Tank Vapor Characterization Project: Headspace vapor characterization of Hanford Waste Tank U-203, Results from samples collected on August 8, 1995

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pool, K.H.; Clauss, T.W.; Evans, J.C.; McVeety, B.D.; Thomas, B.L.; Olsen, K.B.; Fruchter, J.S.; Ligotke, M.W.

1995-11-01

This report describes the analytical results of vapor samples taken from the headspace of the waste storage tank 241-U-203 (Tank U-203) at the Hanford Site in Washington State. The results described in this report were obtained to characterize the vapors present in the tank headspace and to support safety evaluations and tank-farm operations. The results include air concentrations of selected inorganic and organic analytes and grouped compounds from samples obtained by Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) and provided for analysis to Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL). Analyses were performed by the Vapor Analytical Laboratory (VAL) at PNL. Analyte concentrations were based on analytical results and, where appropriate, sample volumes provided by WHC. A summary of the results is listed. Detailed descriptions of the analytical results appear in the text

Tank Vapor Characterization Project: Headspace vapor characterization of Hanford Waste Tank U-204, Results from samples collected on August 8, 1995

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Clauss, T.W.; Evans, J.C.; McVeety, B.D.; Pool, K.H.; Thomas, B.L.; Olsen, K.B.; Fruchter, J.S.; Ligotke, M.W.

1995-11-01

This report describes the analytical results of vapor samples taken from the headspace of the waste storage tank 241-U-204 (Tank U-204) at the Hanford Site in Washington State. The results described in this report were obtained to characterize the vapors present in the tank headspace and to support safety evaluations and tank-farm operations. The results include air concentrations of selected inorganic and organic analytes and grouped compounds from samples obtained by Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) and provided for analysis to Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNL). Analyses were performed by the Vapor Analytical Laboratory (VAL) at PNL. Analyte concentrations were based on analytical results and, where appropriate, sample volumes provided by WHC. A summary of the results is listed. Detailed descriptions of the analytical results appear in the text

Waste Tank Vapor Program: Vapor space characterization of waste tank 241-T-111. Results from samples collected on January 20, 1995

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Klinger, G.S.; Clauss, T.W.; Ligotke, M.W.; Pool, K.H.; McVeety, B.D.; Olsen, K.B.; Bredt, O.P.; Fruchter, J.S.; Goheen, S.C.

1995-10-01

This document presents the details of the inorganic and organic analysis that was performed on samples from the headspace of Hanford waste tank 241-T-111. The results described were obtained to support the safety and toxicological evaluations. A summary of the results for the inorganic and organic analytes is included, as well as, a detailed description of the results which appears in the text

Waste Tank Vapor Program: Vapor space characterization of waste tank 241; C-102: Results from samples collected on August 23, 1994

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Klinger, G.S.; Clauss, T.W.; Ligotke, M.W.

1995-10-01

This document presents the details of the inorganic and organic analysis that was performed on samples from the headspace of Hanford waste tank 241-C-102. The results described were obtained to support the safety and toxicological evaluations. A summary of the results for the inorganic and organic analytes is included, as well as, a detailed description of the results which appears in the text

Vapor space characterization of waste tank 241-U-111: Results from samples collected on February 28, 1995. Waste Tank Vapor Program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Clauss, T.W.; Pool, K.H.; McVeety, B.D.; Bredt, O.P.; Goheen, S.C.; Ligotke, M.W.; Lucke, R.B.; Klinger, G.S.; Fruchter, J.S.

1995-07-01

This document presents the details of the inorganic and organic analysis that was performed on samples from the headspace of Hanford waste tank 241-U-111. The results described were obtained to support the safety and toxicological evaluations. A summary of the results for the inorganic and organic analytes is included, as well as, a detailed description of the results which appears in the text

Safety evaluation for packaging transportation of equipment for tank 241-C-106 waste sluicing system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Calmus, D.B.

1994-01-01

A Waste Sluicing System (WSS) is scheduled for installation in nd waste storage tank 241-C-106 (106-C). The WSS will transfer high rating sludge from single shell tank 106-C to double shell waste tank 241-AY-102 (102-AY). Prior to installation of the WSS, a heel pump and a transfer pump will be removed from tank 106-C and an agitator pump will be removed from tank 102-AY. Special flexible receivers will be used to contain the pumps during removal from the tanks. After equipment removal, the flexible receivers will be placed in separate containers (packagings). The packaging and contents (packages) will be transferred from the Tank Farms to the Central Waste Complex (CWC) for interim storage and then to T Plant for evaluation and processing for final disposition. Two sizes of packagings will be provided for transferring the equipment from the Tank Farms to the interim storage facility. The packagings will be designated as the WSSP-1 and WSSP-2 packagings throughout the remainder of this Safety Evaluation for Packaging (SEP). The WSSP-1 packagings will transport the heel and transfer pumps from 106-C and the WSSP-2 packaging will transport the agitator pump from 102-AY. The WSSP-1 and WSSP-2 packagings are similar except for the length

Report on the handling of safety information concerning flammable gases and ferrocyanide at the Hanford waste tanks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1990-07-01

This report discusses concerns safety issues, and management at Hanford Tank Farm. Concerns center on the issue of flammable gas generation which could ignite, and on possible exothermic reactions of ferrocyanide compounds which were added to single shell tanks in the 1950's. It is believed that information concerning these issues has been mis-handled and the problems poorly managed

Report on the handling of safety information concerning flammable gases and ferrocyanide at the Hanford waste tanks

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1990-07-01

This report discusses concerns safety issues, and management at Hanford Tank Farm. Concerns center on the issue of flammable gas generation which could ignite, and on possible exothermic reactions of ferrocyanide compounds which were added to single shell tanks in the 1950's. It is believed that information concerning these issues has been mis-handled and the problems poorly managed. (CBS)

Scanning electron microscopic analyses of Ferrocyanide tank wastes for the Ferrocyanide safety program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Callaway, W.S.

1995-09-01

This is Fiscal Year 1995 Annual Report on the progress of activities relating to the application of scanning electron microscopy in addressing the Ferrocyanide Safety Issue associated with Hanford Site high-level radioactive waste tanks. The status of the FY 1995 activities directed towards establishing facilities capable of providing SEM based micro-characterization of ferrocyanide tank wastes is described. A summary of key events in the SEM task over FY 1995 and target activities in FY 1996 are presented. A brief overview of the potential applications of computer controlled SEM analytical data in light of analyses of ferrocyanide simulants performed by an independent contractor is also presented

A summary of available information on ferrocyanide tank wastes

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Burger, L.L.; Strachan, D.M.; Reynolds, D.A.; Schulz, W.W.

1991-10-01

Ferrocyanide wastes were generated at the Hanford site during the mid to late 1950s to make more tank space available for the storage of high level nuclear waste. The ferrocyanide process was developed as a method of removing 137 Cs from existing waste solutions and from process solutions that resulted from the recovery of valuable uranium in waste tanks. During the coarse of the research associated with the ferrocyanide process, it was discovered that ferrocyanide materials when mixed with NaNO 3 and/or NaNO 2 exploded. This chemical reactivity became an issue in the 1980s when the safety associated with the storage of ferrocyanide wastes in Hanford tanks became prominent. These safety issues heightened in the late 1980s and led to the current scrutiny of the safety associated with these wastes and the current research and waste management programs. Over the past three years, numerous explosive test have been carried out using milligram quantities of cyanide compounds. These tests provide information on the nature of possible tank reactions. On heating a mixture of ferrocyanide and nitrate or nitrite, an explosive reaction normally begins at about 240 degrees C, but may occur well below 200 degrees C in the presence of catalysts or organic compounds that may act as initiators. The energy released is highly dependent on the course of the reaction. Three attempts to model hot spots in local areas of the tanks indicate a very low probability of having a hot spot large enough and hot enough to be of concern. The main purpose of this document is to inform the members of the Tank Waste Science Panel of the background and issues associated with the ferrocyanide wastes. Hopefully, this document fulfills similar needs outside of the framework of the Tank Waste Science Panel. 50 refs., 9 figs., 7 tabs

Safety organization

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lutz, M.

1984-06-01

After a rapid definition of a nuclear basis installation, the national organization of nuclear safety in France is presented, as also the main organizations concerned and their functions. This report shows how the licensing procedure leading to the construction and exploitation of such installations is applied in the case of nuclear laboratories of research and development: examinations of nuclear safety problems are carried out at different levels: - centralized to define the frame out of which the installation has not to operate, - decentralized to follow in a more detailed manner its evolution [fr

Waste compatibility safety issues and final results for tank 241-T-110 push mode samples

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nuzum, J.L.

1997-01-01

This document is the final laboratory report for Tank 241-T-110. Push mode core segments were removed from risers 2 and 6 between January 29, 1997, and February 7, 1997. Segments were received and extruded at 222-S Laboratory. Analyses were performed in accordance with Tank 241-T-110 Push Mode Core Sampling and analysis Plan (TSAP) and Safety Screening Data Quality Objective (DQO). None of the subsamples submitted for total alpha activity (AT) or differential scanning calorimetry (DSC) analyses exceeded the notification limits stated in DQO

45-Day safety screening results for tank 241-U-102, push mode cores 143 and 144

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Steen, F.H.

1996-01-01

This document is the 45-day report deliverable for tank 241-U-102 push mode core segments collected between April 16, 1996 and May 6, 1996 and received by the 222-S Laboratory between April 17, 1996 and May 8, 1996. The segments were subsampled and analyzed in accordance, with the Tank 241-U-102 Push Mode Core Sampling and analysis Plan (TSAP) (Hu, 1996) and the Safety Screening Data Quality Objective (DQO) (Dukelow, et al., 1995). The analytical results are included in Table 1. Attachment I is a cross reference to relate the tank farm identification numbers to the 222-S Laboratory LabCore sample numbers. The subsamples generated in the laboratory for analysis are identified in these diagrams with their sources shown. The diagram identifying the hydrostatic head fluid (HHF) blank is also included, Primary safety screening results and the raw data from Differential Scanning Calorimetry (DSC) and thermogravimetric analysis (TGA) analyses are included in this report. Two of the samples submitted for DSC analysis exceeded notification limits as stated in the Safety Screening DQO (Dukelow, et al., 1995). Cyanide analysis was requested on these samples and a Reactive System Screening Tool analysis was requested for the sample exhibiting the highest exothenn in accordance with the TSAP (Hu, 1996). The results for these analyses will be reported in a revision to this document

9 CFR 316.14 - Marking tank cars and tank trucks used in transportation of edible products.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 9 Animals and Animal Products 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Marking tank cars and tank trucks used in transportation of edible products. 316.14 Section 316.14 Animals and Animal Products FOOD SAFETY... CONTAINERS § 316.14 Marking tank cars and tank trucks used in transportation of edible products. Each tank...

Enabling social listening for cardiac safety monitoring: Proceedings from a drug information association-cardiac safety research consortium cosponsored think tank.

Science.gov (United States)

Seifert, Harry A; Malik, Raleigh E; Bhattacharya, Mondira; Campbell, Kevin R; Okun, Sally; Pierce, Carrie; Terkowitz, Jeffrey; Turner, J Rick; Krucoff, Mitchell W; Powell, Gregory E

2017-12-01

This white paper provides a summary of the presentations and discussions from a think tank on "Enabling Social Listening for Cardiac Safety Monitoring" trials that was cosponsored by the Drug Information Association and the Cardiac Safety Research Consortium, and held at the White Oak headquarters of the US Food and Drug Administration on June 3, 2016. The meeting's goals were to explore current methods of collecting and evaluating social listening data and to consider their applicability to cardiac safety surveillance. Social listening is defined as the act of monitoring public postings on the Internet. It has several theoretical advantages for drug and device safety. First, these include the ability to detect adverse events that are "missed" by traditional sources and the ability to detect adverse events sooner than would be allowed by traditional sources, both by affording near-real-time access to data from culturally and geographically diverse sources. Social listening can also potentially introduce a novel patient voice into the conversation about drug safety, which could uniquely augment understanding of real-world medication use obtained from more traditional methodologies. Finally, it can allow for access to information about drug misuse and diversion. To date, the latter 2 of these have been realized. Although regulators from the Food and Drug Administration and the United Kingdom's Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency participated in the think tank along with representatives from industry, academia, and patient groups, this article should not be construed to constitute regulatory guidance. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Tank characterization data report: Tank 241-C-112

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Simpson, B.C.; Borsheim, G.L.; Jensen, L.

1993-09-01

Tank 241-C-112 is a Hanford Site Ferrocyanide Watch List tank that was most recently sampled in March 1992. Analyses of materials obtained from tank 241-C-112 were conducted to support the resolution of the Ferrocyanide Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) and to support Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) Milestone M-10-00. Analysis of core samples obtained from tank 241-C-112 strongly indicates that the fuel concentration in the tank waste will not support a propagating exothermic reaction. Analysis of the process history of the tank as well as studies of simulants provided valuable information about the physical and chemical condition of the waste. This information, in combination with the analysis of the tank waste, sup ports the conclusion that an exothermic reaction in tank 241-C-112 is not plausible. Therefore, the contents of tank 241-C-112 present no imminent threat to the workers at the Hanford Site, the public, or the environment from its forrocyanide inventory. Because an exothermic reaction is not credible, the consequences of this accident scenario, as promulgated by the General Accounting Office, are not applicable.

Tank characterization data report: Tank 241-C-112

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Simpson, B.C.; Borsheim, G.L.; Jensen, L.

1993-09-01

Tank 241-C-112 is a Hanford Site Ferrocyanide Watch List tank that was most recently sampled in March 1992. Analyses of materials obtained from tank 241-C-112 were conducted to support the resolution of the Ferrocyanide Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) and to support Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) Milestone M-10-00. Analysis of core samples obtained from tank 241-C-112 strongly indicates that the fuel concentration in the tank waste will not support a propagating exothermic reaction. Analysis of the process history of the tank as well as studies of simulants provided valuable information about the physical and chemical condition of the waste. This information, in combination with the analysis of the tank waste, sup ports the conclusion that an exothermic reaction in tank 241-C-112 is not plausible. Therefore, the contents of tank 241-C-112 present no imminent threat to the workers at the Hanford Site, the public, or the environment from its forrocyanide inventory. Because an exothermic reaction is not credible, the consequences of this accident scenario, as promulgated by the General Accounting Office, are not applicable

Food safety and organic meats.

Science.gov (United States)

Van Loo, Ellen J; Alali, Walid; Ricke, Steven C

2012-01-01

The organic meat industry in the United States has grown substantially in the past decade in response to consumer demand for nonconventionally produced products. Consumers are often not aware that the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) organic standards are based only on the methods used for production and processing of the product and not on the product's safety. Food safety hazards associated with organic meats remain unclear because of the limited research conducted to determine the safety of organic meat from farm-to-fork. The objective of this review is to provide an overview of the published results on the microbiological safety of organic meats. In addition, antimicrobial resistance of microbes in organic food animal production is addressed. Determining the food safety risks associated with organic meat production requires systematic longitudinal studies that quantify the risks of microbial and nonmicrobial hazards from farm-to-fork.

SCOPE safety-controls optimization by performance evaluation: A systematic approach for safety-related decisions at the Hanford Tank Remediation System. Phase 1, final report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bergeron, K.D.; Williams, D.C.; Slezak, S.E.; Young, M.L.

1996-12-01

The Department of Energy's Hanford Tank Waste Remediation system poses a significant challenge for hazard management because of the uncertainty that surrounds many of the variables that must be considered in decisions on safety and control strategies. As a result, site managers must often operate under excessively conservative and expensive assumptions. This report describes a systematic approach to quantifying the uncertainties surrounding the critical parameters in control decisions (e.g., condition of the tanks, kinds of wastes, types of possible accidents) through the use of expert elicitation methods. The results of the elicitations would then be used to build a decision support system and accident analysis model that would allow managers to see how different control strategies would affect the cost and safety of a facility configuration

Review of Nuclear Criticality Safety Requirements Implementation for Hanford Tank Farms Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

DEFIGH PRICE, C.

2000-01-01

In November 1999, the Deputy Secretary of the Department of Energy directed a series of actions to strengthen the Department's ongoing nuclear criticality safety programs. A Review Plan describing lines of inquiry for assessing contractor programs was included. The Office of River Protection completed their assessment of the Tank Farm Contractor program in May 2000. This document supports that assessment by providing a compliance statement for each line of inquiry

49 CFR 229.217 - Fuel tank.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-10-01

... 49 Transportation 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Fuel tank. 229.217 Section 229.217 Transportation... tank. (a) External fuel tanks. Locomotives equipped with external fuel tanks shall, at a minimum... to the fuel tank safety requirements of § 238.223 or § 238.423 of this chapter. The Director of the...

Organization and Nuclear Safety: Safety culture

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Martin Marquinez, A.

