WorldWideScience

Sample records for operating experience safety

  1. Operating experience: safety perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Piplani, Vivek; Krishnamurthy, P.R.; Kumar, Neeraj; Upadhyay, Devendra

    2015-01-01

    Operating Experience (OE) provides valuable information for improving NPP safety. This may include events, precursors, deviations, deficiencies, problems, new insights to safety, good practices, lessons and corrective actions. As per INSAG-10, an OE program caters as a fundamental means for enhancing the defence-in-depth at NPPs and hence should be viewed as ‘Continuous Safety Performance Improvement Tool’. The ‘Convention on Nuclear Safety’ also recognizes the OE as a tool of high importance for enhancing the NPP safety and its Article 19 mandates each contracting party to establish an effective OE program at operating NPPs. The lessons drawn from major accidents at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi NPPs had prompted nuclear stalwarts to change their safety perspective towards NPPs and to frame sound policies on issues like safety culture, severe accident prevention and mitigation. An effective OE program, besides correcting current/potential problems, help in proactively improving the NPP design, operating and maintenance procedures, practices, training, etc., and thus plays vital role in ensuring safe and efficient operation of NPPs. Further it enhances knowledge with regard to equipment operating characteristics, system performance trends and provides data for quantitative and qualitative safety analysis. Besides all above, an OE program inculcates a learning culture in the organisation and thus helps in continuously enhancing the expertise, technical competency and knowledge base of its staff. Nuclear and Radiation Facilities in India are regulated by Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB). Operating Plants Safety Division (OPSD) of AERB is involved in managing operating experience activities. This paper provides insights about the operating experience program of OPSD, AERB (including its on-line data base namely OPSD STAR) and its utilisation in improving the regulations and safety at Indian NPPs/projects. (author)

  2. Evaluation of operating experience with safety values

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bung, W.; Hoemke, P.; Oberender, W.; Paul, H.; Rueter, W.

    1985-01-01

    This report describes statistical investigations of 2076 functional tests carried out on power operated safety valves in conventional power plants in 1972 until 1983 with special regard to Common Mode-Failures. The results clearly show that Common Mode-Failures play an important part of non-availability for the controlled safety valves, especially in the control system. The 'Deutsche Risikostudie' does not consider any Common Mode-Failures of the primary safety valves. However there is no significant increase of the risk resulted by the primary safety valves in the 'Referenzanlage' if the calculated Common Mode-Failures probabilities are considered. (orig.) [de

  3. [Operating Room Nurses' Experiences of Securing for Patient Safety].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Park, Kwang Ok; Kim, Jong Kyung; Kim, Myoung Sook

    2015-10-01

    This study was done to evaluate the experience of securing patient safety in hospital operating rooms. Experiential data were collected from 15 operating room nurses through in-depth interviews. The main question was "Could you describe your experience with patient safety in the operating room?". Qualitative data from the field and transcribed notes were analyzed using Strauss and Corbin's grounded theory methodology. The core category of experience with patient safety in the operating room was 'trying to maintain principles of patient safety during high-risk surgical procedures'. The participants used two interactional strategies: 'attempt continuous improvement', 'immersion in operation with sharing issues of patient safety'. The results indicate that the important factors for ensuring the safety of patients in the operating room are manpower, education, and a system for patient safety. Successful and safe surgery requires communication, teamwork and recognition of the importance of patient safety by the surgical team.

  4. LMFBR operational safety: the EBR-II experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sackett, J.I.; Allen, N.L.; Dean, E.M.; Fryer, R.M.; Larson, H.A.; Lehto, W.K.

    1978-01-01

    The mission of the Experimental Breeder Reactor II (EBR-II) has evolved from that of a small LMFBR demonstration plant to a major irradiation-test facility. Because of that evolution, many operational-safety issues have been encountered. The paper describes the EBR-II operational-safety experience in four areas: protection-system design, safety-document preparation, tests of off-normal reactor conditions, and tests of elements with breached cladding

  5. Feedback of safety - related operational experience: Lessons learned

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Elias, D [Commonwealth Edison Co. (United States)

    1997-09-01

    The presentation considers the following aspects of feedback of safety-related operational experience: lessons learned program, objectives, personnel characteristics; three types of documents for transmitting lessons learned issues.

  6. Feedback of safety - related operational experience: Lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Elias, D.

    1997-01-01

    The presentation considers the following aspects of feedback of safety-related operational experience: lessons learned program, objectives, personnel characteristics; three types of documents for transmitting lessons learned issues

  7. Safety review of experiments at Albuquerque Operations Office

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Elliott, K.

    1984-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) Albuquerque Operations Office is responsible for the safety overview of nuclear reactor and critical assembly facilities at Sandia National Laboratories, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and the Rocky Flats Plant. The important safety concerns with these facilities involve the complex experiments that are performed, and that is the area emphasized. A determination is made by the Albuquerque Office (AL) with assistance from DOE/OMA whether or not a proposed experiment is an unreviewed safety question. Meetings are held with the contractor to resolve and clarify questions that are generated during the review of the proposed experiment. The AL safety evaluation report is completed and any recommendations are discussed. Prior to the experiment a preoperational appraisal is performed to assure that personnel, procedures, and equipment are in readiness for operations. During the experiment, any abnormal condition is reviewed in detail to determine any safety concerns

  8. Proceedings of 2nd PHWR operating safety experience meeting

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1991-04-01

    Papers presented during the eight sessions of the meeting were devoted to the impact of PHWR operating experience on design of civil structures (reactor building integrity); operating experiences related to pressure tubes, nuclear steam supply system, plant stability; reactor maintenance and control systems, reactor operational safety. Some events concerned with reactor shutdown due to power failures are described, as well as action undertaken to prevent major damage.

  9. Proceedings of 2nd PHWR operating safety experience meeting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-04-01

    Papers presented during the eight sessions of the meeting were devoted to the impact of PHWR operating experience on design of civil structures (reactor building integrity); operating experiences related to pressure tubes, nuclear steam supply system, plant stability; reactor maintenance and control systems, reactor operational safety. Some events concerned with reactor shutdown due to power failures are described, as well as action undertaken to prevent major damage

  10. Operational safety experience feedback by means of unusual event reports

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-07-01

    Operational experience of nuclear power plants can be used to great advantage to enhance safety performance provided adequate measures are in place to collect and analyse it and to ensure that the conclusions drawn are acted upon. Feedback of operating experience is thus an extremely important tool to ensure high standards of safety in operational nuclear power plants and to improve the capability to prevent serious accidents and to learn from minor deviations and equipment failures - which can serve as early warnings -to prevent even minor events from occurring. Mechanisms also need to be developed to ensure that operating experience is shared both nationally as well as internationally. The operating experience feedback process needs to be fully and effectively established within the nuclear power plant, the utility, the regulatory organization as well as in other institutions such as technical support organizations and designers. The main purpose of this publication is to reflect the international consensus as to the general principles and practices in the operational safety experience feedback process. The examples of national practices for the whole or for particular parts of the process are given in annexes. The publication complements the IAEA Safety Series No.93 ''Systems for Reporting Unusual Events in Nuclear Power Plants'' (1989) and may also give a general guidance for Member States in fulfilling their obligations stipulated in the Nuclear Safety Convention. Figs, tabs

  11. Operational safety experience feedback by means of unusual event reports

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1996-07-01

    Operational experience of nuclear power plants can be used to great advantage to enhance safety performance provided adequate measures are in place to collect and analyse it and to ensure that the conclusions drawn are acted upon. Feedback of operating experience is thus an extremely important tool to ensure high standards of safety in operational nuclear power plants and to improve the capability to prevent serious accidents and to learn from minor deviations and equipment failures - which can serve as early warnings -to prevent even minor events from occurring. Mechanisms also need to be developed to ensure that operating experience is shared both nationally as well as internationally. The operating experience feedback process needs to be fully and effectively established within the nuclear power plant, the utility, the regulatory organization as well as in other institutions such as technical support organizations and designers. The main purpose of this publication is to reflect the international consensus as to the general principles and practices in the operational safety experience feedback process. The examples of national practices for the whole or for particular parts of the process are given in annexes. The publication complements the IAEA Safety Series No.93 ``Systems for Reporting Unusual Events in Nuclear Power Plants`` (1989) and may also give a general guidance for Member States in fulfilling their obligations stipulated in the Nuclear Safety Convention. Figs, tabs.

  12. Lessons from feedback of safety operating experience for reactor physics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suchomel, J.; Rapavy, S.

    1999-01-01

    Analyses of events in WWER operations as a part of safety experience feedback provide a valuable source of lessons for reactor physics. Examples of events from Bohunice operation will be shown such as events with inadequate approach to criticality, positive reactivity insertions, expulsion of a control rod from shut-down reactor, problems with reactor protection system and control rods. (Authors)

  13. Operating experience feedback from safety significant events at research reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Shokr, A.M. [Atomic Energy Authority, Abouzabal (Egypt). Egypt Second Research Reactor; Rao, D. [Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Mumbai (India)

    2015-05-15

    Operating experience feedback is an effective mechanism to provide lessons learned from the events and the associated corrective actions to prevent recurrence of events, resulting in improving safety in the nuclear installations. This paper analyzes the events of safety significance that have been occurred at research reactors and discusses the root causes and lessons learned from these events. Insights from literature on events at research reactors and feedback from events at nuclear power plants that are relevant to research reactors are also presented along with discussions. The results of the analysis showed the importance of communication of safety information and exchange of operating experience are vital to prevent reoccurrences of events. The analysis showed also the need for continued attention to human factors and training of operating personnel, and the need for establishing systematic ageing management programmes of reactor facilities, and programmes for safety management of handling of nuclear fuel, core components, and experimental devices.

  14. Operating experience feedback from safety significant events at research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shokr, A.M.

    2015-01-01

    Operating experience feedback is an effective mechanism to provide lessons learned from the events and the associated corrective actions to prevent recurrence of events, resulting in improving safety in the nuclear installations. This paper analyzes the events of safety significance that have been occurred at research reactors and discusses the root causes and lessons learned from these events. Insights from literature on events at research reactors and feedback from events at nuclear power plants that are relevant to research reactors are also presented along with discussions. The results of the analysis showed the importance of communication of safety information and exchange of operating experience are vital to prevent reoccurrences of events. The analysis showed also the need for continued attention to human factors and training of operating personnel, and the need for establishing systematic ageing management programmes of reactor facilities, and programmes for safety management of handling of nuclear fuel, core components, and experimental devices.

  15. Safety aspects and operating experience of LWR plants in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aoki, S.; Yoshioka, T.; Toyota, M.; Hinoki, M.

    1977-01-01

    To develop nuclear power generation for the future, it is necessary to put further emphasis on safety assurance and to endeavour to devise measures to improve plant availability, based on the careful analysis of causes that reduce plant availability. The paper discusses the results of studies on the following items from such viewpoints: (1) Safety and operating experience of LWR nuclear power plants in Japan: operating experience with LWRs; improvements in LWR design during the past ten years; analysis of the factors affecting plant availability; (2) Assurance of safety and measures to increase availability: measures for safety and environmental protection; measures to reduce radiation exposure of employees; appropriateness of maintenance and inspection work; measures to increase plant availability; measures to improve reliability of equipment and components; (3) Future technical problems. (author)

  16. Safety aspects and operating experience of LWR plants in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aoki, S.; Hinoki, M.

    1977-01-01

    From the outset of nuclear power development in Japan, major emphasis has been placed on the safety of the nuclear power plants. There are now twelve nuclear power plants in operation with a total output of 6600 MWe. Their operating records were generally satisfactory, but in the 1974 to 1975 period, they experienced somewhat declined availability due to the repair work under the specific circumstances. After investigation of causes of troubles and the countermeasures thereof were made to ensure safety, they are now keeping good performance. In Japan, nuclear power plants are strictly subject to sufficient and careful inspection in compliance with the safety regulation, and are placed under stringent radiation control of employees. Under the various circumstances, however, the period of annual inspection tends to be prolonged more than originally planned, and this consequently is considered to be one of the causes of reduced availability. In order to develop nuclear power generation for the future, it is necessary to put further emphasis on the assurance of safety and to endeavor to devise measures to improve availability of the plants, based on the careful analysis of causes which reduce plant availability. This paper discusses the results of studies made for the following items from such viewpoints: (1) Safety and Operating Experience of LWR Nuclear Power Plants in Japan; a) Operating experience with light water reactors b) Improvements in design of light water reactors during the past ten years c) Analysis of the factors which affect plant availability; 2) Assurance of Safety and Measures to Increase Availability a) Measures for safety and environmental protection b) Measures to reduce radiation exposure of employees c) Appropriateness of maintenance and inspection work d) Measures to increase plant availability e) Measures to improve reliability of equipments and components; and 3) Future Technical Problems

  17. The safety experience of New Zealand adventure tourism operators.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bentley, Tim A; Page, Stephen; Walker, Linda

    2004-01-01

    This survey examined parameters of the New Zealand adventure tourism industry client injury risk. The research also sought to establish priorities for intervention to reduce adventure tourism risk, and identify client injury control measures currently in place (or absent) in the New Zealand adventure tourism industry, with a view to establishing guidelines for the development of effective adventure tourism safety management systems. This 2003 survey builds upon an exploratory study of New Zealand adventure tourism safety conducted by us during 1999. A postal questionnaire was used to survey all identifiable New Zealand adventure tourism operators. The questionnaire asked respondents about their recorded client injury experience, perceptions of client injury risk factors, safety management practices, and barriers to safety. Some 27 adventure tourism activities were represented among the responding sample (n=96). The highest client injury risk was reported in the snow sports, bungee jumping and horse riding sectors, although serious underreporting of minor injuries was evident across the industry. Slips, trips and falls (STF) were the major client injury mechanisms, and a range of risk factors for client injuries were identified. Safety management measures were inconsistently applied across the industry. The industry should consider the implications of poor injury reporting standards and safety management practices generally. Specifically, the industry should consider risk management that focuses on minor (e.g., STF) as well as catastrophic events.

  18. Experience gained in enhancing operational safety at ComEd`s nuclear power plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Elias, D [Commonwealth Edison Co. (United States)

    1997-09-01

    The following aspects of experience gained in enhancing operational safety at Comed`s nuclear power plants are discussed: nuclear safety policy; centralization/decentralization; typical nuclear operating organization; safety review boards; human performance enhancement; elements of effective nuclear oversight.

  19. Experience gained in enhancing operational safety at ComEd's nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Elias, D.

    1997-01-01

    The following aspects of experience gained in enhancing operational safety at Comed's nuclear power plants are discussed: nuclear safety policy; centralization/decentralization; typical nuclear operating organization; safety review boards; human performance enhancement; elements of effective nuclear oversight

  20. Halden fuel and material experiments beyond operational and safety limits

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Volkov, Boris; Wiesenack, Wolfgang; McGrath, M.; Tverberg, T.

    2014-01-01

    One of the main tasks of any research reactor is to investigate the behavior of nuclear fuel and materials prior to their introduction into the market. For commercial NPPs, it is important both to test nuclear fuels at a fuel burn-up exceeding current limits and to investigate reactor materials for higher irradiation dose. For fuel vendors such tests enable verification of fuel reliability or for the safety limits to be found under different operational conditions and accident situations. For the latter, in-pile experiments have to be performed beyond some normal limits. The program of fuel tests performed in the Halden reactor is aimed mainly at determining: The thermal FGR threshold, which may limit fuel operational power with burn-up increase, the “lift-off effect” when rod internal pressure exceeds coolant pressure, the effects of high burn-up on fuel behavior under power ramps, fuel relocation under LOCA simulation at higher burn-up, the effect of dry-out on high burn-up fuel rod integrity. This paper reviews some of the experiments performed in the Halden reactor for understanding some of the limits for standard fuel utilization with the aim of contributing to the development of innovative fuels and cladding materials that could be used beyond these limits. (author)

  1. Safety evaluation by living probabilistic safety assessment. Procedures and applications for planning of operational activities and analysis of operating experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johanson, Gunnar; Holmberg, J.

    1994-01-01

    Living Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) is a daily safety management system and it is based on a plant-specific PSA and supporting information systems. In the living use of PSA, plant status knowledge is used to represent actual plant safety status in monitoring or follow-up perspective. The PSA model must be able to express the risk at a given time and plant configuration. The process, to update the PSA model to represent the current or planned configuration and to use the model to evaluate and direct the changes in the configuration, is called living PSA programme. The main purposes to develop and increase the usefulness of living PSA are: Long term safety planning: To continue the risk assessment process started with the basic PSA by extending and improving the basic models and data to provide a general risk evaluation tool for analyzing the safety effects of changes in plant design and procedures. Risk planning of operational activities: To support the operational management by providing means for searching optimal operational maintenance and testing strategies from the safety point of view. The results provide support for risk decision making in the short term or in a planning mode. The operational limits and conditions given by technical specifications can be analyzed by evaluating the risk effects of alternative requirements in order to balance the requirements with respect to operational flexibility and plant economy. Risk analysis of operating experience: To provide a general risk evaluation tool for analyzing the safety effects of incidents and plant status changes. The analyses are used to: identify possible high risk situations, rank the occurred events from safety point of view, and get feedback from operational events for the identification of risk contributors. This report describes the methods, models and applications required to continue the process towards a living use of PSA. 19 tabs, 20 figs

  2. Safety related experience in FFTF startup and operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Peterson, R.E.; Halverson, T.G.; Daughtry, J.W.

    1982-06-01

    The Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) is a 400 MW(t) sodium cooled fast reactor operating at the Hanford Engineering Development Laboratory, Richland, Washington, to conduct fuels and materials testing in support of the US LMFBR program. Startup and initial power ascension testing of the facility involved a comprehensive series of readiness reviews and acceptance tests, many of which relate to the inherent safety of the plant. Included are physics measurements, natural circulation, integrated containment leakage, shielding effectiveness, fuel failure detection, and plant protection system tests. Described are the measurements taken to confirm the design safety margins upon which the operating authorization of the plant was based. These measurements demonstrate that large margins of safety are available in the FFTF design

  3. JET-ISX-B beryllium limiter experiment safety analysis report and operational safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Edmonds, P.H.

    1985-09-01

    An experiment to evaluate the suitability of beryllium as a limiter material has been completed on the ISX-B tokamak. The experiment consisted of two phases: (1) the initial operation and characterization in the ISX experiment, and a period of continued operation to the specified surface fluence (10 22 atoms/cm 2 ) of hydrogen ions; and (2) the disassembly, decontamination, or disposal of the ISX facility. During these two phases of the project, the possibility existed for beryllium and/or beryllium oxide powder to be produced inside the vacuum vessel. Beryllium dust is a highly toxic material, and extensive precautions are required to prevent the release of the beryllium into the experimental work area and to prevent the contamination of personnel working on the device. Details of the health hazards associated with beryllium and the appropriate precautions are presented. Also described in appendixes to this report are the various operational safety requirements for the project

  4. Operational safety experience reporting in the United States

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hartfield, R.A.

    1978-01-01

    Licensees of nuclear power plants in the United States have many reporting requirements included in their technical specifications and the code of federal regulations, title 10. The Nuclear Regulatory Commisson receives these reports and utilizes them in its regulatory program. Part of this usage includes collecting and publishing this operating experience data in various reports and storing information in various data systems. This paper will discuss the data systems and reports on operating experience published and used by the NRC. In addition, some observations on operating experience will be made. Subjects included will be the Licensee Event Report (LER) Data File, the Operating Unit Status Report (Gray Book), Radiation Exposure Reports, Effluents Reports, the Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System, Current Events, Bulletin Wrapups and Annual Summaries. Some of the uses of the reports and systems will be discussed. The Abnormal Occurence Report to the US Congress will also be described and discussed. (author)

  5. Bohunice V-1. Review of safety upgrading and operating experiences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Korec, J.; Kuschel, D.

    2000-01-01

    The Bohunice site in the Slovak Republic has two Russian-designed twin-unit nuclear power plants, one equipped with reactors of the WWER 440/230 type, the other with type WWER 440/213 reactors. Two older units (V-1) started commercial operation in late 1978 and 1980 respectively and have been supplying electricity to the national grid since that time without any events that could have degraded plant safety level. In the period prior to 1990 the utility Slovenske Elektrarne (S.E.) performed extensive modifications and upgrades to the original design of the two older units V-1 NPP. Furthermore, significant steps in safety improvement for Bohunice NPP V-1 have been made since 1990. Following the political restructuring of the former Czechoslovakia and the country's new open-door policy towards western organizations, several international expert missions were focused on evaluation of Bohunice NPP safety status level and operational reliability, particularly targeting the two older units. Based on recommendations of individual expert missions and complementary deterministic and probabilistic safety analyses performed by S.E., the Czechoslovak Nuclear Regulatory Authority issued the Resolution No. 5/91 defining 81 measures concerning further safety and reliability improvement of Bohunice V1 .A range of short-term and long-term upgrades was prioritised in terms of importance to plant safety and work to implement these measures commenced in the early nineties. During the 'Small Reconstruction' from 1991 to 1993 some of the short term upgrading measures were realized to eliminate the most serious safety deficits, thus to achieve a significant reduction in core damage frequency and a major improvement in confinement integrity. In this paper and presentation the goals of the gradual reconstruction project, basic engineering, detailed engineering and realization, last major stage of Unit 2 upgrade, as well as final stage of Unit 1 upgrade in early 2000 are presented

  6. The importance for nuclear safety of efficient feedback of operational experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-09-01

    Experience of practical operation is a valuable source of information for improving and optimizing the safety and reliability of nuclear power plants. Therefore it is essential to collect information on abnormal events occurring at plants during operation and on all deviations from normal performance by systems and personnel that could be precursors of accidents. For this purpose it is necessary to establish hierarchical systems to feedback operational safety experience at utility, national and international levels and to make these systems as effective as possible. The present report attempts to identify the safety objectives of these systems, to analyse the difficulties presently encountered and to suggest possible improvements

  7. Use of operational experience in fire safety assessment of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    collection of data related to fire safety occurrences in NPPs, the so called operational experience and the use of such operational experience in NPPs. This report provides good practice information on data needs, data reporting requirements and some advice on database features. In addition, this publication provides information on the applications of fire related operational experience, highlighting their benefits. This publication has been developed to complement other IAEA publications related to fire safety analysis within the framework of the IAEA programme of fire safety

  8. Evaluation of operating experience for early recognition of deteriorating safety performance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beckmerhagen, I.A.; Berg, H.P.

    2004-01-01

    One of the most difficult challenges facing nuclear power plants is to recognize the early signs of degrading safety performance before regulatory requirements are imposed or serious incidents or accidents occur. Today, the nuclear industry is striving for collecting more information on occurrences that could improve the operational safety performance. To achieve this, the reporting threshold has been lowered from incidents to anomalies with minor or no impact to safety. Industry experience (also outside nuclear industry) has shown that these are typical issues which should be considered when looking for such early warning signs. Therefore, it is important that nuclear power plant operators have the capability to trend, analyse and recognize early warning signs of deteriorating performance. It is necessary that plant operators are sensitive to these warning signs which may not be immediately evident. Reviewing operating experience is one of the main tasks for plant operators in their daily activities. Therefore, self assessment should be at the centre of any operational safety performance programme. One way of applying a self assessment program is through the following four basic elements: operational data, events, safety basis, and related experience. This approach will be described in the paper in more details. (authors)

  9. Operational safety performance indicator system at the Dukovany Nuclear Power Plant - Experience with indicator aggregation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mandula, J.

    2001-01-01

    The operational safety performance indicators serve as an important tool of performance monitoring and management at the Dukovany NPP. A software-supported system has been developed, which has included: data collection, central data storage, graphic output production and periodical report generation. Analyses of performance indicator trends together with evaluation in respect of annually updated target values and acceptance criteria are used for operational safety reviews forming an integral part of continual self-assessment process. This contribution has been focused on experience obtained during development of the operational safety assessment model using indicator aggregation. It summarises problems that had to be paid specific attention in the development process. Thanks to their solution, the model has become a synoptic monitor and a useful tool for operational safety assessment. (author)

  10. The role of the regulator in promoting and evaluating safety culture. Operating experience feedback programme approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Perez, S.

    2002-01-01

    Promoting and Evaluating Safety Culture (S.C.) in Operating Organizations must be one of the main Nuclear Regulator goals to achieve. This can be possible only if each and every one of the regulatory activities inherently involves S.C. It can be seen throughout attitudes, values, uses and practices in both individuals and the whole regulatory organization. One among all the regulatory tools commonly used by regulators to promote and evaluate the commitment of the licensees with safety culture as a whole involves organizational factors and particular attention is directed to the operating organization. This entailed a wide range of activities, including all those related with management of safety performance. Operating Experience Feedback Programme as a tool to enhance safety operation is particularly useful for regulators in the evaluation of the role of S.C. in operating organization. Safety Culture is recognized as a subset of the wider Organizational Culture. Practices that improve organizational effectiveness can also contribute to enhance safety. An effective event investigation methodology is a specific practice, which contributes to a healthy Safety Culture. (author)

  11. Safety and operating experience at EBR-II: lessons for the future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sackett, J.I.; Golden, G.H.

    1981-01-01

    EBR-II is a small LMFBR power plant that has performed safely and reliably for 16 years. Much has been learned from operating it to facilitate the design, licensing, and operation of large commercial LMFBR power plants in the US. EBR-II has been found relatively easy to keep in conformity with evolving safety requirements, largely because of inherent safety features of the plant. Such features reduce dependence on active safety systems to protect against accidents. EBR-II has experienced a number of plant-transient incidents, some planned, others inadvertent; none has resulted in any significant plant damage. The operating experience with EBR-II has led to the formulation of an Operational Reliability Test Program (ORTP), aimed at showing inherently safe performance of fuel and plant systems

  12. Operating experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McRae, L.P.; Six, D.E.

    1991-01-01

    In 1987, Westinghouse Hanford Company began operating a first-generation integrated safeguards system in the Plutonium Finishing Plant storage vaults. This Vault Safety and Inventory System is designed to integrate data into a computer-based nuclear material inventory monitoring system. The system gathers, in real time, measured physical parameters that generate nuclear material inventory status data for thousands of stored items and sends tailored report to the appropriate users. These data include canister temperature an bulge data reported to Plant Operations and Material Control and Accountability personnel, item presence and identification data reported to Material Control and Accountability personnel, and unauthorized item movement data reported to Security response forces and Material Control and Accountability personnel. The Westinghouse Hanford Company's experience and operational benefits in using this system for reduce radiation exposure, increase protection against insider threat, and real-time inventory control are discussed in this paper

  13. The Belgian experience on the backfitting and safety upgrading of old operating nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brognon, T.

    1993-01-01

    The paper describes the methodology for backfitting and safety upgrading during the reevaluation of the Belgian NPP's: first generation (Doel-1, Doel-2, Tihange-1) and second generation plants (Doel-3, Doel-4, Tihange-2 and Tihange-3). A list of essential safety subjects and topics is given. The experience has proved the feasibility of a safety upgrading of operating NPP without injury to its availability, the benefit of a close cooperation between owner, engineering company and safety authorities throughout the project. A global approach to solving numerous specific deficiencies along with the optimization of the investments regarding the safety improvement of the NPP is suggested. Further increase of the know-how will be achieved through the present Belgian programme along with similar activities abroad. (R.I.)

  14. Experience on operational safety improvement of control and operation support systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Itoh, N.; Nakagawa, T.; Mano, K.

    1988-01-01

    Japanese nuclear industry started in 1956 and about 30 years have passed since that time. Through these years, we have made a lot of efforts and developments in the field of Control and Instrumentation (C and I) system. The above 30 years and following years can be divided into four major periods. The first one is the period of research, the second of domestic production, the third of improvement, and the fourth of advancement. Improvements of C and I system, which we have made in those periods have made a great contribution to enhancement of reliability, availability and operability of nuclear power plants. Fig. 1 shows TEPCO's nuclear power plant (BWR) construction experience and technical trend of C and I system in Japan. This paper is to introduce the efforts and operational experience on control and operation support systems

  15. Operational safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1977-01-01

    The PNL Safety, Standards and Compliance Program contributed to the development and issuance of safety policies, standards, and criteria; for projects in the nuclear and nonnuclear areas. During 1976 the major emphasis was on developing criteria, instruments and methods to assure that radiation exposure to occupational personnel and to people in the environs of nuclear-related facilities is maintained at the lowest level technically and economically practicable. Progress in 1976 is reported on the preparation of guidelines for radiation exposure; Pu dosimetry studies; the preparation of an environmental monitoring handbook; and emergency instrumentation preparedness

  16. Operational experience review and methods to enhance safety and reliability in the NPP-Leibstadt (KKL)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Haeusermann, R [Kernkraftwerk Leibstadt AG, Leibstadt (Switzerland)

    1997-10-01

    In the nuclear community it became clear that an integrated feedback system of operating experience must also include the unsuccessful results. The deviations, expected to achieved performance are analysed to the failure mode and its effect. KKL has lowered the number of safety significant events since commercial operation started. The thoroughness of the review/analysis of the events has increased with high priority set to human factor induced events in operation and maintenance. Since the participation of the author in the ASSET-Mission in Smolensk in 1993, KKL introduced the ASSET-Root-Cause method and has supplemented it by the HPES (Human Performance Enhancement System). 4 refs, 6 figs.

  17. Operational experience review and methods to enhance safety and reliability in the NPP-Leibstadt (KKL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haeusermann, R.

    1997-01-01

    In the nuclear community it became clear that an integrated feedback system of operating experience must also include the unsuccessful results. The deviations, expected to achieved performance are analysed to the failure mode and its effect. KKL has lowered the number of safety significant events since commercial operation started. The thoroughness of the review/analysis of the events has increased with high priority set to human factor induced events in operation and maintenance. Since the participation of the author in the ASSET-Mission in Smolensk in 1993, KKL introduced the ASSET-Root-Cause method and has supplemented it by the HPES (Human Performance Enhancement System). 4 refs, 6 figs

  18. Industry use of operating experience to achieve improved nuclear plant safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zebroski, E.L.

    1981-01-01

    A principal lesson drawn from the accident at Three Mile Island was the need for a comprehensive and rigorous system for analysis and feedback of operating experience to reactor operators. Chief executives of US utilities directed in mid-1979 that an intensive and rigorous system of analysis and feedback of operating experience be established. This system is commonly referred to as the ''Significant Events Program''. Since April 1980, the Nuclear Safety Analysis Center (NSAC) has been joined by the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) in the field investigation of significant operating events. NSAC has responsibility for analysis of the design and physical events aspects, while INPO has primary responsibility for the operators' aspects, including procedures and training. The process of screening, analysis and feedback of operating experience is now functioning as a seven-step process. A variety of data sources is used, including License Event Reports and outage and major maintenance reports. These are compiled and indexed in convenient form. However, such data bases are used only as incidental tools for the basic investigations and analytical efforts. Rapid dissemination of results is provided by a computer-aided conferencing system, which links 70 operating LWR reactors in the USA, and which has now been extended to four utilities outside the USA, representing several dozen more reactors. Major safety and economic incentives are evident for the rigorous use of such operating experience and for participation in a comprehensive system. Traditional habits of secrecy are recognized as obstacles to timely communication. A principal responsibility of top management of reactor-operating organizations is to overcome such habits where they are counter to the public interest, as well as to the health and survival interest of the utility itself

  19. Experience relevant to safety obtained from reactor decommissioning operations in the French Atomic Energy Commission

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Giraudel, B.; Langlois, G.

    1979-01-01

    From among the nuclear facilities constructed in France the authors cite eight large reactors, ranging from critical assemblies to power reactors, that have been finally shut-down since 1965. A brief account is given of the way in which the various operations were carried out after the final control rod drop, a distinction being drawn between the shut-down proper and the containment and dismantling work. A description is also given, from the technical and regulatory standpoint, of the final stage attained, and mention is made of French safety arrangements and of the part played by the safety services during decommissioning operations. Among the lessons derived from French experience, the authors mention the completion of operations without any serious safety problems, and with guarantees for the protection of personnel and the population as a whole, by conventional techniques; the advantage of planning decommissioning operations from the very beginning of construction of the facilities; and the importance of filing descriptive documents. In view of the experience gained, the French Atomic Energy Commission has devised internal procedures for facilitating the application of regulations governing the shut-down and decommissioning phases, which are aimed at preserving surveillance procedures similar to those in force during normal operation. (author)

  20. Enhancing operational nuclear safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sengoku, Katsuhisa

    2008-01-01

    's safety standards and program which provides the safety objective following the 10 fundamental safety principles. The safety requirements defines the functional conditions required for safety and the safety guides provides user-friendly and up-to-date practical guidance representing good/best practices to fulfill the requirements. The IAEA provides safety review services and fields safety review teams upon request of member states for the regulatory, the International Regulatory Review Team (IRRT) and Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) and Peer Review of the Operational and Safety Performance Experience Review (PROSPER). The OSART programme's purpose is to assist member states in enhancing the operational safety of individual nuclear power plants and to promote the continuous development of operational safety within all member states by the dissemination of information on good practice. The OSART Mission Results (OSMIR) database contains the results from 73 OSART missions and 54 follow up visits from 1991 and its continually updated. The Asian Nuclear Safety Network (ANSN) was established to pool and share existing and new technical knowledge and practical experience to further improve the safety of nuclear installation in Asia. In summary, the enhancement of the GNSR is anchored in the recognition that all the states are in the same boat and the increasing importance of sharing and mutual learning, sharing knowledge and experience through regional and global networking. It requires joint and coordinated strategy by all states. The IAEA is willing and ready to support the GNSR through the establishment and application of safety standards, and safety review and advisory services and international instruments. (Author)

  1. Radiological safety experience in nuclear fuel cycle operations at Bhabha Atomic Research Center, Trombay, Mumbai, India

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pushparaja; Gopalakrishnan, R.K.; Subramaniam, G.

    2000-01-01

    Activities at Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), Mumbai, cover nuclear fuel cycle operations based on natural uranium as the fuel. The facilities include: plant for purification and production of nuclear grade uranium metal, fuel fabrication, research reactor operation, fuel reprocessing and radioactive waste management in each stage. Comprehensive radiation protection programmes for assessment and monitoring of radiological impact of these operations, both in occupational and public environment, have been operating in BARC since beginning. These programmes, based on the 1990 ICRP Recommendations as prescribed by national regulatory body, the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), are being successfully implemented by the Health, Safety and Environment Group, BARC. Radiation Hazards Control Units attached to the nuclear fuel cycle facilities provide radiation safety surveillance to the various operations. The radiation monitoring programme consists of measurement and control of external exposures by thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs), hand-held and installed instruments, and internal exposures by bioassay and direct whole body counting using shadow shield counter for beta gamma emitters and phoswich detector based system for plutonium. In addition, an environmental monitoring programme is in place to assess public exposures resulting from the operation of these facilities. The programme involves analysis of various matrices in the environment such as bay water, salt, fish, sediment and computation of resulting public exposures. Based on the operating experience in these plants, improved educating and training programmes for plant operators, have been designed. This, together with the application of new technologies have brought down individual as well as average doses of occupational workers. The environmental releases remain a small fraction of the authorised limits. The operating health physics experience in some of these facilities is discussed in this paper

  2. Operational-safety advantages of LMFBR's: the EBR-II experience and testing program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sackett, J.I.; Lindsay, R.W.; Golden, G.H.

    1982-01-01

    LMFBR's contain many inherent characteristics that simplify control and improve operating safety and reliability. The EBR-II design is such that good advantage was taken of these characteristics, resulting in a vary favorable operating history and allowing for a program of off-normal testing to further demonstrate the safe response of LMFBR's to upsets. The experience already gained, and that expected from the future testing program, will contribute to further development of design and safety criteria for LMFBR's. Inherently safe characteristics are emphasized and include natural convective flow for decay heat removal, minimal need for emergency power and a large negative reactivity feedback coefficient. These characteristics at EBR-II allow for ready application of computer diagnosis and control to demonstrate their effectiveness in response to simulated plant accidents. This latter testing objective is an important part in improvements in the man-machine interface

  3. Operational safety at the FFTF

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baird, Q.L.; Hagan, J.W.; Seeman, S.E.; Baker, S.M.

    1981-02-01

    An extensive operational nuclear safety program has been an integral part of the design, startup, and initial operating phases of the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF). During the design and construction of the facility, a program of independent safety overviews and analyses assured the provision of responsible safety margins within the plant, protective systems, and engineered safety features for protection of the public, operating staff, and the facility. The program is continuing through surveillance of operations to verify continued adherence to the established operating envelope and for timely identification of any trends potentially adverse to those margins. Experience from operation of FFTF is being utilized in the development of enhanced operational nuclear safety aids for application in follow-on breeder reactor power systems. The commendable plant and personnel safety experiences of FFTF through its startup and ascension to full power demonstrate the overall effectiveness of the FFTF operational nuclear safety program

  4. 10 Years of operating experience of the valves in the safety systems on Caorso plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Curcuruto, S.; Pasquini, M.

    1990-01-01

    The Operating Experience (O.E.) of the valves in the safety related systems on Caorso plant has been analysed. The valves have been grouped according to system, type and manufacturer. All the data on the failures have been respectively drawn out by the O.E. data bank and, in some cases, they have been integrated by informations collected directly on the plant. The events and the relevant causes have been analysed, particularly taking into account the repetitive events. Most of the failures were discovered during the surveillance tests, giving a positive indication of the effectiveness of the periodic test program. It was also that concluded hardware problems caused more failures than human errors both during operation and maintenance. Abnormal distributions of failures on the valves and on their components have been found out. Weak components both mechanical and electrical and pertinent corrective measures have been identified, aimed to eliminate the recurring failure modes

  5. Improving operating room safety

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Garrett Jill

    2009-11-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Despite the introduction of the Universal Protocol, patient safety in surgery remains a daily challenge in the operating room. This present study describes one community health system's efforts to improve operating room safety through human factors training and ultimately the development of a surgical checklist. Using a combination of formal training, local studies documenting operating room safety issues and peer to peer mentoring we were able to substantially change the culture of our operating room. Our efforts have prepared us for successfully implementing a standardized checklist to improve operating room safety throughout our entire system. Based on these findings we recommend a multimodal approach to improving operating room safety.

  6. Safety significance of component ageing, exemplary for MOV, based on French and German operating experience

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Morlent, O. [CEA Fontenay-aux-Roses, 92 (France). Inst. de Protection et de Surete Nucleaire; Michel, F. [Gesellschaft fuer Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH, Garching (Germany)

    2001-07-01

    An outline is given of how IPSN and GRS assess the effects of physical ageing on the safety of French and German Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) on the basis of the available knowledge and how investigations are carried out. The presentation is focused exemplary on a preliminary study illustrating approaches for the evaluation of the ageing behaviour of active components, the motor-operated valves (MOV). The results so far seems to demonstrate that the developed methodological approaches are suitable to obtain qualitative evidence with regard to the ageing behaviour of technical facilities such as MOV. The evaluation of the operating experience with French 900 MWe plants seems to reveal, for MOV of one system, a trend similar to some international findings about ageing-related events with increasing operating time; this trend will have to be confirmed. For the German NPPs so far, there appears to be no significant increase of ageing-related events concerning MOV as the plants get older. Future work on ageing scheduled at IPSN and GRS includes further cooperation on this issue, too; a deep analysis is necessary to explain the reasons of such apparent differences before any conclusion. (authors)

  7. Safety significance of component ageing, exemplary for MOV, based on French and German operating experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Morlent, O.

    2001-01-01

    An outline is given of how IPSN and GRS assess the effects of physical ageing on the safety of French and German Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) on the basis of the available knowledge and how investigations are carried out. The presentation is focused exemplary on a preliminary study illustrating approaches for the evaluation of the ageing behaviour of active components, the motor-operated valves (MOV). The results so far seems to demonstrate that the developed methodological approaches are suitable to obtain qualitative evidence with regard to the ageing behaviour of technical facilities such as MOV. The evaluation of the operating experience with French 900 MWe plants seems to reveal, for MOV of one system, a trend similar to some international findings about ageing-related events with increasing operating time; this trend will have to be confirmed. For the German NPPs so far, there appears to be no significant increase of ageing-related events concerning MOV as the plants get older. Future work on ageing scheduled at IPSN and GRS includes further cooperation on this issue, too; a deep analysis is necessary to explain the reasons of such apparent differences before any conclusion. (authors)

  8. Development of reliability database for safety-related I and C component based on operating experience of KSNP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jang, S. C.; Han, S. H.; Min, K. R.

    2001-01-01

    Reliability database for safety-related I and C components has been developed, based on domestic operating experience of total 8.63 years from four units-Yonggwang Units 3 and 4, and Ulchin Units 3 and 4. This plant-specific data of safety-related I and C components has compared with operating experience for CE-supplied plants in U.S.A. As a results, we found that on the whole the domestic reliability data was similar to CE-supplied plants in USA, through lots of failures occurred early in the commercial operation were included in our analyses without percolation

  9. Experience of Hungarian model project: 'Strengthening training for operational safety at Paks NPP'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kiss, I.

    1998-01-01

    Training of Operational Safety at Paks NPP is described including all the features of the project including namely: description of Paks NPP, its properties and performances; reasons for establishing Hungarian Model Project, its main goals, mentioning Hungarian and IAEA experts involved in the Project, its organization, operation, budget, current status together with its short term and long term impact

  10. Links between operating experience feedback of industrial accidents and nuclear safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eury, S.P.

    2012-01-01

    Since 1992, the bureau for analysis of industrial risks and pollutions (BARPI) collects, analyzes and publishes information on industrial accidents. The ARIA database lists over 40.000 accidents or incidents, most of which occurred in French classified facilities (ICPE). Events occurring in nuclear facilities are rarely reported in ARIA because they are reported in other databases. This paper describes the process of selection, characterization and review of these accidents, as well as the following consultation with industry trade groups. It is essential to publicize widely the lessons learned from analyzing industrial accidents. To this end, a web site (www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr) gives free access to the accidents summaries, detailed sheets, studies, etc. to professionals and the general public. In addition, the accidents descriptions and characteristics serve as inputs to new regulation projects or risk analyses. Finally, the question of the links between operating experience feedback of industrial accidents and nuclear safety is explored: if the rigorous and well-documented methods of experience feedback in the nuclear field certainly set an example for other activities, nuclear safety can also benefit from inputs coming from the vast diversity of accidents arisen into industrial facilities because of common grounds. Among these common grounds we can find: -) the fuel cycle facilities use many chemicals and chemical processes that are also used by chemical industries; -) the problems resulting from the ageing of equipment affect both heavy and nuclear industries; -) the risk of hydrogen explosion; -) the risk of ammonia, ammonia is a gas used by nuclear power plants as an ingredient in the onsite production of mono-chloramine and ammonia is involved in numerous accidents in the industry: at least 900 entries can be found in the ARIA database. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  11. Safety in New Zealand's adventure tourism industry: the client accident experience of adventure tourism operators.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bentley , T A; Page, S J; Laird, I S

    2000-01-01

    Injuries and fatalities among participants of adventure tourism activities have the potential to seriously impact on New Zealand's tourism industry. However, the absence of statistics for tourist accidents in New Zealand, and the lack of detailed academic research into adventure tourism safety, means the extent of the problem is unknown. The aims of the present study were to determine the incidence of client injuries across a range of adventure tourism activity sectors, and to identify common accident events and contributory risk factors. A postal questionnaire survey of New Zealand adventure tourism operators was used. Operators were asked to provide information related to their business; the number of recorded client injuries during the preceding 12 month period, January to December 1998; common accident and injury events associated with their activity; and perceived risk factors for accidents in their sector of the adventure tourism industry. The survey was responded to by 142 New Zealand adventure tourism operators. The operators' reported client injury experience suggests the incidence of serious client injuries is very low. Highest client injury incidence rates were found for activities that involved the risk of falling from a moving vehicle or animal (e.g., cycle tours, quad biking, horse riding, and white-water rafting). Slips, trips, and falls on the level were common accident events across most sectors of the industry. Perceived accident/incident causes were most commonly related to the client, and in particular, failure to attend to and follow instructions. The prevalence of client injuries in activity sectors not presently covered by government regulation, suggests policy makers should look again at extending codes of practice to a wider range of adventure tourism activities. Further research considering adventure tourism involvement in overseas visitor hospitalized injuries in New Zealand, is currently in progress. This will provide supporting evidence

  12. Improving the international system for operating experience feedback. INSAG-23. A report by the International Nuclear Safety Group

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    The operational safety performance of nuclear facilities has, in general, improved notably over time throughout the world. This has been achieved, in part, through operating experience feedback (OEF) and the introduction of new technology. While the continued strong safety performance by operators is encouraging, safety significant events continue to recur in nuclear installations. This indicates that operators are not learning and applying the lessons that experience can teach us. This report focuses on systems that are operated by intergovernmental organizations with close contacts to national regulatory authorities. These systems provide an alternative network to the worldwide system employed by the operators of nuclear facilities known as the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO). The WANO system is restricted to its members, who have concluded that keeping the information exchanged confidential improves its usefulness. INSAG recognizes the merits of this approach, particularly in light of the primary responsibility of licensed operators for the safety of their facilities. Nevertheless, INSAG encourages WANO to share key safety lessons with national regulatory authorities and intergovernmental organization

  13. Safety Assessment in the AREVA Group: Operating Experience from a Self-Assessment Tool

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coye de Brunélis, T.; Mignot, E.; Sidaner, J.-F.

    2016-01-01

    The expression “safety culture” first appeared following analysis of the Chernobyl accident in 1986. It was first defined in INSAG-4 (International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group safety series) in 1991. Other events have occurred in nuclear facilities and during transportation since Chernobyl: Tokai Mura in 1999, Roissy Transport in 2002, Davis Besse in 2002, Thorp in 2005. These events show that the initial approach was too simplistic. Based on this observation, the definition of safety culture was supplemented by including concepts of cultural value (associated with the country and the company) and human and organizational factors, and was integrated in that form with the emergence and implementation of integrated management systems (IMS). Today, the concept of nuclear safety culture covers a wide set of factors such as safety, quality, corporate culture, defined processes and policies, organizations and related resources. Any assessment of people’s safety culture, particularly people directly involved in facility operations, is thus part of a comprehensive policy and contributes to a de facto demonstration of the priority which management assigns to safety.

  14. CANDU operating experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McConnell, L.G.; Woodhead, L.W.; Fanjoy, G.R.; Thurygill, E.W.

    1980-05-01

    The CANDU-PHW program is based upon 38 years of heavy water reactor experience with 35 years of operating experience. Canada has had 72 reactor years of nuclear-electric operations experience with 10 nuclear units in 4 generating stations during a period of 18 years. All objectives have been met with outstanding performance: worker safety, public safety, environmental emissions, reliable electricity production, and low electricity cost. The achievement has been realized through total teamwork involving all scientific disciplines and all project functions (research, design, manufacturing, construction, and operation). (auth)

  15. Feedback of experience as a contribution to safety - an operator's duty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Micklinghoff, M.; Pamme, H.; Raetzke, C.

    2007-01-01

    Exchanges of information about events and reliability problems make important contributions to nuclear power plant safety. In an article in the last but one issue of atw, journalist Timm Kraegenow proposed that the operators of nuclear power plants model their attitude towards this subject, and their flows of information, on the example of civil aviation. In particular, vendors should be made the nodes of information exchange. However, in-depth comparison shows that the two areas, civil aviation and nuclear power, have fundamentally different structures. The safety of aircraft designs continues to be the vendor's responsibility throughout the service life of that aircraft, and it is the vendor who holds the type certification. When a deficit becomes apparent, the vendor is the partner to be contacted by the competent authority, and it is the vendor's duty to elaborate solutions. In the case of nuclear power plants, however, responsibility for safety after plant commissioning rests with the operator, i.e. the licensee. The licensee initiates improvements in safety and is also the addressee of instructions by the authorities. This fundamental difference in responsibility for safety is in the nature of things. It is bound to affect also exchanges of information as a module of safety. Although comparison with civil aviation is interesting, it becomes apparent in the end that the way in which flows of information are designed cannot be transferred to the nuclear sector. (orig.)

  16. Enhancing operational safety

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wiebe, J S

    1997-09-01

    The presentation briefly considers the following aspects concerning enhancing operational safety of NPP: licensed control room supervision, reactivity changes, personnel access to control room, simulator training.

  17. Safety evaluation of the NSRR facility relevant to the modification for improved pulse operation and preirradiated fuel experiments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Inabe, Teruo; Terakado, Yoshibumi; Tanzawa, Sadamitsu; Katagiri, Hiroshi; Kobayashi, Hideo

    1988-11-01

    The Nuclear Safety Research Reactor (NSRR) is a pulse reactor for the inpile experiments to study the fuel behavior under reactivity initiated accident conditions. The present operation modes of the NSRR consist of the steady state operation up to 300 kW and the natural pulse operation in which a sharp pulsed power is generated from substantially zero power level. In addition to these, two new modes of shaped pulse operation and combined pulse operation will be conducted in the near future as the improved pulse operations. A transient power up to 10 MW will be generated in the shaped pulse operation, and a combination of a transient power up to 10 MW and a sharp pulsed power will be generated in the combined pulse operation. Furthermore, preirradiated fuel rods will be employed in the future experiments whereas the present experiments are confined to the test specimens of unirradiated fuel rods. To provide for these programs, the fundamental design works relevant to the modification of the reactor facility including the reactor instrumentation and control systems and experimental provision were developed. The reactor safety evaluation is prerequisite for confirming the propriety of the fundamental design of the reactor facility from the safety point of view. The safety evaluation was therefore conducted postulating such events that would bring about abnormal conditions in the reactor facility. As a result of the safety evaluation, it has been confirmed as to the NSRR facility after modification that the anticipated transients, the postulated accidents, the major accident and the hypothetical accident do not result respectively in any serious safety problem and that the fundamental design principles and the reactor siting are adequate and acceptable. (author)

  18. 48{sup th} Annual meeting on nuclear technology (AMNT 2017). Key topic / Enhanced safety and operation excellence. Focus session: International operational experience

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mohrbach, Ludger [VGB PowerTech e.V., Essen (Germany). Abteilung ' ' N' ' ; Gottschling, Helge

    2017-11-15

    Summary report on the Key Topic Enhanced Safety and Operation Excellence: Focus Session: International Operational Experience and the Nuclear Energy Campus of the 48{sup th} Annual Meeting on Nuclear Technology (AMNT 2017) held in Berlin, 16 to 17 May 2017.

  19. Proceedings of the specialist meeting on nuclear fuel and control rods: operating experience, design evolution and safety aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    Design and management of nuclear fuel has undergone a strong evolution process during past years. The increase of the operating cycle length and of the discharge burnup has led to the use of more advanced fuel designs, as well as to the adoption of fuel efficient operational strategies. The analysis of recent operational experience highlighted a number of issues related to nuclear fuel and control rod events raising concerns about the safety aspects of these new designs and operational strategies, which led to the organisation of this Specialists Meeting on fuel and control rod issues. The meeting was intended to provide a forum for the exchange of information on lessons learned and safety concern related to operating experience with fuel and control rods (degradation, reliability, experience with high burnup fuel, and others). After an opening session 6 papers), this meeting was subdivided into four sessions: Operating experience and safety concern (technical session I - 6 papers), Fuel performance and operational issues (technical session II - 7 papers), Control rod issues (technical session III - 9 papers), Improvement of fuel design (technical session IV.A - 4 papers), Improvement on fuel fabrication and core management (technical session IV.B - 6 papers)

  20. Safety analysis of the Los Alamos critical experiments facility: burst operation of Skua

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Orndoff, J.D.; Paxton, H.C.; Wimett, T.F.

    1979-05-01

    A detailed consideration of the Skua burst assembly is presented, thereby supplementing the facility safety analysis report covering the operation of other critical assemblies at Los Alamos. As with these assemblies the small fission-product inventory, ambient pressure, and moderate temperatures in Skua are amenable to straightforward measures to ensure the protection of the public

  1. Experience with Periodic Safety Review (PSR) at Kozloduy NPP after 20 years of operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Popov, V.

    2011-01-01

    Conclusion: Measures in the long-term Programs for improving safety and radiation protection of unit 5&6, based on PSR outcome and addressed on the units’ operation licence renewal are under way. • NPP Kozloduy intends to fulfils requirements on modern nuclear power plants which occasionally exceeds limits of the effective national nuclear legislation

  2. Safety analysis of the Los Alamos critical experiments facility: burst operation of Skua

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Orndoff, J.D.; Paxton, H.C.; Wimett, T.F.

    1980-12-01

    Detailed consideration of the Skua burst assembly is provided, thereby supplementing the facility Safety Analysis Report covering the operation of other critical assemblies at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. As with these assemblies the small fission-product inventory, ambient pressure, and moderate temperatures in Skua are amenable to straightforward measures to ensure the protection of the public

  3. How to ensure the safety of extended operations: Practice and experience of Paks NPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kovacs, J.

    2005-01-01

    The Paks Nuclear Power Plant strategy is to extend the operational lifetime of the plant and renew the operational license for 20 years over the designed and licensed lifetime. In the paper the preconditions of long-term operation are discussed and the basic findings and experience of the license renewal works are also presented. The further plans fo NPP Paks for ensuring safe operation in long-term are discussed. (author)

  4. Experience in the implementation of quality assurance program and safety culture assessment of research reactor operation and maintenance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Syarip; Suryopratomo, K.

    2001-01-01

    The implementation of quality assurance program and safety culture for research reactor operation are of importance to assure its safety status. It comprises an assessment of the quality of both technical and organizational aspects involved in safety. The method for the assessment is based on judging the quality of fulfillment of a number of essential issues for safety i.e. through audit, interview and/or discussions with personnel and management in plant. However, special consideration should be given to the data processing regarding the fuzzy nature of the data i.e. in answering the questionnaire. To accommodate this situation, the SCAP, a computer program based on fuzzy logic for assessing plant safety status, has been developed. As a case study, the experience in the assessment of Kartini research reactor safety status shows that it is strongly related to the implementation of quality assurance program in reactor operation and awareness of reactor operation staffs to safety culture practice. It is also shown that the application of the fuzzy rule in assessing reactor safety status gives a more realistic result than the traditional approach. (author)

  5. The effects of risk perception and flight experience on airline pilots' locus of control with regard to safety operation behaviors.

