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Sample records for nuclear safeguards infrastructure

  1. Nuclear Safeguards Infrastructure Required for the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dr. Mark Schanfein; Philip Casey Durst

    2012-07-01

    The Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) is a Very High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (VHTR) to be constructed near Idaho Falls, Idaho The NGNP is intrinsically safer than current reactors and is planned for startup ca. 2021 Safety is more prominent in the minds of the Public and Governing Officials following the nuclear reactor meltdown accidents in Fukushima, Japan The authors propose that the NGNP should be designed with International (IAEA) Safeguards in mind to support export to Non-Nuclear-Weapons States There are two variants of the NGNP design; one using integral Prismatic-shaped fuel assemblies in a fixed core; and one using recirculating fuel balls (or Pebbles) The following presents the infrastructure required to safeguard the NGNP This infrastructure is required to safeguard the Prismatic and Pebble-fueled NGNP (and other HTGR/VHTR) The infrastructure is based on current Safeguards Requirements and Practices implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for similar reactors The authors of this presentation have worked for decades in the area of International Nuclear Safeguards and are recognized experts in this field Presentation for INMM conference in July 2012.

  2. Nuclear safeguards; Salvaguardias nucleares

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Zurron, O.

    2015-07-01

    Safeguards control at the Juzbado Plant is implemented through the joint IAEA/EURATOM partnership approach in force within the European Union for all nuclear facilities. this verification agreement is designed to minimize burden on the operators whilst ensuring that both inspectorate achieve the objectives related to their respective safeguards regimes. This paper outlines the safeguards approaches followed by the inspectorate and the particularities of the Juzbado Plants nuclear material accountancy and control system. (Authors)

  3. Integration of Nuclear Safeguards Infrastructure Development with UNSCR 1540 Implementation - Context and Challenges

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dreicer, M; Essner, J

    2008-11-03

    On 28 April 2004, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 (2004), obliging States, inter alia, to refrain from supporting by any means non-State actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their delivery systems. It imposes binding obligations on all States to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials. This mandate was extended an additional two years with the adoption of Resolution 1673 (2006) and an additional three years with the adoption of Resolution 1810 (2008). UNSCR 1540 is a key nonproliferation and counterterrorism tool that needs to be implemented well. Its obligations are a core part of nuclear infrastructure development.

  4. Nuclear safeguards technology handbook

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1977-12-01

    The purpose of this handbook is to present to United States industrial organizations the Department of Energy's (DOE) Safeguards Technology Program. The roles and missions for safeguards in the U.S. government and application of the DOE technology program to industry safeguards planning are discussed. A guide to sources and products is included. (LK)

  5. Improving the Safeguardability of Nuclear Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    T. Bjornard; R. Bari; D. Hebditch; P. Peterson; M. Schanfein

    2009-07-01

    The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities has the potential to reduce security risks and proliferation hazards while improving the synergy of major design features and raising operational efficiency, in a world where significant expansion of nuclear energy use may occur. Correspondingly, the U.S. DOE’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) includes objectives to contribute to international efforts to develop SBD, and to apply SBD in the development of new U.S. nuclear infrastructure. Here, SBD is defined as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient and cost effective integration of international safeguards and other nonproliferation barriers with national material control and accountability, physical protection, and safety objectives into the overall design process for a nuclear facility, from initial planning through design, construction and operation. The SBD process, in its simplest form, may be applied usefully today within most national regulatory environments. Development of a mature approach to implementing SBD requires work in the areas of requirements definition, design processes, technology and methodology, and institutionalization. The U.S. efforts described in this paper are supportive of SBD work for international safeguards that has recently been initiated by the IAEA with the participation of many stakeholders including member States, the IAEA, nuclear technology suppliers, nuclear utilities, and the broader international nonproliferation community.

  6. Organizational Culture for Safety, Security, and Safeguards in New Nuclear Power Countries

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kovacic, Donald N [ORNL

    2015-01-01

    This chapter will contain the following sections: Existing international norms and standards for developing the infrastructure to support new nuclear power programs The role of organizational culture and how it supports the safe, secure, and peaceful application of nuclear power Identifying effective and efficient strategies for implementing safety, security and safeguards in nuclear operations Challenges identified in the implementation of safety, security and safeguards Potential areas for future collaboration between countries in order to support nonproliferation culture

  7. Nuclear hybrid energy infrastructure

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Agarwal, Vivek; Tawfik, Magdy S.

    2015-02-01

    The nuclear hybrid energy concept is becoming a reality for the US energy infrastructure where combinations of the various potential energy sources (nuclear, wind, solar, biomass, and so on) are integrated in a hybrid energy system. This paper focuses on challenges facing a hybrid system with a Small Modular Reactor at its core. The core of the paper will discuss efforts required to develop supervisory control center that collects data, supports decision-making, and serves as an information hub for supervisory control center. Such a center will also be a model for integrating future technologies and controls. In addition, advanced operations research, thermal cycle analysis, energy conversion analysis, control engineering, and human factors engineering will be part of the supervisory control center. Nuclear hybrid energy infrastructure would allow operators to optimize the cost of energy production by providing appropriate means of integrating different energy sources. The data needs to be stored, processed, analyzed, trended, and projected at right time to right operator to integrate different energy sources.

  8. Nuclear material safeguards for enrichments plants: Part 4, Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant: Diversion scenarios and IAEA safeguards activities: Safeguards training course

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1988-10-01

    This publication is Part 4 of a safeguards training course in Nuclear Material Safeguards for enrichment plants. This part of the course deals with diversion scenarios and safeguards activities at gas centrifuge enrichment plants.

  9. Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence for Safeguards Applications

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ludewigt, Bernhard A; Quiter, Brian J; Ambers, Scott D

    2011-02-04

    In nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF) measurements, resonances are excited by an external photon beam leading to the emission of {gamma} rays with specific energies that are characteristic of the emitting isotope. The promise of NRF as a non-destructive analysis technique (NDA) in safeguards applications lies in its potential to directly quantify a specific isotope in an assay target without the need for unfolding the combined responses of several fissile isotopes as often required by other NDA methods. The use of NRF for detection of sensitive nuclear materials and other contraband has been researched in the past. In the safeguards applications considered here one has to go beyond mere detection and precisely quantify the isotopic content, a challenge that is discussed throughout this report. Basic NRF measurement methods, instrumentation, and the analytical calculation of NRF signal strengths are described in Section 2. Well understood modeling and simulation tools are needed for assessing the potential of NRF for safeguards and for designing measurement systems. All our simulations were performed with the radiation transport code MCNPX, a code that is widely used in the safeguards community. Our initial studies showed that MCNPX grossly underestimated the elastically scattered background at backwards angles due to an incorrect treatment of Rayleigh scattering. While new, corrected calculations based on ENDF form factors showed much better agreement with experimental data for the elastic scattering of photons on an uranium target, the elastic backscatter is still not rigorously treated. Photonuclear scattering processes (nuclear Thomson, Delbruck and Giant Dipole Resonance scattering), which are expected to play an important role at higher energies, are not yet included. These missing elastic scattering contributions were studied and their importance evaluated evaluated against data found in the literature as discussed in Section 3. A transmission experiment

  10. Safeguards Guidance Document for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities: International Nuclear Safeguards Requirements and Practices For Uranium Enrichment Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Robert Bean; Casey Durst

    2009-10-01

    This report is the second in a series of guidelines on international safeguards requirements and practices, prepared expressly for the designers of nuclear facilities. The first document in this series is the description of generic international nuclear safeguards requirements pertaining to all types of facilities. These requirements should be understood and considered at the earliest stages of facility design as part of a new process called “Safeguards-by-Design.” This will help eliminate the costly retrofit of facilities that has occurred in the past to accommodate nuclear safeguards verification activities. The following summarizes the requirements for international nuclear safeguards implementation at enrichment plants, prepared under the Safeguards by Design project, and funded by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of NA-243. The purpose of this is to provide designers of nuclear facilities around the world with a simplified set of design requirements and the most common practices for meeting them. The foundation for these requirements is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Relevant safeguards requirements are also cited from the Safeguards Criteria for inspecting enrichment plants, found in the IAEA Safeguards Manual, Part SMC-8. IAEA definitions and terms are based on the IAEA Safeguards Glossary, published in 2002. The most current specification for safeguards measurement accuracy is found in the IAEA document STR-327, “International Target Values 2000 for Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding Nuclear Materials,” published in 2001. For this guide to be easier for the designer to use, the requirements have been restated in plainer language per expert interpretation using the source documents noted. The safeguards agreement is fundamentally a

  11. Safeguards Guidance for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities – International Safeguards Requirements for Uranium Enrichment Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Philip Casey Durst; Scott DeMuth; Brent McGinnis; Michael Whitaker; James Morgan

    2010-04-01

    For the past two years, the United States National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of International Regimes and Agreements (NA-243), has sponsored the Safeguards-by-Design Project, through which it is hoped new nuclear facilities will be designed and constructed worldwide more amenable to nuclear safeguards. In the course of this project it was recognized that commercial designer/builders of nuclear facilities are not always aware of, or understand, the relevant domestic and international safeguards requirements, especially the latter as implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To help commercial designer/builders better understand these requirements, a report was prepared by the Safeguards-by-Design Project Team that articulated and interpreted the international nuclear safeguards requirements for the initial case of uranium enrichment plants. The following paper summarizes the subject report, the specific requirements, where they originate, and the implications for design and construction. It also briefly summarizes the established best design and operating practices that designer/builder/operators have implemented for currently meeting these requirements. In preparing the subject report, it is recognized that the best practices are continually evolving as the designer/builder/operators and IAEA consider even more effective and efficient means for meeting the safeguards requirements and objectives.

  12. Safeguards-by-Design: Early Integration of Physical Protection and Safeguardability into Design of Nuclear Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    T. Bjornard; R. Bean; S. DeMuth; P. Durst; M. Ehinger; M. Golay; D. Hebditch; J. Hockert; J. Morgan

    2009-09-01

    The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities has the potential to minimize proliferation and security risks as the use of nuclear energy expands worldwide. This paper defines a generic SBD process and its incorporation from early design phases into existing design / construction processes and develops a framework that can guide its institutionalization. SBD could be a basis for a new international norm and standard process for nuclear facility design. This work is part of the U.S. DOE’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), and is jointly sponsored by the Offices of Non-proliferation and Nuclear Energy.

  13. Safeguards Issues at Nuclear Reactors and Enrichment Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Boyer, Brian D [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-08-15

    The Agency's safeguards technical objective is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.

  14. Advancement of safeguards inspection technology for CANDU nuclear power plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Jae Sung; Park, W. S.; Cha, H. R.; Ham, Y. S.; Lee, Y. G.; Kim, K. P.; Hong, Y. D

    1999-04-01

    The objectives of this project are to develop both inspection technology and safeguards instruments, related to CANDU safeguards inspection, through international cooperation, so that those outcomes are to be applied in field inspections of national safeguards. Furthermore, those could contribute to the improvement of verification correctness of IAEA inspections. Considering the level of national inspection technology, it looked not possible to perform national inspections without the joint use of containment and surveillance equipment conjunction with the IAEA. In this connection, basic studies for the successful implementation of national inspections was performed, optimal structure of safeguards inspection was attained, and advancement of safeguards inspection technology was forwarded. The successful implementation of this project contributed to both the improvement of inspection technology on CANDU reactors and the implementation of national inspection to be performed according to the legal framework. In addition, it would be an opportunity to improve the ability of negotiating in equal shares in relation to the IAEA on the occasion of discussing or negotiating the safeguards issues concerned. Now that the national safeguards technology for CANDU reactors was developed, the safeguards criteria, procedure and instruments as to the other item facilities and fabrication facilities should be developed for the perfection of national inspections. It would be desirable that the recommendations proposed and concreted in this study, so as to both cope with the strengthened international safeguards and detect the undeclared nuclear activities, could be applied to national safeguards scheme. (author)

  15. Advancement of safeguards inspection technology for CANDU nuclear power plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Jae Sung; Park, W. S.; Cha, H. R.; Ham, Y. S.; Lee, Y. G.; Kim, K. P.; Hong, Y. D

    1999-04-01

    The objectives of this project are to develop both inspection technology and safeguards instruments, related to CANDU safeguards inspection, through international cooperation, so that those outcomes are to be applied in field inspections of national safeguards. Furthermore, those could contribute to the improvement of verification correctness of IAEA inspections. Considering the level of national inspection technology, it looked not possible to perform national inspections without the joint use of containment and surveillance equipment conjunction with the IAEA. In this connection, basic studies for the successful implementation of national inspections was performed, optimal structure of safeguards inspection was attained, and advancement of safeguards inspection technology was forwarded. The successful implementation of this project contributed to both the improvement of inspection technology on CANDU reactors and the implementation of national inspection to be performed according to the legal framework. In addition, it would be an opportunity to improve the ability of negotiating in equal shares in relation to the IAEA on the occasion of discussing or negotiating the safeguards issues concerned. Now that the national safeguards technology for CANDU reactors was developed, the safeguards criteria, procedure and instruments as to the other item facilities and fabrication facilities should be developed for the perfection of national inspections. It would be desirable that the recommendations proposed and concreted in this study, so as to both cope with the strengthened international safeguards and detect the undeclared nuclear activities, could be applied to national safeguards scheme. (author)

  16. Technology development of nuclear material safeguards for DUPIC fuel cycle

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hong, Jong Sook; Kim, Ho Dong; Kang, Hee Young; Lee, Young Gil; Byeon, Kee Ho; Park, Young Soo; Cha, Hong Ryul; Park, Ho Joon; Lee, Byung Doo; Chung, Sang Tae; Choi, Hyung Rae; Park, Hyun Soo

    1997-07-01

    During the second phase of research and development program conducted from 1993 to 1996, nuclear material safeguards studies system were performed on the technology development of DUPIC safeguards system such as nuclear material measurement in bulk form and product form, DUPIC fuel reactivity measurement, near-real-time accountancy, and containment and surveillance system for effective and efficient implementation of domestic and international safeguards obligation. By securing in advance a optimized safeguards system with domestically developed hardware and software, it will contribute not only to the effective implementation of DUPIC safeguards, but also to enhance the international confidence build-up in peaceful use of spent fuel material. (author). 27 refs., 13 tabs., 89 figs.

  17. Implementation of integrated safeguards at nuclear fuel plant Pitesti Romania

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Olaru, Vasilica; Tiberiu, Ivana; Epure, Gheorghe [Nuclear Safety Department, Nuclear Fuel Plant Pitesti, Cimpului, No 1, 115400 Mioveni (Romania)

    2010-07-01

    The nuclear activity in Romania was for many years under Traditional Safeguards (TS) and has developed in good conditions this type of nuclear safeguards. Now it has the opportunity to improve the performance and quality of the safeguards activity and increase the accountancy and control of nuclear material by passing to Integrated Safeguards (IS). The legal framework is Law 100/2000 for ratification of the Protocol between Romania and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Romania Government and IAEA related to safeguards as part of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons published in the Official Gazette no. 3/31 January 1970, and the Additional Protocol content published in the Official Gazette no. 295/ 29.06.2000. The first discussion about Integrated Safeguards (IS) between Nuclear Fuel Plant (FCN) representatives and IAEA inspectors was in June 2005. In Feb. 2007 an IAEA mission visited FCN and established the main steps for implementing the IS. There were visited the storages, technological flow, and was reviewed the residence times for different nuclear materials, the applied chemical analysis, metrological methods, weighting method and elaborating the documents and lists. At that time the IAEA and FCN representatives established the main points for starting the IS at FCN: perform the Short Notice Random Inspections (SNRI), communicate the eligible days for SNRI for each year, communicate the estimated deliveries and shipments for first quarter and then for the rest of the year, daily mail box declaration (DD) with respect to the residence time for several nuclear material, advance notification (AN) for each nuclear material transfer (shipments and receipts), others. At 01 June 2007 Romania has passed officially to Integrated Safeguards and FCN (RO-D) has taken all measures to realize this objective. (authors)

  18. Cyber Threats to Nuclear Infrastructures

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Robert S. Anderson; Paul Moskowitz; Mark Schanfein; Trond Bjornard; Curtis St. Michel

    2010-07-01

    Nuclear facility personnel expend considerable efforts to ensure that their facilities can maintain continuity of operations against both natural and man-made threats. Historically, most attention has been placed on physical security. Recently however, the threat of cyber-related attacks has become a recognized and growing world-wide concern. Much attention has focused on the vulnerability of the electric grid and chemical industries to cyber attacks, in part, because of their use of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. Lessons learned from work in these sectors indicate that the cyber threat may extend to other critical infrastructures including sites where nuclear and radiological materials are now stored. In this context, this white paper presents a hypothetical scenario by which a determined adversary launches a cyber attack that compromises the physical protection system and results in a reduced security posture at such a site. The compromised security posture might then be malevolently exploited in a variety of ways. The authors conclude that the cyber threat should be carefully considered for all nuclear infrastructures.

  19. Nuclear safeguards research and development program. Status report, January--April 1977

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sapir, J.L. (comp.)

    1977-06-01

    The status of the Nuclear Safeguards Research and Development program pursued by LASL Safeguards Groups Q-1, Q-2, Q-3, and Q-4 is presented . Topics covered include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards, perimeter safeguards and surveillance, concepts and subsystems development (e.g., DYMAC program), integrated safeguards systems, training courses, and technology transfer.

  20. International training course on nuclear materials accountability for safeguards purposes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1980-12-01

    The two volumes of this report incorporate all lectures and presentations at the International Training Course on Nuclear Materials Accountability and Control for Safeguards Purposes, held May 27-June 6, 1980, at the Bishop's Lodge near Santa Fe, New Mexico. The course, authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a National system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both National and IAEA International safeguards objectives. Volume I, covering the first week of the course, presents the background, requirements, and general features of material accounting and control in modern safeguard systems. Volume II, covering the second week of the course, provides more detailed information on measurement methods and instruments, practical experience at power reactor and research reactor facilities, and examples of operating state systems of accountability and control.

  1. An Introduction to Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Haakansson, Ane; Jonter, Thomas

    2007-06-15

    The purpose of this project was to compile a course material that covers how the nuclear safeguards system has emerged and how it works today. The produced compendium is directed to both university students and people concerned by safeguards from the industry. The primary aim of the first part of this paper is to describe the historical development of this global non-proliferation system and its central tasks. A second purpose is to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of its current design in order to answer the following question: Can we today say that we have a functioning global non-proliferation system? Does it require further strengthening, and, if so, how can this be achieved? In the second section we review the verification regime within nuclear safeguards, i. e. describe the methods and techniques that are available to reassure the world community that concluded treaties are adhered to

  2. Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

    Science.gov (United States)

    1995-04-01

    Control and Disarmament McLean, VA AecBurton F. Judson Agency David Dorn Consultant Washington, DC United Nations Special Los Gatos , CA Henry Sokolski...admitted to conducting nuclear activities safeguards are willing to cede additional soy - there. If the request for such a "special inspec- ereignty to

  3. Methodology for characterizing potential adversaries of Nuclear Material Safeguards Systems

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kirkwood, C.W.; Pollock, S.M.

    1978-11-01

    The results are described of a study by Woodward--Clyde Consultants to assist the University of California Lawrence Livermore Laboratory in the development of methods to analyze and evaluate Nuclear Material Safeguards (NMS) Systems. The study concentrated on developing a methodology to assist experts in describing, in quantitative form, their judgments about the characteristics of potential adversaries of NMS Systems.

  4. A GRADUATE CERTIFICATE PROGRAM IN NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS TECHNOLOGY.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    FISHBONE, L.; SISKIND, B.; PEPPER, S.

    2005-07-10

    While there are a number of university graduate-education programs that address non-proliferation and safeguards policy issues; there are none in the United States that train students in the specific technical aspects of nuclear safeguards. Formal education of this kind is necessary to sustain the flow of technically trained individuals to diverse programs in safeguards, nonproliferation, and national security. In response to this need, the University of Missouri-Columbia, with assistance from Brookhaven National Laboratory, is initiating a Graduate Certificate Program in Nuclear Safeguards Technology: Students seeking advanced degrees in a variety of technical areas will complete a required sequence of courses in order to receive the certification. Required course work covers topics such as Nuclear Material Control and Accountability (MC&A), Physical Protection (PP); nuclear measurements, and a variety of other relevant subjects. Laboratory-based instruction will be included which will utilize the University of Missouri Research Reactor(MURR). MURR is the largest university-based research reactor and has extensive laboratory resources including a Canberra Aquila MPC&A Operational Monitoring demonstration system.

  5. INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM CYBER SECURITY: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS RELEVANT TO NUCLEAR FACILITIES, SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Robert S. Anderson; Mark Schanfein; Trond Bjornard; Paul Moskowitz

    2011-07-01

    Typical questions surrounding industrial control system (ICS) cyber security always lead back to: What could a cyber attack do to my system(s) and; how much should I worry about it? These two leading questions represent only a fraction of questions asked when discussing cyber security as it applies to any program, company, business, or organization. The intent of this paper is to open a dialog of important pertinent questions and answers that managers of nuclear facilities engaged in nuclear facility security and safeguards should examine, i.e., what questions should be asked; and how do the answers affect an organization's ability to effectively safeguard and secure nuclear material. When a cyber intrusion is reported, what does that mean? Can an intrusion be detected or go un-noticed? Are nuclear security or safeguards systems potentially vulnerable? What about the digital systems employed in process monitoring, and international safeguards? Organizations expend considerable efforts to ensure that their facilities can maintain continuity of operations against physical threats. However, cyber threats particularly on ICSs may not be well known or understood, and often do not receive adequate attention. With the disclosure of the Stuxnet virus that has recently attacked nuclear infrastructure, many organizations have recognized the need for an urgent interest in cyber attacks and defenses against them. Several questions arise including discussions about the insider threat, adequate cyber protections, program readiness, encryption, and many more. These questions, among others, are discussed so as to raise the awareness and shed light on ways to protect nuclear facilities and materials against such attacks.

  6. A Suggestion for Safeguards System under Nuclear Supply Assurance Environment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jo, Seong Youn [Korea Institute of Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2009-05-15

    Various ideas about nuclear fuel supply assurance have been proposed with the expectation of a new era of 'Nuclear Renaissance.' The possibility is ever than high now as the environmental impact due to the fossil fuel burning is worsening. But there are several obstacles to realize the resurrection of nuclear power as promising energy source in the future. The disposal of high radioactive wastes like nuclear spent fuel could be the first one that everyone can imagine, because those wastes are regarded as one of the direct threat to human health. But the most dangerous threat can be materialized through the diversion of nuclear material, if some malicious actors like some rogue states or terrorist groups take chance of the nuclear industry booming. Most supply assurance ideas based on multilateral approach provide the way to provide nuclear fuel while limiting dissipation of sensitive technologies. But regarding the safeguards implementation under the supply assurance environment, it seems that any appropriate approach has not been prepared. It is prerequisite to establish safeguards implementation system for multilateral facilities prior to their actual operation.

  7. Current Status of Helium-3 Alternative Technologies for Nuclear Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Henzlova, Daniela [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Kouzes, R. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); McElroy, R. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Peerani, P. [European Commission, Ispra (Italy). Joint Research Centre; Aspinall, M. [Hybrid Instruments Ltd., Birmingham (United Kingdom); Baird, K. [Intl Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Vienna (Austria); Bakel, A. [National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Washington, DC (United States); Borella, M. [SCK.CEN, Mol (Belgium); Bourne, M. [Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (United States); Bourva, L. [Canberra Ltd., Oxford (United Kingdom); Cave, F. [Hybrid Instruments Ltd., Birmingham (United Kingdom); Chandra, R. [Arktis Radiation Detectors Ltd., Zurich (Sweden); Chernikova, D. [Chalmers Univ. of Technology (Sweden); Croft, S. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Dermody, G. [Symetrica Inc., Maynard, MA (United States); Dougan, A. [National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Washington, DC (United States); Ely, J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Fanchini, E. [Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare (INFN), Milano (Italy); Finocchiaro, P. [Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare (INFN), Milano (Italy); Gavron, Victor [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Kureta, M. [Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), Tokai (Japan); Ianakiev, Kiril Dimitrov [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Ishiyama, K. [Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), Tokai (Japan); Lee, T. [Intl Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Vienna (Austria); Martin, Ch. [Symetrica Inc., Maynard, MA (United States); McKinny, K. [GE Reuter-Stokes, Twinsburg, OH (United States); Menlove, Howard Olsen [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Orton, Ch. [National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Washington, DC (United States); Pappalardo, A. [Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare (INFN), Milano (Italy); Pedersen, B. [European Commission, Ispra (Italy). Joint Research Centre; Peranteau, D. [National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Washington, DC (United States); Plenteda, R. [Intl Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Vienna (Austria); Pozzi, S. [Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (United States); Schear, M. [Symetrica Inc., Maynard, MA (United States); Seya, M. [Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), Tokai (Japan); Siciliano, E. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Stave, S. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Sun, L. [Proportional Technologies Inc., Houston, TX (United States); Swinhoe, Martyn Thomas [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Tagziria, H. [European Commission, Ispra (Italy). Joint Research Centre; Vaccaro, S. [DG Energy (Luxembourg); Takamine, J. [Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), Tokai (Japan); Weber, A. -L. [Inst. for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN), Fontenay-aux-Roses (France); Yamaguchi, T. [Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), Tokai (Japan); Zhu, H. [National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Washington, DC (United States)

    2015-12-01

    International safeguards inspectorates (e.g., International Atomic Energy Agency {IAEA}, or Euratom) rely heavily on neutron assay techniques, and in particular, on coincidence counters for the verification of declared nuclear materials under safeguards and for monitoring purposes. While 3He was readily available, the reliability, safety, ease of use, gamma-ray insensitivity, and high intrinsic thermal neutron detection efficiency of 3He-based detectors obviated the need for alternative detector technologies. However, the recent decline of the 3He gas supply has triggered international efforts to develop and field neutron detectors that make use of alternative materials. In response to this global effort, the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and Euratom launched a joint effort aimed at bringing together international experts, technology users and developers in the field of nuclear safeguards to discuss and evaluate the proposed 3He alternative materials and technologies. The effort involved a series of two workshops focused on detailed overviews and viability assessments of various 3He alternative technologies for use in nuclear safeguards applications. The key objective was to provide a platform for collaborative discussions and technical presentations organized in a compact, workshop-like format to stimulate interactions among the participants. The meetings culminated in a benchmark exercise providing a unique opportunity for the first inter-comparison of several available alternative technologies. This report provides an overview of the alternative technology efforts presented during the two workshops along with a summary of the benchmarking activities and results. The workshop recommendations and key consensus observations are discussed in the report, and used to outline a proposed path forward and future needs foreseeable in the area of 3

  8. Oak Ridge National Laboratory Office of International Nuclear Safeguards: Human Capital Development Activity in FY16

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gilligan, Kimberly V. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States). Nuclear Security and Isotope Technology Division; Gaudet, Rachel N. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States). Nuclear Security and Isotope Technology Division

    2016-09-30

    In 2007, the U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC) completed a comprehensive review of the current and potential future challenges facing the international safeguards system. One of the report’s key recommendations was for DOE NNSA to launch a major new program to revitalize the international safeguards technology and human resource base. In 2007, at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference, then Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman announced the newly created Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). NGSI consists of five program elements: policy development and outreach, concepts and approaches, technology and analytical methodologies, human capital development (HCD), and infrastructure development. This report addresses the HCD component of NGSI. The goal of the HCD component as defined in the NNSA Program Plan is “to revitalize and expand the international safeguards human capital base by attracting and training a new generation of talent.” The major objectives listed in the HCD goal include education and training, outreach to universities and professional societies, postdoctoral appointments, and summer internships at national laboratories.

  9. Supporting Technical Work Under IAEA Safeguards Agreements of 2013 Completed by Laboratory of Technical Research for Nuclear Safeguards

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    GAO; Qiang; LIU; Hong-bin; YANG; Qun; BU; Li-xin; MIAO; Qiang; HE; Li-xia; XU; Zheng; ZHANG; Wen-liang

    2013-01-01

    Safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA)are an important element of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.In order to verify that commitments made by states under safeguards agreements with the IAEA are fulfilled.China signed the voluntary offer agreement(INFCIRC/369)with IAEA in 1988.The agreement entered into force in 1989.There are three nuclear

  10. Safeguards Culture

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2012-07-01

    The concepts of nuclear safety and security culture are well established; however, a common understanding of safeguards culture is not internationally recognized. Supported by the National Nuclear Security Administration, the authors prepared this report, an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture, and gauged its value to the safeguards community. The authors explored distinctions between safeguards culture, safeguards compliance, and safeguards performance, and evaluated synergies and differences between safeguards culture and safety/security culture. The report concludes with suggested next steps.

  11. Nuclear safeguards research and development. Program status report, October 1980-January 1981

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Henry, C.N. (comp.)

    1981-11-01

    This report presents the status of the Nuclear Safeguards Research and Development Program pursued by the Energy, Chemistry-Materials Science, and Operational Security/Safeguards Divisions of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Topics include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards systems. Also discussed are training courses, technology transfer, analytical chemistry methods for fissionable materials safeguards, the Department of Energy Computer Security Technical Center, and operational security.

  12. Nuclear Safeguards Considerations For The Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Phillip Casey Durst; David Beddingfield; Brian Boyer; Robert Bean; Michael Collins; Michael Ehinger; David Hanks; David L. Moses; Lee Refalo

    2009-10-01

    High temperature reactors (HTRs) have been considered since the 1940s, and have been constructed and demonstrated in the United Kingdom (Dragon), United States (Peach Bottom and Fort Saint Vrain), Japan (HTTR), Germany (AVR and THTR-300), and have been the subject of conceptual studies in Russia (VGM). The attraction to these reactors is that they can use a variety of reactor fuels, including abundant thorium, which upon reprocessing of the spent fuel can produce fissile U-233. Hence, they could extend the stocks of available uranium, provided the fuel is reprocessed. Another attractive attribute is that HTRs typically operate at a much higher temperature than conventional light water reactors (LWRs), because of the use of pyrolytic carbon and silicon carbide coated (TRISO) fuel particles embedded in ceramic graphite. Rather than simply discharge most of the unused heat from the working fluid in the power plant to the environment, engineers have been designing reactors for 40 years to recover this heat and make it available for district heating or chemical conversion plants. Demonstrating high-temperature nuclear energy conversion was the purpose behind Fort Saint Vrain in the United States, THTR-300 in Germany, HTTR in Japan, and HTR-10 and HTR-PM, being built in China. This resulted in nuclear reactors at least 30% or more thermodynamically efficient than conventional LWRs, especially if the waste heat can be effectively utilized in chemical processing plants. A modern variant of high temperature reactors is the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR). Originally developed in the United States and Germany, it is now being redesigned and marketed by the Republic of South Africa and China. The team examined historical high temperature and high temperature gas reactors (HTR and HTGR) and reviewed safeguards considerations for this reactor. The following is a preliminary report on this topic prepared under the ASA-100 Advanced Safeguards Project in support of the NNSA Next

  13. A Comparative Study on Safeguards Implementation under Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements and the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jeon, Jihye; Kim, Ki-Hyun; Lee, Young Wook [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    A Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA) requires several conditions, so-called obligations, on the items under the agreement such as: 1) peaceful use, 2) retransfer consent, 3) consent prior to reprocessing or enrichment and 4) safeguards and security. These obligations of the NCAs are imposed by the supplier country. The Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its member states require similar activities. However, there is a significant gap in nuclear material accountancy between safeguards implementation under the NCA and CSA. The difference of those two frameworks is compared herein, focusing on the unique features of the NCA safeguards and its implications are presented. In this study, the NCAs between the ROK and Canada, Australia and US were analyzed since each of them is one of the ROK’s major nuclear trading partners. The safeguards implementation under the NCA is usually specified in an Administrative Arrangement (AA) under the Agreement. The ROK has two AAs in force with Canada and Australia among 29 countries with NCA. Recently, the AA with Canada was revised in December 2015, with those concepts mentioned above. The AA with the US is currently under discussion. Cooperation in nuclear energy between two countries could be further enhanced through reliable implementation of the NCA undertakings. Taking into account the unique features of the NCA, we need to establish effective strategy for fulfilling the obligation under the Agreement.

  14. Preliminary concepts: materials management in an internationally safeguarded nuclear-waste geologic repository

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ostenak, C.A.; Whitty, W.J.; Dietz, R.J.

    1979-11-01

    Preliminary concepts of materials accountability are presented for an internationally safeguarded nuclear-waste geologic repository. A hypothetical reference repository that receives nuclear waste for emplacement in a geologic medium serves to illustrate specific safeguards concepts. Nuclear wastes received at the reference repository derive from prior fuel-cycle operations. Alternative safeguards techniques ranging from item accounting to nondestructive assay and waste characteristics that affect the necessary level of safeguards are examined. Downgrading of safeguards prior to shipment to the repository is recommended whenever possible. The point in the waste cycle where international safeguards may be terminate depends on the fissile content, feasibility of separation, and practicable recoverability of the waste: termination may not be possible if spent fuels are declared as waste.

  15. DOE/DHS INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM CYBER SECURITY PROGRAMS: A MODEL FOR USE IN NUCLEAR FACILITY SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Robert S. Anderson; Mark Schanfein; Trond Bjornard; Paul Moskowitz

    2011-07-01

    Many critical infrastructure sectors have been investigating cyber security issues for several years especially with the help of two primary government programs. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National SCADA Test Bed and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Control Systems Security Program have both implemented activities aimed at securing the industrial control systems that operate the North American electric grid along with several other critical infrastructure sectors (ICS). These programs have spent the last seven years working with industry including asset owners, educational institutions, standards and regulating bodies, and control system vendors. The programs common mission is to provide outreach, identification of cyber vulnerabilities to ICS and mitigation strategies to enhance security postures. The success of these programs indicates that a similar approach can be successfully translated into other sectors including nuclear operations, safeguards, and security. The industry regulating bodies have included cyber security requirements and in some cases, have incorporated sets of standards with penalties for non-compliance such as the North American Electric Reliability Corporation Critical Infrastructure Protection standards. These DOE and DHS programs that address security improvements by both suppliers and end users provide an excellent model for nuclear facility personnel concerned with safeguards and security cyber vulnerabilities and countermeasures. It is not a stretch to imagine complete surreptitious collapse of protection against the removal of nuclear material or even initiation of a criticality event as witnessed at Three Mile Island or Chernobyl in a nuclear ICS inadequately protected against the cyber threat.

  16. Development of Metallic Magnetic Calorimeters for Nuclear Safeguards Applications

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bates, Cameron Russell [Univ. of California, Berkeley, CA (United States)

    2015-03-11

    Many nuclear safeguards applications could benefit from high-resolution gamma-ray spectroscopy achievable with metallic magnetic calorimeters. This dissertation covers the development of a system for these applications based on gamma-ray detectors developed at the University of Heidelberg. It demonstrates new calorimeters of this type, which achieved an energy resolution of 45.5 eV full-width at half-maximum at 59.54 keV, roughly ten times better than current state of the art high purity germanium detectors. This is the best energy resolution achieved with a gamma-ray metallic magnetic calorimeter at this energy to date. In addition to demonstrating a new benchmark in energy resolution, an experimental system for measuring samples with metallic magnetic calorimeters was constructed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. This system achieved an energy resolution of 91.3 eV full-width at half-maximum at 59.54 keV under optimal conditions. Using this system it was possible to characterize the linearity of the response, the count-rate limitations, and the energy resolution as a function of temperature of the new calorimeter. With this characterization it was determined that it would be feasible to measure 242Pu in a mixed isotope plutonium sample. A measurement of a mixed isotope plutonium sample was performed over the course of 12 days with a single two-pixel metallic magnetic calorimeter. The relative concentration of 242Pu in comparison to other plutonium isotopes was determined by direct measurement to less than half a percent accuracy. This is comparable with the accuracy of the best-case scenario using traditional indirect methods. The ability to directly measure the relative concentration of 242Pu in a sample could enable more accurate accounting and detection of indications of undeclared activities in nuclear safeguards, a better constraint on source material in forensic samples containing plutonium, and improvements in verification in a future plutonium

  17. Innovations in Nuclear Infrastructure and Education

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    John Bernard

    2010-12-13

    The decision to implement the Innovation in Nuclear Infrastructure and Engineering Program (INIE) was an important first step towards ensuring that the United States preserves its worldwide leadership role in the field of nuclear science and engineering. Prior to INIE, university nuclear science and engineering programs were waning, undergraduate student enrollment was down, university research reactors were being shut down, while others faced the real possibility of closure. For too long, cutting edge research in the areas of nuclear medicine, neutron scattering, radiochemistry, and advanced materials was undervalued and therefore underfunded. The INIE program corrected this lapse in focus and direction and started the process of drawing a new blueprint with positive goals and objectives that supports existing as well the next generation of educators, students and researchers.

  18. Integrated neutron/gamma-ray portal monitors for nuclear safeguards

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fehlau, Paul E.

    1994-08-01

    Radiation monitoring is one nuclear-safeguards measure used to protect against the theft of special nuclear materials (SNM) by pedestrians departing from SNM access areas. The integrated neutron/gamma-ray portal monitor is an ideal radiation monitor for the task when the SNM is plutonium. It achieves high sensitivity for detecting both bare and shielded plutonium by combining two types of radiation detector. One type is a neutron-chamber detector, comprising a large, hollow, neutron moderator that contains a single thermal-neutron proportional counter. The entrance wall of each chamber is thin to admit slow neutrons from plutonium contained in a moderating shield, while the other walls are thick to moderate fast neutrons from bare or lead-shielded plutonium so that they can be detected. The other type of detector is a plastic scintillator that is primarily for detecting gamma rays from small amounts of unshielded plutonium. The two types of detector are easily integrated by making scintillators part of the thick back wall of each neutron chamber or by inserting them into each chamber void. We compared the influence of the two methods of integration on detecting neutrons and gamma rays, and we examined the effectiveness of other design factors and the methods for signal detection as well.

  19. Evaluation of a Business Case for Safeguards by Design in Nuclear Power Reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wood, Thomas W.; Seward, Amy M.; Lewis, Valerie A.; Gitau, Ernest TN; Zentner, Michael D.

    2012-12-01

    Safeguards by Design (SbD) is a well-known paradigm for consideration and incorporation of safeguards approaches and associated design features early in the nuclear facility development process. This paradigm has been developed as part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), and has been accepted as beneficial in many discussions and papers on NGSI or specific technologies under development within NGSI. The Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security funded the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to examine the business case justification of SbD for nuclear power reactors. Ultimately, the implementation of SbD will rely on the designers of nuclear facilities. Therefore, it is important to assess the incentives which will lead designers to adopt SbD as a standard practice for nuclear facility design. This report details the extent to which designers will have compelling economic incentives to adopt SbD.

  20. REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON NUCLEAR FACILITY DESIGN INFORMATION EXAMINATION AND VERIFICATION FOR SAFEGUARDS

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Richard Metcalf; Robert Bean

    2009-10-01

    Executive Summary The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements nuclear safeguards and verifies countries are compliant with their international nuclear safeguards agreements. One of the key provisions in the safeguards agreement is the requirement that the country provide nuclear facility design and operating information to the IAEA relevant to safeguarding the facility, and at a very early stage. , This provides the opportunity for the IAEA to verify the safeguards-relevant features of the facility and to periodically ensure that those features have not changed. The national authorities (State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) provide the design information for all facilities within a country to the IAEA. The design information is conveyed using the IAEA’s Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) and specifies: (1) Identification of the facility’s general character, purpose, capacity, and location; (2) Description of the facility’s layout and nuclear material form, location, and flow; (3) Description of the features relating to nuclear material accounting, containment, and surveillance; and (4) Description of existing and proposed procedures for nuclear material accounting and control, with identification of nuclear material balance areas. The DIQ is updated as required by written addendum. IAEA safeguards inspectors examine and verify this information in design information examination (DIE) and design information verification (DIV) activities to confirm that the facility has been constructed or is being operated as declared by the facility operator and national authorities, and to develop a suitable safeguards approach. Under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the National Nuclear Security Administrations (NNSA) Office of Non-Proliferation and International Security identified the need for more effective and efficient verification of design information by the IAEA for improving international safeguards

  1. Application of Telepresence Technologies to Nuclear Material Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wright, M.C.; Rome, J.A.

    1999-09-20

    Implementation of remote monitoring systems has become a priority area for the International Atomic Energy Agency and other international inspection regimes. For the past three years, DOE2000 has been the US Department of Energy's (DOE's) initiative to develop innovative applications to exploit the capabilities of broadband networks and media integration. The aim is to enhance scientific collaboration by merging computing and communications technologies. These Internet-based telepresence technologies could be easily extended to provide remote monitoring and control for confidence building and transparency systems at nuclear facilities around the world. One of the original DOE2000 projects, the Materials Microcharacterization Collaboratory is an interactive virtual laboratory, linking seven DOE user facilities located across the US. At these facilities, external collaborators have access to scientists, data, and instrumentation, all of which are available to varying degrees using the Internet. Remote operation of the instruments varies between passive (observational) to active (direct control), in many cases requiring no software at the remote site beyond a Web browser. Live video streams are continuously available on the Web so that participants can see what is happening at a particular location. An X.509 certificate system provides strong authentication, The hardware and software are commercially available and are easily adaptable to safeguards applications.

  2. Possible Nuclear Safeguards Applications: Workshop on Next-Generation Laser Compton Gamma Source

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Durham, J. Matthew [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States). Physics Division

    2016-11-17

    These are a set of slides for the development of a next-generation photon source white paper. The following topics are covered in these slides: Nuclear Safeguards; The Nuclear Fuel Cycle; Precise isotopic determination via NRF; UF6 Enrichment Assay; and Non-Destructive Assay of Spent Nuclear Fuel. In summary: A way to non-destructively measure precise isotopics of ~kg and larger samples has multiple uses in nuclear safeguards; Ideally this is a compact, fieldable device that can be used by international inspectors. Must be rugged and reliable; A next-generation source can be used as a testing ground for these techniques as technology develops.

  3. Framework for Integrating Safety, Operations, Security, and Safeguards in the Design and Operation of Nuclear Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Darby, John L. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Horak, Karl Emanuel [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); LaChance, Jeffrey L. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Tolk, Keith Michael [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Whitehead, Donnie Wayne [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2007-10-01

    The US is currently on the brink of a nuclear renaissance that will result in near-term construction of new nuclear power plants. In addition, the Department of Energy’s (DOE) ambitious new Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) program includes facilities for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel and reactors for transmuting safeguards material. The use of nuclear power and material has inherent safety, security, and safeguards (SSS) concerns that can impact the operation of the facilities. Recent concern over terrorist attacks and nuclear proliferation led to an increased emphasis on security and safeguard issues as well as the more traditional safety emphasis. To meet both domestic and international requirements, nuclear facilities include specific SSS measures that are identified and evaluated through the use of detailed analysis techniques. In the past, these individual assessments have not been integrated, which led to inefficient and costly design and operational requirements. This report provides a framework for a new paradigm where safety, operations, security, and safeguards (SOSS) are integrated into the design and operation of a new facility to decrease cost and increase effectiveness. Although the focus of this framework is on new nuclear facilities, most of the concepts could be applied to any new, high-risk facility.

  4. System aspects on safeguards for the back-end of the Swedish nuclear fuel cycle

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fritzell, Anni (Dept. of Physics and Astronomy, Uppsala Univ., Uppsala (Sweden))

    2008-03-15

    This thesis has investigated system aspects of safeguarding the back-end of the Swedish nuclear fuel cycle. These aspects include the important notion of continuity of knowledge, the philosophy of verifying measurements and the need to consider the safeguards system as a whole when expanding it to include the encapsulation facility and the geological repository. The research has been analytical in method both in the identification of concrete challenges for the safeguards community in Paper 1, and in the diversion path analysis performed in Paper 2. This method of work is beneficial for example when abstract notions are treated. However, as a suggestion for further work along these lines, a formal systems analysis would be advantageous, and may even reveal properties of the safeguards system that the human mind so far has been to narrow to consider. A systems analysis could be used to model a proposed safeguards approach with the purpose of finding vulnerabilities in its detection probabilities. From the results, capabilities needed to overcome these vulnerabilities could be deduced, thereby formulating formal boundary conditions. These could include: The necessary partial defect level for the NDA measurement; The level of redundancy required in the C/S system to minimize the risk of inconclusive results due to equipment failure; and, Requirements on the capabilities of seismic methods, etc. The field of vulnerability assessment as a tool for systems analysis should be of interest for the safeguards community, as a formal approach could give a new dimension to the credibility of safeguards systems

  5. Development of DUPIC safeguards technology; development of web based nuclear material accounting program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, J. T.; Choi, S. H.; Choi, S. J. [Kongju National University, Kongju (Korea)

    2002-04-01

    The purpose of this project is to develop the web-based digital image processing system with the client/server architecture based on TCP/IP to be able to search and manage image data at the remote place. This system provides a nuclear facility with the ability to track the movement of nuclear material and to control and account nuclear material at anywhere and anytime. Also, this system will be helpful to increase the efficiency of safeguards affairs. The developed web-based digital image processing system for tracking the movement of nuclear material and MC and A can be applied to DUPIC facility. The result of this project will eventually contribute to similar nuclear facilities as well as the effective implementation of DUPIC safeguards. In addition, it will be helpful to enhance international confidence build-up in the peaceful use of spent fuel material. 15 refs., 33 figs., 4 tabs. (Author)

  6. Evolution of Safeguards over Time: Past, Present, and Projected Facilities, Material, and Budget

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kollar, Lenka; Mathews, Caroline E.

    2009-07-01

    This study examines the past trends and evolution of safeguards over time and projects growth through 2030. The report documents the amount of nuclear material and facilities under safeguards from 1970 until present, along with the corresponding budget. Estimates for the future amount of facilities and material under safeguards are made according to non-nuclear-weapons states’ (NNWS) plans to build more nuclear capacity and sustain current nuclear infrastructure. Since nuclear energy is seen as a clean and economic option for base load electric power, many countries are seeking to either expand their current nuclear infrastructure, or introduce nuclear power. In order to feed new nuclear power plants and sustain existing ones, more nuclear facilities will need to be built, and thus more nuclear material will be introduced into the safeguards system. The projections in this study conclude that a zero real growth scenario for the IAEA safeguards budget will result in large resource gaps in the near future.

  7. The U.S./IAEA Workshop on Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation: Report to the NNSA DOE Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (NA-241)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pepper, Susan E. [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States); Pickett, Chris A. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Queirolo, Al [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States); Bachner, Katherine M. [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States); Worrall, Louise G. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

    2015-04-07

    The U.S Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) convened a workshop on Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation in Vienna, Austria, May 6-8, 2014. Safeguards instrumentation software must be sustained in a changing environment to ensure existing instruments can continue to perform as designed, with improved security. The approaches to the development and maintenance of instrument software used in the past may not be the best model for the future and, therefore, the organizers’ goal was to investigate these past approaches and to determine an optimal path forward. The purpose of this report is to provide input for the DOE NNSA Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (NA-241) and other stakeholders that can be utilized when making decisions related to the development and maintenance of software used in the implementation of international nuclear safeguards. For example, this guidance can be used when determining whether to fund the development, upgrade, or replacement of a particular software product. The report identifies the challenges related to sustaining software, and makes recommendations for addressing these challenges, supported by summaries and detailed notes from the workshop discussions. In addition the authors provide a set of recommendations for institutionalizing software sustainability practices in the safeguards community. The term “software sustainability” was defined for this workshop as ensuring that safeguards instrument software and algorithm functionality can be maintained efficiently throughout the instrument lifecycle, without interruption and providing the ability to continue to improve that software as needs arise.

  8. Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Database Description and User’s Manual

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Heidrich, Brenden [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

    2015-11-01

    In 2014, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Science and Technology Innovation initiated the Nuclear Energy (NE)–Infrastructure Management Project by tasking the Nuclear Science User Facilities, formerly the Advanced Test Reactor National Scientific User Facility, to create a searchable and interactive database of all pertinent NE-supported and -related infrastructure. This database, known as the Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Database (NEID), is used for analyses to establish needs, redundancies, efficiencies, distributions, etc., to best understand the utility of NE’s infrastructure and inform the content of infrastructure calls. The Nuclear Science User Facilities developed the database by utilizing data and policy direction from a variety of reports from the U.S. Department of Energy, the National Research Council, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and various other federal and civilian resources. The NEID currently contains data on 802 research and development instruments housed in 377 facilities at 84 institutions in the United States and abroad. The effort to maintain and expand the database is ongoing. Detailed information on many facilities must be gathered from associated institutions and added to complete the database. The data must be validated and kept current to capture facility and instrumentation status as well as to cover new acquisitions and retirements. This document provides a short tutorial on the navigation of the NEID web portal at NSUF-Infrastructure.INL.gov.

  9. Active Interrogation Using Electronic Neutron Generators for Nuclear Safeguards Applications

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    David L. Chichester; Edward H. Seabury

    2008-08-01

    Active interrogation, a measurement technique which uses a radiation source to probe materials and generate unique signatures useful for characterizing those materials, is a powerful tool for assaying special nuclear material. The most commonly used technique for performing active interrogation is to use an electronic neutron generator as the probe radiation source. Exploiting the unique operating characteristics of these devices, including their monoenergetic neutron emissions and their ability to operate in pulsed modes, presents a number of options for performing prompt and delayed signature analyses using both photon and neutron sensors. A review of literature in this area shows multiple applications of the active neutron interrogation technique for performing nuclear nonproliferation measurements. Some examples include measuring the plutonium content of spent fuel, assaying plutonium residue in spent fuel hull claddings, assaying plutonium in aqueous fuel reprocessing process streams, and assaying nuclear fuel reprocessing facility waste streams to detect and quantify fissile material. This paper discusses the historical use of this technique and examines its context within the scope and challenges of next-generation nuclear fuel cycles and advanced concept nuclear fuel cycle facilities.

  10. Passive Measurement of Organic-Scintillator Neutron Signatures for Nuclear Safeguards Applications

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jennfier L. Dolan; Eric C. Miller; Alexis C. Kaplan; Andreas Enqvist; Marek Flaska; Alice Tomanin; Paolo Peerani; David L. Chichester; Sara A. Pozzi

    2012-10-01

    At nuclear facilities, domestically and internationally, most measurement systems used for nuclear materials’ control and accountability rely on He-3 detectors. Due to resource shortages, alternatives to He-3 systems are needed. This paper presents preliminary simulation and experimental efforts to develop a fast-neutron-multiplicity counter based on liquid organic scintillators. This mission also provides the opportunity to broaden the capabilities of such safeguards measurement systems to improve current neutron-multiplicity techniques and expand the scope to encompass advanced nuclear fuels.

  11. Effects of hypothetical improvised nuclear detonation on the electrical infrastructure

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Barrett, Christopher L.; Eubank, Stephen; Evrenosoglu, C. Yaman; Marathe, Achla; Marathe, Madhav V.; Phadke, Arun; Thorp, James; Vullikanti, Anil [Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA (United States). Network Dynamics and Simulation Science Lab.

    2013-07-01

    We study the impacts of a hypothetical improvised nuclear detonation (IND) on the electrical infrastructure and its cascading effects on other urban inter-dependent infrastructures of a major metropolitan area in the US. We synthesize open source information, expert knowledge, commercial software and Google Earth data to derive a realistic electrical transmission and distribution network spanning the region. A dynamic analysis of the geo-located grid is carried out to determine the cause of malfunction of components, and their short-term and long-term effect on the stability of the grid. Finally a detailed estimate of the cost of damage to the major components of the infrastructure is provided.

  12. Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Database Fitness and Suitability Review

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Heidrich, Brenden [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

    2015-03-01

    In 2014, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Science and Technology Innovation (NE-4) initiated the Nuclear Energy-Infrastructure Management Project by tasking the Nuclear Science User Facilities (NSUF) to create a searchable and interactive database of all pertinent NE supported or related infrastructure. This database will be used for analyses to establish needs, redundancies, efficiencies, distributions, etc. in order to best understand the utility of NE’s infrastructure and inform the content of the infrastructure calls. The NSUF developed the database by utilizing data and policy direction from a wide variety of reports from the Department of Energy, the National Research Council, the International Atomic Energy Agency and various other federal and civilian resources. The NEID contains data on 802 R&D instruments housed in 377 facilities at 84 institutions in the US and abroad. A Database Review Panel (DRP) was formed to review and provide advice on the development, implementation and utilization of the NEID. The panel is comprised of five members with expertise in nuclear energy-associated research. It was intended that they represent the major constituencies associated with nuclear energy research: academia, industry, research reactor, national laboratory, and Department of Energy program management. The Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Database Review Panel concludes that the NSUF has succeeded in creating a capability and infrastructure database that identifies and documents the major nuclear energy research and development capabilities across the DOE complex. The effort to maintain and expand the database will be ongoing. Detailed information on many facilities must be gathered from associated institutions added to complete the database. The data must be validated and kept current to capture facility and instrumentation status as well as to cover new acquisitions and retirements.

  13. A Study on Comparison of HANARO and KIJANG Research Reactor in Nuclear Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jung, Juang; Lee, Sung Ho; Kim, Hyun-Jo [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-10-15

    As one of major national projects for nuclear science and engineering in Korea, the KIJANG Research Reactor(KJRR) project was commenced in order to develop the core research reactor(RR) technologies for strengthening the competitiveness of the RR export and also to stabilize the supply of key radioisotopes for medical and industrial applications. This paper is about applying IAEA safeguards at new nuclear facility (KJRR). The beginning of this project is comparing of HANARO and KIJANG research reactor in nuclear safeguards for nuclear material accountancy method. As mentioned before, research reactor is basically item counting facility. In Fig 1, first two processes are belonging to item counting. But last two processes are for bulk handling. So KIJANG RR would be treated item counting facility as well as bulk handling facility by fission moly production facility. For this reason, nuclear material accountancy method for KJRR is not easy compared to existing one. This paper accounted for solution of KJRR nuclear material accountancy briefly. Future study on the suitable nuclear material accountancy method for mixed facility between item counting facility and bulk handling facility will be conducted more specifically.

  14. Signal Estimation Using Wavelet Analysis of Solution Monitoring Data for Nuclear Safeguards

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Tom Burr

    2013-03-01

    Full Text Available Wavelets are explored as a data smoothing (or de-noising option for solution monitoring data in nuclear safeguards. In wavelet-smoothed data, the Gibbs phenomenon can obscure important data features that may be of interest. This paper compares wavelet smoothing to piecewise linear smoothing and local kernel smoothing, and illustrates that the Haar wavelet basis is effective for reducing the Gibbs phenomenon.

  15. Nuclear Safeguards Approach Consideration for HTR With Pebble Fuels

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    LIU; Hong-bin; MIAO; Qiang

    2013-01-01

    High temperature reactor(HTR)is considered to be a kind of fourth generation nuclear energy with advanced technology.It is typically safety,high efficiency and applicable in many areas.HTR has beenlisted as one of 16 significant development projects in the Middle and Long Term National Science and Technology Development Projects(2006—2020).On the basis of the research and development of

  16. The nuclear safeguards system and the process of global governance accountability

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Xavier, Roberto Salles, E-mail: xavier@cnen.gov.b [Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear (CNEN), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil). Coordenacao Geral de Planejamento e Avaliacao

    2011-07-01

    Due to rising energy costs and climate concerns, nuclear energy is again being seriously considered as an energy source for several countries. Along with the resurgence of nuclear energy comes the concern of the world if these countries will develop their programs for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. If on one hand the growth potential of nuclear energy should not be stifled, on the other hand it is imperative that a climate of mutual trust is developed, respecting the right of each country to develop its nuclear program without taking a climate of mistrust to a possible 'intention' behind the pursuit of peaceful use of nuclear energy. Therefore, it is essential that appropriate mechanisms of accountability of global governance are institutionalized at the institutional architecture of the international process of nuclear safeguards, more specifically to the nuclear fuel cycle, so that abuses of power in this sphere does not happen, both by countries that aspire to develop projects nuclear, and by the suppliers of technology. In this context, the case study of Brazil and Argentina gained importance, because these two countries have a single binational organization of nuclear safeguards in the world: Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials - ABACC. In the theoretical question, the paper tries to understand what happens with the process of legitimacy and authority of the organizations of global governance by analyzing the degree of publicness and constrictiveness. This work intends to focus on the role of ABACC as an interstate institution of accountability, which has a key role to control the nation States of Brazil and Argentina regarding the appropriate use of nuclear material used in their programs, and analyze how this Agency behaves within of tension legitimacy-authority, taking into account existing studies on accountability in global governance. (author)

  17. Concerns when designing a safeguards approach for the back-end of the Swedish nuclear fuel cycle

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fritzell, Anni (Uppsala Univ., Uppsala (Sweden))

    2008-03-15

    In Sweden, the construction of an encapsulation plant and a geological repository for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel is planned to start within the next ten years. Due to Sweden's international agreements on non-proliferation, the Swedish safeguards regime must be extended to include these facilities. The geological repository has some unique features, which present the safeguards system with unprecedented challenges. These features include, inter alia, the long period of time that the facility will contain nuclear material and that the disposed nuclear material will be very difficult to access, implying that physical verification of its presence in the repository is not foreseen. This work presents the available techniques for creating a safeguards system for the backend of the Swedish nuclear fuel cycle. Important issues to consider in the planning and implementation of the safeguards system have been investigated, which in some cases has led to an identification of areas needing further research. The results include three proposed options for a safeguards approach, which have been evaluated on the basis of the safeguards authorities' requirements. Also, the evolution and present situation of the work carried out in connection to safeguards for geological repositories has been compiled

  18. Application of Framework for Integrating Safety, Security and Safeguards (3Ss) into the Design Of Used Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Badwan, Faris M. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Demuth, Scott F [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2015-01-06

    Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy, Fuel Cycle Research and Development develops options to the current commercial fuel cycle management strategy to enable the safe, secure, economic, and sustainable expansion of nuclear energy while minimizing proliferation risks by conducting research and development focused on used nuclear fuel recycling and waste management to meet U.S. needs. Used nuclear fuel is currently stored onsite in either wet pools or in dry storage systems, with disposal envisioned in interim storage facility and, ultimately, in a deep-mined geologic repository. The safe management and disposition of used nuclear fuel and/or nuclear waste is a fundamental aspect of any nuclear fuel cycle. Integrating safety, security, and safeguards (3Ss) fully in the early stages of the design process for a new nuclear facility has the potential to effectively minimize safety, proliferation, and security risks. The 3Ss integration framework could become the new national and international norm and the standard process for designing future nuclear facilities. The purpose of this report is to develop a framework for integrating the safety, security and safeguards concept into the design of Used Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility (UNFSF). The primary focus is on integration of safeguards and security into the UNFSF based on the existing Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approach to addressing the safety/security interface (10 CFR 73.58 and Regulatory Guide 5.73) for nuclear power plants. The methodology used for adaptation of the NRC safety/security interface will be used as the basis for development of the safeguards /security interface and later will be used as the basis for development of safety and safeguards interface. Then this will complete the integration cycle of safety, security, and safeguards. The overall methodology for integration of 3Ss will be proposed, but only the integration of safeguards and security will be applied to the design of the

  19. Certified reference materials and reference methods for nuclear safeguards and security.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jakopič, R; Sturm, M; Kraiem, M; Richter, S; Aregbe, Y

    2013-11-01

    Confidence in comparability and reliability of measurement results in nuclear material and environmental sample analysis are established via certified reference materials (CRMs), reference measurements, and inter-laboratory comparisons (ILCs). Increased needs for quality control tools in proliferation resistance, environmental sample analysis, development of measurement capabilities over the years and progress in modern analytical techniques are the main reasons for the development of new reference materials and reference methods for nuclear safeguards and security. The Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements (IRMM) prepares and certifices large quantities of the so-called "large-sized dried" (LSD) spikes for accurate measurement of the uranium and plutonium content in dissolved nuclear fuel solutions by isotope dilution mass spectrometry (IDMS) and also develops particle reference materials applied for the detection of nuclear signatures in environmental samples. IRMM is currently replacing some of its exhausted stocks of CRMs with new ones whose specifications are up-to-date and tailored for the demands of modern analytical techniques. Some of the existing materials will be re-measured to improve the uncertainties associated with their certified values, and to enable laboratories to reduce their combined measurement uncertainty. Safeguards involve the quantitative verification by independent measurements so that no nuclear material is diverted from its intended peaceful use. Safeguards authorities pay particular attention to plutonium and the uranium isotope (235)U, indicating the so-called 'enrichment', in nuclear material and in environmental samples. In addition to the verification of the major ratios, n((235)U)/n((238)U) and n((240)Pu)/n((239)Pu), the minor ratios of the less abundant uranium and plutonium isotopes contain valuable information about the origin and the 'history' of material used for commercial or possibly clandestine purposes, and

  20. Multi-Element CZT Array for Nuclear Safeguards Applications

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kwak, S.-W.; Lee, A.-R.; Shin, J.-K.; Park, U.-R.; Park, S.; Kim, Y.; Chung, H.

    2016-12-01

    Due to its electronic properties, a cadmium zinc telluride (CZT) detector has been used as a hand-held portable nuclear measurement instrument. However, a CZT detector has low detection efficiency because of a limitation of its single crystal growth. To address its low efficiency, we have constructed a portable four-CZT array based gamma-ray spectrometer consisting of a CZT array, electronics for signal processing and software. Its performance has been characterized in terms of energy resolution and detection efficiency using radioactive sources and nuclear materials. Experimental results showed that the detection efficiency of the four-CZT array based gamma-ray spectrometer was much higher than that of a single CZT detector in the array. The FWHMs of the CZT array were 9, 18, and 21 keV at 185.7, 662, and 1,332 keV, respectively. Some gamma-rays in a range of 100 keV to 200 keV were not clear in a single crystal detector while those from the CZT array system were observed to be clear. The energy resolution of the CZT array system was only slightely worse than those of the single CZT detectors. By combining several single crystals and summing signals from each single detector at a digital electronic circuit, the detection efficiency of a CZT array system increased without degradation of its energy resolution. The technique outlined in this paper shows a very promising method for designing a CZT-based gamma-ray spectroscopy that overcomes the fundamental limitations of a small volume CZT detector.

  1. Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence Measurements on ^237Np for Security and Safeguards Applications

    Science.gov (United States)

    Angell, C. T.; Joshi, T.; Yee, Ryan; Norman, E. B.; Kulp, W. D.; Warren, G. A.; Korbly, S.; Klimenko, A.; Wilson, C.; Copping, R.; Shuh, D. K.

    2009-10-01

    The smuggling of nuclear material and the diversion of fissile material for covert weapon programs both present grave risks to world security. Methods are needed to detect nuclear material smuggled in cargo, and for proper material accountability in civilian fuel re-processing facilities. Nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF) is a technique that can address both needs. It is a non-destructive active interrogation method that provides isotope-specific information. It works by using a γ-ray beam to resonantly excite levels in a nucleus and observing the γ-rays emitted whose energy and intensity are characteristic of that isotope. ^237Np presents significant safeguard challenges; it is fissile yet currently has fewer safeguard restrictions. NRF measurements on ^237Np will expand the nuclear database and will permit designing interrogation and assay systems. Measurements were made using the bremsstrahlung beam at the HVRL at MIT on a 7 g target of ^237Np with two incident electron energies of 2.8 and 3.1 MeV. Results will be presented with discussion of the relevant nuclear structure necessary to predict levels in other actinides.

  2. International and national security applications of cryogenic detectors - mostly nuclear safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rabin, Michael W [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01

    As with science, so with security - in both arenas, the extraordinary sensitivity of cryogenic sensors enables high-confidence detection and high-precision measurement even of the faintest signals. Science applications are more mature, but several national and international security applications have been identified where cryogenic detectors have high potential payoff. International safeguards and nuclear forensics are areas needing new technology and methods to boost speed, sensitivity, precision and accuracy. Successfully applied, improved nuclear materials analysis will help constrain nuclear materials diversion pathways and contribute to treaty verification. Cryogenic microcalorimeter detectors for X-ray, gamma ray, neutron, and alpha particle spectrometry are under development with these aims in mind. In each case the unsurpassed energy resolution of microcalorimeters reveals previously invi sible spectral features of nuclear materials. Preliminary results of quantitative analysis indicate substantial improvements are still possible, but significant work will be required to fully understand the ultimate performance limits.

  3. Evaluating Safeguards Benefits of Process Monitoring as compared with Nuclear Material Accountancy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Humberto Garcia; Wen-Chiao Lin; Reed Carlson

    2014-07-01

    This paper illustrates potential safeguards benefits that process monitoring (PM) may have as a diversion deterrent and as a complementary safeguards measure to nuclear material accountancy (NMA). This benefit is illustrated by quantifying the standard deviation associated with detecting a considered material diversion scenario using either an NMA-based method or a PM-based approach. To illustrate the benefits of PM for effective safeguards, we consider a reprocessing facility. We assume that the diversion of interest for detection manifests itself as a loss of Pu caused by abnormally operating a dissolver for an extended period to accomplish protracted diversion (or misdirection) of Pu to a retained (unconditioned) waste stream. For detecting the occurrence of this diversion (which involves anomalous operation of the dissolver), we consider two different data evaluation and integration (DEI) approaches, one based on NMA and the other based on PM. The approach based on PM does not directly do mass balance calculations, but rather monitors for the possible occurrence of anomaly patterns related to potential loss of nuclear material. It is thus assumed that the loss of a given mass amount of nuclear material can be directly associated with the execution of proliferation-driven activities that trigger the occurrence of an anomaly pattern consisting of series of events or signatures occurring at different unit operations and time instances. By effectively assessing these events over time and space, the PM-based DEI approach tries to infer whether this specific pattern of events has occurred and how many times within a given time period. To evaluate the goodness of PM, the 3 Sigma of the estimated mass loss is computed under both DEI approaches as function of the number of input batches processed. Simulation results are discussed.