1998-01-01

This book presents the experience in nuclear safety and its influence in the exploitation on nuclear power plants. The safety organization and quality management before and after Chernobylsk and three mile island accidents

HANFORD DOUBLE SHELL TANK (DST) THERMAL & SEISMIC PROJECT BUCKLING EVALUATION METHODS & RESULTS FOR THE PRIMARY TANKS

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

MACKEY TC; JOHNSON KI; DEIBLER JE; PILLI SP; RINKER MW; KARRI NK

2007-02-14

This report documents a detailed buckling evaluation of the primary tanks in the Hanford double-shell waste tanks (DSTs), which is part of a comprehensive structural review for the Double-Shell Tank Integrity Project. This work also provides information on tank integrity that specifically responds to concerns raised by the Office of Environment, Safety, and Health (ES&H) Oversight (EH-22) during a review of work performed on the double-shell tank farms and the operation of the aging waste facility (AWF) primary tank ventilation system. The current buckling review focuses on the following tasks: (1) Evaluate the potential for progressive I-bolt failure and the appropriateness of the safety factors that were used for evaluating local and global buckling. The analysis will specifically answer the following questions: (a) Can the EH-22 scenario develop if the vacuum is limited to -6.6-inch water gage (w.g.) by a relief valve? (b) What is the appropriate factor of safety required to protect against buckling if the EH-22 scenario can develop? (c) What is the appropriate factor of safety required to protect against buckling if the EH-22 scenario cannot develop? (2) Develop influence functions to estimate the axial stresses in the primary tanks for all reasonable combinations of tank loads, based on detailed finite element analysis. The analysis must account for the variation in design details and operating conditions between the different DSTs. The analysis must also address the imperfection sensitivity of the primary tank to buckling. (3) Perform a detailed buckling analysis to determine the maximum allowable differential pressure for each of the DST primary tanks at the current specified limits on waste temperature, height, and specific gravity. Based on the I-bolt loads analysis and the small deformations that are predicted at the unfactored limits on vacuum and axial loads, it is very unlikely that the EH-22 scenario (i.e., progressive I-bolt failure leading to global

Tank characterization report for double-shell tank 241-AW-105

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sasaki, L.M.

1997-01-01

One of the major functions of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) is to characterize wastes in support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis, along with other available information about a tank, are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report (TCR). This report and its appendices serve as the TCR for double-shell tank 241-AW-105. The objectives of this report are to use characterization data in response to technical issues associated with tank 241-AW-105 waste; and to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. The response to technical issues is summarized in Section 2.0, and the best-basis inventory estimate is presented in Section 3.0. Recommendations regarding safety status and additional sampling needs are provided in Section 4.0. Supporting data and information are contained in the appendices. This report supports the requirements of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order milestone Characterization. information presented in this report originated from sample analyses and known historical sources. While only the results of a recent sampling event will be used to fulfill the requirements of the data quality objectives (DQOs), other information can be used to support or question conclusions derived from these results. Historical information for tank 241-AW-105 is provided in Appendix A, including surveillance information, records pertaining to waste transfers and tank operations, and expected tank contents derived from a process knowledge model. The recent sampling event listed, as well as pertinent sample data obtained before 1996, are summarized in Appendix B along with the sampling results. The results of the 1996 grab sampling event satisfied the data requirements specified in the sampling and analysis plan (SAP) for this tank. In addition, the tank headspace flammability was measured, which addresses

Ferrocyanide tank waste stability

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fowler, K.D.

1993-01-01

Ferrocyanide wastes were generated at the Hanford Site during the mid to late 1950s as a result of efforts to create more tank space for the storage of high-level nuclear waste. The ferrocyanide process was developed to remove 137 CS from existing waste and newly generated waste that resulted from the recovery of valuable uranium in Hanford Site waste tanks. During the course of research associated with the ferrocyanide process, it was recognized that ferrocyanide materials, when mixed with sodium nitrate and/or sodium nitrite, were capable of violent exothermic reaction. This chemical reactivity became an issue in the 1980s, when safety issues associated with the storage of ferrocyanide wastes in Hanford Site tanks became prominent. These safety issues heightened in the late 1980s and led to the current scrutiny of the safety issues associated with these wastes, as well as current research and waste management programs. Testing to provide information on the nature of possible tank reactions is ongoing. This document supplements the information presented in Summary of Single-Shell Tank Waste Stability, WHC-EP-0347, March 1991 (Borsheim and Kirch 1991), which evaluated several issues. This supplement only considers information particular to ferrocyanide wastes

Monitoring Volatile Organic Tank Waste Using Cermet Microsensors

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Edward G. Gatliff, Ph.D.; Laura R. Skubal, Ph.D.; Michael C. Vogt, Ph.D.

2006-03-13

Presently, very few inexpensive technologies exist in the marketplace that can determine the contents of tank waste or monitor the chemistry of tank constituents in near-real time. The research addressed this problem by developing and assessing ceramic-metallic based microsensors for determining the constituents of a liquid organic storage tank by examining the gases in the headspace of the tank. Overall, the WBO and YSZ sensors responded well to the chemicals in this study. Responses to various concentrations were distinguishable visually. This is a clear indication that pattern recognition tools will be effective in resolving the constituents and concentrations. In tests, such as the test with acetophenone, one sensor, the WBO sensor is not extremely effective. However, the other sensor, the YSZ sensor, is effective in resolving the concentrations. This supports the need to use an array of sensors, as one sensor may be reactive to a compound while another may not. In the course of this research, several interesting phenomena surfaced. New sensors, that were fabricated but not used in a contaminant gas, seemed to function more effectively and predictably if a ?conditioning? step was imposed upon them prior to use in square wave voltammetry. A conditioning step consists of running cyclic voltammetry prior to running square wave voltammetry. This step tends to ?cleanse? the sensor surface by providing a full -1.0 V to +1.0V sweep and both oxidizing and reducing compounds on the sensor surface. [Note: squarewave voltammetry will simply oxidize or reduce compounds ? it will not induce both reactions.] This sweep is essential for recovery between samples.

Tank characterization report for double-shell Tank 241-AW-105

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

DiCenso, A.T.; Amato, L.C.; Franklin, J.D.; Lambie, R.W.; Stephens, R.H.; Simpson, B.C.

1994-01-01

In May 1990, double-shell Tank 241-AW-105 was sampled to determine proper handling of the waste, to address corrosivity and compatibility issues, and to comply with requirements of the Washington Administrative Code. This Tank Characterization Report presents an overview of that tank sampling and analysis effort, and contains observations regarding waste characteristics. It also addresses expected concentration and bulk inventory data for the waste contents based on this latest sampling data and background tank information. This report summarizes the available information regarding the waste in Tank 241-AW-105, and using the historical information to place the analytical data in context, arranges this information in a useful format for making management and technical decisions concerning this waste tank. In addition, conclusions and recommendations are given based on safety issues and further characterization needs

60-day safety screen results and final report for tank 241-C-111, auger samples 95-Aug-002, 95-Aug-003, 95-Aug-016, and 95-Aug-017

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rice, A.D.

1995-01-01

This report presents the details of the auger sampling events for underground waste tank C-111. The samples were shipped to the 222-S laboratories were they underwent safety screening analysis and primary ferricyanide analysis. The samples were analyzed for alpha total, total organic carbon, cyanide, Ni, moisture, and temperature differentials. The results of this analysis are presented in this document

Final report for tank 241-BX-104 push mode core 126 and 127

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hu, T.A.

1996-01-01

This is the final sample analysis report for tank 241-BX-104 (BX-104), cores 126 and 127. Two segments from each core yielded a total of 11 samples which were analyzed. The data quality objectives (DQOs) applicable to this sampling event were the Safety Screening DQO (Dukelow et al. 1995) and the Organic Safety DQO (Turner et al. 1995). The samples were received, extruded and analyzed at PNNL 325 Analytical Chemistry Laboratory (ACL). The analyses were performed in accordance with the Sample Analysis Plan (Gretsinger 1996) and indicated that the tank is safe with respect to the criteria in the Safety Screening and Organic DQO. Detailed analytical results were described in the analytical laboratory 45-day Report (Attachment 1, WHC-SD-WM-DP-171, REV. 0) and final report (Attachment 2, PNL-BX-104 REV.1) prepared by PNNL, 325 Laboratory. Corrections and/or exceptions to the PNNL final report are provided

SCOPE safety-controls optimization by performance evaluation: A systematic approach for safety-related decisions at the Hanford Tank Remediation System. Phase 1, final report

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bergeron, K.D.; Williams, D.C.; Slezak, S.E.; Young, M.L. [and others

1996-12-01

The Department of Energy`s Hanford Tank Waste Remediation system poses a significant challenge for hazard management because of the uncertainty that surrounds many of the variables that must be considered in decisions on safety and control strategies. As a result, site managers must often operate under excessively conservative and expensive assumptions. This report describes a systematic approach to quantifying the uncertainties surrounding the critical parameters in control decisions (e.g., condition of the tanks, kinds of wastes, types of possible accidents) through the use of expert elicitation methods. The results of the elicitations would then be used to build a decision support system and accident analysis model that would allow managers to see how different control strategies would affect the cost and safety of a facility configuration.

High priority tank sampling and analysis report

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Brown, T.M.

1998-03-05

In July 1993, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) transmitted Recommendation 93-5 (Conway 1993) to the US Department of Energy (DOE). Recommendation 93-5 noted that there was insufficient tank waste technical information and the pace to obtain it was too slow to ensure that Hanford Site wastes could be safely stored, that associated operations could be conducted safely, and that future disposal data requirements could be met. In May 1996, the DOE issued Revision 1 of the Recommendation 93-5 Implementation Plan (DOE-RL 1996). The Implementation Plan revision presented a modified approach to achieve the original plan`s objectives. The approach concentrated on actions necessary to ensure that wastes can be safely stored, that operations can be safely conducted, and that timely characterization information for the tank waste Disposal Program could be obtained. The Implementation Plan proposed 28 High Priority tanks, which, if sampled and analyzed, were expected to provide information to answer questions regarding safety and disposal issues. The High Priority tank list was originally developed in Section 9.0 of the Tank Waste Characterization Basis (Brown et al. 1995) by integrating the needs of the various safety and disposal programs. The High Priority tank list represents a set of tanks that were expected to provide the highest information return for characterization resources expended. The High Priority tanks were selected for near-term core sampling and were not expected to be the only tanks that would provide meaningful information. Sampling and analysis of non-High Priority tanks also could be used to provide scientific and technical data to confirm assumptions, calibrate models, and measure safety related phenomenological characteristics of the waste. When the sampling and analysis results of the High Priority and other tanks were reviewed, it was expected that a series of questions should be answered allowing key decisions to be made. The first

High priority tank sampling and analysis report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Brown, T.M.

1998-01-01

In July 1993, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) transmitted Recommendation 93-5 (Conway 1993) to the US Department of Energy (DOE). Recommendation 93-5 noted that there was insufficient tank waste technical information and the pace to obtain it was too slow to ensure that Hanford Site wastes could be safely stored, that associated operations could be conducted safely, and that future disposal data requirements could be met. In May 1996, the DOE issued Revision 1 of the Recommendation 93-5 Implementation Plan (DOE-RL 1996). The Implementation Plan revision presented a modified approach to achieve the original plan's objectives. The approach concentrated on actions necessary to ensure that wastes can be safely stored, that operations can be safely conducted, and that timely characterization information for the tank waste Disposal Program could be obtained. The Implementation Plan proposed 28 High Priority tanks, which, if sampled and analyzed, were expected to provide information to answer questions regarding safety and disposal issues. The High Priority tank list was originally developed in Section 9.0 of the Tank Waste Characterization Basis (Brown et al. 1995) by integrating the needs of the various safety and disposal programs. The High Priority tank list represents a set of tanks that were expected to provide the highest information return for characterization resources expended. The High Priority tanks were selected for near-term core sampling and were not expected to be the only tanks that would provide meaningful information. Sampling and analysis of non-High Priority tanks also could be used to provide scientific and technical data to confirm assumptions, calibrate models, and measure safety related phenomenological characteristics of the waste. When the sampling and analysis results of the High Priority and other tanks were reviewed, it was expected that a series of questions should be answered allowing key decisions to be made. The first

Feed tank transfer requirements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Freeman-Pollard, J.R.

1998-01-01

This document presents a definition of tank turnover; DOE responsibilities; TWRS DST permitting requirements; TWRS Authorization Basis (AB) requirements; TWRS AP Tank Farm operational requirements; unreviewed safety question (USQ) requirements; records and reporting requirements, and documentation which will require revision in support of transferring a DST in AP Tank Farm to a privatization contractor for use during Phase 1B

Measurements of waste tank passive ventilation rates using tracer gases

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Huckaby, J.L.; Olsen, K.B.; Sklarew, D.S.; Evans, J.C.; Remund, K.M.

1997-09-01

This report presents the results of ventilation rate studies of eight passively ventilated high-level radioactive waste tanks using tracer gases. Head space ventilation rates were determined for Tanks A-101, AX-102, AX-103, BY-105, C-107, S-102, U-103, and U-105 using sulfur hexafluoride (SF 6 ) and/or helium (He) as tracer gases. Passive ventilation rates are needed for the resolution of several key safety issues. These safety issues are associated with the rates of flammable gas production and ventilation, the rates at which organic salt-nitrate salt mixtures dry out, and the estimation of organic solvent waste surface areas. This tracer gas study involves injecting a tracer gas into the tank headspace and measuring its concentration at different times to establish the rate at which the tracer is removed by ventilation. Tracer gas injection and sample collection were performed by SGN Eurisys Service Corporation and/or Lockheed Martin Hanford Corporation, Characterization Project Operations. Headspace samples were analyzed for He and SF 6 by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). The tracer gas method was first demonstrated on Tank S-102. Tests were conducted on Tank S-102 to verify that the tracer gas was uniformly distributed throughout the tank headspace before baseline samples were collected, and that mixing was sufficiently vigorous to maintain an approximately uniform distribution of tracer gas in the headspace during the course of the study. Headspace samples, collected from a location about 4 in away from the injection point and 15, 30, and 60 minutes after the injection of He and SF 6 , indicated that both tracer gases were rapidly mixed. The samples were found to have the same concentration of tracer gases after 1 hour as after 24 hours, suggesting that mixing of the tracer gas was essentially complete within 1 hour

TFA Tank Focus Area - multiyear program plan FY98-FY00

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-09-01

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) continues to face a major radioactive waste tank remediation problem with hundreds of waste tanks containing hundreds of thousands of cubic meters of high-level waste (HLW) and transuranic (TRU) waste across the DOE complex. Approximately 80 tanks are known or assumed to have leaked. Some of the tank contents have reacted to form flammable gases, introducing additional safety risks. These tanks must be maintained in a safe condition and eventually remediated to minimize the risk of waste migration and/or exposure to workers, the public, and the environment. However, programmatic drivers are more ambitious than baseline technologies and budgets will support. Science and technology development investments are required to reduce the technical and programmatic risks associated with the tank remediation baselines. The Tanks Focus Area (TFA) was initiated in 1994 to serve as the DOE's Office of Environmental Management's (EM's) national technology development program for radioactive waste tank remediation. The national program was formed to increase integration and realize greater benefits from DOE's technology development budget. The TFA is responsible for managing, coordinating, and leveraging technology development to support DOE's four major tank sites: Hanford Site (Washington), Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) (Idaho), Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) (Tennessee), and Savannah River Site (SRS) (South Carolina). Its technical scope covers the major functions that comprise a complete tank remediation system: waste retrieval, waste pretreatment, waste immobilization, tank closure, and characterization of both the waste and tank with safety integrated into all the functions. The TFA integrates program activities across organizations that fund tank technology development EM, including the Offices of Waste Management (EM-30), Environmental Restoration (EM-40), and Science and Technology (EM-50)

TFA Tanks Focus Area Multiyear Program Plan FY00-FY04

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

BA Carteret; JH Westsik; LR Roeder-Smith; RL Gilchrist; RW Allen; SN Schlahta; TM Brouns

1999-10-12

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) continues to face a major radioactive waste tank remediation problem with hundreds of waste tanks containing hundreds of thousands of cubic meters of high-level waste (HLW) and transuranic (TRU) waste across the DOE complex. Approximately 68 tanks are known or assumed to have leaked contamination to the soil. Some of the tank contents have reacted to form flammable gases, introducing additional safety risks. These tanks must be maintained in a safe condition and eventually remediated to minimize the risk of waste migration and/or exposure to workers, the public, and the environment. However, programmatic drivers are more ambitious than baseline technologies and budgets will support. Science and technology development investments are required to reduce the technical and programmatic risks associated with the tank remediation baselines. The Tanks Focus Area (TFA) was initiated in 1994 to serve as the DOE Office of Environmental Management's (EM's) national technology development program. for radioactive waste tank remediation. The national program was formed to increase integration and realize greater benefits from DOE's technology development budget. The TFA is responsible for managing, coordinating, and leveraging technology development to support DOE's five major tank sites: Hanford Site (Washington), Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) (Idaho), Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) (Tennessee), Savannah River Site (SRS) (South Carolina), and West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) (New York). Its technical scope covers the major functions that comprise a complete tank remediation system: waste retrieval, waste pretreatment, waste immobilization, tank closure, and characterization of both the waste and tank with safety integrated into all the functions. The TFA integrates program activities across EM organizations that fund tank technology development, including the Offices of Waste

TFA Tanks Focus Area Multiyear Program Plan FY00-FY04

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

BA Carteret; JH Westsik; LR Roeder-Smith; RL Gilchrist; RW Allen; SN Schlahta; TM Brouns

1999-01-01

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) continues to face a major radioactive waste tank remediation problem with hundreds of waste tanks containing hundreds of thousands of cubic meters of high-level waste (HLW) and transuranic (TRU) waste across the DOE complex. Approximately 68 tanks are known or assumed to have leaked contamination to the soil. Some of the tank contents have reacted to form flammable gases, introducing additional safety risks. These tanks must be maintained in a safe condition and eventually remediated to minimize the risk of waste migration and/or exposure to workers, the public, and the environment. However, programmatic drivers are more ambitious than baseline technologies and budgets will support. Science and technology development investments are required to reduce the technical and programmatic risks associated with the tank remediation baselines. The Tanks Focus Area (TFA) was initiated in 1994 to serve as the DOE Office of Environmental Management's (EM's) national technology development program. for radioactive waste tank remediation. The national program was formed to increase integration and realize greater benefits from DOE's technology development budget. The TFA is responsible for managing, coordinating, and leveraging technology development to support DOE's five major tank sites: Hanford Site (Washington), Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) (Idaho), Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) (Tennessee), Savannah River Site (SRS) (South Carolina), and West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) (New York). Its technical scope covers the major functions that comprise a complete tank remediation system: waste retrieval, waste pretreatment, waste immobilization, tank closure, and characterization of both the waste and tank with safety integrated into all the functions. The TFA integrates program activities across EM organizations that fund tank technology development, including the Offices of Waste Management (EM-30

TFA Tank Focus Area - multiyear program plan FY98-FY00

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1997-09-01

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) continues to face a major radioactive waste tank remediation problem with hundreds of waste tanks containing hundreds of thousands of cubic meters of high-level waste (HLW) and transuranic (TRU) waste across the DOE complex. Approximately 80 tanks are known or assumed to have leaked. Some of the tank contents have reacted to form flammable gases, introducing additional safety risks. These tanks must be maintained in a safe condition and eventually remediated to minimize the risk of waste migration and/or exposure to workers, the public, and the environment. However, programmatic drivers are more ambitious than baseline technologies and budgets will support. Science and technology development investments are required to reduce the technical and programmatic risks associated with the tank remediation baselines. The Tanks Focus Area (TFA) was initiated in 1994 to serve as the DOE`s Office of Environmental Management`s (EM`s) national technology development program for radioactive waste tank remediation. The national program was formed to increase integration and realize greater benefits from DOE`s technology development budget. The TFA is responsible for managing, coordinating, and leveraging technology development to support DOE`s four major tank sites: Hanford Site (Washington), Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) (Idaho), Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) (Tennessee), and Savannah River Site (SRS) (South Carolina). Its technical scope covers the major functions that comprise a complete tank remediation system: waste retrieval, waste pretreatment, waste immobilization, tank closure, and characterization of both the waste and tank with safety integrated into all the functions. The TFA integrates program activities across organizations that fund tank technology development EM, including the Offices of Waste Management (EM-30), Environmental Restoration (EM-40), and Science and Technology (EM-50).

