WorldWideScience

Sample records for nuclear nonproliferation concerns

  1. Nuclear nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Neubert, M.

    1992-01-01

    The following motion was put before the United Kingdom House of Commons on 3rd February 1992 and agreed; that this House, recognising the potential dangers of the rapidly changing world order, welcomes the recent proposals for substantial reductions in nuclear weaponry, the growing support for the non-proliferation treaty and progress in the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions concerning the dismantling of Iraqi nuclear, chemical and biological capabilities; urges the Government to play their full part in helping the relevant authorities in the Commonwealth of Independent States to dismantle their nuclear devices, to safeguard their nuclear components and to discourage the proliferation of nuclear expertise; and believes it is of the first importance that Britain retains an effective and credible minimum nuclear deterrent as security in a world where there remain many sources of instability. The record of arguments for and against the motion in the debate is presented. (author)

  2. Proposed nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy concerning foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel. Summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-03-01

    The United States Department of Energy and United States Department of State are jointly proposing to adopt a policy to manage spent nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors. Only spent nuclear fuel containing uranium enriched in the United States would be covered by the proposed policy. The purpose of the proposed policy is to promote U.S. nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy objectives, specifically by seeking to reduce highly-enriched uranium from civilian commerce. This is a summary of the Draft Environmental Impact Statement. Environmental effects and policy considerations of three Management Alternative approaches for implementation of the proposed policy are assessed. The three Management Alternatives analyzed are: (1) acceptance and management of the spent nuclear fuel by the Department of Energy in the United States, (2) management of the spent nuclear fuel at one or more foreign facilities (under conditions that satisfy United States nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy objectives), and (3) a combination of components of Management Alternatives 1 and 2 (Hybrid Alternative). A No Action Alternative is also analyzed. For each Management Alternative, there are a number of alternatives for its implementation. For Management Alternative 1, this document addresses the environmental effects of various implementation alternatives such as varied policy durations, management of various quantities of spent nuclear fuel, and differing financing arrangements. Environmental impacts at various potential ports of entry, along truck and rail transportation routes, at candidate management sites, and for alternate storage technologies are also examined. For Management Alternative 2, this document addresses two subalternatives: (1) assisting foreign nations with storage; and (2) assisting foreign nations with reprocessing of the spent nuclear fuel

  3. Proposed nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy concerning foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel: Appendix B, foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel characteristics and transportation casks. Volume 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-03-01

    This is Appendix B of a draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel. It discusses relevant characterization and other information of foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel that could be managed under the proposed action. It also discusses regulations for the transport of radioactive materials and the design of spent fuel casks

  4. Nuclear nonproliferation: Concerns with US delays in accepting foregin research reactors' spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    One key US nonproliferation goal is to discourage use of highly enriched uranium fuel (HEU), which can be used to make nuclear bombs, in civilian nuclear programs worldwide. DOE's Off-Site Fuels Policy for taking back spent HEU from foreign research reactors was allowed to expire due to environmental reasons. This report provides information on the effects of delays in renewing the Off-Site Fuels Policy on US nonproliferation goals and programs (specifically the reduced enrichment program), DOE's efforts to renew the fuels policy, and the price to be charged to the operators of foreign reactors for DOE's activities in taking back spent fuel

  5. Proposed nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy concerning foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel: Appendix A, environmental justice analysis. Volume 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-03-01

    This is Appendix A to a draft Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel. This appendix addresses environmental justice for the acceptance of foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel containing uranium enriched in the United States. Analyses of environmental justice concerns are provided in three areas: (1) potential ports of entry, (2) potential transportation routes from candidate ports of entry to interim management sites, and (3) areas surrounding potential interim management sites. These analyses lead to the conclusion that the alternatives analyzed in this Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) would result in no disproportionate adverse effects on minority populations or low-income communities surrounding the candidate ports, transport routes, or interim management sites

  6. Nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1984-01-01

    DOE's nuclear non-proliferation responsibilities are defined by the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA). The Department's major responsibilities in this area are to: (1) provide technical assistance to the Department of State in negotiating agreements for civil cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with other countries and international organizations; (2) join with other agencies to reach executive branch judgments with respect to the issuance of export licenses by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; (3) be responsible for processing subsequent arrangements with other agencies as required by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act; (4) control the distribution of special nuclear materials, components, equipment, and nuclear technology exports; (5) participate in bilateral and multilateral cooperation with foreign governments and organizations to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and (6) act as a primary technical resource with respect to US participation in the International Atomic Energy Agency

  7. Nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1990-01-01

    This patent describes the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which is the corner-stone of an international non-proliferation regime which has grown to embrace the overwhelming majority of countries in the world in the period since the Treaty. The other elements of the regime include, first of all, the safeguards system of IAEA-which operates to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to military or other prohibited activities and must be accepted by all non-nuclear-weapon parties to the Treaty and, secondly, the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and the south Pacific Nuclear Free zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)-which serve to extend the regime geographically. The last two Treaties require safeguards agreements with IAEA. In addition, the Treaty of Tlatelolco contains provisions establishing the agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean to ensure compliance

  8. The handbook of nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang, M. H.; Lee, B. W.; Oh, K. B.; Lee, H. M.; Ko, H. S.; Ryu, J. S.; Lee, K. S.

    2003-07-01

    This report analyzed international non-proliferation regime preventing from spread of nuclear weapon. This report took review from the historical background of non-proliferation regime to the recent changes and current status. It is here divided into multilateral and bilateral regime. First of all, this report dealt four multilateral treaties concluded for international non-proliferation such as NPT, NWFZ, CTBT and others. And international organization and regimes concerned with non-proliferation are also analyzed focused on UN, IAEA, ZC and NSG, regional safeguards system and international conferences. In addition, this report reviewed the nuclear cooperation agreement related with Korea which is a important tool for bilateral regime

  9. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION: Concerns With the U.S. International Nuclear Materials Tracking System

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Rezendes, Victor

    1996-01-01

    ...) provide data to policymakers and other government officials. The United States regulates and controls its exports of civilian-use nuclear materials through three mechanisms-agreements for cooperation, export licenses, and subsequent arrangements...

  10. Draft Environmental Impact Statement on a proposed nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy concerning foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel. Volume 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-03-01

    The United States Department of Energy and United States Department of State are jointly proposing to adopt a policy to manage spent nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors. Only spent nuclear fuel containing uranium enriched in the United States would be covered by the proposed policy. The purpose of the proposed policy is to promote U.S. nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy objectives, specifically by seeking to reduce highly-enriched uranium from civilian commerce. Environmental effects and policy considerations of three Management Alternative approaches for implementation of the proposed policy are assessed. The three Management Alternatives analyzed are: (1) acceptance and management of the spent nuclear fuel by the Department of Energy in the United States, (2) management of the spent nuclear fuel at one or more foreign facilities (under conditions that satisfy United States nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy objectives), and (3) a combination of components of Management Alternatives 1 and 2 (Hybrid Alternative). A No Action Alternative is also analyzed. For each Management Alternative, there are a number of alternatives for its implementation. For Management Alternative 1, this document addresses the environmental effects of various implementation alternatives such as varied policy durations, management of various quantities of spent nuclear fuel, and differing financing arrangements. Environmental impacts at various potential ports of entry, along truck and rail transportation routes, at candidate management sites, and for alternate storage technologies are also examined. For Management Alternative 2, this document addresses two subalternatives: (1) assisting foreign nations with storage; and (2) assisting foreign nations with reprocessing of the spent nuclear fuel. Management Alternative 3 analyzes a hybrid alternative. This document is Vol. 1 of 2 plus summary volume

  11. Nuclear power generation and nuclear nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Walske, C.

    1978-01-01

    In the future outlook around year 2000 of nuclear power, thought must be given to fuel reprocessing and plutonium utilization. The adverse utilization of plutonium may be prevented by the means balanced with its economical value. As the method of less cost with lower effect of nonproliferation, combination of fuel reprocessing and fuel fabrication facilities and mixed plutonium/uranium processing are possible. As the method of more cost with higher effect of nonproliferation the maintenance of high radioactivity and inaccessibility of plutonium is conceivable. As for the agreeable methods in 2000, seven principles may be mentioned, such as the dependence upon the agreements among major nations and upon nuclear exporting countries. These are still inadequate, however. What is important is to provide with the sufficient safeguards to countries concerned to negate the need for nuclear weapons. Efforts are then necessary for leading nuclear countries to extend aids to other nuclear-oriented countries. (Mori, K.)

  12. Handbook for nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Byung Wook; Oh, Keun Bae; Lee, Kwang Seok; Lee, Dong Jin; Ko, Han Seok.

