International exchange on nuclear safety related expert systems: The role of software verification and validation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sun, B.K.H.

1996-01-01

An important lesson learned from the Three Mile Island accident is that human errors can be significant contributors to risk. Recent advancement in computer hardware and software technology helped make expert system techniques potentially viable tools for improving nuclear power plant safety and reliability. As part of the general man-machine interface technology, expert systems have recently become increasingly prominent as a potential solution to a number of previously intractable problems in many phases of human activity, including operation, maintenance, and engineering functions. Traditional methods for testing and analyzing analog systems are no longer adequate to handle the increased complexity of software systems. The role of Verification and Validation (V and V) is to add rigor to the software development and maintenance cycle to guarantee the high level confidence needed for applications. Verification includes the process and techniques for confirming that all the software requirements in one stage of the development are met before proceeding on to the next stage. Validation involves testing the integrated software and hardware system to ensure that it reliably fulfills its intended functions. Only through a comprehensive V and V program can a high level of confidence be achieved. There exist many different standards and techniques for software verification and validation, yet they lack uniform approaches that provides adequate levels of practical guidance which can be used by users for nuclear power plant applications. There is a need to unify different approaches for addressing software verification and validation and to develop practical and cost effective guidelines for user and regulatory acceptance. (author). 8 refs

Nuclear disarmament and the verification role of the IAEA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Duarte, Carlos S.

2008-01-01

At the height of the cold war, nuclear arsenals reached a peak of some 70000 weapons. Although these numbers have since come down significantly, some 27000 weapons remain. The fact that decades go by and nuclear disarmament is not realised contributes to a deep sense of concern and disappointment. So do other factors, such as the persistence of nuclear doctrines that admit first use; the lack of binding negative assurances; the ongoing research on nuclear explosives including subcritical tests, and the maintaining readiness to resume full-scale testing. The sense of insufficient or outright lack of progress in nuclear disarmament is even more disturbing if measured against existing legal obligations. First and foremost among those is of course Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). According to the ICJ's Advisory Opinion, the obligation contained in Article VI is an obligation to achieve results in nuclear disarmament. Bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force is still missing, as well as negotiating a Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). Despite significant unilateral reductions in nuclear arsenals, these have not been done within an international process that includes the commitment to total elimination. The notion that it is morally reprehensible for some countries to pursue weapons of mass destruction yet morally acceptable for others to rely on them for their security is simply unworkable. For achieving nuclear disarmament verification objectives, the IAEA clearly would have a major role to play. Under Article III.A.5 of its Statute, the Agency is allowed to apply, at the request of a State, safeguards to any of that State's nuclear activities. The Agency's capabilities and experience make it the international institution best suited to eventually perform nuclear disarmament verification tasks. In order to perform nuclear disarmament verification activities, the Agency would of course need to

Working Group 3: Broader Perspectives on Non-proliferation and Nuclear Verification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dreicer, M.; Pregenzer, A.; Stein, G.

2013-01-01

This working group (WG) focused on the technical topics related to international security and stability in global nonproliferation and arms control regimes and asked how nonproliferation tools and culture might facilitate verification of future nuclear treaties. The review of existing and future nonproliferation and disarmament regimes (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty - CTBT, UNSC Resolution 1540, UK/Norway/VERTIC exercise, Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty - FMCT) offered a view on challenges, possibilities, and limitations for future initiatives. The concepts that the WG considered, with potential use in implementing future nuclear verification treaties, are: Triple S Culture (Safety, Security, Safeguards), State-Level Approach, Safeguards-by-Design, risk-based approaches, managed access, inspections, and protection of sensitive information. Under these concepts, many existing tools, considered by the WG could be used for nuclear verification. Export control works to control sensitive technology and expertise. Global implementation is complicated and multi-faceted and would benefit from greater consistency and efficiency. In most cases, international cooperation and development international capability would supplement efforts. This document is composed of the slides and the paper of the presentation. (A.C.)

As-Built Verification Plan Spent Nuclear Fuel Canister Storage Building MCO Handling Machine

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

SWENSON, C.E.

2000-01-01

This as-built verification plan outlines the methodology and responsibilities that will be implemented during the as-built field verification activity for the Canister Storage Building (CSB) MCO HANDLING MACHINE (MHM). This as-built verification plan covers THE ELECTRICAL PORTION of the CONSTRUCTION PERFORMED BY POWER CITY UNDER CONTRACT TO MOWAT. The as-built verifications will be performed in accordance Administrative Procedure AP 6-012-00, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project As-Built Verification Plan Development Process, revision I. The results of the verification walkdown will be documented in a verification walkdown completion package, approved by the Design Authority (DA), and maintained in the CSB project files

Verification and nuclear material security

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2001-01-01

Full text: The Director General will open the symposium by presenting a series of challenges facing the international safeguards community: the need to ensure a robust system, with strong verification tools and a sound research and development programme; the importance of securing the necessary support for the system, in terms of resources; the effort to achieve universal participation in the non-proliferation regime; and the necessity of re-energizing disarmament efforts. Special focus will be given to the challenge underscored by recent events, of strengthening international efforts to combat nuclear terrorism. (author)

Verification of structural analysis computer codes in nuclear engineering

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zebeljan, Dj.; Cizelj, L.

1990-01-01

Sources of potential errors, which can take place during use of finite element method based computer programs, are described in the paper. The magnitude of errors was defined as acceptance criteria for those programs. Error sources are described as they are treated by 'National Agency for Finite Element Methods and Standards (NAFEMS)'. Specific verification examples are used from literature of Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Example of verification is made on PAFEC-FE computer code for seismic response analyses of piping systems by response spectrum method. (author)

Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project Design Verification and Validation Process

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

OLGUIN, L.J.

2000-01-01

This document provides a description of design verification and validation activities implemented by the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project. During the execution of early design verification, a management assessment (Bergman, 1999) and external assessments on configuration management (Augustenburg, 1999) and testing (Loscoe, 2000) were conducted and identified potential uncertainties in the verification process. This led the SNF Chief Engineer to implement corrective actions to improve process and design products. This included Design Verification Reports (DVRs) for each subproject, validation assessments for testing, and verification of the safety function of systems and components identified in the Safety Equipment List to ensure that the design outputs were compliant with the SNF Technical Requirements. Although some activities are still in progress, the results of the DVR and associated validation assessments indicate that Project requirements for design verification are being effectively implemented. These results have been documented in subproject-specific technical documents (Table 2). Identified punch-list items are being dispositioned by the Project. As these remaining items are closed, the technical reports (Table 2) will be revised and reissued to document the results of this work

Safety assessment and verification for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2001-01-01

This publication supports the Safety Requirements on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. This Safety Guide was prepared on the basis of a systematic review of all the relevant publications including the Safety Fundamentals, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design, current and ongoing revisions of other Safety Guides, INSAG reports and other publications that have addressed the safety of nuclear power plants. This Safety Guide also provides guidance for Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety in meeting their obligations under Article 14 on Assessment and Verification of Safety. The Safety Requirements publication entitled Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design states that a comprehensive safety assessment and an independent verification of the safety assessment shall be carried out before the design is submitted to the regulatory body. This publication provides guidance on how this requirement should be met. This Safety Guide provides recommendations to designers for carrying out a safety assessment during the initial design process and design modifications, as well as to the operating organization in carrying out independent verification of the safety assessment of new nuclear power plants with a new or already existing design. The recommendations for performing a safety assessment are suitable also as guidance for the safety review of an existing plant. The objective of reviewing existing plants against current standards and practices is to determine whether there are any deviations which would have an impact on plant safety. The methods and the recommendations of this Safety Guide can also be used by regulatory bodies for the conduct of the regulatory review and assessment. Although most recommendations of this Safety Guide are general and applicable to all types of nuclear reactors, some specific recommendations and examples apply mostly to water cooled reactors. Terms such as 'safety assessment', 'safety analysis' and 'independent

Challenges for effective WMD verification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Andemicael, B.

2006-01-01

already awash in fissile material and is increasingly threatened by the possible consequences of illicit trafficking in such material. The chemical field poses fewer problems. The ban on chemical weapons is a virtually complete post-Cold War regime, with state-of-the-art concepts and procedures of verification resulting from decades of negotiation. The detection of prohibited materials and activities is the common goal of the nuclear and chemical regimes for which the most intrusive and intensive procedures are activated by the three organizations. Accounting for the strictly peaceful application of dual-use items constitutes the bulk of the work of the inspectorates at the IAEA and the OPCW. A common challenge in both fields is the advance of science and technology in the vast nuclear and chemical industries and the ingenuity of some determined proliferators to deceive by concealing illicit activities under legitimate ones. Inspection procedures and technologies need to keep up with the requirement for flexibility and adaptation to change. The common objective of the three organizations is to assemble and analyze all relevant information in order to conclude reliably whether a State is or is not complying with its treaty obligations. The positive lessons learned from the IAEA's verification experience today are valuable in advancing concepts and technologies that might also benefit the other areas of WMD verification. Together with the emerging, more comprehensive verification practice of the OPCW, they may provide a useful basis for developing common standards, which may in turn help in evaluating the cost-effectiveness of verification methods for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and other components of a WMD control regime

Design Verification Report Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project Canister Storage Building (CSB)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

PICKETT, W.W.

2000-01-01

The Sub-project W379, ''Spent Nuclear Fuel Canister Storage Building (CSB),'' was established as part of the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project. The primary mission of the CSB is to safely store spent nuclear fuel removed from the K Basins in dry storage until such time that it can be transferred to the national geological repository at Yucca Mountain Nevada. This sub-project was initiated in late 1994 by a series of studies and conceptual designs. These studies determined that the partially constructed storage building, originally built as part of the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant (HWVP) Project, could be redesigned to safely store the spent nuclear fuel. The scope of the CSB facility initially included a receiving station, a hot conditioning system, a storage vault, and a Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) Handling Machine (MHM). Because of evolution of the project technical strategy, the hot conditioning system was deleted from the scope and MCO welding and sampling stations were added in its place. This report outlines the methods, procedures, and outputs developed by Project W379 to verify that the provided Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs): satisfy the design requirements and acceptance criteria; perform their intended function; ensure that failure modes and hazards have been addressed in the design; and ensure that the SSCs as installed will not adversely impact other SSCs. Because this sub-project is still in the construction/start-up phase, all verification activities have not yet been performed (e.g., canister cover cap and welding fixture system verification, MCO Internal Gas Sampling equipment verification, and As-built verification.). The verification activities identified in this report that still are to be performed will be added to the start-up punchlist and tracked to closure

Design Verification Report Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project Canister Storage Building (CSB)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

PICKETT, W.W.

2000-09-22

The Sub-project W379, ''Spent Nuclear Fuel Canister Storage Building (CSB),'' was established as part of the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project. The primary mission of the CSB is to safely store spent nuclear fuel removed from the K Basins in dry storage until such time that it can be transferred to the national geological repository at Yucca Mountain Nevada. This sub-project was initiated in late 1994 by a series of studies and conceptual designs. These studies determined that the partially constructed storage building, originally built as part of the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant (HWVP) Project, could be redesigned to safely store the spent nuclear fuel. The scope of the CSB facility initially included a receiving station, a hot conditioning system, a storage vault, and a Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) Handling Machine (MHM). Because of evolution of the project technical strategy, the hot conditioning system was deleted from the scope and MCO welding and sampling stations were added in its place. This report outlines the methods, procedures, and outputs developed by Project W379 to verify that the provided Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs): satisfy the design requirements and acceptance criteria; perform their intended function; ensure that failure modes and hazards have been addressed in the design; and ensure that the SSCs as installed will not adversely impact other SSCs. Because this sub-project is still in the construction/start-up phase, all verification activities have not yet been performed (e.g., canister cover cap and welding fixture system verification, MCO Internal Gas Sampling equipment verification, and As-built verification.). The verification activities identified in this report that still are to be performed will be added to the start-up punchlist and tracked to closure.

IAEA inspectors complete verification of nuclear material in Iraq

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2004-01-01

Full text: At the request of the Government of Iraq and pursuant to the NPT Safeguards Agreement with Iraq, a team of IAEA safeguards inspectors has completed the annual Physical Inventory Verification of declared nuclear material in Iraq, and is returning to Vienna. The material - natural or low-enriched uranium - is not sensitive from a proliferation perspective and is consolidated at a storage facility near the Tuwaitha complex, south of Baghdad. This inspection was conducted with the logistical and security assistance of the Multinational Force and the Office of the UN Security Coordinator. Inspections such as this are required by safeguards agreements with every non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT that has declared holdings of nuclear material, to verify the correctness of the declaration, and that material has not been diverted to any undeclared activity. Such inspections have been performed in Iraq on a continuing basis. The most recent took place in June 2003, following reports of looting of nuclear material at the Tuwaitha complex; IAEA inspectors recovered, repackaged and resealed all but a minute amount of material. NPT safeguards inspections are limited in scope and coverage as compared to the verification activities carried out in 1991-98 and 2002-03 by the IAEA under Security Council resolution 687 and related resolutions. 'This week's mission was a good first step,' IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei said. 'Now we hope to be in a position to complete the mandate entrusted to us by the Security Council, to enable the Council over time to remove all sanctions and restrictions imposed on Iraq - so that Iraq's rights as a full-fledged member of the international community can be restored.' The removal of remaining sanctions is dependent on completion of the verification process by the IAEA and the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). It should be noted that IAEA technical assistance to Iraq has been resumed over

Verification and uncertainty evaluation of CASMO-3/MASTER nuclear analysis system

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Song, Jae Seung; Cho, Byung Oh; Joo, Han Kyu; Zee, Sung Quun; Lee, Chung Chan; Park, Sang Yoon

2000-06-01

MASTER is a nuclear design code developed by KAERI. It uses group constants generated by CASMO-3 developed by Studsvik. In this report the verification and evaluation of uncertainty were performed for the code system application in nuclear reactor core analysis and design. The verification is performed via various benchmark comparisons for static and transient core condition, and core follow calculations with startup physics test predictions of total 14 cycles of pressurized water reactors. Benchmark calculation include comparisons with reference solutions of IAEA and OECA/NEA problems and critical experiment measurements. The uncertainty evaluation is focused to safety related parameters such as power distribution, reactivity coefficients, control rod worth and core reactivity. It is concluded that CASMO-3/MASTER can be applied for PWR core nuclear analysis and design without any bias factors. Also, it is verified that the system can be applied for SMART core, via supplemental comparisons with reference calculations by MCNP which is a probabilistic nuclear calculation code.

Verification and uncertainty evaluation of CASMO-3/MASTER nuclear analysis system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Song, Jae Seung; Cho, Byung Oh; Joo, Han Kyu; Zee, Sung Quun; Lee, Chung Chan; Park, Sang Yoon

2000-06-01

MASTER is a nuclear design code developed by KAERI. It uses group constants generated by CASMO-3 developed by Studsvik. In this report the verification and evaluation of uncertainty were performed for the code system application in nuclear reactor core analysis and design. The verification is performed via various benchmark comparisons for static and transient core condition, and core follow calculations with startup physics test predictions of total 14 cycles of pressurized water reactors. Benchmark calculation include comparisons with reference solutions of IAEA and OECA/NEA problems and critical experiment measurements. The uncertainty evaluation is focused to safety related parameters such as power distribution, reactivity coefficients, control rod worth and core reactivity. It is concluded that CASMO-3/MASTER can be applied for PWR core nuclear analysis and design without any bias factors. Also, it is verified that the system can be applied for SMART core, via supplemental comparisons with reference calculations by MCNP which is a probabilistic nuclear calculation code

North Korea's nuclear weapons program:verification priorities and new challenges.

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Moon, Duk-ho (Korean Consulate General in New York)

2003-12-01

A comprehensive settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue may involve military, economic, political, and diplomatic components, many of which will require verification to ensure reciprocal implementation. This paper sets out potential verification methodologies that might address a wide range of objectives. The inspection requirements set by the International Atomic Energy Agency form the foundation, first as defined at the time of the Agreed Framework in 1994, and now as modified by the events since revelation of the North Korean uranium enrichment program in October 2002. In addition, refreezing the reprocessing facility and 5 MWe reactor, taking possession of possible weapons components and destroying weaponization capabilities add many new verification tasks. The paper also considers several measures for the short-term freezing of the North's nuclear weapon program during the process of negotiations, should that process be protracted. New inspection technologies and monitoring tools are applicable to North Korean facilities and may offer improved approaches over those envisioned just a few years ago. These are noted, and potential bilateral and regional verification regimes are examined.

Software verification for nuclear industry

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wilburn, N.P.

1985-08-01

Why verification of software products throughout the software life cycle is necessary is considered. Concepts of verification, software verification planning, and some verification methodologies for products generated throughout the software life cycle are then discussed

Multilateral disarmament verification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Persbo, A.

2013-01-01

Non-governmental organisations, such as VERTIC (Verification Research, Training and Information Centre), can play an important role in the promotion of multilateral verification. Parties involved in negotiating nuclear arms accords are for the most part keen that such agreements include suitable and robust provisions for monitoring and verification. Generally progress in multilateral arms control verification is often painstakingly slow, but from time to time 'windows of opportunity' - that is, moments where ideas, technical feasibility and political interests are aligned at both domestic and international levels - may occur and we have to be ready, so the preparatory work is very important. In the context of nuclear disarmament, verification (whether bilateral or multilateral) entails an array of challenges, hurdles and potential pitfalls relating to national security, health, safety and even non-proliferation, so preparatory work is complex and time-greedy. A UK-Norway Initiative was established in order to investigate the role that a non-nuclear-weapon state such as Norway could potentially play in the field of nuclear arms control verification. (A.C.)

Discussion on verification criterion and method of human factors engineering for nuclear power plant controller

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yang Hualong; Liu Yanzi; Jia Ming; Huang Weijun

2014-01-01

In order to prevent or reduce human error and ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants, control device should be verified from the perspective of human factors engineering (HFE). The domestic and international human factors engineering guidelines about nuclear power plant controller were considered, the verification criterion and method of human factors engineering for nuclear power plant controller were discussed and the application examples were provided for reference in this paper. The results show that the appropriate verification criterion and method should be selected to ensure the objectivity and accuracy of the conclusion. (authors)

Sustaining a verification regime in a nuclear weapon-free world. VERTIC research report no. 4

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Moyland, S. van

1999-01-01

Sustaining high levels of commitment to and enthusiasm for the verification regime in a nuclear weapon-free world (NWFW) would be a considerable challenge, but the price of failure would be high. No verification system for a complete ban on a whole of weapon of mass destruction (WMD) has been in existence long enough to provide a precedent or the requisite experience. Nevertheless, lessons from the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) nuclear safeguards system are instructive. A potential problem over the long haul is the gradual erosion of the deterrent effect of verification that may result from the continual overlooking of minor instances of non-compliance. Flaws in the verification system must be identified and dealt with early lest they also corrode the system. To achieve this the verification organisation's inspectors and analytical staff will need sustained support, encouragement, resources and training. In drawing attention to weaknesses, they must be supported by management and at the political level. The leaking of sensitive information, either industrial or military, by staff of the verification regime is a potential problem. 'Managed access' techniques should be constantly examined and improved. The verification organisation and states parties will need to sustain close co-operation with the nuclear and related industries. Frequent review mechanisms must be established. States must invest time and effort to make them effective. Another potential problem is the withering of resources for sustained verification. Verification organisations tend to be pressured by states to cut or last least cap costs, even if the verification workload increases. The verification system must be effective as knowledge and experience allows. The organisation will need continuously to update its scientific methods and technology. This requires in-house resources plus external research and development (R and D). Universities, laboratories and industry need incentives to

The CTBT Verification Regime: Monitoring the Earth for nuclear explosions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-03-01

The Comprehensive nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans all nuclear weapon tests. Its unique verification regime is designed to detect nuclear explosions anywhere on the planet - in the oceans, underground and in the atmosphere. once complete, the international Monitoring system (iMs) will consist of 337 facilities located in 89 countries around the globe. The iMs is currently operating in test mode so that data are already transmitted for analysis from monitoring facilities to the international Data Centre (iDC) at the headquarters of the preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) in Vienna. Data and analysis results are shared with Member states.

The US National Resources Defense Council/Soviet Academy of Sciences Nuclear Test Ban Verification Project

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cochran, T.B.

1989-01-01

The first week in September 1987 was an extraordinary one for arms control verification. As part of the co-operative Test Ban Verification Project of the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and the Soviet Academy of Sciences, fourteen American scientists from the Scripps Institution of Oceanography (at the University of California- San Diego), University of Nevada-Reno and the University of Colorado went to the region of the Soviet's principal nuclear test site near Semipalatinsk. Together with their Soviet counterparts from the Institute of Physics of the Earth (IPE) in Moscow, they fired off three large chemical explosions. The purpose of these explosions was to demonstrate the sensitivity of the three seismic stations surrounding the test site, to study the efficiency with which high-frequency seismic waves propagate in the region, and to study differences between chemical explosions, nuclear explosions and earthquakes in order more firmly to establish procedures for verification of a nuclear test ban. This paper presents a review of the results of these experiments, an update on the status of the joint project, and a review of the significance of high frequency seismic data to test ban verification

New Approaches and New Technologies for the Verification of Nuclear Disarmament

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Keir, David

2013-01-01

ESARDA’s New Approaches/Novel Technologies Working group has recently begun to take a great interest in technology for use in arms control verification, in parallel with a focus on Nuclear Safeguards technology. A topic-based meeting of members of the NA/NT Subgroup was hosted at Joint Research Centre (JRC), ITU-Nuclear Security Unit in Ispra (Italy), to further explore the technical issues and opportunities presented by the need for new approaches and technologies in a future verified nuclear weapons dismantlement regime. Nuclear warheads must contain radioactive material and, by their nature, gamma rays and neutrons are likely to penetrate to the outside of the warhead casing and even metal containers. Therefore radiation signatures should be detectable by appropriate pieces of equipment. For this reason, researchers in the field of technical verification of nuclear warhead dismantlement have studied and developed technologies for Non-Destructive Assay (NDA). This paper presents a generic dismantlement pathway for verified nuclear warhead dismantlement, based on the scenario employed by the UK-Norway initiative for their exercise in 2008/9. Using this as a framework the types of measurement challenge likely to be presented to a verifying inspector are discussed. The problem of intrusiveness of measurements in relation to the issue of proliferative release of classified information about the warhead attributes is discussed and the concept of ‘information barriers is introduced as a possible solution to this issue. A list of candidate technologies for use in verification activities, with or without information barriers is then presented and, since most of these are new or novel approaches to the issue, an already-established system for classifying them – in terms of state of development and complexity of use in this context – is proposed. Finally, the concept of capturing this information as a library of ‘data sheets’, designed for periodic review as

FPGA Design and Verification Procedure for Nuclear Power Plant MMIS

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lee, Dongil; Yoo, Kawnwoo; Ryoo, Kwangki [Hanbat National Univ., Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2013-05-15

In this paper, it is shown that it is possible to ensure reliability by performing the steps of the verification based on the FPGA development methodology, to ensure the safety of application to the NPP MMIS of the FPGA run along the step. Currently, the PLC (Programmable Logic Controller) which is being developed is composed of the FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array) and CPU (Central Processing Unit). As the importance of the FPGA in the NPP (Nuclear Power Plant) MMIS (Man-Machine Interface System) has been increasing than before, the research on the verification of the FPGA has being more and more concentrated recently.

Verification and software validation for nuclear instrumentation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gaytan G, E.; Salgado G, J. R.; De Andrade O, E.; Ramirez G, A.

2014-10-01

In this work is presented a Verification Methodology and Software Validation, to be applied in instruments of nuclear use with associate software. This methodology was developed under the auspices of IAEA, through the regional projects RLA4022 (ARCAL XCIX) and RLA1011 (RLA CXXIII), led by Mexico. In the first project three plans and three procedures were elaborated taking into consideration IEEE standards, and in the second project these documents were updated considering ISO and IEC standards. The developed methodology has been distributed to the participant countries of Latin America in the ARCAL projects and two related courses have been imparted with the participation of several countries, and participating institutions of Mexico like Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Nucleares (ININ), Comision Federal de Electricidad (CFE) and Comision Nacional de Seguridad Nuclear y Salvaguardias (CNSNS). In the ININ due to the necessity to work with Software Quality Guarantee in systems for the nuclear power plant of the CFE, a Software Quality Guarantee Plan and five procedures were developed in the year 2004, obtaining the qualification of the ININ for software development for the nuclear power plant of CFE. These first documents were developed taking like reference IEEE standards and regulator guides of NRC, being the first step for the development of the methodology. (Author)

Supporting the President's Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agenda: Transparency and Verification for Nuclear Arms Reductions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Doyle, James E.; Meek, Elizabeth

2009-01-01

The President's arms control and nonproliferation agenda is still evolving and the details of initiatives supporting it remain undefined. This means that DOE, NNSA, NA-20, NA-24 and the national laboratories can help define the agenda, and the policies and the initiatives to support it. This will require effective internal and interagency coordination. The arms control and nonproliferation agenda is broad and includes the path-breaking goal of creating conditions for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Responsibility for various elements of the agenda will be widely scattered across the interagency. Therefore an interagency mapping exercise should be performed to identify the key points of engagement within NNSA and other agencies for creating effective policy coordination mechanisms. These can include informal networks, working groups, coordinating committees, interagency task forces, etc. It will be important for NA-20 and NA-24 to get a seat at the table and a functional role in many of these coordinating bodies. The arms control and nonproliferation agenda comprises both mature and developing policy initiatives. The more mature elements such as CTBT ratification and a follow-on strategic nuclear arms treaty with Russia have defined milestones. However, recent press reports indicate that even the START follow-on strategic arms pact that is planned to be complete by the end of 2009 may take significantly longer and be more expansive in scope. The Russians called for proposals to count non-deployed as well as deployed warheads. Other elements of the agenda such as FMCT, future bilateral nuclear arms reductions following a START follow-on treaty, nuclear posture changes, preparations for an international nuclear security summit, strengthened international safeguards and multilateral verification are in much earlier stages of development. For this reason any survey of arms control capabilities within the USG should be structured to address potential needs across the

Design Verification Report Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project Canister Storage Building (CSB)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

BAZINET, G.D.

2001-05-15

The Sub-project W379, ''Spent Nuclear Fuel Canister Storage Building (CSB),'' was established as part of the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project. The primary mission of the CSB is to safely store spent nuclear fuel removed from the K Basins in dry storage until such time that it can be transferred to the national geological repository at Yucca Mountain Nevada. This sub-project was initiated in late 1994 by a series of studies and conceptual designs. These studies determined that the partially constructed storage building, originally built as part of the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant (HWVP) Project, could be redesigned to safely store the spent nuclear fuel. The scope of the CSB facility initially included a receiving station, a hot conditioning system, a storage vault, and a Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) Handling Machine (MHM). Because of evolution of the project technical strategy, the hot conditioning system was deleted from the scope and MCO welding and sampling stations were added in its place. This report outlines the methods, procedures, and outputs developed by Project W379 to verify that the provided Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs): satisfy the design requirements and acceptance criteria; perform their intended function; ensure that failure modes and hazards have been addressed in the design; and ensure that the SSCs as installed will not adversely impact other SSCs. The original version of this document was prepared by Vista Engineering for the SNF Project. Revision 1 documented verification actions that were pending at the time the initial report was prepared. Verification activities for the installed and operational SSCs have been completed. Verification of future additions to the CSB related to the canister cover cap and welding fixture system and MCO Internal Gas Sampling equipment will be completed as appropriate for those components. The open items related to verification of those requirements are noted in section 3

Design Verification Report Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project Canister Storage Building (CSB)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

BAZINET, G.D.

2000-11-03

The Sub-project W379, ''Spent Nuclear Fuel Canister Storage Building (CSB),'' was established as part of the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project. The primary mission of the CSB is to safely store spent nuclear fuel removed from the K Basins in dry storage until such time that it can be transferred to the national geological repository at Yucca Mountain Nevada. This sub-project was initiated in late 1994 by a series of studies and conceptual designs. These studies determined that the partially constructed storage building, originally built as part of the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant (HWVP) Project, could be redesigned to safely store the spent nuclear fuel. The scope of the CSB facility initially included a receiving station, a hot conditioning system, a storage vault, and a Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) Handling Machine (MHM). Because of evolution of the project technical strategy, the hot conditioning system was deleted from the scope and MCO welding and sampling stations were added in its place. This report outlines the methods, procedures, and outputs developed by Project W379 to verify that the provided Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs): satisfy the design requirements and acceptance criteria; perform their intended function; ensure that failure modes and hazards have been addressed in the design; and ensure that the SSCs as installed will not adversely impact other SSCs. The original version of this document was prepared by Vista Engineering for the SNF Project. The purpose of this revision is to document completion of verification actions that were pending at the time the initial report was prepared. Verification activities for the installed and operational SSCs have been completed. Verification of future additions to the CSB related to the canister cover cap and welding fixture system and MCO Internal Gas Sampling equipment will be completed as appropriate for those components. The open items related to verification of those

Design Verification Report Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project Canister Storage Building (CSB)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

BAZINET, G.D.

2001-01-01

The Sub-project W379, ''Spent Nuclear Fuel Canister Storage Building (CSB),'' was established as part of the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project. The primary mission of the CSB is to safely store spent nuclear fuel removed from the K Basins in dry storage until such time that it can be transferred to the national geological repository at Yucca Mountain Nevada. This sub-project was initiated in late 1994 by a series of studies and conceptual designs. These studies determined that the partially constructed storage building, originally built as part of the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant (HWVP) Project, could be redesigned to safely store the spent nuclear fuel. The scope of the CSB facility initially included a receiving station, a hot conditioning system, a storage vault, and a Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) Handling Machine (MHM). Because of evolution of the project technical strategy, the hot conditioning system was deleted from the scope and MCO welding and sampling stations were added in its place. This report outlines the methods, procedures, and outputs developed by Project W379 to verify that the provided Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs): satisfy the design requirements and acceptance criteria; perform their intended function; ensure that failure modes and hazards have been addressed in the design; and ensure that the SSCs as installed will not adversely impact other SSCs. The original version of this document was prepared by Vista Engineering for the SNF Project. Revision 1 documented verification actions that were pending at the time the initial report was prepared. Verification activities for the installed and operational SSCs have been completed. Verification of future additions to the CSB related to the canister cover cap and welding fixture system and MCO Internal Gas Sampling equipment will be completed as appropriate for those components. The open items related to verification of those requirements are noted in section 3.1.5 and will be

Design Verification Report Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project Canister Storage Building (CSB)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

BAZINET, G.D.

2000-01-01

The Sub-project W379, ''Spent Nuclear Fuel Canister Storage Building (CSB),'' was established as part of the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project. The primary mission of the CSB is to safely store spent nuclear fuel removed from the K Basins in dry storage until such time that it can be transferred to the national geological repository at Yucca Mountain Nevada. This sub-project was initiated in late 1994 by a series of studies and conceptual designs. These studies determined that the partially constructed storage building, originally built as part of the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant (HWVP) Project, could be redesigned to safely store the spent nuclear fuel. The scope of the CSB facility initially included a receiving station, a hot conditioning system, a storage vault, and a Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) Handling Machine (MHM). Because of evolution of the project technical strategy, the hot conditioning system was deleted from the scope and MCO welding and sampling stations were added in its place. This report outlines the methods, procedures, and outputs developed by Project W379 to verify that the provided Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs): satisfy the design requirements and acceptance criteria; perform their intended function; ensure that failure modes and hazards have been addressed in the design; and ensure that the SSCs as installed will not adversely impact other SSCs. The original version of this document was prepared by Vista Engineering for the SNF Project. The purpose of this revision is to document completion of verification actions that were pending at the time the initial report was prepared. Verification activities for the installed and operational SSCs have been completed. Verification of future additions to the CSB related to the canister cover cap and welding fixture system and MCO Internal Gas Sampling equipment will be completed as appropriate for those components. The open items related to verification of those requirements are noted

Verification and validation of software related to nuclear power plant instrumentation and control

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

This report is produced in response to a recommendation of the IAEA International Working Group on Nuclear Power Plant Control and Instrumentation. The report has objectives of providing practical guidance on the methods available for verification of the software and validation of computer based systems, and on how and when these methods can be effectively applied. It is meant for those who are in any way involved with the development, implementation, maintenance and use of software and computer based instrumentation and control systems in nuclear power plants. The report is intended to be used by designers, software producers, reviewers, verification and validation teams, assessors, plant operators and licensers of computer based systems

Burnup verification measurements at a US nuclear utility using the FORK measurement system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ewing, R.I.; Bosler, G.E.; Walden, G.

1993-01-01

The FORK measurement system, designed at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards program, has been used to examine spent reactor fuel assemblies at Duke Power Company's Oconee Nuclear Station. The FORK system measures the passive neutron and gamma-ray emission from spent fuel assemblies while in the storage pool. These measurements can be correlated with burnup and cooling time, and can be used to verify the reactor site records. Verification measurements may be used to help ensure nuclear criticality safety when burnup credit is applied to spent fuel transport and storage systems. By taking into account the reduced reactivity of spent fuel due to its burnup in the reactor, burnup credit results in more efficient and economic transport and storage. The objectives of these tests are to demonstrate the applicability of the FORK system to verify reactor records and to develop optimal procedures compatible with utility operations. The test program is a cooperative effort supported by Sandia National Laboratories, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), Los Alamos National Laboratory, and the Duke Power Company

Selection and verification of safety parameters in safety parameter display system for nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zhang Yuangfang

1992-02-01

The method and results for safety parameter selection and its verification in safety parameter display system of nuclear power plants are introduced. According to safety analysis, the overall safety is divided into six critical safety functions, and a certain amount of safety parameters which can represent the integrity degree of each function and the causes of change are strictly selected. The verification of safety parameter selection is carried out from the view of applying the plant emergency procedures and in the accident man oeuvres on a full scale nuclear power plant simulator

Verification tests for remote controlled inspection system in nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kohno, Tadaaki

1986-01-01

Following the increase of nuclear power plants, the total radiation exposure dose accompanying inspection and maintenance works tended to increase. Japan Power Engineering and Inspection Corp. carried out the verification test of a practical power reactor automatic inspection system from November, 1981, to March, 1986, and in this report, the state of having carried out this verification test is described. The objects of the verification test were the equipment which is urgently required for reducing radiation exposure dose, the possibility of realization of which is high, and which is important for ensuring the safety and reliability of plants, that is, an automatic ultrasonic flaw detector for the welded parts of bend pipes, an automatic disassembling and inspection system for control rod driving mechanism, a fuel automatic inspection system, and automatic decontaminating equipments for steam generator water chambers, primary system crud and radioactive gas in coolant. The results of the verification test of these equipments were judged as satisfactory, therefore, the application to actual plants is possible. (Kako, I.)

Nuclear verification in Iraq: Are we closing the file? 1 June 1998

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

1998-01-01

The document reproduces the text of an essay on IAEA's nuclear verification in Iraq written by the Director General of the IAEA, and published in the Editorial Pages of the Washington Post on 1 June 1998

DESIGN VERIFICATION REPORT SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL (SNF) PROJECT CANISTER STORAGE BUILDING (CSB)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

BAZINET, G.D.

2003-01-01

The Sub-project W379, ''Spent Nuclear Fuel Canister Storage Building (CSB),'' was established as part of the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project. The primary mission of the CSB is to safely store spent nuclear fuel removed from the K Basins in dry storage until such time that it can be transferred to the national geological repository at Yucca Mountain Nevada. This sub-project was initiated in late 1994 by a series of studies and conceptual designs. These studies determined that the partially constructed storage building, originally built as part of the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant (HWVP) Project, could be redesigned to safely store the spent nuclear fuel. The scope of the CSB facility initially included a receiving station, a hot conditioning system, a storage vault, and a Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) Handling Machine (MHM). Because of evolution of the project technical strategy, the hot conditioning system was deleted from the scope and MCO welding and sampling stations were added in its place. This report outlines the methods, procedures, and outputs developed by Project W379 to verify that the provided Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs): satisfy the design requirements and acceptance criteria; perform their intended function; ensure that failure modes and hazards have been addressed in the design; and ensure that the SSCs as installed will not adversely impact other SSCs. The original version of this document was prepared by Vista Engineering for the SNF Project. Revision 1 documented verification actions that were pending at the time the initial report was prepared. Revision 3 of this document incorporates MCO Cover Cap Assembly welding verification activities. Verification activities for the installed and operational SSCs have been completed

Sasset: Attribute verification of accountancy records in nuclear safeguards Pt.1: Theoretical basis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mueller, K.H.

1980-01-01

This study demonstrates the construction of a sampling plan to be followed by the inspector during the statical verification (in attribute mode) of the accountancy records of a nuclear fuel fabrication plant. It presents the instructions defining inspector's tasks and guiding his actions; it permits to validate his decisions. Part I deals with the statistical fundaments of the verification technique in attribute mode. Part II is a manual for the corresponding computer code SASSET developed at JRC Ispra

Technical verification of advanced nuclear fuel for KSNPs

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lee, C. B.; Bang, J. G.; Kim, D. H. and others

2002-03-01

KNFC has developed the advanced 16x16 fuel assembly for the Korean Standard Nuclear Plants through the three-year R and D project (from April 1999 to March 2002) under the Nuclear R and D program by MOST. The purpose of this project is to verify the advanced 16x16 fuel assembly for the Korean Standard Nuclear Plants being developed by KNFC during the same period. Verification tests for the advanced fuel assembly and its components such as characteristic test on the spacer grid spring and dimple, static buckling and dynamic impact test on the 5x5 partial spacer grid, the fuel rod vibration test supported by the PLUS7 mid-spacer grid, fretting wear test, turbulent flow structure test in wind tunnel and corrosion test were performed by using the KAERI facilities. Design reports and test results produced by KNFC were technically reviewed. For the domestic production of burnable poison rod, manufacturing technology of burnable poison pellets was developed

DESIGN INFORMATION VERIFICATION FOR NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Robert S. Bean; Richard R. M. Metcalf; Phillip C. Durst

2009-07-01

A critical aspect of international safeguards activities performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the verification that facility design and construction (including upgrades and modifications) do not create opportunities for nuclear proliferation. These Design Information Verification activities require that IAEA inspectors compare current and past information about the facility to verify the operator’s declaration of proper use. The actual practice of DIV presents challenges to the inspectors due to the large amount of data generated, concerns about sensitive or proprietary data, the overall complexity of the facility, and the effort required to extract just the safeguards relevant information. Planned and anticipated facilities will (especially in the case of reprocessing plants) be ever larger and increasingly complex, thus exacerbating the challenges. This paper reports the results of a workshop held at the Idaho National Laboratory in March 2009, which considered technologies and methods to address these challenges. The use of 3D Laser Range Finding, Outdoor Visualization System, Gamma-LIDAR, and virtual facility modeling, as well as methods to handle the facility data issues (quantity, sensitivity, and accessibility and portability for the inspector) were presented. The workshop attendees drew conclusions about the use of these techniques with respect to successfully employing them in an operating environment, using a Fuel Conditioning Facility walk-through as a baseline for discussion.

DESIGN VERIFICATION REPORT SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL (SNF) PROJECT CANISTER STORAGE BUILDING (CSB)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

BAZINET, G.D.

2003-02-12

The Sub-project W379, ''Spent Nuclear Fuel Canister Storage Building (CSB),'' was established as part of the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project. The primary mission of the CSB is to safely store spent nuclear fuel removed from the K Basins in dry storage until such time that it can be transferred to the national geological repository at Yucca Mountain Nevada. This sub-project was initiated in late 1994 by a series of studies and conceptual designs. These studies determined that the partially constructed storage building, originally built as part of the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant (HWVP) Project, could be redesigned to safely store the spent nuclear fuel. The scope of the CSB facility initially included a receiving station, a hot conditioning system, a storage vault, and a Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) Handling Machine (MHM). Because of evolution of the project technical strategy, the hot conditioning system was deleted from the scope and MCO welding and sampling stations were added in its place. This report outlines the methods, procedures, and outputs developed by Project W379 to verify that the provided Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs): satisfy the design requirements and acceptance criteria; perform their intended function; ensure that failure modes and hazards have been addressed in the design; and ensure that the SSCs as installed will not adversely impact other SSCs. The original version of this document was prepared by Vista Engineering for the SNF Project. Revision 1 documented verification actions that were pending at the time the initial report was prepared. Revision 3 of this document incorporates MCO Cover Cap Assembly welding verification activities. Verification activities for the installed and operational SSCs have been completed.

Societal Verification: Intellectual Game or International Game-Changer

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hartigan, Kelsey; Hinderstein, Corey

2013-01-01

Within the nuclear nonproliferation and arms control field, there is an increasing appreciation for the potential of open source information technologies to supplement existing verification and compliance regimes. While clearly not a substitute for on-site inspections or national technical means, it may be possible to better leverage information gleaned from commercial satellite imagery, international trade records and the vast amount of data being exchanged online and between publics (including social media) so as to develop a more comprehensive set of tools and practices for monitoring and verifying a state’s nuclear activities and helping judge compliance with international obligations. The next generation “toolkit” for monitoring and verifying items, facility operations and activities will likely include a more diverse set of analytical tools and technologies than are currently used internationally. To explore these and other issues, the Nuclear Threat Initiative has launched an effort that examines, in part, the role that emerging technologies and “citizen scientists” might play in future verification regimes. This paper will include an assessment of past proliferation and security “events” and whether emerging tools and technologies would have provided indicators concurrently or in advance of these actions. Such case studies will be instrumental in understanding the reliability of these technologies and practices and in thinking through the requirements of a 21st century verification regime. Keywords: Verification, social media, open-source information, arms control, disarmament.

Advanced control and instrumentation systems in nuclear power plants. Design, verification and validation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Haapanen, P.

1995-01-01

The Technical Committee Meeting on design, verification and validation of advanced control and instrumentation systems in nuclear power plants was held in Espoo, Finland on 20 - 23 June 1994. The meeting was organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) International Working Group's (IWG) on Nuclear Power Plant Control and Instrumentation (NPPCI) and on Advanced Technologies for Water Cooled Reactors (ATWR). VTT Automation together with Imatran Voima Oy and Teollisuuden Voima Oy responded about the practical arrangements of the meeting. In total 96 participants from 21 countries and the Agency took part in the meeting and 34 full papers and 8 posters were presented. Following topics were covered in the papers: (1) experience with advanced and digital systems, (2) safety and reliability analysis, (3) advanced digital systems under development and implementation, (4) verification and validation methods and practices, (5) future development trends. (orig.)

Verification and disarmament

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Blix, H. [IAEA, Vienna (Austria)

1998-07-01

The main features are described of the IAEA safeguards verification system that non-nuclear weapon states parties of the NPT are obliged to accept. Verification activities/problems in Iraq and North Korea are discussed.

Verification and disarmament

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Blix, H.

1998-01-01

The main features are described of the IAEA safeguards verification system that non-nuclear weapon states parties of the NPT are obliged to accept. Verification activities/problems in Iraq and North Korea are discussed

Methods of Verification, Accountability and Control of Special Nuclear Material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stewart, J.E.

1999-01-01

This session demonstrates nondestructive assay (NDA) measurement, surveillance and analysis technology required to protect, control and account (MPC and A) for special nuclear materials (SNM) in sealed containers. These measurements, observations and analyses comprise state-of-the art, strengthened, SNM safeguards systems. Staff member specialists, actively involved in research, development, training and implementation worldwide, will present six NDA verification systems and two software tools for integration and analysis of facility MPC and A data

Stability of transition to a world without nuclear weapons: Technical problems of verification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zhigalov, V.

1998-01-01

A serious psychological barrier to acceptance of the concept for achieving the nuclear-weapon-free world is fear of facing the prospect that one or more nations or extremist political groups might develop their own nuclear weapons. Actually this is a question of stability of the nuclear-weapon-free world. From this point of view the most effective system of verification is an absolute necessity. This system must ensure detection of so called undeclared nuclear activity at early stage. Scientists of Russian nuclear centers are working today on solving this problem. This paper is considered to be a comprehensive attempt to analyze the technical and organizational aspects of the problems of transition to a nuclear-weapons-free world, setting aside the difficulties of resolving purely political problems

Formal Verification of Digital Protection Logic and Automatic Testing Software

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Cha, S. D.; Ha, J. S.; Seo, J. S. [KAIST, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2008-06-15

- Technical aspect {center_dot} It is intended that digital I and C software have safety and reliability. Project results help the software to acquire license. Software verification technique, which results in this project, can be to use for digital NPP(Nuclear power plant) in the future. {center_dot} This research introduces many meaningful results of verification on digital protection logic and suggests I and C software testing strategy. These results apply to verify nuclear fusion device, accelerator, nuclear waste management and nuclear medical device that require dependable software and high-reliable controller. Moreover, These can be used for military, medical or aerospace-related software. - Economical and industrial aspect {center_dot} Since safety of digital I and C software is highly import, It is essential for the software to be verified. But verification and licence acquisition related to digital I and C software face high cost. This project gives economic profit to domestic economy by using introduced verification and testing technique instead of foreign technique. {center_dot} The operation rate of NPP will rise, when NPP safety critical software is verified with intellectual V and V tool. It is expected that these software substitute safety-critical software that wholly depend on foreign. Consequently, the result of this project has high commercial value and the recognition of the software development works will be able to be spread to the industrial circles. - Social and cultural aspect People expect that nuclear power generation contributes to relieving environmental problems because that does not emit more harmful air pollution source than other power generations. To give more trust and expectation about nuclear power generation to our society, we should make people to believe that NPP is highly safe system. In that point of view, we can present high-reliable I and C proofed by intellectual V and V technique as evidence

FMCT verification: Case studies

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hui Zhang

2001-01-01

Full text: How to manage the trade-off between the need for transparency and the concern about the disclosure of sensitive information would be a key issue during the negotiations of FMCT verification provision. This paper will explore the general concerns on FMCT verification; and demonstrate what verification measures might be applied to those reprocessing and enrichment plants. A primary goal of an FMCT will be to have the five declared nuclear weapon states and the three that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities become parties. One focus in negotiating the FMCT will be verification. Appropriate verification measures should be applied in each case. Most importantly, FMCT verification would focus, in the first instance, on these states' fissile material production facilities. After the FMCT enters into force, all these facilities should be declared. Some would continue operating to produce civil nuclear power or to produce fissile material for non- explosive military uses. The verification measures necessary for these operating facilities would be essentially IAEA safeguards, as currently being applied to non-nuclear weapon states under the NPT. However, some production facilities would be declared and shut down. Thus, one important task of the FMCT verifications will be to confirm the status of these closed facilities. As case studies, this paper will focus on the verification of those shutdown facilities. The FMCT verification system for former military facilities would have to differ in some ways from traditional IAEA safeguards. For example, there could be concerns about the potential loss of sensitive information at these facilities or at collocated facilities. Eventually, some safeguards measures such as environmental sampling might be seen as too intrusive. Thus, effective but less intrusive verification measures may be needed. Some sensitive nuclear facilities would be subject for the first time to international inspections, which could raise concerns

Knowledge Based Help desk System in Nuclear Malaysia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mohamad Safuan Sulaiman; Abdul Muin Abdul Rahman; Norzalina Nasirudin; Khairiel Adyani Abdul Ghani; Abdul Aziz Mhd Ramli; Mohd Ashhar Khalid

2012-01-01

Knowledge based (K-based) Help desk system is a knowledge oriented web based system that provides support to business process of the technical service providers. It is a multi-centric system which focuses on end-users, technical workers and higher level management through utilization of knowledge which resides and grows within the system. The objectives of the system are to be a user-friendly, capture technical knowledge for efficient performance and educating users for self reliance. These were achieved through the improvement of the help desk business process and better management of technical knowledge. This system has been tested and implemented in Information Technology Center (IT), Engineering Division (BKJ) and Instrumentation and Automation Center (IAC) at the Malaysian Nuclear Agency (Nuclear Malaysia). Higher levels of user satisfaction and faster growth in technical knowledge repository have been recorded in the system. This paper describes the help desk system in the perspective of management of its technical knowledge contributing to strengthening organizational knowledge asset of Nuclear Malaysia as national nuclear research institution. (Author)

Burnup verification using the FORK measurement system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ewing, R.I.

1994-01-01

Verification measurements may be used to help ensure nuclear criticality safety when burnup credit is applied to spent fuel transport and storage systems. The FORK measurement system, designed at Los Alamos National Laboratory for the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards program, has been used to verify reactor site records for burnup and cooling time for many years. The FORK system measures the passive neutron and gamma-ray emission from spent fuel assemblies while in the storage pool. This report deals with the application of the FORK system to burnup credit operations based on measurements performed on spent fuel assemblies at the Oconee Nuclear Station of Duke Power Company

Why nuclear power generation must be developed? A many-faceted verification of its irreplaceable role

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kawai, Yuichi; Oda, Toshiyuki

1998-01-01

Given the poor public acceptance right now, the future of nuclear power development is not necessarily bright. Yet, from the energy security aspect, the role of nuclear power, already responsible for about 30% of Japan's generated output, is never negligible. Also, Japan could hardly meet the GHG reduction target under the Kyoto Protocol without carbon-free nuclear power generation. While Japan is required to deal with both energy security and global warming from now on, to satisfy the two concurrently without nuclear power development is nearly impossible in practical terms. We have to consider calmly how nuclear power generation should be understood and treated in our effort to ensure energy supply and mitigate global warming. With this study, the need for nuclear power development was verified anew by reevaluating nuclear power generation from many facets, which are energy (electricity) supply and demand, environmental measures, energy security, and cost. Verification results showed: On supply and demand, the absence of nuclear power causes an electricity shortage during peak hours; On environment, no GHG-free power sources but nuclear currently have a sufficient supply capacity; On energy security, nuclear fuel procurement sources are diverse and located in relatively stable areas; On cost, the strong yen and cheap oil favors fossil fuels, and the weak yen and dear oil does nuclear power, though depending on unpredictable elements to send their cost up, typically waste disposal cost incurred in nuclear power, and CO 2 reduction cost in fossil fuels. With all these factors taken into consideration, the best mix of power sources should be figured out. From the verification results, we can conclude that nuclear power is one of irreplaceable energy sources for Japan. To prepare for growing electricity demand and care the environment better, Japan has few choices but to increase the installed capacity of nuclear power generation in the years to come. (author)

Development of an automated testing system for verification and validation of nuclear data

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Triplett, B. S.; Anghaie, S.; White, M. C.

2008-01-01

Verification and validation of nuclear data is critical to the accuracy of both stochastic and deterministic particle transport codes. In order to effectively test a set of nuclear data, the data must be applied to a wide variety of transport problems. Performing this task in a timely, efficient manner is tedious. The nuclear data team at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in collaboration with the University of Florida is developing a methodology to automate the process of nuclear data verification and validation. The International Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiment Project (ICSBEP) provides a set of criticality problems that may be used to evaluate nuclear data. This process tests a number of data libraries using cases from the ICSBEP benchmark set to demonstrate how automation of these tasks may reduce errors and increase efficiency. The process is driven by an integrated set of Python scripts. Material and geometry data may be read from an existing code input file to generate a standardized template or the template may be generated directly by the user The user specifies the desired precision and other vital problem parameters. The Python scripts generate input decks for multiple transport codes from these templates, run and monitor individual jobs, and parse the relevant output. This output can then be used to generate reports directly or can be stored into a database for later analysis. This methodology eases the burden on the user by reducing the amount of time and effort required for obtaining and compiling calculation results. (authors)

Nuclear verification: What it is, how it works, the assurances it can provide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fortakov, V.

1998-01-01

International nuclear safeguards consist of a complex control system based on material accountancy with the technical objective of providing for 'the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection' (INFCIR 153). This paper addresses the many technical principles of nuclear safeguards as implemented today. States with comprehensive safeguards agreements undertake to accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear material within the State territory or under its jurisdiction or control. The basic procedural elements of the safeguards system are facility design examination and verification, maintenance of records by facility operators, provision of reports to the IAEA and on-site inspections by IAEA staff. The system requires the concerted action of nuclear facility operators, State Authorities and the IAEA inspectorate and is constantly improved to strengthen it and make it more cost-efficient

Verification and validation benchmarks.