Vapor space characterization of waste Tank 241-U-106: Results from samples collected on March 7, 1995. Waste Tank Vapor Program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Klinger, G.S.; Lucke, R.B.; McVeety, B.D.

1995-07-01

This report describes inorganic and organic analyses results from samples obtained from the headspace of the Hanford waste storage Tank 241-U-106 (referred to as Tank U-106). The results described here were obtained to support safety and toxicological evaluations. Quantitative results were obtained for the inorganic compounds ammonia (NH 3 ), nitrogen dioxide (NO 2 ), nitric oxide (NO), and water (H 2 O) Sampling for hydrogen cyanide (HCN) and sulfur oxides (SO x ) was not requested. The NH 3 concentration was 16% greater than that determined from an ISS sample obtained in August 1994; the H 2 O concentration was about 10% less. In addition, quantitative results were obtained for the 39 TO-14 compounds plus an additional 14 analytes. Of these, 5 were observed in two or more canisters above the 5-ppbv reporting cutoff. Eleven organic tentatively identified compounds (TICS) were observed in two or more canisters above the reporting cutoff of (ca.) 10 ppbv and are reported with concentrations that are semiquantitative estimates based on internal-standard response factors. The 10 organic analytes with the highest estimated concentrations account for approximately 90% of the total organic components in Tank U-106. Three permanent gases, nitrous oxide (N 2 O), hydrogen (H 2 ) and carbon dioxide (COD were also detected

49 CFR 193.2623 - Inspecting LNG storage tanks.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-10-01

... MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (CONTINUED) PIPELINE SAFETY LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS FACILITIES: FEDERAL SAFETY STANDARDS Maintenance § 193.2623 Inspecting LNG storage tanks. Each LNG... 49 Transportation 3 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Inspecting LNG storage tanks. 193.2623 Section 193...

Analysis of consequences of postulated solvent fires in Hanford site waste tanks

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Cowley, W.L., Westinghouse Hanford

1996-08-12

This document contains the calculations that support the accident analyses for accidents involving organic solvents. This work was performed to support the Basis for Interim Operation (BIO) and the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for Tank Waste Remediation Systems (TWRS).

Risk factors associated with bulk tank standard plate count, bulk tank coliform count, and the presence of Staphylococcus aureus on organic and conventional dairy farms in the United States.

Science.gov (United States)

Cicconi-Hogan, K M; Gamroth, M; Richert, R; Ruegg, P L; Stiglbauer, K E; Schukken, Y H

2013-01-01

The purpose of this study was to assess the association of bulk tank milk standard plate counts, bulk tank coliform counts (CC), and the presence of Staphylococcus aureus in bulk tank milk with various management and farm characteristics on organic and conventional dairy farms throughout New York, Wisconsin, and Oregon. Data from size-matched organic farms (n=192), conventional nongrazing farms (n=64), and conventional grazing farms (n=36) were collected at a single visit for each farm. Of the 292 farms visited, 290 bulk tank milk samples were collected. Statistical models were created using data from all herds in the study, as well as exclusively for the organic subset of herds. Because of incomplete data, 267 of 290 herds were analyzed for total herd modeling, and 173 of 190 organic herds were analyzed for the organic herd modeling. Overall, more bulk tanks from organic farms had Staph. aureus cultured from them (62% of organic herds, 42% conventional nongrazing herds, and 43% of conventional grazing herds), whereas fewer organic herds had a high CC, defined as ≥50 cfu/mL, than conventional farms in the study. A high standard plate count (×1,000 cfu/mL) was associated with decreased body condition score of adult cows and decreased milk production in both models. Several variables were significant only in the model created using all herds or only in organic herds. The presence of Staph. aureus in the bulk tank milk was associated with fewer people treating mastitis, increased age of housing, and a higher percentage of cows with 3 or fewer teats in both the organic and total herd models. The Staph. aureus total herd model also showed a relationship with fewer first-lactation animals, higher hock scores, and less use of automatic takeoffs at milking. High bulk tank CC was related to feeding a total mixed ration and using natural service in nonlactating heifers in both models. Overall, attentive management and use of outside resources were useful with regard to CC

Low temperature hydrothermal processing of organic contaminants in Hanford tank waste

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jones, E.O.; Pederson, L.R.; Freeman, H.D.; Schmidt, A.J.; Babad, H.

1993-02-01

Batch and continuous flow reactor tests at Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) have shown that organics similar to those present in the single-shell and double-shell underground storage tanks at Hanford can be decomposed in the liquid phase at relatively mild temperatures of 150 degree C to 350 degree C in an aqueous process known as hydrothermal processing (HTP). The organics will react with the abundant oxidants such s nitrite already present in the Hanford tank waste to form hydrogen, carbon dioxide, methane, and ammonia. No air or oxygen needs to be added to the system. Ferrocyanides and free cyanide will hydrolyze at similar temperatures to produce formate and ammonia and may also react with nitrates or other oxides. During testing, the organic carbon was transformed first to oxalate at∼310 degree C and completely oxidized to carbonate at ∼350 degree C accompanied by hydroxide consumption. Solids were formed at higher temperatures, causing a small-diameter outlet tube to plug. The propensity for plugging was reduced by diluting the feed with concentrated hydroxide

14 CFR 415.33 - Safety organization.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safety organization. 415.33 Section 415.33....33 Safety organization. (a) An applicant shall maintain a safety organization and document it by... communication, both within the applicant's organization and between the applicant and any federal launch range...

Progress in evaluating the hazard of ferrocyanide waste storage tanks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Babad, Harry; Cash, Robert J.; Postma, Arlin

1992-01-01

There are 177 high-level waste tanks on the Hanford site. Twenty-four single-shell tanks are identified as potential safety issues. These tanks contain quantities of ferrocyanide, nitrate, and nitrite salts that potentially could explode under certain conditions. Efforts were initiated in September 1990 to determine the reactive properties of the ferrocyanide waste and to define the criteria necessary to ensure tank safety until mitigation or remediation actions, if required, could be implemented. This paper describes the results of recent chemical and physical studies on synthetic ferrocyanide waste mixtures. Data obtained from monitoring, tank behavior modeling, and research studies on waste have provided sufficient understanding of the tank behavior. The Waste Tank Safety Program is exploring whether the waste in many of the ferrocyanide tanks actually represents an unreviewed safety question. The General Accounting Office (GAO) in October 1990 suggested that ferrocyanide tank accident scenarios exceed the bounds of the Hanford Environmental Impact Statement. Using the same assumptions Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) staff confirmed the consistency of the GAO report calculations. The hypothetical accident scenario in the GAO report, and in the EIS, are based on several assumptions that may, or may not reflect actual tank conditions. The Ferrocyanide Stabilization Program at Westinghouse Hanford (summarized in this paper) will provide updated and new data using scientific research with synthetic wastes and characterization of actual tank samples. This new information will replace the assumptions on tank waste chemical and physical properties allowing an improved recalculation of current safety and future risk associated with these tanks. (author)

Progress in evaluating the hazards of ferrocyanide waste storage tanks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Babad, H.; Cash, R.; Postma, A.

1992-03-01

There are 177 high-level waste tanks on the Hanford site. Twenty-four single-shell tanks are identified as potential safety issues. These tanks contain quantities of ferrocyanide, nitrate, and nitrite salts that potentially could explode under certain conditions. Efforts were initiated in September 1990 to determine the reactive properties of the ferrocyanide waste and to define the criteria necessary to ensure tank safety until mitigation or remediation actions, if required, could be implemented. This paper describes the results of recent chemical and physical studies on synthetic ferrocyanide waste mixtures. Data obtained from monitoring, tank behavior modeling, and research studies on waste have provided sufficient understanding of the tank behavior. The Waste Tank Safety Program is exploring to determine whether the waste in many of the ferrocyanide tanks actually represents an unreviewed safety question. The General Accounting Office (GAO) in October 1990 (1) suggested that ferrocyanide-tanks accident scenarios exceed the bounds of the Hanford Environmental Impact Statement (2). Using the same assumptions Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) staff confirmed the consistency of the GAO report calculations. The hypothetical accident scenario in the GAO report, and in the EIS, are based on several assumptions that may, or may not reflect actual tank conditions. The Ferrocyanide Stabilization Program at Westinghouse Hanford (summarized in this paper) will provide updated and new data using scientific research with synthetic and actual waste tank characterization. This new information will replace the assumptions on tank waste chemical and physical properties allowing an improved recalculation of current safety and future risk associated with these tanks

Criticality safety calculations of 'poison tube tank' compared with annular tanks for storing fissile solutions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gopalakrishnan, C.R.; Joseph, G.

1995-01-01

A comparative study of the shielded area space required for storing fissile solution by the conventional annular tank and by poison tube tank is made. Poison tube tank is similar to commercial heat exchanger. The neutron poisons studied are gadolinium oxide and borax. Variation of multiplication factor for an array of annular tanks containing uranium nitrate or plutonium nitrate solutions are presented for annular widths of 10, 7.5 and 5 cm. It is concluded that for the given concentration, 5 cm annular width tanks are safe at a pitch distance of 120 and 90 cm for uranium and plutonium solutions respectively. Using these, as reference values, it is found that the shielded area saving for the poison tube tank is a factor of 12 and 8 for the given concentration of uranium and plutonium solutions respectively. (author)

Organic solvent topical report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cowley, W.L.

1998-01-01

This report is the technical basis for the accident and consequence analyses used in the Hanford Tank Farms Basis for Interim Operation. The report also contains the scientific and engineering information and reference material needed to understand the organic solvent safety issue. This report includes comments received from the Chemical Reactions Subcommittee of the Tank Advisory Panel

Organic solvent topical report

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Cowley, W.L.

1998-04-30

This report is the technical basis for the accident and consequence analyses used in the Hanford Tank Farms Basis for Interim Operation. The report also contains the scientific and engineering information and reference material needed to understand the organic solvent safety issue. This report includes comments received from the Chemical Reactions Subcommittee of the Tank Advisory Panel.

METHODOLOGY & CALCULATIONS FOR THE ASSIGNMENT OF WASTE FOR THE LARGE UNDERGROUND WASTE STORAGE TANKS AT THE HANFORD SITE

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

TU, T.A.

2007-01-04

Waste stored within tank farm double-shell tanks (DST) and single-shell tanks (SST) generates flammable gas (principally hydrogen) to varying degrees depending on the type, amount, geometry, and condition of the waste. The waste generates hydrogen through the radiolysis of water and organic compounds, thermolytic decomposition of organic compounds, and corrosion of a tank's carbon steel walls. Radiolysis and thermolytic decomposition also generates ammonia. Nonflammable gases, which act as dilutents (such as nitrous oxide), are also produced. Additional flammable gases (e.g., methane) are generated by chemical reactions between various degradation products of organic chemicals present in the tanks. Volatile and semi-volatile organic chemicals in tanks also produce organic vapors. The generated gases in tank waste are either released continuously to the tank headspace or are retained in the waste matrix. Retained gas may be released in a spontaneous or induced gas release event (GRE) that can significantly increase the flammable gas concentration in the tank headspace as described in RPP-7771, Flammable Gas Safety Isme Resolution. Appendices A through I provide supporting information. The document categorizes each of the large waste storage tanks into one of several categories based on each tank's waste and characteristics. These waste group assignments reflect a tank's propensity to retain a significant volume of flammable gases and the potential of the waste to release retained gas by a buoyant displacement event. Revision 6 is the annual update of the flammable gas Waste Groups for DSTs and SSTs.

Descriptive display of total alpha, energetics, TOC, oxlate as TOC, and H2O sample data from Hanford waste tanks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

SIMPSON, B.C.

1999-01-01

In March 1999, staff at Lockheed Makn Hanford Company (LMHC) were asked to make a presentation to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) about the safety of the waste tanks at the Hanford Site and the necessity for further tank sampling. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory provided a statistical analysis of available tank data to help determine whether additional sampling would in fact be required. The analytes examined were total alpha, energetics, total organic carbon (TOC), oxalate as TOC and moisture. These analytes serve as indicators of the stability of tank contents; if any of them fall above or below certain values, further investigation is warranted (Dukelow et al. 1995). PNNL performed an analysis of the data collected on these safety screening analytes with respect to empirical distributions and the established Safety Screening Data Quality Objectives (SS DQO) thresholds and Basis for Interim Operations (BIO) limits. Both univariate and bivariate analyses were performed. Summary statistics and graphical representations of the data were generated

Use of organic functional group concentrations as a means of screening for energetics

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Burgeson, I.E.; Bryan, S.A.; Camaioni, D.M.; Hallen, R.T.; Lerner, B.D.; Scheele, R.D.

1996-06-01

One of the safety concerns associated with the waste tanks on the Hanford site is the presence of organics in a highly oxidizing environment that could potentially act as a fuel source to maintain a propagating reaction. To determine this risk, it is necessary to determine the amount of high enthalpy organics present in the tanks. Currently, the primary ways of obtaining this information are to either rely on tank-fill histories, which are often unreliable and do not account for waste-aging processes, or obtain samples from the tank and speciate the organics present through a series of analytical procedures. While organic speciation has been successful in providing very valuable information about organics present in the tanks and the waste aging processes that are occurring in general, it can be costly and time consuming analyzing a large number of waste tanks. Differential scanning calorimetry has previously been used to obtain heat of reaction measurements of Hanford tank waste samples. However, differential scanning calorimetry is shown here to inadequately measure calculated heats of reaction of simulant tank mixtures. Overall, the preliminary results presented here, suggest that indeed Fourier transform infrared and Raman spectroscopy would be useful screening tools for determination of C-H and COO- organic content in tank waste samples analyzed in a hot cell environment. These techniques however, are not truly quantitative for this application and would be primarily used for identifying tanks of potential safety concern that would require further, more detailed confirmatory analysis by organic speciation techniques

Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-T-104

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

DiCenso, A.T.; Simpson, B.C.

1994-01-01

In August 1992, Single-Shell Tank 241-T-104 was sampled to determine proper handling of the waste, to address corrosivity and compatibility issues, and to comply with requirements of the Washington Administrative Code (Ecology, 1991). This Tank Characterization Report presents an overview of that tank sampling and analysis effort, and contains observations regarding waste characteristics. It also addresses expected concentration and bulk inventory data for the waste contents based on this latest sampling data and background tank information. The purpose of this report is to describe and characterize the waste in Single-Shall Tank 241-T-104 (hereafter, Tank 241-T-104) based on information given from various sources. This report summarizes the available information regarding the waste in Tank 241-T-104, and using the historical information to place the analytical data in context, arranges this information in a useful format for making management and technical decisions concerning this waste tank. In addition, conclusions and recommendations are given based on safety issues and further characterization needs

A Value of Information approach to data quality objectives for the Hanford high-level waste tanks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wood, T.W.; Hunter, V.L.; Ulvila, J.W.