    1997-05-01

    This book analyzed international non-proliferation regime preventing from spread of nuclear weapon. This book took review from the historical background of non-proliferation regime to the recent changes and status. The regime, here, is divided into multilateral and bilateral regime. First of all, this book reports four multilateral treaties concluded for non-proliferation such as NPT, NWFZ, CTBT and others. Secondly, international organization and regimes concerned with non-proliferation are analyzed with emphasis of UN, IAEA, ZC and NSG, Regional Safeguards System and international conference. Finally, this book report the current circumstances of nuclear cooperation agreement related with Korea which is an important means for bilateral regime. (author). 13 tabs., 2 figs

  13. Handbook for nuclear non-proliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Byung Wook; Oh, Keun Bae; Lee, Kwang Seok; Lee, Dong Jin; Ko, Han Seok

    1997-05-01

    This book analyzed international non-proliferation regime preventing from spread of nuclear weapon. This book took review from the historical background of non-proliferation regime to the recent changes and status. The regime, here, is divided into multilateral and bilateral regime. First of all, this book reports four multilateral treaties concluded for non-proliferation such as NPT, NWFZ, CTBT and others. Secondly, international organization and regimes concerned with non-proliferation are analyzed with emphasis of UN, IAEA, ZC and NSG, Regional Safeguards System and international conference. Finally, this book report the current circumstances of nuclear cooperation agreement related with Korea which is an important means for bilateral regime. (author). 13 tabs., 2 figs.

  14. Nuclear arbitration: Interpreting non-proliferation agreements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tzeng, Peter

    2015-01-01

    At the core of the nuclear non-proliferation regime lie international agreements. These agreements include, inter alia, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, nuclear co-operation agreements and nuclear export control agreements.1 States, however, do not always comply with their obligations under these agreements. In response, commentators have proposed various enforcement mechanisms to promote compliance. The inconvenient truth, however, is that states are generally unwilling to consent to enforcement mechanisms concerning issues as critical to national security as nuclear non-proliferation.3 This article suggests an alternative solution to the non-compliance problem: interpretation mechanisms. Although an interpretation mechanism does not have the teeth of an enforcement mechanism, it can induce compliance by providing an authoritative interpretation of a legal obligation. Interpretation mechanisms would help solve the non-compliance problem because, as this article shows, in many cases of alleged non-compliance with a non-proliferation agreement, the fundamental problem has been the lack of an authoritative interpretation of the agreement, not the lack of an enforcement mechanism. Specifically, this article proposes arbitration as the proper interpretation mechanism for non-proliferation agreements. It advocates the establishment of a 'Nuclear Arbitration Centre' as an independent branch of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and recommends the gradual introduction of arbitration clauses into the texts of non-proliferation agreements. Section I begins with a discussion of international agreements in general and the importance of interpretation and enforcement mechanisms. Section II then discusses nuclear non-proliferation agreements and their lack of interpretation and enforcement mechanisms. Section III examines seven case studies of alleged non-compliance with non-proliferation agreements in order to show that the main problem in many cases

  15. Nuclear nonproliferation strategy in Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jenkins, F.W.

    1989-07-01

    The most immediate danger of a further spread of nuclear weapons in Asia is in South Asia, where both India and Pakistan have developed the means of producing nuclear explosive materials. In East Asia, North Korea appears to be in the early stages of a weapon-related nuclear program, and before the end of the century South Korea or Taiwan could revive their past efforts to move closer to a nuclear weapons capability. Over the longer run, Japan could conceivably decide to abandon its present strong opposition to the acquisition of nuclear Weapons. At present, the United States has largely separate approaches to the nuclear weapon proliferation problems in South Asia and in East Asia. This paper argues that these separate approaches should be strengthened and integrated into a broader regional nonproliferation strategy. This regional strategy would have three major strands: inducing India and Pakistan to agree not to produce nuclear weapons or test nuclear explosive devices for a specific period; bolstering the existing nonproliferation regime, principally by maintaining nonproliferation incentives and involving China more in the nonproliferation regime; and encouraging regional cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy

  16. Nonproliferation norms in civilian nuclear fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kawata, Tomio

    2005-01-01

    For sustainable use of nuclear energy in large scale, it seems inevitable to choose a closed cycle option. One of the important questions is, then, whether we can really achieve the compatibility between civilian nuclear fuel cycle and nonproliferation norms. In this aspect, Japan is very unique because she is now only one country with full-scope nuclear fuel cycle program as a non-nuclear weapon state in NPT regime. In June 2004 in the midst of heightened proliferation concerns in NPT regime, the IAEA Board of Governors concluded that, for Japanese nuclear energy program, non-diversion of declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities were verified through the inspections and examinations under Comprehensive Safeguards and the Additional Protocol. Based on this conclusion, the IAEA announced the implementation of Integrated Safeguards in Japan in September 2004. This paper reviews how Japan has succeeded in becoming the first country with full-scope nuclear fuel cycle program to qualify for integrated Safeguards, and identifies five key elements that have made this achievement happen: (1) Obvious need of nuclear fuel cycle program, (2) Country's clear intention for renunciation of nuclear armament, (3) Transparency of national nuclear energy program, (4) Record of excellent compliance with nonproliferation obligations for many decades, and (5) Numerous proactive efforts. These five key elements will constitute a kind of an acceptance model for civilian nuclear fuel cycle in NNWS, and may become the basis for building 'Nonproliferation Culture'. (author)

  17. Reassessing nuclear nonproliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, G.; Rathjens, G.

    1981-01-01

    Unresolved proliferation problems are as serious issues for the Reagan Administration as East-West relations and dependence on imported oil. The linkage of nuclear weapons to power reactors is debatable, but developing and industrialized countries alike feel that nuclear power is an important option. A review of Carter policies finds them flawed in several respects. Although they heightened worldwide concern about proliferation, they fell short because (1) most governments and the nuclear industry reacted negatively; (2) they offered no way to deal with countries which construct only weapons facilities; (3) they did not help the US image as a reliable supplier; (4) no realistic fuel-cycle alternatives emerged; and (5) little has been done about fuel assurances and international spent-fuel storage. Past policies need to be restructured under new premises to deal effectively with the motivation to acquire nuclear weapons. The effort should stress collective rather than unilateral action and a renewed effort for a comprehensive test ban treaty. 10 references

  18. Proposed nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy concerning foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel: Appendix C, marine transport and associated environmental impacts. Volume 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-03-01

    This is Appendix C to a Draft Environmental Statement on a Proposed Nuclear Weapon Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel. Shipment of any material via ocean transport entails risks to both the ship's crew and the environment. The risks result directly from transportation-related accidents and, in the case of radioactive or other hazardous materials, also include exposure to the effects of the material itself. This appendix provides a description of the approach used to assess the risks associated with the transport of foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel from a foreign port to a U.S. port(s) of entry. This appendix also includes a discussion of the shipping configuration of the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel, the possible types of vessels that could be used to make the shipments, the risk assessment methodology (addressing both incident-free and accident risks), and the results of the analyses. Analysis of activities in the port(s) is described in Appendix D. The incident-free and accident risk assessment results are presented in terms of the per shipment risk and total risks associated with the basic implementation of Management Alternative 1and other implementation alternatives. In addition, annual risks from incident-free transport are developed

  19. Nuclear World Order and Nonproliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Joeck, N

    2007-02-05

    The decision by India and Pakistan in May 1998 to conduct nuclear weapon tests and declare themselves as nuclear weapon states challenged South Asian regional stability calculations, US nonproliferation policy, and prevailing assumptions about international security. A decade later, the effects of those tests are still being felt and policies are still adjusting to the changed global conditions. This paper will consider non- and counter-proliferation policy options for the United States and Pakistan as they work as partners to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology and further nuclear proliferation.

  20. The international nuclear non-proliferation system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simpson, J.; McGrew, T.