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Oberkampf, William Louis; Trucano, Timothy Guy

2007-02-01

Verification and validation (V&V) are the primary means to assess the accuracy and reliability of computational simulations. V&V methods and procedures have fundamentally improved the credibility of simulations in several high-consequence fields, such as nuclear reactor safety, underground nuclear waste storage, and nuclear weapon safety. Although the terminology is not uniform across engineering disciplines, code verification deals with assessing the reliability of the software coding, and solution verification deals with assessing the numerical accuracy of the solution to a computational model. Validation addresses the physics modeling accuracy of a computational simulation by comparing the computational results with experimental data. Code verification benchmarks and validation benchmarks have been constructed for a number of years in every field of computational simulation. However, no comprehensive guidelines have been proposed for the construction and use of V&V benchmarks. For example, the field of nuclear reactor safety has not focused on code verification benchmarks, but it has placed great emphasis on developing validation benchmarks. Many of these validation benchmarks are closely related to the operations of actual reactors at near-safety-critical conditions, as opposed to being more fundamental-physics benchmarks. This paper presents recommendations for the effective design and use of code verification benchmarks based on manufactured solutions, classical analytical solutions, and highly accurate numerical solutions. In addition, this paper presents recommendations for the design and use of validation benchmarks, highlighting the careful design of building-block experiments, the estimation of experimental measurement uncertainty for both inputs and outputs to the code, validation metrics, and the role of model calibration in validation. It is argued that the understanding of predictive capability of a computational model is built on the level of

Monitoring and verification R and D

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pilat, Joseph F.; Budlong-Sylvester, Kory W.; Fearey, Bryan L.

2011-01-01

The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) report outlined the Administration's approach to promoting the agenda put forward by President Obama in Prague on April 5, 2009. The NPR calls for a national monitoring and verification R and D program to meet future challenges arising from the Administration's nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament agenda. Verification of a follow-on to New START could have to address warheads and possibly components along with delivery capabilities. Deeper cuts and disarmament would need to address all of these elements along with nuclear weapon testing, nuclear material and weapon production facilities, virtual capabilities from old weapon and existing energy programs and undeclared capabilities. We only know how to address some elements of these challenges today, and the requirements may be more rigorous in the context of deeper cuts as well as disarmament. Moreover, there is a critical need for multiple options to sensitive problems and to address other challenges. There will be other verification challenges in a world of deeper cuts and disarmament, some of which we are already facing. At some point, if the reductions process is progressing, uncertainties about past nuclear materials and weapons production will have to be addressed. IAEA safeguards will need to continue to evolve to meet current and future challenges, and to take advantage of new technologies and approaches. Transparency/verification of nuclear and dual-use exports will also have to be addressed, and there will be a need to make nonproliferation measures more watertight and transparent. In this context, and recognizing we will face all of these challenges even if disarmament is not achieved, this paper will explore possible agreements and arrangements; verification challenges; gaps in monitoring and verification technologies and approaches; and the R and D required to address these gaps and other monitoring and verification challenges.

Verification of the Correctness and Completeness of Nuclear Operators' Declarations by Euratom

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Meylemans, P.; Szymanski, P.; Synetos, S.; Beuseling, P.; Jirsa, P.; Ciccarello, S.; Kilb, W.; Klumpp, P.; Schwalbach, P.; Schoop, K.; Koutsoyannopoulos, C.; Lahogue, Y.; Persson, L.; Coadou, J.; Koehne, W.; Kahnmeyer, W.; Dratschmidt, H.; Thomas, M.; Lahogue-Incerti, M.; )

2015-01-01

We present the Euratom nuclear safeguards system, a supranational system used to verify the operators' and States' (when required by the Additional Protocol) declarations. The verifications performed by the European Commission serve to conclude on the nondiversion of the civil stocks of nuclear materials in the territories of EU Member States (Article 77a Euratom Treaty) and to fulfil obligations stemming from nuclear cooperation agreements with third States and international organizations such as the IAEA (Article 77b). In line with multilateral safeguards agreements and their respective additional protocols, as well as under the New Partnership Approach, Euratom works closely with the IAEA in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of efforts while maintaining the ability of both organizations to reach independent conclusions. In our paper the focus lies on the verifications performed before transmitting data to the IAEA. Starting from the sheer volume of data we describe checks and other operations performed (e.g., format adaptations) on the nuclear material accountancy (NMAC) data and Additional Protocol declarations; including quality assurance measures. We also present some statistics on the related workload, including answering queries from the IAEA. We describe the IT tools developed by Euratom for nuclear operators to submit their declarations and which are subsequently verified by Euratom before being transmitted to the IAEA. Moreover, we present support activities aiming at improving the operators' NMAC systems such as audits (including audits of measurement systems). We conclude by presenting the challenges lying ahead and ways to address them to further strengthen and improve the quality of the Euratom work and cooperation with the IAEA. (author)

Canada and international safeguards. Verifying nuclear non-proliferation. Verification brochure no. 5

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1990-01-01

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970 and now has about 140 signatory nations. By creating legal barriers against proliferation and by promoting an international non-proliferation ethic, the NPT has promoted international peace and security. A key ingredient has been the confidence generated through verification by IAEA safeguards. By the end of 1988 IAEA safeguards agreements had been concluded with about 100 countries, including Canada. Over 500 nuclear facilities worldwide are under safeguards or contain safeguarded nuclear material. The existence of this credible and effective safeguards system makes international trade in nuclear equipment and materials possible, monitoring the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries as well as between industrial countries. Canada is committed to non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards. Canadian non-proliferation policy is among the strictest in the world, even though opportunities have been lost to sell Canadian technology abroad as a result.

Disarmament Verification - the OPCW Experience

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lodding, J.

2010-01-01

The Chemical Weapons Convention is the only multilateral treaty that bans completely an entire category of weapons of mass destruction under international verification arrangements. Possessor States, i.e. those that have chemical weapons stockpiles at the time of becoming party to the CWC, commit to destroying these. All States undertake never to acquire chemical weapons and not to help other States acquire such weapons. The CWC foresees time-bound chemical disarmament. The deadlines for destruction for early entrants to the CWC are provided in the treaty. For late entrants, the Conference of States Parties intervenes to set destruction deadlines. One of the unique features of the CWC is thus the regime for verifying destruction of chemical weapons. But how can you design a system for verification at military sites, while protecting military restricted information? What degree of assurance is considered sufficient in such circumstances? How do you divide the verification costs? How do you deal with production capability and initial declarations of existing stockpiles? The founders of the CWC had to address these and other challenges in designing the treaty. Further refinement of the verification system has followed since the treaty opened for signature in 1993 and since inspection work was initiated following entry-into-force of the treaty in 1997. Most of this work concerns destruction at the two large possessor States, Russia and the United States. Perhaps some of the lessons learned from the OPCW experience may be instructive in a future verification regime for nuclear weapons. (author)

Verification of Chemical Weapons Destruction

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lodding, J.

2010-01-01

The Chemical Weapons Convention is the only multilateral treaty that bans completely an entire category of weapons of mass destruction under international verification arrangements. Possessor States, i.e. those that have chemical weapons stockpiles at the time of becoming party to the CWC, commit to destroying these. All States undertake never to acquire chemical weapons and not to help other States acquire such weapons. The CWC foresees time-bound chemical disarmament. The deadlines for destruction for early entrants to the CWC are provided in the treaty. For late entrants, the Conference of States Parties intervenes to set destruction deadlines. One of the unique features of the CWC is thus the regime for verifying destruction of chemical weapons. But how can you design a system for verification at military sites, while protecting military restricted information? What degree of assurance is considered sufficient in such circumstances? How do you divide the verification costs? How do you deal with production capability and initial declarations of existing stockpiles? The founders of the CWC had to address these and other challenges in designing the treaty. Further refinement of the verification system has followed since the treaty opened for signature in 1993 and since inspection work was initiated following entry-into-force of the treaty in 1997. Most of this work concerns destruction at the two large possessor States, Russia and the United States. Perhaps some of the lessons learned from the OPCW experience may be instructive in a future verification regime for nuclear weapons. (author)

Verification and software validation for nuclear instrumentation; Verificacion y validacion de software para instrumentacion nuclear

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Gaytan G, E. [ININ, Carretera Mexico-Toluca s/n, 52750 Ocoyoacac, Estado de Mexico (Mexico); Salgado G, J. R. [Comision Nacional de Seguridad Nuclear y Salvaguardias, Dr. Barragan No. 779, Col. Narvarte, 03020 Mexico D. F. (Mexico); De Andrade O, E. [Universidad Federal de Rio de Janeiro, Caixa Postal 68509, 21945-970 Rio de Janeiro (Brazil); Ramirez G, A., E-mail: elvira.gaytan@inin.gob.mx [Comision Federal de Electricidad, Gerencia de Centrales Nucleoelectricas, Alto Lucero, Veracruz (Mexico)

2014-10-15

In this work is presented a Verification Methodology and Software Validation, to be applied in instruments of nuclear use with associate software. This methodology was developed under the auspices of IAEA, through the regional projects RLA4022 (ARCAL XCIX) and RLA1011 (RLA CXXIII), led by Mexico. In the first project three plans and three procedures were elaborated taking into consideration IEEE standards, and in the second project these documents were updated considering ISO and IEC standards. The developed methodology has been distributed to the participant countries of Latin America in the ARCAL projects and two related courses have been imparted with the participation of several countries, and participating institutions of Mexico like Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Nucleares (ININ), Comision Federal de Electricidad (CFE) and Comision Nacional de Seguridad Nuclear y Salvaguardias (CNSNS). In the ININ due to the necessity to work with Software Quality Guarantee in systems for the nuclear power plant of the CFE, a Software Quality Guarantee Plan and five procedures were developed in the year 2004, obtaining the qualification of the ININ for software development for the nuclear power plant of CFE. These first documents were developed taking like reference IEEE standards and regulator guides of NRC, being the first step for the development of the methodology. (Author)

Nuclear cooperation targets global challenges. States back main pillars of the IAEA's work to strengthen nuclear safety, verification and technology transfer

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

States meeting at the 44th IAEA General Conference in Vienna have set a challenging agenda for international nuclear cooperation into the 21st century that targets issues of global safety, security, and sustainable development. They adopted resolutions endorsing the Agency's programmes for strengthening activities under its three main pillars of work - nuclear verification, safety, and technology - that are closely linked to major challenges before the world. The document presents the main actions taken during the conference

Reload core safety verification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Svetlik, M.; Minarcin, M.

2003-01-01

This paper presents a brief look at the process of reload core safety evaluation and verification in Slovak Republic. It gives an overview of experimental verification of selected nuclear parameters in the course of physics testing during reactor start-up. The comparison of IAEA recommendations and testing procedures at Slovak and European nuclear power plants of similar design is included. An introduction of two level criteria for evaluation of tests represents an effort to formulate the relation between safety evaluation and measured values (Authors)

Verification and validation of software related to nuclear power plant control and instrumentation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wall, N.; Kossilov, A.

1994-01-01

There has always been significant concern with introduction of software in industry and the nuclear industry is no different from any other sector save its safety demands are some of the most onerous. The problems associated with software have led to the well documented difficulties in the introduction of computer based systems. An important area of concern with software in systems is the processes of Verification and Validation. One of the many activities the IAEA is currently engaged in is the preparation of a document on the process of verification and validation of software. The document follows the safety classification of IEC 1226 but includes software important to plant operation to establish three levels of assurance. The software that might be deployed on a plant was then identified as one of four types: new software, existing software for which full access to the code and documentation is possible, existing software of a proprietary nature and finally configurable software. The document attempts to identify the appropriate methods and tools for conducting the verification and validation processes. (author). 5 refs, 5 figs, 7 tabs

A method of knowledge base verification for nuclear power plant expert systems using extended Petri Nets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kwon, I. W.; Seong, P. H.

1996-01-01

The adoption of expert systems mainly as operator supporting systems is becoming increasingly popular as the control algorithms of system become more and more sophisticated and complicated. The verification phase of knowledge base is an important part for developing reliable expert systems, especially in nuclear industry. Although several strategies or tools have been developed to perform potential error checking, they often neglect the reliability of verification methods. Because a Petri net provides a uniform mathematical formalization of knowledge base, it has been employed for knowledge base verification. In this work, we devise and suggest an automated tool, called COKEP(Checker of Knowledge base using Extended Petri net), for detecting incorrectness, inconsistency, and incompleteness in a knowledge base. The scope of the verification problem is expended to chained errors, unlike previous studies that assume error incidence to be limited to rule pairs only. In addition, we consider certainty factor in checking, because most of knowledge bases have certainly factors. 8 refs,. 2 figs,. 4 tabs. (author)

Verification and validation benchmarks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Oberkampf, William Louis; Trucano, Timothy Guy

2007-01-01

Verification and validation (V and V) are the primary means to assess the accuracy and reliability of computational simulations. V and V methods and procedures have fundamentally improved the credibility of simulations in several high-consequence fields, such as nuclear reactor safety, underground nuclear waste storage, and nuclear weapon safety. Although the terminology is not uniform across engineering disciplines, code verification deals with assessing the reliability of the software coding, and solution verification deals with assessing the numerical accuracy of the solution to a computational model. Validation addresses the physics modeling accuracy of a computational simulation by comparing the computational results with experimental data. Code verification benchmarks and validation benchmarks have been constructed for a number of years in every field of computational simulation. However, no comprehensive guidelines have been proposed for the construction and use of V and V benchmarks. For example, the field of nuclear reactor safety has not focused on code verification benchmarks, but it has placed great emphasis on developing validation benchmarks. Many of these validation benchmarks are closely related to the operations of actual reactors at near-safety-critical conditions, as opposed to being more fundamental-physics benchmarks. This paper presents recommendations for the effective design and use of code verification benchmarks based on manufactured solutions, classical analytical solutions, and highly accurate numerical solutions. In addition, this paper presents recommendations for the design and use of validation benchmarks, highlighting the careful design of building-block experiments, the estimation of experimental measurement uncertainty for both inputs and outputs to the code, validation metrics, and the role of model calibration in validation. It is argued that the understanding of predictive capability of a computational model is built on the

Verification and validation benchmarks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Oberkampf, William L.; Trucano, Timothy G.

2008-01-01

Verification and validation (V and V) are the primary means to assess the accuracy and reliability of computational simulations. V and V methods and procedures have fundamentally improved the credibility of simulations in several high-consequence fields, such as nuclear reactor safety, underground nuclear waste storage, and nuclear weapon safety. Although the terminology is not uniform across engineering disciplines, code verification deals with assessing the reliability of the software coding, and solution verification deals with assessing the numerical accuracy of the solution to a computational model. Validation addresses the physics modeling accuracy of a computational simulation by comparing the computational results with experimental data. Code verification benchmarks and validation benchmarks have been constructed for a number of years in every field of computational simulation. However, no comprehensive guidelines have been proposed for the construction and use of V and V benchmarks. For example, the field of nuclear reactor safety has not focused on code verification benchmarks, but it has placed great emphasis on developing validation benchmarks. Many of these validation benchmarks are closely related to the operations of actual reactors at near-safety-critical conditions, as opposed to being more fundamental-physics benchmarks. This paper presents recommendations for the effective design and use of code verification benchmarks based on manufactured solutions, classical analytical solutions, and highly accurate numerical solutions. In addition, this paper presents recommendations for the design and use of validation benchmarks, highlighting the careful design of building-block experiments, the estimation of experimental measurement uncertainty for both inputs and outputs to the code, validation metrics, and the role of model calibration in validation. It is argued that the understanding of predictive capability of a computational model is built on the

Independent tube verification and dynamic tracking in et inspection of nuclear steam generator

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Xiongzi, Li; Zhongxue, Gan; Lance, Fitzgibbons

2001-01-01

The full text follows. In the examination of pressure boundary tubes in steam generators of commercial pressurized water nuclear power plants (PWR's), it is critical to know exactly which particular tube is being accessed. There are no definitive landmarks or markings on the individual tubes. Today this is done manually, it is tedious, and interrupts the normal inspection work, and is difficult due to the presence of water on the tube surface, plug ends instead of tube openings in the field of view, and varying lighting quality. In order to eliminate the human error and increase the efficiency of operation, there is a need to identify tube position during the inspection process, independent of robot encoder position and motion. A process based on a Cognex MVS-8200 system and its application function package has been developed to independently identify tube locations. ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Power's Outage Services group, USPPL in collaboration with ABB Power Plant Laboratories' Advanced Computers and Controls department has developed a new vision-based Independent Tube Verification system (GENESIS-ITVS-TM ). The system employ's a model-based tube-shape detection algorithm and dynamic tracking methodology to detect the true tool position and its offsets from identified tube location. GENESIS-ITVS-TM is an automatic Independent Tube Verification System (ITVS). Independent tube verification is a tube validation technique using computer vision, and not using any robot position parameters. This process independently counts the tubes in the horizontal and vertical axes of the plane of the steam generator tube sheet as the work tool is moved. Thus it knows the true position in the steam generator, given a known starting point. This is analogous to the operator's method of counting tubes for verification, but it is automated. GENESIS-ITVS-TM works independent of the robot position, velocity, or acceleration. The tube position information is solely obtained from

Employing 3D Virtual Reality and the Unity Game Engine to Support Nuclear Verification Research

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Patton, T.

2015-01-01

This project centres on the development of a virtual nuclear facility environment to assist non-proliferation and nuclear arms control practitioners - including researchers, negotiators, or inspectors - in developing and refining a verification system and secure chain of custody of material or equipment. The platform for creating the virtual facility environment is the Unity 3D game engine. This advanced platform offers both the robust capability and flexibility necessary to support the design goals of the facility. The project also employs Trimble SketchUp and Blender 3D for constructing the model components. The development goal of this phase of the project was to generate a virtual environment that includes basic physics in which avatars can interact with their environment through actions such as picking up objects, operating vehicles, dismantling a warhead through a spherical representation system, opening/closing doors through a custom security access system, and conducting CCTV surveillance. Initial testing of virtual radiation simulation techniques was also explored in preparation for the next phase of development. Some of the eventual utilities and applications for this platform include: 1. conducting live multi-person exercises of verification activities within a single, shared virtual environment, 2. refining procedures, individual roles, and equipment placement in the contexts of non-proliferation or arms control negotiations 3. hands on training for inspectors, and 4. a portable tool/reference for inspectors to use while carrying out inspections. This project was developed under the Multilateral Verification Project, led by the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) in the United Kingdom, and financed by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The environment was constructed at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP). (author)

A hybrid approach to quantify software reliability in nuclear safety systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Arun Babu, P.; Senthil Kumar, C.; Murali, N.

2012-01-01

Highlights: ► A novel method to quantify software reliability using software verification and mutation testing in nuclear safety systems. ► Contributing factors that influence software reliability estimate. ► Approach to help regulators verify the reliability of safety critical software system during software licensing process. -- Abstract: Technological advancements have led to the use of computer based systems in safety critical applications. As computer based systems are being introduced in nuclear power plants, effective and efficient methods are needed to ensure dependability and compliance to high reliability requirements of systems important to safety. Even after several years of research, quantification of software reliability remains controversial and unresolved issue. Also, existing approaches have assumptions and limitations, which are not acceptable for safety applications. This paper proposes a theoretical approach combining software verification and mutation testing to quantify the software reliability in nuclear safety systems. The theoretical results obtained suggest that the software reliability depends on three factors: the test adequacy, the amount of software verification carried out and the reusability of verified code in the software. The proposed approach may help regulators in licensing computer based safety systems in nuclear reactors.

Verification of failover effects from distributed control system communication networks in digitalized nuclear power plants

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Min, Moon Gi; Lee, Jae Ki; Lee, Kwang Hyun; Lee, Dong Il; Lim, Hee Taek [Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Co., Ltd, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2017-08-15

Distributed Control System (DCS) communication networks, which use Fast Ethernet with redundant networks for the transmission of information, have been installed in digitalized nuclear power plants. Normally, failover tests are performed to verify the reliability of redundant networks during design and manufacturing phases; however, systematic integrity tests of DCS networks cannot be fully performed during these phases because all relevant equipment is not installed completely during these two phases. In additions, practical verification tests are insufficient, and there is a need to test the actual failover function of DCS redundant networks in the target environment. The purpose of this study is to verify that the failover functions works correctly in certain abnormal conditions during installation and commissioning phase and identify the influence of network failover on the entire DCS. To quantify the effects of network failover in the DCS, the packets (Protocol Data Units) must be collected and resource usage of the system has to be monitored and analyzed. This study introduces the use of a new methodology for verification of DCS network failover during the installation and commissioning phases. This study is expected to provide insight into verification methodology and the failover effects from DCS redundant networks. It also provides test results of network performance from DCS network failover in digitalized domestic nuclear power plants (NPPs)

Verification and validation as an integral part of the development of digital systems for nuclear applications

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Straker, E.A.; Thomas, N.C.

1983-01-01

The nuclear industry's current attitude toward verification and validation (V and V) is realized through the experiences gained to date. On the basis of these experiences, V and V can effectively be applied as an integral part of digital system development for nuclear electric power applications. An overview of a typical approach for integrating V and V with system development is presented. This approach represents a balance between V and V as applied in the aerospace industry and the standard practice commonly applied within the nuclear industry today

Development of a consensus standard for verification and validation of nuclear system thermal-fluids software

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Harvego, Edwin A.; Schultz, Richard R.; Crane, Ryan L.

2011-01-01

With the resurgence of nuclear power and increased interest in advanced nuclear reactors as an option to supply abundant energy without the associated greenhouse gas emissions of the more conventional fossil fuel energy sources, there is a need to establish internationally recognized standards for the verification and validation (V and V) of software used to calculate the thermal–hydraulic behavior of advanced reactor designs for both normal operation and hypothetical accident conditions. To address this need, ASME (American Society of Mechanical Engineers) Standards and Certification has established the V and V 30 Committee, under the jurisdiction of the V and V Standards Committee, to develop a consensus standard for verification and validation of software used for design and analysis of advanced reactor systems. The initial focus of this committee will be on the V and V of system analysis and computational fluid dynamics (CFD) software for nuclear applications. To limit the scope of the effort, the committee will further limit its focus to software to be used in the licensing of High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactors. Although software verification will be an important and necessary part of the standard, much of the initial effort of the committee will be focused on the validation of existing software and new models that could be used in the licensing process. In this framework, the Standard should conform to Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and other regulatory practices, procedures and methods for licensing of nuclear power plants as embodied in the United States (U.S.) Code of Federal Regulations and other pertinent documents such as Regulatory Guide 1.203, “Transient and Accident Analysis Methods” and NUREG-0800, “NRC Standard Review Plan”. In addition, the Standard should be consistent with applicable sections of ASME NQA-1-2008 “Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Facility Applications (QA)”. This paper describes the general

Report Of The Workshop On Nuclear Facility Design Information Examination And Verification For Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Metcalf, Richard; Bean, Robert

2009-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements nuclear safeguards and verifies countries are compliant with their international nuclear safeguards agreements. One of the key provisions in the safeguards agreement is the requirement that the country provide nuclear facility design and operating information to the IAEA relevant to safeguarding the facility, and at a very early stage. , This provides the opportunity for the IAEA to verify the safeguards-relevant features of the facility and to periodically ensure that those features have not changed. The national authorities (State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) provide the design information for all facilities within a country to the IAEA. The design information is conveyed using the IAEA's Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) and specifies: (1) Identification of the facility's general character, purpose, capacity, and location; (2) Description of the facility's layout and nuclear material form, location, and flow; (3) Description of the features relating to nuclear material accounting, containment, and surveillance; and (4) Description of existing and proposed procedures for nuclear material accounting and control, with identification of nuclear material balance areas. The DIQ is updated as required by written addendum. IAEA safeguards inspectors examine and verify this information in design information examination (DIE) and design information verification (DIV) activities to confirm that the facility has been constructed or is being operated as declared by the facility operator and national authorities, and to develop a suitable safeguards approach. Under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the National Nuclear Security Administrations (NNSA) Office of Non-Proliferation and International Security identified the need for more effective and efficient verification of design information by the IAEA for improving international safeguards in the future

Application of Integrated Verification Approach to FPGA-based Safety-Critical I and C System of Nuclear Power Plant

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Ahmed, Ibrahim; Heo, Gyunyoung [Kyunghee Univ., Yongin (Korea, Republic of); Jung, Jaecheon [KEPCO, Ulsan (Korea, Republic of)

2016-10-15

Safety-critical instrumentation and control (I and C) system in nuclear power plant (NPP) implemented on programmable logic controllers (PLCs) plays a vital role in safe operation of the plant. The challenges such as fast obsolescence, the vulnerability to cyber-attack, and other related issues of software systems have currently led to the consideration of field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) as an alternative to PLCs because of their advantages and hardware related benefits. Generally in FPGA design verification, the designers make use of verification techniques by writing the test benches which involved various stages of verification activities of register-transfer level (RTL), gate-level, and place and route. Writing the test benches is considerably time consuming and require a lot of efforts to achieve a satisfied desire results. Furthermore, performing the verification at each stage is a major bottleneck and demanded much activities and time. In addition, verification is conceivably, the most difficult and complicated aspect of any design. Therefore, in view of these, this work applied an integrated verification approach to the verification of FPGA-based I and C system in NPP that simultaneously verified the whole design modules using MATLAB/Simulink HDL Co-simulation models. Verification is conceivably, the most difficult and complicated aspect of any design, and an FPGA design is not an exception. Therefore, in this work, we introduced and discussed how an application of integrated verification technique to the verification and testing of FPGA-based I and C system design in NPP can facilitate the verification processes, and verify the entire design modules of the system simultaneously using MATLAB/Simulink HDL co-simulation models. In conclusion, the results showed that, the integrated verification approach through MATLAB/Simulink models, if applied to any design to be verified, could speed up the design verification and reduce the V and V tasks.

Application of Integrated Verification Approach to FPGA-based Safety-Critical I and C System of Nuclear Power Plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ahmed, Ibrahim; Heo, Gyunyoung; Jung, Jaecheon

2016-01-01

Safety-critical instrumentation and control (I and C) system in nuclear power plant (NPP) implemented on programmable logic controllers (PLCs) plays a vital role in safe operation of the plant. The challenges such as fast obsolescence, the vulnerability to cyber-attack, and other related issues of software systems have currently led to the consideration of field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) as an alternative to PLCs because of their advantages and hardware related benefits. Generally in FPGA design verification, the designers make use of verification techniques by writing the test benches which involved various stages of verification activities of register-transfer level (RTL), gate-level, and place and route. Writing the test benches is considerably time consuming and require a lot of efforts to achieve a satisfied desire results. Furthermore, performing the verification at each stage is a major bottleneck and demanded much activities and time. In addition, verification is conceivably, the most difficult and complicated aspect of any design. Therefore, in view of these, this work applied an integrated verification approach to the verification of FPGA-based I and C system in NPP that simultaneously verified the whole design modules using MATLAB/Simulink HDL Co-simulation models. Verification is conceivably, the most difficult and complicated aspect of any design, and an FPGA design is not an exception. Therefore, in this work, we introduced and discussed how an application of integrated verification technique to the verification and testing of FPGA-based I and C system design in NPP can facilitate the verification processes, and verify the entire design modules of the system simultaneously using MATLAB/Simulink HDL co-simulation models. In conclusion, the results showed that, the integrated verification approach through MATLAB/Simulink models, if applied to any design to be verified, could speed up the design verification and reduce the V and V tasks

Design and verification of computer-based reactor control system modification at Bruce-A candu nuclear generating station

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Basu, S.; Webb, N.

1995-01-01

The Reactor Control System at Bruce-A Nuclear Generating Station is going through some design modifications, which involve a rigorous design process including independent verification and validation. The design modification includes changes to the control logic, alarms and annunciation, hardware and software. The design (and verification) process includes design plan, design requirements, hardware and software specifications, hardware and software design, testing, technical review, safety evaluation, reliability analysis, failure mode and effect analysis, environmental qualification, seismic qualification, software quality assurance, system validation, documentation update, configuration management, and final acceptance. (7 figs.)

Quality verification at Arkansas Nuclear One using performance-based concepts

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cooper, R.M.

1990-01-01

Performance-based auditing is beginning to make an impact within the nuclear industry. Its use provides performance assessments of the operating plant. In the past, this company along with most other nuclear utilities, performed compliance-based audits. These audits focused on paper reviews of past activities that were completed in weeks or months. This type of audit did not provide a comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness of an activity's performance, nor was it able to identify any performance problems that may have occurred. To respond to this discrepancy, a comprehensive overhaul of quality assurance (QA) assessment programs was developed. The first major change was to develop a technical specification (tech spec) audit program, with the objective of auditing each tech spec line item every 5 yr. To achieve performance-based results within the tech spec audit program, a tech spec surveillance program was implemented whose goal is to observe 75% of the tech-spec required tests every 5 yr. The next major change was to develop a QA surveillance program that would provide surveillance coverage for the remainder of the plant not covered by the tech spec surveillance program. One other improvement was to merge the QA/quality control (QC) functions into one nuclear quality group. The final part of the quality verification effort is trending of the quality performance-based data (including US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) violations)

Helping Your Heart with Nuclear Imaging

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Madsen, Michael Amdi

2014-01-01

The IAEA is helping in the fight against cardiovascular diseases (CVDs) by assisting its Member States in using nuclear science and technology to track and monitor CVDs. Nuclear imaging techniques allow doctors to look inside a patient’s body and see how organs function without running the risk of surgery. CVDs kill more people than just about anything else on the planet. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that roughly 30 per cent of all deaths in 2008 were caused by CVDs. That number is increasing, and by 2030 the WHO estimates that more than 23 million people will die annually from CVDs. For comparison, that is equivalent to roughly the entire population of a medium-sized country

Some major challenges: Nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear arms control and nuclear terrorism. Vienna, 29 October 2001. Statement to the symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2001-01-01

The main topics dealt with the ensuring of an effective, universal and adequately financed system for the verification of nuclear non-proliferation, namely as follows: Effectiveness of the system; Participation in the system ; Financing of the system; Making Progress in Nuclear Arms Control; Protection Against Nuclear Terrorism. In the Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) for 2000, the Agency was able to conclude that for all 140 states with safeguards agreements in place the nuclear material and other items placed under safeguards remained in peaceful nuclear activities or were otherwise adequately accounted for. The Agency currently safeguards over 900 facilities in 70 countries on a regular safeguards budget of approximately US $80 million per year. Turning to the major recent challenge, protection against nuclear terrorism, the IAEA has long been active in encouraging States to make security an integral part of the management of their nuclear programmes. The recent attacks in the United States were, however, a wake-up call to all that more can and must be done. In the week immediately following the tragedy, the IAEA General Conference adopted a resolution which requested a thorough review of Agency activities and programmes relevant to preventing acts of nuclear terrorism

Preparation of Input Deck to analyze the Nuclear Power Plant for the Use of Regulatory Verification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kang, Doo Hyuk; Kim, Hyung Seok; Suh, Jae Seung; Ahn, Seung Hoon

2009-01-01

The objectives of this paper are to make out the input deck that analyzes a nuclear power plant for the use of regulatory verification and to produce its calculation note. We have been maintained the input deck of T/H safety codes used in existing domestic reactors to ensure independent and accurate regulatory verification for the thermal-hydraulic safety analysis in domestic NPPs. This paper is mainly divided into two steps: first step is to compare existing input deck to the calculation note in order to verify the consistency. Next step is to model 3-dimensional reactor pressure vessel using MULTID component instead of the 1D existing input deck

Verification of MCNP6.2 for Nuclear Criticality Safety Applications

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Brown, Forrest B. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Rising, Michael Evan [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Alwin, Jennifer Louise [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2017-05-10

Several suites of verification/validation benchmark problems were run in early 2017 to verify that the new production release of MCNP6.2 performs correctly for nuclear criticality safety applications (NCS). MCNP6.2 results for several NCS validation suites were compared to the results from MCNP6.1 [1] and MCNP6.1.1 [2]. MCNP6.1 is the production version of MCNP® released in 2013, and MCNP6.1.1 is the update released in 2014. MCNP6.2 includes all of the standard features for NCS calculations that have been available for the past 15 years, along with new features for sensitivity-uncertainty based methods for NCS validation [3]. Results from the benchmark suites were compared with results from previous verification testing [4-8]. Criticality safety analysts should consider testing MCNP6.2 on their particular problems and validation suites. No further development of MCNP5 is planned. MCNP6.1 is now 4 years old, and MCNP6.1.1 is now 3 years old. In general, released versions of MCNP are supported only for about 5 years, due to resource limitations. All future MCNP improvements, bug fixes, user support, and new capabilities are targeted only to MCNP6.2 and beyond.

Highlights of the IAEA scientific forum: Nuclear science: Physics helping the world

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Richter, B.

2005-01-01

The conclusions drawn at the Scientific Forum during the 49th regular Session of the IAEA General Conference entitled 'Nuclear Physics: Helping the World' are as follows. Physics is indeed helping the world and the IAEA, applications of nuclear are continuing to grow, nuclear power is likely to increase dramatically, work on 'Beyond Kyoto' should begin and nuclear should be part of any 'Clean Development Mechanism'. IAEA should look again at the role of R and D in safeguards, IAEA should look at safety issues in newly nuclear countries, internationalizing the fuel cycle is right IF one can do it

Numerical verification of equilibrium chemistry software within nuclear fuel performance codes

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Piro, M.H.; Lewis, B.J.; Thompson, W.T.; Simunovic, S.; Besmann, T.M.

2010-01-01

A numerical tool is in an advanced state of development to compute the equilibrium compositions of phases and their proportions in multi-component systems of importance to the nuclear industry. The resulting software is being conceived for direct integration into large multi-physics fuel performance codes, particularly for providing transport source terms, material properties, and boundary conditions in heat and mass transport modules. Consequently, any numerical errors produced in equilibrium chemistry computations will be propagated in subsequent heat and mass transport calculations, thus falsely predicting nuclear fuel behaviour. The necessity for a reliable method to numerically verify chemical equilibrium computations is emphasized by the requirement to handle the very large number of elements necessary to capture the entire fission product inventory. A simple, reliable and comprehensive numerical verification method called the Gibbs Criteria is presented which can be invoked by any equilibrium chemistry solver for quality assurance purposes. (author)

Report on the INMM Workshop on preparing for nuclear arms reductions to address technical transparency and verification challenges

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dreicer, M.; Dalnoki-Veress, F.; Lewis, P.

2013-01-01

In May 2011, a workshop was held to develop broader awareness of the technical and operational challenges that could be used to enhance effective transparency and/or verification in the medium to long-term. Building confidence in a broader multi-lateral engagement scenario adds even greater challenges than the traditional bi-lateral approaches. The multi-disciplinary group that attended included decision-makers needing to understand present and possible future technical capabilities, and the technical community needing clearer definition of possible requirements and operational constraints. In additional to traditional presentations, the group conducted an exercise to stimulate new perspectives on verification requirements for a scenario based on nuclear arms reductions at very low numbers of nuclear weapons. The workshop participants were divided into two groups and asked to explore the political and technical requirements needed for States to move towards significant arms reductions. Using a technique called 'back-casting' participants were asked to imagine a world without nuclear weapons and describe what would be needed to achieve levels of one thousand, one hundred, ten, and ultimately zero weapons in the world. Most participants agreed that a strong political commitment will be necessary and that complete disarmament will only be possible if states are convinced that nuclear weapons serve no purpose. Both groups believed that a time period of greater instability would be encountered when moving from 1000 to 100 nuclear weapons and that it would be imperative to accelerate quickly through this period. The group discussed the need to have an international body monitor the disarmament process to maintain legitimacy for the international community. One possibility could be the development of an intergovernmental panel on verification and disarmament to monitor and facilitate disarmament. The groups recognized the problem of fissile material disposition after

A formal design verification and validation on the human factors of a computerized information system in nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lee, Yong Hee; Park, Jae Chang; Cheon, Se Woo; Jung, Kwang Tae; Baek, Seung Min; Han, Seung; Park, Hee Suk; Son, Ki Chang; Kim, Jung Man; Jung Yung Woo

1999-11-01

This report describe a technical transfer under the title of ''A formal design verification and validation on the human factors of a computerized information system in nuclear power plants''. Human factors requirements for the information system designs are extracted from various regulatory and industrial standards and guidelines, and interpreted into a more specific procedures and checklists for verifying the satisfaction of those requirements. A formalized implementation plan is established for human factors verification and validation of a computerized information system in nuclear power plants. Additionally, a Computer support system, named as DIMS-web (design Issue Management System), is developed based upon web internet environment so as to enhance the implementation of the human factors activities. DIMS-Web has three maine functions: supporting requirements review, tracking design issues, and management if issues screening evaluation. DIMS-Web shows its benefits in practice through a trial application to the design review of CFMS for YGN nuclear unit 5 and 6. (author)

A formal design verification and validation on the human factors of a computerized information system in nuclear power plants

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lee, Yong Hee; Park, Jae Chang; Cheon, Se Woo; Jung, Kwang Tae; Baek, Seung Min; Han, Seung; Park, Hee Suk; Son, Ki Chang; Kim, Jung Man; Jung Yung Woo

1999-11-01

This report describe a technical transfer under the title of ''A formal design verification and validation on the human factors of a computerized information system in nuclear power plants''. Human factors requirements for the information system designs are extracted from various regulatory and industrial standards and guidelines, and interpreted into a more specific procedures and checklists for verifying the satisfaction of those requirements. A formalized implementation plan is established for human factors verification and validation of a computerized information system in nuclear power plants. Additionally, a Computer support system, named as DIMS-web (design Issue Management System), is developed based upon web internet environment so as to enhance the implementation of the human factors activities. DIMS-Web has three maine functions: supporting requirements review, tracking design issues, and management if issues screening evaluation. DIMS-Web shows its benefits in practice through a trial application to the design review of CFMS for YGN nuclear unit 5 and 6. (author)

Guidelines for verification and validation of software related to nuclear power plant control and instrumentation. Working material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1993-01-01

The main purpose of the consultancy organized by the IAEA and held form 6 to 10 September 1993 was to prepare an extended outline of a new technical document in which a current status of Verification and Validation of software related to NPP I and C systems and guidance on the practical use of Verification and Validation methods for solving special problems in design, operation and maintenance of nuclear power plants are to be presented. The present volume contains: (1) report of the meeting; (2) reports presented by the national delegates; and (3) technical draft document. Ref and figs

Verification and the safeguards legacy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Perricos, Demetrius

2001-01-01

A number of inspection or monitoring systems throughout the world over the last decades have been structured drawing upon the IAEA experience of setting up and operating its safeguards system. The first global verification system was born with the creation of the IAEA safeguards system, about 35 years ago. With the conclusion of the NPT in 1968, inspections were to be performed under safeguards agreements, concluded directly between the IAEA and non-nuclear weapon states parties to the Treaty. The IAEA developed the safeguards system within the limitations reflected in the Blue Book (INFCIRC 153), such as limitations of routine access by the inspectors to 'strategic points', including 'key measurement points', and the focusing of verification on declared nuclear material in declared installations. The system, based as it was on nuclear material accountancy. It was expected to detect a diversion of nuclear material with a high probability and within a given time and therefore determine also that there had been no diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes. The most vital element of any verification system is the inspector. Technology can assist but cannot replace the inspector in the field. Their experience, knowledge, intuition and initiative are invaluable factors contributing to the success of any inspection regime. The IAEA inspectors are however not part of an international police force that will intervene to prevent a violation taking place. To be credible they should be technically qualified with substantial experience in industry or in research and development before they are recruited. An extensive training program has to make sure that the inspectors retain their professional capabilities and that it provides them with new skills. Over the years, the inspectors and through them the safeguards verification system gained experience in: organization and management of large teams; examination of records and evaluation of material balances

REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON NUCLEAR FACILITY DESIGN INFORMATION EXAMINATION AND VERIFICATION FOR SAFEGUARDS

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Richard Metcalf; Robert Bean

2009-10-01

Executive Summary The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements nuclear safeguards and verifies countries are compliant with their international nuclear safeguards agreements. One of the key provisions in the safeguards agreement is the requirement that the country provide nuclear facility design and operating information to the IAEA relevant to safeguarding the facility, and at a very early stage. , This provides the opportunity for the IAEA to verify the safeguards-relevant features of the facility and to periodically ensure that those features have not changed. The national authorities (State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) provide the design information for all facilities within a country to the IAEA. The design information is conveyed using the IAEA’s Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) and specifies: (1) Identification of the facility’s general character, purpose, capacity, and location; (2) Description of the facility’s layout and nuclear material form, location, and flow; (3) Description of the features relating to nuclear material accounting, containment, and surveillance; and (4) Description of existing and proposed procedures for nuclear material accounting and control, with identification of nuclear material balance areas. The DIQ is updated as required by written addendum. IAEA safeguards inspectors examine and verify this information in design information examination (DIE) and design information verification (DIV) activities to confirm that the facility has been constructed or is being operated as declared by the facility operator and national authorities, and to develop a suitable safeguards approach. Under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the National Nuclear Security Administrations (NNSA) Office of Non-Proliferation and International Security identified the need for more effective and efficient verification of design information by the IAEA for improving international safeguards

Technical challenges for dismantlement verification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Olinger, C.T.; Stanbro, W.D.; Johnston, R.G.; Nakhleh, C.W.; Dreicer, J.S.

1997-01-01

In preparation for future nuclear arms reduction treaties, including any potential successor treaties to START I and II, the authors have been examining possible methods for bilateral warhead dismantlement verification. Warhead dismantlement verification raises significant challenges in the political, legal, and technical arenas. This discussion will focus on the technical issues raised by warhead arms controls. Technical complications arise from several sources. These will be discussed under the headings of warhead authentication, chain-of-custody, dismantlement verification, non-nuclear component tracking, component monitoring, and irreversibility. The authors will discuss possible technical options to address these challenges as applied to a generic dismantlement and disposition process, in the process identifying limitations and vulnerabilities. They expect that these considerations will play a large role in any future arms reduction effort and, therefore, should be addressed in a timely fashion

A New Approach to Nuclear Warhead Verification Using a Zero-Knowledge Protocol

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Glaser,; Alexander, [Princeton University

2012-05-16

Warhead verification systems proposed to date fundamentally rely on the use of information barriers to prevent the release of classified design information. Measurements with information carriers significantly increase the complexity of inspection systems, make their certification and authentication difficult, and may reduce the overall confidence in the verifiability of future arms- control agreements. This talk presents a proof-of-concept of a new approach to nuclear warhead verification that minimizes the role of information barriers from the outset and envisions instead an inspection system that a priori avoids leakage of sensitive information using a so-called zero-knowledge protocol. The proposed inspection system is based on the template-matching approach and relies on active interrogation of a test object with 14-MeV neutrons. The viability of the method is examined with MCNP Monte Carlo neutron transport calculations modeling the experimental setup, an investigation of different diversion scenarios, and an analysis of the simulated data showing that it does not contain information about the properties of the inspected object.

The design of verification regimes

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gallagher, N.W.

1991-01-01

Verification of a nuclear agreement requires more than knowledge of relevant technologies and institutional arrangements. It also demands thorough understanding of the nature of verification and the politics of verification design. Arms control efforts have been stymied in the past because key players agreed to verification in principle, only to disagree radically over verification in practice. In this chapter, it is shown that the success and stability of arms control endeavors can be undermined by verification designs which promote unilateral rather than cooperative approaches to security, and which may reduce, rather than enhance, the security of both sides. Drawing on logical analysis and practical lessons from previous superpower verification experience, this chapter summarizes the logic and politics of verification and suggests implications for South Asia. The discussion begins by determining what properties all forms of verification have in common, regardless of the participants or the substance and form of their agreement. Viewing verification as the political process of making decisions regarding the occurrence of cooperation points to four critical components: (1) determination of principles, (2) information gathering, (3) analysis and (4) projection. It is shown that verification arrangements differ primarily in regards to how effectively and by whom these four stages are carried out

DOE/LLNL verification symposium on technologies for monitoring nuclear tests related to weapons proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nakanishi, K.K.

1993-01-01

The rapidly changing world situation has raised concerns regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the ability to monitor a possible clandestine nuclear testing program. To address these issues, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's (LLNL) Treaty Verification Program sponsored a symposium funded by the US Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Arms Control, Division of Systems and Technology. The DOE/LLNL Symposium on Technologies for Monitoring Nuclear Tests Related to Weapons Proliferation was held at the DOE's Nevada Operations Office in Las Vegas, May 6--7,1992. This volume is a collection of several papers presented at the symposium. Several experts in monitoring technology presented invited talks assessing the status of monitoring technology with emphasis on the deficient areas requiring more attention in the future. In addition, several speakers discussed proliferation monitoring technologies being developed by the DOE's weapons laboratories

Transmutation Fuel Performance Code Thermal Model Verification

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Gregory K. Miller; Pavel G. Medvedev

2007-09-01

FRAPCON fuel performance code is being modified to be able to model performance of the nuclear fuels of interest to the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). The present report documents the effort for verification of the FRAPCON thermal model. It was found that, with minor modifications, FRAPCON thermal model temperature calculation agrees with that of the commercial software ABAQUS (Version 6.4-4). This report outlines the methodology of the verification, code input, and calculation results.

Experimental inventory verification system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Steverson, C.A.; Angerman, M.I.

1991-01-01

As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) goals and Department of Energy (DOE) inventory requirements are frequently in conflict at facilities across the DOE complex. The authors wish, on one hand, to verify the presence of correct amounts of nuclear materials that are in storage or in process; yet on the other hand, we wish to achieve ALARA goals by keeping individual and collective exposures as low as social, technical, economic, practical, and public policy considerations permit. The Experimental Inventory Verification System (EIVSystem) is a computer-based, camera-driven system that utilizes image processing technology to detect change in vault areas. Currently in the test and evaluation phase at Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, this system guards personnel. The EIVSystem continually monitors the vault, providing proof of changed status for objects sorted within the vault. This paper reports that these data could provide the basis for reducing inventory requirements when no change has occurred, thus helping implement ALARA policy; the data will also help describe there target area of an inventory when change has been shown to occur

Verification and validation of the safety parameter display system for nuclear power plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zhang Yuanfang

1993-05-01

During the design and development phase of the safety parameter display system for nuclear power plant, a verification and validation (V and V) plan has been implemented to improve the quality of system design. The V and V activities are briefly introduced, which were executed in four stages of feasibility research, system design, code development and system integration and regulation. The evaluation plan and the process of implementation as well as the evaluation conclusion of the final technical validation for this system are also presented in detail

Verification of codes used for the nuclear safety assessment of the small space heterogeneous reactors with zirconium hydride moderator

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Glushkov, E.S.; Gomin, E.A.; Kompaniets, G.V.

1994-01-01

Computer codes used for assessment of nuclear safety for space NPP are compared taking as an example small-sized heterogeneous reactor with zirconium hydride moderator of the Topaz-2 facility. The code verifications are made for five different variants

The Challenge for Arms Control Verification in the Post-New START World

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Wuest, C R

2012-05-24

Nuclear weapon arms control treaty verification is a key aspect of any agreement between signatories to establish that the terms and conditions spelled out in the treaty are being met. Historically, arms control negotiations have focused more on the rules and protocols for reducing the numbers of warheads and delivery systems - sometimes resorting to complex and arcane procedures for counting forces - in an attempt to address perceived or real imbalances in a nation's strategic posture that could lead to instability. Verification procedures are generally defined in arms control treaties and supporting documents and tend to focus on technical means and measures designed to ensure that a country is following the terms of the treaty and that it is not liable to engage in deception or outright cheating in an attempt to circumvent the spirit and the letter of the agreement. As the Obama Administration implements the articles, terms, and conditions of the recently ratified and entered-into-force New START treaty, there are already efforts within and outside of government to move well below the specified New START levels of 1550 warheads, 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles, and 800 deployed and nondeployed strategic launchers (Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) silos, Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) tubes on submarines, and bombers). A number of articles and opinion pieces have appeared that advocate for significantly deeper cuts in the U.S. nuclear stockpile, with some suggesting that unilateral reductions on the part of the U.S. would help coax Russia and others to follow our lead. Papers and studies prepared for the U.S. Department of Defense and at the U.S. Air War College have also been published, suggesting that nuclear forces totaling no more than about 300 warheads would be sufficient to meet U.S. national security and deterrence needs. (Davis 2011, Schaub and Forsyth 2010) Recent articles by James M. Acton and others suggest that

Mobile Pit verification system design based on passive special nuclear material verification in weapons storage facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Paul, J. N.; Chin, M. R.; Sjoden, G. E. [Nuclear and Radiological Engineering Program, George W. Woodruff School of Mechanical Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, 770 State St, Atlanta, GA 30332-0745 (United States)

2013-07-01

A mobile 'drive by' passive radiation detection system to be applied in special nuclear materials (SNM) storage facilities for validation and compliance purposes has been designed through the use of computational modeling and new radiation detection methods. This project was the result of work over a 1 year period to create optimal design specifications to include creation of 3D models using both Monte Carlo and deterministic codes to characterize the gamma and neutron leakage out each surface of SNM-bearing canisters. Results were compared and agreement was demonstrated between both models. Container leakages were then used to determine the expected reaction rates using transport theory in the detectors when placed at varying distances from the can. A 'typical' background signature was incorporated to determine the minimum signatures versus the probability of detection to evaluate moving source protocols with collimation. This established the criteria for verification of source presence and time gating at a given vehicle speed. New methods for the passive detection of SNM were employed and shown to give reliable identification of age and material for highly enriched uranium (HEU) and weapons grade plutonium (WGPu). The finalized 'Mobile Pit Verification System' (MPVS) design demonstrated that a 'drive-by' detection system, collimated and operating at nominally 2 mph, is capable of rapidly verifying each and every weapon pit stored in regularly spaced, shelved storage containers, using completely passive gamma and neutron signatures for HEU and WGPu. This system is ready for real evaluation to demonstrate passive total material accountability in storage facilities. (authors)

Fault-specific verification (FSV) - An alternative VV ampersand T strategy for high reliability nuclear software systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Miller, L.A.

1994-01-01

The author puts forth an argument that digital instrumentation and control systems can be safely applied in the nuclear industry, but it will require changes to the way software for such systems is developed and tested. He argues for a fault-specific verification procedure to be applied to software development. This plan includes enumerating and classifying all software faults at all levels of the product development, over the whole development process. While collecting this data, develop and validate different methods for software verification, validation and testing, and apply them against all the detected faults. Force all of this development toward an automated product for doing this testing. Continue to develop, expand, test, and share these testing methods across a wide array of software products

CTBT integrated verification system evaluation model supplement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

EDENBURN, MICHAEL W.; BUNTING, MARCUS; PAYNE, ARTHUR C. JR.; TROST, LAWRENCE C.

2000-01-01

Sandia National Laboratories has developed a computer based model called IVSEM (Integrated Verification System Evaluation Model) to estimate the performance of a nuclear detonation monitoring system. The IVSEM project was initiated in June 1994, by Sandia's Monitoring Systems and Technology Center and has been funded by the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Nonproliferation and National Security (DOE/NN). IVSEM is a simple, ''top-level,'' modeling tool which estimates the performance of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) monitoring system and can help explore the impact of various sensor system concepts and technology advancements on CTBT monitoring. One of IVSEM's unique features is that it integrates results from the various CTBT sensor technologies (seismic, in sound, radionuclide, and hydroacoustic) and allows the user to investigate synergy among the technologies. Specifically, IVSEM estimates the detection effectiveness (probability of detection), location accuracy, and identification capability of the integrated system and of each technology subsystem individually. The model attempts to accurately estimate the monitoring system's performance at medium interfaces (air-land, air-water) and for some evasive testing methods such as seismic decoupling. The original IVSEM report, CTBT Integrated Verification System Evaluation Model, SAND97-25 18, described version 1.2 of IVSEM. This report describes the changes made to IVSEM version 1.2 and the addition of identification capability estimates that have been incorporated into IVSEM version 2.0

Advancing the Fork detector for quantitative spent nuclear fuel verification

Science.gov (United States)

Vaccaro, S.; Gauld, I. C.; Hu, J.; De Baere, P.; Peterson, J.; Schwalbach, P.; Smejkal, A.; Tomanin, A.; Sjöland, A.; Tobin, S.; Wiarda, D.