  4. Predicting linear and nonlinear time series with applications in nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Burr, T.L.

    1994-04-01

    This report is a primer on the analysis of both linear and nonlinear time series with applications in nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation. We analyze eight simulated and two real time series using both linear and nonlinear modeling techniques. The theoretical treatment is brief but references to pertinent theory are provided. Forecasting is our main goal. However, because our most common approach is to fit models to the data, we also emphasize checking model adequacy by analyzing forecast errors for serial correlation or nonconstant variance.

  5. Predicting linear and nonlinear time series with applications in nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Burr, T.L.

    1994-04-01

    This report is a primer on the analysis of both linear and nonlinear time series with applications in nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation. We analyze eight simulated and two real time series using both linear and nonlinear modeling techniques. The theoretical treatment is brief but references to pertinent theory are provided. Forecasting is our main goal. However, because our most common approach is to fit models to the data, we also emphasize checking model adequacy by analyzing forecast errors for serial correlation or nonconstant variance.

  6. Establishment of a clean laboratory for ultra trace analysis of nuclear materials in safeguards environmental samples

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hanzawa, Yukiko; Magara, Masaaki; Watanabe, Kazuo [Japan Atomic Energy Research Inst., Tokai, Ibaraki (Japan). Tokai Research Establishment] (and others)

    2003-01-01

    The Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute has established a cleanroom facility with cleanliness of ISO Class 5: the Clean Laboratory for Environmental Analysis and Research (CLEAR). It was designed to be used for the analysis of nuclear materials in environmental samples mainly for the safeguards, in addition to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty verification and research on environmental sciences. The CLEAR facility was designed to meet conflicting requirements of a cleanroom and for handling of nuclear materials according to Japanese regulations, i.e., to avoid contamination from outside and to contain nuclear materials inside the facility. This facility has been intended to be used for wet chemical treatment, instrumental analysis and particle handling. A fume-hood to provide a clean work surface for handling of nuclear materials was specially designed. Much attention was paid to the selection of construction materials for use to corrosive acids. The performance of the cleanroom and analytical background in the laboratory are discussed. This facility has satisfactory specification required for joining the International Atomic Energy Agency Network of Analytical Laboratories. It can be concluded that the CLEAR facility enables analysis of ultra trace amounts of nuclear materials at sub-pictogram level in environmental samples. (author)

  7. New Features in the Computational Infrastructure for Nuclear Astrophysics

    Science.gov (United States)

    Smith, Michael S.; Lingerfelt, Eric J.; Hix, W. Raphael; Nesaraja, Caroline D.; Thomsen, Kyle

    2011-10-01

    The Computational Infrastructure for Nuclear Astrophysics (CINA) is a platform- independent suite of computer codes that are freely available online at http://nucastrodata.org. The system enhances the utilization of nuclear data by streamlining the process to include the latest data into astrophysics simulations. Users can upload measured or calculated cross sections, process them into reaction rates, incorporate rates into libraries, run simulations with these custom libraries, and store and visualize the results -- all with a simple graphical user interface. New features in CINA include: automated studies of the sensitivity of astrophysical predictions on nuclear input; calculation of thermonuclear reaction rates from resonance information; and the ability to extract information from several additional international databases. Several utilizations of, and future plans for, this software suite will be given.

  8. Reactor safeguards

    CERN Document Server

    Russell, Charles R

    1962-01-01

    Reactor Safeguards provides information for all who are interested in the subject of reactor safeguards. Much of the material is descriptive although some sections are written for the engineer or physicist directly concerned with hazards analysis or site selection problems. The book opens with an introductory chapter on radiation hazards, the construction of nuclear reactors, safety issues, and the operation of nuclear reactors. This is followed by separate chapters that discuss radioactive materials, reactor kinetics, control and safety systems, containment, safety features for water reactor

  9. The Coming Nuclear Renaissance for Next Generation Safeguards Specialists--Maximizing Potential and Minimizing the Risks

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Eipeldauer, Mary D [ORNL

    2009-01-01

    This document is intended to provide an overview of the workshop entitled 'The Coming Nuclear Renaissance for the Next Generation Safeguards Experts-Maximizing Benefits While Minimizing Proliferation Risks', conducted at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in partnership with the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) and the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). This document presents workshop objectives; lists the numerous participant universities and individuals, the nuclear nonproliferation lecture topics covered, and the facilities tours taken as part of the workshop; and discusses the university partnership sessions and proposed areas for collaboration between the universities and ORNL for 2009. Appendix A contains the agenda for the workshop; Appendix B lists the workshop attendees and presenters with contact information; Appendix C contains graphics of the evaluation form results and survey areas; and Appendix D summarizes the responses to the workshop evaluation form. The workshop was an opportunity for ORNL, Y-12, and SRNL staff with more than 30 years combined experience in nuclear nonproliferation to provide a comprehensive overview of their expertise for the university professors and their students. The overall goal of the workshop was to emphasize nonproliferation aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle and to identify specific areas where the universities and experts from operations and national laboratories could collaborate.

  10. The US nuclear weapon infrastructure and a stable global nuclear weapon regime

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Immele, John D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Wagner, Richard L [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01

    US nuclear weapons capabilities -- extant force structure and nuclear weapons infrastructure as well as declared policy -- influence other nations' nuclear weapons postures, at least to some extent. This influence can be desirable or undesirable, and is, of course, a mixture of both. How strong the influence is, and its nature, are complicated, controversial, and -- in our view -- not well understood but often overstated. Divergent views about this influence and how it might shape the future global nuclear weapons regime seem to us to be the most serious impediment to reaching a national consensus on US weapons policy, force structure and supporting infrastructure. We believe that a paradigm shift to capability-based deterrence and dissuasion is not only consistent with the realities of the world and how it has changed, but also a desirable way for nuclear weapon postures and infrastructures to evolve. The US and other nuclear states could not get to zero nor even reduce nuclear arms and the nuclear profile much further without learning to manage latent capability. This paper has defined three principles for designing NW infrastructure both at the 'next plateau' and 'near zero.' The US can be a leader in reducing weapons and infrastructure and in creating an international regime in which capability gradually substitutes for weapons in being and is transparent. The current 'strategy' of not having policy or a Congressionally-approved plan for transforming the weapons complex is not leadership. If we can conform the US infrastructure to the next plateau and architect it in such a way that it is aligned with further arms reductions, it will have these benefits: The extant stockpile can be reduced in size, while the smaller stockpile still deters attack on the US and Allies. The capabilities of the infrastructure will dissuade emergence of new challenges/threats; if they emerge, nevertheless, the US will be able to deal with them in

  11. Uncertainty Quantification for Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Destructive Assay - Fact Sheet

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Croft, Stephen [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Nicholson, Andrew D [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

    2016-04-01

    UQ is the scientific art of generating confidence statements. Without defensible UQ physical measurements and calculations have no meaning. The UQ team performed a series of case studies with the following results: minimum detectable activity of a Tomographic Gamma-Ray Scanning system was determined using the Currie formalism. Bootstrapping method was used to generate fluorescence yield parameters and uncertainties. For Hybrid K-Edge Densitometry (HKED) measurements, these parameters can be used to predict the concentration of plutonium and quantify uncertainty in HKED models for nuclear safeguards measurements. Detection efficiency was determined for a coincidence counter using covariance data. The use of covariance information drastically reduced the total uncertainty in the average detection efficiency.

  12. 10 CFR Appendix C to Part 73 - Nuclear Power Plant Safeguards Contingency Plans

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... recommendations of the safeguards contingency plan review, management findings on whether the safeguards.... Licensee's Organizational Structure for Contingency Responses—A delineation of the organization's chain of... safeguards contingency will be easily accessible, in good working order, and in sufficient supply to...

  13. Case Study for Effectiveness Analysis on Nuclear Regulatory Infrastructure Support for Emerging Nuclear Energy Countries

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Y. E.; Byeon, M. J.; Yoo, J. W.; Lee, J. M.; Lim, J. H. [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    The donor countries need to make decisions on various steps such as whether to fully accept newcomers’ requests, the depth of support, and how the supportive action will be carried out. Such is not an easy task due to limited time, resources, manpower, etc. Thus, creating an infrastructure to support emerging nuclear energy countries is needed. This paper suggests the resource portfolio concept used in business management and aims to analyze the validity of supporting the new entrants’ development of regulatory infrastructure as a case study. This study tries to develop a very simple Excel-based tool for assessing the supporting strategy quantitatively and screening the activities that is projected to be less effective and attractive. There are many countries, so called newcomers, which have expressed interests in developing their own nuclear power program. It has been recognized by the international community that every country considering embarking upon their own nuclear power program should establish their nuclear safety infrastructure to sustain a high level of nuclear safety. The newcomers have requested for considerable assistance from the IAEA and they already have bilateral cooperation programs with the advanced countries with matured nuclear regulatory programs. Currently, the regulatory bodies that provide support are confronted with two responsibilities as follows; the primary objective of the regulatory bodies is to ensure that the operator fulfills the responsibility to protect human health.

  14. Integrated Process Monitoring based on Systems of Sensors for Enhanced Nuclear Safeguards Sensitivity and Robustness

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Humberto E. Garcia

    2014-07-01

    This paper illustrates safeguards benefits that process monitoring (PM) can have as a diversion deterrent and as a complementary safeguards measure to nuclear material accountancy (NMA). In order to infer the possible existence of proliferation-driven activities, the objective of NMA-based methods is often to statistically evaluate materials unaccounted for (MUF) computed by solving a given mass balance equation related to a material balance area (MBA) at every material balance period (MBP), a particular objective for a PM-based approach may be to statistically infer and evaluate anomalies unaccounted for (AUF) that may have occurred within a MBP. Although possibly being indicative of proliferation-driven activities, the detection and tracking of anomaly patterns is not trivial because some executed events may be unobservable or unreliably observed as others. The proposed similarity between NMA- and PM-based approaches is important as performance metrics utilized for evaluating NMA-based methods, such as detection probability (DP) and false alarm probability (FAP), can also be applied for assessing PM-based safeguards solutions. To this end, AUF count estimates can be translated into significant quantity (SQ) equivalents that may have been diverted within a given MBP. A diversion alarm is reported if this mass estimate is greater than or equal to the selected value for alarm level (AL), appropriately chosen to optimize DP and FAP based on the particular characteristics of the monitored MBA, the sensors utilized, and the data processing method employed for integrating and analyzing collected measurements. To illustrate the application of the proposed PM approach, a protracted diversion of Pu in a waste stream was selected based on incomplete fuel dissolution in a dissolver unit operation, as this diversion scenario is considered to be problematic for detection using NMA-based methods alone. Results demonstrate benefits of conducting PM under a system

  15. SAFEGUARDS ENVELOPE

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Duc Cao; Richard Metcalf

    2010-07-01

    The Safeguards Envelope is a strategy to determine a set of specific operating parameters within which nuclear facilities may operate to maximize safeguards effectiveness without sacrificing safety or plant efficiency. This paper details advanced statistical techniques that will be applied to real plant process monitoring (PM) data from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). In a simulation based on this data, multi-tank and multi-attribute correlations were tested against synthetic diversion scenarios. Kernel regression smoothing was used to fit a curve to the historical data, and multivariable, residual analysis and cumulative sum techniques set parameters for operating conditions. Diversion scenarios were created and tested, showing improved results when compared with a previous study utilizing only one-variable Z-testing. A brief analysis of the impact of the safeguards optimization on the rest of plant efficiency, criticality concerns, and overall requirements is presented.

  16. Technology diffusion of a different nature: Applications of nuclear safeguards technology to the chemical weapons verification regime

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kadner, S.P. [Aquila Technologies Group, Inc., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Reisman, A. [Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States); Turpen, E. [Aquila Technologies Group, Inc., Cambridge, MA (United States)

    1996-10-01

    The following discussion focuses on the issue of arms control implementation from the standpoint of technology and technical assistance. Not only are the procedures and techniques for safeguarding nuclear materials undergoing substantial changes, but the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) will give rise to technical difficulties unprecedented in the implementation of arms control verification. Although these regimes present new challenges, an analysis of the similarities between the nuclear and chemical weapons non-proliferation verification regimes illustrates the overlap in technological solutions. Just as cost-effective and efficient technologies can solve the problems faced by the nuclear safeguards community, these same technologies offer solutions for the CWC safeguards regime. With this in mind, experts at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), who are responsible for verification implementation, need to devise a CWC verification protocol that considers the technology already available. The functional similarity of IAEA and the OPCW, in conjunction with the technical necessities of both verification regimes, should receive attention with respect to the establishment of a technical assistance program. Lastly, the advanced status of the nuclear and chemical regime vis-a-vis the biological non-proliferation regime can inform our approach to implementation of confidence building measures for biological weapons.

  17. Critical Infrastructure Protection- Los Alamos National Laboratory

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bofman, Ryan K. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2017-02-24

    Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has been a key facet of Critical National Infrastructure since the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima exposed the nature of the Laboratory’s work in 1945. Common knowledge of the nature of sensitive information contained here presents a necessity to protect this critical infrastructure as a matter of national security. This protection occurs in multiple forms beginning with physical security, followed by cybersecurity, safeguarding of classified information, and concluded by the missions of the National Nuclear Security Administration.

  18. Handbook of nuclear engineering: vol 1: nuclear engineering fundamentals; vol 2: reactor design; vol 3: reactor analysis; vol 4: reactors of waste disposal and safeguards

    CERN Document Server

    2013-01-01

    The Handbook of Nuclear Engineering is an authoritative compilation of information regarding methods and data used in all phases of nuclear engineering. Addressing nuclear engineers and scientists at all academic levels, this five volume set provides the latest findings in nuclear data and experimental techniques, reactor physics, kinetics, dynamics and control. Readers will also find a detailed description of data assimilation, model validation and calibration, sensitivity and uncertainty analysis, fuel management and cycles, nuclear reactor types and radiation shielding. A discussion of radioactive waste disposal, safeguards and non-proliferation, and fuel processing with partitioning and transmutation is also included. As nuclear technology becomes an important resource of non-polluting sustainable energy in the future, The Handbook of Nuclear Engineering is an excellent reference for practicing engineers, researchers and professionals.

  19. Accountability and non-proliferation nuclear regime: a review of the mutual surveillance Brazilian-Argentine model for nuclear safeguards; Accountability e regime de nao proliferacao nuclear: uma avaliacao do modelo de vigilancia mutua brasileiro-argentina de salvaguardas nucleares

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Xavier, Roberto Salles

    2014-08-01

    The regimes of accountability, the organizations of global governance and institutional arrangements of global governance of nuclear non-proliferation and of Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine of Nuclear Safeguards are the subject of research. The starting point is the importance of the institutional model of global governance for the effective control of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this context, the research investigates how to structure the current arrangements of the international nuclear non-proliferation and what is the performance of model Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine of Nuclear Safeguards in relation to accountability regimes of global governance. For that, was searched the current literature of three theoretical dimensions: accountability, global governance and global governance organizations. In relation to the research method was used the case study and the treatment technique of data the analysis of content. The results allowed: to establish an evaluation model based on accountability mechanisms; to assess how behaves the model Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine Nuclear Safeguards front of the proposed accountability regime; and to measure the degree to which regional arrangements that work with systems of global governance can strengthen these international systems. (author)

  20. Strengthening regional safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Palhares, L.; Almeida, G.; Mafra, O. [Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, Rio de Janeiro (Brazil)] [and others

    1996-08-01

    Nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil has been growing since the early 1980`s and as it grew, so did cooperation with the US Department of Energy (DOE). The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was formed in December 1991 to operate the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). In April 1994, ABACC and the DOE signed an Agreement of Cooperation in nuclear material safeguards. This cooperation has included training safeguards inspectors, exchanging nuclear material measurement and containment and surveillance technology, characterizing reference materials, and studying enrichment plant safeguards. The goal of the collaboration is to exchange technology, evaluate new technology in Latin American nuclear facilities, and strengthen regional safeguards. This paper describes the history of the cooperation, its recent activities, and future projects. The cooperation is strongly supported by all three governments: the Republics of Argentina and Brazil and the United States.

  1. Implementation of Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information guidelines for fixed-site safeguards and security (FSSS) at Los Alamos National Laboratory

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rood, P.L.

    1995-02-01

    Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI) is one type of sensitive information that DOE employees, including computer users, must now identify and protect. Guidelines to identify information as UCNI are gradually being put in place. The publication of Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information Topical Guideline for Fixed-Site Safeguards and Security, TG-FSSS-1, is a major step in the development of UCNI guidelines. This DOE published guide cuts across and addresses many different programmatic areas including automated data processing. Our local guideline, Los Alamos National Laboratory Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information Guideline for Fixed-Site Safeguards and Security, IG-LAFSSS-1, is based on TG-FSSS-1. In this paper, I plan to discuss the background of UCNI, the definition of UCNI, information that qualifies as UCNI, the consequences of information being UCNI, the development of UCNI guidelines, TG-FSSS-1 and IG-LAFSSS-1, the relationship of UCNI to classification, and the implementation of the IG-LAFSSS-1 at Los Alamos.

  2. sup 2 sup 5 sup 2 Cf source-correlated transmission measurements and genetic programming for nuclear safeguards

    CERN Document Server

    Pozzi, S A

    2002-01-01

    One of the main targets of nuclear safeguards is to determine the mass and enrichment of fissile samples enclosed in special, non-accessible containers. In this paper, we present a method to estimate the mass of uranium oxide samples based on sup 2 sup 5 sup 2 Cf source-driven noise-analysis measurements. We show that the mass of the samples can be successfully predicted using a genetic programming algorithm. The input presented to the algorithm was in the form of features extracted from the physical properties of the measured correlation functions.

  3. Facility Safeguardability Analysis In Support of Safeguards-by-Design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Philip Casey Durst; Roald Wigeland; Robert Bari; Trond Bjornard; John Hockert; Michael Zentner

    2010-07-01

    The following report proposes the use of Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) to: i) compare and evaluate nuclear safeguards measures, ii) optimize the prospective facility safeguards approach, iii) objectively and analytically evaluate nuclear facility safeguardability, and iv) evaluate and optimize barriers within the facility and process design to minimize the risk of diversion and theft of nuclear material. As proposed by the authors, Facility Safeguardability Analysis would be used by the Facility Designer and/or Project Design Team during the design and construction of the nuclear facility to evaluate and optimize the facility safeguards approach and design of the safeguards system. Through a process of “Safeguards-by-Design” (SBD), this would be done at the earliest stages of project conceptual design and would involve domestic and international nuclear regulators and authorities, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The benefits of the Safeguards-by-Design approach is that it would clarify at a very early stage the international and domestic safeguards requirements for the Construction Project Team, and the best design and operating practices for meeting these requirements. It would also minimize the risk to the construction project, in terms of cost overruns or delays, which might otherwise occur if the nuclear safeguards measures are not incorporated into the facility design at an early stage. Incorporating nuclear safeguards measures is straight forward for nuclear facilities of existing design, but becomes more challenging with new designs and more complex nuclear facilities. For this reason, the facility designer and Project Design Team require an analytical tool for comparing safeguards measures, options, and approaches, and for evaluating the “safeguardability” of the facility. The report explains how preliminary diversion path analysis and the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PRPP) evaluation

  4. Technology development for safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Ho Dong; Kang, H. Y.; Song, D. Y. [and others

    2005-04-01

    The objective of this project are to establish the safeguards technology of the nuclear proliferation resistance to the facilities which handle with high radioactivity nuclear materials like the spent fuel, to provide the foundation of the technical independency for the establishment of the effective management of domestic spent fuels, and to construct the base of the early introduction of the key technology relating to the back-end nuclear fuel cycle through the development of the safeguards technology of the DFDF of the nuclear non-proliferation. The essential safeguards technologies of the facility such as the measurement and account of nuclear materials and the C/S technology were carried out in this stage (2002-2004). The principal results of this research are the development of error reduction technology of the NDA equipment and a new NDA system for the holdup measurement of process materials, the development of the intelligent surveillance system based on the COM, the evaluation of the safeguardability of the Pyroprocessing facility which is the core process of the nuclear fuel cycle, the derivation of the research and development items which are necessary to satisfy the safeguards criteria of IAEA, and the presentation of the direction of the technology development relating to the future safeguards of Korea. This project is the representative research project in the field of the Korea's safeguards. The safeguards technology and equipment developed while accomplishing this project can be applied to other nuclear fuel cycle facilities as well as DFDF and will be contributed to increase the international confidence in the development of the nuclear fuel cycle facility of Korea and its nuclear transparency.

  5. The multi-isotope process monitor: Non-destructive, near-real-time nuclear safeguards monitoring at a reprocessing facility

    Science.gov (United States)

    Orton, Christopher Robert

    The IAEA will require advanced technologies to effectively safeguard nuclear material at envisioned large scale nuclear reprocessing plants. This dissertation describes results from simulations and experiments designed to test the Multi-Isotope Process (MIP) Monitor, a novel safeguards approach for process monitoring in reprocessing plants. The MIP Monitor combines the detection of intrinsic gamma ray signatures emitted from process solutions with multivariate analysis to detect off-normal conditions in process streams, nondestructively and in near-real time (NRT). Three different models were used to predict spent nuclear fuel composition, estimate chemical distribution during separation, and simulate spectra from a variety of gamma detectors in product and raffinate streams for processed fuel. This was done for fuel with various irradiation histories and under a variety of plant operating conditions. Experiments were performed to validate the results from the model. Three segments of commercial spent nuclear fuel with variations in burnup and cooling time were dissolved and subjected to a batch PUREX method to separate the uranium and plutonium from fission and activation products. Gamma spectra were recorded by high purity germanium (HPGe) and cadmium zinc telluride (CZT) detectors. Hierarchal Cluster Analysis (HCA) and Principal Component Analysis (PCA) were applied to spectra from both model and experiment to investigate spectral variations as a function of acid concentration, burnup level and cooling time. Partial Least Squares was utilized to extract quantitative information about process variables, such as acid concentration or burnup. The MIP Monitor was found to be sensitive to the induced variations of the process and was capable of extracting quantitative process information from the analyzed spectra.

  6. INFRASTRUCTURE

    CERN Multimedia

    A. Gaddi and P. Tropea

    2012-01-01

    The CMS Infrastructures teams are preparing for the LS1 activities. A long list of maintenance, consolidation and upgrade projects for CMS Infrastructures is on the table and is being discussed among Technical Coordination and sub-detector representatives. Apart from the activities concerning the cooling infrastructures (see below), two main projects have started: the refurbishment of the SX5 building, from storage area to RP storage and Muon stations laboratory; and the procurement of a new dry-gas (nitrogen and dry air) plant for inner detector flushing. We briefly present here the work done on the first item, leaving the second one for the next CMS Bulletin issue. The SX5 building is entering its third era, from main assembly building for CMS from 2000 to 2007, to storage building from 2008 to 2012, to RP storage and Muon laboratory during LS1 and beyond. A wall of concrete blocks has been erected to limit the RP zone, while the rest of the surface has been split between the ME1/1 and the CSC/DT laborat...

  7. INFRASTRUCTURE

    CERN Multimedia

    A.Gaddi

    2011-01-01

    Between the end of March to June 2011, there has been no detector downtime during proton fills due to CMS Infrastructures failures. This exceptional performance is a clear sign of the high quality work done by the CMS Infrastructures unit and its supporting teams. Powering infrastructure At the end of March, the EN/EL group observed a problem with the CMS 48 V system. The problem was a lack of isolation between the negative (return) terminal and earth. Although at that moment we were not seeing any loss of functionality, in the long term it would have led to severe disruption to the CMS power system. The 48 V system is critical to the operation of CMS: in addition to feeding the anti-panic lights, essential for the safety of the underground areas, it powers all the PLCs (Twidos) that control AC power to the racks and front-end electronics of CMS. A failure of the 48 V system would bring down the whole detector and lead to evacuation of the cavern. EN/EL technicians have made an accurate search of the fault, ...

  8. INFRASTRUCTURE

    CERN Multimedia

    A. Gaddi and P. Tropea

    2011-01-01

    Most of the work relating to Infrastructure has been concentrated in the new CSC and RPC manufactory at building 904, on the Prevessin site. Brand new gas distribution, powering and HVAC infrastructures are being deployed and the production of the first CSC chambers has started. Other activities at the CMS site concern the installation of a new small crane bridge in the Cooling technical room in USC55, in order to facilitate the intervention of the maintenance team in case of major failures of the chilled water pumping units. The laser barrack in USC55 has been also the object of a study, requested by the ECAL community, for the new laser system that shall be delivered in few months. In addition, ordinary maintenance works have been performed during the short machine stops on all the main infrastructures at Point 5 and in preparation to the Year-End Technical Stop (YETS), when most of the systems will be carefully inspected in order to ensure a smooth running through the crucial year 2012. After the incide...

  9. Evaluation of beta spectrometry for environmental monitoring of undeclared nuclear activities. Report on task FIN A846 on the Finnish support programme to IAEA safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rosenberg, R.; Lipponen, M. [VTT Chemical Technology, Espoo (Finland); Jaakkola, T. [Helsinki Univ. (Finland). Dept. of Radiochemistry

    1996-03-01

    The IAEA (the Agency) is considering environmental monitoring as a possible method to detect the presence of undeclared nuclear activities in a country covered by a comprehensive safeguards agreement. The Finnish support program (FINSP), implemented by the Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety (STUK), is supporting the Agency in this new programme. This Agency Task FIN A 846, addresses the possibility of using beta-emitting nuclides as indicators for covert nuclear fuel reprocessing activities. (90 refs., 1 fig., 12 tabs.).

  10. The safeguards options study

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Mullen, M.F.; Olinger, C.T.; Stanbro, W.D. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Olsen, A.P.; Roche, C.T.; Rudolph, R.R. [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States); Bieber, A.M.; Lemley, J. [Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States); Filby, E. [Idaho National Engineering Lab., Idaho Falls, ID (United States)] [and others

    1995-04-01

    The Safeguards Options Study was initiated to aid the International Safeguards Division (ISD) of the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation in developing its programs in enhanced international safeguards. The goal was to provide a technical basis for the ISD program in this area. The Safeguards Options Study has been a cooperative effort among ten organizations. These are Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Mound Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories, and Special Technologies Laboratory. Much of the Motivation for the Safeguards Options Study is the recognition after the Iraq experience that there are deficiencies in the present approach to international safeguards. While under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at their declared facilities, Iraq was able to develop a significant weapons program without being noticed. This is because negotiated safeguards only applied at declared sites. Even so, their nuclear weapons program clearly conflicted with Iraq`s obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear weapon state.

  11. INFRASTRUCTURE

    CERN Multimedia

    A. Gaddi

    2012-01-01

    The CMS Infrastructures teams are constantly ensuring the smooth operation of the different services during this critical period when the detector is taking data at full speed. A single failure would spoil hours of high luminosity beam and everything is put in place to avoid such an eventuality. In the meantime however, the fast approaching LS1 requires that we take a look at the various activities to take place from the end of the year onwards. The list of infrastructures consolidation and upgrade tasks is already long and will touch all the services (cooling, gas, inertion, powering, etc.). The definitive list will be available just before the LS1 start. One activity performed by the CMS cooling team that is worth mentioning is the maintenance of the cooling circuits at the CMS Electronics Integration Centre (EIC) at building 904. The old chiller has been replaced by a three-units cooling plant that also serves the HVAC system for the new CSC and RPC factories. The commissioning of this new plant has tak...

  12. INFRASTRUCTURE

    CERN Multimedia

    Andrea Gaddi

    2010-01-01

    In addition to the intense campaign of replacement of the leaky bushing on the Endcap circuits, other important activities have also been completed, with the aim of enhancing the overall reliability of the cooling infrastructures at CMS. Remaining with the Endcap circuit, the regulating valve that supplies cold water to the primary side of the circuit heat-exchanger, is not well adapted in flow capability and a new part has been ordered, to be installed during a stop of LHC. The instrumentation monitoring of the refilling rate of the circuits has been enhanced and we can now detect leaks as small as 0.5 cc/sec, on circuits that have nominal flow rates of some 20 litres/sec. Another activity starting now that the technical stop is over is the collection of spare parts that are difficult to find on the market. These will be stored at P5 with the aim of reducing down-time in case of component failure. Concerning the ventilation infrastructures, it has been noticed that in winter time the relative humidity leve...

  13. Preparations for the start-up of a research program in nuclear safeguards at Chalmers - Stage 2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kitamura, Yasunori; Pazsit, Imre

    2004-12-01

    This report gives an account of the work performed at the Dept. of Reactor Physics at Chalmers Univ. of Technology in the second stage of the preparations for the start-up of a research program in nuclear safeguards and nuclear material management. The program is aimed at utilizing the experimental facilities as well as the experience in reactor physics, criticality safety, signal processing and unfolding, and experimental nuclear techniques, in tackling problems in non-destructive assay (NDA) of nuclear materials. During the present project, the following three main subjects were dealt with: first tests and pilot measurements were performed with one of the two newly acquired {sup 252}Cf detectors that were obtained from JNC Japan; the second exercise of the ESARDA benchmark. which consisted of the evaluation of the pulse train generated by Los Alamos Laboratory for multiplicity counting was performed and reported to the organisers of the benchmark; the modified Monte-Carlo code MCNP-PoliMi was installed, tested and work started for generating (although outside the ESARDA benchmark), pulse train data as obtained from various neutron sources with or without the presence of fissile material, as detected with an Active Well Coincidence Counter.

  14. Perspectives for photonuclear research at the Extreme Light Infrastructure - Nuclear Physics (ELI-NP) facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Filipescu, D.; Balabanski, D.L.; Constantin, P.; Gales, S.; Tesileanu, O.; Ur, C.A.; Ursu, I.; Zamfir, N.V. [Horia Hulubei National Institute for R and D in Physics and Nuclear Engineering (IFIN-HH), Extreme Light Infrastructure - Nuclear Physics (ELI-NP), Bucharest-Magurele (Romania); Anzalone, A.; La Cognata, M.; Spitaleri, C. [INFN-LNS, Catania (Italy); Belyshev, S.S. [Lomonosov Moscow State University, Physics Faculty, Moscow (Russian Federation); Camera, F. [Departement of Physics, University of Milano, Milano (Italy); INFN section of Milano, Milano (Italy); Csige, L.; Krasznahorkay, A. [Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA Atomki), Institute of Nuclear Research, Post Office Box 51, Debrecen (Hungary); Cuong, P.V. [Vietnam Academy of Science and Technology, Centre of Nuclear Physics, Institute of Physics, Hanoi (Viet Nam); Cwiok, M.; Dominik, W.; Mazzocchi, C. [University of Warsaw, Warszawa (Poland); Derya, V.; Zilges, A. [University of Cologne, Institute for Nuclear Physics, Cologne (Germany); Gai, M. [University of Connecticut, LNS at Avery Point, Connecticut, Groton (United States); Gheorghe, I. [Horia Hulubei National Institute for R and D in Physics and Nuclear Engineering (IFIN-HH), Extreme Light Infrastructure - Nuclear Physics (ELI-NP), Bucharest-Magurele (Romania); University of Bucharest, Nuclear Physics Department, Post Office Box MG-11, Bucharest-Magurele (Romania); Ishkhanov, B.S. [Lomonosov Moscow State University, Physics Faculty, Moscow (Russian Federation); Lomonosov Moscow State University, Skobeltsyn Institute of Nuclear Physics, Moscow (Russian Federation); Kuznetsov, A.A.; Orlin, V.N.; Stopani, K.A.; Varlamov, V.V. [Lomonosov Moscow State University, Skobeltsyn Institute of Nuclear Physics, Moscow (Russian Federation); Pietralla, N. [Technische Universitat Darmstadt, Institut fur Kernphysik, Darmstadt (Germany); Sin, M. [University of Bucharest, Nuclear Physics Department, Post Office Box MG-11, Bucharest-Magurele (Romania); Utsunomiya, H. [Konan University, Department of Physics, Kobe (Japan); University of Tokyo, Center for Nuclear Study, Saitama (Japan); Weller, H.R. [Triangle Universities Nuclear Laboratory, North Carolina, Durham (United States); Duke University, Department of Physics, North Carolina, Durham (United States)

    2015-12-15

    The perspectives for photonuclear experiments at the new Extreme Light Infrastructure - Nuclear Physics (ELI-NP) facility are discussed in view of the need to accumulate novel and more precise nuclear data. The parameters of the ELI-NP gamma beam system are presented. The emerging experimental program, which will be realized at ELI-NP, is presented. Examples of day-one experiments with the nuclear resonance fluorescence technique, photonuclear reaction measurements, photofission experiments and studies of nuclear collective excitation modes and competition between various decay channels are discussed. The advantages which ELI-NP provides for all these experiments compared to the existing facilities are discussed. (orig.)

  15. INFRASTRUCTURE

    CERN Multimedia

    A. Gaddi

    2011-01-01

    During the last winter technical stop, a number of corrective maintenance activities and infrastructure consolidation work-packages were completed. On the surface, the site cooling facility has passed the annual maintenance process that includes the cleaning of the two evaporative cooling towers, the maintenance of the chiller units and the safety checks on the software controls. In parallel, CMS teams, reinforced by PH-DT group personnel, have worked to shield the cooling gauges for TOTEM and CASTOR against the magnetic stray field in the CMS Forward region, to add labels to almost all the valves underground and to clean all the filters in UXC55, USC55 and SCX5. Following the insertion of TOTEM T1 detector, the cooling circuit has been branched off and commissioned. The demineraliser cartridges have been replaced as well, as they were shown to be almost saturated. New instrumentation has been installed in the SCX5 PC farm cooling and ventilation network, in order to monitor the performance of the HVAC system...

  16. INFRASTRUCTURE

    CERN Multimedia

    Andrea Gaddi

    2010-01-01

    During the last six months, the main activity on the cooling circuit has essentially been preventive maintenance. At each short machine technical stop, a water sample is extracted out of every cooling circuit to measure the induced radioactivity. Soon after, a visual check of the whole detector cooling network is done, looking for water leaks in sensitive locations. Depending on sub-system availability, the main water filters are replaced; the old ones are inspected and sent to the CERN metallurgical lab in case of suspicious sediments. For the coming winter technical stop, a number of corrective maintenance activities and infrastructure consolidation work-packages are foreseen. A few faulty valves, found on the muon system cooling circuit, will be replaced; the cooling gauges for TOTEM and CASTOR, in the CMS Forward region, will be either changed or shielded against the magnetic stray field. The demineralizer cartridges will be replaced as well. New instrumentation will also be installed in the SCX5 PC farm ...

  17. INFRASTRUCTURE

    CERN Multimedia

    Andrea Gaddi.

    The various water-cooling circuits ran smoothly over the summer. The overall performance of the cooling system is satisfactory, even if some improvements are possible, concerning the endcap water-cooling and the C6F14 circuits. In particular for the endcap cooling circuit, we aim to lower the water temperature, to provide more margin for RPC detectors. An expert-on-call piquet has been established during the summer global run, assuring the continuous supervision of the installations. An effort has been made to collect and harmonize the existing documentation on the cooling infrastructures at P5. The last six months have seen minor modifications to the electrical power network at P5. Among these, the racks in USC55 for the Tracker and Sniffer systems, which are backed up by the diesel generator in case of power outage, have been equipped with new control boxes to allow a remote restart. Other interventions have concerned the supply of assured power to those installations that are essential for CMS to run eff...

  18. INFRASTRUCTURE

    CERN Multimedia

    A. Gaddi and P. Tropea

    2013-01-01

      Most of the CMS infrastructures at P5 will go through a heavy consolidation-work period during LS1. All systems, from the cryogenic plant of the superconducting magnet to the rack powering in the USC55 counting rooms, from the cooling circuits to the gas distribution, will undergo consolidation work. As announced in the last issue of the CMS Bulletin, we present here one of the consolidation projects of LS1: the installation of a new dry-gas plant for inner detectors inertion. So far the oxygen and humidity suppression inside the CMS Tracker and Pixel volumes were assured by flushing dry nitrogen gas evaporated from a large liquid nitrogen tank. For technical reasons, the maximum flow is limited to less than 100 m3/h and the cost of refilling the tank every two weeks with liquid nitrogen is quite substantial. The new dry-gas plant will supply up to 400 m3/h of dry nitrogen (or the same flow of dry air, during shut-downs) with a comparatively minimal operation cost. It has been evaluated that the...

  19. INFRASTRUCTURE

    CERN Multimedia

    Andrea Gaddi

    With all the technical services running, the attention has moved toward the next shutdown that will be spent to perform those modifications needed to enhance the reliability of CMS Infrastructures. Just to give an example for the cooling circuit, a set of re-circulating bypasses will be installed into the TS/CV area to limit the pressure surge when a circuit is partially shut-off. This problem has affected especially the Endcap Muon cooling circuit in the past. Also the ventilation of the UXC55 has to be revisited, allowing the automatic switching to full extraction in case of magnet quench. (Normally 90% of the cavern air is re-circulated by the ventilation system.) Minor modifications will concern the gas distribution, while the DSS action-matrix has to be refined according to the experience gained with operating the detector for a while. On the powering side, some LV power lines have been doubled and the final schematics of the UPS coverage for the counting rooms have been released. The most relevant inte...

  20. INFRASTRUCTURE

    CERN Multimedia

    A. Gaddi

    The long winter shut-down allows for modifications that will improve the reliability of the detector infrastructures at P5. The annual maintenance of detector services is taking place as well. This means a full stop of water-cooling circuits from November 24th with a gradual restart from mid January 09. The annual maintenance service includes the cleaning of the two SF5 cooling towers, service of the chiller plants on the surface, and the cryogenic plant serving the CMS Magnet. In addition, the overall site power is reduced from 8MW to 2MW, compatible with the switchover to the Swiss power network in winter. Full power will be available again from end of January. Among the modification works planned, the Low Voltage cabinets are being refurbished; doubling the cable sections and replacing the 40A circuit breakers with 60A types. This will reduce the overheating that has been experienced. Moreover, two new LV transformers will be bought and pre-cabled in order to assure a quick swap in case of failure of any...

  1. Emergency preparedness source term development for the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards-Licensed Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sutter, S.L.; Mishima, J.; Ballinger, M.Y.; Lindsey, C.G.

    1984-08-01

    In order to establish requirements for emergency preparedness plans at facilities licensed by the Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) needs to develop source terms (the amount of material made airborne) in accidents. These source terms are used to estimate the potential public doses from the events, which, in turn, will be used to judge whether emergency preparedness plans are needed for a particular type of facility. Pacific Northwest Laboratory is providing the NRC with source terms by developing several accident scenarios for eleven types of fuel cycle and by-product operations. Several scenarios are developed for each operation, leading to the identification of the maximum release considered for emergency preparedness planning (MREPP) scenario. The MREPP scenarios postulated were of three types: fire, tornado, and criticality. Fire was significant at oxide fuel fabrication, UF/sub 6/ production, radiopharmaceutical manufacturing, radiopharmacy, sealed source manufacturing, waste warehousing, and university research and development facilities. Tornadoes were MREPP events for uranium mills and plutonium contaminated facilities, and criticalities were significant at nonoxide fuel fabrication and nuclear research and development facilities. Techniques for adjusting the MREPP release to different facilities are also described.

  2. Innovations in Nuclear Infrastructure and Education From the SW Consortium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Reece, Warren

    2011-03-22

    This report describes the final expenditures for the INIE project during FY 08/09. (There were no expenditures during FY09/10 or during FY10/11.) To see the list of accomplishments done using the INIE funds, please see the reports included here. The last of the FY 07/08 funds were brought forward and used to complete two distance education modules teaching reactor experiments. These modules and parts from the modules are still being used and are being disseminated off-campus as a part of our distance education effort. The second largest expenditure was sending students to the ANS to present student papers on work that they had done the previous year underwritten by INIE funds. The remaining expenditures were IDC charges and minor travel expenses to give students a tour of a medical facility. Once again we wish to express of sincere appreciation of the INIE program and hope that the return on investment is appreciated by the DOE. Although INIE has come to a close, looking back at all the Consortium has accomplished is astounding. And, as was hoped, these funds have proved to be a springboard for continuing work, particularly at Texas A&M. With the resurgence of nuclear power, the utilities have realized that the nuclear workforce in the near future will be too small for the task of bringing dozens of new plants on line and have turned their attention to the URRs to help feed the workforce pipeline. The distance education modules developed at the A&M are soon to be broadcast throughout the country to help train a new generation of nuclear workers. Our students at the Nuclear Science Center at being snapped up by the nuclear power plants after graduating. Our research projects at A&M have all ended with new data, new ways of looking at old problems, and produced a covey of good students. I want to say 'Thanks' with utmost sincerity because without the INIE funds our efforts would yield a small fraction of the accomplishments you see in this report.

  3. Supplemental Report on Nuclear Safeguards Considerations for the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Moses, David Lewis [ORNL; Ehinger, Michael H [ORNL

    2010-05-01

    Recent reports by Department of Energy National Laboratories have discussed safeguards considerations for the low enriched uranium (LEU) fueled Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) and the need for bulk accountancy of the plutonium in used fuel. These reports fail to account effectively for the degree of plutonium dilution in the graphitized-carbon pebbles that is sufficient to meet the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) 'provisional' guidelines for termination of safeguards on 'measured discards.' The thrust of this finding is not to terminate safeguards but to limit the need for specific accountancy of plutonium in stored used fuel. While the residual uranium in the used fuel may not be judged sufficiently diluted to meet the IAEA provisional guidelines for termination of safeguards, the estimated quantities of {sup 232}U and {sup 236}U in the used fuel at the target burn-up of {approx}91 GWD/MT exceed specification limits for reprocessed uranium (ASTM C787) and will require extensive blending with either natural uranium or uranium enrichment tails to dilute the {sup 236}U content to fall within specification thus making the PBMR used fuel less desirable for commercial reprocessing and reuse than that from light water reactors. Also the PBMR specific activity of reprocessed uranium isotopic mixture and its A{sub 2} values for effective dose limit if released in a dispersible form during a transportation accident are more limiting than the equivalent values for light water reactor spent fuel at 55 GWD/MT without accounting for the presence of the principal carry-over fission product ({sup 99}Tc) and any possible plutonium contamination that may be present from attempted covert reprocessing. Thus, the potentially recoverable uranium from PBMR used fuel carries reactivity penalties and radiological penalties likely greater than those for reprocessed uranium from light water reactors. These factors impact the economics of

  4. Considerations for Possible Light Impact of Spent Nuclear Fuel for Safeguards Measurements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Brian K. Castle; Kelly D. Ellis

    2012-09-01

    This effort is designed to be a preliminary study to determine the appropriateness of lightly contacting SNF with zirconium-based cladding, in wet storage, for the purpose of taking safeguards measurements. Contact will likely consist of an initial impact followed by a light tensile load on the exterior surface of the SNF cladding. In the past, concerns have been raised that contacting SNF cladding could result in a loss of long-term mechanical integrity due to crack initiation, uncontrolled crack propagation, and a mechanical exfoliation of the protective oxide layer. The mechanical integrity concerns are addressed with an analytic model that evaluates the threshold impact limits for degraded, but undamaged SNF cladding. Aqueous corrosion concerns, associated with exfoliation of the protective oxide layer, are addressed with a qualitative argument, focusing on the possible corrosion mechanisms of zirconium-based cladding.

  5. Safeguards and physics measurements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Carchon, R

    2002-04-01

    SCK-CEN's programme on safeguards and physics measurements involves gamma and neutron dosimetry, calibrations and irradiations, electronic support, metrology of various samples including internal contamination of human beings, of waste barrels and of fissile materials, neutron activation analysis, and radioisotope source preparation. The document reports on the main activities and achievements of the sections 'Instrumentation, Calibration and Dosimetry' and 'Safeguards and Nuclear Physics Measurements'.

  6. Us-Japan cooperation on safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Beddingfield, David H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Menlove, Howard O [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Hori, Masato [JAEA; Kawakubo, Yoko [JAEA; Mcclelland - Kerr, J [NNSA

    2009-01-01

    There is a long history of collaborative safeguards development between the United States and Japan. Japan has built, and continues to expand, the largest civil nuclear fuel cycle under full-scope IAEA safeguards in world. This development has posed unique challenges to the international safeguards system. Safeguards developments made through the US-Japan cooperation to address these unique challenges have significantly impacted the technologies deployed for international safeguards applications around the world.

  7. Measuring Safeguards Culture

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2011-07-19

    As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

  8. Update of the α - n Yields for Reactor Fuel Materials for the Interest of Nuclear Safeguards

    Science.gov (United States)

    Simakov, S. P.; van den Berg, Q. Y.

    2017-01-01

    The neutron yields caused by spontaneous α-decay of actinides and subsequent (α,xn) reactions were re-evaluated for the reactor fuel materials UO2, UF6, PuO2 and PuF4. For this purpose, the most recent reference data for decay parameters, α-particle stopping powers and (α,xn) cross sections were collected, analysed and used in calculations. The input data and elaborated code were validated against available thick target neutron yields in pure and compound materials measured at accelerators or with radioactive sources. This paper provides the specific neutron yields and their uncertainties resultant from α-decay of actinides 241Am, 249Bk, 252Cf, 242,244Cm, 237Np, 238-242Pu, 232Th and 232-236,238U in oxide and fluoride compounds. The obtained results are an update of previous reference tables issued by the Los Alamos National Laboratory in 1991 which were used for the safeguarding of radioactive materials by passive non-destructive techniques. The comparison of the updated values with previous ones shows an agreement within one estimated uncertainty (≈ 10%) for oxides, and deviations of up to 50% for fluorides.

  9. Safeguards by Design Challenge

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Alwin, Jennifer Louise [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2016-09-13

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA’s limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

  10. FURTHER ASSESSMENTS OF THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF MATERIALS IN ADVANCED NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES FROM A SAFEGUARDS PERSPECTIVE

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bathke, C. G.; Jarvinen, G. D.; Wallace, R. K.; Ireland, J. R.; Johnson, M. W.; Sleaford, Brad W.; Ebbinghaus, B. B.; Bradley, Keith S.; Collins, Brian A.; Smith, Brian W.; Prichard, Andrew W.

    2008-10-01

    This paper summarizes the results of an extension to an earlier study [ ] that examined the attractiveness of materials mixtures containing special nuclear materials (SNM) associated with the PUREX, UREX+, and COEX reprocessing schemes. This study focuses on the materials associated with the UREX, COEX, THOREX, and PYROX reprocessing schemes. This study also examines what is required to render plutonium as “unattractive.” Furthermore, combining the results of this study with those from the earlier study permits a comparison of the uranium and thorium based fuel cycles on the basis of the attractiveness of the SNM associated with each fuel cycle. Both studies were performed at the request of the United States Department of Energy (DOE), and are based on the calculation of “attractiveness levels” that has been couched in terms chosen for consistency with those normally used for nuclear materials in DOE nuclear facilities [ ]. The methodology and key findings will be presented. Additionally, how these attractiveness levels relate to proliferation resistance (e.g. by increasing impediments to the diversion, theft, undeclared production of SNM for the purpose of acquiring a nuclear weapon), and how they could be used to help inform policy makers, will be discussed.

  11. Adversary modeling: an analysis of criminal activities analogous to potential threats to nuclear safeguard systems

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Heineke, J.M.

    1978-12-20

    This study examines and analyzes several classes of incidents in which decision makers are confronted with adversaries. The classes are analogous to adversaries in a material control system in a nuclear facility. Both internal threats (bank frauds and embezzlements) and external threats (aircraft hijackings and hostage-type terrorist events were analyzed. (DLC)

  12. Network Computing Infrastructure to Share Tools and Data in Global Nuclear Energy Partnership

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kim, Guehee; Suzuki, Yoshio; Teshima, Naoya

    CCSE/JAEA (Center for Computational Science and e-Systems/Japan Atomic Energy Agency) integrated a prototype system of a network computing infrastructure for sharing tools and data to support the U.S. and Japan collaboration in GNEP (Global Nuclear Energy Partnership). We focused on three technical issues to apply our information process infrastructure, which are accessibility, security, and usability. In designing the prototype system, we integrated and improved both network and Web technologies. For the accessibility issue, we adopted SSL-VPN (Security Socket Layer-Virtual Private Network) technology for the access beyond firewalls. For the security issue, we developed an authentication gateway based on the PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) authentication mechanism to strengthen the security. Also, we set fine access control policy to shared tools and data and used shared key based encryption method to protect tools and data against leakage to third parties. For the usability issue, we chose Web browsers as user interface and developed Web application to provide functions to support sharing tools and data. By using WebDAV (Web-based Distributed Authoring and Versioning) function, users can manipulate shared tools and data through the Windows-like folder environment. We implemented the prototype system in Grid infrastructure for atomic energy research: AEGIS (Atomic Energy Grid Infrastructure) developed by CCSE/JAEA. The prototype system was applied for the trial use in the first period of GNEP.

  13. Neutron flux from a 14‐MeV neutron generator with tungsten filter for research in NDA methods for nuclear safeguards and security

    OpenAIRE

    2009-01-01

    The Joint Research Centre has taken into operation a new experimental device designed for research in the fields of nuclear safeguards and security applications. The research projects currently undertaken include detection of shielded contraband materials, detection of fissile materials, and mass determination of small fissile materials in shielded containers. The device, called the Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly (PUNITA), incorporates a pulsed 14‐MeV (D‐T) neutron generator and a...

  14. Potential application of LIBS to NNSA next generation safeguards initiative (NGSI)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Barefield Ii, James E [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Clegg, Samuel M [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Veirs, Douglas K [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Browne, Mike [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Lopez, Leon [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Martinez, Ron [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Le, Loan [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Lamontagne, Stephen A [DOE/NNSA/NA241; Veal, Kevin [NN/ADTR

    2009-01-01

    In a climate in which states and nations have been and perhaps currently are involved in the prol iferation of nuclear materials and technologies, advanced methodologies and improvements in current measurement techniques are needed to combat new threats and increased levels of sophistication. The Department of Energy through the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has undertaken a broad review of International Safeguards. The conclusion from that review was that a comprehensive initiative to revitalize international safeguards technology and the human resource base was urgently needed to keep pace with demands and increasingly sophisticated emerging safeguards challenges. To address these challenges, NNSA launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to develop policies, concepts, technologies, expertise, and infrastructure necessary to sustain the international safeguards system as its mission evolves for the next 25 years. NGSI is designed to revitalize and strengthen the U.S. safeguards technical base, recognizing that without a robust program the United States of America will not be in a position to exercise leadership or provide the necessary support to the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). International safeguards as administrated by the IAEA are the primary vehicle for verifying compliance with the peaceful use and nonproliferation of nuclear materials and technologies. Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy or LIBS has the potential to support the goals of NGSI as follows: by providing (1) automated analysis in complex nuclear processing or reprocessing facilities in real-time or near real-time without sample preparation or removal, (2) isotopic and important elemental ratio (Cm/Pu, Cm/U, ... etc) analysis, and (3) centralized remote control, process monitoring, and analysis of nuclear materials in nuclear facilities at multiple locations within the facility. Potential application of LIBS to international safeguards as

  15. Active neutron methods for nuclear safeguards applications using Helium-4 gas scintillation detectors

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lewis, Jason M.

    Active neutron methods use a neutron source to interrogate fissionable material. In this work a 4He gas scintillation fast neutron detection system is used to measure neutrons created by the interrogation. Three new applications of this method are developed: spent nuclear fuel assay, fission rate measurement, and special nuclear material detection. Three active neutron methods are included in this thesis. First a non-destructive plutonium assay technique called Multispectral Active Neutron Interrogation Analysis is developed. It is based on interrogating fuel with neutrons at several different energies. The induced fission rates at each interrogation energy are compared with results from a neutron transport model of the irradiation geometry in a system of equations to iteratively solve the inverse problem for isotopic composition. The model is shown to converge on the correct composition for a material with 3 different fissionable components, a representative neutron absorber, and any neutron transparent material such as oxygen in a variety of geometries. Next an experimental fission rate measurement technique is developed using 4He gas scintillation fast neutron detector. Several unique features of this detector allow it to detect and provide energy information on fast neutrons with excellent gamma discrimination efficiency. The detector can measure induced fission rate by energetically differentiating between interrogation neutrons and higher energy fission neutrons. The detector response to a mono-energetic deuterium-deuterium fusion neutron generator and a 252Cf source are compared to examine the difference in detected energy range. Finally we demonstrate a special nuclear material detection technique by detecting an unambiguous fission neutron signal produced in natural uranium during active neutron interrogation using a deuterium-deuterium neutron generator and a high pressure 4He gas fast neutron scintillation detector. Energy histograms resulting from this

  16. Spectral X-ray Radiography for Safeguards at Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Facilities: A Feasibility Study

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gilbert, Andrew J.; McDonald, Benjamin S.; Smith, Leon E.

    2017-04-20

    The methods currently used by the International Atomic Energy Agency to account for nuclear materials at fuel fabrication facilities are time consuming and require in-field chemistry and operation by experts. Spectral X-ray radiography, along with advanced inverse algorithms, is an alternative inspection that could be completed noninvasively, without any in-field chemistry, with inspections of tens of seconds. The proposed inspection system and algorithms are presented here. The inverse algorithm uses total variation regularization and adaptive regularization parameter selection with the unbiased predictive risk estimator. Performance of the system is quantified with simulated X-ray inspection data and sensitivity of the output is tested against various inspection system instabilities. Material quantification from a fully-characterized inspection system is shown to be very accurate, with biases on nuclear material estimations of < 0.02%. It is shown that the results are sensitive to variations in the fuel powder sample density and detector pixel gain, which increase biases to 1%. Options to mitigate these inaccuracies are discussed.

  17. Cyber security in nuclear power plants and its portability to other industrial infrastructures

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Champigny, Sebastien; Gupta, Deeksha; Watson, Venesa; Waedt, Karl [AREVA GmbH, Erlangen (Germany)

    2017-06-15

    Power generation increasingly relies on decentralised and interconnected computerised systems. Concepts like ''Industrial Internet of Things'' of the Industrial Internet Consortium (IIC), and ''Industry 4.0'' find their way in this strategic industry. Risk of targeted exploits of errors and vulnerabilities increases with complexity, interconnectivity and decentralization. Inherently stringent security requirements and features make nuclear computerised applications and systems a benchmark for industrial counterparts seeking to hedge against those risks. Consequently, this contribution presents usual cyber security regulations and practices for nuclear power plants. It shows how nuclear cyber security can be ported and used in an industrial context to protect critical infrastructures against cyber-attacks and industrial espionage.

  18. Development of DUPIC safeguards technology

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, H. D.; Ko, W. I.; Song, D. Y. [and others

    2000-03-01

    During the first phase of R and D program conducted from 1997 to 1999, nuclear material safeguards studies system were performed on the technology development of DUPIC safeguards system such as nuclear material measurement in bulk form and product form, DUPIC fuel reactivity measurement, near-real-time accountancy, and containment and surveillance system for effective and efficient implementation of domestic and international safeguards obligation. For the nuclear material measurement system, the performance test was finished and received IAEA approval, and now is being used in DUPIC Fuel Fabrication Facility(DFDF) for nuclear material accounting and control. Other systems being developed in this study were already installed in DFDF and being under performance test. Those systems developed in this study will make a contribution not only to the effective implementation of DUPIC safeguards, but also to enhance the international confidence build-up in peaceful use of spent fuel material. (author)

  19. Preliminary Study of the Efficacy of Using Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence with Quasi-Monoenergetic Gamma-Ray Sources for Nuclear Safeguards Assay

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Johnson, M S; McNabb, D P; Hall, J M; Gonzalez, J J

    2011-02-17

    We have studied the efficacy of using nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF)-based techniques to assay spent nuclear fuel for Pu content using quasi-monoenergetic sources. We have developed two techniques to precisely determine the Pu content in a fuel rod/pin. One of our approaches is virtually free of systematic uncertainties. Using analytical models, we have determined the amount of time required to measure the Pu content in spent nuclear fuel rods and spent fuel assemblies to within 1% precision. We note that Pu content can be determined in a fuel assembly about as fast as in a single fuel pin. The performance of NRF-based assay techniques with improved photon sources, which are currently under development, will also estimated. For follow-on research we propose to: (1) Construct research prototype detection systems for both of the NRF-based assay systems proposed in this paper and measure their calibration curves; (2) Determine the systematic errors associated with both assay methods, explore ways to reduce the errors and fold the results into future performance calculations; (3) Develop an algorithm to assay a fuel assembly; (4) Perform validation measurements using a single pin and scaled assemblies; (5) Research and develop current-mode detection and/or threshold detection techniques to improve assay times; (6) Characterize the flux of newly constructed sources and fold the results into the calculations presented here to determine the feasibility of a variety of proposed sources; and (7) Collaborate with others in the safeguards community to build a prototype system and perform an NRF-based assay demonstration on spent fuel.

  20. Korean safeguards experience and its perspective

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yoon, W.K. [Korea Atomic Energy Research Inst., Daejon (Korea, Republic of). Technology Center for Nuclear Control

    1995-07-01

    This paper presents an overview of Korean safeguards implementation. The Korean safeguards program has been influenced by a wide range of international and national developments. The Joint Declaration for Denuclearization in the Korean peninsula and the recent establishment of the technology Center for Nuclear Control are the most prominent factors to have a major impact on Korean safeguards. Their influences, as well as the general status of safeguards in Korea, are described.

  1. Implementation status of the extreme light infrastructure - nuclear physics (ELI-NP) project

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gales, S., E-mail: sydney.gales@eli-np.ro; Zamfir, N. V., E-mail: sydney.gales@eli-np.ro [ELI-NP, Horia Hulubei National Institute for Physics and Nuclear Engineering, 30 Reactorului Street, RO-077125 Bucharest-Magurele (Romania)

    2015-02-24

    The Project Extreme Light Infrastructure (ELI) is part of the European Strategic Forum for Research Infrastructures (ESFRI) Roadmap. ELI will be built as a network of three complementary pillars at the frontier of laser technologies. The ELI-NP pillar (NP for Nuclear Physics) is under construction near Bucharest (Romania) and will develop a scientific program using two 10 PW lasers and a Compton back-scattering high-brilliance and intense gamma beam, a marriage of laser and accelerator technology at the frontier of knowledge. In the present paper, the technical description of the facility, the present status of the project as well as the science, applications and future perspectives will be discussed.

  2. A Study on Nuclear Blast Overpressure on Buildings and other infrastructures using Geospatial Technology

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    D. Thirumalaivasan

    2012-01-01

    Full Text Available An Improvised Nuclear Device or nuclear bomb of yield 10 kiloton to 20 kiloton explodes in any major city due to terrorism or any other reason can cause catastrophic damages on the building's and other infrastructures and also shutting down of critical life-safety systems.. The explosion may produce blast overpressure, thermal radiation and harmful instant and delayed nuclear radiations. The buildings and other Civil Engineering structures may be highly vulnerabke due to the blast overpressure from the explosion and thermal radiation. In this present study Remote Sensing and Geographical Information System is effectively utilized to model the blast affected zone from the ground Zero of the study area. This study also introduces different emperical methods to estimate blast loads and structural response. The purpose is to describe the blast effects of a nuclear explosion, thereby informing people of the real dangers posed by nuclear weapons. Therefore, as a case study, we consider a hypothetical City as a target for detonation. Due to security reasons the data for existing City is not used for this study purpose. The study area is hypothetically detonated with a 15 kiloton yield nuclear explosion as surface blast and wind spped is assumed as 5 meters per second.

  3. Strengthening IAEA Safeguards for Research Reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Reid, Bruce D. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Anzelon, George A. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Budlong-Sylvester, Kory [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2016-09-01

    During their December 10-11, 2013, workshop in Grenoble France, which focused on the history and future of safeguarding research reactors, the United States, France and the United Kingdom (UK) agreed to conduct a joint study exploring ways to strengthen the IAEA’s safeguards approach for declared research reactors. This decision was prompted by concerns about: 1) historical cases of non-compliance involving misuse (including the use of non-nuclear materials for production of neutron generators for weapons) and diversion that were discovered, in many cases, long after the violations took place and as part of broader pattern of undeclared activities in half a dozen countries; 2) the fact that, under the Safeguards Criteria, the IAEA inspects some reactors (e.g., those with power levels under 25 MWt) less than once per year; 3) the long-standing precedent of States using heavy water research reactors (HWRR) to produce plutonium for weapons programs; 4) the use of HEU fuel in some research reactors; and 5) various technical characteristics common to some types of research reactors that could provide an opportunity for potential proliferators to misuse the facility or divert material with low probability of detection by the IAEA. In some research reactors, for example, such characteristics include rapid on-line refueling, and a core design with room for such a large number of assemblies or targets that it is difficult to detect diversion or undeclared irradiation. In addition, infrastructure associated with research reactors, such as hot cells, where plutonium could be separated, could pose a safeguards challenge because, in some cases, they are not declared (because they are not located in the facility or because nuclear materials are not foreseen to be processed inside) and may not be accessible to inspectors in States without an Additional Protocol in force.

  4. Generalized Nuclear Data: A New Structure (with Supporting Infrastructure) for Handling Nuclear Data

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mattoon, C.M. [Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 7000 East Avenue, Livermore CA (United States); Beck, B.R.; Patel, N.R.; Summers, N.C.; Hedstrom, G.W. [Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 7000 East Avenue, Livermore CA (United States); Brown, D.A. [National Nuclear Data Center, Upton NY (United States)

    2012-12-15

    The Evaluated Nuclear Data File (ENDF) format was designed in the 1960s to accommodate neutron reaction data to support nuclear engineering applications in power, national security and criticality safety. Over the years, the scope of the format has been extended to handle many other kinds of data including charged particle, decay, atomic, photo-nuclear and thermal neutron scattering. Although ENDF has wide acceptance and support for many data types, its limited support for correlated particle emission, limited numeric precision, and general lack of extensibility mean that the nuclear data community cannot take advantage of many emerging opportunities. More generally, the ENDF format provides an unfriendly environment that makes it difficult for new data evaluators and users to create and access nuclear data. The Cross Section Evaluation Working Group (CSEWG) has begun the design of a new Generalized Nuclear Data (or 'GND') structure, meant to replace older formats with a hierarchy that mirrors the underlying physics, and is aligned with modern coding and database practices. In support of this new structure, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has updated its nuclear data/reactions management package Fudge to handle GND structured nuclear data. Fudge provides tools for converting both the latest ENDF format (ENDF-6) and the LLNL Evaluated Nuclear Data Library (ENDL) format to and from GND, as well as for visualizing, modifying and processing (i.e., converting evaluated nuclear data into a form more suitable to transport codes) GND structured nuclear data. GND defines the structure needed for storing nuclear data evaluations and the type of data that needs to be stored. But unlike ENDF and ENDL, GND does not define how the data are to be stored in a file. Currently, Fudge writes the structured GND data to a file using the eXtensible Markup Language (XML), as it is ASCII based and can be viewed with any text editor. XML is a meta-language, meaning that it

  5. Generalized Nuclear Data: A New Structure (with Supporting Infrastructure) for Handling Nuclear Data

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mattoon, C. M.; Beck, B. R.; Patel, N. R.; Summers, N. C.; Hedstrom, G. W.; Brown, D. A.

    2012-12-01

    The Evaluated Nuclear Data File (ENDF) format was designed in the 1960s to accommodate neutron reaction data to support nuclear engineering applications in power, national security and criticality safety. Over the years, the scope of the format has been extended to handle many other kinds of data including charged particle, decay, atomic, photo-nuclear and thermal neutron scattering. Although ENDF has wide acceptance and support for many data types, its limited support for correlated particle emission, limited numeric precision, and general lack of extensibility mean that the nuclear data community cannot take advantage of many emerging opportunities. More generally, the ENDF format provides an unfriendly environment that makes it difficult for new data evaluators and users to create and access nuclear data. The Cross Section Evaluation Working Group (CSEWG) has begun the design of a new Generalized Nuclear Data (or 'GND') structure, meant to replace older formats with a hierarchy that mirrors the underlying physics, and is aligned with modern coding and database practices. In support of this new structure, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has updated its nuclear data/reactions management package Fudge to handle GND structured nuclear data. Fudge provides tools for converting both the latest ENDF format (ENDF-6) and the LLNL Evaluated Nuclear Data Library (ENDL) format to and from GND, as well as for visualizing, modifying and processing (i.e., converting evaluated nuclear data into a form more suitable to transport codes) GND structured nuclear data. GND defines the structure needed for storing nuclear data evaluations and the type of data that needs to be stored. But unlike ENDF and ENDL, GND does not define how the data are to be stored in a file. Currently, Fudge writes the structured GND data to a file using the eXtensible Markup Language (XML), as it is ASCII based and can be viewed with any text editor. XML is a meta-language, meaning that it

  6. Production and characterization of monodisperse plutonium, uranium, and mixed uranium-plutonium particles for nuclear safeguard applications.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ranebo, Y; Niagolova, N; Erdmann, N; Eriksson, M; Tamborini, G; Betti, M

    2010-05-15

    In order to prevent nuclear proliferation, the isotopic analysis of uranium and plutonium microparticles has strengthened the means in international safeguards for detecting undeclared nuclear activities. In order to ensure accuracy and precision in the analytical methodologies used, the instrumental techniques need to be calibrated. The objective of this study was to produce and characterize particles consisting of U, Pu, and mixed U-Pu, suitable for such reliability verifications. A TSI vibrating orifice aerosol generator in connection with a furnace system was used to produce micrometer sized, monodispersed particles from reference U and Pu materials in solution. The particle masses (in the range of 3-6 pg) and sizes (approximately 1.5 microm) were controlled by the experimental conditions and the parameters for the aerosol generator. Size distributions were obtained from scanning electron microscopy, and energy-dispersive X-ray analysis confirmed that the particle composition agreed with the starting material used. A secondary ion mass spectrometer (SIMS) was used to characterize the isotopic composition of the particles. Isobaric and polyatomic interference in the SIMS spectra was identified. In order to obtain accurate estimates of the interference, a batch of Pu particles were produced of mainly (242)Pu. These were used for SIMS analysis to characterize the relative ionization of Pu and U hydride ions and to determine the SIMS useful yields of U and Pu. It was found that U had a higher propensity to form the hydride than Pu. Useful yields were determined at a mass resolution of 450 for U-Pu particles: (1.71 +/- 0.15) % for Pu and (0.72 +/- 0.06) % for U. For Pu particles: (1.65 +/- 0.14) % for Pu. This gave a relative sensitivity factor between U and Pu (RSF(U:Pu)) of 2.4 +/- 0.2. However, the RSF(U:Pu) showed large fluctuations during the sputtering time for each analyses of the mixed U-Pu particles, in the range of 1.9-3.4.