    1985-01-01

    This volume focuses upon the issues raised at this Conference, and attempts to address the international diplomatic, political and trading, rather than technical, questions which surround nuclear non-proliferation policies. It does so by bringing together chapters contributed by participants in non-proliferation diplomacy, those with experience in shaping International Atomic Energy Agency and national policies and academic observers of non-proliferation activities and the international nuclear industry. An analysis is provided of past non-proliferation policies and activities and current issues, and an attempt is made to offer ideas for new initiatives which may sustain the non-proliferation system in the future

  1. Nuclear exports and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Courteix, Simone.

    1978-01-01

    Increased preoccupation in present times with the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons is reflected in the multiplication of international agreements such as the Non-proliferation Treaty and in the strengthening of consultations between industrialised countries (London Club). After analysing the IAEA safeguards system under the Non-proliferation Treaty and its shortcomings both technically and otherwise, the author considers how this situation can be remedied in the light of the London Agreements and in view of the position of the main countries concerned. The annex to the book contains the texts of many international agreements and relevant national regulations as well as nuclear policy statements. It also includes a detailed bibliograaphy. (NEA) [fr

  2. International nuclear trade and nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Potter, W.C.

    1990-01-01

    The purpose of this book, the culmination of one phase of an ongoing international research project on nuclear suppliers and nonproliferation, is to explore the international political and economic dimensions of nuclear trade, especially as they pertain to the behavior of eleven emerging nuclear-supplier states. More specifically, the book sets forth a conceptual framework for analyzing international nuclear trade; details the domestic and external factors that shape the nuclear export policies of Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Japan, Pakistan, the People's Republic of China, South Korea, South Africa, Spain and Taiwan; and identifies and assesses alternative strategies for containing the new proliferation risks posed by these emerging suppliers. The book also describes an innovative effort to utilize a computer-based system for tracking international nuclear trade

  3. Multinational alternatives and nuclear nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scheinman, L.

    1981-01-01

    The use of multinational institutional arrangements to control sensitive nuclear-fuel-cycle activities has interested policymakers since the dawn of the nuclear age. Several such ventures have been tried in the past, largely for economic, commercial, or technical reasons, and they have enjoyed varying degrees of success. More recently, with the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies, multinational arrangements have received increasing attention as a means of reinforcing international safeguards which, together with political commitments on peaceful use, have been the principal components of the nonproliferation regime. The political acceptability and efficacy of multinational arrangements is related to the historic experience with multinational ventures, the changed political circumstances of the 1970s, and the probable requirements for constructive future cooperation. As part of a comprehensive regime covering the development of sensitive nuclear activities, multinational arrangements can reinforce the regime in a manner that is widely acceptable. A political effort to win support for such arrangements is thus worthwhile. 29 references

  4. China's position on nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Qian Jiadong.

    1986-01-01

    The paper discusses China's position on nuclear non-proliferation, in view of the fact that China does not subscribe to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). China refuses to accede to the NPT because it considers the treaty to be discriminatory, and reasons are given for this point of view. However its stand for nuclear disarmament and disapproval of nuclear proliferation are declared. Nuclear arms race, prevention of nuclear war, and nuclear disarmament are also considered. (UK)

  5. The third review conference of the parties of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and recent developments concerning international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Canty, M.J.; Richter, B.; Schlupp, C.; Stein, G.

    1986-11-01

    The non-proliferation activities and instruments are listed in a table. The two main instruments are the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the IAEA Safeguards, which are supplemented by treaties of regional restricted effects, such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the EURATOM treaty. The two-tier structure of the treaties, i.e. to provide for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and at the same time foster the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, has proven to have a particularly stabilizing effect, which was confirmed by the last Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation. The conference members were particularly satisfied with the results of the IAEA Safeguards. Future developments towards improving international safeguards will concentrate on operator-friendly and financially reasonable safeguards measures, such as safeguards effectiveness evaluations and near-real-time accountancy. The results of the CAS discussions on the definition of principles and goals of co-operation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are of importance also to the PUNE conference. The PUNE conference will be held in 1987 and is expected to yield points of orientation for further embedding the non-proliferation principle in the international co-operative activities and the nuclear business in the 1980s. (orig./HP) [de

  6. Communication received from the Resident Representatives of Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to the Agency concerning multilateral cooperation on energy security in support of Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Director General has received a letter dated 13 September 2007 from the Resident Representatives of Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, attaching a declaration concerning multilateral cooperation on energy security in support of Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The letter and, as requested therein, the declaration, are herewith circulated for information

  7. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, D.; Haeckel, E.; Haefele, W.; Lauppe, W.D.; Mueller, H.; Ungerer, W.

    1991-01-01

    During the turbulant transitional events in world politics in the nineties, the control of nuclear weapons plays a major role. While the superpowers are reducing their nuclear arsenal, the danger of nuclear anarchy in the world remains virulent. The NPT of 1968 is up for review soon. The falling apart of the former communist sphere of power, and the regions of conflict in the Third World present new risks for the proliferation of nuclear arms. For unified Germany, which explicitly renounced nuclear weapons, this situation presents difficult questions concerning national safety policies and international responsibility. This volume presents contributions which take a new look at topical and long-term problems of nuclear NP politics. The authors evaluate the conditions under which the NP regime came into being, and assess short- and long-term possibilities and risks. The following papers are included: 1.) Basic controversies during the negotiations concerning the Treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (Ungerer); 2.) Prologation of the NPT 1995 and appropriate problems concerning safety and control (Haefele/Lauppe); 3.) Consequences of the Iraq case for NP policy (Ficher); 4.) Problems of nuclear technology control (Mueller); 5.) Framework conditions of a nuclear world system (Haeckel). (orig./HP) [de

  8. Canada's nuclear non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-05-01

    Canada's non-proliferation safeguards policy has two objectives: 1) to promote a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime; and 2) to ensure that Canadian nuclear exports will not be used for any nuclear explosive purpose. By emphasizing the key role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, promoting reliance upon and improvements in the IAEA safeguards system, treating nuclear weapon and non-weapon states alike, and working for new approaches covering reprocessing, Canada promotes attainment of the first objective. The second is served through the network of bilateral nuclear agreements that Canada has put into place with its partners. The Canadian objective in post-INFCE forums is to persuade the international community to devise a more effective and comprehensive non-proliferation regime into which Canada and other suppliers may subsume their national requirements

  9. Canada's nuclear non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    Canada's non-proliferation and safeguards policy has two objectives: 1) to promote the emergence of a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime; and 2) to assure the Canadian people and the international community that Canadian nuclear exports will not be used for any nuclear explosive purpose. By emphasizing the key role of the NPT, by promoting reliance upon and improvements in the IAEA safeguards system, by treating nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states alike regarding Canadian nuclear exports, by working for new approaches covering the sensitive phases (e.g. reprocessing) of the nuclear fuel cycle, Canada's policy promotes attainment of the first objective. The latter objective is served through the network of bilateral nuclear agreements that Canada has put into place with its nuclear partners. Those agreements provide assurance that Canada's nuclear exports are used solely for legitimate, peaceful, nuclear energy production purposes. At the same time, Canada, having formulated its non-proliferation and safeguards policy during the period 1945 to 1980, has recognized that it has gone as far as it can on its own in this field and that from this point on any further changes should be made on the basis of international agreement. The Canadian objective in post-INFCE forums such as the Committee on Assurances of Supply is to exert Canada's best efforts to persuade the international community to devise a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime into which Canada and other suppliers might subsume their national requirements

  10. Nuclear Society and non-proliferation problems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gagarinskij, A.Ya.; Kushnarev, S.V.; Ponomarev-Stepnoj, N.N.; Sukhoruchkin, V.K.; Khromov, V.V.; Shmelev, V.M.

    1997-01-01

    In the USSR Nuclear Society in 1991 the special working group on the problems of nuclear weapons non-proliferation and nuclear materials control, uniting the experts of different types (nuclear physicists, lawyers, teachers), was created. This group became the mechanism of the practical Nuclear Society activity realization in this sphere. Three milestones of the innovative activity can be specified. First Milestone. In January 1992 the Central Nuclear Society Board (of the International Public Nuclear Society Association) published a special appeal to the First Leaders of all countries - former USSR republics. This address paid a special attention to the unity of the USSR power-industrial complex, and numerous problems arisen while separating this complex, including nuclear weapons non-proliferation problems, were indicated as well. Second Milestone. In 1992 and 1993 the Nuclear Society experts issued two selection 'Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control Problems' including reviewing basic papers. In addition, materials on non-proliferation and control are published regularly in the organs. Third Milestone.In 1993 - 1997 some special scientific and technical events (conferences, workshops, meetings) allowing to analyze the joint international projects and contracts outcomes, and establish new contacts between the specialists of NIS, Baltic states and others, have been hold

  11. The emerging nuclear suppliers and nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Potter, W.C.

    1990-01-01

    The number of states capable of exporting nuclear material, technology, equipment, and services is large and growing. Once confined primarily to states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the list of actual and potential nuclear suppliers now includes many countries that do not subscribe to the NPT or to other international nuclear export control agreements. Although international control accords---such as the Nuclear Exporters' (Zangger) Committee and the London Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines---do not prohibit the export of sensitive nuclear materials and equipment, they do reduce the risks of proliferation by imposing international safeguards as a condition for export. The purpose of this book---the culmination of one phase of an ongoing international research project on the emerging nuclear suppliers and nonproliferation---is to remedy, at least in part, this data deficiency

  12. British nuclear non-proliferation policy and the trident purchase

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keohane, D.