1995-02-01

This report summarizes a Pacific Northwest Laboratory review of the organic-nitrate reaction safety issue in the Hanford single-shell tanks. This study employed a decision analytic method known as Value of Information (VOI). VOI analysis is a special form of decision analysis that has an information collection alternative as one of the initial decision choices. This type of decision analysis, therefore results in the ability to specify the preferred information collection alternative, taking into account all information gathering and other relevant alternatives. For example, the risk reduction benefit associated with further sampling to quantify total organic carbon inventory or to improve information on energetics can be compared to the risk reduction benefit of better temperature monitoring, operational restrictions, or mitigation by moisture control. This approach allows freedom from built-in assumptions, e.g., that all tanks must be sampled to some degree or that all tanks must be deemed intrinsically safe by some means or another. It allows for each tank management decision to be judged in terms of risk reduction from the current state of affairs, and for that state of affairs to be continuously updated to incorporate new information on tank contents, the phenomenology of safety issues, or the effectiveness of mitigation schemes

Test plan for measuring ventilation rates and combustible gas levels in TWRS active catch tanks

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NGUYEN, D.M.

1999-05-20

The purpose of this test is to provide an initial screening of combustible gas concentrations in catch tanks that currently are operated by Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS). The data will be used to determine whether or not additional data will be needed for closure of the flammable gas unreviewed safety question for these facilities. This test will involve field measurements of ammonia, organic vapor, and total combustible gas levels in the headspace of the catch tanks. If combustible gas level in a tank exceeds an established threshold, gas samples will be collected in SUMMA canisters for more extensive laboratory analysis. In addition, ventilation rates of some catch tanks will be measured to evaluate removal of flammable gas by air flow through the tanks.

Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-BX-107

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Raphael, G.F.

1996-01-01

This study examined and assessed the status, safety issues, composition, and distribution of the wastes contained in the tank 241-BX-107. Historical and most recent information, ranging from engineering structural assessment experiments, process history, monitoring and remediation activities, to analytical core sample data, were compiled and interpreted in an effort to develop a realistic, contemporary profile for the tank BX-107 contents

HANFORD DOUBLE-SHELL TANK (DST) THERMAL and SEISMIC PROJECT-BUCKLING EVALUATION METHODS and RESULTS FOR THE PRIMARY TANKS

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mackey, T.C.; Johnson, K.I.; Deibler, J.E.; Pilli, S.P.; Rinker, M.W.; Karri, N.K.

2007-01-01

This report documents a detailed buckling evaluation of the primary tanks in the Hanford double-shell waste tanks (DSTs), which is part of a comprehensive structural review for the Double-Shell Tank Integrity Project. This work also provides information on tank integrity that specifically responds to concerns raised by the Office of Environment, Safety, and Health (ES and H) Oversight (EH-22) during a review of work performed on the double-shell tank farms and the operation of the aging waste facility (AWF) primary tank ventilation system. The current buckling review focuses on the following tasks: (1) Evaluate the potential for progressive I-bolt failure and the appropriateness of the safety factors that were used for evaluating local and global buckling. The analysis will specifically answer the following questions: (a) Can the EH-22 scenario develop if the vacuum is limited to -6.6-inch water gage (w.g.) by a relief valve? (b) What is the appropriate factor of safety required to protect against buckling if the EH-22 scenario can develop? (c) What is the appropriate factor of safety required to protect against buckling if the EH-22 scenario cannot develop? (2) Develop influence functions to estimate the axial stresses in the primary tanks for all reasonable combinations of tank loads, based on detailed finite element analysis. The analysis must account for the variation in design details and operating conditions between the different DSTs. The analysis must also address the imperfection sensitivity of the primary tank to buckling. (3) Perform a detailed buckling analysis to determine the maximum allowable differential pressure for each of the DST primary tanks at the current specified limits on waste temperature, height, and specific gravity. Based on the I-bolt loads analysis and the small deformations that are predicted at the unfactored limits on vacuum and axial loads, it is very unlikely that the EH-22 scenario (i.e., progressive I-bolt failure leading to

Prerequisites of ideal safety-critical organizations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Takeuchi, Michiru; Hikono, Masaru; Matsui, Yuko; Goto, Manabu; Sakuda, Hiroshi

2013-01-01

This study explores the prerequisites of ideal safety-critical organizations, marshalling arguments of 4 areas of organizational research on safety, each of which has overlap: a safety culture, high reliability organizations (HROs), organizational resilience, and leadership especially in safety-critical organizations. The approach taken in this study was to retrieve questionnaire items or items on checklists of the 4 research areas and use them as materials of abduction (as referred to in the KJ method). The results showed that the prerequisites of ideal safety-oriented organizations consist of 9 factors as follows: (1) The organization provides resources and infrastructure to ensure safety. (2) The organization has a sharable vision. (3) Management attaches importance to safety. (4) Employees openly communicate issues and share wide-ranging information with each other. (5) Adjustments and improvements are made as the organization's situation changes. (6) Learning activities from mistakes and failures are performed. (7) Management creates a positive work environment and promotes good relations in the workplace. (8) Workers have good relations in the workplace. (9) Employees have all the necessary requirements to undertake their own functions, and act conservatively. (author)

ATR/OTR-SY Tank Camera Purge System and in Tank Color Video Imaging System

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Werry, S.M.

1995-01-01

This procedure will document the satisfactory operation of the 101-SY tank Camera Purge System (CPS) and 101-SY in tank Color Camera Video Imaging System (CCVIS). Included in the CPRS is the nitrogen purging system safety interlock which shuts down all the color video imaging system electronics within the 101-SY tank vapor space during loss of nitrogen purge pressure

Minutes of the Tank Waste Science Panel meeting, July 20, 1990: Hanford Tank Safety Project

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Strachan, D.M.; Morgan, L.G.

1991-02-01

The second meeting of the Tank Waste Science Panel was held July 20, 1990. Science Panel members discussed the prioritization of various analyses to be performed on core samples from tank 101-SY, and were asked to review and comment on the draft Westinghouse Hanford Company document ''Analytical Chemistry Plan.'' They also reviewed and discussed the initial contributions to the report titled Chemical and Physical Processes in Tank 101-SY: A Preliminary Report. Science Panel members agreed that a fundamental understanding of the physical and chemical processes in the tank is essential, and strongly recommended that no remediation measures be taken until there is a better understanding of the chemical and physical phenomena that result in the episodic gas release from tank 101-SY. 1 ref

Headspace vapor characterization of Hanford Waste Tank 241-U-112: Results from samples collected on 7/09/96

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Evans, J.C.; Pool, K.H.; Thomas, B.L.; Olsen, K.B.; Fruchter, J.S.; Silvers, K.L.

1997-01-01

This report describes the analytical results of vapor samples taken from the headspace of the waste storage tank 241-U-112 at the Hanford Site in Washington State. The results described in this report were obtained to characterize the vapors present in the tank headspace and to support safety evaluations and tank farm operations. The results include air concentrations of selected inorganic and organic analytes and grouped compounds from samples obtained by Westinghouse Hanford Company

Maximum surface level and temperature histories for Hanford waste tanks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Flanagan, B.D.; Ha, N.D.; Huisingh, J.S.

1994-01-01

Radioactive defense waste resulting from the chemical processing of spent nuclear fuel has been accumulating at the Hanford Site since 1944. This waste is stored in underground waste-storage tanks. The Hanford Site Tank Farm Facilities Interim Safety Basis (ISB) provides a ready reference to the safety envelope for applicable tank farm facilities and installations. During preparation of the ISB, tank structural integrity concerns were identified as a key element in defining the safety envelope. These concerns, along with several deficiencies in the technical bases associated with the structural integrity issues and the corresponding operational limits/controls specified for conduct of normal tank farm operations are documented in the ISB. Consequently, a plan was initiated to upgrade the safety envelope technical bases by conducting Accelerated Safety Analyses-Phase 1 (ASA-Phase 1) sensitivity studies and additional structural evaluations. The purpose of this report is to facilitate the ASA-Phase 1 studies and future analyses of the single-shell tanks (SSTs) and double-shell tanks (DSTs) by compiling a quantitative summary of some of the past operating conditions the tanks have experienced during their existence. This report documents the available summaries of recorded maximum surface levels and maximum waste temperatures and references other sources for more specific data

Food safety in an organic perspective

OpenAIRE

Kristensen, Erik Steen; Alrøe, Hugo Fjelsted; Hansen, Birgitte

2002-01-01

The holistic perspective of organic farming implies a broader conception of food safety that includes both product safety and agri-food system safety. The credibility of organic food can only be maintained if the organic agri-food system is developed in correspondence with the basic organic principles. In this way it will be possible to show the whole organic agri-food system as a safer alternative to conventional farming. Thereby trust will be supported in organic foods despite the sparse (a...

Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-T-102

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Baldwin, J.H.

1997-01-01

A major function of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) is to characterize wastes in support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis, along with other available information about a tank, are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report (TCR). This report and its appendixes serve as the TCR for single-shell tank 241-T-102. The objectives of this report are to use characterization data in response to technical issues associated with tank 241-T-102 waste; and to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. The response to technical issues is summarized in Section 2.0, and the best-basis inventory estimate is presented in Section 3.0. Recommendations regarding safety status and additional sampling needs are provided in Section 4.0. Supporting data and information are contained in the appendixes. This report supports the requirements of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order milestone M-44-05. Characterization information presented in this report originated from sample analyses and known historical sources. The most recent core sampling of tank 241-T-102 (March 1993) predated the existence of data quality objectives (DQOs). An assessment of the technical issues from the currently applicable DQOs was made using data from the 1993 push mode core sampling event, a July 1994 grab sampling event, and a May 1996 vapor flammability measurement. Historical information for tank 241-T-102, provided in Appendix A, includes surveillance information, records pertaining to waste transfers and tank operations, and expected tank contents derived from a process knowledge model. Appendix B contains further sampling and analysis data from the March 1993 push mode core sampling event and data from the grab sampling event in August 1994 and May 1996 vapor flammability measurement. Of the two push mode cores taken in March of 1993, cores 55

Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-T-102

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Baldwin, J.H.

1997-06-24

A major function of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) is to characterize wastes in support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis, along with other available information about a tank, are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report (TCR). This report and its appendixes serve as the TCR for single-shell tank 241-T-102. The objectives of this report are to use characterization data in response to technical issues associated with tank 241-T-102 waste; and to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. The response to technical issues is summarized in Section 2.0, and the best-basis inventory estimate is presented in Section 3.0. Recommendations regarding safety status and additional sampling needs are provided in Section 4.0. Supporting data and information are contained in the appendixes. This report supports the requirements of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order milestone M-44-05. Characterization information presented in this report originated from sample analyses and known historical sources. The most recent core sampling of tank 241-T-102 (March 1993) predated the existence of data quality objectives (DQOs). An assessment of the technical issues from the currently applicable DQOs was made using data from the 1993 push mode core sampling event, a July 1994 grab sampling event, and a May 1996 vapor flammability measurement. Historical information for tank 241-T-102, provided in Appendix A, includes surveillance information, records pertaining to waste transfers and tank operations, and expected tank contents derived from a process knowledge model. Appendix B contains further sampling and analysis data from the March 1993 push mode core sampling event and data from the grab sampling event in August 1994 and May 1996 vapor flammability measurement. Of the two push mode cores taken in March of 1993, cores 55

49 CFR 179.10 - Tank mounting.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-10-01

... 49 Transportation 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Tank mounting. 179.10 Section 179.10 Transportation Other Regulations Relating to Transportation PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY... Design Requirements § 179.10 Tank mounting. (a) The manner in which tanks are attached to the car...

14 CFR 431.33 - Safety organization.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safety organization. 431.33 Section 431.33... Launch and Reentry of a Reusable Launch Vehicle § 431.33 Safety organization. (a) An applicant shall maintain a safety organization and document it by identifying lines of communication and approval authority...

Supporting document for the historical tank content estimate for S tank farm

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Brevick, C.H.; Gaddis, L.A.; Walsh, A.C.

1994-06-01

This document provides historical evaluations of the radioactive mixed wastes stored in the Hanford Site 200 West Area underground single-shell tanks (SSTs). A Historical Tank Content Estimate has been developed by reviewing the process histories, waste transfer data, and available physical and chemical characterization data from various Department of Energy (DOE) and Department of Defense (DOD) contractors. The historical data will supplement information gathered from in-tank core sampling activities that are currently underway. A tank history review that is accompanied by current characterization data creates a complete and reliable inventory estimate. Additionally, historical review of the tanks may reveal anomalies or unusual contents that are critical to characterization and post characterization activities. Complete and accurate tank waste characterizations are critical first steps for DOE and Westinghouse Hanford Company safety programs, waste pretreatment, and waste retrieval activities. The scope of this document is limited to all the SSTs in the S Tank Farm of the southwest quadrant of the 200 West Area. Nine appendices compile data on: tank level histories; temperature graphs; surface level graphs; drywell graphs; riser configuration and tank cross section; sampling data; tank photographs; unknown tank transfers; and tank layering comparison. 113 refs

Supporting document for the historical tank content estimate for A Tank Farm

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Brevick, C.H.; Gaddis, L.A.; Walsh, A.C.

1994-06-01

This document provides historical evaluations of the radioactive mixed wastes stored in the Hanford Site 200-East Area underground single-shell tanks (SSTs). A Historical Tank Content Estimate has been developed by reviewing the process histories, waste transfer data, and available physical and chemical characterization data from various Department of Energy (DOE) and Department of Defense (DOD) contractors. The historical data will supplement information gathered from in-tank core sampling activities that are currently underway. A tank history review that is accompanied by current characterization data creates a complete and reliable inventory estimate. Additionally, historical review of the tanks may reveal anomalies or unusual contents that are critical to characterization and post characterization activities. Complete and accurate tank waste characterizations are critical first steps for DOE and Westinghouse Hanford Company safety programs, waste pretreatment, and waste retrieval activities. The scope of this document is limited to the SSTs in the A Tank Farm of the northeast quadrant of the 200 East Area. Nine appendices compile data on: tank level histories; temperature graphs; surface level graphs; drywell graphs; riser configuration and tank cross section; sampling data; tank photographs; unknown tank transfers; and tank layering comparison. 113 refs

Supporting document for the historical tank content estimate for A Tank Farm

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Brevick, C.H.; Gaddis, L.A.; Walsh, A.C.

1994-06-01

This document provides historical evaluations of the radioactive mixed wastes stored in the Hanford Site 200-East Area underground single-shell tanks (SSTs). A Historical Tank Content Estimate has been developed by reviewing the process histories, waste transfer data, and available physical and chemical characterization data from various Department of Energy (DOE) and Department of Defense (DOD) contractors. The historical data will supplement information gathered from in-tank core sampling activities that are currently underway. A tank history review that is accompanied by current characterization data creates a complete and reliable inventory estimate. Additionally, historical review of the tanks may reveal anomalies or unusual contents that are critical to characterization and post characterization activities. Complete and accurate tank waste characterizations are critical first steps for DOE and Westinghouse Hanford Company safety programs, waste pretreatment, and waste retrieval activities. The scope of this document is limited to the SSTs in the A Tank Farm of the northeast quadrant of the 200 East Area. Nine appendices compile data on: tank level histories; temperature graphs; surface level graphs; drywell graphs; riser configuration and tank cross section; sampling data; tank photographs; unknown tank transfers; and tank layering comparison. 113 refs.

Supporting document for the historical tank content estimate for S tank farm

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Brevick, C.H.; Gaddis, L.A.; Walsh, A.C.

1994-06-01

This document provides historical evaluations of the radioactive mixed wastes stored in the Hanford Site 200 West Area underground single-shell tanks (SSTs). A Historical Tank Content Estimate has been developed by reviewing the process histories, waste transfer data, and available physical and chemical characterization data from various Department of Energy (DOE) and Department of Defense (DOD) contractors. The historical data will supplement information gathered from in-tank core sampling activities that are currently underway. A tank history review that is accompanied by current characterization data creates a complete and reliable inventory estimate. Additionally, historical review of the tanks may reveal anomalies or unusual contents that are critical to characterization and post characterization activities. Complete and accurate tank waste characterizations are critical first steps for DOE and Westinghouse Hanford Company safety programs, waste pretreatment, and waste retrieval activities. The scope of this document is limited to all the SSTs in the S Tank Farm of the southwest quadrant of the 200 West Area. Nine appendices compile data on: tank level histories; temperature graphs; surface level graphs; drywell graphs; riser configuration and tank cross section; sampling data; tank photographs; unknown tank transfers; and tank layering comparison. 113 refs.

Supporting document for the historical tank content estimate for B Tank Farm

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Brevick, C.H.; Gaddis, L.A.; Johnson, E.D.

1994-06-01

This document provides historical evaluations of the radioactive mixed wastes stored in the Hanford Site 200-East Area underground single-shell tanks (SSTs). A Historical Tank Content Estimate has been developed by reviewing the process histories, waste transfer data, and available physical and chemical characterization data from various Department of Energy (DOE) and Department of Defense (DOD) contractors. The historical data will supplement information gathered from in-tank core sampling activities that are currently underway. A tank history review that is accompanied by current characterization data creates a complete and reliable inventory estimate. Additionally, historical review of the tanks may reveal anomalies or unusual contents that are critical to characterization and post characterization activities. Complete and accurate tank waste characterizations are critical first steps for DOE and Westinghouse Hanford Company safety programs, waste pretreatment, and waste retrieval activities. The scope of this document is limited to the SSTs in the B Tank Farm of the northeast quadrant of the 200 East Area. Nine appendices compile data on: tank level histories; temperature graphs; surface level graphs; drywell graphs; riser configuration and tank cross section; sampling data; tank photographs; unknown tank transfers; and tank layering comparison. 113 refs

Tank 241-TX-118, core 236 analytical results for the final report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ESCH, R.A.