2018-04-01

The Fork detector is widely used by the safeguards inspectorate of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify spent nuclear fuel. Fork measurements are routinely performed for safeguards prior to dry storage cask loading. Additionally, spent fuel verification will be required at the facilities where encapsulation is performed for acceptance in the final repositories planned in Sweden and Finland. The use of the Fork detector as a quantitative instrument has not been prevalent due to the complexity of correlating the measured neutron and gamma ray signals with fuel inventories and operator declarations. A spent fuel data analysis module based on the ORIGEN burnup code was recently implemented to provide automated real-time analysis of Fork detector data. This module allows quantitative predictions of expected neutron count rates and gamma units as measured by the Fork detectors using safeguards declarations and available reactor operating data. This paper describes field testing of the Fork data analysis module using data acquired from 339 assemblies measured during routine dry cask loading inspection campaigns in Europe. Assemblies include both uranium oxide and mixed-oxide fuel assemblies. More recent measurements of 50 spent fuel assemblies at the Swedish Central Interim Storage Facility for Spent Nuclear Fuel are also analyzed. An evaluation of uncertainties in the Fork measurement data is performed to quantify the ability of the data analysis module to verify operator declarations and to develop quantitative go/no-go criteria for safeguards verification measurements during cask loading or encapsulation operations. The goal of this approach is to provide safeguards inspectors with reliable real-time data analysis tools to rapidly identify discrepancies in operator declarations and to detect potential partial defects in spent fuel assemblies with improved reliability and minimal false positive alarms

Procedure generation and verification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sheely, W.F.

1986-01-01

The Department of Energy has used Artificial Intelligence of ''AI'' concepts to develop two powerful new computer-based techniques to enhance safety in nuclear applications. The Procedure Generation System, and the Procedure Verification System, can be adapted to other commercial applications, such as a manufacturing plant. The Procedure Generation System can create a procedure to deal with the off-normal condition. The operator can then take correct actions on the system in minimal time. The Verification System evaluates the logic of the Procedure Generator's conclusions. This evaluation uses logic techniques totally independent of the Procedure Generator. The rapid, accurate generation and verification of corrective procedures can greatly reduce the human error, possible in a complex (stressful/high stress) situation

Surface coatings as xenon diffusion barriers on plastic scintillators : Improving Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty verification

OpenAIRE

Bläckberg, Lisa

2011-01-01

This thesis investigates the ability of transparent surface coatings to reduce xenon diffusion into plastic scintillators. The motivation for the work is improved radioxenon monitoring equipment, used with in the framework of the verification regime of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. A large part of the equipment used in this context incorporates plastic scintillators which are in direct contact with the radioactive gas to be detected. One problem with such setup is that radioxenon...

HTGR analytical methods and design verification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Neylan, A.J.; Northup, T.E.

1982-05-01

Analytical methods for the high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) include development, update, verification, documentation, and maintenance of all computer codes for HTGR design and analysis. This paper presents selected nuclear, structural mechanics, seismic, and systems analytical methods related to the HTGR core. This paper also reviews design verification tests in the reactor core, reactor internals, steam generator, and thermal barrier

Material integrity verification radar

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Koppenjan, S.K.

1999-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has the need for verification of 'as-built' spent fuel-dry storage containers and other concrete structures. The IAEA has tasked the Special Technologies Laboratory (STL) to fabricate, test, and deploy a stepped-frequency Material Integrity Verification Radar (MIVR) system to nondestructively verify the internal construction of these containers. The MIVR system is based on previously deployed high-frequency, ground penetrating radar (GPR) systems that have been developed by STL for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Whereas GPR technology utilizes microwave radio frequency energy to create subsurface images, MTVR is a variation for which the medium is concrete instead of soil. The purpose is to nondestructively verify the placement of concrete-reinforcing materials, pipes, inner liners, and other attributes of the internal construction. The MIVR system underwent an initial field test on CANDU reactor spent fuel storage canisters at Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), Chalk River Laboratories, Ontario, Canada, in October 1995. A second field test at the Embalse Nuclear Power Plant in Embalse, Argentina, was completed in May 1996. The DOE GPR also was demonstrated at the site. Data collection and analysis were performed for the Argentine National Board of Nuclear Regulation (ENREN). IAEA and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the Control and Accounting of Nuclear Material (ABACC) personnel were present as observers during the test. Reinforcing materials were evident in the color, two-dimensional images produced by the MIVR system. A continuous pattern of reinforcing bars was evident and accurate estimates on the spacing, depth, and size were made. The potential uses for safeguard applications were jointly discussed. The MIVR system, as successfully demonstrated in the two field tests, can be used as a design verification tool for IAEA safeguards. A deployment of MIVR for Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ

Anchorage of equipment - requirements and verification methods with emphasis on equipment of existing and constructed VVER-type nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Masopust, R.

1999-01-01

Criteria and verification methods which are recommended for use in the capacity evaluation of anchorage of safety-related equipment at WWER-type nuclear power plants are presented. Developed in compliance with the relevant basic standards documents specifically for anchorage of WWER-type equipment components, the criteria and methods cover different types of anchor bolts and other anchorage elements which are typical of existing, constructed, or reconstructed WWER-type nuclear power plants

Seismic verification of nuclear plant equipment anchorage

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lepiece, M.; Van Vyve, J.

1991-01-01

More than 60% of the electrical power of Belgium is generated by seven PWR nuclear power plants. For three of them, the electro-mechanical equipment had to be reassessed after ten years of operation, because the seismic requirements were upgraded from 0.1 g to 0.17 g free field ground acceleration. The seismic requalification of the active equipment was a critical problem as the classical methods were too conservative. The approach based on the use of the past experience on the seismic behavior of nonnuclear equipment, chosen and developed by the SQUG, had to be transposed to the Belgian N.P.P. The decision of the accept-ability of equipment relies heavily on the aseismatic capacity of anchorage. The Electrical Power Research Institute (EPRI) developed the procedure and guideline for the demonstration of the aseismatic adequacy of equipment anchorage in a cost-effective and consistent manner, to support the decision by Seismic Review Team. The field inspection procedure to identify the type of fasteners and detect their possible defects and the verification procedure developed to calculate the aseismatic capacity of equipment anchorage on the strength of fasteners, the aseismatic capacity of anchorage and the comparison of the capacity with the demand are reported. (K.I.)

How much software verification and validation is adequate for nuclear safety?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fujii, R.U.

1994-01-01

For over 26 years, software verification and validation (V ampersand V) has been applied to major DOD weapon systems, especially nuclear weapon systems, to ensure that the software is free of catastrophic software errors. Software V ampersand V is a systems engineering discipline that evaluates the software as part of the entire system including hardware, human operators, and other interfacing software. When applied from a systems perspective, software V ampersand V has been proven to be an effective technique for the early detection and correction of errors. Several V ampersand V cost/benefit case studies for the Rome Air Development Center have shown that the dollar savings of the early detection of errors clearly offset the cost of the software V ampersand V

Does nuclear power really help us fight climate change?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chudakov, Mikhail

2015-01-01

The global community is facing a double challenge: the world’s population, level of development and, consequently, energy demands are steadily rising; at the same time, we must understand, mitigate, and adapt to climate change, which is an unfortunate by-product of increased energy use. Nuclear power is the only low-carbon technology that is available today that has the potential to be deployed on a wide scale and in large capacities to help meet the global climate–energy challenge. First, direct greenhouse gas emissions from nuclear power plants are negligible. Secondly, when emissions over the entire life cycle are considered, hydro, nuclear, and wind-based electricity generation are the lowest CO_2 emitters. Therefore, nuclear energy is ideally placed to mitigate the effects of climate change in a most cost effective way.

Burnup verification measurements on spent fuel assemblies at Arkansas Nuclear One

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ewing, R.I.

1995-01-01

Burnup verification measurements have been performed using the Fork system at Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2, operated by Energy Operations, Inc. Passive neutron and gamma-ray measurements on individual spent fuel assemblies were correlated with the reactor records for burnup, cooling time, and initial enrichment. The correlation generates an internal calibration for the system in the form of a power law determined by a least squares fit to the neutron data. The values of the exponent in the power laws were 3.83 and 4.35 for Units 1 and 2, respectively. The average deviation of the reactor burnup records from the calibration determined from the measurements is a measure of the random error in the burnup records. The observed average deviations were 2.7% and 3.5% for assemblies at Units 1 and 2, respectively, indicating a high degree of consistency in the reactor records. Two non-standard assemblies containing neutron sources were studied at Unit 2. No anomalous measurements were observed among the standard assemblies at either Unit. The effectiveness of the Fork system for verification of reactor records is due to the sensitivity of the neutron yield to burnup, the self-calibration generated by a series of measurements, the redundancy provided by three independent detection systems, and the operational simplicity and flexibility of the design

CTBT integrated verification system evaluation model supplement

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

EDENBURN,MICHAEL W.; BUNTING,MARCUS; PAYNE JR.,ARTHUR C.; TROST,LAWRENCE C.

2000-03-02

Sandia National Laboratories has developed a computer based model called IVSEM (Integrated Verification System Evaluation Model) to estimate the performance of a nuclear detonation monitoring system. The IVSEM project was initiated in June 1994, by Sandia's Monitoring Systems and Technology Center and has been funded by the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Nonproliferation and National Security (DOE/NN). IVSEM is a simple, ''top-level,'' modeling tool which estimates the performance of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) monitoring system and can help explore the impact of various sensor system concepts and technology advancements on CTBT monitoring. One of IVSEM's unique features is that it integrates results from the various CTBT sensor technologies (seismic, in sound, radionuclide, and hydroacoustic) and allows the user to investigate synergy among the technologies. Specifically, IVSEM estimates the detection effectiveness (probability of detection), location accuracy, and identification capability of the integrated system and of each technology subsystem individually. The model attempts to accurately estimate the monitoring system's performance at medium interfaces (air-land, air-water) and for some evasive testing methods such as seismic decoupling. The original IVSEM report, CTBT Integrated Verification System Evaluation Model, SAND97-25 18, described version 1.2 of IVSEM. This report describes the changes made to IVSEM version 1.2 and the addition of identification capability estimates that have been incorporated into IVSEM version 2.0.

An international cooperative verification agenda for arms reduction

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hinderstein, C.

2013-01-01

The biggest challenge to the overall verification and monitoring agenda for future arms reductions may be that posed by uncertainties regarding the quantities of existing stocks of fissile material and nuclear weapons. We must develop strategies to reduce the residual uncertainties regarding completeness of initial declarations as all declared weapons-related inventories go to zero. Establishing this confidence in countries' initial baseline declarations will likely be a key point in all states' decisions to move to very low numbers, much less zero. The author reviews the questions and challenges that need to be addressed if there is to be significant progress in negotiating and implementing a verifiable fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) and a policy of nuclear weapon dismantling. In support of greater security as the world works towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, individual States could begin immediately by increasing the transparency of their nuclear activities. The International Verification Project is designed to bring experts from a wide array of related backgrounds together to build capacity for verification internationally in support of arms control goals (and in support of the larger objective of a world without nuclear weapons), build confidence between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon states, promote freer flow of information among governments and between governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and solve technical problems that could be barriers to progress. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (A.C.)

Design verification enhancement of field programmable gate array-based safety-critical I&C system of nuclear power plant

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Ahmed, Ibrahim [Department of Nuclear Engineering, Kyung Hee University, 1732 Deogyeong-daero, Giheung-gu, Yongin-si, Gyeonggi-do 17104 (Korea, Republic of); Jung, Jaecheon, E-mail: jcjung@kings.ac.kr [Department of Nuclear Power Plant Engineering, KEPCO International Nuclear Graduate School, 658-91 Haemaji-ro, Seosang-myeon, Ulju-gun, Ulsan 45014 (Korea, Republic of); Heo, Gyunyoung [Department of Nuclear Engineering, Kyung Hee University, 1732 Deogyeong-daero, Giheung-gu, Yongin-si, Gyeonggi-do 17104 (Korea, Republic of)

2017-06-15

Highlights: • An enhanced, systematic and integrated design verification approach is proposed for V&V of FPGA-based I&C system of NPP. • RPS bistable fixed setpoint trip algorithm is designed, analyzed, verified and discussed using the proposed approaches. • The application of integrated verification approach simultaneously verified the entire design modules. • The applicability of the proposed V&V facilitated the design verification processes. - Abstract: Safety-critical instrumentation and control (I&C) system in nuclear power plant (NPP) implemented on programmable logic controllers (PLCs) plays a vital role in safe operation of the plant. The challenges such as fast obsolescence, the vulnerability to cyber-attack, and other related issues of software systems have currently led to the consideration of field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) as an alternative to PLCs because of their advantages and hardware related benefits. However, safety analysis for FPGA-based I&C systems, and verification and validation (V&V) assessments still remain important issues to be resolved, which are now become a global research point of interests. In this work, we proposed a systematic design and verification strategies from start to ready-to-use in form of model-based approaches for FPGA-based reactor protection system (RPS) that can lead to the enhancement of the design verification and validation processes. The proposed methodology stages are requirement analysis, enhanced functional flow block diagram (EFFBD) models, finite state machine with data path (FSMD) models, hardware description language (HDL) code development, and design verifications. The design verification stage includes unit test – Very high speed integrated circuit Hardware Description Language (VHDL) test and modified condition decision coverage (MC/DC) test, module test – MATLAB/Simulink Co-simulation test, and integration test – FPGA hardware test beds. To prove the adequacy of the proposed

Design verification enhancement of field programmable gate array-based safety-critical I&C system of nuclear power plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ahmed, Ibrahim; Jung, Jaecheon; Heo, Gyunyoung

2017-01-01

Highlights: • An enhanced, systematic and integrated design verification approach is proposed for V&V of FPGA-based I&C system of NPP. • RPS bistable fixed setpoint trip algorithm is designed, analyzed, verified and discussed using the proposed approaches. • The application of integrated verification approach simultaneously verified the entire design modules. • The applicability of the proposed V&V facilitated the design verification processes. - Abstract: Safety-critical instrumentation and control (I&C) system in nuclear power plant (NPP) implemented on programmable logic controllers (PLCs) plays a vital role in safe operation of the plant. The challenges such as fast obsolescence, the vulnerability to cyber-attack, and other related issues of software systems have currently led to the consideration of field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) as an alternative to PLCs because of their advantages and hardware related benefits. However, safety analysis for FPGA-based I&C systems, and verification and validation (V&V) assessments still remain important issues to be resolved, which are now become a global research point of interests. In this work, we proposed a systematic design and verification strategies from start to ready-to-use in form of model-based approaches for FPGA-based reactor protection system (RPS) that can lead to the enhancement of the design verification and validation processes. The proposed methodology stages are requirement analysis, enhanced functional flow block diagram (EFFBD) models, finite state machine with data path (FSMD) models, hardware description language (HDL) code development, and design verifications. The design verification stage includes unit test – Very high speed integrated circuit Hardware Description Language (VHDL) test and modified condition decision coverage (MC/DC) test, module test – MATLAB/Simulink Co-simulation test, and integration test – FPGA hardware test beds. To prove the adequacy of the proposed

Burnup verification tests with the FORK measurement system-implementation for burnup credit

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ewing, R.I.

1994-01-01

Verification measurements may be used to help ensure nuclear criticality safety when burnup credit is applied to spent fuel transport and storage systems. The FORK system measures the passive neutron and gamma-ray emission from spent fuel assemblies while in the storage pool. It was designed at Los Alamos National Laboratory for the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards program and is well suited to verify burnup and cooling time records at commercial Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) sites. This report deals with the application of the FORK system to burnup credit operations

Policy implications of Iran's Nuclear Deal in technical terms for the plutonium route, uranium route, covert options, inspections, monitoring and verifications

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pinheiro, Andre Ricardo M.

2017-01-01

The present Paper addresses the policy implications of Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) known as 'Ian Nuclear Deal', implemented on 16 th January of 2016 between the Iran and the P5+1 countries (the U.S., U.K. France, Germany, Russia, and China), along with the EU in technical terms to analyze the Plutonium Route, Uranium Route and the Covert options and Inspections, Monitoring and Verifications. A historical review is presented to understand how the Iranian Nuclear Program is formed. Following is shown the current nuclear facilities in Iran and its capacity to process nuclear materials. It is analyzed the impact of JCPOA in Uranium and Plutonium routes. Covert Options always will be an option, so the most sensitive impact is related to the new monitoring and verification policies that must ensure real control of illegal procedures. The main conclusion is that the deal postpones the Iran's nuclear program for more than a decade (15 years), delaying Iran's nuclear bomb time from a few months to at least one year, although there is a current latent capacity to develop a nuclear bomb in Uranium route. It also gives IAEA inspectors capability to monitor nuclear activities and prevent to possible development to a nuclear bomb. To arrive in this conclusion an extensive technical analyze of impact of JCPOA in Iran's nuclear capabilities was made to discover how effective is the deal to prevent Iran to build, or acquire a nuclear weapon. (author)

Policy implications of Iran's Nuclear Deal in technical terms for the plutonium route, uranium route, covert options, inspections, monitoring and verifications

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Pinheiro, Andre Ricardo M., E-mail: andrericardopinheiro@usp.br [Universidade de São Paulo (USP), SP (Brazil). Departamento de Engenharia Naval; Guimarães, Leonam dos Santos, E-mail: leonam@eletronuclear.gov.br [Eletrobrás Termonuclear S.A. (ELETRONUCLEAR), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil)

2017-07-01

The present Paper addresses the policy implications of Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) known as 'Ian Nuclear Deal', implemented on 16{sup th} January of 2016 between the Iran and the P5+1 countries (the U.S., U.K. France, Germany, Russia, and China), along with the EU in technical terms to analyze the Plutonium Route, Uranium Route and the Covert options and Inspections, Monitoring and Verifications. A historical review is presented to understand how the Iranian Nuclear Program is formed. Following is shown the current nuclear facilities in Iran and its capacity to process nuclear materials. It is analyzed the impact of JCPOA in Uranium and Plutonium routes. Covert Options always will be an option, so the most sensitive impact is related to the new monitoring and verification policies that must ensure real control of illegal procedures. The main conclusion is that the deal postpones the Iran's nuclear program for more than a decade (15 years), delaying Iran's nuclear bomb time from a few months to at least one year, although there is a current latent capacity to develop a nuclear bomb in Uranium route. It also gives IAEA inspectors capability to monitor nuclear activities and prevent to possible development to a nuclear bomb. To arrive in this conclusion an extensive technical analyze of impact of JCPOA in Iran's nuclear capabilities was made to discover how effective is the deal to prevent Iran to build, or acquire a nuclear weapon. (author)

Joint experiment on verification of the treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear tests and its value in nuclear disarmament problem

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mikhailov, V.N.

1998-01-01

This conference commemorates the 10th anniversary of the Joint Verification Experiment. The experiment was performed in order to specify methods controlling yield of underground explosions in the USA and the USSR. Basic of the the experiment were coordinated and formulated in the Agreement signed by Heads of departments of foreign policies in Moscow on 31 May 1988. The tasks can be briefly revealed the following way: - each of the parties can measure (on mutual basis) the explosion yield in the course of the experiment performed on the test site of the other party using tele seismic and hydrodynamic methods; - each party also makes tele seismic measurement of both explosions of the experiment with the help of its national net of seismic stations; - each party makes hydrodynamic measurements of explosion yield in the course of the experiment in a special additional borehole; - each party performs tele-seismic measurements of both explosions' yield at its five seismic stations with which the parties exchanged data on the explosions made earlier. In the course of the experiment the parties exchanged the data obtained in the same volume. The analysis showed: 1. The experiment conformed to all the requirements of the Agreement in spite of all the complexity of the procedures and differences in conditions of the experiment performance. 2. The experiment became an example of an unprecedented level of cooperation between two countries in one of the most significant for national security fields of defense activity. 3. The experiment gave the basis for concrete coordination of underground test yield control measures. It also considerable advanced the elaboration of protocols to treaties of 1974 and 1976. 4. In the course of the experiment there appeared an opportunity to compare scientific-technical level of hydrodynamic and seismic measurements and safety provision for nuclear tests of both countries. Cooperative development of anti intrusive devices for hydrodynamic method

Is flow verification necessary

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Beetle, T.M.

1986-01-01

Safeguards test statistics are used in an attempt to detect diversion of special nuclear material. Under assumptions concerning possible manipulation (falsification) of safeguards accounting data, the effects on the statistics due to diversion and data manipulation are described algebraically. A comprehensive set of statistics that is capable of detecting any diversion of material is defined in terms of the algebraic properties of the effects. When the assumptions exclude collusion between persons in two material balance areas, then three sets of accounting statistics are shown to be comprehensive. Two of the sets contain widely known accountancy statistics. One of them does not require physical flow verification - comparisons of operator and inspector data for receipts and shipments. The third set contains a single statistic which does not require physical flow verification. In addition to not requiring technically difficult and expensive flow verification, this single statistic has several advantages over other comprehensive sets of statistics. This algebraic approach as an alternative to flow verification for safeguards accountancy is discussed in this paper

Distributed source term analysis, a new approach to nuclear material inventory verification

CERN Document Server

Beddingfield, D H

2002-01-01

The Distributed Source-Term Analysis (DSTA) technique is a new approach to measuring in-process material holdup that is a significant departure from traditional hold-up measurement methodology. The DSTA method is a means of determining the mass of nuclear material within a large, diffuse, volume using passive neutron counting. The DSTA method is a more efficient approach than traditional methods of holdup measurement and inventory verification. The time spent in performing DSTA measurement and analysis is a fraction of that required by traditional techniques. The error ascribed to a DSTA survey result is generally less than that from traditional methods. Also, the negative bias ascribed to gamma-ray methods is greatly diminished because the DSTA method uses neutrons which are more penetrating than gamma-rays.

Distributed source term analysis, a new approach to nuclear material inventory verification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Beddingfield, D.H.; Menlove, H.O.

2002-01-01

The Distributed Source-Term Analysis (DSTA) technique is a new approach to measuring in-process material holdup that is a significant departure from traditional hold-up measurement methodology. The DSTA method is a means of determining the mass of nuclear material within a large, diffuse, volume using passive neutron counting. The DSTA method is a more efficient approach than traditional methods of holdup measurement and inventory verification. The time spent in performing DSTA measurement and analysis is a fraction of that required by traditional techniques. The error ascribed to a DSTA survey result is generally less than that from traditional methods. Also, the negative bias ascribed to γ-ray methods is greatly diminished because the DSTA method uses neutrons which are more penetrating than γ-rays

Verification and validation for waste disposal models

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1987-07-01

A set of evaluation criteria has been developed to assess the suitability of current verification and validation techniques for waste disposal methods. A survey of current practices and techniques was undertaken and evaluated using these criteria with the items most relevant to waste disposal models being identified. Recommendations regarding the most suitable verification and validation practices for nuclear waste disposal modelling software have been made

Better Quality of IT Help Desk Service in Nuclear Malaysia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mohamad Safuan Bin Sulaiman; Abdul Muin Abdul Rahman; Norzalina Nasirudin

2012-01-01

Information Technology Centre (ITC) is a part of technical support division which plays important role as technical service provider for Nuclear Malaysia. As the only IT service provider, it could not be excused from the issue of delivering quality of service for better serving organization. The implementation of IT help desk system has improved the quality of the help desk service through better management of knowledge and communication. In this system, help desk business process has been re engineered in which communications and knowledge is captured in every stage of help desk processes. Although the system is for IT Help desk, surprisingly, its framework has been successfully implemented at other technical support providers like Engineering Division (BKJ) and Instrumentation and Automation Center (IAC). This paper describes the reengeneering of IT help desk business process which focus on the management of IT knowledge and help desk communication for better quality of service. (author)

Automated Installation Verification of COMSOL via LiveLink for MATLAB

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Crowell, Michael W

2015-01-01

Verifying that a local software installation performs as the developer intends is a potentially time-consuming but necessary step for nuclear safety-related codes. Automating this process not only saves time, but can increase reliability and scope of verification compared to ''hand'' comparisons. While COMSOL does not include automatic installation verification as many commercial codes do, it does provide tools such as LiveLink"T"M for MATLAB® and the COMSOL API for use with Java® through which the user can automate the process. Here we present a successful automated verification example of a local COMSOL 5.0 installation for nuclear safety-related calculations at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory's High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR).

Automated Installation Verification of COMSOL via LiveLink for MATLAB

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Crowell, Michael W [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

2015-01-01

Verifying that a local software installation performs as the developer intends is a potentially time-consuming but necessary step for nuclear safety-related codes. Automating this process not only saves time, but can increase reliability and scope of verification compared to ‘hand’ comparisons. While COMSOL does not include automatic installation verification as many commercial codes do, it does provide tools such as LiveLink™ for MATLAB® and the COMSOL API for use with Java® through which the user can automate the process. Here we present a successful automated verification example of a local COMSOL 5.0 installation for nuclear safety-related calculations at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR).

Verification of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT): The Potential Role of the IAEA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chung, Jin Ho

2016-01-01

The objective of a future verification of a FMCT(Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty) is to deter and detect non-compliance with treaty obligations in a timely and non-discriminatory manner with regard to banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices. Since the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has already established the IAEA safeguards as a verification system mainly for Non -Nuclear Weapon States (NNWSs), it is expected that the IAEA's experience and expertise in this field will make a significant contribution to setting up a future treaty's verification regime. This paper is designed to explore the potential role of the IAEA in verifying the future treaty by analyzing verification abilities of the Agency in terms of treaty verification and expected challenges. Furthermore, the concept of multilateral verification that could be facilitated by the IAEA will be examined as a measure of providing a credible assurance of compliance with a future treaty. In this circumstance, it is necessary for the IAEA to be prepared for playing a leading role in FMCT verifications as a form of multilateral verification by taking advantage of its existing verification concepts, methods, and tools. Also, several challenges that the Agency faces today need to be overcome, including dealing with sensitive and proliferative information, attribution of fissile materials, lack of verification experience in military fuel cycle facilities, and different attitude and culture towards verification between NWSs and NNWSs

Verification of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT): The Potential Role of the IAEA

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Chung, Jin Ho [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2016-05-15

The objective of a future verification of a FMCT(Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty) is to deter and detect non-compliance with treaty obligations in a timely and non-discriminatory manner with regard to banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices. Since the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has already established the IAEA safeguards as a verification system mainly for Non -Nuclear Weapon States (NNWSs), it is expected that the IAEA's experience and expertise in this field will make a significant contribution to setting up a future treaty's verification regime. This paper is designed to explore the potential role of the IAEA in verifying the future treaty by analyzing verification abilities of the Agency in terms of treaty verification and expected challenges. Furthermore, the concept of multilateral verification that could be facilitated by the IAEA will be examined as a measure of providing a credible assurance of compliance with a future treaty. In this circumstance, it is necessary for the IAEA to be prepared for playing a leading role in FMCT verifications as a form of multilateral verification by taking advantage of its existing verification concepts, methods, and tools. Also, several challenges that the Agency faces today need to be overcome, including dealing with sensitive and proliferative information, attribution of fissile materials, lack of verification experience in military fuel cycle facilities, and different attitude and culture towards verification between NWSs and NNWSs.

Environmental technology verification methods

CSIR Research Space (South Africa)

Szewczuk, S

2016-03-01

Full Text Available Environmental Technology Verification (ETV) is a tool that has been developed in the United States of America, Europe and many other countries around the world to help innovative environmental technologies reach the market. Claims about...

Survey and assessment of conventional software verification and validation techniques

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Miller, L.A.; Groundwater, E.; Mirsky, S.M.

1993-02-01

Reliable software is required for nuclear power plant applications. Verification and validation (V ampersand V) techniques may be applied during software development to help eliminate errors that can inhibit the proper operation of digital systems and that may cause safety problems. EPRI and the NRC are cosponsoring this investigation to determine the best strategies for V ampersand V of expert system software. The strategy used for a particular system will depend on the complexity of the software and the level of integrity required. This report covers the first task in the investigation of reviewing methods for V ampersand V of conventional software systems and evaluating them for use with expert systems

Automated Image Acquisition System for the Verification of Copper-Brass Seal Images

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stringa, E.; Bergonzi, C.; Littmann, F.; ); Marszalek, Y.; Tempesta, S.; )

2015-01-01

This paper describes a system for the verification of copper-brass seals realized by JRC according to DG ENER requirements. DG ENER processes about 20,000 metal seals per year. The verification of metal seals consists in visually checking the identity of a removed seal. The identity of a copper-brass seal is defined by a random stain pattern realized by the seal producer together with random scratches engraved when the seals are initialized ('seal production'). In order to verify that the seal returned from the field is the expected one its pattern is compared with an image taken during seal production. Formerly, seal initialization and verification were very heavy tasks as seal pictures were acquired with a camera one by one both in the initialization and verification stages. During the initialization the Nuclear Safeguards technicians had to place one by one new seals under a camera and acquire the related reference images. During the verification, the technician had to take used seals and place them one by one under a camera to take new pictures. The new images were presented to the technicians without any preprocessing and the technicians had to recognize the seal. The new station described in this paper has an automated image acquisition system allowing to easily process seals in batches of 100 seals. To simplify the verification, a software automatically centres and rotates the newly acquired seal image in order to perfectly overlap with the reference image acquired during the production phase. The new system significantly speeds up seal production and helps particularly with the demanding task of seal verification. As a large part of the seals is dealt with by a joint Euratom-IAEA team, the IAEA directly profits from this development. The new tool has been in routine use since mid 2013. (author)

Preliminary Research on the Verification Task of North Korea's Plutonium Declaration

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, Hyun Chul; Park, Il Jin

2009-01-01

The denuclearization of North Korea seems challenging. North Korea has recognized itself as a nuclear weapon state by carrying out two nuclear tests while many other nations including South Korea have opposed North Korea's nuclear proliferation. As a result of longstanding negotiations, North Korea provided nearly 19,000 pages of operation history of three Yongbyon nuclear facilities on May 8, 2008 and a 60-page declaration of its nuclear activities and programs on June 26, 2008. However, one should notice that declaration documents are by themselves meaningless without their verification. To completely dismantle North Korea's nuclear programs, the verification task based on its declaration documents should be performed very thoroughly, considering the possibility of the presence of the undeclared nuclear materials and facilities. The verification task of North Korea's nuclear declaration consists of many broad themes to deal with, such as the review of declaration documents, the interview with facility operators, the sampling in the field, the laboratory analysis of the sample, data interpretation, and so on. One of the important themes is to verify North Korea's declared plutonium stockpile by comparing the declaration documents with measurement data which can be obtained from the sampling in the field and laboratory analysis. To prepare for the possible future verification of the declared plutonium stockpile, it is meaningful to give a thought on what data can be compared and what samples need to be taken and analyzed. In this study, we focus on the data to be compared and samples to be taken and analyzed for the plutonium accounting, as a preliminary research. To give a quantitative example, the nuclear material of the most recent North Korea's spent fuel rods discharged from the 5 MWe reactor is analyzed. On June 13, 2009, North Korea declared that more than one-third of the spent fuel rods had been reprocessed

Computerized information system for inventory-taking and verification at a nuclear fuel fabrication plant with closed production lines

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bahm, W.; Brueckner, C.; Hartmann, G.

1976-01-01

By means of a model the use of electronic data processing is studied for preparing inventory listings and for inventory verification in a fabrication plant for Pu-U mixed-oxide fuel pins. It is postulated that interruptions in operation should be avoided as much as possible. Closed-Line production is assumed so that access to nuclear material calls for special withdrawal via locks. The production line is subdivided into sections with measuring points placed in between to record the nuclear material flow. The measured results are fed to a central data acquisition and reporting system capable of calculating on-line from these results the book inventories present in the individual sections. Inventory-taking and verification are carried out simultaneously in the sections of the production line using the EDP system. The production is not interrupted for this purpose. The production stream is tagged prior to reaching a section to be measured and is subsequently measured when entering the respective section until the tag has reached the end of the section. The measurement can be verified by inspectors. Movements of nuclear materials in and from other plant areas such as the storage area are likewise fed into the central data processing system so that inventory lists can be recalled at any moment. By this means the inventory can be taken quickly and at any time. The inventory is verified in the conventional way. (author)

Symposium on International Safeguards: Preparing for Future Verification Challenges

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The purpose of the symposium is to foster dialogue and information exchange involving Member States, the nuclear industry and members of the broader nuclear non-proliferation community to prepare for future verification challenges. Topics addressed during the 2010 symposium include the following: - Supporting the global nuclear non-proliferation regime: Building support for strengthening international safeguards; Enhancing confidence in compliance with safeguards obligations; Legal authority as a means to enhance effectiveness and efficiency; Verification roles in support of arms control and disarmament. - Building collaboration and partnerships with other international forums: Other verification and non-proliferation regimes; Synergies between safety, security and safeguards regimes. - Improving cooperation between IAEA and States for safeguards implementation: Strengthening State systems for meeting safeguards obligations; Enhancing safeguards effectiveness and efficiency through greater cooperation; Lessons learned: recommendations for enhancing integrated safeguards implementation. - Addressing safeguards challenges in an increasingly interconnected world: Non-State actors and covert trade networks; Globalization of nuclear information and technology. - Preparing for the global nuclear expansion and increasing safeguards workload: Furthering implementation of the State-level concept and integrated safeguards; Information-driven safeguards; Remote data-driven safeguards inspections; Safeguards in States without comprehensive safeguards agreements. - Safeguarding advanced nuclear facilities and innovative fuel cycles: Proliferation resistance; Safeguards by design; Safeguards approaches for advanced facilities. - Advanced technologies and methodologies: For verifying nuclear material and activities; For detecting undeclared nuclear material and activities; For information collection, analysis and integration. - Enhancing the development and use of safeguards

How the Nuclear Applications Laboratories Help in Strengthening Emergency Response

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

Safety is one of the most important considerations when engaging in highly advanced scientific and technological activities. In this respect, utilizing the potential of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes also involves risks, and nuclear techniques themselves can be useful in strengthening emergency response measures related to the use of nuclear technology. In the case of a nuclear incident, the rapid measurement and subsequent monitoring of radiation levels are top priorities as they help to determine the degree of risk faced by emergency responders and the general public. Instruments for the remote measurement of radioactivity are particularly important when there are potential health risks associated with entering areas with elevated radiation levels. The Nuclear Science and Instrumentation Laboratory (NSIL) — one of the eight laboratories of the Department of Nuclear Sciences and Applications (NA) in Seibersdorf, Austria — focuses on developing a variety of specialized analytical and diagnostic instruments and methods, and transferring knowledge to IAEA Member States. These include instruments capable of carrying out remote measurements. This emergency response work carried out by the NA laboratories supports health and safety in Member States and supports the IAEA’s mandate to promote the safe and peaceful use of nuclear energy

Exploring the Possible Use of Information Barriers for future Biological Weapons Verification Regimes

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Luke, S.J.

2011-01-01

This report describes a path forward for implementing information barriers in a future generic biological arms-control verification regime. Information barriers have become a staple of discussion in the area of arms control verification approaches for nuclear weapons and components. Information barriers when used with a measurement system allow for the determination that an item has sensitive characteristics without releasing any of the sensitive information. Over the last 15 years the United States (with the Russian Federation) has led on the development of information barriers in the area of the verification of nuclear weapons and nuclear components. The work of the US and the Russian Federation has prompted other states (e.g., UK and Norway) to consider the merits of information barriers for possible verification regimes. In the context of a biological weapons control verification regime, the dual-use nature of the biotechnology will require protection of sensitive information while allowing for the verification of treaty commitments. A major question that has arisen is whether - in a biological weapons verification regime - the presence or absence of a weapon pathogen can be determined without revealing any information about possible sensitive or proprietary information contained in the genetic materials being declared under a verification regime. This study indicates that a verification regime could be constructed using a small number of pathogens that spans the range of known biological weapons agents. Since the number of possible pathogens is small it is possible and prudent to treat these pathogens as analogies to attributes in a nuclear verification regime. This study has determined that there may be some information that needs to be protected in a biological weapons control verification regime. To protect this information, the study concludes that the Lawrence Livermore Microbial Detection Array may be a suitable technology for the detection of the

Exploring the Possible Use of Information Barriers for future Biological Weapons Verification Regimes

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Luke, S J

2011-12-20

This report describes a path forward for implementing information barriers in a future generic biological arms-control verification regime. Information barriers have become a staple of discussion in the area of arms control verification approaches for nuclear weapons and components. Information barriers when used with a measurement system allow for the determination that an item has sensitive characteristics without releasing any of the sensitive information. Over the last 15 years the United States (with the Russian Federation) has led on the development of information barriers in the area of the verification of nuclear weapons and nuclear components. The work of the US and the Russian Federation has prompted other states (e.g., UK and Norway) to consider the merits of information barriers for possible verification regimes. In the context of a biological weapons control verification regime, the dual-use nature of the biotechnology will require protection of sensitive information while allowing for the verification of treaty commitments. A major question that has arisen is whether - in a biological weapons verification regime - the presence or absence of a weapon pathogen can be determined without revealing any information about possible sensitive or proprietary information contained in the genetic materials being declared under a verification regime. This study indicates that a verification regime could be constructed using a small number of pathogens that spans the range of known biological weapons agents. Since the number of possible pathogens is small it is possible and prudent to treat these pathogens as analogies to attributes in a nuclear verification regime. This study has determined that there may be some information that needs to be protected in a biological weapons control verification regime. To protect this information, the study concludes that the Lawrence Livermore Microbial Detection Array may be a suitable technology for the detection of the

Verification of design calculations of a PGNAA setup using nuclear track ejectors

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Naqvi, A.A. E-mail: aanaqvi@kfupm.edu.sa; Fazal-ur-Rehman,; Nagadi, .M.; Maslehuddin, M.; Khateeb-ur-Rehman; Kidwai, S

2004-02-01

A rectangular moderator assembly has been designed for the PGNAA setup at ing Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals (KFUPM). The design calculations of the rectangular moderator, which were obtained through Monte Carlo simulation, have been verified experimentally through thermal neutron field measurement using CR-39 nuclear track detectors (NTDs). These measurements were carried out at the KFUPM 350 keV accelerator using 2.8 MeV pulsed neutron beam from D(d,n) reaction. The thermal neutron yield was measured inside the sample volume of the rectangular moderator by two NTDs fixed at back and front end of the sample cavity. The good agreement between he experimental results and the results of the calculations shows useful application of NTDs in verification of design calculations of a PGNAA setup.

Development of technologies for national control of and accountancy for nuclear materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Choi, Young Myung; Kwack, E. H.; Kim, B. K.

2002-03-01

The aim of this project is to establish a rigid foundation of national safeguards and to develop the new technologies for the nuclear control. This project is composed of four different technologies; 1. Monitoring technology for nuclear materials, 2. Detection technology for a single particle, 3. Safeguards information management technology, 4. Physical protection technology. Various studies such as a remote verification system for CANDU spent fuel in dry storage canister, a spent fuel verification system using an optical fiber scintillator, and development of softwares for safeguards and physical protection were performed in the frist phase('99-'01). As a result of this research, it has been identified that the developed technologies could be a crucial means of the control for the nuclear material and facilities related. We are planing to accomplish a steady national safeguard system in the second phase('02-'06). This research will help to elevate the transparency and credibility in national nuclear activities by improving the relative technologies

More on fatigue verification of Class 1 nuclear power piping according to ASME BPV III NB-3600

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zeng, Lingfu; Dahlström, Lars; Jansson, Lennart G.

2011-01-01

In this paper, fatigue verification of Class 1 nuclear power piping according to ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, NB-3600, and relevant issues that are often discussed in connection to the power uprate of several Swedish BWR reactors in recent years, are dealt with. Key parameters involved in the fatigue verification, i.e. the alternating stress intensity S alt , the penalty factor K e and the cumulative damage factor U, and relevant computational procedures applicable for the assessment of low-cycle fatigue failure using strain-controlled data, are particularly addressed. A so-called simplified elastic-plastic discontinuity analysis for alternative verification when basic fatigue requirements found unsatisfactory, and the procedures provided in NB-3600 for evaluating the alternating stress intensity S alt , are reviewed in detail. Our emphasis is placed on other procedures alternative to the simplified elastic-plastic discontinuity analysis. A more in-depth discussion is given to an alternative suggested earlier by the authors using nonlinear finite element analyses. This paper is a continuation of our work presented in ICONE16/17/18, which attempted to categorize design rules in the code into linear design rules and non-linear design rules and to clarify corresponding design requirements and finite element analyses, in particular, those non-linear ones. (author)

Development of Measurement Techniques For Strengthening Nuclear Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Badawy, I.

2007-01-01

The strategy of nuclear safeguards is based on the accounting and control of nuclear materials, nuclear technologies and activities in a State in order to attain its ''Legal'' goals of the application of atomic energy. The present paper investigates the development in the measurement techniques used in the verification and control of NMs for the purpose of strengthening safeguards. Its focus is to review the recent nuclear measurement techniques used for the identification and verification of nuclear materials.The different levels of verification and the accuracy of these techniques are discussed. The implementation of stregthened safeguards; and nuclear materials verification and control in the world are mentioned. Also, the recently proposed measures to enhance the ability to detect undeclared nuclear materials, nuclear activities and facilities that would need advanced measurement techniques are indicated.

Verification of Scientific Simulations via Hypothesis-Driven Comparative and Quantitative Visualization

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Ahrens, James P [ORNL; Heitmann, Katrin [ORNL; Petersen, Mark R [ORNL; Woodring, Jonathan [Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL); Williams, Sean [Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL); Fasel, Patricia [Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL); Ahrens, Christine [Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL); Hsu, Chung-Hsing [ORNL; Geveci, Berk [ORNL

2010-11-01

This article presents a visualization-assisted process that verifies scientific-simulation codes. Code verification is necessary because scientists require accurate predictions to interpret data confidently. This verification process integrates iterative hypothesis verification with comparative, feature, and quantitative visualization. Following this process can help identify differences in cosmological and oceanographic simulations.

International safeguards: Accounting for nuclear materials

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Fishbone, L.G.

1988-09-28

Nuclear safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are one element of the non-proliferation regime'', the collection of measures whose aim is to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already possess them. Safeguards verifications provide evidence that nuclear materials in peaceful use for nuclear-power production are properly accounted for. Though carried out in cooperation with nuclear facility operators, the verifications can provide assurance because they are designed with the capability to detect diversion, should it occur. Traditional safeguards verification measures conducted by inspectors of the IAEA include book auditing; counting and identifying containers of nuclear material; measuring nuclear material; photographic and video surveillance; and sealing. Novel approaches to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in safeguards verifications are under investigation as the number and complexity of nuclear facilities grow. These include the zone approach, which entails carrying out verifications for groups of facilities collectively, and randomization approach, which entails carrying out entire inspection visits some fraction of the time on a random basis. Both approaches show promise in particular situations, but, like traditional measures, must be tested to ensure their practical utility. These approaches are covered on this report. 15 refs., 16 figs., 3 tabs.

International safeguards: Accounting for nuclear materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fishbone, L.G.

1988-01-01

Nuclear safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are one element of the ''non-proliferation regime'', the collection of measures whose aim is to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already possess them. Safeguards verifications provide evidence that nuclear materials in peaceful use for nuclear-power production are properly accounted for. Though carried out in cooperation with nuclear facility operators, the verifications can provide assurance because they are designed with the capability to detect diversion, should it occur. Traditional safeguards verification measures conducted by inspectors of the IAEA include book auditing; counting and identifying containers of nuclear material; measuring nuclear material; photographic and video surveillance; and sealing. Novel approaches to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in safeguards verifications are under investigation as the number and complexity of nuclear facilities grow. These include the zone approach, which entails carrying out verifications for groups of facilities collectively, and randomization approach, which entails carrying out entire inspection visits some fraction of the time on a random basis. Both approaches show promise in particular situations, but, like traditional measures, must be tested to ensure their practical utility. These approaches are covered on this report. 15 refs., 16 figs., 3 tabs

CTBT Integrated Verification System Evaluation Model

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Edenburn, M.W.; Bunting, M.L.; Payne, A.C. Jr.

1997-10-01

Sandia National Laboratories has developed a computer based model called IVSEM (Integrated Verification System Evaluation Model) to estimate the performance of a nuclear detonation monitoring system. The IVSEM project was initiated in June 1994, by Sandia`s Monitoring Systems and Technology Center and has been funded by the US Department of Energy`s Office of Nonproliferation and National Security (DOE/NN). IVSEM is a simple, top-level, modeling tool which estimates the performance of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) monitoring system and can help explore the impact of various sensor system concepts and technology advancements on CTBT monitoring. One of IVSEM`s unique features is that it integrates results from the various CTBT sensor technologies (seismic, infrasound, radionuclide, and hydroacoustic) and allows the user to investigate synergy among the technologies. Specifically, IVSEM estimates the detection effectiveness (probability of detection) and location accuracy of the integrated system and of each technology subsystem individually. The model attempts to accurately estimate the monitoring system`s performance at medium interfaces (air-land, air-water) and for some evasive testing methods such as seismic decoupling. This report describes version 1.2 of IVSEM.

Change Detection with Polarimetric SAR Imagery for Nuclear Verification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Canty, M.

2015-01-01

This paper investigates the application of multivariate statistical change detection with high-resolution polarimetric SAR imagery acquired from commercial satellite platforms for observation and verification of nuclear activities. A prototype software tool comprising a processing chain starting from single look complex (SLC) multitemporal data through to change detection maps is presented. Multivariate change detection algorithms applied to polarimetric SAR data are not common. This is because, up until recently, not many researchers or practitioners have had access to polarimetric data. However with the advent of several spaceborne polarimetric SAR instruments such as the Japanese ALOS, the Canadian Radarsat-2, the German TerraSAR-X, the Italian COSMO-SkyMed missions and the European Sentinal SAR platform, the situation has greatly improved. There is now a rich source of weather-independent satellite radar data which can be exploited for Nuclear Safeguards purposes. The method will also work for univariate data, that is, it is also applicable to scalar or single polarimetric SAR data. The change detection procedure investigated here exploits the complex Wishart distribution of dual and quad polarimetric imagery in look-averaged covariance matrix format in order to define a per-pixel change/no-change hypothesis test. It includes approximations for the probability distribution of the test statistic, and so permits quantitative significance levels to be quoted for change pixels. The method has been demonstrated previously with polarimetric images from the airborne EMISAR sensor, but is applied here for the first time to satellite platforms. In addition, an improved multivariate method is used to estimate the so-called equivalent number of looks (ENL), which is a critical parameter of the hypothesis test. (author)

Verification of safety critical software

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Son, Ki Chang; Chun, Chong Son; Lee, Byeong Joo; Lee, Soon Sung; Lee, Byung Chai

1996-01-01

To assure quality of safety critical software, software should be developed in accordance with software development procedures and rigorous software verification and validation should be performed. Software verification is the formal act of reviewing, testing of checking, and documenting whether software components comply with the specified requirements for a particular stage of the development phase[1]. New software verification methodology was developed and was applied to the Shutdown System No. 1 and 2 (SDS1,2) for Wolsung 2,3 and 4 nuclear power plants by Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute(KAERI) and Atomic Energy of Canada Limited(AECL) in order to satisfy new regulation requirements of Atomic Energy Control Boars(AECB). Software verification methodology applied to SDS1 for Wolsung 2,3 and 4 project will be described in this paper. Some errors were found by this methodology during the software development for SDS1 and were corrected by software designer. Outputs from Wolsung 2,3 and 4 project have demonstrated that the use of this methodology results in a high quality, cost-effective product. 15 refs., 6 figs. (author)

Future of monitoring and verification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wagenmakers, H.

1991-01-01

The organized verification entrusted to IAEA for the implementation of the NPT, of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and of the Treaty of Rarotonga, reaches reasonable standards. The current dispute with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea about the conclusion of a safeguards agreement with IAEA, by its exceptional nature, underscores rather than undermines the positive judgement to be passed on IAEA's overall performance. The additional task given to the Director General of IAEA under Security Council resolution 687 (1991) regarding Iraq's nuclear-weapons-usable material is particularly challenging. For the purposes of this paper, verification is defined as the process for establishing whether the States parties are complying with an agreement. In the final stage verification may lead into consideration of how to respond to non-compliance. Monitoring is perceived as the first level in the verification system. It is one generic form of collecting information on objects, activities or events and it involves a variety of instruments ranging from communications satellites to television cameras or human inspectors. Monitoring may also be used as a confidence-building measure

Verification and Validation of Digitally Upgraded Control Rooms

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Boring, Ronald; Lau, Nathan

2015-01-01

As nuclear power plants undertake main control room modernization, a challenge is the lack of a clearly defined human factors process to follow. Verification and validation (V&V) as applied in the nuclear power community has tended to involve efforts such as integrated system validation, which comes at the tail end of the design stage. To fill in guidance gaps and create a step-by-step process for control room modernization, we have developed the Guideline for Operational Nuclear Usability and Knowledge Elicitation (GONUKE). This approach builds on best practices in the software industry, which prescribe an iterative user-centered approach featuring multiple cycles of design and evaluation. Nuclear regulatory guidance for control room design emphasizes summative evaluation - which occurs after the design is complete. In the GONUKE approach, evaluation is also performed at the formative stage of design - early in the design cycle using mockups and prototypes for evaluation. The evaluation may involve expert review (e.g., software heuristic evaluation at the formative stage and design verification against human factors standards like NUREG-0700 at the summative stage). The evaluation may also involve user testing (e.g., usability testing at the formative stage and integrated system validation at the summative stage). An additional, often overlooked component of evaluation is knowledge elicitation, which captures operator insights into the system. In this report we outline these evaluation types across design phases that support the overall modernization process. The objective is to provide industry-suitable guidance for steps to be taken in support of the design and evaluation of a new human-machine interface (HMI) in the control room. We suggest the value of early-stage V&V and highlight how this early-stage V&V can help improve the design process for control room modernization. We argue that there is a need to overcome two shortcomings of V&V in current practice

Verification and Validation of Digitally Upgraded Control Rooms

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Boring, Ronald [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Lau, Nathan [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

2015-09-01

As nuclear power plants undertake main control room modernization, a challenge is the lack of a clearly defined human factors process to follow. Verification and validation (V&V) as applied in the nuclear power community has tended to involve efforts such as integrated system validation, which comes at the tail end of the design stage. To fill in guidance gaps and create a step-by-step process for control room modernization, we have developed the Guideline for Operational Nuclear Usability and Knowledge Elicitation (GONUKE). This approach builds on best practices in the software industry, which prescribe an iterative user-centered approach featuring multiple cycles of design and evaluation. Nuclear regulatory guidance for control room design emphasizes summative evaluation—which occurs after the design is complete. In the GONUKE approach, evaluation is also performed at the formative stage of design—early in the design cycle using mockups and prototypes for evaluation. The evaluation may involve expert review (e.g., software heuristic evaluation at the formative stage and design verification against human factors standards like NUREG-0700 at the summative stage). The evaluation may also involve user testing (e.g., usability testing at the formative stage and integrated system validation at the summative stage). An additional, often overlooked component of evaluation is knowledge elicitation, which captures operator insights into the system. In this report we outline these evaluation types across design phases that support the overall modernization process. The objective is to provide industry-suitable guidance for steps to be taken in support of the design and evaluation of a new human-machine interface (HMI) in the control room. We suggest the value of early-stage V&V and highlight how this early-stage V&V can help improve the design process for control room modernization. We argue that there is a need to overcome two shortcomings of V&V in current practice�

Nuclear material accountancy and data verification (the muf-d-problem)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Avenhaus, R.

1981-01-01

According to general agreement international nuclear material safeguards are organized in such a way that the plant operators generate all data necessary for the establishment of a material balance, that the inspectors verify the operator's data with the help of independent measurements and that - if there are no significant differences between the operator's data and the inspector's findings - the material balance is established with the help of the operator's data. This procedure implies two tests of significance: one difference test (D-test) for the comparison of the operator's and the inspector's data and one for the material balance establishment (MUF-test). In this paper these two test procedures as well as their combination, under the boundary condition of a given overall false alarm probability, are analyzed. The results are illustrated with the help of a concrete example. 15 refs

Human factors engineering plan for reviewing nuclear plant modernization programs

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

O'Hara, John; Higgins, James

2004-12-01

The Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate reviews the human factors engineering (HFE) aspects of nuclear power plants (NPPs) involved in the modernization of the plant systems and control rooms. The purpose of a HFE review is to help ensure personnel and public safety by verifying that accepted HFE practices and guidelines are incorporated into the program and nuclear power plant design. Such a review helps to ensure the HFE aspects of an NPP are developed, designed, and evaluated on the basis of a structured top-down system analysis using accepted HFE principles. The review addresses eleven HFE elements: HFE Program Management, Operating Experience Review, Functional Requirements Analysis and Allocation, Task Analysis, Staffing, Human Reliability Analysis, Human-System Interface Design, Procedure Development, Training Program Development, Human Factors Verification and Validation, and Design Implementation

Human factors engineering plan for reviewing nuclear plant modernization programs

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

O' Hara, John; Higgins, James [Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, NY (United States)

2004-12-01

The Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate reviews the human factors engineering (HFE) aspects of nuclear power plants (NPPs) involved in the modernization of the plant systems and control rooms. The purpose of a HFE review is to help ensure personnel and public safety by verifying that accepted HFE practices and guidelines are incorporated into the program and nuclear power plant design. Such a review helps to ensure the HFE aspects of an NPP are developed, designed, and evaluated on the basis of a structured top-down system analysis using accepted HFE principles. The review addresses eleven HFE elements: HFE Program Management, Operating Experience Review, Functional Requirements Analysis and Allocation, Task Analysis, Staffing, Human Reliability Analysis, Human-System Interface Design, Procedure Development, Training Program Development, Human Factors Verification and Validation, and Design Implementation.