    1984-01-01

    Since the mid-1950s, the UK has had a policy of making significant and sustained efforts to minimise the spread of nuclear arms. Unlike the global focus of its non-proliferation policy, the decision on Trident in centred upon national and perhaps regional requirements. At a time when non-nuclear countries are charging nuclear-weapon states with a grave failure to meet their obligations under Article VI of the NPT, Britain is making plans that would further increase the gap between the nuclear 'haves' and have-nots' and that indicate it expects to require nuclear arms in the next century. It would of course be unrealistic to expect a government to fully harmonise its manifold policies and unreasonable to suggest it should give absolute priority to one of its policy concerns, such as non-proliferation. But Britain is emphasising the high value it places upon the independent possession of strategic nuclear arms through its decision to purchase Trident, thus implicitly contradicting the logic underlying its non-proliferation policy. Compared to other factors, the influence of the Trident decision upon the non-proliferation regime appears very marginal, yet it is unlikely to strengthen that regime

  13. Activities of the ANS special committee on nuclear nonproliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Buckner, M.R. [Westinghouse Savannah River Co., Aiken, SC (United States); Sanders, T.L. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2001-07-01

    The American Nuclear Society (ANS) Special Committee on Nuclear Nonproliferation (SCNN) believes that to reverse current trends, U.S. policy must revisit the fundamental premise of Atoms for Peace: A collaborative nuclear enterprise enhances rather than diminishes national security. To accomplish this, the U.S. Government must develop an integrated policy on energy, nuclear technology, and national security. The policy must recognize that these are interrelated and that an integrated policy will require substantial investments in nuclear research and development and in nuclear education. This paper describes the current activities of the SCNN to heighten awareness of nonproliferation issues for decision makers and ANS members, and alert them to the need for action to resolve these concerns. (author)

  14. Activities of the ANS special committee on nuclear nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Buckner, M.R.; Sanders, T.L.

    2001-01-01

    The American Nuclear Society (ANS) Special Committee on Nuclear Nonproliferation (SCNN) believes that to reverse current trends, U.S. policy must revisit the fundamental premise of Atoms for Peace: A collaborative nuclear enterprise enhances rather than diminishes national security. To accomplish this, the U.S. Government must develop an integrated policy on energy, nuclear technology, and national security. The policy must recognize that these are interrelated and that an integrated policy will require substantial investments in nuclear research and development and in nuclear education. This paper describes the current activities of the SCNN to heighten awareness of nonproliferation issues for decision makers and ANS members, and alert them to the need for action to resolve these concerns. (author)

  15. Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shea, M.

    2000-01-01

    Fissionable materials are common to all nuclear weapons and controls on the production, storage, processing and use of fissionable materials provides one means to address non-proliferation and disarmament. In this article, the relevance of such controls is examined and the current situation and future prospects are assessed. (authors)

  16. The control of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear development - present uncertainties

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Machado de Faria, N.G.; Amaral Barros, E.

    1983-01-01

    This report gives the views of Brazilian lawyers on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It deals with the present situation and future prospects concerning the uses of nuclear energy. In particular, it proposes the preparation of a protocol prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. (NEA) [fr

  17. Strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.

    2003-01-01

    Although the nuclear non-proliferation regime has enjoyed considerable success, today the regime has never been under greater threat. Three states have challenged the objectives of the NPT, and there is a technology challenge - the spread of centrifuge enrichment technology and know-how. A major issue confronting the international community is, how to deal with a determined proliferator? Despite this gloomy scenario, however, the non-proliferation regime has considerable strengths - many of which can be developed further. The regime comprises complex interacting and mutually reinforcing elements. At its centre is the NPT - with IAEA safeguards as the Treaty's verification mechanism. Important complementary elements include: restraint in the supply and the acquisition of sensitive technologies; multilateral regimes such as the CTBT and proposed FMCT; various regional and bilateral regimes; the range of security and arms control arrangements outside the nuclear area (including other WMD regimes); and the development of proliferation-resistant technologies. Especially important are political incentives and sanctions in support of non-proliferation objectives. This paper outlines some of the key issues facing the non-proliferation regime

  18. Nuclear disarmament. Options for the coming non-proliferation treaty surveillance cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueller, Harald

    2011-01-01

    The report is aimed on the nuclear disarmament discussion with respect to the disagreement of nuclear weapon states and those without nuclear weapons, esp. the non-aligned movement (NAM) concerning the non-proliferation treaty. The report covers the following issues: The role of the non-proliferation treaty, nuclear disarmament in the last surveillance conference 2010, the different disarmament philosophies, the possibilities of bridging the disagreement, further disarmament options for the future non-proliferation treaty surveillance cycle, German options for the future surveillance cycle.

  19. The legal points at issue concerning the Non-proliferation Treaty and the verification agreement of EURATOM with the IAEA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zieger, G.

    1975-01-01

    An excellent and comprehensive but very juridicial contribution on: Development and content of the Non-proliferation Treaty, the problems which this Treaty poses for EURATOM (a common market, common supply, joint enterprises, Non-proliferation Treaty and France), the compatibility of the Non-proliferation Treaty with the EURATOM Treaty, verification agreement EURATOM - IAEA (the IAEA as the supervisory authority, the control system of the IAEA, guidelines elaborated by the IAEA to be used as the basis for negotiating safeguard agreements, national systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material IAEA supervision as a secondary control, principles of IAEA supervision, secrecy, conflict management), conclusion of the verification agreement, deviations from the guidelines elaborated by the IAEA to be used as the basis for negotiating safeguard agreements legal reflexions (verification agreement and Non-proliferation Treaty, reservations concerning the Non-proliferation Treaty, questions of competence between EURATOM and member states without nuclear weapons, problems of equal treatment). (HP/LN) [de

  20. Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Nonproliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Richardson, J

    2009-01-21

    The fallacy of zero nuclear weapons, even as a virtual goal, is discussed. Because the complete abolition of nuclear weapons is not verifiable, nuclear weapons will always play a role in the calculus of assure, dissuade, deter and defeat (ADDD). However, the relative contribution of nuclear weapons to international security has diminished. To reconstitute the Cold War nuclear capability, with respect to both the nuclear weapons capability and their associated delivery systems, is fiscally daunting and not warranted due to competing budgetary pressures and their relative contribution to international security and nonproliferation. A proposed pathway to a sustainable nuclear weapons capability end-state is suggested which provides enough ADDD; a Dyad composed of fewer delivery and weapon systems, with trickle production at the National Laboratories and private sector to maintain capability and guard against technological surprise.

  1. An Introduction to Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haakansson, Ane; Jonter, Thomas

    2007-06-01

    The purpose of this project was to compile a course material that covers how the nuclear safeguards system has emerged and how it works today. The produced compendium is directed to both university students and people concerned by safeguards from the industry. The primary aim of the first part of this paper is to describe the historical development of this global non-proliferation system and its central tasks. A second purpose is to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of its current design in order to answer the following question: Can we today say that we have a functioning global non-proliferation system? Does it require further strengthening, and, if so, how can this be achieved? In the second section we review the verification regime within nuclear safeguards, i. e. describe the methods and techniques that are available to reassure the world community that concluded treaties are adhered to

  2. An Introduction to Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Haakansson, Ane; Jonter, Thomas

    2007-06-15

    The purpose of this project was to compile a course material that covers how the nuclear safeguards system has emerged and how it works today. The produced compendium is directed to both university students and people concerned by safeguards from the industry. The primary aim of the first part of this paper is to describe the historical development of this global non-proliferation system and its central tasks. A second purpose is to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of its current design in order to answer the following question: Can we today say that we have a functioning global non-proliferation system? Does it require further strengthening, and, if so, how can this be achieved? In the second section we review the verification regime within nuclear safeguards, i. e. describe the methods and techniques that are available to reassure the world community that concluded treaties are adhered to

  3. Export of nuclear equipment and materials and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Courteix, Simone.

    1977-01-01

    The problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of great concern today despite the entry into force in the early '70s of the NPT. To master civilian nuclear technology implies the ability to develop nuclear explosive devices; therefore in recent years contacts have strengthened between countries exporting nuclear equipment, specially in the frame of the 'London Club' so as to ensure that their exports will not result in disseminating nuclear weapons. (NEA) [fr

  4. The future of nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Siddiqa, A.

    1997-01-01

    Nuclear proliferation in South Asia is currently one of the hot topics in world politics. The concern of the international community, and especially the USA, over this issue is coupled with the fear of nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan. As a result, Washington has been using its 'stick and carrot' policy to persuade the two countries involved not to develop their nuclear programs for military purposes. However both countries have not only continued to develop their nuclear ambitions, but seem to have achieved vertical nuclear proliferation. This paper examines the future non-proliferation in the South Asian region in the 1990s. This will be achieved by looking at the following: the development of the nuclear capabilities of both India and Pakistan; how these programs have been developed; the reasons for acquiring the capability for non-conventional defence; the real fear in terms of nuclear proliferation in the region; the possible options for dealing with nuclear proliferation in South Asia

  5. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy of the Obama Administration

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baek, Jin Hyun; Hwang, Ji Hwan

    2009-12-01

    The objective of this study is to analyze and foresee trends of international nuclear non-proliferation regimes focused on the nuclear non-proliferation policy of the Obama administration, and suggest national policy directions which promote utilization and development of nuclear energy in Korea. For the effective and efficient implementation of the national nuclear use and development program in current international nuclear environment, many efforts should be made: to actively and positively participate in the international nuclear non-proliferation regime; to strengthen nuclear diplomacy in a more systematic manner; and to strengthen the international nuclear cooperation

  6. Nuclear nonproliferation: The long haul

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dunn, L.A.