    Science.gov (United States)

    You, Xuqun; Ji, Ming; Han, Haiyan

    2013-08-01

    The primary objective of this paper was to integrate two research traditions, social cognition approach and individual state approach, and to understand the relationships between locus of control (LOC), risk perception, flight time, and safety operation behavior (SOB) among Chinese airline pilots. The study sample consisted of 193 commercial airline pilots from China Southern Airlines Ltd. The results showed that internal locus of control directly affected pilot safety operation behavior. Risk perception seemed to mediate the relationship between locus of control and safety operation behaviors, and total flight time moderated internal locus of control. Thus, locus of control primarily influences safety operation behavior indirectly by affecting risk perception. The total effect of internal locus of control on safety behaviors is larger than that of external locus of control. Furthermore, the safety benefit of flight experience is more pronounced among pilots with high internal loci of control in the early and middle flight building stages. Practical implications for aviation safety and directions for future research are also discussed. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  6. CANDU operating experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McConnell, L.G.; Woodhead, L.W.; Fanjoy, G.R.

    1982-03-01

    The CANDU Pressurized Heavy Water (CANDU-PHW) type of nuclear electric generating station has been developed jointly by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited and Ontario Hydro. This paper highlights Ontario Hydro's operating experience using the CANDU-PHW system, with a focus on the operating performance and costs, reliability of system components and nuclear safety considerations both to the workers and the public

  7. Evaluation of experience and trends in international co-operation in nuclear safety and licensing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stadie, K.B.; Strohl, P.

    1977-01-01

    The paper traces the development of co-operation in nuclear safety technology between the OECD Member countries which began as early as 1965 and is now organised under the auspices of the Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency. The principal objective is to exchange and evaluate information on relevant R and D and hence broaden the technical basis for decision-making by licensing authorities in the different countries. The membership of the Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations combines expertise in nuclear safety R and D and in licensing questions so that licensing procedures in the different countries may be exposed continuously to the influence of overall technological progress. The Committee actively seeks to narrow the differences between administrative procedures and traditional legal practices in Member countries as these affect the licensing of nuclear installations, primarily by assessing and comparing the methods employed. The paper shows how the Committee's working arrangements provide for maximum flexibility: the various co-ordinated programmes are selected after in-depth evaluation of potential areas of priority and are implemented through ad hoc Working Groups, specialist meetings or task forces, or in the form of special studies involving all interested countries. The results, conclusions and recommendations emerging from each programme are reviewed by the Committee before dissemination. Hitherto the greater part of the Committee's activities has been concerned with the safety of light water reactors and related subjects, but more attention is now being given to other topics such as LMFBR safety technology and the safety of fuel cycle facilities, particularly those at the end of the process, the so-called ''back-end'' plants. The paper discusses certain problems and constraints encountered in implementing the programme, some of which stem from Member countries' different degrees of penetration

  8. Design, operation, and safety of single-room interventional MRI suites: practical experience from two centers.

    Science.gov (United States)

    White, Mark J; Thornton, John S; Hawkes, David J; Hill, Derek L G; Kitchen, Neil; Mancini, Laura; McEvoy, Andrew W; Razavi, Reza; Wilson, Sally; Yousry, Tarek; Keevil, Stephen F

    2015-01-01

    The design and operation of a facility in which a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scanner is incorporated into a room used for surgical or endovascular cardiac interventions presents several challenges. MR safety must be maintained in the presence of a much wider variety of equipment than is found in a diagnostic unit, and of staff unfamiliar with the MRI environment, without compromising the safety and practicality of the interventional procedure. Both the MR-guided cardiac interventional unit at Kings College London and the intraoperative imaging suite at the National Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery are single-room interventional facilities incorporating 1.5 T cylindrical-bore MRI scanners. The two units employ similar strategies to maintain MR safety, both in original design and day-to-day operational workflows, and between them over a decade of incident-free practice has been accumulated. This article outlines these strategies, highlighting both similarities and differences between the units, as well as some lessons learned and resulting procedural changes made in both units since installation. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

  9. Operational safety experience at 14 MW research reactor from Institute for Nuclear Research Pitesti

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ciocanescu, M.

    2007-01-01

    The main challenges identified in TRIGA Research Reactor operated in Institute for Nuclear Research in Pitesti, Romania, are in fact similar with challenges of many other research reactors in the world, those are: Ageing of work forces and knowledge management; Maintaining an enhanced technical and scientific competences; Ensuring adequate financial and human resources; Enhancing excellence in management; Ensuring confidence of stakeholders and public; Ageing of equipment and systems.To ensure safety availability of TRIGA Research Reactor in INR Pitesti, the financial resources were secured and a large refurbishment programme and modernization was undertaking by management of institute. This programme concern the modernization of reactor control and safety systems, primary cooling system instrumentation, radiation protection and releases monitoring with new spectrometric computerized abilities, ventilation filtering system and cooling towers. The expected life extension of the reactor will be about 15 years

  10. Operational safety reliability research

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hall, R.E.; Boccio, J.L.

    1986-01-01

    Operating reactor events such as the TMI accident and the Salem automatic-trip failures raised the concern that during a plant's operating lifetime the reliability of systems could degrade from the design level that was considered in the licensing process. To address this concern, NRC is sponsoring the Operational Safety Reliability Research project. The objectives of this project are to identify the essential tasks of a reliability program and to evaluate the effectiveness and attributes of such a reliability program applicable to maintaining an acceptable level of safety during the operating lifetime at the plant

  11. Operational and environmental safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1978-01-01

    The responsibility of the DOE Office of Operational and Environmental Safety is to assure that DOE-controlled activities are conducted in a manner that will minimize risks to the public and employees and will provide protection for property and the environment. The program supports the various energy technologies by identifying and resolving safety problems; developing and issuing safety policies, standards, and criteria; assuring compliance with DOE, Federal, and state safety regulations; and establishing procedures for reporting and investigating accidents in DOE operations. Guidelines for the radiation protection of personnel; radiation monitoring at nuclear facilities; an assessment of criticality accidents by fault tree analysis; and the preparation of environmental, safety, and health standards applicable to geothermal energy development are discussed

  12. Operational safety improvement in OPR 1000

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jung, Y.-E.

    2005-01-01

    Nuclear power operating experience management might be an important factor for the operational safety improvement. KHNP's nuclear information management system, called KONIS receives, distributes and manages all nuclear information from domestic and foreign, especially operating experience. Ulchin 3 and 4, the first units of OPR 1000 series operates several organizations regarding management of operating experience e.g. specialist group program, various task forces, equipment specialist system for operator, etc. Peer review is another contribution for nuclear safety. (author)

  13. Operational safety of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tanguy, P.

    1987-01-01

    The operational safety of nuclear power plants has become an important safety issue since the Chernobyl accident. A description is given of the various aspects of operational safety, including the importance of human factors, responsibility, the role and training of the operator, the operator-machine interface, commissioning and operating procedures, experience feedback, and maintenance. The lessons to be learnt from Chernobyl are considered with respect to operator errors and the management of severe accidents. Training of personnel, operating experience feedback, actions to be taken in case of severe accidents, and international cooperation in the field of operational safety, are also discussed. (U.K.)

  14. New trends in the evaluation and implementation of the safety-related operating experience associated with NRC-licensed reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Michelson, C.; Heltemes, C.J.

    1981-01-01

    This article is an overview of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission program for the evaluation and dissemination of the safety-related operating experience associated with all NRC-licensed reactors. It discusses the historical background and past problems that led to the recent formation of NRC's Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AEOD) and details its activities, organization, staffing, and proposed analysis and evaluation methodology. The programs of industry organizations and nuclear plant licensees and the integration of foreign operating experience are included in the overview. The problems and limitations of the Licensee Event Report (LER) program and the Nuclear Plant Reliability Data system program are discussed. The AEOD analysis and evaluation methodology program includes some new improvements in the assessment of safety-related operating experience. Of particular note is the sequence coding and search procedure being developed by AEOD under a contract with the Nuclear Safety Information Center at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. This computer-based retrieval system will have markedly improved search strategy capability for such items as commoncause failures or complex system interactions involving various failure sequences and other relationships associated with an event. The system retrieves failure data and information on the principal LER occurrence and on related component and system responses. The computer-generated Power Reactor Watch List enables AEOD to monitor all critical or unusual situations warranting close attention because of potential public health and safety. This listing is supported by a preestablished computer search strategy of the historical data base permitting identification of all past events and statistical information that are applicable to the situation being watched

  15. Glovebox and Experiment Safety

    Science.gov (United States)

    Maas, Gerard

    2005-12-01

    Human spaceflight hardware and operations must comply with NSTS 1700.7. This paper discusses how a glovebox can help.A short layout is given on the process according NSTS/ISS 13830, explaining the responsibility of the payload organization, the approval authority of the PSRP and the defined review phases (0 till III).Amongst others, the following requirement has to be met:"200.1 Design to Tolerate Failures. Failure tolerance is the basic safety requirement that shall be used to control most payload hazards. The payload must tolerate a minimum number of credible failures and/or operator errors determined by the hazard level. This criterion applies when the loss of a function or the inadvertent occurrence of a function results in a hazardous event.200.1a Critical Hazards. Critical hazards shall be controlled such that no single failure or operator error can result in damage to STS/ISS equipment, a nondisabling personnel injury, or the use of unscheduled safing procedures that affect operations of the Orbiter/ISS or another payload.200.1b Catastrophic Hazards. Catastrophic hazards shall be controlled such that no combination of two failures or operator errors can result in the potential for a disabling or fatal personnel injury or loss of the Orbiter/ISS, ground facilities or STS/ISS equipment."For experiments in material science, biological science and life science that require real time operator manipulation, the above requirement may be hard or impossible to meet. Especially if the experiment contains substances that are considered hazardous when released into the habitable environment. In this case operation of the experiment in a glovebox can help to comply.A glovebox provides containment of the experiment and at the same time allows manipulation and visibility to the experiment.The containment inside the glovebox provides failure tolerance because the glovebox uses a negative pressure inside the working volume (WV). The level of failure tolerance is dependent of

  16. The Nigerian experience in health, safety, and environmental matters during oil and gas exploration and production operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oyekan, A.J.

    1991-01-01

    Since crude oil was first discovered in commercial quantities in the Country, in 1956, Nigerian oil and gas exploration and production activities have steadily increased as petroleum assumed strategic importance in the nation's economy. However, just as occurs in many parts of the world, crude oil and gas are found and produced in Nigeria sometimes in very hostile and unfavorable environments. The search for oil and gas takes explorers to the hot regions of the Northern parts of the country, the swamp jungle location of the Niger Delta, as well as offshore locations in the Atlantic Ocean. Each terrain, whether land, swamp or offshore, in deep or shallow waters, present unique health, safety and environmental implications and challenges to the operators, as well as, to the Government regulators. From a background of existing Nigerian Laws and operational experience, this paper details the programmes that have been put in place to guarantee a healthy workforce, ensure the safety of personnel and equipment, and protect the Nigerian environment during oil and gas exploration and production operations, as well as their documented effectiveness. The paper discusses the performance of the Petroleum Industry by analyzing the health, safety and environmental records available from 1956 - 1990. The records of major incidents related to safety and environment over the period are discussed and evaluated. The paper notes that relatively speaking, in spite of the Bomu 2 and Funiwa V oil well blow-outs in 1970 and 1980 respectively which caused extensive environmental damages and the Anieze, Oniku and KC 1 gas well blow-out of 1972, 1975 and 1989 respectively, which resulted in the loss of the rigs drilling the locations concerned, the safety performance records in the Nigerian oil and gas exploration and production activities in the past thirty-five years have been satisfactory compared with the records of similar operations in most other parts of the world

  17. Life management and operational experience feedback - tools to enhance safety and reliability of the NPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mach, P.

    1997-01-01

    Preparation has started of the Temelin power plant centralized equipment database. Principles of reliability centered maintenance are studied, and use of these activities will be made in the Plant Ageing Management Programme. The aims of the Programme are as follows: selection of important components subject to ageing, data collection, determination of dominant stressors, development, selection and validation of ageing evaluation methods, setup of experience feedback, determination of responsibilities, methodologies and strategy, elaboration of programme procedures and documentation, and maintenance of programme flexibility. Pilot studies of component ageing are under way: for the reactor pressure vessel, steam generator, pressurizer, piping, ECCS and cables. The organizational structure of the Operational Experience Feedback system is described, as are the responsibility of staff and sources of information. (M.D.)

  18. Operating experience feedback

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cimesa, S.

    2007-01-01

    Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration (SNSA) has developed its own system for tracking, screening and evaluating the operating experiences of the nuclear installations. The SNSA staff regularly tracks the operating experiences throughout the world and screens them on the bases of applicability for the Slovenian nuclear facilities. The operating experiences, which pass the screening, are thoroughly evaluated and also recent operational events in these facilities are taken into account. If needed, more information is gathered to evaluate the conditions of the Slovenian facilities and appropriate corrective actions are considered. The result might be the identification of the need for modification at the licensee, the need for modification of internal procedures in the SNSA or even the proposal for the modification of regulations. Information system helps everybody to track the process of evaluation and proper logging of activities. (author)

  19. Corrosion in PWR steam generator tubes made of alloy 600TT: overview of operating experience, NDE and safety issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Curieres, I. de; Sollier, T.; Delaval, C.

    2015-01-01

    About 60 PWR plants worldwide are operating with steam generator tubes made of alloy 600TT, among which 27 are located in France. This alloy is susceptible to corrosion, both on the primary and secondary side in every fleet, though with different kinetics or extent. It is noteworthy that many of the primary side corrosion issues can be clearly explained by design or operating conditions. However, studies show that all the secondary side issues are much hardly explained by simple considerations. This paper will give an overview of the international operating experience of this alloy and indicate the associated controllability and safety-related issues. An emphasis will be put on the manufacturing, chemistry and specificities of the different fleets. The French situation will be reviewed in this frame. (authors)

  20. Operation safety of complex industrial systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zwingelstein, G.

    1999-01-01

    Zero fault or zero risk is an unreachable goal in industrial activities like nuclear activities. However, methods and techniques exist to reduce the risks to the lowest possible and acceptable level. The operation safety consists in the recognition, evaluation, prediction, measurement and mastery of technological and human faults. This paper analyses each of these points successively: 1 - evolution of operation safety; 2 - definitions and basic concepts: failure, missions and functions of a system and of its components, basic concepts and operation safety; 3 - forecasting analysis of operation safety: reliability data, data-banks, precautions for the use of experience feedback data; realization of an operation safety study: management of operation safety, quality assurance, critical review and audit of operation safety studies; 6 - conclusions. (J.S.)

  1. Operation safety at Ignalina NPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zheltobriukh, G.

    1999-01-01

    An improvement of operational safety at Ignalina NPP covers: improvement of management structure and safety culture; symptom-based emergency operating procedures; staff training and full scope simulator; program of components ageing; metal inspection; improvement of fire safety. The first plan of Ignalina NPP Safety culture development for 1997 purposed to the SAR recommendation implementation was prepared and approved by the General Director

  2. Contribution of materials investigations and operating experience of reactor vessel internals to PWRs' safety, performance and reliability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lemaire, E.; Monteil, N.; Jardin, N.; Doll, M.

    2015-01-01

    The Reactor Pressure Vessel Internals (RVI) include all the components inside the pressure vessel, except the nuclear fuel, the rod cluster assemblies and the instrumentation. The RVI consist of bolted and welded structures that are divided into two sub-assemblies: the upper internals which are removed at every refueling outage and the lower internals which are systematically removed for inspection at every 10-year outage. The main functions of the RVI are to position the core, to support it, and to provide a coolant flow by channeling the fluid. Moreover, the lower internals contribute to a neutron protection of the reactor pressure vessel by absorbing most of the neutron flux from the core. Depending on their location and material composition, the RVI components can face different ageing phenomena, that are actual or potential (such as wear, fatigue, stress corrosion cracking, irradiation assisted stress corrosion cracking, hardening and loss of ductility due to neutron irradiation, irradiation creep and irradiation swelling). EDF has developed a strategy for managing ageing and demonstrating the capacity of the RVI to perform their design functions over 40 years of operation. This overall approach is periodically revisited to take into account the most recent knowledge obtained from the following main topics: Safety Analyses, Research-Development programs, In-Service Inspection (ISI) results, Maintenance programs and Metallurgical Examinations. Based on continuous improvements in those fields, the goal of this paper is to present the way that materials investigations and operating experience obtained on RVI are managed by EDF to improve RVI safety, performance and reliability. It is shown that a perspective of 60 years of operation of RVI components is supported by large Research-Development efforts combined with field experience. (authors)

  3. Critical Drivers for Safety Culture: Examining Department of Energy and U.S. Army Operational Experiences - 12382

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lowes, Elizabeth A. [The S.M. Stoller Corporation, Broomfield, Colorado (United States)

    2012-07-01

    Evaluating operational incidents can provide a window into the drivers most critical to establishing and maintaining a strong safety culture, thereby minimizing the potential project risk associated with safety incidents. By examining U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) versus U.S. Army drivers in terms of regulatory and contract requirements, programs implemented to address the requirements, and example case studies of operational events, a view of the elements most critical to making a positive influence on safety culture is presented. Four case studies are used in this evaluation; two from DOE and two from U.S. Army experiences. Although the standards guiding operations at these facilities are different, there are many similarities in the level of hazards, as well as the causes and the potential consequences of the events presented. Two of the incidents examined, one from a DOE operation and the other from a U.S. Army facility, resulted in workers receiving chemical burns. The remaining two incidents are similar in that significant conduct of operations failures occurred resulting in high-level radioactive waste (in the case of the DOE facility) or chemical agent (in the case of the Army facility) being transferred outside of engineering controls. A review of the investigation reports for all four events indicates the primary causes to be failures in work planning leading to ineffective hazard evaluation and control, lack of procedure adherence, and most importantly, lack of management oversight to effectively reinforce expectations for safe work planning and execution. DOE and Army safety programs are similar, and although there are some differences in contractual requirements, the expectations for safe performance are essentially the same. This analysis concludes that instilling a positive safety culture comes down to management leadership and engagement to (1) cultivate an environment that values a questioning attitude and (2) continually reinforce expectations

  4. Dam safety operating guidelines

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Elsayed, E.; Leung, T.; Kirkham, A.; Lum, D.

    1990-01-01

    As part of Ontario Hydro's dam structure assessment program, the hydraulic design review of several river systems has revealed that many existing dam sites, under current operating procedures, would not have sufficient discharge capacity to pass the Inflow Design Flood (IDF) without compromising the integrity of the associated structures. Typical mitigative measures usually considered in dealing with these dam sites include structural alterations, emergency action plans and/or special operating procedures designed for extreme floods. A pilot study was carried out for the Madawaska River system in eastern Ontario, which has seven Ontario Hydro dam sites in series, to develop and evaluate the effectiveness of the Dam Safety Operating Guidelines (DSOG). The DSOG consist of two components: the flood routing schedules and the minimum discharge schedules, the former of which would apply in the case of severe spring flood conditions when the maximum observed snowpack water content and the forecast rainfall depth exceed threshold values. The flood routing schedules would identify to the operator the optimal timing and/or extent of utilizing the discharge facilities at each dam site to minimize the potential for dam failures cased by overtopping anywhere in the system. It was found that the DSOG reduced the number of structures overtopped during probable maximum flood from thirteen to four, while the number of structures that could fail would be reduced from seven to two. 8 refs., 4 figs., 3 tabs

  5. Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2. Annual operating report: January--December 1977, volume I--introduction, summary of operating experience; changes, tests, experiments, and safety-related maintenance; effluent releases; data tabulations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    A chronological operating sequence including shutdowns and occurrences during the year which required load reductions or resulted in non-load related incidents is given. Data are presented concerning plant and procedure changes, tests, experiments, safety related maintenance, effluent releases and personnel radiation exposures

  6. INMACS: Operating experience of a mature, computer-assisted control system for nuclear material inventory and criticality safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ross, A.M.

    1983-01-01

    This paper describes the operating experience of INMACS, the Integrated Nuclear Material Accounting and Control System used in the Recycle Fuel Fabrication Laboratories at Chalk River. Since commissioning was completed in 1977, INMACS has checked and recorded approximately 3000 inventory-related transactions involved in fabricating thermal-recycle fuels of (U,Pu)0 2 and (Th,Pu)0 2 . No changes have been necessary to INMACS programs that are used by laboratory staff when moving or processing nuclear material. The various utility programs have allowed efficient management and surveillance of the INMACS data base. Hardware failures and the nuisance of system unavailability at the laboratory terminals have been minimized by regular preventative maintenance. The original efforts in the design and rigorous testing of programs have helped INMACS to be accepted enthusiastically by old and new staff of the laboratories. The work required for nuclear material inventory control is done efficiently and in an atmosphere of safety

  7. Nuclear power plant safety and reliability improvements derived from operational experience analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zebroski, E.L.; Rosen, S.L.

    1983-01-01

    The frequency and distribution of significant events at operating nuclear power plants can be used as one of several indices to obtain a preliminary indication of unit and/or utility performance in the development and implementation of improvements aimed at reducing the probability or consequences of troublesome events. Initial data of this type are presented along with qualifications on the validity of such indicators. Planned further steps to improve this as a performance indicator are noted

  8. Modelling software failures of digital I and C in probabilistic safety analyses based on the TELEPERM registered XS operating experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jockenhoevel-Barttfeld, Mariana; Taurines Andre; Baeckstroem, Ola; Holmberg, Jan-Erik; Porthin, Markus; Tyrvaeinen, Tero

    2015-01-01

    Digital instrumentation and control (I and C) systems appear as upgrades in existing nuclear power plants (NPPs) and in new plant designs. In order to assess the impact of digital system failures, quantifiable reliability models are needed along with data for digital systems that are compatible with existing probabilistic safety assessments (PSA). The paper focuses on the modelling of software failures of digital I and C systems in probabilistic assessments. An analysis of software faults, failures and effects is presented to derive relevant failure modes of system and application software for the PSA. The estimations of software failure probabilities are based on an analysis of the operating experience of TELEPERM registered XS (TXS). For the assessment of application software failures the analysis combines the use of the TXS operating experience at an application function level combined with conservative engineering judgments. Failure probabilities to actuate on demand and of spurious actuation of typical reactor protection application are estimated. Moreover, the paper gives guidelines for the modelling of software failures in the PSA. The strategy presented in this paper is generic and can be applied to different software platforms and their applications.

  9. Safety of nuclear power plants: Operation. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The safety of a nuclear power plant is ensured by means of its proper siting, design, construction and commissioning, followed by the proper management and operation of the plant. In a later phase, proper decommissioning is required. This Safety Requirements publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which was issued in 1988 as Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1). The purpose of this revision was: to restructure Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1) in the light of the basic objectives, concepts and principles in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. To be consistent with the requirements of the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources. And to reflect current practice and new concepts and technical developments. Guidance on fulfillment of these Safety Requirements may be found in the appropriate Safety Guides relating to plant operation. The objective of this publication is to establish the requirements which, in the light of experience and the present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. These requirements are governed by the basic objectives, concepts and principles that are presented in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. This publication deals with matters specific to the safe operation of land based stationary thermal neutron nuclear power plants, and also covers their commissioning and subsequent decommissioning

  10. Safety of nuclear power plants: Operation. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The safety of a nuclear power plant is ensured by means of its proper siting, design, construction and commissioning, followed by the proper management and operation of the plant. In a later phase, proper decommissioning is required. This Safety Requirements publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which was issued in 1988 as Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1). The purpose of this revision was: to restructure Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1) in the light of the basic objectives, concepts and principles in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. To be consistent with the requirements of the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources. And to reflect current practice and new concepts and technical developments. Guidance on fulfillment of these Safety Requirements may be found in the appropriate Safety Guides relating to plant operation. The objective of this publication is to establish the requirements which, in the light of experience and the present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. These requirements are governed by the basic objectives, concepts and principles that are presented in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. This publication deals with matters specific to the safe operation of land based stationary thermal neutron nuclear power plants, and also covers their commissioning and subsequent decommissioning

  11. Safety of nuclear power plants: Operation. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The safety of a nuclear power plant is ensured by means of its proper siting, design, construction and commissioning, followed by the proper management and operation of the plant. In a later phase, proper decommissioning is required. This Safety Requirements publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which was issued in 1988 as Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1). The purpose of this revision was: to restructure Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1) in the light of the basic objectives, concepts and principles in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations; to be consistent with the requirements of the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources; and to reflect current practice and new concepts and technical developments. Guidance on fulfillment of these Safety Requirements may be found in the appropriate Safety Guides relating to plant operation. The objective of this publication is to establish the requirements which, in the light of experience and the present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. These requirements are governed by the basic objectives, concepts and principles that are presented in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. This publication deals with matters specific to the safe operation of land based stationary thermal neutron nuclear power plants, and also covers their commissioning and subsequent decommissioning

  12. Report of the peer review mission of national operational safety experience feedback process to the Ukraine 11-15 November 1996 Kiev

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-01-01

    At the invitation of the Nuclear Regulatory Administration of Ukraine (NRA), the IAEA carried out a Peer review mission of national operational safety experience feedback process at Kiev from 11 to 15 November 1996. The objective of this mission was to provide the host country, represented by the regulatory body, with independent and comprehensive review of current status of operational safety experience feedback (OSEF) process with respect to the IAEA's recommendations and international practices. The mission concluded that principal arrangements of operational feedback process in Ukraine are, at present, in force and brought positive results since their introduction. The mission also noted several good practices in these activities. 1 tab

  13. Safety Evaluation Report, related to the renewal of the operating license for the critical experiment facility of the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (Docket No. 50-225)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-10-01

    This Safety Evaluation Report for the application filed by the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI) for a renewal of operating license CX-22 to continue to operate a critical experiment facility has been prepared by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The facility is owned and operated by Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and is located at a site in the city of Schenectady, New York. The staff concludes that this critical facility can continue to be operated by RPI without endangering the health and safety of the public

  14. IAEA/NEA incident reporting system (IRS). Reporting guidelines. Feedback from safety related operating experience for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The Incident Reporting System (IRS) is an international system jointly operated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD/NEA). The fundamental objective of the IRS is to contribute to improving the safety of commercial nuclear power plants (NPPs) which are operated worldwide. This objective can be achieved by providing timely and detailed information on both technical and human factors related to events of safety significance which occur at these plants. The purpose of these guidelines, which supersede the previous IAEA Safety Series No. 93 (Part II) and the NEA IRS guidelines, is to describe the system and to give users the necessary background and guidance to enable them to produce IRS reports meeting a high standard of quality while retaining the high efficiency of the system expected by all Member States operating nuclear power plants. These guidelines have been jointly developed and approved by the NEA/IAEA

  15. Ontario Hydro CANDU operating experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jackson, H.A.; Woodhead, L.W.; Fanjoy, G.R.

    1984-03-01

    The CANDU Pressurized Heavy Water (CANDU-PHW) type of nuclear-electric generating station has been developed jointly by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited and Ontario Hydro. This report highlights Ontario Hydro's operating experience using the CANDU-PHW system, with a focus on the operating performance and costs, reliability of system components and nuclear safety considerations for the workers and the public

  16. Ontario Hydro CANDU operating experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bartholomew, R.W.; Woodhead, L.W.; Horton, E.P.; Nichols, M.J.; Daly, I.N.

    1987-01-01

    The CANDU Pressurized Heavy Water (CANDU-PHW) type of nuclear-electric generating station has been developed jointly by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited and Ontario Hydro. This report highlights Ontario Hydro's operating experience using the CANDU-PHW system, with a focus on worker and public safety, operating performance and costs, and reliability of system components

  17. Nuclear safety: operational aspects. 5. Data Communication in a Nuclear Digital I and C System-The Korean Experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lim, Tae-Wook; Byun, Jae-Youb; Jhun, James S.

    2001-01-01

    Full-scale use of a microprocessor-based digital instrumentation and control (I and C) system for the control of nuclear power plants (NPPs) in Korea has spanned >14 yr and has covered eight plants. Experience gained from these applications is substantial. In this paper, the discussion centers on the design experience of the data communication portion of the digital I and C system along with the associated nuclear licensing issues. The data communication designs of the eight plants (four operating and four under construction) have changed from project to project and from supplier to supplier. The first two of the eight plants, Yonggwang NPP (YGN) Units 3 and 4 (YGN-3 and 4) included only the on/off (binary) controls in the digital I and C system. The subsequent six plants had a fully expanded scope of plant controls including both on/off controls as well as continuous (analog) controls. These latter six plants are Ulchin NPP (UCN) Units 3 and 4 (UCN 3 and 4), YGN Units 5 and 6 (YGN 5 and 6), and UCN Units 5 and 6 (UCN 5 and 6) in the order of their construction start dates. The digital system suppliers are Forney for YGN 3 and 4 and UCN 5 and 6; and Eaton for UCN 3 and 4 and YGN 5 and 6. The Forney system uses bus network architecture, while the Eaton system is based on a ring network configuration. The design differences, advantages, disadvantages, and specific licensing issues of these two configurations unique to the NPP operating environment are discussed in the abstract. The discussions are organized into two parts: the Forney system of YGN 3 and 4 and the Eaton system of YGN 5 and 6. The Forney system of UCN 5 and 6 is still in its early stage of design and manufacture, and it is basically similar to the design of YGN 3 and 4 except for the system upgrade from a 16- to a 32-bit system and the addition of an analog plant monitoring and control function. The Eaton system of UCN 3 and 4 is essentially identical to that of YGN 5 and 6 except that the YGN 5 and 6

  18. Initial experience with a robotically operated video optical telescopic-microscope in cranial neurosurgery: feasibility, safety, and clinical applications.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gonen, Lior; Chakravarthi, Srikant S; Monroy-Sosa, Alejandro; Celix, Juanita M; Kojis, Nathaniel; Singh, Maharaj; Jennings, Jonathan; Fukui, Melanie B; Rovin, Richard A; Kassam, Amin B

    2017-05-01

    . Overall, the authors encountered 3 (1.5%) major neurological morbidities and 6 (3%) 30-day mortalities. Four of the 6 deaths were in the ICH group, resulting in a 1% mortality rate for the remainder of the cohort when excluding these patients. None of the intraoperative complications were considered to be attributable to the visualization provided by the ROVOT-m. When comparing the early and late cohorts, the authors noticed an increase in the proportion of higher-complexity surgeries (Categories IV-VI), from 23% in the early cohort, to 37% in the late cohort (p = 0.030). In addition, a significant reduction in operating room setup time was demonstrated (p < 0.01). CONCLUSIONS The feasibility and safety of the ROVOT-m was demonstrated in a wide range of cranial microsurgical applications. The authors report a gradual increase in case complexity over time, representing an incremental acquisition of experience with this technology. A learning curve of both setup and execution phases should be anticipated by new adopters of the robot system. Further prospective studies are required to address the efficacy of ROVOT-m. This system may play a role in neurosurgery as an integrated platform that is applicable to a variety of cranial procedures.

  19. ITER safety and operational scenario

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shimomura, Y.; Saji, G.

    1998-01-01

    The safety and environmental characteristics of ITER and its operational scenario are described. Fusion has built-in safety characteristics without depending on layers of safety protection systems. Safety considerations are integrated in the design by making use of the intrinsic safety characteristics of fusion adequate to the moderate hazard inventories. In addition to this, a systematic nuclear safety approach has been applied to the design of ITER. The safety assessment of the design shows how ITER will safely accommodate uncertainties, flexibility of plasma operations, and experimental components, which is fundamental in ITER, the first experimental fusion reactor. The operation of ITER will progress step by step from hydrogen plasma operation with low plasma current, low magnetic field, short pulse and low duty factor without fusion power to deuterium-tritium plasma operation with full plasma current, full magnetic field, long pulse and high duty factor with full fusion power. In each step, characteristics of plasma and optimization of plasma operation will be studied which will significantly reduce uncertainties and frequency/severity of plasma transient events in the next step. This approach enhances reliability of ITER operation. (orig.)

  20. Safety experience on EDF's PWRs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tanguy, P.

    1986-01-01

    The french nuclear programme has been widely publicized. In 1985, the total nuclear electricity generated was around 216 GWh, i. e. 70% of the electricity produced by electricity de France (EDF). If we consider only pressurized water reactors, at the end of 1985, 37 units were in operation (32 900 MWe and 5 1300 MWe) and 18 were under construction. I intend to review our experience with the safety of PWR's, but I will first present briefly some aspects related to the safety organization in France and the standardization policy. (author) [pt

  1. Operational safety - the IAEA response

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rosen, M.

    1984-01-01

    Nuclear safety is an international issue. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency is growing because it offers a centre for contact and exchange between East and West, North and South. New initiatives are under way to intensify international co-operative safety efforts through exchange of information on abnormal events at nuclear power plants, and through greater sharing of safety research results. Emergency preparedness also lends itself to international co-operation. A report has been prepared on the need for establishing mutual emergency assistance. By analysing possible constraints to bilateral or multinational efforts in advance, a basis for agreement at the time of an emergency is being worked out. Safety standards have been developed in several areas. The NUSS Codes and Guides, now almost complete, make available to countries starting a nuclear power programme a coherent set of nuclear safety standards. A revised set of Basic Safety Standards for Radiation Protection has been issued in 1982. (author)

  2. Indicators to monitor NPP operational safety performance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gomez-Cobo, Ana

    2002-01-01

    operational safety performance' that was started in 1999. The objective of this project is to foster the co-ordination of efforts and the exchange of information and experience among NPPs world-wide in the field of operational safety performance indicators. (author)

  3. Operating Experience at NPP Krsko

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kavsek, D.; Bach, B.

    1998-01-01

    Systematic analysis of operational experience by assessment of internal and industry events and the feedback of lessons learned is one of the essential activities in the improvement of the operational safety and reliability of the nuclear power plant. At NPP Krsko we have developed a document called ''Operating Experience Assessment Program''. Its purpose is to establish administrative guidance for the processing of operating events including on-site and industry events. Assessment of internal events is based on the following methods: Event and Causal Factor Charting, Change Analysis, Barrier Analysis, MORT (Management Oversight and Risk Tree Analysis) and Human Performance Evaluation. The operating experience group has developed a sophisticated program entitled ''Operating experience tracking system'' (OETS) in response to the need for a more efficient way of processing internal and industry operating experience information. The Operating Experience Tracking System is used to initiate and track operational events including recommended actions follow up. Six screens of the system contain diverse essential information which allows tracking of operational events and enables different kinds of browsing. OETS is a part of the NPP Krsko nuclear network system and can be easily accessed by all plant personnel. (author)

  4. Reactor operation safety information document

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1990-01-01

    The report contains a reactor facility description which includes K, P, and L reactor sites, structures, operating systems, engineered safety systems, support systems, and process and effluent monitoring systems; an accident analysis section which includes cooling system anomalies, radioactive materials releases, and anticipated transients without scram; a summary of onsite doses from design basis accidents; severe accident analysis (reactor core disruption); a description of operating contractor organization and emergency planning; and a summary of reactor safety evolution. (MB)

  5. Increasing the operational efficiency and safety in operation control centers: the TRANSPETRO experience; Aumentando a seguranca e eficiencia operacional em centros de controle: a experiencia da TRANSPETRO

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Felicio, Marco Aurelio Fierro; Frisoli, Caetano [PETROBRAS Transporte S.A. (TRANSPETRO), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil)

    2009-12-19

    The increase in operational efficiency and safety in operation control centers has been traditionally obtained through direct actions in the operational activity itself and on the resources and systems used for that. Modern supervisory and control systems, sophisticated simulation software, cutting-edge last generation equipment and installations, clear and comprehensive procedures definitions and intensive and constant training of the operation teams are, usually, the chosen paths followed by control centers in their incessant quest for increased operational efficiency and safety. This paper presents the path followed by the TRANSPETRO's National Operational Control Center - Natural Gas (Centro Nacional de Controle Operacional - CNCO-Gas) - that has not only focused with the traditional aspects above, but has also made intensive investments in systems and data base integrations, aiming at eliminating data inconsistencies and redundancies and at including automation, standardization and systematization of non-operational and complementary operational activities. These investments allowed TRANSPETRO CNCO-Gas face the big challenge of growing that TRANSPETRO's gas transportation activity is facing now and will be facing in the near future: from 2,600 km to 7,000 km of gas pipelines, and a volume of transported natural gas from 35 MMm{sup 3}/day to 100 MMm{sup 3}/day. (author)

  6. Operating procedures and safety culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carnino, A.

    1993-01-01

    The development of new technologies in recent years has led to a tremendous increase in the information to be mastered by operators in industrial processes. The information at operators disposal both in routine situations and accidental ones needs to be well prepared and organized to ensure reliability and safety. The man-machine interface should give operators all the necessary and clear indications on the process status and evolution so that the operators can operate the installation through adequate procedures. Procedures represent the real interface and mode of action of the operators on the machine, and they are of prime importance. Although they are by essence quite different, the routine, accident, and emergency procedures have in common one attribute: They all require a good safety culture both in their development and their implementation. From the definition given by the members of the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG), open-quotes Safety culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance,close quotes one can see that two aspects are embedded, a collective attitude that in fact is reflected in the managerial framework and an individual one that is linked to personnel behavior and work practices

  7. Magnet operating experience review for fusion applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cadwallader, L.C.

    1991-11-01

    This report presents a review of magnet operating experiences for normal-conducting and superconducting magnets from fusion, particle accelerator, medical technology, and magnetohydrodynamics research areas. Safety relevant magnet operating experiences are presented to provide feedback on field performance of existing designs and to point out the operational safety concerns. Quantitative estimates of magnet component failure rates and accident event frequencies are also presented, based on field experience and on performance of similar components in other industries

  8. 47{sup th} Annual meeting on nuclear technology (AMNT 2016). Key Topics / Enhanced safety and operation excellence and decommissioning experience and Waste management solutions

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Salnikova, Tatiana [AREVA GmbH, Erlangen (Germany); Schaffrath, Andreas [Gesellschaft fuer Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) gGmbH, Garching (Germany)

    2016-10-15

    Summary report on the Key Topics ''Enhanced Safety and Operation Excellence'' and ''Decommissioning Experience and Waste Management Solutions'' of the 47{sup th} Annual Conference on Nuclear Technology (AMNT 2016) held in Hamburg, 10 to 12 May 2016. Other Sessions of AMNT 2016 have been and will be covered in further issues of atw.

  9. Experience of CR and RCCA operation in Ukrainian WWER-1000: Aspects of reliability, safety and economic efficiency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Afanasyev, A.

    2000-01-01

    The next topics are represented in the paper: A brief history of WWER-1000 control rod (CR) and WWER-1000 rod cluster control assembly (RCCA) design; Evolution of WWER-1000 CR manufacturing technology and design; Experience of RCCA operation; Lifetime extension of WWER-1000 boron carbide CR; WWER-1000 reactor core operation problems due to partial RCCA insertion; Designing and licensing procedures and first operational experience of WWER-1000 RCCA (CR) with a combined absorber 'boron carbide-hafnium' and a chromium-nickel alloy cladding. The main conclusions are: Fuel assembly (FA) bow is the main reason of partial RCCA insertion during reactor core operation. However, the use of the RCCA and its driver bar with increased dead load, alongside with other measures, allow to reduce the probability of incomplete RCCA insertion; The materials used in CRs of RCCA in existing reactor operating modes have been working reliably; The use of hafnium under an appropriate price policy can give certain economic advantages for the Ukrainian NPPs, however, additional research is needed in order to confirm the specific CR physical characteristics and reliability. (author)

  10. Operating experience feedback program at Olkiluoto NPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kosonen, Mikko

    2002-01-01

    Recent review and development of the operating experience feedback program will be described. The development of the program has been based on several reviews by outside organizations. Main conclusions from these review reports and from the self assessment of safety performance, safety problems and safety culture on the basis of the operational events made by ASSET-method will be described. An approach to gather and analyze small events - so-called near misses - will be described. The operating experience program has been divided into internal and external operating experience. ASSET-methodology and a computer program assisting the analysis are used for the internal operating experience events. Noteworthy incidents occurred during outage are analyzed also by ASSET-method. Screening and pre analysis of the external operating experience relies on co-operation with ERFATOM, an organization of Nordic utilities for the exchange of nuclear industry experience. A short presentation on the performance of the Olkiluoto units will conclude the presentation. (author)

  11. Recent U.S. reactor operating experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stello, V. Jr.

    1977-01-01

    A qualitative assessment of U.S. and foreign reactor operating experience is provided. Recent operating occurrences having potentially significant safety impacts on power operation are described. An evaluation of the seriousness of each of these issues and the plans for resolution is discussed. A quantitative report on U.S. reactor operational experience is included. The details of the NRC program for evaluating and applying operating reactor experience in the regulatory process is discussed. A review is made of the adequacy of operating reactor safety and environmental margins based on actual operating experience. The Regulatory response philosophy to operating reactor experiences is detailed. This discussion indicates the NRC emphasis on the importance of a balanced action plan to provide for the protection of public safety in the national interest

  12. Modernization of Unit 2 at Oskarshamn NPP- Main Objectives, Experience from Design, Separation of Operational and Nuclear Safety Equipment - Lessons Learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kanaan, Salah K.

    2015-01-01

    This paper aims to give a picture of Oskarshamn Nuclear Power Plant (OKG) experience from design for one of the biggest modernization project in the world and focuses on what was learned that is specific to robustness of electrical power systems, especially through Fukushima Station Blackout (SBO). The planning for unit 2 at OKG was initiated in 1967 and the plant was completed on time and was synchronized to the grid October 2, 1974 and is of type BWR. Unit 2 was originally on 580 MW. In 1982 a thermal power up-rate was performed, from 1700 MWh to 1800 MWh (106% reactor output). A decision was made to perform a modernization and a new power up-rate to 850 MW and there were several reasons for this decision; New safety regulations from Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM), Ageing of important components and the initial focus was on safety and availability - Project Plant Life Extension (Plex) was established and became the largest nuclear power modernization in the world. The modernization will lead to: - New safety concept with 4 divisions instead for existing 2 with 2 new buildings South Electrical Building (SEB) and North Electrical Building (NEB); - Completely new software - based equipments for monitoring, control and I and C; - New Low Pressure Turbine, new generator and main transformer; - New MCR and simulator; - Compliance with modern reactor safety requirements; - Redundancy, Separation, Diversification, Earthquake; - Reinforcement of existing safety functions; - New Electricity - I and C (electric power incl. reinforced emergency power and control systems); - New buildings for Electricity - I and C; - Reinforcement of existing process systems as well as installation of new ones. Based on studies and good experiences on how to separate the operational and the safety equipment, the project led to a completely new safety concept. The safety concept is based on fully understanding the safety system that shall encompass all of the elements required to

  13. A BWR Safety and Operability Improvements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sawyer, Craig D.

    1993-01-01

    The A BWR is the culmination of 30 years of design, development and operating experience of BWRs around the world. It represents across the board improvements is safety, operation and maintenance practices (O and M), economics, radiation exposure and rad waste generation. More than ten years and $20m5 went into the design and development of its new features, and it is now under construction in Japan. This paper concentrates on the safety and operability improvements. In the safety area, more than a decade improvement in core damage frequency (CDFR) has been assessed by formal PIRA techniques, with CDFR less than 10 -6 /year. Severe accident mitigation has also been formally addressed in the design. Plant operations were simplified by incorporation of better materials, optimum use of redundancy in mechanical and electrical equipment so that on-line maintenance can be performed, by better arrangements which account for required maintenance practices, and by an advanced control room

  14. Operational characteristics of nuclear power plants - modelling of operational safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Studovic, M.

    1984-01-01

    By operational experience of nuclear power plants and realize dlevel of availability of plant, systems and componenst reliabiliuty, operational safety and public protection, as a source on nature of distrurbances in power plant systems and lessons drawn by the TMI-2, in th epaper are discussed: examination of design safety for ultimate ensuring of safe operational conditions of the nuclear power plant; significance of the adequate action for keeping proess parameters in prescribed limits and reactor cooling rquirements; developed systems for measurements detection and monitoring all critical parameters in the nuclear steam supply system; contents of theoretical investigation and mathematical modeling of the physical phenomena and process in nuclear power plant system and components as software, supporting for ensuring of operational safety and new access in staff education process; program and progress of the investigation of some physical phenomena and mathematical modeling of nuclear plant transients, prepared at faculty of mechanical Engineering in Belgrade. (author)

  15. Evaluation of BOR-60 operation safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Minakov, A.A.; Antipin, G.K.; Efimov, V.N.; Kuzin, G.G.; Eschenko, L.V.; Eschenko, S.N.

    1987-12-01

    In this communication, BOR-60 reactor operation anomalies capable to produce a dangerous overheating of the core (SDC) is examined. On bases of calculations and reactor operation experience an event tree for SDC is built. Evaluations of probable anomalies entering in the event tree and reactor parameters modifications in case of anomalies are presented. In conclusion BOR-60 agree with the sovietic nuclear safety [fr

  16. Operating experience with snubbers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Levin, H.; Cudlin, R.

    1978-06-01

    Recent operating experience with hydraulic and mechanical snubbers has indicated that there is a need to evaluate current practice in the industry associated with snubber qualification testing programs, design and analysis procedures, selection and specification criteria, and the preservice inspection and inservice surveillance programs. The report provides a summary of operational experiences that represent problems that are generic throughout the industry. Generic Task A-13 is part of the NRC Program for the Resolution of Generic Issues Related to Nuclear Power Plants described in NUREG-0410. The report is based upon a rather large amount of data that have become available in the past four years. These data have been evaluated by the Division of Operating Reactors to develop a data base for use in connection with several NRC activities including Category A, Technical Activity A-13 (Snubbers); the Standard Review Plan; future Regulatory Guides; ASME Code Provisions; and various technical specifications of operating nuclear power plants

  17. Operating plant safety analysis needs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Young, M.Y.; Love, D.S.

    1992-01-01

    The primary objective for nuclear power station owners is to operate and manage their plants safely. However, there is also a need to provide economical electric power, which requires that the unit be operated as efficiently as possible, consistent with the safety requirements. The objectives cited above can be achieved through the identification and use of available margins inherent in the plant design. As a result of conservative licensing and analytical approaches taken in the past, many of these margins may be found in the safety analysis limits within which plants currently operate. Improvements in the accuracy of the safety analysis, and a more realistic treatment of plant initial and boundary conditions, can make this margin available for a variety of uses which enhance plant performance, help to reduce O and M costs, and may help to extend licensed operation. Opportunities for improvement exist in several areas in the accident analysis normally performed for Chapter 15 of the FSAR. For example, recent modifications to the ECCS rule, 10CFR50.46 and Appendix K, allow use of margins previously unavailable in the analysis of the Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). To take advantage of this regulatory change, new methods are being developed to analyze both the large and small break loss of coolant accident (LOCA). As this margin is used, enhancements in the analysis of other transients will become necessary. The paper discusses accident analysis methods, future development needs, and analysis margin utilization in specific accident scenarios

  18. International co-operation in the field of operational safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dupuis, M.C.

    1988-10-01

    Operational safety in nuclear power plants is without doubt a field where international co-operation is in constant progress. Accounting for over 80 per cent of the 400 reactors in service throughout the world, the menber countries of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) are constantly striving to improve the exchange and use of the wealth of information to be gained not just from power plant accidents and incidents but from the routine operation of these facilities. The Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) helps the Steering Committee for Nuclear Energy to meet the NEA's objectives in the safety field, namely: - to promote co-operation between the safety bodies of member countries - to contribute to the safety and regulation of nuclear activities. The CSNI relies on the technical back-up of several different working groups made up of experts appointed by the member countries. For the past three years I have had the honour of chairing Principal Working Group 1 (PWG 1), which deals with operating experience and human factor. It is in this capacity that I will attempt to outline the group's various activities and its findings illustrated by a few examples

  19. ATLAS IBL operational experience

    CERN Document Server

    AUTHOR|(INSPIRE)INSPIRE-00237659; The ATLAS collaboration

    2017-01-01

    The Insertable B-Layer (IBL) is the inner most pixel layer in the ATLAS experiment, which was installed at 3.3 cm radius from the beam axis in 2014 to improve the tracking performance. To cope with the high radiation and hit occupancy due to proximity to the interaction point, a new read-out chip and two different silicon sensor technologies (planar and 3D) have been developed for the IBL. After the long shut-down period over 2013 and 2014, the ATLAS experiment started data-taking in May 2015 for Run-2 of the Large Hadron Collider (LHC). The IBL has been operated successfully since the beginning of Run-2 and shows excellent performance with the low dead module fraction, high data-taking efficiency and improved tracking capability. The experience and challenges in the operation of the IBL is described as well as its performance.

  20. Proceedings of the CSNI WGOE/SEGHOF workshop on modifications at nuclear power plants - Operating experience, safety significance and the role of human factors and organisation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    Operating experience repeatedly shows that changes and modifications at nuclear power plants (NPPs) may lead to safety significant events. At the same time, modifications are necessary to ensure a safe and economic functioning of the NPPs. To ensure the continuing safety of NPPs it is important that processes for change and modification are given proper attention both by the NPPs and the regulators. The operability, maintainability and testability of every modification should be thoroughly assessed from different points of view to ensure that no safety problems are introduced. The OECD/NEA Committee on Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) addressed the issue of modifications at a 'Workshop on Modifications at Nuclear Power Plants - Operating Experience, Safety Significance and Role of Human Factors' held at the OECD headquarters in Paris on October 6 to 8, 2003. This workshop was undertaken as a joint effort of the Working Group on Operating Experience (WGOE) and the Special Experts Group on Human and Organisational Factors (SEGHOF). During the workshop, WGOE focused on the theme of 'Minor Modifications and their Safety Significance', while SEGHOF focused on the topic 'Human and Organisational Factors in NPP Modifications'. The workshop was attended by 55 experts from the industry, regulators and technical support organizations in 15 countries. The workshop programme consisted of plenary and parallel sessions for presentations and discussions. One important part of the workshop was to discuss findings of the WGOE and SEGHOF surveys of utility and regulatory experience from modifications at the NPPs. Modifications at the NPPs are controlled by written procedures. The process varies depending on the type of the modification. Large modifications generally lead to fewer problems, because the projects are given both a great deal of attention and resources. In contrast, minor modifications seem to represent a generic challenge because they are less likely to be

  1. US nuclear safety review and experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gilinsky, V.

    1977-01-01

    The nuclear safety review of commercial nuclear power reactors has changed over the years from the relatively simple review of Dresden 1 in 1955 to the highly complex and sophisticated regulatory process which characterizes today's reviews. Four factors have influenced this evolution: (1) maturing of the technology and industry; (2) development of the regulatory process and associated staff; (3) feedback of operating experience; and (4) public awareness and participation. The NRC's safety review responsibilities start before an application is tendered and end when the plant is decommissioned. The safety review for reactor licensing is a comprehensive, two-phase process designed to assure that all the established conservative acceptance criteria are satisfied. Operational safety is assured through a strong inspection and enforcement program which includes shutting down operating facilities when necessary to protect the health and safety of the public. The safety of operating reactors is further insured through close regulation of license changes and selective backfitting of new regulatory requirements. An effective NRC standards development program has been implemented and coordinates closely with the national standards program. A confirmatory safety research program has been developed. Both of these efforts are invaluable to the nuclear safety review because they provide the staff with key tools needed to carry out its regulatory responsibilities. Both have been given increased emphasis since the formation of the NRC in 1975. The safety review process will continue to evolve, but changes will be slower and more deliberate. It will be influenced by standardization, early site reviews and development of advanced reactor concepts. New legislation may make possible changes which will simplify and shorten the regulatory process. Certainly the experience provided by the increasing number and types of operating plants will have a very strong impact on future trends in the

  2. FFTF operational experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Newland, D.J.; Krupar, J.J.

    1984-01-01

    In April 1982, the FFTF began its first nominally 100 day irradiation cycle. Since that time the plant has operated very well with steadily increasing plant capacity factors during its first four cycles. One hundred fifty fuel assemblies (eighty of which are experiments) and over 32,000 individual fuel pins have been irradiated, some in excess of 100 MWd/Kg burnup. Specialized equipment and systems unique to sodium cooled reactor plants have performed well

  3. Regulatory challenges in using nuclear operating experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    There can be no doubt that the systematic evaluation of operating experience by the operator and the regulator is essential for continued safe operation of nuclear power plants. Recent concerns have been voiced that the operating experience information and insights are not being used effectively to promote safety. If these concerns foreshadow a real trend in OECD countries toward complacency in reporting and analysing operating events and taking corrective actions, then past experience suggests that similar or even more serious events will recur. This report discusses how the regulator can take actions to assure that operators have effective programmes to collect and analyse operating experience and, just as important, for taking steps to follow up with actions to prevent the events and conditions from recurring. These regulatory actions include special inspections of an operator operating experience programme and discussion with senior plant managers to emphasize the importance of having an effective operating experience programme. In addition to overseeing the operator programmes, the regulator has the broader responsibility for assuring that industry-wide trends, both national and international are monitored. To meet these responsibilities, the regulatory body must have its own operating experience programme, and this report discusses the important attributes of such regulatory programmes. It is especially important for the regulator to have the capability for assessing the full scope of operating experience issues, including those that may not be included in an operator operating experience programme, such as new research results, international operating experience, and broad industry trend information. (author)

  4. Regulatory challenges in using nuclear operating experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The fundamental objective of all nuclear safety regulatory bodies is to ensure that nuclear utilities operate their plants in an acceptably safe manner at all times. Learning from experience has been a key element in meeting this objective. It is therefore very important for nuclear power plant operators to have an active programme for collecting, analysing and acting on the lessons of operating experience that could affect the safety of their plants. NEA experts have noted that almost all of the recent, significant events reported at international meetings have occurred earlier in one form or another. Counteractions are usually well-known, but information does not always seem to reach end users, or corrective action programmes are not always rigorously applied. Thus, one of the challenges that needs to be met in order to maintain good operational safety performance is to ensure that operating experience is promptly reported to established reporting systems, preferably international in order to benefit from a larger base of experience, and that the lessons from operating experience are actually used to promote safety. This report focuses on how regulatory bodies can ensure that operating experience is used effectively to promote the safety of nuclear power plants. While directed at nuclear power plants, the principles in this report may apply to other nuclear facilities as well. (author)

  5. Experiment to evaluate software safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Soubies, B.; Henry, J.Y.

    1994-01-01

    The process of licensing nuclear power plants for operation consists of mandatory steps featuring detailed examination of the instrumentation and control system by the safety authorities, including softwares. The criticality of these softwares obliges the manufacturer to develop in accordance with the IEC 880 standard 'Computer software in nuclear power plant safety systems' issued by the International Electronic Commission. The evaluation approach, a two-stage assessment is described in detail. In this context, the IPSN (Institute of Protection and Nuclear Safety), the technical support body of the safety authority uses the MALPAS tool to analyse the quality of the programs. (R.P.). 4 refs

  6. US nuclear safety. Review and experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hanauer, S.H.

    1977-01-01

    The paper deals with the evolution of reactor safety principles, design bases, regulatory requirements, and experience in the United States. Safety concerns have evolved over the years, from reactivity transients and shut-down systems, to blowdowns and containment, to severe design basis accidents and mitigating systems, to the performance of actual materials, systems and humans. The primary safety concerns of one epoch have been superseded in considerable measure by those of later times. Successive plateaus of technical understanding are achieved by solutions being found to earlier problems. Design studies, research, operating experience and regulatory imperatives all contribute to the increased understanding and thus to the safety improvements adopted and accepted. The improvement of safety with time, and the ability of existing reactors to operate safely in the face of new concerns, has confirmed the correctness and usefulness of the defence-in-depth approach and safety margins used in safety design in the United States of America. A regulatory programme such as the one in the United States justifies its great cost by its important contributions to safety. Yet only the designers, constructors and operators of nuclear power plants can actually achieve public safety. The regulatory programme audits, assesses and spot-checks the actual work. Since neither materials nor human beings are flawless, mistakes will be made; that is why defence-in-depth and safety margins are provided. The regulatory programme should enhance safety by decreasing the frequency of uncorrected mistakes. Maintenance of public safety also requires technical and managerial competence and attention in the organizations responsible for nuclear plants as well as regulatory organizations. (author)

  7. Operating experience in reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schueller, W.

    1983-01-01

    Since 1953, reprocessing has accumulated 180 years of operating experience in ten plants, six of them with 41 years of operation in reprocessing oxide fuel from light water reactors. After abortive, premature attempts at what is called commercial reprocessing, which had been oriented towards the market value of recoverable uranium and plutonium, non-military reprocessing technologies have proved their technical feasibility, since 1966 on a pilot scale and since 1976 on an industrial scale. Reprocessing experience obtained on uranium metal fuel with low and medium burnups can now certainly be extrapolated to oxide fuel with high burnup and from pilot plants to industrial scale plants using the same technologies. The perspectives of waste management of the nuclear power plants operated in the Federal Republic of Germany should be viewed realistically. The technical problems still to be solved are in a balanced relationship to the benefit arising to the national economy out of nuclear power generation and can be solved in time, provided there are clearcut political boundary conditions. (orig.) [de

  8. GNF2 Operating Experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schardt, John

    2007-01-01

    GNF's latest generation fuel product, GNF2, is designed to deliver improved nuclear efficiency, higher bundle and cycle energy capability, and more operational flexibility. But along with high performance, our customers face a growing need for absolute fuel reliability. This is driven by a general sense in the industry that LWR fuel reliability has plateaued. Too many plants are operating with fuel leakers, and the impact on plant operations and operator focus is unacceptable. The industry has responded by implementing an INPO-coordinated program aimed at achieving leaker-free reliability by 2010. One focus area of the program is the relationship between fuel performance (i.e., duty) and reliability. The industry recognizes that the right balance between performance and problem-free fuel reliability is critical. In the development of GNF2, GNF understood the requirement for a balanced solution and utilized a product development and introduction strategy that specifically addressed reliability: evolutionary design features supported by an extensive experience base; thoroughly tested components; and defense-in-depth mitigation of all identified failure mechanisms. The final proof test that the balance has been achieved is the application of the design, initially through lead use assemblies (LUAs), in a variety of plants that reflect the diversity of the BWR fleet. Regular detailed surveillance of these bundles provides the verification that the proper balance between performance and reliability has been achieved. GNF currently has GNF2 lead use assemblies operating in five plants. Included are plants that have implemented extended power up-rates, plants on one and two-year operating cycles, and plants with and without NobleChem TM and zinc injection. The leading plant has undergone three pool-side inspections outages to date. This paper reviews the actions taken to insure GNF2's reliability, and the lead use assembly surveillance data accumulated to date to validate

  9. Operator Actions Within a Safety Instrumented Function

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suttinger, L.T.