1998-01-01

This document is the analytical laboratory report for tank 241-TX-118 push mode core segments collected between April 1, 1998 and April 13, 1998. The segments were subsampled and analyzed in accordance with the Tank 241-TX-118 Push Mode Core sampling and Analysis Plan (TSAP) (Benar, 1997), the Safety Screening Data Quality Objective (DQO) (Dukelow, et al., 1995), the Data Quality Objective to Support Resolution of the Organic Complexant Safety Issue (Organic DQO) (Turner, et al, 1995) and the Historical Model Evaluation Data Requirements (Historical DQO) (Sipson, et al., 1995). The analytical results are included in the data summary table (Table 1). None of the samples submitted for Differential Scanning Calorimetry (DSC) and Total Organic Carbon (TOC) exceeded notification limits as stated in the TSAP (Benar, 1997). One sample exceeded the Total Alpha Activity (AT) analysis notification limit of 38.4microCi/g (based on a bulk density of 1.6), core 236 segment 1 lower half solids (S98T001524). Appropriate notifications were made. Plutonium 239/240 analysis was requested as a secondary analysis. The statistical results of the 95% confidence interval on the mean calculations are provided by the Tank Waste Remediation Systems Technical Basis Group in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding (Schreiber, 1997) and are not considered in this report

76 FR 71345 - Patient Safety Organizations: Voluntary Relinquishment From Child Health Patient Safety...

Science.gov (United States)

2011-11-17

... Organizations: Voluntary Relinquishment From Child Health Patient Safety Organization, Inc. AGENCY: Agency for... notification of voluntary relinquishment from Child Health Patient Safety Organization, Inc. of its status as a Patient Safety Organization (PSO). The Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 (Patient Safety...

Kartini reactor tank inspection using NDT method for safety improvement of the reactor operation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Syarip; Sutondo, Tegas; Saleh, Chaerul; Nitiswati; Puradwi; Andryansah; Mudiharjo

2002-01-01

The inspection of Kartini reactor tank liner (TRK) by using Non Destructive Testing (NDT) methods to improve the reactor operation safety, have been done. The type of NDT used were: visual examination using an underwater camera and magnifier, replication survey using dental putty, hardness test using an Equotip D indentor, thickness test using ultrasonic probe, and dye penetrant test. The visual examination showed that the surface of TRK was in good condition. The hardness readings were considered to be consistent with the original condition of the tank and the slight hardness increase at the reactor core area consistent with the neutron fluence experienced -10 1 4 n/cm 2 . Results of ultrasonic thickness survey showed that in average the TRK thickness is between 5,0 mm - 6,5 mm, a low 2,1 mm thickness exists at the top of the TRK in the belt area (double layer aluminum plat, therefore do not influencing the safety ). The replica and dye penetrant test at the low thickness area and several suspected areas showed that it could be some defect from original manufacture. Therefore, it can be concluded that the TRK is still feasible for continued operation safely

33 CFR 183.518 - Fuel tank openings.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... 33 Navigation and Navigable Waters 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Fuel tank openings. 183.518...) BOATING SAFETY BOATS AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT Fuel Systems Equipment Standards § 183.518 Fuel tank openings. Each opening into the fuel tank must be at or above the topmost surface of the tank. ...

Test Plan for Measuring Ventilation Rates and Combustible Gas Levels in TWRS Active Catch Tanks

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NGUYEN, D.M.

1999-10-25

The purpose of this sampling activity is to obtain data to support an initial evaluation of potential hazards due to the presence of combustible gas in catch tanks that are currently operated by the River Protection Project (RPP). Results of the hazard analysis will be used to support closure of the flammable gas unreviewed safety question for these facilities. The data collection will be conducted in accordance with the Tank Safety Screening Data Quality Objective (Dukelow et al. 1995). Combustible gas, ammonia, and organic vapor levels in the headspace of the catch tanks will be field-measured using hand-held instruments. If a combustible gas level measurement in a tank exceeds an established threshold, gas samples will he collected in SUMMA' canisters for more extensive laboratory analysis. In addition, ventilation rates of some catch tanks will be measured to evaluate removal of flammable gas by air flowing through the tanks. This test plan identifies the sample collection, laboratory analysis, quality assurance, and reporting objectives for this data collection effort. The plan also provides the procedures for field measurement of combustible gas concentrations and ventilation rates.

Tank 241-C-101 vapor sampling and analysis tank characterization report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Huckaby, J.L.

1995-01-01

Tank C-101 headspace gas and vapor samples were collected and analyzed to help determine the potential risks of fugitive emissions to tank farm workers. Gas and vapor samples from the Tank C-101 headspace were collected on July 7, 1994 using the in situ sampling (ISS) method, and again on September 1, 1994 using the more robust vapor sampling system (VSS). Gas and vapor concentrations in Tank C-101 are influenced by its connections to other tanks and its ventilation pathways. At issue is whether the organic vapors in Tank C-101 are from the waste in that tank, or from Tanks C-102 or C-103. Tank C-103 is on the Organic Watch List; the other two are not. Air from the Tank C-101 headspace was withdrawn via a 7.9-m long heated sampling probe mounted in riser 8, and transferred via heated tubing to the VSS sampling manifold. The tank headspace temperature was determined to be 34.0 C, and all heated zones of the VSS were maintained at approximately 50 C. Sampling media were prepared and analyzed by WHC, Oak Ridge National Laboratories, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, and Oregon Graduate Institute of Science and Technology through a contract with Sandia National Laboratories. The 39 tank air samples and 2 ambient air control samples collected are listed in Table X-1 by analytical laboratory. Table X-1 also lists the 14 trip blanks and 2 field blanks provided by the laboratories

Final report for tank 241-AN-102, grab samples 2AN-95-1 through 2AN-95-6 and 102-AN-1 through 102-AN-4

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Esch, R.A.

1996-01-01

Ten grab samples (2AN-95-1, 2, 3, 4A, 5A; 102-AN-1, 2, 3(A), 3(B), and 4) and one field blank (2AN-95-6) were taken from tank 241-AN-102. In support of the safety screening program, total organic carbon and cyanide were performed as secondary analyses because the differential scanning calorimetry results exceeded the notification limit. These were compared to safety screening limits at a confidence level of 95%. Waste compatibility analyses were performed on the 3 supernate samples and the field blank from the latest sampling event. Results presented in the 45 day and in this report show that the waste in Tank 241-AN-1D2 has energetics greater than 480 J/g (dry) and total organic carbon > 3 wt%; however, with a moisture content > 17 wt%, the tank may be considered ''conditionally'' safe in accordance with the Data Quality Objective to Support Resolution of the Organic Complexant Safety Issue

Implementation of Recommendations from the One System Comparative Evaluation of the Hanford Tank Farms and Waste Treatment Plant Safety Bases

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Garrett, Richard L.; Niemi, Belinda J.; Paik, Ingle K.; Buczek, Jeffrey A.; Lietzow, J.; McCoy, F.; Beranek, F.; Gupta, M.

2013-01-01

A Comparative Evaluation was conducted for One System Integrated Project Team to compare the safety bases for the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant Project (WTP) and Tank Operations Contract (TOC) (i.e., Tank Farms) by an Expert Review Team. The evaluation had an overarching purpose to facilitate effective integration between WTP and TOC safety bases. It was to provide One System management with an objective evaluation of identified differences in safety basis process requirements, guidance, direction, procedures, and products (including safety controls, key safety basis inputs and assumptions, and consequence calculation methodologies) between WTP and TOC. The evaluation identified 25 recommendations (Opportunities for Integration). The resolution of these recommendations resulted in 16 implementation plans. The completion of these implementation plans will help ensure consistent safety bases for WTP and TOC along with consistent safety basis processes. procedures, and analyses. and should increase the likelihood of a successful startup of the WTP. This early integration will result in long-term cost savings and significant operational improvements. In addition, the implementation plans lead to the development of eight new safety analysis methodologies that can be used at other U.S. Department of Energy (US DOE) complex sites where URS Corporation is involved

Tank 24-C-103 headspace flammability

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Huckaby, J.L.

1994-05-01

Information regarding flammable vapors, gases, and aerosols is presented and interpreted to help resolve the tank 241-C-103 headspace flammability issue. Analyses of recent vapor and liquid samples, as well as visual inspections of the tank headspace, are discussed in the context of tank dynamics. Concern that the headspace of tank 241-C-103 may contain a flammable mixture of organic vapors and an aerosol of combustible organic liquid droplets arises from the presence of a layer of organic liquid in the tank. This organic liquid is believed to have originated in the plutonium-uranium extraction (PUREX) process, having been stored initially in tank 241-C-102 and apparently transferred to tank 241-C-103 in 1975 (Carothers 1988). Analyses of samples of the organic liquid collected in 1991 and 1993 indicate that the primary constituents are tributyl phosphate (TBP) and several semivolatile hydrocarbons (Prentice 1991, Pool and Bean 1994). This is consistent with the premise that the organic waste came from the PUREX process, because the PUREX process used a solution of TBP in a diluent composed of the n-C 11 H 24 to n-C 15 H 32 normal paraffinic hydrocarbons (NPH)

Vapor space characterization of waste Tank 241-C-104: Results from samples collected on 2/17/94 and 3/3/94

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lucke, R.B.; McVeety, B.D.; Clauss, T.W.; Pool, K.H.; Young, J.S.; McCulloch, M.; Ligotke, M.W.; Fruchter, J.S.; Goheen, S.C.

1995-10-01

This report describes inorganic and organic analyses results from samples obtained from the headspace of the Hanford waste storage Tank 241-C-104 (referred to as Tank C-104). The results described here were obtained to support safety and toxicological evaluations. A summary of the results for inorganic and organic analytes is listed in Summary Table 1. Detailed descriptions of the results appear in the text. Quantitative results were obtained for the inorganic compounds ammonia (NH 3 ), nitrogen dioxide (NO 2 ), nitric oxide (NO), sulfur oxides (SO x ), and water vapor (H 2 O). Organic compounds were also quantitatively determined. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) versatile sampler (OVS) tubes were analyzed for tributyl phosphate. Twenty-four organic tentatively identified compounds (TICs) were observed above the detection limit of (ca.) 10 ppbv, but standards for most of these were not available at the time of analysis, and the reported concentrations are semiquantitative estimates. In addition, the authors looked for the 40 standard TO-14 analytes. Of these, two were observed above the 2-ppbv calibrated instrument detection limit. The 10 organic analytes with the highest estimated concentrations are listed in Summary Table 1. These 10 analytes account for approximately 88% of the total organic components in Tank C 104. Tank C-104 is not on any of the Watch Lists

Test plan for measuring ventilation rates and combustible gas levels in RPP active catch tanks

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NGUYEN, D.M.

1999-06-03

The purpose of this test is to provide an initial screening of combustible gas concentrations in catch tanks that currently are operated by River Protection Project (RPP). The data will be used to determine whether or not additional data will be needed for closure of the flammable gas unreviewed safety question for these facilities. This test will involve field measurements of ammonia, organic vapor, and total combustible gas levels in the headspace of the catch tanks. If combustible gas level in a tank exceeds an established threshold, gas samples will be collected in SUMMA canisters for more extensive laboratory analysis. In addition, ventilation rates of some catch tanks will be measured to evaluate removal of flammable gas by air flow through the tanks.

Tanks focus area. Annual report 1997

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Frey, J.

1997-01-01

The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Environmental Management is tasked with a major remediation project to treat and dispose of radioactive waste in hundreds of underground storage tanks. These tanks contain about 90,000,000 gallons of high-level and transuranic wastes. We have 68 known or assumed leaking tanks, that have allowed waste to migrate into the soil surrounding the tank. In some cases, the tank contents have reacted to form flammable gases, introducing additional safety risks. These tanks must be maintained in the safest possible condition until their eventual remediation to reduce the risk of waste migration and exposure to workers, the public, and the environment. Science and technology development for safer, more efficient, and cost-effective waste treatment methods will speed up progress toward the final remediation of these tanks. The DOE Office of Environmental Management established the Tanks Focus Area to serve as the DOE-EM's technology development program for radioactive waste tank remediation in partnership with the Offices of Waste Management and Environmental Restoration. The Tanks Focus Area is responsible for leading, coordinating, and facilitating science and technology development to support remediation at DOE's four major tank sites: the Hanford Site in Washington State, Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory in Idaho, Oak Ridge Reservation in Tennessee, and the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. The technical scope covers the major functions that comprise a complete tank remediation system: waste retrieval, waste pretreatment, waste immobilization, tank closure, and characterization of both the waste and tank. Safety is integrated across all the functions and is a key component of the Tanks Focus Area program

Tank vapor characterization project. Headspace vapor characterization of Hanford waste Tank SX-101: Results from samples collected on 07/21/95

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Evans, J.C.; Clauss, T.W.; McVeety, B.D.; Pool, K.H.; Olsen, K.B.; Fruchter, J.S.; Silvers, K.L.

1996-05-01

Results described in this report were obtained to characterize the vapors present in the tank headspace and to support safety evaluations and tank-farm operations. They include air concentrations of inorganic and organic analytes and grouped compounds from samples. The vapor concentrations are based either on whole-volume samples or on sorbent traps exposed to sample flow. No immediate notifications were needed because analytical results indicated no specific analytes exceeded notification levels. Summary of results: NH3, 3.8 ppmv; NO2, 0.10 ppmv; NO, 0.13 ppm; H2O, 11.8 mg/L; CO2, 338 ppmv; CO, 3 ; methanol, 0.060 ppmv; acetone, 0.033 ppmv; trichlorofluoromethane, 0.023 ppmv; and acetone, 0.034 ppmv

Interfacial radiolysis effects in tank waste speciation. 1998 annual progress report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Camaioni, D.; Meisel, D.; Orlando, T.M.

1998-01-01

'The purpose of this program is to deliver pertinent, fundamental information that can be used to make technically defensible decisions on safety issues and processing strategies associated with storage and clean up of DOE mixed chemical and radioactive wastes. The radioactive and chemical wastes present in DOE underground storage tanks contain complex mixtures of sludges, salts, and supernatant liquids. These mixtures, which contain a wide variety of oxide materials, aqueous solvents, and organic components, are constantly bombarded with gamma quanta, beta and alpha particles produced via the decay of radioactive isotopes. Currently, there is a vital need to understand radiolysis of organic and inorganic species present in mixed waste tanks because these processes: (a) produce mixtures of toxic, flammable, and potentially explosive gases (i.e., H 2 , N 2 O and volatile organics) (b) degrade organics, possibly to gas-generating organic fragments, even as the degradation reduces the hazards associated with nitrate-organic mixtures, (c) alter the surface chemistry of insoluble colloids in tank sludge, influencing sedimentation and the gas/solid interactions that may lead to gas entrapment phenomena. This report summarizes the technical achievements of a 3-year project that is now in its 2nd year. Progress in three areas is reported: (1) radiation effects at NaNO 3 crystal interfaces, (2) reactions of organic complexants with NO 2 in water, and (3) radiation effects in oxide particles.'

A survey of available information on gas generation in tank 241-SY-101: Hanford Tank Safety Project

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Strachan, D.M.; Reynolds, D.A.; Siemer, D.D.; Wallace, R.W.

1991-03-01

As a result of a concerted effort to determine the chemical and physical mechanisms underlying the generation and episodic release of gases from tank 241-SY-101, more commonly known as tank 101-SY, the Tank Waste Science Panel has been established at the Pacific Northwest Laboratory. Four of the members of this panel met to screen the available information on tank 101-SY and provide to the remaining members a shortened list of references that could be used to assess the mechanisms underlying the generation and episodic release of gases from tank 101-SY. This document is the result of this preliminary screening of information for the Tank Waste Science Panel and was provided to the Panel members at their first meeting. 14 refs., 3 tabs

Tank Characterization report for single-shell tank 241-SX-103

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

WILMARTH, S.R.

1999-01-01

A major function of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) is to characterize waste in support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis and other available information about a tank are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report. This report and its appendices serve as the tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-SX-103. The objectives of this report are (1) to use characterization data in response to technical issues associated with tank 241-SX-103 waste, and (2) to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. Section 2.0 summarizes the response to technical issues, Section 3.0 shows the best-basis inventory estimate, and Section 4.0 makes recommendations about the safety status of the tank and additional sampling needs. The appendices contain supporting data and information. This report supports the requirements of Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Ecology et al. 1997), Milestone M-44-15c, change request M-44-97-03 to ''issue characterization deliverables consistent with the Waste Information Requirements Document developed for fiscal year 1999'' (Adams et al. 1998)

Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-U-103

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

SASAKI, L.M.

1999-02-24

A major function of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) is to characterize waste in support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis and other available information about a tank are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report. This report and its appendices serve as the tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-U-103. The objectives of this report are (1) to use characterization data in response to technical issues associated with tank 241-U-103 waste and (2) to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. Section 2.0 summarizes the response to technical issues, Section 3.0 shows the best-basis inventory estimate, Section 4.0 makes recommendations about the safety status of the tank and additional sampling needs. The appendices contain supporting data and information. This report supports the requirements of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Ecology et al. 1997), Milestone M-44-15b, change request M-44-97-03 to ''issue characterization deliverables consistent with Waste Information Requirements Documents developed for 1998.''

Nuclear criticality safety evaluation of the passage of decontaminated salt solution from the ITP filters into tank 50H for interim storage

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hobbs, D.T.; Davis, J.R.