  7. Proof of Concept Simulations of the Multi-Isotope Process Monitor: An Online, Nondestructive, Near-Real-Time Safeguards Monitor for Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Orton, Christopher R.; Fraga, Carlos G.; Christensen, Richard; Schwantes, Jon M.

    2011-02-11

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will require the development of advanced technologies to effectively safeguard nuclear material at increasingly large-scale nuclear recycling facilities. Ideally, the envisioned technologies would be capable of nondestructive, near-real-time, autonomous process monitoring. This paper describes recent results from model simulations designed to test the Multi-Isotope Process (MIP) monitor, a novel approach to safeguarding reprocessing plants. The MIP monitor combines the detection of intrinsic gamma ray signatures emitted from process solutions with multivariate analysis to detect off-normal conditions in process streams nondestructively and in near-real-time. Three computer models including ORIGEN-ARP, AMUSE, and SYNTH were used in series to predict spent nuclear fuel composition, estimate element partitioning during separation, and simulate spectra from product and raffinate streams using a variety of gamma detectors, respectively. Simulations were generated for fuel with various irradiation histories and under a variety of plant operating conditions. Principal component analysis (PCA) was applied to the simulated gamma spectra to investigate pattern variations as a function of acid concentration, burnup, and cooling time. Hierarchical cluster analysis (HCA) and partial least squares (PLS) were also used in the analysis. The MIP monitor was found to be sensitive to induced variations of several operating parameters including distinguishing ±2.5% variation from normal process acid concentrations. The ability of PLS to predict burnup levels from simulated spectra was also demonstrated to be within 3.5% of measured values.

  8. Proof of concept simulations of the Multi-Isotope Process monitor: An online, nondestructive, near-real-time safeguards monitor for nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities

    Science.gov (United States)

    Orton, Christopher R.; Fraga, Carlos G.; Christensen, Richard N.; Schwantes, Jon M.

    2011-02-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency will require the development of advanced technologies to effectively safeguard nuclear material at increasingly large-scale nuclear recycling facilities. Ideally, the envisioned technologies would be capable of nondestructive, near-real-time, autonomous process monitoring. This paper describes recent results from model simulations designed to test the Multi-Isotope Process (MIP) monitor, a novel addition to a safeguards system for reprocessing facilities. The MIP monitor combines the detection of intrinsic gamma ray signatures emitted from process solutions with multivariate analysis to detect off-normal conditions in process streams nondestructively and in near-real-time. Three computer models including ORIGEN-ARP, AMUSE, and SYNTH were used in series to predict spent nuclear fuel composition, estimate element partitioning during separation, and simulate spectra from product and raffinate streams using a variety of gamma detectors, respectively. Simulations were generated for fuel with various irradiation histories and under a variety of plant operating conditions. Principal component analysis was applied to the simulated gamma spectra to investigate pattern variations as a function of acid concentration, burnup, and cooling time. Hierarchical cluster analysis and partial least squares (PLS) were also used in the analysis. The MIP monitor was found to be sensitive to induced variations of several operating parameters including distinguishing ±2.5% variation from normal process acid concentrations. The ability of PLS to predict burnup levels from simulated spectra was also demonstrated to be within 3.5% of measured values.

  9. A Mock UF6 Feed and Withdrawal System for Testing Safeguards Monitoring Systems and Strategies Intended for Nuclear Fuel Enrichment and Processing Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Krichinsky, Alan M [ORNL; Bates, Bruce E [ORNL; Chesser, Joel B [ORNL; Koo, Sinsze [ORNL; Whitaker, J Michael [ORNL

    2009-12-01

    This report describes an engineering-scale, mock UF6 feed and withdrawal (F&W) system, its operation, and its intended uses. This system has been assembled to provide a test bed for evaluating and demonstrating new methodologies that can be used in remote, unattended, continuous monitoring of nuclear material process operations. These measures are being investigated to provide independent inspectors improved assurance that operations are being conducted within declared parameters, and to increase the overall effectiveness of safeguarding nuclear material. Testing applicable technologies on a mock F&W system, which uses water as a surrogate for UF6, enables thorough and cost-effective investigation of hardware, software, and operational strategies before their direct installation in an industrial nuclear material processing environment. Electronic scales used for continuous load-cell monitoring also are described as part of the basic mock F&W system description. Continuous monitoring components on the mock F&W system are linked to a data aggregation computer by a local network, which also is depicted. Data collection and storage systems are described only briefly in this report. The mock UF{sub 6} F&W system is economical to operate. It uses a simple process involving only a surge tank between feed tanks and product and withdrawal (or waste) tanks. The system uses water as the transfer fluid, thereby avoiding the use of hazardous UF{sub 6}. The system is not tethered to an operating industrial process involving nuclear materials, thereby allowing scenarios (e.g., material diversion) that cannot be conducted otherwise. These features facilitate conducting experiments that yield meaningful results with a minimum of expenditure and quick turnaround time. Technologies demonstrated on the engineering-scale system lead to field trials (described briefly in this report) for determining implementation issues and performance of the monitoring technologies under plant

  10. Los Alamos safeguards program overview and NDA in safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Keepin, G.R.

    1988-01-01

    Over the years the Los Alamos safeguards program has developed, tested, and implemented a broad range of passive and active nondestructive analysis (NDA) instruments (based on gamma and x-ray detection and neutron counting) that are now widely employed in safeguarding nuclear materials of all forms. Here very briefly, the major categories of gamma ray and neutron based NDA techniques, give some representative examples of NDA instruments currently in use, and cite a few notable instances of state-of-the-art NDA technique development. Historical aspects and a broad overview of the safeguards program are also presented.

  11. Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fishbone, L.G.; Keisch, B.

    1981-08-01

    The information contained in this catalog is needed to provide a data base for safeguards studies and to help establish criteria and procedures for international safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities. The catalog primarily presents information on new safeguards equipment. It also describes entire safeguards systems for certain facilities, but it does not describe the inspection procedures. Because IAEA safeguards do not include physical security, devices for physical protection (as opposed to containment and surveillance) are not included. An attempt has been made to list capital costs, annual maintenance costs, replacement costs, and useful lifetime for the equipment. For equipment which is commercially available, representative sources have been listed whenever available.

  12. Overview of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) Process

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bari, Robert A.; Hockert, John; Wonder, Edward F.; Johnson, Scott J.; Wigeland, Roald; Zentner, Michael D.

    2012-08-01

    Executive Summary The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is intended to provide the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its safeguards obligations. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of IAEA safeguards as those safeguards evolve towards a “State-Level approach.” The Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept can facilitate the implementation of these effective and cost-efficient facility-level safeguards (Bjornard, et al. 2009a, 2009b; IAEA, 1998; Wonder & Hockert, 2011). This report, sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security, introduces a methodology intended to ensure that the diverse approaches to Safeguards by Design can be effectively integrated and consistently used to cost effectively enhance the application of international safeguards.

  13. Strengthening IAEA Safeguards for Research Reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Reid, Bruce D. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Anzelon, George A. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Budlong-Sylvester, Kory [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2016-09-01

    During their December 10-11, 2013, workshop in Grenoble France, which focused on the history and future of safeguarding research reactors, the United States, France and the United Kingdom (UK) agreed to conduct a joint study exploring ways to strengthen the IAEA’s safeguards approach for declared research reactors. This decision was prompted by concerns about: 1) historical cases of non-compliance involving misuse (including the use of non-nuclear materials for production of neutron generators for weapons) and diversion that were discovered, in many cases, long after the violations took place and as part of broader pattern of undeclared activities in half a dozen countries; 2) the fact that, under the Safeguards Criteria, the IAEA inspects some reactors (e.g., those with power levels under 25 MWt) less than once per year; 3) the long-standing precedent of States using heavy water research reactors (HWRR) to produce plutonium for weapons programs; 4) the use of HEU fuel in some research reactors; and 5) various technical characteristics common to some types of research reactors that could provide an opportunity for potential proliferators to misuse the facility or divert material with low probability of detection by the IAEA. In some research reactors it is difficult to detect diversion or undeclared irradiation. In addition, infrastructure associated with research reactors could pose a safeguards challenge. To strengthen the effectiveness of safeguards at the State level, this paper advocates that the IAEA consider ways to focus additional attention and broaden its safeguards toolbox for research reactors. This increase in focus on the research reactors could begin with the recognition that the research reactor (of any size) could be a common path element on a large number of technically plausible pathways that must be considered when performing acquisition pathway analysis (APA) for developing a State Level Approach (SLA) and Annual Implementation Plan (AIP). To

  14. Safeguards technology and computer security training

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hunteman, W.J.; Zack, N.R.

    1992-01-01

    The Los Alamos National Laboratory Safeguards Systems Group provides a variety of training services to the federal government and its contractors. The US Department of Energy sponsors a Safeguards Technology Training Program at Los Alamos in which seminars are offered concerning materials accounting for nuclear safeguards, measurement control for materials accounting, and variance propagation and systems analysis. These seminars provide guidance and techniques for accounting for nuclear material, developing and quantifying quality nuclear material measurements, and assessing overall accounting system performance. The Safeguards Systems Group also provides training in computer and data security applications; i.e., a workshop and the Los Alamos Vulnerability/Risk Assessment System (LAVA), computer system security officer training, and nuclear material safeguards for managers training, which are available on request. This paper describes the purpose, content, and expected benefits of the training activities that can be applied at nuclear materials facilities or where there are computer and/or data security concerns.

  15. Safeguards technology and computer security training

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hunteman, W.J.; Zack, N.R.

    1992-09-01

    The Los Alamos National Laboratory Safeguards Systems Group provides a variety of training services to the federal government and its contractors. The US Department of Energy sponsors a Safeguards Technology Training Program at Los Alamos in which seminars are offered concerning materials accounting for nuclear safeguards, measurement control for materials accounting, and variance propagation and systems analysis. These seminars provide guidance and techniques for accounting for nuclear material, developing and quantifying quality nuclear material measurements, and assessing overall accounting system performance. The Safeguards Systems Group also provides training in computer and data security applications; i.e., a workshop and the Los Alamos Vulnerability/Risk Assessment System (LAVA), computer system security officer training, and nuclear material safeguards for managers training, which are available on request. This paper describes the purpose, content, and expected benefits of the training activities that can be applied at nuclear materials facilities or where there are computer and/or data security concerns.

  16. Annual Report FY2013-- A Kinematically Complete, Interdisciplinary, and Co-Institutional Measurement of the 19F(α,n) Cross-section for Nuclear Safeguards Science

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Peters, William A [ORNL; Smith, Michael Scott [ORNL; Clement, Ryan [INL; Tan, Wanpeng [University of Notre Dame; Stech, Ed [University of Notre Dame; Cizewski, J A [Rutgers University; Febbraro, Michael [University of Michigan; Madurga Flores, Miguel [ORNL

    2013-10-01

    The goal of this proposal is to enable neutron detection for precision Non-Destructive Assays (NDAs) of actinide-fluoride samples. Neutrons are continuously generated from a UFx matrix in a container or sample as a result of the interaction of alpha particles from uranium-decay α particles with fluorine nuclei in the matrix. Neutrons from 19F(α,n)22Na were once considered a poorly characterized background for assays of UFx samples via 238U spontaneous fission neutron detection [SMI2010B]. However, the yield of decay-α-driven neutrons is critical for 234,235U LEU and HEU assays, as it can used to determine both the total amount of uranium and the enrichment [BER2010]. This approach can be extremely valuable in a variety of safeguard applications, such as cylinder monitoring in underground uranium storage facilities, nuclear criticality safety studies, nuclear materials accounting, and other nonproliferation applications. The success of neutron-based assays critically depends on an accurate knowledge of the cross section of the (α,n) reaction that generates the neutrons. The 40% uncertainty in the 19F(α,n)22Na cross section currently limits the precision of such assays, and has been identified as a key factor in preventing accurate enrichment determinations [CRO2003]. The need for higher quality cross section data for (α,n) reactions has been a recurring conclusion in reviews of the nuclear data needs to support safeguards. The overarching goal of this project is to enable neutron detection to be used for precision Non- Destructive Assays (NDAs) of actinide-fluoride samples. This will significantly advance safeguards verification at existing declared facilities, nuclear materials accounting, process control, nuclear criticality safety monitoring, and a variety of other nonproliferation applications. To reach this goal, Idaho National Laboratory (INL), in partnership with Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Rutgers University (RU), and the University of Notre

  17. Progress and goals for INMM ASC N15 consensus standard ""Administrative practices for the determination and reporting of results of non-destructive assay measurements of nuclear material in situ for safeguards nuclear criticality safety and other purposes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bracken, David S [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Lamb, Frank W [UNWIN CORPORATION

    2009-01-01

    This paper will discuss the goals and progress to date on the development of INMM Accredited Standard Committee (ASC) N15 consensus standard Administrative Practices for the Determination and Reporting of Results of Non-Destructive Assay Measurements of Nuclear Material in situ for Safeguards, Nuclear Criticality Safety, and Other Purposes. This standard will define administrative practices in the areas of data generation and reporting of NDA assay of holdup deposits with consideration of the stakeholders of the reported results. These stakeholders may include nuclear material accounting and safeguards, nuclear criticality safety, waste management, health physics, facility characterization, authorization basis, radiation safety, and site licensing authorities. Stakeholder input will be solicited from interested parties and incorporated during the development of the document. Currently only one consensus standard exists that explicitly deals with NDA holdup measurements: ASTM C1455 Standard Test Method for Nondestructive Assay of Special Nuclear Material Holdup Using Gamma-Ray Spectroscopic Methods. The ASTM International standard emphasizes the activities involved in actually making measurements, and was developed by safeguards and NDA experts. This new INMM ASC N15 standard will complement the existing ASTM international standard. One of the largest driving factors for writing this new standard was the recent emphasis on in situ NDA measurements by the safeguards community due to the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board (DNFSB) recommendation 2007-1 on in situ NDA measurements. Specifically, DNFSB recommendation 2007-1 referenced the lack of programmatic requirements for accurate in situ measurements and the use of measurement results for compliance with safety based requirements. That being the case, this paper will also discuss the progress made on the Implementation Plan for Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 2007-1 Safety-Related In Situ

  18. Technology Development of Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Ho Dong; Kang, H. Y.; Ko, W. I. (and others)

    2007-04-15

    The objective of this project is to perform R and D on the essential technologies in nuclear material measurement and surveillance and verification system, and to improve the state of being transparent on the nuclear material management of DUPIC Fuel Development Facility (DFDF) through the evaluation of safeguard ability on non-proliferation fuel cycle and nuclear proliferation resistance. Nuclear material position scan system for the reduction of measurement error was developed for the spatial distribution search of spent fuel in DUPIC facility. Web-based realtime remote monitoring system was designed and constructed for satisfying the IAEA's performance criteria of continuous monitoring, and also developed a software for the function of remote control and message. And diversion paths in a proliferation resistant pyroprocess for SFR were analyzed and its protecting system against the diversion paths were suggested for enhancing proliferation resistance of advanced nuclear fuel cycle. These results could be used for planning the further R and D items in the area of safeguards. Those R and D results mentioned above would be helpful for increasing Korean nuclear transparency in the future.

  19. Oak Ridge National Laboratory Next Generation Safeguards Initiative

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kirk, Bernadette Lugue [ORNL; Eipeldauer, Mary D [ORNL; Whitaker, J Michael [ORNL

    2011-12-01

    In 2007, the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a comprehensive review of the current and potential future challenges facing the international safeguards system. The review examined trends and events impacting the mission of international safeguards and the implications of expanding and evolving mission requirements on the legal authorities and institutions that serve as the foundation of the international safeguards system, as well as the technological, financial, and human resources required for effective safeguards implementation. The review's findings and recommendations were summarized in the report, 'International Safeguards: Challenges and Opportunities for the 21st Century (October 2007)'. One of the report's key recommendations was for DOE/NNSA to launch a major new program to revitalize the international safeguards technology and human resource base. In 2007, at the International Atomic Energy Agency's General Conference, then Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman announced the newly created Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). NGSI consists of five program elements: (1) Policy development and outreach; (2) Concepts and approaches; (3) Technology and analytical methodologies; (4) Human resource development; and (5) Infrastructure development. The ensuing report addresses the 'Human Resource Development (HRD)' component of NGSI. The goal of the HRD as defined in the NNSA Program Plan (November 2008) is 'to revitalize and expand the international safeguards human capital base by attracting and training a new generation of talent.' One of the major objectives listed in the HRD goal includes education and training, outreach to universities, professional societies, postdoctoral appointments, and summer internships at national laboratories. ORNL is a participant in the NGSI program, together

  20. Development of methodologies used in the areas of safeguards and nuclear forensics based on LA-HR-ICP-MS technique; Desenvolvimento de metodologias utilizadas nas areas de salvaguardas e forense nuclear baseadas na tecnica LA-HR-ICP-MS

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Marin, Rafael Coelho

    2013-07-01

    Environmental sampling performed by means of swipe samples is a methodology frequently employed by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify if the signatory States of the Safeguards Agreements are conducing unauthorized activities. Swipe samples analysis is complementary to the Safeguards ordinary procedures used to verify the information given by the States. In this work it was described a methodology intending to strengthen the nuclear safeguards and nuclear forensics procedures. The proposal is to study and evaluate the laser ablation high resolution inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (LA-HR-ICP-MS) technique as an alternative to analyze the real-life swipe samples. The precision achieved through the standard (CRM - 125A) measurements, represented by the relative standard deviation (RSD), was respectively 1.3 %, 0.2 % e 7.6 % for the {sup 234}U/{sup 238}U, {sup 235}U/{sup 238}U e {sup 236}U/{sup 238}U isotopes ratios. The percent uncertainties (u %), which covers the RSD, ranged from 3.5 % to 29.8 % to the {sup 235}U/{sup 238}U measurements and from 16.6 % to 42.9 % to the {sup 234}U/{sup 238}U isotope ratio. These results were compatible with former studies performed by the LA-HR-ICP-MS that analyzed real-life swipe samples collected at a nuclear facility. Swipe samples collected from several points of the nuclear facility presented enrichment level ranging from (2.3 ± 0.7) % (sample 3) to (17.3 ± 2.8) % (sample 18). They also allowed detecting different enrichment levels within the facility. (author)

  1. Recommendations on legislative and regulatory framework and regulatory body of nuclear security in China

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    PU Jilong; LI Xiaoyan

    2007-01-01

    This paper describes the definition of nuclear security that has been changing from the cold war age to the post-911 period, and clarifies the close relationship and yet a clear distinction between nuclear security, nuclear safety and nuclear safeguard. Based on analyses of the current state of nuclear security activities in China as well as the requirements and the law infrastructure, a legislative and regulatory framework of nuclear security and the mandate of a regulatory body in China are recommended.

  2. Achieving the Benefits of Safeguards by Design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Trond Bjornard; Robert Bean; David Hebditch; Jim Morgan; Bruce Meppen; Scott DeMuth; Michael Ehinger; John Hockert

    2008-07-01

    The overarching driver for developing a formalized process to achieve safeguards by design is to support the global growth of nuclear power while reducing ‘nuclear security’ risks. This paper discusses an institutional approach to the design process for a nuclear facility, for designing proliferation resistance, international safeguards and U.S. national safeguards and security into new nuclear facilities. In the United States, the need exists to develop a simple, concise, formalized, and integrated approach for incorporating international safeguards and other non-proliferation considerations into the facility design process. An effective and efficient design process is one which clearly defines the functional requirements at the beginning of the project and provides for the execution of the project to achieve a reasonable balance among competing objectives in a cost effective manner. Safeguards by Design is defined as “the integration of international and national safeguards, physical security and non-proliferation features as full and equal partners in the design process of a nuclear energy system or facility,” with the objective to achieve facilities that are intrinsically more robust while being less expensive to safeguard and protect. This Safeguards by Design process has been developed such that it: • Provides improved safeguards, security, and stronger proliferation barriers, while reducing the life cycle costs to the operator and regulatory agencies, • Can be translated to any international context as a model for nuclear facility design, • Fosters a culture change to ensure the treatment of ‘nuclear security’ considerations as “full and equal” partners in the design process, • Provides a useful tool for the project manager responsible for the design, construction, and start-up of nuclear facilities, and • Addresses the key integration activities necessary to efficiently incorporate International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards into

  3. Establishment of national safeguards system and assistance to IAEA safeguards inspection

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Park, Wan Sou; Kwack, Eun Ho; Park, Chan Sik; Lee, Jae Sung; Jeong, Mi Young

    1995-12-01

    In Korea, 17 nuclear facilities are currently under IAEA`s safeguards and it is expected that more than 25 nuclear facilities will be under IAEA`s safeguards in the year 2000 according to nuclear R and D and industry expansion. In connection with unlimited extension of NPT in 1995 and IAEA`s measures to strengthen the safeguards like `Programme 93+2`, the international non-proliferation regime will be strengthened more and nuclear advanced countries will require the transparency and credibility of nuclear activities in recipient countries instead of transferring advanced nuclear technologies and nuclear material. In 1995, the Korean Government had revised the Atomic Energy Law to control increasing nuclear facilities and nuclear material effectively and to establish international transparency and credibility. In the revised Atomic Energy Law, it is provided that the national inspection, other than IAEA inspection, will be started from 1996. Currently, necessary arrangements for national inspection are being prepared by MOST and TCNC at KAERI. However, the safeguards system in Korea is still beginning stage, Korea`s safeguards activity was passive and fragmentary that leads non-attainment of safeguards goal in many facilities. The reasons were; absence of systematic safeguards system(SSAC); lack of understanding safeguards concepts; lack of manpower, designated organization for safeguards, etc. As Korea ranked world top 10 nuclear power generation country and has a plan to be a nuclear advanced country, Korea should have appropriate safeguards system and should not spare necessary assistance to that system. (author). 19 tabs., 2 figs.

  4. Implementing Safeguards-by-Design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Trond Bjornard; Robert Bean; Phillip Casey Durst; John Hockert; James Morgan

    2010-02-01

    Executive Summary Excerpt Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) is an approach to the design and construction of nuclear facilities whereby safeguards are designed-in from the very beginning. It is a systematic and structured approach for fully integrating international and national safeguards (MC&A), physical security, and other proliferation barriers into the design and construction process for nuclear facilities. SBD is primarily a project management or project coordination challenge, and this report focuses on that aspect of SBD. The present report continues the work begun in 2008 and focuses specifically on the design process, or project management and coordination - the planning, definition, organization, coordination, scheduling and interaction of activities of the safeguards experts and stakeholders as they participate in the design and construction of a nuclear facility. It delineates the steps in a nuclear facility design and construction project, in order to provide the project context within which the safeguards design activities take place, describes the involvement of safeguards experts in the design process, the nature of their analyses, interactions and decisions, as well as describing the documents created and how they are used. Designing and constructing a nuclear facility is an extremely complex undertaking. The stakeholders in an actual project are many – owner, operator, State regulators, nuclear facility primary contractor, subcontractors (e.g. instrument suppliers), architect engineers, project management team, safeguards, safety and security experts, in addition to the IAEA and its team. The purpose of the present report is to provide a common basis for discussions amongst stakeholders to collaboratively develop a SBD approach that will be both practically useful and mutually beneficial. The principal conclusions from the present study are: • In the short term, the successful implementation of SBD is principally a project management problem.

  5. AFTER ACTION REPORT Eleventh Annual Radiation Measurement Cross Calibration Workshop (RMCC XI) Applications to Nuclear Safeguards and Security

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Davisson, M L [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Kristo, M J [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Fei, E [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

    2017-01-04

    The intent of this trip was to initiate discussion with the appropriate Jordanian authorities on US collaboration in their development of a nuclear forensic capability. This required firstly to determine which agency has been legally mandated to receive and analyze nuclear forensic evidence and to review their current state of readiness to assess what assistance the US would need to provide. An additional purpose, was to introduce nuclear forensic analysis by example to the several Middle East and north African country labs present at this annual meeting.

  6. Development of Pattern Recognition Options for Combining Safeguards Subsystems

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Burr, Thomas L. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Hamada, Michael S. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-08-24

    This talk reviews project progress in combining process monitoring data and nuclear material accounting data to improve the over nuclear safeguards system. Focus on 2 subsystems: (1) nuclear materials accounting (NMA); and (2) process monitoring (PM).

  7. Potential contribution of materials investigations in reducing the risks of unavailability of nuclear civil engineering infrastructures

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Goy, R.; Gaine, C.; Cornish-Bowden, I.; Auge, L.; Thillard, G.; Capra, B. [Oxand (France)

    2011-07-01

    Many consulting assignments undertaken by Oxand within the framework of life-cycle management of existing nuclear civil engineering structures, relied on taking into account the structure's level of deterioration, the quantitative estimate of its residual strength capacity and the future progression of this capacity over time. The developments of structure assessment techniques allow more and more the integration of the real state of the existing structure by enhancing the value of measures and investigations carried out on structures. On one hand, this information allows to take into account the structure's ageing and therefore estimate the residual resistance and reliability. On the other hand, by investigating the real properties of the structure and of its operation, refined calculations can sometimes highlight a resistance margin of the structure 'such as built' higher than the one considered during design. The precision on the 'real' reliability of the structure allows to refine its management and thus to optimize the infrastructure's performance. Developments of assessment methods are increasingly oriented toward probabilistic approaches. Although they go out of the 'classical regulatory' framework, they bring precision on the 'real' reliability of the structure. Using higher assessment levels needs to have more important and precise input data, what can lead to the need to carry out more detailed investigations. However, these methods offer interesting ways, which can provide, in certain cases, useful additional information for the decision-making of actions to be engaged. The methodology is illustrated with the case of a network of reinforced concrete beams, which are subjected to a rapid increase in their mechanical stresses. In particular this example shows that investigations on the real performances of materials can provided a significant contribution in managing the risks of unavailability

  8. Visualizing Safeguards: Software for Conceptualizing and Communicating Safeguards Data

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gallucci, N. [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States)

    2015-07-12

    The nuclear programs of states are complex and varied, comprising a wide range of fuel cycles and facilities. Also varied are the types and terms of states’ safeguards agreements with the IAEA, each placing different limits on the inspectorate’s access to these facilities. Such nuances make it difficult to draw policy significance from the ground-level nuclear activities of states, or to attribute ground-level outcomes to the implementation of specific policies or initiatives. While acquiring a firm understanding of these relationships is critical to evaluating and formulating effective policy, doing so requires collecting and synthesizing large bodies of information. Maintaining a comprehensive working knowledge of the facilities comprising even a single state’s nuclear program poses a challenge, yet marrying this information with relevant safeguards and verification information is more challenging still. To facilitate this task, Brookhaven National Laboratory has developed a means of capturing the development, operation, and safeguards history of all the facilities comprising a state’s nuclear program in a single graphic. The resulting visualization offers a useful reference tool to policymakers and analysts alike, providing a chronology of states’ nuclear development and an easily digestible history of verification activities across their fuel cycles.

  9. Regional Cooperation to Strengthen Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Minnini, Margot; Elkhamri, Oksana O.

    2016-06-06

    President Obama’s decision over four years ago to ”pivot” toward Asia represented an important strategic shift in American foreign policy and a rebalancing of U.S. economic and security engagement in the Asia-Pacific countries. The United States has since supported a variety of regional initiatives aimed at promoting nuclear security and safeguards. When a new regional organization, the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN) was established in 2010, DOE/NNSA became an early member and enthusiastic advocate. Launched on the initiative of Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, and Indonesia, the APSN aims to strengthen the quality and effectiveness of safeguards implementation in the Asia-Pacific region.

  10. Neutron flux from a 14-MeV neutron generator with tungsten filter for research in NDA methods for nuclear safeguards and security

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rennhofer, H.; Pedersen, B.; Crochemore, J.-M.

    2009-12-01

    The Joint Research Centre has taken into operation a new experimental device designed for research in the fields of nuclear safeguards and security applications. The research projects currently undertaken include detection of shielded contraband materials, detection of fissile materials, and mass determination of small fissile materials in shielded containers. The device, called the Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly (PUNITA), incorporates a pulsed 14-MeV (D-T) neutron generator and a large graphite mantle surrounding the sample cavity. By pulsing the neutron generator with a frequency in the range of 10 to 150 Hz, a sample may be interrogated first by fast neutrons and a few hundred micro-seconds later by a pure thermal neutron flux. The permanent detection systems incorporated in PUNITA include 3He neutrons detectors, HPGe gamma detectors, and lanthanum bromide scintillation detectors. We have studied the effects of placing a tungsten liner around the neutron generator target. The 14-MeV neutrons induce (n, 2n) and (n, 3n) reactions. In addition the mean neutron energy emitted from generator/tungsten assembly is reduced to about 1 MeV. Both of these effects increase the thermal neutron flux in the sample cavity. The paper describes the observed advantages of the tungsten liner with respect to increase in thermal flux, and better shielding capabilities of the nearby gamma and neutron detectors.

  11. An American Academy for Training Safeguards Inspectors - An Idea Revisited

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Philip Casey Durst; Robert Bean

    2010-07-01

    In 2009, we presented the idea of an American academy for training safeguards inspectors for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), due to the declining percentage of Americans in that international organization. In this paper we assert that there is still a compelling need for this academy. While the American Safeguards Academy would be useful in preparing and pre-training American inspectors for the IAEA, it would also be useful for preparing Americans for domestic safeguards duties in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), U.S. DOE National Laboratories, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). It is envisioned that such an academy would train graduate and post-graduate university students, DOE National Laboratory interns, and nuclear safeguards professionals in the modern equipment, safeguards measures, and approaches currently used by the IAEA. It is also envisioned that the Academy would involve the domestic nuclear industry, which could provide use of commercial nuclear facilities for tours and demonstrations of the safeguards tools and methods in actual nuclear facilities. This would be in support of the U.S. DOE National Nuclear Security Administration’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). This training would also help American nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation professionals better understand the potential limitations of the current tools used by the IAEA and give them a foundation from which to consider even more effective and efficient safeguards measures and approaches.

  12. Results of regulatory impact survey of industrial and medical materials licensees of the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lach, D.; Melber, B.; Brichoux, J. [Battelle Human Affairs Research Center, Seattle, WA (United States); Hattrup, M.; Conger, R.; Hughes, K. [Pacific Northwest Lab., Richland, WA (United States)

    1995-06-01

    This report presents the findings of a regulatory impact survey of nuclear materials licensees of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Commissioners of the NRC directed staff to provide the Commission with first hand information from licensees that could be used to improve the overall regulatory program. A self-administered, mail-out survey questionnaire was used to collect data from a sample of licensees who had interaction with the NRC during the previous 12 months. A total of 371 respondents of the 589 who were sent questionnaires returned completed surveys, for a response rate of 63%. The body of the report presents the findings of the survey including a brief introduction to the approach used, followed by survey findings regarding regulations, policies and regulatory guidance; experience with licensing applications, renewals and amendments; inspections; reporting requirements; and enforcement actions. The appendices of the report include a copy of the survey as administered to licensees, a fuller description of the survey design and data collection methods, and detailed graphic material describing survey responses.

  13. Establishment of nuclear knowledge and information infrastructure; establishment of web-based database system for nuclear events

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Park, W. J.; Kim, K. J. [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute , Taejeon (Korea); Lee, S. H. [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Taejeon (Korea)

    2001-05-01

    Nuclear events data reported by nuclear power plants are useful to prevent nuclear accidents at the power plant by examine the cause of initiating events and removal of weak points in the aspects of operational safety, and to improve nuclear safety in design and operation stages by backfitting operational experiences and practices 'Nuclear Event Evaluation Database : NEED' system distributed by CD-ROM media are upgraded to the NEED-Web (Web-based Nuclear Event Evaluation Database) version to manage event data using database system on network basis and the event data and the statistics are provided to the authorized users in the Nuclear Portal Site and publics through Internet Web services. The efforts to establish the NEED-Web system will improve the integrity of events data occurred in Korean nuclear power plant and the usability of data services, and enhance the confidence building and the transparency to the public in nuclear safety. 11 refs., 27 figs. (Author)

  14. Development of DUPIC safeguards technology

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, H. D.; Kang, H. Y.; Ko, W. I. [and others

    2002-05-01

    DUPIC safeguards R and D in the second phase has focused on the development of nuclear material measurement system and its operation and verification, the development of nuclear material control and accounting system, and the development of remote and unmanned containment/surveillance system. Of them, the nuclear material measurement system was authenticated from IAEA and officially used for IAEA and domestic safeguards activities in DFDF. It was also verified that the system could be used for quality control of DUPIC process. It is recognised that the diagnostic software using neural network and remote and unmanned containment/surveillance system developed here could be key technologies to go into remote and near-real time monitoring system. The result of this project will eventually contribute to similar nuclear fuel cycles like MOX and pyroprocessing facility as well as the effective implementation of DUPIC safeguards. In addition, it will be helpful to enhance international confidence build-up in the peaceful use of spent fuel material.

  15. Safeguards culture on 3S interfaces

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jeong, Yon Hong; Lee, Na Young; Han, Jae-Jun [Korea Institute of Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    But when proliferation of nuclear weapon does happen due to violation of safeguards, the impact would be no smaller compare to the others. Therefore, it should be treated as important as the others. In fact, safeguards culture wasn't issued first time in this paper. However, the past safeguards culture only meant the conception based upon specific purpose. But it should be generalized to extend the target and scope enough to cover any possible misbehavior. The aforementioned NMAC will be a quite meaningful research subject not just for strengthening safeguards culture, but also for the security and safeguards interface. Recognizing the importance of this, the , IAEA has developed a set of technical criteria based on the IAEA implementing guide entitled Use of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Nuclear Security Purposes at Facilities(in publication) and a methodology to assess the use of a facility's NMAC system for nuclear security. IAEA has established an expert team to continuously evaluate and apply NMAC systems going forward. In the process of such efforts, the ROK should work to select and apply appropriate features so as to build a more improved safeguards culture and to determine the best practice.

  16. The Concept of Goals-Driven Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    R. Wigeland; T Bjornard; B. Castle

    2009-02-01

    The IAEA, NRC, and DOE regulations and requirements for safeguarding nuclear material and facilities have been reviewed and each organization’s purpose, objectives, and scope are discussed in this report. Current safeguards approaches are re-examined considering technological advancements and how these developments are changing safeguards approaches used by these organizations. Additionally, the physical protection approaches required by the IAEA, NRC, and DOE were reviewed and the respective goals, objectives, and requirements are identified and summarized in this report. From these, a brief comparison is presented showing the high-level similarities among these regulatory organizations’ approaches to physical protection. The regulatory documents used in this paper have been assembled into a convenient reference library called the Nuclear Safeguards and Security Reference Library. The index of that library is included in this report, and DVDs containing the full library are available.

  17. IAEA Safeguards: Past, Present, and Future

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Santi, Peter A. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Hypes, Philip A. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-06-14

    This talk will present an overview of the International Atomic Energy Agency with a specific focus on its international safeguards mission and activities. The talk will first present a brief history of the IAEA and discuss its current governing structure. It will then focus on the Safeguards Department and its role in providing assurance that nuclear materials are being used for peaceful purposes. It will then look at how the IAEA is currently evolving the way in which it executes its safeguards mission with a focus on the idea of a state-level approach.

  18. Simulation Enabled Safeguards Assessment Methodology

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Robert Bean; Trond Bjornard; Thomas Larson

    2007-09-01

    It is expected that nuclear energy will be a significant component of future supplies. New facilities, operating under a strengthened international nonproliferation regime will be needed. There is good reason to believe virtual engineering applied to the facility design, as well as to the safeguards system design will reduce total project cost and improve efficiency in the design cycle. Simulation Enabled Safeguards Assessment MEthodology (SESAME) has been developed as a software package to provide this capability for nuclear reprocessing facilities. The software architecture is specifically designed for distributed computing, collaborative design efforts, and modular construction to allow step improvements in functionality. Drag and drop wireframe construction allows the user to select the desired components from a component warehouse, render the system for 3D visualization, and, linked to a set of physics libraries and/or computational codes, conduct process evaluations of the system they have designed.

  19. The requirement for proper storage of nuclear and related decommissioning samples to safeguard accuracy of tritium data.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kim, Daeji; Croudace, Ian W; Warwick, Phillip E

    2012-04-30

    Large volumes of potentially tritium-contaminated waste materials are generated during nuclear decommissioning that require accurate characterisation prior to final waste sentencing. The practice of initially determining a radionuclide waste fingerprint for materials from an operational area is often used to save time and money but tritium cannot be included because of its tendency to be chemically mobile. This mobility demands a specific measurement for tritium and also poses a challenge in terms of sampling, storage and reliable analysis. This study shows that the extent of any tritium redistribution during storage will depend on its form or speciation and the physical conditions of storage. Any weakly or moderately bound tritium (e.g. adsorbed water, waters of hydration or crystallisation) may be variably lost at temperatures over the range 100-300 °C whereas for more strongly bound tritium (e.g. chemically bound or held in mineral lattices) the liberation temperature can be delayed up to 800 °C. For tritium that is weakly held the emanation behaviour at different temperatures becomes particularly important. The degree of (3)H loss and cross-contamination that can arise after sampling and before analysis can be reduced by appropriate storage. Storing samples in vapour tight containers at the point of sampling, the use of triple enclosures, segregating high activity samples and using a freezer all lead to good analytical practice. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  20. Fiscal Year 2014 Annual Report on BNLs Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Human Capital Development Activities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pepper, Susan E. [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States)

    2014-10-10

    Brookhaven National Laboratory’s (BNL’s) Nonproliferation and National Security Department contributes to the National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Nonproliferation and International Security Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) through university engagement, safeguards internships, safeguards courses, professional development, recruitment, and other activities aimed at ensuring the next generation of international safeguards professionals is adequately prepared to support the U.S. safeguards mission. This report is a summary of BNL s work under the NGSI program in Fiscal Year 2014.

  1. The requirement for proper storage of nuclear and related decommissioning samples to safeguard accuracy of tritium data

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Daeji, E-mail: kimdj@kins.re.kr [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, 19 Guseong, Yuseong, Daejeon, 303-338 (Korea, Republic of); Croudace, Ian W.; Warwick, Phillip E. [GAU-Radioanalytical, University of Southampton, NOC, European Way, Southampton SO14 3ZH (United Kingdom)

    2012-04-30

    Highlights: Black-Right-Pointing-Pointer Identification of variation in tritium loss rates in concrete samples. Black-Right-Pointing-Pointer Quantification of variation in tritium loss rates under different storage conditions. Black-Right-Pointing-Pointer Quantification of tritium cross-contamination rates for a range of matrix types. Black-Right-Pointing-Pointer Storage strategies for routine waste characterisation involving tritium. - Abstract: Large volumes of potentially tritium-contaminated waste materials are generated during nuclear decommissioning that require accurate characterisation prior to final waste sentencing. The practice of initially determining a radionuclide waste fingerprint for materials from an operational area is often used to save time and money but tritium cannot be included because of its tendency to be chemically mobile. This mobility demands a specific measurement for tritium and also poses a challenge in terms of sampling, storage and reliable analysis. This study shows that the extent of any tritium redistribution during storage will depend on its form or speciation and the physical conditions of storage. Any weakly or moderately bound tritium (e.g. adsorbed water, waters of hydration or crystallisation) may be variably lost at temperatures over the range 100-300 Degree-Sign C whereas for more strongly bound tritium (e.g. chemically bound or held in mineral lattices) the liberation temperature can be delayed up to 800 Degree-Sign C. For tritium that is weakly held the emanation behaviour at different temperatures becomes particularly important. The degree of {sup 3}H loss and cross-contamination that can arise after sampling and before analysis can be reduced by appropriate storage. Storing samples in vapour tight containers at the point of sampling, the use of triple enclosures, segregating high activity samples and using a freezer all lead to good analytical practice.

  2. AFCI Safeguards Enhancement Study: Technology Development Roadmap

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, Leon E.; Dougan, A.; Tobin, Stephen; Cipiti, B.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Bakel, A. J.; Bean, Robert; Grate, Jay W.; Santi, P.; Bryan, Steven; Kinlaw, M. T.; Schwantes, Jon M.; Burr, Tom; Lehn, Scott A.; Tolk, K.; Chichester, David; Menlove, H.; Vo, D.; Duckworth, Douglas C.; Merkle, P.; Wang, T. F.; Duran, F.; Nakae, L.; Warren, Glen A.; Friedrich, S.; Rabin, M.

    2008-12-31

    The Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) Safeguards Campaign aims to develop safeguards technologies and processes that will significantly reduce the risk of proliferation in the U.S. nuclear fuel cycle of tomorrow. The Safeguards Enhancement Study was chartered with identifying promising research and development (R&D) directions over timescales both near-term and long-term, and under safeguards oversight both domestic and international. This technology development roadmap documents recognized gaps and needs in the safeguarding of nuclear fuel cycles, and outlines corresponding performance targets for each of those needs. Drawing on the collective expertise of technologists and user-representatives, a list of over 30 technologies that have the potential to meet those needs was developed, along with brief summaries of each candidate technology. Each summary describes the potential impact of that technology, key research questions to be addressed, and prospective development milestones that could lead to a definitive viability or performance assessment. Important programmatic linkages between U.S. agencies and offices are also described, reflecting the emergence of several safeguards R&D programs in the U.S. and the reinvigoration of nuclear fuel cycles across the globe.

  3. Trial Application of the Facility Safeguardability Assessment Process to the NuScale SMR Design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Coles, Garill A.; Hockert, John; Gitau, Ernest TN; Zentner, Michael D.

    2013-01-26

    FSA is a screening process intended to focus a facility designer’s attention on the aspects of their facility or process design that would most benefit from application of SBD principles and practices. The process is meant to identify the most relevant guidance within the SBD tools for enhancing the safeguardability of the design. In fiscal year (FY) 2012, NNSA sponsored PNNL to evaluate the practical application of FSA by applying it to the NuScale small modular nuclear power plant. This report documents the application of the FSA process, presenting conclusions regarding its efficiency and robustness. It describes the NuScale safeguards design concept and presents functional "infrastructure" guidelines that were developed using the FSA process.

  4. Trial Application of the Facility Safeguardability Assessment Process to the NuScale SMR Design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Coles, Garill A.; Gitau, Ernest TN; Hockert, John; Zentner, Michael D.

    2012-11-09

    FSA is a screening process intended to focus a facility designer’s attention on the aspects of their facility or process design that would most benefit from application of SBD principles and practices. The process is meant to identify the most relevant guidance within the SBD tools for enhancing the safeguardability of the design. In fiscal year (FY) 2012, NNSA sponsored PNNL to evaluate the practical application of FSA by applying it to the NuScale small modular nuclear power plant. This report documents the application of the FSA process, presenting conclusions regarding its efficiency and robustness. It describes the NuScale safeguards design concept and presents functional "infrastructure" guidelines that were developed using the FSA process.

  5. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pepper,S.; Rosenthal, M.; Fishbone, L.; Occhiogrosso, D.; Carroll, C.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Rankhauser, J.

    2008-10-22

    In 2007, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a yearlong review of the challenges facing the international safeguards system today and over the next 25 years. The study found that without new investment in international safeguards, the U.S. safeguards technology base, and our ability to support International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, will continue to erode and soon may be at risk. To reverse this trend, the then U.S. Secretary of Energy, Samuel Bodman, announced at the 2007 IAEA General Conference that the Department of Energy (DOE) would launch the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). He stated 'IAEA safeguards must be robust and capable of addressing proliferation threats. Full confidence in IAEA safeguards is essential for nuclear power to grow safely and securely. To this end, the U.S. Department of Energy will seek to ensure that modern technology, the best scientific expertise, and adequate resources are available to keep pace with expanding IAEA responsibilities.' To meet this goal, the NGSI objectives include the recruitment of international safeguards experts to work at the U.S. national laboratories and to serve at the IAEA's headquarters. Part of the latter effort will involve enhancing our existing efforts to place well-qualified Americans in a sufficient number of key safeguards positions within the IAEA's Department of Safeguards. Accordingly, the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards (ERIS) on October 22 and 23, 2008. The ISPO used a workshop format developed earlier with Sonalysts, Inc., that was followed at the U.S. Support Program's (USSP's) technology road-mapping sessions. ISPO invited participants from the U.S. DOE, the IAEA, the U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and

  6. IAEA safeguards and non-proliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Harry, R.J.S.

    1995-02-01

    An overview is given of efforts to contain the nuclear weapons proliferation during half a century of man-controlled nuclear fission. An initial policy of denial did not work, a following period of cooperation needed a gradual strengthening of international assurances on the peaceful character of the flourishing use of nuclear techniques for power generation and of other applications. The focus of the nuclear weapon proliferation concern changed from the highly developed states to developing states. The Non-Proliferation Treaty laid the basis for a unique system of voluntarily accepted international inspections to verify the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA got the task to implement this `Full Scope Safeguards` on all nuclear material and all nuclear activities in the non-nuclear weapon states. Thanks to the structure of the IAEA, in which both proponent and states with a critical attitude take part in the decision making process on the IAEA execution of its tasks, a balanced, and widely acceptable system emerged. International developments necessitated additional improvements of the non-proliferation system. The increase of strength of sub-national groups triggered international cooperation on physical protection, about a quarter of a century ago. More recently, it appeared that NPT states with assumed nuclear weapon ambitions operated in the margins between the interpretation of IAEA safeguards and the spirit and purpose of NPT. Improvements of the IAEA safeguards and a stronger cooperation between states, including the constraints which exporting states have imposed on nuclear supplies, strengthen the safeguards system. The important reductions in the two largest nuclear weapon arsenals lead, together with the delay in the fast breeder implementation, to large stockpiles of nuclear weapon usable materials. Also in this areas new internationally credible assurances have to be obtained, that these materials will never return to nuclear weapon applications.

  7. Safeguards-By-Design: Guidance and Tools for Stakeholders

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mark Schanfein; Shirley Johnson

    2012-02-01

    Effective implementation of the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach can help meet the challenges of global nuclear energy growth, by designing facilities that have improved safeguardability and reduced safeguards-related life cycle costs. The ultimate goal of SBD is to implement effective and efficient safeguards that reduce the burden to both the facility operator and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Since 2008, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative's Safeguards By Design Project has initiated multiple studies and workshops with industry and regulatory stakeholders, including the IAEA, to develop relevant documents to support the implementation of SBD. These 'Good Practices Guides' describe facility and process design features that will facilitate implementation of effective nuclear material safeguards starting in the earliest phases of design through to final design. These guides, which are in their final editorial stages, start at a high level and then narrow down to specific nuclear fuel cycle facilities such as Light Water Reactors, Generation III/IV Reactors, High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors, and Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants. Most recently, NGSI has begun development of a facility safeguardability assessment toolkit to assist the designer. This paper will review the current status of these efforts, provide some examples of these documents, and show some standard IAEA Unattended Instrumentation that is permanently installed in nuclear facilities for monitoring.

  8. Summary report on transportation of nuclear fuel materials in Japan : transportation infrastructure, threats identified in open literature, and physical protection regulations.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cochran, John Russell; Ouchi, Yuichiro (Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Japan); Furaus, James Phillip; Marincel, Michelle K.

    2008-03-01

    This report summarizes the results of three detailed studies of the physical protection systems for the protection of nuclear materials transport in Japan, with an emphasis on the transportation of mixed oxide fuel materials1. The Japanese infrastructure for transporting nuclear fuel materials is addressed in the first section. The second section of this report presents a summary of baseline data from the open literature on the threats of sabotage and theft during the transport of nuclear fuel materials in Japan. The third section summarizes a review of current International Atomic Energy Agency, Japanese and United States guidelines and regulations concerning the physical protection for the transportation of nuclear fuel materials.

  9. Basic Nuclear Physics Research Needs for Nuclear Energy

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hill, Tony

    2008-10-01

    Basic nuclear physics research will play a central role in the development of the future nuclear facilities. Federal requirements for higher efficiencies, lower operating and construction costs, and advanced safeguards can all be impacted by the quality of nuclear data used in the fuel cycle calculations for design and licensing. Uncertainties in the underlying nuclear data propagate to uncertainties in integral and operational parameters, which drive margins and cost. Department of Energy (DOE) programs are underway to help develop the necessary nuclear research infrastructure. The Nuclear Energy office of DOE leads the development of new nuclear energy generation technologies to meet energy and climate change goals and advanced, proliferation resistant nuclear fuel technologies that maximize energy from nuclear fuel, while maintaining and enhancing the national nuclear infrastructure. These activities build on important work started over the last three years to deploy new nuclear plants in the United States by early in the next decade, and to develop advanced, next-generation nuclear technology. In this talk, I will discuss some of the foreseen opportunities and needs for basic nuclear research in nuclear energy.

  10. Suggested safeguards an

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    MJM Venter

    ... COORDINATION. (FACILITATION OR CASE MANAGEMENT) IN SOUTH AFRICA ... SUGGESTED SAFEGUARDS AND LIMITATIONS FOR EFFECTIVE AND .... professional practice.27 They have to assess the situation; educate the parents.

  11. Safeguards and security research and development: Program status report, February-July 1981

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Henry, C.N.; Walton, R.B. (comps.)

    1982-04-01

    This report, one of a series of biannual progress reports, describes the status of research and development in the Safeguards and Security Program at Los Alamos from February-July 1981. Most work covered here is sponsored by the Office of Safeguards and Security of the Department of Energy; however, project activities that are technically closely related to nuclear safeguards and security also are included where appropriate for conveying information useful to the nuclear community. The report comprises four major subject areas: Security Development and Support; Nuclear Materials Measurement and Engineering; Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support; and International Safeguards, Technology Transfer, and Training. Some technical topics included in the subject areas are computer and informational security, chemical and nondestructive analysis of nuclear materials, process modeling and analysis, nuclear materials accounting systems, evaluation of prototype measurement instrumentation and procedures in nuclear facilities, design and consultation for facilities, technical exchange, training courses, and international safeguards.

  12. Study of an intrinsically safe infrastructure for training and research on nuclear technologies

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ripani Marco

    2014-01-01

    Full Text Available Within European Partitioning & Transmutation research programs, infrastructures specifically dedicated to the study of fundamental reactor physics and engineering parameters of future fast-neutron-based reactors are very important, being some of these features not available in present zero-power prototypes. This presentation will illustrate the conceptual design of an Accelerator-Driven System with high safety standards, but ample flexibility for measurements. The design assumes as base option a 70 MeV, 0.75 mA proton cyclotron, as the one which will be installed at the INFN National Laboratory in Legnaro, Italy and a Beryllium target, with Helium gas as core coolant. Safety is guaranteed by limiting the thermal power to 200 kW, with a neutron multiplication coefficient around 0.94, loading the core with fuel containing Uranium enriched at 20% inserted in a solid-lead diffuser. The small decay heat can be passively removed by thermal radiation from the vessel. Such a system could be used to study, among others, some specific aspects of neutron diffusion in lead, beam-core coupling, target cooling and could serve as a training facility.

  13. Improving NPT safeguards. Particularly at the natural uranium starting point

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Harry, J. [Netherlands Energy Research Foundation (ECN), Petten (Netherlands); Klerk, P. de [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague (Netherlands)

    1996-03-01

    According to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) all nuclear material is subject to safeguards, but according to INFCIRC/153 the full range of safeguards is only applied beyond the `starting point of safeguards`, that is: The point at which nuclear material has reached a composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or enrichment. This paper addresses the two questions: (a) is the starting point adequately defined, and (b) what mesures could be applied to nuclear material before the starting point? Those questions have been asked before, some of the answers in this paper are new. (orig.).

  14. The Mexican Nuclear Medicine Society and the National Commission of Nuclear Safety and Safeguards; La Sociedad Mexicana de Medicina Nuclear y la Comision Nacional de Seguridad Nuclear y Salvaguardias

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Maldonado M, H.I. [CNSNS, Mexico D.F. (Mexico)

    2007-07-01

    This presentation contains an analysis of the work make by the medical and radiological personnel and its recommendations inside the nuclear medicine installations as well as the appropriate safety measures for the patients and its families protection as well as the environment. (Author)

  15. Development of a Flexible Computerized Management Infrastructure for a Commercial Nuclear Power Plant

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ali, Syed Firasat; Hajek, Brian K.; Usman, Shoaib

    2006-05-01

    The report emphasizes smooth transition from paper-based procedure systems (PBPSs) to computer-based procedure systems (CBPSs) for the existing commercial nuclear power plants in the U.S. The expected advantages and of the transition are mentioned including continued, safe and efficient operation of the plants under their recently acquired or desired extended licenses. The report proposes a three-stage survey to aid in developing a national strategic plan for the transition from PBPSs to CBPSs. It also includes a comprehensive questionnaire that can be readily used for the first stage of the suggested survey.

  16. Technology transfer significance of the International Safeguards Project Office

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Marcuse, W.; Wallgura, A.J.

    1988-01-01

    The safeguards implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are of major importance to the non-proliferation objectives of the United States of America and other nations of the world. Assurance of safeguards effectiveness is mandatory to continued peaceful use of nuclear power. To enhance the ability of the IAEA to apply safeguards effectively, and to ensure that the IAEA does not lack technical assistance in critical areas, the U.S. Congress has made available a special authorization for a Program for Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS). In expediting the program full use is made of existing DOE laboratory resources.

  17. Strenghening Safeguards Authorities and Institutions

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Goodman,M.; Lockwood, d.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Tape, J.W.

    2008-06-06

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system has changed in major ways from the establishment of the IAEA in 1957 until the present. Changes include strengthening the legal framework of safeguards; improvements in concepts and approaches for safeguards implementation; and significant improvements in the technical tools available to inspectors. In this paper, we explore three broad areas related to strengthening safeguards authorities and institutions: integrated safeguards and State-Level Approaches; special inspections; and NPT withdrawal and the continuation of safeguards.

  18. Integrated international safeguards concepts for fuel reprocessing

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Gutmacher, R.G.; Markin, J.T.; Shipley, J.P.; Whitty, W.J.; Camp, A.L.; Cameron, C.P.; Bleck, M.E.; Ellwein, L.B.

    1981-12-01

    This report is the fourth in a series of efforts by the Los Alamos National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, to identify problems and propose solutions for international safeguarding of light-water reactor spent-fuel reprocessing plants. Problem areas for international safeguards were identified in a previous Problem Statement (LA-7551-MS/SAND79-0108). Accounting concepts that could be verified internationally were presented in a subsequent study (LA-8042). Concepts for containment/surveillance were presented, conceptual designs were developed, and the effectiveness of these designs was evaluated in a companion study (SAND80-0160). The report discusses the coordination of nuclear materials accounting and containment/surveillance concepts in an effort to define an effective integrated safeguards system. The Allied-General Nuclear Services fuels reprocessing plant at Barnwell, South Carolina, was used as the reference facility.

  19. Global nuclear energy partnership fuels transient testing at the Sandia National Laboratories nuclear facilities : planning and facility infrastructure options.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kelly, John E.; Wright, Steven Alan; Tikare, Veena; MacLean, Heather J. (Idaho National Laboratory, Idaho Falls, ID); Parma, Edward J., Jr.; Peters, Curtis D.; Vernon, Milton E.; Pickard, Paul S.

    2007-10-01

    The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership fuels development program is currently developing metallic, oxide, and nitride fuel forms as candidate fuels for an Advanced Burner Reactor. The Advance Burner Reactor is being designed to fission actinides efficiently, thereby reducing the long-term storage requirements for spent fuel repositories. Small fuel samples are being fabricated and evaluated with different transuranic loadings and with extensive burnup using the Advanced Test Reactor. During the next several years, numerous fuel samples will be fabricated, evaluated, and tested, with the eventual goal of developing a transmuter fuel database that supports the down selection to the most suitable fuel type. To provide a comparative database of safety margins for the range of potential transmuter fuels, this report describes a plan to conduct a set of early transient tests in the Annular Core Research Reactor at Sandia National Laboratories. The Annular Core Research Reactor is uniquely qualified to perform these types of tests because of its wide range of operating capabilities and large dry central cavity which extents through the center of the core. The goal of the fuels testing program is to demonstrate that the design and fabrication processes are of sufficient quality that the fuel will not fail at its design limit--up to a specified burnup, power density, and operating temperature. Transient testing is required to determine the fuel pin failure thresholds and to demonstrate that adequate fuel failure margins exist during the postulated design basis accidents.

  20. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY10

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Richard Metcalf

    2010-10-01

    The Safeguards Envelope is a strategy to determine a set of specific operating parameters within which nuclear facilities may operate to maximize safeguards effectiveness without sacrificing safety or plant efficiency. This paper details the additions to the advanced operating techniques that will be applied to real plant process monitoring (PM) data from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). Research this year focused on combining disparate pieces of data together to maximize operating time with minimal downtime due to safeguards. A Chi-Square and Croiser's cumulative sum were both included as part of the new analysis. Because of a major issue with the original data, the implementation of the two new tests did not add to the existing set of tests, though limited one-variable optimization made a small increase in detection probability. Additional analysis was performed to determine if prior analysis would have caused a major security or safety operating envelope issue. It was determined that a safety issue would have resulted from the prior research, but that the security may have been increased under certain conditions.

  1. Optical assay technology for safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Edelson, M.C.; Lipert, R.J.; Murray, G.M.; Schuler, R.A.; Vera, J.; Wang, Z.M.; Weeks, S.J.

    1990-10-01

    Research conducted in the Ames Laboratory Nuclear Safeguards and Security Program during the period July 1, 1990 to September 30, 1990 is reviewed; included are reprints and preprints of papers written during this quarter. The first demonstration of isotopic selectivity in Inductively Coupled Plasma -- Laser Excited Atomic Fluorescence Spectroscopy (ICP-LEAFS) is reported and the application of ICP-LEAFS to U isotopic analysis is discussed. Current work in applying optical spectroscopy to the analytical determination of gas phase metal atoms is reviewed. Program administration topics are included in a separately bound Management Supplement to this report.

  2. The future of IAEA safeguards: challenges and responses

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pilat, Joseph F [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Budlong - Sylvester, Kory W [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2011-01-01

    For nearly two decades, the International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA) has been transforming its safeguards system to address the challenges posed by undeclared nuclear programs, the associated revelation of an extensive non-State nuclear procurement network and other issues, including past limits to its verification mandate and the burden of noncompliance issues. Implementing the new measures, including those in the Additional Protocol, and integrating new and old safeguards measures, remains a work in progress. Implementation is complicated by factors including the limited teclmological tools that are available to address such issues as safeguarding bulk handling facilities, detection of undeclared facilities/activities, especially related to enrichment, etc. As this process continues, new challenges are arising, including the demands of expanding nuclear power production worldwide, so-called safeguards by design for a new generation of facilities, the possible IAEA role in a fissile material cutoff treaty and other elements of the arms control and disarmament agenda, the possible role in 'rollback' cases, etc. There is no doubt safeguards will need to evolve in the future, as they have over the last decades. In order for the evolutionary path to proceed, there will inter alia be a need to identify technological gaps, especially with respect to undeclared facilities, and ensure they are filled by adapting old safeguards technologies, by developing and introducing new and novel safeguards teclmologies and/or by developing new procedures and protocols. Safeguards will also need to respond to anticipated emerging threats and to future, unanticipated threats. This will require strategic planning and cooperation among Member States and with the Agency. This paper will address challenges to IAEA safeguards and the technological possibilities and R&D strategies needed to meet those challenges in the context of the forty-year evolution of safeguards, including

  3. The future of IAEA safeguards: challenges and responses

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pilat, Joseph F [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Budlong - Sylvester, Kory W [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2011-01-01

    For nearly two decades, the International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA) has been transforming its safeguards system to address the challenges posed by undeclared nuclear programs, the associated revelation of an extensive non-State nuclear procurement network and other issues, including past limits to its verification mandate and the burden of noncompliance issues. Implementing the new measures, including those in the Additional Protocol, and integrating new and old safeguards measures, remains a work in progress. Implementation is complicated by factors including the limited teclmological tools that are available to address such issues as safeguarding bulk handling facilities, detection of undeclared facilities/activities, especially related to enrichment, etc. As this process continues, new challenges are arising, including the demands of expanding nuclear power production worldwide, so-called safeguards by design for a new generation of facilities, the possible IAEA role in a fissile material cutoff treaty and other elements of the arms control and disarmament agenda, the possible role in 'rollback' cases, etc. There is no doubt safeguards will need to evolve in the future, as they have over the last decades. In order for the evolutionary path to proceed, there will inter alia be a need to identify technological gaps, especially with respect to undeclared facilities, and ensure they are filled by adapting old safeguards technologies, by developing and introducing new and novel safeguards teclmologies and/or by developing new procedures and protocols. Safeguards will also need to respond to anticipated emerging threats and to future, unanticipated threats. This will require strategic planning and cooperation among Member States and with the Agency. This paper will address challenges to IAEA safeguards and the technological possibilities and R&D strategies needed to meet those challenges in the context of the forty-year evolution of safeguards, including

  4. Technology transfer significance of the International Safeguards Project Office

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Marcuse, W.; Waligura, A.J.

    1988-06-01

    The safeguards implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are of major importance to the non-proliferation objectives of the United States of America and other nations of the world. Assurance of safeguards effectiveness is mandatory to continued peaceful use of nuclear power. To enhance the ability of the IAEA to apply safeguards effectively, and to ensure that the IAEA does not lack technical assistance in critical areas, the US Congress has made available a special authorization for a Program for Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS). This substantial program of technology transfer was initiated in 1976. The United States Departments of State and Energy, the Arms control and Disarmament Agency and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have each accepted responsibility for parts of the Program for Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards. Funding is provided by state through the Foreign Assistance Act. This report provides a discussion of this program.

  5. Safeguards Accountability Network accountability and materials management

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Carnival, G.J.; Meredith, E.M.

    1985-01-01

    The Safeguards Accountability Network (SAN) is an on-line accountability system used by Rocky Flats Plant to provide accountability control of its nuclear material inventory. The system is also used to monitor and evaluate the use of the nuclear material inventory against programmatic objectives for materials management. The SAN system utilizes two Harris 800 Computers as central processing units. Enhancement plans are currently being formulated to provide automated data collection from process operations on the shop floor and from non-destructive analysis safeguards instrumentation. SAN, discussed in this paper, is an excellent system for basic accountability control of nuclear materials inventories and is a quite useful tool in evaluating the efficient use of nuclear materials inventories at Rocky Flats Plant.

  6. The potential use of domestic safeguards interior monitors in International Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Williams, J.D.; Dupree, S.A. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Sonnier, C.S. [Jupiter Corp., Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    1998-08-01

    An important future element of International Safeguards instrumentation is expected to be the merging of containment/surveillance and nondestructive assay equipment with domestic physical protection equipment into integrated systems, coupled with remote monitoring. Instrumentation would include interior monitoring and assessment and entry/exit monitoring. Of particular importance is the application of interior monitors in spaces of declared inactivity; for example, in nuclear material storage locations that are entered infrequently. The use of modern interior monitors in International Safeguards offers potential for improving effectiveness and efficiency. Within the context of increased cooperation, one can readily envision increased interaction between International Safeguards and Domestic Safeguards, including increased joint use of State System of Accounting and Control data.

  7. The bomb as option. Motivation for the development of a nuclear infrastructure in the Federal Republic of Germany until 1963; Die Bombe als Option. Motive fuer den Aufbau einer atomtechnischen Infrastruktur in der Bundesrepublik bis 1963

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hanel, Tilmann

    2015-07-01

    The book on the motivation for the development of a nuclear infrastructure in the Federal Republic of Germany until 1963 discusses the following issues: History of the German reactor development during the time of the National Socialism and World War II, reactor research abroad (examples Sweden and Switzerland), protagonists and motivation (politics, science, economy, army), the development of a nuclear infrastructure, results and consequences of the German nuclear policy until 1963.