    1985-01-01

    The policy of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency rests upon the recognition that nuclear proliferation would profoundly threaten international stability and global order. Suspicions among traditional rivals would be exacerbated, regional disputes made more complex, and the possibility of local conflict increased. The security and well-being of the United Sttes and its close friends and allies, but also the security and well-being of the countries acquiring these weapons, would be threatened. Indeed, the greatest chance of use of nuclear weapons stems not from the US-Soviet strategic balance but from the possible emergence of small, unstable nuclear arsenals in many regions of the world characterized by crises and periodic military conflict

  7. Joint DOE-PNC research on the use of transparency in support of Nuclear Nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mochiji, Toshiro; Tazaki, Makiko; Keeney, Robin; Puckett, John; Stanbro, William; Nakhleh, Charles

    1998-01-01

    PNC and LANL collaborated in research on the concept of transparency in nuclear nonproliferation. The research was based on the Action Sheet no.21, which was signed in February 1996, 'The Joint Research on 'Transparency' in Nuclear Nonproliferation' under the 'Agreement between the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation of Japan (PNC) and the US Department of Energy (DOE) for Cooperation in Research and Development Concerning Nuclear Material Control and Accounting Measures for Safeguards and Nonproliferation.' The scope of the research was a fundamental study on transparency to clarify the means to improve worldwide acceptability of nuclear energy from a nuclear nonproliferation viewpoint. The research encompassed three main topics: the policy environment of transparency, the development of transparency options, and technical options for transparency. Each side performed independent research then joint workshops were held to exchange information and views. This paper summarizes the results of these workshops. (author)

  8. Nuclear non-proliferation: failures and prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Imai, R.; Press, R.

    1980-01-01

    The objective of this paper is to examine the evolution of combined political and technical attempts to achieve worldwide acceptance of a commitment to non-proliferation, to note failures to date, and to identify essential factors to be satisfied if greater and necessary success is to be achieved in the immediate future. For this it is necessary to separate the realism and unrealism so often involved in discussing the concept of non-proliferation, as defined above, particularly if treated as a moral principle rather than as part of a general security issue reflecting shifts in regional and global stability. The political nature of the non-proliferation problem is underlined by the fact that whereas five nuclear weapon states are currently accepted, any threatened increase in that number is discouraged by every possible peaceful means. This fact combines political acceptance of an existing international situation with a belief that any addition to the present number must lead to international instability. Success in preventing additions may be more readily achieved through political understanding and perhaps some compromises, in particular cases, rather than through seeking a universal solution to a generalized problem

  9. Reviewing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-05-01

    howitzers also were deployed by U.S. forces landing in Lebanon in 1958. The Russians, meanwhile, threatened the use of nuclear weapons to end the...with six or seven feet for shielding, lead glass windows, etc. Tons of spent fuel must be handled to produce kilograms of plutonium. At the other...contracts were written during a pe- riod of surplus and include price ceilings . The same basic situation applies to enrichment cost and sup- ply. Most

  10. Evaluation method of nuclear nonproliferation credibility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kwon, Eun-ha; Ko, Won Il

    2009-01-01

    This paper presents an integrated multicriteria analysis method for the quantitative evaluation of a state's nuclear nonproliferation credibility level. Underscoring the implications of policy on the sources of political demand for nuclear weapons rather than focusing on efforts to restrict the supply of specific weapons technology from the 'haves' to the 'have-nots', the proposed methodology considers the political, social, and cultural dimensions of nuclear proliferation. This methodology comprises three steps: (1) identifying the factors that influence credibility formation and employing them to construct a criteria tree that will illustrate the relationships among these factors; (2) defining the weight coefficients of each criterion through pairwise comparisons of the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP); and (3) assigning numerical scores to a state under each criterion and combining them with the weight coefficients in order to provide an overall assessment of the state. The functionality of this methodology is examined by assessing the current level of nuclear nonproliferation credibility of four countries: Japan, North Korea, South Korea, and Switzerland.

  11. Nuclear Nonproliferation Ontology Assessment Team Final Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Strasburg, Jana D.; Hohimer, Ryan E.

    2012-01-01

    Final Report for the NA22 Simulations, Algorithm and Modeling (SAM) Ontology Assessment Team's efforts from FY09-FY11. The Ontology Assessment Team began in May 2009 and concluded in September 2011. During this two-year time frame, the Ontology Assessment team had two objectives: (1) Assessing the utility of knowledge representation and semantic technologies for addressing nuclear nonproliferation challenges; and (2) Developing ontological support tools that would provide a framework for integrating across the Simulation, Algorithm and Modeling (SAM) program. The SAM Program was going through a large assessment and strategic planning effort during this time and as a result, the relative importance of these two objectives changed, altering the focus of the Ontology Assessment Team. In the end, the team conducted an assessment of the state of art, created an annotated bibliography, and developed a series of ontological support tools, demonstrations and presentations. A total of more than 35 individuals from 12 different research institutions participated in the Ontology Assessment Team. These included subject matter experts in several nuclear nonproliferation-related domains as well as experts in semantic technologies. Despite the diverse backgrounds and perspectives, the Ontology Assessment team functioned very well together and aspects could serve as a model for future inter-laboratory collaborations and working groups. While the team encountered several challenges and learned many lessons along the way, the Ontology Assessment effort was ultimately a success that led to several multi-lab research projects and opened up a new area of scientific exploration within the Office of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Verification.

  12. Physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nilsson, A.

    1999-01-01

    Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has been one of the main concerns of the international community since the first nuclear weapons were developed. To prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been on the agenda for individual States, groups of States and the international organizations. A number of treaties, conventions and agreements, the most important being the Non-Proliferation Treaty, have been negotiated to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. States have concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA to fulfill their obligations according to Article III.1 of the NPT. Other agreements relate to the prevention of vertical proliferation and also to the disarmament of nuclear weapons. It has also been recognized that sub-national, terrorist, or criminal activities may pose a proliferation risk. Illicit trafficking of nuclear material, particularly highly enriched uranium or plutonium, is a non-proliferation concern. States have recognized the need to prevent, as far as possible, the use of nuclear material in unlawful activities. The Convention of Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, obligates the State Parties to protect nuclear material from theft during international transport, and to make unlawful possession, use, etc., of nuclear material a criminal offense, subject to punishment under national law. Although the physical protection convention recognizes the importance of the physical protection of nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport, it does not obligate the State party to establish the necessary systems for this purpose. It is this limitation which led many States to believe that the international physical protection regime needs to be strengthened. Although not legally binding per se, the recommendations documented in INFCIRC/225/Rev. 4, The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, has obtained wide recognition. There is recognition among States that protecting nuclear material

  13. Fast Reactors and Nuclear Nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Avrorina, E.N.; Chebeskovb, A.N.

    2013-01-01

    Conclusion remarks: 1. Fast reactor start-up with U-Pu fuel: – dependent on thermal reactors, – no needs in U enrichment, – needs in SNF reprocessing, – Pu is a little suitable for NED, – practically impossible gun-type NED, – difficulties for implosion-type NED: necessary tests, advanced technologies, etc. – Pu in blankets is similar to WPu by isotopic composition, – Use of blanket for production isotopes (e.g. 233 U), – Combined reprocessing of SNF: altogether blanket and core, – Blanket elimination: decrease in Pu production – No pure Pu separation. 2. Fast reactor start-up with U fuel: - Needs in both U enrichment and SNF reprocessing, - Independent of thermal reactors, - Good Pu bred in the core let alone blankets, - NED of simple gun-type design, - Increase of needs in SWU, - Increased demands in U supply. 3. Fast reactors for export: - Uranium shortage, - To replace thermal reactors in future, - No blankets (depends on the country, though), - Fuel supply and SNF take back, - International centers for rendering services of NFC. Time has come to remove from FRs and their NFC the label unfairly identifying them as the most dangerous installations of nuclear power from the standpoint of being a proliferation problem

  14. Current nuclear non-proliferation policies in the world

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kurosawa, Mitsuru

    1997-01-01

    Although a global nuclear confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union has disappeared, many challenges to nuclear non-proliferation have emerged. Sources of concern, like a nuclear weapon program by Iraq and suspicions of North Korea have caused the adoption of a variety of political and technical measures in order to meet these challenges in the post-Cold War era. This paper describes the following ten policies for non-proliferation: 1) Strengthening the NPT; 2) Nuclear reduction; 3) CTBT and cut-off treaty; 4) Establishment of NWFZs; 5) Counterproliferation; 6) Strengthening the IAEA Safeguards; 7) Control and disposal of nuclear material from dismantled nuclear weapons; 8) Export control; 9) Registration of plutonium; and 10) Actions against nuclear smuggling. The first four measures can be said to be mainly political policies, the fifth measure (counterproliferation), can be categorized as basically a military policy, and the last five measures can be said to be technical. (J.P.N.)