    2002-01-01

    This paper presents an overview of the factors that should be considered when crediting operator action for performing a safety function or being a part of the process of enabling a safety function. Criteria for evaluating operator action, such as required time response and operator training among others, are discussed. The paper will address these and other factors that should be considered when determining the reliability of the operator to respond and perform his/her part of the safety function. The entire safety function includes the operator and the reliability of the instrumented system that provides the alarm or indication, the final control element, and support systems. The integration of the operator performance with the hardware safety availability, including the effects of the supporting systems is discussed. The analysis of these factors will provide the justification for the amount of risk reduction or safety integrity level that can be credited for the Safety Instrumented Function (SIF), including operator action

  10. Safety aspects of cryochamber operation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chorowski, M.; Piotrowska, A.; Sieron, A.; Stanek, A.

    2014-01-01

    Local and whole body cryotherapy is well recognized, developed and appreciated both from medical and technical point of view. Poland is a country with a highest number of medical cryochambers in operation (above 200) and more than 3 millions of whole body cryotherapeutic sessions have been performed since 1989. Cryogenic temperatures applied for whole-body apart from medical effects have also significant influence on patient's psyche. A number of cryochambers is constantly increasing in hospitals, sport centers and spas. A temperature inside a cryochamber should be below 150 K. To achieve and stabilize such low temperature, either cascade compressor unit or liquid cryogens evaporation (N2 or synthetic air) are used. This paper presents safety oriented review of cryochamber design and constructions.

  11. Safety aspects of cryochamber operation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chorowski, M.; Piotrowska, A. [Wroclaw University of Technology, Institute of Aviation, Processing and Power Machines Engineering, Process Control and Cryogenics Group, Wybrzeze Wyspianskiego 27, 50-370 Wroclaw (Poland); Sieron, A.; Stanek, A. [Medical University of Silesia, Department and Clinic of Internal Diseases, Angiology and Physiacal Medicine in Bytom (Poland)

    2014-01-29

    Local and whole body cryotherapy is well recognized, developed and appreciated both from medical and technical point of view. Poland is a country with a highest number of medical cryochambers in operation (above 200) and more than 3 millions of whole body cryotherapeutic sessions have been performed since 1989. Cryogenic temperatures applied for whole-body apart from medical effects have also significant influence on patient's psyche. A number of cryochambers is constantly increasing in hospitals, sport centers and spas. A temperature inside a cryochamber should be below 150 K. To achieve and stabilize such low temperature, either cascade compressor unit or liquid cryogens evaporation (N{sub 2} or synthetic air) are used. This paper presents safety oriented review of cryochamber design and constructions.

  12. Safety aspects of cryochamber operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chorowski, M.; Piotrowska, A.; Sieron, A.; Stanek, A.

    2014-01-01

    Local and whole body cryotherapy is well recognized, developed and appreciated both from medical and technical point of view. Poland is a country with a highest number of medical cryochambers in operation (above 200) and more than 3 millions of whole body cryotherapeutic sessions have been performed since 1989. Cryogenic temperatures applied for whole-body apart from medical effects have also significant influence on patient's psyche. A number of cryochambers is constantly increasing in hospitals, sport centers and spas. A temperature inside a cryochamber should be below 150 K. To achieve and stabilize such low temperature, either cascade compressor unit or liquid cryogens evaporation (N 2 or synthetic air) are used. This paper presents safety oriented review of cryochamber design and constructions

  13. Reviewing operational experience feedback

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-04-01

    The purpose of this document is to provide detailed supplementary guidance to OSART experts to aid in the evaluation of operational experience feedback (OEF) programmes at nuclear power plants. The document begins by describing the objectives of an OEF programme. It goes on to indicate preparatory work and investigatory guidance for the expert. Section 5 describes attributes of an excellent OEF programme. Appended to these guidelines are examples of OEF documents from various plants. These are intended to help the expert by demonstrating the actual implementation of OEF in practice. These guidelines are in no way intended to conflict with existing national regulations and rules. A comprehensive OEF programme, as described in Section 2, would be impossible to evaluated in detail in the amount of time typically allocated for assessing OEF in an OSART review. The expert must use his or her time wisely by concentrating on those areas that appear to be the weakest

  14. Operating experience at CEBAF

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Legg, R.

    1996-01-01

    CEBAF, the Continuous Electron Beam Accelerator Facility, is a 5-pass, recirculating, superconducting rf linac designed to provide exceptional beam quality at 4 GeV up to 200 μA CW. It is made up of an injector, two 400-MeV linacs, and 9 recirculation arcs having a total beamline length of more than 4.5 km. On Nov. 5, 1995, CEBAF delivered a 4 GeV, 25-μA CW electron beam to the first of 3 experimental halls and the experimental physics program was started 10 days later. Accelerator availability during the first month of the experimental run exceeded 75%. Beam properties measured in the experimental hall to date are a one sigma momentum spread of 5x10 -5 and an rms emittance of 0.2 nanometer-radians, better than design specification. CW beam has been provided from all 5 passes at 800 MeV intervals. Outstanding performance of the superconducting linacs suggests a machine energy upgrade to 6 GeV in the near term with eventual machine operation at 8-10 GeV. Results from commissioning and operations experience since the last conference are presented

  15. Operating experience feedback report: Reliability of safety-related steam turbine-driven standby pumps. Commercial power reactors, Volume 10

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boardman, J.R.

    1994-10-01

    This report documents a detailed analysis of failure initiators, causes and design features for steam turbine assemblies (turbines with their related components, such as governors and valves) which are used as drivers for standby pumps in the auxiliary feedwater systems of US commercial pressurized water reactor plants, and in the high pressure coolant injection and reactor core isolation cooling systems of US commercial boiling water reactor plants. These standby pumps provide a redundant source of water to remove reactor core heat as specified in individual plant safety analysis reports. The period of review for this report was from January 1974 through December 1990 for licensee event reports (LERS) and January 1985 through December 1990 for Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System (NPRDS) failure data. This study confirmed the continuing validity of conclusions of earlier studies by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and by the US nuclear industry that the most significant factors in failures of turbine-driven standby pumps have been the failures of the turbine-drivers and their controls. Inadequate maintenance and the use of inappropriate vendor technical information were identified as significant factors which caused recurring failures

  16. Track 5: safety in engineering, construction, operations, and maintenance. Reactor physics design, validation, and operating experience. 5. A Negative Reactivity Feedback Device for Actinide Burner Cores

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Driscoll, M.J.; Hejzlar, P.

    2001-01-01

    Lead-bismuth eutectic (LBE) cooled reactors are of considerable interest because they may be useful for destruction of actinides in a cost-effective manner, particularly cores fueled predominantly with minor actinides, which gain reactivity with burnup. However, they also pose several design challenges: 1. a small (and perhaps even slightly positive) Doppler feedback; 2. small effective delayed neutron yield; 3. a small negative feedback from axial fuel expansion; 4. positive coolant void and temperature coefficients for conventional designs. This has motivated a search for palliative measures, leading to conceptualization of the reactivity feedback device (RFD). The RFD consists of an in-core flask containing helium gas, tungsten wool, and a small reservoir of LBE that communicates with vertical tubes housing neutron absorber floats. The upper part of these guide tubes contains helium gas that is vented into a separate, cooler ex-core helium gas plenum. The principle of operation is as follows: 1. The tungsten wool, hence the helium gas in the in-core plenum, is heated by gammas and loses heat to the walls by convection and conduction (radiation is feeble for monatomic gases and, in any event, intercepted by the tungsten wool). An energy balance determines the gas temperature, hence, pressure, which is 10 atm here. The energy loss rate can be adjusted by using xenon or a gas mixture in place of helium. The tungsten wool mass, which is 1 vol% wool here, can also be increased to increase gamma heating and further retard convection; alternatively, a Dewar flask could be used in place of the additional wool. 2. An increase in core power causes a virtually instantaneous increase in gamma flux, hence, gas heatup: The thermal time constant of the tungsten filaments and their surrounding gas film is ∼40 μs. 3. The increased gas temperature is associated with an increased gas pressure, which forces more liquid metal into the float guide tubes: LBE will rise ∼100 cm

  17. Experience gained in the current LWR that influence the design and operation of the LWR advanced from the viewpoint of safety analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barrera, J.; Corisco, M.; Riverola, J.

    2010-01-01

    Since the construction of the first light water reactors (LWR) safety analysis has played a very important role in the operation and its evolution to come up with designs that are currently operating. With new tools available, this role will see increased allowing more efficient operation with security assessments in real time, and a more efficient designs both in terms of fuel efficiency and from the security of the plant during operation.

  18. Experience in operation of heavy water reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rotaru, Ion; Bilegan, Iosif; Ghitescu, Petre

    1999-01-01

    The paper presents the main topics of the CANDU owners group (COG) meeting held in Mangalia, Romania on 7-10 September 1998. These meetings are part of the IAEA program for exchange of information related mainly to CANDU reactor operation safety. The first meeting for PHWR reactors took place in Vienna in 1989, followed by those in Argentina (1991), India (1994) and Korea (1996). The topics discussed at the meeting in Romania were: operation experience and recent major events, performances of CANDU reactors and safe operation, nuclear safety and operation procedures of PHWR, programs and strategies of lifetime management of installations and components of NPPs, developments and updates

  19. Use of safety experience feedback to design new nuclear units

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lange, D.; Crochon, J.P.

    1985-06-01

    For the designer, and about safety, the experience feedback can take place in 3 fields: the operating experience feedback (incidents analysis), the ''study'' experience feedback (improvement of justification and evolution of safety considerations), and the fabrication experience feedback. Some examples are presented for each field [fr

  20. [The institutional promotion of good practices in the operational management of health and safety: the experience of Italy Crown Aerosols on the monitoring of behavior].

    Science.gov (United States)

    de Merich, D; Pellicci, M; Serignoli, R

    2010-01-01

    Within the intelligence support and training to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and promoting a culture of health and safety at work, ISPESL is engaged on two fundamental pillars of activity: Consolidation of the national surveillance system of injuries through the promotion of methods and tools for the reconstruction of the dynamics incidental identification of causal determinants, with the aim of improving the capabilities of risk assessment of systems to prevent corporate. The promotion of good working practices, as Focal Point of the European Health and Safety at Work in Bilbao, the goal is to support prevention activities by providing business application examples of measures for improvement (technical, organizational, procedural) made in the proposing firms and validated by a technical appraisal conducted by ISPESL. Among the methodologies and tools that can be made available to companies in the operational management of health and safety in work activities, the approach to analyze and evaluate the behavior implemented by all persons within the company (managers, employees, workers) is a the most innovative preventive strategies that can be implemented to correct any improper practices behavioral wrongly tolerated in everyday work practice. The experience of Crown Aerosol Italy, the program "STOP TO ACCIDENTS, 2009 Best Practices award in the competition on the theme" Risk Assessment ", aims to demonstrate how the application of a method for monitoring behavior at work, shared in its planning with all those business, has not only reached but would assist the organization has developed at an individual level greater awareness and sense of responsibility also to their colleagues, by promoting good working practices.

  1. Operations and maintenance - Safety challenges

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nielsen, Liv [Oljedirektoratet, Stavanger (Norway)

    1999-07-01

    With the unsteady oil prices and the possible consequences of the deregulation of the European energy markets one may expect further optimization of operating and maintenance costs. One may also expect extended use of various risk-based optimization techniques such as RCM (Reliability Centered Maintenance) and RBI (Risk Based Inspection). This presentation addresses the need for further research and development in this area. Maintenance work is necessary, but it can also create risk. The accident statistics show many examples of this. The Norwegian petroleum industry's ability to learn from previous incidents is questioned. Maintenance staff must be well trained and possess the necessary routines. Technical documentation must be updated. Uncertainties with respect to future oil and gas prices combined with the effect of the deregulation of the European energy markets will lead to even more focus on cost-effective operations and maintenance. The need for long-term research and development is stressed. Risk based techniques such as RCM and RBI are extensively used in the defence industry and the nuclear industry, but applying them to the petroleum industry requires improved risk models. Ageing effects such as corrosion, erosion, fatigue etc. can be expected, but the capability to predict, monitor and control them should be improved. At present, not even the most sophisticated risk analysis can model ageing effects. The importance of efficient use of information technology (IT) is stressed. Improving the product quality and safety often requires new technology and so research and development is important. Close cooperation with the industry is required.

  2. The spent fuel safety experiment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harmms, G.A.; Davis, F.J.; Ford, J.T.

    1995-01-01

    The Department of Energy is conducting an ongoing investigation of the consequences of taking fuel burnup into account in the design of spent fuel transportation packages. A series of experiments, collectively called the Spent Fuel Safety Experiment (SFSX), has been devised to provide integral benchmarks for testing computer-generated predictions of spent fuel behavior. A set of experiments is planned in which sections of unirradiated fuel rods are interchanged with similar sections of spent PWR fuel rods in a critical assembly. By determining the critical size of the arrays, one can obtain benchmark data for comparison with criticality safety calculations. The integral reactivity worth of the spent fuel can be assessed by comparing the measured delayed critical fuel loading with and without spent fuel. An analytical effort to model the experiments and anticipate the core loadings required to yield the delayed critical conditions runs in parallel with the experimental effort

  3. MIT January Operational Internship Experience 2011

    Science.gov (United States)

    DeLatte, Danielle; Furhmann, Adam; Habib, Manal; Joujon-Roche, Cecily; Opara, Nnaemeka; Pasterski, Sabrina Gonzalez; Powell, Christina; Wimmer, Andrew

    2011-01-01

    This slide presentation reviews the 2011 January Operational Internship experience (JOIE) program which allows students to study operational aspects of spaceflight, how design affects operations and systems engineering in practice for 3 weeks. Topics include: (1) Systems Engineering (2) NASA Organization (3) Workforce Core Values (4) Human Factors (5) Safety (6) Lean Engineering (7) NASA Now (8) Press, Media, and Outreach and (9) Future of Spaceflight.

  4. Criteria for safety-related operator actions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gray, L.H.; Haas, P.M.

    1983-01-01

    The Safety-Related Operator Actions (SROA) Program was designed to provide information and data for use by NRC in assessing the performance of nuclear power plant (NPP) control room operators in responding to abnormal/emergency events. The primary effort involved collection and assessment of data from simulator training exercises and from historical records of abnormal/emergency events that have occurred in operating plants (field data). These data can be used to develop criteria for acceptability of the use of manual operator action for safety-related functions. Development of criteria for safety-related operator actions are considered

  5. The operator's role and safety functions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Corcoran, W.R.; Finnicum, D.J.; Hubbard, F.R.; Musick, C.R.; Walzer, R.F.

    1980-01-01

    A nuclear power plant can be thought of as a single system with two major subsystems: equipment and people. Both play important roles in nuclear safety. Whereas, in the past, the role of equipment had been emphasized in nuclear safety, the accident at Three Mile Island and its subsequent investigations point out the vital role of the operator. This paper outlines the operator's roles in nuclear safety and suggests how the concept of safety functions can be used to reduce economic losses and increase safety margins. (auth)

  6. The critical safety functions and plant operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Corcoran, W.R.; Church, J.F.; Cross, M.T.; Guinn, W.M.; Porter, N.J.

    1981-01-01

    The operator's role in nuclear safety is outlined and the concept of ''safety functions'' introduced. Safety functions are a group of actions that prevent core melt or minimize radiation releases to the general public. They can be used to provide a hierarchy of practical plant protection that an operator should use. The plant safety evaluation uses four inputs in predicting the results of an event: the event initiator, the plant design, the initial plant conditions and setup, and the operator actions. If any of these inputs are not as assumed in the evaluation, confidence that the consequences will be as predicted is reduced. Based on the safety evaluation, the operator has three roles in assuring that the consequences of an event will be no worse than the predicted acceptable results: Maintain plant setup in readiness to properly respond. Operate the plant in a manner such that fewer, milder events minimize the frequency and the severity of adverse events. Monitor the plant to verify that the safety functions are accomplished. The operator needs a systematic approach to mitigating the consequences of an event. The concept of safety functions introduces this systematic approach and presents a hierarchy of protection. If the operator has difficulty identifying an event for any reason, the systematic safety function approach allows accomplishing the overall path of mitigating consequences. Ten functions designed to protect against core melt, preserve containment integrity, prevent indirect release of radioactivity, and maintain vital auxiliaries needed to support the other safety functions are identified

  7. Operating experience and TPA: the Italian perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grimaldi, G.

    1990-01-01

    Collection and analysis of operating experience from the Italian plants and utilization of abroad data both to plants in operation and in construction are presented. Some results are also referred, aimed to evidence the role of the international cooperation to safe operation of nuclear plants. The approach to the Trend and Pattern analyses is described as well, and the use of computerized techniques of analysis on personal computer. Finally on going activities are introduced, specifically application of operating experience of plants in operation to small sized reactors and to ones with more intrinsic safety characteristics; review of the reporting system for future application and comparative analysis of the different realization of selected safety systems

  8. Nuclear safety: an operational constraint or necessity

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gauvenet, A.

    1983-01-01

    Different aspects of the nuclear safety in the operation of power stations are analysed. There is always a danger that safety is considered as a constraint at operator level, but it is essential that human factors and working conditions be taken into consideration [fr

  9. Tevatron operational experiences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Norris, B.L.; Theilacker, J.C.

    1989-02-01

    Fermilabs superconducting accelerator, the Tevatron has been operational for nearly six years. The history of its operation is presented. Several long shutdowns for superconducting dipole repairs are discussed. The dominant factor influencing the repair was conductor motion which fatigued the cable in the magnet ends. Borescoping and x-raying techniques were used to determine which magnet ends required repair. Detailed downtime logs were kept for each of the running periods. A discussion of the sources of downtime and a comparison for different operating modes is presented

  10. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The safety of a nuclear power plant is ensured by means of proper site selection, design, construction and commissioning, and the evaluation of these, followed by proper management, operation and maintenance of the plant. In a later phase, a proper transition to decommissioning is required. The organization and management of plant operations ensures that a high level of safety is achieved through the effective management and control of operational activities. This publication is a revision of the Safety Requirements publication Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which was issued in 2000 as IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-2. The purpose of this revision was to restructure Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-2 in the light of new operating experience and new trends in the nuclear industry; to introduce new requirements that were not included in Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-2 on the operation of nuclear power plants; and to reflect current practices, new concepts and technical developments. This update also reflects feedback on the use of the standards, both from Member States and from the IAEA's safety related activities. The publication is presented in the new format for Safety Requirements publications. The present publication reflects the safety principles of the Fundamental Safety Principles. It has been harmonized with IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-3 on The Management System for Facilities and Activities. Guidance on the fulfilment of the safety requirements is provided in supporting Safety Guides. The terminology used in this publication is defined and explained in the IAEA Safety Glossary. The objective of this publication is to establish the requirements which, in the light of experience and the present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. These requirements are governed by the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the Fundamental Safety Principles. This

  11. International cooperation for operating safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dupuis, M.C.

    1989-03-01

    The international-cooperation organization in nuclear safety domain is discussed. The nuclear energy Direction Committee is helped by the Security Committee for Nuclear Power Plants in the cooperation between security organizations of member countries and in the safety and nuclear activity regulations. The importance of the cooperation between experts in human being and engine problems is underlined. The applied methods, exchange activities and activity analysis, and the cooperation of the Nuclear Energy Agency and international organizations is analysed [fr

  12. The critical safety functions and plant operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Corcoran, W.R.; Church, J.F.; Porter, N.J.; Cross, M.T.; Guinn, W.M.

    1981-01-01

    The paper outlines the operator's role in nuclear safety and introduces the concept of ''safety functions''. Safety functions are a group of actions that prevent core melt or minimize radiation releases to the general public. They can be used to provide a hierarchy of practical plant protection that an operator should use. ''An accident identical to that at Three Mile Island is not going to happen again'', said the Rogovin investigators. The concepts put forward in this paper are intended to help the operator avoid serious consequence from the next unexpected threat. On the basis of the safety evaluation, the operator has three roles in assuring that the consequences of an event will be no worse than the predicted acceptable results. These three operator roles are: first, maintain plant setup in readiness to properly respond; second, operate the plant in a manner such that fewer, milder events minimize the frequency and the severity of adverse events; third, the operator needs to monitor the plant to verify that the safety functions are accomplished. The operator needs a systematic approach to mitigating the consequences of an event. The concept of ''safety function'' introduces that systematic approach and prevents a hierarchy of protection. If the operator has difficulty in identifying an event for any reason, the systematic safety function approach allows ones to accomplish the overall path of mitigating consequences. There are ten identified functions designed to protect against core melt, preserve containment integrity, prevent indirect release of radioactivity, and maintain vital auxiliaries needed to support the other safety functions. The paper describes in detail the operator's role and the safety functions, and provides many examples of the use of alternative success paths to accomplish the safety function

  13. Industry Operating Experience Process at Krsko NPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bach, B.; Bozin, B.; Cizmek, R.

    2012-01-01

    Experience has shown that number of minor events and near misses, usually without immediate or significant impact to plant safety and reliability, are precursors of significant or severe events due to the same or similar root or apparent cause(s). It is therefore desirable to identify and analyze weaknesses of the precursor problems (events) in order to prevent occurrence of significant events. Theoretically, significant events could be prevented from occurring if the root cause(s) of these precursor problems could be identified and eliminated. The Operating Experience Program identifies such event precursors and by reporting them to the industry, plant specific corrective actions can be taken to prevent events at other operational plants. The intent of the Operating Experience Program is therefore to improve nuclear power plant safety and reliability of the operating nuclear power plants. Each plant develops its own Operating Experience Program in order to learn from the in-house operating experience as well as from the world community of nuclear plants. The effective use of operating experience includes analyzing both plant and industry events in order to identify fundamental weaknesses and then determining appropriate plant-specific actions that will minimize the likelihood of similar events. Learning and applying the lessons from operating experience is an integral part of station safety culture and is encouraged by managers throughout the top plant administrative programs and procedures. Krsko NPP is developed it own Operating Experience Program by using the most relevant INPO/WANO/IAEA guidelines as well as its own knowledge, skills an operating practice. The Operating Experience Program is a part of the Corrective Action Program, which is among top management programs, thus program is strongly encouraged by top management. The purpose of Operating Experience Program is to provide guidance for using, sharing, and evaluating operating experience information

  14. The safety of operations in the Dragon fuel element production building during the manufacture of thorium fuel for the first charge of the Dragon Reactor experiment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beutler, H.; Gardham, B.; Holliday, J.

    1965-04-01

    The first charge of fuel and fuel elements for the Dragon Reactor has been completed without significant difficulty. This report covers the safety of operations during the production of the 10 thorium elements together with the final 2 driver elements needed to complete the 37 element charge. (author)

  15. Operating experience feedback in TVO

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Piirto, A [Teollisuuden Voima Oy (Finland)

    1997-12-31

    TVO is a power company operating with two 710 MW BWR units at Olkiluoto. For operating experience feedback TVO has not established a separate organizational unit but rather relies on a group of persons representing various technical disciplines. The ``Operating Experience Group`` meets at about three-week intervals to handle the reports of events (in plant and external) which have been selected for handling by an engineer responsible for experience feedback. 7 charts.

  16. TRIGA reactor operating experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anderson, T.V.

    1970-01-01

    The Oregon State TRIGA Reactor (OSTR) has been in operation 3 years. Last August it was upgraded from 250 kW to 1000 kW. This was accomplished with little difficulty. During the 3 years of operation no major problems have been experienced. Most of the problems have been minor in nature and easily corrected. They came from lazy susan (dry bearing), Westronics Recorder (dead spots in the range), The Reg Rod Magnet Lead-in Circuit (a new type lead-in wire that does not require the lead-in cord to coil during rod withdrawal hss been delivered, much better than the original) and other small corrections

  17. Combining risk analysis and operating experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-10-01

    In recent years there has been an increasing interest in the systematic utilization of operating experience in the decision making process concerning large industrial facilities. Even before the advent of Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA), operating experience had always played an important role in such decisions. Of course, operating experience has always been an input to PSA also; however, as PSA becomes more mature and the quality and quantity of operating experience improve, greater emphasis is now being placed on the use of operating experience to update and validate PSA and thereby provide a more rational basis for decision making. This report outlines the ways in which data are collected, processed using mathematical techniques and utilized in decision making. It is not intended to provide details of the methods and procedures to be used in these areas, but is rather intended as an introduction to these topics and some of the relevant literature. The meeting presentations were divided into three sessions devoted to the following topics: evaluation of nuclear power plants operational experience (5 papers); uncertainties (2 papers); probabilistic safety assessment studies in Member States (7 papers). A separate abstract was prepared for each of these papers

  18. Safety engineering experiments of explosives

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ishikawa, Noboru

    1987-07-24

    The outline of large scale experiments carried out every year since 1969 to obtain fundamental data and then establish the safety engineering standards concerning the manufacturing, storage and transportation, etc. of all explosives was described. Because it becomes recently difficult to ensure the safety distance in powder magazines and powder plants, the sandwich structure with sand is thought to be suitable as the neighboring barrier walls. The special vertical structure for embankments to provide against a emergency explosion is effective to absorb the blast. Explosion behaviors such as initiating sensitivity, detonation, sympathetic detonation, and shock occurence of the ANFO explosives in place of dynamite and the slurry explosives were studied. The safety engineering standards for the manufacturing and application of explosives were studied to establish because accidents by tabacco fire are not still distinguished. Much data concerning early stage fire fighting, a large quantity of flooding and shock occurence from a assumption of ignition during machining in the propellants manufacturing plant, could be obtained. Basic studies were made to prevent pollution in blasting sites. Collected data are utilized for the safety administration after sufficient discussion. (4 figs, 2 tabs, 3 photos, 17 refs)

  19. Psychology of NPP operation safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tret'yakov, V.P.

    1993-01-01

    The book is devoted to psychologic investigations into different aspects of NPP operative personnel activities. The whole set of conditions on which successful and accident-free personnel operation depends, is analysed. Based on original engineering and socio-psychologic investigations complex psychologic support for NPP personnel and a system of training and upkeep of operative personnel skills are developed. The methods proposed have undergone a practical examination and proved their efficiency. 154 refs., 12 figs., 9 tabs

  20. Effective corrective actions to enhance operational safety of nuclear installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-07-01

    The safe operation of nuclear power plants around the world and the prevention of incidents in these installations remain key concerns for the nuclear community. In this connection the feedback of operating experience plays a major role: every nuclear plant operator needs to have a system in place to identify and feed back the lessons learned from operating experience and to implement effective corrective actions to prevent safety events from reoccurring. An effective operating experience programme also includes a proactive approach that is aimed at preventing the first-time occurrence of safety events. In April 2003, the IAEA issued the PROSPER guidelines for nuclear installations to strengthen and enhance their own operating experience process and for self-assessment on the effectiveness of the feedback process. Subsequently, in the course of the Operational Safety Review Teams missions conducted by the IAEA that focused on the operational safety practices of nuclear power plants, the IAEA enhanced the review of the operating experience in nuclear power plants by implementing a new module that is derived from these guidelines. In order to highlight the effective implementation of the operating experience programme and to provide practical assistance in this area, the IAEA organized workshops and conferences to discuss recent trends in operating experience. The IAEA also performed assistance and review missions at plants and corporate organizations. The IAEA is further developing advice and assistance on operating experience feedback programmes and is reporting on good practices. The present publication is the outcome of two years of coordinated effort involving the participation of experts of nuclear organizations in several Member States. It provides information and good practices for successfully establishing an effective corrective actions programme. This publication forms part of a series that develops the principles set forth in these guidelines

  1. Operational and safety status of Krsko NPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sirola, P.; Kavsek, D.

    1998-01-01

    Nuclear Power Plants Krsko (NEK) is producing electricity with the high level of reliability, safety and at acceptable price for 17 years. Energy is shared between both Slovenian and Croatian grid. The specifics of sharing the initial investment costs, later covering the operations costs and energy supply between Croatia and Slovenia is causing specific decision making problems about energy cost and future investments, however not influencing the plant safety, by now. NEK is continuously following the international nuclear technology practices, standards' changes and improvements and introducing them into the processes and equipment upgrades. As the member of the most important international integration, NEK is having the possibility of sharing its experience with others. Slovenian Energy Consumption and Supply Strategy is recognizing the NEK as a long term supply of energy in Slovenia being a strong decision making base for the future. According to the above mentioned Slovenian Energy Consumption and Supply Strategy the plant is obliged to keep all the radioactive waste, produced during the plant life, on site. The extensive efforts are taking place to reduce the radioactive waste production and save the area available for temporary waste deposition. The plant is licensed for the period of 40 years of commercial operation which started in 1983, so the Life Time Management is getting more and more important, including the performance tracing of the essential components, their maintenance and surveillance programs and also replacement plans of critical equipment. The major problems the NEK is confronted with at the moment are the Steam Generators which are reaching their and of life, and a very limited radioactive waste storage area. They are excerting influence on the plant availability and operations and maintenance costs. At the moment the process of Modernization is in progress, covering the Steam Generators replacement and a Plant Specific Simulators supply

  2. Experience related to the safety of advanced LMFBR fuel elements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kerrisk, J.F.

    1975-07-01

    Experiments and experience relative to the safety of advanced fuel elements for the liquid metal fast breeder reactor are reviewed. The design and operating parameters and some of the unique features of advanced fuel elements are discussed breifly. Transient and steady state overpower operation and loss of sodium bond tests and experience are discussed in detail. Areas where information is lacking are also mentioned

  3. Managing Safety and Operations: The Effect of Joint Management System Practices on Safety and Operational Outcomes.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tompa, Emile; Robson, Lynda; Sarnocinska-Hart, Anna; Klassen, Robert; Shevchenko, Anton; Sharma, Sharvani; Hogg-Johnson, Sheilah; Amick, Benjamin C; Johnston, David A; Veltri, Anthony; Pagell, Mark

    2016-03-01

    The aim of this study was to determine whether management system practices directed at both occupational health and safety (OHS) and operations (joint management system [JMS] practices) result in better outcomes in both areas than in alternative practices. Separate regressions were estimated for OHS and operational outcomes using data from a survey along with administrative records on injuries and illnesses. Organizations with JMS practices had better operational and safety outcomes than organizations without these practices. They had similar OHS outcomes as those with operations-weak practices, and in some cases, better outcomes than organizations with safety-weak practices. They had similar operational outcomes as those with safety-weak practices, and better outcomes than those with operations-weak practices. Safety and operations appear complementary in organizations with JMS practices in that there is no penalty for either safety or operational outcomes.

  4. The Safety Prevention in the Theater Management and Operation

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    WU Sheng

    2015-01-01

    Take the operation and management experience as examples, the author discussed how to formulate a set of complete and effective equipment management system, operating rules, procedures and standards, as well as the safety prevention and control measures, according to the national or trade related laws and regulations and combining the operation and performance characteristics of theatre management, in order to ensure the safe operation of theatre and stage equipment.

  5. Safety valve opening and closing operation monitor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kodama, Kunio; Takeshima, Ikuo; Takahashi, Kiyokazu.

    1981-01-01

    Purpose: To enable the detection of the closing of a safety valve when the internal pressure in a BWR type reactor is a value which will close the safety valve, by inputting signals from a pressure detecting device mounted directly at a reactor vessel and a safety valve discharge pressure detecting device to an AND logic circuit. Constitution: A safety valve monitor is formed of a pressure switch mounted at a reactor pressure vessel, a pressure switch mounted at the exhaust pipe of the escape safety valve and a logic circuit and the lide. When the input pressure of the safety valve is raised so that the valve and the pressure switch mounted at the exhaust pipe are operated, an alarm is indicated, and the operation of the pressure switch mounted at a pressure vessel is eliminated. If the safety valve is not reclosed when the vessel pressure is decreased lower than the pressure at which it is to be reclosed after the safety valve is operated, an alarm is generated by the logic circuit since both the pressure switches are operated. (Sekiya, K.)

  6. EBR-II operating experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, C.R.F.

    1978-07-01

    Operation of the EBR-2 reactor is presented concerning the performance of the heat removal system; reactor materials; fuel handling system; sodium purification and sampling system; cover-gas purification; plant diagnostics and instrumentation; recent improvements in identifying fission product sources in EBR-2; and EBR-2 safety

  7. NPD Operating Experience

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Horton, E. P. [Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario, Rolphton, ON (Canada)

    1968-04-15

    NPD has demonstrated high-capacity factor operation and for the past three years has achieved an average net capacity factor of 98% for the ''winter-peak'' period. The net capacity factor for the year 1966 was 88% and for the period from the end of commissioning (October 1962) to the end of 1966 was 71%. The output of the station has been stretched from 22 MW(e) gross to 25 MW(e) gross. This was aided by the installation of an internal steam separator in the turbine but no basic modifications to the reactor-boiler systems were required. The turbine has also been modified by the installation of chrome steel diaphragms as a solution to an erosion problem. The station also continues as a test facility to develop new components and techniques. This includes the recent successful replacement of two reactor pressure tubes and the conversion of the reactor vault ventilation system to a ''dry'' atmosphere using a molecular sieve to collect heavy-water leakage and control the concentration of acidic oxides of nitrogen. Fuel performance has been excellent and the average burn-up in the core is now 84 MWh/kg U which is slightly above the equilibrium design value. Only three fuel bundles have been found with sheath failures and none of these was due to a deficiency in the fuel but was as a result of handling problems with the refuelling equipment. In spite of undesirably high maintenance time, the fuelling machines have now inserted over 1000 fuel bundles into the reactor ''on power''. Heavy-water loss rates have been acceptable and are improving. The average loss rate from leaks during 1966 was 210 g/h. A proposal to modify the NPD heavy-water heat transport system to allow boiling is under consideration. (author)

  8. Simulator experiments: effects of NPP operator experience on performance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beare, A.N.; Gray, L.H.

    1985-01-01

    Experiments are being conducted on nuclear power plant (NPP) control room training simulators by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, its subcontractor, General Physics Corporation, and participating utilities. The experiments are sponsored by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Human Factors and Safeguards Branch, Division of Risk Analysis and Operations, and are a continuation of prior research using simulators, supported by field data collection, to provide a technical basis for NRC human factors regulatory issues concerned with the operational safety of nuclear power plants. During the FY83 research, a simulator experiment was conducted at the control room simulator for a GE boiling water reactor (BWR) NPP. The research subjects were licensed operators undergoing requalification training and shift technical advisors (STAs). This experiment was designed to investigate the effects of (a) senior reactor operator (SRO) experience, (b) operating crew augmentation with an STA and (c) practice, as a crew, upon crew and individual operator performance, in response to anticipated plant transients. The FY84 experiments are a partial replication and extension of the FY83 experiment, but with PWR operators and simulator. Methodology and results to date are reported

  9. AMNT 2014. Key topic: Reactor operation, safety - report. Pt. 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, Klaus-Christian; Willschuetz, Hans-Georg; Wortmann, Birgit

    2014-01-01

    Summary report on the following sessions of the Annual Conference on Nuclear Technology held in Frankfurt, 6 to 8 May 2014: - Thermo Dynamics and Fluid Dynamics: Experiments and Backfittings for the Improvement of Safety and Efficiency; - Safety of Nuclear Installations - Methods, Analyses, Results: In-Vessel Phenomena; Ex-Vessel Phenomena; - Standards and Regulations; Hazard and Safety Analysis; and Validation and Uncertainty Analysis. The other Sessions of the Key Topics 'Reactor Operation, Safety', 'Competence, Innovation, Regulation' and 'Fuel, Decommissioning and Disposal' have been covered in atw 10 (2014) and will be covered in further issues of atw.

  10. Leadership for safety: industrial experience.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Flin, R; Yule, S

    2004-12-01

    The importance of leadership for effective safety management has been the focus of research attention in industry for a number of years, especially in energy and manufacturing sectors. In contrast, very little research into leadership and safety has been carried out in medical settings. A selective review of the industrial safety literature for leadership research with possible application in health care was undertaken. Emerging findings show the importance of participative, transformational styles for safety performance at all levels of management. Transactional styles with attention to monitoring and reinforcement of workers' safety behaviours have been shown to be effective at the supervisory level. Middle managers need to be involved in safety and foster open communication, while ensuring compliance with safety systems. They should allow supervisors a degree of autonomy for safety initiatives. Senior managers have a prime influence on the organisation's safety culture. They need to continuously demonstrate a visible commitment to safety, best indicated by the time they devote to safety matters.

  11. Relation between water chemistry and operational safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oliveira, M.F. de.

    1991-01-01

    This report describes the relation between chemistry/radiochemistry and operational safety, the technics bases for chemical and radiochemical parameters and an analysis of the Annual Report of Angra I Operation and OSRAT Mission report to 1989 in this area too. Furthermore it contains the transcription of the technical Specifications related to the chemistry and radiochemistry for Angra I. (author)

  12. Operating manual for the critical experiments facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-01-01

    The operation of the Critical Experiments Facility (CEF) requires careful attention to procedures in order that all safety precautions are observed. Since an accident could release large amounts of radioactivity, careful operation and strict enforcement of procedures are necessary. To provide for safe operation, detailed procedures have been written for all phases of the operation of this facility. The CEF operating procedures are not to be construed to constitute a part ofthe Technical Specifications. In the event of any discrepancy between the information given herein and the Technical Specifications, limits set forth in the Technical Specifications apply. All normal and most emergency operation conditions are covered by procedures presented in this manual. These procedures are designed to be followed by the operating personnel. Strict adherence to these procedures is expected for the following reasons. (1) To provide a standard, safe method of performing all operations, the procedures were written by reactor engineers experienced in supervising the operation of reactors and were reviewed by an organization with over 30 years of reactor operating experience. (2) To have an up-to-date description of operating techniques available at all times for reference and review, it is necessary that the procedures be written

  13. Operating manual for the critical experiments facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1986-01-01

    The operation of the Critical Experiments Facility (CEF) requires careful attention to procedures in order that all safety precautions are observed. Since an accident could release large amounts of radioactivity, careful operation and strict enforcement of procedures are necessary. To provide for safe operation, detailed procedures have been written for all phases of the operation of this facility. The CEF operating procedures are not to be construed to constitute a part ofthe Technical Specifications. In the event of any discrepancy between the information given herein and the Technical Specifications, limits set forth in the Technical Specifications apply. All normal and most emergency operation conditions are covered by procedures presented in this manual. These procedures are designed to be followed by the operating personnel. Strict adherence to these procedures is expected for the following reasons. (1) To provide a standard, safe method of performing all operations, the procedures were written by reactor engineers experienced in supervising the operation of reactors and were reviewed by an organization with over 30 years of reactor operating experience. (2) To have an up-to-date description of operating techniques available at all times for reference and review, it is necessary that the procedures be written.

  14. Enhancing Safety at Airline Operations Control Centre

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Lukáš Řasa

    2015-04-01

    Full Text Available In recent years a new term of Safety Management System (SMS has been introduced into aviation legislation. This system is being adopted by airline operators. One of the groundbased actors of everyday operations is Operations Control Centre (OCC. The goal of this article has been to identify and assess risks and dangers which occur at OCC and create a template for OCC implementation into SMS.

  15. Bayesian approach and application to operation safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Procaccia, H.; Suhner, M.Ch.

    2003-01-01

    The management of industrial risks requires the development of statistical and probabilistic analyses which use all the available convenient information in order to compensate the insufficient experience feedback in a domain where accidents and incidents remain too scarce to perform a classical statistical frequency analysis. The Bayesian decision approach is well adapted to this problem because it integrates both the expertise and the experience feedback. The domain of knowledge is widen, the forecasting study becomes possible and the decisions-remedial actions are strengthen thanks to risk-cost-benefit optimization analyzes. This book presents the bases of the Bayesian approach and its concrete applications in various industrial domains. After a mathematical presentation of the industrial operation safety concepts and of the Bayesian approach principles, this book treats of some of the problems that can be solved thanks to this approach: softwares reliability, controls linked with the equipments warranty, dynamical updating of databases, expertise modeling and weighting, Bayesian optimization in the domains of maintenance, quality control, tests and design of new equipments. A synthesis of the mathematical formulae used in this approach is given in conclusion. (J.S.)

  16. BWR and ABWR operating experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nagai, Kimio; Takayama, Yoshito; Shimizu, Shunichi

    1998-01-01

    The first commercial operation of a nuclear power plant in Japan was in 1969. At present, there are 52 nuclear power plants operating in the country, accounting for about 35% of the total electricity generated and about 20 % of the total capacity of electricity generation facilities in Japan. Moreover, Japan has had the highest facility utilization rate, which is an indicator of operational safety, among the top four nuclear-generation countries (U.S.A., France, Germany, and Japan) every year since 1993, and has maintained a utilization rate of more than 80% since 1995. Toshiba has supported plant operation and maintenance in 19 nuclear power plants. The overall facility utilization rate of these plants attained a record of 86.4% in fiscal 1996. Furthermore, the averaged rates over the past three fiscal years from 1995 to 1997 have been the highest in the world among plant constructors such as GE, WH, and Siemens. (author)

  17. Reliability analysis of safety systems of nuclear power plant and utility experience with reliability safeguarding of systems during specified normal operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Balfanz, H.P.

    1989-01-01

    The paper gives an outline of the methods applied for reliability analysis of safety systems in nuclear power plant. The main tasks are to check the system design for detection of weak points, and to find possibilities of optimizing the strategies for inspection, inspection intervals, maintenance periods. Reliability safeguarding measures include the determination and verification of the broundary conditions of the analysis with regard to the reliability parameters and maintenance parameters used in the analysis, and the analysis of data feedback reflecting the plant response during operation. (orig.) [de

  18. Plant designer's view of the operator's role in nuclear plant safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Corcoran, W.R.; Church, J.F.; Cross, M.T.; Porter, N.J.

    1981-01-01

    The nuclear plant operator's role supports the design assumptions and equipment with four functional tasks. He must set up th plant for predictable response to disturbances, operate the plant so as to minimize the likelihood and severity of event initiators, assist in accomplishing the safety functions, and feed back operating experiences to reinforce or redefine the safety analyses' assumptions. The latter role enhances the operator effectiveness in the former three roles. The Safety Level Concept offers a different perspective that enables the operator to view his roles in nuclear plant safety. This paper outlines the operator's role in nuclear safety and classifies his tasks using the Safety Level Concept

  19. Safety and operation of the Stade nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Salcher, H.

    1991-01-01

    The concept of PreussenElektra is to continuously increase the existing safety standard of the Stade nuclear power station using experience gained from faults and operation in nuclear power stations and the progressive state of the art. Modifications to achieve the most gentle operation of the plant have been completed and other are on-going. To do so instruments were attached to those components which are susceptible to fatigue to record the transients and extensive calculatory records were kept. Although the plant has almost 20 years successful operation behind it, it can still stand up well to comparisons with more recent plants as far as safety aspects are concerned. 6 figs

  20. Tritium Room Air Monitor Operating Experience Review

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    L. C. Cadwallader; B. J. Denny

    2008-09-01

    Monitoring the breathing air in tritium facility rooms for airborne tritium is a radiological safety requirement and a best practice for personnel safety. Besides audible alarms for room evacuation, these monitors often send signals for process shutdown, ventilation isolation, and cleanup system actuation to mitigate releases and prevent tritium spread to the environment. Therefore, these monitors are important not only to personnel safety but also to public safety and environmental protection. This paper presents an operating experience review of tritium monitor performance on demand during small (1 mCi to 1 Ci) operational releases, and intentional airborne inroom tritium release tests. The tritium tests provide monitor operation data to allow calculation of a statistical estimate for the reliability of monitors annunciating in actual tritium gas airborne release situations. The data show a failure to operate rate of 3.5E-06/monitor-hr with an upper bound of 4.7E-06, a failure to alarm on demand rate of 1.4E-02/demand with an upper bound of 4.4E-02, and a spurious alarm rate of 0.1 to 0.2/monitor-yr.

  1. Operational safety evaluation for minor reactor accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wang, O.S.

    1981-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to address a concern of applying conservatism in analysing minor reactor incidents. A so-called ''conservative'' safety analysis may exaggerate the system responses and result in a reactor scram tripped by the reactor protective system (RPS). In reality, a minor incident may lead the reactor to a new thermal hydraulic steady-state without scram, and the mitigation or termination of the incident may entirely depend on operator actions. An example on a small steamline break evaluation for a pressurized water reactor recently investigated by the staff at the Washington Public Power Supply System is presented to illustrate this point. A safety evaluation using mainly the safety-related systems to be consistent with the conservative assumptions used in the Safety Analysis Report was conducted. For comparison, a realistic analysis was also performed using both the safety- and control-related systems. The analyses were performed using the RETRAN plant simulation computer code. The ''conservative'' safety analysis predicts that the incident can be turned over by the RPS scram trips without operator intervention. However, the realistic analysis concludes that the reactor will reach a new steady-state at a different plant thermal hydraulic condition. As a result, the termination of the incident at this stage depends entirely on proper operator action. On the basis of this investigation it is concluded that, for minor incidents, ''conservative'' assumptions are not necessary, sometimes not justifiable. A realistic investigation from the operational safety point of view is more appropriate. It is essential to highlight the key transient indications for specific incident recognition in the operator training program

  2. Safety assessment for TA-48 radiochemical operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-08-01

    The purpose of this report is to document an assessment performed to evaluate the safety of the radiochemical operations conducted at the Los Alamos National Laboratory operations area designated as TA-48. This Safety Assessment for the TA-48 radiochemical operations was prepared to fulfill the requirements of US Department of Energy (DOE) Order 5481.1B, ''Safety Analysis and Review System.'' The area designated as TA-48 is operated by the Chemical Science and Technology (CST) Division and is involved with radiochemical operations associated with nuclear weapons testing, evaluation of samples collected from a variety of environmental sources, and nuclear medicine activities. This report documents a systematic evaluation of the hazards associated with the radiochemical operations that are conducted at TA-48. The accident analyses are limited to evaluation of the expected consequences associated with a few bounding accident scenarios that are selected as part of the hazard analysis. Section 2 of this report presents an executive summary and conclusions, Section 3 presents pertinent information concerning the TA-48 site and surrounding area, Section 4 presents a description of the TA-48 radiochemical operations, and Section 5 presents a description of the individual facilities. Section 6 of the report presents an evaluation of the hazards that are associated with the TA-48 operations and Section 7 presents a detailed analysis of selected accident scenarios

  3. Transportation Safety Excellence in Operations Through Improved Transportation Safety Document

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dr. Michael A. Lehto; MAL

    2007-01-01

    A recent accomplishment of the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) Nuclear Safety analysis group was to obtain DOE-ID approval for the inter-facility transfer of greater-than-Hazard-Category-3 quantity radioactive/fissionable waste in Department of Transportation (DOT) Type A drums at MFC. This accomplishment supported excellence in operations through safety analysis by better integrating nuclear safety requirements with waste requirements in the Transportation Safety Document (TSD); reducing container and transport costs; and making facility operations more efficient. The MFC TSD governs and controls the inter-facility transfer of greater-than-Hazard-Category-3 radioactive and/or fissionable materials in non-DOT approved containers. Previously, the TSD did not include the capability to transfer payloads of greater-than-Hazard-Category-3 radioactive and/or fissionable materials using DOT Type A drums. Previous practice was to package the waste materials to less-than-Hazard-Category-3 quantities when loading DOT Type A drums for transfer out of facilities to reduce facility waste accumulations. This practice allowed operations to proceed, but resulted in drums being loaded to less than the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) waste acceptance criteria (WAC) waste limits, which was not cost effective or operations friendly. An improved and revised safety analysis was used to gain DOE-ID approval for adding this container configuration to the MFC TSD safety basis. In the process of obtaining approval of the revised safety basis, safety analysis practices were used effectively to directly support excellence in operations. Several factors contributed to the success of MFC's effort to obtain approval for the use of DOT Type A drums, including two practices that could help in future safety basis changes at other facilities. (1) The process of incorporating the DOT Type A drums into the TSD at MFC helped to better integrate nuclear safety

  4. Fire protection system operating experience review for fusion applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cadwallader, L.C.

    1995-12-01

    This report presents a review of fire protection system operating experiences from particle accelerator, fusion experiment, and other applications. Safety relevant operating experiences and accident information are discussed. Quantitative order-of-magnitude estimates of fire protection system component failure rates and fire accident initiating event frequencies are presented for use in risk assessment, reliability, and availability studies. Safety concerns with these systems are discussed, including spurious operation. This information should be useful to fusion system designers and safety analysts, such as the team working on the Engineering Design Activities for the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor

  5. Fire protection system operating experience review for fusion applications

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cadwallader, L.C.

    1995-12-01

    This report presents a review of fire protection system operating experiences from particle accelerator, fusion experiment, and other applications. Safety relevant operating experiences and accident information are discussed. Quantitative order-of-magnitude estimates of fire protection system component failure rates and fire accident initiating event frequencies are presented for use in risk assessment, reliability, and availability studies. Safety concerns with these systems are discussed, including spurious operation. This information should be useful to fusion system designers and safety analysts, such as the team working on the Engineering Design Activities for the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor.

  6. PNRA Process for Utilizing Experience Feedback for Enhancing Nuclear Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shah, Z.H.

    2016-01-01

    One of the elements essential for any organization to become a learning organization is to learn from its own and others experience. The importance of utilizing experience feedback for enhancing operational safety is highlighted in nuclear industry again and again and this has resulted in establishment of several national and international forums. In addition, IAEA action plan on nuclear safety issued after Fukushima accident further highlighted the importance of experience sharing among nuclear community to enhance global nuclear safety regime. PNRA utilizes operating experience feedback gathered through different sources in order to improve its regulatory processes. During the review of licensing submissions, special emphasis is given to utilize the lessons learnt from experience feedback relating to nuclear industry within and outside the country. This emphasis has gradually resulted in various safety improvements in the facilities and processes. Accordingly, PNRA has developed a systematic process of evaluation of international operating experience feedback with the aim to create safety conscious approach. This process includes collecting information from different international forums such as IAEA, regulatory bodies of other countries and useful feedback of past accidents followed by its screening, evaluation and suggesting recommendations both for PNRA and its licensees. As a result of this process, several improvements concerning regulatory inspection plans of PNRA as well as in regulatory decision making and operational practices of licensees have been highlighted. This paper will present PNRA approach for utilizing experience feedback in its regulatory processes for enhancing / improving nuclear safety. (author)

  7. Operating practical experience at Argentina

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Quihillalt, Oscar

    1997-01-01

    Operating experiences of Atucha-1 and Embalse Nuclear Power Plants were discussed in this work. The technical and economic aspects, such as reliability, availability, personnel training, operating costs, prices and market, which exercise influence upon Argentina nuclear energy policy, mainly on the power electric generation by nuclear power plants were considered. Finally the current status of the nucleoelectric sector in Argentina and forecasting were analysed

  8. Preliminary Safety Analysis Report for the Tokamak Physics Experiment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Motloch, C.G.; Bonney, R.F.; Levine, J.D.; Masson, L.S.; Commander, J.C.