  8. Reactor monitoring and safeguards using antineutrino detectors

    CERN Document Server

    Bowden, N S

    2008-01-01

    Nuclear reactors have served as the antineutrino source for many fundamental physics experiments. The techniques developed by these experiments make it possible to use these very weakly interacting particles for a practical purpose. The large flux of antineutrinos that leaves a reactor carries information about two quantities of interest for safeguards: the reactor power and fissile inventory. Measurements made with antineutrino detectors could therefore offer an alternative means for verifying the power history and fissile inventory of a reactors, as part of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other reactor safeguards regimes. Several efforts to develop this monitoring technique are underway across the globe.

  9. Idaho National Laboratory Ten-year Site Plan (2012 through 2021) -- DOE-NE's National Nuclear Capability -- Developing and Maintaining the INL Infrastructure

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cal Ozaki

    2010-06-01

    To meet long-term objectives to transform the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), we are providing an integrated, long-term vision of infrastructure requirements that support research, development and demonstration (RD&D) goals outlined in the DOE strategic plans, including the NE Roadmap and reports such as Facilities for the Future of Nuclear Energy Research: A Twenty-year Outlook. The goal of the INL Ten-year Site Plan (TYSP) is to clearly link RD&D mission goals and INL core capabilities with infrastructure requirements (single and multi-program), establish the 10-year end-state vision for INL complexes, identify and prioritize infrastructure and capability gaps, as well as the most efficient and economic approaches to closing those gaps.

  10. International safeguards data authentication

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Melton, R.B.; Smith, C.E.; DeLand, S.M.; Manatt, D.R.

    1996-07-01

    The International Safeguards community is becoming increasingly reliant on information stored in electronic form. In international monitoring and related activities it must be possible to verify and maintain the integrity of this electronic information. This paper discusses the use of data authentication technology to assist in accomplishing this task. The paper provides background information, identifies the relevance to international safeguards, discusses issues related to export controls, algorithm patents, key management and the use of commercial vs. custom software.

  11. The European Safeguards Research and Development Association Addresses Safeguards and Nonproliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Janssens-Maenhout, Greet; Kusumi, R.; Daures, Pascal A.; Janssens, Willem; Dickman, Deborah A.

    2010-06-16

    The renaissance of efforts to expand the use of nuclear energy requires the parallel development of a renewed and more sophisticated work force. Growth in the nuclear sector with high standard of safety, safeguards and security requires skilled staff for design, operations, inspections etc. High-quality nuclear technology educational programs are diminished from past years, and the ability of universities to attract students and to meet future staffing requirements of the nuclear industry is becoming seriously compromised. Thus, education and training in nuclear engineering and sciences is one of the cornerstones for the nuclear sector. Teaching in the nuclear field still seems strongly influenced by national history but it is time to strengthen resources and collaborate. Moreover with the current nuclear security threats it becomes critical that nuclear technology experts master the basic principles not only of safety, but also of nuclear safeguards, nonproliferation and nuclear security. In Europe the European Nuclear Education Network (ENEN) Association has established the certificate 'European Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering (EMSNE)' as the classic nuclear engineering program covering reactor operation and nuclear safety. However, it does not include courses on nonproliferation, safeguards, or dual-use technologies. The lack of education in nuclear safeguards was tackled by the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA), through development and implementation of safeguards course modules. Since 2005 the ESARDA Working Group, called the Training and Knowledge Management Working Group, (TKMWG) has worked with the Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Ispra, Italy to organize a Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation course. This five-day course is held each spring at the JRC, and continues to show increasing interest as evidenced by the positive responses of international lecturers and students. The standard set of lectures

  12. Next generation safeguards initiative (NGSI) program plan for safeguards by design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Demuth, Scott F [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Budlong - Sylvester, Kory [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Lockwood, Dunbar [DOE/NA-243

    2010-01-01

    Safeguards by Design (SBD) is defined as the incorporation of safeguards features early in the design phase of a new nuclear facility in order to avoid the need to redesign the facility at a later date, or retrofit the completed facility. Not only can SBD avoid the need for redesign or retrofit, but consideration of safeguards features early in the facility design effort can provide for a more efficient and effective safeguards design. A program has been initiated by the United States Department of Energy during the past several years to develop, demonstrate and institutionalization SBD. This plan has been developed in parallel with a similar effort at the IAEA while taking into account their achievements and future plans. The United States SBD program is focused on (1) identification of best practices that satisfy existing safeguards requirements, (2) identification of advanced concepts where best practices can be improved, and (3) institutionalizing SBD by gaining its acceptance as a global norm for the design of new nuclear facilities. SBD guidance documents are being prepared as an aid to industry for their design activities, to describe the relationship between requirements, best practices, and advanced concepts. SBD 'lessons learned' studies have been conducted to help identify the existing best practices and potential areas for improvement. Finally, acceptance as a global norm is being pursued by way of international workshops, engagement with industry and the IAEA, and setting an example by way of its use in new nuclear facilities in the United States.

  13. Safeguards and security status report, August 1981-January 1982

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Shipley, J.P. (comp.)

    1982-09-01

    From August 1981 through January 1982, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in many activities that are described in the four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers those efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance varies from consultation on materials accounting problems, through development of specialized techniques and devices, to comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards helps make the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 concerns a relatively new set of activities at Los Alamos aimed at the security of information and computer systems. The focus this period has been on furthering the development of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating the emerging technology. Part 3 describes the development efforts that are essential to continued improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, in every case they are directed ultimately at recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. In addition, enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer.

  14. SARS: Safeguards Accounting and Reporting Software

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mohammedi, B.; Saadi, S.; Ait-Mohamed, S.

    In order to satisfy the requirements of the SSAC (State System for Accounting and Control of nuclear materials), for recording and reporting objectives; this computer program comes to bridge the gape between nuclear facilities operators and national inspection verifying records and delivering reports. The SARS maintains and generates at-facility safeguards accounting records and generates International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards reports based on accounting data input by the user at any nuclear facility. A database structure is built and BORLAND DELPHI programming language has been used. The software is designed to be user-friendly, to make extensive and flexible management of menus and graphs. SARS functions include basic physical inventory tacking, transaction histories and reporting. Access controls are made by different passwords.

  15. The status of the safeguards implementation under the State-Level Approach at the HANARO

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, H. S.; Lee, B. D.; Kim, I. C.; Kim, H. J.; Jung, J. A.; Lee, S. H. [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    The IAEA developed the SLA(State-Level Approach) for the States in order to maximize effectiveness of safeguards in an environment of constrained resources. The SLA has been implemented at KAERI-Daejeon site in the ROK since 2015. The ten nuclear facilities and one LOF(Location Outsides Facility) of the KAERI-Daejeon site are grouped into three categories under the SLA. The HANARO(High flux Advanced Neutron Application ReactOr) and PIEF(Post Irradiation Examination Facility) are involved in the category I “self-contained capability” facilities that have at least one significant quantity of suitable nuclear material and which could support undeclared plutonium production/separation activities without other supporting infrastructures. This paper described the status of the safeguards implementation at the HANARO involved in the category I under the SLA. The status of a model inventory management system for a research reactor developed in 2013 was also investigated. In this paper, the features and status of the safeguards implementation of the HANARO under the SLA were analyzed. Under the SLA, the monthly, quarterly and annual advanced facility operational information for the HANARO has been submitted to the IAEA in a timely manner. The IAEA inspection at HANARO has been successfully performed under the SLA. It is expected that the safeguards implementation work at HANARO under the SLA has the similar level with that under IS. Under the SLA, the data occurred from the surveillance cameras and other equipment installed at HANARO enables to transmit remotely to the IAEA. The IAEA is targeting 2017~2018 to upgrade them. In addition, the development status of a model inventory management system for a research reactor was investigated. It aims at controlling the material inventory for the nuclear material accounting work and the convenient facility operation. The major functions of it are to trace the transfer history of the nuclear materials and non-nuclear materials

  16. Can a safeguards accountancy system really detect an unauthorized removal

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ehinger, M.H.; Ellis, J.H.

    1981-11-01

    Theoretical investigations and system studies indicate safeguards material balance data from reprocessing plants can be used to detect unauthorized removals. Plant systems have been modeled and simulated data used to demonstrate the techniques. But how sensitive are the techniques when used with actual plant data. What is the effect of safeguards applications on plant operability. Can safeguards be acceptable to plant operators, and are there any benefits to be derived. The Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP) has been devoted to answering these and other questions over the past several years. A computerized system of near-real-time accounting and in-process inventory has been implemented and demonstrated during actual plant test runs. Measured inventories and hourly material balance closures have been made to assess safeguards in an operating plant application. The tests have culminated in actual removals of material from the operating plant to investigate the response and measure the sensitivity of the safeguards and data evaluation system.

  17. Organizational Culture, 3S, and Safeguards by Design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mladineo, Stephen V.; Frazar, Sarah L.

    2012-01-31

    While Safety and Security Culture are well socialized among nuclear facility designers, the concept of safeguards culture is less well defined. One area where safeguards culture may play a helpful role is in the area of Safeguards by Design. This paper will include a theoretical discussion of organizational culture, leading with safety culture and security culture that are well known, and positing that there may be room to think about safeguards culture along with the others. It will also examine the utility of the 3S concept and how this concept has been used in training for newcomer states. These will lead into a discussion of how the addition of safeguards to the mix of safety by design and security by design can be valuable, particularly as it is socialized to newcomer states.

  18. Sustaining International CBRN Centers of Excellence with a Focus on Nuclear Security and Safeguards: Initial Scoping Session London, 23-24 September 2013 SUMMARY REPORT

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Anderson, Roger G.; Frazar, Sarah L.

    2013-12-12

    This report provides a summary-level description of the key information, observations, ideas, and recommendations expressed during the subject meeting. The report is organized to correspond to the meeting agenda provided in Appendix 1 and includes references to several of the participants listed in Appendix 2 .The meeting venue was Lloyd’s Register in the City of London. Lloyd’s Register graciously accommodated the request of The Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNNL) with whom it works on various safeguards activities commissioned by NNSA. PNNL and NNSA also shared the goal of the meeting/study with the United Kingdom (UK) Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department of Energy and Climate Change with whom they coordinated the participant list.

  19. Pebble bed modular reactor safeguards: developing new approaches and implementing safeguards by design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Beyer, Brian David [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Beddingfield, David H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Durst, Philip [INL; Bean, Robert [INL

    2010-01-01

    The design of the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) does not fit or seem appropriate to the IAEA safeguards approach under the categories of light water reactor (LWR), on-load refueled reactor (OLR, i.e. CANDU), or Other (prismatic HTGR) because the fuel is in a bulk form, rather than discrete items. Because the nuclear fuel is a collection of nuclear material inserted in tennis-ball sized spheres containing structural and moderating material and a PBMR core will contain a bulk load on the order of 500,000 spheres, it could be classified as a 'Bulk-Fuel Reactor.' Hence, the IAEA should develop unique safeguards criteria. In a multi-lab DOE study, it was found that an optimized blend of: (i) developing techniques to verify the plutonium content in spent fuel pebbles, (ii) improving burn-up computer codes for PBMR spent fuel to provide better understanding of the core and spent fuel makeup, and (iii) utilizing bulk verification techniques for PBMR spent fuel storage bins should be combined with the historic IAEA and South African approaches of containment and surveillance to verify and maintain continuity of knowledge of PBMR fuel. For all of these techniques to work the design of the reactor will need to accommodate safeguards and material accountancy measures to a far greater extent than has thus far been the case. The implementation of Safeguards-by-Design as the PBMR design progresses provides an approach to meets these safeguards and accountancy needs.

  20. The evolution of information-driven safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Budlong-sylvester, Kory W [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Pilat, Joseph F [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-10-14

    From the adoption of the Model Additional Protocol and integrated safeguards in the 1990s, to current International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) efforts to deal with cases of noncompliance, the question of how the Agency can best utilize all the information available to it remains of great interest and increasing importance. How might the concept of 'information-driven' safeguards (IDS) evolve in the future? The ability of the Agency to identify and resolve anomalies has always been important and has emerged as a core Agency function in recent years as the IAEA has had to deal with noncompliance in Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Future IAEA safeguards implementation should be designed with the goal of facilitating and enhancing this vital capability. In addition, the Agency should utilize all the information it possesses, including its in-house assessments and expertise, to direct its safeguards activities. At the State level, knowledge of proliferation possibilities is currently being used to guide the analytical activities of the Agency and to develop inspection plans. How far can this approach be extended? Does it apply across State boundaries? Should it dictate a larger fraction of safeguards activities? Future developments in IDS should utilize the knowledge resident within the Agency to ensure that safeguards resources flow to where they are most needed in order to address anomalies first and foremost, but also to provide greater confidence in conclusions regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. The elements of such a system and related implementation issues are assessed in this paper.

  1. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1984

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, D.B. (comp.)

    1986-01-01

    From January to December 1984, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. was Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  2. Reactor safeguards system assessment and design. Volume I

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Varnado, G.B.; Ericson, D.M. Jr.; Daniel, S.L.; Bennett, H.A.; Hulme, B.L.

    1978-06-01

    This report describes the development and application of a methodology for evaluating the effectiveness of nuclear power reactor safeguards systems. Analytic techniques are used to identify the sabotage acts which could lead to release of radioactive material from a nuclear power plant, to determine the areas of a plant which must be protected to assure that significant release does not occur, to model the physical plant layout, and to evaluate the effectiveness of various safeguards systems. The methodology was used to identify those aspects of reactor safeguards systems which have the greatest effect on overall system performance and which, therefore, should be emphasized in the licensing process. With further refinements, the methodology can be used by the licensing reviewer to aid in assessing proposed or existing safeguards systems.

  3. TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT ON THE DUPIC SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    H. KIM; H. CHA; ET AL

    2001-02-01

    A safeguards system has been developed since 1993 in the course of supporting a fuel cycle process to fabricate CANDU fuel with spent PWR fuel (known as Direct Use of PWR spent fuel In CANDU, DUPIC). The major safeguards technology involved here was to design and fabricate a neutron coincidence counting system for process accountability, and also an unattended continuous monitoring system in association with independent verification by the IAEA. This combined technology was to produce information of nuclear material content and to maintain knowledge of the continuity of nuclear material flow. In addition to hardware development, diagnosis software is being developed to assist data acquisition, data review, and data evaluation based on a neural network system on the IAEA C/S system.

  4. Safeguards Accountability Network accountability and materials management

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Carnival, G.J.; Meredith, E.M.

    1985-01-01

    The Safeguards Accountability Network (SAN) is a computerized on-line accountability system for the safeguards accountability control of nuclear materials inventories at Rocky Flats Plant. SAN is a dedicated accountability system utilizing source documents filled out on the shop floor as its base. The system incorporates double entry accounting and is developed around the Material Balance Area (MBA) concept. MBA custodians enter transaction information from source documents prepared by personnel in the process areas directly into the SAN system. This provides a somewhat near-real time perpetual inventory system which has limited interaction with MBA custodians. MBA custodians are permitted to inquire into the system and status items on inventory. They are also responsible for the accuracy of the accountability information used as input to the system for their MBA. Monthly audits by the Nuclear Materials Control group assure the timeliness and accuracy of SAN accountability information.

  5. 10 CFR 76.119 - Security facility approval and safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Security facility approval and safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data. 76.119 Section 76.119 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) CERTIFICATION OF GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANTS Safeguards and Security § 76.119 Security facility approval and safeguarding of National...

  6. Integrating Safeguards and Security with Safety into Design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Robert S. Bean; John W. Hockert; David J. Hebditch

    2009-05-01

    There is a need to minimize security risks, proliferation hazards, and safety risks in the design of new nuclear facilities in a global environment of nuclear power expansion, while improving the synergy of major design features and raising operational efficiency. In 2008, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) covering many safeguards areas. One of these, launched by NNSA with support of the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, was a multi-laboratory project, led by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), to develop safeguards by design. The proposed Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process has been developed as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient, and cost effective integration of international safeguards and other nonproliferation barriers with national material control and accountability, physical security, and safety objectives into the overall design process for the nuclear facility lifecycle. A graded, iterative process was developed to integrate these areas throughout the project phases. It identified activities, deliverables, interfaces, and hold points covering both domestic regulatory requirements and international safeguards using the DOE regulatory environment as exemplar to provide a framework and guidance for project management and integration of safety with security during design. Further work, reported in this paper, created a generalized SBD process which could also be employed within the licensed nuclear industry and internationally for design of new facilities. Several tools for integrating safeguards, safety, and security into design are discussed here. SBD appears complementary to the EFCOG TROSSI process for security and safety integration created in 2006, which focuses on standardized upgrades to enable existing DOE facilities to meet a more severe design basis threat. A collaborative approach is suggested.

  7. Nuclear Fuel Cycle & Vulnerabilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Boyer, Brian D. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-06-18

    The objective of safeguards is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection. The safeguards system should be designed to provide credible assurances that there has been no diversion of declared nuclear material and no undeclared nuclear material and activities.

  8. Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Fast Reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Durst, Philip C.; Therios, Ike; Bean, Robert; Dougan, A.; Boyer, Brian; Wallace, Rick L.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Kovacic, Don N.; Tolk, K.

    2007-12-15

    This third report in the series reviews possible safeguards approaches for new fast reactors in general, and the ABR in particular. Fast-neutron spectrum reactors have been used since the early 1960s on an experimental and developmental level, generally with fertile blanket fuels to “breed” nuclear fuel such as plutonium. Whether the reactor is designed to breed plutonium, or transmute and “burn” actinides depends mainly on the design of the reactor neutron reflector and the whether the blanket fuel is “fertile” or suitable for transmutation. However, the safeguards issues are very similar, since they pertain mainly to the receipt, shipment and storage of fresh and spent plutonium and actinide-bearing “TRU”-fuel. For these reasons, the design of existing fast reactors and details concerning how they have been safeguarded were studied in developing advanced safeguards approaches for the new fast reactors. In this regard, the design of the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II “EBR-II” at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) was of interest, because it was designed as a collocated fast reactor with a pyrometallurgical reprocessing and fuel fabrication line – a design option being considered for the ABR. Similarly, the design of the Fast Flux Facility (FFTF) on the Hanford Site was studied, because it was a successful prototype fast reactor that ran for two decades to evaluate fuels and the design for commercial-scale fast reactors.

  9. Antineutrino reactor safeguards - a case study

    CERN Document Server

    Christensen, Eric; Jaffke, Patrick

    2013-01-01

    Antineutrinos have been proposed as a means of reactor safeguards for more than 30 years and there has been impressive experimental progress in neutrino detection. In this paper we conduct, for the first time, a case study of the application of antineutrino safeguards to a real-world scenario - the North Korean nuclear crisis in 1994. We derive detection limits to a partial or full core discharge in 1989 based on actual IAEA safeguards access and find that two independent methods would have yielded positive evidence for a second core with very high confidence. To generalize our results, we provide detailed estimates for the sensitivity to the plutonium content of various types of reactors, including most types of plutonium production reactors, based on detailed reactor simulations. A key finding of this study is that a wide class of reactors with a thermal power of less than 0.1-1 GWth can be safeguarded achieving IAEA goals for quantitative sensitivity and timeliness with detectors right outside the reactor ...

  10. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1983

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, D.B. (comp.)

    1984-09-01

    From January to December 1983, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this peiod was on continuing the activities of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  11. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1985

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1987-03-01

    From January to December 1985, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Safeguards Operations, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and evaluation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards and international safeguards for reprocessing plants required a significant portion of our resources. All of these efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  12. Electrochemically Modulated Separation for Plutonium Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pratt, Sandra H.; Breshears, Andrew T.; Arrigo, Leah M.; Schwantes, Jon M.; Duckworth, Douglas C.

    2013-12-31

    Accurate and timely analysis of plutonium in spent nuclear fuel is critical in nuclear safeguards for detection of both protracted and rapid plutonium diversions. Gamma spectroscopy is a viable method for accurate and timely measurements of plutonium provided that the plutonium is well separated from the interfering fission and activation products present in spent nuclear fuel. Electrochemically modulated separation (EMS) is a method that has been used successfully to isolate picogram amounts of Pu from nitric acid matrices. With EMS, Pu adsorption may be turned "on" and "off" depending on the applied voltage, allowing for collection and stripping of Pu without the addition of chemical reagents. In this work, we have scaled up the EMS process to isolate microgram quantities of Pu from matrices encountered in spent nuclear fuel during reprocessing. Several challenges have been addressed including surface area limitations, radiolysis effects, electrochemical cell performance stability, and chemical interferences. After these challenges were resolved, 6 µg Pu was deposited in the electrochemical cell with approximately an 800-fold reduction of fission and activation product levels from a spent nuclear fuel sample. Modeling showed that these levels of Pu collection and interference reduction may not be sufficient for Pu detection by gamma spectroscopy. The main remaining challenges are to achieve a more complete Pu isolation and to deposit larger quantities of Pu for successful gamma analysis of Pu. If gamma analyses of Pu are successful, EMS will allow for accurate and timely on-site analysis for enhanced Pu safeguards.

  13. Coordinated safeguards for materials management in a mixed-oxide fuel facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Shipley, J.P.; Cobb, D.D.; Dietz, R.J.; Evans, M.L.; Schelonka, E.P.; Smith, D.B.; Walton, R.B.

    1977-02-01

    A coordinated safeguards system is described for safeguarding strategic quantities of special nuclear materials in mixed-oxide recycle fuel fabrication facilities. The safeguards system is compatible with industrial process requirements and combines maximum effectiveness consistent with modest cost and minimal process interference. It is based on unit process accounting using a combination of conventional and state-of-the-art NDA measurement techniques. The effectiveness of the system against single and multiple thefts is evaluated using computer modeling and simulation techniques.

  14. LESSONS LEARNED IN TESTING OF SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    PEPPER,S.; FARNITANO,M.; CARELLI,J.; HAZELTINE,J.; BAILEY,D.

    2001-10-29

    The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Department of Safeguards uses complex instrumentation for the application of safeguards at nuclear facilities around the world. Often, this equipment is developed through cooperation with member state support programs because the Agency's requirements are unique and are not met by commercially available equipment. Before approving an instrument or system for routine inspection use, the IAEA subjects it to a series of tests designed to evaluate its reliability. In 2000, the IAEA began to observe operational failures in digital surveillance systems. In response to the observed failures, the IAEA worked with the equipment designer and manufacturer to determine the cause of failure. An action plan was developed to correct the performance issues and further test the systems to make sure that additional operational issues would not surface later. This paper addresses the steps taken to address operation issues related to digital image surveillance systems and the lessons learned during this process.

  15. Negotiating supranational rules. The genesis of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Forland, A.

    1997-12-31

    The object of this study is the evolution from 1954-56 up until the mid-1970s of the nuclear safeguards system administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. The main aim of the study is not to describe the IAEA safeguards system as such. The focus will be on analysing the arguments advanced in the various negotiations, and the main objective will be to single out the factors determining the result. In the course of the time span under study two international treaties were negotiated which were decisive for the development of international nuclear safeguards. These were the IAEA Stature (1956) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968). The Statue as well as the NPT contain articles on international nuclear safeguards. These articles limit themselves to spelling out the safeguards principles. It was thus left to the IAEA Board of Governors to develop the safeguards procedures in detail. Two IAEA safeguards documents were negotiated between 1959 and 1965 in order to implement the safeguards article of the Statue. The safeguards requirements of the NPT were spelled out in a new model agreement in 1972. 58 refs.

  16. Cooperation of nuclear manpower development between Viet Nam and Korea in order to enhance establishment of infrastructure in exporting nuclear technology to Viet Nam

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, E. J.; Han, K. W.; Park, J. K.; Kim, Y. T.; Nam, Y. M.; Jang, Y. H.; Yang, M. H

    2003-08-15

    Through this project, KAERI provided OJT Programme to 3 nuclear experts of Viet Nam at the KAERI for 3 months as a cooperation of human resource development in the field of nuclear policy, nuclear safety analysis and thermo hydraulic. We could have publicity activities of S/W and H/W then achieve an advantage position of economical and technical in exporting nuclear technology to Viet Nam. Also we have provided a training course and seminar for a high-level delegation of nuclear policy decision makers, which is consisted of 5 deputy ministers and general directors of Viet Nam in Korea. Thus we could have Vietnamese who are favoring Korea. The KAERI will also prepare a data base of trained Vietnamese in Korea for the maximum utilization of them in cooperating with Viet Nam. We accomplished the cooperation of human resource development and providing program and curriculum of the nuclear education and training in Viet Nam. Furthermore, it is expected that the enhancement of nuclear technical cooperation between Viet Nam and Korea and the nuclear human resource development.

  17. Bike Infrastructures

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Silva, Victor; Harder, Henrik; Jensen, Ole B.;

    Bike Infrastructures aims to identify bicycle infrastructure typologies and design elements that can help promote cycling significantly. It is structured as a case study based research where three cycling infrastructures with distinct typologies were analyzed and compared. The three cases are Ves......, the findings of this research project can also support bike friendly design and planning, and cyclist advocacy....

  18. Safeguards and security by design (SSBD) for the domestic threat - theft and sabotage

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Demuth, Scott F [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Mullen, Mark [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2011-10-05

    Safeguards by Design (SBD) is receiving significant interest with respect to international safeguards objectives. However, less attention has been focused on the equally important topic of domestic Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD), which addresses requirements such as those of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in the United States. While international safeguards are concerned with detecting State diversion of nuclear material from peaceful to nuclear explosives purposes, domestic Material Protection, Control and Accounting measures (MPC&A) are focused on non-State theft and sabotage. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has described the Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' This same concept is equally applicable to SSBD for domestic requirements. The United States Department of Energy (DOE) has initiated a project through its Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) and more specifically its Fuel Cycle Research and Development (FCRD) program, to develop a domestic SSBD discipline and methodology in parallel with similar efforts sponsored by the DOE Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the IAEA for international safeguards. This activity includes the participation of industry (through DOE-sponsored contracts) and DOE National Laboratories. This paper will identify the key domestic safeguards and security requirements (i.e. MC&A and physical protection) and explain how and why Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) is important and beneficial for the design of future US nuclear energy systems.

  19. Nuclear control

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yoon, Wan Kee [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    1995-02-01

    International cooperation in nuclear industries requires nuclear control as prerequisites. The concept of nuclear control is based on the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapon (NPT). The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) plays central role in implementing nuclear control. Nuclear control consists of nuclear safeguards, physical protection, and export/import control. Each member state of NPT is subject to the IAEA`s safeguards by concluding safeguards agreements with the IAEA. IAEA recommends member states to implement physical protection on nuclear materials by `The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material` and `The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material` of IAEA. Export/Import Control is to deter development of nuclear weapons by controlling international trade on nuclear materials, nuclear equipments and technology. Current status of domestic and foreign nuclear control implementation including recent induction of national inspection system in Korea is described and functions of recently set-up Technology Center for Nuclear Control (TCNC) under the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) are also explained. 6 tabs., 11 refs. (Author).

  20. End user needs for enhanced IAEA Safeguards Information Management Capabilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Badalamente, R. [Pacific Northwest Lab., Richland, WA (United States); Anzelon, G. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States); Deland, S. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Whiteson, R. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)

    1994-07-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency is undertaking a program for strengthening its safeguards on the recognition that safeguards must give assurance not only of the non-diversion of declared material or that declared facilities are not being misused, but also of the absence of any undeclared nuclear activities in States which have signed comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency. The IAEA has determined that the detection of undeclared nuclear activities and the creation of confidence in the continuing peaceful use of declared material and facilities is largely dependent on more information being made available to the Agency and on the capability of the Agency to make more effective use of this additional information, as well as existing information.

  1. Infrastructure sensing.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Soga, Kenichi; Schooling, Jennifer

    2016-08-01

    Design, construction, maintenance and upgrading of civil engineering infrastructure requires fresh thinking to minimize use of materials, energy and labour. This can only be achieved by understanding the performance of the infrastructure, both during its construction and throughout its design life, through innovative monitoring. Advances in sensor systems offer intriguing possibilities to radically alter methods of condition assessment and monitoring of infrastructure. In this paper, it is hypothesized that the future of infrastructure relies on smarter information; the rich information obtained from embedded sensors within infrastructure will act as a catalyst for new design, construction, operation and maintenance processes for integrated infrastructure systems linked directly with user behaviour patterns. Some examples of emerging sensor technologies for infrastructure sensing are given. They include distributed fibre-optics sensors, computer vision, wireless sensor networks, low-power micro-electromechanical systems, energy harvesting and citizens as sensors.

  2. Investigation of novel spent fuel verification system for safeguard application

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Haneol; Yim, Man-Sung [KAIST, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    Radioactive waste, especially spent fuel, is generated from the operation of nuclear power plants. The final stage of radioactive waste management is disposal which isolates radioactive waste from the accessible environment and allows it to decay. The safety, security, and safeguard of a spent fuel repository have to be evaluated before its operation. Many researchers have evaluated the safety of a repository. These researchers calculated dose to public after the repository is closed depending on their scenario. Because most spent fuel repositories are non-retrievable, research on security or safeguards of spent fuel repositories have to be performed. Design based security or safeguard have to be developed for future repository designs. This study summarizes the requirements of future spent fuel repositories especially safeguards, and suggests a novel system which meets the safeguard requirements. Applying safeguards to a spent fuel repository is becoming increasingly important. The future requirements for a spent fuel repository are suggested by several expert groups, such as ASTOR in IAEA. The requirements emphasizes surveillance and verification. The surveillance and verification of spent fuel is currently accomplished by using the Cerenkov radiation detector while spent fuel is being stored in a fuel pool. This research investigated an advanced spent fuel verification system using a system which converts spent fuel radiation into electricity. The system generates electricity while it is conveyed from a transportation cask to a disposal cask. The electricity conversion system was verified in a lab scale experiment using an 8.51GBq Cs-137 gamma source.

  3. Safeguards-by-Design: Guidance for Independent Spent Fuel Dry Storage Installations (ISFSI)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Trond Bjornard; Philip C. Durst

    2012-05-01

    This document summarizes the requirements and best practices for implementing international nuclear safeguards at independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs), also known as Away-from- Reactor (AFR) storage facilities. These installations may provide wet or dry storage of spent fuel, although the safeguards guidance herein focuses on dry storage facilities. In principle, the safeguards guidance applies to both wet and dry storage. The reason for focusing on dry independent spent fuel storage installations is that this is one of the fastest growing nuclear installations worldwide. Independent spent fuel storage installations are typically outside of the safeguards nuclear material balance area (MBA) of the reactor. They may be located on the reactor site, but are generally considered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the State Regulator/SSAC to be a separate facility. The need for this guidance is becoming increasingly urgent as more and more nuclear power plants move their spent fuel from resident spent fuel ponds to independent spent fuel storage installations. The safeguards requirements and best practices described herein are also relevant to the design and construction of regional independent spent fuel storage installations that nuclear power plant operators are starting to consider in the absence of a national long-term geological spent fuel repository. The following document has been prepared in support of two of the three foundational pillars for implementing Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). These are: i) defining the relevant safeguards requirements, and ii) defining the best practices for meeting the requirements. This document was prepared with the design of the latest independent dry spent fuel storage installations in mind and was prepared specifically as an aid for designers of commercial nuclear facilities to help them understand the relevant international requirements that follow from a country’s safeguards agreement with

  4. Nuclear Manpower Training

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Min, B. J.; Han, K. W.; Lee, H. Y. and others

    2006-01-15

    Through the project on nuclear human resources development in 2005, the Nuclear Training Center of KAERI has provided 67 nuclear education and training courses for 3,658 persons from the domestic nuclear related organizations such as Government Agencies, nuclear industries, R and D institutes, universities, and public as well as from IAEA Member States. In addition, 6 students (MS and Ph D.) have taken nuclear technology related courses offered by UST-KAERI. The project has developed 8 programs and 12 courses. They includes programs for IAEA training, bilateral education and training, and in-house training as well as courses dealing with maintenance of nuclear power plants and management of electricity generation, thermal-hydraulics nuclear hydrogen, nuclear safeguards, radiation emergency preparedness and etc. National and international cooperation has been promoted. For ANENT, test operation, data loading and revision of the web-portal have been undertaken. Also the web-portal operation system has been established. For FNCA, NTC has cooperated for the establishment of a model of human resource development and the exchange of information/materials. With WNU, the NTC has made an effort for hosting 2007 WNU Summer Institute. The infrastructure for nuclear education and training has been strengthened. Basic directions for providing the customers with better service, This includes showing kindness to the customer, renovation of the interior of training facilities, and upgrading of web-based management system for learning and using facilities of NTC. Other efforts have resulted in the publication of 25 course materials (10 for international courses and 15 for national courses), and the improvement of education and training equipment. The International Nuclear Training and Education Center (INTEC), which was opened in 2002, has hosted 296 international and domestic events in 2005.

  5. Remote instrumentation and safeguards monitoring for the star project

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Buettner, H M; Labiak, W; Spiridon, A

    2000-06-15

    A part of the Nuclear Energy Research Initiative (NERI) is the development of the Small Transportable Autonomous Reactor (STAR) for deployment in countries that do not have a nuclear industry. STARs would have an output of from 100 to 150 MW electric, would be fueled in the country of manufacture, and after 15 to 20 years of operation the reactor core would be returned to the country of manufacture for refueling. A candidate STAR design can be found in (Greenspan, 2000). This paper describes the design of the control and monitoring system that might be used. There are two unique features to this system. One is that the monitored information will be transmitted to a remote site for two purposes, safeguards, and allowing experts a great distance away direct access to view the reactor's operating parameters. The second feature is safeguards sensors will be designed into the system and there will monitoring of the safeguards aspects of the system for tampering. Any safeguards anomalies will be sent to the remote site as alarms. Encrypted satellite communications will be used to transmit the data. These features allow the STAR to be operated by a small staff and will reduce the costs of safeguards monitoring by reducing the number of plant visits by inspectors.

  6. Remote instrumentation and safeguards monitoring for the star project

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Buettner, H M; Labiak, W; Spiridon, A

    2000-06-15

    A part of the Nuclear Energy Research Initiative (NERI) is the development of the Small Transportable Autonomous Reactor (STAR) for deployment in countries that do not have a nuclear industry. STARs would have an output of from 100 to 150 MW electric, would be fueled in the country of manufacture, and after 15 to 20 years of operation the reactor core would be returned to the country of manufacture for refueling. A candidate STAR design can be found in (Greenspan, 2000). This paper describes the design of the control and monitoring system that might be used. There are two unique features to this system. One is that the monitored information will be transmitted to a remote site for two purposes, safeguards, and allowing experts a great distance away direct access to view the reactor's operating parameters. The second feature is safeguards sensors will be designed into the system and there will monitoring of the safeguards aspects of the system for tampering. Any safeguards anomalies will be sent to the remote site as alarms. Encrypted satellite communications will be used to transmit the data. These features allow the STAR to be operated by a small staff and will reduce the costs of safeguards monitoring by reducing the number of plant visits by inspectors.

  7. 75 FR 8154 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-02-23

    ... NRC staff regarding new advanced reactor designs such as NuScale, Iris, Babcock and Wilcox Modular... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards In accordance with the purposes of Sections 29 and...

  8. Long-term proliferation and safeguards issues in future technologies

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Keisch, B.; Auerbach, C.; Fainberg, A.; Fiarman, S.; Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.; Lemley, J.R.; O' Brien, J.

    1986-02-01

    The purpose of the task was to assess the effect of potential new technologies, nuclear and non-nuclear, on safeguards needs and non-proliferation policies, and to explore possible solutions to some of the problems envisaged. Eight subdivisions were considered: New Enrichment Technologies; Non-Aqueous Reprocessing Technologies; Fusion; Accelerator-Driven Reactor Systems; New Reactor Types; Heavy Water and Deuterium; Long-Term Storage of Spent Fuel; and Other Future Technologies (Non-Nuclear). For each of these subdivisions, a careful review of the current world-wide effort in the field provided a means of subjectively estimating the viability and qualitative probability of fruition of promising technologies. Technologies for which safeguards and non-proliferation requirements have been thoroughly considered by others were not restudied here (e.g., the Fast Breeder Reactor). The time scale considered was 5 to 40 years for possible initial demonstration although, in some cases, a somewhat optimistic viewpoint was embraced. Conventional nuclear-material safeguards are only part of the overall non-proliferation regime. Other aspects are international agreements, export controls on sensitive technologies, classification of information, intelligence gathering, and diplomatic initiatives. The focus here is on safeguards, export controls, and classification.

  9. 76 FR 34276 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Digital...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-06-13

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Digital Instrumentation...

  10. 10 CFR 73.22 - Protection of Safeguards Information: Specific requirements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ..., or sabotage of source, byproduct, or special nuclear material. (2) Physical protection in transit... Safeguards Information is attended by such an individual even though the information is in fact...

  11. 78 FR 2295 - Consideration of Approval of Application Containing Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-01-10

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office ] NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Consideration of Approval of Application Containing Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information Regarding Proposed Energy Future Holdings Corporation Internal Restructuring AGENCY:...

  12. Analysis on approach of safeguards implementation at research reactor handling item count and bulk material

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Hyun Jo; Lee, Sung Ho; Lee, Byung Doo; Jung, Juang [KAERI, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-05-15

    KiJang research reactor (KJRR) will be constructed to produce the radioisotope such as Mo-99 etc., provide the neutron transmutation doping (NTD) service of silicon, and develop the core technologies of research reactor. In this paper, the features of the process and nuclear material flow are reviewed and the material balance area (MBA) and key measurement point (KMP) are established based on the nuclear material flow. Also, this paper reviews the approach on safeguards and nuclear material accountancy at the facility level for Safeguards-by-Design at research reactor handling item count and bulk material. In this paper, MBA and KMPs are established through the analysis on facility features and major process at KJRR handling item count and bulk material. Also, this paper reviews the IAEA safeguards implementation and nuclear material accountancy at KJRR. It is necessary to discuss the safeguards approach on the fresh FM target assemblies and remaining uranium in the intermediate level liquid wastes.

  13. Future challenges and DOE/NNSA-JAEA cooperation for the development of advanced safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Stevens, Rebecca S [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Mc Clelland - Kerr, John [NNSA-NA-242; Senzaki, Masao [JAEA; Hori, Masato [JAEA

    2009-01-01

    The United States Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) has been cooperating with Japan on nuclear safeguards for over thirty years. DOE/NNSA has collaborated with the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and its predecessors in addressing the need for innovative solutions to nuclear transparency and verification issues in one of the world's most advanced nuclear fuel cycle states. This collaboration includes over ninety activities that have involved nearly every facility in the JAEA complex and many national laboratories in the U.S. complex. The partnership has yielded new technologies and approaches that have benefited international safeguards not only in Japan, but around the world. The International Atomic Energy Agency uses a number of safeguards solutions developed under this collaboration to improve its inspection efforts in Japan and elsewhere. Japanese facilities serve as test beds for emerging safeguards technologies and are setting the trend for new nuclear energy and fuel cycle development worldwide. The collaboration continues to be an essential component of U.S. safeguards outreach and is integral to the DOE/NNSA's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative. In addition to fostering international safeguards development, the cooperation is an opportunity for U.S. scientists to work in facilities that have no analog in the United States, thus providing crucial real-life experience for and aiding development of the next generation of U.S. safeguards specialists. It is also an important element of promoting regional transparency thereby building confidence in the peaceful nature of nuclear programs in the region. The successes engendered by this partnership provide a strong basis for addressing future safeguards challenges, in Japan and elsewhere. This paper summarizes these challenges and the associated cooperative efforts that are either underway or anticipated.

  14. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory safeguards and security quarterly progress report to the US Department of Energy quarter ending September 30, 1994

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Davis, G.; Mansur, D.L.; Ruhter, W.D.; Steele, E.; Strait, R.S.

    1994-10-01

    This report presents the details of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory safeguards and securities program. This program is focused on developing new technology, such as x- and gamma-ray spectrometry, for measurement of special nuclear materials. This program supports the Office of Safeguards and Securities in the following five areas; safeguards technology, safeguards and decision support, computer security, automated physical security, and automated visitor access control systems.

  15. Integrated safeguards and facility design and operations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tape, J.W.; Coulter, C.A.; Markin, J.T.; Thomas, K.E.

    1987-01-01

    The integration of safeguards functions to deter or detect unauthorized actions by insiders requires careful communication and management of safeguards-relevant information on a timely basis. The separation of safeguards functions into physical protection, materials control, and materials accounting often inhibits important information flows. Redefining the major safeguards functions as authorization, enforcement, and verification and careful attention to management of information can result in effective safeguards integration. Whether designing new systems or analyzing existing ones, understanding the interface between facility operations and safeguards is critical to cost-effective integrated safeguards systems that meet modern standards of performance.

  16. Evaluative Infrastructures

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kornberger, Martin; Pflueger, Dane; Mouritsen, Jan

    BnB or Uber, this paper develops the concept of evaluative infrastructures for a heterarchical modus of accounting. Evaluative infrastructures are decentralized accounting practices that underpin distributed production processes. They are evaluative because they deploy a plethora of interacting devices...

  17. A free topology safeguards network

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kadner, S.P.; Resnik, W.M. [Aquila Technologies Group, Inc., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Schurig, A. [Communications Foundation, Orem, UT (United States)

    1995-12-31

    Free Topology Network technology provides cost reduction benefits as well as flexibility in safeguards applications. Power line communications technologies have proven viability for transmission and reception of safeguards data, including surveillance photographs, the source of the largest data files. In the future, enhancements will be made to the technology that should boost both performance and flexibility. Work is already underway to achieve higher data rates over power line communications eventually, it should be possible to reach data rates of one million bits per second or higher. Also, the use of technologies such as Novell Embedded Systems Technology (NEST) and Echelon LON technology will allow a greater number of safeguards technologies to become resident on the Free Topology Safeguards Network.

  18. USSP-IAEA WORKSHOP ON ADVANCED SENSORS FOR SAFEGUARDS.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    PEPPER,S.; QUEIROLO, A.; ZENDEL, M.; WHICHELLO, J.; ANNESE, C.; GRIEBE, J.; GRIEBE, R.

    2007-11-13

    The IAEA Medium Term Strategy (2006-2011) defines a number of specific goals in respect to the IAEA's ability to provide assurances to the international community regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy through States adherences to their respective non-proliferation treaty commitments. The IAEA has long used and still needs the best possible sensors to detect and measure nuclear material. The Department of Safeguards, recognizing the importance of safeguards-oriented R&D, especially targeting improved detection capabilities for undeclared facilities, materials and activities, initiated a number of activities in early 2005. The initiatives included letters to Member State Support Programs (MSSPs), personal contacts with known technology holders, topical meetings, consultant reviews of safeguards technology, and special workshops to identify new and novel technologies and methodologies. In support of this objective, the United States Support Program to IAEA Safeguards hosted a workshop on ''Advanced Sensors for Safeguards'' in Santa Fe, New Mexico, from April 23-27, 2007. The Organizational Analysis Corporation, a U.S.-based management consulting firm, organized and facilitated the workshop. The workshop's goal was to help the IAEA identify and plan for new sensors for safeguards implementation. The workshop, which was attended by representatives of seven member states and international organizations, included presentations by technology holders and developers on new technologies thought to have relevance to international safeguards, but not yet in use by the IAEA. The presentations were followed by facilitated breakout sessions where the participants considered two scenarios typical of what IAEA inspectors might face in the field. One scenario focused on an enrichment plant; the other scenario focused on a research reactor. The participants brainstormed using the technologies presented by the participants and other technologies

  19. Integrated safeguards & security for material protection, accounting, and control.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Duran, Felicia Angelica; Cipiti, Benjamin B.

    2009-10-01

    Traditional safeguards and security design for fuel cycle facilities is done separately and after the facility design is near completion. This can result in higher costs due to retrofits and redundant use of data. Future facilities will incorporate safeguards and security early in the design process and integrate the systems to make better use of plant data and strengthen both systems. The purpose of this project was to evaluate the integration of materials control and accounting (MC&A) measurements with physical security design for a nuclear reprocessing plant. Locations throughout the plant where data overlap occurs or where MC&A data could be a benefit were identified. This mapping is presented along with the methodology for including the additional data in existing probabilistic assessments to evaluate safeguards and security systems designs.

  20. Advances in nuclear instrumentation for safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Prettyman, T.H.; Reilly, T.D.; Miller, M.C.; Hollas, C.L.; Pickrell, M.M.; Prommel, J.M.; Dreicer, J.S.

    1996-12-31

    This paper describes detectors, instrumentation, and analytical methods under development to address the above issues. The authors will describe work underway on room-temperature semiconductors including attempts to model the response of these detectors to improve spectrum analysis procedures and detector design. Computerized tomography is used in many medical and industrial applications; they are developing both gamma-ray and neutron tomography for improved measurements of waste and direct-use materials. Modern electronics and scintillation detectors should permit the development of fast neutron coincidence detectors with dramatically improved signal-to-noise ratios. For active measurements, they are studying several improved neutron sources, including a high-fluence, plasma-based, d-t generator. New analysis tools from information theory may permit one to better combine data from different measurement systems. This paper attempts to briefly describe a range of new sensors, electronics, and data analysis methods under study at Los Alamos and other laboratories to promote discussion of promising technology that they may bring to bear on these important global issues.

  1. Seismotectonic characteristics of the Krško Basin with relation to seismic safety of existing and planned nuclear infrastructure

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bavec, Miloš; Atanackov, Jure; Jamšek Rupnik, Petra

    2015-04-01

    The Kr\\vsko Basin hosts complex infrastructure and is being investigated as a potential site for several future projects including a new NPP and a low and intermediate level radioactive waste repository. A large database of geological, geophysical and geotechnical data has been accumulated, producing increasingly detailed tectonic and seismotectonic models of the Kr\\vsko Basin. The first tectonic and seismotectonic investigation campaign was undertaken in the 1970s for the first Kr\\vsko NPP (Arsovski et al., 1973). The next study (Fajfar et al., 1994) was followed by an extensive geophysical survey in in which basin axis-trending syncline was reevaluated (Persoglia, ed., 2000). In 2004 the geological, tectonic and seismotectonic characteristics of the Kr\\vsko Basin were readdressed by performing a periodic seismic hazard assessment for the NPP (Swan et al., 2004). After which, a series of field investigations were conducted for the potential radwaste repository site evaluation (Brenčič, ed., 2006; Petkovšek, ed., 2009). In 2008-2013 a set of geological, geotechnical and seismological investigations were performed for the proposed new NPP unit (Bazargan-Sabet et al., 2010). As part of this project the seismotectonic model and the seismic source model were updated (Bavec et al., 2010a,b). Particular attention was given to the Libna fault (Bavec et al., 2013), which was also the subject of a follow up study to further evaluate the age of deformed sediments in the basin (Cline et al., 2013). A new phase of geological, geophysical and geomorphic investigations is being undertaken in the Kr\\vsko basin by the team of Rizzo Associates and Geological Survey of Slovenia to refine on the geological and seismological inputs to the planned PSHA. The Basin has experienced moderate and dispersed seismic activity. The catalogue of known earthquakes in the region (ARSO, 2011) extends back to the early 17th century. The strongest earthquake in the Kr\\vsko basin was the

  2. FY 2008 Next Generation Safeguards Initiative International Safeguards Education and Training Pilot Progerams Summary Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dreicer, M; Anzelon, G; Essner, J; Dougan, A; Doyle, J; Boyer, B; Hypes, P; Sokova, E; Wehling, F

    2008-10-17

    Key component of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) launched by the National Nuclear Security Administration is the development of human capital to meet present and future challenges to the safeguards regime. An effective university-level education in safeguards and related disciplines is an essential element in a layered strategy to rebuild the safeguards human resource capacity. Two pilot programs at university level, involving 44 students, were initiated and implemented in spring-summer 2008 and linked to hands-on internships at LANL or LLNL. During the internships, students worked on specific safeguards-related projects with a designated Laboratory Mentor to provide broader exposure to nuclear materials management and information analytical techniques. The Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management pilot program was a collaboration between the Texas A&M University (TAMU), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). It included a 16-lecture course held during a summer internship program. The instructors for the course were from LANL together with TAMU faculty and LLNL experts. The LANL-based course was shared with the students spending their internship at LLNL via video conference. A week-long table-top (or hands-on) exercise on was also conducted at LANL. The student population was a mix of 28 students from a 12 universities participating in a variety of summer internship programs held at LANL and LLNL. A large portion of the students were TAMU students participating in the NGSI pilot. The International Nuclear Safeguards Policy and Information Analysis pilot program was implemented at the Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS) in cooperation with LLNL. It included a two-week intensive course consisting of 20 lectures and two exercises. MIIS, LLNL, and speakers from other U.S. national laboratories (LANL, BNL) delivered lectures for the audience of 16 students. The majority of students were

  3. Greening infrastructure

    CSIR Research Space (South Africa)

    Van Wyk, Llewellyn V

    2014-10-01

    Full Text Available ), transport (typically roads, rail and airports), and telecommunications. The focus of this chapter will be on greening bulk services and roads. Despite the importance of infrastructure to economic growth and social wellbeing, many countries struggle to meet...

  4. Bike Infrastructures

    OpenAIRE

    2010-01-01

    Bike Infrastructures aims to identify bicycle infrastructuretypologies and design elements that can help promotecycling significantly. It is structured as a case study basedresearch where three cycling infrastructures with distincttypologies were analyzed and compared. The three casesare Vestergade Vest and Mageløs in Odense (sharedusespace in the core of the city); Hans Broges Gade inAarhus (an extension of a bicycle route linking the suburbto Aarhus Central station) and Bryggebro in Copenha...

  5. Reducing The Nuclear Danger

    Science.gov (United States)

    1995-10-01

    Conference on Disarmament - Ambassadors tour the Hanford Site (October 1994) - Pacific Northwest - Ensuring effective international nuclear safeguards...requirements of a CTBT by seismic , hydroacoustic and satellite instrumentation capabilities. - Initiation of Project CALIOPE, which is intended to...N excess fissle materials at Hanford for placement under IAEA | National Lab || safeguards. Additionally, develop tutorials on the IAEA I

  6. Negotiating supranational rules - The genesis of the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards System

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Forland, Astrid

    1998-12-31

    The object of this thesis is the evolution from 1954-56 up until the mid 1970s of the nuclear safeguards system administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. The evolution is traced not through the practical implementation of the safeguards system, but through the various multilateral negotiations through which it was created. The focus is on analysing the arguments advanced in the various negotiations, and the main objective is to single out the factors determining the result. The discussion is organised into the following chapters: (1) The statute of the IAEA, (2) The IAEA 1961 safeguard document (INFCIRC/26), (3) The IAEA 1965 safeguards document (INFCIRC/66), (4) The non-proliferation treaty, (5) NPT safeguards. 92 refs.

  7. Oak Ridge National Laboratory Next-Generation Safeguards Initiative: Human Capital Development

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gilligan, Kimberly [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

    2014-01-01

    In 2007, the US Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a comprehensive review of the current and potential future challenges facing the international safeguards system. The review examined: trends and events that have an effect on the mission of international safeguards; the implications of expanding and evolving mission requirements of the legal authorities and institutions that serve as the foundation of the international safeguards system; and, the technological, financial, and human resources required for effective safeguards implementation. The review’s findings and recommendations were summarized in the report International Safeguards: Challenges and Opportunities for the 21st Century (October 2007). The executive summary is available at the following link: http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/inlinefiles/NGSI_Report.pdf.

  8. Safeguards-by-Design: An Element of 3S Integration

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    R. S. Bean; T. A. Bjornard; D. J. Hebdich

    2009-04-01

    In 2008, the “20/20 Vision for the Future” background report by the IAEA Director General identified the possibility of integrating certain activities related to safeguards, safety, and security. Later in the year, the independent Commission report prepared at the request of the IAEA Director General noted that the Agency’s roles in nuclear safeguards, safety, and security (3S) complement and can mutually reinforce each other. Safeguards-by-design (SBD) is a practical measure that strengthens 3S integration, especially for the stage of nuclear facility design and construction, but also with ramifications for other stages of the facility life-cycle. This paper describes the SBD concept, with examples for diverse regulatory environments, being developed in the U.S under the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative and the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative. This is compared with related international SBD work performed in the recent IAEA workshop on “Facility Design and Plant Operation Features that Facilitate the Implementation of IAEA Safeguards”. Potential future directions for further development of SBD and its integration within 3S are identified.

  9. Technology development for DUPIC process safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hong, J. S.; Kim, H. D.; Lee, Y. G.; Kang, H. Y.; Cha, H. R.; Byeon, K. H.; Park, Y. S.; Choi, H. N. [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    1997-07-01

    As the strategy for DUPIC(Direct Use of spent PWR fuel In CANDU reactor) process safeguards, the neutron detection method was introduced to account for nuclear materials in the whole DUPIC process by selectively measuring spontaneous fission neutron signals from {sup 244}Cm. DSNC was designed and manufactured to measure the account of curium in the fuel bundle and associated process samples in the DUPIC fuel cycle. The MCNP code had response profile along the length of the CANDU type fuel bundle. It was found experimentally that the output signal variation due to the overall azimuthal asymmetry was less than 0.2%. The longitudinal detection efficiency distribution at every position including both ends was kept less than 2% from the average value. Spent fuel standards almost similar to DUPIC process material were fabricated from a single spent PWR fuel rod and the performance verification of the DSNC is in progress under very high radiation environment. The results of this test will be eventually benchmarked with other sources such as code simulation, chemical analysis and gamma analysis. COREMAS-DUPIC has been developed for the accountability management of nuclear materials treated by DUPIC facility. This system is able to track the controlled nuclear materials maintaining the material inventory in near-real time and to generate the required material accountability records and reports. Concerning the containment and surveillance technology, a focused R and D effort is given to the development of unattended continuous monitoring system. Currently, the component technologies of radiation monitoring and surveillance have been established, and continued R and D efforts are given to the integration of the components into automatic safeguards diagnostics. (author).

  10. Safeguards-by-Design: Guidance for High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) With Pebble Fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Philip Casey Durst; Mark Schanfein

    2012-08-01

    The following is a guidance document from a series prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), to assist facility designers and operators in implementing international Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). SBD has two main objectives: (1) to avoid costly and time consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear fuel cycle facilities and (2) to make the implementation of international safeguards more effective and efficient at such facilities. In the long term, the attainment of these goals would save industry and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) time, money, and resources and be mutually beneficial. This particular safeguards guidance document focuses on pebble fuel high temperature gas reactors (HTGR). The purpose of the IAEA safeguards system is to provide credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. The safeguards system consists of the IAEA’s statutory authority to establish safeguards; safeguards rights and obligations in safeguards agreements and additional protocols; and technical measures implemented pursuant to those agreements. Of foremost importance is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the IAEA, concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). According to a 1992 IAEA Board of Governors decision, countries must: notify the IAEA of a decision to construct a new nuclear facility as soon as such decision is taken; provide design information on such facilities as the designs develop; and provide detailed design information based on construction plans at least 180 days prior to the start of construction, and on "as-built" designs at least 180 days before the first receipt of nuclear material. Ultimately, the design information will be captured in an IAEA Design Information

  11. Preliminary Safeguards Assessment for the Pebble-Bed Fluoride High-Temperature Reactor (PB-FHR) Concept

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Disser, Jay; Arthur, Edward; Lambert, Janine

    2016-09-01

    This report examines a preliminary design for a pebble bed fluoride salt-cooled high temperature reactor (PB-FHR) concept, assessing it from an international safeguards perspective. Safeguards features are defined, in a preliminary fashion, and suggestions are made for addressing further nuclear materials accountancy needs.

  12. Implementation of remove monitoring in facilities under safeguards with unattended systems

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Beddingfield, David H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Nordquist, Heather A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Umebayaashi, Eiji [JAEA

    2009-01-01

    Remote monitoring is being applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at nuclear facilities around the world. At the Monju Reactor in Japan we have designed, developed and implemented a remote monitoring approach that can serve as a model for applying remote monitoring to facilities that are already under full-scope safeguards using unattended instrumentation. Remote monitoring implementations have historically relied upon the use of specialized data collection hardware and system design features that integrate remote monitoring into the safeguards data collection system. The integration of remote monitoring and unattended data collection increases the complexity of safeguards data collection systems. This increase in complexity necessarily produces a corresponding reduction of system reliability compared to less-complex unattended monitoring systems. At the Monju facility we have implemented a remote monitoring system that is decoupled from the activity of safeguards data collection. In the completed system the function of remote data transfer is separated from the function of safeguards data collection. As such, a failure of the remote monitoring function cannot produce an associated loss of safeguards data, as is possible with integrated remote-monitoring implementations. Currently, all safeguards data from this facility is available to the IAEA on a 24/7 basis. This facility employs five radiation-based unattended systems, video surveillance and numerous optical seal systems. The implementation of remote monitoring at this facility, while increasing the complexity of the safeguards system, is designed to avoid any corresponding reduction in reliability of the safeguards data collection systems by having decoupled these functions. This design and implementation can serve as a model for implementation of remote monitoring at nuclear facilities that currently employ unattended safeguards systems.

  13. Safeguards and security research and development: Progress report, October 1994--September 1995

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rutherford, D.R.; Henriksen, P.W. [comp.

    1997-03-01

    The primary goal of the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Technology Development Program, International Safeguards, and other Safeguards and Security Programs is to continue to be the center of excellence in the field of Safeguards and Security. This annual report for 1995 describes those scientific and engineering projects that contribute to all of the aforementioned programs. The authors have presented the information in a different format from previous annual reports. Part I is devoted to Nuclear Material Measurement Systems. Part II contains projects that are specific to Integrated Safeguards Systems. Part III highlights Safeguards Systems Effectiveness Evaluations and Part IV is a compilation of highlights from Information Assurance projects. Finally Part V highlights work on the projects at Los Alamos for International Safeguards. The final part of this annual report lists titles and abstracts of Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Technology Development reports, technical journal articles, and conference papers that were presented and published in 1995. This is the last annual report in this format. The authors wish to thank all of the individuals who have contributed to this annual report and made it so successful over the years.

  14. Open source information acquisition, analysis and integration in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Barletta, M.; Zarimpas, N.; Zarucki, R., E-mail: M.Barletta@iaea.or [IAEA, Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100, 1400 Vienna (Austria)

    2010-10-15

    Acquisition and analysis of open source information plays an increasingly important role in the IAEA strengthened safeguards system. The Agency's focal point for open source information collection and analysis is the Division of Safeguards Information Management (SGIM) within the IAEA Department of Safeguards. In parallel with the approval of the Model Additional Protocol in 1997, a new centre of information acquisition and analysis expertise was created within SGIM. By acquiring software, developing databases, retraining existing staff and hiring new staff with diverse analytical skills, SGIM is pro actively contributing to the future implementation of information-driven safeguards in collaboration with other Divisions within the Department of Safeguards. Open source information support is now fully integrated with core safeguards processes and activities, and has become an effective tool in the work of the Department of Safeguards. This provides and overview of progress realized through the acquisition and use of open source information in several thematic areas: evaluation of additional protocol declarations; support to the State Evaluation process; in-depth investigation of safeguards issues, including assisting inspections and complementary access; research on illicit nuclear procurement networks and trafficking; and monitoring nuclear developments. Demands for open source information have steadily grown and are likely to continue to grow in the future. Coupled with the enormous growth and accessibility in the volume and sources of information, new challenges are presented, both technical and analytical. This paper discusses actions taken and future plans for multi-source and multi-disciplinary analytic integration to strengthen confidence in safeguards conclusions - especially regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. (Author)

  15. INSTITUTIONALIZING SAFEGUARDS-BY-DESIGN: HIGH-LEVEL FRAMEWORK

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Trond Bjornard PhD; Joseph Alexander; Robert Bean; Brian Castle; Scott DeMuth, Ph.D.; Phillip Durst; Michael Ehinger; Prof. Michael Golay, Ph.D.; Kevin Hase, Ph.D.; David J. Hebditch, DPhil; John Hockert, Ph.D.; Bruce Meppen; James Morgan; Jerry Phillips, Ph.D., PE

    2009-02-01

    The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities can reduce proliferation risks. A multi-laboratory team was sponsored in Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 to define a SBD process and determine how it could be incorporated into existing facility design and construction processes. The possibility to significantly influence major design features, such as process selection and plant layout, largely ends with the conceptual design step. Therefore SBD’s principal focus must be on the early inclusion of safeguards requirements and the early identification of beneficial design features. The result could help form the basis for a new international norm for integrating safeguards into facility design. This is an interim report describing progress and project status as of the end of FY08. In this effort, SBD is defined as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient, and cost-effective integration of international and national safeguards, physical security, and other nonproliferation objectives into the overall design process for a nuclear facility. A key objective is to ensure that security and nonproliferation issues are considered when weighing facility design alternatives. Central to the work completed in FY08 was a study in which a SBD process was developed in the context of the current DOE facility acquisition process. The DOE study enabled the development of a “SBD design loop” that is suitable for use in any facility design process. It is a graded, iterative process that incorporates safeguards concerns throughout the conceptual, preliminary and final design processes. Additionally, a set of proposed design principles for SBD was developed. A “Generic SBD Process” was then developed. Key features of the process include the initiation of safeguards design activities in the pre-conceptual planning phase, early incorporation of safeguards requirements into the project requirements, early appointment of an SBD team, and

  16. Cloud computing can simplify HIT infrastructure management.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Glaser, John

    2011-08-01

    Software as a Service (SaaS), built on cloud computing technology, is emerging as the forerunner in IT infrastructure because it helps healthcare providers reduce capital investments. Cloud computing leads to predictable, monthly, fixed operating expenses for hospital IT staff. Outsourced cloud computing facilities are state-of-the-art data centers boasting some of the most sophisticated networking equipment on the market. The SaaS model helps hospitals safeguard against technology obsolescence, minimizes maintenance requirements, and simplifies management.

  17. Exploring the Application of Shared Ledger Technology to Safeguards and other National Security Topics

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Winters, Samuel T.; Kreyling, Sean J.; Joslyn, Cliff A.; West, Curtis L.; Schanfein, Mark J.; Sayre, Amanda M.

    2017-07-17

    In 2016, the Office of International Nuclear Safeguards at the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) within the Department of Energy (DOE) commissioned the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to explore the potential implications of the digital currency bitcoin and its underlying technologies on the safeguards system. The authors found that one category of technologies referred to as Shared Ledger Technology (SLT) offers a spectrum of benefits to the safeguards system. While further research is needed to validate assumptions and findings in the paper, preliminary analysis suggests that both the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Member States can use SLT to promote efficient, effective, accurate, and timely reporting, and increase transparency in the safeguards system without sacrificing confidentiality of safeguards data. This increased transparency and involvement of Member States in certain safeguards transactions could lead to increased trust and cooperation among States and the public, which generates a number of benefits. This paper describes these benefits and the analytical framework for assessing SLT applications for specific safeguards problems. The paper will also describe other national security areas where SLT could provide benefits.

  18. Used fuel extended storage security and safeguards by design roadmap

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Durbin, Samuel G. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Lindgren, Eric Richard [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Jones, Robert [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States). Savannah River National Lab. (SRNL); Ketusky, Edward [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States). Savannah River National Lab. (SRNL); England, Jeffrey [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States). Savannah River National Lab. (SRNL); Scherer, Carolynn [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Sprinkle, James [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Miller, Michael. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Rauch, Eric [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Scaglione, John [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Dunn, T. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

    2016-05-01

    In the United States, spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is safely and securely stored in spent fuel pools and dry storage casks. The available capacity in spent fuel pools across the nuclear fleet has nearly reached a steady state value. The excess SNF continues to be loaded in dry storage casks. Fuel is expected to remain in dry storage for periods beyond the initial dry cask certification period of 20 years. Recent licensing renewals have approved an additional 40 years. This report identifies the current requirements and evaluation techniques associated with the safeguards and security of SNF dry cask storage. A set of knowledge gaps is identified in the current approaches. Finally, this roadmap identifies known knowledge gaps and provides a research path to deliver the tools and models needed to close the gaps and allow the optimization of the security and safeguards approaches for an interim spent fuel facility over the lifetime of the storage site.

  19. Infrastructural Fractals

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Bruun Jensen, Casper

    2007-01-01

    . Instead, I outline a fractal approach to the study of space, society, and infrastructure. A fractal orientation requires a number of related conceptual reorientations. It has implications for thinking about scale and perspective, and (sociotechnical) relations, and for considering the role of the social...... and a fractal social theory....

  20. Instrument development for safeguards measurements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Zebarth, M.; Davidson, D.; Koskelo, M.; Gardner, G. [Canberra Nuclear Products Group, Meriden, CT (United States)

    1996-12-31

    New safeguards requirements, such as those resulting from industrial reprocessing activities, makes the faster and more accurate determination of the uranium enrichment and/or the isotopic composition of plutonium essential in measuring the fissile mass. In response to these needs, Canberra has developed several improved safeguards systems in the last few years. In this paper, we will present an overview of our newest safeguards systems and the improvements they contain. The portable systems include the U-Pu InSpector, the IMCA and the JSR-14 systems. All combine automatic control of acquisition electronics and rapid analysis with an integrated software package for ease of use. The U-Pu InSpector incorporates the MGA code used by the IAEA and Euratom for plutonium analysis. The IMCA complies with IAEA PMCN and PMCG procedures for uranium analysis. With the JSR-14, we are currently developing the procedures to provide compliance with the IAEA neutron counting procedures. In addition to portable safeguards systems, Canberra has designed and installed many installed systems such as the WDAS and PSMC systems at PNC Tokai in Japan, and the large unattended neutron/gamma systems at Cogema La Hague and the Melox reprocessing facility in France. (author)

  1. Safeguards Technology Strategic Planning Pentachart

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Carroll, C. J. [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States)

    2017-05-25

    Builds on earlier strategic planning workshops conducted for SGIT, SGTS, and SGCP. Many of recommendations from these workshops have been successfully implemented at the IAEA. Provide a context for evaluating new approaches for anticipated safeguards challenges of the future. Approach used by government and military to plan for an uncertain future. Uses consensus decision-making.