Production of plastic scintillation survey meter for clearance verification measurement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tachibana, Mitsuo; Shiraishi, Kunio; Ishigami, Tsutomu; Tomii, Hiroyuki

2008-03-01

In the Nuclear Science Research Institute, the decommissioning of various nuclear facilities is carried out according to the plan for meeting the midterm goal of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA). An increase in the clearance verification measurement of concrete on buildings and the radiation measurement for releasing controlled areas will be expected along with the dismantlement of nuclear facilities in the future. The radiation measurement for releasing controlled areas has been carried out in small-scale nuclear facilities including the JPDR (Japan Power Demonstration Reactor). However, the radiation measurement with an existing measuring device was difficult in effects of radiation from radioactive materials that remains in buried piping. On the other hand, there is no experience that the clearance verification measurement is executed in the JAEA. The generation of a large amount of clearance object will be expected along with the decommissioning of the nuclear facilities in the future. The plastic scintillation survey meter (hereafter, 'PL measuring device') was produced to apply to the clearance verification measurement and the radiation measurement for releasing controlled areas. The basic characteristic test and the actual test were confirmed using the PL measuring device. As a result of these tests, it was found that the evaluation value of radioactivity with the PL measuring device was accuracy equal with the existing measuring device. The PL measuring device has feature of the existing measuring device with a light weight and easy operability. The PL measuring device can correct the gamma ray too. The PL measuring device is effective to the clearance verification measurement of concrete on buildings and the radiation measurement for releasing controlled areas. (author)

Crowd-Sourced Help with Emergent Knowledge for Optimized Formal Verification (CHEKOFV)

Science.gov (United States)

2016-03-01

up game Binary Fission, which was deployed during Phase Two of CHEKOFV. Xylem: The Code of Plants is a casual game for players using mobile ...there are the design and engineering challenges of building a game infrastructure that integrates verification technology with crowd participation...the backend processes that annotate the originating software. Allowing players to construct their own equations opened up the flexibility to receive

Verification of a primary-to-secondary leaking safety procedure in a nuclear power plant using coloured Petri nets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nemeth, E.; Bartha, T.; Fazekas, Cs.; Hangos, K.M.

2009-01-01

This paper deals with formal and simulation-based verification methods of a PRImary-to-SEcondary leaking (abbreviated as PRISE) safety procedure. The PRISE safety procedure controls the draining of the contaminated water in a faulty steam generator when a non-compensable leaking from the primary to the secondary circuit occurs. Because of the discrete nature of the verification, a Coloured Petri Net (CPN) representation is proposed for both the procedure and the plant model. We have proved by using a non-model-based strategy that the PRISE safety procedure is safe, there are no dead markings in the state space, and all transitions are live; being either impartial or fair. Further analysis results have been obtained using a model-based verification approach. We created a simple, low dimensional, nonlinear dynamic model of the primary circuit in a VVER-type pressurized water nuclear power plant for the purpose of the model-based verification. This is in contrast to the widely used safety analysis that requires an accurate detailed model. Our model also describes the relevant safety procedures, as well as all of the major leaking-type faults. We propose a novel method to transform this model to a CPN form by discretization. The composed plant and PRISE safety procedure system has also been analysed by simulation using CPN analysis tools. We found by the model-based analysis-using both single and multiple faults-that the PRISE safety procedure initiates the draining when the PRISE event occurs, and no false alarm will be initiated

Formal Verification of Computerized Procedure with Colored Petri Nets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, Yun Goo; Shin, Yeong Cheol

2008-01-01

Computerized Procedure System (CPS) supports nuclear power plant operators in performing operating procedures which are instructions to guide in monitoring, decision making and controlling nuclear power plants. Computerized Procedure (CP) should be loaded to CPS. Due to its execution characteristic, computerized procedure acts like a software in CPS. For example, procedure flows are determined by operator evaluation and computerized procedure logic which are pre-defined. So the verification of Computerized Procedure logic and execution flow is needed before computerized procedures are installed in the system. Formal verification methods are proposed and the modeling of operating procedures with Coloured Petri Nets(CP-nets) is presented

Verifying the transition from low levels of nuclear weapons to a nuclear weapon-free world. VERTIC research report no. 2

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Milne, T.; Wilson, H.

1999-01-01

The process of verifying the complete elimination of nuclear warheads in national stockpiles can be divided, conceptually, into four stages: first, comprehensive declarations of warhead and material inventories, as a base-line from which verified disarmament can proceed; second, the transfer of all nuclear weapons and weapons-grade fissile material into bonded store; third, demilitarisation measures, such as to render warheads unusable without disassembly and refabrication; fourth, dismantlement of warheads and disposition of fissile material. Many of the technologies and technologies and techniques needed for verifying the elimination of nuclear warheads have been worked out at a general level, largely in US studies. While it is essential that these techniques are refined and improved, what is most important now, if disarmament is to proceed expeditiously, is for each of the nuclear weapon states (NWS) themselves to study the central verification problems and requirements in order to identify particular techniques and approaches that meet their needs. As yet there is no system of integrated data exchange and verification that any of the NWS is willing to endorse. Each of the NWS should give detailed consideration to the logistics of dismantling the warheads in their respective stockpiles, including, for example, the practicalities of accommodating international verification at their potential dismantlement facilities. Each of the NWS might usefully review exactly which details of warhead design and construction have to remain secret in the course of the disarmament process, in the first place from one another, and second from the IAEA or any other international body that might be involved in international disarmament arrangements. Introducing transparency and verification into national nuclear weapons programmes might have a significant financial cost. Research and ingenuity might reduce this cost, however, and early investments in these fields, with sharing of

Neutron spectrometric methods for core inventory verification in research reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ellinger, A.; Filges, U.; Hansen, W.; Knorr, J.; Schneider, R.

2002-01-01

In consequence of the Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards, inspections are periodically made in nuclear facilities by the IAEA and the EURATOM Safeguards Directorate. The inspection methods are permanently improved. Therefore, the Core Inventory Verification method is being developed as an indirect method for the verification of the core inventory and to check the declared operation of research reactors

Multi-canister overpack project - verification and validation, MCNP 4A

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Goldmann, L.H.

1997-01-01

This supporting document contains the software verification and validation (V and V) package used for Phase 2 design of the Spent Nuclear Fuel Multi-Canister Overpack. V and V packages for both ANSYS and MCNP are included. Description of Verification Run(s): This software requires that it be compiled specifically for the machine it is to be used on. Therefore to facilitate ease in the verification process the software automatically runs 25 sample problems to ensure proper installation and compilation. Once the runs are completed the software checks for verification by performing a file comparison on the new output file and the old output file. Any differences between any of the files will cause a verification error. Due to the manner in which the verification is completed a verification error does not necessarily indicate a problem. This indicates that a closer look at the output files is needed to determine the cause of the error

EURATOM safeguards efforts in the development of spent fuel verification methods by non-destructive assay

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Matloch, L.; Vaccaro, S.; Couland, M.; De Baere, P.; Schwalbach, P. [Euratom, Communaute europeenne de l' energie atomique - CEEA (European Commission (EC))

2015-07-01

The back end of the nuclear fuel cycle continues to develop. The European Commission, particularly the Nuclear Safeguards Directorate of the Directorate General for Energy, implements Euratom safeguards and needs to adapt to this situation. The verification methods for spent nuclear fuel, which EURATOM inspectors can use, require continuous improvement. Whereas the Euratom on-site laboratories provide accurate verification results for fuel undergoing reprocessing, the situation is different for spent fuel which is destined for final storage. In particular, new needs arise from the increasing number of cask loadings for interim dry storage and the advanced plans for the construction of encapsulation plants and geological repositories. Various scenarios present verification challenges. In this context, EURATOM Safeguards, often in cooperation with other stakeholders, is committed to further improvement of NDA methods for spent fuel verification. In this effort EURATOM plays various roles, ranging from definition of inspection needs to direct participation in development of measurement systems, including support of research in the framework of international agreements and via the EC Support Program to the IAEA. This paper presents recent progress in selected NDA methods. These methods have been conceived to satisfy different spent fuel verification needs, ranging from attribute testing to pin-level partial defect verification. (authors)

SNF verification requirements imposed through 10 CFR Part 961: Interrelationship with MC ampersand A requirements for the OCRWM safeguards system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Slater, N.; Vance, S.

1994-01-01

Article VI.B.2 of the Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and/or High-Level Radioactive Waste (10 CFR Part 961, Standard Contract) provides that spent nuclear fuel shall be subject to verification prior to acceptance by the Department of Energy. As part of the overall process for scheduling deliveries of spent nuclear fuel, the Standard Contract requires contract holders to submit detailed descriptions of the spent nuclear fuel they intend to deliver. Thus, the provision for verification in the Standard contract allows the Department the opportunity to ensure that the spent nuclear fuel intended for deliver is consistent with the description provided, and that the material is properly loaded, packaged, marked, and labeled. The Department is currently evaluating the verification requirements for spent nuclear fuel that it will establish pursuant to Article VI.B.2 of the Standard Contract. The Department recognizes that there may be significant overlap between these verification requirements and the requirements established for material control and accountability (MC ampersand A). Therefore, the Department may recommend modifications to the process established in the Standard Contract to ensure that the verification and MC ampersand A functions and activities are fully integrated

Verification for excess reactivity on beginning equilibrium core of RSG GAS

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Daddy Setyawan; Budi Rohman

2011-01-01

BAPETEN is an institution authorized to control the use of nuclear energy in Indonesia. Control for the use of nuclear energy is carried out through three pillars: regulation, licensing, and inspection. In order to assure the safety of the operating research reactors, the assessment unit of BAPETEN is carrying out independent assessment in order to verify safety related parameters in the SAR including neutronic aspect. The work includes verification to the Power Peaking Factor in the equilibrium silicide core of RSG GAS reactor by computational method using MCNP-ORIGEN. This verification calculation results for is 9.4 %. Meanwhile, the RSG-GAS safety analysis report shows that the excess reactivity on equilibrium core of RSG GAS is 9.7 %. The verification calculation results show a good agreement with the report. (author)

Current Research on Containment Technologies for Verification Activities: Advanced Tools for Maintaining Continuity of Knowledge

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Smartt, H.; Kuhn, M.; Krementz, D.

2015-01-01

The U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Non-proliferation and Verification Research and Development currently funds research on advanced containment technologies to support Continuity of Knowledge (CoK) objectives for verification regimes. One effort in this area is the Advanced Tools for Maintaining Continuity of Knowledge (ATCK) project. Recognizing that CoK assurances must withstand potential threats from sophisticated adversaries, and that containment options must therefore keep pace with technology advances, the NNSA research and development on advanced containment tools is an important investment. The two ATCK efforts underway at present address the technical containment requirements for securing access points (loop seals) and protecting defined volumes. Multiple U.S. national laboratories are supporting this project: Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). SNL and SRNL are developing the ''Ceramic Seal,'' an active loop seal that integrates multiple advanced security capabilities and improved efficiency housed within a small-volume ceramic body. The development includes an associated handheld reader and interface software. Currently at the prototype stage, the Ceramic Seal will undergo a series of tests to determine operational readiness. It will be field tested in a representative verification trial in 2016. ORNL is developing the Whole Volume Containment Seal (WCS), a flexible conductive fabric capable of enclosing various sizes and shapes of monitored items. The WCS includes a distributed impedance measurement system for imaging the fabric surface area and passive tamper-indicating features such as permanent-staining conductive ink. With the expected technology advances from the Ceramic Seal and WCS, the ATCK project takes significant steps in advancing containment technologies to help maintain CoK for various verification

EPRI expert system activities for nuclear utility industry application

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Naser, J.A.

1990-01-01

This paper reports on expert systems which have reached a level of maturity where they offer considerable benefits for the nuclear utility industry. The ability of expert systems to enhance expertise makes them an important tool for the nuclear utility industry in the areas of engineering, operations and maintenance. Benefits of expert system applications include comprehensive and consistent reasoning, reduction of time required for activities, retention of human expertise and ability to utilize multiple experts knowledge for an activity. The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) has been performing four basic activities to help the nuclear industry take advantage of this expert system technology. The first is the development of expert system building tools which are tailored to nuclear utility industry applications. The second is the development of expert system applications. The third is work in developing a methodology for verification and validation of expert systems. The last is technology transfer activities to help the nuclear utility industry benefit from expert systems. The purpose of this paper is to describe the EPRI activities

A method of knowledge base verification and validation for nuclear power plants expert systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kwon, Il Won

1996-02-01

The adoption of expert systems mainly as operator supporting systems is becoming increasingly popular as the control algorithms of system become more and more sophisticated and complicated. As a result of this popularity, a large number of expert systems are developed. The nature of expert systems, however, requires that they be verified and validated carefully and that detailed methodologies for their development be devised. Therefore, it is widely noted that assuring the reliability of expert systems is very important, especially in nuclear industry, and it is also recognized that the process of verification and validation is an essential part of reliability assurance for these systems. Research and practices have produced numerous methods for expert system verification and validation (V and V) that suggest traditional software and system approaches to V and V. However, many approaches and methods for expert system V and V are partial, unreliable, and not uniform. The purpose of this paper is to present a new approach to expert system V and V, based on Petri nets, providing a uniform model. We devise and suggest an automated tool, called COKEP (Checker Of Knowledge base using Extended Petri net), for checking incorrectness, inconsistency, and incompleteness in a knowledge base. We also suggest heuristic analysis for validation process to show that the reasoning path is correct

Nuclear Energy -- Knowledge Base for Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NE-KAMS) Code Verification and Validation Data Standards and Requirements: Fluid Dynamics Version 1.0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Greg Weirs; Hyung Lee

2011-09-01

V&V and UQ are the primary means to assess the accuracy and reliability of M&S and, hence, to establish confidence in M&S. Though other industries are establishing standards and requirements for the performance of V&V and UQ, at present, the nuclear industry has not established such standards or requirements. However, the nuclear industry is beginning to recognize that such standards are needed and that the resources needed to support V&V and UQ will be very significant. In fact, no single organization has sufficient resources or expertise required to organize, conduct and maintain a comprehensive V&V and UQ program. What is needed is a systematic and standardized approach to establish and provide V&V and UQ resources at a national or even international level, with a consortium of partners from government, academia and industry. Specifically, what is needed is a structured and cost-effective knowledge base that collects, evaluates and stores verification and validation data, and shows how it can be used to perform V&V and UQ, leveraging collaboration and sharing of resources to support existing engineering and licensing procedures as well as science-based V&V and UQ processes. The Nuclear Energy Knowledge base for Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NE-KAMS) is being developed at the Idaho National Laboratory in conjunction with Bettis Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, Argonne National Laboratory, Utah State University and others with the objective of establishing a comprehensive and web-accessible knowledge base to provide V&V and UQ resources for M&S for nuclear reactor design, analysis and licensing. The knowledge base will serve as an important resource for technical exchange and collaboration that will enable credible and reliable computational models and simulations for application to nuclear power. NE-KAMS will serve as a valuable resource for the nuclear industry, academia, the national laboratories, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and

Systems Approach to Arms Control Verification

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Allen, K; Neimeyer, I; Listner, C; Stein, G; Chen, C; Dreicer, M

2015-05-15

Using the decades of experience of developing concepts and technologies for verifying bilateral and multilateral arms control agreements, a broad conceptual systems approach is being developed that takes into account varying levels of information and risk. The IAEA has already demonstrated the applicability of a systems approach by implementing safeguards at the State level, with acquisition path analysis as the key element. In order to test whether such an approach could also be implemented for arms control verification, an exercise was conducted in November 2014 at the JRC ITU Ispra. Based on the scenario of a hypothetical treaty between two model nuclear weapons states aimed at capping their nuclear arsenals at existing levels, the goal of this exercise was to explore how to use acquisition path analysis in an arms control context. Our contribution will present the scenario, objectives and results of this exercise, and attempt to define future workshops aimed at further developing verification measures that will deter or detect treaty violations.

Groundwater flow code verification ''benchmarking'' activity (COVE-2A): Analysis of participants' work

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dykhuizen, R.C.; Barnard, R.W.

1992-02-01

The Nuclear Waste Repository Technology Department at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) is investigating the suitability of Yucca Mountain as a potential site for underground burial of nuclear wastes. One element of the investigations is to assess the potential long-term effects of groundwater flow on the integrity of a potential repository. A number of computer codes are being used to model groundwater flow through geologic media in which the potential repository would be located. These codes compute numerical solutions for problems that are usually analytically intractable. Consequently, independent confirmation of the correctness of the solution is often not possible. Code verification is a process that permits the determination of the numerical accuracy of codes by comparing the results of several numerical solutions for the same problem. The international nuclear waste research community uses benchmarking for intercomparisons that partially satisfy the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) definition of code verification. This report presents the results from the COVE-2A (Code Verification) project, which is a subset of the COVE project

Advancing Disarmament Verification Tools: A Task for Europe?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Göttsche, Malte; Kütt, Moritz; Neuneck, Götz; Niemeyer, Irmgard

2015-01-01

A number of scientific-technical activities have been carried out to establish more robust and irreversible disarmament verification schemes. Regardless of the actual path towards deeper reductions in nuclear arsenals or their total elimination in the future, disarmament verification will require new verification procedures and techniques. This paper discusses the information that would be required as a basis for building confidence in disarmament, how it could be principally verified and the role Europe could play. Various ongoing activities are presented that could be brought together to produce a more intensified research and development environment in Europe. The paper argues that if ‘effective multilateralism’ is the main goal of the European Union’s (EU) disarmament policy, EU efforts should be combined and strengthened to create a coordinated multilateral disarmament verification capacity in the EU and other European countries. The paper concludes with several recommendations that would have a significant impact on future developments. Among other things, the paper proposes a one-year review process that should include all relevant European actors. In the long run, an EU Centre for Disarmament Verification could be envisaged to optimize verification needs, technologies and procedures.

Engineering a static verification tool for GPU kernels

OpenAIRE

Bardsley, E; Betts, A; Chong, N; Collingbourne, P; Deligiannis, P; Donaldson, AF; Ketema, J; Liew, D; Qadeer, S

2014-01-01

We report on practical experiences over the last 2.5 years related to the engineering of GPUVerify, a static verification tool for OpenCL and CUDA GPU kernels, plotting the progress of GPUVerify from a prototype to a fully functional and relatively efficient analysis tool. Our hope is that this experience report will serve the verification community by helping to inform future tooling efforts. ? 2014 Springer International Publishing.

Can abolition of nuclear weapons be adequately verified?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rotblat, J.

1993-01-01

Speaking on the problems of preventing proliferations of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament the author suggests the following measures to reach these goals: signing a treaty that binds all the nuclear weapon states to the no-first-use principle as a basic policy; the United Nations should put the elimination of nuclear weapons on its agenda; having the treaty safeguarded two-pronged verification regime, one would be technological verification, the second one - so called societal verification which means that not just a group of experts but everybody would be asked to take part in ensuring that the treaty would not be violated

Formal verification and validation of the safety-critical software in a digital reactor protection system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kwon, K. C.; Park, G. Y.

2006-01-01

This paper describes the Verification and Validation (V and V) activities for the safety-critical software in a Digital Reactor Protection System (DRPS) that is being developed through the Korea nuclear instrumentation and control system project. The main activities of the DRPS V and V process are a preparation of the software planning documentation, a verification of the software according to the software life cycle, a software safety analysis and a software configuration management. The verification works for the Software Requirement Specification (SRS) of the DRPS consist of a technical evaluation, a licensing suitability evaluation, a inspection and traceability analysis, a formal verification, and preparing a test plan and procedure. Especially, the SRS is specified by the formal specification method in the development phase, and the formal SRS is verified by a formal verification method. Through these activities, we believe we can achieve the functionality, performance, reliability, and safety that are the major V and V objectives of the nuclear safety-critical software in a DRPS. (authors)

Nuclear disarmament verification via resonant phenomena.

Science.gov (United States)

Hecla, Jake J; Danagoulian, Areg

2018-03-28

Nuclear disarmament treaties are not sufficient in and of themselves to neutralize the existential threat of the nuclear weapons. Technologies are necessary for verifying the authenticity of the nuclear warheads undergoing dismantlement before counting them toward a treaty partner's obligation. Here we present a concept that leverages isotope-specific nuclear resonance phenomena to authenticate a warhead's fissile components by comparing them to a previously authenticated template. All information is encrypted in the physical domain in a manner that amounts to a physical zero-knowledge proof system. Using Monte Carlo simulations, the system is shown to reveal no isotopic or geometric information about the weapon, while readily detecting hoaxing attempts. This nuclear technique can dramatically increase the reach and trustworthiness of future nuclear disarmament treaties.

Verification of wet blasting decontamination technology

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Matsubara, Sachito; Murayama, Kazunari; Yoshida, Hirohisa; Igei, Shigemitsu; Izumida, Tatsuo

2013-01-01

Macoho Co., Ltd. participated in the projects of 'Decontamination Verification Test FY 2011 by the Ministry of the Environment' and 'Decontamination Verification Test FY 2011 by the Cabinet Office.' And we tested verification to use a wet blasting technology for decontamination of rubble and roads contaminated by the accident of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant of the Tokyo Electric Power Company. As a results of the verification test, the wet blasting decontamination technology showed that a decontamination rate became 60-80% for concrete paving, interlocking, dense-grated asphalt pavement when applied to the decontamination of the road. When it was applied to rubble decontamination, a decontamination rate was 50-60% for gravel and approximately 90% for concrete and wood. It was thought that Cs-134 and Cs-137 attached to the fine sludge scraped off from a decontamination object and the sludge was found to be separated from abrasives by wet cyclene classification: the activity concentration of the abrasives is 1/30 or less than the sludge. The result shows that the abrasives can be reused without problems when the wet blasting decontamination technology is used. (author)

INF and IAEA: A comparative analysis of verification strategy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Scheinman, L.; Kratzer, M.

1992-07-01

This is the final report of a study on the relevance and possible lessons of Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) verification to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) international safeguards activities

Core power capability verification for PWR NPP

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Xian Chunyu; Liu Changwen; Zhang Hong; Liang Wei

2002-01-01

The Principle and methodology of pressurized water reactor nuclear power plant core power capability verification for reload are introduced. The radial and axial power distributions of normal operation (category I or condition I) and abnormal operation (category II or condition II) are simulated by using neutronics calculation code. The linear power density margin and DNBR margin for both categories, which reflect core safety, are analyzed from the point view of reactor physics and T/H, and thus category I operating domain and category II protection set point are verified. Besides, the verification results of reference NPP are also given

Verification OFENDF/B-VII.0, ENDF/B-VII.1 and JENDL-4.0 nuclear data libraries for criticality calculations using NEA/NSC benchmarks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bouhaddane, A.; Farkas, G.; Hascik, J.; Slugen, V.

2015-01-01

The paper presents verification of selected nuclear data libraries with the aim to apply them to fast reactor calculations. More precise results were achieved for thermal neutrons calculations. This corresponds with the demand for more precise nuclear data for fast reactors. However, fast neutron calculations show some consistency, in particular between ENDF-B/VII.1 and JENDL-4.0 nuclear data libraries. The results support the idea to prefer using newer ENDF-B/VII.1 instead of the previous version ENDF-B/VII.0. Certainly, there are still some issues to be addressed and there is potential to gain more conclusive results. Although, application of ENDF-B/VII.1 and JENDL-4.0 is expected for further calculations. (authors)

Heavy water physical verification in power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Morsy, S.; Schuricht, V.; Beetle, T.; Szabo, E.

1986-01-01

This paper is a report on the Agency experience in verifying heavy water inventories in power plants. The safeguards objectives and goals for such activities are defined in the paper. The heavy water is stratified according to the flow within the power plant, including upgraders. A safeguards scheme based on a combination of records auditing, comparing records and reports, and physical verification has been developed. This scheme has elevated the status of heavy water safeguards to a level comparable to nuclear material safeguards in bulk facilities. It leads to attribute and variable verification of the heavy water inventory in the different system components and in the store. The verification methods include volume and weight determination, sampling and analysis, non-destructive assay (NDA), and criticality check. The analysis of the different measurement methods and their limits of accuracy are discussed in the paper

A Translator Verification Technique for FPGA Software Development in Nuclear Power Plants

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kim, Jae Yeob; Kim, Eui Sub; Yoo, Jun Beom [Konkuk University, Seoul (Korea, Republic of)

2014-10-15

Although the FPGAs give a high performance than PLC (Programmable Logic Controller), the platform change from PLC to FPGA impose all PLC software engineers give up their experience, knowledge and practices accumulated over decades, and start a new FPGA-based hardware development from scratch. We have researched to fine the solution to this problem reducing the risk and preserving the experience and knowledge. One solution is to use the FBDtoVerilog translator, which translates the FBD programs into behavior-preserving Verilog programs. In general, the PLCs are usually designed with an FBD, while the FPGAs are described with a HDL (Hardware Description Language) such as Verilog or VHDL. Once PLC designer designed the FBD programs, the FBDtoVerilog translates the FBD into Verilog, mechanically. The designers, therefore, need not consider the rest of FPGA development process (e.g., Synthesis and Place and Routing) and can preserve the accumulated experience and knowledge. Even if we assure that the translation from FBD to Verilog is correct, it must be verified rigorously and thoroughly since it is used in nuclear power plants, which is one of the most safety critical systems. While the designer develops the FPGA software with the FBD program translated by the translator, there are other translation tools such as synthesis tool and place and routing tool. This paper also focuses to verify them rigorously and thoroughly. There are several verification techniques for correctness of translator, but they are hard to apply because of the outrageous cost and performance time. Instead, this paper tries to use an indirect verification technique for demonstrating the correctness of translator using the co-simulation technique. We intend to prove only against specific inputs which are under development for a target I and C system, not against all possible input cases.

A Translator Verification Technique for FPGA Software Development in Nuclear Power Plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, Jae Yeob; Kim, Eui Sub; Yoo, Jun Beom

2014-01-01

Although the FPGAs give a high performance than PLC (Programmable Logic Controller), the platform change from PLC to FPGA impose all PLC software engineers give up their experience, knowledge and practices accumulated over decades, and start a new FPGA-based hardware development from scratch. We have researched to fine the solution to this problem reducing the risk and preserving the experience and knowledge. One solution is to use the FBDtoVerilog translator, which translates the FBD programs into behavior-preserving Verilog programs. In general, the PLCs are usually designed with an FBD, while the FPGAs are described with a HDL (Hardware Description Language) such as Verilog or VHDL. Once PLC designer designed the FBD programs, the FBDtoVerilog translates the FBD into Verilog, mechanically. The designers, therefore, need not consider the rest of FPGA development process (e.g., Synthesis and Place and Routing) and can preserve the accumulated experience and knowledge. Even if we assure that the translation from FBD to Verilog is correct, it must be verified rigorously and thoroughly since it is used in nuclear power plants, which is one of the most safety critical systems. While the designer develops the FPGA software with the FBD program translated by the translator, there are other translation tools such as synthesis tool and place and routing tool. This paper also focuses to verify them rigorously and thoroughly. There are several verification techniques for correctness of translator, but they are hard to apply because of the outrageous cost and performance time. Instead, this paper tries to use an indirect verification technique for demonstrating the correctness of translator using the co-simulation technique. We intend to prove only against specific inputs which are under development for a target I and C system, not against all possible input cases

A Correctness Verification Technique for Commercial FPGA Synthesis Tools

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, Eui Sub; Yoo, Jun Beom; Choi, Jong Gyun; Kim, Jang Yeol; Lee, Jang Soo

2014-01-01

Once the FPGA (Filed-Programmable Gate Array) designers designs Verilog programs, the commercial synthesis tools automatically translate the Verilog programs into EDIF programs so that the designers can have largely focused on HDL designs for correctness of functionality. Nuclear regulation authorities, however, require more considerate demonstration of the correctness and safety of mechanical synthesis processes of FPGA synthesis tools, even if the FPGA industry have acknowledged them empirically as correct and safe processes and tools. In order to assure of the safety, the industry standards for the safety of electronic/electrical devices, such as IEC 61508 and IEC 60880, recommend using the formal verification technique. There are several formal verification tools (i.e., 'FormalPro' 'Conformal' 'Formality' and so on) to verify the correctness of translation from Verilog into EDIF programs, but it is too expensive to use and hard to apply them to the works of 3rd-party developers. This paper proposes a formal verification technique which can contribute to the correctness demonstration in part. It formally checks the behavioral equivalence between Verilog and subsequently synthesized Net list with the VIS verification system. A Net list is an intermediate output of FPGA synthesis process, and EDIF is used as a standard format of Net lists. If the formal verification succeeds, then we can assure that the synthesis process from Verilog into Net list worked correctly at least for the Verilog used. In order to support the formal verification, we developed the mechanical translator 'EDIFtoBLIFMV,' which translates EDIF into BLIF-MV as an input front-end of VIS system, while preserving their behavior equivalence.. We performed the case study with an example of a preliminary version of RPS in a Korean nuclear power plant in order to provide the efficiency of the proposed formal verification technique and implemented translator. It

A Correctness Verification Technique for Commercial FPGA Synthesis Tools

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kim, Eui Sub; Yoo, Jun Beom [Konkuk University, Seoul (Korea, Republic of); Choi, Jong Gyun; Kim, Jang Yeol; Lee, Jang Soo [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2014-10-15

Once the FPGA (Filed-Programmable Gate Array) designers designs Verilog programs, the commercial synthesis tools automatically translate the Verilog programs into EDIF programs so that the designers can have largely focused on HDL designs for correctness of functionality. Nuclear regulation authorities, however, require more considerate demonstration of the correctness and safety of mechanical synthesis processes of FPGA synthesis tools, even if the FPGA industry have acknowledged them empirically as correct and safe processes and tools. In order to assure of the safety, the industry standards for the safety of electronic/electrical devices, such as IEC 61508 and IEC 60880, recommend using the formal verification technique. There are several formal verification tools (i.e., 'FormalPro' 'Conformal' 'Formality' and so on) to verify the correctness of translation from Verilog into EDIF programs, but it is too expensive to use and hard to apply them to the works of 3rd-party developers. This paper proposes a formal verification technique which can contribute to the correctness demonstration in part. It formally checks the behavioral equivalence between Verilog and subsequently synthesized Net list with the VIS verification system. A Net list is an intermediate output of FPGA synthesis process, and EDIF is used as a standard format of Net lists. If the formal verification succeeds, then we can assure that the synthesis process from Verilog into Net list worked correctly at least for the Verilog used. In order to support the formal verification, we developed the mechanical translator 'EDIFtoBLIFMV,' which translates EDIF into BLIF-MV as an input front-end of VIS system, while preserving their behavior equivalence.. We performed the case study with an example of a preliminary version of RPS in a Korean nuclear power plant in order to provide the efficiency of the proposed formal verification technique and implemented translator. It

Focussed approach to verification under FMCT

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bragin, V.; Carlson, J.; Bardsley, J.; Hill, J.

1998-01-01

FMCT will have different impacts on individual states due to the enormous variance in their nuclear fuel cycles and the associated fissile material inventories. The problem is how to negotiate a treaty that would achieve results favourable for all participants, given that interests and priorities vary so much. We believe that focussed verification, confined to safeguarding of enrichment and reprocessing facilities in NWS and TS, coupled with verification of unirradiated direct-use material produced after entry-into-force of a FMCT and supported with measures to detect possible undeclared enrichment and reprocessing activities, is technically adequate for the FMCT. Eventually this would become the appropriate model for all states party to the NPT

The Learner Verification of Series r: The New Macmillan Reading Program; Highlights.

Science.gov (United States)

National Evaluation Systems, Inc., Amherst, MA.

National Evaluation Systems, Inc., has developed curriculum evaluation techniques, in terms of learner verification, which may be used to help the curriculum-development efforts of publishing companies, state education departments, and universities. This document includes a summary of the learner-verification approach, with data collected about a…

Software verification, model validation, and hydrogeologic modelling aspects in nuclear waste disposal system simulations. A paradigm shift

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sheng, G.M.

1994-01-01

This work reviewed the current concept of nuclear waste disposal in stable, terrestrial geologic media with a system of natural and man-made multi-barriers. Various aspects of this concept and supporting research were examined with the emphasis on the Canadian Nuclear Fuel Waste Management Program. Several of the crucial issues and challenges facing the current concept were discussed. These include: The difficulties inherent in a concept that centres around lithologic studies; the unsatisfactory state of software quality assurance in the present computer simulation programs; and the lack of a standardized, comprehensive, and systematic procedure to carry out a rigorous process of model validation and assessment of simulation studies. An outline of such an approach was presented and some of the principles, tools and techniques for software verification were introduced and described. A case study involving an evaluation of the Canadian performance assessment computer program is presented. A new paradigm to nuclear waste disposal was advocated to address the challenges facing the existing concept. The RRC (Regional Recharge Concept) was introduced and its many advantages were described and shown through a modelling exercise. (orig./HP)

Verification and validation of RADMODL Version 1.0

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kimball, K.D.

1993-03-01

RADMODL is a system of linked computer codes designed to calculate the radiation environment following an accident in which nuclear materials are released. The RADMODL code and the corresponding Verification and Validation (V ampersand V) calculations (Appendix A), were developed for Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC) by EGS Corporation (EGS). Each module of RADMODL is an independent code and was verified separately. The full system was validated by comparing the output of the various modules with the corresponding output of a previously verified version of the modules. The results of the verification and validation tests show that RADMODL correctly calculates the transport of radionuclides and radiation doses. As a result of this verification and validation effort, RADMODL Version 1.0 is certified for use in calculating the radiation environment following an accident

Verification and validation of RADMODL Version 1.0

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kimball, K.D.

1993-03-01

RADMODL is a system of linked computer codes designed to calculate the radiation environment following an accident in which nuclear materials are released. The RADMODL code and the corresponding Verification and Validation (V&V) calculations (Appendix A), were developed for Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC) by EGS Corporation (EGS). Each module of RADMODL is an independent code and was verified separately. The full system was validated by comparing the output of the various modules with the corresponding output of a previously verified version of the modules. The results of the verification and validation tests show that RADMODL correctly calculates the transport of radionuclides and radiation doses. As a result of this verification and validation effort, RADMODL Version 1.0 is certified for use in calculating the radiation environment following an accident.

Verification study of the FORE-2M nuclear/thermal-hydraulilc analysis computer code

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Coffield, R.D.; Tang, Y.S.; Markley, R.A.

1982-01-01

The verification of the LMFBR core transient performance code, FORE-2M, was performed in two steps. Different components of the computation (individual models) were verified by comparing with analytical solutions and with results obtained from other conventionally accepted computer codes (e.g., TRUMP, LIFE, etc.). For verification of the integral computation method of the code, experimental data in TREAT, SEFOR and natural circulation experiments in EBR-II were compared with the code calculations. Good agreement was obtained for both of these steps. Confirmation of the code verification for undercooling transients is provided by comparisons with the recent FFTF natural circulation experiments. (orig.)

Sandia technology. Volume 13, number 2 Special issue: verification of arms control treaties

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1989-01-01

Nuclear deterrence, a cornerstone of US national security policy, has helped prevent global conflict for over 40 years. The DOE and DoD share responsibility for this vital part of national security. The US will continue to rely on nuclear deterrence for the foreseeable future. In the late 1950s, Sandia developed satellite-borne nuclear burst detection systems to support the treaty banning atmospheric nuclear tests. This activity has continued to expand and diversify. When the Non-Proliferation Treaty was ratified in 1970, we began to develop technologies to protect nuclear materials from falling into unauthorized hands. This program grew and now includes systems for monitoring the movement and storage of nuclear materials, detecting tampering, and transmiting sensitive data securely. In the late 1970s, negotiations to further limit underground nuclear testing were being actively pursued. In less than 18 months, we fielded the National Seismic Station, an unattended observatory for in-country monitoring of nuclear tests. In the mid-l980s, arms-control interest shifted to facility monitoring and on-site inspection. Our Technical On-site Inspection Facility is the national test bed for perimeter and portal monitoring technology and the prototype for the inspection portal that was recently installed in the USSR under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces accord. The articles in the special issue of Sundiu Technology describe some of our current contributions to verification technology. This work supports the US policy to seek realistic arms control agreements while maintaining our national security.

Packaged low-level waste verification system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tuite, K.T.; Winberg, M.; Flores, A.Y.; Killian, E.W.; McIsaac, C.V.

1996-01-01

Currently, states and low-level radioactive waste (LLW) disposal site operators have no method of independently verifying the radionuclide content of packaged LLW that arrive at disposal sites for disposal. At this time, disposal sites rely on LLW generator shipping manifests and accompanying records to insure that LLW received meets the waste acceptance criteria. An independent verification system would provide a method of checking generator LLW characterization methods and help ensure that LLW disposed of at disposal facilities meets requirements. The Mobile Low-Level Waste Verification System (MLLWVS) provides the equipment, software, and methods to enable the independent verification of LLW shipping records to insure that disposal site waste acceptance criteria are being met. The MLLWVS system was developed under a cost share subcontract between WMG, Inc., and Lockheed Martin Idaho Technologies through the Department of Energy's National Low-Level Waste Management Program at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL)

SB LOCA analyses for Krsko Full Scope Simulator verification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Prosek, A.; Parzer, I.; Mavko, B.

2000-01-01

Nuclear power plant simulators are intended to be used for training and maintaining competence to ensure safe, reliable operation of nuclear power plants throughout the world. The simulator shall be specified to a reference unit and its performance validation testing shall be provided. In this study a small-break loss-of-coolant accident (SB LOCA) response of Krsko nuclear power plant (NPP) was calculated for full scope simulator verification. The investigation included five cases with varying the break size in the cold leg of reactor coolant system. The plant specific and verified RELAP5/MOD2 model of Krsko nuclear power plant (NPP), developed in the past for 1882 MWt power, was adapted for 2000 MWt power (cycle 17) including the model for replacement steam generators. The results showed that the plant system response to breaks with small break area was slower compared to breaks with larger break area. The core heatup occurred in most of the cases analyzed. The acceptance criteria for emergency core cooling system were also met. The predicted results of the SB LOCA analysis for Krsko NPP suggest that they may be used for verification of the Krsko Full Scope Simulator performance. (author)

Verification lessons learned and CTBT's contribution to disarmament and nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zerbo, L.

2013-01-01

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) prohibits all nuclear tests for any purposes. The CTBT is essential for peace and security; it is a core element of the nonproliferation regime. It limits the ability of countries to develop advanced nuclear weapons technology. It is enforced through the extensive International Monitoring System designed to detect and deter nuclear explosions in atmosphere, underwater and underground. In the process of monitoring and detecting a potential nuclear test - the system registers over 30,000 events a year - the vast majority of them are earthquakes. The civil and scientific applications of the CTBT data can be used to gain better understanding of the earth, of climate change, of volcanic ash clouds, of the tsunamis, of the movements of whales and much more. The CTBT sets a new legal and verification standard for nuclear weapons. It is a non-discriminatory Treaty with the same rights and obligations for all Member States. Its verification regime is equally nondiscriminatory and provides equal access for all Member States to CTBTO data. We are driving to achieve 160 ratifications by the end of the year, and this will provide additional momentum towards entry into force (EIF) and universality. (A.C.)

Verification of analysis methods for predicting the behaviour of seismically isolated nuclear structures. Final report of a co-ordinated research project 1996-1999

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-06-01

This report is a summary of the work performed under a co-ordinated research project (CRP) entitled Verification of Analysis Methods for Predicting the Behaviour of Seismically isolated Nuclear Structures. The project was organized by the IAEA on the recommendation of the IAEA's Technical Working Group on Fast Reactors (TWGFR) and carried out from 1996 to 1999. One of the primary requirements for nuclear power plants and facilities is to ensure safety and the absence of damage under strong external dynamic loading from, for example, earthquakes. The designs of liquid metal cooled fast reactors (LMFRs) include systems which operate at low pressure and include components which are thin-walled and flexible. These systems and components could be considerably affected by earthquakes in seismic zones. Therefore, the IAEA through its advanced reactor technology development programme supports the activities of Member States to apply seismic isolation technology to LMFRs. The application of this technology to LMFRs and other nuclear plants and related facilities would offer the advantage that standard designs may be safely used in areas with a seismic risk. The technology may also provide a means of seismically upgrading nuclear facilities. Design analyses applied to such critical structures need to be firmly established, and the CRP provided a valuable tool in assessing their reliability. Ten organizations from India, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the European Commission co-operated in this CRP. This report documents the CRP activities, provides the main results and recommendations and includes the work carried out by the research groups at the participating institutes within the CRP on verification of their analysis methods for predicting the behaviour of seismically isolated nuclear structures

Knowledge base verification based on enhanced colored petri net

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kim, Jong Hyun; Seong, Poong Hyun [Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

1998-12-31

Verification is a process aimed at demonstrating whether a system meets it`s specified requirements. As expert systems are used in various applications, the knowledge base verification of systems takes an important position. The conventional Petri net approach that has been studied recently in order to verify the knowledge base is found that it is inadequate to verify the knowledge base of large and complex system, such as alarm processing system of nuclear power plant. Thus, we propose an improved method that models the knowledge base as enhanced colored Petri net. In this study, we analyze the reachability and the error characteristics of the knowledge base and apply the method to verification of simple knowledge base. 8 refs., 4 figs. (Author)

Knowledge base verification based on enhanced colored petri net

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kim, Jong Hyun; Seong, Poong Hyun [Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

1997-12-31

Verification is a process aimed at demonstrating whether a system meets it`s specified requirements. As expert systems are used in various applications, the knowledge base verification of systems takes an important position. The conventional Petri net approach that has been studied recently in order to verify the knowledge base is found that it is inadequate to verify the knowledge base of large and complex system, such as alarm processing system of nuclear power plant. Thus, we propose an improved method that models the knowledge base as enhanced colored Petri net. In this study, we analyze the reachability and the error characteristics of the knowledge base and apply the method to verification of simple knowledge base. 8 refs., 4 figs. (Author)

Technical workshop on safeguards, verification technologies, and other related experience

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

The aim of the Technical Workshop on safeguards was to encourage a clearer understanding of the IAEA Safeguards System, its origins and evolution and the present state of the art. Presentations held by the IAEA officials and outside experts examined as well other components of the non-proliferation regime, the current practices and procedures, and the future prospects. A series of presentations described the characteristics of the interaction between global and regional verification systems and described relevant past and present experience. Prominence given to such state of the art verification technologies as environmental sampling, satellite imaging and monitoring thorough remote and unattended techniques demonstrated, beyond any doubt, the essentially dynamic nature of verification. It is generally acknowledged that there have been major achievements in preventing spread of nuclear weapons, but no verification system can in itself prevent proliferation

Technical workshop on safeguards, verification technologies, and other related experience

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1999-12-31

The aim of the Technical Workshop on safeguards was to encourage a clearer understanding of the IAEA Safeguards System, its origins and evolution and the present state of the art. Presentations held by the IAEA officials and outside experts examined as well other components of the non-proliferation regime, the current practices and procedures, and the future prospects. A series of presentations described the characteristics of the interaction between global and regional verification systems and described relevant past and present experience. Prominence given to such state of the art verification technologies as environmental sampling, satellite imaging and monitoring thorough remote and unattended techniques demonstrated, beyond any doubt, the essentially dynamic nature of verification. It is generally acknowledged that there have been major achievements in preventing spread of nuclear weapons, but no verification system can in itself prevent proliferation Refs, figs, tabs

Technical safety requirements control level verification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

STEWART, J.L.

1999-01-01

A Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) control level verification process was developed for the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) TSRs at the Hanford Site in Richland, WA, at the direction of the US. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL). The objective of the effort was to develop a process to ensure that the TWRS TSR controls are designated and managed at the appropriate levels as Safety Limits (SLs), Limiting Control Settings (LCSs), Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs), Administrative Controls (ACs), or Design Features. The TSR control level verification process was developed and implemented by a team of contractor personnel with the participation of Fluor Daniel Hanford, Inc. (FDH), the Project Hanford Management Contract (PHMC) integrating contractor, and RL representatives. The team was composed of individuals with the following experience base: nuclear safety analysis; licensing; nuclear industry and DOE-complex TSR preparation/review experience; tank farm operations; FDH policy and compliance; and RL-TWRS oversight. Each TSR control level designation was completed utilizing TSR control logic diagrams and TSR criteria checklists based on DOE Orders, Standards, Contractor TSR policy, and other guidance. The control logic diagrams and criteria checklists were reviewed and modified by team members during team meetings. The TSR control level verification process was used to systematically evaluate 12 LCOs, 22 AC programs, and approximately 100 program key elements identified in the TWRS TSR document. The verification of each TSR control required a team consensus. Based on the results of the process, refinements were identified and the TWRS TSRs were modified as appropriate. A final report documenting key assumptions and the control level designation for each TSR control was prepared and is maintained on file for future reference. The results of the process were used as a reference in the RL review of the final TWRS TSRs and control suite. RL

The study of necessity of verification-methods for Depleted Uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Park, J. B.; Ahn, S. H.; Ahn, G. H.; Chung, S. T.; Shin, J. S.

2006-01-01

ROK has tried to establish management system for depleted uranium from 2004, and ROK achieved some results in this field including management software, management skill, and the list of company using the nuclear material. But, the studies for the depleted uranium are insufficient exclude the studies of KAERI. In terms of SSAC, we have to study more about whether the depleted uranium is really dangerous material or not and how is the depleted uranium diverted to the nuclear weapon. The depleted uranium was controlled by the item counting in the national system for the small quantity nuclear material. We don't have unique technical methods to clarify the depleted uranium on-the-spot inspection not laboratory scale. Therefore, I would like to suggest of the necessity of the verification methods for depleted uranium. Furthermore, I would like to show you the methods of the verification of the depleted uranium in national system up to now

A Cherenkov viewing device for used-fuel verification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Attas, E.M.; Chen, J.D.; Young, G.J.

1990-01-01

A Cherenkov viewing device (CVD) has been developed to help verify declared inventories of used nuclear fuel stored in water bays. The device detects and amplifies the faint ultraviolet Cherenkov glow from the water surrounding the fuel, producing a real-time visible image on a phosphor screen. Quartz optics, a UV-pass filter and a microchannel-plate image-intensifier tube serve to form the image, which can be photographed or viewed directly through an eyepiece. Normal fuel bay lighting does not interfere with the Cherenkov light image. The CVD has been successfully used to detect anomalous PWR, BWR and CANDU (CANada Deuterium Uranium: registered trademark) fuel assemblies in the presence of normal-burnup assemblies stored in used-fuel bays. The latest version of the CVD, known as Mark IV, is being used by inspectors from the International Atomic Energy agency for verification of light-water power-reactor fuel. Its design and operation are described, together with plans for further enhancements of the instrumentation. (orig.)

DOE handbook: Integrated safety management systems (ISMS) verification. Team leader's handbook

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-06-01

The primary purpose of this handbook is to provide guidance to the ISMS verification Team Leader and the verification team in conducting ISMS verifications. The handbook describes methods and approaches for the review of the ISMS documentation (Phase I) and ISMS implementation (Phase II) and provides information useful to the Team Leader in preparing the review plan, selecting and training the team, coordinating the conduct of the verification, and documenting the results. The process and techniques described are based on the results of several pilot ISMS verifications that have been conducted across the DOE complex. A secondary purpose of this handbook is to provide information useful in developing DOE personnel to conduct these reviews. Specifically, this handbook describes methods and approaches to: (1) Develop the scope of the Phase 1 and Phase 2 review processes to be consistent with the history, hazards, and complexity of the site, facility, or activity; (2) Develop procedures for the conduct of the Phase 1 review, validating that the ISMS documentation satisfies the DEAR clause as amplified in DOE Policies 450.4, 450.5, 450.6 and associated guidance and that DOE can effectively execute responsibilities as described in the Functions, Responsibilities, and Authorities Manual (FRAM); (3) Develop procedures for the conduct of the Phase 2 review, validating that the description approved by the Approval Authority, following or concurrent with the Phase 1 review, has been implemented; and (4) Describe a methodology by which the DOE ISMS verification teams will be advised, trained, and/or mentored to conduct subsequent ISMS verifications. The handbook provides proven methods and approaches for verifying that commitments related to the DEAR, the FRAM, and associated amplifying guidance are in place and implemented in nuclear and high risk facilities. This handbook also contains useful guidance to line managers when preparing for a review of ISMS for radiological

The joint verification experiments as a global non-proliferation exercise

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shaner, J.W.

1998-01-01

This conference commemorates the 10th anniversary of the second of two Joint Verification Experiments conducted by the Soviet Union and the US. These two experiments, one at the Nevada test site in the US, and the second here at the Semipalatinsk test site were designed to test the verification of a nuclear testing treaty limiting the size underground explosions to 150 kilotons. By building trust and technical respect between the weapons scientists of the two most powerful adversaries, the Joint Verification Experiment (JVE) had the unanticipated result of initiating a suite of cooperative projects and programs aimed at reducing the Cold War threats and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

Sampling for the verification of materials balances

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Avenhaus, R.; Goeres, H.J.; Beedgen, R.

1983-08-01

The results of a theory for verification of nuclear materials balance data are presented. The sampling theory is based on two diversion models where also a combination of models is taken into account. The theoretical considerations are illustrated with numerical examples using the data of a highly enriched uranium fabrication plant. (orig.) [de

Verification Process of Behavioral Consistency between Design and Implementation programs of pSET using HW-CBMC

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lee, Dong Ah; Lee, Jong Hoon; Yoo, Jun Beom

2011-01-01

Controllers in safety critical systems such as nuclear power plants often use Function Block Diagrams (FBDs) to design embedded software. The design is implemented using programming languages such as C to compile it into particular target hardware. The implementation must have the same behavior with the design and the behavior should be verified explicitly. For example, the pSET (POSAFE-Q Software Engineering Tool) is a loader software to program POSAFE-Q PLC (Programmable Logic Controller) and is developed as a part of the KNICS (Korea Nuclear Instrumentation and Control System R and D Center) project. It uses FBDs to design software of PLC, and generates ANSI-C code to compile it into specific machine code. To verify the equivalence between the FBDs and ANSI-C code, mathematical proof of code generator or a verification tools such as RETRANS can help guarantee the equivalence. Mathematical proof, however, has a weakness that requires high expenditure and repetitive fulfillment whenever the translator is modified. On the other hand, RETRANS reconstructs the generated source code without consideration of the generator. It has also a weakness that the reconstruction of generated code needs additional analysis This paper introduces verification process of behavioral consistency between design and its implementation of the pSET using the HW-CBMC. The HW-CBMC is a formal verification tool, verifying equivalence between hardware and software description. It requires two inputs for checking equivalence, Verilog for hard-ware and ANSI-C for software. In this approach, FBDs are translated into semantically equivalent Verilog pro-gram, and the HW-CBMC verifies equivalence between the Verilog program and the ANSI-C program which is generated from the FBDs

Verification Process of Behavioral Consistency between Design and Implementation programs of pSET using HW-CBMC

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lee, Dong Ah; Lee, Jong Hoon; Yoo, Jun Beom [Konkuk University, Seoul (Korea, Republic of)

2011-05-15

Controllers in safety critical systems such as nuclear power plants often use Function Block Diagrams (FBDs) to design embedded software. The design is implemented using programming languages such as C to compile it into particular target hardware. The implementation must have the same behavior with the design and the behavior should be verified explicitly. For example, the pSET (POSAFE-Q Software Engineering Tool) is a loader software to program POSAFE-Q PLC (Programmable Logic Controller) and is developed as a part of the KNICS (Korea Nuclear Instrumentation and Control System R and D Center) project. It uses FBDs to design software of PLC, and generates ANSI-C code to compile it into specific machine code. To verify the equivalence between the FBDs and ANSI-C code, mathematical proof of code generator or a verification tools such as RETRANS can help guarantee the equivalence. Mathematical proof, however, has a weakness that requires high expenditure and repetitive fulfillment whenever the translator is modified. On the other hand, RETRANS reconstructs the generated source code without consideration of the generator. It has also a weakness that the reconstruction of generated code needs additional analysis This paper introduces verification process of behavioral consistency between design and its implementation of the pSET using the HW-CBMC. The HW-CBMC is a formal verification tool, verifying equivalence between hardware and software description. It requires two inputs for checking equivalence, Verilog for hard-ware and ANSI-C for software. In this approach, FBDs are translated into semantically equivalent Verilog pro-gram, and the HW-CBMC verifies equivalence between the Verilog program and the ANSI-C program which is generated from the FBDs

Nuclear power plant C and I design verification by simulation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Storm, Joachim; Yu, Kim; Lee, D.Y

2003-01-01

An important part of the Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) in the Taiwan NPP Lungmen Units no.1 and no.2 is the Full Scope Simulator (FSS). The simulator was to be built according to design data and therefore, apart from the training aspect, a major part of the development is to apply a simulation based test bed for the verification, validation and improvement of plant design in the control and instrumentation (C and I) areas of unit control room equipment, operator Man Machine Interface (MMI), process computer functions and plant procedures. Furthermore the Full Scope Simulator will be used after that to allow proper training of the plant operators two years before Unit no.1 fuel load. The article describes scope, methods and results of the advanced verification and validation process and highlights the advantages of test bed simulation for real power plant design and implementation. Subsequent application of advanced simulation software tools like instrumentation and control translators, graphical model builders, process models, graphical on-line test tools and screen based or projected soft panels, allowed a team to fulfil the task of C and I verification in time before the implementation of the Distributed Control and Information System (DCIS) started. An additional area of activity was the Human Factors Engineering (HFE) for the operator MMI. Due to the fact that the ABWR design incorporates a display-based operation with most of the plant components, a dedicated verification and validation process is required by NUREG-0711. In order to support this activity an engineering test system had been installed for all the necessary HFE investigations. All detected improvements had been properly documented and used to update the plant design documentation by a defined process. The Full Scope Simulator (FSS) with hard panels and stimulated digital control and information system are in the final acceptance test process with the end customer, Taiwan Power Company

Development of requirements tracking and verification technology for the NPP software

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Jung, Chul Hwan; Kim, Jang Yeol; Lee, Jang Soo; Song, Soon Ja; Lee, Dong Young; Kwon, Kee Choon

1998-12-30

Searched and analyzed the technology of requirements engineering in the areas of aerospace and defense industry, medical industry and nuclear industry. Summarized the status of tools for the software design and requirements management. Analyzed the software design methodology for the safety software of NPP. Development of the design requirements for the requirements tracking and verification system. Development of the background technology to design the prototype tool for the requirements tracking and verification.