    1995-04-01

    This Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR), includes an indication of the magnitude of facility hazards, complexity of facility operations, and the stage of the facility life-cycle. It presents the results of safety analyses, safety assurance programs, identified vulnerabilities, compensatory measures, and, in general, the rationale describing why the Tokamak Physics Experiment (TPX) can be safely operated. It discusses application of the graded approach to the TPX safety analysis, including the basis for using Department of Energy (DOE) Order 5480.23 and DOE-STD-3009-94 in the development of the PSAR

  9. Large Scale Experiments on Spacecraft Fire Safety

    Science.gov (United States)

    Urban, David; Ruff, Gary A.; Minster, Olivier; Fernandez-Pello, A. Carlos; Tien, James S.; Torero, Jose L.; Legros, Guillaume; Eigenbrod, Christian; Smirnov, Nickolay; Fujita, Osamu; hide

    2012-01-01

    Full scale fire testing complemented by computer modelling has provided significant knowhow about the risk, prevention and suppression of fire in terrestrial systems (cars, ships, planes, buildings, mines, and tunnels). In comparison, no such testing has been carried out for manned spacecraft due to the complexity, cost and risk associated with operating a long duration fire safety experiment of a relevant size in microgravity. Therefore, there is currently a gap in knowledge of fire behaviour in spacecraft. The entire body of low-gravity fire research has either been conducted in short duration ground-based microgravity facilities or has been limited to very small fuel samples. Still, the work conducted to date has shown that fire behaviour in low-gravity is very different from that in normal gravity, with differences observed for flammability limits, ignition delay, flame spread behaviour, flame colour and flame structure. As a result, the prediction of the behaviour of fires in reduced gravity is at present not validated. To address this gap in knowledge, a collaborative international project, Spacecraft Fire Safety, has been established with its cornerstone being the development of an experiment (Fire Safety 1) to be conducted on an ISS resupply vehicle, such as the Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) or Orbital Cygnus after it leaves the ISS and before it enters the atmosphere. A computer modelling effort will complement the experimental effort. Although the experiment will need to meet rigorous safety requirements to ensure the carrier vehicle does not sustain damage, the absence of a crew removes the need for strict containment of combustion products. This will facilitate the possibility of examining fire behaviour on a scale that is relevant to spacecraft fire safety and will provide unique data for fire model validation. This unprecedented opportunity will expand the understanding of the fundamentals of fire behaviour in spacecraft. The experiment is being

  10. The experiences of research reactor accident to safety improvement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wiranto, S.

    1999-01-01

    The safety of reactor operation is the main factor in order that the nuclear technology development program can be held according the expected target. Several experience with research reactor incidents must be learned and understood by the nuclear program personnel, especially for operators and supervisors of RSG-GA. Siwabessy. From the incident experience of research reactor in the world, which mentioned in the book 'Experience with research reactor incidents' by IAEA, 1995, was concluded that the main cause of research reactor accidents is understandless about the safety culture by the nuclear installation personnel. With learn, understand and compare between this experiences and the condition of RSG GA Siwabessy is expended the operators and supervisors more attention about the safety culture, so that RSG GA Siwabessy can be operated successfull, safely according the expected target

  11. Summary of the nuclear safety in operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    This summary is a collection of general information about nuclear safety of PWR type reactors exploited by EDF. Teaching aid, this work has been conceived by operators for operators, it must not be considered nor used as a doctrine document with a regulatory or prescriptive characteristic. it summarizes the great principles of nuclear safety, places them in a global approach and shows their coherence. It consists in 6 chapters and 6 annexes. The news of this edition are the chapter 2 devoted to the safety management and the annexe 6 devoted to the principal teaching coming from the feedback. At the end a glossary explains the signs and abbreviations and an index allows to find themes in the memento text from keywords. (N.C.)

  12. Experiences in assessing safety culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Spitalnik, J.

    2002-01-01

    Based on several Safety Culture self-assessment applications in nuclear organisations, the paper stresses relevant aspects to be considered when programming an assessment of this type. Reasons for assessing Safety Culture, basic principles to take into account, necessary resources, the importance of proper statistical analyses, the feed-back of results, and the setting up of action plans to enhance Safety Culture are discussed. (author)

  13. AST-500 safety analysis experience

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Falikov, A A; Bakhmetiev, A M; Kuul, V S; Samoilov, O B [OKBM, Nizhny Novgorod (Russian Federation)

    1997-09-01

    Characteristic AST-type NHR safety features and requirements are described briefly. The main approaches and results of design and beyond-design accidents analyses for the AST-500 NHR, and the results of probabilistic safety assessments are considered. It is concluded that the AST-500 possesses a high safety level in virtue of the development and realization in the design of self-protection, passivity and defence-in-depth principles. (author). 9 refs, 2 figs.

  14. Fort Saint Vrain operational experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fuller, C.H.

    1989-01-01

    Fort St. Vrain (FSV), on the system of the Public Service Company of Colorado, is the only high temperature gas-cooled (HTGR) power reactor in the United States. The plant features a helium-cooled reactor with a uranium-thorium fuel cycle. The paper describes the experience made during its operation. (author). 2 refs, 4 figs, 2 tabs

  15. Comparing PRAs with operating experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Picard, R.R.; Martz, H.F.

    1998-01-01

    Probabilistic Risk Assessment is widely used to estimate the frequencies of rare events, such as nuclear power plant accidents. An obvious question concerns the extent to which PRAs conform to operating experience--that is, do PRAs agree with reality? The authors discuss a formal methodology to address this issue and examine its performance using plant-specific data

  16. Regulatory Safety Requirements for Operating Nuclear Installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gubela, W.

    2017-01-01

    The National Nuclear Regulator (NNR) is established in terms of the National Nuclear Regulator Act (Act No 47 of 1999) and its mandate and authority are conferred through sections 5 and 7 of this Act, setting out the NNR's objectives and functions, which include exercising regulatory control over siting, design, construction etc of nuclear installations through the granting of nuclear authorisations. The NNR's responsibilities embrace all those actions aimed at providing the public with confidence and assurance that the risks arising from the production of nuclear energy remain within acceptable safety limits -> Therefore: Set fundamental safety standards, conducting pro-active safety assessments, determining licence conditions and obtaining assurance of compliance. The promotional aspects of nuclear activities in South Africa are legislated by the Nuclear Energy Act (Act No 46 of 1999). The NNR approach to regulations of nuclear safety and security take into consideration, amongst others, the potential hazards associated with the facility or activity, safety related programmes, the importance of the authorisation holder's safety related processes as well as the need to exercise regulatory control over the technical aspects such as of the design and operation of a nuclear facility in ensuring nuclear safety and security. South Africa does not have national nuclear industry codes and standards. The NNR is therefore non-prescriptive as it comes to the use of industry codes and standards. Regulatory framework (current) provide for the protection of persons, property, and environment against nuclear damage, through Licensing Process: Safety standards; Safety assessment; Authorisation and conditions of authorisation; Public participation process; Compliance assurance; Enforcement

  17. ERB-II operating experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, R.N.; Cissel, D.W.; Smith, R.R.

    1977-01-01

    As originally designed and operated, EBR-II successfully demonstrated the concept of a sodium-cooled fast breeder power plant with a closed fuel reprocessing cycle (mini-nuclear park). Subsequent operation has been as an irradiation facility, a role which will continue into the foreseeable future. Since the beginning of operation in 1961, operating experience of EBR-II has been very satisfactory. Most of the components and systems have performed well. In particular, the mechanical performance of heat-removal systems has been excellent. A review of the operating experience reveals that all the original design objectives have been successfully demonstrated. To date, no failures or incidents resulting in serious in-core or out-of-core consequences have occurred. No water-to-sodium leaks have been detected over the life of the plant. At the present time, the facility is operating very well and continuously except for short shutdowns required by maintenance, refueling, modification, and minor repair. A plant factor of 76.9% was achieved for the calendar year 1976

  18. Emergency planning and operating experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Halpern, O.; Breniere, J.

    1984-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to derive lessons from operating experience for the planning of emergency measures. This operating experience has two facets: it is obtained not only from the various incidents and accidents which have occurred in countries with nuclear power programmes and from the resulting application of emergency plans but also from the different exercises and simulations carried out in France and in other countries. Experience generally confirms the main approaches selected for emergency plans. The lessons to be derived are of three types: first, it appears necessary to set forth precisely the responsibilities of each person involved in order to prevent a watering-down of decisions in the event of an accident; secondly, considerable improvements need to be made in the different communication networks to be used; and thirdly, small accidents with minor radiological consequences deserve as systematic and thorough an approach as large and more improbable accidents. (author)

  19. A reliability program approach to operational safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueller, C.J.; Bezella, W.A.

    1985-01-01

    A Reliability Program (RP) model based on proven reliability techniques is being formulated for potential application in the nuclear power industry. Methods employed under NASA and military direction, commercial airline and related FAA programs were surveyed and a review of current nuclear risk-dominant issues conducted. The need for a reliability approach to address dependent system failures, operating and emergency procedures and human performance, and develop a plant-specific performance data base for safety decision making is demonstrated. Current research has concentrated on developing a Reliability Program approach for the operating phase of a nuclear plant's lifecycle. The approach incorporates performance monitoring and evaluation activities with dedicated tasks that integrate these activities with operation, surveillance, and maintenance of the plant. The detection, root-cause evaluation and before-the-fact correction of incipient or actual systems failures as a mechanism for maintaining plant safety is a major objective of the Reliability Program. (orig./HP)

  20. The electron test accelerator safety in design and operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McKeown, J.

    1980-06-01

    The Electron Test Accelerator is being designed as an experiment in accelerator physics and technology. With an electron beam power of up to 200 kW the operation of the accelerator presents a severe radiation hazard as well as rf and electrical hazards. The design of the safety system provides fail-safe protection while permitting flexibility in the mode of operation and minimizing administrative controls. (auth)

  1. Safety of research reactors (Design and Operation)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dirar, H. M.

    2012-06-01

    The primary objective of this thesis is to conduct a comprehensive up-to-date literature review on the current status of safety of research reactor both in design and operation providing the future trends in safety of research reactors. Data and technical information of variety selected historical research reactors were thoroughly reviewed and evaluated, furthermore illustrations of the material of fuel, control rods, shielding, moderators and coolants used were discussed. Insight study of some historical research reactors was carried with considering sample cases such as Chicago Pile-1, F-1 reactor, Chalk River Laboratories,. The National Research Experimental Reactor and others. The current status of research reactors and their geographical distribution, reactor category and utilization is also covered. Examples of some recent advanced reactors were studied like safety barriers of HANARO of Korea including safety doors of the hall and building entrance and finger print identification which prevent the reactor from sabotage. On the basis of the results of this research, it is apparent that a high quality of safety of nuclear reactors can be attained by achieving enough robust construction, designing components of high levels of efficiency, replacing the compounds of the reactor in order to avoid corrosion and degradation with age, coupled with experienced scientists and technical staffs to operate nuclear research facilities.(Author)

  2. Self-assessment of operational safety for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-12-01

    Self-assessment processes have been continuously developed by nuclear organizations, including nuclear power plants. Currently, the nuclear industry and governmental organizations are showing an increasing interest in the implementation of this process as an effective way for improving safety performance. Self-assessment involves the use of different types of tools and mechanisms to assist the organizations in assessing their own safety performance against given standards. This helps to enhance the understanding of the need for improvements, the feeling of ownership in achieving them and the safety culture as a whole. Although the primary beneficiaries of the self-assessment process are the plant and operating organization, the results of the self-assessments are also used, for example, to increase the confidence of the regulator in the safe operation of an installation, and could be used to assist in meeting obligations under the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Such considerations influence the form of assessment, as well as the type and detail of the results. The concepts developed in this report present the basic approach to self-assessment, taking into consideration experience gained during Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) missions, from organizations and utilities which have successfully implemented parts of a self-assessment programme and from meetings organized to discuss the subject. This report will be used in IAEA sponsored workshops and seminars on operational safety that include the topic of self-assessment

  3. Safety status system for operating room devices.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Guédon, Annetje C P; Wauben, Linda S G L; Overvelde, Marlies; Blok, Joleen H; van der Elst, Maarten; Dankelman, Jenny; van den Dobbelsteen, John J

    2014-01-01

    Since the increase of the number of technological aids in the operating room (OR), equipment-related incidents have come to be a common kind of adverse events. This underlines the importance of adequate equipment management to improve the safety in the OR. A system was developed to monitor the safety status (periodic maintenance and registered malfunctions) of OR devices and to facilitate the notification of malfunctions. The objective was to assess whether the system is suitable for use in an busy OR setting and to analyse its effect on the notification of malfunctions. The system checks automatically the safety status of OR devices through constant communication with the technical facility management system, informs the OR staff real-time and facilitates notification of malfunctions. The system was tested for a pilot period of six months in four ORs of a Dutch teaching hospital and 17 users were interviewed on the usability of the system. The users provided positive feedback on the usability. For 86.6% of total time, the localisation of OR devices was accurate. 62 malfunctions of OR devices were reported, an increase of 12 notifications compared to the previous year. The safety status system was suitable for an OR complex, both from a usability and technical point of view, and an increase of reported malfunctions was observed. The system eases monitoring the safety status of equipment and is a promising tool to improve the safety related to OR devices.

  4. ETSON proposal on the European operational experience feedback system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maqua, Michael; Bertrand, Remy; Gelder, Pieter de

    2007-01-01

    The new IAEA Safety Fundamentals states regarding the operating experience feedback: The feedback of operating experience from facilities and activities - and, where relevant, from elsewhere - is a key means of enhancing safety. Processes must be put in place for the feedback and analysis of operating experience, including initiating events, accident precursors, near misses, accidents and unauthorized acts, so that lessons may be learned, shared and acted upon. This presentation deals with the proposal of the ETSON (European TSO Network) to optimize the European operating experiences feedback (OEF). It is generally recognized that the efficiency of nuclear safety supervision by public authorities is based on two key requirements: - the existence of a competent authority at national level, benefiting from an appropriate legislative and regulatory basis, from adequate (quantitatively and qualitatively) human resources, particularly for inspection purposes, - the availability of resources devoted to highly specialised independent technical expertise, in order to provide competent authorities with pertinent technical opinions on: -- the safety files provided by operators, for the purpose of licensing corresponding activities, -- the exploitation for regulatory purposes of the operating experience feed back from licensed nuclear installations. There are two worldwide systems intended to learn lessons from experience: the WANO (World Association of Nuclear Operators) system established by the licensees with access restricted to operating organizations and the IRS system jointly operated by IAEA and OECD/NEA accessible to regulators and to some other users nominated by the regulators in their countries. The IRS itself is dedicated to the analysis of safety significant operating events. NEA/CNRA runs a permanent working group on operating experience (WGOE). WGOE provides among other things also generic reports on safety concerns related to operating experiences and

  5. Feedback of operating experience in nuclear power plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-06-01

    The feedback of operating experience of nuclear facilities to the designers, manufacturers, operators and regulators is one important means of maintaining and improving safety. The Atomic Energy Control Board`s Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety examined the means for feedback currently being employed, how effective they are and what improvements are advisable. The review found that the need for feedback of operating experience is well recognized within those institutions contributing to the safety of CANDU power reactors, and that the existing procedures are generally effective. Some recommendations, however, are submitted for improvement in the process.

  6. Feedback of operating experience in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-06-01

    The feedback of operating experience of nuclear facilities to the designers, manufacturers, operators and regulators is one important means of maintaining and improving safety. The Atomic Energy Control Board's Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety examined the means for feedback currently being employed, how effective they are and what improvements are advisable. The review found that the need for feedback of operating experience is well recognized within those institutions contributing to the safety of CANDU power reactors, and that the existing procedures are generally effective. Some recommendations, however, are submitted for improvement in the process

  7. Cryogenic system operating experience review for fusion applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cadwallader, L.C.

    1992-01-01

    This report presents a review of cryogenic system operating experiences, from particle accelerator, fusion experiment, space research, and other applications. Safety relevant operating experiences and accident information are discussed. Quantitative order-of-magnitude estimates of cryogenic component failure rates and accident initiating event frequencies are presented for use in risk assessment, reliability, and availability studies. Safety concerns with cryogenic systems are discussed, including ozone formation, effects of spills, and modeling spill behavior. This information should be useful to fusion system designers and safety analysts, such as the team working on the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor design

  8. Impact of LMFBR operating experience on PFBR design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bhoje, S.B.; Chetal, S.C.; Chellapandi, P.; Govindarajan, S.; Lee, S.M.; Kameswara Rao, A.S.L.; Prabhakar, R.; Raghupathy, S.; Sodhi, B.S.; Sundaramoorthy, T.R.; Vaidyanathan, G.

    2000-01-01

    PFBR is a 500 MWe, sodium cooled, pool type, fast breeder reactor currently under detailed design. It is essential to reduce the capital cost of PFBR in order to make it competitive with thermal reactors. Operating experience of LMFBRs provides a vital input towards simplification of the design, improving its reliability, enhancing safety and achieving overall cost reduction. This paper includes a summary of LMFBR operating experience and details the design features of PFBR as influenced by operating experience of LMFBRs. (author)

  9. Operating and maintenance experience with computer-based systems in nuclear power plants - A report by the PWG-1 Task Group on Computer-based Systems Important to Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    This report was prepared by the Task Group on Computer-based Systems Important to Safety of the Principal Working Group No. 1. Canada had a leading role in this study. Operating and Maintenance Experience with Computer-based Systems in nuclear power plants is essential for improving and upgrading against potential failures. The present report summarises the observations and findings related to the use of digital technology in nuclear power plants. It also makes recommendations for future activities in Member Countries. Continued expansion of digital technology in nuclear power reactor has resulted in new safety and licensing issues, since the existing licensing review criteria were mainly based on the analogue devices used when the plants were designed. On the industry side, a consensus approach is needed to help stabilise and standardise the treatment of digital installations and upgrades while ensuring safety and reliability. On the regulatory side, new guidelines and regulatory requirements are needed to assess digital upgrades. Upgrades or new installation issues always involve potential for system failures. They are addressed specifically in the 'hazard' or 'failure' analysis, and it is in this context that they ultimately are resolved in the design and addressed in licensing. Failure Analysis is normally performed in parallel with the design, verification and validation (V and V), and implementation activities of the upgrades. Current standards and guidelines in France, U.S. and Canada recognise the importance of failure analysis in computer-based system design. Thus failure analysis is an integral part of the design and implementation process and is aimed at evaluating potential failure modes and cause of system failures. In this context, it is essential to define 'System' as the plant system affected by the upgrade, not the 'Computer' system. The identified failures would provide input to the design process in the form of design requirements or design

  10. Risk based limits for Operational Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cappucci, A.J. Jr.

    1993-01-01

    OSR limits are designed to protect the assumptions made in the facility safety analysis in order to preserve the safety envelope during facility operation. Normally, limits are set based on ''worst case conditions'' without regard to the likelihood (frequency) of a credible event occurring. In special cases where the accident analyses are based on ''time at risk'' arguments, it may be desirable to control the time at which the facility is at risk. A methodology has been developed to use OSR limits to control the source terms and the times these source terms would be available, thus controlling the acceptable risk to a nuclear process facility. The methodology defines a new term ''gram-days''. This term represents the area under a source term (inventory) vs time curve which represents the risk to the facility. Using the concept of gram-days (normalized to one year) allows the use of an accounting scheme to control the risk under the inventory vs time curve. The methodology results in at least three OSR limits: (1) control of the maximum inventory or source term, (2) control of the maximum gram-days for the period based on a source term weighted average, and (3) control of the maximum gram-days at the individual source term levels. Basing OSR limits on risk based safety analysis is feasible, and a basis for development of risk based limits is defensible. However, monitoring inventories and the frequencies required to maintain facility operation within the safety envelope may be complex and time consuming

  11. Operational and reliability experience with reactor instrumentation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dixon, F.; Gow, R.S.

    1978-01-01

    In the last 15 years the CEGB has experienced progressive plant development, integration and changes in operating regime through nine nuclear (gas-cooled reactor) power stations with corresponding instrumentation advances leading towards more refined centralized control. Operation and reliability experience with reactor instrumentation is reported in this paper with reference to the progressive changes related to the early magnox, late magnox and AGR periods. Data on instrumentation reliability in terms of reactor forced outages are presented and show that the instrumentation contributions to loss of generating plant availability are small. Reactor safety circuits, neutron flux and temperature measurements, gas analysis and vibration monitoring are discussed. In reviewing the reactor instrumentation the emphasis is on reporting recent experience, particularly on AGR equipment, but overall performance and changes to magnox equipment are included so that some appreciation can be obtained of instrumentation requirements with respect to plant lifetimes. (author)

  12. CloudSat Safety Operations at Vandenberg AFB

    Science.gov (United States)

    Greenberg, Steve

    2006-01-01

    CloudSat safety operations at Vendenberg AFB is given. The topics include: 1) CloudSat Project Overview; 2) Vandenberg Ground Operations; 3) Delta II Launch Vehicle; 4) The A-Train; 5) System Safety Management; 6) CALIPSO Hazards Assessment; 7) CALIPSO Supplemental Safeguards; 8) Joint System Safety Operations; 9) Extended Stand-down; 10) Launch Delay Safety Concerns; and 11) Lessons Learned.

  13. Use of safety analysis results to support process operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Karvonen, I.; Heino, P.

    1990-01-01

    Safety and risk analysis carried out during the design phase of a process plant produces useful knowledge about the behavior and the disturbances of the system. This knowledge, however, often remains to the designer though it would be of benefit to the operators and supervisors of the process plant, too. In Technical Research Centre of Finland a project has been started to plan and construct a prototype of an information system to make use of the analysis knowledge during the operation phase. The project belongs to a Nordic KRM project (Knowledge Based Risk Management System). The information system is planned to base on safety and risk analysis carried out during the design phase and completed with operational experience. The safety analysis includes knowledge about potential disturbances, their causes and consequences in the form of Hazard and Operability Study, faut trees and/or event trees. During the operation disturbances can however, occur, which are not included in the safety analysis, or the causes or consequences of which have been incompletely identified. Thus the information system must also have an interface for the documentation of the operational knowledge missing from the analysis results. The main tasks off the system when supporting the management of a disturbance are to identify it (or the most important of the coexistent ones) from the stored knowledge and to present it in a proper form (for example as a deviation graph). The information system may also be used to transfer knowledge from one shift to another and to train process personnel

  14. Safety in Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Operations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Buhrow, C. [Technische Univ. Bergakademie, Freiberg (Germany). Lehrstuhl Bergbau/Tiefbau; Niemann-Delius, C.; Okafor, E. [Technische Hochschule Aachen (Germany). Lehrstuhl und Inst. fuer Bergbaukunde 3

    2005-07-01

    Germany needs an LNG receiving terminal to import LNG and supplement expected future gas supply shortages. Enormous economic benefits also abound if Germany is to install an LNG receiving terminal. Jobs will be created for several hundred people. New tax revenues will be generated for state and local governments and this will further enhance the economic competitiveness of Germany. Additionally, it will provide Germany with a reliable source of clean-burning energy. Any proposed LNG receiving terminal should incorporate safety right from the start. These safety requirements will: ensure that certain public land uses, people, and structures outside the LNG facility boundaries are protected in the event of LNG fire, prevent vapour clouds associated with an LNG spill from reaching a property line that can be built upon, prevent severe burns resulting from thermal radiation, specify requirements for design, construction and use of LNG facilities and other equipments, and promote safe, secure and reliable LNG operations. The German future LNG business will not be complete without the evolution of both local and international standards that can apply to LNG operations. Currently existing European standards also appear inadequate. With an OHSAS 18001 management system integrated with other existing standards we can better control our LNG occupational health and safety risks, and improve performance in the process. Additionally, an OHSAS 18001 System will help future German LNG contractors and operators safeguard their most important assets - their employees. (orig.)

  15. Operational Safety Performance Indicators and Balanced Scorecard in HANARO

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wu, Jong-Sup; Jung, Hoan-Sung; Ahn, Guk-Hoon; Lee, Kye-Hong; Lim, In-Cheol; Kim, Hark-Rho

    2007-01-01

    Research reactors need an extensive basis for ensuring their safety. The importance of a safety management in nuclear facilities and activities has been emphasized. The safety activities in HANARO have been continuously conducted to enhance its safe operation. Last year, HANARO prepared two indicator sets to measure and assess the safety status of the reactor's operation and utilization. One is Safety Performance Indicators (SPI) and the other is Balanced Scorecard (BSC). Through reviewing these indicators, we can obtain the following information; - Plant safety status - Safety parameter trends - Safety information, for example, reactor operation status and radiation safety HANARO will continuously pursue the trends of SPI and BSC

  16. Nuclear safety requirements for operation licensing of Egyptian research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ahmed, E.E.M.; Rahman, F.A.

    2000-01-01

    From the view of responsibility for health and nuclear safety, this work creates a framework for the application of nuclear regulatory rules to ensure safe operation for the sake of obtaining or maintaining operation licensing for nuclear research reactors. It has been performed according to the recommendations of the IAEA for research reactor safety regulations which clearly states that the scope of the application should include all research reactors being designed, constructed, commissioned, operated, modified or decommissioned. From that concept, the present work establishes a model structure and a computer logic program for a regulatory licensing system (RLS code). It applies both the regulatory inspection and enforcement regulatory rules on the different licensing process stages. The present established RLS code is then applied to the Egyptian Research Reactors, namely; the first ET-RR-1, which was constructed and still operating since 1961, and the second MPR research reactor (ET-RR-2) which is now in the preliminary operation stage. The results showed that for the ET-RR-1 reactor, all operational activities, including maintenance, in-service inspection, renewal, modification and experiments should meet the appropriate regulatory compliance action program. Also, the results showed that for the new MPR research reactor (ET-RR-2), all commissioning and operational stages should also meet the regulatory inspection and enforcement action program of the operational licensing safety requirements. (author)

  17. Large Scale Experiments on Spacecraft Fire Safety

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Urban, David L.; Ruff, Gary A.; Minster, Olivier

    2012-01-01

    -based microgravity facilities or has been limited to very small fuel samples. Still, the work conducted to date has shown that fire behaviour in low-gravity is very different from that in normal-gravity, with differences observed for flammability limits, ignition delay, flame spread behaviour, flame colour and flame......Full scale fire testing complemented by computer modelling has provided significant knowhow about the risk, prevention and suppression of fire in terrestrial systems (cars, ships, planes, buildings, mines, and tunnels). In comparison, no such testing has been carried out for manned spacecraft due...... to the complexity, cost and risk associ-ated with operating a long duration fire safety experiment of a relevant size in microgravity. Therefore, there is currently a gap in knowledge of fire behaviour in spacecraft. The entire body of low-gravity fire research has either been conducted in short duration ground...

  18. Operational experience feedback with precursor analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koncar, M.; Ferjancic, M.; Muehleisen, A.; Vojnovic, D.

    2003-01-01

    Experience of practical operation is a valuable source of information for improving the safety and reliability of nuclear power plants. Operational experience feedback (Olef) system manages this aspect of NPP operation. The traditional ways of investigating operational events, such as the root cause analysis (RCA), are predominantly qualitative. RCA as a part of the Olef system provides technical guidance and management expectations in the conduct of assessing the root cause to prevent recurrence, covering the following areas: conditions preceding the event, sequence of events, equipment performance and system response, human performance considerations, equipment failures, precursors to the event, plant response and follow-up, radiological considerations, regulatory process considerations and safety significance. The root cause of event is recognized when there is no known answer on question 'why has it happened?' regarding relevant condition that may have affected the event. At that point the Olef is proceeding by actions taken in response to events, utilization, dissemination and exchange of operating experience information and at the end reviewing the effectiveness of the Olef. Analysis of the event and the selection of recommended corrective/preventive actions for implementation and prioritization can be enhanced by taking into account the information and insights derived from Pasa-based analysis. A Pasa based method, called probabilistic precursor event analysis (PPE A) provides a complement to the RCA approach by focusing on how an event might have developed adversely, and implies the mapping of an operational event on a probabilistic risk model of the plant in order to obtain a quantitative assessment of the safety significance of the event PSA based event analysis provides, due to its quantitative nature, appropriate prioritization of corrective actions. PPEA defines requirements for PSA model and code, identifies input requirements and elaborates following

  19. Experience from operation of WWER-440 model 213 nuclear power plants. Reference plant: Bohunice V2 (Slovakia). Report of the IAEA technical co-operation project RER/9/004 on evaluation of safety aspects of WWER-440 model 213 nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-07-01

    This TECDOC provides a comprehensive review of the operational experience with WWER-440/213 plants. It is hoped that it will be useful to anyone working in the field of WWER safety, and in particular to experts planning, executing or reviewing studies related to the subject. Refs, figs and tabs

  20. Experience from operation of WWER-440 model 213 nuclear power plants. Reference plant: Bohunice V2 (Slovakia). Report of the IAEA technical co-operation project RER/9/004 on evaluation of safety aspects of WWER-440 model 213 nuclear power plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-07-01

    This TECDOC provides a comprehensive review of the operational experience with WWER-440/213 plants. It is hoped that it will be useful to anyone working in the field of WWER safety, and in particular to experts planning, executing or reviewing studies related to the subject. Refs, figs and tabs.

  1. Operating experience review for the AP1000 plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chaney, T. E.; Lipner, M. H.

    2006-01-01

    Westinghouse is performing an update to the Operating Experience Review (OER) Report for the AP1000 project to account for operating experience since December 1996. Significant Operating Experience Reports, Significant Event Reports, Significant Event Notifications, Operations and Maintenance Reminders, Topical Reports, Event Analysis Reports and Licensee Event Reports were researched for pertinent input to the update. As a part of the OER, Westinghouse has also conducted operator interviews and observations during simulated plant operations and after operating events. The main purpose of the OER is to identify Human Factors Engineering (HFE) related safety issues from existing operating plant experience and to ensure that these issues are addressed in the new design. The issues and lessons learned regarding operating experience provide a basis for improving the plant design. (authors)

  2. Procedures for self-assessment of operational safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-08-01

    Self-assessment processes have been continuously developed by nuclear organizations, including nuclear power plants. Currently, the nuclear industry and governmental organizations are showing an increasing interest in the implementation of this process as an effective way for improving safety performance. Self-assessment involves the use of different types of tools and mechanisms to assist the organizations in assessing their own safety performance against given standards. This helps to enhance the understanding of the need for improvements, the feeling of ownership in achieving them and and the safety culture as a whole. The concepts developed in this report present the basic approach to self-assessment taking into consideration experience gained during Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) missions, from organizations and utilities which have successfully implemented parts of a self-assessment programme and from meetings organized to discuss the subject

  3. Safety-related operator actions: methodology for developing criteria

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kozinsky, E.J.; Gray, L.H.; Beare, A.N.; Barks, D.B.; Gomer, F.E.

    1984-03-01

    This report presents a methodology for developing criteria for design evaluation of safety-related actions by nuclear power plant reactor operators, and identifies a supporting data base. It is the eleventh and final NUREG/CR Report on the Safety-Related Operator Actions Program, conducted by Oak Ridge National Laboratory for the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The operator performance data were developed from training simulator experiments involving operator responses to simulated scenarios of plant disturbances; from field data on events with similar scenarios; and from task analytic data. A conceptual model to integrate the data was developed and a computer simulation of the model was run, using the SAINT modeling language. Proposed is a quantitative predictive model of operator performance, the Operator Personnel Performance Simulation (OPPS) Model, driven by task requirements, information presentation, and system dynamics. The model output, a probability distribution of predicted time to correctly complete safety-related operator actions, provides data for objective evaluation of quantitative design criteria

  4. Operation experience at the UWTF

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ueno, Kazuhiro; Inada, Kameji; Ohmori, Kouji; Usui, Kazuya; Irinouchi, Sigenori; Asami, Makoto; Tohchi, Katsunori

    2003-01-01

    This report describes the operation experience on the volume reduction of metal wastes and used air filters contaminated with uranium at the Uranium contaminated Waste Treatment Facility (UWTF) in JNC Tokai Works. The UWTF consists of the metal waste treatment system and the filter-waste treatment system. The former treats metal wastes, the latter treats used air filters. Metal wastes are unpacked from drums, cut, and then compacted. Used air filters are separated into filter media and frames. Then the filter media are compacted and the frames are crushed. The operation of the UWTF was started in June 1998. The following volumes of wastes had been treated at the UWTF from the beginning of the operation to March 2003 (for about 5 years). (1) 1,524 drums of the metal wastes had been reduced to 410 drums. The volume reduction factor was 3.7. (2) 372 drums of the used air filters had been reduced to 39 drums. The volume reduction factor was 9.5. These systems have been operated without trouble for 5 years and have demonstrated to be able to reduce the volumes of the wastes to designed values. The volume reduction technologies for metal wastes and used air filters contaminated with uranium were successfully demonstrated at the UWTF. (author)

  5. ATLAS Pixel Detector Operational Experience

    CERN Document Server

    Di Girolamo, B; The ATLAS collaboration

    2011-01-01

    The ATLAS Pixel Detector is the innermost detector of the ATLAS experiment at the Large Hadron Collider at CERN, providing high-resolution measurements of charged particle tracks in the high radiation environment close to the collision region. This capability is vital for the identification and measurement of proper decay times of long-lived particles such as b-hadrons, and thus vital for the ATLAS physics program. The detector provides hermetic coverage with three cylindrical layers and three layers of forward and backward pixel detectors. It consists of approximately 80 million pixels that are individually read out via chips bump-bonded to 1744 n-in-n silicon substrates. In this talk, results from the successful operation of the Pixel Detector at the LHC will be presented, including monitoring, calibration procedures, timing optimization and detector performance. The detector performance is excellent: 96.9% of the pixels are operational, noise occupancy and hit efficiency exceed the design specification, an...

  6. IAEA Leads Operational Safety Mission to Muehleberg Nuclear Power Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    Full text: An international team of nuclear safety experts led by the International Atomic Energy Agency today concluded a review of the safety practices at the Muehleberg Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) near Bern in Switzerland. The team noted a series of good practices and made recommendations and suggestions to reinforce them. The IAEA assembled the Operational Safety Review Team at the request of the Swiss government. The team, led by the IAEA's Division of Nuclear Installation Safety, performed an in-depth operational safety review from 8 to 25 October 2012. The team comprised experts from Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Slovakia, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States as well as experts from the IAEA. The team conducted an in-depth review of the aspects essential to the safe operation of the Muehleberg NPP. The conclusions of the review are based on the IAEA's Safety Standards and proven good international practices. The review covered the areas of Management, Organization and Administration; Training; Operations; Maintenance; Technical Support; Operating Experience; Radiation Protection; Chemistry, Emergency Planning and Preparedness, Severe Accident Management and Long-Term Operation. The OSART team made 10 recommendations and 11 suggestions related to areas where operations of Muehleberg NPP could be further improved, for example: - Plant management could improve the operating experience program and methods throughout the plant to ensure corrective actions are taken in a timely manner; - In the area of Long-Term Operation, the ageing management review for some systems and components is not complete and the environmental qualification of originally installed safety cables has not yet been revalidated for long-term operation; and - The plant provisions for the protection of persons on the site during an emergency with radioactive release can be improved to minimize health risks to plant personnel. The team also identified 10 good

  7. Oswer integrated health and safety standard operating practices. Directive

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-02-01

    The directive implements the OSWER (Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response) Integrated Health and Safety Standards Operating Practices in conjunction with the OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Act) Worker Protection Standards, replacing the OSWER Integrated Health and Safety Policy

  8. The detector safety system for LHC experiments

    CERN Document Server

    Schmeling, Sascha; Lüders, S; Morpurgo, Giulio

    2004-01-01

    The Detector Safety System (DSS), currently being developed at CERN under the auspices of the Joint Controls Project (JCOP), will be responsible for assuring the protection of equipment for the four Large Hadron Collider (LHC)**1 experiments. Thus, the DSS will require a high degree of both availability and reliability. After evaluation of various possible solutions, a prototype is being built based on a redundant Siemens PLC**2 front-end, to which the safety- critical part of the DSS task is delegated. This is then supervised by a PVSS**3 SCADA**4 system via an OPC**5 server. The PLC front-end is capable of running autonomously and of automatically taking predefined protective actions whenever required. The supervisory layer provides the operator with a status display and with limited online reconfiguration capabilities. Configuration of the code running in the PLCs will be completely data driven via the contents of a "configuration database." Thus, the DSS can easily adapt to the different and constantly ev...

  9. Safety of nuclear operation and maintenance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mori, M.; Nitta, T.; Sakai, K.

    1994-01-01

    The Kansai Electric Power Co. Inc.(Kansai EPC) aims to pursue a high quality and highly reliable operation in nuclear power generation in order to ensure safety by reducing the risk of accidents and win the confidence from the society and the public. It is emphasised that in order to realize this aim manufacturers and contractors cooperate with each other in performing high quality maintenance through plant lifetime maintenance system. TQC (Total Quality Control) activity enhances the motivation for each individual to have a quality-oriented mind and cultivate the safety culture. Under the lifetime employment practice, Kansai EPC and maintenance contractors can conduct systematic education and training, and the Maintenance Training Center helps to make it effective. 6 figs

  10. Safety goals for nuclear power plant operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-05-01

    This report presents and discusses the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's, Policy Statement on Safety Goals for the Operation of Nuclear Power Plants. The safety goals have been formulated in terms of qualitative goals and quantitative design objectives. The qualitative goals state that the risk to any individual member of the public from nuclear power plant operation should not be a significant contributor to that individual's risk of accidental death or injury and that the societal risks should be comparable to or less than those of viable competing technologies. The quantitative design objectives state that the average risks to individual and the societal risks of nuclear power plant operation should not exceed 0.1% of certain other risks to which members of the US population are exposed. A subsidiary quantitative design objective is established for the frequency of large-scale core melt. The significance of the goals and objectives, their bases and rationale, and the plan to evaluate the goals are provided. In addition, public comments on the 1982 proposed policy statement and responses to a series of questions that accompanied the 1982 statement are summarized

  11. Experiment on safety software evaluation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Soubies, B.; Henry, J.Y.

    1994-06-01

    The licensing procedures process of nuclear plants includes compulsory steps which bring about a thorough exam of the commands control system. In this context the IPSN uses a tool called MALPAS to carry out an analysis of the quality of the software involved in safety control. The IPSN also try to obtain the automation of the generation of test games necessary for dynamical analysis. The MALPAS tool puts forward the particularities of programing which can influence the testability and the upholding of the studied software. (TEC). 4 refs

  12. Stack Monitor Operating Experience Review

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cadwallader, L.C.; Bruyere, S.A.

    2009-01-01

    Stack monitors are used to sense radioactive particulates and gases in effluent air being vented from rooms of nuclear facilities. These monitors record the levels and types of effluents to the environment. This paper presents the results of a stack monitor operating experience review of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Occurrence Reporting and Processing System (ORPS) database records from the past 18 years. Regulations regarding these monitors are briefly described. Operating experiences reported by the U.S. DOE and in engineering literature sources were reviewed to determine the strengths and weaknesses of these monitors. Electrical faults, radiation instrumentation faults, and human errors are the three leading causes of failures. A representative 'all modes' failure rate is 1E-04/hr. Repair time estimates vary from an average repair time of 17.5 hours (with spare parts on hand) to 160 hours (without spare parts on hand). These data should support the use of stack monitors in any nuclear facility, including the National Ignition Facility and the international ITER project.

  13. Operating experience and systems analysis at Trillo NPP: A program intended for systematic review of plant safety systems to assess design basis requirements compliance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vega, R. de la

    1996-01-01

    The program was defined to apply to all plant safety systems and/or systems included in plant Technical Specifications. The goal of the program was to ensure, by systematic design, construction, and commissioning review, the adequacy of safety systems, structures and components to fulfill their safety functions. Also, as a result of the program, it was established that a complete, unambiguous, systematic, design basis definition shall take place. And finally, a complete documental review of the plant design shall result from the program execution

  14. IAEA Leads Operational Safety Mission to Armenian Nuclear Power Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    Full text: An international team of nuclear installation safety experts, led by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has reviewed the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant (ANPP) near Metsamor for its safety practices and has noted a series of good practices, as well as recommendations to reinforce them. The IAEA assembled an international team of experts at the request of the Government of the Republic of Armenia to conduct an Operational Safety Review (OSART) of the NPP. Under the leadership of the IAEA's Division of Nuclear Installation Safety, the OSART team performed an in-depth operational safety review from 16 May to 2 June 2011. The team was made up of experts from Finland, France, Lithuania, Hungary, Netherlands, Slovakia, UK, USA, EC and the IAEA. An OSART mission is designed as a review of programmes and activities essential to operational safety. It is not a regulatory inspection, nor is it a design review or a substitute for an exhaustive assessment of the plant's overall safety status. Experts participating in the IAEA's June 2010 International Conference on Operational Safety of Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) reviewed the experience of the OSART programme and concluded: In OSART missions NPPs are assessed against IAEA safety standards which reflect the current international consensus on what constitutes a high level of safety; and OSART recommendations and suggestions are of utmost importance for operational safety improvement of NPPs. Armenia is commended for openness to the international nuclear community and for actively inviting IAEA safety review missions to submit their activities to international scrutiny. Examples of IAEA safety reviews include: Design Safety Review in 2003; Review of Probabilistic Safety Assessment in 2007; and Assessment of Seismic Safety Re-Evaluation in 2009. The team at ANPP conducted an in-depth review of the aspects essential to the safe operation of the plant, which is largely under the control of the site management

  15. Operation experience with elevated ammonia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vankova, Katerina; Kysela, Jan; Malac, Miroslav; Petrecky, Igor; Svarc, Vladimir

    2011-01-01

    The 10 VVER units in the Czech and Slovak Republics are all in very good water chemistry and radiation condition, yet questions have arisen regarding the optimization of cycle chemistry and improved operation in these units. To address these issues, a comprehensive experimental program for different water chemistries of the primary circuit was carried out at the Rez Nuclear Research Institute, Czech Republic, with the goal of judging the influence of various water chemistries on radiation build-up. Four types of water chemistries were compared: standard VVER water chemistry (in common use), direct hydrogen dosing without ammonia, standard VVER water chemistry with elevated ammonia levels, and zinc dosing to standard VVER water chemistry. The test results showed that the types of water chemistry other than the common one have benefits for the operation of the nuclear power plant (NPP) primary circuit. Operation experience with elevated ammonia at NPP Dukovany Units 3 and 4 is presented which validates the experimental results, demonstrating improved corrosion product volume activity. (orig.)

  16. Aviation safety and operation problems research and technology

    Science.gov (United States)

    Enders, J. H.; Strickle, J. W.

    1977-01-01

    Aircraft operating problems are described for aviation safety. It is shown that as aircraft technology improves, the knowledge and understanding of operating problems must also improve for economics, reliability and safety.

  17. Selection of operations staff, qualifications and experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gutmann, H.

    1977-01-01

    Requirements and suggestions have been made by authorities and various organisations in a number of countries which define necessary experience and training for the various groups of nuclear power plant personnel. For two countries, the USA and the FRG, a comparison has been made which shows that there is only a slight deviation, taking into account the different education systems. With the example of the Biblis nuclear power plant the training on the job is described. Especially the production or operation department is looked at in more detail. The training is split up into several parts: a general part, such as nuclear physics, reactor physics and engineering, reactor safety, radiation protection and so on and a plant related part, such as arrangement and mode of operation of the plant under normal and accident conditions, license conditions and so on. (orig.) [de

  18. Operating experience with gamma ray irradiators

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fraser, F.M.; Ouwerkerk, T.

    1980-01-01

    The experience of Atomic Energy of Canada, Limited (AECL) with radioisotopes dates back to the mid-1940s when radium was marketed for medical purposes. Cobalt-60 came on the scene in 1949 and within a few years a thriving business in cancer teletherapy machines and research irradiators was developed. AECL's first full-scale cobalt-60 gamma ray sterilizer for medical products was installed in 1964. AECL now has over 50 plants and 30 million curies in service around the world. Sixteen years of design experience in cobalt-60 sources, radiation shielding, safety interlock systems, and source pass mechanisms have made gamma irradiators safe, reliable, and easy to operate. This proven technology is being applied in promising new fields such as sludge treatment and food preservation. Cesium-137 is expected to be extensively utilized as the gamma radiation source for these applications

  19. Implications of passive safety based on historical industrial experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Forsberg, C.W.

    1988-01-01

    In the past decade, there have been multiple proposals for applying different technologies to achieve passively safe light water reactors (LWRs). A key question for all such concepts is, ''What are the gains in safety, costs, and reliability for passive safety systems.'' Using several types of historical data, estimates have been made of gains from passive safety and operating systems, which are independent of technology. Proposals for passive safety in reactors usually have three characteristics: (1) Passive systems with no moving mechanical parts, (2) systems with far fewer components and (3) more stringent design criteria for safety-related and process systems. Each characteristic reduces the potential for an accident and may increase plant reliability. This paper addresses gains from items (1) and (2). Passive systems often allow adoption of more rigorous design criteria which would be either impossible or economically unfeasible for active systems. This important characteristic of passive safety systems cannot be easily addressed using historical industrial experience

  20. The Patient Safety Attitudes among the Operating Room Personnel

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Cherdsak Iramaneerat

    2016-07-01

    Full Text Available Background: The first step in cultivating the culture of safety in the operating room is the assessment of safety culture among operating room personnel. Objective: To assess the patient safety culture of operating room personnel at the Department of Surgery, Faculty of Medicine Siriraj Hospital, and compare attitudes among different groups of personnel, and compare them with the international standards. Methods: We conducted a cross-sectional survey of safety attitudes among 396 operating room personnel, using a short form of the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ. The SAQ employed 30 items to assess safety culture in six dimensions: teamwork climate, safety climate, stress recognition, perception of hospital management, working conditions, and job satisfaction. The subscore of each dimension was calculated and converted to a scale score with a full score of 100, where higher scores indicated better safety attitudes. Results: The response rate was 66.4%. The overall safety culture score of the operating room personnel was 65.02, higher than an international average (61.80. Operating room personnel at Siriraj Hospital had safety attitudes in teamwork climate, safety climate, and stress recognition lower than the international average, but had safety attitudes in the perception of hospital management, working conditions, and job satisfaction higher than the international average. Conclusion: The safety culture attitudes of operating room personnel at the Department of Surgery, Siriraj Hospital were comparable to international standards. The safety dimensions that Siriraj Hospital operating room should try to improve were teamwork climate, safety climate, and stress recognition.

  1. Mochovce NPP safety measures evaluation from point of view of operational safety enhancement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cillik, I.; Vrtik, L.

    2000-01-01

    Mochovce NPP consists of four reactor units of WWER 440/V213 type and it is located in the south-middle part of Slovakia. At present first unit operated and the second one under the construction finishing. As these units represent second generation of WWER reactor design, the additional safety measures (SM) were implemented to enhance operational and nuclear safety according to the recommendations of performed international audits and operational experience based on exploitation of other similar units (as Dukovany and J. Bohunice NPPs). These requirements result into a number of SMs grouped according to their purpose to reach recent international requirements on nuclear and operational safety. The paper presents the bases used for safety measures establishing including their grouping into the comprehensive tasks covering different areas of safety goals as well as structural organization of a project management of including participating companies and work performance. More, results are given regarding contribution of selected SMs to the total core damage frequency decreasing. (author)

  2. PSA analysis focused on Mochovce NPP safety measures evaluation from operational safety point of view

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cillik, I.; Vrtik, L.

    2001-01-01

    Mochovce NPP consists of four reactor units of WWER 440/V213 type and it is located in the south-middle part of Slovakia. At present first unit operated and the second one under the construction finishing. As these units represent second generation of WWER reactor design, the additional safety measures (SM) were implemented to enhance operational and nuclear safety according to the recommendations of performed international audits and operational experience based on exploitation of other similar units (as Dukovany and J. Bohunice NPPs). These requirements result into a number of SMs grouped according to their purpose to reach recent international requirements on nuclear and operational safety. The paper presents the bases used for safety measures establishing including their grouping into the comprehensive tasks covering different areas of safety goals as well as structural organization of a project management of including participating companies and work performance. More, results are given regarding contribution of selected SMs to the total core damage frequency decreasing.(author)

  3. Operating experience with nuclear power plants 2015. Pt. 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Anon.

    2016-07-01

    The VGB Technical Committee ''Nuclear Plant Operation'' has been exchanging operating experience about nuclear power plants for more than 30 years. Plant operators from several European countries are participating in the exchange. A report is given on the operating results achieved in 2015, events important to plant safety, special and relevant repair, and retrofit measures from Germany. The second part of this report will focus on nuclear power plant in Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Spain.

  4. Predicting safety culture: the roles of employer, operations manager and safety professional.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wu, Tsung-Chih; Lin, Chia-Hung; Shiau, Sen-Yu

    2010-10-01

    This study explores predictive factors in safety culture. In 2008, a sample 939 employees was drawn from 22 departments of a telecoms firm in five regions in central Taiwan. The sample completed a questionnaire containing four scales: the employer safety leadership scale, the operations manager safety leadership scale, the safety professional safety leadership scale, and the safety culture scale. The sample was then randomly split into two subsamples. One subsample was used for measures development, one for the empirical study. A stepwise regression analysis found four factors with a significant impact on safety culture (R²=0.337): safety informing by operations managers; safety caring by employers; and safety coordination and safety regulation by safety professionals. Safety informing by operations managers (ß=0.213) was by far the most significant predictive factor. The findings of this study provide a framework for promoting a positive safety culture at the group level. Crown Copyright © 2010. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  5. Evaluation of German and international operating experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stueck, Reinhard; Verstegen, Claus

    2014-01-01

    The systematic analysis of safety-relevant events in nuclear power plants and their causes is a key driver for the further development of nuclear safety. The findings obtained from the evaluation of operating experience in this respect form the basis for both technical and organisational improvements in the plants as well as for adaptations of technical rules and standards. In its role as Technical Safety Organisation advising the German federal government, Gesellschaft fuer Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) has been concerned with the detection and analysis of failure mechanisms that underlie events in nuclear power plants at home and abroad since its foundation in 1977. This article provides an overview of the different objectives which are pursued in this context by order of or funded by the Federal Environment Ministry. Here, the focus is on the evaluation of reportable events for the preparation of so-called Information Notices and generic reports as well as for the acquisition of data that can be used for in-depth probabilistic analyses.

  6. Operating experience feedback report - Solenoid-operated valve problems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ornstein, H.L.

    1991-02-01

    This report highlights significant operating events involving observed or potential common-mode failures of solenoid-operated valves (SOVs) in US plants. These events resulted in degradation or malfunction of multiple trains of safety systems as well as of multiple safety systems. On the basis of the evaluation of these events, the Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AEOD) of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) concludes that the problems with solenoid-operated valves are an important issue that needs additional NRC and industry attention. This report also provides AEOD's recommendations for actions to reduce the occurrence of SOV common-mode failures. 115 refs., 7 figs., 2 tabs

  7. Safety indicators as a tool for operational safety evaluation of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Araujo, Jefferson Borges; Melo, Paulo Fernando Ferreira Frutuoso e; Schirru, Roberto

    2009-01-01

    Performance indicators have found a wide use in the conventional and nuclear industries. For the conventional industry, the goal is to optimize production, reducing loss of time with accidents, human error and equipment downtimes. In the nuclear industry, nuclear safety is an additional goal. This paper presents a general methodology to the establishment, selection and use of safety indicators for a two loop PWR plant, as Angra 1. The use of performance indicators is not new. The NRC has its own methodology and the IAEA presents methodology suggestions, but there is no detailed documentation about indicators selection, criteria and bases used. Additionally, only the NRC methodology performs a limited integrated evaluation. The study performed identifies areas considered critical for the plant operational safety. For each of these areas, strategic sub-areas are defined. For each strategic sub-area, specific safety indicators are defined. These proposed Safety Indicators are based on the contribution to risk considering a quantitative risk analysis. For each safety indicator, a goal, a bounded interval and proper bases are developed, to allow for a clear and comprehensive individual behavior evaluation. On the establishment of the intervals and boundaries, a probabilistic safety study, operational experience, international and national standards and technical specifications were used. Additionally, an integrated evaluation of the indicators, using expert systems, was done to obtain an overview of the plant general safety. This evaluation uses well-defined and clear rules and weights for each indicator to be considered. These rules were implemented by means of a computational language, on a friendly interface, so that it is possible to obtain a quick response about operational safety. This methodology can be used to identify situations where the plant safety is challenged, by giving a general overview of the plant operational condition. Additionally, this study can

  8. Nuclear Power Plant Operating Experience from the IAEA/NEA International Reporting System for Operating Experience 2012-2014

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2018-03-01

    The International Reporting System for Operating Experience (IRS) is an essential element of the international operating experience feedback system for nuclear power plants. Its fundamental objective is to contribute to improving safety of commercial nuclear power plants which are operated worldwide. IRS reports contain information on events of safety significance with important lessons learned which assist in reducing recurrence of events at other plants. This sixth publication, covering the period 2012 - 2014, follows the structure of the previous editions. It highlights important lessons based on a review of the approximately 240 event reports received from the participating countries over this period.

  9. Safety Climate of Commercial Vehicle Operation

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-03-01

    Enhancing the safety culture within trucking and motor coach industries has become a key area of concern given the potential impact it has on crashes and overall safety. Many organizations recognize that safety is compromised if the culture within th...

  10. The enhancement of Ignalina NPP in design and operational safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Negrivoda, G.

    1999-01-01

    Enhancement of Ignalina NPP design include: core design improvements; fuel channel integrity (multiple pressure tube rupture); improvements of shutdown systems; improvements of instrumentation and control devices; containment strength and tightness; design basis accident analysis; improvements of safety and support systems; seismic safety enhancement; Year 2000 project; cracks in pipes. Enhancement of operational safety includes: quality assurance; configuration management; safety management and safety culture; emergency operating procedures; training and full scope simulator; in-service inspection; fire protection and ageing monitoring and management

  11. Vacuum system operating experience review for fusion applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cadwallader, L.C.