  2. Safeguards against Takeover after Volkswagen

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Werlauff, Erik

    2009-01-01

    The article analyses the significance of the European Court's decision on the effects of the rules on the free movement of capital on the takeover safeguards in Volkswagen AG for restrictions on the right to vote, ownership ceilings, division into A and B share classes, increased majority...

  3. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY08

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Robert Bean; Richard Metcalf; Aaron Bevill

    2008-09-01

    The Safeguards Envelope Project met its milestones by creating a rudimentary safeguards envelope, proving the value of the approach on a small scale, and determining the most appropriate path forward. The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant’s large cache of reprocessing process monitoring data, dubbed UBER Data, was recovered and used in the analysis. A probabilistic Z test was used on a Markov Monte Carlo simulation of expected diversion data when compared with normal operating data. The data regarding a fully transient event in a tank was used to create a simple requirement, representative of a safeguards envelope, whose impact was a decrease in operating efficiency by 1.3% but an increase in material balance period of 26%. This approach is operator, state, and international safeguards friendly and should be applied to future reprocessing plants. Future requirements include tank-to-tank correlations in reprocessing facilities, detailed operations impact studies, simulation inclusion, automated optimization, advanced statistics analysis, and multi-attribute utility analysis.

  4. 76 FR 5220 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Future Plant...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-01-28

    ... small modular reactor applications. The Subcommittee will hear presentations by and hold discussions... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office ] NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Future...

  5. Towards integrated safeguards in Spain: implementation issues at the Juzbado plant

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Zurron-Cifuentes, Oscar; Luis-Merino, Marcos [Department of Safety, ENUSA Industrias Avanzadas S.A., Juzbado Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Plant, Ctra. Salamanca-Ledesma, km. 26, 37015 Juzbado, Salamanca (Spain)

    2010-07-01

    Nuclear safeguards are implemented on the global international scale by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which aims to verify that a State uses nuclear energy for only peaceful purposes, whereas in the European Union (EU) the European Commission applies nuclear safeguards to make certain that nuclear materials are not diverted to purposes other than those for which are intended. Thus, nuclear operators in the EU are subjected to the scrutiny of two different Inspectorates with different goals. To cope with this issue, safeguards in the EU are undertaken on a joint team partnership approach (EURATOM/IAEA), designed to minimise the burden on nuclear operators whilst ensuring that both Inspectorates are able to meet the goals derived from their respective safeguards regime. Notwithstanding, nuclear safeguards implementation has largely evolved since 1950's to the present day, which implies a continuous effort to adapt the EURATOM/IAEA's partnership agreements to state-of-the art approaches without excessive burden to nuclear operators. In this context, Integrated Safeguards (IS) can be seen as the latest evolution of the IAEA's safeguards regime. IS introduces new key factors to provide credible assurance of both the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared nuclear activities and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the State as a whole. The adaptation of the EU States to this new regime has just been finished. Nevertheless, the way to IS has not always been straight and easy, mainly because several parties were involved in the discussions and the common minimum denominator was sometimes hard to achieve. In particular, discussions in Spain started by 2004 and finished at the end of 2009. An example is the Facility Specific Partnership Approach agreement for the Juzbado Plant, which entered into force recently in September 2009 and governs IS implementation at the Juzbado Plant. This paper briefly describes

  6. INFRASTRUCTURING DESIGN

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Ertner, Sara Marie

    one such project, Project Lev Vel, a public-private and user driven innovation project. The central questions posed by the dissertation are: What is welfare technology? How is it imagined, designed, and developed, and by whom? Who are driving the design processes and how? Who are the elderly users...... sites and infrastructures for project communication plays a central role for design and, ultimately, for what welfare technology comes to be. The chapters explore different processes of what I call infrastructuring design; the ongoing crafting of social, material, and technical arrangements......The fact that the average citizen in Western societies is aging has significant implications for national welfare models. What some call ’the grey tsunami’ has resulted in suggestions for, and experiments in, re-designing healthcare systems and elderly care. In Denmark, one attempted solution...

  7. Feasibility of x ray fluorescence for spent fuel safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Freeman, Corey Ross [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Mozin, Vladimir [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Tobin, Stephen J [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Fensin, Michael L [Los Alamos National Laboratory; White, Julia M [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Croft, Stephen [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Stafford, Alissa [TAMU; Charlton, William [TAMU

    2010-01-01

    Quantifying the Pu content in spent nuclear fuel is necessary for many reasons, in particular to verify that diversion or other illicit activities have not occurred. Therefore, safeguarding the world's nuclear fuel is paramount to responsible nuclear regulation and public acceptance, but achieving this goal presents many difficulties from both a technical and economic perspective. The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) of NA-24 is funding a large collaborative effort between multiple laboratories and universities to improve spent nuclear fuel safeguards methods and equipment. This effort involves the current work of modeling several different nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques. Several are being researched, because no single NDA technique, in isolation, has the potential to properly characterize fuel assemblies and offer a robust safeguards measure. The insights gained from this research, will be used to down-select from the original set a few of the most promising techniques that complement each other. The goal is to integrate the selected instruments to create an accurate measurement system for fuel verification that is also robust enough to detect diversions. These instruments will be fabricated and tested under realistic conditions. This work examines one of the NDA techniques; the feasibility of using x ray emission peaks from Pu and U to gather information about their relative quantities in the spent fuel. X Ray Fluorescence (XRF), is unique compared to the investigated techniques in that it is the only one able to give the elemental ratio of Pu to U, allowing the possibility of a Pu gram quantity for the assembly to be calculated. XRF also presents many challenges, mainly its low penetration, since the low energy x rays of interest are effectively shielded by the first few millimeters of a fuel pin. This paper will explore the results of Monte Carlo N-Particle eXtended (MCNPX) transport code calculations of spent fuel x ray peaks. The MCNPX

  8. Assess How Changes in Fuel Cycle Operation Impact Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tobin, Stephen Joseph [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States). Nuclear Engineering and Nonproliferation Division; Adigun, Babatunde John [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States). Nuclear Engineering and Nonproliferation Division; Fugate, Michael Lynn [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States). Nuclear Engineering and Nonproliferation Division; Trellue, Holly Renee [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States). Nuclear Engineering and Nonproliferation Division; Sprinkle, James K. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States). Nuclear Engineering and Nonproliferation Division

    2016-10-31

    In this report two research topics of interest to Concepts and Approaches are investigated. The motivation of joining them into one project is that both require (1) the simulation of fuel irradiation in a reactor and (2) the transport of gamma and neutron irradiation from the fuel to safeguards detectors. In the next two subsections the merits of each of the two safeguards applications are further introduced. Given the cumulative impact of the enhancements listed above, it is not surprising that both fuel assembly design and fuel assembly irradiation optimization have improved over the past 50+ years. The purpose of the research summarized in this sub-­section is to investigate what, if any, consequence this evolution in reactor operation might have for nuclear safeguards. It is anticipated that the burnup and isotopics of the spent fuel should exhibit less variation over the decades as reactor operators irradiate each assembly to the optimum amount. In contrast, older spent fuel is anticipated to vary more in burnup and resulting isotopics for a given initial enrichment. Continuing with this thesis, modern fuel should be more uniform in composition, and thus, measured safeguards results should be easier to interpret than results from older spent fuel. With spent fuel ponds filling up, interim and long-­term storage of spent fuel will need to be addressed. Additionally after long periods of storage, spent fuel is no longer self-­protecting and as such the IAEA will categorize it as more attractive; in approximately 20 years many of the assemblies from early commercial cores will no longer be considered self-­protecting. This study will assess how more recent changes in the reactor operation could impact the interpretation of safeguards measurements.

  9. Infrastructure Development

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Williams, Idongesit

    2012-01-01

    It is the quest of every government to achieve universal Access and service of telecommunication services and ICTs. Unfortunately due to the high cost of deploying infrastructure in rural areas of developing countries due to non-significant or no economic activity, this dream of achieving Universal...... access and service of telecommunications/ICTs have been stalled. This paper throws light on a possible Public Private Partnership framework as a development path that will enable affordable network technologies to be deployed in rural areas at a cost that will translate to what the rural dweller...

  10. Infrastructure Development

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Williams, Idongesit

    2012-01-01

    It is the quest of every government to achieve universal Access and service of telecommunication services and ICTs. Unfortunately due to the high cost of deploying infrastructure in rural areas of developing countries due to non-significant or no economic activity, this dream of achieving Universal...... access and service of telecommunications/ICTs have been stalled. This paper throws light on a possible Public Private Partnership framework as a development path that will enable affordable network technologies to be deployed in rural areas at a cost that will translate to what the rural dweller...

  11. Stress Tests and Critical Infrastructure Protection-Resilience

    OpenAIRE

    2014-01-01

    This article describes the methodology to conduct stress tests for critical infrastructures in order to improve their resilience. We leverage the example of nuclear and financial sector in order to investigate how critical infrastructures can benefit from stress tests

  12. Safeguard monitoring of direct electrolytic reduction

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jurovitzki, Abraham L.

    Nuclear power is regaining global prominence as a sustainable energy source as the world faces the consequences of depending on limited fossil based, CO2 emitting fuels. A key component to achieving this sustainability is to implement a closed nuclear fuel cycle. Without achieving this goal, a relatively small fraction of the energy value in nuclear fuel is actually utilized. This involves recycling of spent nuclear fuel (SNF)---separating fissile actinides from waste products and using them to fabricate fresh fuel. Pyroprocessing is a viable option being developed for this purpose with a host of benefits compared to other recycling options, such as PUREX. Notably, pyroprocessing is ill suited to separate pure plutonium from spent fuel and thus has non-proliferation benefits. Pyroprocessing involves high temperature electrochemical and chemical processing of SNF in a molten salt electrolyte. During this batch process, several intermediate and final streams are produced that contain radioactive material. While pyroprocessing is ineffective at separating pure plutonium, there are various process misuse scenarios that could result in diversion of impure plutonium into one or more of these streams. This is a proliferation risk that should be addressed with innovative safeguards technology. One approach to meeting this challenge is to develop real time monitoring techniques that can be implemented in the hot cells and coupled with the various unit operations involved with pyroprocessing. Current state of the art monitoring techniques involve external chemical assaying which requires sample removal from these unit operations. These methods do not meet International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) timeliness requirements. In this work, a number of monitoring techniques were assessed for their viability as online monitoring tools. A hypothetical diversion scenario for the direct electrolytic reduction process was experimentally verified (using Nd2O3 as a surrogate for PuO2

  13. Processing large sensor data sets for safeguards : the knowledge generation system.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Thomas, Maikel A.; Smartt, Heidi Anne; Matthews, Robert F.

    2012-04-01

    Modern nuclear facilities, such as reprocessing plants, present inspectors with significant challenges due in part to the sheer amount of equipment that must be safeguarded. The Sandia-developed and patented Knowledge Generation system was designed to automatically analyze large amounts of safeguards data to identify anomalous events of interest by comparing sensor readings with those expected from a process of interest and operator declarations. This paper describes a demonstration of the Knowledge Generation system using simulated accountability tank sensor data to represent part of a reprocessing plant. The demonstration indicated that Knowledge Generation has the potential to address several problems critical to the future of safeguards. It could be extended to facilitate remote inspections and trigger random inspections. Knowledge Generation could analyze data to establish trust hierarchies, to facilitate safeguards use of operator-owned sensors.

  14. Making green infrastructure healthier infrastructure

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mare Lõhmus

    2015-11-01

    Full Text Available Increasing urban green and blue structure is often pointed out to be critical for sustainable development and climate change adaptation, which has led to the rapid expansion of greening activities in cities throughout the world. This process is likely to have a direct impact on the citizens’ quality of life and public health. However, alongside numerous benefits, green and blue infrastructure also has the potential to create unexpected, undesirable, side-effects for health. This paper considers several potential harmful public health effects that might result from increased urban biodiversity, urban bodies of water, and urban tree cover projects. It does so with the intent of improving awareness and motivating preventive measures when designing and initiating such projects. Although biodiversity has been found to be associated with physiological benefits for humans in several studies, efforts to increase the biodiversity of urban environments may also promote the introduction and survival of vector or host organisms for infectious pathogens with resulting spread of a variety of diseases. In addition, more green connectivity in urban areas may potentiate the role of rats and ticks in the spread of infectious diseases. Bodies of water and wetlands play a crucial role in the urban climate adaptation and mitigation process. However, they also provide habitats for mosquitoes and toxic algal blooms. Finally, increasing urban green space may also adversely affect citizens allergic to pollen. Increased awareness of the potential hazards of urban green and blue infrastructure should not be a reason to stop or scale back projects. Instead, incorporating public health awareness and interventions into urban planning at the earliest stages can help insure that green and blue infrastructure achieves full potential for health promotion.

  15. 21 CFR 26.21 - Safeguard clause.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... OF PHARMACEUTICAL GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICE REPORTS, MEDICAL DEVICE QUALITY SYSTEM AUDIT REPORTS... Specific Sector Provisions for Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practices § 26.21 Safeguard clause....

  16. Separations and safeguards model integration.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cipiti, Benjamin B.; Zinaman, Owen

    2010-09-01

    Research and development of advanced reprocessing plant designs can greatly benefit from the development of a reprocessing plant model capable of transient solvent extraction chemistry. This type of model can be used to optimize the operations of a plant as well as the designs for safeguards, security, and safety. Previous work has integrated a transient solvent extraction simulation module, based on the Solvent Extraction Process Having Interaction Solutes (SEPHIS) code developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, with the Separations and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM) developed at Sandia National Laboratory, as a first step toward creating a more versatile design and evaluation tool. The goal of this work was to strengthen the integration by linking more variables between the two codes. The results from this integrated model show expected operational performance through plant transients. Additionally, ORIGEN source term files were integrated into the SSPM to provide concentrations, radioactivity, neutron emission rate, and thermal power data for various spent fuels. This data was used to generate measurement blocks that can determine the radioactivity, neutron emission rate, or thermal power of any stream or vessel in the plant model. This work examined how the code could be expanded to integrate other separation steps and benchmark the results to other data. Recommendations for future work will be presented.

  17. Safeguards summary event list (SSEL), January 1, 1990--December 31, 1995

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1996-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL), Vol. 2, Rev. 4, provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) which occurred and were reported from January 1, 1990, rough December 31, 1995. Because of public interest, the Miscellaneous category includes a few events which involve either source material, byproduct material, or natural uranium which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of Bomb-related, Intrusion, Missing and/or Allegedly Stolen, Transportation-related, Tampering/Vandalism, Arson, Firearms, Radiological Sabotage, Nonradiological Sabotage, and Miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels.

  18. Long-Term Information Management (LTIM) of Safeguards Data at Repositories: Phase II

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Haddal, Risa N. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2016-10-01

    One of the challenges of implementing safeguards for geological repositories will be the long-term preservation of safeguards-related data for 100 years or more. While most countries considering the construction and operation of such facilities agree that safeguards information should be preserved, there are gaps with respect to standardized requirements, guidelines, timescales, and approaches. This study analyzes those gaps and explores research to clarify stakeholder needs, identify current policies, approaches, best practices and international standards, and explores existing safeguards information management infrastructure. The study also attempts to clarify what a safeguards data classification system might look like, how long data should be retained, and how information should be exchanged between stakeholders at different phases of a repository’s life cycle. The analysis produced a variety of recommendations on what information to preserve, how to preserve it, where to store it, retention options and how to exchange information in the long term. Key findings include the use of the globally recognized international records management standard, ISO15489, for guidance on the development of information management systems, and the development of a Key Information File (KIF). The KIF could be used to identify only the most relevant, high-level safeguards information and the history of decision making about the repository. The study also suggests implementing on-site and off-site records storage in digital and physical form; developing a safeguards data classification system; long-term records retention with periodic reviews every 5 to 10 years during each phase of the repository life cycle; and establishing transition procedures well in advance so that data shepherds and records officers can transfer information with incoming facility managers effectively and efficiently. These and other recommendations are further analyzed in this study.

  19. 22 CFR 9.13 - Safeguarding.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... persons are contained in Volume 12 of the Department's Foreign Affairs Manual. ... 22 Foreign Relations 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Safeguarding. 9.13 Section 9.13 Foreign Relations DEPARTMENT OF STATE GENERAL SECURITY INFORMATION REGULATIONS § 9.13 Safeguarding. Specific...

  20. 32 CFR 887.2 - Safeguarding certificates.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... costly to the Air Force. To keep requests for CILs at a minimum: (a) Personnel officers will tell members of the importance of safeguarding the original certificates. (b) Persons who issue CILs will type or stamp across the lower margin “THIS IS AN IMPORTANT RECORD—SAFEGUARD IT” (if it is not printed on...

  1. Gas centrifuge enrichment plants inspection frequency and remote monitoring issues for advanced safeguards implementation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Boyer, Brian David [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Erpenbeck, Heather H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Miller, Karen A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Ianakiev, Kiril D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Reimold, Benjamin A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Ward, Steven L [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Howell, John [GLASGOW UNIV.

    2010-09-13

    Current safeguards approaches used by the IAEA at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) need enhancement in order to verify declared low enriched uranium (LEU) production, detect undeclared LEU production and detect high enriched uranium (BEU) production with adequate probability using non destructive assay (NDA) techniques. At present inspectors use attended systems, systems needing the presence of an inspector for operation, during inspections to verify the mass and {sup 235}U enrichment of declared cylinders of uranium hexafluoride that are used in the process of enrichment at GCEPs. This paper contains an analysis of how possible improvements in unattended and attended NDA systems including process monitoring and possible on-site destructive analysis (DA) of samples could reduce the uncertainty of the inspector's measurements providing more effective and efficient IAEA GCEPs safeguards. We have also studied a few advanced safeguards systems that could be assembled for unattended operation and the level of performance needed from these systems to provide more effective safeguards. The analysis also considers how short notice random inspections, unannounced inspections (UIs), and the concept of information-driven inspections can affect probability of detection of the diversion of nuclear material when coupled to new GCEPs safeguards regimes augmented with unattended systems. We also explore the effects of system failures and operator tampering on meeting safeguards goals for quantity and timeliness and the measures needed to recover from such failures and anomalies.

  2. International safeguards for reprocessing plants. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kratzer, M.; Scheinman, L.; Sievering, N.; Wonder, E.; Lipman, D.; Immerman, W.; Elliott, J.M.; Crane, F.

    1981-04-01

    Proliferation risks inherent in reprocessing show the need to employ technically effective safeguards which can detect, with a high degree of assurance and on a timely basis, the diversion of significant quantities of fissionable material. A balance must be struck between what is technically feasible and effective and what is institutionally acceptable. Purpose of this report is to examine the several technical approaches to safeguards in light of their prospective acceptability. This study defines the economic, political and institutional nature of the safeguards problem; surveys generically alternative technical approaches to international safeguards including their effectiveness and relative development; characterizes the institutional implications and uncertainties associated with the acceptance and implementation of each technical alternative; and integrates these assessments into a set of overall judgments on feasible directions for reprocessing plant safeguards systems.

  3. Safeguards and retrievability from waste forms

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Danker, W.

    1996-05-01

    This report describes issues discussed at a session from the PLutonium Stabilization and Immobilization Workshop related to safeguards and retrievability from waste forms. Throughout the discussion, the group probed the goals of disposition efforts, particularly an understanding of the {open_quotes}spent fuel standard{close_quotes}, since the disposition material form derives from these goals. The group felt strongly that not only the disposition goals but safeguards to meet these goals could affect the material form. Accordingly, the Department was encouraged to explore and apply safeguards as early in the implementation process as possible. It was emphasized that this was particularly true for any planned use of existing facilities. It is much easier to build safeguards approaches into the development of new facilities, than to backfit existing facilities. Accordingly, special safeguards challenges are likely to be encountered, given the cost and schedule advantages offered by use of existing facilities.

  4. Safeguards in prototype fast breeder reactor MONJU

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Deshimaru, Takehide; Tomura, Katsuji; Okuda, Yosihisa; Iwamoto, Tomonori [Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp., Tokyo (Japan)

    1994-12-31

    MONJU is the prototype fast breeder reactor in Japan designed to have the electricity output of 280 MWe. Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC) started its construction in the autumn of 1985 in Tsuruga site. The loading of the core fuel assemblies to the core have been started since October 1993 and the pre-operational test is undergoing. MONJU uses 198 MOX fuel assemblies as core fuel and 172 DU assemblies as blanket fuel. Assemblies loaded in core and stored in the ex-vessel storage tank (EVST) exist in liquid sodium. These Pu containing fuel assemblies, MOX and irradiated DU, are regarded as in the difficult-to-access area, and the flows of fuel assemblies into and out of the area are requested to be verified. The verification of the flows is designed to be made with fuel flow monitors measuring radiations, which can abridge the inspector attendance during the fuel handling. This paper describes the detailed aspects of the fuel transfers in MONJU facility and the verification of them through flow monitors together with the functions of other safeguards equipments. (author).

  5. SALE: Safeguards Analytical Laboratory Evaluation computer code

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Carroll, D.J.; Bush, W.J.; Dolan, C.A.

    1976-09-01

    The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory Evaluation (SALE) program implements an industry-wide quality control and evaluation system aimed at identifying and reducing analytical chemical measurement errors. Samples of well-characterized materials are distributed to laboratory participants at periodic intervals for determination of uranium or plutonium concentration and isotopic distributions. The results of these determinations are statistically-evaluated, and each participant is informed of the accuracy and precision of his results in a timely manner. The SALE computer code which produces the report is designed to facilitate rapid transmission of this information in order that meaningful quality control will be provided. Various statistical techniques comprise the output of the SALE computer code. Assuming an unbalanced nested design, an analysis of variance is performed in subroutine NEST resulting in a test of significance for time and analyst effects. A trend test is performed in subroutine TREND. Microfilm plots are obtained from subroutine CUMPLT. Within-laboratory standard deviations are calculated in the main program or subroutine VAREST, and between-laboratory standard deviations are calculated in SBLV. Other statistical tests are also performed. Up to 1,500 pieces of data for each nuclear material sampled by 75 (or fewer) laboratories may be analyzed with this code. The input deck necessary to run the program is shown, and input parameters are discussed in detail. Printed output and microfilm plot output are described. Output from a typical SALE run is included as a sample problem.

  6. Advanced Process Monitoring Techniques for Safeguarding Reprocessing Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Orton, Christopher R.; Bryan, Samuel A.; Schwantes, Jon M.; Levitskaia, Tatiana G.; Fraga, Carlos G.; Peper, Shane M.

    2010-11-30

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has established international safeguards standards for fissionable material at spent fuel reprocessing plants to ensure that significant quantities of weapons-grade nuclear material are not diverted from these facilities. For large throughput nuclear facilities, it is difficult to satisfy the IAEA safeguards accountancy goal for detection of abrupt diversion. Currently, methods to verify material control and accountancy (MC&A) at these facilities require time-consuming and resource-intensive destructive assay (DA). Leveraging new on-line non destructive assay (NDA) process monitoring techniques in conjunction with the traditional and highly precise DA methods may provide an additional measure to nuclear material accountancy which would potentially result in a more timely, cost-effective and resource efficient means for safeguards verification at such facilities. By monitoring process control measurements (e.g. flowrates, temperatures, or concentrations of reagents, products or wastes), abnormal plant operations can be detected. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing on-line NDA process monitoring technologies, including both the Multi-Isotope Process (MIP) Monitor and a spectroscopy-based monitoring system, to potentially reduce the time and resource burden associated with current techniques. The MIP Monitor uses gamma spectroscopy and multivariate analysis to identify off-normal conditions in process streams. The spectroscopic monitor continuously measures chemical compositions of the process streams including actinide metal ions (U, Pu, Np), selected fission products, and major cold flowsheet chemicals using UV-Vis, Near IR and Raman spectroscopy. This paper will provide an overview of our methods and report our on-going efforts to develop and demonstrate the technologies.

  7. Green(ing) infrastructure

    CSIR Research Space (South Africa)

    Van Wyk, Llewellyn V

    2014-03-01

    Full Text Available Green infrastructure can be defined as the design and development of infrastructure that works with natural systems in the performance of its functions. Green infrastructure recognises the importance of the natural environment in land use planning...

  8. The entry into force of the Additional Protocol in the European Union: The new dimension of safeguards in Europe

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Recio, M. [Deputy Direction General for Nuclear Energy, Direction General for Energy Policy and Mines Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade, Paseo de la Castellana, 160 Madrid 28046 (Spain)]. E-mail: MRecio@mityc.es; Prieto, N. [Asesoria Juridica, Direccion de Division Administracion, Enresa, c/Emilio Vargas, 7, Madrid 28043 (Spain)]. E-mail: nprs@enresa.es

    2006-07-01

    The Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has entered into force on 30 April 2004. This completes the implementation in the EU of what undoubtedly represents the most ambitious project undertaken by the IAEA, designed to reinforce its current safeguards system, a project that the international community considers to be a key component strengthening the fight against one of the most serious threats for world security: nuclear proliferation. (author)

  9. 76 FR 18586 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Revised Meeting Notice

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-04-04

    ... discussion on the Commission Paper on Emergency Planning for Small Modular Reactors, scheduled to be held on... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Revised Meeting Notice The Agenda for the 582nd...

  10. 75 FR 10840 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the Subcommittee on Advanced Boiling...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-03-09

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the Subcommittee on Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR); Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on ABWR will hold a meeting on March 18...

  11. 75 FR 7632 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the Subcommittee on Advanced Boiling...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-02-22

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the Subcommittee on Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) The ACRS Subcommittee on ABWR will hold a meeting on March 2, 2010, at 11545...

  12. Reactor antineutrino monitoring with a plastic scintillator array as a new safeguards method

    CERN Document Server

    Oguri, S; Kato, Y; Nakata, R; Inoue, Y; Ito, C; Minowa, M

    2014-01-01

    We developed a segmented reactor-antineutrino detector made of plastic scintillators for application as a tool in nuclear safeguards inspection and performed mostly unmanned field operations at a commercial power plant reactor. At a position outside the reactor building, we measured the difference in reactor antineutrino flux above the ground when the reactor was active and inactive.

  13. Armenia - Irrigation Infrastructure

    Data.gov (United States)

    Millennium Challenge Corporation — This study evaluates irrigation infrastructure rehabilitation in Armenia. The study separately examines the impacts of tertiary canals and other large infrastructure...

  14. Central Region Green Infrastructure

    Data.gov (United States)

    Minnesota Department of Natural Resources — This Green Infrastructure data is comprised of 3 similar ecological corridor data layers ? Metro Conservation Corridors, green infrastructure analysis in counties...

  15. Understanding the infrastructure of European Research Infrastructures

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Lindstrøm, Maria Duclos; Kropp, Kristoffer

    2017-01-01

    European Research Infrastructure Consortia (ERICs) are a new form of legal and financial framework for the establishment and operation of research infrastructures in Europe. Despite their scope, ambition and novelty, the topic has received limited scholarly attention. This paper analyses one ERIC...... the ESS became an ERIC using the Bowker and Star’s sociology of infrastructures. We conclude that focusing on ERICs as a European standard for organising and funding research collaboration gives new insights into the problems of membership, durability and standardisation faced by research infrastructures....... It is also a promising theoretical framework for addressing the relationship between the ERIC-construct and the large diversity of European Research Infrastructures....

  16. Safeguards and Security Technology Development Directory. FY 1993

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1993-06-01

    The Safeguards and Security Technology Development Directory is published annually by the Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS) of the US Department of Energy (DOE), and is Intended to inform recipients of the full scope of the OSS R&D program. It is distributed for use by DOE headquarters personnel, DOE program offices, DOE field offices, DOE operating contractors, national laboratories, other federal agencies, and foreign governments. Chapters 1 through 7 of the Directory provide general information regarding the Technology Development Program, including the mission, program description, organizational roles and responsibilities, technology development lifecycle, requirements analysis, program formulation, the task selection process, technology development infrastructure, technology transfer activities, and current research and development tasks. These chapters are followed by a series of appendices which contain more specific information on aspects of the Program. Appendix A is a summary of major technology development accomplishments made during FY 1992. Appendix B lists S&S technology development reports issued during FY 1992 which reflect work accomplished through the OSS Technology Development Program and other relevant activities outside the Program. Finally, Appendix C summarizes the individual task statements which comprise the FY 1993 Technology Development Program.

  17. New Prototype Safeguards Technology Offers Improved Confidence and Automation for Uranium Enrichment Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Brim, Cornelia P.

    2013-04-01

    An important requirement for the international safeguards community is the ability to determine the enrichment level of uranium in gas centrifuge enrichment plants and nuclear fuel fabrication facilities. This is essential to ensure that countries with nuclear nonproliferation commitments, such as States Party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, are adhering to their obligations. However, current technologies to verify the uranium enrichment level in gas centrifuge enrichment plants or nuclear fuel fabrication facilities are technically challenging and resource-intensive. NNSA’s Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) supports the development, testing, and evaluation of future systems that will strengthen and sustain U.S. safeguards and security capabilities—in this case, by automating the monitoring of uranium enrichment in the entire inventory of a fuel fabrication facility. One such system is HEVA—hybrid enrichment verification array. This prototype was developed to provide an automated, nondestructive assay verification technology for uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders at enrichment plants.

  18. Development of DUPIC safeguards neutron counter

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Young Gil; Cha, Hong Ryul; Kim, Ho Dong; Hong, Jong Sook; Kang, Hee Young

    1999-08-01

    KAERI, in cooperation with LANL, developed DSNC (DUPIC Safeguards Neutron Counter) for safeguards implementing on DUPIC process which is under development by KAERI for direct use of spent PWR fuel in CANDU reactors. DSNC is a well-type neutron coincidence counter with substantial shielding to protect system from high gamma radiation of spent fuel. General development procedures in terms of design, manufacturing, fabrication, cold and hot test, performance test for DSNC authentication by KAERI-IAEA-LANL are described in this report. It is expected that the techniques related DSNC development and associated neutron detection and evaluation method could be applied for safeguards improvement. (Author). 20 refs., 16 tabs. 98 figs.

  19. Development of DUPIC safeguards neutron counter

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Young Gil; Cha, Hong Ryul; Kim, Ho Dong; Hong, Jong Sook; Kang, Hee Young

    1999-08-01

    KAERI, in cooperation with LANL, developed DSNC (DUPIC Safeguards Neutron Counter) for safeguards implementing on DUPIC process which is under development by KAERI for direct use of spent PWR fuel in CANDU reactors. DSNC is a well-type neutron coincidence counter with substantial shielding to protect system from high gamma radiation of spent fuel. General development procedures in terms of design, manufacturing, fabrication, cold and hot test, performance test for DSNC authentication by KAERI-IAEA-LANL are described in this report. It is expected that the techniques related DSNC development and associated neutron detection and evaluation method could be applied for safeguards improvement. (Author). 20 refs., 16 tabs. 98 figs.

  20. A status of installation and operational experience of safeguards equipment for DFDF safeguards implementation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cha, H. Y.; Ko, W. I.; Song, D. Y.; Kang, H. Y.; Lee, S. Y.; Kim, H. D. [KAERI, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    2001-05-01

    DUPIC Fuel Fabrication Facility (DFDF) fabricates CANDU-type fuel directly out of spent PWR fuel material with no alternation of composition of spent fuel throughout the whole process. DFDF belong to 'Other Facilities' among the 13 facilities types under IAEA safeguards criteria and is a unique facility type in the world because the DUPIC process has no separation activity of fission products from process materials. For the IAEA safeguards implementation of DFDF, facility was developed the DUPIC Safeguards Neutron Counter (DSNC) and DUPIC Safeguards Neutron Monitor(DSNM) for accountancy of SNM in DUPIC fuel and a monitoring of DUPIC fuel, respectively. These instruments were used jointly between IAEA and facility operator authorized by IAEA and installed at DFDF. And facility operator and IAEA also installed and operated the surveillance systems for DFDF surveillance each other. This paper describes the status of installation and operational experience of safeguards equipment for DFDF safeguards implementation.

  1. Nuclear Security for Floating Nuclear Power Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Skiba, James M. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Scherer, Carolynn P. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2015-10-13

    Recently there has been a lot of interest in small modular reactors. A specific type of these small modular reactors (SMR,) are marine based power plants called floating nuclear power plants (FNPP). These FNPPs are typically built by countries with extensive knowledge of nuclear energy, such as Russia, France, China and the US. These FNPPs are built in one country and then sent to countries in need of power and/or seawater desalination. Fifteen countries have expressed interest in acquiring such power stations. Some designs for such power stations are briefly summarized. Several different avenues for cooperation in FNPP technology are proposed, including IAEA nuclear security (i.e. safeguards), multilateral or bilateral agreements, and working with Russian design that incorporates nuclear safeguards for IAEA inspections in non-nuclear weapons states

  2. Report on the NGS3 Working Group on Safeguards by Design For Aqueous Reprocessing Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Johnson, Shirley J.; Ehinger, Michael; Schanfein, Mark

    2011-02-01

    The objective of the Working Group on SBD for Aqueous Reprocessing Facilities was to provide recommendations, for facility operators and designers, which would aid in the coordination and integration of nuclear material accountancy and the safeguards requirements of all concerned parties - operators, state/regional authorities, and the IAEA. The recommendations, which are to be provided to the IAEA, are intended to assist in optimizing facility design and operating parameters to ensure the safeguardability of the facility while minimizing impact on the operations. The one day Working Group session addressed a wide range of design and operating topics.

  3. DOE/NNSA perspective safeguard by design: GEN III/III+ light water reactors and beyond

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pan, Paul Y [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-12-10

    An overview of key issues relevant to safeguards by design (SBD) for GEN III/IV nuclear reactors is provided. Lessons learned from construction of typical GEN III+ water reactors with respect to SBD are highlighted. Details of SBD for safeguards guidance development for GEN III/III+ light water reactors are developed and reported. This paper also identifies technical challenges to extend SBD including proliferation resistance methodologies to other GEN III/III+ reactors (except HWRs) and GEN IV reactors because of their immaturity in designs.

  4. Safeguards Workforce Repatriation, Retention and Utilization

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gallucci, Nicholas [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States); Poe, Sarah [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States)

    2015-10-01

    Brookhaven National Laboratory was tasked by NA-241 to assess the transition of former IAEA employees back to the United States, investigating the rate of retention and overall smoothness of the repatriation process among returning safeguards professionals. Upon conducting several phone interviews, study authors found that the repatriation process went smoothly for the vast majority and that workforce retention was high. However, several respondents expressed irritation over the minimal extent to which their safeguards expertise had been leveraged in their current positions. This sentiment was pervasive enough to prompt a follow-on study focusing on questions relating to the utilization rather than the retention of safeguards professionals. A second, web-based survey was conducted, soliciting responses from a larger sample pool. Results suggest that the safeguards workforce may be oversaturated, and that young professionals returning to the United States from Agency positions may soon encounter difficulties finding jobs in the field.

  5. Fully integrated safeguards and security for reprocessing plant monitoring.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Duran, Felicia Angelica; Ward, Rebecca; Cipiti, Benjamin B.; Middleton, Bobby D.

    2011-10-01

    Nuclear fuel reprocessing plants contain a wealth of plant monitoring data including material measurements, process monitoring, administrative procedures, and physical protection elements. Future facilities are moving in the direction of highly-integrated plant monitoring systems that make efficient use of the plant data to improve monitoring and reduce costs. The Separations and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM) is an analysis tool that is used for modeling advanced monitoring systems and to determine system response under diversion scenarios. This report both describes the architecture for such a future monitoring system and present results under various diversion scenarios. Improvements made in the past year include the development of statistical tests for detecting material loss, the integration of material balance alarms to improve physical protection, and the integration of administrative procedures. The SSPM has been used to demonstrate how advanced instrumentation (as developed in the Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies campaign) can benefit the overall safeguards system as well as how all instrumentation is tied into the physical protection system. This concept has the potential to greatly improve the probability of detection for both abrupt and protracted diversion of nuclear material.

  6. INL Human Resource Development and the Next-Generation Safeguards Initiative

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gouveia, Fernando; Metcalf, Richard Royce Madison

    2010-07-01

    It is the stated goal of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to promote the development of a strengthened nuclear safeguards base, one with the potential to advance the secure and peaceful implementation of nuclear energy world-wide. To meet this goal, the initiative, among other things, has sought to develop a revitalized effort to ensure the continued availability of next generation safeguards professionals. Accordingly, this paper serves to outline the human capital building strategies taken by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in line with the NGSI. Various components are presented in detail, including INL’s efforts directed at university outreach, in particular the laboratory’s summer internship program, along with the development of various innovative training programs and long-term oriented strategies for student professional development. Special highlights include a video training series, developed by INL in cooperation with LLNL and other laboratories, which sought to expose students and entry-level professionals to the concept and practice of international nuclear safeguards.

  7. Using Carbon Pricing Revenues to Finance Infrastructure Access

    OpenAIRE

    2015-01-01

    Introducing a price on greenhouse gas emissions would not only contribute to reducing the risk of dangerous anthropogenic climate change, but would also generate substantial public revenues. Some of these revenues could be used to cover investment needs for infrastructure providing access to water, sanitation, electricity, telecommunications and transport. In this way, emission pricing could promote sustainable socio-economic development by safeguarding the stability of natural systems which ...

  8. Designing Data Protection Safeguards Ethically

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ugo Pagallo

    2011-03-01

    Full Text Available Since the mid 1990s, lawmakers and scholars have worked on the idea of embedding data protection safeguards in information and communication technology (ICT with the aim to access and control personal data in compliance with current regulatory frameworks. This effort has been strengthened by the capacities of computers to draw upon the tools of artificial intelligence (AI and operations research. However, work on AI and the law entails crucial ethical issues concerning both values and modalities of design. On one hand, design choices might result in conflicts of values and, vice versa, values may affect design features. On the other hand, the modalities of design cannot only limit the impact of harm-generating behavior but also prevent such behavior from occurring via self-enforcement technologies. In order to address some of the most relevant issues of data protection today, the paper suggests we adopt a stricter, yet more effective version of “privacy by design.” The goal should be to reinforce people’s pre-existing autonomy, rather than having to build it from scratch.

  9. ELECTROCHEMICALLY-MODULATED SEPARATIONS FOR SAFEGUARDS MEASUREMENTS

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Green, Michael A.; Arrigo, Leah M.; Liezers, Martin; Orton, Christopher R.; Douglas, Matthew; Peper, Shane M.; Schwantes, Jon M.; Hazelton, Sandra G.; Duckworth, Douglas C.

    2010-08-11

    A critical objective of materials accountability in safeguards is the accurate and timely analysis of fuel reprocessing streams to detect both abrupt and prolonged diversions of nuclear materials. For this reason both on-line nondestructive (NDA) and destructive analysis (DA) approaches are sought-after. Current methods for DA involve grab sampling and laboratory based column extractions that are costly, hazardous, and time consuming. While direct on-line gamma measurements of Pu are desirable, they are not possible due to contributions from other actinides and fission products. Researchers at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory are currently investigating electrochemically-modulated separation (EMS) as a straightforward, cost-effective technology for selective separation of Pu or U from aqueous reprocessing streams. The EMS selectivity is electrochemically controlled and results from the sorption of Pu4+ and U4+ redox states onto the anodized target electrode, allowing for selective accumulation of U or Pu from nitric acid streams to be turned “on” or “off.” It is envisioned that this technology can be utilized to isolate Pu for both NDA and DA analysis. For the NDA approach, rapid Pu analysis by gamma-ray spectroscopy could be performed after chemical clean-up of activation and fission products by EMS. Likewise, in the DA approach, EMS could be used to retain and concentrate the Pu in nanogram quantities on the electrode surface to be transported to the lab for analysis using high precision mass spectrometry. Due to the challenges associated with complex matrices, a systematic investigation of the redox-dependent accumulation of Pu using EMS was necessary, and results will be presented. Approaches to mitigate interelement effects using large surface area cells will also be discussed. The EMS chemistry and spectroscopy for Pu isolation and measurement will be presented, proof-of-principle measurements will be described, and the application of this

  10. Behavior of 241Am in fast reactor systems - a safeguards perspective

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Beddingfield, David H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Lafleur, Adrienne M [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01

    Advanced fuel-cycle developments around the world currently under development are exploring the possibility of disposing of {sup 241}Am from spent fuel recycle processes by burning this material in fast reactors. For safeguards practitioners, this approach could potentially complicate both fresh- and spent-fuel safeguards measurements. The increased ({alpha},n) production in oxide fuels from the {sup 241}Am increases the uncertainty in coincidence assay of Pu in MOX assemblies and will require additional information to make use of totals-based neutron assay of these assemblies. We have studied the behavior of {sup 241}Am-bearing MOX fuel in the fast reactor system and the effect on neutron and gamma-ray source-terms for safeguards measurements. In this paper, we will present the results of simulations of the behavior of {sup 241}Am in a fast breeder reactor system. Because of the increased use of MOX fuel in thermal reactors and advances in fuel-cycle designs aimed at americium disposal in fast reactors, we have undertaken a brief study of the behavior of americium in these systems to better understand the safeguards impacts of these new approaches. In this paper we will examine the behavior of {sup 241}Am in a variety of nuclear systems to provide insight into the safeguards implications of proposed Am disposition schemes.

  11. IAEA Safeguards: Cost/benefit analysis of commercial satellite imagery

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Andersson, Christer [SSC Satellitbild AB, Kiruna (Sweden)

    1999-03-01

    A major milestone in the efforts to strengthen the Safeguards System was reached in May 1997 when the Board of Governors approved a `Model Protocol Additional to Safeguards Agreements`. The Protocol provides the legal basis necessary to enhance the Agency`s ability to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities by using information available from open sources to complement the declarations made by Member States. Commercially available high-resolution satellite data has emerged as one potential complementary open information source to support the traditional and extended Safeguard activities of IAEA. This document constitutes a first report from SSC Satellitbild giving the Agency tentative and initial estimates of the potential cost and time-savings possible with the new proposed technology. The initial cost/benefit simulation will be further finalised in the following `Implementation Blueprint` study. The general foundation and starting point for the cost/benefit calculation is to simulate a new efficient and relatively small `imagery unit` within the IAEA, capable of performing advanced image processing as a tool for various safeguards tasks. The image processing capacity is suggested to be task- and interpretation-oriented. The study was performed over a period of 1,5 weeks in late 1998, and is based upon interviews of IAEA staff, reviews of existing IAEA documentation as well as from SSC Satellitbild`s long-standing experience of satellite imagery and field missions. The cost/benefit analysis is based on a spreadsheet simulation of five potential applications of commercial satellite imagery: Reference information; Confirmation of Agency acquired and Member State supplied data; Change detection and on-going monitoring; Assessing open source information available to the Agency; Detecting undeclared activities and undeclared sites. The study confirms that the proposed concept of a relatively small `imagery unit` using high-resolution data will be a sound and

  12. A Monte Carlo based spent fuel analysis safeguards strategy assessment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fensin, Michael L [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Tobin, Stephen J [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Swinhoe, Martyn T [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Menlove, Howard O [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sandoval, Nathan P [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01

    Safeguarding nuclear material involves the detection of diversions of significant quantities of nuclear materials, and the deterrence of such diversions by the risk of early detection. There are a variety of motivations for quantifying plutonium in spent fuel assemblies by means of nondestructive assay (NDA) including the following: strengthening the capabilities of the International Atomic Energy Agencies ability to safeguards nuclear facilities, shipper/receiver difference, input accountability at reprocessing facilities and burnup credit at repositories. Many NDA techniques exist for measuring signatures from spent fuel; however, no single NDA technique can, in isolation, quantify elemental plutonium and other actinides of interest in spent fuel. A study has been undertaken to determine the best integrated combination of cost effective techniques for quantifying plutonium mass in spent fuel for nuclear safeguards. A standardized assessment process was developed to compare the effective merits and faults of 12 different detection techniques in order to integrate a few techniques and to down-select among the techniques in preparation for experiments. The process involves generating a basis burnup/enrichment/cooling time dependent spent fuel assembly library, creating diversion scenarios, developing detector models and quantifying the capability of each NDA technique. Because hundreds of input and output files must be managed in the couplings of data transitions for the different facets of the assessment process, a graphical user interface (GUI) was development that automates the process. This GUI allows users to visually create diversion scenarios with varied replacement materials, and generate a MCNPX fixed source detector assessment input file. The end result of the assembly library assessment is to select a set of common source terms and diversion scenarios for quantifying the capability of each of the 12 NDA techniques. We present here the generalized

  13. Building a Successful Machine Safeguarding Program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McConnell, S

    2003-03-06

    Safeguarding hazards associated with machines is a goal common to all health and safety professionals. Whether the individual is new to the safety field or has held associated responsibilities for a period of time, safeguarding personnel who work with or around machine tools and equipment should be considered an important aspect of the job. Although significant progress has been made in terms of safeguarding machines since the era prior to the organized safety movement, companies continue to be cited by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and workers continue to be injured, even killed by machine tools and equipment. In the early 1900s, it was common practice to operate transmission machinery (gears, belts, pulleys, shafting, etc.) completely unguarded. At that time, the countersunk set screw used on shafting had not been invented and projecting set screws were involved in many horrific accidents. Manufacturers built machines with little regard for worker safety. Workers were killed or seriously injured before definitive actions were taken to improve safety in the workplace. Many states adopted legislation aimed at requiring machine guarding and improved injury reduction. The first patent for a machine safeguard was issued in 1868 for a mechanical interlock. Other patents followed. As methods for safeguarding machinery and tools were developed, standards were written and programs were set up to monitor factories for compliance. Many of those standards continue to govern how we protect workers today. It is common to see machine tools built in the forties, fifties and sixties being used in machine shops today. In terms of safeguarding, these machines may be considered poorly designed, improperly safeguarded or simply unguarded. In addition to the potential threat of an OSHA citation, these conditions expose the operator to serious hazards that must be addressed. The safety professional can help line management determine workable solutions for

  14. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pepper,S.E.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Occhogrosso, D.M.; Lockwood, D.; Carroll, C.J.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Fankhauser, J.

    2009-07-12

    Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards October 22 and 23, 2008. The workshop was sponsored by DOE/NA-243 under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). Placing well-qualified Americans in sufficient number and in key safeguards positions within the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) Department of Safeguards is an important U.S. non-proliferation objective. The goal of the NGSI Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards was to improve U.S. efforts to recruit U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. BNL’s International Safeguards Project Office invited participants from the U.S. Department of Energy, the IAEA, U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who are either experts in international safeguards or who understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. A final report for the workshop will be finalized and distributed in early 2009. The main finding of the workshop was the need for an integrated recruitment plan to take into account pools of potential candidates, various government and private agency stakeholders, the needs of the IAEA, and the NGSI human capital development plan. There were numerous findings related to and recommendations for maximizing the placement of U.S. experts in IAEA Safeguards positions. The workshop participants offered many ideas for increasing the pool of candidates and increasing the placement rate. This paper will provide details on these findings and recommendations

  15. Training in Environmental Analyses for Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Williams, R W; Gaffney, A M; Hutcheon, N A; Kersting, A B

    2009-05-28

    Responding to recommendations of the DOE/NNSA's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, a new course, Training in Environmental Sample Analysis for IAEA Safeguards, is being offered as a summer internship opportunity at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The first students completed the 8 week program during the summer of 2008. Interns are given training in the analysis of bulk environmental samples for safeguards through hands-on experience working in a clean laboratory, purifying U and Pu from bulk environmental samples, and measuring U and Pu isotope ratios by multi-collector ICP mass spectrometry. A series of lectures by invited safeguards and non-proliferation experts gives the students a broad picture of the safeguards work of the IAEA. At the end of the course, the students prepare a poster of their work to showcase at LLNL's summer student poster symposium. Both undergraduate and graduate students are recruited and hired as paid interns under the aegis of the Glenn T. Seaborg Institute in the Physical and Life Sciences Directorate at LLNL. This training course seeks to introduce students to analytical and interpretive skill-sets that are not generally taught at universities, and to encourage them to pursue careers with the IAEA.

  16. In-Born Radio Frequency Identification Devices for Safeguards Use at Gas-Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ward,R.; Rosenthal,M.

    2009-07-12

    Global expansion of nuclear power has made the need for improved safeguards measures at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEPs) imperative. One technology under consideration for safeguards applications is Radio Frequency Identification Devices (RFIDs). RFIDs have the potential to increase IAEA inspector"s efficiency and effectiveness either by reducing the number of inspection visits necessary or by reducing inspection effort at those visits. This study assesses the use of RFIDs as an integral component of the "Option 4" safeguards approach developed by Bruce Moran, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for a model GCEP [1]. A previous analysis of RFIDs was conducted by Jae Jo, Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), which evaluated the effectiveness of an RFID tag applied by the facility operator [2]. This paper presents a similar evaluation carried out in the framework of Jo’s paper, but it is predicated on the assumption that the RFID tag is applied by the manufacturer at the birth of the cylinder, rather than by the operator. Relevant diversion scenarios are examined to determine if RFIDs increase the effectiveness and/ or efficiency of safeguards in these scenarios. Conclusions on the benefits offered to inspectors by using in-born RFID tagging are presented.

  17. Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) through a Common Global Approach

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Badwan, Faris M. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Demuth, Scott Francis [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Miller, Michael Conrad [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Pshakin, Gennady [Obninsk Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (Russian Federation)

    2015-02-23

    Small Modular Reactors (SMR) with power levels significantly less than the currently standard 1000 to 1600-MWe reactors have been proposed as a potential game changer for future nuclear power. SMRs may offer a simpler, more standardized, and safer modular design by using factory built and easily transportable components. Additionally, SMRs may be more easily built and operated in isolated locations, and may require smaller initial capital investment and shorter construction times. Because many SMRs designs are still conceptual and consequently not yet fixed, designers have a unique opportunity to incorporate updated design basis threats, emergency preparedness requirements, and then fully integrate safety, physical security, and safeguards/material control and accounting (MC&A) designs. Integrating safety, physical security, and safeguards is often referred to as integrating the 3Ss, and early consideration of safeguards and security in the design is often referred to as safeguards and security by design (SSBD). This paper describes U.S./Russian collaborative efforts toward developing an internationally accepted common approach for implementing SSBD/3Ss for SMRs based upon domestic requirements, and international guidance and requirements. These collaborative efforts originated with the Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security working group established under the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission during the 2009 Presidential Summit. Initial efforts have focused on review of U.S. and Russian domestic requirements for Security and MC&A, IAEA guidance for security and MC&A, and IAEA requirements for international safeguards. Additionally, example SMR design features that can enhance proliferation resistance and physical security have been collected from past work and reported here. The development of a U.S./Russian common approach for SSBD/3Ss should aid the designer of SMRs located anywhere in the world. More specifically, the application of this approach may

  18. The US Support Program Assistance to the IAEA Safeguards Information Technology, Collection, and Analysis 2008

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tackentien,J.

    2008-06-12

    One of the United States Support Program's (USSP) priorities for 2008 is to support the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) development of an integrated and efficient safeguards information infrastructure, including reliable and maintainable information systems, and effective tools and resources to collect and analyze safeguards-relevant information. The USSP has provided funding in support of this priority for the ISIS Re-engineering Project (IRP), and for human resources support to the design and definition of the enhanced information analysis architecture project (nVision). Assistance for several other information technology efforts is provided. This paper will report on the various ongoing support measures undertaken by the USSP to support the IAEA's information technology enhancements and will provide some insights into activities that the USSP may support in the future.

  19. Applications of nuclear physics

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hayes, A. C.

    2017-02-01

    Today the applications of nuclear physics span a very broad range of topics and fields. This review discusses a number of aspects of these applications, including selected topics and concepts in nuclear reactor physics, nuclear fusion, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear-geophysics, and nuclear medicine. The review begins with a historic summary of the early years in applied nuclear physics, with an emphasis on the huge developments that took place around the time of World War II, and that underlie the physics involved in designs of nuclear explosions, controlled nuclear energy, and nuclear fusion. The review then moves to focus on modern applications of these concepts, including the basic concepts and diagnostics developed for the forensics of nuclear explosions, the nuclear diagnostics at the National Ignition Facility, nuclear reactor safeguards, and the detection of nuclear material production and trafficking. The review also summarizes recent developments in nuclear geophysics and nuclear medicine. The nuclear geophysics areas discussed include geo-chronology, nuclear logging for industry, the Oklo reactor, and geo-neutrinos. The section on nuclear medicine summarizes the critical advances in nuclear imaging, including PET and SPECT imaging, targeted radionuclide therapy, and the nuclear physics of medical isotope production. Each subfield discussed requires a review article unto itself, which is not the intention of the current review; rather, the current review is intended for readers who wish to get a broad understanding of applied nuclear physics.

  20. Advanced Safeguards Technology Demonstration at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Orton, Christopher R.; Schwantes, Jon M.; Bryan, Samuel A.; Levitskaia, Tatiana G.; Duckworth, Douglas C.; Douglas, Matthew; Farmer, O. T.; Fraga, Carlos G.; Lehn, Scott A.; Liezers, Martin; Peper, Shane M.; Christensen, Richard

    2008-10-01

    The IAEA has established international safeguards standards for fissionable materials at spent fuel reprocessing plants to ensure that significant quantities of weapons-grade nuclear material are not diverted over a specified time frame. It is, therefore, necessary to confirm proper operational performance to verify facilities operate under adequate safeguard-declared conditions. This verification can be achieved by employing monitoring equipment. Online real time monitoring of the flowsheet radiochemical streams provides a unique capability to rapidly identify deviations from normal operating conditions. Flowsheet monitoring technologies being developed at PNNL include three integrated systems: Multi-Isotope Process (MIP) Monitor, spectroscopy-based monitor (UV-vis-NIR and Raman spectrometers), and Electrochemically Modulated Separations (EMS). The MIP Monitor is designed to identify off-normal conditions in process streams using gamma spectroscopy and pattern recognition software. The spectroscopic monitoring continuously measures chemical compositions of the process streams including actinide metal ions (U, Pu, Np), selected fission products, and major cold flowsheet chemicals. EMS provides an on-line means for pre-separating and pre-concentrating elements of interest out of complex matrices prior to detection. PNNL is preparing to test these multi-parametric technologies using different samples of dissolved spent fuel and aqueous and organic phases of the PUREX and UREX flowsheets. We will report our on-going efforts with specific focus given to quantifying sensitivity of the MIP Monitor and UV-Vis and Raman spectrometers to detect minor changes in major process variables.

  1. RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION DEVICES: EFFECTIVENESS IN IMPROVING SAFEGUARDS AT GAS-CENTRIFUGE URANIUM-ENRICHMENT PLANTS.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    JOE,J.

    2007-07-08

    Recent advances in radio frequency identification devices (RFIDs) have engendered a growing interest among international safeguards experts. Potentially, RFIDs could reduce inspection work, viz. the number of inspections, number of samples, and duration of the visits, and thus improve the efficiency and effectiveness of international safeguards. This study systematically examined the applications of RFIDs for IAEA safeguards at large gas-centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). These analyses are expected to help identify the requirements and desirable properties for RFIDs, to provide insights into which vulnerabilities matter most, and help formulate the required assurance tests. This work, specifically assesses the application of RFIDs for the ''Option 4'' safeguards approach, proposed by Bruce Moran, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for large gas-centrifuge uranium-enrichment plants. The features of ''Option 4'' safeguards include placing RFIDs on all feed, product and tails (F/P/T) cylinders, along with WID readers in all FP/T stations and accountability scales. Other features of Moran's ''Option 4'' are Mailbox declarations, monitoring of load-cell-based weighing systems at the F/P/T stations and accountability scales, and continuous enrichment monitors. Relevant diversion paths were explored to evaluate how RFIDs improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards. Additionally, the analysis addresses the use of RFIDs in conjunction with video monitoring and neutron detectors in a perimeter-monitoring approach to show that RFIDs can help to detect unidentified cylinders.

  2. Parallel digital forensics infrastructure.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Liebrock, Lorie M. (New Mexico Tech, Socorro, NM); Duggan, David Patrick

    2009-10-01

    This report documents the architecture and implementation of a Parallel Digital Forensics infrastructure. This infrastructure is necessary for supporting the design, implementation, and testing of new classes of parallel digital forensics tools. Digital Forensics has become extremely difficult with data sets of one terabyte and larger. The only way to overcome the processing time of these large sets is to identify and develop new parallel algorithms for performing the analysis. To support algorithm research, a flexible base infrastructure is required. A candidate architecture for this base infrastructure was designed, instantiated, and tested by this project, in collaboration with New Mexico Tech. Previous infrastructures were not designed and built specifically for the development and testing of parallel algorithms. With the size of forensics data sets only expected to increase significantly, this type of infrastructure support is necessary for continued research in parallel digital forensics. This report documents the implementation of the parallel digital forensics (PDF) infrastructure architecture and implementation.

  3. JINR cloud infrastructure evolution

    Science.gov (United States)

    Baranov, A. V.; Balashov, N. A.; Kutovskiy, N. A.; Semenov, R. N.

    2016-09-01

    To fulfil JINR commitments in different national and international projects related to the use of modern information technologies such as cloud and grid computing as well as to provide a modern tool for JINR users for their scientific research a cloud infrastructure was deployed at Laboratory of Information Technologies of Joint Institute for Nuclear Research. OpenNebula software was chosen as a cloud platform. Initially it was set up in simple configuration with single front-end host and a few cloud nodes. Some custom development was done to tune JINR cloud installation to fit local needs: web form in the cloud web-interface for resources request, a menu item with cloud utilization statistics, user authentication via Kerberos, custom driver for OpenVZ containers. Because of high demand in that cloud service and its resources over-utilization it was re-designed to cover increasing users' needs in capacity, availability and reliability. Recently a new cloud instance has been deployed in high-availability configuration with distributed network file system and additional computing power.

  4. Analysis of safeguards information treatment system at the facility level

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Byung Doo; Song, Dae Yong; Kwack, Eun Ho

    2000-12-01

    Safeguards Information Treatment System(SITS) at the facility level is required to implement efficiently the obligations under the Korea-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, bilateral agreements with other countries and domestic law. In this report, the analysis of information, which the SITS treats, and operation environment of SITS including the review of the relationship between safeguards information are described. SITS will be developed to cover the different accounting procedures and methods applied at the various facilities under IAEA safeguards.

  5. Gamma-Ray Library and Uncertainty Analysis: Passively Emitted Gamma Rays Used in Safeguards Technology

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Parker, W

    2009-09-18

    Non-destructive gamma-ray analysis is a fundamental part of nuclear safeguards, including nuclear energy safeguards technology. Developing safeguards capabilities for nuclear energy will certainly benefit from the advanced use of gamma-ray spectroscopy as well as the ability to model various reactor scenarios. There is currently a wide variety of nuclear data that could be used in computer modeling and gamma-ray spectroscopy analysis. The data can be discrepant (with varying uncertainties), and it may difficult for a modeler or software developer to determine the best nuclear data set for a particular situation. To use gamma-ray spectroscopy to determine the relative isotopic composition of nuclear materials, the gamma-ray energies and the branching ratios or intensities of the gamma-rays emitted from the nuclides in the material must be well known. A variety of computer simulation codes will be used during the development of the nuclear energy safeguards, and, to compare the results of various codes, it will be essential to have all the {gamma}-ray libraries agree. Assessing our nuclear data needs allows us to create a prioritized list of desired measurements, and provides uncertainties for energies and especially for branching intensities. Of interest are actinides, fission products, and activation products, and most particularly mixtures of all of these radioactive isotopes, including mixtures of actinides and other products. Recent work includes the development of new detectors with increased energy resolution, and studies of gamma-rays and their lines used in simulation codes. Because new detectors are being developed, there is an increased need for well known nuclear data for radioactive isotopes of some elements. Safeguards technology should take advantage of all types of gamma-ray detectors, including new super cooled detectors, germanium detectors and cadmium zinc telluride detectors. Mixed isotopes, particularly mixed actinides found in nuclear reactor

  6. Safeguards instruments for Large-Scale Reprocessing Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hakkila, E.A. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Case, R.S.; Sonnier, C. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    1993-06-01

    Between 1987 and 1992 a multi-national forum known as LASCAR (Large Scale Reprocessing Plant Safeguards) met to assist the IAEA in development of effective and efficient safeguards for large-scale reprocessing plants. The US provided considerable input for safeguards approaches and instrumentation. This paper reviews and updates instrumentation of importance in measuring plutonium and uranium in these facilities.

  7. Nonproliferation and safeguards aspects of the DUPIC fuel cycle concept

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Persiani, P. K. [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States)

    1997-07-01

    The purpose of the study is to comment on the proliferation characteristic profiles of some of the proposed fuel cycle alternatives to help ensure that nonproliferation concerns are introduced into the early stages of a fuel cycle concept development program, and to perhaps aid in the more effective implementation of the international nonproliferation regime initiative and safeguards systems. Alternative recycle concepts proposed by several countries involve the recycle of spent fuel without the separation of plutonium from uranium and fission products. The concepts are alternatives to either the direct long-term storage deposition of or the purex reprocessing of the spent fuels. The alternate fuel cycle concepts reviewed include: the dry-recycle processes such as the direct use of reconfigured PWR spent fuel assemblies into CANDU reactors(DUPIC); low-decontamination, single-cycle co-extraction of fast reactor fuels in a wet-purex type of reprocessing; and on a limited scale the thorium-uranium fuel cycle. The nonproliferation advantages usually associated with the above non-separation processes are: the highly radioactive spent fuel presents a barrier to the physical diversion of the nuclear material; avoid the need to dissolve and chemically separate the plutonium from the uranium and fission products; and that the spent fuel isotopic quality of the plutonium vector is further degraded. Although the radiation levels and the need for reprocessing may be perceived as barriers to the terrorist or the subnational level of safeguards, the international level of nonproliferation concerns is addressed primarily by material accountancy and verification activities. On the international level of nonproliferation concerns, the non-separation fuel cycle concepts involved have to be evaluated on the bases of the impact the processes may have on nuclear materials accountancy. (author).

  8. Safeguards performance model for evaluation of potential safeguards strategies applied to pyroprocessing facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Riley, T.R., E-mail: riletony@isu.edu; Pope, C.L.; Benedict, R.W.

    2016-05-15

    Highlights: • A model was created for simulating safeguards strategies for a pyroprocessing facility. • The model is flexible and simulates process monitoring during steady state operations. • A sensitivity study revealed input spent fuel and storage mass measures most limiting. - Abstract: Electrochemical reprocessing has been proposed as a spent fuel disposition technique. If implemented on a commercial scale, traditional safeguards approaches used to satisfy IAEA requirements may be insufficient. To aid in testing safeguard strategies, a new tool was developed: the Pyroprocessing Safeguards Performance Model, a MATLAB/Simulink simulation of plant operations capable of calculating inventory differences for a specified balance period as well as sensitivity studies of detection measurements. This paper discusses the development of the model and a measurement uncertainty study performed using the model.

  9. The integration of process monitoring for safeguards.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cipiti, Benjamin B.; Zinaman, Owen R.

    2010-09-01

    The Separations and Safeguards Performance Model is a reprocessing plant model that has been developed for safeguards analyses of future plant designs. The model has been modified to integrate bulk process monitoring data with traditional plutonium inventory balances to evaluate potential advanced safeguards systems. Taking advantage of the wealth of operator data such as flow rates and mass balances of bulk material, the timeliness of detection of material loss was shown to improve considerably. Four diversion cases were tested including both abrupt and protracted diversions at early and late times in the run. The first three cases indicated alarms before half of a significant quantity of material was removed. The buildup of error over time prevented detection in the case of a protracted diversion late in the run. Some issues related to the alarm conditions and bias correction will need to be addressed in future work. This work both demonstrates the use of the model for performing diversion scenario analyses and for testing advanced safeguards system designs.

  10. 75 FR 81894 - Safeguarding Child Support Information

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-12-29

    ... effect safeguards on the access to and use of data in the State's automated system. II. Background This... referred to information provided to parents and putative fathers. The technical correction is necessary to...), which requires that a parent's or putative father's Social Security Number (SSN) be provided to...

  11. "Safeguarding" Sports Coaching: Foucault, Genealogy and Critique

    Science.gov (United States)

    Garratt, Dean; Piper, Heather; Taylor, Bill

    2013-01-01

    This paper offers a genealogical account of safeguarding in sport. Drawing specifically on Foucault's work, it examines the "politics of touch" in relation to the social and historical formation of child protection policy in sports coaching. While the analysis has some resonance with the context of coaching as a whole, for illustrative…

  12. 38 CFR 18.436 - Procedural safeguards.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... or are believed to need special instruction or related services. The system shall include: (1) Notice... THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap Elementary, Secondary, and Adult Education § 18.436 Procedural safeguards. (a) A recipient that operates a public elementary...