Development of requirements tracking and verification technology for the NPP software

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jung, Chul Hwan; Kim, Jang Yeol; Lee, Jang Soo; Song, Soon Ja; Lee, Dong Young; Kwon, Kee Choon

1998-01-01

Searched and analyzed the technology of requirements engineering in the areas of aerospace and defense industry, medical industry and nuclear industry. Summarized the status of tools for the software design and requirements management. Analyzed the software design methodology for the safety software of NPP. Development of the design requirements for the requirements tracking and verification system. Development of the background technology to design the prototype tool for the requirements tracking and verification

How regional non-proliferation arrangements complement international verification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carlson, J.

1999-01-01

This presentation focuses on international verification in the form of IAEA Safeguards, and discusses the relationship between IAEA safeguards and the relevant regional arrangements, both the existing and the future. For most States the political commitment against acquisition of nuclear weapons has been carefully reached and strongly held. Their observance of treaty commitments does not depend on the deterrent effect of verification activities. Safeguards serve to assist States who recognise it is in their own interest to demonstrate their compliance to others. Thus safeguards are a vital confidence building measure in their own right, as well as being a major complement to the broader range of international confidence building measures. Safeguards can both complement other confidence building measures and in turn be complemented by them. Within consideration of how it could work it is useful to consider briefly current developments of IAEA safeguards, i.e. existing regional arrangements and nuclear weapon free zones

Seismic verification of underground explosions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Glenn, L.A.

1985-06-01

The first nuclear test agreement, the test moratorium, was made in 1958 and lasted until the Soviet Union unilaterally resumed testing in the atmosphere in 1961. It was followed by the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which prohibited nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater. In 1974 the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) was signed, limiting underground tests after March 1976 to a maximum yield of 250 kt. The TTBT was followed by a treaty limiting peaceful nuclear explosions and both the United States and the Soviet Union claim to be abiding by the 150-kt yield limit. A comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT), prohibiting all testing of nuclear weapons, has also been discussed. However, a verifiable CTBT is a contradiction in terms. No monitoring technology can offer absolute assurance that very-low-yield illicit explosions have not occurred. The verification process, evasion opportunities, and cavity decoupling are discussed in this paper

Development of a tool for knowledge base verification of expert system based on Design/CPN

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, Jong Hyun

1998-02-01

Verification is a necessary work in developing a reliable expert system. Verification is a process aimed at demonstrating whether a system meets it's specified requirements. As expert systems are used in various applications, the knowledge base verification of systems takes an important position. The conventional Petri net approach that has been studied recently in order to verify the knowledge base is found that it is inadequate to verify the knowledge base of large and complex system, such as alarm processing system of nuclear power plant. Thus, we propose an improved method that models the knowledge base as enhanced colored Petri net. In this study, we analyze the reachability and the error characteristics of the knowledge base. Generally, verification process requires computational support by automated tools. For this reason, this study developed a tool for knowledge base verification based on Design/CPN, which is a tool for editing, modeling, and simulating Colored Petri net. This tool uses Enhanced Colored Petri net as a modeling method. By applying this tool to the knowledge base of nuclear power plant, it is noticed that it can successfully check most of the anomalies that can occur in a knowledge base

Verification of the MOTIF code version 3.0

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chan, T.; Guvanasen, V.; Nakka, B.W.; Reid, J.A.K.; Scheier, N.W.; Stanchell, F.W.

1996-12-01

As part of the Canadian Nuclear Fuel Waste Management Program (CNFWMP), AECL has developed a three-dimensional finite-element code, MOTIF (Model Of Transport In Fractured/ porous media), for detailed modelling of groundwater flow, heat transport and solute transport in a fractured rock mass. The code solves the transient and steady-state equations of groundwater flow, solute (including one-species radionuclide) transport, and heat transport in variably saturated fractured/porous media. The initial development was completed in 1985 (Guvanasen 1985) and version 3.0 was completed in 1986. This version is documented in detail in Guvanasen and Chan (in preparation). This report describes a series of fourteen verification cases which has been used to test the numerical solution techniques and coding of MOTIF, as well as demonstrate some of the MOTIF analysis capabilities. For each case the MOTIF solution has been compared with a corresponding analytical or independently developed alternate numerical solution. Several of the verification cases were included in Level 1 of the International Hydrologic Code Intercomparison Project (HYDROCOIN). The MOTIF results for these cases were also described in the HYDROCOIN Secretariat's compilation and comparison of results submitted by the various project teams (Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate 1988). It is evident from the graphical comparisons presented that the MOTIF solutions for the fourteen verification cases are generally in excellent agreement with known analytical or numerical solutions obtained from independent sources. This series of verification studies has established the ability of the MOTIF finite-element code to accurately model the groundwater flow and solute and heat transport phenomena for which it is intended. (author). 20 refs., 14 tabs., 32 figs

Verification and validation process for the safety software in KNICS

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kwon, Kee-Choon; Lee, Jang-Soo; Kim, Jang-Yeol

2004-01-01

This paper describes the Verification and Validation (V and V ) process for safety software of Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), Digital Reactor Protection System (DRPS), and Engineered Safety Feature-Component Control System (ESF-CCS) that are being developed in Korea Nuclear Instrumentation and Control System (KNICS) projects. Specifically, it presents DRPS V and V experience according to the software development life cycle. The main activities of DRPS V and V process are preparation of software planning documentation, verification of Software Requirement Specification (SRS), Software Design Specification (SDS) and codes, and testing of the integrated software and the integrated system. In addition, they include software safety analysis and software configuration management. SRS V and V of DRPS are technical evaluation, licensing suitability evaluation, inspection and traceability analysis, formal verification, preparing integrated system test plan, software safety analysis, and software configuration management. Also, SDS V and V of RPS are technical evaluation, licensing suitability evaluation, inspection and traceability analysis, formal verification, preparing integrated software test plan, software safety analysis, and software configuration management. The code V and V of DRPS are traceability analysis, source code inspection, test case and test procedure generation, software safety analysis, and software configuration management. Testing is the major V and V activity of software integration and system integration phase. Software safety analysis at SRS phase uses Hazard Operability (HAZOP) method, at SDS phase it uses HAZOP and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), and at implementation phase it uses FTA. Finally, software configuration management is performed using Nu-SCM (Nuclear Software Configuration Management) tool developed by KNICS project. Through these activities, we believe we can achieve the functionality, performance, reliability and safety that are V

Bibliography for Verification and Validation in Computational Simulation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Oberkampf, W.L.

1998-01-01

A bibliography has been compiled dealing with the verification and validation of computational simulations. The references listed in this bibliography are concentrated in the field of computational fluid dynamics (CFD). However, references from the following fields are also included: operations research, heat transfer, solid dynamics, software quality assurance, software accreditation, military systems, and nuclear reactor safety. This bibliography, containing 221 references, is not meant to be comprehensive. It was compiled during the last ten years in response to the author's interest and research in the methodology for verification and validation. The emphasis in the bibliography is in the following areas: philosophy of science underpinnings, development of terminology and methodology, high accuracy solutions for CFD verification, experimental datasets for CFD validation, and the statistical quantification of model validation. This bibliography should provide a starting point for individual researchers in many fields of computational simulation in science and engineering

Bibliography for Verification and Validation in Computational Simulations

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Oberkampf, W.L.

1998-10-01

A bibliography has been compiled dealing with the verification and validation of computational simulations. The references listed in this bibliography are concentrated in the field of computational fluid dynamics (CFD). However, references from the following fields are also included: operations research, heat transfer, solid dynamics, software quality assurance, software accreditation, military systems, and nuclear reactor safety. This bibliography, containing 221 references, is not meant to be comprehensive. It was compiled during the last ten years in response to the author's interest and research in the methodology for verification and validation. The emphasis in the bibliography is in the following areas: philosophy of science underpinnings, development of terminology and methodology, high accuracy solutions for CFD verification, experimental datasets for CFD validation, and the statistical quantification of model validation. This bibliography should provide a starting point for individual researchers in many fields of computational simulation in science and engineering.

Formal specification and verification of interactive systems with plasticity: Applications to nuclear-plant supervision

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Oliveira, Raquel Araujo de

2015-01-01

The advent of ubiquitous computing and the increasing variety of platforms and devices change user expectations in terms of user interfaces. Systems should be able to adapt themselves to their context of use, i.e., the platform (e.g. a PC or a tablet), the users who interact with the system (e.g. administrators or regular users), and the environment in which the system executes (e.g. a dark room or outdoor). The capacity of a UI to withstand variations in its context of use while preserving usability is called plasticity. Plasticity provides users with different versions of a UI. Although it enhances UI capabilities, plasticity adds complexity to the development of user interfaces: the consistency between multiple versions of a given UI should be ensured. Given the large number of possible versions of a UI, it is time-consuming and error prone to check these requirements by hand. Some automation must be provided to verify plasticity.This complexity is further increased when it comes to UIs of safety-critical systems. Safety-critical systems are systems in which a failure has severe consequences. The complexity of such systems is reflected in the UIs, which are now expected not only to provide correct, intuitive, non-ambiguous and adaptable means for users to accomplish a goal, but also to cope with safety requirements aiming to make sure that systems are reasonably safe before they enter the market. Several techniques to ensure quality of systems in general exist, which can also be used to safety-critical systems. Formal verification provides a rigorous way to perform verification, which is suitable for safety-critical systems. Our contribution is an approach to verify safety-critical interactive systems provided with plastic UIs using formal methods. Using a powerful tool-support, our approach permits:-The verification of sets of properties over a model of the system. Using model checking, our approach permits the verification of properties over the system formal

Verification Results of Safety-grade Optical Modem for Core Protection Calculator (CPC) in Korea Standard Nuclear Power Plant (KSNP)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kim, Jangyeol; Son, Kwangseop; Lee, Youngjun; Cheon, Sewoo; Cha, Kyoungho; Lee, Jangsoo; Kwon, Keechoon [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2013-05-15

We confirmed that the coverage criteria for a safety-grade optical modem of a Core Protection Calculator is satisfactory using a traceability analysis matrix between high-level requirements and lower-level system test case data set. This paper describes the test environment, test components and items, a traceability analysis, and system tests as a result of system verification and validation based on Software Requirement Specifications (SRS) for a safety-grade optical modem of a Core Protection Calculator (CPC) in a Korea Standard Nuclear Power Plant (KSNP), and Software Design Specifications (SDS) for a safety-grade optical modem of a CPC in a KSNP. All tests were performed according to the test plan and test procedures. Functional testing, performance testing, event testing, and scenario based testing for a safety-grade optical modem of a Core Protection Calculator in a Korea Standard Nuclear Power Plant as a thirty-party verifier were successfully performed.

Safety assessment and verification for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2004-01-01

This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA programme for safety standards for nuclear power plants. The present publication is a revision of the IAEA Safety Guide on Management of Nuclear Power Plants for Safe Operation issued in 1984. It supplements Section 2 of the Safety Requirements publication on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation. Nuclear power technology is different from the customary technology of power generation from fossil fuel and by hydroelectric means. One major difference between the management of nuclear power plants and that of conventional generating plants is the emphasis that should be placed on nuclear safety, quality assurance, the management of radioactive waste and radiological protection, and the accompanying national regulatory requirements. This Safety Guide highlights the important elements of effective management in relation to these aspects of safety. The attention to be paid to safety requires that the management recognize that personnel involved in the nuclear power programme should understand, respond effectively to, and continuously search for ways to enhance safety in the light of any additional requirements socially and legally demanded of nuclear energy. This will help to ensure that safety policies that result in the safe operation of nuclear power plants are implemented and that margins of safety are always maintained. The structure of the organization, management standards and administrative controls should be such that there is a high degree of assurance that safety policies and decisions are implemented, safety is continuously enhanced and a strong safety culture is promoted and supported. The objective of this publication is to guide Member States in setting up an operating organization which facilitates the safe operation of nuclear power plants to a high level internationally. The second objective is to provide guidance on the most important organizational elements in order to contribute to a strong safety

Safety assessment and verification for nuclear power plants. Safety guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

This Safety Guide was prepared under the IAEA programme for safety standards for nuclear power plants. The present publication is a revision of the IAEA Safety Guide on Management of Nuclear Power Plants for Safe Operation issued in 1984. It supplements Section 2 of the Safety Requirements publication on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation. Nuclear power technology is different from the customary technology of power generation from fossil fuel and by hydroelectric means. One major difference between the management of nuclear power plants and that of conventional generating plants is the emphasis that should be placed on nuclear safety, quality assurance, the management of radioactive waste and radiological protection, and the accompanying national regulatory requirements. This Safety Guide highlights the important elements of effective management in relation to these aspects of safety. The attention to be paid to safety requires that the management recognize that personnel involved in the nuclear power programme should understand, respond effectively to, and continuously search for ways to enhance safety in the light of any additional requirements socially and legally demanded of nuclear energy. This will help to ensure that safety policies that result in the safe operation of nuclear power plants are implemented and that margins of safety are always maintained. The structure of the organization, management standards and administrative controls should be such that there is a high degree of assurance that safety policies and decisions are implemented, safety is continuously enhanced and a strong safety culture is promoted and supported. The objective of this publication is to guide Member States in setting up an operating organization which facilitates the safe operation of nuclear power plants to a high level internationally. The second objective is to provide guidance on the most important organizational elements in order to contribute to a strong safety

Public's perception and judgment on nuclear power

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Choi, Young Sung; Kim, Jong Seok; Lee, Byung Wook

2000-01-01

A public's perception and judgment model on nuclear power is developed to reveal the structure of public acceptance toward nuclear power in Korea. This is somewhat a verification of an earlier study by the author using two independent sets of survey data. A perception model makes it possible to construct two major exploratory variables, perceived risk and perceived benefit. The difference of perception is analyzed for different groups such as gender, education difference, and different information channels. A judgment model helps identify influential factors that improve the acceptance of nuclear energy. Estimates of model parameters from independent data sets were not significantly different, which implies the validity of the model. Methodologies of this study can be used as the basis for investigating the structure of public perception of technological risks and benefits, designing a public information and risk communication program, and developing remedial policy actions to improve public acceptance

Machine learning techniques for the verification of refueling activities in CANDU-type nuclear power plants (NPPs) with direct applications in nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Budzinski, J.

2006-06-01

the Viterbi algorithm is applied for the state sequence decoding, which allows for physical constraints derived from simulation models to be efficiently incorporated into the overall recognition scheme by appropriately rescoring the resulting n-best hypothesis lists. The physical constraints are derived from the local balance equation for precursors produced in fuel during discharge and the corresponding log-likelihood scores on the physical model are given by the negative chi-squared between the model predictions and data measurements. The proposed hybrid recognition algorithm is finally implemented in an automated fuel-handling verification system (AVER), the parameters of which are then optimized for maximum performance. This thesis also gives a dynamic, functional validation framework for such verification systems in nuclear safeguards, including the developed AVER system. The system's conclusions on random test data from both historical and synthesized data sets are compared against the relevant expert knowledge, and various metrics and risk measures are computed to judge the system's performance and reliability of its conclusions. The validation tests have shown that the developed verification system meets the desired competency requirements on its entire prespecified input domain of CANDU-6 data. Results on simulated data have also demonstrated the ability of the proposed system to detect radiation signatures corresponding to abnormal and rare events that normally do not appear in data. Throughout all the tests, AVER greatly outperformed an existing rudimentary verification system, consistently producing a reduction in the misclassification rate of about 170 %. The expected risk of undetected fuel discharge was estimated to be a hundred thousand times less than one significant quantity (SQ) of irradiated direct-use material (IDU) per unit per year, which is much below the acceptable limits and hence may be subject to no or only less intrusive safeguards

FY2017 Final Report: Power of the People: A technical ethical and experimental examination of the use of crowdsourcing to support international nuclear safeguards verification.

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Gastelum, Zoe Nellie [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Sentz, Kari [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Swanson, Meili Claire [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Rinaudo, Cristina [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2017-10-01

Recent advances in information technology have led to an expansion of crowdsourcing activities that utilize the “power of the people” harnessed via online games, communities of interest, and other platforms to collect, analyze, verify, and provide technological solutions for challenges from a multitude of domains. To related this surge in popularity, the research team developed a taxonomy of crowdsourcing activities as they relate to international nuclear safeguards, evaluated the potential legal and ethical issues surrounding the use of crowdsourcing to support safeguards, and proposed experimental designs to test the capabilities and prospect for the use of crowdsourcing to support nuclear safeguards verification.

The crisis bears the chance. The nuclear conflict with Iran and the impact on the nuclear non-proliferation regime; In der Krise liegt die Chance. Der Atomkonflikt mit Iran und seine Auswirkungen auf das nukleare Nichtverbreitungsregime

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Meier, Oliver

2014-10-15

The contribution on the nuclear conflict with Iran and the impact on the nuclear non-proliferation regime covers the following topics: Iran and the verification of non-nuclear -weapon states, the system of nuclear safeguards, the application of new verification instruments, verification of possible military research and development activities, the limitation of proliferation relevant activities, delivery guarantees as mean for non-proliferation, Iran and the handling of contract violations, graded reactions, political issues, problems of harmonization, capacity and process deficiencies, before the ninth non-proliferation verification conference, approaches for strengthening the non-proliferation regime, recommendation to the German politics.

A knowledge-base verification of NPP expert systems using extended Petri nets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kwon, Il Won; Seong, Poong Hyun

1995-01-01

The verification phase of knowledge base is an important part for developing reliable expert systems, especially in nuclear industry. Although several strategies or tools have been developed to perform potential error checking, they often neglect the reliability of verification methods. Because a Petri net provides a uniform mathematical formalization of knowledge base, it has been employed for knowledge base verification. In this work, we devise and suggest an automated tool, called COKEP (Checker Of Knowledge base using Extended Petri net), for detecting incorrectness, inconsistency, and incompleteness in a knowledge base. The scope of the verification problem is expanded to chained errors, unlike previous studies that assumed error incidence to be limited to rule pairs only. In addition, we consider certainty factor in checking, because most of knowledge bases have certainty factors

NPP Temelin instrumentation and control system upgrade and verification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ubra, O.; Petrlik, J.

1998-01-01

Two units of Ver 1000 type of the Czech nuclear power plant Temelin, which are under construction are being upgraded with the latest instrumentation and control system delivered by WEC. To confirm that the functional design of the new Reactor Control and Limitation System, Turbine Control System and Plant Control System are in compliance with the Czech customer requirements and that these requirements are compatible with NPP Temelin upgraded technology, the verification of the control systems has been performed. The method of transient analysis has been applied. Some details of the NPP Temelin Reactor Control and Limitation System verification are presented.(author)

Technical safety requirements control level verification; TOPICAL

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

STEWART, J.L.

1999-01-01

A Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) control level verification process was developed for the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) TSRs at the Hanford Site in Richland, WA, at the direction of the US. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL). The objective of the effort was to develop a process to ensure that the TWRS TSR controls are designated and managed at the appropriate levels as Safety Limits (SLs), Limiting Control Settings (LCSs), Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs), Administrative Controls (ACs), or Design Features. The TSR control level verification process was developed and implemented by a team of contractor personnel with the participation of Fluor Daniel Hanford, Inc. (FDH), the Project Hanford Management Contract (PHMC) integrating contractor, and RL representatives. The team was composed of individuals with the following experience base: nuclear safety analysis; licensing; nuclear industry and DOE-complex TSR preparation/review experience; tank farm operations; FDH policy and compliance; and RL-TWRS oversight. Each TSR control level designation was completed utilizing TSR control logic diagrams and TSR criteria checklists based on DOE Orders, Standards, Contractor TSR policy, and other guidance. The control logic diagrams and criteria checklists were reviewed and modified by team members during team meetings. The TSR control level verification process was used to systematically evaluate 12 LCOs, 22 AC programs, and approximately 100 program key elements identified in the TWRS TSR document. The verification of each TSR control required a team consensus. Based on the results of the process, refinements were identified and the TWRS TSRs were modified as appropriate. A final report documenting key assumptions and the control level designation for each TSR control was prepared and is maintained on file for future reference. The results of the process were used as a reference in the RL review of the final TWRS TSRs and control suite. RL

Nuclear safeguards: power tool for ensuring nuclear safety and security

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ramakumar, K.L.

2016-01-01

The quantitative measurement of fissile nuclear materials through independent measurements is one of the cornerstones of the Nuclear Material Accounting and Control (NUMAC) edifice. The verification of the accountancy also represents one of the key elements of international nuclear materials Safeguards. The very basis of NUMAC is to ensure safeguarding nuclear material and to state with confidence, “no significant amount of nuclear material has been withdrawn from its intended civilian use.” Thus, materials accounting systems are designed to account for or keep track of the amounts and locations of sensitive nuclear materials by periodic measurements. The purpose of this activity is to detect missing items (gross defects). A variety of C/S techniques are used, primarily optical surveillance and sealing. These measures serve to back up nuclear material accountancy by providing means by which access to nuclear material can be monitored. Unattended monitoring is a special mode of application of NDA or C/S techniques, or a combination of these, that operates for extended periods of time. The complexity and diversity of facilities containing safeguarded nuclear material require a correspondingly diverse set of verification techniques and equipment. The equipment and techniques used in safeguards are briefly described in this talk

Applying Human-performance Models to Designing and Evaluating Nuclear Power Plants: Review Guidance and Technical Basis

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

O' Hara, J.M.

2009-11-30

Human performance models (HPMs) are simulations of human behavior with which we can predict human performance. Designers use them to support their human factors engineering (HFE) programs for a wide range of complex systems, including commercial nuclear power plants. Applicants to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) can use HPMs for design certifications, operating licenses, and license amendments. In the context of nuclear-plant safety, it is important to assure that HPMs are verified and validated, and their usage is consistent with their intended purpose. Using HPMs improperly may generate misleading or incorrect information, entailing safety concerns. The objective of this research was to develop guidance to support the NRC staff's reviews of an applicant's use of HPMs in an HFE program. The guidance is divided into three topical areas: (1) HPM Verification, (2) HPM Validation, and (3) User Interface Verification. Following this guidance will help ensure the benefits of HPMs are achieved in a technically sound, defensible manner. During the course of developing this guidance, I identified several issues that could not be addressed; they also are discussed.

Applying Human-performance Models to Designing and Evaluating Nuclear Power Plants: Review Guidance and Technical Basis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

O'Hara, J.M.

2009-01-01

Human performance models (HPMs) are simulations of human behavior with which we can predict human performance. Designers use them to support their human factors engineering (HFE) programs for a wide range of complex systems, including commercial nuclear power plants. Applicants to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) can use HPMs for design certifications, operating licenses, and license amendments. In the context of nuclear-plant safety, it is important to assure that HPMs are verified and validated, and their usage is consistent with their intended purpose. Using HPMs improperly may generate misleading or incorrect information, entailing safety concerns. The objective of this research was to develop guidance to support the NRC staff's reviews of an applicant's use of HPMs in an HFE program. The guidance is divided into three topical areas: (1) HPM Verification, (2) HPM Validation, and (3) User Interface Verification. Following this guidance will help ensure the benefits of HPMs are achieved in a technically sound, defensible manner. During the course of developing this guidance, I identified several issues that could not be addressed; they also are discussed.

Verification of nuclear material balances: General theory and application to a highly enriched uranium fabrication plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Avenhaus, R.; Beedgen, R.; Neu, H.

1980-08-01

In the theoretical part it is shown that under the assumption, that in case of diversion the operator falsifies all data by a class specific amount, it is optimal in the sense of the probability of detection to use the difference MUF-D as the test statistics. However, as there are arguments for keeping the two tests separately, and furthermore, as it is not clear that the combined test statistics is optimal for any diversion strategy, the overall guaranteed probability of detection for the bivariate test is determined. A numerical example is given applying the theoretical part. Using the material balance data of a Highly Enriched Uranium fabrication plant the variances of MUF, D (no diversion) and MUF-D are calculated with the help of the standard deviations of operator and inspector measurements. The two inventories of the material balance are stratified. The samples sizes of the strata and the total inspection effort for data verification are determined by game theoretical methods (attribute sampling). On the basis of these results the overall detection probability of the combined system (data verification and material accountancy) is determined both for the MUF-D test and the bivariate (D,MUF) test as a function of the goal quantity. The results of both tests are evaluated for different diversion strategies. (orig./HP) [de

The peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Amman, 5 March 1999

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

1999-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the conference given by the Director General of the IAEA at a meeting held at the Diplomatic Institute, Amman, 5 March 1999. The following aspects from the Agency's activity are presented to emphasize its role in the peaceful use of nuclear energy: the transfer of nuclear technologies to the developing countries through the technical co-operation programme, nuclear power for electricity production, nuclear safety, safeguards and verification including a broad outlook for nuclear disarmament, the strengthened safeguards system, present verification activities, Middle East nuclear weapons free zone

Development and verification of the CATHENA GUI

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chin, T.

2008-01-01

This paper presents the development and verification of a graphical user interface for CATHENA MOD-3.5d. The thermalhydraulic computer code CATHENA has been developed to simulate the physical behaviour of the hydraulic components in nuclear reactors and experimental facilities. A representation of the facility is developed as an ASCII text file and used by CATHENA to perform the simulation. The existing method of manual generation of idealizations of a physical system for performing thermal hydraulic analysis is complex, time-consuming and prone to errors. An overview is presented of the CATHENA GUI and its depiction of a CATHENA idealization through the manipulation of a visual collection of objects. The methodologies and rigour involved in the verification of the CATHENA GUI will be discussed. (author)

Verification Survey of Uranium Mine Remediation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ron, Stager

2009-01-01

The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) contracted an independent verification of an intensive gamma radiation survey conducted by a mining company to demonstrate that remediation of disturbed areas was complete. This site was the first of the recent mines being decommissioned in Canada and experience gained here may be applied to other mines being decommissioned in the future. The review included examination of the site-specific basis for clean-up criteria and ALARA as required by CNSC guidance. A paper review of the company report was conducted to determine if protocols were followed and that the summarized results could be independently reproduced. An independent verification survey was conducted on parts of the site and comparisons were made between gamma radiation measurements from the verification survey and the original company survey. Some aspects of data collection using rate meters linked to GPS data loggers are discussed as are aspects for data management and analyses methods required for the large amount of data collected during these surveys. Recommendations were made for implementation of future surveys and reporting the data from those surveys in order to ensure that remediation was complete. (authors)

US monitoring and verification technology: on-site inspection experience and future challenges

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gullickson, R.L.; Carlson, D.; Ingraham, J.; Laird, B.

2013-01-01

The United States has a long and successful history of cooperation with treaty partners in monitoring and verification. For strategic arms reduction treaties, our collaboration has resulted in the development and application of systems with limited complexity and intrusiveness. As we progress beyond New START (NST) along the 'road to zero', the reduced number of nuclear weapons is likely to require increased confidence in monitoring and verification techniques. This may place increased demands on the technology to verify the presence of a nuclear weapon and even confirm the presence of a certain type. Simultaneously, this technology must include the ability to protect each treaty partner's sensitive nuclear weapons information. Mutual development of this technology by treaty partners offers the best approach for acceptance in treaty negotiations. This same approach of mutual cooperation and development is essential for developing nuclear test monitoring technology in support of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Our ability to detect low yield and evasive testing will be enhanced through mutually developed techniques and experiments using laboratory laser experiments and high explosives tests in a variety of locations and geologies. (authors)

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear security. IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lodding, Jan; Kinley, David III

2002-09-01

One of the most urgent challenges facing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system for verification in order to increase the likelihood of detecting any clandestine nuclear weapons programme in breach of international obligations. The IAEA should be able to provide credible assurance not only about declared nuclear material in a State but also about the absence of undeclared material and activities. Realising the full potential of the strengthened system will require that all States bring into force their relevant safeguards agreements, as well as additional protocols thereto. Today, 45 years after the Agency's foundation, its verification mission is as relevant as ever. This is illustrated by the special challenges encountered with regard to verification in Iraq and North Korea in the past decade. Moreover, the horrifying events of 11 September 2001 demonstrated all too well the urgent need to strengthen worldwide control of nuclear and other radioactive material. The IAEA will continue to assist States in their efforts to counter the spread of nuclear weapons and to prevent, detect and respond to illegal uses of nuclear and radioactive material. Adherence by as many States as possible to the strengthened safeguards system is a crucial component in this endeavour

Communication helps development of nuclear energy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kopriva, A.

2007-01-01

In mid-February more than 170 nuclear energy sector communicators from 24 countries all over the world met in Milan, Italy. This year, the whole agenda dealt with the already known phenomenon of nuclear energy sector renaissance and the need for construction of new nuclear power plants, as a clean source of electricity generation without greenhouse emissions, which forms inseparable part of the energy mix in the world. (author)

Transmutation in ADS and Needs for Nuclear Data, with an introduction to the n-TOF at CERN

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gonzalez, E.; Embid, M.; Fernandez, R.; Garcia, J.; Villamarin, D.

1999-01-01

Transmutation can help in the nuclear waste problem by reducing seriously the life and amount of the most dangerous isotopes (radiotoxicity, heat, packing volume and neutron multiplication reductions). ADS are one of the best technologies for nuclear waste transmutation at large scale. Although enough information is available to prepare conceptual designs and make assessments on their performance, a large R and D campaign is required to obtain the precision data required to optimize the detailed engineering design and refine our expectations calculations on waste reduction by the different transmutation strategies being proposed. In particular a large R and D effort is required in nuclear physics, where fundamental differential measurements and integral verification experiments are required. In this sense, the PS213 n-TOF at CERN PS (At Switzerland) will become one of the largest installations to perform the fundamental differential measurements and a wide international collaboration has been setup to perform the cross section measuring campaign. Similarly, the MUSE and several other experiments taking place and in preparation in Europe, USA and Japan will provide the integral verification

New materials in nuclear fusion reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Iwata, Shuichi

1988-01-01

In the autumn of 1987, the critical condition was attained in the JET in Europe and Japanese JT-60, thus the first subject in the physical verification of nuclear fusion reactors was resolved, and the challenge to the next attainment of self ignition condition started. As the development process of nuclear fusion reactors, there are the steps of engineering, economical and social verifications after this physical verification, and in respective steps, there are the critical problems related to materials, therefore the development of new materials must be advanced. The condition of using nuclear fusion reactors is characterized by high fluence, high thermal flux and strong magnetic field, and under such extreme condition, the microscopic structures of materials change, and they behave much differently from usual case. The subjects of material development for nuclear fusion reactors, the material data base being built up, the materials for facing plasma and high thermal flux, first walls, blanket structures, electric insulators and others are described. The serious effect of irradiation and the rate of defect inducement must be taken in consideration in the structural materials for nuclear fusion reactors. (Kako, I.)

Advances in the Processing of VHR Optical Imagery in Support of Safeguards Verification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Niemeyer, I.; Listner, C.; Canty, M.

2015-01-01

Under the Additional Protocol of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) complementing the safeguards agreements between States and the International Atomic Energy Agency, commercial satellite imagery, preferably acquired by very high-resolution (VHR) satellite sensors, is an important source of safeguards-relevant information. Satellite imagery can assist in the evaluation of site declarations, design information verification, the detection of undeclared nuclear facilities, and the preparation of inspections or other visits. With the IAEA's Geospatial Exploitation System (GES), satellite imagery and other geospatial information such as site plans of nuclear facilities are available for a broad range of inspectors, analysts and country officers. The demand for spatial information and new tools to analyze this data is growing, together with the rising number of nuclear facilities under safeguards worldwide. Automated computer-driven processing of satellite imagery could therefore add a big value in the safeguards verification process. These could be, for example, satellite imagery pre-processing algorithms specially developed for new sensors, tools for pixel or object-based image analysis, or geoprocessing tools that generate additional safeguards-relevant information. In the last decade procedures for automated (pre-) processing of satellite imagery have considerably evolved. This paper aims at testing some pixel-based and object-based procedures for automated change detection and classification in support of safeguards verification. Taking different nuclear sites as examples, these methods will be evaluated and compared with regard to their suitability to (semi-) automatically extract safeguards-relevant information. (author)

Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation Waste Integrated Performance and Safety Codes (NEAMS Waste IPSC) verification and validation plan. version 1.

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bartlett, Roscoe Ainsworth; Arguello, Jose Guadalupe, Jr.; Urbina, Angel; Bouchard, Julie F.; Edwards, Harold Carter; Freeze, Geoffrey A.; Knupp, Patrick Michael; Wang, Yifeng; Schultz, Peter Andrew; Howard, Robert (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN); McCornack, Marjorie Turner

2011-01-01

The objective of the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation Waste Integrated Performance and Safety Codes (NEAMS Waste IPSC) is to provide an integrated suite of computational modeling and simulation (M&S) capabilities to quantitatively assess the long-term performance of waste forms in the engineered and geologic environments of a radioactive-waste storage facility or disposal repository. To meet this objective, NEAMS Waste IPSC M&S capabilities will be applied to challenging spatial domains, temporal domains, multiphysics couplings, and multiscale couplings. A strategic verification and validation (V&V) goal is to establish evidence-based metrics for the level of confidence in M&S codes and capabilities. Because it is economically impractical to apply the maximum V&V rigor to each and every M&S capability, M&S capabilities will be ranked for their impact on the performance assessments of various components of the repository systems. Those M&S capabilities with greater impact will require a greater level of confidence and a correspondingly greater investment in V&V. This report includes five major components: (1) a background summary of the NEAMS Waste IPSC to emphasize M&S challenges; (2) the conceptual foundation for verification, validation, and confidence assessment of NEAMS Waste IPSC M&S capabilities; (3) specifications for the planned verification, validation, and confidence-assessment practices; (4) specifications for the planned evidence information management system; and (5) a path forward for the incremental implementation of this V&V plan.

Technology Foresight and nuclear test verification: a structured and participatory approach

Science.gov (United States)

Noack, Patrick; Gaya-Piqué, Luis; Haralabus, Georgios; Auer, Matthias; Jain, Amit; Grenard, Patrick

2013-04-01

As part of its mandate, the CTBTO's nuclear explosion monitoring programme aims to maintain its sustainability, effectiveness and its long-term relevance to the verification regime. As such, the PTS is conducting a Technology Foresight programme of activities to identify technologies, processes, concepts and ideas that may serve said purpose and become applicable within the next 20 years. Through the Technology Foresight activities (online conferences, interviews, surveys, workshops and other) we have involved the wider science community in the fields of seismology, infrasound, hydroacoustics, radionuclide technology, remote sensing and geophysical techniques. We have assembled a catalogue of over 200 items, which incorporate technologies, processes, concepts and ideas which will have direct future relevance to the IMS (International Monitoring System), IDC (International Data Centre) and OSI (On-Site Inspection) activities within the PTS. In order to render this catalogue as applicable and useful as possible for strategy and planning, we have devised a "taxonomy" based on seven categories, against which each technology is assessed through a peer-review mechanism. These categories are: 1. Focus area of the technology in question: identify whether the technology relates to (one or more of the following) improving our understanding of source and source physics; propagation modelling; data acquisition; data transport; data processing; broad modelling concepts; quality assurance and data storage. 2. Current Development Stage of the technology in question. Based on a scale from one to six, this measure is specific to PTS needs and broadly reflects Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs). 3. Impact of the technology on each of the following capabilities: detection, location, characterization, sustainment and confidence building. 4. Development cost: the anticipated monetary cost of validating a prototype (i.e. Development Stage 3) of the technology in question. 5. Time to

Formal verification of reactor process control software using assertion checking environment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sharma, Babita; Balaji, Sowmya; John, Ajith K.; Bhattacharjee, A.K.; Dhodapkar, S.D.

2005-01-01

Assertion Checking Environment (ACE) was developed in-house for carrying out formal (rigorous/ mathematical) functional verification of embedded software written in MISRA C. MISRA C is an industrially sponsored safe sub-set of C programming language and is well accepted in the automotive and aerospace industries. ACE uses static assertion checking technique for verification of MISRA C programs. First the functional specifications of the program are derived from the specifications in the form of pre- and post-conditions for each C function. These pre- and post-conditions are then introduced as assertions (formal comments) in the program code. The annotated C code is then formally verified using ACE. In this paper we present our experience of using ACE for the formal verification of process control software of a nuclear reactor. The Software Requirements Document (SRD) contained textual specifications of the process control software. The SRD was used by the designers to draw logic diagrams which were given as input to a code generator. The verification of the generated C code was done at 2 levels viz. (i) verification against specifications derived from logic diagrams, and (ii) verification against specifications derived from SRD. In this work we checked approximately 600 functional specifications of the software having roughly 15000 lines of code. (author)

Consortium for Verification Technology Fellowship Report.

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Sadler, Lorraine E. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

2017-06-01

As one recipient of the Consortium for Verification Technology (CVT) Fellowship, I spent eight days as a visiting scientist at the University of Michigan, Department of Nuclear Engineering and Radiological Sciences (NERS). During this time, I participated in multiple department and research group meetings and presentations, met with individual faculty and students, toured multiple laboratories, and taught one-half of a one-unit class on Risk Analysis in Nuclear Arms control (six 1.5 hour lectures). The following report describes some of the interactions that I had during my time as well as a brief discussion of the impact of this fellowship on members of the consortium and on me/my laboratory’s technical knowledge and network.

A hand held photo identity verification system for mobile applications

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kumar, Ranajit; Upreti, Anil; Mahaptra, U.; Bhattacharya, S.; Srivastava, G.P.

2009-01-01

A handheld portable system has been developed for mobile personnel identity verification. The system consists of a contact less RF smart card reader integrated to a Simputer through serial link. The simputer verifies the card data, with the data base and aids the security operator in identifying the persons by providing the facial image of the verified person along with other personal details like name, designation, division etc. All transactions are recorded in the Simputer with time and date for future record. This system finds extensive applications in mobile identity verification in nuclear or other industries. (author)

Co-simulation for real time safety verification of nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Boafo, E.K.; Zhang, L.; Nasimi, E.; Gabbar, H.A.

2015-01-01

Small and major accidents and near misses are still occurring in nuclear power plants (NPPs). Risk level has increased with the degradation of NPP equipment and instrumentations. In order to achieve NPP safety, it is important to continuously evaluate risk for all potential hazard and fault propagation scenarios and map protection layers to fault / failure / hazard propagation scenarios to be able to evaluate and verify safety level during NPP operation. There are major limitations in current real time safety verification tools, as it is mainly offline and with no integration to NPP simulation tools. The main goal of this research is to develop real time safety verification with co-simulation tool to be integrated with plant operation support systems. This includes the development of static and dynamic fault semantic network (FSN) to model all possible fault propagation scenarios and the interrelationships among associated process variables. Safety and protection layers along with their reliability are mapped to FSN so that safety levels can be verified during plant operation. Errors between multiphysics models and real time data are modeled to accurately and dynamically tune FSN for each fault propagation scenario. The detailed methodology will show how to integrate process models, construction of static FSN with fault propagation scenarios, and evaluation and tuning of dynamic FSN with probabilistic and process variable interaction values. Principle Component Analysis method is used reduce dimensionality and reduce process variables associated with each fault scenario. Then map independent protection layers (IPL) to FSN with estimated reliability measures of each protection layer to accurately verify safety for different operational scenarios. Intelligent algorithms is used with multivariate techniques to accurate define the interrelation among process variables, in terms of signal strength and time delay, using Genetic Programming (GP), which will provide basis

VBMC: a formal verification tool for VHDL programs

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ajith, K.J.; Bhattacharjee, A.K.

2014-01-01

The design of Control and Instrumentation (C and I) systems used in safety critical applications such as nuclear power plants involves partitioning of the overall system functionality into subparts and implementing each subpart in hardware and/or software as appropriate. With increasing use of programmable devices like FPGA, the hardware subsystems are often implemented in Hardware Description Languages (HDL) like VHDL. Since the functional bugs in such hardware subsystems used in safety critical C and I systems have disastrous consequences, it is important to use rigorous reasoning to verify the functionalities of the HDL models. This paper describes an indigenously developed software tool named VBMC (VHDL Bounded Model Checker) for mathematically proving/refuting functional properties of hardware designs described in VHDL. VBMC accepts hardware design as VHDL program file, functional property in PSL, and verification bound (number of cycles of operation) as inputs. It either reports that the design satisfies the functional property for the given verification bound or generates a counter example providing the reason of violation. In case of satisfaction, the proof holds good for the verification bound. VBMC has been used for the functional verification of FPGA based intelligent I/O boards developed at Reactor Control Division, BARC. (author)

VBMC: a formal verification tool for VHDL program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ajith, K.J.; Bhattacharjee, A.K.

2014-08-01

The design of Control and Instrumentation (C and I) systems used in safety critical applications such as nuclear power plants involves partitioning of the overall system functionality into sub-parts and implementing each sub-part in hardware and/or software as appropriate. With increasing use of programmable devices like FPGA, the hardware subsystems are often implemented in Hardware Description Languages (HDL) like VHDL. Since the functional bugs in such hardware subsystems used in safety critical C and I systems have serious consequences, it is important to use rigorous reasoning to verify the functionalities of the HDL models. This report describes the design of a software tool named VBMC (VHDL Bounded Model Checker). The capability of this tool is in proving/refuting functional properties of hardware designs described in VHDL. VBMC accepts design as a VHDL program file, functional property in PSL, and verification bound (number of cycles of operation) as inputs. It either reports that the design satisfies the functional property for the given verification bound or generates a counterexample providing the reason of violation. In case of satisfaction, the proof holds good for the verification bound. VBMC has been used for the functional verification of FPGA based intelligent I/O boards developed at Reactor Control Division, BARC. (author)

Design verification and validation plan for the cold vacuum drying facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

NISHIKAWA, L.D.

1999-01-01

The Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (CVDF) provides the required process systems, supporting equipment, and facilities needed for drying spent nuclear fuel removed from the K Basins. This document presents the both completed and planned design verification and validation activities

National and International Security Applications of Cryogenic Detectors - Mostly Nuclear Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rabin, Michael W.

2009-01-01

As with science, so with security--in both arenas, the extraordinary sensitivity of cryogenic sensors enables high-confidence detection and high-precision measurement even of the faintest signals. Science applications are more mature, but several national and international security applications have been identified where cryogenic detectors have high potential payoff. International safeguards and nuclear forensics are areas needing new technology and methods to boost speed, sensitivity, precision and accuracy. Successfully applied, improved nuclear materials analysis will help constrain nuclear materials diversion pathways and contribute to treaty verification. Cryogenic microcalorimeter detectors for X-ray, gamma-ray, neutron, and alpha-particle spectrometry are under development with these aims in mind. In each case the unsurpassed energy resolution of microcalorimeters reveals previously invisible spectral features of nuclear materials. Preliminary results of quantitative analysis indicate substantial improvements are still possible, but significant work will be required to fully understand the ultimate performance limits.

National and International Security Applications of Cryogenic Detectors—Mostly Nuclear Safeguards

Science.gov (United States)

Rabin, Michael W.

2009-12-01

As with science, so with security—in both arenas, the extraordinary sensitivity of cryogenic sensors enables high-confidence detection and high-precision measurement even of the faintest signals. Science applications are more mature, but several national and international security applications have been identified where cryogenic detectors have high potential payoff. International safeguards and nuclear forensics are areas needing new technology and methods to boost speed, sensitivity, precision and accuracy. Successfully applied, improved nuclear materials analysis will help constrain nuclear materials diversion pathways and contribute to treaty verification. Cryogenic microcalorimeter detectors for X-ray, gamma-ray, neutron, and alpha-particle spectrometry are under development with these aims in mind. In each case the unsurpassed energy resolution of microcalorimeters reveals previously invisible spectral features of nuclear materials. Preliminary results of quantitative analysis indicate substantial improvements are still possible, but significant work will be required to fully understand the ultimate performance limits.

International and national security applications of cryogenic detectors - mostly nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rabin, Michael W.

2009-01-01

As with science, so with security - in both arenas, the extraordinary sensitivity of cryogenic sensors enables high-confidence detection and high-precision measurement even of the faintest signals. Science applications are more mature, but several national and international security applications have been identified where cryogenic detectors have high potential payoff. International safeguards and nuclear forensics are areas needing new technology and methods to boost speed, sensitivity, precision and accuracy. Successfully applied, improved nuclear materials analysis will help constrain nuclear materials diversion pathways and contribute to treaty verification. Cryogenic microcalorimeter detectors for X-ray, gamma ray, neutron, and alpha particle spectrometry are under development with these aims in mind. In each case the unsurpassed energy resolution of microcalorimeters reveals previously invi sible spectral features of nuclear materials. Preliminary results of quantitative analysis indicate substantial improvements are still possible, but significant work will be required to fully understand the ultimate performance limits.

High-Resolution Fast-Neutron Spectrometry for Arms Control and Treaty Verification

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

David L. Chichester; James T. Johnson; Edward H. Seabury

2012-07-01

Many nondestructive nuclear analysis techniques have been developed to support the measurement needs of arms control and treaty verification, including gross photon and neutron counting, low- and high-resolution gamma spectrometry, time-correlated neutron measurements, and photon and neutron imaging. One notable measurement technique that has not been extensively studied to date for these applications is high-resolution fast-neutron spectrometry (HRFNS). Applied for arms control and treaty verification, HRFNS has the potential to serve as a complimentary measurement approach to these other techniques by providing a means to either qualitatively or quantitatively determine the composition and thickness of non-nuclear materials surrounding neutron-emitting materials. The technique uses the normally-occurring neutrons present in arms control and treaty verification objects of interest as an internal source of neutrons for performing active-interrogation transmission measurements. Most low-Z nuclei of interest for arms control and treaty verification, including 9Be, 12C, 14N, and 16O, possess fast-neutron resonance features in their absorption cross sections in the 0.5- to 5-MeV energy range. Measuring the selective removal of source neutrons over this energy range, assuming for example a fission-spectrum starting distribution, may be used to estimate the stoichiometric composition of intervening materials between the neutron source and detector. At a simpler level, determination of the emitted fast-neutron spectrum may be used for fingerprinting 'known' assemblies for later use in template-matching tests. As with photon spectrometry, automated analysis of fast-neutron spectra may be performed to support decision making and reporting systems protected behind information barriers. This paper will report recent work at Idaho National Laboratory to explore the feasibility of using HRFNS for arms control and treaty verification applications, including simulations

Verification of criticality safety in on-site spent fuel storage systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rasmussen, R.W.

1989-01-01

On February 15, 1984, Duke Power Company received approval for a two-region, burnup credit, spent fuel storage rack design at both Units 1 and 2 of the McGuire Nuclear Station. Duke also hopes to obtain approval by January of 1990 for a dry spent fuel storage system at the Oconee Nuclear Station, which will incorporate the use of burnup credit in the criticality analysis governing the design of the individual storage units. While experiences in burnup verification for criticality safety for their dry storage system at Oconee are in the future, the methods proposed for burnup verification will be similar to those currently used at the McGuire Nuclear Station in the two-region storage racks installed in both pools. In conclusion, the primary benefit of the McGuire rerack effort has obviously been the amount of storage expansion it provided. A total increase of about 2,000 storage cells was realized, 1,000 of which were the result of pursuing the two-region rather than the conventional poison rack design. Less impacting, but equally as important, however, has been the experience gained during the planning, installation, and operation of these storage racks. This experience should prove useful for future rerack efforts likely to occur at Duke's Catawba Nuclear Station as well as for the current dry storage effort underway for the Oconee Nuclear Station

Verification station for Sandia/Rockwell Plutonium Protection system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nicholson, N.; Hastings, R.D.; Henry, C.N.; Millegan, D.R.

1979-04-01

A verification station has been designed to confirm the presence of plutonium within a container module. These container modules [about 13 cm (5 in.) in diameter and 23 cm (9 in.) high] hold sealed food-pack cans containing either plutonium oxide or metal and were designed by Sandia Laboratories to provide security and continuous surveillance and safety. After the plutonium is placed in the container module, it is closed with a solder seal. The verification station discussed here is used to confirm the presence of plutonium in the container module before it is placed in a carousel-type storage array inside the plutonium storage vault. This measurement represents the only technique that uses nuclear detectors in the plutonium protection system

Verification and Diagnostics Framework in ATLAS Trigger/DAQ

CERN Document Server

Barczyk, M.; Caprini, M.; Da Silva Conceicao, J.; Dobson, M.; Flammer, J.; Jones, R.; Kazarov, A.; Kolos, S.; Liko, D.; Lucio, L.; Mapelli, L.; Soloviev, I.; Hart, R.; Amorim, A.; Klose, D.; Lima, J.; Pedro, J.; Wolters, H.; Badescu, E.; Alexandrov, I.; Kotov, V.; Mineev, M.; Ryabov, Yu.; Ryabov, Yu.

2003-01-01

Trigger and data acquisition (TDAQ) systems for modern HEP experiments are composed of thousands of hardware and software components depending on each other in a very complex manner. Typically, such systems are operated by non-expert shift operators, which are not aware of system functionality details. It is therefore necessary to help the operator to control the system and to minimize system down-time by providing knowledge-based facilities for automatic testing and verification of system components and also for error diagnostics and recovery. For this purpose, a verification and diagnostic framework was developed in the scope of ATLAS TDAQ. The verification functionality of the framework allows developers to configure simple low-level tests for any component in a TDAQ configuration. The test can be configured as one or more processes running on different hosts. The framework organizes tests in sequences, using knowledge about components hierarchy and dependencies, and allowing the operator to verify the fun...

IAEA, EU Senior Officials Review Nuclear-Related Cooperation, Chart Way Ahead

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Amano, Y.