1994-01-01

This report assesses the nuclear criticality safety associated with the decontaminated salt solution after passing through the In-Tank Precipitation (ITP) filters, through the stripper columns and into Tank 50H for interim storage until transfer to the Saltstone facility. The criticality safety basis for the ITP process is documented. Criticality safety in the ITP filtrate has been analyzed under normal and process upset conditions. This report evaluates the potential for criticality due to the precipitation or crystallization of fissionable material from solution and an ITP process filter failure in which insoluble material carryover from salt dissolution is present. It is concluded that no single inadvertent error will cause criticality and that the process will remain subcritical under normal and credible abnormal conditions

14 CFR 417.103 - Safety organization.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safety organization. 417.103 Section 417... organization. (a) A launch operator must maintain and document a safety organization. A launch operator must... within the launch operator's organization and between the launch operator and any federal launch range or...

Tank characterization report for Single-Shell Tank B-111

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Remund, K.M.; Tingey, J.M.; Heasler, P.G.; Toth, J.J.; Ryan, F.M.; Hartley, S.A.; Simpson, D.B.; Simpson, B.C.

1994-09-01

Tank 241-B-111 (hereafter referred to as B-111) is a 2,006,300 liter (530,000 gallon) single-shell waste tank located in the 200 East B tank farm at Hanford. Two cores were taken from this tank in 1991 and analysis of the cores was conducted by Battelle's 325-A Laboratory in 1993. Characterization of the waste in this tank is being done to support Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) Milestone M-44-05. Tank B-111 was constructed in 1943 and put into service in 1945; it is the second tank in a cascade system with Tanks B-110 and B-112. During its process history, B-111 received mostly second-decontamination-cycle waste and fission products waste via the cascade from Tank B-110. This tank was retired from service in 1976, and in 1978 the tank was assumed to have leaked 30,300 liters (8,000 gallons). The tank was interim stabilized and interim isolated in 1985. The tank presently contains approximately 893,400 liters (236,000 gallons) of sludge-like waste and approximately 3,800 liters (1,000 gallons) of supernate. Historically, there are no unreviewed safety issues associated with this tank and none were revealed after reviewing the data from the latest core sampling event in 1991. An extensive set of analytical measurements was performed on the core composites. The major constituents (> 0.5 wt%) measured in the waste are water, sodium, nitrate, phosphate, nitrite, bismuth, iron, sulfate and silicon, ordered from largest concentration to the smallest. The concentrations and inventories of these and other constituents are given. Since Tanks B-110 and B-111 have similar process histories, their sampling results were compared. The results of the chemical analyses have been compared to the dangerous waste codes in the Washington Dangerous Waste Regulations (WAC 173-303). This assessment was conducted by comparing tank analyses against dangerous waste characteristics 'D' waste codes; and against state waste codes

The integrated criticality safety evaluation for the Hanford tank waste treatment and immobilization plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Losey, D. C.; Miles, R. E.; Perks, M. F.

2009-01-01

The Criticality Safety Evaluation Report (CSER) for the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) has been developed as a single, integrated evaluation with a scope that covers all of the planned WTP operations. This integrated approach is atypical, as the scopes of criticality evaluations are usually more narrowly defined. Several adjustments were made in developing the WTP CSER, but the primary changes were to provide introductory overview for the criticality safety control strategy and to provide in-depth analysis of the underlying physical and chemical mechanisms that contribute to ensuring safety. The integrated approach for the CSER allowed a more consistent evaluation of safety and avoided redundancies that occur when evaluation is distributed over multiple documents. While the approach used with the WTP CSER necessitated more coordination and teamwork, it has yielded a report is that more integrated and concise than is typical. The integrated approach with the CSER produced a simple criticality control scheme that uses relatively few controls. (authors)

Waste tank characterization sampling limits

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tusler, L.A.

1994-01-01

This document is a result of the Plant Implementation Team Investigation into delayed reporting of the exotherm in Tank 241-T-111 waste samples. The corrective actions identified are to have immediate notification of appropriate Tank Farm Operations Shift Management if analyses with potential safety impact exceed established levels. A procedure, WHC-IP-0842 Section 12.18, ''TWRS Approved Sampling and Data Analysis by Designated Laboratories'' (WHC 1994), has been established to require all tank waste sampling (including core, auger and supernate) and tank vapor samples be performed using this document. This document establishes levels for specified analysis that require notification of the appropriate shift manager. The following categories provide numerical values for analysis that may indicate that a tank is either outside the operating specification or should be evaluated for inclusion on a Watch List. The information given is intended to translate an operating limit such as heat load, expressed in Btu/hour, to an analysis related limit, in this case cesium-137 and strontium-90 concentrations. By using the values provided as safety flags, the analytical laboratory personnel can notify a shift manager that a tank is in potential violation of an operating limit or that a tank should be considered for inclusion on a Watch List. The shift manager can then take appropriate interim measures until a final determination is made by engineering personnel

78 FR 41853 - Safety Advisory Guidance: Heating Rail Tank Cars To Prepare Hazardous Material for Unloading or...

Science.gov (United States)

2013-07-12

... rail tank car due to chemical self-reaction and expansion of the toluene diisocyanate matter wastes. On...: Cheryl West Freeman, Division of Engineering and Research, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety... catastrophically ruptured at a transfer station at the BASF Corporation chemical facility in Freeport, Texas. The...

Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-C-109

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Simpson, B.C.

1997-05-23

One of the major functions of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) is to characterize wastes in support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis, along with other available information about a tank, are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report (TCR). This report and its appendices serve as the TCR for single-shell tank 241-C-109. The objectives of this report are: (1) to use characterization data in response to technical issues associated with tank 241 C-109 waste; and (2) to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. The response to technical issues is summarized in Section 2.0, and the best-basis inventory estimate is presented in Section 3.0. Recommendations regarding safety status and additional sampling needs are provided in Section 4.0. Supporting data and information are contained in the appendices.

Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-C-109

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Simpson, B.C.

1997-01-01

One of the major functions of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) is to characterize wastes in support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis, along with other available information about a tank, are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report (TCR). This report and its appendices serve as the TCR for single-shell tank 241-C-109. The objectives of this report are: (1) to use characterization data in response to technical issues associated with tank 241 C-109 waste; and (2) to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. The response to technical issues is summarized in Section 2.0, and the best-basis inventory estimate is presented in Section 3.0. Recommendations regarding safety status and additional sampling needs are provided in Section 4.0. Supporting data and information are contained in the appendices

Tank characterization report for double-shell tank 241-AP-101. Revision 1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Conner, J.M.

1997-01-01

One major function of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) is to characterize wastes m support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis and other available information about a tank are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report (TCR). This report and its appendixes serve as the TCR for double-shell tank 241-AP-101. The objectives of this report are to use characterization data in response to technical issues associated with tank 241-AP-101 waste; and to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. Section 2.0 summarizes the response to technical issues, Section 3.0 provides the best-basis inventory estimate, and Section 4.0 makes recommendations about safety status and additional sampling needs. The appendixes contain supporting data and information. This report supported the requirements of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order, Milestone M-44-05. The characterization information in this report originated from sample analyses and known historical sources. Appendix A provides historical information for tank 241-AP-101 including surveillance, information, records pertaining to waste transfers and tank operations, and expected tank contents derived from a model based upon process knowledge. Appendix B summarizes recent sampling events and historical sampling information. Tank 241-AP-101 was grab sampled in November 1995, when the tank contained 2,790 kL (737 kgal) of waste. An addition1034al 1,438 kL (380 kgal) of waste was received from tank 241-AW-106 in transfers on March 1996 and January 1997. This waste was the product of the 242-A Evaporator Campaign 95-1. Characterization information for the additional 1,438 kL (380 kgal) was obtained using grab sampling data from tank 241-AW-106 and a slurry sample from the evaporator. Appendix C reports on the statistical analysis and numerical manipulation of data used in

33 CFR 183.510 - Fuel tanks.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... SAFETY BOATS AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT Fuel Systems Equipment Standards § 183.510 Fuel tanks. (a) Each fuel tank in a boat must have been tested by its manufacturer under § 183.580 and not leak when...

Chemical compatibility of tank wastes in tanks 241-C-106, 241-AY-101, and 241-AY-102

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sederburg, J.P.

1994-01-01

This report documents the chemical compatibility of waste types within tanks 241-C-106, 241-AY-101, and 241-AY-102. This information was compiled to facilitate the transfer of tank 241-C-106 waste to tank 241-AY-102 utilizing supernatant from tank 241-AY-101 as the sluicing medium. This document justifies that no chemical compatibility safety issues currently understood, or theorized from thermodynamic modeling, will result from the intended sluice transfer operation

Minutes of the Tank Waste Science Panel meeting, November 11--13, 1991. Hanford Tank Safety Project

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Strachan, D.M. [comp.

1992-04-01

The sixth meeting of the Tank Waste Science Panel was held November 11--13, 1991, in Pasco and Richland, Washington. Participating scientists presented the results of recent work on various aspects of issues relating to the generation and release of gases from Tank 241-SY-101 and the presence of ferrocyanide in other tanks at Hanford. Results are discussed.

NRC Information No. 90-18: Potential problems with Crosby safety relief valves used on diesel generator air start receiver tanks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rossi, C.E.

1992-01-01

On March 31, 1989, Cooper Industries was made aware of circumstances at Perry Unit 1 that led to the Division I EDG being declared inoperable. A Crosby safety relief valve on one of the two EDG starting air receiving tanks was inadvertently hit during maintenance activities. The force of the impact caused the valve to open and blow down both air receiving tanks. The safety relief valve did not reseat until approximately 30 psig below the EDG automatic start lockout signal. On January 12, 1990, Cooper Industries learned that a similar event had occurred at Comanche Peak. On January 17, 1990, Cooper Industries submitted a 10 CFR Part 21 report on the affected safety relief valves (Crosby style JMBU and JRU safety relief valves). Although Crosby-style JMBU and JRU safety relief valves were designed to meet the requirements of Section VIII of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, they were not seismically qualified. In addition, the blowdown characteristics of the valves were not consistent with the functional requirements of the system in which they were installed. Cooper Industries has recommended replacing these valves with seismically qualified valves that have the proper blowdown reseat characteristics

Aboveground storage tanks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rizzo, J.A.

1992-01-01

With the 1988 promulgation of the comprehensive Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) regulations for underground storage of petroleum and hazardous substances, many existing underground storage tank (UST) owners have been considering making the move to aboveground storage. While on the surface, this may appear to be the cure-all to avoiding the underground leakage dilemma, there are many other new and different issues to consider with aboveground storage. The greatest misconception is that by storing materials above ground, there is no risk of subsurface environmental problems. it should be noted that with the aboveground storage tank (AGST) systems, there is still considerable risk of environmental contamination, either by the failure of onground tank bottoms or the spillage of product onto the ground surface where it subsequently finds its way to the ground water. In addition, there are added safety concerns that must be addressed. So what are the other specific areas of concern besides environmental to be addressed when making the decision between underground and aboveground tanks? The primary issues that will be addressed in this paper are: Safety, Product Losses, Cost Comparison of USTs vs AGSTs, Space Availability/Accessibility, Precipitation Handling, Aesthetics and Security, Pending and Existing Regulations

Vapor space characterization of Waste Tank 241-U-107: Results from samples collected on 2/17/95

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

McVeety, B.D.; Clauss, T.W.; Ligotke, M.W.

1995-10-01

This report describes inorganic and organic analyses results from samples obtained from the headspace of the Hanford waste storage Tank 241-U-107 (referred to as Tank U-107). The results described here were obtained to support safety and toxicological evaluations. A summary of the results for inorganic and organic analytes is listed in Table 1. Detailed descriptions of the results appear in the text. Quantitative results were obtained for the inorganic compounds ammonia (NH 3 ), nitrogen dioxide (NO 2 ), nitric oxide (NO), and water (H 2 O). Sampling for hydrogen cyanide (HCN) and sulfur oxides (SO x ) was not requested. In addition, quantitative results were obtained for the 39 TO-14 compounds plus an additional 14 analytes. Of these, 10 were observed above the 5-ppbv reporting cutoff. Sixteen organic tentatively identified compounds (TICs) were observed above the reporting cutoff of (ca.) 10 ppbv, and are reported with concentrations that are semiquantitative estimates based on internal-standard response factors. The 10 organic analytes with the highest estimated concentrations are listed in Table 1 and account for approximately 88% of the total organic components in Tank U-107. Nitrous oxide (N 2 O) was the only permanent gas detected in the tank-headspace samples. Tank U-107 is on the Organic and the Hydrogen Watch Lists

Nuclear criticality safety bounding analysis for the in-tank-precipitation (ITP) process, impacted by fissile isotopic weight fractions

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bess, C.E.

1994-04-22

The In-Tank Precipitation process (ITP) receives High Level Waste (HLW) supernatant liquid containing radionuclides in waste processing tank 48H. Sodium tetraphenylborate, NaTPB, and monosodium titanate (MST), NaTi{sub 2}O{sub 5}H, are added for removal of radioactive Cs and Sr, respectively. In addition to removal of radio-strontium, MST will also remove plutonium and uranium. The majority of the feed solutions to ITP will come from the dissolution of supernate that had been concentrated by evaporation to a crystallized salt form, commonly referred to as saltcake. The concern for criticality safety arises from the adsorption of U and Pt onto MST. If sufficient mass and optimum conditions are achieved then criticality is credible. The concentration of u and Pt from solution into the smaller volume of precipitate represents a concern for criticality. This report supplements WSRC-TR-93-171, Nuclear Criticality Safety Bounding Analysis For The In-Tank-Precipitation (ITP) Process. Criticality safety in ITP can be analyzed by two bounding conditions: (1) the minimum safe ratio of MST to fissionable material and (2) the maximum fissionable material adsorption capacity of the MST. Calculations have provided the first bounding condition and experimental analysis has established the second. This report combines these conditions with canyon facility data to evaluate the potential for criticality in the ITP process due to the adsorption of the fissionable material from solution. In addition, this report analyzes the potential impact of increased U loading onto MST. Results of this analysis demonstrate a greater safety margin for ITP operations than the previous analysis. This report further demonstrates that the potential for criticality in the ITP process due to adsorption of fissionable material by MST is not credible.

46 CFR 154.235 - Cargo tank location.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-10-01

... 46 Shipping 5 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cargo tank location. 154.235 Section 154.235 Shipping COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (CONTINUED) CERTAIN BULK DANGEROUS CARGOES SAFETY STANDARDS... Survival Capability and Cargo Tank Location § 154.235 Cargo tank location. (a) For type IG hulls, cargo...

77 FR 11120 - Patient Safety Organizations: Voluntary Relinquishment From UAB Health System Patient Safety...

Science.gov (United States)

2012-02-24

... Organizations: Voluntary Relinquishment From UAB Health System Patient Safety Organization AGENCY: Agency for... notification of voluntary relinquishment from the UAB Health System Patient Safety Organization of its status as a Patient Safety Organization (PSO). The Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005...

33 CFR 183.520 - Fuel tank vent systems.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

...) BOATING SAFETY BOATS AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT Fuel Systems Equipment Standards § 183.520 Fuel tank vent systems. (a) Each fuel tank must have a vent system that prevents pressure in the tank from exceeding 80... 33 Navigation and Navigable Waters 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Fuel tank vent systems. 183.520...

Tank characterization reference guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

De Lorenzo, D.S.; DiCenso, A.T.; Hiller, D.B.; Johnson, K.W.; Rutherford, J.H.; Smith, D.J.; Simpson, B.C.

1994-09-01

Characterization of the Hanford Site high-level waste storage tanks supports safety issue resolution; operations and maintenance requirements; and retrieval, pretreatment, vitrification, and disposal technology development. Technical, historical, and programmatic information about the waste tanks is often scattered among many sources, if it is documented at all. This Tank Characterization Reference Guide, therefore, serves as a common location for much of the generic tank information that is otherwise contained in many documents. The report is intended to be an introduction to the issues and history surrounding the generation, storage, and management of the liquid process wastes, and a presentation of the sampling, analysis, and modeling activities that support the current waste characterization. This report should provide a basis upon which those unfamiliar with the Hanford Site tank farms can start their research

Preliminary safety equipment list for Tank 241-C-106 Manipulator Retrieval System, Project W-340

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Guthrie, R.L.

1994-01-01

This document identifies the anticipated safety classification of the estimated major subsystems, based on the projected major functions, that will be used as guidance for the development of the conceptual design of the Manipulator Retrieval System for Tank 241-C-106. This document is intended to be updated as the design of the Manipulator Retrieval System evolves through the conceptual and definitive design phases. The Manipulator Retrieval System is to be capable of removing the hardened sludge heel at the bottom of single shell Tank 241-C-106 and to perform an overall clean out of the tank that leaves a maximum of 360 ft 3 (TPA milestone M-45-00). The thickness of the heel prior to initiation of waste retrieval with the Manipulator Retrieval System is estimated to be 1- to 2-ft. The Manipulator Retrieval System is currently in the pre-conceptual phase with no definitive systems or subsystems. The anticipated retrieval functions for the Manipulator Retrieval System is based on Table 6-2 of WHC-SD-W340-ES-001, Rev. 1. Projected equipment to accomplish these functions were based on the following systems and equipment: Rotary Mode Core Sampling Equipment (WHC-SD-WM-SEL-032); Light Duty Utility Arm System Equipment (WHC-SD-WM-SEL-034); Single Shell Tanks Equipment (WHC-SD-WM-SEL-020)

Locomotive fuel tank structural safety testing program : passenger locomotive fuel tank jackknife derailment load test.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-08-01

This report presents the results of a passenger locomotive fuel tank load test simulating jackknife derailment (JD) load. The test is based on FRA requirements for locomotive fuel tanks in the Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 238, Ap...