  13. 45 CFR 605.36 - Procedural safeguards.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... records, an impartial hearing with opportunity for participation by the person's parents or guardian and... Public Welfare Regulations Relating to Public Welfare (Continued) NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION... Preschool, Elementary, and Secondary Education § 605.36 Procedural safeguards. A recipient that operates a...

  14. Readability of Special Education Procedural Safeguards

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mandic, Carmen Gomez; Rudd, Rima; Hehir, Thomas; Acevedo-Garcia, Dolores

    2012-01-01

    This study focused on literacy-related barriers to understanding the rights of students with disabilities and their parents within the special education system. SMOG readability scores were determined for procedural safeguards documents issued by all state departments of education. The average reading grade level was 16; 6% scored in the high…

  15. A study of a zone approach to IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards: The low-enriched-uranium zone of a light-water-reactor fuel cycle

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.

    1986-06-01

    At present the IAEA designs its safeguards approach with regard to each type of nuclear facility so that the safeguards activities and effort are essentially the same for a given type and size of nuclear facility wherever it may be located. Conclusions regarding a state are derived by combining the conclusions regarding the effectiveness of safeguards for the individual facilities within a state. In this study it was convenient to define three zones in a state with a closed light-water-reactor nuclear fuel cycle. Each zone contains those facilities or parts thereof which use or process nuclear materials of the same safeguards significance: low-enriched uranium, radioactive spent fuel, or recovered plutonium. The possibility that each zone might be treated as an extended material balance area for safeguards purposes is under investigation. The approach includes defining the relevant features of the facilities in the three zones and listing the safeguards activities which are now practiced. This study has focussed on the fresh-fuel zone, the several facilities of which use or process low-enriched uranium. At one extreme, flows and inventories would be verified at each material balance area. At the other extreme, the flows into and out of the zone and the inventory of the whole zone would be verified. There are a number of possible safeguards approaches which fall between the two extremes. The intention is to develop a rational approach which will make it possible to compare the technical effectiveness and the inspection effort for the facility-oriented approach, for the approach involving the zone as a material balance area, and for some reasonable intermediate safeguards approaches.

  16. A Legal Analysis of Safeguard Measures in the European Community

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Guang Ma

    2006-12-01

    Full Text Available In 2002, the European Community imposed its first safeguard measure since the establishment of the WTO. And in 2003, it introduced two new regulations on safeguard measures, namely the “Council Regulation on a transitional product- specific safeguard mechanism for imports originating in the People's Republic of China” and the “Council Regulation on measures that the Community may take in relation to the combined effect of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures with safeguard measures." In this article, the author analyzes these safeguard measures and the European Commission's practice of such measures. By comparing the safeguard laws and their practice, it is the author's intention to clarify whether the safeguard measures in thIn 2002, the European Community imposed its first safeguard measure since the establishment of the WTO. And in 2003, it introduced two new regulations on safeguard measures, namely the "Council Regulation on a transitional product- specific safeguard mechanism for imports originating in the People's Republic of China" and the "Council Regulation on measures that the Community may take in relation to the combined effect of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy measures with safeguard measures." In this article, the author analyzes these safeguard measures and the European Commission's practice of such measures. By comparing the safeguard laws and their practice, it is the author's intention to clarify whether the safeguard measures in the European Community comply with the WTO Agreement on Safeguards. In conclusion, based on the analysis of safeguard measures in the European Community's legal system and their practice in actual cases, it apparent that the European Community is making a serious effort to comply with the standards of the WTO Safeguards Agreement. In certain respects, the European Community has a comparatively higher level of standards than the WTO. Nevertheless, there continue to be challenges to WTO

  17. The first 50 years: A review of the Department of Energy domestic safeguards and security program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Desmond, W.J.; Zack, N.R.; Tape, J.W.

    1997-12-01

    World War II not only brought the United States rapidly into the nuclear age, but it also brought a new term, {open_quotes}safeguards.{close_quotes} By that time, physical security was an already established activity that dealt with the protection of possessions such as property, vehicles, and other valuables. A secret nuclear project under a stadium at the University of Chicago would add a new dimension to physical security. Similarly, a community known only by its post office box at a location 27 miles from Santa Fe, New Mexico (PO Box 1663) would initiate new programs to protect information and technology while their programs changed the science and warfare around the world. The Manhattan Project and what was to become the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (now Los Alamos National Laboratory) would extend the applications of physical security and, soon to be implemented, safeguards to produce important technical advances for the protection, accounting, control, and nonproliferation of fissile nuclear materials. Security for nuclear materials and weapons information began as a foremost consideration with the start of the nuclear programs in the early 1940s. In the 1960s, the Atoms for Peace Program promoted the peaceful use of nuclear energy and made the US a supplier of nuclear materials and peaceful-use nuclear technology to other states. This program also changed the focus on nuclear materials from that of worldwide control to inspection by an independent agency, the proposed International Atomic Energy Agency. At this same time the nuclear weapons states increased from three to five. Other nations worked to obtain a nuclear weapons capability, resulting in increasing concerns about nuclear proliferation.

  18. 76 FR 7882 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Digital I&C...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-02-11

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Digital I&C Systems The ACRS Subcommittee on Digital Instrumentation & Control (DI&C) Systems will hold a meeting...

  19. 76 FR 16016 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Future Plant...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-03-22

    ..., 10 a.m. until 5 p.m. The Subcommittee will review the NRC Staff's High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactor... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office ] NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Future...

  20. 76 FR 68793 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Planning and...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-11-07

    ... No: 2011-28738] NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Planning and Procedures; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Planning and Procedures will hold a meeting on November 29, 2011, Room T-2B1, 11545 Rockville...

  1. Model of a Generic Natural Uranium Conversion Plant ? Suggested Measures to Strengthen International Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Raffo-Caiado, Ana Claudia [ORNL; Begovich, John M [ORNL; Ferrada, Juan J [ORNL

    2009-11-01

    This is the final report that closed a joint collaboration effort between DOE and the National Nuclear Energy Commission of Brazil (CNEN). In 2005, DOE and CNEN started a collaborative effort to evaluate measures that can strengthen the effectiveness of international safeguards at a natural uranium conversion plant (NUCP). The work was performed by DOE s Oak Ridge National Laboratory and CNEN. A generic model of a NUCP was developed and typical processing steps were defined. Advanced instrumentation and techniques for verification purposes were identified and investigated. The scope of the work was triggered by the International Atomic Energy Agency s 2003 revised policy concerning the starting point of safeguards at uranium conversion facilities. Prior to this policy only the final products of the uranium conversion plant were considered to be of composition and purity suitable for use in the nuclear fuel cycle and therefore, subject to the IAEA safeguards control. DOE and CNEN have explored options for implementing the IAEA policy, although Brazil understands that the new policy established by the IAEA is beyond the framework of the Quadripartite Agreement of which it is one of the parties, together with Argentina, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) and the IAEA. Two technical papers on this subject were published at the 2005 and 2008 INMM Annual Meetings.

  2. Model of a Generic Natural Uranium Conversion Plant ? Suggested Measures to Strengthen International Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Raffo-Caiado, Ana Claudia [ORNL; Begovich, John M [ORNL; Ferrada, Juan J [ORNL

    2009-11-01

    This is the final report that closed a joint collaboration effort between DOE and the National Nuclear Energy Commission of Brazil (CNEN). In 2005, DOE and CNEN started a collaborative effort to evaluate measures that can strengthen the effectiveness of international safeguards at a natural uranium conversion plant (NUCP). The work was performed by DOE s Oak Ridge National Laboratory and CNEN. A generic model of a NUCP was developed and typical processing steps were defined. Advanced instrumentation and techniques for verification purposes were identified and investigated. The scope of the work was triggered by the International Atomic Energy Agency s 2003 revised policy concerning the starting point of safeguards at uranium conversion facilities. Prior to this policy only the final products of the uranium conversion plant were considered to be of composition and purity suitable for use in the nuclear fuel cycle and therefore, subject to the IAEA safeguards control. DOE and CNEN have explored options for implementing the IAEA policy, although Brazil understands that the new policy established by the IAEA is beyond the framework of the Quadripartite Agreement of which it is one of the parties, together with Argentina, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) and the IAEA. Two technical papers on this subject were published at the 2005 and 2008 INMM Annual Meetings.

  3. Cyber Security: Critical Infrastructure Controls Assessment Framework

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-05-01

    recoverability Storm and Lightning Fire Chemical Leakage Nuclear Leakage n ercep on & Spoofing, Hacking Sabotage or Vandalism 4 capability 5...Action  10. ICS – Infrastructure Control System 11. IEC  – International Electrochemical  Commission 12. IED – Intelligent Electronic Devices 13 IEEE

  4. Using Process Load Cell Information for IAEA Safeguards at Enrichment Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Laughter, Mark D [ORNL; Whitaker, J Michael [ORNL; Howell, John [University of Glasgow

    2010-01-01

    Uranium enrichment service providers are expanding existing enrichment plants and constructing new facilities to meet demands resulting from the shutdown of gaseous diffusion plants, the completion of the U.S.-Russia highly enriched uranium downblending program, and the projected global renaissance in nuclear power. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducts verification inspections at safeguarded facilities to provide assurance that signatory States comply with their treaty obligations to use nuclear materials only for peaceful purposes. Continuous, unattended monitoring of load cells in UF{sub 6} feed/withdrawal stations can provide safeguards-relevant process information to make existing safeguards approaches more efficient and effective and enable novel safeguards concepts such as information-driven inspections. The IAEA has indicated that process load cell monitoring will play a central role in future safeguards approaches for large-scale gas centrifuge enrichment plants. This presentation will discuss previous work and future plans related to continuous load cell monitoring, including: (1) algorithms for automated analysis of load cell data, including filtering methods to determine significant weights and eliminate irrelevant impulses; (2) development of metrics for declaration verification and off-normal operation detection ('cylinder counting,' near-real-time mass balancing, F/P/T ratios, etc.); (3) requirements to specify what potentially sensitive data is safeguards relevant, at what point the IAEA gains on-site custody of the data, and what portion of that data can be transmitted off-site; (4) authentication, secure on-site storage, and secure transmission of load cell data; (5) data processing and remote monitoring schemes to control access to sensitive and proprietary information; (6) integration of process load cell data in a layered safeguards approach with cross-check verification; (7) process mock-ups constructed to provide

  5. The U.S./IAEA Workshop on Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pepper S. E.; .; Worrall, L.; Pickett, C.; Bachner, K.; Queirolo, A.

    2014-08-08

    The U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, the U.S. Department of State, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) organized a a workshop on the subject of ”Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation.” The workshop was held at the Vienna International Centre in Vienna, Austria, May 6-8, 2014. The workshop participants included software and hardware experts from national laboratories, industry, government, and IAEA member states who were specially selected by the workshop organizers based on their experience with software that is developed for the control and operation of safeguards instrumentation. The workshop included presentations, to orient the participants to the IAEA Department of Safeguards software activities related to instrumentation data collection and processing, and case studies that were designed to inspire discussion of software development, use, maintenance, and upgrades in breakout sessions and to result in recommendations for effective software practices and management. This report summarizes the results of the workshop.

  6. The new role of non-proliferation surveillance; Safeguards - die neue Rolle der Nichtverbreitungsueberwachung

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Weh, R. [GNS Gesellschaft fuer Nuklear-Service mbH, Essen (Germany)

    2001-10-01

    Non-proliferation and nuclear safeguards are intimately connected with the peaceful development and use of nuclear power. The contractual obligation to forgo any misuse aimed at the construction of atom boms has been, and is, an important basis of all activities in the nuclear field. For the Federal Republic of Germany and the other participating states, subdivided into nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states, the 1954 Brussels Treaty, which contains a fundamental clause waiving the production of nuclear weapons, the establishment of the European Atomic Energy Community, EURATOM, within the framework of the 1957 Treaties of Rome, and the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-proliferation Treaty) within the framework of IAEA are the underlying basic legal instruments. These treaties, and the extended agreements based on them, operated on the basis of the 'old' system of surveillance of fissile material (nuclear safeguards). Both the inspection effort to be coped with by IAEA, which has kept rising steadily since the eighties and for which no additional budget funds were made available, and the violation by Iraq of the treaty as corroborated by a UN inspection team discovering a program for the production of weapons of mass destruction, boosted efforts in the early nineties to revise the existing system of treaties and controls. The International Atomic Energy Agency, among other measures, decided to improve nuclear safeguards by introducing immediate measures and optimization programs and upgrading inspection possibilities by a new model agreement. The model protocol, INFCIRC/153, adopted by the Board of Governors in September 1997 among other things serves to supplement the existing system of verification of the correctness of information received by another system verifying the completeness of such information. It incorporates an extended duty to supply information and extended rights of access. This includes activities not

  7. Clustering of Infrastructure

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Willems, J.K.C.A.S.

    2001-01-01

    Bundling or converging infrastructure has been the leading principle for locating infrastructure since the mid seventies. It is assumed to offer certain advantages, such as a restriction of severance, consumption of free space and environmental hindrance. However, the concept of converging

  8. Building an evaluation infrastructure

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Brandrup, Morten; Østergaard, Kija Lin

    Infrastructuring does not happen by itself; it must be supported. In this paper, we present a feedback mechanism implemented as a smartphone-based application, inspired by the concept of infrastructure probes, which supports the in situ elicitation of feedback. This is incorporated within an eval...

  9. Infrastructure Survey 2011

    Science.gov (United States)

    Group of Eight (NJ1), 2012

    2012-01-01

    In 2011, the Group of Eight (Go8) conducted a survey on the state of its buildings and infrastructure. The survey is the third Go8 Infrastructure survey, with previous surveys being conducted in 2007 and 2009. The current survey updated some of the information collected in the previous surveys. It also collated data related to aspects of the…

  10. Mock Nuclear Processing Facility-Safeguards Training Requirements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gibbs, Philip [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States); Hasty, Tim [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States). Savannah River National Lab. (SRNL); Johns, Rissell [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Baum, Gregory [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2014-08-31

    This document outlines specific training requirements in the topical areas of Material Control and Accounting (MC&A) and Physical Protection(PP) which are to be used as technical input for designing a mock Integrated Security Facility (ISF) at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). The overall project objective for these requirements is to enhance the ability to deliver training on Material Protection Control and Accounting (MC&A) concepts regarding hazardous material such as irradiated materials with respect to bulk processing facilities.

  11. Integrating security analysis and safeguards software engineering

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Spencer, D.D.; Axline, R.M.

    1989-01-01

    These initiatives will work together to provide more secure safeguards software, as well as other critical systems software. The resulting design tools and methodologies, the evolving guidelines for software security, and the adversary-resistant software components will be applied to the software design at each stage to increase the design's inherent security and to make the design easier to analyze. The resident hardware monitor or other architectural innovations will provide complementary additions to the design to remove some of the burden of security from the software. The security analysis process, supported by new analysis methodologies and tools, will be applied to the software design as it evolves in an attempt to identify and remove vulnerabilities at the earliest possible point in the safeguards system life cycle. The result should be better and more verifiably secure software systems.

  12. Building Connecticut's clinical biodosimetry laboratory surge capacity to mitigate the health consequences of radiological and nuclear disasters: A collaborative approach between the state biodosimetry laboratory and Connecticut's medical infrastructure

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Albanese, Joseph [Yale New Haven Health Center for Emergency Preparedness and Disaster Response, New Haven, CT 06510 (United States)], E-mail: Joseph.Albanese@ynhh.org; Martens, Kelly [Yale New Haven Health Center for Emergency Preparedness and Disaster Response, New Haven, CT 06510 (United States); Emergency Department, Yale-New Haven Hospital, New Haven, CT (United States); Arnold, Jeffrey L. [Emergency Department, Natividad Medical Center, Salinas, CA (United States); Kelley, Katherine [Connecticut Department of Public Health, Hartford, CT (United States); Kristie, Virginia [Hartford Hospital, Hartford, CT (United States); Forte, Elaine; Schneider, Mark [Yale New Haven Health Center for Emergency Preparedness and Disaster Response, New Haven, CT 06510 (United States); Dainiak, Nicholas [Yale New Haven Health Center for Emergency Preparedness and Disaster Response, New Haven, CT 06510 (United States); Department of Medicine, Bridgeport Hospital, Bridgeport, CT (United States); Yale University School of Medicine, New Haven, CT (United States)

    2007-07-15

    used to further optimize biodosimetry specimen processing protocols in Connecticut. Based on our findings, we conclude that clinical laboratory professionals are an important resource for assisting with the processing biodosimetry specimens that are used for triage of patients from accidental or terrorist-related mass-casualty radiological or nuclear catastrophies. The approach described in this paper to enroll and train clinical laboratorians in sample preparation for dicentric analysis forms the basis for the next step (namely, further training on harvesting cultured cells and preparing cytogenetic slides) in collaborative efforts between the State of Connecticut's Biodosimetry Laboratory and the state's medical infrastructure towards building laboratory surge capacity to estimate radiation dose in victims of a mass casualty event.

  13. Developing a simulation for border safeguarding

    CSIR Research Space (South Africa)

    Van Rooyen, S

    2011-09-01

    Full Text Available Operations Other Than War (OOTW). Border safeguarding provides a platform to develop doctrine through simulation. Defence against aggression is replaced by arrests, and target damage assessment is replaced by the number of intercepts without kills... without the use of intelligent threat behaviour. Section 5 contains our conclusions. 2. Joint Control and Command Figure 1 shows how JC2 operate and communicate between the levels of war as defined in [2]. The levels signify Strategic goals...

  14. Overview of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) Process

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bari, Robert A.; Hockert, John; Wonder, Edward F.; Johnson, Shirley J.; Wigeland, Roald; Zentner, Michael D.

    2011-10-10

    The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provides the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its nonproliferation obligations. The IAEA draws such conclusions from the evaluation of all available information. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of this “State-level” approach. Efficiently used, the Safeguards by Design (SBD) methodologies , , , now being developed can contribute to effective and cost-efficient facility-level safeguards. The Facility Safeguardability Assessment (FSA) introduced here supports SBD in three areas. 1. It describes necessary interactions between the IAEA, the State regulator, and the owner / designer of a new or modified facility to determine where SBD efforts can be productively applied, 2. It presents a screening approach intended to identify potential safeguard issues for; a) design changes to existing facilities; b) new facilities similar to existing facilities with approved safeguards approaches, and c) new designs, 3. It identifies resources (the FSA toolkit), such as good practice guides, design guidance, and safeguardability evaluation methods that can be used by the owner/designer to develop solutions for potential safeguards issues during the interactions with the State regulator and IAEA. FSA presents a structured framework for the application of the SBD tools developed in other efforts. The more a design evolves, the greater the probability that new safeguards issues could be introduced. Likewise, for first-of-a-kind facilities or research facilities that involve previously unused processes or technologies, it is reasonable to expect that a number of possible safeguards issues might exist. Accordingly, FSA is intended to help the designer and its safeguards experts identify early in the design process: • Areas where elements of previous accepted safeguards approach(es) may be applied

  15. Safeguards First Principle Initiative (SFPI) Cost Model

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mary Alice Price

    2010-07-11

    The Nevada Test Site (NTS) began operating Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) under the Safeguards First Principle Initiative (SFPI), a risk-based and cost-effective program, in December 2006. The NTS SFPI Comprehensive Assessment of Safeguards Systems (COMPASS) Model is made up of specific elements (MC&A plan, graded safeguards, accounting systems, measurements, containment, surveillance, physical inventories, shipper/receiver differences, assessments/performance tests) and various sub-elements, which are each assigned effectiveness and contribution factors that when weighted and rated reflect the health of the MC&A program. The MC&A Cost Model, using an Excel workbook, calculates budget and/or actual costs using these same elements/sub-elements resulting in total costs and effectiveness costs per element/sub-element. These calculations allow management to identify how costs are distributed for each element/sub-element. The Cost Model, as part of the SFPI program review process, enables management to determine if spending is appropriate for each element/sub-element.

  16. The application of state-level integration of safeguards in Sweden. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dahlin, G.; Haeggblom, E.; Larsson, Mats; Rehn, I

    2000-12-01

    The role of Sweden in disarmament and non-proliferation efforts extends from the late 1940's to the present. It covers active support to place nuclear weapons under international control and participation in practically all control regimes aimed at non-proliferation and elimination of any mass destruction capability. Sweden has also made available highly competent and high-ranking officers to serve many of the institutions and organisations supporting the political work and operative functions in this field. Until 1968, Sweden had a double-track policy where both the nuclear weapons option and non-proliferation as a possibility were pursued and investigated. After 1968, non-proliferation became the established policy, and the nuclear programme, materials and activities have since served exclusively peaceful purposes. It appears possible that the IAEA could, after a short period of initial implementation, be in a position to draw conclusions on the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities in Sweden. Sweden has undertaken to ensure the transparency of its nuclear programme by providing all relevant information and by facilitating physical access, as necessary, and by addressing any questions and issues of concern in a direct and open-minded manner. The implementation of traditional safeguards should continue effectively, to enable the Agency to draw its conclusions on the absence of diversion of declared nuclear material in Sweden in the future. Using its reporting mechanisms, the Agency should share these conclusions with Member States so as to ensure that the objectives of the strengthened safeguards are met. Under these conditions, IAEA could and would decide to proceed with the implementation of integrated safeguard measures at the declared facilities and locations in Sweden. It is proposed that IAEA would participate in annual PIV's, but would, however, detach from routine verification work to the extent possible and make full use of the

  17. Analysis of the vibration response of a safeguard piping system

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Trollat, C.; Tephany, F.; Payan, F. (Electricite de France, Villeurbanne (France))

    1993-01-01

    Following the discovery of a longitudinal through-wall crack at the base of a pressure instrumentation tap on the system, Electricite de France started a huge campaign to check the safeguard pipes in its 1300-MW nuclear power plants. The analysis of several hundreds of taps of this type on-site revealed several tens of cases of cracking. These safeguard systems practically only operate during periodic test phases that generally correspond to partial now regimes for the pump and to hydraulic configurations that do not correspond to the main system function. These hydraulic configurations were clearly identified as [open quotes]worst cases[close quotes] for the system through vibration measurements during the startup tests, allowing the system to be tested under rated conditions. Experience feedback raises several difficulties in interpreting the damage; in particular, considerable differences were found in the vibration levels of the same tap on the same piping system from one plant unit to another. Also, the vibration measurements taken on the main pipe are not always correlated with the tap vibration level. To explain these phenomena, it was decided to model the discharge line of the 1300-MW low head safety injection system. To obtain the system response to pump excitation, a fluid-structure-coupled finite element model was built for which the boundary conditions are well controlled. Modal analysis revealed acoustic-mechanical coupling of the system in the environment of the discontinuous zone that cracked. Further analysis of this mechanical discontinuity showed that its first natural frequency is close to that of the coupled mode. Knowing the system transfer function, the force and displacement response are obtained.

  18. Advanced Safeguards Technology Demonstration at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Arrigo, Leah M.; Bryan, Samuel A.; Christensen, Richard; Douglas, Matthew; Duckworth, Douglas C.; Fraga, Carlos G.; Levitskaia, Tatiana G.; Liezers, Martin; Orton, Christopher R.; Peper, Shane M.; Schwantes, Jon M.

    2010-05-21

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has established international safeguards standards for fissionable material at spent fuel reprocessing plants to ensure that significant quantities of weapons-grade nuclear material are not diverted over a specified time frame. Currently, methods to verify that the facilities are operating under adequate safeguard-declared conditions require time consuming sampling and expensive, destructive analysis. The time delay between sampling and subsequent analysis provides a potential opportunity to divert the material out of the appropriate chemical stream. One way to avoid this problem is to use process monitoring equipment that is capable of on-line and in near-real time monitoring of the flowsheet radiochemical streams to rapidly identify deviations from normal operating conditions. Three integrated systems for flowsheet monitoring are currently being developed at PNNL including: 1) Multi-Isotope Process Monitor (MIP), 2) a spectroscopy-based monitor utilizing UV-Vis-NIR (Ultra Violet-Visible-Near Infrared) and Raman spectrometers, and 3) Electrochemically Modulated Separations (EMS). MIP uses gamma spectroscopy and pattern recognition software to identify off-normal conditions in process streams. The UV-Vis-NIR and Raman spectroscopic monitoring continuously measures chemical compositions of the process streams including actinide metal ions (U, Pu, Np), selected fission products, and major cold flowsheet chemicals. EMS provides an on-line means for pre-separating and preconcentrating elements of interest out of complex matrices prior to detection via non-destructive assay by gamma spectroscopy or destructive analysis with mass spectrometry. PNNL previously reported some of its initial modeling work as proof of principle. Here we will provide a general overview of the technologies and the ongoing demonstrations that utilize actual spent fuel.

  19. Web-Based Training Applications in Safeguards and Security

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lopez, R.L.

    1999-05-21

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) requires all employees who hold a security clearance and have access to classified information and/or special nuclear material to be trained in the area of Safeguards and Security. Since the advent of the World Wide Web, personnel who are responsible for training have capitalized on this communication medium to develop and deliver Web-based training. Unlike traditional computer based training where the student was required to find a workstation where the training program resided, one of Web-based training strongest advantage is that the training can be delivered right to the workers desk top computer. This paper will address reasons for the driving forces behind the utilization of Web-based training at the Laboratory with a brief explanation of the different types of training conducted. Also discussed briefly is the different types of distance learning used in conjunction with Web-based training. The implementation strategy will be addressed and how the Laboratory utilized a Web-Based Standards Committee to develop standards for Web-based training applications. Web-based problems resulting from little or no communication between training personnel across the Laboratory will be touched on and how this was solved. Also discussed is the development of a ''Virtual Training Center'' where personnel can shop on-line for their training needs. Web-based training programs within the Safeguards and Security arena will be briefly discussed. Specifically, Web-based training in the area of Materials Control and Accountability will be explored. A Web-based example of what a student would experience during a training session is also discussed. A short closing statement of what the future of Web-based Training holds in the future is offered.

  20. Safeguards and Security progress report, January--December 1989

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, D.B.; Jaramillo, G.R. (comps.)

    1990-11-01

    From January to December 1989, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Research and Development (R D) program carried out the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Science and Technology Base Development, Basic Systems Design, Onsite Test and Evaluation and Facility Support, and International Safeguards. For the most part, these activities were sponsored by the Department of Energy's Office of Safeguards and Security. Part 1 covers development of the basic technology essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards and security. It includes our computer security R D and the activities of the DOE Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this important technology. Part 2 treats activities aimed at developing methods for designing and evaluating safeguards systems, with special emphasis on the integration of the several subsystems into a real safeguards system. Part 3 describes efforts of direct assistance to the DOE and its contractors and includes consultation on materials control and accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and demonstration of advanced safeguards systems. Part 3 also reports a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards that makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Part 5 reports several safeguards-related activities that have sponsors other than the DOE/OSS. 87 refs., 52 figs.

  1. Coordinated safeguards for materials management in a uranium--plutonium nitrate-to-oxide coconversion facility: Coprecal

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dayem, H.A.; Cobb, D.D.; Dietz, R.J.; Hakkila, E.A.; Kern, E.A.; Schelonka, E.P.; Shipley, J.P.; Smith, D.B.

    1979-02-01

    This report describes the conceptual design of an advanced materials-management system for safeguarding special nuclear materials in a uranium--plutonium nitrate-to-oxide coconversion facility based on the Coprecal process. Design concepts are presented for near real-time (dynamic) accountability by forming dynamic materials balances from information provided by chemical and nondestructive analyses and from process-control instrumentation. Modeling and simulation techniques are used to compare the sensitivities of proposed dynamic materials accounting strategies to both abrupt and protracted diversion. The safeguards implications of coconversion as well as some unique features of the reference process are discussed and design criteria are identified to improve the safeguardability of the Coprecal coconversion process.

  2. Information infrastructure(s) boundaries, ecologies, multiplicity

    CERN Document Server

    Mongili, Alessandro

    2014-01-01

    This book marks an important contribution to the fascinating debate on the role that information infrastructures and boundary objects play in contemporary life, bringing to the fore the concern of how cooperation across different groups is enabled, but also constrained, by the material and immaterial objects connecting them. As such, the book itself is situated at the crossroads of various paths and genealogies, all focusing on the problem of the intersection between different levels of scale...

  3. Toward a Fieldable Atomic Mass Spectrometer for Safeguards Applications: Sample Preparation and Ionization

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Barinaga, Charles J.; Hager, George J.; Hart, Garret L.; Koppenaal, David W.; Marcus, R. Kenneth; Jones, Sarah MH; Manard, Benjamin T.

    2014-10-31

    The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) long-term research and development plan calls for the development of new methods to detect misuse at nuclear fuel cycle facilities such as reprocessing and enrichment plants. At enrichment plants, for example, the IAEA’s contemporary safeguards approaches are based on a combination of routine and random inspections that include collection of UF6 samples from in-process material and selected cylinders for subsequent analyses. These analyses include destructive analysis (DA) in a laboratory (typically by mass spectrometry [MS]) for isotopic characterization, and environmental sampling (ES) for subsequent laboratory elemental and isotopic analysis (also both typically by MS). One area of new method development includes moving this kind of isotope ratio analytical capability for DA and ES activities into the field. Some of the reasons for these developments include timeliness of results, avoidance of hazardous material shipments, and guidance for additional sample collecting. However, this capability does not already exist for several reasons, such as that most lab-based chemical and instrumental methods rely on laboratory infrastructure (highly trained staff, power, space, hazardous material handling, etc.) and require significant amounts of consumables (power, compressed gases, etc.). In addition, there are no currently available, fieldable instruments for atomic or isotope ratio analysis. To address these issues, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and collaborator, Clemson University, are studying key areas that limit the fieldability of isotope ratio mass spectrometry for atomic ions: sample preparation and ionization, and reducing the physical size of a fieldable mass spectrometer. PNNL is seeking simple and robust techniques that could be effectively used by inspectors who may have no expertise in analytical MS. In this report, we present and describe the preliminary findings for three candidate

  4. Chef infrastructure automation cookbook

    CERN Document Server

    Marschall, Matthias

    2013-01-01

    Chef Infrastructure Automation Cookbook contains practical recipes on everything you will need to automate your infrastructure using Chef. The book is packed with illustrated code examples to automate your server and cloud infrastructure.The book first shows you the simplest way to achieve a certain task. Then it explains every step in detail, so that you can build your knowledge about how things work. Eventually, the book shows you additional things to consider for each approach. That way, you can learn step-by-step and build profound knowledge on how to go about your configuration management

  5. Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards and Nonproliferation Workshop

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gilligan, Kimberly V. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Kirk, Bernadette Lugue [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

    2015-01-01

    The Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards and Nonproliferation Workshop was held December 15–18, 2014, at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. This workshop was made possible by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Human Capital Development (NGSI HCD) Program. The idea of the workshop was to move beyond the tried-and-true boot camp training of nonproliferation concepts to spend several days on the unique perspective of applying modeling and simulation (M&S) solutions to safeguards challenges.

  6. Green Infrastructure Modeling Toolkit

    Science.gov (United States)

    Green infrastructure, such as rain gardens, green roofs, porous pavement, cisterns, and constructed wetlands, is becoming an increasingly attractive way to recharge aquifers and reduce the amount of stormwater runoff that flows into wastewater treatment plants or into waterbodies...

  7. Infrastructure Area Simplification Plan

    CERN Document Server

    Field, L.

    2011-01-01

    The infrastructure area simplification plan was presented at the 3rd EMI All Hands Meeting in Padova. This plan only affects the information and accounting systems as the other areas are new in EMI and hence do not require simplification.

  8. EV Charging Infrastructure Roadmap

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Karner, Donald [Electric Transportation Inc., Rogers, AR (United States); Garetson, Thomas [Electric Transportation Inc., Rogers, AR (United States); Francfort, Jim [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

    2016-08-01

    As highlighted in the U.S. Department of Energy’s EV Everywhere Grand Challenge, vehicle technology is advancing toward an objective to “… produce plug-in electric vehicles that are as affordable and convenient for the average American family as today’s gasoline-powered vehicles …” [1] by developing more efficient drivetrains, greater battery energy storage per dollar, and lighter-weight vehicle components and construction. With this technology advancement and improved vehicle performance, the objective for charging infrastructure is to promote vehicle adoption and maximize the number of electric miles driven. The EV Everywhere Charging Infrastructure Roadmap (hereafter referred to as Roadmap) looks forward and assumes that the technical challenges and vehicle performance improvements set forth in the EV Everywhere Grand Challenge will be met. The Roadmap identifies and prioritizes deployment of charging infrastructure in support of this charging infrastructure objective for the EV Everywhere Grand Challenge

  9. IPHE Infrastructure Workshop Proceedings

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    None

    2010-02-01

    This proceedings contains information from the IPHE Infrastructure Workshop, a two-day interactive workshop held on February 25-26, 2010, to explore the market implementation needs for hydrogen fueling station development.

  10. Infrastructure Engineering and Deployment Division

    Data.gov (United States)

    Federal Laboratory Consortium — Volpe's Infrastructure Engineering and Deployment Division advances transportation innovation by being leaders in infrastructure technology, including vehicles and...

  11. Managing green infrastructures

    OpenAIRE

    Manton, Michael

    2014-01-01

    The term green infrastructure addresses the spatial structure of anthropogenic, semi-natural and natural areas, as well as other environmental features which enable society to benefit from ecosystems’ multiple services. Focusing on two green infrastructures, anthropogenic wet meadows and natural forest successions, this thesis applies a macro-ecological approach based on comparisons of multiple landscapes as complex social-ecological systems. Firstly, the trophic interactions of avian predati...

  12. Western Nuclear Science Alliance

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Steve Reese; George Miller; Stephen Frantz; Denis Beller; Denis Beller; Ed Morse; Melinda Krahenbuhl; Bob Flocchini; Jim Elliston

    2010-12-07

    The primary objective of the INIE program is to strengthen nuclear science and engineering programs at the member institutions and to address the long term goal of the University Reactor Infrastructure and Education Assistance Program.

  13. MFC Communications Infrastructure Study

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Michael Cannon; Terry Barney; Gary Cook; George Danklefsen, Jr.; Paul Fairbourn; Susan Gihring; Lisa Stearns

    2012-01-01

    Unprecedented growth of required telecommunications services and telecommunications applications change the way the INL does business today. High speed connectivity compiled with a high demand for telephony and network services requires a robust communications infrastructure.   The current state of the MFC communication infrastructure limits growth opportunities of current and future communication infrastructure services. This limitation is largely due to equipment capacity issues, aging cabling infrastructure (external/internal fiber and copper cable) and inadequate space for telecommunication equipment. While some communication infrastructure improvements have been implemented over time projects, it has been completed without a clear overall plan and technology standard.   This document identifies critical deficiencies with the current state of the communication infrastructure in operation at the MFC facilities and provides an analysis to identify needs and deficiencies to be addressed in order to achieve target architectural standards as defined in STD-170. The intent of STD-170 is to provide a robust, flexible, long-term solution to make communications capabilities align with the INL mission and fit the various programmatic growth and expansion needs.

  14. A Simple Candle Filter Safeguard Device

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hurley, J.P.; Henderson, A.K.; Swanson, M.L.

    2002-09-18

    In order to reach the highest possible efficiencies in a coal-fired turbine-based power system, the turbine should be directly fired with the products of coal utilization. Two main designs employ these turbines: those based on pressurized fluidized-bed combustors (PFBCs) and those based on integrated gasification combined cycles (IGCCs). In both designs, the suspended particulates, or dust, must be cleaned from the gas before it enters the turbine to prevent fouling and erosion of the blades. To produce the cleanest gas, barrier filters are being developed and are in commercial use. Barrier filters are composed of porous, high-temperature materials that allow the hot gas to pass but collect the dust on the surface. The three main configurations are candle, cross-flow, and tube. Both candle and tube filters have been tested extensively. They are primarily composed of coarsely porous ceramic that serves as a structural support, overlain with a thin, microporous ceramic layer o n the dirty gas side that serves as the primary filter surface. They are highly efficient at removing particulate matter from the gas stream and, because of their ceramic construction, are resistant to gas and ash corrosion. However, ceramics are brittle, and individual elements can fail, allowing the particulates to pass through the hole left by the filter element and erode the turbine. Because of the possibility of occasional filter breakage, safeguard devices (SGDs) must be employed to prevent the dust streaming through broken filters from reaching the turbine. The Energy & Environmental Research Center (EERC) safeguard device is composed of three main parts: the ceramic substrate, the adhesive coating, and the safeguard device housing. This report describes the development and laboratory testing of each of those parts as well as the bench-scale performance of both types of complete SGDs.

  15. Secret Objective Standoff: International Safeguards Educational Exercise

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Okowita, Samantha L [ORNL

    2014-01-01

    The International Safeguards Regime, being so multi-faceted, can be overwhelming to those first introduced to its many components. The organizers and lecturers of workshops and courses on nonproliferation often provide a series of independent lectures and must somehow demonstrate the cohesive and effective nature of the system. An exercise titled The Secret Objective Standoff was developed to complement lectures with hands-on learning to assist participants in bringing all the many components (IAEA agreements, export controls, treaty obligations, international diplomacy, etc.) of the International Safeguards Regime together. This exercise divides participants into teams that are assigned the role of either a country or the IAEA and asks that they fully immerse themselves in their roles. The teams are then randomly assigned three unique and secret objectives that are intended to represent realistic and current geopolitical scenarios. Through construction, trading, or hoarding of four resources (experts, technology, money, and uranium), the teams have a finite number of turns to accomplish their objectives. Each turn has three phases random dispersal of resources, a timed discussion where teams can coordinate and strategize with others, and an action phase. During the action phase, teams inform the moderator individually and secretly what they will be doing that turn. The exercise has been tested twice with Oak Ridge National Laboratory personnel, and has been conducted with outside participants twice, in each case the experience was well received by both participants and instructors. This exercise provides instructors the ability to modify the exercise before or during game play to best fit their educational goals. By offering a range of experiences, from an in-depth look at specific components to a generalized overview, this exercise is an effective tool in helping participants achieve a full understanding the International Safeguards Regime.

  16. Enhanced AFCI Sampling, Analysis, and Safeguards Technology Review

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    John Svoboda

    2009-09-01

    The focus of this study includes the investigation of sampling technologies used in industry and their potential application to nuclear fuel processing. The goal is to identify innovative sampling methods using state of the art techniques that could evolve into the next generation sampling and analysis system for metallic elements. Sampling and analysis of nuclear fuel recycling plant processes is required both to monitor the operations and ensure Safeguards and Security goals are met. In addition, environmental regulations lead to additional samples and analysis to meet licensing requirements. The volume of samples taken by conventional means, can restrain productivity while results samples are analyzed, require process holding tanks that are sized to meet analytical issues rather than process issues (and that create a larger facility footprint), or, in some cases, simply overwhelm analytical laboratory capabilities. These issues only grow when process flowsheets propose new separations systems and new byproduct material for transmutation purposes. Novel means of streamlining both sampling and analysis are being evaluated to increase the efficiency while meeting all requirements for information. This report addresses just a part of the effort to develop and study novel methods by focusing on the sampling and analysis of aqueous samples for metallic elements. It presents an overview of the sampling requirements, including frequency, sensitivity, accuracy, and programmatic drivers, to demonstrate the magnitude of the task. The sampling and analysis system needed for metallic element measurements is then discussed, and novel options being applied to other industrial analytical needs are presented. Inductively coupled mass spectrometry instruments are the most versatile for metallic element analyses and are thus chosen as the focus for the study. Candidate novel means of process sampling, as well as modifications that are necessary to couple such instruments to

  17. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory safeguards and security quarterly progress report to the US Department of Energy. Quarterly report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Davis, G.; Mansur, D.L.; Ruhter, W.D.; Steele, E.; Strait, R.S.

    1994-04-01

    The Safeguards Technology Program (STP) is a program in LLNL`s Nuclear Chemistry Division that develops advanced, nondestructive-analysis (NDA) technology for measurement of special nuclear materials. Our work focuses on R&D relating to x- and gamma-ray spectrometry techniques and to the development of computer codes for interpreting the spectral data obtained by these techniques. A review of the Safeguards Technology Program at LLNL by representatives of the Department of Energy Office of Safeguards and Security and Office of Research was conducted via teleconference on March 4, 1994. Objectives, milestones, and recent accomplishments were presented for each of the four LLNL tasks in NDA, and plans to address user needs in these NDA areas were discussed. An informal presentation on the LLNL Safeguards Technology Program was presented to the JOWOG-30 meeting at the Los Alamos National Laboratory on March 10, 1994. The JOWOG meetings bring together representatives from Laboratories in the DOE complex, as well as their counterparts from the United Kingdom. Within JOWOG-30 a variety of topics are discussed, including NDA and its various applications within the U.S. and U.K. complexes.

  18. New infrastructures, new landscapes

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Chiara Nifosì

    2014-06-01

    Full Text Available New infrastructures, new landscapes AbstractThe paper will discuss one recent Italian project that share a common background: the relevance of the existing maritime landscape as a non negotiable value. The studies will be discussed in details a feasibility study for the new port in Monfalcone. National infrastructural policies emphasize competitiveness and connection as a central issue incultural, economic and political development of communities . Based on networks and system development along passageways that make up the European infrastructural armor; the two are considered at the meantime as cause and effect of "territorialisation”. These two views are obviously mutually dependent. It's hard to think about a strong attractiveness out of the network, and to be part of the latter encourages competitiveness. Nonetheless this has proved to be conflictual when landscape values and the related attractiveness are considered.The presented case study project, is pursuing the ambition to promote a new approach in realizing large infrastructures; its double role is to improve connectivity and to generate lasting and positive impact on the local regions. It deal with issues of inter-modality and the construction of nodes and lines which connects Europe, and its markets.Reverting the usual approach which consider landscape project as as a way to mitigate or to compensate for the infrastructure, the goal is to succeed in realizing large infrastructural works by conceiving them as an occasion to reinterpret a region or, as extraordinary opportunities, to build new landscapes.The strategy proposed consists in achieving structural images based on the reinforcement of the environmental and historical-landscape systems. Starting from the reinterpretation of local maritime context and resources it is possible not just to preserve the attractiveness of a specific landscape but also to conceive infrastructure in a more efficient way. 

  19. 77 FR 37804 - Rules for Investigations Relating to Global and Bilateral Safeguard Actions, Market Disruption...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-06-25

    ... bilateral safeguard investigations under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Implementation Act... implements bilateral safeguard provisions in several additional free trade agreements (FTAs), including... safeguard provisions in free trade agreements that the United States has negotiated with Australia, Bahrain...

  20. 7 CFR 4290.506 - Safeguarding the RBIC's assets/Internal controls.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 15 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguarding the RBIC's assets/Internal controls... Safeguarding the RBIC's assets/Internal controls. You must adopt a plan to safeguard your assets and monitor... your control procedures....

  1. Sustainability of Urban Infrastructures

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mine Tanac Zeren

    2010-09-01

    Full Text Available The scope of the paper is to overview the different approaches for evaluation of urban infrastructure sustainability. In this context, urban infrastructure covers transportation, energy, water, sewage and information networks as well as waste management and blue-green infrastructure, in terms of both the supply and demand side. A common effort of partners in the European project “C8—Best Practice in Sustainable Urban Infrastructure”, developed under the Cooperation in Science and Technology program (COST, in brief COST C8, was focused on defining the methods, indicators and criteria for evaluation of sustainability, and resulted in a guidebook for decision-makers in local authorities. Here, the COST C8 matrix for simple sustainability assessment of urban infrastructure is applied to The Path (POT case—a circular memorial and recreational park around the city of Ljubljana, Slovenia. The applicability and acceptance of the matrix in 43 other cases of sustainable urban infrastructure, collected in the COST C8 project, is presented and discussed.

  2. A colalborative environment for information driven safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Scott, Mark R [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Michel, Kelly D [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-09-15

    For two decades, the IAEA has recognized the need for a comprehensive and strongly integrated Knowledge Management system to support its Information Driven Safeguards activities. In the past, plans for the development of such a system have progressed slowly due to concerns over costs and feasibility. In recent years, Los Alamos National Laboratory has developed a knowledge management system that could serve as the basis for an IAEA Collaborative Environment (ICE). The ICE derivative knowledge management system described in this paper addresses the challenge of living in an era of information overload coupled with certain knowledge shortfalls. The paper describes and defines a system that is flexible, yet ensures coordinated and focused collaboration, broad data evaluation capabilities, architected and organized work flows, and improved communications. The paper and demonstration of ICE will utilize a hypothetical scenario to highlight the functional features that facilitate collaboration amongst and between information analysts and inspectors. The scenario will place these two groups into a simulated planning exercise for a safeguards inspection drawing upon past data acquisitions, inspection reports, analyst conclusions, and a coordinated walk-through of a 3-D model of the facility. Subsequent to the conduct of the simulated facility inspection, the detection of an anomaly and pursuit of follow up activities will illustrate the event notification, information sharing, and collaborative capabilities of the system. The use of a collaborative environment such as ICE to fulfill the complicated knowledge management demands of the Agency and facilitate the completion of annual State Evaluation Reports will also be addressed.

  3. INL Active Interrogation Testing In Support of the GNEP Safeguards Campaign

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    David L. Chichester

    2008-04-01

    Active interrogation, a measurement technique which uses a radiation source to probe materials and generate unique signatures useful for characterizing those materials, is a powerful tool for assaying special nuclear material. Work at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in the area of active interrogation, using neutron and photon sources, has been under way for many years to develop methods for detecting and quantifying nuclear material for national and homeland security research areas. This research knowledge base is now being extended to address nuclear safeguards and process monitoring issues related to the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). As a first step in this area preliminary scoping studies have been performed to investigate the usefulness of using active neutron interrogation, with a low-power electronic neutron generator, to assay Department of Transportation 6M shipping drums containing uranium oxide fuel rodlets from INL’s zero power physics reactor. Using the paired-counting technique during the die-away time period of interrogation, a lower detection limit of approximately 4.2 grams of enriched uranium (40% 235U) was calculated for a 40 minute measurement using a field portable 2.5 MeV neutron source and an array of 16 moderated helium-3 neutron tubes. Future work in this area, including the use of a more powerful neutron source and a better tailored detector array, would likely improve this limit to a much lower level. Further development work at INL will explore the applicability of active interrogation in association with the nuclear safeguards and process monitoring needs of the advanced GNEP facilities under consideration. This work, which will include both analyses and field demonstrations, will be performed in collaboration with colleagues at INL and elsewhere that have expertise in nuclear fuel reprocessing as well as active interrogation and its use for nuclear material analyses.

  4. International Atomic Energy Agency's advisory group meeting on safeguards related to the final disposal of waste and spent fuel, Vienna, Austria, September 12-16, 1988: Foreign trip report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Moran, B.W.

    1988-10-01

    B.W. Moran traveled to Vienna, Austria, during the period of September 12--16, 1988, to serve as the technical advisor to the US Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) representatives to the International Atomic Energy Agency's Advisory Group Meeting on ''Safeguards Related to the Final Disposal of Nuclear Material in Waste and Spent Fuel.'' The goal of the US representatives to this meeting was to ensure that the advisory group's recommendations established (1) an effective IAEA safeguards approach for all radioactive waste and spent fuel management facilities and (2) a safeguards approach that is appropriate for the US Federal Waste Management System. The principal concerns of the United States on entering the advisory group meeting were: criteria for the termination of safeguards on waste should not be established, but should be referred for further study, safeguards on spent fuel should not be terminated, and safeguards studies are required before IAEA safeguards approaches for spent fuel are established. The US representatives generally recommended that consultant meetings be convened to address the technical issues after the requisite safeguards related research and development tasks have been performed. These objectives of the US representatives were achieved, and the recommendations of the advisory group generally coincided with and extended the recommendations presented in the US position paper.

  5. International Atomic Energy Agency's advisory group meeting on safeguards related to the final disposal of waste and spent fuel, Vienna, Austria, September 12-16, 1988: Foreign trip report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Moran, B.W.

    1988-10-01

    B.W. Moran traveled to Vienna, Austria, during the period of September 12--16, 1988, to serve as the technical advisor to the US Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) representatives to the International Atomic Energy Agency's Advisory Group Meeting on ''Safeguards Related to the Final Disposal of Nuclear Material in Waste and Spent Fuel.'' The goal of the US representatives to this meeting was to ensure that the advisory group's recommendations established (1) an effective IAEA safeguards approach for all radioactive waste and spent fuel management facilities and (2) a safeguards approach that is appropriate for the US Federal Waste Management System. The principal concerns of the United States on entering the advisory group meeting were: criteria for the termination of safeguards on waste should not be established, but should be referred for further study, safeguards on spent fuel should not be terminated, and safeguards studies are required before IAEA safeguards approaches for spent fuel are established. The US representatives generally recommended that consultant meetings be convened to address the technical issues after the requisite safeguards related research and development tasks have been performed. These objectives of the US representatives were achieved, and the recommendations of the advisory group generally coincided with and extended the recommendations presented in the US position paper.

  6. Changing Landscapes in Safeguarding Babies and Young Children in England

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lumsden, Eunice

    2014-01-01

    The importance of safeguarding children from violence is internationally recognised. However, detecting, intervening and protecting children from abuse both within the family and in institutions is complex. This paper specifically focuses on safeguarding in England and how workforce reform in the early years offers the opportunity to forge new…

  7. The Role of School Psychologists in Child Protection and Safeguarding

    Science.gov (United States)

    Woods, Kevin; Bond, Caroline; Tyldesley, Kath; Farrell, Peter; Humphrey, Neil

    2011-01-01

    Child protection and safeguarding are important aspects of work for all professionals working with children. The current article outlines the international context of school psychologists' work in relation to child protection and safeguarding and describes the United Kingdom context in more detail. Given the relatively recent broadening of the UK…

  8. Railway infrastructure security

    CERN Document Server

    Sforza, Antonio; Vittorini, Valeria; Pragliola, Concetta

    2015-01-01

    This comprehensive monograph addresses crucial issues in the protection of railway systems, with the objective of enhancing the understanding of railway infrastructure security. Based on analyses by academics, technology providers, and railway operators, it explains how to assess terrorist and criminal threats, design countermeasures, and implement effective security strategies. In so doing, it draws upon a range of experiences from different countries in Europe and beyond. The book is the first to be devoted entirely to this subject. It will serve as a timely reminder of the attractiveness of the railway infrastructure system as a target for criminals and terrorists and, more importantly, as a valuable resource for stakeholders and professionals in the railway security field aiming to develop effective security based on a mix of methodological, technological, and organizational tools. Besides researchers and decision makers in the field, the book will appeal to students interested in critical infrastructur...

  9. Infrastructures for healthcare

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Langhoff, Tue Odd; Amstrup, Mikkel Hvid; Mørck, Peter

    2017-01-01

    of classifications, on the entire Danish population. However, in the Autumn of 2014, the system was temporarily shut down due to a lawsuit filed by two general practitioners. In this article, we ask why and identify a political struggle concerning authority, control, and autonomy related to a transformation...... adding new actors or purposes to a system without due consideration to the nature of the infrastructure. We argue that while long-term information infrastructures are dynamic by nature and constantly impacted by actors joining or leaving the project, each activity of adding new actors must take reverse...... synergy into account, if not to risk breaking down the fragile nature of otherwise successful information infrastructures supporting research on healthcare....

  10. NGNP Infrastructure Readiness Assessment: Consolidation Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Brian K Castle

    2011-02-01

    The Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) project supports the development, demonstration, and deployment of high temperature gas-cooled reactors (HTGRs). The NGNP project is being reviewed by the Nuclear Energy Advisory Council (NEAC) to provide input to the DOE, who will make a recommendation to the Secretary of Energy, whether or not to continue with Phase 2 of the NGNP project. The NEAC review will be based on, in part, the infrastructure readiness assessment, which is an assessment of industry's current ability to provide specified components for the FOAK NGNP, meet quality assurance requirements, transport components, have the necessary workforce in place, and have the necessary construction capabilities. AREVA and Westinghouse were contracted to perform independent assessments of industry's capabilities because of their experience with nuclear supply chains, which is a result of their experiences with the EPR and AP-1000 reactors. Both vendors produced infrastructure readiness assessment reports that identified key components and categorized these components into three groups based on their ability to be deployed in the FOAK plant. The NGNP project has several programs that are developing key components and capabilities. For these components, the NGNP project have provided input to properly assess the infrastructure readiness for these components.

  11. Developing the information management system for safeguards national inspection

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Park, S. J.; Jeon, I.; Park, W. S.; Min, K. S. [KAERI, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    2003-10-01

    The inspection information management system for safeguards national inspection is aimed to do the national safeguards inspection with efficiency, and to decrease the inspector's load to write inspection report by systematizing the inspection jobs and sharing the inspection data. National safeguards inspection is consisted two large jobs. The first is the national safeguards supporting job of managing to support the national inspection mission. The other is the writing a national inspection report after completing the national inspection. Before the developing of inspection information management system, the official tools(spread sheet, word processor) are usually used. But there is problem to share the data, to produce the statistics data. To solve the these problem, we developed the inspection information management system that process the job from initial to final inspection work, and opened user education. This paper explain the procedure of developing the inspection information management system for safeguards national inspection.

  12. Safeguards and nonproliferation aspects of a dry fuel recycling technology

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1993-05-01

    Los Alamos National Laboratory undertook an independent assessment of the proliferation potentials and safeguardability of a dry fuel recycling technology, whereby spent pressurized-water reactor (PWR) fuels are used to fuel canadian deuterium uranium (CANDU) reactors. Objectives of this study included (1) the evaluation of presently available technologies that may be useful to safeguard technology options for dry fuel recycling (2) and identification of near-term and long-term research needs to develop process-specific safeguards requirements. The primary conclusion of this assessment is that like all other fuel cycle alternatives proposed in the past, the dry fuel recycle entails prolfferation risks and that there are no absolute technical fixes to eliminate such risks. This study further concludes that the proliferation risks of dry fuel recycling options are relatively minimal and presently known safeguards systems and technologies can be modified and/or adapted to meet the requirements of safeguarding such fuel recycle facilities.

  13. Training to raise staff awareness about safeguarding children.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fleming, Jane

    2015-04-01

    To improve outcomes for children and young people health organisations are required to train all staff in children's safeguarding. This creates difficulties for large complex organisations where most staff provide services to the adult population. Heart of England NHS Foundation Trust is a large acute and community trust that had difficulties in engaging staff in children's safeguarding training. Compliance rates for clinical staff who were trained in children's safeguarding were low and needed to be addressed. This article sets out why safeguarding training is important for all staff and how the trust achieved staff engagement and improved compliance rates. To evaluate, maintain and develop safeguarding knowledge, understanding, skills, attitude and behaviour further resources are planned to allow access to learning resources in a variety of formats.

  14. Parental Traffic Safeguarding at School Sites: Unequal Risks and Responsibilities

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Arlene Tigar McLaren

    2011-01-01

    Full Text Available Scholars recognize the importance of parental chauffeuring in urbanenvironments, but pay remarkably little attention to how parents, as part of everyday, domestic practices, safeguard their children in auto-dominated streets. Based on in-depth, qualitative interviews with parents whose children attend public elementary schools, this exploratory study compares traffic safeguarding experiences on the east and west sides of Vancouver, British Columbia. The analysisshows how social class and gender intersect in three traffic sites: school streetscapes, school entrances, and school traffic safety volunteerism. Utilizing automobility and feminist theories, we argue that urban parental traffic safeguarding is a complex and variegated phenomenon involving unequal risks and responsibilities. Our analysis illustrates the ways in which parental traffic safeguarding is a lynchpin to the automobility system, particularly with respect to itsillusion of safety, and how, conversely, this system shapes parenting by constituting traffic safeguarding as part of domestic responsibilities.

  15. Safeguardability of the vitrification option for disposal of plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pillay, K.K.S. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)

    1996-05-01

    Safeguardability of the vitrification option for plutonium disposition is rather complex and there is no experience base in either domestic or international safeguards for this approach. In the present treaty regime between the US and the states of the former Soviet Union, bilaterial verifications are considered more likely with potential for a third-party verification of safeguards. There are serious technological limitations to applying conventional bulk handling facility safeguards techniques to achieve independent verification of plutonium in borosilicate glass. If vitrification is the final disposition option chosen, maintaining continuity of knowledge of plutonium in glass matrices, especially those containing boron and those spike with high-level wastes or {sup 137}Cs, is beyond the capability of present-day safeguards technologies and nondestructive assay techniques. The alternative to quantitative measurement of fissile content is to maintain continuity of knowledge through a combination of containment and surveillance, which is not the international norm for bulk handling facilities.

  16. Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland. Regulatory control, international cooperation and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Annual report 2011

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Okko, O. (ed.)

    2012-07-01

    The regulatory control of nuclear materials (i.e. nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. Safeguards are required for Finland to comply with international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation - mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2011 continued to demonstrate that the Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders' declarations.