2014-01-01

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and European Union officials met this week for the second annual Senior Officials Meeting to review and further strengthen their nuclear-related cooperation. In the past year, the two institutions have improved collaboration in nuclear safety, security, safeguards and peaceful use of nuclear energy through implementing a number of initiatives. In 2013, new contracts for projects have been signed amounting to approximately 24 million euros. These included an EU Council decision to support IAEA nuclear security and verification activities worth of 8.05 million euros. Furthermore, a Memorandum of Understanding establishing a framework for cooperation to help improve nuclear safety was signed, as well as the Practical Arrangement on technical nuclear security issues. The EU and the IAEA have also worked to explore and identify new areas for cooperation such as using nuclear applications for socio-economic development. The meeting addressed enhanced cooperation in the areas of nuclear safety, nuclear security, nuclear applications, nuclear energy and safeguards. Participants agreed on the following steps, including holding a Senior Officials Meeting planned in early 2015 in the premises of the European Commission in Luxembourg

SoC Design Approach Using Convertibility Verification

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Basu Samik

2008-01-01

Full Text Available Abstract Compositional design of systems on chip from preverified components helps to achieve shorter design cycles and time to market. However, the design process is affected by the issue of protocol mismatches, where two components fail to communicate with each other due to protocol differences. Convertibility verification, which involves the automatic generation of a converter to facilitate communication between two mismatched components, is a collection of techniques to address protocol mismatches. We present an approach to convertibility verification using module checking. We use Kripke structures to represent protocols and the temporal logic to describe desired system behavior. A tableau-based converter generation algorithm is presented which is shown to be sound and complete. We have developed a prototype implementation of the proposed algorithm and have used it to verify that it can handle many classical protocol mismatch problems along with SoC problems. The initial idea for -based convertibility verification was presented at SLA++P '07 as presented in the work by Roopak Sinha et al. 2008.

Calculating the new global nuclear terrorism threat

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2001-01-01

Experts from around the world are meeting at the IAEA on 29 October to 2 November at an international symposium on nuclear safeguards, verification, and security. A special session on 2 November focuses on the issue of combating nuclear terrorism. Although terrorists have never used a nuclear weapon, reports that some terrorist groups, particularly al-Qaeda, have attempted to acquire nuclear material is a cause of great concern. According to the IAEA, since 1993, there have been 175 cases of trafficking in nuclear material and 201 cases of trafficking in other radioactive sources (medical, industrial). However, only 18 of these cases have actually involved small amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium, the material needed to produce a nuclear bomb. IAEA experts judge the quantities involved to be insufficient to construct a nuclear explosive device. The IAEA experts have evaluated the risks for nuclear terrorism in these three categories: Nuclear facilities; Nuclear Material; Radioactive Sources. The IAEA is proposing a number of new initiatives, including strengthening border monitoring, helping States search for and dispose of orphan sources and strengthening the capabilities of the IAEA Emergency Response Centre to react to radiological emergencies following a terrorist attack. In the short term, the IAEA estimates that at least $30-$50 million annually will be needed to strengthen and expand its programs to meet this terrorist threat

IAEA verification of weapon-origin fissile material in the Russian Federation and the United States

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2001-01-01

The Secretary of Energy of the United States, Spencer Abraham, Minister of the Russian Federation on Atomic Energy, Alexander Rumyantsev, and Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei, met in Vienna on 18 September 2001 to review progress on the Trilateral Initiative. The Initiative was launched in 1996 to develop a new IAEA verification system for weapon-origin material designated by the United States and the Russian Federation as released from their defence programmes. The removal of weapon-origin fissile material from the defence programmes of the Russian Federation and the United States is in furtherance of the commitment to disarmament undertaken by the two States pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). IAEA verification under this Initiative is intended to promote international confidence that fissile material made subject by either of the two States to Agency verification remains irreversibly removed from nuclear weapon programmes

The role of neural networks in nuclear power plant safety systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Boger, Z.

1993-01-01

Neural networks (NN) techniques have been applied in recent years to many systems by researchers in the nuclear power industry, mainly for modeling and sensor validation. Recent results are reviewed, including new directions in applications to control systems, safety analysis, and ''virtual'' instruments. As new fast learning algorithms become available, large systems may be learned effectively, even with few training examples. The nuclear industry hesitates to include NN in safety related systems, but it seems that the obstacles could be overcome with the demonstration of successful applications, even from other industries. Coupling of full-scale reactor simulators, as fault database generators, with neural networks learning should be explored. The integration of Expert System technology with NN should improve the Validation and Verification tasks, and also help overcome psychological barriers. It may prove that the potential of NN to help operators, compared with the existing and proposed alternatives, outweigh the risks. (author). 58 refs, 2 figs

Maintenance of process instrumentation in nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hashemian, H.M.

2006-01-01

The resurgence of the nuclear power industry at a time when the nuclear plant I and C workforce is diminishing due to aging and retirements has been the motivation for writing this book. This book compiles 30 years of practical knowledge gained by the author and his staff in testing the I and C systems of nuclear power plants around the world. It focuses on process temperature and pressure sensors and the verification of these sensors' calibration and response time. In spite of great advances in electronics, computers, and measurement technologies, important process parameters such as temperature and pressure are still measured with conventional sensing techniques found in RTDs, thermocouples, and conventional pressure and differential pressure sensors. Furthermore, no improved technology providing comparable performance is currently on the horizon. Therefore, it is important to understand how these sensors function and the testing techniques for verifying their performance. This book is intended to help provide this understanding. (orig.)

Implementation Practices of Finland in Facilitating IAEA Verification Activities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Martikka, E.; Ansaranta, T.; Honkamaa, T.; Hamalainen, M.

2015-01-01

The Member States provide the information to the IAEA according to the Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols. For example, the requirements to provide the reports and declarations are very general and there are no explanation what the IAEA is looking for from that information. It is important for the States to understand how their efforts to collect and provide information, and to facilitate IAEA verification activities, contribute to the achievement of objectives and finally to draw conclusions on the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear materials in a State. The IAEA is producing a new series of guidance called Safeguards Implementation Practices, SIP, guides, which are shedding light on the requirements and sharing the good practices of States. It is hoped that the SIP Guides will create a better understanding of the needs of the IAEA and the important role of States and facility operators in achieving safeguards objectives. The guides are also important for the States to share their lessons learned and good practices for the benefit of other States that might be developing their capabilities or enhancing their processes and procedures. The way is very wide and long, when a State decides to start up a new nuclear programme. At first there is a need for legislation, regulatory body, contact point, international agreements and then finally practical implementation of the safeguards in the nuclear facilities. There are a lot of issues to be prepared in advance to facilitate the IAEA's implementation of verification activities successfully, effectively and with the good quality. Using the structure of the IAEA's draft SIP Guide on Facilitating Verification Activities as a framework, this paper will describe the most relevant implementation practices and experiences in Finland. (author)

Case Study in Internal Audit of Nuclear Material; Etude d'un Systeme de Verification Comptable Interne des Matieres Nucleaires; Izuchenie primera organizatsii vnutrennego ucheta yadernykh materialov na predpriyatii; Estudio de la Fiscalizacion Interna de los Materiales Nucleares

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kops, S. [United States Atomic Energy Commission, Argonne, IL (United States)

1966-02-15

The general need for the internal audit function and the basic principles of management underlying this need are briefly discussed. The size, complexity and degree of centralization, or decentralization, are usually the main factors in determining the need for a conventional internal audit. Here, the more specialized needs and characteristics of an internal audit peculiar to an organization handling source or special fissionable material (nuclear material) are discussed and contrasted with an audit of the standard type. The necessity of a special audit, because of the high monetary and strategic value, is demonstrated. Planning the internal audit within a production plant is discussed in detail. This includes the rationale of timing the review together with the records and physical inventory to be tested and verified. Quality and types of professional skills of the personnel to be used in internal audit are also discussed. A qualified statistical plan in choosing the items to be tested is discussed. The application of the plans in the actual performance of the internal audit are described in detail. Possible variances from a recognized norm and possible approaches to audit resolution are discussed. Although in many other manufacturing situations there are variations in the methods of verifying inventories without physically doing so, the necessity for physically testing inventories of nuclear material is demonstrated. The various means of reporting the results of the internal audit are presented. The needs of individual groups within the organization are considered in determining the format of the report, as well as the basic content. Distribution of the report and its variations are discussed. (author) [French] L'auteur etudie brievement la necessite de la verification comptable interne en general, et les principes essentiels de gestion auxquels repond cette necessite. La taille de l'installation, la complexite et le degre de centralisation ou de decentralisation

IAEA Assistance in Helping Member States Develop Effectively Independent and Robust Regulators for Nuclear Installation Safety

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Nicic, A., E-mail: A.Nicic@iaea.org [International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Department of Nuclear Safety and Security, Wagramer Strasse 5, P.O. Box 100, 1400 Vienna (Austria)

2014-10-15

Full text: The International Conference on Topical Issues in Nuclear Installation Safety will be focused on the exchange of information on the latest thinking and advances in the implementation of the concept of Defence-in-Depth (DID) in nuclear installations, and the associated challenges. The focus will be on operating nuclear installations, including nuclear power plants, research reactors and fuel cycle facilities, and on how lessons learned from operating experience and recent events (e.g. the Fukushima Daiichi accident) are used to enhance safety. The implementation of DID covers a number of elements that are directly related to the different states and phases of a nuclear facility. This presentation will discuss the importance of the regulatory body in its oversight role as a cross-cutting element of DID in helping to assure the safety of nuclear installations. Taking note of the numerous challenges in developing an effectively independent and robust regulatory body, the presentation will describe how the IAEA assists Member States in their development of the appropriate regulatory infrastructure and necessary capacity to carry out their regulatory responsibilities – consistent with the IAEA Safety Standards. The presentation will describe the importance of the self-assessment process which serves as a starting point for helping Member States gain an understanding of what support they need and when the support should be provided as they develop into a competent regulatory authority. The presentation will discuss recent improvements in the self-assessment process and related IAEA services in this regard. Once regulatory bodies are established, it is essential that they seek continuous improvement. In this regard, the presentation will describe the IAEA’s assistance provided through the Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) and recent activities to improve the IRRS, consistent with the IAEA’s Action Plan on Nuclear Safety. (author)

Verification in the international treaty and expected its activities for FMCT

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kikuchi, Masahiro

1997-01-01

Cold war had been finished and the international society was going to move detente. The mass destruction weapons decrease its object and they are going to be reduced or reversed. By change of the international conditions in the field of non-proliferation, it is necessary to the activities for decreasing atomic weapons and a countermeasure of diffusion of nuclear materials produced by waste and dissection of excess atomic weapon to other countries and stranger. We understand that non-proliferation means a countermeasure of decreasing nuclear weapon. So that the non-proliferation system should be regulated systematically in order to foresee the international tendency in the future and the verification activities to attain reliability assurance of international treaty for disarmament and non-proliferation. NPT reconsider congress decided to begin early negotiation of Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) in 1995. The functions, verification and expected activities of FMCT are discussed. (S.Y.)

Proposal for a verification facility of ADS in China

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Guan Xialing; Luo Zhanglin

1999-01-01

The concept, general layout and some specifications of a proposed verification facility of the accelerator driven radioactive clean nuclear power system (AD-RCNPS) in China are described. It is composed of a 150 MeV/3 mA low energy accelerator, a swimming pool reactor and some basic research facilities. The 150 MeV accelerator consists of an ECR proton source, LEBT, RFQ, CCDTL and SCC. As the sub-critical reactor, the swimming pool reactor is an existing research reactor at the China Institute of Atomic Energy, whose maximum output power is 3.5 MW. The effect of the instability of proton beam and possibility of simulation tests on the verification facility have been analysed. (author)

Proposal for a verification facility of ADS in China

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Guan Xialing; Luo Zhanglin

2000-01-01

The concept, the general layout and some specifications of a proposed verification facility of the accelerator driven radioactive clean nuclear power system (AD-RCNPS) in China has been described. It is composed of a 150 MeV/3 mA low energy accelerator, a swimming pool reactor and some basic research facility. The 150 MeV accelerator consists of an ECR proton source, LEBT, RFQ, CCDTL and SCC. As the sub-critical reactor, the swimming pool reactor is an existing research reactor in China Institute of Atomic Energy, its maximum output power is 3.5 MW. The effect of the instability of proton beam and possibility of simulation test on the verification facility have been analyzed

Advanced verification topics

CERN Document Server

Bhattacharya, Bishnupriya; Hall, Gary; Heaton, Nick; Kashai, Yaron; Khan Neyaz; Kirshenbaum, Zeev; Shneydor, Efrat

2011-01-01

The Accellera Universal Verification Methodology (UVM) standard is architected to scale, but verification is growing and in more than just the digital design dimension. It is growing in the SoC dimension to include low-power and mixed-signal and the system integration dimension to include multi-language support and acceleration. These items and others all contribute to the quality of the SOC so the Metric-Driven Verification (MDV) methodology is needed to unify it all into a coherent verification plan. This book is for verification engineers and managers familiar with the UVM and the benefits it brings to digital verification but who also need to tackle specialized tasks. It is also written for the SoC project manager that is tasked with building an efficient worldwide team. While the task continues to become more complex, Advanced Verification Topics describes methodologies outside of the Accellera UVM standard, but that build on it, to provide a way for SoC teams to stay productive and profitable.

How Formal Dynamic Verification Tools Facilitate Novel Concurrency Visualizations

Science.gov (United States)

Aananthakrishnan, Sriram; Delisi, Michael; Vakkalanka, Sarvani; Vo, Anh; Gopalakrishnan, Ganesh; Kirby, Robert M.; Thakur, Rajeev

With the exploding scale of concurrency, presenting valuable pieces of information collected by formal verification tools intuitively and graphically can greatly enhance concurrent system debugging. Traditional MPI program debuggers present trace views of MPI program executions. Such views are redundant, often containing equivalent traces that permute independent MPI calls. In our ISP formal dynamic verifier for MPI programs, we present a collection of alternate views made possible by the use of formal dynamic verification. Some of ISP’s views help pinpoint errors, some facilitate discerning errors by eliminating redundancy, while others help understand the program better by displaying concurrent even orderings that must be respected by all MPI implementations, in the form of completes-before graphs. In this paper, we describe ISP’s graphical user interface (GUI) capabilities in all these areas which are currently supported by a portable Java based GUI, a Microsoft Visual Studio GUI, and an Eclipse based GUI whose development is in progress.

RISKIND verification and benchmark comparisons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Biwer, B.M.; Arnish, J.J.; Chen, S.Y.; Kamboj, S.

1997-08-01

This report presents verification calculations and benchmark comparisons for RISKIND, a computer code designed to estimate potential radiological consequences and health risks to individuals and the population from exposures associated with the transportation of spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive materials. Spreadsheet calculations were performed to verify the proper operation of the major options and calculational steps in RISKIND. The program is unique in that it combines a variety of well-established models into a comprehensive treatment for assessing risks from the transportation of radioactive materials. Benchmark comparisons with other validated codes that incorporate similar models were also performed. For instance, the external gamma and neutron dose rate curves for a shipping package estimated by RISKIND were compared with those estimated by using the RADTRAN 4 code and NUREG-0170 methodology. Atmospheric dispersion of released material and dose estimates from the GENII and CAP88-PC codes. Verification results have shown the program to be performing its intended function correctly. The benchmark results indicate that the predictions made by RISKIND are within acceptable limits when compared with predictions from similar existing models.

RISKIND verification and benchmark comparisons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Biwer, B.M.; Arnish, J.J.; Chen, S.Y.; Kamboj, S.

1997-08-01

This report presents verification calculations and benchmark comparisons for RISKIND, a computer code designed to estimate potential radiological consequences and health risks to individuals and the population from exposures associated with the transportation of spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive materials. Spreadsheet calculations were performed to verify the proper operation of the major options and calculational steps in RISKIND. The program is unique in that it combines a variety of well-established models into a comprehensive treatment for assessing risks from the transportation of radioactive materials. Benchmark comparisons with other validated codes that incorporate similar models were also performed. For instance, the external gamma and neutron dose rate curves for a shipping package estimated by RISKIND were compared with those estimated by using the RADTRAN 4 code and NUREG-0170 methodology. Atmospheric dispersion of released material and dose estimates from the GENII and CAP88-PC codes. Verification results have shown the program to be performing its intended function correctly. The benchmark results indicate that the predictions made by RISKIND are within acceptable limits when compared with predictions from similar existing models

An overview of CTBT verification technologies and status of IMS networks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Basham, P.

2002-01-01

The CTBT history is described in brief. Nuclear test environments and verification regime are presented with illustrations. Geographical location of seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide monitoring networks are indicated on globe maps. Benefits of the International Monitoring System (IMS) to host countries are listed

On site PWR fuel inspection measurements for operational and design verification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1996-01-01

The on-site inspection of irradiated Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) fuel and Non-Fuel Bearing Components (NFBC) is typically limited to visual inspections during refuelings using underwater TV cameras and is intended primarily to confirm whether the components will continue in operation. These inspections do not normally provide data for design verification nor information to benefit future fuel designs. Japanese PWR utilities and Nuclear Fuel Industries Ltd. designed, built, and performed demonstration tests of on-site inspection equipment that confirms operational readiness of PWR fuel and NFBC and also gathers data for design verification of these components. 4 figs, 3 tabs

Physical inventory verification exercise at a light-water reactor facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bosler, G.E.; Menlove, H.O.; Halbig, J.K.

1986-04-01

A simulated physical inventory verification exercise was performed at the Three Mile Island (TMI) Unit 1 reactor. Inspectors from the Internatinal Atomic Energy Agency made measurements on fresh- and spent-fuel assemblies and verified the special nuclear material inventory at TMI. Simulated inspection log sheets and computerized inspection reports were prepared

Numerical Verification Of Equilibrium Chemistry

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Piro, Markus; Lewis, Brent; Thompson, William T.; Simunovic, Srdjan; Besmann, Theodore M.

2010-01-01

A numerical tool is in an advanced state of development to compute the equilibrium compositions of phases and their proportions in multi-component systems of importance to the nuclear industry. The resulting software is being conceived for direct integration into large multi-physics fuel performance codes, particularly for providing boundary conditions in heat and mass transport modules. However, any numerical errors produced in equilibrium chemistry computations will be propagated in subsequent heat and mass transport calculations, thus falsely predicting nuclear fuel behaviour. The necessity for a reliable method to numerically verify chemical equilibrium computations is emphasized by the requirement to handle the very large number of elements necessary to capture the entire fission product inventory. A simple, reliable and comprehensive numerical verification method is presented which can be invoked by any equilibrium chemistry solver for quality assurance purposes.

Human factors design, verification, and validation for two types of control room upgrades at a nuclear power plant

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Boring, Laurids Ronald [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

2014-10-01

This paper describes the NUREG-0711 based human factors engineering (HFE) phases and associated elements required to support design, verification and validation (V&V), and implementation of a new plant process computer (PPC) and turbine control system (TCS) at a representative nuclear power plant. This paper reviews ways to take a human-system interface (HSI) specification and use it when migrating legacy PPC displays or designing displays with new functionality. These displays undergo iterative usability testing during the design phase and then undergo an integrated system validation (ISV) in a full scope control room training simulator. Following the successful demonstration of operator performance with the systems during the ISV, the new system is implemented at the plant, first in the training simulator and then in the main control room.

Human factors design, verification, and validation for two types of control room upgrades at a nuclear power plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Boring, Laurids Ronald

2014-01-01

This paper describes the NUREG-0711 based human factors engineering (HFE) phases and associated elements required to support design, verification and validation (V&V), and implementation of a new plant process computer (PPC) and turbine control system (TCS) at a representative nuclear power plant. This paper reviews ways to take a human-system interface (HSI) specification and use it when migrating legacy PPC displays or designing displays with new functionality. These displays undergo iterative usability testing during the design phase and then undergo an integrated system validation (ISV) in a full scope control room training simulator. Following the successful demonstration of operator performance with the systems during the ISV, the new system is implemented at the plant, first in the training simulator and then in the main control room.

Measurement techniques for the verification of excess weapons materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tape, J.W.; Eccleston, G.W.; Yates, M.A.

1998-01-01

The end of the superpower arms race has resulted in an unprecedented reduction in stockpiles of deployed nuclear weapons. Numerous proposals have been put forward and actions have been taken to ensure the irreversibility of nuclear arms reductions, including unilateral initiatives such as those made by President Clinton in September 1993 to place fissile materials no longer needed for a deterrent under international inspection, and bilateral and multilateral measures currently being negotiated. For the technologist, there is a unique opportunity to develop the technical means to monitor nuclear materials that have been declared excess to nuclear weapons programs, to provide confidence that reductions are taking place and that the released materials are not being used again for nuclear explosive programs. However, because of the sensitive nature of these materials, a fundamental conflict exists between the desire to know that the bulk materials or weapon components in fact represent evidence of warhead reductions, and treaty commitments and national laws that require the protection of weapons design information. This conflict presents a unique challenge to technologists. The flow of excess weapons materials, from deployed warheads through storage, disassembly, component storage, conversion to bulk forms, and disposition, will be described in general terms. Measurement approaches based on the detection of passive or induced radiation will be discussed along with the requirement to protect sensitive information from release to unauthorized parties. Possible uses of measurement methods to assist in the verification of arms reductions will be described. The concept of measuring attributes of items rather than quantitative mass-based inventory verification will be discussed along with associated information-barrier concepts required to protect sensitive information

Software Quality Assurance and Verification for the MPACT Library Generation Process

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Liu, Yuxuan [Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (United States); Williams, Mark L. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Wiarda, Dorothea [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Clarno, Kevin T. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Kim, Kang Seog [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Celik, Cihangir [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

2017-05-01

This report fulfills the requirements for the Consortium for the Advanced Simulation of Light-Water Reactors (CASL) milestone L2:RTM.P14.02, “SQA and Verification for MPACT Library Generation,” by documenting the current status of the software quality, verification, and acceptance testing of nuclear data libraries for MPACT. It provides a brief overview of the library generation process, from general-purpose evaluated nuclear data files (ENDF/B) to a problem-dependent cross section library for modeling of light-water reactors (LWRs). The software quality assurance (SQA) programs associated with each of the software used to generate the nuclear data libraries are discussed; specific tests within the SCALE/AMPX and VERA/XSTools repositories are described. The methods and associated tests to verify the quality of the library during the generation process are described in detail. The library generation process has been automated to a degree to (1) ensure that it can be run without user intervention and (2) to ensure that the library can be reproduced. Finally, the acceptance testing process that will be performed by representatives from the Radiation Transport Methods (RTM) Focus Area prior to the production library’s release is described in detail.

Concepts of Model Verification and Validation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Thacker, B.H.; Doebling, S.W.; Hemez, F.M.; Anderson, M.C.; Pepin, J.E.; Rodriguez, E.A.

2004-01-01

Model verification and validation (VandV) is an enabling methodology for the development of computational models that can be used to make engineering predictions with quantified confidence. Model VandV procedures are needed by government and industry to reduce the time, cost, and risk associated with full-scale testing of products, materials, and weapon systems. Quantifying the confidence and predictive accuracy of model calculations provides the decision-maker with the information necessary for making high-consequence decisions. The development of guidelines and procedures for conducting a model VandV program are currently being defined by a broad spectrum of researchers. This report reviews the concepts involved in such a program. Model VandV is a current topic of great interest to both government and industry. In response to a ban on the production of new strategic weapons and nuclear testing, the Department of Energy (DOE) initiated the Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP). An objective of the SSP is to maintain a high level of confidence in the safety, reliability, and performance of the existing nuclear weapons stockpile in the absence of nuclear testing. This objective has challenged the national laboratories to develop high-confidence tools and methods that can be used to provide credible models needed for stockpile certification via numerical simulation. There has been a significant increase in activity recently to define VandV methods and procedures. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Modeling and Simulation Office (DMSO) is working to develop fundamental concepts and terminology for VandV applied to high-level systems such as ballistic missile defense and battle management simulations. The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) has recently formed a Standards Committee for the development of VandV procedures for computational solid mechanics models. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) has been a proponent of model

Verifying a nuclear weapon`s response to radiation environments

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Dean, F.F.; Barrett, W.H.

1998-05-01

The process described in the paper is being applied as part of the design verification of a replacement component designed for a nuclear weapon currently in the active stockpile. This process is an adaptation of the process successfully used in nuclear weapon development programs. The verification process concentrates on evaluating system response to radiation environments, verifying system performance during and after exposure to radiation environments, and assessing system survivability.

Securing a better future for all: making a difference with nuclear technology

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mohamad, Daud; )

2014-01-01

The IAEA is an inter-governmental organization and the world's centre of cooperation in the nuclear field. As per its mandate, the IAEA shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. The IAEA executes its mandate on the basis of three pillars: nuclear verification and security, safety and technology transfer. Nuclear technologies and techniques can offer vital assistance in fighting disease, improving food security and safety, and studying and sustainably managing water resources and the environment. The IAEA's Department of Nuclear Sciences and Applications works to address these critical developmental needs by helping Member States to apply nuclear science and technology more effectively where they have a comparative advantage and can have substantial socio-economic impact. The scale of these needs is growing each day as the world's population and life expectancies increase, as global industry and migration multiply the populations of the world's cities and their demands for resources, and as these trends impact human disease, the availability of safe and sufficient supplies of food and water, the health of our terrestrial and marine ecosystems, and the variability of our climate. These are highly complex challenges, and nuclear science and technology, can make impactful contributions in helping Member States to respond to these challenges

VEG-01: Veggie Hardware Verification Testing

Science.gov (United States)

Massa, Gioia; Newsham, Gary; Hummerick, Mary; Morrow, Robert; Wheeler, Raymond

2013-01-01

The Veggie plant/vegetable production system is scheduled to fly on ISS at the end of2013. Since much of the technology associated with Veggie has not been previously tested in microgravity, a hardware validation flight was initiated. This test will allow data to be collected about Veggie hardware functionality on ISS, allow crew interactions to be vetted for future improvements, validate the ability of the hardware to grow and sustain plants, and collect data that will be helpful to future Veggie investigators as they develop their payloads. Additionally, food safety data on the lettuce plants grown will be collected to help support the development of a pathway for the crew to safely consume produce grown on orbit. Significant background research has been performed on the Veggie plant growth system, with early tests focusing on the development of the rooting pillow concept, and the selection of fertilizer, rooting medium and plant species. More recent testing has been conducted to integrate the pillow concept into the Veggie hardware and to ensure that adequate water is provided throughout the growth cycle. Seed sanitation protocols have been established for flight, and hardware sanitation between experiments has been studied. Methods for shipping and storage of rooting pillows and the development of crew procedures and crew training videos for plant activities on-orbit have been established. Science verification testing was conducted and lettuce plants were successfully grown in prototype Veggie hardware, microbial samples were taken, plant were harvested, frozen, stored and later analyzed for microbial growth, nutrients, and A TP levels. An additional verification test, prior to the final payload verification testing, is desired to demonstrate similar growth in the flight hardware and also to test a second set of pillows containing zinnia seeds. Issues with root mat water supply are being resolved, with final testing and flight scheduled for later in 2013.

Development of digital device based work verification system for cooperation between main control room operators and field workers in nuclear power plants

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lee, Seung Min, E-mail: jewellee@kaeri.re.kr [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, 305-353, 989-111 Daedeok-daero, Yuseong-gu, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Department of Nuclear and Quantum Engineering, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, 373-1, Guseong-dong, Yuseong-gu, Daejeon 305-701 (Korea, Republic of); Lee, Hyun Chul, E-mail: leehc@kaeri.re.kr [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, 305-353, 989-111 Daedeok-daero, Yuseong-gu, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Ha, Jun Su, E-mail: junsu.ha@kustar.ac.ae [Department of Nuclear Engineering, Khalifa University of Science Technology and Research, Abu Dhabi P.O. Box 127788 (United Arab Emirates); Seong, Poong Hyun, E-mail: phseong@kaist.ac.kr [Department of Nuclear and Quantum Engineering, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, 373-1, Guseong-dong, Yuseong-gu, Daejeon 305-701 (Korea, Republic of)

2016-10-15

Highlights: • A digital device-based work verification and cooperation support system was developed. • Requirements were derived by interviewing field operators having experiences with mobile-based work support systems. • The usability of the proposed system was validated by conducting questionnaire surveys. • The proposed system will be useful if the manual or the set of guidelines is well constructed. - Abstract: Digital technologies have been applied in the nuclear field to check task results, monitor events and accidents, and transmit/receive data. The results of using digital devices have proven that these devices can provide high accuracy and convenience for workers, allowing them to obtain obvious positive effects by reducing their workloads. In this study, as one step forward, a digital device-based cooperation support system, the nuclear cooperation support and mobile documentation system (Nu-COSMOS), is proposed to support communication between main control room (MCR) operators and field workers by verifying field workers’ work results in nuclear power plants (NPPs). The proposed system consists of a mobile based information storage system to support field workers by providing various functions to make workers more trusted by MCR operators; also to improve the efficiency of meeting, and a large screen based information sharing system supports meetings by allowing both sides to share one medium. The usability of this system was estimated by interviewing field operators working in nuclear power plants and experts who have experience working as operators. A survey to estimate the usability of the suggested system and the suitability of the functions of the system for field working was conducted for 35 subjects who have experience in field works or with support system development-related research. The usability test was conducted using the system usability scale (SUS), which is widely used in industrial usability evaluation. Using questionnaires

Development of digital device based work verification system for cooperation between main control room operators and field workers in nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lee, Seung Min; Lee, Hyun Chul; Ha, Jun Su; Seong, Poong Hyun

2016-01-01

Highlights: • A digital device-based work verification and cooperation support system was developed. • Requirements were derived by interviewing field operators having experiences with mobile-based work support systems. • The usability of the proposed system was validated by conducting questionnaire surveys. • The proposed system will be useful if the manual or the set of guidelines is well constructed. - Abstract: Digital technologies have been applied in the nuclear field to check task results, monitor events and accidents, and transmit/receive data. The results of using digital devices have proven that these devices can provide high accuracy and convenience for workers, allowing them to obtain obvious positive effects by reducing their workloads. In this study, as one step forward, a digital device-based cooperation support system, the nuclear cooperation support and mobile documentation system (Nu-COSMOS), is proposed to support communication between main control room (MCR) operators and field workers by verifying field workers’ work results in nuclear power plants (NPPs). The proposed system consists of a mobile based information storage system to support field workers by providing various functions to make workers more trusted by MCR operators; also to improve the efficiency of meeting, and a large screen based information sharing system supports meetings by allowing both sides to share one medium. The usability of this system was estimated by interviewing field operators working in nuclear power plants and experts who have experience working as operators. A survey to estimate the usability of the suggested system and the suitability of the functions of the system for field working was conducted for 35 subjects who have experience in field works or with support system development-related research. The usability test was conducted using the system usability scale (SUS), which is widely used in industrial usability evaluation. Using questionnaires

Non proliferation regimes undertakings: Benefits and limits of synergies in verification technologies and procedures

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Richard, M.

2001-01-01

Full text: Thirty years ago the NPT was entering into force. Therewith, when a State became party to the NPT, it had, in accordance with article III.1 of the Treaty, an undertaking to conclude a Comprehensive Safeguards agreement with the IAEA and accept safeguards verification on source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territories in order to verify that such material is not diverted. This multilateral instrument was the foundation stone of the non-proliferation regime and marked the actual birth of internationally accepted measures to verily compliance with politically stringent agreements. Since that time several important multilateral or bilateral instruments on non-proliferation and disarmament have been negotiated and adopted to curb the development and the acquisition of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) most of them since the middle of the eighties and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Amongst the multilateral instruments are the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapon and Toxin Weapons (1972), the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (1993), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (1996), the Strengthening of the IAEA Safeguards and the Additional Protocol (1997), with some still in negotiation like the Protocol of the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons, and some on which negotiation is still a wish like the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Bilateral disarmament agreements between the United States of America and the Russian Federation such as the INF Treaty, START I and II, the agreements on the elimination of excess defence nuclear material as well as the Trilateral Initiative with the IAEA pave the way to nuclear disarmament with the reduction of both the number of nuclear weapons arsenal and the fissile material inventories. The politically stringent undertakings of States that have become parties to those agreements would not be possible without the

Issues of verification and validation of application-specific integrated circuits in reactor trip systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Battle, R.E.; Alley, G.T.

1993-01-01

Concepts of using application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs) in nuclear reactor safety systems are evaluated. The motivation for this evaluation stems from the difficulty of proving that software-based protection systems are adequately reliable. Important issues concerning the reliability of computers and software are identified and used to evaluate features of ASICS. These concepts indicate that ASICs have several advantages over software for simple systems. The primary advantage of ASICs over software is that verification and validation (V ampersand V) of ASICs can be done with much higher confidence than can be done with software. A method of performing this V ampersand V on ASICS is being developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The purpose of the method's being developed is to help eliminate design and fabrication errors. It will not solve problems with incorrect requirements or specifications

Development and Verification of the Computer Codes for the Fast Reactors Nuclear Safety Justification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kisselev, A.E.; Mosunova, N.A.; Strizhov, V.F.

2015-01-01

The information on the status of the work on development of the system of the nuclear safety codes for fast liquid metal reactors is presented in paper. The purpose of the work is to create an instrument for NPP neutronic, thermohydraulic and strength justification including human and environment radiation safety. The main task that is to be solved by the system of codes developed is the analysis of the broad spectrum of phenomena taking place on the NPP (including reactor itself, NPP components, containment rooms, industrial site and surrounding area) and analysis of the impact of the regular and accidental releases on the environment. The code system is oriented on the ability of fully integrated modeling of the NPP behavior in the coupled definition accounting for the wide range of significant phenomena taking place on the NPP under normal and accident conditions. It is based on the models that meet the state-of-the-art knowledge level. The codes incorporate advanced numerical methods and modern programming technologies oriented on the high-performance computing systems. The information on the status of the work on verification of the separate codes of the system of codes is also presented. (author)

IAEA verification experiment at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gordon, D.M.; Subudhi, M.; Calvert, O.L.; Bonner, T.N.; Cherry, R.C.; Whiting, N.E.

1998-01-01

In April 1996, the United States (US) added the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant to the list of facilities eligible for the application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. At that time, the US proposed that the IAEA carry out a Verification Experiment at the plant with respect to the downblending of about 13 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in the form of UF 6 . This material is part of the 226 metric tons of fissile material that President Clinton has declared to be excess to US national-security needs and which will be permanently withdrawn from the US nuclear stockpile. In September 1997, the IAEA agreed to carry out this experiment, and during the first three weeks of December 1997, the IAEA verified the design information concerning the downblending process. The plant has been subject to short-notice random inspections since December 17, 1997. This paper provides an overview of the Verification Experiment, the monitoring technologies used in the verification approach, and some of the experience gained to date

Verification of FPGA-based NPP I and C systems. General approach and techniques

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Andrashov, Anton; Kharchenko, Vyacheslav; Sklyar, Volodymir; Reva, Lubov; Siora, Alexander

2011-01-01

This paper presents a general approach and techniques for design and verification of Field Programmable Gates Arrays (FPGA)-based Instrumentation and Control (I and C) systems for Nuclear Power Plants (NPP). Appropriate regulatory documents used for I and C systems design, development, verification and validation (V and V) are discussed considering the latest international standards and guidelines. Typical development and V and V processes of FPGA electronic design for FPGA-based NPP I and C systems are presented. Some safety-related features of implementation process are discussed. Corresponding development artifacts, related to design and implementation activities are outlined. An approach to test-based verification of FPGA electronic design algorithms, used in FPGA-based reactor trip systems is proposed. The results of application of test-based techniques for assessment of FPGA electronic design algorithms for reactor trip system (RTS) produced by Research and Production Corporation (RPC) 'Radiy' are presented. Some principles of invariant-oriented verification for FPGA-based safety-critical systems are outlined. (author)

Design verification testing for fuel element type CAREM

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Martin Ghiselli, A.; Bonifacio Pulido, K.; Villabrille, G.; Rozembaum, I.

2013-01-01

The hydraulic and hydrodynamic characterization tests are part of the design verification process of a nuclear fuel element prototype and its components. These tests are performed in a low pressure and temperature facility. The tests requires the definition of the simulation parameters for setting the test conditions, the results evaluation to feedback mathematical models, extrapolated the results to reactor conditions and finally to decide the acceptability of the tested prototype. (author)

Verification of industrial x-ray machine: MINTs experience

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Aziz Amat; Saidi Rajab; Eesan Pasupathi; Saipo Bahari Abdul Ratan; Shaharudin Sayuti; Abd Nassir Ibrahim; Abd Razak Hamzah

2005-01-01

Radiation and electrical safety of the industrial x-ray equipment required to meet Atomic Energy Licensing Board(AELB) guidelines ( LEM/TEK/42 ) at the time of installation and subsequently a periodic verification should be ensured. The purpose of the guide is to explain the requirements employed in conducting the test on industrial x-ray apparatus and be certified in meeting with our local legislative and regulation. Verification is aimed to provide safety assurance information on electrical requirements and the minimum radiation exposure to the operator. This regulation is introduced on new models imported into the Malaysian market. Since June, 1997, Malaysian Institute for Nuclear Technology Research (MINT) has been approved by AELB to provide verification services to private company, government and corporate body throughout Malaysia. Early January 1997, AELB has made it mandatory that all x-ray equipment for industrial purpose (especially Industrial Radiography) must fulfill certain performance test based on the LEM/TEK/42 guidelines. MINT as the third party verification encourages user to improve maintenance of the equipment. MINT experiences in measuring the performance on intermittent and continuous duty rating single-phase industrial x-ray machine in the year 2004 indicated that all of irradiating apparatus tested pass the test and met the requirements of the guideline. From MINT record, 1997 to 2005 , three x-ray models did not meet the requirement and thus not allowed to be used unless the manufacturers willing to modify it to meet AELB requirement. This verification procedures on electrical and radiation safety on industrial x-ray has significantly improved the the maintenance cultures and safety awareness in the usage of x-ray apparatus in the industrial environment. (Author)

Iran and the IAEA: Verification and monitoring under the JCPOA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2016-01-01

On 16 January 2016, IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano announced that Iran had completed the necessary preparatory steps to start implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This ushers in a new phase in the relations between the IAEA and Iran, and represents the start of an increased effort of the IAEA’s verification and monitoring activities in Iran. The JCPOA was agreed last July between Iran and China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union, the so called E3/EU+3. The IAEA, which is not party to the JCPOA, is undertaking a wide range of verification and monitoring of nuclear-related commitments set out in the document.

Quality surveillance at nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Deviney, D.E.

1990-01-01

Quality surveillance (QS) of nuclear power plants has been occurring for a number of years and is growing in importance as a management tool for assuring that power plants are operated and maintained safely. Quality surveillance can be identified by many terms, such as monitoring, assessment, technical audits, and others. The name given to the function is not important. Quality surveillance at nuclear power plants developed out of a need. Historically, audits were performed to verify compliance to quality program requirements. Verification of day-to-day implementation of activities was not being performed. This left a void in verification activities since inspections were mainly directed at hardware verification. Quality surveillance, therefore, was born out of a need to fill this void in verification. This paper discusses quality surveillance definition; objectives of QS, activities considered for QS, personnel performing QS. As in any human endeavor, people and the attitudes of those people make a program succeed or fail. In the case of QS this is even more critical because of the overview and exposure given to the nuclear industry. Properly trained and experienced personnel performing QS combined with the right attitude contribute to the successful performance of a QS. This is only one side of the success equation, however; acceptance of and actions taken by plant management establish the total success of a QS program

Training to Support Standardization and Improvement of Safety I and C Related Verification and Validation Activities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Ammon, G.; Schoenfelder, C.

2014-07-01

In recent years AREVA has conducted several measures to enhance the effectiveness of safety I and C related verification and validation activities within nuclear power plant (NPP) new build as well as modernization projects, thereby further strengthening its commitment to achieving the highest level of safety in nuclear facilities. (Author)

NPT and the peaceful use of nuclear energy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pellaud, B.

1993-01-01

In his opening remarks the author spoke on the role of IAEA safeguards in the process of international verification and confidence building that peaceful nuclear programmes are not used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

The research for the design verification of nuclear power plant based on VR dynamic plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wang Yong; Yu Xiao

2015-01-01

This paper studies a new method of design verification through the VR plant, in order to perform verification and validation the design of plant conform to the requirements of accident emergency. The VR dynamic plant is established by 3D design model and digital maps that composed of GIS system and indoor maps, and driven by the analyze data of design analyzer. The VR plant could present the operation conditions and accident conditions of power plant. This paper simulates the execution of accident procedures, the development of accidents, the evacuation planning of people and so on, based on VR dynamic plant, and ensure that the plant design will not cause bad effect. Besides design verification, simulated result also can be used for optimization of the accident emergency plan, the training of accident plan and emergency accident treatment. (author)

Scenarios for exercising technical approaches to verified nuclear reductions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Doyle, James

2010-01-01

Presidents Obama and Medvedev in April 2009 committed to a continuing process of step-by-step nuclear arms reductions beyond the new START treaty that was signed April 8, 2010 and to the eventual goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. In addition, the US Nuclear Posture review released April 6, 2010 commits the US to initiate a comprehensive national research and development program to support continued progress toward a world free of nuclear weapons, including expanded work on verification technologies and the development of transparency measures. It is impossible to predict the specific directions that US-RU nuclear arms reductions will take over the 5-10 years. Additional bilateral treaties could be reached requiring effective verification as indicated by statements made by the Obama administration. There could also be transparency agreements or other initiatives (unilateral, bilateral or multilateral) that require monitoring with a standard of verification lower than formal arms control, but still needing to establish confidence to domestic, bilateral and multilateral audiences that declared actions are implemented. The US Nuclear Posture Review and other statements give some indication of the kinds of actions and declarations that may need to be confirmed in a bilateral or multilateral setting. Several new elements of the nuclear arsenals could be directly limited. For example, it is likely that both strategic and nonstrategic nuclear warheads (deployed and in storage), warhead components, and aggregate stocks of such items could be accountable under a future treaty or transparency agreement. In addition, new initiatives or agreements may require the verified dismantlement of a certain number of nuclear warheads over a specified time period. Eventually procedures for confirming the elimination of nuclear warheads, components and fissile materials from military stocks will need to be established. This paper is intended to provide useful background information

Low-Intrusion Techniques and Sensitive Information Management for Warhead Counting and Verification: FY2011 Annual Report

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Jarman, Kenneth D.; Robinson, Sean M.; McDonald, Benjamin S.; Gilbert, Andrew J.; Misner, Alex C.; Pitts, W. Karl; White, Timothy A.; Seifert, Allen; Miller, Erin A.

2011-09-01

Future arms control treaties may push nuclear weapons limits to unprecedented low levels and may entail precise counting of warheads as well as distinguishing between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Such advances will require assessment of form and function to confidently verify the presence or absence of nuclear warheads and/or their components. Imaging with penetrating radiation can provide such an assessment and could thus play a unique role in inspection scenarios. Yet many imaging capabilities have been viewed as too intrusive from the perspective of revealing weapon design details, and the potential for the release of sensitive information poses challenges in verification settings. A widely held perception is that verification through radiography requires images of sufficient quality that an expert (e.g., a trained inspector or an image-matching algorithm) can verify the presence or absence of components of a device. The concept of information barriers (IBs) has been established to prevent access to relevant weapon-design information by inspectors (or algorithms), and has, to date, limited the usefulness of radiographic inspection. The challenge of this project is to demonstrate that radiographic information can be used behind an IB to improve the capabilities of treaty-verification weapons-inspection systems.

Tritium as an indicator of venues for nuclear tests.

Science.gov (United States)

Lyakhova, O N; Lukashenko, S N; Mulgin, S I; Zhdanov, S V

2013-10-01

Currently, due to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons there is a highly topical issue of an accurate verification of nuclear explosion venues. This paper proposes to consider new method for verification by using tritium as an indicator. Detailed studies of the tritium content in the air were carried in the locations of underground nuclear tests - "Balapan" and "Degelen" testing sites located in Semipalatinsk Test Site. The paper presents data on the levels and distribution of tritium in the air where tunnels and boreholes are located - explosion epicentres, wellheads and tunnel portals, as well as in estuarine areas of the venues for the underground nuclear explosions (UNE). Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Verification of nuclear data for DT neutron induced charged-particle emission reaction of light nuclei

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kondo, K.; Murata, I.; Ochiai, K.; Kubota, N.; Miyamaru, H.; Takagi, S.; Shido, S.; Konno, C.; Nishitani, T.

2007-01-01

Double-differential cross-section (DDX) for emitted charged particles is necessary to estimate material damage, gas production and nuclear heating in a fusion reactor. Detailed measurements of the cross-sections for beryllium, carbon and fluorine, which are among the composition materials of expected fusion blankets and first walls, were carried out with a charged-particle spectrometer using a pencil-beam DT neutron source. As verification of the cross-sections evaluated in three nuclear libraries (JENDL-3.3, ENDF/B-VI and JEFF-3.1), our measured data were compared with the data evaluated in the libraries. From the comparison, the following problems were pointed out: Beryllium: Remarkable differences in energy and angular distribution for α-particles were observed between the measured data and the libraries. The estimated total cross-section for α-particle production well agreed with the libraries. Carbon: There was a discrepancy of about 20% between JENDL-3.3 and ENDF/B-VI (JEFF-3.1) for α-particle production cross-section, and no DDX for α-particles is given in the libraries. Our obtained total cross-section for α-particle production was rather consistent with ENDF/B-VI (JEFF-3.1), and the value evaluated in JENDL-3.3 seemed too large. Fluorine: The remarkable differences for DDX of protons and α-particles were observed between the obtained result and JENDL-3.3, although detailed DDX was stored only in JENDL. The obtained total cross-sections mostly supported the evaluation of ENDF/B-VI (JEFF-3.1)

Status and prospects of nuclear arms control study

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sun Xiangli; Wang Deli

1995-01-01

Some main issues and problems involved in nuclear arms control study, such as nuclear policy, NPT regime, verification technologies for a CTBT and disposal of military nuclear materials are introduced, in which both the current state and prospects of these issues are analyzed

Nuclear material control at IEA-R1 nuclear research reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1988-01-01

The control measurements system and verification of physical inventory for fuel elements used in the operation of IEA-R1 nuclear research reactor are described. The computer code used for burn-up calculation are shown. (E.G.) [pt

Approach to IAEA material-balance verification at the Portsmouth Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gordon, D.M.; Sanborn, J.B.; Younkin, J.M.; DeVito, V.J.

1983-01-01

This paper describes a potential approach by which the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) might verify the nuclear-material balance at the Portsmouth Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant (GCEP). The strategy makes use of the attributes and variables measurement verification approach, whereby the IAEA would perform independent measurements on a randomly selected subset of the items comprising the U-235 flows and inventories at the plant. In addition, the MUF-D statistic is used as the test statistic for the detection of diversion. The paper includes descriptions of the potential verification activities, as well as calculations of: (1) attributes and variables sample sizes for the various strata, (2) standard deviations of the relevant test statistics, and (3) the detection sensitivity which the IAEA might achieve by this verification strategy at GCEP

Nuclear energy in the service of development and peace: the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency. New Delhi, 19 February 1999

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

1999-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the conference given by the Director General of the IAEA at a meeting held at the India Habitat Centre, New Delhi, 19 February 1999. The following aspects from the Agency's activity are presented to emphasize its role in the use of nuclear energy for development and peace: nuclear power for electricity production, nuclear safety, transfer of nuclear technologies through the technical co-operation programme, safeguards and verification including the strengthened safeguards system, present verification activities and future prospects of verification, illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and other radioactive sources

The KNICS approach for verification and validation of safety software

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cha, Kyung Ho; Sohn, Han Seong; Lee, Jang Soo; Kim, Jang Yeol; Cheon, Se Woo; Lee, Young Joon; Hwang, In Koo; Kwon, Kee Choon

2003-01-01

This paper presents verification and validation (VV) to be approached for safety software of POSAFE-Q Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) prototype and Plant Protection System (PPS) prototype, which consists of Reactor Protection System (RPS) and Engineered Safety Features-Component Control System (ESF-CCS) in development of Korea Nuclear Instrumentation and Control System (KNICS). The SVV criteria and requirements are selected from IEEE Std. 7-4.3.2, IEEE Std. 1012, IEEE Std. 1028 and BTP-14, and they have been considered for acceptance framework to be provided within SVV procedures. SVV techniques, including Review and Inspection (R and I), Formal Verification and Theorem Proving, and Automated Testing, are applied for safety software and automated SVV tools supports SVV tasks. Software Inspection Support and Requirement Traceability (SIS-RT) supports R and I and traceability analysis, a New Symbolic Model Verifier (NuSMV), Statemate MAGNUM (STM) ModelCertifier, and Prototype Verification System (PVS) are used for formal verification, and McCabe and Cantata++ are utilized for static and dynamic software testing. In addition, dedication of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) software and firmware, Software Safety Analysis (SSA) and evaluation of Software Configuration Management (SCM) are being performed for the PPS prototype in the software requirements phase

A verification scenario of nuclear plus interference scattering effects using neutron incident angle distribution to the wall in beam-injected deuterium plasmas

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sugiyama, Shota; Matsuura, Hideaki; Uchiyama, Daisuke; Sawada, Daisuke; Watanabe, Tsuguhiro; Goto, Takuya; Mitarai, Osamu

2015-01-01

A verification scenario of knock-on tail formation in the deuteron distribution function due to nuclear plus interference scattering is presented by observing the incident angle distribution of neutrons in a vacuum vessel. Assuming a knock-on tail created in a "3He-beam-injected deuterium plasma, the incident angle distribution and energy spectra of the neutrons produced by fusion reactions between 1-MeV and thermal deuterons are evaluated. The relation between the neutron incident angle to the vacuum vessel and neutron energy is examined in the case of anisotropic neutron emission due to knock-on tail formation in neutral-beam-injected plasmas. (author)

In Situ Object Counting System (ISOCS) Technique: Cost-Effective Tool for NDA Verification in IAEA Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Braverman, E.; Lebrun, A.; Nizhnik, V.; Rorif, F.

2010-01-01

Uranium materials measurements using the ISOCS technique play an increasing role in IAEA verification activities. This methodology provides high uranium/plutonium sensitivity and a low detection limit together with the capability to measure items with different shapes and sizes. In addition, the numerical absolute efficiency calibration of a germanium detector which is used by the technique does not require any calibration standards or reference materials. ISOCS modelling software allows performing absolute efficiency calibration for items of arbitrary container shape and wall material, matrix chemical composition, material fill-height, uranium or plutonium weight fraction inside the matrix and even nuclear material/matrix non-homogeneous distribution. Furthermore, in a number of cases, some key parameters such as matrix density and U/Pu weight fraction can be determined along with analysis of nuclear material mass and isotopic composition. These capabilities provide a verification solution suitable for a majority of cases where quantitative and isotopic analysis should be performed. Today, the basic tool for uranium and plutonium mass measurement used in Safeguards verification activities is the neutron counting technique which employs neutron coincidence and multiplicity counters. In respect to the neutron counting technique, ISOCS calibrated detectors have relatively low cost. Taking into account its advantages, this methodology becomes a cost-effective solution for nuclear material NDA verification. At present, the Agency uses ISOCS for quantitative analysis in a wide range of applications: - Uranium scrap materials; - Uranium contaminated solid wastes; - Uranium fuel elements; - Some specific verification cases like measurement of Pu-Be neutron sources, quantification of fission products in solid wastes etc. For uranium hold-up measurements, ISOCS the only available methodology for quantitative and isotopic composition analysis of nuclear materials deposited

A discussion on the proposal of construction of a verification facility at CIAE for the AD-RCNPS R and D

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ding Dazhao

2000-01-01

ADS is a prospective innovative nuclear power system based on the development of high power proton accelerator and well developed technology of power reactor. Its advantage and benefit in respect of waste transmutation and fuel breeding were recognized by international nuclear community. ADS provides more flexibility from viewpoint of operation and control. To made ADS to be a reliable one, a series of important problem in the components of ADS--accelerator, reactor, material and neutron physics are enumerated. The R and D of a new nuclear power system is a long term activity, including conceptual study, verification of the principle, experimental facility, prototype and commercial demonstration. To construction a verification facility is an essential step in promoting the R and D of ADS from conceptual study to technical comprehension. A verification facility that consisted of a swimming pool reactor at CIAE driven by a pulsed low energy high current accelerator is proposed. According to those experiments that should be carried out at this facility, the specifications of accelerator and the modification of the reactor core structure are given

A study on the decommissioning methods of nuclear facilities of North Korea

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chung, U. S.; Park, J. H.; Park, S. K.; Hong, S. B.; Lee, G. W.