Headspace vapor characterization of Hanford waste tank 241-B-107: Results from samples collected on 7/23/96

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Evans, J.C.; Pool, K.H.; Thomas, B.L.; Olsen, K.B.; Fruchter, J.S.; Silvers, K.L.

1997-01-01

This report describes the analytical results of vapor samples taken from the headspace of the waste storage tank 241-B-107 (Tank B-107) at the Hanford Site in Washington State. The results described in this report were obtained to characterize the vapors present in the tank headspace and to support safety evaluations and tank farm operations. The results include air concentrations of selected inorganic and organic analytes and grouped compounds from samples obtained by Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) and provided for analysis to Pacific Northwestern National Laboratory (PNNL). A summary of the inorganic analytes, permanent gases, and total non-methane organic compounds is listed in a table. The three highest concentration analytes detected in SUMMA trademark canister and triple sorbent trap samples are also listed in the same table. Detailed descriptions of the analytical results appear in the appendices

Headspace vapor characterization of Hanford waste tank 241-S-106: Results from samples collected on 06/13/96

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Evans, J.C.; Pool, K.H.; Thomas, B.L.; Olsen, K.B.; Fruchter, J.S.; Silvers, K.L.

1997-01-01

This report describes the analytical results of vapor samples taken from the headspace of the waste storage tank 241-S-106 (Tank S-106) at the Hanford Site in Washington State. The results described in this report were obtained to characterize the vapors present in the tank headspace and to support safety evaluations and tank farm operations. The results include air concentrations of selected inorganic and organic analytes and grouped compounds from samples obtained by Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) and provided for analysis to Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). A summary of the inorganic analytes, permanent gases, and total non-methane organic compounds is listed in a table. The three highest concentration analytes detected in SUMMA trademark canister and triple sorbent trap samples are also listed in the same table. Detailed descriptions of the analytical results appear in the appendices

Vapor space characterization of Waste Tank 241-TY-104: Results from samples collected on 4/27/95

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Klinger, G.S.; Olsen, K.B.; Clauss, T.W.

1995-10-01

This report describes inorganic and organic analyses results from samples obtained from the headspace of the Hanford waste storage Tank 241-TY-104 (referred to as Tank TY-104). The results described here were obtained to support safety and toxicological evaluations. A summary of the results for inorganic and organic analytes is listed in Table 1. Detailed descriptions of the results appear in the text. Quantitative results were obtained for the inorganic compounds ammonia (NH 3 ), nitrogen dioxide (NO 2 ), nitric oxide (NO), and water (H 2 O). Sampling for hydrogen cyanide (HCN) and sulfur oxides (SO x ) was not requested. In addition, quantitative results were obtained for the 39 TO-14 compounds plus an additional 14 analytes. Of these, 8 were observed above the 5-ppbv reporting cutoff. Five tentatively identified compounds (TICs) were observed above the reporting cutoff of (ca.) 10 ppbv and are reported with concentrations that are semiquantitative estimates based on internal-standard response factors. The 10 organic analytes with the highest estimated concentrations are listed in Table 1 and account for approximately 94% of the total organic components in Tank TY-104. Nitrous oxide (N 2 O) was the only permanent gas detected in the tank-headspace samples. Tank TY-104 is on the Ferrocyanide Watch List

Vapor space characterization of Waste Tank 241-U-105: Results from samples collected on 2/24/95

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pool, K.H.; Clauss, T.W.; Ligotke, M.W.

1995-10-01

This report describes inorganic and organic analyses results from samples obtained from the headspace of the Hanford waste storage Tank 241-U-105 (referred to as Tank U-105). The results described here were obtained to support safety and toxicological evaluations. A summary of the results for inorganic and organic analytes is listed in Table 1. Detailed descriptions of the results appear in the text. Quantitative results were obtained for the inorganic compounds ammonia (NH 3 ), nitrogen dioxide (NO 2 ), nitric oxide (NO), and water (H 2 O). Sampling for hydrogen cyanide (HCN) and sulfur oxides (SO x ) was not requested. In addition, quantitative results were obtained for the 39 TO-14 compounds plus an additional 14 analytes. Of these, six were observed above the 5-ppbv reporting cutoff. Three tentatively identified compounds (TICs) were observed above the reporting cutoff of (ca.) 10 ppbv and are reported with concentrations that are semiquantitative estimates based on internal-standard response factors. All nine of the organic analytes identified are listed in Table 1 and account for 100% of the total organic components in Tank U-105. Nitrous oxide (N 2 O) was the only permanent gas detected in the tank-headspace sample. Tank U-105 is on the Hydrogen Watch List

Vapor space characterization of waste Tank 241-SX-103: Results from samples collected on 3/23/95

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ligotke, M.W.; Clauss, T.W.; Pool, K.H.; McVeety, B.D.; Klinger, G.S.; Olsen, K.B.; Bredt, O.P.; Fruchter, J.S.; Goheen, S.C.

1995-11-01

This report describes inorganic and organic analyses results from samples obtained from the headspace of the Hanford waste storage tank 241-SX-103 (referred to as Tank SX-103). The results described here were obtained to support safety and toxicological evaluations. A summary of the results for inorganic and organic analytes is listed in Table 1. Detailed descriptions of the results appear in the text. Quantitative results were obtained for the inorganic compounds ammonia (NH 3 ), nitrogen dioxide (NO 2 ), nitric oxide (NO), and water vapor (H 2 O). Sampling for hydrogen cyanide (HCN) and sulfur oxides (SO x ) was not requested. In addition, quantitative results were obtained for the 39 TO-14 compounds plus an additional 14 analytes. Of these, two were observed above the 5-ppbv reporting cutoff. Two tentatively identified compounds (TICs) were observed above the reporting cutoff of (ca.) 10 ppbv and are reported with concentrations that are semiquantitative estimates based on internal-standard response factors. The four organic analytes identified are listed in Table 1 and account for approximately 100% of the total organic components in Tank SX-103. Carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) was the only permanent gas detected in the tank-headspace samples. Tank SX-103 is on the Hydrogen Watch List

Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-T-105

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Field, J.G.

1998-01-01

A major function of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) is to characterize waste in support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis and other available information about a tank are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report (TCR). This report and its appendices serve as the TCR for single-shell tank 241-T-105. The objectives of this report are (1) to use characterization data in response to technical issues associated with tank 241-T-105 waste and (2) to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. Section 2.0 summarizes the response to technical issues, Section 3.0 shows the best-basis inventory estimate, Section 4.0 makes recommendations about the safety status of the tank and additional sampling needs. The appendices contain supporting data and information. This report supports the requirements of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Ecology et al. 1997), Milestone M-44-15b, change request M-44-97-03, to ''issue characterization deliverables consistent with the waste information requirements documents developed for 1998''

Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-U-112

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Field, J.G.

1998-01-01

A major function of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) is to characterize waste in support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis and other available information about a tank are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report (TCR). This report and its appendixes serve as the TCR for single-shell tank 241-U-112. The objectives of this report are (1) to use characterization data in response to technical issues associated with tank 241-U-112 waste, and (2) to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. Section 2.0 summarizes the response to technical issues, Section 3.0 shows the best-basis inventory estimate, Section 4.0 makes recommendations about the safety status of the tank and additional sampling needs. The appendixes contain supporting data and information. This report supports the requirements of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Ecology et al. 1997), Milestone M-44-15b, change request M-44-97-03 to issue characterization deliverables consistent with the Waste Information Requirements Document developed for 1998

Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-T-112

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

McCain, D.J.

1998-01-01

A major function of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) is to characterize waste in support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis and other available information about a tank are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report (TCR). This report and its appendices serve as the TCR for single-shell tank 241-T-112. The objectives of this report are (1) to use characterization data in response to technical issues associated with tank 241-T-112 waste and (2) to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. Section 2.0 summarizes the response to technical issues, Section 3.0 shows the best-basis inventory estimate, Section 4.0 makes recommendations about the safety status of the tank and additional sampling needs. The appendices contain supporting data and information. This report supports the requirements of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Ecology et al. 1997), Milestone M-44-15b, change request M-44-97-03, to ''issue characterization deliverables consistent with the Waste Information Requirements Documents developed for 1998.''

Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-T-105

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Field, J.G.

1998-06-18

A major function of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) is to characterize waste in support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis and other available information about a tank are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report (TCR). This report and its appendices serve as the TCR for single-shell tank 241-T-105. The objectives of this report are (1) to use characterization data in response to technical issues associated with tank 241-T-105 waste and (2) to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. Section 2.0 summarizes the response to technical issues, Section 3.0 shows the best-basis inventory estimate, Section 4.0 makes recommendations about the safety status of the tank and additional sampling needs. The appendices contain supporting data and information. This report supports the requirements of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Ecology et al. 1997), Milestone M-44-15b, change request M-44-97-03, to ``issue characterization deliverables consistent with the waste information requirements documents developed for 1998``.

Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-TX-104

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

FIELD, J.G.

1999-01-01

A major function of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) is to characterize waste in support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis and other available information about a tank are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report (TCR). This report and its appendices serve as the TCR for single-shell tank 241-TX-104. The objectives of this report are (1) to use characterization data in response to technical issues associated with tank 241-TX-104 waste, and (2) to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. Section 2.0 summarizes the response to technical issues, Section 3.0 shows the best-basis inventory estimate, Section 4.0 makes recommendations about the safety status of the tank and additional sampling needs. The appendices contain supporting data and information. This report supports the requirements of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Ecology et al. 1997), Milestone M-44-15c, change request M-44-97-03 to ''issue characterization deliverables consistent with the Waste Information Requirements Document developed for FY 1999'' (Adams et al. 1998)

SRTC criticality safety technical review: Nuclear criticality safety evaluation 94-02, uranium solidification facility pencil tank module spacing

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rathbun, R.

1994-01-01

Review of NMP-NCS-94-0087, ''Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation 94-02: Uranium Solidification Facility Pencil Tank Module Spacing (U), April 18, 1994,'' was requested of the SRTC Applied Physics Group. The NCSE is a criticality assessment to show that the USF process module spacing, as given in Non-Conformance Report SHM-0045, remains safe for operation. The NCSE under review concludes that the module spacing as given in Non-Conformance Report SHM-0045 remains in a critically safe configuration for all normal and single credible abnormal conditions. After a thorough review of the NCSE, this reviewer agrees with that conclusion

Headspace vapor characterization of Hanford waste tank 241-U-108: Results from samples collected on 8/29/95

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Thomas, B.L.; Clauss, T.W.; Evans, J.C.; McVeety, B.D.; Pool, K.H.; Olsten, K.B.; Fruchter, J.S.; Ligotke, M.W.

1996-05-01

This report describes the analytical results of vapor samples taken from the headspace of the waste storage tank 241-U-108 (Tank U-108) at the Hanford Site in Washington State. The results described in the report were obtained to characterize the vapors present in the tank headspace and to support safety evaluations and tank farm operations. The results include air concentrations of selected inorganic and organic analytes and grouped compounds from samples obtained by Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) and provided for analysis to Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). Analyte concentrations were based on analytical results and, where appropriate, sample volumes provided by WHC

Organic analysis progress report FY 1997

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Clauss, S.A.; Grant, K.E.; Hoopes, V.; Mong, G.M.; Steele, R.; Bellofatto, D.; Sharma, A.

1998-04-01

The Organic Analysis and Methods Development Task is being conducted by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) as part of the Organic Tank Waste Safety Project. The objective of the task is to apply developed analytical methods to identify and/or quantify the amount of particular organic species in tank wastes. In addition, this task provides analytical support for the Gas Generation Studies Task, Waste Aging, and Solubility Studies. This report presents the results from analyses of tank waste samples archived at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and received from the Project Hanford Management Contractor (PHMC), which included samples associated with both the Flammable Gas and Organic Tank Waste Safety Programs. The data are discussed in Section 2.0. In addition, the results of analytical support for analyzing (1) simulated wastes for Waste Aging, (2) tank waste samples for Gas Generation, and (3) simulated wastes associated with solubility studies discussed in Sections 3.0, 4.0, and 5.0, respectively. The latter part of FY 1997 was devoted to documenting the analytical procedures, including derivation gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS) and GC/FID for quantitation, ion-pair chromatography (IPC), IC, and the cation exchange procedure for reducing the radioactivity of samples. The documentation of analytical procedures is included here and discussed in Section 6.0 and Section 7.0 discusses other analytical procedures. The references are listed in Section 8.0 and future plans are discussed in Section 9.0. Appendix A is a preprint of a manuscript accepted for publication. Appendix B contains the cc mail messages and chain-of-custody forms for the samples received for analyses. Appendix C contains the test plan for analysis of tank waste samples.

Organic analysis progress report FY 1997

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Clauss, S.A.; Grant, K.E.; Hoopes, V.; Mong, G.M.; Steele, R.; Bellofatto, D.; Sharma, A.

1998-04-01

The Organic Analysis and Methods Development Task is being conducted by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) as part of the Organic Tank Waste Safety Project. The objective of the task is to apply developed analytical methods to identify and/or quantify the amount of particular organic species in tank wastes. In addition, this task provides analytical support for the Gas Generation Studies Task, Waste Aging, and Solubility Studies. This report presents the results from analyses of tank waste samples archived at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and received from the Project Hanford Management Contractor (PHMC), which included samples associated with both the Flammable Gas and Organic Tank Waste Safety Programs. The data are discussed in Section 2.0. In addition, the results of analytical support for analyzing (1) simulated wastes for Waste Aging, (2) tank waste samples for Gas Generation, and (3) simulated wastes associated with solubility studies discussed in Sections 3.0, 4.0, and 5.0, respectively. The latter part of FY 1997 was devoted to documenting the analytical procedures, including derivation gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS) and GC/FID for quantitation, ion-pair chromatography (IPC), IC, and the cation exchange procedure for reducing the radioactivity of samples. The documentation of analytical procedures is included here and discussed in Section 6.0 and Section 7.0 discusses other analytical procedures. The references are listed in Section 8.0 and future plans are discussed in Section 9.0. Appendix A is a preprint of a manuscript accepted for publication. Appendix B contains the cc mail messages and chain-of-custody forms for the samples received for analyses. Appendix C contains the test plan for analysis of tank waste samples

33 CFR 183.550 - Fuel tanks: Installation.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

...) BOATING SAFETY BOATS AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT Fuel Systems Manufacturer Requirements § 183.550 Fuel tanks: Installation. (a) Each fuel tank must not be integral with any boat structure or mounted on an engine. (b) Each... the top surface of each metallic fuel tank when the boat is in its static floating position. (e) Each...

Mitigation of the most hazardous tank at the Hanford Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Reynolds, D.A.

1994-09-01

Various tanks at the Hanford Site have been declared to be unresolved safety problems. This means that the tank has the potential to be beyond the limits covered by the current safety documentation. Tank 241-SY-101 poses the greatest hazard. The waste stored in this tank has periodically released hydrogen gas which exceeds the lower flammable limits. A mixer pump was installed in this tank to stir the waste. Stirring the waste would allow the hydrogen to be released slowly in a controlled manner and mitigate the hazard associated with this tank. The testing of this mixer pump is reported in this document. The mixer pump has been successful in controlling the hydrogen concentration in the tank dome to below the flammable limit which has mitigated the hazardous gas releases

Vapor space characterization of waste tank 241-BY-105 (in situ): Results from samples collected on May 9, 1994

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

McVeety, B.D.; Pool, K.H.; Ligotke, M.W.; Clauss, T.W.; Lucke, R.B.; Sharma, A.K.; McCulloch, M.; Fruchter, J.S.; Goheen, S.C.

1995-05-01

This report describes inorganic and organic analyses results from in situ samples obtained from the tank headspace of the Hanford waste storage Tank 241-BY-105 (referred to as Tank BY-105). The results described here were obtained to support safety and toxicological evaluations. A summary of the results for inorganic and organic analytes is listed. Detailed descriptions of the results appear in the text. Quantitative results were obtained for the inorganic compounds NH 3 , NO 2 , NO, HCN, and H 2 O. Sampling for sulfur oxides was not requested. Results of the inorganic samples were affected by sampling errors that led to an undefined uncertainty in sample volume. Consequently, tank-headspace concentrations are estimated only. Thirty-nine tentatively identified organic analytes were observed above the detection limit of (ca.) 10 ppbv, but standards for most of these were not available at the time of analysis, and their quantitation is beyond the scope of this study. In addition, we looked for the 41 standard TO-14 analytes. Of these, only a few were observed above the 2-ppbv detection limit. The 16 organic analytes with the highest estimated concentrations are listed. These 16 analytes account for approximately 68% of the total or organic components in Tank BY-105

Tank characterization report for double-shell tank 241-AN-105

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jo, J.

1997-01-01

A major function of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) is to characterize wastes in support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis, along with other available information about a tank, are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report (TCR). This report and its appendixes serve as the TCR for double-shell tank 241-AN-105. The objectives of this report are: (1) to use characterization data in response to technical issues associated with tank 241-AN-105 waste; and (2) to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. The response to technical issues is summarized in Section 2.0, and the best-basis inventory estimate is presented in Section 3.0. Recommendations regarding safety status and additional sampling needs are provided in Section 4.0. Supporting data and information are contained in the appendices. This report also supports the requirements of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Ecology et al. 1996) milestone M-44-10

Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-S-111

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Conner, J.M.