  17. The ATLAS Simulation Infrastructure

    CERN Document Server

    Aad, Georges; Abdallah, Jalal; Abdelalim, Ahmed Ali; Abdesselam, Abdelouahab; Abdinov, Ovsat; Abi, Babak; Abolins, Maris; Abramowicz, Halina; Abreu, Henso; Acharya, Bobby Samir; Adams, David; Addy, Tetteh; Adelman, Jahred; Adorisio, Cristina; Adragna, Paolo; Adye, Tim; Aefsky, Scott; Aguilar-Saavedra, Juan Antonio; Aharrouche, Mohamed; Ahlen, Steven; Ahles, Florian; Ahmad, Ashfaq; Ahmed, Hossain; Ahsan, Mahsana; Aielli, Giulio; Akdogan, Taylan; Åkesson, Torsten Paul Ake; Akimoto, Ginga; Akimov , Andrei; Aktas, Adil; Alam, Mohammad; Alam, Muhammad Aftab; Albrand, Solveig; Aleksa, Martin; Aleksandrov, Igor; Alexa, Calin; Alexander, Gideon; Alexandre, Gauthier; Alexopoulos, Theodoros; Alhroob, Muhammad; Aliev, Malik; Alimonti, Gianluca; Alison, John; Aliyev, Magsud; Allport, Phillip; Allwood-Spiers, Sarah; Almond, John; Aloisio, Alberto; Alon, Raz; Alonso, Alejandro; Alviggi, Mariagrazia; Amako, Katsuya; Amelung, Christoph; Amorim, Antonio; Amorós, Gabriel; Amram, Nir; Anastopoulos, Christos; Andeen, Timothy; Anders, Christoph Falk; Anderson, Kelby; Andreazza, Attilio; Andrei, George Victor; Anduaga, Xabier; Angerami, Aaron; Anghinolfi, Francis; Anjos, Nuno; Annovi, Alberto; Antonaki, Ariadni; Antonelli, Mario; Antonelli, Stefano; Antos, Jaroslav; Antunovic, Bijana; Anulli, Fabio; Aoun, Sahar; Arabidze, Giorgi; Aracena, Ignacio; Arai, Yasuo; Arce, Ayana; Archambault, John-Paul; Arfaoui, Samir; Arguin, Jean-Francois; Argyropoulos, Theodoros; Arik, Metin; Armbruster, Aaron James; Arnaez, Olivier; Arnault, Christian; Artamonov, Andrei; Arutinov, David; Asai, Makoto; Asai, Shoji; Silva, José; Asfandiyarov, Ruslan; Ask, Stefan; Åsman, Barbro; Asner, David; Asquith, Lily; Assamagan, Ketevi; Astbury, Alan; Astvatsatourov, Anatoli; Atoian, Grigor; Auerbach, Benjamin; Augsten, Kamil; Aurousseau, Mathieu; Austin, Nicholas; Avolio, Giuseppe; Avramidou, Rachel Maria; Axen, David; Ay, Cano; Azuelos, Georges; Azuma, Yuya; Baak, Max; Bach, Andre; Bachacou, Henri; Bachas, Konstantinos; Backes, Moritz; Badescu, Elisabeta; Bagnaia, Paolo; Bai, Yu; Bain, Travis; Baines, John; Baker, Mark; Baker, Oliver Keith; Baker, Sarah; Baltasar Dos Santos Pedrosa, Fernando; Banas, Elzbieta; Banerjee, Piyali; Banerjee, Swagato; Banfi, Danilo; Bangert, Andrea Michelle; Bansal, Vikas; Baranov, Sergey; Baranov, Sergei; Barashkou, Andrei; Barber, Tom; Barberio, Elisabetta Luigia; Barberis, Dario; Barbero, Marlon; Bardin, Dmitri; Barillari, Teresa; Barisonzi, Marcello; Barklow, Timothy; Barlow, Nick; Barnett, Bruce; Barnett, Michael; Baroncelli, Antonio; Barr, Alan; Barreiro, Fernando; Barreiro Guimarães da Costa, João; Barrillon, Pierre; Bartoldus, Rainer; Bartsch, Detlef; Bates, Richard; Batkova, Lucia; Batley, Richard; Battaglia, Andreas; Battistin, Michele; Bauer, Florian; Bawa, Harinder Singh; Bazalova, Magdalena; Beare, Brian; Beau, Tristan; Beauchemin, Pierre-Hugues; Beccherle, Roberto; Becerici, Neslihan; Bechtle, Philip; Beck, Graham; Beck, Hans Peter; Beckingham, Matthew; Becks, Karl-Heinz; Beddall, Ayda; Beddall, Andrew; Bednyakov, Vadim; Bee, Christopher; Begel, Michael; Behar Harpaz, Silvia; Behera, Prafulla; Beimforde, Michael; Belanger-Champagne, Camille; Bell, Paul; Bell, William; Bella, Gideon; Bellagamba, Lorenzo; Bellina, Francesco; Bellomo, Massimiliano; Belloni, Alberto; Belotskiy, Konstantin; Beltramello, Olga; Ben Ami, Sagi; Benary, Odette; Benchekroun, Driss; Bendel, Markus; Benedict, Brian Hugues; Benekos, Nektarios; Benhammou, Yan; Benincasa, Gianpaolo; Benjamin, Douglas; Benoit, Mathieu; Bensinger, James; Benslama, Kamal; Bentvelsen, Stan; Beretta, Matteo; Berge, David; Bergeaas Kuutmann, Elin; Berger, Nicolas; Berghaus, Frank; Berglund, Elina; Beringer, Jürg; Bernat, Pauline; Bernhard, Ralf; Bernius, Catrin; Berry, Tracey; Bertin, Antonio; Besana, Maria Ilaria; Besson, Nathalie; Bethke, Siegfried; Bianchi, Riccardo-Maria; Bianco, Michele; Biebel, Otmar; Biesiada, Jed; Biglietti, Michela; Bilokon, Halina; Bindi, Marcello; Binet, Sebastien; Bingul, Ahmet; Bini, Cesare; Biscarat, Catherine; Bitenc, Urban; Black, Kevin; Blair, Robert; Blanchard, Jean-Baptiste; Blanchot, Georges; Blocker, Craig; Blondel, Alain; Blum, Walter; Blumenschein, Ulrike; Bobbink, Gerjan; Bocci, Andrea; Boehler, Michael; Boek, Jennifer; Boelaert, Nele; Böser, Sebastian; Bogaerts, Joannes Andreas; Bogouch, Andrei; Bohm, Christian; Bohm, Jan; Boisvert, Veronique; Bold, Tomasz; Boldea, Venera; Bondarenko, Valery; Bondioli, Mario; Boonekamp, Maarten; Bordoni, Stefania; Borer, Claudia; Borisov, Anatoly; Borissov, Guennadi; Borjanovic, Iris; Borroni, Sara; Bos, Kors; Boscherini, Davide; Bosman, Martine; Boterenbrood, Hendrik; Bouchami, Jihene; Boudreau, Joseph; Bouhova-Thacker, Evelina Vassileva; Boulahouache, Chaouki; Bourdarios, Claire; Boveia, Antonio; Boyd, James; Boyko, Igor; Bozovic-Jelisavcic, Ivanka; Bracinik, Juraj; Braem, André; Branchini, Paolo; Brandenburg, George; Brandt, Andrew; Brandt, Gerhard; Brandt, Oleg; Bratzler, Uwe; Brau, Benjamin; Brau, James; Braun, Helmut; Brelier, Bertrand; Bremer, Johan; Brenner, Richard; Bressler, Shikma; Britton, Dave; Brochu, Frederic; Brock, Ian; Brock, Raymond; Brodet, Eyal; Bromberg, Carl; Brooijmans, Gustaaf; Brooks, William; Brown, Gareth; Bruckman de Renstrom, Pawel; Bruncko, Dusan; Bruneliere, Renaud; Brunet, Sylvie; Bruni, Alessia; Bruni, Graziano; Bruschi, Marco; Bucci, Francesca; Buchanan, James; Buchholz, Peter; Buckley, Andrew; Budagov, Ioulian; Budick, Burton; Büscher, Volker; Bugge, Lars; Bulekov, Oleg; Bunse, Moritz; Buran, Torleiv; Burckhart, Helfried; Burdin, Sergey; Burgess, Thomas; Burke, Stephen; Busato, Emmanuel; Bussey, Peter; Buszello, Claus-Peter; Butin, Françcois; Butler, Bart; Butler, John; Buttar, Craig; Butterworth, Jonathan; Byatt, Tom; Caballero, Jose; Cabrera Urbán, Susana; Caforio, Davide; Cakir, Orhan; Calafiura, Paolo; Calderini, Giovanni; Calfayan, Philippe; Calkins, Robert; Caloba, Luiz; Calvet, David; Camarri, Paolo; Cameron, David; Campana, Simone; Campanelli, Mario; Canale, Vincenzo; Canelli, Florencia; Canepa, Anadi; Cantero, Josu; Capasso, Luciano; Capeans Garrido, Maria Del Mar; Caprini, Irinel; Caprini, Mihai; Capua, Marcella; Caputo, Regina; Caramarcu, Costin; Cardarelli, Roberto; Carli, Tancredi; Carlino, Gianpaolo; Carminati, Leonardo; Caron, Bryan; Caron, Sascha; Carrillo Montoya, German D.; Carron Montero, Sebastian; Carter, Antony; Carter, Janet; Carvalho, João; Casadei, Diego; Casado, Maria Pilar; Cascella, Michele; Castaneda Hernandez, Alfredo Martin; Castaneda-Miranda, Elizabeth; Castillo Gimenez, Victoria; Castro, Nuno Filipe; Cataldi, Gabriella; Catinaccio, Andrea; Catmore, James; Cattai, Ariella; Cattani, Giordano; Caughron, Seth; Cauz, Diego; Cavalleri, Pietro; Cavalli, Donatella; Cavalli-Sforza, Matteo; Cavasinni, Vincenzo; Ceradini, Filippo; Cerqueira, Augusto Santiago; Cerri, Alessandro; Cerrito, Lucio; Cerutti, Fabio; Cetin, Serkant Ali; Chafaq, Aziz; Chakraborty, Dhiman; Chan, Kevin; Chapman, John Derek; Chapman, John Wehrley; Chareyre, Eve; Charlton, Dave; Chavda, Vikash; Cheatham, Susan; Chekanov, Sergei; Chekulaev, Sergey; Chelkov, Gueorgui; Chen, Hucheng; Chen, Shenjian; Chen, Xin; Cheplakov, Alexander; Chepurnov, Vladimir; Cherkaoui El Moursli, Rajaa; Tcherniatine, Valeri; Chesneanu, Daniela; Cheu, Elliott; Cheung, Sing-Leung; Chevalier, Laurent; Chevallier, Florent; Chiarella, Vitaliano; Chiefari, Giovanni; Chikovani, Leila; Childers, John Taylor; Chilingarov, Alexandre; Chiodini, Gabriele; Chizhov, Mihail; Choudalakis, Georgios; Chouridou, Sofia; Christidi, Illectra-Athanasia; Christov, Asen; Chromek-Burckhart, Doris; Chu, Ming-Lee; Chudoba, Jiri; Ciapetti, Guido; Ciftci, Abbas Kenan; Ciftci, Rena; Cinca, Diane; Cindro, Vladimir; Ciobotaru, Matei Dan; Ciocca, Claudia; Ciocio, Alessandra; Cirilli, Manuela; Citterio, Mauro; Clark, Allan G.; Clark, Philip James; Cleland, Bill; Clemens, Jean-Claude; Clement, Benoit; Clement, Christophe; Coadou, Yann; Cobal, Marina; Coccaro, Andrea; Cochran, James H.; Coggeshall, James; Cogneras, Eric; Colijn, Auke-Pieter; Collard, Caroline; Collins, Neil; Collins-Tooth, Christopher; Collot, Johann; Colon, German; Conde Muiño, Patricia; Coniavitis, Elias; Consonni, Michele; Constantinescu, Serban; Conta, Claudio; Conventi, Francesco; Cooke, Mark; Cooper, Ben; Cooper-Sarkar, Amanda; Cooper-Smith, Neil; Copic, Katherine; Cornelissen, Thijs; Corradi, Massimo; Corriveau, Francois; Corso-Radu, Alina; Cortes-Gonzalez, Arely; Cortiana, Giorgio; Costa, Giuseppe; Costa, María José; Costanzo, Davide; Costin, Tudor; Côté, David; Coura Torres, Rodrigo; Courneyea, Lorraine; Cowan, Glen; Cowden, Christopher; Cox, Brian; Cranmer, Kyle; Cranshaw, Jack; Cristinziani, Markus; Crosetti, Giovanni; Crupi, Roberto; Crépé-Renaudin, Sabine; Cuenca Almenar, Cristóbal; Cuhadar Donszelmann, Tulay; Curatolo, Maria; Curtis, Chris; Cwetanski, Peter; Czyczula, Zofia; D'Auria, Saverio; D'Onofrio, Monica; D'Orazio, Alessia; Da Via, Cinzia; Dabrowski, Wladyslaw; Dai, Tiesheng; Dallapiccola, Carlo; Dallison, Steve; Daly, Colin; Dam, Mogens; Danielsson, Hans Olof; Dannheim, Dominik; Dao, Valerio; Darbo, Giovanni; Darlea, Georgiana Lavinia; Davey, Will; Davidek, Tomas; Davidson, Nadia; Davidson, Ruth; Davies, Merlin; Davison, Adam; Dawson, Ian; Daya, Rozmin; De, Kaushik; de Asmundis, Riccardo; De Castro, Stefano; De Castro Faria Salgado, Pedro; De Cecco, Sandro; de Graat, Julien; De Groot, Nicolo; de Jong, Paul; De Mora, Lee; De Oliveira Branco, Miguel; De Pedis, Daniele; De Salvo, Alessandro; De Sanctis, Umberto; De Santo, Antonella; De Vivie De Regie, Jean-Baptiste; De Zorzi, Guido; Dean, Simon; Dedovich, Dmitri; Degenhardt, James; Dehchar, Mohamed; Del Papa, Carlo; Del Peso, Jose; Del Prete, Tarcisio; Dell'Acqua, Andrea; Dell'Asta, Lidia; Della Pietra, Massimo; della Volpe, Domenico; Delmastro, Marco; Delsart, Pierre-Antoine; Deluca, Carolina; Demers, Sarah; Demichev, Mikhail; Demirkoz, Bilge; Deng, Jianrong; Deng, Wensheng; Denisov, Sergey; Derkaoui, Jamal Eddine; Derue, Frederic; Dervan, Paul; Desch, Klaus Kurt; Deviveiros, Pier-Olivier; Dewhurst, Alastair; DeWilde, Burton; Dhaliwal, Saminder; Dhullipudi, Ramasudhakar; Di Ciaccio, Anna; Di Ciaccio, Lucia; Di Domenico, Antonio; Di Girolamo, Alessandro; Di Girolamo, Beniamino; Di Luise, Silvestro; Di Mattia, Alessandro; Di Nardo, Roberto; Di Simone, Andrea; Di Sipio, Riccardo; Diaz, Marco Aurelio; Diblen, Faruk; Diehl, Edward; Dietrich, Janet; Dietzsch, Thorsten; Diglio, Sara; Dindar Yagci, Kamile; Dingfelder, Jochen; Dionisi, Carlo; Dita, Petre; Dita, Sanda; Dittus, Fridolin; Djama, Fares; Djilkibaev, Rashid; Djobava, Tamar; do Vale, Maria Aline Barros; Do Valle Wemans, André; Doan, Thi Kieu Oanh; Dobos, Daniel; Dobson, Ellie; Dobson, Marc; Doglioni, Caterina; Doherty, Tom; Dolejsi, Jiri; Dolenc, Irena; Dolezal, Zdenek; Dolgoshein, Boris; Dohmae, Takeshi; Donega, Mauro; Donini, Julien; Dopke, Jens; Doria, Alessandra; Dos Anjos, Andre; Dotti, Andrea; Dova, Maria-Teresa; Doxiadis, Alexander; Doyle, Tony; Drasal, Zbynek; Dris, Manolis; Dubbert, Jörg; Duchovni, Ehud; Duckeck, Guenter; Dudarev, Alexey; Dudziak, Fanny; Dührssen , Michael; Duflot, Laurent; Dufour, Marc-Andre; Dunford, Monica; Duran Yildiz, Hatice; Dushkin, Andrei; Duxfield, Robert; Dwuznik, Michal; Düren, Michael; Ebenstein, William; Ebke, Johannes; Eckweiler, Sebastian; Edmonds, Keith; Edwards, Clive; Egorov, Kirill; Ehrenfeld, Wolfgang; Ehrich, Thies; Eifert, Till; Eigen, Gerald; Einsweiler, Kevin; Eisenhandler, Eric; Ekelof, Tord; El Kacimi, Mohamed; Ellert, Mattias; Elles, Sabine; Ellinghaus, Frank; Ellis, Katherine; Ellis, Nicolas; Elmsheuser, Johannes; Elsing, Markus; Emeliyanov, Dmitry; Engelmann, Roderich; Engl, Albert; Epp, Brigitte; Eppig, Andrew; Erdmann, Johannes; Ereditato, Antonio; Eriksson, Daniel; Ermoline, Iouri; Ernst, Jesse; Ernst, Michael; Ernwein, Jean; Errede, Deborah; Errede, Steven; Ertel, Eugen; Escalier, Marc; Escobar, Carlos; Espinal Curull, Xavier; Esposito, Bellisario; Etienvre, Anne-Isabelle; Etzion, Erez; Evans, Hal; Fabbri, Laura; Fabre, Caroline; Facius, Katrine; Fakhrutdinov, Rinat; Falciano, Speranza; Fang, Yaquan; Fanti, Marcello; Farbin, Amir; Farilla, Addolorata; Farley, Jason; Farooque, Trisha; Farrington, Sinead; Farthouat, Philippe; Fassnacht, Patrick; Fassouliotis, Dimitrios; Fatholahzadeh, Baharak; Fayard, Louis; Fayette, Florent; Febbraro, Renato; Federic, Pavol; Fedin, Oleg; Fedorko, Woiciech; Feligioni, Lorenzo; Felzmann, Ulrich; Feng, Cunfeng; Feng, Eric; Fenyuk, Alexander; Ferencei, Jozef; Ferland, Jonathan; Fernandes, Bruno; Fernando, Waruna; Ferrag, Samir; Ferrando, James; Ferrara, Valentina; Ferrari, Arnaud; Ferrari, Pamela; Ferrari, Roberto; Ferrer, Antonio; Ferrer, Maria Lorenza; Ferrere, Didier; Ferretti, Claudio; Fiascaris, Maria; Fiedler, Frank; Filipčič, Andrej; Filippas, Anastasios; Filthaut, Frank; Fincke-Keeler, Margret; Fiolhais, Miguel; Fiorini, Luca; Firan, Ana; Fischer, Gordon; Fisher, Matthew; Flechl, Martin; Fleck, Ivor; Fleckner, Johanna; Fleischmann, Philipp; Fleischmann, Sebastian; Flick, Tobias; Flores Castillo, Luis; Flowerdew, Michael; Fonseca Martin, Teresa; Formica, Andrea; Forti, Alessandra; Fortin, Dominique; Fournier, Daniel; Fowler, Andrew; Fowler, Ken; Fox, Harald; Francavilla, Paolo; Franchino, Silvia; Francis, David; Franklin, Melissa; Franz, Sebastien; Fraternali, Marco; Fratina, Sasa; Freestone, Julian; French, Sky; Froeschl, Robert; Froidevaux, Daniel; Frost, James; Fukunaga, Chikara; Fullana Torregrosa, Esteban; Fuster, Juan; Gabaldon, Carolina; Gabizon, Ofir; Gadfort, Thomas; Gadomski, Szymon; Gagliardi, Guido; Gagnon, Pauline; Galea, Cristina; Gallas, Elizabeth; Gallas, Manuel; Gallo, Valentina Santina; Gallop, Bruce; Gallus, Petr; Galyaev, Eugene; Gan, K K; Gao, Yongsheng; Gaponenko, Andrei; Garcia-Sciveres, Maurice; García, Carmen; García Navarro, José Enrique; Gardner, Robert; Garelli, Nicoletta; Garitaonandia, Hegoi; Garonne, Vincent; Gatti, Claudio; Gaudio, Gabriella; Gautard, Valerie; Gauzzi, Paolo; Gavrilenko, Igor; Gay, Colin; Gaycken, Goetz; Gazis, Evangelos; Ge, Peng; Gee, Norman; Geich-Gimbel, Christoph; Gellerstedt, Karl; Gemme, Claudia; Genest, Marie-Hélène; Gentile, Simonetta; Georgatos, Fotios; George, Simon; Gershon, Avi; Ghazlane, Hamid; Ghodbane, Nabil; Giacobbe, Benedetto; Giagu, Stefano; Giakoumopoulou, Victoria; Giangiobbe, Vincent; Gianotti, Fabiola; Gibbard, Bruce; Gibson, Adam; Gibson, Stephen; Gilbert, Laura; Gilchriese, Murdock; Gilewsky, Valentin; Gingrich, Douglas; Ginzburg, Jonatan; Giokaris, Nikos; Giordani, MarioPaolo; Giordano, Raffaele; Giorgi, Francesco Michelangelo; Giovannini, Paola; Giraud, Pierre-Francois; Girtler, Peter; Giugni, Danilo; Giusti, Paolo; Gjelsten, Børge Kile; Gladilin, Leonid; Glasman, Claudia; Glazov, Alexandre; Glitza, Karl-Walter; Glonti, George; Godfrey, Jennifer; Godlewski, Jan; Goebel, Martin; Göpfert, Thomas; Goeringer, Christian; Gössling, Claus; Göttfert, Tobias; Goggi, Virginio; Goldfarb, Steven; Goldin, Daniel; Golling, Tobias; Gomes, Agostinho; Gomez Fajardo, Luz Stella; Gonçcalo, Ricardo; Gonella, Laura; Gong, Chenwei; González de la Hoz, Santiago; Gonzalez Silva, Laura; Gonzalez-Sevilla, Sergio; Goodson, Jeremiah Jet; Goossens, Luc; Gordon, Howard; Gorelov, Igor; Gorfine, Grant; Gorini, Benedetto; Gorini, Edoardo; Gorišek, Andrej; Gornicki, Edward; Gosdzik, Bjoern; Gosselink, Martijn; Gostkin, Mikhail Ivanovitch; Gough Eschrich, Ivo; Gouighri, Mohamed; Goujdami, Driss; Goulette, Marc Phillippe; Goussiou, Anna; Goy, Corinne; Grabowska-Bold, Iwona; Grafström, Per; Grahn, Karl-Johan; Grancagnolo, Sergio; Grassi, Valerio; Gratchev, Vadim; Grau, Nathan; Gray, Heather; Gray, Julia Ann; Graziani, Enrico; Green, Barry; Greenshaw, Timothy; Greenwood, Zeno Dixon; Gregor, Ingrid-Maria; Grenier, Philippe; Griesmayer, Erich; Griffiths, Justin; Grigalashvili, Nugzar; Grillo, Alexander; Grimm, Kathryn; Grinstein, Sebastian; Grishkevich, Yaroslav; Groh, Manfred; Groll, Marius; Gross, Eilam; Grosse-Knetter, Joern; Groth-Jensen, Jacob; Grybel, Kai; Guicheney, Christophe; Guida, Angelo; Guillemin, Thibault; Guler, Hulya; Gunther, Jaroslav; Guo, Bin; Gupta, Ambreesh; Gusakov, Yury; Gutierrez, Andrea; Gutierrez, Phillip; Guttman, Nir; Gutzwiller, Olivier; Guyot, Claude; Gwenlan, Claire; Gwilliam, Carl; Haas, Andy; Haas, Stefan; Haber, Carl; Hadavand, Haleh Khani; Hadley, David; Haefner, Petra; Härtel, Roland; Hajduk, Zbigniew; Hakobyan, Hrachya; Haller, Johannes; Hamacher, Klaus; Hamilton, Andrew; Hamilton, Samuel; Han, Liang; Hanagaki, Kazunori; Hance, Michael; Handel, Carsten; Hanke, Paul; Hansen, Jørgen Beck; Hansen, Jorn Dines; Hansen, John Renner; Hansen, Peter Henrik; Hansl-Kozanecka, Traudl; Hansson, Per; Hara, Kazuhiko; Hare, Gabriel; Harenberg, Torsten; Harrington, Robert; Harris, Orin; Harrison, Karl; Hartert, Jochen; Hartjes, Fred; Harvey, Alex; Hasegawa, Satoshi; Hasegawa, Yoji; Hashemi, Kevan; Hassani, Samira; Haug, Sigve; Hauschild, Michael; Hauser, Reiner; Havranek, Miroslav; Hawkes, Christopher; Hawkings, Richard John; Hayakawa, Takashi; Hayward, Helen; Haywood, Stephen; Head, Simon; Hedberg, Vincent; Heelan, Louise; Heim, Sarah; Heinemann, Beate; Heisterkamp, Simon; Helary, Louis; Heller, Mathieu; Hellman, Sten; Helsens, Clement; Hemperek, Tomasz; Henderson, Robert; Henke, Michael; Henrichs, Anna; Henriques Correia, Ana Maria; Henrot-Versille, Sophie; Hensel, Carsten; Henß, Tobias; Hernández Jiménez, Yesenia; Hershenhorn, Alon David; Herten, Gregor; Hertenberger, Ralf; Hervas, Luis; Hessey, Nigel; Higón-Rodriguez, Emilio; Hill, John; Hiller, Karl Heinz; Hillert, Sonja; Hillier, Stephen; Hinchliffe, Ian; Hines, Elizabeth; Hirose, Minoru; Hirsch, Florian; Hirschbuehl, Dominic; Hobbs, John; Hod, Noam; Hodgkinson, Mark; Hodgson, Paul; Hoecker, Andreas; Hoeferkamp, Martin; Hoffman, Julia; Hoffmann, Dirk; Hohlfeld, Marc; Holy, Tomas; Holzbauer, Jenny; Homma, Yasuhiro; Horazdovsky, Tomas; Hori, Takuya; Horn, Claus; Horner, Stephan; Hostachy, Jean-Yves; Hou, Suen; Hoummada, Abdeslam; Howe, Travis; Hrivnac, Julius; Hryn'ova, Tetiana; Hsu, Pai-hsien Jennifer; Hsu, Shih-Chieh; Huang, Guang Shun; Hubacek, Zdenek; Hubaut, Fabrice; Huegging, Fabian; Hughes, Emlyn; Hughes, Gareth; Hurwitz, Martina; Husemann, Ulrich; Huseynov, Nazim; Huston, Joey; Huth, John; Iacobucci, Giuseppe; Iakovidis, Georgios; Ibragimov, Iskander; Iconomidou-Fayard, Lydia; Idarraga, John; Iengo, Paolo; Igonkina, Olga; Ikegami, Yoichi; Ikeno, Masahiro; Ilchenko, Yuri; Iliadis, Dimitrios; Ince, Tayfun; Ioannou, Pavlos; Iodice, Mauro; Irles Quiles, Adrian; Ishikawa, Akimasa; Ishino, Masaya; Ishmukhametov, Renat; Isobe, Tadaaki; Issakov, Vladimir; Issever, Cigdem; Istin, Serhat; Itoh, Yuki; Ivashin, Anton; Iwanski, Wieslaw; Iwasaki, Hiroyuki; Izen, Joseph; Izzo, Vincenzo; Jackson, Brett; Jackson, John; Jackson, Paul; Jaekel, Martin; Jain, Vivek; Jakobs, Karl; Jakobsen, Sune; Jakubek, Jan; Jana, Dilip; Jansen, Eric; Jantsch, Andreas; Janus, Michel; Jared, Richard; Jarlskog, Göran; Jeanty, Laura; Jen-La Plante, Imai; Jenni, Peter; Jež, Pavel; Jézéquel, Stéphane; Ji, Weina; Jia, Jiangyong; Jiang, Yi; Jimenez Belenguer, Marcos; Jin, Shan; Jinnouchi, Osamu; Joffe, David; Johansen, Marianne; Johansson, Erik; Johansson, Per; Johnert, Sebastian; Johns, Kenneth; Jon-And, Kerstin; Jones, Graham; Jones, Roger; Jones, Tim; Jorge, Pedro; Joseph, John; Juranek, Vojtech; Jussel, Patrick; Kabachenko, Vasily; Kaci, Mohammed; Kaczmarska, Anna; Kado, Marumi; Kagan, Harris; Kagan, Michael; Kaiser, Steffen; Kajomovitz, Enrique; Kalinin, Sergey; Kalinovskaya, Lidia; Kalinowski, Artur; Kama, Sami; Kanaya, Naoko; Kaneda, Michiru; Kantserov, Vadim; Kanzaki, Junichi; Kaplan, Benjamin; Kapliy, Anton; Kaplon, Jan; Kar, Deepak; Karagounis, Michael; Karagoz, Muge; Kartvelishvili, Vakhtang; Karyukhin, Andrey; Kashif, Lashkar; Kasmi, Azzedine; Kass, Richard; Kastanas, Alex; Kastoryano, Michael; Kataoka, Mayuko; Kataoka, Yousuke; Katsoufis, Elias; Katzy, Judith; Kaushik, Venkatesh; Kawagoe, Kiyotomo; Kawamoto, Tatsuo; Kawamura, Gen; Kayl, Manuel; Kayumov, Fred; Kazanin, Vassili; Kazarinov, Makhail; Keates, James Robert; Keeler, Richard; Keener, Paul; Kehoe, Robert; Keil, Markus; Kekelidze, George; Kelly, Marc; Kenyon, Mike; Kepka, Oldrich; Kerschen, Nicolas; Kerševan, Borut Paul; Kersten, Susanne; Kessoku, Kohei; Khakzad, Mohsen; Khalil-zada, Farkhad; Khandanyan, Hovhannes; Khanov, Alexander; Kharchenko, Dmitri; Khodinov, Alexander; Khomich, Andrei; Khoriauli, Gia; Khovanskiy, Nikolai; Khovanskiy, Valery; Khramov, Evgeniy; Khubua, Jemal; Kim, Hyeon Jin; Kim, Min Suk; Kim, Peter; Kim, Shinhong; Kind, Oliver; Kind, Peter; King, Barry; Kirk, Julie; Kirsch, Guillaume; Kirsch, Lawrence; Kiryunin, Andrey; Kisielewska, Danuta; Kittelmann, Thomas; Kiyamura, Hironori; Kladiva, Eduard; Klein, Max; Klein, Uta; Kleinknecht, Konrad; Klemetti, Miika; Klier, Amit; Klimentov, Alexei; Klingenberg, Reiner; Klinkby, Esben; Klioutchnikova, Tatiana; Klok, Peter; Klous, Sander; Kluge, Eike-Erik; Kluge, Thomas; Kluit, Peter; Klute, Markus; Kluth, Stefan; Knecht, Neil; Kneringer, Emmerich; Ko, Byeong Rok; Kobayashi, Tomio; Kobel, Michael; Koblitz, Birger; Kocian, Martin; Kocnar, Antonin; Kodys, Peter; Köneke, Karsten; König, Adriaan; Koenig, Sebastian; Köpke, Lutz; Koetsveld, Folkert; Koevesarki, Peter; Koffas, Thomas; Koffeman, Els; Kohn, Fabian; Kohout, Zdenek; Kohriki, Takashi; Kolanoski, Hermann; Kolesnikov, Vladimir; Koletsou, Iro; Koll, James; Kollar, Daniel; Kolos, Serguei; Kolya, Scott; Komar, Aston; Komaragiri, Jyothsna Rani; Kondo, Takahiko; Kono, Takanori; Konoplich, Rostislav; Konovalov, Serguei; Konstantinidis, Nikolaos; Koperny, Stefan; Korcyl, Krzysztof; Kordas, Kostantinos; Korn, Andreas; Korolkov, Ilya; Korolkova, Elena; Korotkov, Vladislav; Kortner, Oliver; Kortner, Sandra; Kostka, Peter; Kostyukhin, Vadim; Kotov, Serguei; Kotov, Vladislav; Kotov, Konstantin; Kourkoumelis, Christine; Koutsman, Alex; Kowalewski, Robert Victor; Kowalski, Henri; Kowalski, Tadeusz; Kozanecki, Witold; Kozhin, Anatoly; Kral, Vlastimil; Kramarenko, Viktor; Kramberger, Gregor; Krasny, Mieczyslaw Witold; Krasznahorkay, Attila; Kreisel, Arik; Krejci, Frantisek; Kretzschmar, Jan; Krieger, Nina; Krieger, Peter; Kroeninger, Kevin; Kroha, Hubert; Kroll, Joe; Kroseberg, Juergen; Krstic, Jelena; Kruchonak, Uladzimir; Krüger, Hans; Krumshteyn, Zinovii; Kubota, Takashi; Kuehn, Susanne; Kugel, Andreas; Kuhl, Thorsten; Kuhn, Dietmar; Kukhtin, Victor; Kulchitsky, Yuri; Kuleshov, Sergey; Kummer, Christian; Kuna, Marine; Kunkle, Joshua; Kupco, Alexander; Kurashige, Hisaya; Kurata, Masakazu; Kurchaninov, Leonid; Kurochkin, Yurii; Kus, Vlastimil; Kwee, Regina; La Rotonda, Laura; Labbe, Julien; Lacasta, Carlos; Lacava, Francesco; Lacker, Heiko; Lacour, Didier; Lacuesta, Vicente Ramón; Ladygin, Evgueni; Lafaye, Rémi; Laforge, Bertrand; Lagouri, Theodota; Lai, Stanley; Lamanna, Massimo; Lampen, Caleb; Lampl, Walter; Lancon, Eric; Landgraf, Ulrich; Landon, Murrough; Lane, Jenna; Lankford, Andrew; Lanni, Francesco; Lantzsch, Kerstin; Lanza, Agostino; Laplace, Sandrine; Lapoire, Cecile; Laporte, Jean-Francois; Lari, Tommaso; Larner, Aimee; Lassnig, Mario; Laurelli, Paolo; Lavrijsen, Wim; Laycock, Paul; Lazarev, Alexandre; Lazzaro, Alfio; Le Dortz, Olivier; Le Guirriec, Emmanuel; Le Menedeu, Eve; Le Vine, Micheal; Lebedev, Alexander; Lebel, Céline; LeCompte, Thomas; Ledroit-Guillon, Fabienne Agnes Marie; Lee, Hurng-Chun; Lee, Jason; Lee, Shih-Chang; Lefebvre, Michel; Legendre, Marie; LeGeyt, Benjamin; Legger, Federica; Leggett, Charles; Lehmacher, Marc; Lehmann Miotto, Giovanna; Lei, Xiaowen; Leitner, Rupert; Lellouch, Daniel; Lellouch, Jeremie; Lendermann, Victor; Leney, Katharine; Lenz, Tatiana; Lenzen, Georg; Lenzi, Bruno; Leonhardt, Kathrin; Leroy, Claude; Lessard, Jean-Raphael; Lester, Christopher; Leung Fook Cheong, Annabelle; Levêque, Jessica; Levin, Daniel; Levinson, Lorne; Leyton, Michael; Li, Haifeng; Li, Shumin; Li, Xuefei; Liang, Zhihua; Liang, Zhijun; Liberti, Barbara; Lichard, Peter; Lichtnecker, Markus; Lie, Ki; Liebig, Wolfgang; Lilley, Joseph; Lim, Heuijin; Limosani, Antonio; Limper, Maaike; Lin, Simon; Linnemann, James; Lipeles, Elliot; Lipinsky, Lukas; Lipniacka, Anna; Liss, Tony; Lissauer, David; Lister, Alison; Litke, Alan; Liu, Chuanlei; Liu, Dong; Liu, Hao; Liu, Jianbei; Liu, Minghui; Liu, Tiankuan; Liu, Yanwen; Livan, Michele; Lleres, Annick; Lloyd, Stephen; Lobodzinska, Ewelina; Loch, Peter; Lockman, William; Lockwitz, Sarah; Loddenkoetter, Thomas; Loebinger, Fred; Loginov, Andrey; Loh, Chang Wei; Lohse, Thomas; Lohwasser, Kristin; Lokajicek, Milos; Long, Robin Eamonn; Lopes, Lourenco; Lopez Mateos, David; Losada, Marta; Loscutoff, Peter; Lou, Xinchou; Lounis, Abdenour; Loureiro, Karina; Lovas, Lubomir; Love, Jeremy; Love, Peter; Lowe, Andrew; Lu, Feng; Lubatti, Henry; Luci, Claudio; Lucotte, Arnaud; Ludwig, Andreas; Ludwig, Dörthe; Ludwig, Inga; Luehring, Frederick; Luisa, Luca; Lumb, Debra; Luminari, Lamberto; Lund, Esben; Lund-Jensen, Bengt; Lundberg, Björn; Lundberg, Johan; Lundquist, Johan; Lynn, David; Lys, Jeremy; Lytken, Else; Ma, Hong; Ma, Lian Liang; Macana Goia, Jorge Andres; Maccarrone, Giovanni; Macchiolo, Anna; Maček, Boštjan; Machado Miguens, Joana; Mackeprang, Rasmus; Madaras, Ronald; Mader, Wolfgang; Maenner, Reinhard; Maeno, Tadashi; Mättig, Peter; Mättig, Stefan; Magalhaes Martins, Paulo Jorge; Magradze, Erekle; Mahalalel, Yair; Mahboubi, Kambiz; Mahmood, A.; Maiani, Camilla; Maidantchik, Carmen; Maio, Amélia; Majewski, Stephanie; Makida, Yasuhiro; Makouski, Mikhail; Makovec, Nikola; Malecki, Piotr; Malecki, Pawel; Maleev, Victor; Malek, Fairouz; Mallik, Usha; Malon, David; Maltezos, Stavros; Malyshev, Vladimir; Malyukov, Sergei; Mambelli, Marco; Mameghani, Raphael; Mamuzic, Judita; Mandelli, Luciano; Mandić, Igor; Mandrysch, Rocco; Maneira, José; Mangeard, Pierre-Simon; Manjavidze, Ioseb; Manning, Peter; Manousakis-Katsikakis, Arkadios; Mansoulie, Bruno; Mapelli, Alessandro; Mapelli, Livio; March , Luis; Marchand, Jean-Francois; Marchese, Fabrizio; Marchiori, Giovanni; Marcisovsky, Michal; Marino, Christopher; Marroquim, Fernando; Marshall, Zach; Marti-Garcia, Salvador; Martin, Alex; Martin, Andrew; Martin, Brian; Martin, Brian; Martin, Franck Francois; Martin, Jean-Pierre; Martin, Tim; Martin dit Latour, Bertrand; Martinez, Mario; Martinez Outschoorn, Verena; Martini, Agnese; Martyniuk, Alex; Marzano, Francesco; Marzin, Antoine; Masetti, Lucia; Mashimo, Tetsuro; Mashinistov, Ruslan; Masik, Jiri; Maslennikov, Alexey; Massa, Ignazio; Massol, Nicolas; Mastroberardino, Anna; Masubuchi, Tatsuya; Matricon, Pierre; Matsunaga, Hiroyuki; Matsushita, Takashi; Mattravers, Carly; Maxfield, Stephen; Mayne, Anna; Mazini, Rachid; Mazur, Michael; Mazzanti, Marcello; Mc Donald, Jeffrey; Mc Kee, Shawn Patrick; McCarn, Allison; McCarthy, Robert; McCubbin, Norman; McFarlane, Kenneth; McGlone, Helen; Mchedlidze, Gvantsa; McMahon, Steve; McPherson, Robert; Meade, Andrew; Mechnich, Joerg; Mechtel, Markus; Medinnis, Mike; Meera-Lebbai, Razzak; Meguro, Tatsuma; Mehlhase, Sascha; Mehta, Andrew; Meier, Karlheinz; Meirose, Bernhard; Melachrinos, Constantinos; Mellado Garcia, Bruce Rafael; Mendoza Navas, Luis; Meng, Zhaoxia; Menke, Sven; Meoni, Evelin; Mermod, Philippe; Merola, Leonardo; Meroni, Chiara; Merritt, Frank; Messina, Andrea; Metcalfe, Jessica; Mete, Alaettin Serhan; Meyer, Jean-Pierre; Meyer, Jochen; Meyer, Joerg; Meyer, Thomas Christian; Meyer, W. Thomas; Miao, Jiayuan; Michal, Sebastien; Micu, Liliana; Middleton, Robin; Migas, Sylwia; Mijović, Liza; Mikenberg, Giora; Mikestikova, Marcela; Mikuž, Marko; Miller, David; Mills, Corrinne; Mills, Bill; Milov, Alexander; Milstead, David; Milstein, Dmitry; Minaenko, Andrey; Miñano, Mercedes; Minashvili, Irakli; Mincer, Allen; Mindur, Bartosz; Mineev, Mikhail; Ming, Yao; Mir, Lluisa-Maria; Mirabelli, Giovanni; Misawa, Shigeki; Miscetti, Stefano; Misiejuk, Andrzej; Mitrevski, Jovan; Mitsou, Vasiliki A.; Miyagawa, Paul; Mjörnmark, Jan-Ulf; Mladenov, Dimitar; Moa, Torbjoern; Moed, Shulamit; Moeller, Victoria; Mönig, Klaus; Möser, Nicolas; Mohr, Wolfgang; Mohrdieck-Möck, Susanne; Moles-Valls, Regina; Molina-Perez, Jorge; Monk, James; Monnier, Emmanuel; Montesano, Simone; Monticelli, Fernando; Moore, Roger; Mora Herrera, Clemencia; Moraes, Arthur; Morais, Antonio; Morel, Julien; Morello, Gianfranco; Moreno, Deywis; Moreno Llácer, María; Morettini, Paolo; Morii, Masahiro; Morley, Anthony Keith; Mornacchi, Giuseppe; Morozov, Sergey; Morris, John; Moser, Hans-Guenther; Mosidze, Maia; Moss, Josh; Mount, Richard; Mountricha, Eleni; Mouraviev, Sergei; Moyse, Edward; Mudrinic, Mihajlo; Mueller, Felix; Mueller, James; Mueller, Klemens; Müller, Thomas; Muenstermann, Daniel; Muir, Alex; Munwes, Yonathan; Murillo Garcia, Raul; Murray, Bill; Mussche, Ido; Musto, Elisa; Myagkov, Alexey; Myska, Miroslav; Nadal, Jordi; Nagai, Koichi; Nagano, Kunihiro; Nagasaka, Yasushi; Nairz, Armin Michael; Nakamura, Koji; Nakano, Itsuo; Nakatsuka, Hiroki; Nanava, Gizo; Napier, Austin; Nash, Michael; Nation, Nigel; Nattermann, Till; Naumann, Thomas; Navarro, Gabriela; Nderitu, Simon Kirichu; Neal, Homer; Nebot, Eduardo; Nechaeva, Polina; Negri, Andrea; Negri, Guido; Nelson, Andrew; Nelson, Timothy Knight; Nemecek, Stanislav; Nemethy, Peter; Nepomuceno, Andre Asevedo; Nessi, Marzio; Neubauer, Mark; Neusiedl, Andrea; Neves, Ricardo; Nevski, Pavel; Newcomer, Mitchel; Nickerson, Richard; Nicolaidou, Rosy; Nicolas, Ludovic; Nicoletti, Giovanni; Nicquevert, Bertrand; Niedercorn, Francois; Nielsen, Jason; Nikiforov, Andriy; Nikolaev, Kirill; Nikolic-Audit, Irena; Nikolopoulos, Konstantinos; Nilsen, Henrik; Nilsson, Paul; Nisati, Aleandro; Nishiyama, Tomonori; Nisius, Richard; Nodulman, Lawrence; Nomachi, Masaharu; Nomidis, Ioannis; Nordberg, Markus; Nordkvist, Bjoern; Notz, Dieter; Novakova, Jana; Nozaki, Mitsuaki; Nožička, Miroslav; Nugent, Ian Michael; Nuncio-Quiroz, Adriana-Elizabeth; Nunes Hanninger, Guilherme; Nunnemann, Thomas; Nurse, Emily; O'Neil, Dugan; O'Shea, Val; Oakham, Gerald; Oberlack, Horst; Ochi, Atsuhiko; Oda, Susumu; Odaka, Shigeru; Odier, Jerome; Ogren, Harold; Oh, Alexander; Oh, Seog; Ohm, Christian; Ohshima, Takayoshi; Ohshita, Hidetoshi; Ohsugi, Takashi; Okada, Shogo; Okawa, Hideki; Okumura, Yasuyuki; Okuyama, Toyonobu; Olchevski, Alexander; Oliveira, Miguel Alfonso; Oliveira Damazio, Denis; Oliver, John; Oliver Garcia, Elena; Olivito, Dominick; Olszewski, Andrzej; Olszowska, Jolanta; Omachi, Chihiro; Onofre, António; Onyisi, Peter; Oram, Christopher; Oreglia, Mark; Oren, Yona; Orestano, Domizia; Orlov, Iliya; Oropeza Barrera, Cristina; Orr, Robert; Ortega, Eduardo; Osculati, Bianca; Ospanov, Rustem; Osuna, Carlos; Ottersbach, John; Ould-Saada, Farid; Ouraou, Ahmimed; Ouyang, Qun; Owen, Mark; Owen, Simon; Oyarzun, Alejandro; Ozcan, Veysi Erkcan; Ozone, Kenji; Ozturk, Nurcan; Pacheco Pages, Andres; Padilla Aranda, Cristobal; Paganis, Efstathios; Pahl, Christoph; Paige, Frank; Pajchel, Katarina; Palestini, Sandro; Pallin, Dominique; Palma, Alberto; Palmer, Jody; Pan, Yibin; Panagiotopoulou, Evgenia; Panes, Boris; Panikashvili, Natalia; Panitkin, Sergey; Pantea, Dan; Panuskova, Monika; Paolone, Vittorio; Papadopoulou, Theodora; Park, Su-Jung; Park, Woochun; Parker, Andy; Parker, Sherwood; Parodi, Fabrizio; Parsons, John; Parzefall, Ulrich; Pasqualucci, Enrico; Passeri, Antonio; Pastore, Fernanda; Pastore, Francesca; Pásztor , Gabriella; Pataraia, Sophio; Pater, Joleen; Patricelli, Sergio; Patwa, Abid; Pauly, Thilo; Peak, Lawrence; Pecsy, Martin; Pedraza Morales, Maria Isabel; Peleganchuk, Sergey; Peng, Haiping; Penson, Alexander; Penwell, John; Perantoni, Marcelo; Perez, Kerstin; Perez Codina, Estel; Pérez García-Estañ, María Teresa; Perez Reale, Valeria; Perini, Laura; Pernegger, Heinz; Perrino, Roberto; Persembe, Seda; Perus, Antoine; Peshekhonov, Vladimir; Petersen, Brian; Petersen, Troels; Petit, Elisabeth; Petridou, Chariclia; Petrolo, Emilio; Petrucci, Fabrizio; Petschull, Dennis; Petteni, Michele; Pezoa, Raquel; Phan, Anna; Phillips, Alan; Piacquadio, Giacinto; Piccinini, Maurizio; Piegaia, Ricardo; Pilcher, James; Pilkington, Andrew; Pina, João Antonio; Pinamonti, Michele; Pinfold, James; Pinto, Belmiro; Pizio, Caterina; Placakyte, Ringaile; Plamondon, Mathieu; Pleier, Marc-Andre; Poblaguev, Andrei; Poddar, Sahill; Podlyski, Fabrice; Poffenberger, Paul; Poggioli, Luc; Pohl, Martin; Polci, Francesco; Polesello, Giacomo; Policicchio, Antonio; Polini, Alessandro; Poll, James; Polychronakos, Venetios; Pomeroy, Daniel; Pommès, Kathy; Ponsot, Patrick; Pontecorvo, Ludovico; Pope, Bernard; Popeneciu, Gabriel Alexandru; Popovic, Dragan; Poppleton, Alan; Popule, Jiri; Portell Bueso, Xavier; Porter, Robert; Pospelov, Guennady; Pospisil, Stanislav; Potekhin, Maxim; Potrap, Igor; Potter, Christina; Potter, Christopher; Potter, Keith; Poulard, Gilbert; Poveda, Joaquin; Prabhu, Robindra; Pralavorio, Pascal; Prasad, Srivas; Pravahan, Rishiraj; Pribyl, Lukas; Price, Darren; Price, Lawrence; Prichard, Paul; Prieur, Damien; Primavera, Margherita; Prokofiev, Kirill; Prokoshin, Fedor; Protopopescu, Serban; Proudfoot, James; Prudent, Xavier; Przysiezniak, Helenka; Psoroulas, Serena; Ptacek, Elizabeth; Puigdengoles, Carles; Purdham, John; Purohit, Milind; Puzo, Patrick; Pylypchenko, Yuriy; Qi, Ming; Qian, Jianming; Qian, Weiming; Qin, Zhonghua; Quadt, Arnulf; Quarrie, David; Quayle, William; Quinonez, Fernando; Raas, Marcel; Radeka, Veljko; Radescu, Voica; Radics, Balint; Rador, Tonguc; Ragusa, Francesco; Rahal, Ghita; Rahimi, Amir; Rajagopalan, Srinivasan; Rammensee, Michael; Rammes, Marcus; Rauscher, Felix; Rauter, Emanuel; Raymond, Michel; Read, Alexander Lincoln; Rebuzzi, Daniela; Redelbach, Andreas; Redlinger, George; Reece, Ryan; Reeves, Kendall; Reinherz-Aronis, Erez; Reinsch, Andreas; Reisinger, Ingo; Reljic, Dusan; Rembser, Christoph; Ren, Zhongliang; Renkel, Peter; Rescia, Sergio; Rescigno, Marco; Resconi, Silvia; Resende, Bernardo; Reznicek, Pavel; Rezvani, Reyhaneh; Richards, Alexander; Richards, Ronald; Richter, Robert; Richter-Was, Elzbieta; Ridel, Melissa; Rijpstra, Manouk; Rijssenbeek, Michael; Rimoldi, Adele; Rinaldi, Lorenzo; Rios, Ryan Randy; Riu, Imma; Rizatdinova, Flera; Rizvi, Eram; Roa Romero, Diego Alejandro; Robertson, Steven; Robichaud-Veronneau, Andree; Robinson, Dave; Robinson, James; Robinson, Mary; Robson, Aidan; Rocha de Lima, Jose Guilherme; Roda, Chiara; Roda Dos Santos, Denis; Rodriguez, Diego; Rodriguez Garcia, Yohany; Roe, Shaun; Røhne, Ole; Rojo, Victoria; Rolli, Simona; Romaniouk, Anatoli; Romanov, Victor; Romeo, Gaston; Romero Maltrana, Diego; Roos, Lydia; Ros, Eduardo; Rosati, Stefano; Rosenbaum, Gabriel; Rosselet, Laurent; Rossetti, Valerio; Rossi, Leonardo Paolo; Rotaru, Marina; Rothberg, Joseph; Rousseau, David; Royon, Christophe; Rozanov, Alexander; Rozen, Yoram; Ruan, Xifeng; Ruckert, Benjamin; Ruckstuhl, Nicole; Rud, Viacheslav; Rudolph, Gerald; Rühr, Frederik; Ruggieri, Federico; Ruiz-Martinez, Aranzazu; Rumyantsev, Leonid; Rurikova, Zuzana; Rusakovich, Nikolai; Rutherfoord, John; Ruwiedel, Christoph; Ruzicka, Pavel; Ryabov, Yury; Ryan, Patrick; Rybkin, Grigori; Rzaeva, Sevda; Saavedra, Aldo; Sadrozinski, Hartmut; Sadykov, Renat; Sakamoto, Hiroshi; Salamanna, Giuseppe; Salamon, Andrea; Saleem, Muhammad; Salihagic, Denis; Salnikov, Andrei; Salt, José; Salvachua Ferrando, Belén; Salvatore, Daniela; Salvatore, Pasquale Fabrizio; Salvucci, Antonio; Salzburger, Andreas; Sampsonidis, Dimitrios; Samset, Björn Hallvard; Sandaker, Heidi; Sander, Heinz Georg; Sanders, Michiel; Sandhoff, Marisa; Sandhu, Pawan; Sandstroem, Rikard; Sandvoss, Stephan; Sankey, Dave; Sanny, Bernd; Sansoni, Andrea; Santamarina Rios, Cibran; Santoni, Claudio; Santonico, Rinaldo; Saraiva, João; Sarangi, Tapas; Sarkisyan-Grinbaum, Edward; Sarri, Francesca; Sasaki, Osamu; Sasao, Noboru; Satsounkevitch, Igor; Sauvage, Gilles; Savard, Pierre; Savine, Alexandre; Savinov, Vladimir; Sawyer, Lee; Saxon, David; Says, Louis-Pierre; Sbarra, Carla; Sbrizzi, Antonio; Scannicchio, Diana; Schaarschmidt, Jana; Schacht, Peter; Schäfer, Uli; Schaetzel, Sebastian; Schaffer, Arthur; Schaile, Dorothee; Schamberger, R.~Dean; Schamov, Andrey; Schegelsky, Valery; Scheirich, Daniel; Schernau, Michael; Scherzer, Max; Schiavi, Carlo; Schieck, Jochen; Schioppa, Marco; Schlenker, Stefan; Schmidt, Evelyn; Schmieden, Kristof; Schmitt, Christian; Schmitz, Martin; Schott, Matthias; Schouten, Doug; Schovancova, Jaroslava; Schram, Malachi; Schreiner, Alexander; Schroeder, Christian; Schroer, Nicolai; Schroers, Marcel; Schultes, Joachim; Schultz-Coulon, Hans-Christian; Schumacher, Jan; Schumacher, Markus; Schumm, Bruce; Schune, Philippe; Schwanenberger, Christian; Schwartzman, Ariel; Schwemling, Philippe; Schwienhorst, Reinhard; Schwierz, Rainer; Schwindling, Jerome; Scott, Bill; Searcy, Jacob; Sedykh, Evgeny; Segura, Ester; Seidel, Sally; Seiden, Abraham; Seifert, Frank; Seixas, José; Sekhniaidze, Givi; Seliverstov, Dmitry; Sellden, Bjoern; Semprini-Cesari, Nicola; Serfon, Cedric; Serin, Laurent; Seuster, Rolf; Severini, Horst; Sevior, Martin; Sfyrla, Anna; Shabalina, Elizaveta; Shamim, Mansoora; Shan, Lianyou; Shank, James; Shao, Qi Tao; Shapiro, Marjorie; Shatalov, Pavel; Shaw, Kate; Sherman, Daniel; Sherwood, Peter; Shibata, Akira; Shimojima, Makoto; Shin, Taeksu; Shmeleva, Alevtina; Shochet, Mel; Shupe, Michael; Sicho, Petr; Sidoti, Antonio; Siegert, Frank; Siegrist, James; Sijacki, Djordje; Silbert, Ohad; Silver, Yiftah; Silverstein, Daniel; Silverstein, Samuel; Simak, Vladislav; Simic, Ljiljana; Simion, Stefan; Simmons, Brinick; Simonyan, Margar; Sinervo, Pekka; Sinev, Nikolai; Sipica, Valentin; Siragusa, Giovanni; Sisakyan, Alexei; Sivoklokov, Serguei; Sjölin, Jörgen; Sjursen, Therese; Skovpen, Kirill; Skubic, Patrick; Slater, Mark; Slavicek, Tomas; Sliwa, Krzysztof; Sloper, John erik; Sluka, Tomas; Smakhtin, Vladimir; Smirnov, Sergei; Smirnov, Yuri; Smirnova, Lidia; Smirnova, Oxana; Smith, Ben Campbell; Smith, Douglas; Smith, Kenway; Smizanska, Maria; Smolek, Karel; Snesarev, Andrei; Snow, Steve; Snow, Joel; Snuverink, Jochem; Snyder, Scott; Soares, Mara; Sobie, Randall; Sodomka, Jaromir; Soffer, Abner; Solans, Carlos; Solar, Michael; Solc, Jaroslav; Solfaroli Camillocci, Elena; Solodkov, Alexander; Solovyanov, Oleg; Soluk, Richard; Sondericker, John; Sopko, Vit; Sopko, Bruno; Sosebee, Mark; Soukharev, Andrey; Spagnolo, Stefania; Spanò, Francesco; Spencer, Edwin; Spighi, Roberto; Spigo, Giancarlo; Spila, Federico; Spiwoks, Ralf; Spousta, Martin; Spreitzer, Teresa; Spurlock, Barry; St. Denis, Richard Dante; Stahl, Thorsten; Stahlman, Jonathan; Stamen, Rainer; Stancu, Stefan Nicolae; Stanecka, Ewa; Stanek, Robert; Stanescu, Cristian; Stapnes, Steinar; Starchenko, Evgeny; Stark, Jan; Staroba, Pavel; Starovoitov, Pavel; Stastny, Jan; Stavina, Pavel; Stavropoulos, Georgios; Steele, Genevieve; Steinbach, Peter; Steinberg, Peter; Stekl, Ivan; Stelzer, Bernd; Stelzer, Harald Joerg; Stelzer-Chilton, Oliver; Stenzel, Hasko; Stevenson, Kyle; Stewart, Graeme; Stockton, Mark; Stoerig, Kathrin; Stoicea, Gabriel; Stonjek, Stefan; Strachota, Pavel; Stradling, Alden; Straessner, Arno; Strandberg, Jonas; Strandberg, Sara; Strandlie, Are; Strauss, Michael; Strizenec, Pavol; Ströhmer, Raimund; Strom, David; Stroynowski, Ryszard; Strube, Jan; Stugu, Bjarne; Su, Dong; Soh, Dart-yin; Sugaya, Yorihito; Sugimoto, Takuya; Suhr, Chad; Suk, Michal; Sulin, Vladimir; Sultansoy, Saleh; Sumida, Toshi; Sun, Xiaohu; Sundermann, Jan Erik; Suruliz, Kerim; Sushkov, Serge; Susinno, Giancarlo; Sutton, Mark; Suzuki, Takuya; Suzuki, Yu; Sykora, Ivan; Sykora, Tomas; Szymocha, Tadeusz; Sánchez, Javier; Ta, Duc; Tackmann, Kerstin; Taffard, Anyes; Tafirout, Reda; Taga, Adrian; Takahashi, Yuta; Takai, Helio; Takashima, Ryuichi; Takeda, Hiroshi; Takeshita, Tohru; Talby, Mossadek; Talyshev, Alexey; Tamsett, Matthew; Tanaka, Junichi; Tanaka, Reisaburo; Tanaka, Satoshi; Tanaka, Shuji; Tapprogge, Stefan; Tardif, Dominique; Tarem, Shlomit; Tarrade, Fabien; Tartarelli, Giuseppe Francesco; Tas, Petr; Tasevsky, Marek; Tassi, Enrico; Tatarkhanov, Mous; Taylor, Christopher; Taylor, Frank; Taylor, Geoffrey; Taylor, Ryan P.; Taylor, Wendy; Teixeira-Dias, Pedro; Ten Kate, Herman; Teng, Ping-Kun; Tennenbaum-Katan, Yaniv-David; Terada, Susumu; Terashi, Koji; Terron, Juan; Terwort, Mark; Testa, Marianna; Teuscher, Richard; Thioye, Moustapha; Thoma, Sascha; Thomas, Juergen; Thompson, Stan; Thompson, Emily; Thompson, Peter; Thompson, Paul; Thompson, Ray; Thomson, Evelyn; Thun, Rudolf; Tic, Tomas; Tikhomirov, Vladimir; Tikhonov, Yury; Tipton, Paul; Tique Aires Viegas, Florbela De Jes; Tisserant, Sylvain; Toczek, Barbara; Todorov, Theodore; Todorova-Nova, Sharka; Toggerson, Brokk; Tojo, Junji; Tokár, Stanislav; Tokushuku, Katsuo; Tollefson, Kirsten; Tomasek, Lukas; Tomasek, Michal; Tomoto, Makoto; Tompkins, Lauren; Toms, Konstantin; Tonoyan, Arshak; Topfel, Cyril; Topilin, Nikolai; Torrence, Eric; Torró Pastor, Emma; Toth, Jozsef; Touchard, Francois; Tovey, Daniel; Trefzger, Thomas; Tremblet, Louis; Tricoli, Alesandro; Trigger, Isabel Marian; Trincaz-Duvoid, Sophie; Trinh, Thi Nguyet; Tripiana, Martin; Triplett, Nathan; Trischuk, William; Trivedi, Arjun; Trocmé, Benjamin; Troncon, Clara; Trzupek, Adam; Tsarouchas, Charilaos; Tseng, Jeffrey; Tsiakiris, Menelaos; Tsiareshka, Pavel; Tsionou, Dimitra; Tsipolitis, Georgios; Tsiskaridze, Vakhtang; Tskhadadze, Edisher; Tsukerman, Ilya; Tsulaia, Vakhtang; Tsung, Jieh-Wen; Tsuno, Soshi; Tsybychev, Dmitri; Tuggle, Joseph; Turecek, Daniel; Turk Cakir, Ilkay; Turlay, Emmanuel; Tuts, Michael; Twomey, Matthew Shaun; Tylmad, Maja; Tyndel, Mike; Uchida, Kirika; Ueda, Ikuo; Ugland, Maren; Uhlenbrock, Mathias; Uhrmacher, Michael; Ukegawa, Fumihiko; Unal, Guillaume; Undrus, Alexander; Unel, Gokhan; Unno, Yoshinobu; Urbaniec, Dustin; Urkovsky, Evgeny; Urquijo, Phillip; Urrejola, Pedro; Usai, Giulio; Uslenghi, Massimiliano; Vacavant, Laurent; Vacek, Vaclav; Vachon, Brigitte; Vahsen, Sven; Valente, Paolo; Valentinetti, Sara; Valkar, Stefan; Valladolid Gallego, Eva; Vallecorsa, Sofia; Valls Ferrer, Juan Antonio; Van Berg, Richard; van der Graaf, Harry; van der Kraaij, Erik; van der Poel, Egge; van der Ster, Daniel; van Eldik, Niels; van Gemmeren, Peter; van Kesteren, Zdenko; van Vulpen, Ivo; Vandelli, Wainer; Vaniachine, Alexandre; Vankov, Peter; Vannucci, Francois; Vari, Riccardo; Varnes, Erich; Varouchas, Dimitris; Vartapetian, Armen; Varvell, Kevin; Vasilyeva, Lidia; Vassilakopoulos, Vassilios; Vazeille, Francois; Vellidis, Constantine; Veloso, Filipe; Veneziano, Stefano; Ventura, Andrea; Ventura, Daniel; Venturi, Manuela; Venturi, Nicola; Vercesi, Valerio; Verducci, Monica; Verkerke, Wouter; Vermeulen, Jos; Vetterli, Michel; Vichou, Irene; Vickey, Trevor; Viehhauser, Georg; Villa, Mauro; Villani, Giulio; Villaplana Perez, Miguel; Vilucchi, Elisabetta; Vincter, Manuella; Vinek, Elisabeth; Vinogradov, Vladimir; Viret, Sébastien; Virzi, Joseph; Vitale , Antonio; Vitells, Ofer; Vivarelli, Iacopo; Vives Vaque, Francesc; Vlachos, Sotirios; Vlasak, Michal; Vlasov, Nikolai; Vogel, Adrian; Vokac, Petr; Volpi, Matteo; von der Schmitt, Hans; von Loeben, Joerg; von Radziewski, Holger; von Toerne, Eckhard; Vorobel, Vit; Vorwerk, Volker; Vos, Marcel; Voss, Rudiger; Voss, Thorsten Tobias; Vossebeld, Joost; Vranjes, Nenad; Vranjes Milosavljevic, Marija; Vrba, Vaclav; Vreeswijk, Marcel; Vu Anh, Tuan; Vudragovic, Dusan; Vuillermet, Raphael; Vukotic, Ilija; Wagner, Peter; Walbersloh, Jorg; Walder, James; Walker, Rodney; Walkowiak, Wolfgang; Wall, Richard; Wang, Chiho; Wang, Haichen; Wang, Jin; Wang, Song-Ming; Warburton, Andreas; Ward, Patricia; Warsinsky, Markus; Wastie, Roy; Watkins, Peter; Watson, Alan; Watson, Miriam; Watts, Gordon; Watts, Stephen; Waugh, Anthony; Waugh, Ben; Weber, Marc; Weber, Manuel; Weber, Michele; Weber, Pavel; Weidberg, Anthony; Weingarten, Jens; Weiser, Christian; Wellenstein, Hermann; Wells, Phillippa; Wen, Mei; Wenaus, Torre; Wendler, Shanti; Wengler, Thorsten; Wenig, Siegfried; Wermes, Norbert; Werner, Matthias; Werner, Per; Werth, Michael; Werthenbach, Ulrich; Wessels, Martin; Whalen, Kathleen; White, Andrew; White, Martin; White, Sebastian; Whitehead, Samuel Robert; Whiteson, Daniel; Whittington, Denver; Wicek, Francois; Wicke, Daniel; Wickens, Fred; Wiedenmann, Werner; Wielers, Monika; Wienemann, Peter; Wiglesworth, Craig; Wiik, Liv Antje Mari; Wildauer, Andreas; Wildt, Martin Andre; Wilkens, Henric George; Williams, Eric; Williams, Hugh; Willocq, Stephane; Wilson, John; Wilson, Michael Galante; Wilson, Alan; Wingerter-Seez, Isabelle; Winklmeier, Frank; Wittgen, Matthias; Wolter, Marcin Wladyslaw; Wolters, Helmut; Wosiek, Barbara; Wotschack, Jorg; Woudstra, Martin; Wraight, Kenneth; Wright, Catherine; Wright, Dennis; Wrona, Bozydar; Wu, Sau Lan; Wu, Xin; Wulf, Evan; Wynne, Benjamin; Xaplanteris, Leonidas; Xella, Stefania; Xie, Song; Xu, Da; Xu, Neng; Yamada, Miho; Yamamoto, Akira; Yamamoto, Kyoko; Yamamoto, Shimpei; Yamamura, Taiki; Yamaoka, Jared; Yamazaki, Takayuki; Yamazaki, Yuji; Yan, Zhen; Yang, Haijun; Yang, Un-Ki; Yang, Zhaoyu; Yao, Weiming; Yao, Yushu; Yasu, Yoshiji; Ye, Jingbo; Ye, Shuwei; Yilmaz, Metin; Yoosoofmiya, Reza; Yorita, Kohei; Yoshida, Riktura; Young, Charles; Youssef, Saul; Yu, Dantong; Yu, Jaehoon; Yuan, Li; Yurkewicz, Adam; Zaidan, Remi; Zaitsev, Alexander; Zajacova, Zuzana; Zambrano, Valentina; Zanello, Lucia; Zaytsev, Alexander; Zeitnitz, Christian; Zeller, Michael; Zemla, Andrzej; Zendler, Carolin; Zenin, Oleg; Ženiš, Tibor; Zenonos, Zenonas; Zenz, Seth; Zerwas, Dirk; Zevi della Porta, Giovanni; Zhan, Zhichao; Zhang, Huaqiao; Zhang, Jinlong; Zhang, Qizhi; Zhang, Xueyao; Zhao, Long; Zhao, Tianchi; Zhao, Zhengguo; Zhemchugov, Alexey; Zhong, Jiahang; Zhou, Bing; Zhou, Ning; Zhou, Yue; Zhu, Cheng Guang; Zhu, Hongbo; Zhu, Yingchun; Zhuang, Xuai; Zhuravlov, Vadym; Zimmermann, Robert; Zimmermann, Simone; Zimmermann, Stephanie; Ziolkowski, Michael; Živković, Lidija; Zobernig, Georg; Zoccoli, Antonio; zur Nedden, Martin; Zutshi, Vishnu

    2010-01-01

    The simulation software for the ATLAS Experiment at the Large Hadron Collider is being used for large-scale production of events on the LHC Computing Grid. This simulation requires many components, from the generators that simulate particle collisions, through packages simulating the response of the various detectors and triggers. All of these components come together under the ATLAS simulation infrastructure. In this paper, that infrastructure is discussed, including that supporting the detector description, interfacing the event generation, and combining the GEANT4 simulation of the response of the individual detectors. Also described are the tools allowing the software validation, performance testing, and the validation of the simulated output against known physics processes.

  18. Transformation of technical infrastructure

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Nielsen, Susanne Balslev

    The scope of the project is to investigate the possibillities of - and the barriers for a transformation of technical infrastructure conserning energy, water and waste. It focus on urban ecology as a transformation strategy. The theoretical background of the project is theories about infrastructure......, the evolution of large technological systems and theories about organisational and technological transformationprocesses. The empirical work consist of three analysis at three different levels: socio-technical descriptions of each sector, an envestigation of one municipality and envestigations of one workshop...