    1994-03-01

    This report presents a review of vacuum system operating experiences from particle accelerator, fusion experiment, space simulation chamber, and other applications. Safety relevant operating experiences and accident information are discussed. Quantitative order-of-magnitude estimates of vacuum system component failure rates and accident initiating event frequencies are presented for use in risk assessment, reliability, and availability studies. Safety concerns with vacuum systems are discussed, including personnel safety, foreign material intrusion, and factors relevant to vacuum systems being the primary confinement boundary for tritium and activated dusts. This information should be useful to fusion system designers and safety analysts, such as the team working on the Engineering Design Activities for the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor

  12. Operational and safety requirement of radiation facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zulkafli Ghazali

    2007-01-01

    Gamma and electron irradiation facilities are the most common industrial sources of ionizing radiation. They have been used for medical, industrial and research purposes since the 1950s. Currently there are more than 160 gamma irradiation facilities and over 600 electron beam facilities in operation worldwide. These facilities are either used for the sterilization of medical and pharmaceutical products, the preservation of foodstuffs, polymer synthesis and modification, or the eradication of insect infestation. Irradiation with electron beam, gamma ray or ultra violet light can also destroy complex organic contaminants in both liquid and gaseous waste. EB systems are replacing traditional chemical sterilization methods in the medical supply industry. The ultra-violet curing facility, however, has found more industrial application in printing and furniture industries. Gamma and electron beam facilities produce very high dose rates during irradiation, and thus there is a potential of accidental exposure in the irradiation chamber which can be lethal within minutes. Although, the safety record of this industry has been relatively very good, there have been fatalities recorded in Italy (1975), Norway (1982), El Salvador (1989) and Israel (1990). Precautions against uncontrolled entry into irradiation chamber must therefore be taken. This is especially so in the case of gamma irradiation facilities those contain large amounts of radioactivity. If the mechanism for retracting the source is damaged, the source may remain exposed. This paper will, to certain extent, describe safety procedure and system being installed at ALURTRON, Nuclear Malaysia to eliminate accidental exposure of electron beam irradiation. (author)

  13. Ventilation Systems Operating Experience Review for Fusion Applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cadwallader, L.C.

    1999-01-01

    This report is a collection and review of system operation and failure experiences for air ventilation systems in nuclear facilities. These experiences are applicable for magnetic and inertial fusion facilities since air ventilation systems are support systems that can be considered generic to nuclear facilities. The report contains descriptions of ventilation system components, operating experiences with these systems, component failure rates, and component repair times. Since ventilation systems have a role in mitigating accident releases in nuclear facilities, these data are useful in safety analysis and risk assessment of public safety. An effort has also been given to identifying any safety issues with personnel operating or maintaining ventilation systems. Finally, the recommended failure data were compared to an independent data set to determine the accuracy of individual values. This comparison is useful for the International Energy Agency task on fusion component failure rate data collection

  14. Development of Large-Scale Spacecraft Fire Safety Experiments

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Ruff, Gary A.; Urban, David L.; Fernandez-Pello, A. Carlos

    2013-01-01

    exploration missions outside of low-earth orbit and accordingly, more complex in terms of operations, logistics, and safety. This will increase the challenge of ensuring a fire-safe environment for the crew throughout the mission. Based on our fundamental uncertainty of the behavior of fires in low...... of the spacecraft fire safety risk. The activity of this project is supported by an international topical team of fire experts from other space agencies who conduct research that is integrated into the overall experiment design. The large-scale space flight experiment will be conducted in an Orbital Sciences...

  15. Commissioning and Operational Experience in Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pradhan, S., E-mail: spradhan@barctara.gov.in [Tarapur Based Reprocessing Plant, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Tarapur (India)

    2014-10-15

    After completing design, construction, commissioning, operation and maintenance experience of the reprocessing plants at Tarapur, Mumbai and Kalpakkam a new reprocessing plant is commissioned and put into operation at BARC, Tarapur since 2011. Subsequent to construction clearance, commissioning of the plant is taken in many steps with simultaneous review by design and safety committees. In spite of vast experience, all the staff was retrained in various aspects of process and utility operations and in operation of innovative changes incorporated in the design. Operating personnel are licensed through an elaborate procedure consisting of various check lists followed by personnel interview. Commissioning systems were divided in sub-systems. Sub-systems were commissioned independently and later integrated testing was carried out. For commissioning, extreme operating conditions were identified in consultation with designers and detailed commissioning procedures were made accordingly. Commissioning was done in different conditions to ensure safety, smooth operation and maintainability. Few modifications were carried out based on commissioning experience. Technical specifications for operation of the plant are made in consultation with designers and reviewed by safety committees. Operation of the plant was carried out after successful commissioning trials with Deep Depleted Uranium (DDU). Emergency operating procedures for each design basis accident were made. Performance of various systems, subsystems are quite satisfactory and the plant has given very good capacity factor. (author)

  16. Safety evaluation of the Dalat research reactor operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Long, V.H.; Lam, P.V.; An, T.K.

    1989-01-01

    After an introduction presenting the essential characteristics of the Dalat Nuclear Research Reactor, the document presents i) The safety assurance condition of the reactor, ii) Its safety behaviour after 5 years of operation, iii) Safety research being realized on the reactor. Following is questionnaire of safety evaluation and a list of attachments, which concern the reactor

  17. Operating experience of steam generator test facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sureshkumar, V.A.; Madhusoodhanan, G.; Noushad, I.B.; Ellappan, T.R.; Nashine, B.K.; Sylvia, J.I.; Rajan, K.K.; Kalyanasundaram, P.; Vaidyanathan, G.

    2006-01-01

    Steam Generator (SG) is the vital component of a Fast Reactor. It houses both water at high pressure and sodium at low pressure separated by a tube wall. Any damage to this barrier initiates sodium water reaction that could badly affect the plant availability. Steam Generator Test Facility (SGTF) has been set up in Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR) to test sodium heated once through steam generator of 19 tubes similar to the PFBR SG dimension and operating conditions. The facility is also planned as a test bed to assess improved designs of the auxiliary equipments used in Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR). The maximum power of the facility is 5.7 MWt. This rating is arrived at based on techno economic consideration. This paper covers the performance of various equipments in the system such as Electro magnetic pumps, Centrifugal sodium pump, in-sodium hydrogen meters, immersion heaters, and instrumentation and control systems. Experience in the system operation, minor modifications, overall safety performance, and highlights of the experiments carried out etc. are also brought out. (author)

  18. Higher operational safety of nuclear power plants by evaluating the behaviour of operating personnel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mertins, M.; Glasner, P.

    1990-01-01

    In the GDR power reactors have been operated since 1966. Since that time operational experiences of 73 cumulative reactor years have been collected. The behaviour of operating personnel is an essential factor to guarantee the safety of operation of the nuclear power plant. Therefore a continuous analysis of the behaviour of operating personnel has been introduced at the GDR nuclear power plants. In the paper the overall system of the selection, preparation and control of the behaviour of nuclear power plant operating personnel is presented. The methods concerned are based on recording all errors of operating personnel and on analyzing them in order to find out the reasons. The aim of the analysis of reasons is to reduce the number of errors. By a feedback of experiences the nuclear safety of the nuclear power plant can be increased. All data necessary for the evaluation of errors are recorded and evaluated by a computer program. This method is explained thoroughly in the paper. Selected results of error analysis are presented. It is explained how the activities of the personnel are made safer by means of this analysis. Comparisons with other methods are made. (author). 3 refs, 4 figs

  19. Research on station management in subway operation safety

    Science.gov (United States)

    Li, Yiman

    2017-10-01

    The management of subway station is an important part of the safe operation of urban subway. In order to ensure the safety of subway operation, it is necessary to study the relevant factors that affect station management. In the protection of subway safety operations on the basis of improving the quality of service, to promote the sustained and healthy development of subway stations. This paper discusses the influencing factors of subway operation accident and station management, and analyzes the specific contents of station management security for subway operation, and develops effective suppression measures. It is desirable to improve the operational quality and safety factor for subway operations.

  20. LMFBR safety experiment facility planning and analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stevenson, M.G.; Scott, J.H.

    1976-01-01

    In the past two years considerable effort has been placed on the planning and design of new facilities for the resolution of LMFBR safety issues. The paper reviews the key issues, the experiments needed to resolve them, and the design aspects of proposed new facilities. In addition, it presents a decision theory approach to selecting an optimal combination of modified and new facilities

  1. IAEA Leads Operational Safety Mission to Smolensk Nuclear Power Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    Full text: An international team of nuclear safety experts led by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reviewed the Smolensk Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) near Desnogorsk, in Russia's Smolensk region, for its safety practices and has noted a series of good practices as well as recommendations and suggestions to reinforce them. The IAEA assembled the team at the request of the Government of the Russian Federation to conduct an Operational Safety Review (OSART) of the NPP. Under the leadership of the IAEA's Division of Nuclear Installation Safety, the OSART team performed an in-depth operational safety review from 5 to 22 September 2011. The team was made up of experts from China, India, Lithuania, Slovakia, South Africa, Sweden, UK, USA, the World Association of Nuclear Operators and the IAEA. The team conducted an in-depth review of the aspects essential to the safe operation of the Smolensk NPP. The conclusions of the review are based on the IAEA's Safety Standards and proven good international practices. The review covered the areas of Management, Organization and Administration; Training; Operations; Maintenance; Technical Support; Operating Experience; Radiation Protection; and Chemistry. Throughout the review, the exchange of information between the OSART experts and plant personnel was very open, professional and productive. The plant's staff were found to be motivated, well trained, knowledgeable and experienced. The OSART team has identified good plant practices which will be shared with the rest of the nuclear industry for consideration of their application. Examples include the following: Illuminated hot-spot wire to identify higher radiation levels is used in the radiation-controlled area to reduce exposures when working in the controlled area; Modern and state-of-the-art training infrastructure and facilities are available at the plant. These include: maintenance training centre; multimedia simulator for the refueling machine; and safety

  2. IAEA Operational Safety Team Reviews Cattenom Nuclear Power Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    Full text: An international team of nuclear installation safety experts led by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reviewed operational safety at France's Cattenom Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) noting a series of good practices as well as recommendations and suggestions to reinforce them. The IAEA assembled an international team of experts at the request of the Government of France to conduct an Operational Safety Review (OSART) of Cattenom NPP. Under the leadership of the IAEA's Division of Nuclear Installation Safety in Vienna, the OSART team performed an in-depth operational safety review of the plant from 14 November to 1 December 2011. The team was made up of experts from Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Russia, Slovakia, South Africa, Sweden, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the IAEA. The team at Cattenom conducted an in-depth review of the aspects essential to the safe operation of the NPP, which is largely under the control of the site management. The conclusions of the review are based on the IAEA's Safety Standards. The review covered the areas of Management, Organization and Administration; Training and Qualification; Operations; Maintenance; Technical Support; Operating Experience; Radiation Protection; Chemistry; Emergency Planning and Preparedness; and Severe Accident Management. Cattenom is the first plant in Europe to voluntarily undertake a Severe Accident Management review during an OSART review. The OSART team has identified good plant practices, which will be shared with the rest of the nuclear industry for consideration of their application. Examples include: Sheets are displayed in storage areas where combustible material is present - these sheets are updated readily and accurately by the area owner to ensure that the fire limits are complied with; A simple container is attached to the neutron source handling device to ensure ease and safety of operations and reduce possible radiation exposure during use

  3. Safety Evakuation Of Triga-2000 Reactor Operation Viewed From Safety Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Karliana, Itjeu

    2001-01-01

    The safety evaluation activities of TRIGA-2000 operation viewed from safety culture performed by questioners data collected from the operators and supervisor site of TRIGA-2000 P3TN, Bandung. There are 9 activity aspects surveyed, for instant to avail the policy of safety from their chairman, safety management, education and training, emergency aids planning, safety consultancy, accident information, safety analysis, safety devices, safety and occupational health. The surveying undertaken by filling the questioner that containing of 9 activity aspects and 20 samples of employees. The safety evaluation results' of the operation personnel in TRIGA-2000 P3TN are good implemented by both the operators and supervisors should be improve and attention need to provide the equipment's. The education and training especially for safety refreshment must be performing

  4. Operational experience in the United Kingdom

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gronow, W.S.

    1977-01-01

    In the UK there are 26 Magnox reactors and 4 AGRs operating on 11 licensed sites; a further 6 AGRs are under construction on 2 additional and one of the existing sites. The arrangements by which the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, on behalf of the Health and Safety Executive, carries out its regulatory functions at operating nuclear power plants are described. The range of activities undertaken is described with special reference being made to the biennial shutdowns for approved maintenance and inspections which are required by conditions attached to the site licence. The other means by which the continuing safety of these power reactors is assured are explained and include the relationship with the licensee's own Nuclear Safety Committee, approved arrangements for modifications to plant systems or components which have importance for safety and long term reviews of safety aspects. (author)

  5. Operation Praetorian onsite radiological safety report, October 1981-September 1982

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mullen, O.W.; Eubank, B.F.

    1983-09-01

    PRAETORIAN was the name assigned to the series of underground nuclear experiments conducted at the Nevada Test Site from October 1, 1981 through September 30, 1982. Remote radiation measurements were taken during and after each nuclear experiment by a telemetry system. Monitors with portable radiation detection instruments surveyed reentry routes into ground zeros before other planned entries were made. Continuous surveillance was provided while personnel were in radiation areas and appropriate precautions were taken to protect persons from unnecessary exposure to radiation and toxic gases. Protective clothing and equipment were issued as needed. Complete radiological safety and industrial hygiene coverage was provided during drilling and mineback operations. Telemetered and portable radiation detector measurements are listed. Detection instrumentation used is described and specific operational procedures are defined

  6. Operation CRESSET: onsite radiological safety report, October 1977--September 1978

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mullen, O.W.; Eubank, B.F.

    1979-06-01

    CRESSET was the name assigned to the series of underground nuclear experiments conducted at the Nevada Test Site from October 1, 1977 to September 30, 1978. Remote radiation measurements were taken during and after each nuclear experiment by a telemetry system. Monitors with portable radiation detection instruments surveyed reentry routes into ground zeroes before other planned entries were made. Continuous surveillance was provided while personnel were in radiation areas and appropriate precautions were taken to protect persons from unnecessary exposure to radiation and toxic gases. Protective clothing and equipment were issued as needed. Complete radiological safety and industrial hygiene coverage was provided during drilling and mineback operations. Telemetered and portable radiation detector measurements are listed. Detection instrumentation used is described and specific operational procedures are defined

  7. Operation FULCRUM: onsite radiological safety report, October 1976--September 1977

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mullen, O.W.; Eubank, B.F.

    1978-03-01

    FULCRUM was the name assigned to the series of underground nuclear experiments conducted at the Nevada Test Site from October 1, 1976 to September 30, 1977. Remote radiation measurements were taken during and after each nuclear experiment by a telemetry system. Monitors with portable radiation detection instruments surveyed reentry routes into ground zeroes before other planned entries were made. Continuous surveillance was provided while personnel were in radiation areas and appropriate precautions were taken to protect persons from unnecessary exposure to radiation and toxic gases. Protective clothing and equipment were issued as needed. Complete radiological safety and industrial hygiene coverage was provided during drilling and mineback operations. Telemetered and portable radiation detector measurements are listed. Detection instrumentation used is described and specific operational procedures are defined

  8. Operation GUARDIAN onsite radiological safety report, October 1980-September 1981

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mullen, O.W.; Eubank, B.F.

    1983-02-01

    GUARDIAN was the name assigned to the series of underground nuclear experiments conducted at the Nevada Test Site from October 1, 1980 to September 30, 1981. Remote radiation measurements were taken during and after each nuclear experiment by a telemetry system. Monitors with portable radiation detection intruments surveyed reentry routes into ground zeroes before other planned entries were made. Continuous surveillance was provided while personnel were in radiation areas and appropriate precautions were taken to protect persons from unnecessary exposure to radiation and toxic gases. Protective clothing and equipment were issued as needed. Complete radiological safety and industrial hygiene coverage was provided during drilling and mineback operations. Telemetered and portable radiation detector measurements are listed. Detection instrumentation used is described and specific operational procedures are defined

  9. Upgraded safety analysis document including operations policies, operational safety limits and policy changes. Revision 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Batchelor, K.

    1996-03-01

    The National Synchrotron Light Source Safety Analysis Reports (1), (2), (3), BNL reports number-sign 51584, number-sign 52205 and number-sign 52205 (addendum) describe the basic Environmental Safety and Health issues associated with the department's operations. They include the operating envelope for the Storage Rings and also the rest of the facility. These documents contain the operational limits as perceived prior or during construction of the facility, much of which still are appropriate for current operations. However, as the machine has matured, the experimental program has grown in size, requiring more supervision in that area. Also, machine studies have either verified or modified knowledge of beam loss modes and/or radiation loss patterns around the facility. This document is written to allow for these changes in procedure or standards resulting from their current mode of operation and shall be used in conjunction with the above reports. These changes have been reviewed by NSLS and BNL ES and H committee and approved by BNL management

  10. Supplement to safety analysis report. 306-W building operations safety requirement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richey, C.R.

    1979-08-01

    The operations safety requirements (OSRs) presented in this report define the conditions, safe boundaries, and management control needed for safely conducting operations with radioactive materials in the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) 306-W building. The safety requirements are organized in five sections. Safety limits are safety-related process variables that are observable and measurable. Limiting conditions cover: equipment and technical conditions and characteristics of the facility and operations necessary for continued safe operation. Surveillance requirements prescribe the requirements for checking systems and components that are essential to safety. Equipment design controls require that changes to process equipment and systems be independently checked and approved to assure that the changes will have no adverse effect on safety. Administrative controls describe and discuss the organization and administrative systems and procedures to be used for safe operation of the facility. Details of the implementation of the operations safety requirements are prescribed by internal PNL documents such as criticality safety specifications and radiation work procedures

  11. Operating Experience Review of Tritium-in-Water Monitors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    S. A. Bruyere; L. C. Cadwallader

    2011-09-01

    Monitoring tritium facility and fusion experiment effluent streams is an environmental safety requirement. This paper presents data on the operating experience of a solid scintillant monitor for tritium in effluent water. Operating experiences were used to calculate an average monitor failure rate of 4E-05/hour for failure to function. Maintenance experiences were examined to find the active repair time for this type of monitor, which varied from 22 minutes for filter replacement to 11 days of downtime while waiting for spare parts to arrive on site. These data support planning for monitor use; the number of monitors needed, allocating technician time for maintenance, inventories of spare parts, and other issues.

  12. Steam generator operating experience update, 1982-1983

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frank, L.

    1984-06-01

    This report is a continuation of earlier reports by the staff addressing pressurized water reactor steam generator operating experience. NUREG-0886, Steam Generator Tube Experience, published in February 1982 summarized experience in domestic and foreign plants through December 1981. This report summarizes steam generator operating experience in domestic plants for the years 1982 and 1983. Included are new problems encountered with secondary-side loose parts, sulfur-induced stress-assisted corrosion cracking, and flow-induced vibrational wear in the new preheater design steam generators. The status of Unresolved Safety Issues A3, A4, and A5 is also discussed

  13. Nuclear power plant operation experience - a feedback programme

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Banica, I.; Sociu, F.; Margaritescu, C.

    1994-01-01

    An effective high quality maintenance programme is required for the safe reliable operation of a nuclear power plant. To achieve the objectives of such a programme, both plant management and staff must be highly dedicated and motivated to perform high quality work at all levels. Operating and maintenance experience data collections and analysis are necessary in order to enhance the safety of the plant and reliability of the structures systems and components throughout their operating life. Significant events, but also minor incident, may reveal important deficiencies or negative trends adverse to safety. Therefore, a computer processing system for collecting, classifying and evaluating abnormal events or findings concerning operating-maintenance and for feeding back the results of the lessons learned from experience into the design and the operation of our nuclear power plant is considered to be of paramount importance. (Author)

  14. Operation safety of complex industrial systems. Main concepts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zwingelstein, G.

    2009-01-01

    Operation safety consists in knowing, evaluating, foreseeing, measuring and mastering the technological system and human failures in order to avoid their impacts on health and people's safety, on productivity, and on the environment, and to preserve the Earth's resources. This article recalls the main concepts of operation safety: 1 - evolutions in the domain; 2 - failures, missions and functions of a system and of its components: functional failure, missions and functions, industrial processes, notions of probability; 3 - basic concepts and operation safety: reliability, unreliability, failure density, failure rate, relations between them, availability, maintainability, safety. (J.S.)

  15. The Alternative Design Features for Safety Enhancement in Shutdown Operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oh, Hae Cheol; Kim, Myung Ki; Chung, Bag Soon; Seo, Mi Ro

    2009-01-01

    PSA can be used to confirm that the new plant design is complied with the applicable safety goals, and to select among the alternate design options. A shutdown PSA provides insight for outage planning schedule, outage management practices, and design modifications. Considering the results of both LPSD PSA studies and operating experiences for low power and shutdown, the improvements can be proposed to reduce the high risk contribution. The improvements/enhancements during shutdown operation may be divided into categories such as hardware, administrative management, and operational procedure. This paper presents on an example how the risk related to an accidental situation can be reduced, focusing the hardware design changes for the newly designed NPPs

  16. UK experience of safety requirements for thermal reactor stations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matthews, R.R.; Dale, G.C.; Tweedy, J.N.

    1977-01-01

    The paper summarises the development of safety requirements since the first of the Generating Boards' Magnox reactors commenced operation in 1962 and includes A.G.R. safety together with the preparation of S.G.H.W.R. design safety criteria. It outlines the basic principles originally adopted and shows how safety assessment is a continuing process throughout the life of a reactor. Some description is given of the continuous effort over the years to obtain increased safety margins for existing and new reactors, taking into account the construction and operating experience, experimental information, and more sophisticated computer-aided design techniques which have become available. The main safeguards against risks arising from the Generating Boards' reactors are the achievement of high standards of design, construction and operation, in conjunction with comprehensive fault analyses to ensure that adequate protective equipment is provided. The most important analyses refer to faults which can lead to excessive fuel element temperatures arising from an increase in power or a reduction in cooling capacity. They include the possibility of unintended control rod withdrawal at power or at start-up, coolant flow failure, pressure circuit failure, loss of boiler feed water, and failure of electric power. The paper reviews the protective equipment, and the policy for reactor safety assessments which include application of maximum credible accident philosophy and later the limited use of reliability and probability methods. Some of the Generating Boards' reactors are now more than half way through their planned working lives and during this time safety protective equipment has occasionally been brought into operation, often for spurious reasons. The general performance, of safety equipment is reviewed particularly for incidents such as main turbo-alternator trip, circulator failure, fuel element failures and other similar events, and some problems which have given rise to

  17. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-2, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, and has been extended to cover the commissioning stage. It describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. Over recent years there have been developments in areas such as long term operation, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis and risk informed decision making processes. It became necessary to revise the IAEA's safety requirements in these areas and to correct and/or improve the publication on the basis of feedback from its application by both the IAEA and its Member States. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the Fundamental Safety Principles. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Safety objectives and principles; 3. The management and organizational structure of the operating organization; 4. Management of operational safety; 5. Operational safety programmes; 6. Plant commissioning; 7. Plant operations; 8. Maintenance, testing, surveillance and inspection; 9. Preparation for decommissioning.

  18. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-2, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, and has been extended to cover the commissioning stage. It describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. Over recent years there have been developments in areas such as long term operation, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis and risk informed decision making processes. It became necessary to revise the IAEA's safety requirements in these areas and to correct and/or improve the publication on the basis of feedback from its application by both the IAEA and its Member States. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the Fundamental Safety Principles. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Safety objectives and principles; 3. The management and organizational structure of the operating organization; 4. Management of operational safety; 5. Operational safety programmes; 6. Plant commissioning; 7. Plant operations; 8. Maintenance, testing, surveillance and inspection; 9. Preparation for decommissioning.

  19. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Arabic Edition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-2, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, and has been extended to cover the commissioning stage. It describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. Over recent years there have been developments in areas such as long term operation, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis and risk informed decision making processes. It became necessary to revise the IAEA's safety requirements in these areas and to correct and/or improve the publication on the basis of feedback from its application by both the IAEA and its Member States. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the Fundamental Safety Principles. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Safety objectives and principles; 3. The management and organizational structure of the operating organization; 4. Management of operational safety; 5. Operational safety programmes; 6. Plant commissioning; 7. Plant operations; 8. Maintenance, testing, surveillance and inspection; 9. Preparation for decommissioning.

  20. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-2, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, and has been extended to cover the commissioning stage. It describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. Over recent years there have been developments in areas such as long term operation, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis and risk informed decision making processes. It became necessary to revise the IAEA's safety requirements in these areas and to correct and/or improve the publication on the basis of feedback from its application by both the IAEA and its Member States. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the Fundamental Safety Principles. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Safety objectives and principles; 3. The management and organizational structure of the operating organization; 4. Management of operational safety; 5. Operational safety programmes; 6. Plant commissioning; 7. Plant operations; 8. Maintenance, testing, surveillance and inspection; 9. Preparation for decommissioning.

  1. Safety relevant failure mechanisms in the post-operational phase

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mayer, Gerhard; Stiller, Jan Christopher; Roemer, Sarah

    2017-03-01

    When the 13"t"h amendment of the Atomic Energy Act came into force, eight Germ an nuclear power plant units had their power operating licences revoked and are now in the so-called post operation phase. Of the remaining nuclear power plants, one have by now also entered the post operation phase, with those left in operation bound for entering this phase sometime between now and the end of 2022. Therefore, failure mechanisms that are particularly relevant for post operation were to be identified and described in the frame of the present project. To do so, three major steps were taken: Firstly, recent national and international pertinent literature was evaluated to obtain indications of failure mechanisms in the post operation phase. It turned out that most of the national and international literature deals with the general procedure of the transition from power operation to decommissioning and dismantling. However, there were also some documents providing detailed indications of possible failure mechanisms in post operation. This includes e.g. the release of radioactive materials caused by the drop of containers, chemical impacts on systems important to safety in connection with decontamination work, and corrosion in connection with the storage of the core in the spent fuel pool, with the latter leading to the jamming of the fuel assemblies in the storage racks and a possible reduction of coolant circulation. In a second step, three safety analyses of pressurised water reactors prepared by the respective plant operators were evaluated to identify failure mechanisms based on systems engineering. The failure mechanisms that were found here include e.g. faults in the boric acid concentration of the reactor coolant, damage to the equipment airlock upon the unloading of Castor casks, leakages in connection with primary system decontamination, and the drop of packages holding radioactive residual materials or waste with subsequent mobilisation of radioactive aerosols

  2. The operating organization for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA programme for safety standards for nuclear power plants. The present publication is a revision of the IAEA Safety Guide on Management of Nuclear Power Plants for Safe Operation issued in 1984. It supplements Section 2 of the Safety Requirements publication on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation. Nuclear power technology is different from the customary technology of power generation from fossil fuel and by hydroelectric means. One major difference between the management of nuclear power plants and that of conventional generating plants is the emphasis that should be placed on nuclear safety, quality assurance, the management of radioactive waste and radiological protection, and the accompanying national regulatory requirements. This Safety Guide highlights the important elements of effective management in relation to these aspects of safety. The attention to be paid to safety requires that the management recognize that personnel involved in the nuclear power programme should understand, respond effectively to, and continuously search for ways to enhance safety in the light of any additional requirements socially and legally demanded of nuclear energy. This will help to ensure that safety policies that result in the safe operation of nuclear power plants are implemented and that margins of safety are always maintained. The structure of the organization, management standards and administrative controls should be such that there is a high degree of assurance that safety policies and decisions are implemented, safety is continuously enhanced and a strong safety culture is promoted and supported. The objective of this publication is to guide Member States in setting up an operating organization which facilitates the safe operation of nuclear power plants to a high level internationally. The second objective is to provide guidance on the most important organizational elements in order to contribute to a strong safety

  3. The operating organization for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA programme for safety standards for nuclear power plants. The present publication is a revision of the IAEA Safety Guide on Management of Nuclear Power Plants for Safe Operation issued in 1984. It supplements Section 2 of the Safety Requirements publication on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation. Nuclear power technology is different from the customary technology of power generation from fossil fuel and by hydroelectric means. One major difference between the management of nuclear power plants and that of conventional generating plants is the emphasis that should be placed on nuclear safety, quality assurance, the management of radioactive waste and radiological protection, and the accompanying national regulatory requirements. This Safety Guide highlights the important elements of effective management in relation to these aspects of safety. The attention to be paid to safety requires that the management recognize that personnel involved in the nuclear power programme should understand, respond effectively to, and continuously search for ways to enhance safety in the light of any additional requirements socially and legally demanded of nuclear energy. This will help to ensure that safety policies that result in the safe operation of nuclear power plants are implemented and that margins of safety are always maintained. The structure of the organization, management standards and administrative controls should be such that there is a high degree of assurance that safety policies and decisions are implemented, safety is continuously enhanced and a strong safety culture is promoted and supported. The objective of this publication is to guide Member States in setting up an operating organization which facilitates the safe operation of nuclear power plants to a high level internationally. The second objective is to provide guidance on the most important organizational elements in order to contribute to a strong safety

  4. The operating organization for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA programme for safety standards for nuclear power plants. The present publication is a revision of the IAEA Safety Guide on Management of Nuclear Power Plants for Safe Operation issued in 1984. It supplements Section 2 of the Safety Requirements publication on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation. Nuclear power technology is different from the customary technology of power generation from fossil fuel and by hydroelectric means. One major difference between the management of nuclear power plants and that of conventional generating plants is the emphasis that should be placed on nuclear safety, quality assurance, the management of radioactive waste and radiological protection, and the accompanying national regulatory requirements. This Safety Guide highlights the important elements of effective management in relation to these aspects of safety. The attention to be paid to safety requires that the management recognize that personnel involved in the nuclear power programme should understand, respond effectively to, and continuously search for ways to enhance safety in the light of any additional requirements socially and legally demanded of nuclear energy. This will help to ensure that safety policies that result in the safe operation of nuclear power plants are implemented and that margins of safety are always maintained. The structure of the organization, management standards and administrative controls should be such that there is a high degree of assurance that safety policies and decisions are implemented, safety is continuously enhanced and a strong safety culture is promoted and supported. The objective of this publication is to guide Member States in setting up an operating organization which facilitates the safe operation of nuclear power plants to a high level internationally. The second objective is to provide guidance on the most important organizational elements in order to contribute to a strong safety

  5. Return on experience. Building tomorrow's safety rules

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    2013-01-01

    Based on some experiments and witnesses, this set of articles outlines the importance of the return on experience in the evolution of process for improving the safety of nuclear installations. As an example, an article notably addresses the failures of Diesel engines which are used as spare generators in nuclear power stations: failures have been analysed and attributed to bearings, and more specifically to the degradation of their surface, and a third generation of bearings has been designed and produced. An article outlines that different industrials belonging to the nuclear sector as well as to other sectors share their returns on experience

  6. The Detector Safety System of the ATLAS experiment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beltramello, O; Burckhart, H J; Franz, S; Jaekel, M; Jeckel, M; Lueders, S; Morpurgo, G; Santos Pedrosa, F dos; Pommes, K; Sandaker, H

    2009-01-01

    The ATLAS detector at the Large Hadron Collider at CERN is one of the most advanced detectors for High Energy Physics experiments ever built. It consists of the order of ten functionally independent sub-detectors, which all have dedicated services like power, cooling, gas supply. A Detector Safety System has been built to detect possible operational problems and abnormal and potentially dangerous situations at an early stage and, if needed, to bring the relevant part of ATLAS automatically into a safe state. The procedures and the configuration specific to ATLAS are described in detail and first operational experience is given.

  7. International conference on the operational safety performance in nuclear installations. Contributed papers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    In 2001, the IAEA organized an 'International Conference on Topical Issues in Nuclear Safety'. The issues discussed during the conference were: (1) risk- informed decision-making; (2) influence of external factors on safety; (3) safety of fuel cycle facilities; (4) safety of research reactors; and (5) safety performance indicators. Senior nuclear safety decision makers reviewed the issues and formulated recommendations for future actions by national and international organizations. In 2004, the IAEA organized an 'International Conference on Topical Issues in Nuclear Safety' in Beijing China. The issues discussed during the conference were: (1) changing environment - coping with diversity and globalization; (2) operating experience - managing changes effectively; (3) regulatory management systems - adapting to changes in the environment; and (4) long term operations - maintaining safety margins while extending plant lifetimes. The results of this conference confirmed the importance of operators and regulators of nuclear facilities meeting periodically to share experience and opinion on emerging issues and future challenges of the nuclear industry. Substantial progress has been made, and continues to be made by Member States in enhancing the safety of nuclear installations worldwide. At the same time, more attention is being given to other areas of nuclear safety. The safety standards for research reactors are being updated and new standards are planned on the safety of other facilities in the nuclear fuel cycle. The Agency has taken a lead role in this effort and is receiving much support from its Member States to gain international consensus in these areas. The objective of the conference is to foster the exchange of information on operational safety performance and operating experience in nuclear installations, with the aim of consolidating an international consensus on: - the present status of these issues; - emerging issues with international implications

  8. Nuclear units operating improvement by using operating experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rotaru, I.; Bilegan, I.C.

    1997-01-01

    The paper presents how the information experience can be used to improve the operation of nuclear units. This areas include the following items: conservative decision making; supervisory oversight; teamwork; control room distraction; communications; expectations and standards; operator training and fundamental knowledge, procedure quality and adherence; plant status awareness. For each of these topics, the information illustrate which are the principles, the lessons learned from operating experience and the most appropriate exemplifying documents. (authors)

  9. Operational experience with superconducting synchrotron magnets

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Martin, P.S.

    1987-03-01

    The operational experience with the Fermilab Tevatron is presented, with emphasis on reliability and failure modes. Comprisons are made between the operating efficiencies for the superconducting machine and for he conventional Main Ring

  10. Operational experience with superconducting synchrotron magnets

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Martin, P.S.

    1987-01-01

    The operational experience with the Fermilab Tevatron is presented, with emphasis on reliability and failure modes. Comparisons are made between the operating efficiencies for the superconducting machine and for the conventional Main Ring

  11. Benchmarking criticality safety calculations with subcritical experiments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mihalczo, J.T.

    1984-06-01

    Calculation of the neutron multiplication factor at delayed criticality may be necessary for benchmarking calculations but it may not be sufficient. The use of subcritical experiments to benchmark criticality safety calculations could result in substantial savings in fuel material costs for experiments. In some cases subcritical configurations could be used to benchmark calculations where sufficient fuel to achieve delayed criticality is not available. By performing a variety of measurements with subcritical configurations, much detailed information can be obtained which can be compared directly with calculations. This paper discusses several measurements that can be performed with subcritical assemblies and presents examples that include comparisons between calculation and experiment where possible. Where not, examples from critical experiments have been used but the measurement methods could also be used for subcritical experiments

  12. Time Based Workload Analysis Method for Safety-Related Operator Actions in Safety Analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Yun Goo; Oh, Eung Se [Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Co., Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-05-15

    During the design basis event, the safety system performs safety functions to mitigate the event. The most of safety system is actuated by automatic system however, there are operator manual actions that are needed for the plant safety. These operator actions are classified as important human actions in human factors engineering design. The human factors engineering analysis and evaluation is needed for these important human actions to assure that operator successfully perform their tasks for plant safety and operational goals. The work load analysis is one of the required analysis for the important human actions.

  13. Time Based Workload Analysis Method for Safety-Related Operator Actions in Safety Analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Yun Goo; Oh, Eung Se

    2016-01-01

    During the design basis event, the safety system performs safety functions to mitigate the event. The most of safety system is actuated by automatic system however, there are operator manual actions that are needed for the plant safety. These operator actions are classified as important human actions in human factors engineering design. The human factors engineering analysis and evaluation is needed for these important human actions to assure that operator successfully perform their tasks for plant safety and operational goals. The work load analysis is one of the required analysis for the important human actions.

  14. Review of irradiation experiments for water reactor safety research

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tobioka, Toshiaki

    1977-02-01

    A review is made of irradiation experiments for water reactor safety research under way in both commercial power plants and test reactors. Such experiments are grouped in two; first, LWR fuel performance under normal and abnormal operating conditions, and second, irradiation effects on fracture toughness in LWR vessels. In the former are fuel densification, swelling, and the influence of power ramp and cycling on fuel rod, and also fuel rod behavior under accident conditions in in-reactor experiment. In the latter are the effects of neutron exposure level on the ferritic steel of pressure vessels, etc.. (auth.)

  15. Fuel Supply Shutdown Facility Interim Operational Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BENECKE, M.W.

    2000-01-01

    The Interim Operational Safety Requirements for the Fuel Supply Shutdown (FSS) Facility define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management of administrative controls to ensure safe operation of the facility

  16. AMNT 2014. Key Topic: Reactor operation, safety - report. Pt. 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schaffrath, Andreas

    2014-01-01

    Summary report on one session of the Annual Conference on Nuclear Technology held in Frankfurt, 6 to 8 May 2014: - Safety of Nuclear Installations - Methods, Analysis, Results: Backfittings for the Improvement of Safety and Efficiency. The other Sessions of the Key Topics 'Reactor Operation, Safety', 'Competence, Innovation, Regulation' and 'Fuel, Decommissioning and Disposal' will be covered in further issues of atw.

  17. Operating safety requirements for the intermediate level liquid waste system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-07-01

    The operation of the Intermediate Level Liquid Waste (ILW) System, which is described in the Final Safety Analysis, consists of two types of operations, namely: (1) the operation of a tank farm which involves the storage and transportation through pipelines of various radioactive liquids; and (2) concentration of the radioactive liquids by evaporation including rejection of the decontaminated condensate to the Waste Treatment Plant and retention of the concentrate. The following safety requirements in regard to these operations are presented: safety limits and limiting control settings; limiting conditions for operation; and surveillance requirements. Staffing requirements, reporting requirements, and steps to be taken in the event of an abnormal occurrence are also described

  18. ICSBEP-2007, International Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiment Handbook

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blair Briggs, J.

    2007-01-01

    1 - Description: The Critically Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (CSBEP) was initiated in October of 1992 by the United Sates Department of Energy. The project quickly became an international effort as scientist from other interested countries became involved. The International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) is now an official activity of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development - Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD-NEA). This handbook contains criticality safety benchmark specifications that have been derived from experiments that were performed at various nuclear critical facilities around the world. The benchmark specifications are intended for use by criticality safety engineers to validate calculational techniques used to establish minimum subcritical margins for operations with fissile material. The example calculations presented do not constitute a validation of the codes or cross section data. The work of the ICSBEP is documented as an International Handbook of Evaluated Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments. Currently, the handbook spans over 42,000 pages and contains 464 evaluations representing 4,092 critical, near-critical, or subcritical configurations and 21 criticality alarm placement/shielding configurations with multiple dose points for each and 46 configurations that have been categorized as fundamental physics measurements that are relevant to criticality safety applications. The handbook is intended for use by criticality safety analysts to perform necessary validations of their calculational techniques and is expected to be a valuable tool for decades to come. The ICSBEP Handbook is available on DVD. You may request a DVD by completing the DVD Request Form on the internet. Access to the Handbook on the Internet requires a password. You may request a password by completing the Password Request Form. The Web address is: http://icsbep.inel.gov/handbook.shtml 2 - Method of solution: Experiments that are found

  19. Reactor operator screening test experiences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    O'Brien, W.J.; Penkala, J.L.; Witzig, W.F.

    1976-01-01

    When it became apparent to Duquesne Light Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, that the throughput of their candidate selection-Phase I training-reactor operator certification sequence was something short of acceptable, the utility decided to ask consultants to make recommendations with respect to candidate selection procedures. The recommendation implemented was to create a Nuclear Training Test that would predict the success of a candidate in completing Phase I training and subsequently qualify for reactor operator certification. The mechanics involved in developing and calibrating the Nuclear Training Test are described. An arbitration decision that resulted when a number of International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers union employees filed a grievance alleging that the selection examination was unfair, invalid, not job related, inappropriate, and discriminatorily evaluated is also discussed. The arbitration decision favored the use of the Nuclear Training Test

  20. Experiences of an operating association

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zefferer, H.

    1994-01-01

    The Austrian Draukraftwerke operate a coal power station with a capacity 110 MW el at St. Andraein Kaernten. In 1989, the first stage of a scheme for supplying the town St. Andraewith long-distance energy was started from this power station. To provide for the intermittent downtimes between the plant's operating times, which total an annual 2000 hours, a substitute aggregate was designed consisting of two biomass (chiefly bark)-fueled grate-firing boilers (4 MW th and 2.5 MW th ). The problems that arose during the first years in the areas of biomass storage, conveyor systems, slagging, emission values, and ash removal have meanwhile been solved satisfactorily. Moreover, the Draukraftwerke intend to use biomass for electricity generation in their coal power stations. (orig.) [de

  1. Procedure for following external nuclear power plant operating experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kostadinov, V.

    2003-01-01

    Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration (SNSA) has developed computer database and the procedure for following-up and investigating external nuclear operating experience and administrative requirements. The SNSA's primary goal is to investigate safety significant events in due time, to analyze them from the regulatory point of view and to ensure that meaningful lessons be learned and used for improvement of the safe operation of Slovenian Nuclear Power Plant Krsko. Moreover, we intend to make uniform format and method for reporting broader spectrum of events analyzed including low level event reporting. (author)

  2. Access safety systems - New concepts from the LHC experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ladzinski, T.; Delamare, C.; Luca, S. di; Hakulinen, T.; Hammouti, L.; Havart, F.; Juget, J.F.; Ninin, P.; Nunes, R.; Riesco, T.; Sanchez-Corral Mena, E.; Valentini, F.

    2012-01-01

    The LHC Access Safety System has introduced a number of new concepts into the domain of personnel protection at CERN. These can be grouped into several categories: organisational, architectural and concerning the end-user experience. By anchoring the project on the solid foundations of the IEC 61508/61511 methodology, the CERN team and its contractors managed to design, develop, test and commission on time a SIL3 safety system. The system uses a successful combination of the latest Siemens redundant safety programmable logic controllers with a traditional relay logic hard wired loop. The external envelope barriers used in the LHC include personnel and material access devices, which are interlocked door-booths introducing increased automation of individual access control, thus removing the strain from the operators. These devices ensure the inviolability of the controlled zones by users not holding the required credentials. To this end they are equipped with personnel presence detectors and the access control includes a state of the art bio-metry check. Building on the LHC experience, new projects targeting the refurbishment of the existing access safety infrastructure in the injector chain have started. This paper summarises the new concepts introduced in the LHC access control and safety systems, discusses the return of experience and outlines the main guiding principles for the renewal stage of the personnel protection systems in the LHC injector chain in a homogeneous manner. (authors)

  3. Improving operational safety management through probabilistic safety assessment on personal computers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-10-01

    The Technical Committee Meeting considered the current effort in the implementation and use of PSA information for day-to-day operational safety management on Personal Computers. Due to the very recent development of the necessary hardware and software for Personal Computers, the application of PSA information for day-to-day operational safety management on PCs is essentially still in a pioneering stage. There is at present only one such system for end users existing, the PRISIM (Plant Risk Status Information Management) program for which a limited practical application experience is available. Others are still in the development stage. The main aim of the Technical Committee Meeting was to discuss the present status of PSA based systems for operational safety management support on small computers, to consider practical aspects when implementing these systems into a nuclear installation and to address problems related to the further work in the area. A separate abstract was prepared for the summary of the Technical Committee Meeting and for the 8 papers presented by the participants. Refs, figs and tabs

  4. The Wonderland of Operating the ALICE Experiment

    CERN Document Server

    Augustinus, A; Pinazza, O; Rosinský, P; Lechman, M; Jirdén, L; Chochula, P

    2011-01-01

    ALICE is one of the experiments at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC), CERN, Geneva, Switzerland. Composed of 18 sub-detectors each with numerous subsystems that need to be controlled and operated in a safe and efficient way. The Detector Control System (DCS) is the key to this and has been used by detector experts with success during the commissioning of the individual detectors. During the transition from commissioning to operation, more and more tasks were transferred from detector experts to central operators. By the end of the 2010 datataking campaign, the ALICE experiment was run by a small crew of central operators, with only a single controls operator. The transition from expert to non-expert operation constituted a real challenge in terms of tools, documentation and training. A relatively high turnover and diversity in the operator crew that is specific to the HEP experiment environment (as opposed to the more stable operation crews for accelerators) made this challenge even bigger. Thi...

  5. Operational safety performance of Slovak NPPs in 2005

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tomek, J.

    2006-01-01

    In this presentation author presents operational safety performance of Slovak NPPs in 2005. Operation of Slovak NPPs in 2005 was safe and reliable, with: - high level of performance low risk; - minimal impact on the personnel, environment and public; - positive attitude to safety.

  6. Operating experience feedback report - Air systems problems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ornstein, H.L.

    1987-12-01

    This report highlights significant operating events involving observed or potential failures of safety-related systems in U.S. plants that resulted from degraded or malfunctioning non-safety grade air systems. Based upon the evaluation of these events, the Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AEOD) concludes that the issue of air systems problems is an important one which requires additional NRC and industry attention. This report also provides AEOD's recommendations for corrective actions to deal with the issue. (author)

  7. Operational safety and reactor life improvements of Kyoto University Reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Utsuro, M.; Fujita, Y.; Nishihara, H.

    1990-01-01

    Recent important experience in improving the operational safety and life of a reactor are described. The Kyoto University Reactor (KUR) is a 25-year-old 5 MW light water reactor provided with two thermal columns of graphite and heavy water as well as other kinds of experimental facilities. In the graphite thermal column, noticeable amounts of neutron irradiation effects had accumulated in the graphite blocks near the core. Before the possible release of the stored energy, all the graphite blocks in the column were successfully replaced with new blocks using the opportunity provided by the installation of a liquid deuterium cold neutron source in the column. At the same time, special seal mechanisms were provided for essential improvements to the problem of radioactive argon production in the column. In the heavy-water thermal column we have accomplished the successful repair of a slow leak of heavy water through a thin instrumentation tube failure. The repair work included the removal and reconstructions of the lead and graphite shielding layers and welding of the instrumentation tube under radiation fields. Several mechanical components in the reactor cooling system were also exchanged for new components with improved designs and materials. On-line data logging of almost all instrumentation signals is continuously performed with a high speed data analysis system to diagnose operational conditions of the reactor. Furthermore, through detailed investigations on critical components, operational safety during further extended reactor life will be supported by well scheduled maintenance programs

  8. Operational experience in underwater photogrammetry

    Science.gov (United States)

    Leatherdale, John D.; John Turner, D.

    Underwater photogrammetry has become established as a cost-effective technique for inspection and maintenance of platforms and pipelines for the offshore oil industry. A commercial service based in Scotland operates in the North Sea, USA, Brazil, West Africa and Australia. 70 mm cameras and flash units are built for the purpose and analytical plotters and computer graphics systems are used for photogrammetric measurement and analysis of damage, corrosion, weld failures and redesign of underwater structures. Users are seeking simple, low-cost systems for photogrammetric analysis which their engineers can use themselves.

  9. Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility interim operational safety requirements

    CERN Document Server

    Covey, L I

    2000-01-01

    The Interim Operational Safety Requirements (IOSRs) for the Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility (WESF) define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management or administrative controls required to ensure safe operation during receipt and inspection of cesium and strontium capsules from private irradiators; decontamination of the capsules and equipment; surveillance of the stored capsules; and maintenance activities. Controls required for public safety, significant defense-in-depth, significant worker safety, and for maintaining radiological consequences below risk evaluation guidelines (EGs) are included.

  10. Research on Integration of NPP Operational Safety Management Performance Systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chi, Miao; Shi, Liping

    2014-01-01

    The operational safety management of Nuclear Power Plants demands systematic planning and integrated control. NPPs are following the well-developed safety indicator systems proposed by IAEA Operational Safety Performance Indicator Programme, NRC Reactor Oversight Process or the other institutions. Integration of the systems is proposed to benefiting from the advantages of both systems and avoiding improper application into the real world. The authors analyzed the possibility and necessity for system integration, and propose an indicator system integrating method

  11. Safety parameter display system: an operator support system for enhancement of safety in Indian PHWRs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Subramaniam, K.; Biswas, T.

    1994-01-01

    Ensuring operational safety in nuclear power plants is important as operator errors are observed to contribute significantly to the occurrence of accidents. Computerized operator support systems, which process and structure information, can help operators during both normal and transient conditions, and thereby enhance safety and aid effective response to emergency conditions. An important operator aid being developed and described in this paper, is the safety parameter display system (SPDS). The SPDS is an event-independent, symptom-based operator aid for safety monitoring. Knowledge-based systems can provide operators with an improved quality of information. An information processing model of a knowledge based operator support system (KBOSS) developed for emergency conditions using an expert system shell is also presented. The paper concludes with a discussion of the design issues involved in the use of a knowledge based systems for real time safety monitoring and fault diagnosis. (author). 8 refs., 4 figs., 1 tab

  12. Safety Culture Perspective. Managing the pre Managing the pre-operational phases of new NPPs and creating the safety culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cowan, Pamela B.; Oh, Chaewoon; Dahlgren Persson, Kerstin; Carnino, Annick

    2008-01-01

    Nuclear safety is a key for the revival of nuclear energy future programmes. Lots of competent people will be needed worldwide for ensuring the safety of the installations both existing ones and future ones. Their expertise should range from design to operation, from regulatory role to operators, from fuel fabrication to waste disposal. The challenge in front of us will be to prepare for the right recruitment, the development of the needed expertise in order to face the demand in developed countries, in countries with economies in transition and in developing countries. Time allocated for the panel does not allow for covering all aspects but the panelists will cover some of the important aspects of the challenge in terms of needs, of new competencies, of learning from operation and licensing requirements including for new designs. The key objectives of the panel are: 1- Maintaining safe operation, learning from experience, licensing including aging management and re-licensing with safety improvements for existing installations: - Presentation by Junko Ogawa of the experience and lessons learned from the earthquake on Kashiwasaki Kariwa NPP: effects in terms of manpower involved in the investigation, effects on regulations and licensing, expertise used. - Presentation by Pamela Cowan of her experience in preparing licensing actions, regulatory compliance and interface with the Regulator for both operating plants and modern requirements for constructing new ones. 2 - Special training needed for the human aspect of safety: what are the challenges in areas of safety culture and management of safety: - Presentation by Chae Woon Oh of the Korean safety culture features developed nationally, at the regulator and at the operating organizations and their integration within the safety training programmes. - Presentation by Kerstin Dahlgren Person of the needs in terms of safety culture and safety management, in terms of expertise, practitioners and assessors. 3 - How to

  13. Safety Culture Perspective. Managing the pre Managing the pre-operational phases of new NPPs and creating the safety culture

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cowan, Pamela B. [Exelon Generation, 200 Exelon Way, 19348 Kennett Square, PA 19348 (United States); Oh, Chaewoon [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, 19 Gusung-Dong, Yuseong-Ku, 305-338 Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Dahlgren Persson, Kerstin [International Atomic Energy Agency, Wagramer Strasse 5, PO BOX 100 A-1400 Vienna (Austria); Carnino, Annick [IAEA, Division of Nuclear Installation Safety, Wagramer Strasse 5, PO BOX 100 A-1400 Vienna (Austria)

    2008-07-01

    Nuclear safety is a key for the revival of nuclear energy future programmes. Lots of competent people will be needed worldwide for ensuring the safety of the installations both existing ones and future ones. Their expertise should range from design to operation, from regulatory role to operators, from fuel fabrication to waste disposal. The challenge in front of us will be to prepare for the right recruitment, the development of the needed expertise in order to face the demand in developed countries, in countries with economies in transition and in developing countries. Time allocated for the panel does not allow for covering all aspects but the panelists will cover some of the important aspects of the challenge in terms of needs, of new competencies, of learning from operation and licensing requirements including for new designs. The key objectives of the panel are: 1- Maintaining safe operation, learning from experience, licensing including aging management and re-licensing with safety improvements for existing installations: - Presentation by Junko Ogawa of the experience and lessons learned from the earthquake on Kashiwasaki Kariwa NPP: effects in terms of manpower involved in the investigation, effects on regulations and licensing, expertise used. - Presentation by Pamela Cowan of her experience in preparing licensing actions, regulatory compliance and interface with the Regulator for both operating plants and modern requirements for constructing new ones. 2 - Special training needed for the human aspect of safety: what are the challenges in areas of safety culture and management of safety: - Presentation by Chae Woon Oh of the Korean safety culture features developed nationally, at the regulator and at the operating organizations and their integration within the safety training programmes. - Presentation by Kerstin Dahlgren Person of the needs in terms of safety culture and safety management, in terms of expertise, practitioners and assessors. 3 - How to

  14. US remote monitoring operational experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dupree, S.A.; Sonnier, C.S.

    1997-01-01

    Under international partnerships and bilateral agreements with the U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, other national laboratories, and international partner organizations have emplaced remote monitoring systems in nuclear facilities and laboratories in various parts of the world for the purpose of conducting field trials of remote monitoring. The purpose of the present report is to review the results from these field trials and draw general conclusions regarding the trials. Many thousands of hours of sensor and system operation have been logged, and data have been retrieved from many locations. In virtually all cases the system components have functioned as intended and data have been successfully collected and transmitted for review. Comparisons between front-end-triggered video and time-lapse video have shown that the triggered record has captured all relevant monitored operations at the various nuclear facilities included in the field trials. We believe the utility and functional reliability of remote monitoring for international safeguards has been shown. However, it should be kept in mind that openness and transparency, including some form of short-notice inspections, are likely to be prerequisites to the safeguards implementation of remote monitoring in any State

  15. Operation QUICKSILVER. Onsite radiological safety report, October 1978-September 1979

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mullen, O.W.; Eubank, B.F.

    1980-02-01

    QUICKSILVER was the name assigned to the series of underground nuclear experiments conducted at the Nevada Test Site from October 1, 1978 to September 30, 1979. Remote radiation measurements were taken during and after each nuclear experiment by a telemetry system. Monitors with portable radiation detection instruments surveyed reentry routes into ground zeroes before other planned entries were made. Continuous surveillance was provided while personnel were in radiation areas and appropriate precautions were taken to protect persons from unnecessary exposure to radiation and toxic gases. Protective clothing and equipment were issued as needed. Complete radiological safety and industrial hygiene coverage was provided during drilling and mineback operations. Telemetered and portable radiation detector measurements are listed. Detection instrumentation used is described and specific optional procedures are defined

  16. European clearinghouse on nuclear power plants operational experience feedback

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ranguelova, Vesselina; Bruynooghe, Christiane; Noel, Marc

    2010-01-01

    Learning from operational experience and applying this knowledge promptly and intelligently is one of the ways to improve the safety of Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). Recent reviews of the effectiveness of Operational Experience Feedback (OEF) systems have pointed to the need for further improvement, with importance being placed on tailoring the information to the needs of the regulators. In 2007, at the request of a number of nuclear safety regulatory authorities in Europe, the Institute for Energy of the European Commission's Joint Research Centre (EC JRC) initiated a project on Nuclear Power Plant operational experience feedback, which adopts an integrated approach to the research needed to strengthen the European capabilities for assessment of NPP operational events and to promote the development of tools and mechanisms for the improved application of the lessons learned. Consequently, a so-called ''European Clearinghouse'' on NPP OEF was established, which includes scientific officers from the EC JRC, a number of European nuclear safety regulatory authorities and some of their Technical Support Organizations (TSOs). The paper discusses the activities implemented in 2008 within the framework of the European Clearinghouse on NPP OEF (hereinafter called the European NPP Clearinghouse) and provides an overview of the main conclusions drawn from the safety studies performed. Outlook of the activities carried out in 2009 are given. (orig.)