  15. Systems resilience: a new analytical framework for nuclear nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pregenzer, Arian Leigh

    2011-01-01

    This paper introduces the concept of systems resilience as a new framework for thinking about the future of nonproliferation. Resilience refers to the ability of a system to maintain its vital functions in the face of continuous and unpredictable change. The nonproliferation regime can be viewed as a complex system, and key themes from the literature on systems resilience can be applied to the nonproliferation system. Most existing nonproliferation strategies are aimed at stability rather than resilience, and the current nonproliferation system may be over-constrained by the cumulative evolution of strategies, increasing its vulnerability to collapse. The resilience of the nonproliferation system can be enhanced by diversifying nonproliferation strategies to include general international capabilities to respond to proliferation and focusing more attention on reducing the motivation to acquire nuclear weapons in the first place. Ideas for future research, include understanding unintended consequences and feedbacks among nonproliferation strategies, developing methodologies for measuring the resilience of the nonproliferation system, and accounting for interactions of the nonproliferation system with other systems on larger and smaller scales.

  16. Systems resilience : a new analytical framework for nuclear nonproliferation.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pregenzer, Arian Leigh

    2011-12-01

    This paper introduces the concept of systems resilience as a new framework for thinking about the future of nonproliferation. Resilience refers to the ability of a system to maintain its vital functions in the face of continuous and unpredictable change. The nonproliferation regime can be viewed as a complex system, and key themes from the literature on systems resilience can be applied to the nonproliferation system. Most existing nonproliferation strategies are aimed at stability rather than resilience, and the current nonproliferation system may be over-constrained by the cumulative evolution of strategies, increasing its vulnerability to collapse. The resilience of the nonproliferation system can be enhanced by diversifying nonproliferation strategies to include general international capabilities to respond to proliferation and focusing more attention on reducing the motivation to acquire nuclear weapons in the first place. Ideas for future research, include understanding unintended consequences and feedbacks among nonproliferation strategies, developing methodologies for measuring the resilience of the nonproliferation system, and accounting for interactions of the nonproliferation system with other systems on larger and smaller scales.

  17. Examination of Relationship between Nuclear Transparency and Nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ha, Jee-Min; Yim, Man-Sung; Park, Hyeon Seok; Kim, So Young

    2015-01-01

    In this study, we define the state-level nuclear transparency as a set of the condition that shows how clearly the state's information related to peaceful nuclear power program and nuclear proliferation is revealed to the international community. For conducting expert survey on state-level nuclear transparency, the concept of nuclear transparency should be clearly defined. Based on that concept, the survey was carried out and results show that it tend to score high when nonproliferation activities happen. It means that higher transparency is positively related to nuclear proliferation. Therefore, higher nuclear transparency is positively related to nuclear nonproliferation

  18. Examination of Relationship between Nuclear Transparency and Nonproliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ha, Jee-Min; Yim, Man-Sung; Park, Hyeon Seok; Kim, So Young [Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    In this study, we define the state-level nuclear transparency as a set of the condition that shows how clearly the state's information related to peaceful nuclear power program and nuclear proliferation is revealed to the international community. For conducting expert survey on state-level nuclear transparency, the concept of nuclear transparency should be clearly defined. Based on that concept, the survey was carried out and results show that it tend to score high when nonproliferation activities happen. It means that higher transparency is positively related to nuclear proliferation. Therefore, higher nuclear transparency is positively related to nuclear nonproliferation.

  19. Perspectives of the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koungou, Leon

    2004-01-01

    To join traditional methods and new approaches of 'non-proliferation'. This is a technical method and the best way to fight against 'non-proliferation' which is facing few preoccupations: knowledge's disseminations; technologies; equipments and weapons that should be stopped. As it's important to note the return of nuclear danger as the end of confrontation between west-east which should be reduce. As the adaptation of mechanisms is necessary today, as it is important to react about states' incitations to violate international engagement of non-proliferation. Areas control allows finding out change and evolution, but more insufficient. Functional difficulties show that the IAEA (International Agency of Atomic Energy) does not work good. Safeguard system does not allow to respect 'non-proliferation' engagements; for instance 'junkies states' that they cannot dissuade traditional methods. The fight of 'non-proliferation' shows new progresses with fearing methods of prevention actions and heaviest international controls of exportation. The target of this is very ambitious. This new method is self-successful because it contributes to re-enforce international security when defeating acquisition of nuclear and mass destruction weapons by non-states factors. Therefore non-proliferation regime and especially 'non-proliferation treaty' remains delicate as long as some militaries state such USA will reject their 'non-proliferation' engagement. (author) [fr

  20. Non-proliferation and nuclear cooperation - accomplishments and challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marshall, H.R. Jr.

    1983-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to assess the accomplishments in non-proliferation and nuclear co-operation since the beginning of President Reagan's administration, and the challenges remaining to be met in those fields. (NEA) [fr

  1. Canada and international safeguards. Verifying nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-01-01

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970 and now has about 140 signatory nations. By creating legal barriers against proliferation and by promoting an international non-proliferation ethic, the NPT has promoted international peace and security. A key ingredient has been the confidence generated through verification by IAEA safeguards. By the end of 1988 IAEA safeguards agreements had been concluded with about 100 countries, including Canada. Over 500 nuclear facilities worldwide are under safeguards or contain safeguarded nuclear material. The existence of this credible and effective safeguards system makes international trade in nuclear equipment and materials possible, monitoring the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries as well as between industrial countries. Canada is committed to non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards. Canadian non-proliferation policy is among the strictest in the world, even though opportunities have been lost to sell Canadian technology abroad as a result

  2. On the non-proliferation framework of Japan's peaceful nuclear utilization program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kano, Takashi

    1996-01-01

    The Conference of the States Party to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter referred to as the NPT) convened in New York, from April 17 to May 12, 1995 and decided that the NPT shall continue in force indefinitely, after reviewing the operation and affirming some aspects of the NPT, while emphasizing the ''Decision on Strengthening the Review Process'' for the NPT and the ''Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament,'' also adopted by the Conference. In parallel, Japan made its basic non-proliferation policy clear in the ''Long-Term Program for Research, Development and Utilization of Nuclear Energy'' which was decided by the Atomic Energy Commission (chaired by Mikio Oomi, then Minister of the Science and Technology Agency of Japan) in June 1994. The Long-Term Program discusses various problems facing post-Cold-War international society and describes Japan's policy for establishing international confidence concerning non-proliferation. This paper summarizes Japan's non-proliferation policy as articulated in the Long-Term Program, and describes some results of an analysis comparing the Long-Term Program with the resolutions on the international non-proliferation frameworks adopted by the NPT conference

  3. Nuclear power generation and nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rathjens, G.

    1979-01-01

    The main points existing between nuclear energy development and nuclear non-proliferation policy are reviewed. The solar energy and other energy will replace for nuclear fission energy in the twenty first century, but it may not occur in the first half, and the structure has to be established to continue the development of nuclear fission technology, including breeder reactor technology. In the near future, it should be encouraged to use advanced thermal reactors if they are economic and operated with safety. Miserable results may be created in the worldwide scale, if a serious accident occurs anywhere or nuclear power reactors are utilized for military object. It is estimated to be possible to develop the ability of manufacturing nuclear weapons within two or three years in the countries where the industry is highly developed so as to generate nuclear power. It is also difficult to take measures so that nuclear power generation does not increase nuclear proliferation problems, and it is necessary to mitigate the motive and to establish the international organization. Concensus exists that as the minimum security action, the storage and transportation of materials, which can be directly utilized for nuclear weapons, should be decided by the international system. The most portions of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle should be put under the international management, as far as possible. This problem is discussed in INFCE. Related to the nuclear nonproliferation, the difference of policy in fuel cycle problems between USA and the other countries, the enrichment of nuclear fuel material, especially the reasons to inhibit the construction of additional enrichment facilities, nuclear fuel reprocessing problems, radioactive waste disposal, plutonium stock and plutonium recycle problems are reviewed. (Nakai, Y.)