2012-02-01

For Korea, it is essential to participate in the decommissioning of North Korean nuclear facilities for Pu-based weapon program and to lead the project for the protection of the environments from the possible spread of nuclear contamination. Before, the studies for the verification of the North Korea nuclear facilities and for the technical preparation of the decommissioning of north Korea were conducted but the depth of the studies was not reached to the evaluation of the decommissioning project by the documentation of a decommissioning plan to the provision of the technical information to the policy decision makers. It is very helpful for understanding the characteristics of the decommissioning projects to formulate a possible dismantling scenario and to make a decommissioning plan. The cost and the periods estimated on the base of this scenario is more exact and the analysis for the selection of different policies will be possible

Embedded software verification and debugging

CERN Document Server

Winterholer, Markus

2017-01-01

This book provides comprehensive coverage of verification and debugging techniques for embedded software, which is frequently used in safety critical applications (e.g., automotive), where failures are unacceptable. Since the verification of complex systems needs to encompass the verification of both hardware and embedded software modules, this book focuses on verification and debugging approaches for embedded software with hardware dependencies. Coverage includes the entire flow of design, verification and debugging of embedded software and all key approaches to debugging, dynamic, static, and hybrid verification. This book discusses the current, industrial embedded software verification flow, as well as emerging trends with focus on formal and hybrid verification and debugging approaches. Includes in a single source the entire flow of design, verification and debugging of embedded software; Addresses the main techniques that are currently being used in the industry for assuring the quality of embedded softw...

Remote sensing and geoinformation technologies in support of nuclear non-proliferation and arms control verification regimes

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Niemeyer, Irmgard [Forschungszentrum Juelich GmbH, Institut fuer Energie- und Klimaforschung, IEK-6: Nukleare Entsorgung und Reaktorsicherheit (Germany)

2013-07-01

A number of international agreements and export control regimes have been concluded in order to reduce the risk and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In order to provide confidence that Member States are complying with the agreed commitments, most of the treaties and agreements include verification provisions. Different types of verification measures exist, e.g. cooperative measures; national technical means; technical monitoring or measurement devices placed at or near sites; on-site inspections; intelligence information; open-source information, such as commercial internet data and satellite imagery. The study reviews the technical progress in the field of satellite imaging sensors and explores the recent advances in satellite imagery processing and geoinformation technologies as to the extraction of significant observables and signatures. Moreover, it discusses how satellite data and geoinformation technologies could be used complementary for confirming information gathered from other systems or sources. The study also aims at presenting the legal and political aspects and the cost benefits of using imagery from both national and commercial satellites in the verification procedure. The study concludes that satellite imagery and geoinformation technologies are expected to enhance the verification efficiency and effectiveness.

The status of nuclear inspections in Iraq. New York, 27 January 2003. Statement to the United Nations Security Council

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2003-01-01

For the past 60 days, the inspectors of the IAEA have been engaged in the process of verifying the existence or absence of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq. Today, pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution 1441, I have submitted to the President of the Security Council an update report on progress since our nuclear verification activities in Iraq were resumed - in terms of the approach we adopted, the tools being used, the specific results achieved, the degree of co-operation received, and finally the view on how the inspectors should proceed. This statement outlines the key aspects of this report. To date no evidence was found that Iraq has revived its nuclear weapons programme since the elimination of the programme in the 1990s. However, the work is steadily progressing and should be allowed to run its natural course. With the IAEA verification system now in place, barring exceptional circumstances, and provided there is sustained proactive cooperation by Iraq, the IAEA should be able within the next few months to provide credible assurance that Iraq has no nuclear weapons programme. These few months would be a valuable investment in peace because they could help to avoid a war. We trust that we will continue to have your support as we make every effort to verify Iraq's nuclear disarmament through peaceful means, and to demonstrate that the inspection process can and does work, as a central feature of the international nuclear arms control regime

Crisis as opportunity. Implications of the nuclear conflict with Iran for the nuclear non-proliferation regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Meier, Oliver

2014-01-01

The conflict over the Iranian nuclear programme represents the greatest challenge for international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. For decades Iran has been violating obligations contained in its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to become nuclear weapons capable. But what impact does the conflict over Tehran's nuclear programme have on the nuclear non-proliferation regime? In three areas there is significant overlap between efforts to find a solution with Iran and broader discussions about strengthening non-proliferation norms, rules and procedures: verification of civilian nuclear programmes, limiting the ability to produce weapons-grade fissile materials, and nuclear fuel supply guarantees. The nuclear dispute with Tehran is likely to have specific effects in each of these fields on the non-proliferation regime's norms, rules and procedures. The ninth NPT review conference, which will take place from 27 April to 22 May 2015, offers an opportunity to draw lessons from the nuclear conflict and discuss ideas for further strengthening the regime. Germany is the only non-nuclear-weapon state within the E3+3 group and the strongest proponent of nuclear disarmament. As a supporter of effective multilateralism, Berlin also bears a special responsibility for ensuring that steps to strengthen nuclear verification and control efforts in the talks with Iran also reflect the non-nuclear-weapon states' interest in disarmament and transparency on the part of the nuclear-weapons states.

Crisis as opportunity. Implications of the nuclear conflict with Iran for the nuclear non-proliferation regime

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Meier, Oliver

2014-11-15

The conflict over the Iranian nuclear programme represents the greatest challenge for international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. For decades Iran has been violating obligations contained in its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to become nuclear weapons capable. But what impact does the conflict over Tehran's nuclear programme have on the nuclear non-proliferation regime? In three areas there is significant overlap between efforts to find a solution with Iran and broader discussions about strengthening non-proliferation norms, rules and procedures: verification of civilian nuclear programmes, limiting the ability to produce weapons-grade fissile materials, and nuclear fuel supply guarantees. The nuclear dispute with Tehran is likely to have specific effects in each of these fields on the non-proliferation regime's norms, rules and procedures. The ninth NPT review conference, which will take place from 27 April to 22 May 2015, offers an opportunity to draw lessons from the nuclear conflict and discuss ideas for further strengthening the regime. Germany is the only non-nuclear-weapon state within the E3+3 group and the strongest proponent of nuclear disarmament. As a supporter of effective multilateralism, Berlin also bears a special responsibility for ensuring that steps to strengthen nuclear verification and control efforts in the talks with Iran also reflect the non-nuclear-weapon states' interest in disarmament and transparency on the part of the nuclear-weapons states.

Verification and validation guidelines for high integrity systems. Volume 1

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Hecht, H.; Hecht, M.; Dinsmore, G.; Hecht, S.; Tang, D. [SoHaR, Inc., Beverly Hills, CA (United States)

1995-03-01

High integrity systems include all protective (safety and mitigation) systems for nuclear power plants, and also systems for which comparable reliability requirements exist in other fields, such as in the process industries, in air traffic control, and in patient monitoring and other medical systems. Verification aims at determining that each stage in the software development completely and correctly implements requirements that were established in a preceding phase, while validation determines that the overall performance of a computer system completely and correctly meets system requirements. Volume I of the report reviews existing classifications for high integrity systems and for the types of errors that may be encountered, and makes recommendations for verification and validation procedures, based on assumptions about the environment in which these procedures will be conducted. The final chapter of Volume I deals with a framework for standards in this field. Volume II contains appendices dealing with specific methodologies for system classification, for dependability evaluation, and for two software tools that can automate otherwise very labor intensive verification and validation activities.

Verification and validation guidelines for high integrity systems. Volume 1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hecht, H.; Hecht, M.; Dinsmore, G.; Hecht, S.; Tang, D.

1995-03-01

High integrity systems include all protective (safety and mitigation) systems for nuclear power plants, and also systems for which comparable reliability requirements exist in other fields, such as in the process industries, in air traffic control, and in patient monitoring and other medical systems. Verification aims at determining that each stage in the software development completely and correctly implements requirements that were established in a preceding phase, while validation determines that the overall performance of a computer system completely and correctly meets system requirements. Volume I of the report reviews existing classifications for high integrity systems and for the types of errors that may be encountered, and makes recommendations for verification and validation procedures, based on assumptions about the environment in which these procedures will be conducted. The final chapter of Volume I deals with a framework for standards in this field. Volume II contains appendices dealing with specific methodologies for system classification, for dependability evaluation, and for two software tools that can automate otherwise very labor intensive verification and validation activities

Helping Children Deal with the Nuclear Threat.

Science.gov (United States)

Schirmer, Peggy

1982-01-01

Suggests how elementary school teachers can address the topic of nuclear warfare with young children. Emphasizes that educating children for peace requires that parents and teachers (1) recognize and deal with the anxieties provoked by nuclear war and that (2) they provide role models by participating in the antinuclear movement. (GC)

Improved verification methods for safeguards verifications at enrichment plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lebrun, A.; Kane, S. C.; Bourva, L.; Poirier, S.; Loghin, N. E.; Langlands, D.

2009-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has initiated a coordinated research and development programme to improve its verification methods and equipment applicable to enrichment plants. The programme entails several individual projects to meet the objectives of the IAEA Safeguards Model Approach for Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants updated in 2006. Upgrades of verification methods to confirm the absence of HEU (highly enriched uranium) production have been initiated and, in particular, the Cascade Header Enrichment Monitor (CHEM) has been redesigned to reduce its weight and incorporate an electrically cooled germanium detector. Such detectors are also introduced to improve the attended verification of UF 6 cylinders for the verification of the material balance. Data sharing of authenticated operator weighing systems such as accountancy scales and process load cells is also investigated as a cost efficient and an effective safeguards measure combined with unannounced inspections, surveillance and non-destructive assay (NDA) measurement. (authors)

Improved verification methods for safeguards verifications at enrichment plants

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lebrun, A.; Kane, S. C.; Bourva, L.; Poirier, S.; Loghin, N. E.; Langlands, D. [Department of Safeguards, International Atomic Energy Agency, Wagramer Strasse 5, A1400 Vienna (Austria)

2009-07-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has initiated a coordinated research and development programme to improve its verification methods and equipment applicable to enrichment plants. The programme entails several individual projects to meet the objectives of the IAEA Safeguards Model Approach for Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants updated in 2006. Upgrades of verification methods to confirm the absence of HEU (highly enriched uranium) production have been initiated and, in particular, the Cascade Header Enrichment Monitor (CHEM) has been redesigned to reduce its weight and incorporate an electrically cooled germanium detector. Such detectors are also introduced to improve the attended verification of UF{sub 6} cylinders for the verification of the material balance. Data sharing of authenticated operator weighing systems such as accountancy scales and process load cells is also investigated as a cost efficient and an effective safeguards measure combined with unannounced inspections, surveillance and non-destructive assay (NDA) measurement. (authors)

Nuclear disarmament and evolution of the nuclear non-proliferation regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bragin, V.; Carlson, J.; Bardsley, J.; Hill, J.

1999-01-01

The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference reaffirmed 'the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control' and endorsed 'universal application of safeguards once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved'. Hence strengthening the international non-proliferation regime and incremental broadening of its coverage towards the universal application of international safeguards in all States is a high priority albeit for the medium to long term. A tentative attempt is made in this paper to anticipate how the elements of verification under the NPT, FMCT and other conventions and arrangements related to nuclear non-proliferation will evolve against the background of the disarmament process, with the goal of achieving at some future stage an ultimate convergence of verification regimes under a complete nuclear disarmament. We think, however, that most of the new initiatives in the area of disarmament/non-proliferation should be realised during the current disarmament phase. We do not wish our model to be perceived as a rigid time-bound scheme. New initiatives should be implemented in parallel and as soon as practicable. This paper reflects the personal views of the authors and should not be taken to represent Australian Government policy. (author)

Experimental verification of internal dosimetry calculations. Annual progress report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1980-05-01

During the past year a dosimetry research program has been established in the School of Nuclear Engineering at the Georgia Institute of Technology. The major objective of this program has been to provide research results upon which a useful internal dosimetry system could be based. The important application of this dosimetry system will be the experimental verification of internal dosimetry calculations such as those published by the MIRD Committee

Evaluation of verification methods for input-accountability measurements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Maeck, W.J.

1980-01-01

As part of TASTEX related programs two independent methods have been evaluated for the purpose of providing verification of the amount of Pu charged to the head-end of a nuclear fuel processing plant. The first is the Pu/U (gravimetric method), TASTEX Task-L, and the second is the Tracer Method, designated Task-M. Summaries of the basic technology, results of various studies under actual plant conditions, future requirements, are given for each of the Tasks

A Formal Verification Method of Function Block Diagram

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Koh, Kwang Yong; Seong, Poong Hyun; Jee, Eun Kyoung; Jeon, Seung Jae; Park, Gee Yong; Kwon, Kee Choon

2007-01-01

Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), an industrial computer specialized for real-time applications, is widely used in diverse control systems in chemical processing plants, nuclear power plants or traffic control systems. As a PLC is often used to implement safety, critical embedded software, rigorous safety demonstration of PLC code is necessary. Function block diagram (FBD) is a standard application programming language for the PLC and currently being used in the development of a fully-digitalized reactor protection system (RPS), which is called the IDiPS, under the KNICS project. Therefore, verification issue of FBD programs is a pressing problem, and hence is of great importance. In this paper, we propose a formal verification method of FBD programs; we defined FBD programs formally in compliance with IEC 61131-3, and then translate the programs into Verilog model, and finally the model is verified using a model checker SMV. To demonstrate the feasibility and effective of this approach, we applied it to IDiPS which currently being developed under KNICS project. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes Verilog and Cadence SMV. In Section 3, we introduce FBD2V which is a tool implemented to support the proposed FBD verification framework. A summary and conclusion are provided in Section 4

A practical approach to perform graded verification and validation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Terrado, Carlos; Woolley, J.

2000-01-01

Modernization of instrumentation and control (I and C) systems in nuclear power plants often implies to go from analog to digital systems. One condition for the upgrade to be successful is that the new systems achieve at least the same quality level as the analog they replace. The most important part of digital systems quality assurance (QA) is verification and validation (V and V). V and V is concerned with the process as much as the product, it is a systematic program of review and testing activities performed throughout the system development life cycle. Briefly, we can say that verification is to build the product correctly, and validation is to build the correct product. Since V and V is necessary but costly, it is helpful to tailor the effort that should be performed to achieve the quality goal for each particular case. To do this, an accepted practice is to establish different V and V levels, each one with a proper degree of stringency or rigor. This paper shows a practical approach to estimate the appropriate level of V and V, and the resulting V and V techniques recommended for each specific system. The firs step purposed is to determine 'What to do', that is the selection of the V and V class. The main factors considered here are: required integrity, functional complexity, defense in depth and development environment. A guideline to classify the particular system using these factors and show how they lead to the selection of the V and V class is presented. The second step is to determine 'How to do it', that is to choose an appropriate set of V and V methods according to the attributes of the system and the V and V class already selected. A list of possible V and V methods that are recommended for each V and V level during different stages of the development life cycle is included. As a result of the application of this procedure, solutions are found for generalists interested in 'What to do', as well as for specialists, interested in 'How to do'. Finally

Verification of Space Weather Forecasts using Terrestrial Weather Approaches

Science.gov (United States)

Henley, E.; Murray, S.; Pope, E.; Stephenson, D.; Sharpe, M.; Bingham, S.; Jackson, D.

2015-12-01

The Met Office Space Weather Operations Centre (MOSWOC) provides a range of 24/7 operational space weather forecasts, alerts, and warnings, which provide valuable information on space weather that can degrade electricity grids, radio communications, and satellite electronics. Forecasts issued include arrival times of coronal mass ejections (CMEs), and probabilistic forecasts for flares, geomagnetic storm indices, and energetic particle fluxes and fluences. These forecasts are produced twice daily using a combination of output from models such as Enlil, near-real-time observations, and forecaster experience. Verification of forecasts is crucial for users, researchers, and forecasters to understand the strengths and limitations of forecasters, and to assess forecaster added value. To this end, the Met Office (in collaboration with Exeter University) has been adapting verification techniques from terrestrial weather, and has been working closely with the International Space Environment Service (ISES) to standardise verification procedures. We will present the results of part of this work, analysing forecast and observed CME arrival times, assessing skill using 2x2 contingency tables. These MOSWOC forecasts can be objectively compared to those produced by the NASA Community Coordinated Modelling Center - a useful benchmark. This approach cannot be taken for the other forecasts, as they are probabilistic and categorical (e.g., geomagnetic storm forecasts give probabilities of exceeding levels from minor to extreme). We will present appropriate verification techniques being developed to address these forecasts, such as rank probability skill score, and comparing forecasts against climatology and persistence benchmarks. As part of this, we will outline the use of discrete time Markov chains to assess and improve the performance of our geomagnetic storm forecasts. We will also discuss work to adapt a terrestrial verification visualisation system to space weather, to help

Physics Verification Overview

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Doebling, Scott William [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2017-09-12

The purpose of the verification project is to establish, through rigorous convergence analysis, that each ASC computational physics code correctly implements a set of physics models and algorithms (code verification); Evaluate and analyze the uncertainties of code outputs associated with the choice of temporal and spatial discretization (solution or calculation verification); and Develop and maintain the capability to expand and update these analyses on demand. This presentation describes project milestones.

Global Warming; Can Nuclear Energy Help?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Knapp, V.

1998-01-01

Kyoto conference is setting the targets and limits for CO 2 emission. In the same time energy consumption is increasing, especially in developing world. If developing countries attain even a moderate fraction of energy consumption of developed countries, this will lead into large increase of total CO 2 emission, unless there is a strong increase of energy production by CO 2 non-emitting sources. Of two major candidates, solar and nuclear energy, the second is technically and economically much closer to ability to accomplish the task. The requirements for a large scale use of nuclear energy and the role of IAEA are discussed. (author)

Verification of cold nuclear fusion reaction, (1)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yoshida, Zenko; Aratono, Yasuyuki; Hirabayashi, Takakuni

1991-01-01

Can cold nuclear fusion reaction occur as is expected? If it occurs, what extent is its reaction probability? At present after 2 years elapsed since its beginning, the clear solution of these questions is not yet obtained. In many reaction systems employing different means, the experiments to confirm the cold nuclear fusion reaction have been attempted. In order to confirm that the nuclear fusion reaction of deuterium mutually has occurred, the neutrons, He-3, protons, tritium or generated heat, which were formed by the reaction and released from the system, are measured. Since it is considered that the frequency of the occurrence at normal temperature of the reaction is very low, it is necessary to select the most suitable method upon evaluating the limit of detection peculiar to the measuring methods. The methods of measuring neutrons, protons, gamma ray and generated heat, and the reaction systems by electrolytic process and dry process are explained. The detection of plural kinds of the reaction products and the confirmation of synchronism of signals are important. (K.I.)

Verification of electromagnetic effects from wireless devices in operating nuclear power plants

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Ye, Song Hae; Kim, Young Sik; Lyou, Ho Sun; Kim, Min Suk [Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Co. (KHNP), Central Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Lyou, Joon [Dept. of Electronics Engineering, Chungnam National University, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2015-10-15

Wireless communication technologies, especially smart phones, have become increasingly common. Wireless technology is widely used in general industry and this trend is also expected to grow with the development of wireless technology. However, wireless technology is not currently applied in any domestic operating nuclear power plants (NPPs) because of the highest priority of the safety policy. Wireless technology is required in operating NPPs, however, in order to improve the emergency responses and work efficiency of the operators and maintenance personnel during its operation. The wired telephone network in domestic NPPs can be simply connected to a wireless local area network to use wireless devices. This design change can improve the ability of the operators and personnel to respond to an emergency situation by using important equipment for a safe shutdown. IEEE 802.11 smart phones (Wi-Fi standard), Internet Protocol (IP) phones, personal digital assistant (PDA) for field work, notebooks used with web cameras, and remote site monitoring tablet PCs for on-site testing may be considered as wireless devices that can be used in domestic operating NPPs. Despite its advantages, wireless technology has only been used during the overhaul period in Korean NPPs due to the electromagnetic influence of sensitive equipment and cyber security problems. This paper presents the electromagnetic verification results from major sensitive equipment after using wireless devices in domestic operating NPPs. It also provides a solution for electromagnetic interference/radio frequency interference (EMI/RFI) from portable and fixed wireless devices with a Wi-Fi communication environment within domestic NPPs.

Verification of electromagnetic effects from wireless devices in operating nuclear power plants

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Song-Hae Ye

2015-10-01

Full Text Available Wireless communication technologies, especially smartphones, have become increasingly common. Wireless technology is widely used in general industry and this trend is also expected to grow with the development of wireless technology. However, wireless technology is not currently applied in any domestic operating nuclear power plants (NPPs because of the highest priority of the safety policy. Wireless technology is required in operating NPPs, however, in order to improve the emergency responses and work efficiency of the operators and maintenance personnel during its operation. The wired telephone network in domestic NPPs can be simply connected to a wireless local area network to use wireless devices. This design change can improve the ability of the operators and personnel to respond to an emergency situation by using important equipment for a safe shutdown. IEEE 802.11 smartphones (Wi-Fi standard, Internet Protocol (IP phones, personal digital assistant (PDA for field work, notebooks used with web cameras, and remote site monitoring tablet PCs for on-site testing may be considered as wireless devices that can be used in domestic operating NPPs. Despite its advantages, wireless technology has only been used during the overhaul period in Korean NPPs due to the electromagnetic influence of sensitive equipment and cyber security problems. This paper presents the electromagnetic verification results from major sensitive equipment after using wireless devices in domestic operating NPPs. It also provides a solution for electromagnetic interference/radio frequency interference (EMI/RFI from portable and fixed wireless devices with a Wi-Fi communication environment within domestic NPPs.

Verification of electromagnetic effects from wireless devices in operating nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ye, Song Hae; Kim, Young Sik; Lyou, Ho Sun; Kim, Min Suk; Lyou, Joon

2015-01-01

Wireless communication technologies, especially smart phones, have become increasingly common. Wireless technology is widely used in general industry and this trend is also expected to grow with the development of wireless technology. However, wireless technology is not currently applied in any domestic operating nuclear power plants (NPPs) because of the highest priority of the safety policy. Wireless technology is required in operating NPPs, however, in order to improve the emergency responses and work efficiency of the operators and maintenance personnel during its operation. The wired telephone network in domestic NPPs can be simply connected to a wireless local area network to use wireless devices. This design change can improve the ability of the operators and personnel to respond to an emergency situation by using important equipment for a safe shutdown. IEEE 802.11 smart phones (Wi-Fi standard), Internet Protocol (IP) phones, personal digital assistant (PDA) for field work, notebooks used with web cameras, and remote site monitoring tablet PCs for on-site testing may be considered as wireless devices that can be used in domestic operating NPPs. Despite its advantages, wireless technology has only been used during the overhaul period in Korean NPPs due to the electromagnetic influence of sensitive equipment and cyber security problems. This paper presents the electromagnetic verification results from major sensitive equipment after using wireless devices in domestic operating NPPs. It also provides a solution for electromagnetic interference/radio frequency interference (EMI/RFI) from portable and fixed wireless devices with a Wi-Fi communication environment within domestic NPPs

The legal points at issue concerning the Non-proliferation Treaty and the verification agreement of EURATOM with the IAEA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zieger, G.

1975-01-01

An excellent and comprehensive but very juridicial contribution on: Development and content of the Non-proliferation Treaty, the problems which this Treaty poses for EURATOM (a common market, common supply, joint enterprises, Non-proliferation Treaty and France), the compatibility of the Non-proliferation Treaty with the EURATOM Treaty, verification agreement EURATOM - IAEA (the IAEA as the supervisory authority, the control system of the IAEA, guidelines elaborated by the IAEA to be used as the basis for negotiating safeguard agreements, national systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material IAEA supervision as a secondary control, principles of IAEA supervision, secrecy, conflict management), conclusion of the verification agreement, deviations from the guidelines elaborated by the IAEA to be used as the basis for negotiating safeguard agreements legal reflexions (verification agreement and Non-proliferation Treaty, reservations concerning the Non-proliferation Treaty, questions of competence between EURATOM and member states without nuclear weapons, problems of equal treatment). (HP/LN) [de

Dual-use benefits of the CTBT verification system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Meade, C.E.F.

1999-01-01

Since it has been completed in September 1996, the CTBT has been signed by 151 countries. Awaiting the 44 ratifications and entry into force, all of the nuclear powers have imposed unilateral moratoriums on nuclear test explosions. The end of these weapons development activities is often cited as the principal benefit of the CTBT. As the world begins to implement the Treaty, it has become clear that the development and operation of the CTBT verification system will provide a wide range of additional benefits if the data analysis products are available for dual-purpose applications. As this paper describes these could have economic and social implications, especially for countries with limited technical infrastructures. These involve, seismic monitoring, mineral exploration, scientific and technical training

Software analysis by simulation for nuclear plant availability and safety goals

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lapassat, A.M.; Segalard, J.; Salichon, M.; Le Meur, M.; Boulc'h, J.

1988-01-01

The microprocessors utilisation for monitoring protection and safety of nuclear reactor has become reality in the eighties. The authorities responsible for reactor safety systems have considered the necessity of the correct functioning of reactor control systems. The problems take off, when analysis of software, has led us in a first time to develop a completely software tool of verification and validation of programs and specifications. The CEA (French Atomic Energie Commission) responsible of reliable distributed techniques of nuclear plant discusses in this paper the software test and simulation tools used to analyse real-time software. The tool O.S.T. make part of a big program of help for the conception and the evaluation for the systems' fault tolerance which the European ESPRIT SMART no. 1609 (System Measurement and Architecture Technique) will be the kernel [fr

Verification methods for treaties limiting and banning nuclear tests

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Voloshin, N.P.

1998-01-01

Treaty on limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests and treaty on world banning of nuclear tests contribute to and accompany the process of nuclear disarmament. Test ban in three (Moscow treaty of 1963) as well as the Threshold Test Ban up to 1991 was controlled only with national means. But since 1991 nuclear test threshold of 150 kt has been measured with hydrodynamic and tele seismic methods and checked by the inspection. Distinctive feature of this control is that control is that it is bilateral. This conforms to Treaty on limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests signed by two countries - USA and USSR. The inspection at the place of tests requires monitoring of the test site of the party conducting a test and geological information of rock in the area of explosion. In the treaty of the World Nuclear Test Ban the following ways of international control are provided for: - seismologic measurements; - radionuclide measurements; - hydro-acoustics measurements; - infra-sound measurements; - inspection at the place of the tests conduction

On-power verification of the dynamic response of self-powered in-core detectors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Serdula, K.; Beaudet, M.

1996-01-01

Self-powered in-core detectors are used for on-line safety and regulation purposes in CANDU reactors. Such applications require use of detectors whose response is primarily prompt to changes in flux. In-service verification of the detectors' response is required to ensure significant degradation in performance has not occurred during long-term operation. Changes in the detector characteristics occur due to nuclear interactions and failures. Present verification requires significant station resources and disrupts power production. Use of the 'noise' in the detector signal is being investigated as an alternative to assess the dynamic response of the detectors during long-term operation. Measurements of reference 'signatures' were obtained from replacement shutdown system detectors. Results show 'noise' measurements are a promising alternative to the current verification method. Identification of changes in the detector response function assist in accurate diagnosis and prognosis of changes in detector signals due to process changes. (author)

INIS: Nuclear information helping the world

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Atieh, T.

2005-01-01

The International Nuclear Information System of the IAEA, called INIS is the leading information source on peaceful application of nuclear sciences and technology. It is based on international cooperation and decentralized responsibilities. The INIS secretariat cooperates with 114 national and 19 international centres. INIS comprises more than 2.6 mill bibliographic references and more than 600 non-conventional full text papers. INIS assists the user to locate information in his/her field of interest over the time and informs about colleagues as well as the locations of research. INIS offers a single point of access to current and historical information, reliable and value-added information, ensures worldwide visibility for the researcher and addresses the need of developing and developed countries

Inspector measurement verification activities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

George, R.S.; Crouch, R.

e most difficult and complex activity facing a safeguards inspector involves the verification of measurements and the performance of the measurement system. Remeasurement is the key to measurement verification activities. Remeasurerements using the facility's measurement system provide the bulk of the data needed for determining the performance of the measurement system. Remeasurements by reference laboratories are also important for evaluation of the measurement system and determination of systematic errors. The use of these measurement verification activities in conjunction with accepted inventory verification practices provides a better basis for accepting or rejecting an inventory. (U.S.)

Advanced Collimators for Verification of the Pu Isotopic Composition in Fresh Fuel by High Resolution Gamma Spectrometry

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lebrun, Alain; Berlizov, Andriy

2013-06-01

IAEA verification of the nuclear material contained in fresh nuclear fuel assemblies is usually based on neutron coincidence counting (NCC). In the case of uranium fuel, active NCC provides the total content of uranium-235 per unit of length which, combined with active length verification, fully supports the verification. In the case of plutonium fuel, passive NCC provides the plutonium-240 equivalent content which needs to be associated with a measurement of the isotopic composition and active length measurement to complete the verification. Plutonium isotopic composition is verified by high resolution gamma spectrometry (HRGS) applied on fresh fuel assemblies assuming all fuel rods are fabricated from the same plutonium batch. For particular verifications when such an assumption cannot be reasonably made, there is a need to optimize the HRGS measurement so that contributions of internal rods to the recorded spectrum are maximized, thus providing equally strong verification of the internal fuel rods. This paper reports on simulation work carried out to design special collimators aimed at reducing the relative contribution of external fuel rods while enhancing the signal recorded from internal rods. Both cases of square lattices (e.g. 17x17 pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuel) and hexagonal compact lattices (e.g. BN800 fast neutron reactor (FNR) fuel) have been addressed. In the case of PWR lattices, the relatively large optical path to internal pins compensates for low plutonium concentrations and the large size of the fuel assemblies. A special collimator based on multiple, asymmetrical, vertical slots allows recording a spectrum from internal rods only when needed. In the FNR case, the triangular lattice is much more compact and the optical path to internal rods is very narrow. However, higher plutonium concentration and use of high energy ranges allow the verification of internal rods to be significantly strengthened. Encouraging results from the simulation

Do the TTBT and JVE provide a framework for 'effective' verification?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vergino, E.S.

1998-01-01

The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) was signed in 1974 by Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev with both the US and USSR agreeing to adhere to the 150 kt limit of the treaty as of March 31, 1976. Yet the treaty remained non ratified for more than twelve years and during this time during the height of the Cold War, the US and USSR continued to accuse one another of violating the treaty. During late 1987, during the Nuclear Testing Talks in Geneva the Joint Verification Experiment (JVE) was discussed and then was formally announced at the Shultz/Shevardnadze meeting in December, 1987. In the course of arranging JVE Information and data for five Soviet and five US nuclear tests, were exchanged. JVE activity culminated with Kearsarge, detonated on August 17, 1988 and Shagan, detonated on September 14, 1988. JVE provided a unique opportunity for US and USSR technical experts to work together to demonstrate that effective verification of the TTBT could be achieved. The TTBT was the first treaty in which the US pursued a series of complex protocols involving additional, intrusive verification measures. These required extensive collaboration between scientific and political communities, a collaboration necessary to address the balance between the technical capabilities and requirements and the political drivers and needs. During this talk the author discusses this balance, how the balance changed with time, the drivers for change and the lessons learned, and weather there are lessons to be learned that are applicable to the development of other, future, arms control agreements

Testing the algorithms for automatic identification of errors on the measured quantities of the nuclear power plant. Verification tests

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Svatek, J.

1999-12-01

During the development and implementation of supporting software for the control room and emergency control centre at the Dukovany nuclear power plant it appeared necessary to validate the input quantities in order to assure operating reliability of the software tools. Therefore, the development of software for validation of the measured quantities of the plant data sources was initiated, and the software had to be debugged and verified. The report contains the proposal for and description of the verification tests for testing the algorithms of automatic identification of errors on the observed quantities of the NPP by means of homemade validation software. In particular, the algorithms treated serve the validation of the hot leg temperature at primary circuit loop no. 2 or 4 at the Dukovany-2 reactor unit using data from the URAN and VK3 information systems, recorded during 3 different days. (author)

e-Gamma: Nuclear Material Accountancy and Control System in Brazil

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Negri Ferreira, S.; Souza Dunley, L.

2015-01-01

The Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) is the government organization responsible for regulating all nuclear activities in Brazil and for ensuring that international safeguards are implemented according to the international agreements. In 2006 CNEN initiated a project aiming at the development and implementation of a web based system (e-Gamma) for on line nuclear material accountancy and control. In January-2014, after three years of beta testing, e-Gamma finally became the official nuclear material accountancy system in Brazil. e-Gamma is a web system hosted in a dedicated server under a secure environment maintained at CNEN headquarters. Secure access is provided by the use of Digital Client Certificate and internal user pre-authorization for login as well as multiple access profiles each one with specific function menus. The System operation is based on source documents for each inventory change prepared and updated by the MBA operators with the help of specific forms with strong validations. After the document conclusion the System records the inventory change in a general ledger. Monthly the officers of CNEN analyzes the general ledgers of each MBA and generates the applicable reports through the System [Inventory Change Reports (ICR), Physical Inventory List (PIL), and Material Balance Report (MBR)]. The System allows the running of managerial queries and has brought to CNEN much more control and traceability of the inventory changes and significant reduction in typing errors, costs and inspection efforts. Therefore, more efficient accountancy verification procedures at national and international levels are expected, as well as remote accountancy verification previous to an inspection. The proposed paper will describe the e-Gamma System, its main features and the oral presentation will contain a brief demonstration of some functionalities through the use of a local version installed on a notebook. (author)

Arms control verification costs: the need for a comparative analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

MacLean, G.; Fergusson, J.

1998-01-01

The end of the Cold War era has presented practitioners and analysts of international non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament (NACD) the opportunity to focus more intently on the range and scope of NACD treaties and their verification. Aside from obvious favorable and well-publicized developments in the field of nuclear non-proliferation, progress also has been made in a wide variety of arenas, ranging from chemical and biological weapons, fissile material, conventional forces, ballistic missiles, to anti-personnel landmines. Indeed, breaking from the constraints imposed by the Cold War United States-Soviet adversarial zero-sum relationship that impeded the progress of arms control, particularly on a multilateral level, the post Cold War period has witnessed significant developments in NACD commitments, initiatives, and implementation. The goals of this project - in its final iteration - will be fourfold. First, it will lead to the creation of a costing analysis model adjustable for uses in several current and future arms control verification tasks. Second, the project will identify data accumulated in the cost categories outlined in Table 1 in each of the five cases. By comparing costs to overall effectiveness, the application of the model will demonstrate desirability in each of the cases (see Chart 1). Third, the project will identify and scrutinize 'political costs' as well as real expenditures and investment in the verification regimes (see Chart 2). And, finally, the project will offer some analysis on the relationship between national and multilateral forms of arms control verification, as well as the applicability of multilateralism as an effective tool in the verification of international non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament agreements. (author)

Hungarian national nuclear material control and accounting system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lendvai, O.

1985-01-01

The Hungarian system for nuclear materials control and accounting is briefly described. Sections include a historical overview, a description of nuclear activities and an outline of the organizational structure of the materials management system. Subsequent sections discuss accounting, verification and international relations

Development of the clearance level verification evaluation system. 2. Construction of the clearance data management system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kubota, Shintaro; Usui, Hideo; Kawagoshi, Hiroshi

2014-06-01

Clearance is defined as the removal of radioactive materials or radioactive objects within authorized practices from any further regulatory control by the regulatory body. In Japan, clearance level and a procedure for its verification has been introduced under the Laws and Regulations, and solid clearance wastes inspected by the national authority can be handled and recycled as normal wastes. The most prevalent type of wastes have generated from the dismantling of nuclear facilities, so the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) has been developing the Clearance Level Verification Evaluation System (CLEVES) as a convenient tool. The Clearance Data Management System (CDMS), which is a part of CLEVES, has been developed to support measurement, evaluation, making and recording documents with clearance level verification. In addition, validation of the evaluation result of the CDMS was carried out by inputting the data of actual clearance activities in the JAEA. Clearance level verification is easily applied by using the CDMS for the clearance activities. (author)

HDL to verification logic translator

Science.gov (United States)

Gambles, J. W.; Windley, P. J.

1992-01-01

The increasingly higher number of transistors possible in VLSI circuits compounds the difficulty in insuring correct designs. As the number of possible test cases required to exhaustively simulate a circuit design explodes, a better method is required to confirm the absence of design faults. Formal verification methods provide a way to prove, using logic, that a circuit structure correctly implements its specification. Before verification is accepted by VLSI design engineers, the stand alone verification tools that are in use in the research community must be integrated with the CAD tools used by the designers. One problem facing the acceptance of formal verification into circuit design methodology is that the structural circuit descriptions used by the designers are not appropriate for verification work and those required for verification lack some of the features needed for design. We offer a solution to this dilemma: an automatic translation from the designers' HDL models into definitions for the higher-ordered logic (HOL) verification system. The translated definitions become the low level basis of circuit verification which in turn increases the designer's confidence in the correctness of higher level behavioral models.

Why the Japanese Nuclear Power Plants are not trusted? Verification of current nuclear energy policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yoshioka, Hitoshi

2007-01-01

Since the liberalization of electric power following the trend of structural reform and government's economic and financial rebuild had impacted the management of electric utilities in 1990, current nuclear power comes to be subject to government's leadership and support to promote nuclear energy. The Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy Japan of atomic energy commission in 2005 aims to (1) maintain the 30 to 40% or more share of nuclear energy in electricity generation up to 2030 and afterwards, (2) promote the nuclear fuel cycle and (3) commercialize the fast-breeder reactors. Nuclear Energy National Plan of ministry of economy, trade and industry in 2006 makes reference to construction of FBR demonstration reactor by 2025, development of Japanese next-generation LWR and also construction of second reprocessing plant. Major stakeholders related with nuclear power generation such as politicians, government (the authorities concerned), electric utilities and local governments play respective important role in nuclear policy as 'a tetrahedral structure'. The Niigataken Chuets-oki earthquake reminded risk problems of nuclear power management and shook the nuclear tetrahedron structure, which might collapse with loss of public trust. (T. Tanaka)

Study of applicable methods on safety verification of disposal facilities and waste packages

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2013-08-15

Three subjects about safety verification on the disposal of low level radioactive waste were investigated in FY. 2012. For radioactive waste disposal facilities, specs and construction techniques of covering with soil to prevent possible destruction caused by natural events (e.g. earthquake) were studied to consider verification methods for those specs. For waste packages subject to near surface pit disposal, settings of scaling factor and average radioactivity concentration (hereafter referred to as ''SF'') on container-filled and solidified waste packages generated from Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 1-5, setting of cesium residual ratio of molten solidified waste generated from Tokai and Tokai No.2 Power Stations, etc. were studied. Those results were finalized in consideration of the opinion from advisory panel, and publicly opened as JNES-EV reports. In FY 2012, five JNES reports were published and these have been used as standards of safety verification on waste packages. The verification method of radioactive wastes subject to near-surface trench disposal and intermediate depth disposal were also studied. For radioactive wastes which will be returned from overseas, determination methods of radioactive concentration, heat rate and hydrogen generation rate of CSD-C were established. Determination methods of radioactive concentration and heat rate of CSD-B were also established. These results will be referred to verification manuals. (author)

Electric and mechanical basic parameters to elaborate a process for a technical verification of safety related design modifications

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lamuno Fernandez, Mercedes; La Roca Mallofre, GISEL; Bano Azcon, Alberto

2010-01-01

This paper presents a systematic process to check a design in order to achieve all the requirements that regulations demand. Nuclear engineers must verify that a design is done according to the safety requirements, and this paper presents how we have elaborated a process to improve the technical project verification. For a faster, better and easier verification process, here we summarize how to select the electric and mechanical basic parameters, which ensure the correct project verification of safety related design modifications. This process considers different aspects, which guarantee that the design preserves the availability, reliability and functional capability of the Structures, Systems and Components needed to operate the Nuclear Power Station with security. Electric and mechanical reference parameters are identified and discussed as well as others related ones, which are critical to safety. The implementation procedure to develop tasks performed in any company that has a quality plan is a requirement. On the engineering business, it is important not to use the personal criteria to do a technical analysis of a project; although, many times it is the checker's criteria and knowledge responsibility to ensure the correct development of a design modification. Then, the checker capabilities are the basis of the modification verification. This kind of procedure's development is not easy, because in an engineering project with important technical contents, there are multiple scenarios, but lots of them have a common basis. If we can identify the technical common basis of these projects, we will make good project verification but there are many difficulties we can encounter along this process. (authors)

Adult education as information and help in forming opinions shown from the example of nuclear power

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wild, W.; Markus, B.; Dietrich, T.; Schmitt Glaeser, W.

1977-01-01

The lectures printed here, partly in revised form, were given at a University meeting for teachers in adult education on July 9th and 10th 1976 in Bayreuth, with the main theme of 'Adult education as information and help in forming opinions shown from the subject of nuclear power'. It should be shown by examples related to this problem, which urgently requires more objectivity, and which will be freed of emotional opinions with extraordinary difficulty, how complex such objects can be and how many different aspects have to be taken into account. The grouping of scientific referees, a teacher, a nuclear physicist, a radiation biologist and a lawyer, makes the plurality of the aspects quite clear. Themes: 1) The contribution of adult education to de-idealogising the population, 2) The scientific and technical basis of generation and use of nuclear power, 3)Radiation stresses of living organismus, particularly human being. 4) Smug authorities, protesting citizens, overload judges. (GL) [de

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy: Meeting societal needs. 15 November 2004, Mumbai, India. 15th Annual Conference of the Indian Nuclear Society (INSAC-2004)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2004-01-01

A number of issues facing the international nuclear community and the IAEA discussed are concerned with Nuclear Power, including Global Growth and Current Status of Nuclear Power, Nuclear Safety Performance and Reliability, Factors That Will Shape Future Growth, Carbon Emissions and the Growth in Demand, security of energy supply, Public Perceptions and Misconceptions, Innovation in Reactor and Fuel Cycle Technology, Nuclear Security, Non-power nuclear applications, Nuclear Verification - The final aspect of the IAEA activity

You Can't See the Real Me: Attachment Avoidance, Self-Verification, and Self-Concept Clarity.

Science.gov (United States)

Emery, Lydia F; Gardner, Wendi L; Carswell, Kathleen L; Finkel, Eli J

2018-03-01

Attachment shapes people's experiences in their close relationships and their self-views. Although attachment avoidance and anxiety both undermine relationships, past research has primarily emphasized detrimental effects of anxiety on the self-concept. However, as partners can help people maintain stable self-views, avoidant individuals' negative views of others might place them at risk for self-concept confusion. We hypothesized that avoidance would predict lower self-concept clarity and that less self-verification from partners would mediate this association. Attachment avoidance was associated with lower self-concept clarity (Studies 1-5), an effect that was mediated by low self-verification (Studies 2-3). The association between avoidance and self-verification was mediated by less self-disclosure and less trust in partner feedback (Study 4). Longitudinally, avoidance predicted changes in self-verification, which in turn predicted changes in self-concept clarity (Study 5). Thus, avoidant individuals' reluctance to trust or become too close to others may result in hidden costs to the self-concept.

Verification of the burn-up of spent fuel assemblies by means of the Consulha containment/surveillance system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Daniel, G.; Gourlez, P.

1991-01-01

CONSULHA is a containment/surveillance system which has been developed as part of the French Support Programme for the IAEA Safeguards in cooperation with EURATOM and was designed to meet the IAEA EURATOM requirements for the verification of nuclear materials. This system will make it possible to count movements and verify irradiation of spent fuel assemblies in industrial facilities such as reprocessing plants and nuclear reactors

Nuclear fission and nuclear safeguards: Common technologies and challenges

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Keepin, G.R.

1989-01-01

Nuclear fission and nuclear safeguards have much in common, including the basic physical phenomena and technologies involved as well as the commitments and challenges posed by expanding nuclear programs in many countries around the world. The unique characteristics of the fission process -- such as prompt and delayed neutron and gamma ray emission -- not only provide the means of sustaining and controlling the fission chain reaction, but also provide unique ''signatures'' that are essential to quantitative measurement and effective safeguarding of key nuclear materials (notably 239 Pu and 235 U) against theft, loss, or diversion. In this paper, we trace briefly the historical emergence of safeguards as an essential component of the expansion of the nuclear enterprise worldwide. We then survey the major categories of passive and active nondestructive assay techniques that are currently in use or under development for rapid, accurate measurement and verification of safe-guarded nuclear materials in the many forms in which they occur throughout the nuclear fuel cycle. 23 refs., 14 figs

Nuclear safeguards - a new profession

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Thorne, L.

1984-01-01

Early moves to restrict the proliferation of nuclear weapons are described together with the application of vigorous scientific techniques to the political framework of international treaties. Technical criteria for safeguards and verification methods are discussed. (U.K.)

Example of material accounting and verification of reprocessing input

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Koch, L.; Schoof, S.

1981-01-01

An example is described in this paper of material accounting at the reprocessing input point. Knowledge of the fuel history and chemical analyses of the spent fuel permitted concepts to be tested which have been developed for the determination of the input by the operator and for its verification by nuclear material safeguards with the intention of detecting a protracted as well as an abrupt diversion. Accuracies obtained for a material balance of a PWR fuel reprocessing campaign are given. 6 refs

Formal verification method for nuclear I and C systems using ESDT and SMV in the software design phase

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Song, Myung Jun; Koo, Seo Ryong; Seong, Poong Hyun

2004-01-01

As PLCs are widely used in the digital I and C systems of nuclear power plants (NPPs), the safety of PLC software has become the most important consideration. Software safety is an important property for safety critical systems, especially those in aerospace, satellite and nuclear power plants, whose failure could result in danger to human life, property or environment. It is recently becoming more important due to the increase in the complexity and size of safety critical systems. This research proposes a method to perform effective verification tasks on the traceability analysis and software design evaluation in the software design phase. In order to perform the traceability analysis between a Software Requirements Specification (SRS) written in a natural language and a Software Design Specification (SDS) written in Function Block Diagram (FBD), this method uses extended-structured decision tables (ESDTs). ESDTs include information related to the traceability analysis from a text-based SRS and a FBD-based SDS, respectively. Through comparing with both ESDTs from an SRS and ESDTs from an SDS, the effective traceability analysis of both a text-based SRS and a FBD-based SDS can be achieved. For the software design evaluation, a model checking, which is mainly used to verify PLC programs formally, is used in this research. A FBD-style design specification is translated into input languages of the SMV by translation rules and then the FBD-style design specification can be formally analyzed using SMV. (author)

Verification of Spent Fuel Transfers in Germany — Linking Strategy, Implementation and People

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tsvetkov, I.; Araujo, J.; Morris, G.; Vukadin, Z.; Wishard, B.; Kahnmeyer, W.; ); Trautwein, W.

2015-01-01

Following the decision of the German Government to completely phase out nuclear energy by 2022, the Agency is facing an increasing number of spent fuel (SF) transfers from nuclear power plants (NPP) to dry SF storage facilities. Verification of these transfers in the period 2015-2016 would have required about 1000 additional calendar-days in the field by inspectors. To meet the verification requirements with the available resources, the Agency together with the European Commission (EC) designed an innovative approach. The approach is making full use of safeguards cooperation with the EC and Germany's NPP operators to reduce the inspector's efforts, while fully adhering to the Agency's safeguards policy and requirements. The approach includes verification for partial defect test using digital Cerenkov viewing device (DCVD) of all SF assemblies in a reactor pond(s) before and after a SF loading campaign; during the SF loading campaign all SF in pond(s) is maintained under continuous surveillance, while the containment measures on SF casks, i.e., fibre-optic and electronic seals, and corresponding fibre-optic cables, are applied by the NPP operator in accordance with the agreed procedure. While the above approach allows for substantial reduction of the Agency inspector presence during the SF cask loading campaign, it can only be implemented when good cooperation exists between the Agency, the facility operator, and, as in the case of Germany, the regional safeguards authority. (author)

Likelihood-ratio-based biometric verification

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Bazen, A.M.; Veldhuis, Raymond N.J.

2002-01-01

This paper presents results on optimal similarity measures for biometric verification based on fixed-length feature vectors. First, we show that the verification of a single user is equivalent to the detection problem, which implies that for single-user verification the likelihood ratio is optimal.

Likelihood Ratio-Based Biometric Verification

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Bazen, A.M.; Veldhuis, Raymond N.J.

The paper presents results on optimal similarity measures for biometric verification based on fixed-length feature vectors. First, we show that the verification of a single user is equivalent to the detection problem, which implies that, for single-user verification, the likelihood ratio is optimal.

Proceedings of the 22nd Annual DoD/DOE Seismic Research Symposium: Planning for Verification of and Compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Nichols, James W., LTC [Editor

2000-09-15

These proceedings contain papers prepared for the 22nd Annual DoD/DOE Seismic Research Symposium: Planning for Verification of and Compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), held 13-15 September 2000 in New Orleans, Louisiana. These papers represent the combined research related to ground-based nuclear explosion monitoring funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC), Department of Defense (DoD), US Army Space and Missile Defense Command, Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA), and other invited sponsors. The scientific objectives of the research are to improve the United States capability to detect, locate, and identify nuclear explosions. The purpose of the meeting is to provide the sponsoring agencies, as well as potential users, an opportunity to review research accomplished during the preceding year and to discuss areas of investigation for the coming year. For the researchers, it provides a forum for the exchange of scientific information toward achieving program goals, and an opportunity to discuss results and future plans. Paper topics include: seismic regionalization and calibration; detection and location of sources; wave propagation from source to receiver; the nature of seismic sources, including mining practices; hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide methods; on-site inspection; and data processing.

Functional verification of a safety class controller for NPPs using a UVM register Model

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kim, Kyu Chull [Dept. of Applied Computer Engineering, Dankook University, Cheonan (Korea, Republic of)

2014-06-15

A highly reliable safety class controller for NPPs (Nuclear Power Plants) is mandatory as even a minor malfunction can lead to disastrous consequences for people, the environment or the facility. In order to enhance the reliability of a safety class digital controller for NPPs, we employed a diversity approach, in which a PLC-type controller and a PLD-type controller are to be operated in parallel. We built and used structured testbenches based on the classes supported by UVM for functional verification of the PLD-type controller designed for NPPs. We incorporated a UVM register model into the testbenches in order to increase the controllability and the observability of the DUT(Device Under Test). With the increased testability, we could easily verify the datapaths between I/O ports and the register sets of the DUT, otherwise we had to perform black box tests for the datapaths, which is very cumbersome and time consuming. We were also able to perform constrained random verification very easily and systematically. From the study, we confirmed the various advantages of using the UVM register model in verification such as scalability, reusability and interoperability, and set some design guidelines for verification of the NPP controllers.

Role of physical protection and safeguards technology used to Nuclear Material Security

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Djoko-Irianto, Ign.

2005-01-01

The presence of nuclear materials at any nuclear facility must be in secure and must be known as safeguards purpose such as its position, from or type and amount. The clarification of the amount be reported to the national regulatory body and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the International regulatory body. The national regulatory body and IAEA will then verify that report. The verification must be done to know there is no difference of the amount, and to give the assurance to the International community that any diversion of safeguarded nuclear material from civil use to a prescribed military purpose would be detected. To carry out verification, several verification techniques such as non-destructive analysis, surveillance, unattended and remote monitoring and environmental sampling are explained to convey the impression how those techniques are implemented. According to the security requirement, the physical protection system including all components of physical protection system have to be effectively designed

Status of core nuclear design technology for future fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Joo, Hyung Kook; Jung, Hyung Guk; Noh, Jae Man; Kim, Yeong Il; Kim, Taek Kyum; Gil, Choong Sup; Kim, Jung Do; Kim, Young Jin; Sohn, Dong Seong

1997-01-01

The effective utilization of nuclear resource is more important factor to be considered in the design of next generation PWR in addition to the epochal consideration on economics and safety. Assuming that MOX fuel can be considered as one of the future fuel corresponding to the above request, the establishment of basic technology for the MOX core design has been performed : : the specification of the technical problem through the preliminary core design and nuclear characteristic analysis of MOX, the development and verification of the neutron library for lattice code, and the acquisition of data to be used for verification of lattice and core analysis codes. The following further studies will be done in future: detailed verification of library E63LIB/A, development of the spectral history effect treatment module, extension of decay chain, development of new homogenization for the MOX fuel assembly. (author). 6 refs., 7 tabs., 2 figs

Modality Switching in a Property Verification Task: An ERP Study of What Happens When Candles Flicker after High Heels Click.

Science.gov (United States)

Collins, Jennifer; Pecher, Diane; Zeelenberg, René; Coulson, Seana

2011-01-01

The perceptual modalities associated with property words, such as flicker or click, have previously been demonstrated to affect subsequent property verification judgments (Pecher et al., 2003). Known as the conceptual modality switch effect, this finding supports the claim that brain systems for perception and action help subserve the representation of concepts. The present study addressed the cognitive and neural substrate of this effect by recording event-related potentials (ERPs) as participants performed a property verification task with visual or auditory properties in key trials. We found that for visual property verifications, modality switching was associated with an increased amplitude N400. For auditory verifications, switching led to a larger late positive complex. Observed ERP effects of modality switching suggest property words access perceptual brain systems. Moreover, the timing and pattern of the effects suggest perceptual systems impact the decision-making stage in the verification of auditory properties, and the semantic stage in the verification of visual properties.