  17. Mastery of risks and operating safety, risks and efficiencies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    A proper management of ones risks consists in acting to exert prevention and protection capacities against the negative consequences of an event, but also by committing oneself into an offensive approach allowing to improve efficiency, quality and availability. Safety and efficiencies are mutual reinforcing goals aiming at ensuring the perenniality of industries and services. The implementation of a risk management approach in an industrial environment allows to reach a better reactiveness and to increase the efficiency of a system by the mastery of organization and processes. The activities in concern are those of industries and services: transports, energy and environment, automotive industry, petrochemistry, chemistry, food, space, health, defense industries, telecommunication, mining industry, information systems, textile industry, finances.. The topics approached during this meeting treat of: the relevance of risk-abatement resources with respect to risks criticality; the consistent management of uncertainties with respect to stakes; the mastery of components aging and the expression of aging-dependent availability, maintenance and safety policies; the expression of obsolescence-related renewing policies; the operating safety tools and methods applied to complex and computerized-controlled systems; the integration of social, organizational and human factors in technical decisions and companies management; transverse and global risk analysis and decision-aid approaches; the vigilance culture; crisis anticipation and management; the experience feedback on technical and organisational aspects; efficiency and risk mastery indicators; cost/benefit approach in risk management, and economic intelligence approaches. Nineteen presentations have been selected which deal with the mastery of risks and the operating safety at nuclear facilities. (J.S.)

  18. OSART Guidelines. 2015 Edition. Reference Report for IAEA Operational Safety Review Teams (OSARTs)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    The IAEA works to provide a global nuclear safety and security framework for the protection of people and the environment from the effects of ionizing radiation, the minimization of the likelihood of accidents that could endanger life and property, and effective mitigation of the effects of any such events, should they occur. The strategic approach to achieving such a framework involves continual improvement in four areas: national and international safety infrastructures; the establishment and global acceptance of IAEA safety standards; an integrated approach to the provision for the application of the safety standards; and a global network of knowledge and experience. The IAEA Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) programme provides advice and assistance to Member States to enhance the safety of nuclear power plants during commissioning and operation. The OSART programme, initiated in 1982, is available to all Member States with nuclear power plants under commissioning or in operation. Conservative design, careful manufacture and sound construction are all prerequisites for the safe operation of nuclear power plants. However, the safety of the plant also depends ultimately on: sound management, policies, procedures, processes and practices; the capability and reliability of commissioning and operating personnel; comprehensive instructions; sound accident management and emergency preparedness; and adequate resources. Finally, a positive attitude and conscientiousness on the part of all staff in discharging their responsibilities is important to safety. The OSART programme is based on the safety standards applicable to nuclear power plants. IAEA safety standards reflect the consensus of Member States on nuclear safety matters. The reports of the International Nuclear Safety Group identify important current nuclear safety issues and also serve as references during an OSART review. The publication OSART Guidelines provides overall guidance on the conduct of OSART

  19. Proposed Reactor Operating Experience Feedback System Development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ahn, Seung Hoon; Kim, Min Chul; Huh, Chang Wook; Lee, Durk Hun; Bae, Koo Hyun

    2006-01-01

    Most events occurring in nuclear power plants are not individually significant, and prevented from progressing to accident conditions by a series of barriers against core damage and radioactive releases. Significant events, if occur, are almost always a breach of these multiple barriers. As illustrated in the 'Swiss cheese' model, the individual layers of defense or 'cheese slices' have weakness or 'holes.' These weaknesses are inconstant, i.e., the holes are open or close at random. When by chance all the holes are aligned, a hazard causes the significant event of concern. Elements of low significant events, inattention to detail, time or economic pressure, uncorrected poor practices/habits, marginal maintenance and equipment care, etc., make holes in the layers of defense; some elements may make more holes in different layers, incurring more chances to be aligned. An effective reduction of the holes, therefore, is gained through better knowledge or awareness of increasing trends of the event elements, followed by appropriate actions. According to the Swiss cheese metaphor, attention to the Operating Experience (OE) feedback system, as opposed to the individual and to randomness, is drawn from a viewpoint of reactor safety

  20. International comparison of safety criteria applied to radwaste repositories. Safety aspects of the post-operational phase

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baltes, B.

    1994-01-01

    There is a generally accepted system of framework safety conditions governing the construction, operation, and post-operational monitoring of radwaste repositories. Although the development of these framework conditions may vary from country to country, the resulting criteria are based on the commonly accepted system of priciples and purposes established for ultimate radioactive waste disposal. The experience accumulated by GRS in the course of the plan approval procedure for the Konrad mine site and the safety-relevant studies performed for the planned Morsleben repository clearly show demand for further development of the safety criteria. In Germany, it is especially the safety criteria and detailed requirements filling the framework safety conditions that need revision and in-depth definition, as well as comparison and harmonisation with internationally applied criteria. These activities will particularly consider the international convention on radioactive waste management currently in preparation under the auspieces of the IAEA. (orig.) [de

  1. Synthetic vision systems: operational considerations simulation experiment

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kramer, Lynda J.; Williams, Steven P.; Bailey, Randall E.; Glaab, Louis J.

    2007-04-01

    Synthetic vision is a computer-generated image of the external scene topography that is generated from aircraft attitude, high-precision navigation information, and data of the terrain, obstacles, cultural features, and other required flight information. A synthetic vision system (SVS) enhances this basic functionality with real-time integrity to ensure the validity of the databases, perform obstacle detection and independent navigation accuracy verification, and provide traffic surveillance. Over the last five years, NASA and its industry partners have developed and deployed SVS technologies for commercial, business, and general aviation aircraft which have been shown to provide significant improvements in terrain awareness and reductions in the potential for Controlled-Flight-Into-Terrain incidents / accidents compared to current generation cockpit technologies. It has been hypothesized that SVS displays can greatly improve the safety and operational flexibility of flight in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) to a level comparable to clear-day Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC), regardless of actual weather conditions or time of day. An experiment was conducted to evaluate SVS and SVS-related technologies as well as the influence of where the information is provided to the pilot (e.g., on a Head-Up or Head-Down Display) for consideration in defining landing minima based upon aircraft and airport equipage. The "operational considerations" evaluated under this effort included reduced visibility, decision altitudes, and airport equipage requirements, such as approach lighting systems, for SVS-equipped aircraft. Subjective results from the present study suggest that synthetic vision imagery on both head-up and head-down displays may offer benefits in situation awareness; workload; and approach and landing performance in the visibility levels, approach lighting systems, and decision altitudes tested.

  2. Synthetic Vision Systems - Operational Considerations Simulation Experiment

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kramer, Lynda J.; Williams, Steven P.; Bailey, Randall E.; Glaab, Louis J.

    2007-01-01

    Synthetic vision is a computer-generated image of the external scene topography that is generated from aircraft attitude, high-precision navigation information, and data of the terrain, obstacles, cultural features, and other required flight information. A synthetic vision system (SVS) enhances this basic functionality with real-time integrity to ensure the validity of the databases, perform obstacle detection and independent navigation accuracy verification, and provide traffic surveillance. Over the last five years, NASA and its industry partners have developed and deployed SVS technologies for commercial, business, and general aviation aircraft which have been shown to provide significant improvements in terrain awareness and reductions in the potential for Controlled-Flight-Into-Terrain incidents/accidents compared to current generation cockpit technologies. It has been hypothesized that SVS displays can greatly improve the safety and operational flexibility of flight in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) to a level comparable to clear-day Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC), regardless of actual weather conditions or time of day. An experiment was conducted to evaluate SVS and SVS-related technologies as well as the influence of where the information is provided to the pilot (e.g., on a Head-Up or Head-Down Display) for consideration in defining landing minima based upon aircraft and airport equipage. The "operational considerations" evaluated under this effort included reduced visibility, decision altitudes, and airport equipage requirements, such as approach lighting systems, for SVS-equipped aircraft. Subjective results from the present study suggest that synthetic vision imagery on both head-up and head-down displays may offer benefits in situation awareness; workload; and approach and landing performance in the visibility levels, approach lighting systems, and decision altitudes tested.

  3. Operator training and the training simulator experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mills, D.

    The author outlines the approach used by Ontario Hydro to train operators from the day they are hired as Operators-in-Training until they are Authorized Unit First Operators. He describes in detail the use of the simulator in the final year of the authorization program, drawing on experience with the Pickering NGS A simulator. Simulators, he concludes, are important aids to training but by no means all that is required to guarantee capable First Operators

  4. Access Safety Systems – New Concepts from the LHC Experience

    CERN Document Server

    Ladzinski, T; di Luca, S; Hakulinen, T; Hammouti, L; Riesco, T; Nunes, R; Ninin, P; Juget, J-F; Havart, F; Valentini, F; Sanchez-Corral Mena, E

    2011-01-01

    The LHC Access Safety System has introduced a number of new concepts into the domain of personnel protection at CERN. These can be grouped into several categories: organisational, architectural and concerning the end-user experience. By anchoring the project on the solid foundations of the IEC 61508/61511 methodology, the CERN team and its contractors managed to design, develop, test and commission on time a SIL3 safety system. The system uses a successful combination of the latest Siemens redundant safety programmable logic controllers with a traditional relay logic hardwired loop. The external envelope barriers used in the LHC include personnel and material access devices, which are interlocked door-booths introducing increased automation of individual access control, thus removing the strain from the operators. These devices ensure the inviolability of the controlled zones by users not holding the required credentials. To this end they are equipped with personnel presence detectors and th...

  5. Periodic Safety Review of Nuclear Power Plants: Experience of Member States

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-04-01

    Routine reviews of nuclear power plant operation (including modifications to hardware and procedures, operating experience, plant management and personnel competence) and special reviews following major events of safety significance are the primary means of safety verification. In addition, many Member States of the IAEA have initiated systematic safety reassessments, termed periodic safety reviews, of nuclear power plants, to assess the cumulative effects of plant ageing and plant modifications, operating experience, technical developments and siting aspects. The reviews include an assessment of plant design and operation against current safety standards and practices, and they have the objective of ensuring a high level of safety throughout the plant's operating lifetime. They are complementary to the routine and special safety reviews and do not replace them. Periodic safety reviews of nuclear power plants are considered an effective way to obtain an overall view of actual plant safety, and to determine reasonable and practical modifications that should be made in order to maintain a high level of safety. They can be used as a means of identifying time limiting features of the plant in order to determine nuclear power plant operation beyond the designed lifetime. The periodic safety review process can be used to support the decision making process for long term operation or licence renewal. Since 1994, the use of periodic safety reviews by Member States has substantially broadened and confirmed its benefits. Periodic safety review results have, for example, been used by some Member States to help provide a basis for continued operation beyond the current licence term, to communicate more effectively with stakeholders regarding nuclear power plant safety, and to help identify changes to plant operation that enhance safety. This IAEA-TECDOC is intended to assist Member States in the implementation of a periodic safety review. This publication complements the

  6. Configuration control during plant outages. A review of operating experience

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Peinador Veira, Miguel; El Kanbi, Semir [European Commission Joint Research Centre, Petten (Netherlands). Inst. for Energy and Transport; Stephan, Jean-Luc [Institut de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire (IRSN), Fontenay-aux-Roses (France); Martens, Johannes [Gesellschaft fuer Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) gGmbH, Koeln (Germany)

    2015-03-15

    After the occurrence of several significant events in nuclear power plants during shut-down modes of operation in the eighties, and from the results of probabilistic safety assessments completed in the nineties, it was clear that risk from low power and shutdown operational modes could not be neglected and had to be addressed by appropriate safety programs. A comprehensive review of operating experience from the last ten years has been conducted by the Joint Research Centre with the objective of deriving lessons learned and recommendations useful for nuclear regulatory bodies and utilities alike. This paper is focused on one particular challenge that any nuclear plant faces whenever it plans its next outage period: how to manage the configuration of all systems under a complex environment involving numerous concurrent activities, and how to make sure that systems are returned to their valid configuration before the plant resumes power operation. This study highlights the importance of conveying accurate but synthesized information on the status of the plant to the operators in the main control room. Many of the lessons learned are related to the alarm display in the control room and to the use of check lists to control the status of systems. Members of the industry and safety authorities may now use these recommendations and lessons learned to feed their own operating experience feedback programs, and check their applicability for specific sites.

  7. Safety Assurance for Irradiating Experiments in the Advanced Test Reactor

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    T. A. Tomberlin; S. B. Grover

    2004-11-01

    The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), located at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), was specifically designed to provide a high neutron flux test environment for conducting a variety of experiments. This paper addresses the safety assurance process for two general types of experiments conducted in the ATR facility and how the safety analyses for experiments are related to the ATR safety basis. One type of experiment is more routine and generally represents greater risks; therefore, this type of experiment is addressed in more detail in the ATR safety basis. This allows the individual safety analysis for this type of experiment to be more standardized. The second type of experiment is defined in more general terms in the ATR safety basis and is permitted under more general controls. Therefore, the individual safety analysis for the second type of experiment tends to be more unique and is tailored to each experiment.

  8. Safety Assurance for Irradiating Experiments in the Advanced Test Reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    T. A. Tomberlin; S. B. Grover

    2004-01-01

    The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), located at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), was specifically designed to provide a high neutron flux test environment for conducting a variety of experiments. This paper addresses the safety assurance process for two general types of experiments conducted in the ATR facility and how the safety analyses for experiments are related to the ATR safety basis. One type of experiment is more routine and generally represents greater risks; therefore, this type of experiment is addressed in more detail in the ATR safety basis. This allows the individual safety analysis for this type of experiment to be more standardized. The second type of experiment is defined in more general terms in the ATR safety basis and is permitted under more general controls. Therefore, the individual safety analysis for the second type of experiment tends to be more unique and is tailored to each experiment

  9. JET Tokamak, preparation of a safety case for tritium operations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Boyer, Helen, E-mail: helen.boyer@ccfe.ac.uk [CCFE, Culham Science Centre (United Kingdom); Plummer, David; Johnston, Jane [CCFE, Culham Science Centre (United Kingdom)

    2016-11-01

    Highlights: • A safety case incorporating technical and ITER related upgrades. • Hazard analysis reworked to include new modelling assessments. • Fitness for purpose assessment of safety controls. - Abstract: A new Safety Case is required to permit tritium operations on JET during the forthcoming DTE2 campaign. The outputs, benefits and lessons learned associated with the production of this Safety Case are presented. The changes that have occurred to the Safety Case methodology since the last JET tritium Safety Case are reviewed. Consideration is given to the effects of modifications, particularly ITER related changes, made to the JET and the impact these have on the hazard assessments as well as normal operations. Several specialized assessments, including recent MELCOR modelling, have been undertaken to support the production of this Safety Case and the impact of these assessments is outlined. Discussion of the preliminary actions being taken to progress implementation of this Safety Case is provided, highlighting new methods to improve the dissemination of the key Safety Case results to the plant operators. Finally, the work required to complete this Safety Case, before the next tritium campaign, is summarized.

  10. Contribution of operating feedback to probabilistic safety studies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Guio, J.M. de; Lannoy, A.

    1992-03-01

    This paper presents the method used for PWR unit operation feedback analysis and its contribution to probabilistic safety studies. The targets were as follows: - use of failure data banks to assess reliability parameters, - use of event data banks to identify and quantify main system initiating events, - determination of a standard operating profile. These studies, performed in the context of nuclear power plant safety programs, prove useful not only to safety engineers but also to equipment experts, designers, operators and maintenance specialists. They constitute basic data for studies in all these areas or the departure point for new investigations. (authors). 3 figs., 3 tabs., 3 refs

  11. Operational limits and conditions and operating procedures for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared as part of the Agency's programme for establishing safety standards relating to nuclear power plants. The present Safety Guide supersedes the IAEA Safety Guide on Operational Limits and Conditions for Nuclear Power Plants which was issued in 1979 as Safety Series No. 50-SG-O3. For a nuclear power plant to be operated in a safe manner, the provisions made in the final design and subsequent modifications shall be reflected in limitations on plant operating parameters and in the requirements on plant equipment and personnel. Under the responsibility of the operating organization, these shall be developed during the design safety evaluation as a set of operational limits and conditions (OLCs). A major contribution to compliance with the OLCs is made by the development and utilization of operating procedures (OPs) that are consistent with and fully implement the OLCs. The requirements for the OLCs and OPs are established in Section 5 of the IAEA Safety Requirements publication Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which this Safety Guide supplements. The purpose of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance on the development, content and implementation of OLCs and OPs. The Safety Guide is directed at both regulators and owners/operators. This Safety Guide covers the concept of OLCs, their content as applicable to land based stationary power plants with thermal neutron reactors, and the responsibilities of the operating organization regarding their establishment, modification, compliance and documentation. The OPs to support the implementation of the OLCs and to ensure their observance are also within the scope of this Safety Guide. The particular aspects of the procedures for maintenance, surveillance, in-service inspection and other safety related activities in connection with the safe operation of nuclear power plants are outside the scope of this Safety Guide but can be found in other IAEA Safety Guides. Section 2 indicates the

  12. Operational limits and conditions and operating procedures for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    This Safety Guide was prepared as part of the Agency's programme for establishing safety standards relating to nuclear power plants. The present Safety Guide supersedes the IAEA Safety Guide on Operational Limits and Conditions for Nuclear Power Plants which was issued in 1979 as Safety Series No. 50-SG-O3. For a nuclear power plant to be operated in a safe manner, the provisions made in the final design and subsequent modifications shall be reflected in limitations on plant operating parameters and in the requirements on plant equipment and personnel. Under the responsibility of the operating organization, these shall be developed during the design safety evaluation as a set of operational limits and conditions (OLCs). A major contribution to compliance with the OLCs is made by the development and utilization of operating procedures (OPs) that are consistent with and fully implement the OLCs. The requirements for the OLCs and OPs are established in Section 5 of the IAEA Safety Requirements publication Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which this Safety Guide supplements. The purpose of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance on the development, content and implementation of OLCs and OPs. The Safety Guide is directed at both regulators and owners/operators. This Safety Guide covers the concept of OLCs, their content as applicable to land based stationary power plants with thermal neutron reactors, and the responsibilities of the operating organization regarding their establishment, modification, compliance and documentation. The OPs to support the implementation of the OLCs and to ensure their observance are also within the scope of this Safety Guide. The particular aspects of the procedures for maintenance, surveillance, in-service inspection and other safety related activities in connection with the safe operation of nuclear power plants are outside the scope of this Safety Guide but can be found in other IAEA Safety Guides. Section 2 indicates the

  13. Safety requirements and safety experience of nuclear facilities in the Federal Republic of Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schnurer, H.L.

    1977-01-01

    Peaceful use of nuclear energy within the F.R.G. is rapidly growing. The Energy Programme of the Federal Government forecasts a capacity of up to 50.000 MW in 1985. Whereas most of this capacity will be of the LWR-Type, other activities are related to LMFBR - and HTGR - development, nuclear ships, and facilities of the nuclear fuel cycle. Safety of nuclear energy is the pacemaker for the realization of nuclear programmes and projects. Due to a very high population - and industrialisation density, safety has the priority before economical aspects. Safety requirements are therefore extremely stringent, which will be shown for the legal, the technical as well as for the organizational area. They apply for each nuclear facility, its site and the nuclear energy system as a whole. Regulatory procedures differ from many other countries, assigning executive power to state authorities, which are supervised by the Federal Government. Another particularity of the regulatory process is the large scope of involvement of independent experts within the licensing procedures. The developement of national safety requirements in different countries generates a necessity to collaborate and harmonize safety and radiation protection measures, at least for facilities in border areas, to adopt international standards and to assist nuclear developing countries. However, different nationally, regional or local situations might raise problems. Safety experience with nuclear facilities can be concluded from the positive construction and operation experience, including also a few accidents and incidents and the conclusions, which have been drawn for the respective factilities and others of similar design. Another tool for safety assessments will be risk analyses, which are under development by German experts. Final, a scope of future problems and developments shows, that safety of nuclear installations - which has reached a high performance - nevertheless imposes further tasks to be solved

  14. Main indicators used in french PWR units for safety, operation and maintenance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Guio, J.M. de

    1990-01-01

    The development of analyses aimed at improving nuclear plant operations through an optimum use of experience feedback naturally leads to the implementation of trend indicators in the fields of safety, operation and maintenance. This process, part of the more general framework of promoting safety culture, facilitates collective thinking on these matters at the local site level, and, at the national level, allows a clearer definition of the main lines of strategy and helps coordinate the resulting actions

  15. The operating organization and the recruitment, training and qualification of personnel for research reactors. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    This Safety Guide provides recommendations on meeting the requirements on the operating organization and on personnel for research reactors. It covers the typical operating organization for research reactor facilities; the recruitment process and qualification in terms of education, training and experience; programmes for initial and continuing training; the authorization process for those individuals having an immediate bearing on safety; and the processes for their requalification and reauthorization

  16. Fuel supply shutdown facility interim operational safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Besser, R.L.; Brehm, J.R.; Benecke, M.W.; Remaize, J.A.

    1995-01-01

    These Interim Operational Safety Requirements (IOSR) for the Fuel Supply Shutdown (FSS) facility define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management or administrative controls to ensure safe operation. The IOSRs apply to the fuel material storage buildings in various modes (operation, storage, surveillance)

  17. Operating results and experience and operating regimes in changing demands of energy world

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hobza, L.

    2004-01-01

    In this paper, there are stated some operating results and experience obtained from trial operation of Temelin NPP. In Europe, Temelin NPP is presently one of the latest implemented projects of the series of VVER 1000 nuclear units with proven V-320 pressurized water reactor. The distinction between Temelin NPP and original project lays mainly in supply of nuclear fuel and in I and C systems delivered by Westinghouse Company. Temelin NPP has passed through commissioning period and trial operation. The main goal of the trial operation was to meet the requirements of section 2, par. 4, point b) of Decree No. 106/98 Sb. and verification of project parameters and stability of operation, and the situation leading to violation of safety functions fulfilment according to Pre-operational Safety Report should not occur. The integral part of trial operation assessment was also successful performing of determined monitoring programmes, first refuelling and performing of prescribed tests and operational inspections. Simultaneously, first experience was obtained with nuclear fuel; providing of ancillary services; reliability of important components; operation of turbine-generator 1000 MW; chemical regime; influence to environment; and quality of contractors. As safety is the most important indicator, it can be stated that: no facts which would lead to decreasing of safety systems operability have been detected; no facts which would lead to negative affecting of barriers against fading the radioactivity into both working areas and environment, have been detected; good condition of fire safety has been continuously documented; requirements of limits for releasing waste water into environment have been continuously complied with; requirements of limits for releasing radioactive substances (in gaseous and/or liquid state) into environment have been continuously complied with. From the operation regimes point of view is clear, that it would be suitable for the power plant if the

  18. Presurized water reactor safety approach and analysis. From conception to experience feedback

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Libmann, J.

    1987-04-01

    This report deals in ten chapters, with the following subjects: 1. Safety approach methods; 2. Study of accidents; 3. Safety analysis; 4. Study of internal aggressions or those involved by the site; 5. Consideration of complementary situations; 6. Three Mile Island accident; 7. Safety during operation and experience feedback; 8. An example of analysis: steam generator closure plug; 9. Probabilistic safety evaluation; 10. Chernobyl accident. 30 refs [fr

  19. Operational experience with the Daresbury accelerator tube

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aitken, T.W.; Eastham, D.A.; Joy, T.; Leese, J.M.; Tait, N.R.S.; Thorn, R.

    1986-01-01

    Operational experience with the Daresbury MKI accelerator tube is reviewed with particular attention to conditioning and high voltage performance. The effects of surges and transients on the tube are described and lines of future development are discussed. (orig.)

  20. AMNT 2014. Key Topic: Reactor operation, safety - report. Pt. 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Schaffrath, Andreas [Gesellschaft fuer Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit mbH (GRS), Garching (Germany). Forschungszentrum

    2014-10-15

    Summary report on one session of the Annual Conference on Nuclear Technology held in Frankfurt, 6 to 8 May 2014: - Safety of Nuclear Installations - Methods, Analysis, Results: Backfittings for the Improvement of Safety and Efficiency. The other Sessions of the Key Topics 'Reactor Operation, Safety', 'Competence, Innovation, Regulation' and 'Fuel, Decommissioning and Disposal' will be covered in further issues of atw.

  1. Operational Risk Management and Military Aviation Safety

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Ashley, Park

    1999-01-01

    .... The Army's Class A aviation mishap rate declined after it implemented risk management (RM) principles in 1987. This reduction caught the attention of Air Force leadership who have since stated that the application of operational risk management...

  2. Physics experiments with the operating reactor

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cullington, G R; King, D C

    1973-09-27

    Experimental techniques have been developed and used on Dragon to give consistent information on excess reactivity and shut down margin. The reactivity measurements have been correlated with the theoretical calculations and have led to improvements in the calculations. The methods used and the results obtained are accepted by the Safety Committee as sufficient evidence for compliance with the fuel loading safety rules. Although the reactor was not designed as an experimental facility, flux and dose measurements experiments have been successfully carried out. Mass flow and negative reactivity transient measurements have been carried out. These are valuable for demonstration of the flexibility of the reactor system and for giving confidence in theoretical calculations.

  3. Current trends in codal requirements for safety in operation of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Srivasista, K.; Shah, Y.K.; Gupta, S.K.

    2006-01-01

    The Code of practice on safety in nuclear power plant operation states the requirements to be met during operation of a nuclear power plant for assuring safety. Among various stages of authorization, regulatory body issues authorization for operation of a nuclear power plant, monitors and enforces regulatory requirements. The responsible organization shall have overall responsibility and the plant management shall have the primary responsibility for ensuring safe and efficient operation of its nuclear power plants. A set of codal requirements covering technical and administrative aspects are mandatory for the plant management to implement to ensure that the nuclear power plant is operated in accordance with the design intent. Requirements on operating procedures and instructions establish operation and maintenance, inspection and testing of the plant in a planned and systematic way. The requirements on emergency preparedness programme establish with a reasonable assurance that, in the event of an emergency situation, appropriate measures can be taken to mitigate the consequences. Commissioning requirements verify performance criteria during commissioning to ensure that the design intent and QA requirements are met. Several modifications in systems important to safety required during operation of a nuclear power plant are regulated. However new operational codal requirements arising out of periodic safety review, operational experience feedback, life management, probabilistic safety assessment, physical security, safety convention and obligations and decommissioning are not covered in the present code of practice for safety in nuclear power plant operation. Codal provisions on 'Review by operating organization on aspects of design having implications on operability' are also required to be addressed. The merits in developing such a methodology include acceptance of the design by operating organization, ensuring maintainability, proper layout etc. in the new designs

  4. Passive safety injection experiments and analyses (PAHKO)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tuunanen, J.

    1998-01-01

    PAHKO project involved experiments on the PACTEL facility and computer simulations of selected experiments. The experiments focused on the performance of Passive Safety Injection Systems (PSIS) of Advanced Light Water Reactors (ALWRs) in Small Break Loss-Of-Coolant Accident (SBLOCA) conditions. The PSIS consisted of a Core Make-up Tank (CMT) and two pipelines (Pressure Balancing Line, PBL, and Injection Line, IL). The examined PSIS worked efficiently in SBLOCAs although the flow through the PSIS stopped temporarily if the break was very small and the hot water filled the CMT. The experiments demonstrated the importance of the flow distributor in the CMT to limit rapid condensation. The project included validation of three thermal-hydraulic computer codes (APROS, CATHARE and RELAP5). The analyses showed the codes are capable to simulate the overall behaviour of the transients. The detailed analyses of the results showed some models in the codes still need improvements. Especially, further development of models for thermal stratification, condensation and natural circulation flow with small driving forces would be necessary for accurate simulation of the PSIS phenomena. (orig.)

  5. 78 FR 54510 - New Entrant Safety Assurance Program Operational Test

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-09-04

    ... safety management controls; (2) consider their effects on small businesses; and (3) consider establishing alternate locations where such reviews may be conducted for the convenience of small businesses. In response... safety review within 18 months of starting interstate operations. [49 U.S.C. 31144(g)]. In issuing these...

  6. Research on asset management for safety and operations.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-11-01

    The Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) is challenged with managing a wide range of : transportation safety and operations assets in order to respond to public and other outside interests. These : assets include, but are not limited to pavemen...

  7. RATU2, research for safety and operability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Solin, J.

    1998-01-01

    The Finnish research programme on the structural integrity of nuclear power plants, RATU2 was launched in 1995 for four years to coordinate the independent national research and development work aiming for structural safety in NPP's. The general planning and goal setting of the programme was based on the research need assessment and evaluation of the previous RATU programme. The research plans have been updated and refined annually on the basis of available funding. The RATU2 programme is briefly introduced in this paper. The role of RATU2 in the national nuclear energy research field, the research areas, administrative data, main objectives and future plans are reported in this paper

  8. Operational experience of the Marcoule reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Conte, F.

    1963-01-01

    The results obtaining from three years operation of the reactors G-2, G-3 have made it possible to accumulate a considerable amount of operational experience of these reactors. The main original points: - the pre-stressed concrete casing - the possibility of loading while under power - automatic temperature control have been perfectly justified by the results of operation. The author confirms the importance of these original solutions and draws conclusions concerning the study of future nuclear power stations. (author) [fr

  9. Tritium operating safety seminar, Los Alamos, New Mexico, July 30, 1975

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1976-03-01

    A seminar for the exchange of information on tritium operating and safety problems was held at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. The topics discussed are: (1) material use (tubing, lubricants, valves, seals, etc.); (2) hardware selection (valves, fittings, pumps, etc.); (3) biological effects; (4) high pressure; (5) operating procedures (high pressure tritium experiment at LLL); (6) incidents; and (7) emergency planning

  10. Safety parameter display systems' effect on operator performance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cerven, F.; Ford, R.E.; Blackman, H.S.

    1983-01-01

    Computer generated displays are a powerful and flexible tool for presenting data to the operators of nuclear power plants. Such displays are currently being developed in industry for use as safety parameter displays and for use in advanced control rooms. There exists a need for methods to objectively evaluate the effect of these displays, positive or negative, on the performance of control room personnel. Results of developing one such method, noninteractive simulation, and the two experiments that were performed to determine if it can be used as a method for evaluating computer displays are presented. This method is more objective and powerful than pencil and paper methods because it measures human performance rather than opinion or perference, has excellent control of the experimental variables, and has a higher fidelity to the control room environment. The results of these experiments indicates that the present methodology does not differentiate among the display types tested at a statistically significant level. In other words, all display types tested worked equally well in providing operators needed information

  11. Safety operation of training reactor VR-1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matejka, K.

    2001-01-01

    There are three nuclear research reactors in the Czech Republic in operation now: light water reactor LVR-15, maximum reactor power 10 MW t , owner and operator Nuclear Research Institute Rez; light water zero power reactor LR-0, maximum reactor power 5 kW t , owner and operator Nuclear Research Institute Rez and training reactor VR-1 Sparrow, maximum reactor power 5 kW t , owner and operate Faculty of Nuclear Sciences and Physical Engineering, CTU in Prague. The training reactor VR-1 Vrabec 'Sparrow', operated at the Faculty of Nuclear Sciences and Physical Engineering, Czech Technical University in Prague, was started up on December 3, 1990. Particularly it is designed for training the students of Czech universities, preparing the experts for the Czech nuclear programme, as well as for certain research work, and for information programmes in the nuclear programme, as well as for certain research work, and for information programmes in sphere of using the nuclear energy (public relations). (author)

  12. Simulator experiments: effects of NPP operator experience on performance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beare, A.N.; Gray, L.H.

    1984-01-01

    During the FY83 research, a simulator experiment was conducted at the control room simulator for a GE Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) NPP. The research subjects were licensed operators undergoing requalification training and shift technical advisors (STAs). This experiment was designed to investigate the effects of senior reactor operator (SRO) experience, operating crew augmentation with an STA and practice, as a crew, upon crew and individual operator performance, in response to anticipated plant transients. Sixteen two-man crews of licensed operators were employed in a 2 x 2 factorial design. The SROs leading the crews were split into high and low experience groups on the basis of their years of experience as an SRO. One half of the high- and low-SRO experience groups were assisted by an STA. The crews responded to four simulated plant casualties. A five-variable set of content-referenced performance measures was derived from task analyses of the procedurally correct responses to the four casualties. System parameters and control manipulations were recorded by the computer controlling the simulator. Data on communications and procedure use were obtained from analysis of videotapes of the exercises. Questionnaires were used to collect subject biographical information and data on subjective workload during each simulated casualty. For four of the five performance measures, no significant differences were found between groups led by high (25 to 114 months) and low (1 to 17 months as an SRO) experience SROs. However, crews led by low experience SROs tended to have significantly shorter task performance times than crews led by high experience SROs. The presence of the STA had no significant effect on overall team performance in responding to the four simulated casualties. The FY84 experiments are a partial replication and extension of the FY83 experiment, but with PWR operators and simulator

  13. Experience With Laser Safety In The USA--A Review

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sliney, David H.

    1986-10-01

    Following several research programs in the 1960's aimed at studying the adverse biological effects of lasers and other optical radiation sources, laser occupational exposure limits were set and general safety standards were developed. Today, the experience from laser accidents and the development of new lasers and new applications have altered the format of the exposure limits and the safety procedures. It is critically important to distinguish between different biological injury mechanisms. The biological effects of ultraviolet radiation upon the skin and eye are additive over a period of at least one workday, and require different safety procedures. The scattered UV irradiance from excimer lasers may be quite hazardous, depending upon wavelength and action spectra. Since laser technology is young, the exposure of an individual in natural sunlight must be studied to evaluate the potential for chronic effects. The safety measures necessary in the use of lasers depend upon a hazard evaluation. The appropriate control measures and alternate means of enclosure, baffling, and operational control measures are presented. Present laser safety standards are explained briefly. Eye protective techniques and eyewear are considered for a variety of sources. The optical properties of enclosure materials are also discussed.

  14. Improvements in operational safety performance of the Magnox power stations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Marchese, C.J. [BNFL Magnox Generation, Berkeley (United Kingdom)

    2000-10-01

    In the 43 years since commencement of operation of Calder Hall, the first Magnox power station, there remain eight Magnox stations and 20 reactors still in operation, owned by BNFL Magnox Generation. This paper describes how the operational safety performance of these stations has significantly improved over the last ten years. This has been achieved against a background of commercial competition introduced by privatization and despite the fact that the Magnox base design belongs to the past. Finally, the company's future plans for continued improvements in operational safety performance are discussed. (author)

  15. Kayenta advanced series compensation operational experience

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1994-01-01

    The world's first three-phase, thyristor-controlled series compensation scheme with continuously variable impedance has been introduced into a transmission system. Energized and dedicated in September 1992, the installation was placed into commercial operation in January 1993 and has provided over one year of operating experience. This paper describes the 230 kV, 330 MVAr (60 Hz) advanced series compensation (ASC) project, located in north-eastern Arizona at Kayenta Substation on the 320 km Glen Canyon-Shiprock transmission line. The paper describes operating experiences, coordination with phase shifting transformer, phase shifter failure, platform power, system disturbances, and future plans.

  16. Review and updates of the risk assessment for advanced test reactor operations for operating events and experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Atkinson, S.A.

    1996-01-01

    Annual or biannual reviews of the operating history of the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) have been conducted for the purpose of reviewing and updating the ATR probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) for operating events and operating experience since the first compilation of plant- specific experience data for the ATR PSA which included data for operation from initial power operation in 1969 through 1988. This technical paper briefly discusses the means and some results of these periodic reviews of operating experience and their influence on the ATR PSA

  17. Operational characteristics of nuclear power plants - modelling of operational safety; Pogonske karakteristike nuklearnih elektrana - modelsko izucavanje pogonske sigurnosti

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Studovic, M [Masinski fakultet, Beograd (Yugoslavia)

    1984-07-01

    By operational experience of nuclear power plants and realize dlevel of availability of plant, systems and componenst reliabiliuty, operational safety and public protection, as a source on nature of distrurbances in power plant systems and lessons drawn by the TMI-2, in th epaper are discussed: examination of design safety for ultimate ensuring of safe operational conditions of the nuclear power plant; significance of the adequate action for keeping proess parameters in prescribed limits and reactor cooling rquirements; developed systems for measurements detection and monitoring all critical parameters in the nuclear steam supply system; contents of theoretical investigation and mathematical modeling of the physical phenomena and process in nuclear power plant system and components as software, supporting for ensuring of operational safety and new access in staff education process; program and progress of the investigation of some physical phenomena and mathematical modeling of nuclear plant transients, prepared at faculty of mechanical Engineering in Belgrade. (author)

  18. Relations between the safety authority and the nuclear power plant operators

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laverie, M.; Flandrin, R.

    1991-01-01

    The French experience has led the safety authority to pay particular attention to the competence of a nuclear operator and to the exercise of his responsibility. In this context, safety does not seem to be improved by the imposition of too many regulations and control activities. On the contrary, an excessive regulatory framework may blunt the operator's awareness of his responsibility. It is the duty of the safety authority to fix the safety objectives. It is the operator's duty to establish the practical conditions for attaining these objectives and to justify these conditions to the safety authority. It is also his duty to implement them correctly. The authority must then verify the quality of this implementation by random inspection methods. Each of the two partners, each conforming to his role and exercise of his particular responsibilities, must remain vigilant. These different actions necessitate a permanent technical dialogue which is not in contradiction with the exercise of strict regulatory control. (orig.)

  19. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Specific Safety Requirements (Arabic Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    This publication is a revision of IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-2, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, and has been extended to cover the commissioning stage. It describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe commissioning, operation, and transition from operation to decommissioning of nuclear power plants. Over recent years there have been developments in areas such as long term operation of nuclear power plants, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis review and risk informed decision making processes. It became necessary to revise the IAEA’s Safety Requirements in these areas and to correct and/or improve the publication on the basis of feedback from its application by both the IAEA and its Member States. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles. A review of Safety Requirements publications, initiated in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan, revealed no significant areas of weakness but resulted in a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation. These are contained in the present publication.

  20. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Specific Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    This publication is a revision of IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-2, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, and has been extended to cover the commissioning stage. It describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe commissioning, operation, and transition from operation to decommissioning of nuclear power plants. Over recent years there have been developments in areas such as long term operation of nuclear power plants, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis review and risk informed decision making processes. It became necessary to revise the IAEA’s Safety Requirements in these areas and to correct and/or improve the publication on the basis of feedback from its application by both the IAEA and its Member States. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles. A review of Safety Requirements publications, initiated in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan, revealed no significant areas of weakness but resulted in a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation. These are contained in the present publication.

  1. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Specific Safety Requirements (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. It takes into account developments in areas such as long term operation of nuclear power plants, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis and risk informed decision making processes. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication.

  2. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Specific Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. It takes into account developments in areas such as long term operation of nuclear power plants, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis and risk informed decision making processes. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication

  3. Operational safety analysis status of Novi Han repository

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boiadjiev, A.

    2000-01-01

    This article presents the status of the safety studies and activities related to Novi Han repository. The case of this facility is such that no clear boundary exists between post-closure safety assessment and operational safety assessment. The major findings of these activities are given. The Safety Analysis Report (SAR) for Novi Han repository is developed by Risk Engineering Ltd. under a contract with the Committee on the Use of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes. The general structure and main conclusions and recommendations of the SAR are presented. (author)

  4. From USA operation experience of industrial uranium-graphite reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Burdakov, N.S.

    1996-01-01

    The review on materials, presented by a group of the USA specialists at the seminar in Moscow on October 9-11, 1995 is considered. The above specialists shared their experience in operation of the Hanford industrial reactors, aimed at plutonium production for atomic bombs. The purpose of the above visit consisted in providing assistance to the Russian specialists by evaluation and modernization of operational conditions safety improvement of the RBMK type reactors. Special attention is paid to the behaviour of the graphite lining and channel tubes with an account of possible channel power interaction with the reactor structural units. The information on the experience of the Hanford reactor operation may be useful for specialists, operating the RBMK type reactors

  5. Improving plant state information for better operational safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Girard, C.; Olivier, E.; Grimaldi, X.

    1994-01-01

    Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) safety is strongly dependent on components' reliability and particularly on plant state information reliability. This information, used by the plant operators in order to produce appropriate actions, have to be of a high degree of confidence, especially in accidental conditions where safety is threatened. In this perspective, FRAMATOME, EDF and CEA have started a joint research program to prospect different solutions aiming at a better reliability for critical information needed to safety operate the plant. This paper gives the main results of this program and describes the developments that have been made in order to assess reliability of different information systems used in a Nuclear Power Plant. (Author)

  6. Proceedings of the High Consequence Operations Safety Symposium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1994-12-01

    Many organizations face high consequence safety situations where unwanted stimuli due to accidents, catastrophes, or inadvertent human actions can cause disasters. In order to improve interaction among such organizations and to build on each others` experience, preventive approaches, and assessment techniques, the High Consequence Operations Safety Symposium was held July 12--14, 1994 at Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico. The symposium was conceived by Dick Schwoebel, Director of the SNL Surety Assessment Center. Stan Spray, Manager of the SNL System Studies Department, planned strategy and made many of the decisions necessary to bring the concept to fruition on a short time scale. Angela Campos and about 60 people worked on the nearly limitless implementation and administrative details. The initial symposium (future symposia are planned) was structured around 21 plenary presentations in five methodology-oriented sessions, along with a welcome address, a keynote address, and a banquet address. Poster papers addressing the individual session themes were available before and after the plenary sessions and during breaks.

  7. Human and organization factors: engineering operating safety into offshore structures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bea, Robert G.

    1998-01-01

    History indicates clearly that the safety of offshore structures is determined primarily by the humans and organizations responsible for these structures during their design, construction, operation, maintenance, and decommissioning. If the safety of offshore structures is to be preserved and improved, then attention of engineers should focus on to how to improve the reliability of the offshore structure 'system,' including the people that come into contact with the structure during its life-cycle. This article reviews and discusss concepts and engineering approaches that can be used in such efforts. Two specific human factor issues are addressed: (1) real-time management of safety during operations, and (2) development of a Safety Management Assessment System to help improve the safety of offshore structures

  8. To improve nuclear plant safety by learning from accident's experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matsumoto, Hidezo; Kida, Masanori; Kato, Hiroyuki; Hara, Shin-ichi

    1994-01-01

    The ultimate goal of this study is to produce an expert system that enables the experience (records and information) gained from accidents to be put to use towards improving nuclear plant safety. A number of examples have been investigated, both domestic and overseas, in which experience gained from accidents was utilized by utilities in managing and operating their nuclear power stations to improve safety. The result of investigation has been used to create a general 'basic flow' to make the best use of experience. The ultimate goal is achieved by carrying out this 'basic flow' with artificial intelligence (AI). To do this, it is necessary (1) to apply language analysis to process the source information (primary data base; domestic and overseas accident's reports) into the secondary data base, and (2) to establish an expert system for selecting (screening) significant events from the secondary data base. In the processing described in item (1), a multi-lingual thesaurus for nuclear-related terms become necessary because the source information (primary data bases) itself is multi-lingual. In the work described in item (2), the utilization of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), for example, is a candidate method for judging the significance of events. Achieving the goal thus requires developing various new techniques. As the first step of the above long-term study project, this report proposes the 'basic flow' and presents the concept of how the nuclear-related AI can be used to carry out this 'basic flow'. (author)

  9. International handbook of evaluated criticality safety benchmark experiments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (CSBEP) was initiated in October of 1992 by the United States Department of Energy. The project quickly became an international effort as scientists from other interested countries became involved. The International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) became an official activity of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development - Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD-NEA) in 1995. This handbook contains criticality safety benchmark specifications that have been derived from experiments performed at various nuclear critical facilities around the world. The benchmark specifications are intended for use by criticality safety engineers to validate calculational techniques used to establish minimum subcritical margins for operations with fissile material and to determine criticality alarm requirement and placement. Many of the specifications are also useful for nuclear data testing. Example calculations are presented; however, these calculations do not constitute a validation of the codes or cross section data. The evaluated criticality safety benchmark data are given in nine volumes. These volumes span over 55,000 pages and contain 516 evaluations with benchmark specifications for 4,405 critical, near critical, or subcritical configurations, 24 criticality alarm placement / shielding configurations with multiple dose points for each, and 200 configurations that have been categorized as fundamental physics measurements that are relevant to criticality safety applications. Experiments that are found unacceptable for use as criticality safety benchmark experiments are discussed in these evaluations; however, benchmark specifications are not derived for such experiments (in some cases models are provided in an appendix). Approximately 770 experimental configurations are categorized as unacceptable for use as criticality safety benchmark experiments. Additional evaluations are in progress and will be

  10. EBR-II: summary of operating experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Perry, W.H.; Leman, J.D.; Lentz, G.L.; Longua, K.J.; Olson, W.H.; Shields, J.A.; Wolz, G.C.

    1978-01-01

    Experimental Breeder Reactor II (EBR-II) is an unmoderated, sodium-cooled reactor with a design power of 62.5 MWt. The primary cooling system is a submerged-pool type. The early operation of the reactor successfully demonstrated the feasibility of a sodium-cooled fast breeder reactor operating as an integrated reactor, power plant, and fuel-processing facility. In 1967, the role of EBR-II was reoriented from a demonstration plant to an irradiation facility. Many changes have been made and are continuing to be made to increase the usefulness of EBR-II for irradiation and safety tests. A review of EBR-II's operating history reveals a plant that has demonstrated high availability, stable and safe operating characteristics, and excellent performance of sodium components. Levels of radiation exposure to the operating and maintenance workers have been low; and fission-gas releases to the atmosphere have been minimal. Driver-fuel performance has been excellent. The repairability of radioactive sodium components has been successfully demonstrated a number of times. Recent highlights include installation and successful operation of (1) the hydrogen-meter leak detectors for the steam generators, (2) the cover-gas-cleanup system and (3) the cesium trap in the primary sodium. Irradiations now being conducted in EBR-II include the run-beyond-cladding breach fuel tests for mixed-oxide and carbide elements. Studies are in progress to determine EBR-II's capability for conducting important ''operational safety'' tests. These tests would extend the need and usefulness of EBR-II into the 1980's

  11. Lessons Learned from Missing Flooding Barriers Operating Experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simic, Z.; Veira, M. P.

    2016-01-01

    Flooding hazard is highly significant for nuclear power plant safety because of its potential for common cause impact on safety related systems, and because operating experience reviews regularly identify flooding as a cause of concern. Source of the flooding could be external (location) or internal (plant design). The amount of flooding water could vary but even small amount might suffice to affect redundant trains of safety related systems for power supply and cooling. The protection from the flooding is related to the design-basis flood level (DBFL) and it consists of three elements: structural, organizational and accessibility. Determination of the DBFL is critical, as Fukushima Daiichi accident terribly proved. However, as the topic of flooding is very broad, the scope of this paper is focused only on the issues related to the missing flood barriers. Structural measures are physically preventing flooding water to reach or damage safety related system, and they could be permanent or temporary. For temporary measures it is important to have necessary material, equipment and organizational capacity for the timely implementation. Maintenance is important for permanent protection and periodical review is important for assuring readiness and feasibility of temporary flooding protection. Final flooding protection element is assured accessibility to safety related systems during the flooding. Appropriate flooding protection is based on the right implementation of design requirements, proper maintenance and periodic reviews. Operating experience is constantly proving how numerous water sources and systems interactions make flooding protection challenging. This paper is presenting recent related operating experience feedback involving equipment, procedures and analysis. Most frequent deficiencies are: inadequate, degraded or missing seals that would allow floodwaters into safety related spaces. Procedures are inadequate typically because they underestimate necessary

  12. The Pajarito Site operating procedures for the Los Alamos Critical Experiments Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Malenfant, R.E.

    1991-12-01

    Operating procedures consistent with DOE Order 5480.6, and the American National Standard Safety Guide for the Performance of Critical Experiments are defined for the Los Alamos Critical Experiments Facility (LACEF) of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. These operating procedures supersede and update those previously published in 1983 and apply to any criticality experiment performed at the facility. 11 refs

  13. Experience in the development and practical use of working control levels for radiation safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Epishin, A.V.

    1981-01-01

    The experience of development and practical use of working control levels (WCL) of radiation safety in the Gorky region, is discussed. WCL are introduced by ''Radiation Safety Guides'' (RSG-76) and have great practical importance. Regional control levels of radiation safety are determined for certain types of operations implying radioactive hazard and differentiated according to the types of sources applied and types of operation. Dose rates, radioactive contamination of operating surfaces, skin, air and waste water are subject to normalization. Limits of individual radiation doses specified according to operation categories are included. 10 tables of regional WCL indices are developed [ru

  14. 14 CFR 417.121 - Safety critical preflight operations.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safety critical preflight operations. 417.121 Section 417.121 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION... surveillance. A launch operator must implement its hazard area surveillance and clearance plan, of § 417.111(j...

  15. Regulatory Oversight of Safety Culture — Korea’s Experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jung, S.J.; Choi, Y.S.; Kim, J.T.

    2016-01-01

    In Korea, a regulatory oversight program of safety culture was launched in 2012 to establish regulatory measures against several events caused by weak safety culture in the nuclear industry. This paper is intended to introduce the preliminary regulatory oversight framework, development and validation of safety culture components, pilot safety culture inspection results and lessons learned. The safety culture model should be based on a sound understanding of the national culture and industry characteristics where the model will be applied. The nuclear safety culture oversight model is being developed and built on the Korean regulatory system to independently assess the nuclear power operating organizations’ safety culture.

  16. Safety concerns for superconducting magnets of upcoming fusion experiments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Turner, L.R.

    1983-01-01

    -Several fusion experiments being constructed (Tore Supra) or contemplated (DCT 8, Alcator DCT) feature superconducting coils. These coils introduce the following safety concerns: 1. Internally Cooled Conductor (ICC). ICC's are found to be highly stable against short heat pulses, even when the coolant is stagnant or moving at low steady-state velocity. However, a large heat pulse is certain to quench the conductor. Thus, determining the stability limits is vital. 2. Helium II Cooling. Helium II has both unique advantages as a coolant and unique safety problems. 3. Shorted Turns. In magnets with shorts from operational accidents, the current can switch back and forth between the short and the shorted turns, as those alternatively go normal and superconducting. 4. Hybrid Superconducting-Normal Conducting Coil System. The possibility of unequal currents in the different magnets and thus of unexpected forces on the superconducting magnets is much greater than for an all-superconducting system. Analysis of these problems are presented

  17. Code on the safety of nuclear research reactors: Operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-01-01

    The purpose of this publication is to provide the essential requirements and recommendations for the safe operation of research reactors, with emphasis on the supervisory and managerial aspects. However, the publication also provides some guidance and information on topics concerning all the organizations involved in operation. These objectives are expressed in terms of requirements and recommendations for the safe operation of research reactors. Emphasis is placed on the safety requirements that shall be met rather than on the ways in which they can be met. The requirements and recommendations may form the foundation necessary for a Member State to develop regulations and safety criteria for its research reactor programme.

  18. Applying lessons from commercial aviation safety and operations to resuscitation.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ornato, Joseph P; Peberdy, Mary Ann

    2014-02-01

    Both commercial aviation and resuscitation are complex activities in which team members must respond to unexpected emergencies in a consistent, high quality manner. Lives are at stake in both activities and the two disciplines have similar leadership structures, standard setting processes, training methods, and operational tools. Commercial aviation crews operate with remarkable consistency and safety, while resuscitation team performance and outcomes are highly variable. This commentary provides the perspective of two physician-pilots showing how commercial aviation training, operations, and safety principles can be adapted to resuscitation team training and performance. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

  19. Operating experience insights supporting ageing assessments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nitoi, M.

    2013-01-01

    Be effective in ageing management means looking at the right aspects, with the right techniques, and one of the most effective tool which could be used for that purpose is the analysis of operating experience. The paper has as objective to perform a review of available operating experience, with the aim to provide a better picture about the impact of ageing effects. The IAEA International Reporting System and NRC Licensee Event Reports were chosen as reference databases, both databases being internationally recognized as important sources of information about events occurrences in the nuclear power plants. The ageing related events identified in the selected time window were analyzed in detail, and the contributions of each major degradation mechanisms that have induced the ageing related events (specific to each defined group of components) was represented and discussed. The paper demonstrates the possibility to use operating experience insights in highlighting the ageing effects. (authors)

  20. The work of the Operational Safety Review Team (OSART)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hide, K.W.

    1996-01-01

    The Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) programme was set up by the IAEA in 1982 to assist Member States to enhance the operational safety of nuclear power plants. Each team is staffed by senior experts in the relevant fields. The review team discusses with plant staff the existing operational programmes for plant which may be under construction, being commissioned or already operating. Following a detailed examination of a safety programme, the OSART team lists strengths and weaknesses and makes recommendations on how to overcome the latter. Since their conclusions are based on the best prevailing international practice, they may be more stringent than those based on national criteria. The results of the 77 missions conducted at 62 plants in 28 countries by the end of 1994 are summarised. (UK)

  1. Operation safety of control systems. Principles and methods

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aubry, J.F.; Chatelet, E.

    2008-01-01

    This article presents the main operation safety methods that can be implemented to design safe control systems taking into account the behaviour of the different components with each other (binary 'operation/failure' behaviours, non-consistent behaviours and 'hidden' failures, dynamical behaviours and temporal aspects etc). To take into account these different behaviours, advanced qualitative and quantitative methods have to be used which are described in this article: 1 - qualitative methods of analysis: functional analysis, preliminary risk analysis, failure mode and failure effects analyses; 2 - quantitative study of systems operation safety: binary representation models, state space-based methods, event space-based methods; 3 - application to the design of control systems: safe specifications of a control system, qualitative analysis of operation safety, quantitative analysis, example of application; 4 - conclusion. (J.S.)

  2. Analysis of operating experience of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Volta, G.; Amesz, J.; Mancini, G.

    1981-01-01

    The power reactors operating experience has been matter for studies at the Joint Research Centre of the C.E.C. with the aim of validating probabilistic analysis models and of setting up data banks concerning reliability, availability of components and systems and safety related events. The report shows problems encountered and solutions given to attain the goal. For what concerns validation, the need of more satisfactory models that could handle both the technical and the organizational aspects of an operating plant is shown. For what concerns the data banks the possibilities opened by a coherent international system of classification are underlined. (author)

  3. Joint road safety operations in tunnels and open roads

    Science.gov (United States)

    Adesiyun, Adewole; Avenoso, Antonio; Dionelis, Kallistratos; Cela, Liljana; Nicodème, Christophe; Goger, Thierry; Polidori, Carlo

    2017-09-01

    The objective of the ECOROADS project is to overcome the barrier established by the formal interpretation of the two Directives 2008/96/EC and 2004/54/EC, which in practice do not allow the same Road Safety Audits/Inspections to be performed inside tunnels. The projects aims at the establishment of a common enhanced approach to road infrastructure and tunnel safety management by using the concepts and criteria of the Directive 2008/96/CE on road infrastructure safety management and the results of related European Commission (EC) funded projects. ECOROADS has already implemented an analysis of national practices regarding Road Safety Inspections (RSI), two Workshops with the stakeholders, and an exchange of best practices between European tunnel experts and road safety professionals, which led to the definition of common agreed safety procedures. In the second phase of the project, different groups of experts and observers applied the above common procedures by inspecting five European road sections featuring both open roads and tunnels in Belgium, Albania, Germany, Serbia and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. This paper shows the feedback of the 5 joint safety operations and how they are being used for a set of - recommendations and guidelines for the application of the RSA and RSI concepts within the tunnel safety operations.