  4. Course modules on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bril, L.-V.; Janssens-Maenhout, G.

    2004-01-01

    Full text: One of major current concern in the nuclear field is the conservation of developed knowledge and expertise. The relevance of this subject is steadily increasing for several reasons: retirement of the generation of first industrial development of nuclear energy, only one new reactor under construction in Europe while several in Eastern and Asian countries, the public's concern on safety, radioactive waste and safeguards aspects, and some lack of interest common to many activities in engineering and physics. Moreover nuclear safeguards is nowadays characterised with an enlarged scope and no longer strictly limited to the accountancy of nuclear material; today it encompasses non proliferation of nuclear material, and deals with the control of dual use equipment and technologies, illicit trafficking and External Security. Some higher education networks, such as the European Nuclear Engineering Network (ENEN), have been established to make better use of dwindling teaching capacity, scientific equipment and research infrastructure, through co-operation amongst universities and research centres. The European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) initiated the set-up of course modules under an e-learning medium, to preserve knowledge in nuclear safeguards. These course modules should be considered as basic pedagogical documentation, which will be accessible via the Internet. Monitoring or controlling of the accesses will be ensured. The modules are structured with an increasing level of detail, in function of the audience. On one hand the course modules should be attractive to University students in nuclear, chemical or mechanical engineering, in radiochemistry, statistics, law, political science etc. at universities or specialised institutes. On the other hand the course modules aim to give professionals, working on specific safeguards or non-proliferation issues an overview and detailed technical information on the wide variety of nuclear

  5. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Regulating Nuclear Weapons around the World

    Science.gov (United States)

    Middleton, Tiffany Willey

    2010-01-01

    In May 2010, scientists, national security experts, and state delegates from nations around the world will convene in New York for the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. They will review current guidelines for nuclear testing and possession of nuclear weapons in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968,…

  6. U.S. - India nuclear cooperation and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yash Thomas, Mannully

    2008-01-01

    The agreement for cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the government of India concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy (referred as 123 agreement) acknowledges a shift in international strategies and relations in both countries. As to India, it marks the end of nuclear isolation resulting from constraint, embargoes and controls and instead opens the path for nuclear commerce. With respect to the United States it entails a major geo strategic ally in the evolving South Asia region and promises large commercial benefits to the US nuclear sector. This is called 'nuclear deal' and constitutes one of the major political, economic and strategic relationship developing between the two countries since 2001. It will lead to the separation of military and civilian nuclear installations in India, the latter to be placed under the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It thus, de facto accepts India in the club of nuclear weapon states within the meaning of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) although it is not party to this treaty, refuses adhering to it, officially possesses nuclear weapons and is not subject to a comprehensive system of safeguards. This article will examine the developments which led to the 123 agreement and its subsequent implementation in a wider context of international relations and non proliferation. First, the articles gives a brief introduction into the Indian nuclear programme, the legislative framework and the factors which necessitated nuclear cooperation between India and the United States. Secondly, it will address the implementation of the nuclear deal and subsequent developments. Finally, it will analyse the non proliferation issues related to the implementation of the agreement. (N.C.)

  7. The new US nuclear non-proliferation and export policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Welck, S. von.

    1981-01-01

    The future American nuclear non-proliferation and export policy will be determined chiefly by three elements: (1) Adherence to the former objective of nuclear non-proliferation. (2) A large and varied assortment of old and new tools for implementing this goal. (3) Much more differentiation in applying these tools in the light of the reliability, with respect to non-proliferation policy, of the respective partner. Consequently, it would make little sense for the new Administration to force upon allied industrialized countries, whose nuclear technologies are at the same level as that of the United States, restrictive rules on reprocessing and breeder technology. The new measures designed to curb proliferation are especially meant to destroy motivations that could cause states to own nuclear explosives. This also applies to the removal of economic motivations. (orig.) [de

  8. Previewing the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pomper, Miles A.

    2010-01-01

    Despite groundbreaking disarmament pledges and substantial effort, the Obama administration's hopes for a successful Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference may not be fully realised. Many developing countries are in no mood to grant new non-proliferation concessions, such as tightened rules on access to sensitive nuclear technologies, tougher inspection rules, or limits on withdrawing from the treaty. The non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) remain angered by the failure to move forward on many disarmament commitments pledged at the 1995 and 2000 Conferences. Moreover, progress on disarmament measures under Obama has been slower than hoped, as he faces considerable scepticism in Washington about his strategy. (author)

  9. Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kimura, Naohito; Naoi, Yosuke

    2010-01-01

    In April 2010, at the Nuclear Security Summit, Japan demonstrated its commitment to the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security and announced the establishment of the Integrated Comprehensive Support Center for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security in the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), under the guidance and authority of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports and Science and Technology (MEXT), and in cooperation with other ministries. The goal of the Center is to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation and security in emerging nuclear power countries by sharing Japan's accumulated experiences in its peaceful use of nuclear energy. To achieve its goal, the Center serves three functions: (1) human resource and capacity building, (2) infrastructure development and technical assistance and (3) international coordination and cooperation. The Center will offer three types of training courses to strengthen human resources and capacity building in emerging nuclear power countries. In the Training Course on Nuclear Security, the participants will learn the design and evaluation process for physical protection and detection of and response to illegal or unauthorized acts related to nuclear materials. They will learn these issues not only through lectures and training but also using mockup facilities and virtual reality systems. Second, in the Training Course on Safeguards and State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC), the Center will teach the experience of advanced safeguards activities in Japan for its full-scale nuclear fuel cycle facilities as a non-nuclear weapon state. The participants will learn the IAEA and national safeguards systems, the material accounting system and inspector activities. Third, in the Training on the International Nuclear Nonproliferation Framework, the participants will learn the international framework of nuclear non-proliferation including the IAEA safeguards system and

  10. From nuclear non-proliferation to nuclear disarmament: a need to refocus NPT priorities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sethi, Manpreet

    1998-01-01

    This paper seeks to suggest that attempts at general and complete nuclear disarmament have largely failed because of an over emphasis on nuclear non-proliferation, particularly horizontal, while disarmament has attracted only lip service from the perpetrators of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that is deemed to be the core of the global non-proliferation regime is no less to blame for having indulged in a skewed pursuit of its twin objectives - nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The paper argues that nuclear non-proliferation can be sustainable only if complemented by nuclear disarmament. In the absence of the latter, proliferation of nuclear weapons, irrespective of the NPT and its safeguards regime, would always pose a potential risk

  11. Strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime: focus on the civilian nuclear fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Saltiel, David H.; Pregenzer, Arian Leigh

    2005-01-01

    the century and could increase even more quickly. Much of the new demand will come from the rapidly expanding economies in China and India, but much of the developing world stands poised to follow the same path. This growth in demand is paralleled by concerns about global warming and the long-term reliability of carbon-based fuel supplies, concerns which expanded use of nuclear power can help to address. For these reasons and others, many countries in Asia have already clearly signaled that nuclear energy will play a key role for years to come. Numerous proposals have been made in the last two years for reducing the proliferation risk of the civilian nuclear fuel cycle. These range from a ban on export of enrichment and reprocessing technology to countries not already possessing operational capabilities to multinational management of the nuclear fuel cycle and strengthening existing monitoring and security mechanisms. The need for international willingness to enforce nonproliferation commitments and norms has also been emphasized. Some of these proposals could significantly impact the production of nuclear energy. Because the successful strengthening of the nonproliferation regime and the expansion of nuclear energy are so closely related, any successful approach to resolving these issues will require the creative input of experts from both the nuclear energy and nonproliferation communities. Against this backdrop, Sandia National Laboratories organized its 14th International Security Conference (ISC) around the theme: Strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Focus on the Civilian Nuclear Fuel Cycle. The goal of the conference was to begin a constructive dialogue between the nuclear energy and nuclear nonproliferation communities. The conference was held in Chantilly, Virginia, just outside Washington, D.C. on April 4-6, 2005, and was attended by approximately 125 participants from fifteen countries. The ISC agenda was structured to produce a systematic

  12. Impasses and mistakes of the nuclear non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hirst, M.

    1980-01-01

    It is analyzed the limitations for implementing the American Nuclear non-proliferation policy. It is shown the crisis of the North American international relations, with the economic and scientific development of the advanced capitalist nations and some countries of the third world, the penetration of these countries in the world trade commerce of the nuclear industry as sellers and cunsumers, and the Latin American's and Brazil's position in the international panorama of nuclear power. (M.C.K.) [pt

  13. Promotion of Nuclear Non-proliferation in East Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hwang, Yong Soo

    2009-07-01

    KAERI has jointly worked with Sandia National Laboratories for Nuclear Energy Non-proliferation in East Asia for the last five years. This project aims at support activities in this joint project between two states. The annual meetings were held during the project period, the 4th one in 2008 and the 5th one in 2009. In addition code comparison between KAERI and SNL's codes for assessing the back-end fuel cycle options was carried out. This project strongly enhances the close tie for the non-proliferation, transparency and safeguards among Korea Japan China Taiwan the United States Russia Malaysia Singapore Indonesia Thailand Vietnam and others for the project period

  14. Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2000-01-01

    The document reproduces the statement of the Director General of the IAEA to the Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 24 April 2000. The speech focus on the IAEA activities relevant to the implementation of the Treaty, namely: verification through the IAEA safeguards, peaceful nuclear co-operation in the field of human health, food and agriculture, water resources management, environmental pollution monitoring, training

  15. Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament: Where Next?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Evans, G.