Verification of operating software for cooperative monitoring applications

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tolk, K.M.; Rembold, R.K.

1997-01-01

Monitoring agencies often use computer based equipment to control instruments and to collect data at sites that are being monitored under international safeguards or other cooperative monitoring agreements. In order for this data to be used as an independent verification of data supplied by the host at the facility, the software used must be trusted by the monitoring agency. The monitoring party must be sure that the software has not be altered to give results that could lead to erroneous conclusions about nuclear materials inventories or other operating conditions at the site. The host might also want to verify that the software being used is the software that has been previously inspected in order to be assured that only data that is allowed under the agreement is being collected. A description of a method to provide this verification using keyed has functions and how the proposed method overcomes possible vulnerabilities in methods currently in use such as loading the software from trusted disks is presented. The use of public key data authentication for this purpose is also discussed

VERIFICATION OF GEAR DYNAMIC MODEL IN DIFFERENT OPERATING CONDITIONS

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Grzegorz PERUŃ

2014-09-01

Full Text Available The article presents the results of verification of the drive system dynamic model with gear. Tests were carried out on the real object in different operating conditions. For the same assumed conditions were also carried out simulation studies. Comparison of the results obtained from those two series of tests helped determine the suitability of the model and verify the possibility of replacing experimental research by simulations with use of dynamic model.

Research on the improvement of nuclear safety -Thermal hydraulic tests for reactor safety system-

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Jung, Moon Kee; Park, Choon Kyung; Yang, Sun Kyoo; Chun, Se Yung; Song, Chul Hwa; Jun, Hyung Kil; Jung, Heung Joon; Won, Soon Yun; Cho, Yung Roh; Min, Kyung Hoh; Jung, Jang Hwan; Jang, Suk Kyoo; Kim, Bok Deuk; Kim, Wooi Kyung; Huh, Jin; Kim, Sook Kwan; Moon, Sang Kee; Lee, Sang Il [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

1995-06-01

The present research aims at the development of the thermal hydraulic verification test technology for the safety system of the conventional and advanced nuclear power plant and the development of the advanced thermal hydraulic measuring techniques. In this research, test facilities simulating the primary coolant system and safety system are being constructed for the design verification tests of the existing and advanced nuclear power plant. 97 figs, 14 tabs, 65 refs. (Author).

Cognitive Bias in the Verification and Validation of Space Flight Systems

Science.gov (United States)

Larson, Steve

2012-01-01

Cognitive bias is generally recognized as playing a significant role in virtually all domains of human decision making. Insight into this role is informally built into many of the system engineering practices employed in the aerospace industry. The review process, for example, typically has features that help to counteract the effect of bias. This paper presents a discussion of how commonly recognized biases may affect the verification and validation process. Verifying and validating a system is arguably more challenging than development, both technically and cognitively. Whereas there may be a relatively limited number of options available for the design of a particular aspect of a system, there is a virtually unlimited number of potential verification scenarios that may be explored. The probability of any particular scenario occurring in operations is typically very difficult to estimate, which increases reliance on judgment that may be affected by bias. Implementing a verification activity often presents technical challenges that, if they can be overcome at all, often result in a departure from actual flight conditions (e.g., 1-g testing, simulation, time compression, artificial fault injection) that may raise additional questions about the meaningfulness of the results, and create opportunities for the introduction of additional biases. In addition to mitigating the biases it can introduce directly, the verification and validation process must also overcome the cumulative effect of biases introduced during all previous stages of development. A variety of cognitive biases will be described, with research results for illustration. A handful of case studies will be presented that show how cognitive bias may have affected the verification and validation process on recent JPL flight projects, identify areas of strength and weakness, and identify potential changes or additions to commonly used techniques that could provide a more robust verification and validation of

Verification and validation of control system software

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Munro, J.K. Jr.; Kisner, R.A.; Bhadtt, S.C.

1991-01-01

The following guidelines are proposed for verification and validation (V ampersand V) of nuclear power plant control system software: (a) use risk management to decide what and how much V ampersand V is needed; (b) classify each software application using a scheme that reflects what type and how much V ampersand V is needed; (c) maintain a set of reference documents with current information about each application; (d) use Program Inspection as the initial basic verification method; and (e) establish a deficiencies log for each software application. The following additional practices are strongly recommended: (a) use a computer-based configuration management system to track all aspects of development and maintenance; (b) establish reference baselines of the software, associated reference documents, and development tools at regular intervals during development; (c) use object-oriented design and programming to promote greater software reliability and reuse; (d) provide a copy of the software development environment as part of the package of deliverables; and (e) initiate an effort to use formal methods for preparation of Technical Specifications. The paper provides background information and reasons for the guidelines and recommendations. 3 figs., 3 tabs

Safety technical considerations on the 2012 periodic safety verification of the Beznau nuclear power plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2016-12-01

According to nuclear legislation, the owner of an operational license for a nuclear power plant has to provide a periodic safety verification (PSU) every 10 years. The 'North Eastern Power Plants' company (NOK), today AXPO Power AG already performed such a PSU for the Beznau-2 nuclear reactor block (KKB2) in 2002. The Beznau-1 nuclear reactor block (KKB1) received its definitive operational license in October 1970, after test operation during 7 months. After the license for test operation received on July 16 th , 1971, the operational license of KKB2 was renewed several times, each time for a certain period of validity. In 1991, NOK requested a definitive operational license for KKB2, but in 1994 the Swiss Federal Council lengthened the license for only 10 years. Moreover, it laid down that NOK has to periodically report on the safety of the facility. With its letter of August 23 rd , 1998, the Federal Office of Energy defined the documents to be produced for the PSU. The extent of the PSU was defined in such a way that many documents concern the whole power plant, i.e. both nuclear reactor blocks. On December 3 rd , 2004, the Swiss Federal Council granted KKB2 an operational license of limited validity. The present report reviews the 2012 PSU, which covers the time interval from January 1 st , 2002, to December 31 st , 2011, from the point of view of safety. It contains documents for the evaluation of both reactor blocks at KKB. The Beznau interim storage pool was also taken into consideration; it is situated on the KKB site, but, according to a decision of the Swiss Federal Council of May 23 rd , 1991, it has an independent operational license. The evaluation of ageing surveillance takes the whole operational period of the facility into account, i.e. the ageing mechanisms acting as from the beginning of the operation. Moreover, important developments that occurred after the surveillance time interval have been taken into account, especially the status

Scalable Techniques for Formal Verification

CERN Document Server

Ray, Sandip

2010-01-01

This book presents state-of-the-art approaches to formal verification techniques to seamlessly integrate different formal verification methods within a single logical foundation. It should benefit researchers and practitioners looking to get a broad overview of the spectrum of formal verification techniques, as well as approaches to combining such techniques within a single framework. Coverage includes a range of case studies showing how such combination is fruitful in developing a scalable verification methodology for industrial designs. This book outlines both theoretical and practical issue

Transmutation in ADS and needs for nuclear data, with an introduction to the n-TOF at CERN

CERN Document Server

González, E; Fernández, R; García, J; Villamarín, D

1999-01-01

Transmutation can help in the nuclear waste problem by reducing seriously the life and amount of the most dangerous isotopes (radiotoxicity, heat, packing volume and neutron multiplication reductions). ADS are one of the best technologies for nuclear waste transmutation at large scale. Although enough information is available to prepare conceptual designs and make assessments on their performance, a large R&D campaign is required to obtain the precision data required to optimize the detailed engineering design and refine our expectations calculations on waste reduction by the different transmutation strategies being proposed. In particular a large R&D effort is required in nuclear physics, where fundamental differential measurements and integral verification experiments are required. In this sense, the PS213 n-TOF at CERN PS (at Switzerland) will become one of the largest installations to perform the fundamental differential measurements and a wide international collaboration has been setup to perform...

Multidimensional Analysis of Nuclear Detonations

Science.gov (United States)

2015-09-17

Training Command in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Robert C. Slaughter, B.S., M.S. Captain, USAF 16...15-S-029 Abstract Digitized versions of atmospheric nuclear testing films represent a unique data set that enables the scientific community to create...temperature distribution of a nuclear fireball using digitized film . This temperature analysis underwent verification using the Digital Imaging and Remote

IAEA verification of weapon-origin fissile material in the Russian Federation and the United States

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

Full text: Russian Federation Minister of Atomic Energy Alexander Rumyantsev, United States Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham and Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Mohamed ElBaradei met in Vienna on 16 September 2002 to review the status of the Trilateral Initiative and agree on its future direction. The parties concluded that the task entrusted to the Trilateral Initiative Working Group in 1996 has been fulfilled. The work completed has demonstrated practical approaches for IAEA verification of weapon-origin fissile material designated as released from defence programmes in classified forms or at certain sensitive facilities. The work included the examination of technical, legal and financial issues associated with such verification. The removal of weapon-origin fissile material from defence programmes of the Russian Federation and the United States is in furtherance of the commitment to disarmament steps undertaken by the two States pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). IAEA verification of the materials declared excess to nuclear weapons programmes and made subject to this Initiative would build international confidence that this material will never again be used in nuclear weapons. Minister Rumyantsev, Secretary Abraham and Director General ElBaradei recognized the value of the groundbreaking work completed over the last six years. Building on the work completed, they directed the technical experts to begin without delay discussions on future possible cooperation within the trilateral format. Minister Rumyantsev, Secretary Abraham and Director General ElBaradei agreed that the Principals would meet again in September 2003 to review progress within the trilateral format. (IAEA)

FEFTRA {sup TM} verification. Update 2013

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Loefman, J. [VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, Espoo (Finland); Meszaros, F. [The Relief Lab., Harskut, (Hungary)

2013-12-15

FEFTRA is a finite element program package developed at VTT for the analyses of groundwater flow in Posiva's site evaluation programme that seeks a final repository for spent nuclear fuel in Finland. The code is capable of modelling steady-state or transient groundwater flow, solute transport and heat transfer as coupled or separate phenomena. Being a typical research tool used only by its developers, the FEFTRA code lacked long of a competent testing system and precise documentation of the verification of the code. In 2006 a project was launched, in which the objective was to reorganise all the material related to the existing verification cases and place them into the FEFTRA program path under the version-control system. The work also included development of a new testing system, which automatically calculates the selected cases, checks the new results against the old approved results and constructs a summary of the test run. All the existing cases were gathered together, checked and added into the new testing system. The documentation of each case was rewritten with the LATEX document preparation system and added into the testing system in a way that the whole test documentation (this report) could easily be generated in a postscript or pdf-format. The current report is the updated version of the verification report published in 2007. At the moment the report includes mainly the cases related to the testing of the primary result quantities (i.e. hydraulic head, pressure, salinity concentration, temperature). The selected cases, however, represent typical hydrological applications, in which the program package has been and will be employed in the Posiva's site evaluation programme, i.e. the simulations of groundwater flow, solute transport and heat transfer as separate or coupled phenomena. The comparison of the FEFTRA results to the analytical, semianalytical and/or other numerical solutions proves the capability of FEFTRA to simulate such problems

Specification and verification of the RTOS for plant protection systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, Jin Hyun; Ahn, Young Ah; Lee, Su-Young; Choi, Jin Young; Lee, Na Young

2004-01-01

PLC is a computer system for instrumentation and control (I and C) systems such as control of machinery on factory assembly lines. control of machinery on factory assembly lines and Nucleare power plants. In nuclear power industry, systems is classified into 3 classes- Non-safety, safety-related and safety-critical up to integrity on system's using purpose. If PLC is used for controlling reactor in nuclear power plant, it should be identified as safety-critical. PLC has several I and C logics in software, including real-time operating system (RTOS). Hence, RTOS must be also proved that it is safe and reliable by various way and methods. In this paper, we apply formal methods to a development of RTOS for PLC in safety-critical level; Statecharts for specification and model checking for verification. In this paper, we give the results of applying formal methods to RTOS. (author)

Can self-verification strivings fully transcend the self-other barrier? Seeking verification of ingroup identities.

Science.gov (United States)

Gómez, Angel; Seyle, D Conor; Huici, Carmen; Swann, William B

2009-12-01

Recent research has demonstrated self-verification strivings in groups, such that people strive to verify collective identities, which are personal self-views (e.g., "sensitive") associated with group membership (e.g., "women"). Such demonstrations stop short of showing that the desire for self-verification can fully transcend the self-other barrier, as in people working to verify ingroup identities (e.g., "Americans are loud") even when such identities are not self-descriptive ("I am quiet and unassuming"). Five studies focus on such ingroup verification strivings. Results indicate that people prefer to interact with individuals who verify their ingroup identities over those who enhance these identities (Experiments 1-5). Strivings for ingroup identity verification were independent of the extent to which the identities were self-descriptive but were stronger among participants who were highly invested in their ingroup identities, as reflected in high certainty of these identities (Experiments 1-4) and high identification with the group (Experiments 1-5). In addition, whereas past demonstrations of self-verification strivings have been limited to efforts to verify the content of identities (Experiments 1 to 3), the findings also show that they strive to verify the valence of their identities (i.e., the extent to which the identities are valued; Experiments 4 and 5). Self-verification strivings, rather than self-enhancement strivings, appeared to motivate participants' strivings for ingroup identity verification. Links to collective self-verification strivings and social identity theory are discussed.

Sensitivity Verification of PWR Monitoring System Using Neuro-Expert For LOCA Detection

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Muhammad Subekti

2009-01-01

Sensitivity Verification of PWR Monitoring System Using Neuro-Expert For LOCA Detection. The present research was done for verification of previous developed method on Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) detection and perform simulations for knowing the sensitivity of the PWR monitoring system that applied neuro-expert method. The previous research continuing on present research, has developed and has tested the neuro-expert method for several anomaly detections in Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) typed Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR). Neuro-expert can detect the LOCA anomaly with sensitivity of primary coolant leakage of 7 gallon/min and the conventional method could not detect the primary coolant leakage of 30 gallon/min. Neuro expert method detects significantly LOCA anomaly faster than conventional system in Surry-1 NPP as well so that the impact risk is reducible. (author)

Reviving nuclear disarmament, 26 February 2008, Oslo, Norway

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2008-01-01

In 1987, Reagan and Gorbachev did agree to abolish an entire class of nuclear weapons - shorter- and intermediate-range missiles - in the INF Treaty. They also created a legacy of dialogue, trust and verification. Significant cuts were subsequently agreed by the two opposing power blocs in everything from military manpower, tanks and warplanes to attack helicopters. There were also verified reductions in strategic nuclear weapons in the START process. Unfortunately, the momentum got lost. In recent years, nuclear threats have become more dangerous and more complex. The number of states known to have nuclear weapons has expanded to nine. Virtually all are extending or modernizing their nuclear weapon arsenals. Others have tried to develop clandestine nuclear programmes. Extremist groups have shown keen interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. Nuclear materials have become more difficult to control. Roughly 27 000 nuclear warheads still remain in the arsenals of these nine countries, 95 percent of which are in the hands of the United States and the Russian Federation. Strategic reliance on these weapons by these countries and their allies undoubtedly motivates others to do the same. And naturally, plans to replenish and modernize these weapons create a pervasive feeling of cynicism among many states - which sense a 'do as I say, not as I do' posture. The rest of the world should actually concentrate on is reaching out to the Middle East by helping to address the dire conditions in the region - chronic and festering conflicts, poverty and social injustice, repression and inept governance. These very conditions are at the root of the pervasive sense of injustice and humiliation that translates into extremism and violence, the drivers for most of the world's major non-proliferation and security concerns. Control of the nuclear fuel cycle is key to curbing proliferation risks. But it must be unambiguously under multinational control, not just managed by the leading nuclear

Non-Proliferation, the IAEA Safeguards System, and the importance of nuclear material measurements

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Stevens, Rebecca S. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2017-09-18

The objective of this project is to explain the contribution of nuclear material measurements to the system of international verification of State declarations and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

A regulatory frame for safety digital systems in nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mozas Garcia, A.

1998-01-01

The paper focuses on Spanish experience regarding software based systems for safety applications from the regulator's point of view. It describes the actual situation in Spain, number and models of reactors, modernization projects, digital systems implemented and licensing documentation and processes already followed by some upgrading projects. The paper wonders what documents should be required for safety and reliability demonstration of a safety system, when they should be reviewed, and what other activities may be necessary to acquire confidence on a particular system. It describes Spanish laws regarding nuclear safety under which, national standards from the NPP design original country apply to nuclear reactors in Spain. It finally suggests that an international standard jointly used by system manufacturers, nuclear licensees and nuclear safety authorities, both from the country where the NPP is installed, and from the original design country, should be developed so that rapid and easy agreement on licensing issues is reached among all parties. The last part of the paper describes the licensing approach proposed by CSN (Spanish Nuclear Safety Authority). It is still under development and it is based on previous experience on digital systems for non-safety applications. It consists of constructing several frames: 1) databases of existing software based systems, 2) guides for inspection and 3) questionnaires for helping in verification and validation activities evaluation. The scope is to establish a well defined procedure that helps in evaluating the particular system. However, in order for such a procedure to be useful, both regulators and utilities and, perhaps also system manufacturers, should agree on it. Joint CSN-utilities working groups may be suitable for such a purpose. (author)

A large capacity turbine generator for nuclear power generation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Maeda, Susumu; Miki, Takahiro; Suzuki, Kazuichi

2000-01-01

In future large capacity nuclear power plant, capacity of a generator to be applied will be 1800 MVA of the largest class in the world. In response to this, the Mitsubishi Electric Co., Ltd. began to carry out element technology verification of a four-pole large capacity turbine generator mainly using upgrading technique of large capacity, since 1994 fiscal year. And, aiming at reliability verification of the 1800 MVA class generator, a model generator with same cross-section as that of an actual one was manufactured, to carry out some verifications on its electrified tests, and so on. Every performance evaluation result of tests on the model generator were good, and high reliability to design and manufacturing technique of the 1800 MVA class generator could be verified. In future, on the base of these technologies, further upgrading of reliability on the large capacity turbine generator for nuclear power generation is intended to be carried out. (G.K.)

Modeling of containment response for Krsko NPP Full Scope Simulator verification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kljenak, I.; Skerlavaj, A.

2000-01-01

Containment responses during the first 10000 s of Anticipated Transient Without Scram and Small Break Loss-of-Coolant Accident scenarios in the Krsko two-loop Westinghouse pressurized water reactor nuclear power plant were simulated with the CONTAIN computer code. Sources of coolant were obtained from simulations with the RELAP5 code. The simulations were carried out so that the results could be used for the verification of the Krsko Full Scope Simulator. (author)

Staying ahead of the game [The world's nuclear regime is being tested like never before

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Heinonen, O.J.

2007-01-01

The nuclear non-proliferation regime today faces a number of challenges. Not all would agree that the system is 'in crisis', but we can confidently say that the regime is certainly being tested. It goes without saying that the reported nuclear test by DPRK in October 2006 has not made the situation easier. So we should begin to find innovative solutions to overcome vulnerabilities or the international nuclear safeguards regime will become obsolete. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was ratified more than 30 years ago. Since then the world has undergone rapid social, political and economic changes, which have resulted in a changed non-proliferation landscape. Developments in the three pillars of the NPT -disarmament, technology transfer and verification- have not necessarily been even. The IAEA has a role to play, in particular, in the latter two pillars. Although one might argue that there has been slow progress with regards to disarmament, it is my belief that we should continue to improve nuclear verification methods and techniques to keep up with the changing non-proliferation landscape. If we fail to do so, we might not only impact international safeguards, but also the future prospects of peaceful nuclear applications. During the last two decades we have seen three major developments related to nuclear non-proliferation: the increased dissemination of nuclear technology and nuclear know-how, particularly in light of renewed interest in nuclear power; a renewed drive on the part of a few States to acquire technology suitable for nuclear weapons purpose; the emergence of clandestine procurement networks. Under the NPT regime, there is nothing illegal about any State having enrichment or reprocessing technology. However, we ought to ensure that nuclear material and infrastructure is not used for illicit and non-peaceful purposes. Better control of access to nuclear fuel cycle technology is being explored through initiatives such as

International ENEA/ISMES/ENS specialist meeting on 'On-site experimental verification of the seismic behaviour of nuclear reactor structures and components'. Proceedings

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1988-01-01

The seismic verification of nuclear plants is a subject of increasing interest in all the industrial countries, with respect to both the safety aspects and the impact of the seismic event on the design and the costs of a nuclear reactor. This topic is especially of great interest for a country like Italy, whose territory is unfortunately characterized by non - negligible seismicity: we remember, not too many years ago, the catastrophic earthquakes of Frioul and Irpinia, that caused thousands of dead people. The meeting aimed at establishing the state-of-the-art on on-site testing of nuclear reactors structures and components, with particular attention to experiences and research programmes concerning: methodologies of on-site tests and interpretation of the experimental data; seismic monitoring systems, recorded data, their use and interpretation; calibration and validation of numerical analyses. Six technical sessions were held, during which 23 high papers were presented and discussed, and six panel discussions were held (the importance of discussion was emphasized in the meeting). The technical contributions consisted of: an introduction paper, summarizing the seismic studies performed in Italy for PEC reactor and explaining the reasons why on-site tests had been performed on this reactor; 6 invited lectures, one for each of the countries that are more deeply involved in seismic analysis, providing the state-of-the-art on the topics of interest for the meeting; 16 contributed papers dealing with more specific technical items, related to the various countries and international organizations

International ENEA/ISMES/ENS specialist meeting on 'On-site experimental verification of the seismic behaviour of nuclear reactor structures and components'. Proceedings

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1988-07-01

The seismic verification of nuclear plants is a subject of increasing interest in all the industrial countries, with respect to both the safety aspects and the impact of the seismic event on the design and the costs of a nuclear reactor. This topic is especially of great interest for a country like Italy, whose territory is unfortunately characterized by non - negligible seismicity: we remember, not too many years ago, the catastrophic earthquakes of Frioul and Irpinia, that caused thousands of dead people. The meeting aimed at establishing the state-of-the-art on on-site testing of nuclear reactors structures and components, with particular attention to experiences and research programmes concerning: methodologies of on-site tests and interpretation of the experimental data; seismic monitoring systems, recorded data, their use and interpretation; calibration and validation of numerical analyses. Six technical sessions were held, during which 23 high papers were presented and discussed, and six panel discussions were held (the importance of discussion was emphasized in the meeting). The technical contributions consisted of: an introduction paper, summarizing the seismic studies performed in Italy for PEC reactor and explaining the reasons why on-site tests had been performed on this reactor; 6 invited lectures, one for each of the countries that are more deeply involved in seismic analysis, providing the state-of-the-art on the topics of interest for the meeting; 16 contributed papers dealing with more specific technical items, related to the various countries and international organizations.

A hardware-software system for the automation of verification and calibration of oil metering units secondary equipment

Science.gov (United States)

Boyarnikov, A. V.; Boyarnikova, L. V.; Kozhushko, A. A.; Sekachev, A. F.

2017-08-01

In the article the process of verification (calibration) of oil metering units secondary equipment is considered. The purpose of the work is to increase the reliability and reduce the complexity of this process by developing a software and hardware system that provides automated verification and calibration. The hardware part of this complex carries out the commutation of the measuring channels of the verified controller and the reference channels of the calibrator in accordance with the introduced algorithm. The developed software allows controlling the commutation of channels, setting values on the calibrator, reading the measured data from the controller, calculating errors and compiling protocols. This system can be used for checking the controllers of the secondary equipment of the oil metering units in the automatic verification mode (with the open communication protocol) or in the semi-automatic verification mode (without it). The peculiar feature of the approach used is the development of a universal signal switch operating under software control, which can be configured for various verification methods (calibration), which allows to cover the entire range of controllers of metering units secondary equipment. The use of automatic verification with the help of a hardware and software system allows to shorten the verification time by 5-10 times and to increase the reliability of measurements, excluding the influence of the human factor.

Verification of Simulation Tools

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Richard, Thierry

2015-01-01

Before qualifying a simulation tool, the requirements shall first be clearly identified, i.e.: - What type of study needs to be carried out? - What phenomena need to be modeled? This phase involves writing a precise technical specification. Once the requirements are defined, the most adapted product shall be selected from the various software options available on the market. Before using a particular version of a simulation tool to support the demonstration of nuclear safety studies, the following requirements shall be met. - An auditable quality assurance process complying with development international standards shall be developed and maintained, - A process of verification and validation (V and V) shall be implemented. This approach requires: writing a report and/or executive summary of the V and V activities, defining a validated domain (domain in which the difference between the results of the tools and those of another qualified reference is considered satisfactory for its intended use). - Sufficient documentation shall be available, - A detailed and formal description of the product (software version number, user configuration, other settings and parameters) in the targeted computing environment shall be available. - Source codes corresponding to the software shall be archived appropriately. When these requirements are fulfilled, the version of the simulation tool shall be considered qualified for a defined domain of validity, in a given computing environment. The functional verification shall ensure that: - the computer architecture of the tool does not include errors, - the numerical solver correctly represents the physical mathematical model, - equations are solved correctly. The functional verification can be demonstrated through certification or report of Quality Assurance. The functional validation shall allow the user to ensure that the equations correctly represent the physical phenomena in the perimeter of intended use. The functional validation can

Utterance Verification for Text-Dependent Speaker Recognition

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Kinnunen, Tomi; Sahidullah, Md; Kukanov, Ivan

2016-01-01

Text-dependent automatic speaker verification naturally calls for the simultaneous verification of speaker identity and spoken content. These two tasks can be achieved with automatic speaker verification (ASV) and utterance verification (UV) technologies. While both have been addressed previously...

Cleanup Verification Package for the 118-C-1, 105-C Solid Waste Burial Ground

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

M. J. Appel and J. M. Capron

2007-07-25

This cleanup verification package documents completion of remedial action for the 118-C-1, 105-C Solid Waste Burial Ground. This waste site was the primary burial ground for general wastes from the operation of the 105-C Reactor and received process tubes, aluminum fuel spacers, control rods, reactor hardware, spent nuclear fuel and soft wastes.

Cleanup Verification Package for the 118-C-1, 105-C Solid Waste Burial Ground

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Appel, M.J.; Capron, J.M.

2007-01-01

This cleanup verification package documents completion of remedial action for the 118-C-1, 105-C Solid Waste Burial Ground. This waste site was the primary burial ground for general wastes from the operation of the 105-C Reactor and received process tubes, aluminum fuel spacers, control rods, reactor hardware, spent nuclear fuel and soft wastes

Muon tomography for imaging nuclear waste and spent fuel verification

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Jonkmans, G.; Anghel, V.N.P.; Thompson, M. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Chalk River (Canada)

2010-07-01

This paper explores the use of cosmic ray muons to image the content of, and to detect high-Z special nuclear material inside, shielded containers. Cosmic ray muons are a naturally occurring form of radiation, are highly penetrating and exhibit large scattering angles on high Z materials. Specifically, we investigated how radiographic and tomographic techniques can be effective for non-invasive nuclear waste characterization and for nuclear material accountancy of spent fuel inside dry storage containers. We show that the tracking of individual muons, as they enter and exit a structure, can potentially improve the accuracy and availability of data on nuclear waste and the content of Dry Storage Containers (DSC) used for spent fuel storage at CANDU plants. This could be achieved in near real time, with the potential for unattended and remotely monitored operations. We show that the expected sensitivity to perform material accountancy, in the case of the DSC, exceeds the IAEA detection target for nuclear material accountancy. (author)

Passive Tomography for Spent Fuel Verification: Analysis Framework and Instrument Design Study

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

White, Timothy A.; Svard, Staffan J.; Smith, Leon E.; Mozin, Vladimir V.; Jansson, Peter; Davour, Anna; Grape, Sophie; Trellue, H.; Deshmukh, Nikhil S.; Wittman, Richard S.; Honkamaa, Tapani; Vaccaro, Stefano; Ely, James

2015-05-18

The potential for gamma emission tomography (GET) to detect partial defects within a spent nuclear fuel assembly is being assessed through a collaboration of Support Programs to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In the first phase of this study, two safeguards verification objectives have been identified. The first is the independent determination of the number of active pins that are present in the assembly, in the absence of a priori information. The second objective is to provide quantitative measures of pin-by-pin properties, e.g. activity of key isotopes or pin attributes such as cooling time and relative burnup, for the detection of anomalies and/or verification of operator-declared data. The efficacy of GET to meet these two verification objectives will be evaluated across a range of fuel types, burnups, and cooling times, and with a target interrogation time of less than 60 minutes. The evaluation of GET viability for safeguards applications is founded on a modelling and analysis framework applied to existing and emerging GET instrument designs. Monte Carlo models of different fuel types are used to produce simulated tomographer responses to large populations of “virtual” fuel assemblies. Instrument response data are processed by a variety of tomographic-reconstruction and image-processing methods, and scoring metrics specific to each of the verification objectives are defined and used to evaluate the performance of the methods. This paper will provide a description of the analysis framework and evaluation metrics, example performance-prediction results, and describe the design of a “universal” GET instrument intended to support the full range of verification scenarios envisioned by the IAEA.

How the Eximbank helps US nuclear exporters

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Moore, J.L. Jr.

1981-01-01

The way in which the Export-Import Bank operates in support of the United States nuclear industry noting particularly its flexibility in responding to changing needs and budget constraints is described. (author)

A Practitioners Perspective on Verification

Science.gov (United States)

Steenburgh, R. A.

2017-12-01

NOAAs Space Weather Prediction Center offers a wide range of products and services to meet the needs of an equally wide range of customers. A robust verification program is essential to the informed use of model guidance and other tools by both forecasters and end users alike. In this talk, we present current SWPC practices and results, and examine emerging requirements and potential approaches to satisfy them. We explore the varying verification needs of forecasters and end users, as well as the role of subjective and objective verification. Finally, we describe a vehicle used in the meteorological community to unify approaches to model verification and facilitate intercomparison.

A Survey on Formal Verification Techniques for Safety-Critical Systems-on-Chip

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Tomás Grimm

2018-05-01

Full Text Available The high degree of miniaturization in the electronics industry has been, for several years, a driver to push embedded systems to different fields and applications. One example is safety-critical systems, where the compactness in the form factor helps to reduce the costs and allows for the implementation of new techniques. The automotive industry is a great example of a safety-critical area with a great rise in the adoption of microelectronics. With it came the creation of the ISO 26262 standard with the goal of guaranteeing a high level of dependability in the designs. Other areas in the safety-critical applications domain have similar standards. However, these standards are mostly guidelines to make sure that designs reach the desired dependability level without explicit instructions. In the end, the success of the design to fulfill the standard is the result of a thorough verification process. Naturally, the goal of any verification team dealing with such important designs is complete coverage as well as standards conformity, but as these are complex hardware, complete functional verification is a difficult task. From the several techniques that exist to verify hardware, where each has its pros and cons, we studied six well-established in academia and in industry. We can divide them into two categories: simulation, which needs extremely large amounts of time, and formal verification, which needs unrealistic amounts of resources. Therefore, we conclude that a hybrid approach offers the best balance between simulation (time and formal verification (resources.

Keeping the lid on nuclear arms

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Milhollin, G.; Weeks, J.

1991-01-01

In November 1990 Brazil and Argentina agreed not to produce nuclear weapons and to allow mutual inspections of their secret nuclear sites. This exciting move towards nuclear arms control may form the basis of a model of international inspection which other countries may seek to follow. However, neither country will yet unconditionally accept the verification scale proposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA seeks to ensure that civilian nuclear materials are not diverted for military use. Military authorities in both countries oppose the plan. It is anticipated that existing difficulties will be overcome. (UK)

Nuclear Waste Imaging and Spent Fuel Verification by Muon Tomography

OpenAIRE

Jonkmans, G.; Anghel, V. N. P.; Jewett, C.; Thompson, M.

2012-01-01

This paper explores the use of cosmic ray muons to image the contents of shielded containers and detect high-Z special nuclear materials inside them. Cosmic ray muons are a naturally occurring form of radiation, are highly penetrating and exhibit large scattering angles on high Z materials. Specifically, we investigated how radiographic and tomographic techniques can be effective for non-invasive nuclear waste characterization and for nuclear material accountancy of spent fuel inside dry stor...

Hailstorms over Switzerland: Verification of Crowd-sourced Data

Science.gov (United States)

Noti, Pascal-Andreas; Martynov, Andrey; Hering, Alessandro; Martius, Olivia

2016-04-01

The reports of smartphone users, witnessing hailstorms, can be used as source of independent, ground-based observation data on ground-reaching hailstorms with high temporal and spatial resolution. The presented work focuses on the verification of crowd-sourced data collected over Switzerland with the help of a smartphone application recently developed by MeteoSwiss. The precise location, time of hail precipitation and the hailstone size are included in the crowd-sourced data, assessed on the basis of the weather radar data of MeteoSwiss. Two radar-based hail detection algorithms, POH (Probability of Hail) and MESHS (Maximum Expected Severe Hail Size), in use at MeteoSwiss are confronted with the crowd-sourced data. The available data and investigation time period last from June to August 2015. Filter criteria have been applied in order to remove false reports from the crowd-sourced data. Neighborhood methods have been introduced to reduce the uncertainties which result from spatial and temporal biases. The crowd-sourced and radar data are converted into binary sequences according to previously set thresholds, allowing for using a categorical verification. Verification scores (e.g. hit rate) are then calculated from a 2x2 contingency table. The hail reporting activity and patterns corresponding to "hail" and "no hail" reports, sent from smartphones, have been analyzed. The relationship between the reported hailstone sizes and both radar-based hail detection algorithms have been investigated.

SPR Hydrostatic Column Model Verification and Validation.

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bettin, Giorgia [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Lord, David [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Rudeen, David Keith [Gram, Inc. Albuquerque, NM (United States)

2015-10-01

A Hydrostatic Column Model (HCM) was developed to help differentiate between normal "tight" well behavior and small-leak behavior under nitrogen for testing the pressure integrity of crude oil storage wells at the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve. This effort was motivated by steady, yet distinct, pressure behavior of a series of Big Hill caverns that have been placed under nitrogen for extended period of time. This report describes the HCM model, its functional requirements, the model structure and the verification and validation process. Different modes of operation are also described, which illustrate how the software can be used to model extended nitrogen monitoring and Mechanical Integrity Tests by predicting wellhead pressures along with nitrogen interface movements. Model verification has shown that the program runs correctly and it is implemented as intended. The cavern BH101 long term nitrogen test was used to validate the model which showed very good agreement with measured data. This supports the claim that the model is, in fact, capturing the relevant physical phenomena and can be used to make accurate predictions of both wellhead pressure and interface movements.

The Trilateral Initiative: IAEA Verification of Weapon-Origin Plutonium in the Russian Federation and the United States

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shea, T.E.

2015-01-01

One year following the indefinite extension of the NPT, the IAEA, the United States and the Russian Federation entered into a cooperative effort aimed at creating a verification system under which the IAEA could accept and monitor nuclear warheads or nuclear warhead components in relation to the Article VI commitments of both States. Over a six year period, through 98 trilateral events, substantial progress was made on verification arrangements and technologies that could enable the IAEA to carry out such a mission, without gaining access to design or manufacturing secrets associated with nuclear weapons. Substantial progress was made on defining the approaches at lead facilities in the two States. The Board of Governors was looking forward to having the Agency undertake such a mission, and the 2000 NPT Review Conference called for the completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative. Then elections changed the leadership in both States and the incoming Administrations decided to end the effort, call it a success, and walk away. This presentation will summarize the creation, history, accomplishments, unresolved issues, consider the legacy and suggest four steps that might now be taken. (author)

Guidelines for the verification and validation of expert system software and conventional software. Volume 7, User's manual: Final report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Miller, L.A.; Hayes, J.E.; Mirsky, S.M.

1995-05-01

Reliable software is required for nuclear power industry applications. Verification and validation techniques applied during the software development process can help eliminate errors that could inhibit the proper operation of digital systems and cause availability and safety problems. Most of the techniques described in this report are valid for conventional software systems as well as for expert systems. The project resulted in a set of 16 V ampersand V guideline packages and 11 sets of procedures based on the class, development phase, and system component being tested. These guideline packages and procedures help a utility define the level of V ampersand V, which involves evaluating the complexity and type of software component along with the consequences of failure. In all, the project identified 153 V ampersand V techniques for conventional software systems and demonstrated their application to all aspects of expert systems except for the knowledge base, which requires specially developed tools. Each of these conventional techniques covers anywhere from 2-52 total types of conventional software defects, and each defect is covered by 21-50 V ampersand V techniques. The project also identified automated tools to Support V ampersand V activities

Nuclear Forensics' role in analyzing nuclear trafficking activities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hrnecek, E.; Mayer, K.; Schubert, A.; Wallenius, M.

2010-01-01

Nuclear forensics aims at identifying origin and intended use of nuclear material using information inherent to the nuclear material.The information gathered in nuclear forensics include isotopic composition, elemental composition, impurities and age of the material, macroscopic appearance and microstructure. The information so collected helps to solve criminal cases and put the individuals involved in nuclear trafficking in jails. The information also helps to improve safeguards and physical protection measures at place of theft or diversion to prevent future thefts or diversions.

Verification Account Management System (VAMS)

Data.gov (United States)

Social Security Administration — The Verification Account Management System (VAMS) is the centralized location for maintaining SSA's verification and data exchange accounts. VAMS account management...

Use of open source information and commercial satellite imagery for nuclear nonproliferation regime compliance verification by a community of academics

Science.gov (United States)

Solodov, Alexander

The proliferation of nuclear weapons is a great threat to world peace and stability. The question of strengthening the nonproliferation regime has been open for a long period of time. In 1997 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors (BOG) adopted the Additional Safeguards Protocol. The purpose of the protocol is to enhance the IAEA's ability to detect undeclared production of fissile materials in member states. However, the IAEA does not always have sufficient human and financial resources to accomplish this task. Developed here is a concept for making use of human and technical resources available in academia that could be used to enhance the IAEA's mission. The objective of this research was to study the feasibility of an academic community using commercially or publicly available sources of information and products for the purpose of detecting covert facilities and activities intended for the unlawful acquisition of fissile materials or production of nuclear weapons. In this study, the availability and use of commercial satellite imagery systems, commercial computer codes for satellite imagery analysis, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) verification International Monitoring System (IMS), publicly available information sources such as watchdog groups and press reports, and Customs Services information were explored. A system for integrating these data sources to form conclusions was also developed. The results proved that publicly and commercially available sources of information and data analysis can be a powerful tool in tracking violations in the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and a framework for implementing these tools in academic community was developed. As a result of this study a formation of an International Nonproliferation Monitoring Academic Community (INMAC) is proposed. This would be an independent organization consisting of academics (faculty, staff and students) from both nuclear weapon states (NWS) and

Getting ready for final disposal in Finland - Independent verification of spent fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tarvainen, Matti; Honkamaa, Tapani; Martikka, Elina; Varjoranta, Tero; Hautamaeki, Johanna; Tiitta, Antero

2001-01-01

Full text: Final disposal of spent nuclear fuel has been known to be the solution for the back-end of the fuel cycle in Finland already for a long time. This has allowed the State system for accounting and control (SSAC) to prepare for the safeguards requirements in time. The Finnish SSAC includes the operator, the State authority STUK and the parties above them e.g. the Ministry for Trade and Industry. Undisputed responsibility of the safe disposal of spent fuel is on the operator. The role of the safety authority STUK. is to set up detailed requirements, to inspect the operator plans and by using different tools of a quality audit approach to verity that the requirements will be complied with in practice. Responsibility on the safeguards issues is similar with the addition of the role of the regional and the international verification organizations represented by Euratom and the IAEA, As the competent safeguards authority, STUK has decided to maintain its active role also in the future. This will be reflected in the future in the increasing cooperation between the SSAC and the IAEA in the new safeguards activities related to the Additional Protocol. The role of Euratom will remain the same concerning the implementation of conventional safeguards. Based on its SSAC role, STUK has continued carrying out safeguards inspections including independent verification measurements on spent fuel also after joining the EU and Euratom safeguards in 1995. Verification of the operator declared data is the key verification element of safeguards. This will remain to be the case also under the Integrated Safeguards (IS) in the future. It is believed that the importance of high quality measurements will rather increase than decrease when the frequency of interim inspections will decrease. Maintaining the continuity of knowledge makes sense only when the knowledge is reliable and independently verified. One of the corner stones of the high quality of the Finnish SSAC activities is

Performance Verification for Safety Injection Tank with Fluidic Device

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yune, Seok Jeong; Kim, Da Yong

2014-01-01

In LBLOCA, the SITs of a conventional nuclear power plant deliver excessive cooling water to the reactor vessel causing the water to flow into the containment atmosphere. In an effort to make it more efficient, Fluidic Device (FD) is installed inside a SIT of Advanced Power Reactor 1400 (APR 1400). FD, a complete passive controller which doesn't require actuating power, controls injection flow rates which are susceptible to a change in the flow resistance inside a vortex chamber of FD. When SIT Emergency Core Cooling (ECC) water level is above the top of the stand pipe, the water enters the vortex chamber through both the top of the stand pipe and the control ports resulting in injection of the water at a large flow rate. When the water level drops below the top of the stand pipe, the water only enters the vortex chamber through the control ports resulting in vortex formation in the vortex chamber and a relatively small flow injection. Performance verification of SIT shall be carried out because SITs play an integral role to mitigate accidents. In this paper, the performance verification method of SIT with FD is presented. In this paper, the equations for calculation of flow resistance coefficient (K) are induced to evaluate on-site performance of APR 1400 SIT with FD. Then, the equations are applied to the performance verification of SIT with FD and good results are obtained

An unattended verification station for UF6 cylinders: Field trial findings

Science.gov (United States)

Smith, L. E.; Miller, K. A.; McDonald, B. S.; Webster, J. B.; Zalavadia, M. A.; Garner, J. R.; Stewart, S. L.; Branney, S. J.; Todd, L. C.; Deshmukh, N. S.; Nordquist, H. A.; Kulisek, J. A.; Swinhoe, M. T.

2017-12-01

In recent years, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has pursued innovative techniques and an integrated suite of safeguards measures to address the verification challenges posed by the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle. Among the unattended instruments currently being explored by the IAEA is an Unattended Cylinder Verification Station (UCVS), which could provide automated, independent verification of the declared relative enrichment, 235U mass, total uranium mass, and identification for all declared uranium hexafluoride cylinders in a facility (e.g., uranium enrichment plants and fuel fabrication plants). Under the auspices of the United States and European Commission Support Programs to the IAEA, a project was undertaken to assess the technical and practical viability of the UCVS concept. The first phase of the UCVS viability study was centered on a long-term field trial of a prototype UCVS system at a fuel fabrication facility. A key outcome of the study was a quantitative performance evaluation of two nondestructive assay (NDA) methods being considered for inclusion in a UCVS: Hybrid Enrichment Verification Array (HEVA), and Passive Neutron Enrichment Meter (PNEM). This paper provides a description of the UCVS prototype design and an overview of the long-term field trial. Analysis results and interpretation are presented with a focus on the performance of PNEM and HEVA for the assay of over 200 "typical" Type 30B cylinders, and the viability of an "NDA Fingerprint" concept as a high-fidelity means to periodically verify that material diversion has not occurred.

Acoustic techniques in nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Olinger, C.T.; Sinha, D.N.

1995-01-01

Acoustic techniques can be employed to address many questions relevant to current nuclear technology needs. These include establishing and monitoring intrinsic tags and seals, locating holdup in areas where conventional radiation-based measurements have limited capability, process monitoring, monitoring containers for corrosion or changes in pressure, and facility design verification. These acoustics applications are in their infancy with respect to safeguards and nuclear material management, but proof-of-principle has been demonstrated in many of the areas listed

Quantum money with classical verification

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Gavinsky, Dmitry [NEC Laboratories America, Princeton, NJ (United States)

2014-12-04

We propose and construct a quantum money scheme that allows verification through classical communication with a bank. This is the first demonstration that a secure quantum money scheme exists that does not require quantum communication for coin verification. Our scheme is secure against adaptive adversaries - this property is not directly related to the possibility of classical verification, nevertheless none of the earlier quantum money constructions is known to possess it.

Quantum money with classical verification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gavinsky, Dmitry

2014-01-01

We propose and construct a quantum money scheme that allows verification through classical communication with a bank. This is the first demonstration that a secure quantum money scheme exists that does not require quantum communication for coin verification. Our scheme is secure against adaptive adversaries - this property is not directly related to the possibility of classical verification, nevertheless none of the earlier quantum money constructions is known to possess it

Verification Test Report for CFAST 3.1.6

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vincent, A.M. III

2002-01-01

Fire is a significant hazard in most facilities that handle radioactive materials. The severity of fire varies with room arrangement, combustible loading, ventilation and protective system response. The complexity of even simple situations can be unwieldy to solve by hand calculations. Thus, computer simulation of the fire severity has become an important tool in characterizing fire risk. The Savannah River Site (SRS), a Department of Energy facility, has been using the Consolidated Model of Fire Growth and Smoke Transport (CFAST) software to complete such deterministic evaluations to better characterize the nuclear facility fire severity. To fully utilize CFAST at SRS it is necessary to demonstrate that CFAST produces valid analytic solutions over its range of use. This report describes the primary verification exercise that is required to establish that CFAST, and its user interface program FAST, produce valid analytic solutions. This verification exercise may be used to check the fu nctionality of FAST and as a training tool to familiarize users with the software. In addition, the report consolidates the lessons learned by the SRS staff in using FAST and CFAST as fire modeling tools

Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. 2005 review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2 May 2005, United Nations, New York, USA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2005-01-01

The core of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons can be summed up in two words: 'Security' and 'Development'. While the States Party to this Treaty hold differing priorities and views, I trust that all share these two goals: development for all through advanced technology; and security for all by reducing - and ultimately eliminating - the nuclear threat. These shared goals were the foundation on which the international community, in 1970, built this landmark Treaty. They agreed to work towards a world free of nuclear weapons. They agreed, while working towards this goal, to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional States. And they agreed to make the peaceful applications of nuclear energy available to all. Folded together, these agreements, these commitments, are mutually reinforcing. They are as valid today as when they were first made - and even more urgent. What should be all too evident is that, if we cannot work together, each acknowledging the development priorities and security concerns of the other, then the result of this Conference will be inaction. In five years, since the 2000 NPT Review Conference the world has changed. Our fears of a deadly nuclear detonation, whatever the cause, have been reawakened. These realities have heightened the awareness of vulnerabilities in the NPT regime. The Treaty has served us well for 35 years. But unless we regard it as part of a living, dynamic regime - capable of evolving to match changing realities, it will fade into irrelevance and leave us vulnerable and unprotected. The expectations from this Conference are to: re-affirm the goals established in 1970; strengthen the IAEA's verification authority; control over proliferation sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle (activities that involve uranium enrichment and plutonium separation); secure and control nuclear material; show the world that our commitment to nuclear disarmament is firm; back the verification efforts by an

The status of nuclear inspections in Iraq: 14 February 2003 update. New York, 14 February 2003. Statement to the United Nations Security Council

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2003-01-01

The report to the UN Security Council is an update on the status of the IAEA's nuclear verification activities in Iraq pursuant to Security Council resolution 1441 and other relevant resolutions. Less than three weeks, since the last report is a relatively short period in the overall inspection process. However, it is believed to be important for the Council to remain actively engaged and fully informed at this crucial time. As reported on numerous occasions, the IAEA concluded, by December 1998, that it had neutralized Iraq's past nuclear programme and that, therefore, there were no unresolved disarmament issues left at that time. Hence, our focus since the resumption of our inspections in Iraq, two and a half months ago, has been verifying whether Iraq revived its nuclear programme in the intervening years. We have to date found no evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear or nuclear related activities in Iraq. However, as just indicated, a number of issues are still under investigation and we are not yet in a position to reach a conclusion about them, although we are moving forward with regard to some of them. To that end, we intend to make full use of the authority granted under all relevant Security Council resolutions to build as much capacity into the inspection process as necessary. In that context, one would underline the importance of information that States may be able to provide to help in assessing the accuracy and completeness of the information provided by Iraq. The IAEA's experience in nuclear verification shows that it is possible, particularly with an intrusive verification system, to assess the presence or absence of a nuclear weapons programme in a State even without the full co-operation of the inspected state. However, prompt, full and active co-operation by Iraq, as required under resolution 1441, will speed up the process. But more importantly, it will enable the IAEA to reach the high degree of assurance required by the Security Council in the

Particularities of Verification Processes for Distributed Informatics Applications

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Ion IVAN

2013-01-01

Full Text Available This paper presents distributed informatics applications and characteristics of their development cycle. It defines the concept of verification and there are identified the differences from software testing. Particularities of the software testing and software verification processes are described. The verification steps and necessary conditions are presented and there are established influence factors of quality verification. Software optimality verification is analyzed and some metrics are defined for the verification process.

Computer Generated Inputs for NMIS Processor Verification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

J. A. Mullens; J. E. Breeding; J. A. McEvers; R. W. Wysor; L. G. Chiang; J. R. Lenarduzzi; J. T. Mihalczo; J. K. Mattingly

2001-01-01

Proper operation of the Nuclear Identification Materials System (NMIS) processor can be verified using computer-generated inputs [BIST (Built-In-Self-Test)] at the digital inputs. Preselected sequences of input pulses to all channels with known correlation functions are compared to the output of the processor. These types of verifications have been utilized in NMIS type correlation processors at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory since 1984. The use of this test confirmed a malfunction in a NMIS processor at the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF) in 1998. The NMIS processor boards were returned to the U.S. for repair and subsequently used in NMIS passive and active measurements with Pu at VNIIEF in 1999

In situ object counting system (ISOCSi3TM) technique: A cost-effective tool for NDA verification in IAEA Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nizhnik, V.; Belian, A.; Shephard, A.; Lebrun, A.

2011-01-01

Nuclear material measurements using the ISOCS technique are playing an increasing role in IAEA verification activities. The ISOCS capabilities include: a high sensitivity to the presence of U and Pu; the ability to detect very small amounts of material; and the ability to measure items of different shapes and sizes. In addition, the numerical absolute efficiency calibration of a germanium detector used in the technique does not require any calibration standards or reference materials. The ISOCS modelling software performs an absolute efficiency calibration for items with various container shapes, container wall materials, material compositions, material fill-heights, U/Pu weight fractions and even heterogeneously distributed emitting materials. In a number of cases, some key parameters, such as the matrix density and U/Pu weight fraction, can be determined in addition to the emitting material mass and isotopic composition. These capabilities provide a verification solution suitable for a majority of cases where quantitative and isotopic analysis should be performed. Taking into account these advantages, the technique becomes a cost-effective solution for nuclear material non-destructive assay (NDA) verification. At present, the IAEA uses the ISOCS for a wide range of applications including the quantitative analysis of U scrap materials, U/Pu contaminated solid wastes, U fuel elements, U hold-up materials. Additionally, the ISOCS is also applied to some specific verification cases such as the measurement of PuBe neutron sources and the quantification of fission products in solid wastes. In reprocessing facilities with U/Pu waste compaction or facilities with item re-batching, the continuity-of-knowledge can be assured by applying either video surveillance systems together with seals (requiring attaching/detaching and verification activities for each seal) or verification of operator declarations using quantitative measurements for items selected on a random basis

Java bytecode verification via static single assignment form

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Gal, Andreas; Probst, Christian W.; Franz, Michael

2008-01-01

Java Virtual Machines (JVMs) traditionally perform bytecode verification by way of an iterative data-flow analysis. Bytecode verification is necessary to ensure type safety because temporary variables in the JVM are not statically typed. We present an alternative verification mechanism that trans......Java Virtual Machines (JVMs) traditionally perform bytecode verification by way of an iterative data-flow analysis. Bytecode verification is necessary to ensure type safety because temporary variables in the JVM are not statically typed. We present an alternative verification mechanism...

Nuclear cooperation: challenges and prospects

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ollapally, Deepa; Rajagopal, S.

1997-01-01

In this era of globalisation and technology flows, the nuclear field continues to retain strong barriers to international collaboration. From nuclear energy to non-proliferation however, the potential for concerted action exists. The International and Strategic Studies Unit of the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS) held a two day seminar exploring the challenges and prospects for achieving mutual cooperation between states relating to all aspects of nuclear technology. This volume is based on the proceedings of the seminar. The broad themes that the seminar considered included disarmament and the security link; implementation and verification of nonproliferation regimes; transfer of technology and nuclear energy. The seminar culminated with a round table on confidence building