  4. The SM and MIR reactors operation experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuprienko, V.A.; Klinov, A.V.; Svyatkin, M.N.; Shamardin, V.K.

    1995-01-01

    The SM and MIR operation experience show that continuous work on the problem of ageing, in all its aspects, allows for prolongation of the research plant life cycle by several folds as compared to the initial project. The redesigned SM-3 reactor will operate for another 20 years. The similar result is expected from the MIR planned reconstruction which scope will be the topic of future presentations. (orig.)

  5. Nuclear power plant operating experience, 1976

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-11-01

    This report is the third in a series of reports issued annually that summarize the operating experience of U.S. nuclear power plants in commercial operation. Power generation statistics, plant outages, reportable occurrences, fuel element performance, occupational radiation exposure and radioactive effluents for each plant are presented. Summary highlights of these areas are discussed. The report includes 1976 data from 55 plants--23 boiling water reactor plants and 32 pressurized water reactor plants

  6. Ensuring the operational safety of finnish nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vuorinen, A.

    1991-01-01

    The Finnish nuclear energy programme has been successful both from the safety and economical point of view. These achievements are based on different factors which are discussed in the paper. Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety (STUK) has specified the technical requirements and procedures to be followed in the design, construction, commissioning and operation of NPPs in a series of guides. The guides are quite demanding and latest results of safety research and technical development are taken into account. Regulatory supervision of Finnish NPPs is comprehensive. As an example of this the regulatory inspection program for operational phase is presented. An important way to ensure operational safety of a NPP is to define a set of limits and conditions to identify limiting safety envelope for plant operation. Practices in Finland are reviewed in the paper. The strategy of Defence in Depth is amongst the fundamental principles of nuclear safety. Two corollary principles of defence of depth are accident prevention and accident mitigation. Means used in following these principles are discussed. (author)

  7. The Clearing House on Operating Experience Feedback (CH-OEF)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tanarro Colodron, J.

    2016-01-01

    Full text: The Clearing House on Operating Experience Feedback (CH-OEF) is an online information system that contains three technical databases available only to registered users: 1) Operating Experience Feedback (OEF) records, containing information about events occurred at Nuclear Power Plants; 2) Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) records, containing technical details about NPPs; 3) Documents about operating experience, such as the Topical Operating Experience Reports (TOERs) and the quarterly reports on nuclear power plant events. The main objective of the information system is to develop communication, cooperation and sharing of operating experience amongst the national nuclear regulatory authorities participating in EU Clearinghouse network. The CH-OEF is essential for the preparation and dissemination of the quarterly reports on NPP events. These reports are published every three months and are intended to be complementary to other international reporting systems, containing mainly recent information publicly available. Only events that are considered to be likely to have lessons applicable to EU NPPs or with a real or potential impact on nuclear safety are addressed in the reports. The CH-OEF is a fundamental tool for their preparation, providing specific features for a more efficient sharing of information as well as for facilitating the related discussion and decision making. (author

  8. Concluding from operating experience to instrumentation and control systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pleger, H.; Heinsohn, H.

    1997-01-01

    Where conclusions are drawn from operating experience to instrumentation and control systems, two general statements should be made. First: There have been braekdowns, there have also been deficiencies, but in principle operating experience with the instrumentation and control systems of German nuclear power plants has been good. With respect to the debates about the use of modern digital instrumentation and control systems it is safe to say, secondly, that the instrumentation and control systems currently in use are working reliably. Hence, there is no need at present to replace existing systems for reasons of technical safety. However, that time will come. It is a good thing, therefore, that the use of modern digital instrumentation and control systems is to begin in the field of limiting devices. The operating experience which will thus be accumulated will benefit digital instrumentation and control systems in their qualification process for more demanding applications. This makes proper logging of operating experience an important function, even if it cannot be transferred in every respect. All parties involved therefore should see to it that this operating experience is collected in accordance with criteria agreed upon so as to prevent unwanted surprises later on. (orig.) [de

  9. European Clearinghouse for Nuclear Power Plants Operational Experience Feedback

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Martin Ramos, M.; Noel, M.

    2010-01-01

    In the European Union, in order to support the Community activities on operational experience, a centralized regional network on nuclear power plants operational experience feedback (European Clearinghouse on Operational Experience Feedback for Nuclear Power Plants) was established in 2008 at the EC JRC-IE, Petten (The Netherlands) on request of nuclear Safety Authorities of several Member States. Its main goal is to improve the communication and information sharing on OEF, to promote regional collaboration on analyses of operational experience and dissemination of the lessons learned. The enlarged EU Clearinghouse was launched in April 2010, and it is currently gathering the Regulatory Authorities of Finland, Hungary, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovenia, Switzerland, Bulgaria, Czec Republic, France, Germany, Slovak Republic, and Spain (these last six countries as observers). The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, the IAEA, the EC Directorates General of the JRC and ENER are also part of the network. Recently, collaboration between some European Technical Support Organizations (such IRSN and GRS) and the EU Clearinghouse has been initiated. This paper explains in detail the objectives and organization of the EU Clearinghouse, as well as the most relevant activities carried out, like research work in trend analysis of events ocurred in NPP, topical reports on particular events, dissemination of the results, quarterly reports on events reported publicly and operational experience support to the members of the EU Clearinghouse. (Author)

  10. Operational experience with SLAC's beam containment electronics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Constant, T.N.; Crook, K.; Heggie, D.

    1977-03-01

    Considerable operating experience was accumulated at SLAC with an extensive electronic system for the containment of high power accelerated beams. Average beam power at SLAC can approach 900 kilowatts with the potential for burning through beam stoppers, protection collimators, and other power absorbers within a few seconds. Fast, reliable, and redundant electronic monitoring circuits have been employed to provide some of the safeguards necessary for minimizing the risk to personnel. The electronic systems are described, and the design philosophy and operating experience are discussed

  11. LOFT instrumented fuel design and operating experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Russell, M.L.

    1979-01-01

    A summary description of the Loss-of-Fluid Test (LOFT) system instrumented core construction details and operating experience through reactor startup and loss-of-coolant experiment (LOCE) operations performed to date are discussed. The discussion includes details of the test instrumentation attachment to the fuel assembly, the structural response of the fuel modules to the forces generated by a double-ended break of a pressurized water reactor (PWR) coolant pipe at the inlet to the reactor vessel, the durability of the LOFT fuel and test instrumentation, and the plans for incorporation of improved fuel assembly test instrumentation features in the LOFT core

  12. Operational experience - Lessons learned from IRS-reports in Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wetzel, N.; Maqua, M.

    2005-01-01

    The international Incident Reporting System (IRS), jointly operated by IAEA and OECD-NEA, is a main source of safety significant findings and lessons learned of nuclear operating experience. GRS (Gesellschaft fuer Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit mbH) is a scientific-technical expert and research organisation. On Behalf of the Federal Minister of Environment, Nature Conservation and Reactor Safety (BMU), GRS provides the IRS officer. The evaluation of IRS-Reports and the dissemination of the main findings including the assessment of the relevance for German NPPs is task of GRS. The value of IRS is among experts undoubted. But nevertheless, the reporting to IRS decreases since some years. This presentation is aimed to show the support of IRS in strengthening the safety of German NPPs. The evaluation of IRS-Reports at GRS is three-fold. It comprises initial screening, quarterly and yearly reporting and the development of specific German Information Notices on safety significant events with direct applicability to German NPPs. Some examples of lessons learned from recent international events are discussed below. These examples shall demonstrate that the use of the IRS enhances significantly the knowledge on operational events. (author)

  13. Safety analysis of the post-operational phase

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Berg, H.P.; Ehrlich, D.

    1991-01-01

    The safety analysis of normal operation covers an analytical study of the system parts ultimate repository - waste forms of the ultimate repository system under normal and accidental operation. On that basis a requirement concept has been developed which entails reactions on planning and design of the repository, and requirements of waste products, packagings and permissible activities. The procedure for the operational phase is explained giving the Konrad repository project as an example. (DG) [de

  14. Accelerator/Experiment operations - FY 2006

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Brice, S.; Conrad, J.; Denisov, D.; Ginther, G.; Holmes, S.; James, C.; Lee, W.; Louis, W.; Moore, C.; Plunkett, R.; Raja, R.; /Fermilab

    2006-10-01

    This Technical Memorandum (TM) summarizes the Fermilab accelerator and experiment operations for FY 2006. It is one of a series of annual publications intended to gather information in one place. In this case, the information concerns the FY 2006 Run II at the Tevatron Collider, the MiniBooNE experiments running in the Booster Neutrino Beam in neutrino and antineutrino modes, MINOS using the Main Injector Neutrino Beam (NuMI), and SY 120 activities.

  15. Operating Experience from Events Reported to the IAEA Incident Reporting System for Research Reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-03-01

    Operating experience feedback is an effective mechanism in providing lessons learned from events and the associated corrective actions to prevent them, helping to improve safety at nuclear installations. The Incident Reporting System for Research Reactors (IRSRR), which is operated by the IAEA, is an important tool for international exchange of operating experience feedback for research reactors. The IRSRR reports contain information on events of safety significance with their root causes and lessons learned which help in reducing the occurrence of similar events at research reactors. To improve the effectiveness of the system, it is essential that national organizations demonstrate an appropriate interest for the timely reporting of events important to safety and share the information in the IRSRR database. At their biennial technical meetings, the IRSRR national coordinators recommended collecting the operating experience from the events reported to the IRSRR and disseminating it in an IAEA publication. This publication highlights the root causes, safety significance, lessons learned, corrective actions and the causal factors for the events reported to the IRSRR up to September 2014. The publication also contains relevant summary information on research reactor events from sources other than the IRSRR, operating experience feedback from the International Reporting System for Operating Experience considered relevant to research reactors, and a description of the elements of an operating experience programme as established by the IAEA safety standards. This publication will be of use to research reactor operating organizations, regulators and designers, and any other organizations or individuals involved in the safety of research reactors

  16. Arianespace Launch Service Operator Policy for Space Safety (Regulations and Standards for Safety)

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jourdainne, Laurent

    2013-09-01

    Since December 10, 2010, the French Space Act has entered into force. This French Law, referenced as LOS N°2008-518 ("Loi relative aux Opérations Spatiales"), is compliant with international rules. This French Space Act (LOS) is now applicable for any French private company whose business is dealing with rocket launch or in orbit satellites operations. Under CNES leadership, Arianespace contributed to the consolidation of technical regulation applicable to launch service operators.Now for each launch operation, the operator Arianespace has to apply for an authorization to proceed to the French ministry in charge of space activities. In the files issued for this purpose, the operator is able to justify a high level of warranties in the management of risks through robust processes in relation with the qualification maintenance, the configuration management, the treatment of technical facts and relevant conclusions and risks reduction implementation when needed.Thanks to the historic success of Ariane launch systems through its more than 30 years of exploitation experience (54 successes in a row for latest Ariane 5 launches), Arianespace as well as European public and industrial partners developed key experiences and knowledge as well as competences in space security and safety. Soyuz-ST and Vega launch systems are now in operation from Guiana Space Center with identical and proved risks management processes. Already existing processes have been slightly adapted to cope with the new roles and responsibilities of each actor contributing to the launch preparation and additional requirements like potential collision avoidance with inhabited space objects.Up to now, more than 12 Ariane 5 launches and 4 Soyuz-ST launches have been authorized under the French Space Act regulations. Ariane 5 and Soyuz- ST generic demonstration of conformity have been issued, including exhaustive danger and impact studies for each launch system.This article will detail how Arianespace

  17. Management of operational safety in nuclear power plants. INSAG-13. A report by the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency's activities relating to nuclear safety are based upon a number of premises. First and foremost, each Member State bears full responsibility for the safety of its nuclear facilities. States can be advised, but they cannot be relieved of this responsibility. Secondly, much can be gained by exchanging experience; lessons learned can prevent accidents. Finally, the image of nuclear safety is international; a serious accident anywhere affects the public's view of nuclear power everywhere. With the intention of strengthening its contribution to ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants, the IAEA established the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG), whose duties include serving as a forum for the exchange of information on nuclear safety issues of international significance and formulating, where possible, commonly shared safety principles. Engineering issues have received close attention from the nuclear community over many years. However, it is only in the last decade or so that organizational and cultural issues have been identified as vital to achieving safe operation. INSAG's publication No. 4 has been widely recognized as a milestone in advancing thinking about safety culture in the nuclear community and more widely. The present report deals with the framework for safety management that is necessary in organizations in order to promote safety culture. It deals with the general principles underlying the management of operational safety in a systematic way and provides guidance on good practices. It also draws on the results of audits and reviews to highlight how shortfalls in safety management have led to incidents at nuclear power plants. In addition, several specific issues are raised which are particularly topical in view of organizational changes that are taking place in the nuclear industry in various countries. Advice is given on how safety can be managed during organizational change, how safety

  18. Safety management systems and their role in achieving high standards of operational safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coulston, D.J.; Baylis, C.C.

    2000-01-01

    Achieving high standards of operational safety requires a robust management framework that is visible to all personnel with responsibility for its implementation. The structure of the management framework must ensure that all processes used to manage safety interlink in a logical and coherent manner, that is, they form a management system that leads to continuous improvement in safety performance. This Paper describes BNFL's safety management system (SMS). The SMS has management processes grouped within 5 main elements: 1. Policy, 2. Organisation, 3. Planning and Implementation, 4. Measuring and Reviewing Performance, 5. Audit. These elements reflect the overall process of setting safety objective (from Policy), measuring success and reviewing the performance. Effective implementation of the SMS requires senior managers to demonstrate leadership through their commitment and accountability. However, the SMS as a whole reflects that every employee at every level within BNFL is responsible for safety of operations under their control. The SMS therefore promotes a proactive safety culture and safe operations. The system is formally documented in the Company's Environmental, Health and Safety (EHS) Manual. Within in BNFL Group, the Company structures enables the Manual to provide overall SMS guidance and co-ordination to its range of nuclear businesses. Each business develops the SMS to be appropriate at all levels of its organisation, but ensuring that each level is consistent with the higher level. The Paper concludes with a summary of BNFL's safety performance. (author)

  19. Joint operating agreements - health and safety and employment issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Molnar, L.F.

    1999-01-01

    The extent of non-operator exposure to health and safety and other employment liability is considered. Under the terms of the Canadian Association of Petroleum Landman agreements, the designated operator is the sole employer for joint operations. By these terms, the placement of responsibility for employees involved in a joint operation appears clear. It is to rest with the operator alone. As such, one would expect that the non-operator would be free from liabilities arising out of the employment relations of a project. It has been held, in cases of interrelated companies, that an individual can be an employee of more than one company at the same time. Alberta's Occupational Health and Safety Act, as well as the similar Acts in other provinces, impose a hierarchy of duties and obligations not only on employers but also upon contractors, suppliers and workers to ensure that safety is secured. Relevant definitions in the Act state this. An employer of an employee is vicariously liable for torts committed by the employee in the course of his employment. The questions are asked of what happens if a non-operator lends an employee to the operator and the employee tortiously injures a third party, and if the temporary employer, the operator, becomes the employer in the event of vicarious liability. 20 refs

  20. Categorization of safety related motor operated valve safety significance for Ulchin Unit 3

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kang, D. I.; Kim, K. Y.

    2002-03-01

    We performed a categorization of safety related Motor Operated Valve (MOV) safety significance for Ulchin Unit 3. The safety evaluation of MOV of domestic nuclear power plants affects the generic data used for the quantification of MOV common cause failure ( CCF) events in Ulchin Units 3 PSA. Therefore, in this study, we re-estimated the MGL(Multiple Greek Letter) parameter used for the evaluation of MOV CCF probabilities in Ulchin Units 3 Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) and performed a classification of the MOV safety significance. The re-estimation results of the MGL parameter show that its value is decreased by 30% compared with the current value in Ulchin Unit 3 PSA. The categorization results of MOV safety significance using the changed value of MGL parameter shows that the number of HSSCs(High Safety Significant Components) is decreased by 54.5% compared with those using the current value of it in Ulchin Units 3 PSA

  1. Radiological safety aspects of the operation of neutron generators

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boggs, R.F.

    1976-01-01

    The purpose of the manual is to provide some basic guidelines to persons with a minimum of training in radiological health or health physics, on some safety aspects of the operation of sealed-tube and Cockcroft-Walton type neutron generators. The manual does not state rules or regulations but presents a description of the most likely hazards. It is relevant to those relatively compact neutron generators which usually operate at less than 150-200 kV for the purpose of producing 14-MeV neutrons. The scope is limited to basic discussions of hazards and measurement techniques. Separate chapters are devoted to the characteristics and use of neutron generators; radiation hazards and safety considerations; radiation monitoring and interpretation of measurements; and requirements for an effective safety programme. Two appendices deal with non-radiation hazards and safety considerations, and with a neutron generator laboratory, respectively. An extensive list of bibliographic references is included

  2. Study on operational safety issues in the Japanese disposal concept

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suzuki, Satoru; Kitagawa, Yoshito; Hyodo, Hideaki; Kubota, Shigeru; Iijima, Masayoshi; Tamura, Akio; Ishiguro, Katsuhiko; Fujihara, Hiroshi

    2014-01-01

    In Japan, vitrified high-level radioactive waste (HLW) and certain types of low-level radioactive waste that results from the reprocessing of spent fuel and classified as TRU waste will be disposed of in deep geological formations. NUMO aims to ensure the safety of local residents and workers during the operational phase and after repository closure and will therefore establish a safety case for the geological disposal programme at the end of each stage of the stepwise siting process. Although the Japanese programme is still in the stage before initiation of the siting process, updating the generic (non-site-specific) safety case is required for building confidence among stakeholders. This study focuses on operational safety issues for the Japanese HLW disposal concept. (authors)

  3. Providing Nuclear Criticality Safety Analysis Education through Benchmark Experiment Evaluation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bess, John D.; Briggs, J. Blair; Nigg, David W.

    2009-01-01

    One of the challenges that today's new workforce of nuclear criticality safety engineers face is the opportunity to provide assessment of nuclear systems and establish safety guidelines without having received significant experience or hands-on training prior to graduation. Participation in the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) and/or the International Reactor Physics Experiment Evaluation Project (IRPhEP) provides students and young professionals the opportunity to gain experience and enhance critical engineering skills.

  4. Mobile Phone Network Operators' Actions on RF Safety (invited paper)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Causebrook, J.H.

    1999-01-01

    The current and possible future global penetration of mobile phone usage is given. Health and safety aspects relate to both the statutory requirements for the operation of their networks and the public perception of risks in using services provided by the operators. The coordination of this work nationally through trade associations is mentioned. GSM is the predominant standard used for the provision of global mobile phone services. The GSM MoU Association is introduced as the operators' coordination body worldwide for dealing with radio frequency (RF) health and safety issues through its sub-group, EBRC. The scope of the EBRC group is presented with the considerations used to determine if external research should be supported by the GSM MoU Association. A personal view is provided on the present quality of worldwide research on RF health and safety and some consideration is given as to what constitutes 'good' research. The mobile phone network operators' involvement in the science and application of epidemiological research is considered. Consideration is given to introducing risk/benefit analysis into the debate on the health and safety of mobile phone usage. The media presentation of the results of scientific work on this topic often leads to a falsely negative public perception of the perceived risks. This is made worse when such perceptions are used for the purposes of objecting to the deployment of network infrastructure. The operators' approach to RF health and safety procedures is outlined, with a clarification of the distinctions between near-field and far-field methodologies for the calculation of physical exclusion zones. It is concluded that the mobile phone operators are part of an industry which is safe and who work to ensure that their operations are seen to be safe in the context of the best available worldwide scientific knowledge and safety guidelines. (author)

  5. Accelerator/Experiment Operations - FY 2015

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Czarapata, P. [Fermi National Accelerator Lab. (FNAL), Batavia, IL (United States); et al.

    2015-10-01

    This Technical Memorandum summarizes the Fermilab accelerator and experiment operations for FY 2015. It is one of a series of annual publications intended to gather information in one place. In this case, the information concerns the FY 2015 NOvA, MINOS+ and MINERvA experiments using the Main Injector Neutrino Beam (NuMI), the activities in the SciBooNE Hall using the Booster Neutrino Beam (BNB), and the SeaQuest experiment and Meson Test Beam (MTest) activities in the 120 GeV external Switchyard beam (SY120).

  6. Radiological safety design considerations for fusion research experiments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Crase, K.W.; Singh, M.S.

    1979-01-01

    A wide variety of fusion research experiments are in the planning or construction stages. Two such experiments, the Nova Laser Fusion Facility and the Mirror Fusion Test Facility (MFTF), are currently under construction at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. Although the plasma chamber vault for MFTF and the Nova target room will have thick concrete walls and roofs, the radiation safety problems are made complex by the numerous requirements for shield wall penetrations. This paper addresses radiation safety considerations for the MFTF and Nova experiments, and the need for integrated safety considerations and safety technology development during the planning stages of fusion experiments

  7. Risk management for operations of the LANL Critical Experiments Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Paternoster, R.; Butterfield, K.

    1998-01-01

    The Los Alamos Critical Experiments Facility (LACEF) currently operates two burst reactors (Godiva-IV and Skua), one solution assembly [the Solution High-Energy Burst Assembly (SHEBA)], two fast-spectrum benchmark assemblies (Flattop and Big Ten), and five general-purpose remote assembly machines that may be configured with nuclear materials and assembled by remote control. Special nuclear materials storage vaults support these and other operations at the site. With this diverse set of operations, several approaches are possible in the analysis and management of risk. The most conservative approach would be to write a safety analysis report (SAR) for each assembly and experiment. A more cost-effective approach is to analyze the probability and consequences of several classes of operations representative of operations on each critical assembly machine and envelope the bounding case accidents. Although the neutron physics of these machines varies widely, the operations performed at LACEF fall into four operational modes: steady-state mode, approach-to-critical mode, prompt burst mode, and nuclear material operations, which can include critical assembly fuel loading. The operational sequences of each mode are very nearly identical, whether operated on one assembly machine or another. The use of an envelope approach to accident analysis is facilitated by the use of classes of operations and the use of bounding case consequence analysis. A simple fault tree analysis of operational modes helps resolve which operations are sensitive to human error and which are initiated by hardware of software failures. Where possible, these errors and failures are blocked by TSR LCOs. Future work will determine the probability of accidents with various initiators

  8. Regulatory supervision of safety indicators; experience with radiation safety indicators in Dukovany nuclear power plant performance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Urbancik, L.; Kulich, V.

    2004-01-01

    The State Office for Nuclear Safety uses three sets of indicators describing the following aspects of a favourable nuclear power plant operation: smooth operation in normal circumstances, low risk to the population, and operation with a positive safety attitude. These are three safety-related areas for assessment. Each area has its own set of indicators. Overall operational safety performance indicators were identified for each attribute. From this point, a level of strategic indicators was developed, and finally, a set of specific indicators was set up. While neither the overall indicators nor the strategic indicators are directly measurable, the specific indicators are directly measurable and are targeted during inspection. (author)

  9. Confirmatory simulation of safety and operational transients in LMFBR systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Guppy, J.G.; Agrawal, A.K.

    1978-01-01

    Operational and safety transients that may originate anywhere in an LMFBR system must be adequately simulated to assist in safety evaluation and plant design efforts. This paper describes an advanced thermohydraulic transient code, the Super System Code (SSC), that may be used for confirmatory safety evaluations of plant wide events, such as assurance of adequate decay heat removal capability under natural circulation conditions, and presents results obtained with SSC illustrating the degree of modelling detail present in the code as well as the computing efficiency. (author)

  10. Accelerator/Experiment Operations - FY 2016

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blake, A.; Convery, M.; Geer, S.; Geesaman, D.; Harris, D.; Johnson, D.; Lang, K.; McFarland, K.; Messier, M.; Moore, C. D.; Newhart, D.; Reimer, P. E.; Plunkett, R.; Rominsky, M.; Sanchez, M.; Schmidt, J. J.; Shanahan, P.; Tate, C.; Thomas, J.; Donatella Torretta, Donatella Torretta; Matthew Wetstein, Matthew Wetstein

    2016-01-01

    This Technical Memorandum summarizes the Fermilab accelerator and experiment operations for FY 2016. It is one of a series of annual publications intended to gather information in one place. In this case, the information concerns the FY 2016 NOvA, MINOS+ and MINERvA experiments using the Main Injector Neutrino Beam (NuMI), the MicroBooNE experiment and the activities in the SciBooNE Hall using the Booster Neutrino Beam (BNB), and the SeaQuest experiment, LArIAT experiment and Meson Test Beam activities in the 120 GeV external switchyard beam (SY120). Each section was prepared by the relevant authors, and was then edited for inclusion in this summary.

  11. Accelerator/Experiment Operations - FY 2016

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Blake, A. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Convery, M. [Fermi National Accelerator Lab. (FNAL), Batavia, IL (United States); Geer, S. [Fermi National Accelerator Lab. (FNAL), Batavia, IL (United States); Geesaman, D. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Harris, D. [Fermi National Accelerator Lab. (FNAL), Batavia, IL (United States); Johnson, D. [Fermi National Accelerator Lab. (FNAL), Batavia, IL (United States); Lang, K. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); McFarland, K. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Messier, M. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Moore, C. D. [Fermi National Accelerator Lab. (FNAL), Batavia, IL (United States); Newhart, D. [Fermilab; Reimer, P. E. [Argonne; Plunkett, R. [Fermilab; Rominsky, M. [Fermilab; Sanchez, M. [Iowa State U.; Schmidt, J. J. [Fermilab; Shanahan, P. [Fermilab; Tate, C. [Fermilab; Thomas, J. [University Coll. London; Donatella Torretta, Donatella Torretta [Fermilab; Matthew Wetstein, Matthew Wetstein [Iowa State University

    2016-10-01

    This Technical Memorandum summarizes the Fermilab accelerator and experiment operations for FY 2016. It is one of a series of annual publications intended to gather information in one place. In this case, the information concerns the FY 2016 NOvA, MINOS+ and MINERvA experiments using the Main Injector Neutrino Beam (NuMI), the MicroBooNE experiment and the activities in the SciBooNE Hall using the Booster Neutrino Beam (BNB), and the SeaQuest experiment, LArIAT experiment and Meson Test Beam activities in the 120 GeV external switchyard beam (SY120). Each section was prepared by the relevant authors, and was then edited for inclusion in this summary.

  12. Main safety lessons from 5-year operation of the renovated Dalat nuclear research reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anh, T.H.; Lam, P.V.; An, T.K.; Khang, N.P.; Tan, D.Q.

    1989-01-01

    The paper presents main safety related characteristics of the Dalat Nuclear Research Reactor (DNRR), which was reconstructed in 1982 at the site of the former TRIGA Mark II, while retaining some of its structures. Experience acquired from reactor operation is analysed. The programme of investigations aimed at better ensuring nuclear safety of the reactor, together with some of its results are presented. Finally some propositions to improve the present situation are suggested. (Authors). (2 Tables, 2 fig.)

  13. Operating experience from Swedish nuclear power plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-06-01

    During 1997 the PWRs in Ringhals performed extremely well (capability factors 85-90%), the unit Ringhals 2 reached the best capability factor since commercial operation started in 1976. The BWRs made an average 76% capability, which is somewhat less than in 1996. The slightly reduced capability derives from ongoing modernization projects at several units. At the youngest plants, Forsmark 3 and Oskarshamn 3, capability and utilization were very high. Events and data for 1997 are given for each reactor, together with operational statistics for the years 1990-1997. A number of safety-related events are reported, which occurred st the Swedish plants during 1997. These events are classified as level 1 or higher on the international nuclear event scale (INES).

  14. Operating experience from Swedish nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    During 1997 the PWRs in Ringhals performed extremely well (capability factors 85-90%), the unit Ringhals 2 reached the best capability factor since commercial operation started in 1976. The BWRs made an average 76% capability, which is somewhat less than in 1996. The slightly reduced capability derives from ongoing modernization projects at several units. At the youngest plants, Forsmark 3 and Oskarshamn 3, capability and utilization were very high. Events and data for 1997 are given for each reactor, together with operational statistics for the years 1990-1997. A number of safety-related events are reported, which occurred st the Swedish plants during 1997. These events are classified as level 1 or higher on the international nuclear event scale (INES)

  15. FFTF operating experience, 1982-1984

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Waldo, J.B.; Franz, G.R.; Loika, E.F.; Krupar, J.J.

    1984-01-01

    The Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) is a 400 Mwt sodium-cooled fast reactor operating at the Hanford Engineering Development Laboratory, Richland, Washington, to conduct fuels and materials testing in support of the US Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR) program. Startup and initial power testing included a comprehensive series of nonnuclear and nuclear tests to verify the thermal, hydraulic, and neutronic characteristics of the plant. A specially designed series of natural circulation tests were then performed to demonstrate the inherent safety features of the plant. Early in 1982, the FFTF began its first 100-day irradiation cycle. Since that time the plant has operated very well, achieving a cycle capacity factor of 94% in the most recent irradiation cycle. Seventy-five specific test assemblies and 25,000 individual fuel pins have been irradiated, some in excess of 80 MWd/Kg

  16. Operating experiences with programmable logic controller (PLC) system of Indian Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWR)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ughade, A.V.; Singh, Ranjeet; Bhattacharya, P.K.; Kulkarni, R.K.; Chandra, Umesh

    2005-01-01

    PLC system was introduced for the first time in Kaiga-1,2 and RAPS-3,4 Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) for Station Logic Control of Non Safety Related (NSR) and Safety related (SR) systems. However, the safety system logics are still relay based. The experience on the deployment of PLC system, which is computer-based, has brought out various implementation issues. This paper give details of such experiences, the solutions emerged and applied for plants under operation/construction. (author)

  17. Operational experience with CMS Tier-2 sites

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gonzalez Caballero, I

    2010-01-01

    In the CMS computing model, more than one third of the computing resources are located at Tier-2 sites, which are distributed across the countries in the collaboration. These sites are the primary platform for user analyses; they host datasets that are created at Tier-1 sites, and users from all CMS institutes submit analysis jobs that run on those data through grid interfaces. They are also the primary resource for the production of large simulation samples for general use in the experiment. As a result, Tier-2 sites have an interesting mix of organized experiment-controlled activities and chaotic user-controlled activities. CMS currently operates about 40 Tier-2 sites in 22 countries, making the sites a far-flung computational and social network. We describe our operational experience with the sites, touching on our achievements, the lessons learned, and the challenges for the future.

  18. Small nuclear reactor safety design requirements for autonomous operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kozier, K.S.; Kupca, S.

    1997-01-01

    Small nuclear power reactors offer compelling safety advantages in terms of the limited consequences that can arise from major accident events and the enhanced ability to use reliable, passive means to eliminate their occurrence by design. Accordingly, for some small reactor designs featuring a high degree of safety autonomy, it may be-possible to delineate a ''safety envelope'' for a given set of reactor circumstances within which safe reactor operation can be guaranteed without outside intervention for time periods of practical significance (i.e., days or weeks). The capability to operate a small reactor without the need for highly skilled technical staff permanently present, but with continuous remote monitoring, would aid the economic case for small reactors, simplify their use in remote regions and enhance safety by limiting the potential for accidents initiated by inappropriate operator action. This paper considers some of the technical design options and issues associated with the use of small power reactors in an autonomous mode for limited periods. The focus is on systems that are suitable for a variety of applications, producing steam for electricity generation, district heating, water desalination and/or marine propulsion. Near-term prospects at low power levels favour the use of pressurized, light-water-cooled reactor designs, among which those having an integral core arrangement appear to offer cost and passive-safety advantages. Small integral pressurized water reactors have been studied in many countries, including the test operation of prototype systems. (author)

  19. Method of operator safety assessment for underground mobile mining equipment

    Science.gov (United States)

    Działak, Paulina; Karliński, Jacek; Rusiński, Eugeniusz

    2018-01-01

    The paper presents a method of assessing the safety of operators of mobile mining equipment (MME), which is adapted to current and future geological and mining conditions. The authors focused on underground mines, with special consideration of copper mines (KGHM). As extraction reaches into deeper layers of the deposit it can activate natural hazards, which, thus far, have been considered unusual and whose range and intensity are different depending on the field of operation. One of the main hazards that affect work safety and can become the main barrier in the exploitation of deposits at greater depths is climate threat. The authors have analysed the phenomena which may impact the safety of MME operators, with consideration of accidents that have not yet been studied and are not covered by the current safety standards for this group of miners. An attempt was made to develop a method for assessing the safety of MME operators, which takes into account the mentioned natural hazards and which is adapted to current and future environmental conditions in underground mines.

  20. Method of operator safety assessment for underground mobile mining equipment

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Działak Paulina

    2018-01-01

    Full Text Available The paper presents a method of assessing the safety of operators of mobile mining equipment (MME, which is adapted to current and future geological and mining conditions. The authors focused on underground mines, with special consideration of copper mines (KGHM. As extraction reaches into deeper layers of the deposit it can activate natural hazards, which, thus far, have been considered unusual and whose range and intensity are different depending on the field of operation. One of the main hazards that affect work safety and can become the main barrier in the exploitation of deposits at greater depths is climate threat. The authors have analysed the phenomena which may impact the safety of MME operators, with consideration of accidents that have not yet been studied and are not covered by the current safety standards for this group of miners. An attempt was made to develop a method for assessing the safety of MME operators, which takes into account the mentioned natural hazards and which is adapted to current and future environmental conditions in underground mines.

  1. OSART guidelines - 2005 edition. Reference report for IAEA Operational Safety Review Teams (OSARTs)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has put forward the vision of a global nuclear safety regime that provides for the protection of people and the environment from the effects of ionizing radiation from nuclear facilities, the minimization of the likelihood of accidents that could endanger life and property and effective mitigation of the effects of any such events should they occur. The strategic approach for achieving the vision of enhancing this regime involves four elements and aims at ensuring that the overall nuclear safety level in Member States continues to improve: - Improvement of national and international safety infrastructures: - Establishment and global acceptance of IAEA safety standards; - Integrated approach to the provision for the application of safety standards; and - Global network of knowledge and experience. The IAEA Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) programme provides advice and assistance to Member States to enhance the safety of nuclear power plants during commissioning and operation. The OSART programme, initiated in 1982, is available to all Member States with nuclear power plants under commissioning or in operation. The OSART methodology and its safety services may also be applied to other nuclear installations (e.g. fuel cycle facilities, research reactors). Conservative design, careful manufacture and sound construction are all prerequisites for safe operation of nuclear power plants. However, the safety of the plant depends ultimately on sound policies, procedures, processes and practices; on the capability and reliability of the commissioning and operating personnel; on comprehensive instructions; and on adequate resources. A positive attitude and conscientiousness on the part of the management and staff in discharging their responsibilities is important to safety. OSART missions consider these aspects in assessing a facility's operational practices in comparison with those used successfully in other countries and

  2. OSART guidelines - 2005 edition. Reference report for IAEA Operational Safety Review Teams (OSARTs)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has put forward the vision of a global nuclear safety regime that provides for the protection of people and the environment from the effects of ionizing radiation from nuclear facilities, the minimization of the likelihood of accidents that could endanger life and property and effective mitigation of the effects of any such events should they occur. The strategic approach for achieving the vision of enhancing this regime involves four elements and aims at ensuring that the overall nuclear safety level in Member States continues to improve: - Improvement of national and international safety infrastructures: - Establishment and global acceptance of IAEA safety standards. - Integrated approach to the provision for the application of safety standards. And - Global network of knowledge and experience. The IAEA Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) programme provides advice and assistance to Member States to enhance the safety of nuclear power plants during commissioning and operation. The OSART programme, initiated in 1982, is available to all Member States with nuclear power plants under commissioning or in operation. The OSART methodology and its safety services may also be applied to other nuclear installations (e.g. fuel cycle facilities, research reactors). Conservative design, careful manufacture and sound construction are all prerequisites for safe operation of nuclear power plants. However, the safety of the plant depends ultimately on sound policies, procedures, processes and practices. On the capability and reliability of the commissioning and operating personnel. On comprehensive instructions. And on adequate resources. A positive attitude and conscientiousness on the part of the management and staff in discharging their responsibilities is important to safety. OSART missions consider these aspects in assessing a facility's operational practices in comparison with those used successfully in other countries and

  3. OSART guidelines - 2005 edition. Reference report for IAEA Operational Safety Review Teams (OSARTs)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has put forward the vision of a global nuclear safety regime that provides for the protection of people and the environment from the effects of ionizing radiation from nuclear facilities, the minimization of the likelihood of accidents that could endanger life and property and effective mitigation of the effects of any such events should they occur. The strategic approach for achieving the vision of enhancing this regime involves four elements and aims at ensuring that the overall nuclear safety level in Member States continues to improve: - Improvement of national and international safety infrastructures: - Establishment and global acceptance of IAEA safety standards. - Integrated approach to the provision for the application of safety standards. And - Global network of knowledge and experience. The IAEA Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) programme provides advice and assistance to Member States to enhance the safety of nuclear power plants during commissioning and operation. The OSART programme, initiated in 1982, is available to all Member States with nuclear power plants under commissioning or in operation. The OSART methodology and its safety services may also be applied to other nuclear installations (e.g. fuel cycle facilities, research reactors). Conservative design, careful manufacture and sound construction are all prerequisites for safe operation of nuclear power plants. However, the safety of the plant depends ultimately on sound policies, procedures, processes and practices. On the capability and reliability of the commissioning and operating personnel. On comprehensive instructions. And on adequate resources. A positive attitude and conscientiousness on the part of the management and staff in discharging their responsibilities is important to safety. OSART missions consider these aspects in assessing a facility's operational practices in comparison with those used successfully in other countries and

  4. Nuclear electric power safety, operation, and control aspects

    CERN Document Server

    Knowles, J Brian

    2013-01-01

    Assesses the engineering of renewable sources for commercial power generation and discusses the safety, operation, and control aspects of nuclear electric power From an expert who advised the European Commission and UK government in the aftermath of Three Mile Island and Chernobyl comes a book that contains experienced engineering assessments of the options for replacing the existing, aged, fossil-fired power stations with renewable, gas-fired, or nuclear plants. From geothermal, solar, and wind to tidal and hydro generation, Nuclear Electric Power: Safety, Operation, and Control Aspects ass

  5. AMNT 2014. Key topic: Reactor operation, safety - report. Pt. 3

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bohnstedt, Angelika [Karlsruher Institut fuer Technologie (KIT), Eggenstein-Leopoldshafen (Germany). Programm Nukleare Sicherheitsforschung (NUKLEAR); Mull, Thomas [AREVA GmbH, Erlangen (Germany). Nuclear Fusion, HTR and Transverse Issues (PTDH-G); Starflinger, Joerg [Stuttgart Univ. (Germany). Inst. fuer Kernenergetik und Energiesysteme (IKE)

    2015-01-15

    Summary report on the following sessions of the Annual Conference on Nuclear Technology held in Frankfurt, 6 to 8 May 2014: - Reactor Operation, Safety: Radiation Protection (Angelika Bohnstedt); - Competence, Innovation, Regulation: Fusion Technology - Optimisation Steps in the ITER Design (Thomas Mull); - Competence, Innovation, Regulation: Education, Expert Knowledge, Knowledge Transfer (Joerg Starflinger). The other Sessions of the Key Topics 'Reactor Operation, Safety', 'Competence, Innovation, Regulation' and 'Fuel, Decommissioning and Disposal' have been covered in atw 10 and 12 (2015) and will be covered in further issues of atw.

  6. HANARO operation experience in the year 2004

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oh, Soo-Youl; Kim, Heonil; Cho, Yeong-Garp; Jun, Byung-Jin

    2006-01-01

    The experiences of the HANARO operation and maintenance in the year 2004 are presented in this article. The operation of HANARO, a 30 MW research reactor operated by the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), aims at a safe and effective operation to enhance its utilization in various fields of scientific research and industry. Regardless of its importance of the routine operation, this article is devoted to rather unusual matters such as irregular maintenance events and incidents. Since the first criticality in 1995, it has been a long-cherished task to reach the designed power level of 30 MW from the temporarily approved 24 MW. By resolving the concern on the fuel integrity, the designed level could be licensed and, eventually, it was achieved last November. On the other hand, after its 9 years of operation, the mechanical integrity of the heavy water reflector tank was checked. The measurement of the vertical straightness of the tank inner shell indicated its integrity. Meanwhile, the HANARO fuel production facility was completed at the KAERI site, and it will begin to supply centrifugally atomized fuels, instead of conventional comminuted fuels, to HANARO shortly. There were several incidents in 2004, which have all been cleared, including a leak of heavy water, melting of a sample in an irradiation hole for the neutron activation analysis, and a condensation problem in a horizontal beam tube. The progress of and lessons from each incident are presented. The utilization of HANARO is expanding every year and the trend will also continue in 2005. The operation mode has been changed from an 18-day continuous operation and 10-day shutdown (18-10 mode) to the 23-12 mode since the end of 2004, and a further extension is planned to the 30-12 mode. Thanks to this extended operation term, an increased power level and, most importantly, a reliable operation, the HANARO is gaining more and more credit from the end users. (author)

  7. Evolution of the future plants operation for a better safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Papin, B.; Malvache, P.

    1994-01-01

    This paper describes a coordinated research project of the french CEA, addressing to the evolutions in plant operation apt to bring perceptible and assessable improvement in the operational safety. This program has been scheduled for the 1992-1996 period, with a global 40 men/year effort. The present status of the two main parts of the project is presented: ESCRIME (program aiming at defining the optimal share of tasks between humans and computers in plant operation), IMAGIN (research in the domain of plant information management, in order to ensure the global coherence of the image of the plant, used by the different actors in plant operation). (authors). 3 refs., 4 figs

  8. The development of NPP operational safety training courses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Chang Kun; Lee, Duk Sun; Lee, Byung Sun; Lee, Won Koo; Juhn, Heng Run; Moon, Byung Soo; Cho, Min Sik; Lee, Han Young; Moon, Hak Won; Seo, Yeon Ho

    1987-12-01

    The objective of the project is to develop a training course text for the betterment of reactor operation and assurance of its safety in general by providing training materials of the advanced compact nuclear simulator which will become operation in September 1988. Main scope and contents of the project are as follows: - compilation of basic data related to simulator operation and maintenance as well as the comparative analysis with respect to simulator materials in foreign countries - method of training by simulator - review the training status by simulator in foreign countries - development of training course in the field of reactor safety It is expected that the results will be reflected to the actual training and retraining of the reactor operating crew so as to improve and update their capabilities in training fashion. (Author)

  9. Safety and emergency preparedness considerations for geotechnical field operations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wemple, R.P.

    1989-04-01

    The GEO Energy Technology Department at Sandia National Laboratories is involved in several remote-site drilling and/or experimental operations each year. In 1987, the Geothermal Research Division of the Department developed a general set of Safe Operating Procedures (SOPs) that could be applied to a variety of projects. This general set is supplemented by site-specific SOPs as needed. Effective field operations require: integration of safety and emergency preparedness planning with overall project planning, training of field personnel and inventorying of local emergency support resources, and, developing a clear line of responsibility and authority to enforce the safety requirements. Copies of SOPs used in recent operations are included as examples of working documents for the reader.

  10. Operational experience of the ATLAS accelerator

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Den Hartog, P K; Bogaty, J M; Bollinger, L M; Clifft, B E; Craig, S L; Harden, R E; Markovich, P; Munson, F H; Nixon, J M; Pardo, R C; Phillips, D R; Shepard, K W; Tilbrook, I R; Zinkmann, G P [Argonne National Lab., IL (USA). Physics Div.

    1990-02-01

    The ATLAS accelerator consists of a HVEC model FN tandem accelerator injecting into a linac of independently-phased niobium superconducting resonators. The accelerator provides beams with masses 6 {le} A {le} 127 and with energies ranging up to 20 MeV/A for the lightest ions and 4 MeV/A for the heaviest ions. Portions of the linac have been in operation since 1978 and, over the last decade, more than 35000 h of operating experience have been accumulated. The long-term stability of niobium resonators, and their feasibility for use in heavy-ion accelerators is now well established. (orig.).

  11. Operational experience of extreme wind penetrations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Estanqueiro, Ana [INETI/LNEG - National Laboratory for Energy and Geology, Lisbon (Portugal); Mateus, Carlos B. [Instituto de Meteorologia, Lisboa (Portugal); Pestana, Rui [Redes Energeticas Nacionais (REN), Lisboa (Portugal)

    2010-07-01

    This paper reports the operational experience from the Portuguese Power System during the 2009/2010 winter months when record wind penerations were observed: the instantaneous wind power penetration peaked at 70% of consumption during no-load periods and the wind energy accounted for more than 50% of the energy consumed for a large period. The regulation measures taken by the TSO are presented in the paper, together with the additional reserves operated for added system security. Information on the overall power system behavior under such extreme long-term wind power penetrations will also be addressed. (org.)

  12. Operating procedures: Fusion Experiments Analysis Facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lerche, R.A.; Carey, R.W.

    1984-03-20

    The Fusion Experiments Analysis Facility (FEAF) is a computer facility based on a DEC VAX 11/780 computer. It became operational in late 1982. At that time two manuals were written to aid users and staff in their interactions with the facility. This manual is designed as a reference to assist the FEAF staff in carrying out their responsibilities. It is meant to supplement equipment and software manuals supplied by the vendors. Also this manual provides the FEAF staff with a set of consistent, written guidelines for the daily operation of the facility.

  13. Operating procedures: Fusion Experiments Analysis Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lerche, R.A.; Carey, R.W.

    1984-01-01

    The Fusion Experiments Analysis Facility (FEAF) is a computer facility based on a DEC VAX 11/780 computer. It became operational in late 1982. At that time two manuals were written to aid users and staff in their interactions with the facility. This manual is designed as a reference to assist the FEAF staff in carrying out their responsibilities. It is meant to supplement equipment and software manuals supplied by the vendors. Also this manual provides the FEAF staff with a set of consistent, written guidelines for the daily operation of the facility

  14. Preheat operating experiences at the FFTF

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tucker, W.R.

    1978-01-01

    The rather extensive test program performed on the FFTF preheat control system resulted in successful sodium fill of one secondary heat transport loop on July 2, 1978. The data obtained during testing and the attendant operating experience gained resulted in some design changes and provided the information necessary to fully characterize system performance. Temperature excursions and deviations from preset limits of only a minor nature were encountered during preheat for sodium fill. The addition of the rate alarm feature was beneficial to operation of the preheat system and allowed early detection and correction of impending excursions

  15. Integrated model of port oil piping transportation system safety including operating environment threats

    OpenAIRE

    Kołowrocki, Krzysztof; Kuligowska, Ewa; Soszyńska-Budny, Joanna

    2017-01-01

    The paper presents an integrated general model of complex technical system, linking its multistate safety model and the model of its operation process including operating environment threats and considering variable at different operation states its safety structures and its components safety parameters. Under the assumption that the system has exponential safety function, the safety characteristics of the port oil piping transportation system are determined.

  16. Substitute safety rods: Physics of operation and irradiation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baumann, N.P.

    1991-01-01

    Under certain assumed accidents, an SRS reactor may lose most of its bulk moderator while maintaining flow to fuel assemblies. If this occurs immediately after operation at power, components normally dependent on convective heat transfer to the moderator will heat up with the possibility of melting that component. One component at risk is the currently used cadmium safety rod. A substitute safety rod consisting solely of sintered B 4 C and stainless steel has been designed which is capable of withstanding much higher temperatures. This memorandum provides the physics basis for the adequacy of the rod for reactor shutdown and provides a set of criteria for acceptance in the NTG tests. This memorandum provides physics data for other aspects of operation. These include: Heat production and helium production, along with related phenomena, resulting from inadvertent irradiation at power. Gamma heat input under drained tank conditions. An equivalent rod design suitable for charge design and safety analyses. Degradation under normal operation. Thermal flux ripple in adjacent fuel due to axial striping of alternate B 4 C and steel pellets. Possible effect on safety analyses. Safety rod withdrawal during reactor startup

  17. Operating experience and corrective action program at Ontario Hydro Nuclear

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Collingwood, Barry; Turner, David

    1998-01-01

    This is a slide-based talk given at the COG/IAEA: 5. Technical Committee Meeting on 'Exchange of operating experience of pressurized heavy water reactors'. In the introduction there are presented the operating experience (OPEX) program of OHN, and the OPEX Program Mission, ensuring that the right information gets to the right staff at the right time. The OPEX Processes are analysed. These are: - Internal Corrective Action; - Inter-site Lesson Transfer; - External Lesson Transfer; - External Posting of OHN Events; - Internalizing Operating Experience. Steps in solving the Corrective Action Program are described: - Identify the Problem; - Notify Immediate Supervision/Manager; - Evaluate the Problem; - Correct the Problem; Monitor/Report Status. The Internal Corrective Action is then presented as a flowchart. The internalizing operating experience is presented under three aspects: - Communication; - Interface; - Training. The following items are discussed, respectively: peer meetings, department/section meetings, safety meetings, e-mail folders, newsletters and bulletin boards; work planning, pre-job briefings, supervisors' briefing cards; classroom initial and refresher (case studies), simulator, management courses. A diagram is presented showing the flow and treatment of information within OHN, centered on the weekly screening meetings. Finally, the corrective action processes are depicted in a flowchart and analysed in details

  18. Operational safety performance indicators for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-05-01

    Since the late 1980s, the IAEA has been actively sponsoring work in the area of indicators to monitor nuclear power plant (NPP) operational safety performance. The early activities were mainly focused on exchanging ideas and good practices in the development and use of these indicators at nuclear power plants. Since 1995 efforts have been directed towards the elaboration of a framework for the establishment of an operational safety performance indicator programme. The result of this work, compiled in this publication, is intended to assist NPPs in developing and implementing a monitoring programme, without overlooking the critical aspects related to operational safety performance. The framework proposed in this report was presented at two IAEA workshops on operational safety performance indicators held in Ljubljana, Slovenia, in September 1998 and at the Daya Bay NPP, Szenzhen, China, in December 1998. During these two workshops, the participants discussed and brainstormed on the indicator framework presented. These working sessions provided very useful insights and ideas which where used for the enhancement of the framework proposed. The IAEA is acknowledging the support and contribution of all the participants in these two activities. The programme development was enhanced by pilot plant studies. Four plants from different countries with different designs participated in this study with the objective of testing the applicability, usefulness and viability of this approach

  19. NPP Krsko core calculations to improve operational safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ivekovic, I.; Grgic, D.; Nemec, T.

    2007-01-01

    Calculation tools and methodology used to perform independent calculations of cumulative influence of different changes related to fuel and core operation of NPP Krsko were described. Some examples of steady state and transient results are used to illustrate potential improvements to understanding and reviewing plant safety. (author)

  20. Operational Experience with the ATLAS Pixel Detector

    CERN Document Server

    Djama, Fares; The ATLAS collaboration

    2017-01-01

    Run 2 of the LHC collider sets new challenges to track and vertex reconstruction because of its higher energy, pileup and luminosity. The ATLAS tracking performance relies critically on the Pixel Detector. Therefore, in view of Run 2, the ATLAS collaboration has constructed the first 4-layer pixel detector in Particle Physics by installing a new pixel layer, called Insertable B-Layer (IBL). Operational experience and performance of the 4-layer Pixel Detector during Run 2 are presented.

  1. Lesson Learned from the Recent Operating Experience of Domestic Nuclear Power Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Chang-Ju; Kim, Min-Chull; Koo, Bon-Hyun; Kim, Sang-Jae; Lee, Kyung-Won; Kim, Ji-Tae; Lee, Durk-Hun

    2007-01-01

    According to the public concerns, it seems that one of the main missions of a nuclear regulatory body is to collect operational experiences from various nuclear facilities, and to analyze their follow-up information. The extensive use of lessons learned from operating experiences to back fit safety systems, improve operator training and emergency procedures, and to focus more attention on human factors, safety culture and quality management systems are also desired. Collecting operational experiences has been mainly done regarding the incidents and major failures of components (so called 'event'), which usually demands lots of regulatory resources. This paper concentrates on new information, i.e. lesson learned from recent investigation results of domestic events which contain 5 years' experience. This information can induce many insights for improving operational safety of nuclear power plants (NPPs)

  2. Operational Experience from Solar Thermal Energy Projects

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cameron, C. P.

    1984-01-01

    Over the past few years, Sandia National Laboratories were involved in the design, construction, and operation of a number of DOE-sponsored solar thermal energy systems. Among the systems currently in operation are several industrial process heat projects and the Modular Industrial Solar Retrofit qualification test systems, all of which use parabolic troughs, and the Shenandoah Total Energy Project, which uses parabolic dishes. Operational experience has provided insight to both desirable and undesirable features of the designs of these systems. Features of these systems which are also relevant to the design of parabolic concentrator thermal electric systems are discussed. Other design features discussed are system control functions which were found to be especially convenient or effective, such as local concentrator controls, rainwash controls, and system response to changing isolation. Drive systems are also discussed with particular emphasis of the need for reliability and the usefulness of a manual drive capability.

  3. Continuous Air Monitor Operating Experience Review

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cadwallader, L.C.; Bruyere, S.A.

    2008-01-01

    Continuous air monitors (CAMs) are used to sense radioactive particulates in room air of nuclear facilities. CAMs alert personnel of potential inhalation exposures to radionuclides and can also actuate room ventilation isolation for public and environmental protection. This paper presents the results of a CAM operating experience review of the DOE Occurrence Reporting and Processing System (ORPS) database from the past 18 years. Regulations regarding these monitors are briefly reviewed. CAM location selection and operation are briefly discussed. Operating experiences reported by the U.S. Department of Energy and in other literature sources were reviewed to determine the strengths and weaknesses of these monitors. Power losses, human errors, and mechanical issues cause the majority of failures. The average 'all modes' failure rate is 2.65E-05/hr. Repair time estimates vary from an average repair time of 9 hours (with spare parts on hand) to 252 hours (without spare parts on hand). These data should support the use of CAMs in any nuclear facility, including the National Ignition Facility and the international ITER experiment

  4. EDF view on next generation reactor safety and operability issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Serviere, G.