  19. Collaborative financial infrastructure protection

    CERN Document Server

    Baldoni, Roberto

    2012-01-01

    The Critical Infrastructure Protection Survey recently released by Symantec found that 53% of interviewed IT security experts from international companies experienced at least ten cyber attacks in the last five years, and financial institutions were often subject to some of the most sophisticated and large-scale cyber attacks and frauds. The book by Baldoni and Chockler analyzes the structure of software infrastructures found in the financial domain, their vulnerabilities to cyber attacks and the existing protection mechanisms. It then shows the advantages of sharing information among financia

  20. The ATLAS Simulation Infrastructure

    Science.gov (United States)

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C.; Petit, E.; Petridou, C.; Petrolo, E.; Petrucci, F.; Petschull, D.; Petteni, M.; Pezoa, R.; Phan, A.; Phillips, A. W.; Piacquadio, G.; Piccinini, M.; Piegaia, R.; Pilcher, J. E.; Pilkington, A. D.; Pina, J.; Pinamonti, M.; Pinfold, J. L.; Pinto, B.; Pizio, C.; Placakyte, R.; Plamondon, M.; Pleier, M.-A.; Poblaguev, A.; Poddar, S.; Podlyski, F.; Poffenberger, P.; Poggioli, L.; Pohl, M.; Polci, F.; Polesello, G.; Policicchio, A.; Polini, A.; Poll, J.; Polychronakos, V.; Pomeroy, D.; Pommès, K.; Ponsot, P.; Pontecorvo, L.; Pope, B. G.; Popeneciu, G. A.; Popovic, D. S.; Poppleton, A.; Popule, J.; Portell Bueso, X.; Porter, R.; Pospelov, G. E.; Pospisil, S.; Potekhin, M.; Potrap, I. N.; Potter, C. J.; Potter, C. T.; Potter, K. P.; Poulard, G.; Poveda, J.; Prabhu, R.; Pralavorio, P.; Prasad, S.; Pravahan, R.; Pribyl, L.; Price, D.; Price, L. E.; Prichard, P. M.; Prieur, D.; Primavera, M.; Prokofiev, K.; Prokoshin, F.; Protopopescu, S.; Proudfoot, J.; Prudent, X.; Przysiezniak, H.; Psoroulas, S.; Ptacek, E.; Puigdengoles, C.; Purdham, J.; Purohit, M.; Puzo, P.; Pylypchenko, Y.; Qi, M.; Qian, J.; Qian, W.; Qin, Z.; Quadt, A.; Quarrie, D. R.; Quayle, W. B.; Quinonez, F.; Raas, M.; Radeka, V.; Radescu, V.; Radics, B.; Rador, T.; Ragusa, F.; Rahal, G.; Rahimi, A. M.; Rajagopalan, S.; Rammensee, M.; Rammes, M.; Rauscher, F.; Rauter, E.; Raymond, M.; Read, A. L.; Rebuzzi, D. M.; Redelbach, A.; Redlinger, G.; Reece, R.; Reeves, K.; Reinherz-Aronis, E.; Reinsch, A.; Reisinger, I.; Reljic, D.; Rembser, C.; Ren, Z. L.; Renkel, P.; Rescia, S.; Rescigno, M.; Resconi, S.; Resende, B.; Reznicek, P.; Rezvani, R.; Richards, A.; Richards, R. A.; Richter, R.; Richter-Was, E.; Ridel, M.; Rijpstra, M.; Rijssenbeek, M.; Rimoldi, A.; Rinaldi, L.; Rios, R. R.; Riu, I.; Rizatdinova, F.; Rizvi, E.; Roa Romero, D. A.; Robertson, S. H.; Robichaud-Veronneau, A.; Robinson, D.; Robinson, J. E. M.; Robinson, M.; Robson, A.; Rocha de Lima, J. G.; Roda, C.; Roda Dos Santos, D.; Rodriguez, D.; Rodriguez Garcia, Y.; Roe, S.; Røhne, O.; Rojo, V.; Rolli, S.; Romaniouk, A.; Romanov, V. M.; Romeo, G.; Romero Maltrana, D.; Roos, L.; Ros, E.; Rosati, S.; Rosenbaum, G. A.; Rosselet, L.; Rossetti, V.; Rossi, L. P.; Rotaru, M.; Rothberg, J.; Rousseau, D.; Royon, C. R.; Rozanov, A.; Rozen, Y.; Ruan, X.; Ruckert, B.; Ruckstuhl, N.; Rud, V. I.; Rudolph, G.; Rühr, F.; Ruggieri, F.; Ruiz-Martinez, A.; Rumyantsev, L.; Rurikova, Z.; Rusakovich, N. A.; Rutherfoord, J. P.; Ruwiedel, C.; Ruzicka, P.; Ryabov, Y. F.; Ryan, P.; Rybkin, G.; Rzaeva, S.; Saavedra, A. F.; Sadrozinski, H. F.-W.; Sadykov, R.; Sakamoto, H.; Salamanna, G.; Salamon, A.; Saleem, M. S.; Salihagic, D.; Salnikov, A.; Salt, J.; Salvachua Ferrando, B. M.; Salvatore, D.; Salvatore, F.; Salvucci, A.; Salzburger, A.; Sampsonidis, D.; Samset, B. H.; Sandaker, H.; Sander, H. G.; Sanders, M. P.; Sandhoff, M.; Sandhu, P.; Sandstroem, R.; Sandvoss, S.; Sankey, D. P. C.; Sanny, B.; Sansoni, A.; Santamarina Rios, C.; Santoni, C.; Santonico, R.; Saraiva, J. G.; Sarangi, T.; Sarkisyan-Grinbaum, E.; Sarri, F.; Sasaki, O.; Sasao, N.; Satsounkevitch, I.; Sauvage, G.; Savard, P.; Savine, A. Y.; Savinov, V.; Sawyer, L.; Saxon, D. H.; Says, L. P.; Sbarra, C.; Sbrizzi, A.; Scannicchio, D. A.; Schaarschmidt, J.; Schacht, P.; Schäfer, U.; Schaetzel, S.; Schaffer, A. C.; Schaile, D.; Schamberger, R. D.; Schamov, A. G.; Schegelsky, V. A.; Scheirich, D.; Schernau, M.; Scherzer, M. I.; Schiavi, C.; Schieck, J.; Schioppa, M.; Schlenker, S.; Schmidt, E.; Schmieden, K.; Schmitt, C.; Schmitz, M.; Schott, M.; Schouten, D.; Schovancova, J.; Schram, M.; Schreiner, A.; Schroeder, C.; Schroer, N.; Schroers, M.; Schultes, J.; Schultz-Coulon, H.-C.; Schumacher, J. W.; Schumacher, M.; Schumm, B. A.; Schune, Ph.; Schwanenberger, C.; Schwartzman, A.; Schwemling, Ph.; Schwienhorst, R.; Schwierz, R.; Schwindling, J.; Scott, W. G.; Searcy, J.; Sedykh, E.; Segura, E.; Seidel, S. C.; Seiden, A.; Seifert, F.; Seixas, J. M.; Sekhniaidze, G.; Seliverstov, D. M.; Sellden, B.; Semprini-Cesari, N.; Serfon, C.; Serin, L.; Seuster, R.; Severini, H.; Sevior, M. E.; Sfyrla, A.; Shabalina, E.; Shamim, M.; Shan, L. Y.; Shank, J. T.; Shao, Q. T.; Shapiro, M.; Shatalov, P. B.; Shaw, K.; Sherman, D.; Sherwood, P.; Shibata, A.; Shimojima, M.; Shin, T.; Shmeleva, A.; Shochet, M. J.; Shupe, M. A.; Sicho, P.; Sidoti, A.; Siegert, F.; Siegrist, J.; Sijacki, Dj.; Silbert, O.; Silva, J.; Silver, Y.; Silverstein, D.; Silverstein, S. B.; Simak, V.; Simic, Lj.; Simion, S.; Simmons, B.; Simonyan, M.; Sinervo, P.; Sinev, N. B.; Sipica, V.; Siragusa, G.; Sisakyan, A. N.; Sivoklokov, S. Yu.; Sjoelin, J.; Sjursen, T. B.; Skovpen, K.; Skubic, P.; Slater, M.; Slavicek, T.; Sliwa, K.; Sloper, J.; Sluka, T.; Smakhtin, V.; Smirnov, S. Yu.; Smirnov, Y.; Smirnova, L. N.; Smirnova, O.; Smith, B. C.; Smith, D.; Smith, K. M.; Smizanska, M.; Smolek, K.; Snesarev, A. A.; Snow, S. W.; Snow, J.; Snuverink, J.; Snyder, S.; Soares, M.; Sobie, R.; Sodomka, J.; Soffer, A.; Solans, C. A.; Solar, M.; Solc, J.; Solfaroli Camillocci, E.; Solodkov, A. A.; Solovyanov, O. V.; Soluk, R.; Sondericker, J.; Sopko, V.; Sopko, B.; Sosebee, M.; Soukharev, A.; Spagnolo, S.; Spanò, F.; Spencer, E.; Spighi, R.; Spigo, G.; Spila, F.; Spiwoks, R.; Spousta, M.; Spreitzer, T.; Spurlock, B.; Denis, R. D. St.; Stahl, T.; Stahlman, J.; Stamen, R.; Stancu, S. N.; Stanecka, E.; Stanek, R. W.; Stanescu, C.; Stapnes, S.; Starchenko, E. A.; Stark, J.; Staroba, P.; Starovoitov, P.; Stastny, J.; Stavina, P.; Stavropoulos, G.; Steele, G.; Steinbach, P.; Steinberg, P.; Stekl, I.; Stelzer, B.; Stelzer, H. J.; Stelzer-Chilton, O.; Stenzel, H.; Stevenson, K.; Stewart, G. A.; Stockton, M. C.; Stoerig, K.; Stoicea, G.; Stonjek, S.; Strachota, P.; Stradling, A. R.; Straessner, A.; Strandberg, J.; Strandberg, S.; Strandlie, A.; Strauss, M.; Strizenec, P.; Ströhmer, R.; Strom, D. M.; Stroynowski, R.; Strube, J.; Stugu, B.; Soh, D. A.; Su, D.; Sugaya, Y.; Sugimoto, T.; Suhr, C.; Suk, M.; Sulin, V. V.; Sultansoy, S.; Sumida, T.; Sun, X. H.; Sundermann, J. E.; Suruliz, K.; Sushkov, S.; Susinno, G.; Sutton, M. R.; Suzuki, T.; Suzuki, Y.; Sykora, I.; Sykora, T.; Szymocha, T.; Sánchez, J.; Ta, D.; Tackmann, K.; Taffard, A.; Tafirout, R.; Taga, A.; Takahashi, Y.; Takai, H.; Takashima, R.; Takeda, H.; Takeshita, T.; Talby, M.; Talyshev, A.; Tamsett, M. C.; Tanaka, J.; Tanaka, R.; Tanaka, S.; Tanaka, S.; Tapprogge, S.; Tardif, D.; Tarem, S.; Tarrade, F.; Tartarelli, G. F.; Tas, P.; Tasevsky, M.; Tassi, E.; Tatarkhanov, M.; Taylor, C.; Taylor, F. E.; Taylor, G. N.; Taylor, R. P.; Taylor, W.; Teixeira-Dias, P.; Ten Kate, H.; Teng, P. K.; Tennenbaum-Katan, Y. D.; Terada, S.; Terashi, K.; Terron, J.; Terwort, M.; Testa, M.; Teuscher, R. J.; Thioye, M.; Thoma, S.; Thomas, J. P.; Thompson, E. N.; Thompson, P. D.; Thompson, P. D.; Thompson, R. J.; Thompson, A. S.; Thomson, E.; Thun, R. P.; Tic, T.; Tikhomirov, V. O.; Tikhonov, Y. A.; Tipton, P.; Tique Aires Viegas, F. J.; Tisserant, S.; Toczek, B.; Todorov, T.; Todorova-Nova, S.; Toggerson, B.; Tojo, J.; Tokár, S.; Tokushuku, K.; Tollefson, K.; Tomasek, L.; Tomasek, M.; Tomoto, M.; Tompkins, L.; Toms, K.; Tonoyan, A.; Topfel, C.; Topilin, N. D.; Torrence, E.; Torró Pastor, E.; Toth, J.; Touchard, F.; Tovey, D. R.; Trefzger, T.; Tremblet, L.; Tricoli, A.; Trigger, I. M.; Trincaz-Duvoid, S.; Trinh, T. N.; Tripiana, M. F.; Triplett, N.; Trischuk, W.; Trivedi, A.; Trocmé, B.; Troncon, C.; Trzupek, A.; Tsarouchas, C.; Tseng, J. C.-L.; Tsiakiris, M.; Tsiareshka, P. V.; Tsionou, D.; Tsipolitis, G.; Tsiskaridze, V.; Tskhadadze, E. G.; Tsukerman, I. I.; Tsulaia, V.; Tsung, J.-W.; Tsuno, S.; Tsybychev, D.; Tuggle, J. M.; Turecek, D.; Turk Cakir, I.; Turlay, E.; Tuts, P. M.; Twomey, M. S.; Tylmad, M.; Tyndel, M.; Uchida, K.; Ueda, I.; Ugland, M.; Uhlenbrock, M.; Uhrmacher, M.; Ukegawa, F.; Unal, G.; Undrus, A.; Unel, G.; Unno, Y.; Urbaniec, D.; Urkovsky, E.; Urquijo, P.; Urrejola, P.; Usai, G.; Uslenghi, M.; Vacavant, L.; Vacek, V.; Vachon, B.; Vahsen, S.; Valente, P.; Valentinetti, S.; Valkar, S.; Valladolid Gallego, E.; Vallecorsa, S.; Valls Ferrer, J. A.; van Berg, R.; van der Graaf, H.; van der Kraaij, E.; van der Poel, E.; van der Ster, D.; van Eldik, N.; van Gemmeren, P.; van Kesteren, Z.; van Vulpen, I.; Vandelli, W.; Vaniachine, A.; Vankov, P.; Vannucci, F.; Vari, R.; Varnes, E. W.; Varouchas, D.; Vartapetian, A.; Varvell, K. E.; Vasilyeva, L.; Vassilakopoulos, V. I.; Vazeille, F.; Vellidis, C.; Veloso, F.; Veneziano, S.; Ventura, A.; Ventura, D.; Venturi, M.; Venturi, N.; Vercesi, V.; Verducci, M.; Verkerke, W.; Vermeulen, J. C.; Vetterli, M. C.; Vichou, I.; Vickey, T.; Viehhauser, G. H. A.; Villa, M.; Villani, E. G.; Villaplana Perez, M.; Vilucchi, E.; Vincter, M. G.; Vinek, E.; Vinogradov, V. B.; Viret, S.; Virzi, J.; Vitale, A.; Vitells, O.; Vivarelli, I.; Vives Vaque, F.; Vlachos, S.; Vlasak, M.; Vlasov, N.; Vogel, A.; Vokac, P.; Volpi, M.; von der Schmitt, H.; von Loeben, J.; von Radziewski, H.; von Toerne, E.; Vorobel, V.; Vorwerk, V.; Vos, M.; Voss, R.; Voss, T. T.; Vossebeld, J. H.; Vranjes, N.; Vranjes Milosavljevic, M.; Vrba, V.; Vreeswijk, M.; Vu Anh, T.; Vudragovic, D.; Vuillermet, R.; Vukotic, I.; Wagner, P.; Walbersloh, J.; Walder, J.; Walker, R.; Walkowiak, W.; Wall, R.; Wang, C.; Wang, H.; Wang, J.; Wang, S. M.; Warburton, A.; Ward, C. P.; Warsinsky, M.; Wastie, R.; Watkins, P. M.; Watson, A. T.; Watson, M. F.; Watts, G.; Watts, S.; Waugh, A. T.; Waugh, B. M.; Weber, M. D.; Weber, M.; Weber, M. S.; Weber, P.; Weidberg, A. R.; Weingarten, J.; Weiser, C.; Wellenstein, H.; Wells, P. S.; Wen, M.; Wenaus, T.; Wendler, S.; Wengler, T.; Wenig, S.; Wermes, N.; Werner, M.; Werner, P.; Werth, M.; Werthenbach, U.; Wessels, M.; Whalen, K.; White, A.; White, M. J.; White, S.; Whitehead, S. R.; Whiteson, D.; Whittington, D.; Wicek, F.; Wicke, D.; Wickens, F. J.; Wiedenmann, W.; Wielers, M.; Wienemann, P.; Wiglesworth, C.; Wiik, L. A. M.; Wildauer, A.; Wildt, M. A.; Wilkens, H. G.; Williams, E.; Williams, H. H.; Willocq, S.; Wilson, J. A.; Wilson, M. G.; Wilson, A.; Wingerter-Seez, I.; Winklmeier, F.; Wittgen, M.; Wolter, M. W.; Wolters, H.; Wosiek, B. K.; Wotschack, J.; Woudstra, M. J.; Wraight, K.; Wright, C.; Wright, D.; Wrona, B.; Wu, S. L.; Wu, X.; Wulf, E.; Wynne, B. M.; Xaplanteris, L.; Xella, S.; Xie, S.; Xu, D.; Xu, N.; Yamada, M.; Yamamoto, A.; Yamamoto, K.; Yamamoto, S.; Yamamura, T.; Yamaoka, J.; Yamazaki, T.; Yamazaki, Y.; Yan, Z.; Yang, H.; Yang, U. K.; Yang, Z.; Yao, W.-M.; Yao, Y.; Yasu, Y.; Ye, J.; Ye, S.; Yilmaz, M.; Yoosoofmiya, R.; Yorita, K.; Yoshida, R.; Young, C.; Youssef, S. P.; Yu, D.; Yu, J.; Yuan, L.; Yurkewicz, A.; Zaidan, R.; Zaitsev, A. M.; Zajacova, Z.; Zambrano, V.; Zanello, L.; Zaytsev, A.; Zeitnitz, C.; Zeller, M.; Zemla, A.; Zendler, C.; Zenin, O.; Zenis, T.; Zenonos, Z.; Zenz, S.; Zerwas, D.; Zevi Della Porta, G.; Zhan, Z.; Zhang, H.; Zhang, J.; Zhang, Q.; Zhang, X.; Zhao, L.; Zhao, T.; Zhao, Z.; Zhemchugov, A.; Zhong, J.; Zhou, B.; Zhou, N.; Zhou, Y.; Zhu, C. G.; Zhu, H.; Zhu, Y.; Zhuang, X.; Zhuravlov, V.; Zimmermann, R.; Zimmermann, S.; Zimmermann, S.; Ziolkowski, M.; Živković, L.; Zobernig, G.; Zoccoli, A.; Zur Nedden, M.; Zutshi, V.

    2010-12-01

    The simulation software for the ATLAS Experiment at the Large Hadron Collider is being used for large-scale production of events on the LHC Computing Grid. This simulation requires many components, from the generators that simulate particle collisions, through packages simulating the response of the various detectors and triggers. All of these components come together under the ATLAS simulation infrastructure. In this paper, that infrastructure is discussed, including that supporting the detector description, interfacing the event generation, and combining the GEANT4 simulation of the response of the individual detectors. Also described are the tools allowing the software validation, performance testing, and the validation of the simulated output against known physics processes.

  1. Safeguards First Principles Initiative at the Nevada Test Site

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Geneva Johnson

    2007-07-08

    The Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) program at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) was selected as a test bed for the Safeguards First Principles Initiative (SFPI). The implementation of the SFPI is evaluated using the system effectiveness model and the program is managed under an approved MC&A Plan. The effectiveness model consists of an evaluation of the critical elements necessary to detect, deter, and/or prevent the theft or diversion of Special Nuclear Material (SNM). The modeled results indicate that the MC&A program established under this variance is still effective, without creating unacceptable risk. Extensive performance testing is conducted through the duration of the pilot to ensure the protection system is effective and no material is at an unacceptable risk. The pilot was conducted from January 1, 2007, through May 30, 2007. This paper will discuss the following activities in association with SFPI: 1. Development of Timeline 2. Crosswalk of DOE Order and SFPI 3. Peer Review 4. Deviation 5. MC&A Plan and Procedure changes 6. Changes implemented at NTS 7. Training 8. Performance Test

  2. The nuclear materials control technology briefing book

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hartwell, J.K.; Fernandez, S.J.

    1992-03-01

    As national and international interests in nuclear arms control and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, intensify, it becomes ever more important that contributors be aware of the technologies available for the measurement and control of the nuclear materials important to nuclear weapons development. This briefing book presents concise, nontechnical summaries of various special nuclear material (SNM) and tritium production monitoring technologies applicable to the control of nuclear materials and their production. Since the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) operates a multinational, on-site-inspector-based safeguards program in support of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), many (but not all) of the technologies reported in this document are in routine use or under development for IAEA safeguards.

  3. Radio-Frequency (RF) Devices for Safeguards: Where We Are and Where We Need to Go

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rowe, Nathan C [ORNL; Younkin, James R [ORNL; Pickett, Chris A [ORNL; Whitaker, J Michael [ORNL

    2011-01-01

    Radio-Frequency (RF) devices have revolutionized many aspects of modern industrial processes. RF technology can enable wireless communication for tag identification, sensor communication, and asset tracking. Radio-frequency identification (RFID) is a technology that utilizes wireless communication to interrogate and identify an electronic tag attached to an item in order to identify the item. The technology can come in many forms: passive or active tags, low to ultra-wideband frequencies, small paper-thin tags to brick-sized units, and simple tags or highly integrated sensor packages. RF technology, and specifically RFID, has been applied widely in commercial markets for inventory, supply chain management, and asset tracking. Several recent studies have demonstrated the safeguards benefits of utilizing RFID versus conventional inventory tagging methods for tracking nuclear material. These studies have indicated that the RF requirements for safeguards functions are more stringent than the RF requirements for other inventory tracking and accounting applications. Additionally, other requirements must be addressed, including environmental and operating conditions, authentication, and tag location and attachment. Facility restrictions on radio spectrum, method of tag attachment, and sensitivity of the data collected impact the tag selection and system design. More important, the intended use of the system must be considered. The requirements for using RF to simply replace or supplement container identifiers such as bar codes that facilitate the inventory function will differ greatly from the requirements for deploying RF for unattended monitoring applications. Several studies have investigated these considerations to advance commercial RF devices for safeguards use, and a number of system concepts have been developed. This paper will provide an overview of past studies and current technologies, and will investigate the requirements, existing gaps, and several potential

  4. Opportunities to more fully utilize safeguards information reported to the IAEA at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Garner, James R [ORNL; Whitaker, J Michael [ORNL

    2015-01-01

    In an effort to increase transparency and to strengthen IAEA safeguards, more countries are adopting practices that provide the IAEA with more timely, safeguards-relevant information to confirm nuclear operations are as declared. At Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEPs) potential examples include installing unattended IAEA instruments that transmit selected information back to Vienna, instruments that collect and store measurement information on-site, and daily facility operator submissions of material receipts, shipments, or utilization of key operational systems (e.g., UF6 feed stations) to on-site mail boxes. Recently the IAEA has implemented the use of on-site mailbox systems supplemented with short notice or unannounced inspections to maintain effectiveness without significantly increasing the number of inspection days. While these measures significantly improves the IAEA’s effectiveness, we have identified several opportunities for how the use of this information could be improved and how some additional information would further improve safeguards. This paper presents concepts for how the safeguards information currently collected at GCEPs could be more effectively utilized through enhancing the way that raw data is displayed visually so that it is more intuitive to the inspector and provides for more effective inspection planning and execution, comparing information with previous IAEA inspection activities (lists of previous verified inventory), through comparing data with operator supplied data when inspectors arrive (notional inventory change reports), and through evaluating the data over time to provide even greater confidence in the data and operations as declared in between inspections. This paper will also discuss several potential improvements to the submissions themselves, such as including occupancy information about product and tails stations and including weight information for each station.

  5. Regional study on investment for transmission infrastructure in China based on the State Grid data

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wei, Wendong; Wu, Xudong; Wu, Xiaofang; Xi, Qiangmin; Ji, Xi; Li, Guoping

    2016-06-01

    Transmission infrastructure is an integral component of safeguarding the stability of electricity delivery. However, existing studies of transmission infrastructure mostly rely on a simple review of the network, while the analysis of investments remains rudimentary. This study conducted the first regionally focused analysis of investments in transmission infrastructure in China to help optimize its structure and reduce investment costs. Using State Grid data, the investment costs, under various voltages, for transmission lines and transformer substations are calculated. By analyzing the regional profile of cumulative investment in transmission infrastructure, we assess correlations between investment, population, and economic development across the regions. The recent development of ultra-high-voltage transmission networks will provide policy-makers new options for policy development.

  6. Regional study on investment for transmission infrastructure in China based on the State Grid data

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wei, Wendong; Wu, Xudong; Wu, Xiaofang; Xi, Qiangmin; Ji, Xi; Li, Guoping

    2017-03-01

    Transmission infrastructure is an integral component of safeguarding the stability of electricity delivery. However, existing studies of transmission infrastructure mostly rely on a simple review of the network, while the analysis of investments remains rudimentary. This study conducted the first regionally focused analysis of investments in transmission infrastructure in China to help optimize its structure and reduce investment costs. Using State Grid data, the investment costs, under various voltages, for transmission lines and transformer substations are calculated. By analyzing the regional profile of cumulative investment in transmission infrastructure, we assess correlations between investment, population, and economic development across the regions. The recent development of ultra-high-voltage transmission networks will provide policy-makers new options for policy development.

  7. Delayed Gamma-ray Spectroscopy for Safeguards Applications

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mozin, Vladimir [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

    2017-01-03

    The delayed gamma-ray assay technique utilizes an external neutron source (D-D, D-T, or electron accelerator-driven), and high-resolution gamma-ray spectrometers to perform characterization of SNM materials behind shielding and in complex configurations such as a nuclear fuel assembly. High-energy delayed gamma-rays (2.5 MeV and above) observed following the active interrogation, provide a signature for identification of specific fissionable isotopes in a mixed sample, and determine their relative content. Potential safeguards applications of this method are: 1) characterization of fresh and spent nuclear fuel assemblies in wet or dry storage; 2) analysis of uranium enrichment in shielded or non-characterized containers or in the presence of a strong radioactive background and plutonium contamination; 3) characterization of bulk and waste and product streams at SNM processing plants. Extended applications can include warhead confirmation and warhead dismantlement confirmation in the arms control area, as well as SNM diagnostics for the emergency response needs. In FY16 and prior years, the project has demonstrated the delayed gamma-ray measurement technique as a robust SNM assay concept. A series of empirical and modeling studies were conducted to characterize its response sensitivity, develop analysis methodologies, and analyze applications. Extensive experimental tests involving weapons-grade Pu, HEU and depleted uranium samples were completed at the Idaho Accelerator Center and LLNL Dome facilities for various interrogation time regimes and effects of the neutron source parameters. A dedicated delayed gamma-ray response modeling technique was developed and its elements were benchmarked in representative experimental studies, including highresolution gamma-ray measurements of spent fuel at the CLAB facility in Sweden. The objective of the R&D effort in FY17 is to experimentally demonstrate the feasibility of the delayed gamma-ray interrogation of shielded SNM

  8. Nuclear legislation in the European Union; Legislacion nuclear en la Union Europea

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dovale, I.

    2009-07-01

    European Nuclear Legislation, developed under the Euratom Treaty, has evolved in accordance with established priorities and the interpretation of the Treaty on the legislative competence of the Community, and prevailing in particular rules on radiological protection and prevention against the risks of proliferation. The approval, in this year 2009, of a Directive on Nuclear Safety, is an important step in the harmonization of legislation on matters that have not been subject to common regulation, as nuclear safety, and it could have its continuation in a future Directive on the safety, and it could have its continuation in a future. Directive on the safety radioactive waste management. As for nuclear safeguards, a reform in the safeguards regimes in both European and international field has been promoted in order to implement an integrated safeguards system, whose implementation is expected to finalise in January 2010. (Author)

  9. Review Facility Design Drawings M3FT-16LA040105011 - Safeguards and Security by Design for Used Fuel Extended Storage: 1.02.04.01.05 FT – 16LA04010501

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Scherer, Carolynn P. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Rauch, Eric Benton [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2016-04-14

    This work package focuses on developing Best Practices for the design of security for, and domestic safeguarding (e.g. MC&A) of, a pilot-scale independent spent/used fuel storage facility consistent with conceptual design efforts in Nuclear Fuels Storage and Transportation (NFST) and Used Fuel Disposal (UFD) campaigns. This is a review of the basic design of the facility to determine a candidate list of accounting and control requirements that could be considered for safeguards and security purposes.

  10. Review Facility Design Drawings M3FT-16LA040105011 - Safeguards and Security by Design for Used Fuel Extended Storage: 1.02.04.01.05 FT – 16LA04010501

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Scherer, Carolynn P. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Rauch, Eric Benton [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2016-04-14

    This work package focuses on developing Best Practices for the design of security for, and domestic safeguarding (e.g. MC&A) of, a pilot-scale independent spent/used fuel storage facility consistent with conceptual design efforts in Nuclear Fuels Storage and Transportation (NFST) and Used Fuel Disposal (UFD) campaigns. This is a review of the basic design of the facility to determine a candidate list of accounting and control requirements that could be considered for safeguards and security purposes.

  11. Sustainable Bridge Infrastructure Procurement

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Safi, Mohammed; Du, Guangli; Simonsson, Peter

    2016-01-01

    The lack of a flexible but systematic approach for integrating lifecycle aspects into bridge investment decisions is a major obstacle hindering the procurement of sustainable bridge infrastructures. This paper addresses this obstacle by introducing a holistic approach that agencies could use...

  12. Social experience infrastructure

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kvistgaard, Peter

    2006-01-01

    Using the case of Kühlungsborn in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern as an example of a resort in which social experience infrastructure plays a pivotal role in the ongoing success of attracting German tourists from especially Berlin, Hamburg and Hanover it is the aim of this article in a descriptive...

  13. Building National Healthcare Infrastructure

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Jensen, Tina Blegind; Thorseng, Anne

    2017-01-01

    This case chapter is about the evolution of the Danish national e-health portal, sundhed.dk, which provides patient-oriented digital services. We present how the organization behind sundhed.dk succeeded in establishing a national healthcare infrastructure by (1) collating and assembling existing ...

  14. Building National Healthcare Infrastructure

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Jensen, Tina Blegind; Thorseng, Anne

    2017-01-01

    This case chapter is about the evolution of the Danish national e-health portal, sundhed.dk, which provides patient-oriented digital services. We present how the organization behind sundhed.dk succeeded in establishing a national healthcare infrastructure by (1) collating and assembling existing...

  15. Network Infrastructure Security

    CERN Document Server

    Wong, Angus

    2009-01-01

    Attacks to network infrastructure affect large portions of the Internet at a time and create large amounts of service disruption, due to breaches such as IP spoofing, routing table poisoning and routing loops. This book includes conceptual examples that show how network attacks can be run, along with appropriate countermeasures and solutions

  16. Assessing spatial data infrastructures

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Grus, L.

    2010-01-01

    Over the last two decades many countries and regions throughout the world have taken steps to establish Spatial Data Infrastructures (SDIs). Developing SDIs requires a considerable amount of time, energy and financial resources. Therefore it is increasingly important to assess SDI outcomes in order

  17. Language Convergence Infrastructure

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    V. Zaytsev (Vadim); J.M. Fernandes; R. Lämmel (Ralf); J.M.W. Visser (Joost); J. Saraiva

    2011-01-01

    htmlabstractThe process of grammar convergence involves grammar extraction and transformation for structural equivalence and contains a range of technical challenges. These need to be addressed in order for the method to deliver useful results. The paper describes a DSL and the infrastructure behind

  18. Analysis of the impact of safeguards criteria

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mullen, M.F.; Reardon, P.T.

    1981-01-01

    As part of the US Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards, the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) was asked to assist in developing and demonstrating a model for assessing the impact of setting criteria for the application of IAEA safeguards. This report presents the results of PNL's work on the task. The report is in three parts. The first explains the technical approach and methodology. The second contains an example application of the methodology. The third presents the conclusions of the study. PNL used the model and computer programs developed as part of Task C.5 (Estimation of Inspection Efforts) of the Program of Technical Assistance. The example application of the methodology involves low-enriched uranium conversion and fuel fabrication facilities. The effects of variations in seven parameters are considered: false alarm probability, goal probability of detection, detection goal quantity, the plant operator's measurement capability, the inspector's variables measurement capability, the inspector's attributes measurement capability, and annual plant throughput. Among the key results and conclusions of the analysis are the following: the variables with the greatest impact on the probability of detection are the inspector's measurement capability, the goal quantity, and the throughput; the variables with the greatest impact on inspection costs are the throughput, the goal quantity, and the goal probability of detection; there are important interactions between variables. That is, the effects of a given variable often depends on the level or value of some other variable. With the methodology used in this study, these interactions can be quantitatively analyzed; reasonably good approximate prediction equations can be developed using the methodology described here.

  19. The use of kragten spreadsheets for uncertainty evaluation of uranium potentiometric analysis by the Brazilian Safeguards Laboratory

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Silva, Jose Wanderley S. da; Barros, Pedro Dionisio de; Araujo, Radier Mario S. de, E-mail: wanderley@ird.gov.b, E-mail: pedrodio@ird.b, E-mail: radier@ird.gov.b [Instituto de Radioprotecao e Dosimetria (IRD/CNEN-RJ), Rio de Janeiro, RH (Brazil). Lab. de Salvaguardas

    2009-07-01

    In safeguards, independent analysis of uranium content and enrichment of nuclear materials to verify operator's declarations is an important tool to evaluate the accountability system applied by nuclear installations. This determination may be performed by nondestructive (NDA) methods, generally done in the field using portable radiation detection systems, or destructive (DA) methods by chemical analysis when more accurate and precise results are necessary. Samples for DA analysis are collected by inspectors during safeguards inspections and sent to Safeguards Laboratory (LASAL) of the Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission - (CNEN), where the analysis take place. The method used by LASAL for determination of uranium in different physical and chemical forms is the Davies and Gray/NBL using an automatic potentiometric titrator, which performs the titration of uranium IV by a standard solution of K{sub 2}Cr{sub 2}O{sub 7}. Uncertainty budgets have been determined based on the concepts of the ISO 'Guide to the Expression of Uncertainty in Measurement' (GUM). In order to simplify the calculation of the uncertainty, a computational tool named Kragten Spreadsheet was used. Such spreadsheet uses the concepts established by the GUM and provides results that numerically approximates to those obtained by propagation of uncertainty with analytically determined sensitivity coefficients. The main parameters (input quantities) interfering on the uncertainty were studied. In order to evaluate their contribution in the final uncertainty, the uncertainties of all steps of the analytical method were estimated and compiled. (author)

  20. Security infrastructure for on-demand provisioned Cloud infrastructure services

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Demchenko, Y.; Ngo, B.; de Laat, C.T.A.M.; Wlodarczyk, T.; Rong, C.; Ziegler, W.

    2011-01-01

    Providing consistent security services in on-demand provisioned Cloud infrastructure services is of primary importance due to multi-tenant and potentially multi-provider nature of Clouds Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) environment. Cloud security infrastructure should address two aspects of the I

  1. Design of safeguards information treatment system at the facility level

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Song, Dae Yong; Lee, Byung Doo; Kwack, Eun Ho; Choi, Young Myong

    2001-05-01

    We are developing Safeguards Information Treatment System at the facility level(SITS) to manage synthetically safeguards information and to implement efficiently the obligations under the Korea-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, bilateral agreements with other countries and domestic law. In this report, we described the contents of the detailed design of SITS such as database, I/O layout and program. In the present, we are implementing the SITS based on the contents of the design of SITS, and then we plan to provide the system for the facilities after we finish implementing and testing the system.

  2. Process monitoring in international safeguards for reprocessing plants: A demonstration

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ehinger, M.H.

    1989-01-01

    In the period 1985--1987, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory investigated the possible role of process monitoring for international safeguards applications in fuel reprocessing plants. This activity was conducted under Task C.59, ''Review of Process Monitoring Safeguards Technology for Reprocessing Facilities'' of the US program of Technical Assistance to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards program. The final phase was a demonstration of process monitoring applied in a prototypical reprocessing plant test facility at ORNL. This report documents the demonstration and test results. 35 figs.

  3. Establishing the Safety Infrastructure for NPP in Mongolia

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Enkhbat, Norov [Korea Advanced Institue of Science and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Lee, Y. E. [Korean Institute of Nuclear Safety, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2013-10-15

    The survey results and analyses were used to establish the basis for developing nuclear safety infrastructure in Mongolia. Power Energy effective reform or introduction of nuclear reactors should be implemented in coming future to avoid this critical situation faces us. The most participant suggested that Mongolia may cooperate in the field of nuclear safety and infrastructure development with the Republic of Korea. Nuclear Energy Agency of the government of Mongolia has organized Nuclear Power Infrastructure Development (NUPID) training in cooperating with Seoul National University and other organizations in 2008, 2010 and 2012. There is a need to improve the nuclear energy law of Mongolia. Total energy supply of Mongolia is 5124.08 MWt as of 2012. 92.4% of total energy supply produces with coal, 0.56% with liquid fuel, and 0.01% with renewable energy sources, remained 6% imports from Russia. Mongolia operates seven Thermal Centralized Systems (TCS) with total capacity of 802 MWt, which provides dual; electricity and thermal power. Energy demand in Mongolia is expected to increase, due to the dramatically expanding mining industry. It is absolutely impossible to supply such rapid growth having operated old technology and inefficient production which exists currently in Mongolia. Therefor Mongolian government is interested in utilizing nuclear energy and approved Nuclear Energy Law in 2009. National Development Strategy (2008-2021) stated as that the peaceful exploitation of the nuclear energy will be an important factor for the sustainable development of Magnolia. Action Plan of the Government for 2008-2012 stated as that ...conduct a comprehensive research for use of nuclear energy, develop technical and economic feasibility study and improve radiation control and safety. International community has developed appropriate approaches in the form of IAEA safety standards, which has a positive experience of regulation and safety. These approaches contribute to the

  4. Modeling Dependencies in Critical Infrastructures

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Nieuwenhuijs, A.H.; Luiijf, H.A.M.; Klaver, M.H.A.

    2009-01-01

    This paper describes a model for expressing critical infrastructure dependencies. The model addresses the limitations of existing approaches with respect to clarity of definition, support for quality and the influence of operating states of critical infrastructures and environmental factors.

  5. Flowscapes: Designing infrastructure as landscape

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Nijhuis, S.; Jauslin, D.T.; Van der Hoeven, F.D.

    2015-01-01

    Social, cultural and technological developments of our society are demanding a fundamental review of the planning and design of its landscapes and infrastructures, in particular in relation to environmental issues and sustainability. Transportation, green and water infrastructures are important agen

  6. Flowscapes: Designing infrastructure as landscape

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Nijhuis, S.; Jauslin, D.T.; Van der Hoeven, F.D.

    2015-01-01

    Social, cultural and technological developments of our society are demanding a fundamental review of the planning and design of its landscapes and infrastructures, in particular in relation to environmental issues and sustainability. Transportation, green and water infrastructures are important

  7. RFID as an infrastructure

    CERN Document Server

    Qiao, Yan; Li, Tao

    2014-01-01

    RFID (radio frequency identification) tags are becoming ubiquitously available in object tracking, access control, and toll payment. The current application model treats tags simply as ID carriers and deals with each tag individually for the purpose of identifying the object that the tag is attached to. The uniqueness of RFID as an Infrastructure is to change the traditional individual view to a collective view that treats universally-deployed tags as a new infrastructure, a new wireless platform on which novel applications can be developed. The book begins with an introduction to the problems of tag estimation and information collection from RFID systems, and explains the challenges. It discusses how to efficiently estimate the number of tags in a large RFID system, considering both energy cost and execution time. It then gives a detailed account on how to collect information from a sensor-augmented RFID network with new designs that significantly reduce execution time.

  8. Infrastructures as Ontological Experiments

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Casper Bruun Jensen

    2015-11-01

    Full Text Available Ontology has recently gained renewed attention in science and technology studies and anthropology (e.g. Gad, Jensen and Winthereik 2015; Holbraad, Pedersen and Viveiros de Castro 2014; Woolgar and Lezaun 2013. Yet, it has a considerably longer pedigree than these recent debates might lead one to think. Experiments, of course, have long held the attention of sociologists, historians, and philosophers of science (Collins 1985; Gooding 1990; Shapin and Schaffer 1985. And infrastructures have been the focus of sustained inquiry in the sociology and history of technology (Bowker 1994; Hughes 1983. Once these terms are put into conjunction, however, each gets a somewhat different inflection. The following note briefly explores the conceptual purchase of considering infrastructures as ontological experiments.

  9. Social experience infrastructure

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kvistgaard, Peter

    2006-01-01

    Using the case of Kühlungsborn in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern as an example of a resort in which social experience infrastructure plays a pivotal role in the ongoing success of attracting German tourists from especially Berlin, Hamburg and Hanover it is the aim of this article in a descriptive...... and explorative fashion to share with others thoughts and ideas concerning the development of new ways to construct/reconstruct recreational spaces with a better coherence with regard to designing experiences. This article claims that it is possible to design recreational spaces with good social experience...... infrastructure in order to create experience spaces for personal experiences (in line with Schultze’s social constructivist view of experiences) without completely adhering to the economic rationalist thoughts and guidelines of Pine & Gilmore that claim that experiences can be designed and controlled...

  10. Chef infrastructure automation cookbook

    CERN Document Server

    Marschall, Matthias

    2015-01-01

    This book is for system engineers and administrators who have a fundamental understanding of information management systems and infrastructure. It helps if you've already played around with Chef; however, this book covers all the important topics you will need to know. If you don't want to dig through a whole book before you can get started, this book is for you, as it features a set of independent recipes you can try out immediately.

  11. Documentation of Infrastructure

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Workspace

    2003-01-01

    This report describes the software infrastructure developed within the WorkSPACE  project, both from a software architectural point of view and from a user point of  view. We first give an overview of the system architecture, then go on to present the  more prominent features of the 3D graphical...... user interface (GUI), and finally detail  the software modules involved at a programmer's level. ...

  12. IP Infrastructure Geolocation

    Science.gov (United States)

    2015-03-01

    SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER Department of Homeland Security 245 Murray Lane SW, Washington, DC 20528 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The...the-art network infrastructure geolocation relies on Domain Name System ( DNS ) inferences. However, not only is using the DNS relatively inaccurate for...infras- tructure geolocation, many router interfaces lack DNS name entries. We adapt the technique of Wang et al. to send trace route probes from

  13. Building Infrastructure to Accomodate Growth

    OpenAIRE

    Leon Taylor

    1991-01-01

    Do jurisdictions spend too little on infrastructure? To answer the question, one must separate infrastructure built to accommodate growth from infrastructure built to compete for growth. Underspending is most likely for accommodative infrastructure. This paper finds that the accommodative spending path that maximizes utility is also the path leading to an equilibrium. Empirical data that suggest an equilibrium would cast doubt upon the underspending hypothesis. The paper also compares accommo...

  14. Comparison for thorium fuel cycle facilities of two different capacities for implementation of safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gangotra, Suresh, E-mail: sgangotra@yahoo.co.in; Grover, R.B.; Ramakumar, K.L.

    2013-09-15

    Highlights: • Facilities for implementation of safeguards for thorium fuel cycle have been compared. • Two concepts have been compared. • In one concept, the facilities are designed in hub and spoke concept. • In second concept the facilities are designed as self-contained concept. • The comparison is done on a number of factors, which affect safeguardability and proliferation resistance. -- Abstract: Thorium based nuclear fuel cycle has many attractive features, its inherent proliferation resistance being one of them. This is due to the presence of high energy gamma emitting daughter products of U{sup 232} associated with U{sup 233}. This high energy gamma radiation also poses challenges in nuclear material accounting. A typical thorium fuel cycle facility has a number of plants including a fuel fabrication plant for initial and equilibrium core, a reprocessed U{sup 233} fuel fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, a fuel assembly/disassembly plant and associated waste handling and management plants. A thorium fuel cycle facility can be set up to serve reactors at a site. Alternatively, one can follow a hub and spoke approach with a large thorium fuel cycle facility acting as a hub, catering to the requirements of reactors at several sites as spokes. These two concepts have their respective merits and shortcomings in terms of engineering and economics. The present paper is aimed at comparing the merits and challenges for implementation of safeguards on the two concepts viz. a large fuel cycle hub catering to reactors at several sites versus a small fuel cycle facility dedicated to reactors at a single site.

  15. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory safeguards and security quarterly progress report to the US Department of Energy, quarter ending March 31, 1993

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ruhter, W.D.; Strait, R.S.; Mansur, D.L.; Davis, G.

    1993-04-01

    This quarterly report discusses activities in the Safeguards Technology Program (STP) which is a program in LLNL`s Nuclear Chemistry Division that develop advanced, nondestructive-analysis (NDA) technology for measurement of special nuclear materials. The work focuses on R&D relating to x{minus} and gamma-ray spectrometry techniques and to the development of computer codes for interpreting the spectral data obtained by these techniques.

  16. Energy from nuclear fission an introduction

    CERN Document Server

    De Sanctis, Enzo; Ripani, Marco

    2016-01-01

    This book provides an overview on nuclear physics and energy production from nuclear fission. It serves as a readable and reliable source of information for anyone who wants to have a well-balanced opinion about exploitation of nuclear fission in power plants. The text is divided into two parts; the first covers the basics of nuclear forces and properties of nuclei, nuclear collisions, nuclear stability, radioactivity, and provides a detailed discussion of nuclear fission and relevant topics in its application to energy production. The second part covers the basic technical aspects of nuclear fission reactors, nuclear fuel cycle and resources, safety, safeguards, and radioactive waste management. The book also contains a discussion of the biological effects of nuclear radiation and of radiation protection, and a summary of the ten most relevant nuclear accidents. The book is suitable for undergraduates in physics, nuclear engineering and other science subjects. However, the mathematics is kept at a level that...

  17. Durability of critical infrastructures

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Raluca Pascu

    2011-08-01

    Full Text Available The paper deals with those infrastructures by which world society, under the pressure ofdemographic explosion, self-survives. The main threatening comes not from terrorist attacks, but fromthe great natural catastrophes and global climate change. It’s not for the first time in history when suchmeasures of self-protection are built up. First objective of this paper is to present the background fordurability analysis. Then, with the aid of these mathematical tools the absolute durability of three linearmodels, typical for critical infrastructures, are successively calculated. In order to enhance the durabilityof critical infrastructures the solution based on redundancies is chosen. Five types of connection theredundancies for each of the three models are considered. Three topological schemes for connecting theredundancies are adopted: locally, by twining and globally. Absolute values of durability in all fifteenmodels with redundancies are further calculated. Then, the relative performances of enhanced durabilityin the same fifteen models, compared with the three original models, considered as references, areanalysed. The relative costs of the same fifteen models and in similar topologic conditions are furtheranalysed. By dividing the performance with cost the relative profitableness of each model is obtained.Finally, the three initial models, each reshaped with redundancies in three selective modes, arecompared from the perspective of their relative profitableness. The outcomes of this paper are original.They are of practical interests in planning the maintenance programs and checking the plausibility ofproposed interventions according to the clause 7.4 of ISO 13822:2001

  18. Prospection of implementation of distance learning for the course on fundamentals of Nuclear Physics at the graduate course of IPEN using free software infrastructure; Prospeccao de implementacao de ensino a distancia para a disciplina de fundamentos de fisica nuclear na pos-graduacao do IPEN utilizanto infraestrutura de software livre

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tondim, Jose Egidio Marin

    2009-07-01

    In modern society, the utilization of technological resources and of the internet are of fundamental importance in ali areas and as such the educational activities have to follow this evolution. In this context, distance learning is a fundamental tool for educational development, being innovative and stimulating , offering a variety of resources that are complementary to the activities of the students. Also it is important to point out that distance learning can be brought to remote regions, of difficult access in many cases, so allowing a wide dissemination of knowledge and also implying in lower costs. The objective of this work is the prospection of the interest and viability of implantation of distance learning in the course on Fundamentals of Nuclear Physics at the pos-graduate course of IPEN, using free software infra-structure , by means of a pilot project on distance learning. The work was developed in three phases. In the first phase, a questionnaire was applied to the students , with the aim of finding out about their profiles and interest in distance learning, before they had contact with the pilot project. In the second phase, other students were interviewed , also with the objective of knowing their opinion about distance learning ,but after they had access to the pilot project. Finally,the professors of the graduate course of IPEN were consulted, also by means of a questionnaire, in order to know about their interest in the utilization of distance learning. The results obtained in the present work show that distance learning is a welcome pedagogical resource for students as well for teachers; these results will subsidize the future implementation of distance learning in the pos-graduate course of IPEN. (author)

  19. Regulation of gas infrastructure expansion

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    De Joode, J.

    2012-01-01

    The topic of this dissertation is the regulation of gas infrastructure expansion in the European Union (EU). While the gas market has been liberalised, the gas infrastructure has largely remained in the regulated domain. However, not necessarily all gas infrastructure facilities – such as gas storag

  20. Malawi's infrastructure: a continental perspective

    OpenAIRE

    Foster, Vivien; Shkaratan, Maria

    2011-01-01

    Infrastructure contributed 1.2 percentage points to Malawi's annual per capital GDP growth over the past decade. Raising the country's infrastructure endowment to that of the region s middle-income countries could increase that contribution by 3.5 percentage points. Malawi's successes in infrastructure development include reaching the Millennium Development Goals for water and making GSM t...

  1. GPS positioning and desktop mapping. Applications to environmental monitoring. Report on task JNT B898 on the Finnish support programme to IAEA safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kansanaho, A.; Ilander, T.; Toivonen, H.

    1995-10-01

    Satellite navigation has been used for in-field applications by the Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety since 1993. Because of this experience, training in the use of GPS positioning and desktop mapping was chosen as a task under the Finnish Support programme to IAEA safeguards. A lecture and a field experiment was held in the training course on environmental monitoring at the IAEA headquarters in June 1995. Real-time mapping of the co-ordinates and storing information on sampling sites and procedures can make safeguards implementation more efficient and effective. Further software development are needed for these purposes. (author) (6 figs.).

  2. A new fast neutron collar for safeguards inspection measurements of fresh low enriched uranium fuel assemblies containing burnable poison rods

    Science.gov (United States)

    Evans, Louise G.; Swinhoe, Martyn T.; Menlove, Howard O.; Schwalbach, Peter; Baere, Paul De; Browne, Michael C.

    2013-11-01

    Safeguards inspection measurements must be performed in a timely manner in order to detect the diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material. A shorter measurement time can increase the number of items that a nuclear safeguards inspector can reliably measure during a period of access to a nuclear facility. In turn, this improves the reliability of the acquired statistical sample, which is used to inform decisions regarding compliance. Safeguards inspection measurements should also maintain independence from facility operator declarations. Existing neutron collars employ thermal neutron interrogation for safeguards inspection measurements of fresh fuel assemblies. A new fast neutron collar has been developed for safeguards inspection measurements of fresh low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel assemblies containing gadolinia (Gd2O3) burnable poison rods. The Euratom Fast Collar (EFC) was designed with high neutron detection efficiency to make a fast (Cd) mode measurement viable whilst meeting the high counting precision and short assay time requirements of the Euratom safeguards inspectorate. A fast mode measurement reduces the instrument sensitivity to burnable poison rod content and therefore reduces the applied poison correction, consequently reducing the dependence on the operator declaration of the poison content within an assembly. The EFC non-destructive assay (NDA) of typical modern European pressurized water reactor (PWR) fresh fuel assembly designs have been simulated using Monte Carlo N-particle extended transport code (MCNPX) simulations. Simulations predict that the EFC can achieve 2% relative statistical uncertainty on the doubles neutron counting rate for a fast mode measurement in an assay time of 600 s (10 min) with the available 241AmLi (α,n) interrogation source strength of 5.7×104 s-1. Furthermore, the calibration range of the new collar has been extended to verify 235U content in variable PWR fuel designs in the presence of up to 32

  3. Nuclear Nonproliferation Strategies for South Asia

    Science.gov (United States)

    1994-05-03

    a nuclear arsenal. India is presumed to possess components for nuclear weapons including the actual fissile material "pits" or "cores" for weapons...weapons with various aircraft and with ŕ "Lack of Capital Deters Russians from Building VVERs in India," Nucleonics Week, October 1, 1992; "India...ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear explosive devices or outside of safeguards. India opposes regional arms control measures that

  4. California Hydrogen Infrastructure Project

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Heydorn, Edward C

    2013-03-12

    Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. has completed a comprehensive, multiyear project to demonstrate a hydrogen infrastructure in California. The specific primary objective of the project was to demonstrate a model of a real-world retail hydrogen infrastructure and acquire sufficient data within the project to assess the feasibility of achieving the nation's hydrogen infrastructure goals. The project helped to advance hydrogen station technology, including the vehicle-to-station fueling interface, through consumer experiences and feedback. By encompassing a variety of fuel cell vehicles, customer profiles and fueling experiences, this project was able to obtain a complete portrait of real market needs. The project also opened its stations to other qualified vehicle providers at the appropriate time to promote widespread use and gain even broader public understanding of a hydrogen infrastructure. The project engaged major energy companies to provide a fueling experience similar to traditional gasoline station sites to foster public acceptance of hydrogen. Work over the course of the project was focused in multiple areas. With respect to the equipment needed, technical design specifications (including both safety and operational considerations) were written, reviewed, and finalized. After finalizing individual equipment designs, complete station designs were started including process flow diagrams and systems safety reviews. Material quotes were obtained, and in some cases, depending on the project status and the lead time, equipment was placed on order and fabrication began. Consideration was given for expected vehicle usage and station capacity, standard features needed, and the ability to upgrade the station at a later date. In parallel with work on the equipment, discussions were started with various vehicle manufacturers to identify vehicle demand (short- and long-term needs). Discussions included identifying potential areas most suited for hydrogen fueling

  5. 78 FR 61401 - Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.; Big Rock Point; Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-10-03

    ... Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001..., and 10 CFR part 50, allows ENO to possess and store spent nuclear fuel at the permanently shutdown and... Director, Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation, Office of Nuclear Material Safety...

  6. Interim Procedures Safeguarding Mobile Devices during International Travel

    Science.gov (United States)

    This procedure is for safeguarding EPA information and systems for all employees, contractors, and other users while on international travel or to specifically designated locations within the United States and foreign embassies.

  7. It's Never Too Soon to Safeguard Your Bones

    Science.gov (United States)

    ... page: https://medlineplus.gov/news/fullstory_167696.html It's Never Too Soon to Safeguard Your Bones Osteoporosis ... risk, too, according to the National Osteoporosis Foundation. It weakens bones, leaving them at greater risk of ...

  8. Safeguards Knowledge Management & Retention at U.S. National Laboratories.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Haddal, Risa; Jones, Rebecca (PNNL); Bersell, Bridget (PNNL); Frazar, Sarah (PNNL); Burbank, Roberta (PNNL); Stevens, Rebecca (LANL); Cain, Ron (ORNL); Kirk, Bernadette (ORNL); Morell, Sean (ORNL)

    2017-09-01

    In 2017, four U.S. National Laboratories collaborated on behalf of DOE/NNSA to explore the safeguards knowledge retention problem, identify possible approaches, and develop a strategy to address it. The one-year effort consisted of four primary tasks. First, the project sought to identify critical safeguards information at risk of loss. Second, a survey and workshop were conducted to assess nine U.S. National Laboratories' efforts to determine current safeguards knowledge retention practices and challenges, and identify best practices. Third, specific tools were developed to identify and predict critical safeguards knowledge gaps and how best to recruit in order to fill those gaps. Finally, based on findings from the first three tasks and research on other organizational approaches to address similar issues, a strategy was developed on potential knowledge retention methods, customized HR policies, and best practices that could be implemented across the National Laboratory Complex.

  9. HARMONISASI REGULASI DAN EFEKTIVITAS KELEMBAGAAN SAFEGUARD DI INDONESIA

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Abdurrahman Alfaqiih

    2012-06-01

    Full Text Available The implementation of WTO agreement is not easy in accordance with the estabilished regulations, so deviations in the process of trade liberalization that press domestic indrusties will likely to take place. Therefore, it is necessary to have safety actions to actualize mutual benefits in international trade. There are many cases of safety actions conducted by many countries such as Argentine that implements safety actions to its footwear industries without adapting to WTO regulations which causes the country’s losses. The paper examines the consistency of safeguard regulations in Indonesia with safeguard regulations of WTO and its implementation reviewed from the law effectiveness. The result of the study shows that the safeguard regulations in Indonesia is in accordance with the safeguard regulations of WTO in the normative level, but in the implementation the policy is not done effectively.

  10. AUTHENTICATED SENSOR INTERFACE DEVICE FOR JOINT USE SAFEGUARDS APPLICATIONS - CONCEPTS AND CHALLENGES

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Poland, R.; Drayer, R.; Wilson, J.

    2013-08-12

    This paper will discuss the key features of the Authenticated Sensor Interface Device that collectively provide the ability to share data among a number of parties while ensuring the authentication of data and protecting both the operator’s and the IAEA’s interests. The paper will also discuss the development of the prototype, the initial testing with an accountancy scale, and future plans and challenges to implementation into the joint use and remote monitoring applications. As nuclear fuel cycle technology becomes more prevalent throughout the world and the capacity of plants increases, limited resources of the IAEA are being stretched near a breaking point. A strategy is to increase efficiency in safeguards monitoring using “joint use” equipment that will provide the facility operator process data while also providing the IAEA key safeguards data. The data, however, must be authenticated and validated to ensure the data have not been tampered with. The Authenticated Sensor Interface Device provides the capability to share data and can be a valuable component in the IAEA’s ability to collect accountancy data from scales in Uranium conversion and enrichment plants, as well as nuclear fuel fabrication plants. Likewise, the Authenticated Sensor Interface Device can be configured to accept a diverse array of input signals, ranging from analog voltage, to current, to digital interfaces and more. These modular capabilities provide the ability to collect authenticated, joint-use, data streams from various process monitoring sensors.

  11. Laboratory demonstration of a multi-sensor unattended cylinder verification station for uranium enrichment plant safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Goodman, David I [Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (United States); Rowland, Kelly L [Univ. of California, Berkeley, CA (United States); Smith, Sheriden [Colorado State Univ., Fort Collins, CO (United States); Miller, Karen A. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Flynn, Eric B. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2014-01-10

    The objective of safeguards is the timely detection of the diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear materials, and safeguarding uranium enrichment plants is especially important in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The IAEA’s proposed Unattended Cylinder Verification Station (UCVS) for UF6 cylinder verification would combine the operator’s accountancy scale with a nondestructive assay system such as the Passive Neutron Enrichment Meter (PNEM) and cylinder identification and surveillance systems. In this project, we built a laboratory-scale UCVS and demonstrated its capabilities using mock UF6 cylinders. We developed a signal processing algorithm to automate the data collection and processing from four continuous, unattended sensors. The laboratory demonstration of the system showed that the software could successfully identify cylinders, snip sensor data at the appropriate points in time, determine the relevant characteristics of the cylinder contents, check for consistency among sensors, and output the cylinder data to a file. This paper describes the equipment, algorithm and software development, laboratory demonstration, and recommendations for a full-scale UCVS.

  12. Study on interface between nuclear material accounting system and national nuclear forensic library

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jeong, Yonhong; Han, Jae-Jun; Chang, Sunyoung; Shim, Hye-Won; Ahn, Seungho [Korea Institute of Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    The implementation of nuclear forensics requires physical, chemical and radiological characteristics with transport history to unravel properties of seized nuclear materials. For timely assessment provided in the ITWG guideline, development of national response system (e.g., national nuclear forensic library) is strongly recommended. Nuclear material accounting is essential to obtain basic data in the nuclear forensic implementation phase from the perspective of nuclear non-proliferation related to the IAEA Safeguards and nuclear security. In this study, the nuclear material accounting reports were chosen due to its well-established procedure, and reviewed how to efficiently utilize the existing material accounting system to the nuclear forensic implementation phase In conclusion, limits and improvements in implementing the nuclear forensics were discussed. This study reviewed how to utilize the existing material accounting system for implementing nuclear forensics. Concerning item counting facility, nuclear material properties can be obtained based on nuclear material accounting information. Nuclear fuel assembly data being reported for the IAEA Safeguards can be utilized as unique identifier within the back-end fuel cycle. Depending upon the compulsory accountability report period, there exist time gaps. If national capabilities ensure that history information within the front-end nuclear fuel cycle is traceable particularly for the bulk handling facility, the entire cycle of national nuclear fuel would be managed in the framework of developing a national nuclear forensic library.

  13. Entry into Force of the Additional Protocol to the safeguards agreements; Entrada en vigor del protocolo adicional a los acuerdos de salvaguardias

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Prieto, N.; Recio, M.

    2004-07-01

    The development of the peaceful use of nuclear energy has always been linked to verification of the truthfulness of such peaceful application. such checks must necessarily be undertaken by people or organisations possessing technical competence and a status of independence recognised by the international community. this is the case of the safeguards inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The history of safeguards dates back to the speech Atoms for Peace, given by the US President Eisenhower before the General Assembly of the United Nations on 8th December 1953. In his speech, Eisenhower underlined the serious threat of the incipient atomic weapons race and the advisability of achieving a collective commitment to the peaceful use of atomic energy. the speech anticipated the setting up of an international agency that would cooperate in the technological development of nuclear energy and at the same time safeguard a material that should not be used for the clandestine manufacturing of weapons. This agency, the IAEA, was created three years later within the framework of the United Nations and is today the leading actor in the application of safeguards measures in relation to nuclear materials and facilities.

  14. Minor isotope measurements for safeguarding a uranium enrichment plant

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Blumkin, S.; Levin, S.A.; Von Halle, E.

    1979-03-26

    A study of the behavior of the minor uranium isotopes in enrichment cascades indicates that the measurement of their concetrations in cascade feed and withdrawal streams can be used to confirm or deny material accountability results in safeguarding an enrichment plant. In further support of safeguard measures, an indirect non-intrusive method to measure cascade uranium inventory has been devised and tested satisfactorily in a gaseous diffusion cascade.

  15. Self-neglect and adult safeguarding: findings from research

    OpenAIRE

    Braye, Suzy; Orr, David; Preston-Shoot, Michael

    2011-01-01

    This report was commissioned by the Department of Health (DH) and examines the concept of self-neglect. The relationship between self-neglect and safeguarding in the UK is a difficult one, partly because the current definition of abuse specifies harmful actions by someone other than the individual at risk. Safeguarding Adults Boards’ policies and procedures commonly contain no reference to self-neglect; occasionally they explicitly exclude it or set criteria for its inclusion\\ud \\ud The perce...

  16. Infrastructure: concept, types and value

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Alexander E. Lantsov

    2013-01-01

    Full Text Available Researches of influence of infrastructure on the economic growth and development of the countries gained currency. However the majority of authors drop the problem of definition of accurate concept of studied object and its criteria out. In the given article various approaches in the definition of «infrastructure» concept, criterion and the characteristics of infrastructure distinguishing it from other capital assets are presented. Such types of infrastructure, as personal, institutional, material, production, social, etc. are considered. Author’s definition of infrastructure is given.

  17. Application of laser induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) instrumentation for international safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Barefield Ii, James E [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Clegg, Samuel M [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Lopez, Leon N [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Le, Loan A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Veirs, D Kirk [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Browne, Mike [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-01-01

    Advanced methodologies and improvements to current measurements techniques are needed to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of international safeguards. This need was recognized and discussed at a Technical Meeting on 'The Application of Laser Spectrometry Techniques in IAEA Safeguards' held at IAEA headquarters (September 2006). One of the principal recommendations from that meeting was the need to pursue the development of novel complementary access instrumentation based on Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (UBS) for the detection of gaseous and solid signatures and indicators of nuclear fuel cycle processes and associated materials'. Pursuant to this recommendation the Department of Safeguards (SG) under the Division of Technical Support (SGTS) convened the 'Experts and Users Advisory Meeting on Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS) for Safeguards Applications' also held at IAEA headquarters (July 2008). This meeting was attended by 12 LlBS experts from the Czech Republic, the European Commission, France, the Republic of South Korea, the United States of America, Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, Canada, and Northern Ireland. Following a presentation of the needs of the IAEA inspectors, the LIBS experts agreed that needs as presented could be partially or fully fulfilled using LIBS instrumentation. Inspectors needs were grouped into the following broad categories: (1) Improvements to in-field measurements/environmental sampling; (2) Monitoring status of activities in Hot Cells; (3) Verify status of activity at a declared facility via process monitoring; and (4) Need for pre-screening of environmental samples before analysis. The primary tool employed by the IAEA to detect undeclared processes and activities at special nuclear material facilities and sites is environmental sampling. One of the objectives of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) Program Plan calls for the development of advanced

  18. Health Information Security in Hospitals: the Application of Security Safeguards.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mehraeen, Esmaeil; Ayatollahi, Haleh; Ahmadi, Maryam

    2016-02-01

    A hospital information system has potentials to improve the accessibility of clinical information and the quality of health care. However, the use of this system has resulted in new challenges, such as concerns over health information security. This paper aims to assess the status of information security in terms of administrative, technical and physical safeguards in the university hospitals. This was a survey study in which the participants were information technology (IT) managers (n=36) who worked in the hospitals affiliated to the top ranked medical universities (university A and university B). Data were collected using a questionnaire. The content validity of the questionnaire was examined by the experts and the reliability of the questionnaire was determined using Cronbach's coefficient alpha (α=0.75). The results showed that the administrative safeguards were arranged at a medium level. In terms of the technical safeguards and the physical safeguards, the IT managers rated them at a strong level. According to the results, among three types of security safeguards, the administrative safeguards were assessed at the medium level. To improve it, developing security policies, implementing access control models and training users are recommended.

  19. Probabilistic risk analysis toward cost-effective 3S (safety, safeguards, security) implementation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Mochiji, Toshiro

    2014-09-01

    Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) has been introduced for several decades in safety and nuclear advanced countries have already used this methodology in their own regulatory systems. However, PRA has not been developed in safeguards and security so far because of inherent difficulties in intentional and malicious acts. In this paper, probabilistic proliferation and risk analysis based on random process is applied to hypothetical reprocessing process and physical protection system in nuclear reactor with the Markov model that was originally developed by the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Working Group (PRPPWG) in Generation IV International Framework (GIF). Through the challenge to quantify the security risk with a frequency in this model, integrated risk notion among 3S to pursue the cost-effective installation of those countermeasures is discussed in a heroic manner.

  20. Growing the Blockchain information infrastructure

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Jabbar, Karim; Bjørn, Pernille

    2017-01-01

    In this paper, we present ethnographic data that unpacks the everyday work of some of the many infrastructuring agents who contribute to creating, sustaining and growing the Blockchain information infrastructure. We argue that this infrastructuring work takes the form of entrepreneurial actions......, which are self-initiated and primarily directed at sustaining or increasing the initiator’s stake in the emerging information infrastructure. These entrepreneurial actions wrestle against the affordances of the installed base of the Blockchain infrastructure, and take the shape of engaging...... or circumventing activities. These activities purposefully aim at either influencing or working around the enablers and constraints afforded by the Blockchain information infrastructure, as its installed base is gaining inertia. This study contributes to our understanding of the purpose of infrastructuring, seen...

  1. Infrastructure for microsystem production

    Science.gov (United States)

    van Heeren, Henne; Sanchez, Stefan; Elders, Job; Heideman, Rene G.

    1999-03-01

    Manufacturing of micro-systems differs from IC manufacturing because the market requires a diversity of products and lower volumes per product. In addition, a diversity of micro-technologies has been developed, including non-IC compatible processes and potentially IC compatible processes. An infrastructure for the production of micro- system devices is lacking. On one side the technology for MST is available at the universities and small university related companies. On the other side there are several small and medium enterprises and bigger companies wanting to implement MST devices in their products, but unwilling to be dependent on universities. Philips Electronics in the Netherlands and Twente MicroProducts realized this problem and have started a project to fill this gap. At this moment the basic of the infrastructure is available: OnStream BV, Eindhoven, The Netherlands, opened its waferfab and assembly facilities for the production of MST devices. Twente MicroProducts will take care of the design of the products and of the small-scale production. Integration of quality systems for maintenance, yield, statistical process control and production in a Manufacturing Execution System offers direct access for all people involved to all the relevant information. It also ensures quality of the products made. The available capabilities of the infrastructure in the current status are compared to the market needs. In this article, a description of a seamless Micro-System Engineering Foundry is given. A seamless organization is capable of helping the customer from design to production. Several examples are given.

  2. Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA): A Nondestructive Assay Technique for the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative’s Plutonium Assay Challenge

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    J. W. Sterbentz; D. L. Chichester

    2010-12-01

    This is an end-of-year report for a project funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Nuclear Safeguards (NA-241). The goal of this project is to investigate the feasibility of using Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA) to assay plutonium in commercial light-water-reactor spent fuel. This project is part of a larger research effort within the Next-Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to evaluate methods for assaying plutonium in spent fuel, the Plutonium Assay Challenge. The first-year goals for this project were modest and included: 1) developing a zero-order MCNP model for the NRTA technique, simulating data results presented in the literature, 2) completing a preliminary set of studies investigating important design and performance characteristics for the NRTA measurement technique, and 3) documentation of this work in an end of the year report (this report). Research teams at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), and at several universities are also working to investigate plutonium assay methods for spent-fuel safeguards. While the NRTA technique is well proven in the scientific literature for assaying individual spent fuel pins, it is a newcomer to the current NGSI efforts studying Pu assay method techniques having just started in March 2010; several analytical techniques have been under investigation within this program for two to three years or more. This report summarizes a nine month period of work.

  3. Developing a Signature Based Safeguards Approach for the Electrorefiner and Salt Cleanup Unit Operations in Pyroprocessing Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Murphy, Chantell Lynne-Marie [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2016-01-27

    Traditional nuclear materials accounting does not work well for safeguards when applied to pyroprocessing. Alternate methods such as Signature Based Safeguards (SBS) are being investigated. The goal of SBS is real-time/near-real-time detection of anomalous events in the pyroprocessing facility as they could indicate loss of special nuclear material. In high-throughput reprocessing facilities, metric tons of separated material are processed that must be accounted for. Even with very low uncertainties of accountancy measurements (<0.1%) the uncertainty of the material balances is still greater than the desired level. Novel contributions of this work are as follows: (1) significant enhancement of SBS development for the salt cleanup process by creating a new gas sparging process model, selecting sensors to monitor n