1997-01-01

One of the major functions of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) is to characterize wastes in support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis, along with other available information about a tank, are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report (TCR). This report and its appendices serve as the TCR for single-shell tank 241-S-111. The objectives of this report are: (1) to use characterization data to address technical issues associated with tank 241-S-111 waste; and (2) to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. The response to technical issues is summarized in Section 2.0, and the best-basis inventory estimate is presented in Section 3.0. Recommendations regarding safety status and additional sampling needs are provided in Section 4.0. Supporting data and information are contained in the appendices. This report also supports the requirements of Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Ecology et al. 1996) milestone M-44-10

Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-C-104

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Baldwin, J.H.

1997-05-21

A major function of the Tank Waste Remediation System is to characterize wastes in support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis, along with other available information about a tank, are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report (TCR). This report and its appendices serve as the TCR for single-shell tank 241-C-104. The objectives of this report are: (1) to use characterization data in response to technical issues associated with tank 241-C-104 waste; and (2) to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. The response to technical issues is summarized in Section 2.0, and the best-basis inventory estimate is presented in Section 3.0. Recommendations regarding safety status and additional sampling needs are provided in Section 4.0. Supporting data and information are contained in the appendices. This report supports the requirements of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Ecology et al. 1996) milestone M-44-10.

Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-S-111

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Conner, J.M.

1997-04-28

One of the major functions of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) is to characterize wastes in support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis, along with other available information about a tank, are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report (TCR). This report and its appendices serve as the TCR for single-shell tank 241-S-111. The objectives of this report are: (1) to use characterization data to address technical issues associated with tank 241-S-111 waste; and (2) to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. The response to technical issues is summarized in Section 2.0, and the best-basis inventory estimate is presented in Section 3.0. Recommendations regarding safety status and additional sampling needs are provided in Section 4.0. Supporting data and information are contained in the appendices. This report also supports the requirements of Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Ecology et al. 1996) milestone M-44-10.

Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-B-104

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Field, J.G.

1996-01-01

This document summarizes information on the historical uses, present status, and the sampling and analysis results of waste stored in Tank 241-B-104. Sampling and analyses meet safety screening and historical data quality objectives. This report supports the requirements of Tri-party Agreement Milestone M-44-09. his characterization report summoned the available information on the historical uses and the current status of single-shell tank 241-B-104, and presents the analytical results of the June 1995 sampling and analysis effort. This report supports the requirements of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order Milestone M-44-09 (Ecology et al. 1994). Tank 241-B-104 is a single-shell underground waste storage tank located in the 200 East Area B Tank Farm on the Hanford Site. It is the first tank in a three-tank cascade series. The tank went into service in August 1946 with a transfer of second-cycle decontamination waste generated from the bismuth phosphate process. The tank continued to receive this waste type until the third quarter of 1950, when it began receiving first-cycle decontamination waste also produced during the bismuth phosphate process. Following this, the tank received evaporator bottoms sludge from the 242-B Evaporator and waste generated from the flushing of transfer lines. A description and the status of tank 241-B-104 are sum in Table ES-1 and Figure ES-1. The tank has an operating capacity of 2,010 kL (530 kgal), and presently contains 1,400 kL (371 kgal) of waste. The total amount is composed of 4 kL (1 kgal) of supernatant, 260 kL (69 kgal) of saltcake, and 1,140 kL (301 kgal) of sludge (Hanlon 1995). Current surveillance data and observations appear to support these results

49 CFR 179.4 - Changes in specifications for tank cars.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-10-01

... 49 Transportation 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Changes in specifications for tank cars. 179.4... TANK CARS Introduction, Approvals and Reports § 179.4 Changes in specifications for tank cars. (a...—Tank Car Safety, AAR, for consideration by its Tank Car Committee. An application for construction of...

HANFORD DOUBLE SHELL TANK THERMAL AND SEISMIC PROJECT BUCKLING EVALUATION METHODS AND RESULTS FOR THE PRIMARY TANKS

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

MACKEY TC; JOHNSON KI; DEIBLER JE; PILLI SP; RINKER MW; KARRI NK

2009-01-14

This report documents a detailed buckling evaluation of the primary tanks in the Hanford double-shell waste tanks (DSTs), which is part of a comprehensive structural review for the Double-Shell Tank Integrity Project. This work also provides information on tank integrity that specifically responds to concerns raised by the Office of Environment, Safety, and Health (ES&H) Oversight (EH-22) during a review of work performed on the double-shell tank farms and the operation of the aging waste facility (AWF) primary tank ventilation system. The current buckling review focuses on the following tasks: (1) Evaluate the potential for progressive anchor bolt failure and the appropriateness of the safety factors that were used for evaluating local and global buckling. The analysis will specifically answer the following questions: (a) Can the EH-22 scenario develop if the vacuum is limited to -6.6-inch water gage (w.g.) by a relief valve? (b) What is the appropriate factor of safety required to protect against buckling if the EH-22 scenario can develop? (c) What is the appropriate factor of safety required to protect against buckling if the EH-22 scenario cannot develop? (2) Develop influence functions to estimate the axial stresses in the primary tanks for all reasonable combinations of tank loads based on detailed finite element analysis. The analysis must account for the variation in design details and operating conditions between the different DSTs. The analysis must also address the imperfection sensitivity of the primary tank to buckling. (3) Perform a detailed buckling analysis to determine the maximum allowable differential pressure for each of the DST primary tanks at the current specified limits on waste temperature, height, and specific gravity. Based on the concrete anchor bolt loads analysis and the small deformations that are predicted at the unfactored limits on vacuum and axial loads, it is very unlikely that the EH-22 scenario (i.e., progressive anchor bolt

HANFORD DOUBLE-SHELL TANK THERMAL AND SEISMIC PROJECT-BUCKLING EVALUATION METHODS AND RESULTS FOR THE PRIMARY TANKS

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mackey, T.C.; Johnson, K.I.; Deibler, J.E.; Pilli, S.P.; Rinker, M.W.; Karri, N.K.

2009-01-01

This report documents a detailed buckling evaluation of the primary tanks in the Hanford double-shell waste tanks (DSTs), which is part of a comprehensive structural review for the Double-Shell Tank Integrity Project. This work also provides information on tank integrity that specifically responds to concerns raised by the Office of Environment, Safety, and Health (ES and H) Oversight (EH-22) during a review of work performed on the double-shell tank farms and the operation of the aging waste facility (AWF) primary tank ventilation system. The current buckling review focuses on the following tasks: (1) Evaluate the potential for progressive anchor bolt failure and the appropriateness of the safety factors that were used for evaluating local and global buckling. The analysis will specifically answer the following questions: (a) Can the EH-22 scenario develop if the vacuum is limited to -6.6-inch water gage (w.g.) by a relief valve? (b) What is the appropriate factor of safety required to protect against buckling if the EH-22 scenario can develop? (c) What is the appropriate factor of safety required to protect against buckling if the EH-22 scenario cannot develop? (2) Develop influence functions to estimate the axial stresses in the primary tanks for all reasonable combinations of tank loads based on detailed finite element analysis. The analysis must account for the variation in design details and operating conditions between the different DSTs. The analysis must also address the imperfection sensitivity of the primary tank to buckling. (3) Perform a detailed buckling analysis to determine the maximum allowable differential pressure for each of the DST primary tanks at the current specified limits on waste temperature, height, and specific gravity. Based on the concrete anchor bolt loads analysis and the small deformations that are predicted at the unfactored limits on vacuum and axial loads, it is very unlikely that the EH-22 scenario (i.e., progressive anchor

Cesium uptake capacity of simulated ferrocyanide tank waste. Interim report FY 1994, Ferrocyanide Safety Project

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Burgeson, I.E.; Bryan, S.A.; Burger, L.E.

1994-09-01

The objective of this project is to determine the capacity for 137 CS uptake by mixed metal ferrocyanides present in Hanford waste tanks, and to assess the potential for aggregation of these 137 CS exchanged materials to form tank ''hot-spots.'' This research, performed at the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) for the Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC), stems from concerns of possible localized radiolytic heating within the tanks. If radioactive cesium is exchanged and concentrated by the remaining nickel ferrocyanide present in the tanks, this heating could cause temperatures to rise above the safety limits specified for the ferrocyanide tanks. For the purposes of this study, two simulants, In-Farm-2 and U-Plant-2, were chosen to represent the wastes generated by the scavenging processes. These simulants were formulated using protocols from the original cesium scavenging campaign. Later additions of cesium-rich wastes from various processes also were considered. The simulants were prepared and centrifuged to obtain a moist ferrocyanide sludge. The centrifuged sludges were treated with the original supernate spiked with a known amount of cesium nitrate. After analysis by flame atomic absorption spectrometry, distribution coefficients (K d ) were calculated. The capacity of solid waste simulants to exchange radioactive cesium from solution was examined. Initial results showed that the greater the molar ratio of cesium to cesium nickel ferrocyanide, the less effective the exchange of cesium from solution. The theoretical capacity of 2 mol cesium per mol of nickel ferrocyanide was not observed. The maximum capacity under experimental conditions was 0.35 mol cesium per mol nickel ferrocyanide. Future work on this project will examine the layering tendency of the cesium nickel ferrocyanide species

Tank wall thinning -- Process and programs

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Greer, S.D.; McBrine, W.J.

1994-01-01

In-service thinning of tank walls has occurred in the power industry and can pose a significant risk to plant safety and dependability. Appropriate respect for the energy stored in a high-pressure drain tank warrants a careful consideration of this possibility and appropriate action in order to assure the adequate safety margins against leakage or rupture. Although it has not proven to be a widespread problem, several cases of wall thinning and at least one recent tank rupture has highlighted this issue in recent years, particularly in nuclear power plants. However, the problem is not new or unique to the nuclear power industry. Severe wall thinning in deaerator tanks has been frequently identified at fossil-fueled power plants. There are many mechanisms which can contribute to tank wall thinning. Considerations for a specific tank are dictated by the system operating conditions, tank geometry, and construction material. Thinning mechanisms which have been identified include: Erosion/Corrosion Impingement Erosion Cavitation Erosion General Corrosion Galvanic Corrosion Microbial-induced Corrosion of course there are many other possible types of material degradation, many of which are characterized by pitting and cracking. This paper specifically addresses wall thinning induced by Erosion/Corrosion (also called Flow-Accelerated Corrosion) and Impingement Erosion of tanks in a power plant steam cycle. Many of the considerations presented are applicable to other types of vessels, such as moisture separators and heat exchangers

Tank 241-SX-105 rotary mode core sampling and analysis plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Simpson, B.C.

1998-01-01

This sampling and analysis plan (SAP) identifies characterization objectives pertaining to sample collection, laboratory analytical evaluation, and reporting requirements for rotary mode core samples from tank 241-SX-105 (SX-105). It is written in accordance with Tank Safety Screening Data Quality Objective (Dukelow et al. 1995) and Memorandum of Understanding for the Organic Complexant Safety Issue Data Requirements (Schreiber 1997a). Vapor screening issues apply as well, but are outside the scope of this SAP. A physical profile prediction based on waste fill history and previous sampling information is provided in Appendix A. Prior to core sampling, the dome space (below the riser) shall be measured for the presence of flammable gases. The measurement shall be taken from within the dome space and the data reported as a percentage of the lower flammability limit (LFL). The results shall be transmitted to the tank coordinator within ten working days of the sampling event (Schreiber 1997b). If the results are above 25 percent of the LFL when analyzing by gas chromatography/mass spectrometry or gas-specific monitoring gauges or above 10% of the LFL when analyzing with a combustible gas meter, the necessity for recurring sampling for flammable gas concentration and the frequency of such sampling will be determined by the Flammable Gas Safety Project. Any additional vapor sampling is not within the scope of this SAP

Vapor space characterization of Waste Tank 241-U-106 (in situ): Results from samples collected on 8/25/94

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ligotke, M.W.; Lucke, R.B.; Pool, K.H.

1995-10-01

This report describes inorganic and organic analyses results from in situ samples obtained from the headspace of the Hanford waste storage Tank 241-U-106 (referred to as Tank U-106). The results described here were obtained to support safety and toxicological evaluations. A summary of the results for inorganic and organic analytes is listed in Table 1. Detailed descriptions of the results appear in the text. Quantitative results were obtained for the inorganic compounds ammonia (NH 3 ), nitrogen dioxide (NO 2 ), nitric oxide (NO), and water (H 2 O). Sampling for hydrogen cyanide (HCN) and sulfur oxides (SO x ) was not performed. In addition, the authors looked for the 39 TO-14 compounds plus an additional 14 target analytes. Of these, six were observed above the 5-ppbv reporting cutoff. Ten organic tentatively identified compounds (TICs) were observed above the reporting cutoff of (ca.) 10 ppbv in two or more of the three samples collected and are reported with concentrations that are semiquantitative estimates based on internal standard response factors. The 10 organic analytes with the highest estimated concentrations are listed in Table 1 and account for approximately 89% of the total organic components in Tank U-106. Methyl isocyanate, a compound of possible concern in Tank U-106, was not detected. Tank U-106 is on the Organic Watch List

Headspace vapor characterization of Hanford waste Tank 241-C-201: Results from samples collected on 06/19/96

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Thomas, B.L.; Evans, J.C.; Pool, K.H.; Olsen, K.B.; Fruchter, J.S.; Silvers, K.L.

1997-01-01

This report describes the analytical results of vapor samples taken from the headspace of the waste storage tank 241-C-201 (Tank C-201) at the Hanford Site in Washington State. The results described in this report were obtained to characterize the vapors present in the tank headspace and to support safety evaluations and tank farm operations. The results include air concentrations of selected inorganic and organic analytes and grouped compounds from samples obtained by Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) and provided for analysis to Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). Analyses were performed by the Vapor Analytical Laboratory (VAL) at PNNL. Analyte concentrations were based on analytical results and, where appropriate, on sample volumes provided by WHC. A summary, of the inorganic analytes, permanent gases, and total non-methane organic compounds is listed in a table. Detailed descriptions of the analytical results appear in the appendices

Safety assessment for proposed pump mixing operations to mitigate episodic gas releases in tank 241-101-SY: Hanford Site, Richland, Washington

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lentsch, J.W., Westinghouse Hanford

1996-05-16

This safety assessment addresses each of the elements required for the proposed action to remove a slurry distributor and to install, operate, and remove a mixing pump in Tank 241-SY-101, which is located within the Hanford Site, Richland, Washington. The proposed action is required as part of an ongoing evaluation of various mitigation concepts developed to eliminate episodic gas releases that result in hydrogen concentrations in the tank dome space that exceed the lower flammability limit.

Vapor space characterization of Waste Tank 241-TY-104 (in situ): Results from samples collected on 8/5/94

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ligotke, M.W.; Pool, K.H.; Lucke, R.B.

1995-10-01

This report describes inorganic and organic analyses results from in situ samples obtained from the headspace of the Hanford waste storage Tank 241-TY-104 (referred to as Tank TY-104). The results described here were obtained to support safety and toxicological evaluations. A summary of the results for inorganic and organic analytes is listed in Table 1. Detailed descriptions of the results appear in the text. Quantitative results were obtained for the inorganic compounds ammonia (NH 3 ), nitrogen dioxide (NO 2 ), nitric oxide (NO), and water (H 2 O). Sampling for hydrogen cyanide (HCN) and sulfur oxides (SO x ) was not performed. In addition, the authors looked for the 39 TO-14 compounds plus an additional 14 analytes. Of these, eight were observed above the 5-ppbv reporting cutoff. Twenty-four organic tentatively identified compounds (TICs) were observed above the reporting cutoff of (ca.) 10 ppbv and are reported with concentrations that are semiquantitative estimates based on internal standard response factors. The 10 organic analytes with the highest estimated concentrations are listed in Table 1 and account for approximately 86% of the total organic components in Tank TY-104. Tank TY-104 is on the Ferrocyanide Watch List

Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-U-106

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Brown, T.M.

1997-01-01

One major function of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) is to characterize wastes in support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis, along with other available information, are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report (TCR). This report and its appendixes serve as the TCR for single-shell tank 241-U-106. The objectives of this report are: (1) to use characterization data in response to technical issues associated with tank 241-U-106 waste, and (2) to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. Section 2.0 of this report summarizes the response to technical issues, Section 3.0 shows the best-basis inventory estimate, and Section 4.0 makes recommendations regarding safety status and additional sampling. The appendixes contain supporting data and information. This report also supports the requirements of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Ikology et al. 1996), Milestone M-44-10

Tank characterization report for single-shell tank 241-U-106

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Brown, T.M.

1997-04-15

One major function of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) is to characterize wastes in support of waste management and disposal activities at the Hanford Site. Analytical data from sampling and analysis, along with other available information, are compiled and maintained in a tank characterization report (TCR). This report and its appendixes serve as the TCR for single-shell tank 241-U-106. The objectives of this report are: (1) to use characterization data in response to technical issues associated with tank 241-U-106 waste, and (2) to provide a standard characterization of this waste in terms of a best-basis inventory estimate. Section 2.0 of this report summarizes the response to technical issues, Section 3.0 shows the best-basis inventory estimate, and Section 4.0 makes recommendations regarding safety status and additional sampling. The appendixes contain supporting data and information. This report also supports the requirements of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Ikology et al. 1996), Milestone M-44-10.

76 FR 60495 - Patient Safety Organizations: Voluntary Relinquishment From the Patient Safety Group

Science.gov (United States)

2011-09-29

... DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality Patient Safety Organizations: Voluntary Relinquishment From the Patient Safety Group AGENCY: Agency for Healthcare Research and... voluntary relinquishment from The Patient Safety Group of its status as a Patient Safety Organization (PSO...

Hanford Site Waste Storage Tank Information Notebook