    2002-01-01

    In the foreseeable future, EDF will have to compete in an economically de-regulated market. Nuclear currently accounts for more than 80% of the electricity generated by the company, and generation costs are quite competitive compared to that of other competing energies. It is so likely that nuclear units will remain the backbone of EDF generating fleet in the years to come. However, to remain a viable option for electricity generation in the longer term, nuclear will have to maintain both its cost-effectiveness and a very high safety level. This could seem quite straightforward considering the current situation where safety records are at an all time high and Operating and Maintenance costs are under tight control. In fact, it could be a real challenge. Competing fossil technologies progress and there is a concurrent trend to try and improve the performance of future nuclear units. However, in most cases, proposed designs depart from the well-known Light Water Reactor (LWR) technology. They are either new concepts or designs already tested in the past and modified to address some of their perceived drawbacks. Contrary to the prevailing situation where short-term alternatives like the EPR, the ABWR or the AP600 largely build upon experience gathered on operating units, most designs contemplated for implementation beyond 2020 or 2030 cannot be considered proven. Considering the above mentioned uncertainties, EDF have confirmed their preference for proven designs with higher outputs, such as the EPR. However, it would appear unreasonable to consider that new designs are doomed to fail: they could well turn out to be adequate for specific niches in a de-regulated market and provide reasonable alternatives for the utility. Nevertheless, for such an alternative to be considered, additional evidence is needed that utility preferences are reflected in the design, and that all potential technical issues have been identified, adequately addressed and resolved. Currently, EDF

  5. TSTA piping and flame arrestor operating experience data

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cadwallader, Lee C., E-mail: Lee.Cadwallader@inl.gov [Idaho National Laboratory, Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Willms, R. Scott [ITER International Organization, Cadarache (France)

    2015-10-15

    Highlights: • Experiences from the Tritium Systems Test Assembly were examined. • Failure rates of copper piping and a flame arrestor were calculated. • The calculated failure rates compared well to similar data from the literature. • Tritium component failure rate data support fusion safety assessment. - Abstract: The Tritium Systems Test Assembly (TSTA) was a facility dedicated to tritium handling technology and experiment research at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. The facility was operated with tritium for its research and development program from 1984 to 2001, running a prototype fusion fuel processing loop with ∼100 g of tritium as well as small experiments. There have been several operating experience reports written on this facility's operation and maintenance experience. This paper describes reliability analysis of two additional components from TSTA, small diameter copper gas piping that handled tritium in a nitrogen carrier gas, and the flame arrestor used in this piping system. The component failure rates for these components are discussed in this paper. Comparison data from other applications are also presented.

  6. Improving road safety: Experiences from the Netherlands

    OpenAIRE

    Hagenzieker, M.P.

    2012-01-01

    Dr. Hagenzieker's research and education activities focus on the road safety effects of the transport system, with particular interest in road user behaviour aspects. Her PhD-research was on the effects of rewards on road user behaviour.

  7. Operating experience with the DRAGON High Temperature Reactor experiment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simon, R.A.; Capp, P.D.

    2002-01-01

    The Dragon Reactor Experiment in Winfrith/UK was a materials test facility for a number of HTR projects pursued in the sixties and seventies of the last century. It was built and managed as an OECD/NEA international joint undertaking. The reactor operated successfully between 1964 and 1975 to satisfy the growing demand for irradiation testing of fuels and fuel elements as well as for technological tests of components and materials. The paper describes the reactor's main experimental features and presents results of 11 years of reactor operation relevant for future HTRs. (author)

  8. Operational safety review programmes for nuclear power plants. Guidelines for assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The IAEA has been offering the Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) programme to provide advice and assistance to Member States in enhancing the operational safety of nuclear power plants (NPPs). Simultaneously, the IAEA has encouraged self-assessment and review by Member States of their own nuclear power plants to continuously improve nuclear safety. Currently, some utilities have been implementing safety review programmes to independently review their own plants. Corporate or national operational safety review programmes may be compliance or performance based. Successful utilities have found that both techniques are necessary to provide assurance that (i) as a minimum the NPP meets specific corporate and legal requirements and (ii) management at the NPP is encouraged to pursue continuous improvement principles. These programmes can bring nuclear safety benefits to the plants and utilities. The IAEA has conducted two pilot missions to assess the effectiveness of the operational review programme. Based on these missions and on the experience gained during OSART missions, this document has been developed to provide guidance on and broaden national/corporate safety review programmes in Member States, and to assist in maximizing their benefits. These guidelines are intended primarily for the IAEA team to conduct assessment of a national/corporate safety review programme. However, this report may also be used by a country or utility to establish its own national/corporate safety review programme. The guidelines may likewise be used for self-assessment or for establishing a baseline when benchmarking other safety review programmes. This report consists of four parts. Section 2 addresses the planning and preparation of an IAEA assessment mission and Sections 3 and 4 deal with specific guidelines for conducting the assessment mission itself

  9. Recent operating experiences with steam generators in Japanese NPPs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yashima, Seiji

    1997-01-01

    In 1994, the Genkai-3 of Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc. and the Ikata-3 of Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc. started commercial operation, and now 22 PWR plants are being operated in Japan. Since the first PWR plant now 22 PWR plants are being operated in was started to operate, Japanese PWR plants have had an operating experience of approx. 280 reactor-years. During that period, many tube degradations have been experienced in steam generators (SGs). And, in 1991, the steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) occurred in the Mihama-2 of Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc. However, the occurrence of tube degradation of SGs has been decreased by the instructions of the MITI as regulatory authorities, efforts of Electric Utilities, and technical support from the SG manufacturers. Here the author describes the recent SGs in Japan about the following points. (1) Recent Operating Experiences (2) Lessons learned from Mihama-2 SGTR (3) SG replacement (4) Safety Regulations on SG (5) Research and development on SG

  10. Operating experience in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1984-01-01

    The nuclear power plants in the Federal Republic of Germany kept their portion of power supply into the public grid system constant in 1983, compared to 1982. The generation had an absolute increase of 3.6% and amounts now to 65.9 TWh. Particularly mentioned should be the generation of the Grafenrheinfeld Nuclear Power Plant which is holding the 'World Record' with 9.969 TWh. The availability of the plants was generally satisfactory, as far as long-term retrofit measures with long outage periods were not necessary, as it was the case in Brunsbuettel and Wuergassen. The planned retrofit phases have been completed in all power plants. As far as safety is concerned, there was no reason to recommended a change of the present fundamental planning- and operation aspects. (orig.) [de

  11. Estimation of fire frequency from PWR operating experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bertrand, R.; Bonneval, F.; Barrachin, G.; Bonino, F.

    1998-01-01

    In the framework of a fire probabilistic safety assessment (Fire PSA), the French Institute for Nuclear Safety and Protection (IPSN) has developed a method for estimating the frequency of fire in a nuclear power plant room. This method is based on the analysis of French Pressurized Water Reactors operating experience. The method adopted consists is carrying out an in-depth analysis of fire-related incidents. A database has been created including 202 fire events reported in 900 MWe and 1300 MWe reactors from the start of their commercial operation up to the first of March 1994, which represents a cumulated service life of 508 reactor-years. For each reported fire, several data were recorded among which: The operating state of the reactor in the stage preceding the fire, the building in which the fire broke out, the piece of equipment or the human intervention which caused the fire. Operating experience shows that most fires are initiated by electrical problems (short-circuits, arcing, faulty contacts, etc.) and that human intervention also plays an important role (grinding, cutting, welding, cleaning, etc.). A list of equipment and of human interventions which proved to be possible fire sources was therefore drawn up. the items of this list were distributed in 19 reference groups defined by taking into account the nature of the potential ignition source (transformers, electrical cabinets, pumps, fans, etc.). The fire frequency assigned to each reference group was figured out using the operating experience information of the database. The fire frequency in a room is considered to be made out of two contributions: one due to equipment which is proportional to the number of pieces of equipment from each reference group contained in the room, and a second one which is due to human interventions and assumed to be uniform throughout the reactor. Formulas to assess the fire frequencies in a room, the reactor being in a shutdown state or at power, are then proposed

  12. 14 CFR 121.434 - Operating experience, operating cycles, and consolidation of knowledge and skills.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 3 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Operating experience, operating cycles, and... Qualifications § 121.434 Operating experience, operating cycles, and consolidation of knowledge and skills. (a... position, the operating experience, operating cycles, and the line operating flight time for consolidation...

  13. Design improvements, construction and operating experience with BWRs in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Uchigasaki, G.; Yokomi, M.; Sasaki, M.; Aoki, R.; Hashimoto, H.

    1983-01-01

    (1) The first domestic-made 1100-MW(e) BWR in Japan commenced commercial operation in April 1982. The unit is the leading one of the subsequent three in Fukushima Daini nuclear power station owned by the Tokyo Electric Power Company Inc. (Tepco). Based on the accumulated construction and operation experience of 500-MW(e) and 800-MW(e) class BWRs, improvements in various aspects during both the design and construction stages were introduced in core and fuel design with advanced gadolinia distribution, reactor feedwater treatment technology for crud reduction, a radwaste island, control and instrumentation to cope with the lessons learned through Three Mile Island assessment etc. (2) Based on many operating experiences with BWRs, an improved BWR core, which has easier operability and higher load factor than the conventional core, has been developed. The characteristic of the improved core is ''axially two-zoned uranium enrichment distribution''; the enrichment of the upper part of the fuel is slightly higher than that of the lower part. Through the improved core it became possible to optimize the axial power flattening and core reactivity control separately by axial enrichment distribution and burnable poison content. The improved fuels were loaded into operating BWRs and successfully proved the performance by this experience. (3) To shorten annual outage time, to reduce radiation exposure, to save manpower, and to achieve high reliability and safety of inspection operation, the remote automatic service and inspection equipment were developed in Japan. This paper presents the concept, distinctive features, and actual operation experience of the automatic refuelling machine, control-rod drive (CRD) remote-handling machine, improved main steam line isolation plug, and the automated ultrasonic inspection system with a computerized data processing unit, which have been developed by Hitachi, Ltd. with excellent results. (author)

  14. The safety approach in the operation of EDF power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bertron, L.; Mira, J.J.

    1988-01-01

    To get a view on what is involved in maintaining a high level of safety in the operation of EdF nuclear power plants, it may be recalled that in 1987, 76 % of the EdF production was nuclear. The nuclear plants include thirty-four standard PWR 900 plants, fourteen PWR 1300 plants, the 305 MW SENA PWR, the four 500 MW GCR: CHINON A3 plant, St-LAURENT A1 (390 MW), A2 (450 MW) and BUGEY 1 (540 MW), the 233 MW PHENIX fast breeder reactor and the CREYS-MALVILLE 1200 MW fast breeder reactor, now being prepared for a new startup after the 1987 incident. So the importance of a safe operation of this investment is considerable for EdF, which is the designer, owner, industrial architect and operator. According to the French regulations, EdF is responsible for the safe operation of its power plants. A considerable human component is also at stake, as the safe operation of plants implies all the personnel to varying degrees. There are 15,000 such employees, all of whom have to be trained, competent and motivated. The operation of this system for 340 reactor-years has to-date resulted in no incident of any significant impact on the environment. Right from the start, safety in operation has always been an essential and clearly stated priority. Among other lessons the Three-Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents have reinforced the conviction that the human factors, the man-machine interface, and the safety culture were determining elements. With forty-eigh PWR plants in service, the problem is to maintain safe operation of a system now running at cruising speed, but also including some units (particularly the GCRs) that must be prepared for decommissioning. In addition EDF has to demonstrate the safe operations of CREYS MALVILLE, fast breeder reactor

  15. The CERN Detector Safety System for LHC Experiments

    CERN Document Server

    Lüders, S; Morpurgo, G; Schmeling, S M

    2003-01-01

    The Detector Safety System (DSS), developed at CERN in common for the four LHC experiments under the auspices of the Joint Controls Project (JCOP), will be responsible for assuring the equipment protection for these experiments. Therefore, the DSS requires a high degree of both availability and reliability. It is composed of a Front-end and a Back-end part. The Front-end is based on a redundant Siemens PLC, to which the safety-critical part of the DSS task is delegated. The PLC Front-end is capable of running autonomously and of automati-cally taking predefined protective actions whenever re-quired. It is supervised and configured by the CERN-cho-sen PVSS SCADA system via a Siemens OPC server. The supervisory layer provides the operator with a status display and with limited online reconfiguration capabili-ties. Configuration of the code running in the PLCs is completely data driven via the contents of a ?Configura-tion Database?. Thus, the DSS can easily adapt to the different and constantly evolving require...

  16. Regulatory safety aspects of nuclear waste management operations in India

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sundararajan, A.R.

    2000-01-01

    The Department of Atomic Energy in India as part of its programme to harness the nuclear energy for generation of nuclear power has been operating a whole range of nuclear fuel cycle facilities including waste management plants for more than four decades. The waste management plants include three high level waste immobilisation plants, one in operation, one under commissioning and one more under construction. Atomic Energy Regulatory Board is mandated to review and authorise from the safety angle the siting, the design, the construction and the operation of the waste management plants. The regulatory procedures, which involve multi-tier review adopted for ensuring the safety of these facilities, are described in this paper. (author)

  17. Operational safety system performance alternative to the WANO's indicator

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lyra, Moacir

    2002-01-01

    One of the operational safety performance indicators recommended by the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) and adopted by Electronuclear is the reliability of the safety systems. The parameter selected to represent this indicator is the average unavailability of the trains of the concerned system. This parameter would be universally representative of the reliability for comparison purpose only if all nuclear power plants were designed within the same redundancy criteria. Considering the diversity of design criteria of the power plants in operation and based on a probabilistic approach, this paper proposes new performance indicators which are comparable regardless the redundancy criteria of the system. A case example applied to a system of the Angra 2 nuclear power plant shows that, even though with the plant in the infancy phase, the performance of the system in the period is very good. (author)

  18. Cyber Safety and Security for Reduced Crew Operations (RCO)

    Science.gov (United States)

    Driscoll, Kevin

    2017-01-01

    NASA and the Aviation Industry is looking into reduced crew operations (RCO) that would cut today's required two-person flight crews down to a single pilot with support from ground-based crews. Shared responsibility across air and ground personnel will require highly reliable and secure data communication and supporting automation, which will be safety-critical for passenger and cargo aircraft. This paper looks at the different types and degrees of authority delegation given from the air to the ground and the ramifications of each, including the safety and security hazards introduced, the mitigation mechanisms for these hazards, and other demands on an RCO system architecture which would be highly invasive into (almost) all safety-critical avionics. The adjacent fields of unmanned aerial systems and autonomous ground vehicles are viewed to find problems that RCO may face and related aviation accident scenarios are described. The paper explores possible data communication architectures to meet stringent performance and information security (INFOSEC) requirements of RCO. Subsequently, potential challenges for RCO data communication authentication, encryption and non-repudiation are identified. The approach includes a comprehensive safety-hazard analysis of the RCO system to determine top level INFOSEC requirements for RCO and proposes an option for effective RCO implementation. This paper concludes with questioning the economic viability of RCO in light of the expense of overcoming the operational safety and security hazards it would introduce.

  19. Safety culture in the gynecology robotics operating room.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zullo, Melissa D; McCarroll, Michele L; Mendise, Thomas M; Ferris, Edward F; Roulette, G D; Zolton, Jessica; Andrews, Stephen J; von Gruenigen, Vivian E

    2014-01-01

    To measure the safety culture in the robotics surgery operating room before and after implementation of the Robotic Operating Room Computerized Checklist (RORCC). Prospective study. Gynecology surgical staff (n = 32). An urban community hospital. The Safety Attitudes Questionnaire domains examined were teamwork, safety, job satisfaction, stress recognition, perceptions of management, and working conditions. Questions and domains were described using percent agreement and the Cronbach alpha. Paired t-tests were used to describe differences before and after implementation of the checklist. Mean (SD) staff age was 46.7 (9.5) years, and most were women (78%) and worked full-time (97%). Twenty respondents (83% of nurses, 80% of surgeons, 66% of surgical technicians, and 33% of certified registered nurse anesthetists) completed the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire; 6 were excluded because of non-matching identifiers. Before RORCC implementation, the highest quality of communication and collaboration was reported by surgeons and surgical technicians (100%). Certified registered nurse anesthetists reported only adequate levels of communication and collaboration with other positions. Most staff reported positive responses for teamwork (48%; α = 0.81), safety (47%; α = 0.75), working conditions (37%; α = 0.55), stress recognition (26%; α = 0.71), and perceptions of management (32%; α = 0.52). No differences were observed after RORCC implementation. Quality of communication and collaboration in the gynecology robotics operating room is high between most positions; however, safety attitude responses are low overall. No differences after RORCC implementation and low response rates may highlight lack of staff support. Copyright © 2014. Published by Elsevier Inc.

  20. Improving nuclear power plant safety through operator aids

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-12-01

    In October 1986, the IAEA convened a one-week Technical Committee Meeting on Improving Nuclear Power Plant Safety Through Operator Aids. The term ''operator aid'' or more formally ''operator support system'' refers to a class of devices designed to be added to a nuclear power plant control station to assist an operator in performing his job and thereby decrease the probability of operator error. The addition of a carefully planned and designed operator aid should result in an increase in nuclear power plant safety and reliability. Operator aids encompass a wide range of devices from the very simple, such as color coding a display to distinguish it out of a group of similar displays, to the very complex, such as a computer-generated video display which concentrates a number of scattered indicator readings located around a control room into a concise display in front of the operator. This report provides guidelines and information to help make a decision as to whether an operator aid is needed, what kinds of operator aids are available and whether it should be purchased or developed by the utility. In addition, a discussion is presented on advanced operator aids to provide information on what may become available in the future. The broad scope of these guidelines makes it most suitable for use by a multi-disciplinary team. The document consists of two parts. The recommendations and results of the meeting discussions are given in the first part. The second part is the annex where the papers presented at the Technical Committee Meeting are printed. A separate abstract was prepared for each of the 10 papers. Refs, figs and tabs

  1. Nuclear safety approach for PWRs design and operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vignon, D.

    1988-01-01

    The implementation of France's major nuclear programme - 56 PWR units in service or under construction - has gone hand in hand with the development of an original philosophy in the field of nuclear safety. From an initial core of deterministic safety philosophy current in the seventies, which has been wholly retained and in some instances refined, a range of additions has been made to include consideration of a number of additional situations based on a probabilistic approach. This has resulted in a better coherence for safety and a mitigation of the severe accident probability. Furthermore, the establishment of emergency plans has enabled the Safety Authorities and the operator to adopt a coherent and logical approach to severe accidents with the aim of achieving greater defence in depth, this has resulted in the provision of certain additional measures designed to further reduce the consequences of severe accidents. This paper describes the culmination of this work, as exemplified in the new 1 400MWe - N4 advanced plant series currently under construction, of which the essential elements are also incorporated into all previous units, thereby giving them an equivalent level of safety. This now constitutes the French safety policy with respect to PWR nuclear units

  2. Elements of Successful and Safe Fusion Experiment Operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rule, K.; Cadwallader, L.; Takase, Y.; Norimatsu, T.; Kaneko, O.; Sato, M.; Savercool, R.

    2009-01-01

    A group of fusion safety professionals contribute to a Joint Working Group (JWG) that performs occupational safety walkthroughs of US and Japanese fusion experiments on a routine basis to enhance the safety of visiting researchers. The most recent walkthrough was completed in Japan in March 2008 by the US Safety Monitor team. This paper gives the general conclusions on fusion facility personnel safety that can be drawn from the series of walkthroughs

  3. Program of nuclear criticality safety experiment at JAERI

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kobayashi, Iwao; Tachimori, Shoichi; Takeshita, Isao; Suzaki, Takenori; Ohnishi, Nobuaki

    1983-11-01

    JAERI is promoting the nuclear criticality safety research program, in which a new facility for criticality safety experiments (Criticality Safety Experimental Facility : CSEF) is to be built for the experiments with solution fuel. One of the experimental researches is to measure, collect and evaluate the experimental data needed for evaluation of criticality safety of the nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Another research area is a study of the phenomena themselves which are incidental to postulated critical accidents. Investigation of the scale and characteristics of the influences caused by the accident is also included in this research. The result of the conceptual design of CSEF is summarized in this report. (author)

  4. Operating experience and aging-seismic assessment of electric motors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Subudhi, M.; Burns, E.L.; Taylor, J.H.

    1985-06-01

    Objectives of this program are to identify concerns related to the aging and service wear of equipment operating in nuclear power plants, to assess their possible impact on plant safety, to identify effective inspection surveillance and monitoring methods and to recommend suitable maintenance practices for mitigating aging related concerns and diminish the rate of degradation due to aging and service wear. Motor design and materials of construction are reviewed to identify age-sensitive components. Operational and accidental stressors are determined, and their effect on promoting aging degradation is assessed. Failure modes, mechanisms, and causes have been reviewed from operating experiences and existing data banks. The study has also included consideration for the seismic correlation of age-degraded motor components. The aforementioned reviews and assessments were assimilated to characterize the dielectric, rotational, and mechanical hazards on motor performance and operational readiness. The functional indicators which can be monitored to assess motor component deterioration due to aging or other accidental stressors are identified. Conforming with the NPAR strategy as outlined in the program plan, the study also includes a preliminary discussion of current standards and guides, maintenance programs, and research activities pertaining to nuclear power plant safety-related electric motors

  5. MOX use in PWRs. EDF operation experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Provost, Jean-Luc; Debes, Michel

    2011-01-01

    From the origin, EDF back-end fuel cycle strategy has focused on 'closing the fuel cycle', in other words integrating fuel reprocessing, with vitrification of high level waste concentrated within small volumes, and the recycling of valuable materials. The implementation of this policy was marked in 1987 by the first loading of sixteen MOX. By December 2010, 20 reactors have been loaded with 1750 tHM of MOX. EDF current strategy is to match the reprocessing program with MOX manufacturing capacity to limit the quantity of separated plutonium. This is routinely called the 'flow ad-equation' strategy. Currently, the MOX Parity core management achieves balance of MOX and UOX performance with a significant increase of the MOX discharge burn-up. Globally, the behavior under irradiation of MOX fuel assemblies has been satisfactory. So far, from the beginning of MOX use in EDF PWRs, only 6 MOX FAs with rod leakage have been identified, which gives a very satisfactory level of reliability. The industrial maturity of MOX fuel, with increased performances, allows the improvement of nuclear KWh competitiveness and of the plant operation performance, while maintaining in operation the same safety level, without significant impact on environment and radiological protection. (author)

  6. Safety procedures in operation of inspection and maintenance of pressure reduction and metering stations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Villas Boas, Ademar Jose; Biesemeyer, Marco Aurelio R.

    2000-01-01

    Each local Natural Gas Distribution Company in Brazil has its own working procedures for operations of inspection and maintenance on equipment and accessories connected to the gas network. Some of these Companies developed a better elaborated and documented way of working routines, while others only work based on their operators experience. The objective of this work is to create a standard procedure for operations of inspection and maintenance of Pressure Reducing Stations and Metering Stations, mainly the ones concerned to safety aspects. This work has no intention of exhausting all aspects related to this subject but to become the first step to standardize these types of operations among Natural Gas Distribution Companies. (author)

  7. Summary of NRC LWR safety research programs on fuel behavior, metallurgy/materials and operational safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bennett, G.L.

    1979-09-01

    The NRC light-water reactor safety-research program is part of the NRC regulatory program for ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants. This paper summarizes the results of NRC-sponsored research into fuel behavior, metallurgy and materials, and operational safety. The fuel behavior research program provides a detailed understanding of the response of nuclear fuel assemblies to postulated off-normal or accident conditions. Fuel behavior research includes studies of basic fuel rod properties, in-reactor tests, computer code development, fission product release and fuel meltdown. The metallurgy and materials research program provides independent confirmation of the safe design of reactor vessels and piping. This program includes studies on fracture mechanics, irradiation embrittlement, stress corrosion, crack growth, and nondestructive examination. The operational safety research provides direct assistance to NRC officials concerned with the operational and operational-safety aspects of nuclear power plants. The topics currently being addressed include qualification testing evaluation, fire protection, human factors, and noise diagnostics

  8. Measures taken to improve nuclear safety on EdF PWRs in operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kus, J.-P.; Norvez, G.

    1993-01-01

    In parallel with its major nuclear programme (56 PWR units in service or under construction), France has developed an original philosophy in the field of Nuclear Safety. This comprehensive philosophy ensures a fine balance and coordination between design and operation, it provides a methodology to design, construct and operate a safe nuclear plant. Actual experience is then continuously compared to the initial expectation and the methodology refined whenever necessary. This methodology is fully applied to the new 1400 MWe plant series presently under construction. The essential elements are also backfitted into all previous units, thereby giving them an equivalent level of safety. The French PWR park can therefore be considered as very homogeneous with regard to its safety level, regarding both its design and operation. (author)

  9. Experience from operating germanium detectors in GERDA

    Science.gov (United States)

    Palioselitis, Dimitrios; GERDA Collaboration

    2015-05-01

    Phase I of the Germanium Detector Array (GERDA) experiment, searching for the neutrinoless double beta (0νββ) decay of 76Ge, was completed in September 2013. The most competitive half-life lower limit for the 0νββ decay of 76Ge was set (T-0ν1/2 > 2.1 · 1025 yr at 90% C.L.). GERDA operates bare Ge diodes immersed in liquid argon. During Phase I, mainly refurbished semi-coaxial high purity Ge detectors from previous experiments were used. The experience gained with handling and operating bare Ge diodes in liquid argon, as well as the stability and performance of the detectors during GERDA Phase I are presented. Thirty additional new enriched BEGe-type detectors were produced and will be used in Phase II. A subgroup of these detectors has already been used successfully in GERDA Phase I. The present paper gives an overview of the production chain of the new germanium detectors, the steps taken to minimise the exposure to cosmic radiation during manufacturing, and the first results of characterisation measurements in vacuum cryostats.

  10. Experience from operating germanium detectors in GERDA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Palioselitis, Dimitrios

    2015-01-01

    Phase I of the Germanium Detector Array (GERDA) experiment, searching for the neutrinoless double beta (0νββ) decay of 76 Ge, was completed in September 2013. The most competitive half-life lower limit for the 0νββ decay of 76 Ge was set (T- 0ν 1/2 > 2.1 · 10 25 yr at 90% C.L.). GERDA operates bare Ge diodes immersed in liquid argon. During Phase I, mainly refurbished semi-coaxial high purity Ge detectors from previous experiments were used. The experience gained with handling and operating bare Ge diodes in liquid argon, as well as the stability and performance of the detectors during GERDA Phase I are presented. Thirty additional new enriched BEGe-type detectors were produced and will be used in Phase II. A subgroup of these detectors has already been used successfully in GERDA Phase I. The present paper gives an overview of the production chain of the new germanium detectors, the steps taken to minimise the exposure to cosmic radiation during manufacturing, and the first results of characterisation measurements in vacuum cryostats. (paper)

  11. Technical co-operation for nuclear safety in developing countries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Flakus, F.N.; Giuliani, P.

    1984-01-01

    The Agency's programme on technical co-operation for nuclear safety is, largely, responsive in character and the Agency's response is tailored to needs identified by developing countries. However, the Agency's assistance alone is not sufficient: technical co-operation can only be successful and is most effective when there is also a strong input from the counterpart body participating in a particular project. The commitment of national governments is fundamental to success. Technical co-operation is most fruitful if the Agency's assistance capabilities and the recipient country's co-operation capabilities match. Co-operation activities mostly take the form of single projects hosted by individual institutions within a single country; regional and inter-regional projects are also important

  12. Examination on establishment of safety culture for operating nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Taniguchi, Taketoshi

    1997-01-01

    For safely operating nuclear power facilities, in addition to the technical countermeasures, the performance of the organizations that operate and manage them is important. In this paper, the spontaneous cooperation type management system that supported the introduction and development of nuclear power generation in electric power business is analyzed from the viewpoints of organization science and behavioral psychology, and based on the results of the investigation of the sense of value and psychological characteristics of young organization members who bear future nuclear power generation, on how to foster and establish safety culture which is called second safety principle in organizations, the subjects for hereafter are discussed from the viewpoints of respect of individuals and their integration with organizations, upbringing of talents and systematic learning. The factors which compose the safety culture are shown. The form of operating and managing the organizations are seen in first generation nuclear power generation, the similarity to Japanese type enterprise operation system, the change of the prerequisite of spontaneous cooperation type management and the difference of conscience among the generations of organization members are discussed. The above subjects for hereafter are discussed. (K.I.)

  13. IAEA Leads Operational Safety Mission To Gravelines Nuclear Power Plant, France

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    Full text: An IAEA-led international team of experts today began an in-depth operational safety review of the Gravelines Nuclear Power Plant in France. The review, conducted at the invitation of the French government, focuses on programmes and activities essential to the safe operation of the nuclear power plant. The three-week review will cover the areas of Management, Organization and Administration; Training and Qualification; Operations; Maintenance; Technical Support; Operating Experience; Radiation Protection; Chemistry; Emergency Planning and Preparedness; and Severe Accident Management. The conclusions of the review will be based on the IAEA Safety Standards and on well-established international good practices. The mission is not a regulatory inspection, a design review or a substitute for an exhaustive assessment of the plant's overall safety status. The team, led by the IAEA's Division of Nuclear Installation Safety, comprises experts from Bulgaria, China, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Romania, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain and Ukraine. The Gravelines mission is the 173rd conducted as part of the IAEA's Operational Safety Review Team programme, which began in 1982. France participates actively in the programme and the Gravelines mission is the 24th hosted by the country. General information about OSART missions can be found on the IAEA Website: OSART Missions. (IAEA)

  14. Safety aspects in decontamination operations: Lessons learned during the decommissioning of a small PWR reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Klein, M.; Ponnet, M.; Emond, O.

    2002-01-01

    Decontamination operations are generally executed during the decommissioning of nuclear installations for different objectives: decontamination of loops or large pieces to reduce the dose rate inside a contaminated plant or decontamination to minimize the amount of radioactive waste. These decontamination operations raise safety issues such as radiological exposure, classical safety, environmental releases, production and management of secondary waste, management of primary resources, etc. This paper presents the return of experience from decontamination operations performed during the dismantling of the BR3 PWR reactor. The safety issues are discussed for 3 types of decontamination operations: full system decontamination of the primary loop with a chemical process to reduce the dose rate by a factor of 10; thorough decontamination with an aggressive chemical process of dismantled pieces to reach the unconditional clearance values; and thorough decontamination processes with physical processes of metals and of concrete to reach the unconditional clearance values. For the protection of the workers, we must consider the ALARA aspects and the classical safety issues. During the progress of our dismantling operations, the dose rate issue was becoming less important but the classical safety issues were becoming preponderant due to the use of very aggressive techniques. For the protection of the environment, we must take all the precautions to avoid any leakages from the plant and we must use processes which minimize the use of toxic products and which minimize the production of secondary wastes. We therefore promote the use of regenerative processes. (author)

  15. Safer nuclear power. Strengthening training for operational safety at Paks nuclear power plant - Hungary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    For a nuclear power plant, safety must always be paramount. There can be no compromise on safety to meet production targets or to reduce costs. For any reactor, and in particular where older type reactors are in place, their operational safety can be enhanced by upgrading the training of personnel responsible for operating and maintaining the plant. The Department of Technical Co-operation is sponsoring a programme with technical support from the Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Safety Departments to help improve facilities at the PAKS plant in Hungary and establish self sufficiency in training to the highest international standards for all levels of nuclear power plant manpower. The Model Project described will have a direct impact on the improvement of operational safety and performance at PAKS NPP. It will lead to a more efficient use of resources which in turn will result in lower electricity generation costs. The impact of the project is not expected to be limited to Hungary. WWER reactors are common in Eastern Europe and provide one third to one half of the electricity supply to the region. The training programmes and facilities at PAKS offer a possibility in the future to provide training to experts from other countries operating WWER units and serve as a model to be emulated. Slovakia and the Czech Republic have already expressed interest in using the PAKS experience

  16. YKAe - Research programme on nuclear power plant systems behaviour and operational aspects of safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mattila, L.; Vanttola, T.

    1992-01-01

    The major part of nuclear energy research in Finland has been organised as five-year nationally coordinated research programs. The research programme on Systems Behaviour and Operational Aspects of Safety is under way during 1990-1994. Its annual volume has been about 35 person-years and its annual expenditure about FIM 18 million. Studies in the field on safe operational margins of nuclear fuel and reactor core concentrate on fuel high burn-up behaviour, VVER fuel experiments, and reactor core behaviour in complex reactivity transients such as 3-D phenomena and ATWS events. The PACTEL facility is used for the thermal hydraulic studies of the Loviisa type reactors (scaled 1:305). Validation of accident analysis codes is carried out by participation in international standard problems. Advanced foreign computer codes for severe reactor accidents are implemented, modified as needed and applied to level-2 PSAs and the improvement of accident management procedures. Fire simulation methods are tested using data from experiments in the German HDR facility. A nuclear plant analyzer for efficient safety analyses is being developed using the APROS process simulation environment. Computerized operator support systems are being studied in cooperation with the OECD Halden Project. The basic factors affecting plant operator activities and the development of their competence are being investigated. A comprehensive system for the control of plant operational safety is being developed by combining living PSA and safety indicators

  17. Technician support for operation and maintenance of large fusion experiments: the tandem mirror experiment upgrade (TMX-U) approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mattson, G.E.

    1983-01-01

    As experiments continue to grow in size and complexity, a few technicians will no longer be able to maintain and operate the complete experiment. Specialization is becoming the norm. Subsystems are becoming very large and complex, requiring a great deal of experience and training for technicians to become qualified maintenance/operation personnel. Formal in-house and off-site programs supplement on-the-job training to fulfill the qualification criteria. This paper presents the Tandem Mirror Experiment-Upgrade (TMX-U) approach to manpower staffing, some problems encountered, possible improvements, and safety considerations for the successful operation of a large experimental facility

  18. Operational experience of the ATLAS accelerator

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Den Hartog, P.K.; Bogaty, J.M.; Bollinger, L.M.

    1989-01-01

    The ATLAS accelerator consists of a HVEC model FN tandem accelerator injecting into a linac of independently-phased niobium superconducting resonators. The accelerator provides beams with masses from 6≤A≤127 and with energies ranging up to 20 MeV/A for the lightest ions and 4 MeV/A for the heaviest ions. Portions of the linac have been in operation since 1978 and, over the last decade, more than 35,000 hours of operating experience have been accumulated. The long-term stability of niobium resonators, and their feasibility for use in heavy-ion accelerators is now well established. 11 refs., 3 figs., 1 tab

  19. Operating experiences with 1 MW steam generator

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sano, A; Kanamori, A; Tsuchiya, T

    1975-07-01

    1 MW steam generator, which was planned as the first stage of steam generator development in Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Corp. (PNC) in Japan, is a single-unit, once-through, integrated shell and tube type with multi-helical coil tubes. It was completed in Oarai Engineering Center of PNC in March of 1971, and the various performance tests were carried out up to April, 1972. After the dismantle of the steam generator for structural inspection and material test, it was restored with some improvements. In this second 1 MW steam generator, small leak occurred twice during normal operation. After repairing the failure, the same kind of performance tests as the first steam generator were conducted in order to verify the thermal insulation effect of argon gas in downcomer zone from March to June, 1974. In this paper the above operating experiences were presented including the outline of some performance test results. (author)

  20. Operational experience with the ATLAS Pixel Detector

    CERN Document Server

    Ince, T; The ATLAS collaboration

    2012-01-01

    The ATLAS Pixel Detector is the innermost element of the ATLAS experiment at the Large Hadron Collider at CERN, providing high-resolution measurements of charged particle tracks in the high radiation environment close to the collision region. This capability is vital for the identification and measurement of proper decay times of long-lived particles such as b-hadrons, and thus vital for the ATLAS physics program. The detector provides hermetic coverage with three cylindrical layers and three layers of forward and backward pixel detectors. It consists of approximately 80 million pixels that are individually read out via chips bump-bonded to 1744 n-in-n silicon substrates. In this paper, results from the successful operation of the Pixel Detector at the LHC will be presented, including monitoring, calibration procedures, timing optimization and detector performance. The detector performance is excellent: 96.2% of the pixels are operational, noise occupancy and hit efficiency exceed the design specification, an...

  1. Operational experience of the ATLAS Pixel detector

    CERN Document Server

    Hirschbuehl, D; The ATLAS collaboration

    2011-01-01

    The ATLAS Pixel Detector is the innermost detector of the ATLAS experiment at the Large Hadron Collider at CERN, providing high-resolution measurements of charged particle tracks in the high radiation environment close to the collision region. This capability is vital for the identification and measurement of proper decay times of long-lived particles such as b-hadrons, and thus vital for the ATLAS physics program. The detector provides hermetic coverage with three cylindrical layers and three layers of forward and backward pixel detectors. It consists of approximately 80 million pixels that are individually read out via chips bump-bonded to 1744 n-in-n silicon substrates. In this talk, results from the successful operation of the Pixel Detector at the LHC will be presented, including monitoring, calibration procedures, timing optimization and detector performance. The detector performance is excellent: 97,5% of the pixels are operational, noise occupancy and hit efficiency exceed the design specification, an...

  2. Operational experience of the ATLAS Pixel Detector

    CERN Document Server

    Marcisovsky, M; The ATLAS collaboration

    2011-01-01

    The ATLAS Pixel Detector is the innermost detector of the ATLAS experiment at the Large Hadron Collider at CERN, providing high-resolution measurements of charged particle tracks in the high radiation environment close to the collision region. This capability is vital for the identification and measurement of proper decay times of long-lived particles such as b-hadrons, and thus vital for the ATLAS physics program. The detector provides hermetic coverage with three cylindrical layers and three layers of forward and backward pixel detectors. It consists of approximately 80 million pixels that are individually read out via chips bump-bonded to 1744 n-in-n silicon substrates. In this talk, results from the successful operation of the Pixel Detector at the LHC will be presented, including monitoring, calibration procedures, timing optimization and detector performance. The detector performance is excellent: 97,5% of the pixels are operational, noise occupancy and hit efficiency exceed the design specification, an...

  3. The LHC test string first operational experience

    CERN Document Server

    Bézaguet, Alain-Arthur; Casas-Cubillos, J; Coull, L; Cruikshank, P; Dahlerup-Petersen, K; Faugeras, Paul E; Flemsæter, B; Guinaudeau, H; Hagedorn, Dietrich; Hilbert, B; Krainz, G; Kos, N; Lavielle, D; Lebrun, P; Leo, G; Mathewson, A G; Missiaen, D; Momal, F; Parma, Vittorio; Quesnel, Jean Pierre; Richter, D; Riddone, G; Rijllart, A; Rodríguez-Mateos, F; Rohmig, P; Saban, R I; Schmidt, R; Serio, L; Skiadelli, M; Suraci, A; Tavian, L; Walckiers, L; Wallén, E; Van Weelderen, R; Williams, L; McInturff, A

    1996-01-01

    CERN operates the first version of the LHC Test String which consists of one quadrupole and three 10-m twin aperture dipole magnets. An experimental programme aiming at the validation of the LHC systems started in February 1995. During this programme the string has been powered 100 times 35 of which at 12.4 kA or above. The experiments have yielded a number of results some of which, like quench recovery for cryogenics, have modified the design of subsystems of LHC. Others, like controlled helium leaks in the cold bore and quench propagation bewteen magnets, have given a better understanding on the evolution of the phenomena inside a string of superconducting magnets cooled at superfluid helium temperatures. Following the experimental programme, the string will be powered up and powered down in one hour cycles as a fatigue test of the structure thus simulating 20 years of operation of LHC.

  4. Study of the Operational Safety of a Vascular Interventional Surgical Robotic System

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jian Guo

    2018-03-01

    Full Text Available This paper proposes an operation safety early warning system based on LabView (2014, National Instruments Corporation, Austin, TX, USA for vascular interventional surgery (VIS robotic system. The system not only provides intuitive visual feedback information for the surgeon, but also has a safety early warning function. It is well known that blood vessels differ in their ability to withstand stress in different age groups, therefore, the operation safety early warning system based on LabView has a vascular safety threshold function that changes in real-time, which can be oriented to different age groups of patients and a broader applicable scope. In addition, the tracing performance of the slave manipulator to the master manipulator is also an important index for operation safety. Therefore, we also transformed the slave manipulator and integrated the displacement error compensation algorithm in order to improve the tracking ability of the slave manipulator to the master manipulator and reduce master–slave tracking errors. We performed experiments “in vitro” to validate the proposed system. According to previous studies, 0.12 N is the maximum force when the blood vessel wall has been penetrated. Experimental results showed that the proposed operation safety early warning system based on LabView combined with operating force feedback can effectively avoid excessive collisions between the surgical catheter and vessel wall to avoid vascular puncture. The force feedback error of the proposed system is maintained between ±20 mN, which is within the allowable safety range and meets our design requirements. Therefore, the proposed system can ensure the safety of surgery.

  5. Proceedings of the international symposium on research reactor safety operations and modifications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-03-01

    The International Symposium on Research Reactor Safety, Operations and Modifications was organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency in cooperation with Atomic Energy of Canada Limited-Research Company. The main objectives of this Symposium were: (1) to exchange information and to discuss current perspectives and concerns relating to all aspects to research reactor safety, operations, and modifications; and, (2) to present views and to discuss future initiatives and directions for research reactor design, operations, utilization, and safety. The symposium topics included: research reactor programmes and experience; research reactor design safety and analysis; research reactor modifications and decommissioning; research reactor licensing; and new research reactors. These topics were covered during eight oral sessions and three poster sessions. These Proceedings include the full text of the 93 papers presented. The subject of Symposium was quite wide-ranging in that it covered essentially all aspects of research reactor safety, operations, and modifications. This was considered to be appropriate and timely given the 326 research reactors currently in operation in some 56 countries; given the degree of their utilization which ranges from pure and applied research to radioisotopes production to basic training and manpower development; and given that many of these reactors are undergoing extensive modifications, core conversions, power upratings, and are becoming the subject of safety reassessment and regulatory reviews. Although the Symposium covered many topics, the majority of papers and discussions tended to focus mainly on research reactor safety. This was seen as a clear sign of the continuing recognition of the fundamental importance of identifying and addressing, particularly through international cooperation, issues and concerns associated with research reactor safety

  6. EURISOL MERCURY TARGET EXPERIMENT: CERN SAFETY REPORT

    CERN Document Server

    J. Gulley (CERN SC/GS)

    Report on a visit to the mercury-handling lab at IPUL. The aim was to provide recommendations to IPUL on general health and safety issues relatring to the handling of mercury, the objective being to reduce exposure to acceptable levels, so far as is reasonably practical.

  7. Small sodium valve design and operating experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McGough, C.B.

    1974-01-01

    The United States Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor program (LMFBR) includes an extensive program devoted to the development of small sodium valves. This program is now focused on the development and production of valves for the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) now under construction near Richland, Washington. Other AEC support facilities, such as various test loops located at the Liquid Metal Engineering Center (LMEC), Los Angeles, California, and at the Hanford Engineering Development Laboratory (HEDL), Richland, Washington, also have significant requirements for small sodium valves, and valves similar in design to the FFTF valves are being supplied to these AEC laboratories for use in their critical test installations. A principal motivation for these valve programs, beyond the immediate need to provide high-reliability valves for FFTF and the support facilities, is the necessity to develop small valve technology for the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant (CRBRP). FFTF small sodium valve design and development experience will be directly applied to the CRBRP program. Various test programs have been, and are being, conducted to verify the performance and integrity of the FFTF valves, and to uncover any potential problems so that they can be corrected before the valves are placed in service in FFTF. The principal small sodium valve designs being utilized in current U.S. programs, the test and operational experience obtained to date on them, problems uncovered, and future development and testing efforts being planned are reviewed. The standards and requirements to which the valves are being designed and fabricated, the valve designs in current use, valve operators, test and operating experience, and future valve development plans are summarized. (U.S.)

  8. Improving safety through quality management system: SINAGAMA experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Muhammad Lebai Juri

    2000-01-01

    This paper discussed critically the policies and measures adopted during preoperational and operational stages to improve safety of workers, public, the environment as well as the products treated at SINAGAMA. (author)

  9. Microgravity Flammability Experiments for Spacecraft Fire Safety

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Legros, Guillaume; Minster, Olivier; Tóth, Balazs

    2012-01-01

    As fire behaviour in manned spacecraft still remains poorly understood, an international topical team has been created to design a validation experiment that has an unprecedented large scale for a microgravity flammability experiment. While the validation experiment is being designed for a re-sup...

  10. Operating experience with BWR nuclear power

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bonsdorf, Magnus von.

    1986-01-01

    The two-unit nuclear power station in Olkiluoto on the western coast of Finland produces about 20 per cent of the electricity consumption of the country. The first unit, TVO-I was first connected to the national grid in September 1978 and TVO-II in February 1980. The original rated power output of each unit was 660 MWe, corresponding to the thermal power of 2000 MW from the reactor. Technical modifications allowed the power to be uprated by 8%. The operating statistics (load factors etc.) are given and the outage experience discussed. The radiological history shows very low radioactivity and dose levels have been maintained at the plant. (UK)

  11. Operational Experience with the ATLAS Pixel Detector

    CERN Document Server

    Lantzsch, Kerstin; The ATLAS collaboration

    2016-01-01

    Run 2 of the LHC is providing new challenges to track and vertex reconstruction with higher energies, denser jets and higher rates. Therefore the ATLAS experiment has constructed the first 4-layer Pixel detector in HEP, installing a new Pixel layer, also called Insertable B-Layer (IBL). In addition the Pixel detector was refurbished with new service quarter panels to recover about 3% of defective modules lost during run 1 and a new optical readout system to readout the data at higher speed while reducing the occupancy when running with increased luminosity. The commissioning, operation and performance of the 4-layer Pixel Detector will be presented.

  12. Operational Experience with the ATLAS Pixel Detector

    CERN Document Server

    Djama, Fares; The ATLAS collaboration

    2017-01-01

    Run-2 of the LHC is providing new challenges to track and vertex reconstruction imposed by the higher collision energy, pileup and luminosity that are being delivered. The ATLAS tracking performance relies critically on the Pixel Detector, therefore, in view of Run-2 of LHC, the ATLAS experiment has constructed the first 4-layer Pixel detector in HEP, installing a new Pixel layer, also called Insertable B-Layer (IBL). Pixel detector was refurbished with a new service quarter panel to recover about 3% of defective modules lost during run-1 and an additional optical link per module was added to overcome in some layers the readout bandwidth limitation when LHC will exceed the nominal peak luminosity by almost a factor of 3. The key features and challenges met during the IBL project will be presented, as well as its operational experience and Pixel Detector performance in LHC.

  13. Introduction to 'International Handbook of Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Komuro, Yuichi

    1998-01-01

    The Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (CSBEP) was initiated in 1992 by the United States Department of Energy. The project quickly became an international effort as scientists from other interested countries became involved. The International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) is now an official activity of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development-Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD-NEA). 'International Handbook of Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments' was prepared and is updated year by year by the working group of the project. This handbook contains criticality safety benchmark specifications that have been derived from experiments that were performed at various nuclear critical facilities around the world. The benchmark specifications are intended for use by criticality safety engineers to validate calculation techniques used. The author briefly introduces the informative handbook and would like to encourage Japanese engineers who are in charge of nuclear criticality safety to use the handbook. (author)

  14. Current safety issues related to research reactor operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alcala-Ruiz, F.

    2000-01-01

    The Agency has included activities on research reactor safety in its Programme and Budget (P and B) since its inception in 1957. Since then, these activities have traditionally been oriented to fulfil the Agency's functions and obligations. At the end of the decade of the eighties, the Agency's Research Reactor Safety Programme (RRSP) consisted of a limited number of tasks related to the preparation of safety related publications and the conduct of safety missions to research reactor facilities. It was at the beginning of the nineties when the RRSP was upgraded and expanded as a subprogramme of the Agency's P and B. This subprogramme continued including activities related to the above subjects and started addressing an increasing number of issues related to the current situation of research reactors (in operation and shut down) around the world such as reactor ageing, modifications and decommissioning. The present paper discusses some of the above issues as recognised by various external review or advisory groups (e.g., Peer Review Groups under the Agency's Performance Programme Appraisal System (PPAS) or the standing International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG)) and the impact of their recommendations on the preparation and implementation of the part of the Agency's P and B relating to the above subject. (author)

  15. Thermal hydraulic reactor safety analyses and experiments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Holmstroem, H.; Eerikaeinen, L.; Kervinen, T.; Kilpi, K.; Mattila, L.; Miettinen, J.; Yrjoelae, V.

    1989-04-01

    The report introduces the results of the thermal hydraulic reactor safety research performed in the Nuclear Engineering Laboratory of the Technical Research Centre of Finland (VTT) during the years 1972-1987. Also practical applications i.e. analyses for the safety authorities and power companies are presented. The emphasis is on description of the state-of-the-art know how. The report describes VTT's most important computer codes, both those of foreign origin and those developed at VTT, and their assessment work, VTT's own experimental research, as well as international experimental projects and other forms of cooperation VTT has participated in. Appendix 8 contains a comprehensive list of the most important publications and technical reports produced. They present the content and results of the research in detail.(orig.)

  16. TOWARDS FINANCING AND PLANNING ROAD SAFETY AUDIT OPERATIONS IN NIGERIA

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Joshua Adetunji ODELEYE, M.Sc.

    2000-01-01

    Finally, this paper suggests commissioning of a National Road Research Fund, with a view to developing an efficient road safety audit operational system. Also, the introduction of private initiatives and a Community-based Approach in road administration, as well as decentralization of road administration framework at all levels, will greatly help “engineer out” potentially unsafe features across Nigerian roads, towards a better road traffic environment in the 21st century.

  17. Safety analysis to support a safe operating envelope for fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gibb, R.A.; Reid, P.J.

    1998-01-01

    This paper presents an approach for defining a safe operating envelope for fuel. 'Safe operating envelope' is defined as an envelope of fuel parameters defined for application in safety analysis that can be related to, or used to define, the acceptable range of fuel conditions due to operational transients or deviations in fuel manufacturing processes. The paper describes the motivation for developing such a methodology. The methodology involved four steps: the update of fission product inventories, the review of sheath failure criteria, a review of input parameters to be used in fuel modelling codes, and the development of an improved fission product release code. This paper discusses the aspects of fuel sheath failure criteria that pertain to operating or manufacturing conditions and to the evaluation and selection of modelling input data. The other steps are not addressed in this paper since they have been presented elsewhere. (author)

  18. Safety requirements for long term operation of NPPs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Houdre, T.; Osouf, N.; Juvin, J.-C.

    2012-01-01

    In the future, the reactors operating at present will run alongside reactors of the EPR type or their equivalent, designed for a significantly higher level of safety. This raises the question of the acceptability of continued operation of reactors beyond 40 years when there is an available technology that is safer. Two objectives are therefore imperative. First, a re-evaluation of the safety level in the light of that required of EPR type reactors or their equivalent is necessary, with proposals to bring about significant and relevant improvements to the reactors. R and D work in France and elsewhere is already indicating orientations that could lead to answers, and improvements that would provide significant reductions in release in case of severe accident are being studied. Second, strict compliance of the reactors with the applicable regulations must be demonstrated. At the same time, ageing and obsolescence of the equipment will have to be managed. Where these two points are concerned, ASN expects far-reaching proposals from the licensee. With a view to a request for continued operation beyond 40 years, ASN has referred the matter to the Advisory Committee for nuclear reactors which will meet at the end of 2011 to establish the safety requirements for reactors at their fourth ten-yearly outage. (author)

  19. Enhanced operational safety of BWRs by advanced computer technology and human engineering

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tomizawa, T.; Fukumoto, A.; Neda, T.; Toda, Y.; Takizawa, Y.

    1984-01-01

    In BWR nuclear power plants, where unit capacity is increasing and the demand for assured safety is growing, it has become important for the information interface between man and machine to work smoothly. Efforts to improve man-machine communication have been going on for the past ten years in Japan. Computer facilities and colour CRT display systems are amongst the most useful new methods. Advanced computer technology has been applied to operating plants and found to be very helpful for safe operation. A display monitoring system (DMS) is in operation in a 1100 MW(e) BWR plant. A total combination test was successfully completed on the 'plant operation by displayed information and automation' system (PODIA) in February 1983 before shipment to the site. The objective of this test was to verify the improved qualification of the newly developed advanced PODIA man-machine system by this enlarged fabrication test concept. In addition, the development of special graphics displays for the main control room and technical support centre to assist operators in assessing plant safety and diagnosing problems is required to meet post-TMI regulations. For this purpose, a prototype safety parameter display system (called Toshiba SPDS) with two colour CRT displays and a computer (TOSBAC-7/70) was developed in 1981 as an independent safety monitoring system. The PODIA and SPDS are now independent systems, but their combination has been found to be more useful and valuable for nuclear power plant safety. The paper discusses supervisory and operational concepts in the advanced main control room including SPDS, and describes the PODIA and SPDS verification tests including the valuable experience obtained after improvements in the qualification of these systems had been made to satisfactory operational safety levels. (author)

  20. Operating experience from Swedish nuclear power plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-06-01

    The total production of electricity from Swedish nuclear power plants was 70.5 TWh during 1998, which is the second highest yearly production ever. Production losses due to low demand totaled 5.1 TWh combined for all twelve units and production losses due to coastdown operation totaled an additional 0.5 TWh. The reason for this low power demand was a very good supply of water to the hydropower system. Hydroelectric power production was 73.6 TWh, an increase by roughly 5 TWh since 1997. Hence, the hydroelectric power production substantially exceeded the 64 TWh expected during a normal year, i.e. a year with average rainfall. Remaining production sources, mainly fossil fuel electricity production combined with district heating, contributed with 10 TWh. The total electricity production was 154.2 TWh, the highest yearly production ever. The total electricity consumption including transmission losses was 143.5 TWh. This is also the highest consumption ever and an increase by one percent compared to 1997. The preliminary net result of the electric power trade shows a net export by 10.7 TWh. The figures above are calculated from the preliminary production results. A comprehensive report on electric power supply and consumption in Sweden is given in the 1998 Annual Report from the Swedish Power Association. Besides Oskarshamn 1, all plants have periodically been operated in load-following mode, mostly because of the abundant supply of hydropower. The energy availability for the three boiling water reactors at Forsmark averaged 93.3 % and for the three pressure water reactors at Ringhals 91.0 %, both figures are the highest ever noted. In the section `Special Reports` three events of importance to safety that occurred during 1998 are reported. The events were all rated as level 1 according to the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) Figs, tabs.; Also available in Swedish