    2013-01-01

    completely stalled; there is now real uncertainty about US ratification of the New START treaty with the Russian Federation, and with it any major new round of arms reduction negotiations; there has been less movement than hoped for in reducing the role and salience of nuclear weapons in national security doctrine; there has been no movement on the file of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK); and concern about the intentions of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) remain as strong as ever. About the only ray of real light for the year has been the substantial measure of agreement achieved at the Washington Summit on nuclear security issues and cooperative implementation of the global anti-terrorism agenda. In my own approach to difficult international policy issues, I usually err on the side of congenital optimism, and it is possible to see the glass as half full rather than half empty on most of the specific issues I have mentioned - and others as well, such as the question of multilateralization of sensitive stages of the fuel cycle on which the IAEA Board of Governors has already expended so much time and energy. The road ahead - as mapped in detail, for example, in the report last year by the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND), with which I hope you are familiar - was always going to be long and slow. But everything depends on some real momentum being sustained. If that momentum is lost, as it was during the fifteen years or so of sleepwalking that followed the initial flurry of disarmament activity in the early post-Cold War years, and looks in real danger right now of being completely lost again, it is not easy to see how it will ever be regained. And that is very bad news indeed for this planet. It is worth reminding ourselves on these occasions, although the facts and arguments are familiar enough to this audience, why such an outcome would be such bad news, and why it is that the work that is done at symposiums

  16. Non-proliferation and nuclear data

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sowerby, M.G.

    1978-01-01

    A review is made of the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons with particular emphasis on proliferation and nuclear power. Some indications of the nuclear data requirements associated with methods of reducing proliferation risks are presented

  17. Nuclear non-proliferation: a guide to the debate

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldblat, Jozef.

    1985-01-01

    The non-proliferation policies of 15 countries have been studied and summarized for use by participants of the third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation (NPT) of Nuclear weapons held in September 1985. The main purpose of the guide is to examine what action must be taken to ensure the Treaty's survival. There are four chapters following an introduction, covering the implementation of the essential provisions of the NPT, the motivations of the countries which have not joined the NPT, together with the motivations of those which have formally renounced the possession of nuclear weapons, even though they possess the technical and economic potential necessary to manufacture them. The last chapter summarises measures which might be taken to strengthen the NPT including ideas put forward at a workshop held in 1984. (author)

  18. Nuclear disarmament. Options for the coming non-proliferation treaty surveillance cycle; Nukleare Abruestung. Optionen fuer den kommenden Ueberpruefungszyklus des NVV

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mueller, Harald

    2011-07-01

    The report is aimed on the nuclear disarmament discussion with respect to the disagreement of nuclear weapon states and those without nuclear weapons, esp. the non-aligned movement (NAM) concerning the non-proliferation treaty. The report covers the following issues: The role of the non-proliferation treaty, nuclear disarmament in the last surveillance conference 2010, the different disarmament philosophies, the possibilities of bridging the disagreement, further disarmament options for the future non-proliferation treaty surveillance cycle, German options for the future surveillance cycle.

  19. INTEGRATION OF FACILITY MODELING CAPABILITIES FOR NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION ANALYSIS

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gorensek, M.; Hamm, L.; Garcia, H.; Burr, T.; Coles, G.; Edmunds, T.; Garrett, A.; Krebs, J.; Kress, R.; Lamberti, V.; Schoenwald, D.; Tzanos, C.; Ward, R.

    2011-07-18

    Developing automated methods for data collection and analysis that can facilitate nuclear nonproliferation assessment is an important research area with significant consequences for the effective global deployment of nuclear energy. Facility modeling that can integrate and interpret observations collected from monitored facilities in order to ascertain their functional details will be a critical element of these methods. Although improvements are continually sought, existing facility modeling tools can characterize all aspects of reactor operations and the majority of nuclear fuel cycle processing steps, and include algorithms for data processing and interpretation. Assessing nonproliferation status is challenging because observations can come from many sources, including local and remote sensors that monitor facility operations, as well as open sources that provide specific business information about the monitored facilities, and can be of many different types. Although many current facility models are capable of analyzing large amounts of information, they have not been integrated in an analyst-friendly manner. This paper addresses some of these facility modeling capabilities and illustrates how they could be integrated and utilized for nonproliferation analysis. The inverse problem of inferring facility conditions based on collected observations is described, along with a proposed architecture and computer framework for utilizing facility modeling tools. After considering a representative sampling of key facility modeling capabilities, the proposed integration framework is illustrated with several examples.

  20. Integration of facility modeling capabilities for nuclear nonproliferation analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garcia, Humberto; Burr, Tom; Coles, Garill A.; Edmunds, Thomas A.; Garrett, Alfred; Gorensek, Maximilian; Hamm, Luther; Krebs, John; Kress, Reid L.; Lamberti, Vincent; Schoenwald, David; Tzanos, Constantine P.; Ward, Richard C.

    2012-01-01

    Developing automated methods for data collection and analysis that can facilitate nuclear nonproliferation assessment is an important research area with significant consequences for the effective global deployment of nuclear energy. Facility modeling that can integrate and interpret observations collected from monitored facilities in order to ascertain their functional details will be a critical element of these methods. Although improvements are continually sought, existing facility modeling tools can characterize all aspects of reactor operations and the majority of nuclear fuel cycle processing steps, and include algorithms for data processing and interpretation. Assessing nonproliferation status is challenging because observations can come from many sources, including local and remote sensors that monitor facility operations, as well as open sources that provide specific business information about the monitored facilities, and can be of many different types. Although many current facility models are capable of analyzing large amounts of information, they have not been integrated in an analyst-friendly manner. This paper addresses some of these facility modeling capabilities and illustrates how they could be integrated and utilized for nonproliferation analysis. The inverse problem of inferring facility conditions based on collected observations is described, along with a proposed architecture and computer framework for utilizing facility modeling tools. After considering a representative sampling of key facility modeling capabilities, the proposed integration framework is illustrated with several examples.

  1. Integration Of Facility Modeling Capabilities For Nuclear Nonproliferation Analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gorensek, M.; Hamm, L.; Garcia, H.; Burr, T.; Coles, G.; Edmunds, T.; Garrett, A.; Krebs, J.; Kress, R.; Lamberti, V.; Schoenwald, D.; Tzanos, C.; Ward, R.

    2011-01-01

    Developing automated methods for data collection and analysis that can facilitate nuclear nonproliferation assessment is an important research area with significant consequences for the effective global deployment of nuclear energy. Facility modeling that can integrate and interpret observations collected from monitored facilities in order to ascertain their functional details will be a critical element of these methods. Although improvements are continually sought, existing facility modeling tools can characterize all aspects of reactor operations and the majority of nuclear fuel cycle processing steps, and include algorithms for data processing and interpretation. Assessing nonproliferation status is challenging because observations can come from many sources, including local and remote sensors that monitor facility operations, as well as open sources that provide specific business information about the monitored facilities, and can be of many different types. Although many current facility models are capable of analyzing large amounts of information, they have not been integrated in an analyst-friendly manner. This paper addresses some of these facility modeling capabilities and illustrates how they could be integrated and utilized for nonproliferation analysis. The inverse problem of inferring facility conditions based on collected observations is described, along with a proposed architecture and computer framework for utilizing facility modeling tools. After considering a representative sampling of key facility modeling capabilities, the proposed integration framework is illustrated with several examples.

  2. Approaches to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Subrahmanyam, K.

    1981-01-01

    The logic behind the approach of the nuclear weapon states (NWS) to the issue of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is based on: (1) The assumption that the less the number of decision makers who could initiate a nuclear war less the probability of war, (2) the claim of the NWS that their nuclear weapons are under strict control, and (3) the claim of the NWS who have signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that the Treaty is being scrupulously observed by them. This logic is critically examined in the light of disclosures that indicate that: (1) both vertical and horizontal proliferation is going on without respite among the NWS, and (2) the fissile material is clandestinely being allowed to be diverted to the favoured clients by one or more of the NWS. These NWS are not subject to any safeguards under the NPT. They are using the NPT and the concept of nuclear free zone as a sort of tactic to divert the attention from the correct approach to the disarmament and to impose their hegemony over the Third World Countries. Moreover, the NPT has conferred a sort of legitimacy to the possession of nuclear weapons by the NWS. In these circumstances their preaching to the Third World countries about nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation sounds hypocritical. The correct approach to these issues would be to put the nuclear weapons under the category of weapons of mass destruction and to ban their use under a non-discriminatory international convention as has been done in the case of biological and chemical weapons. (M.G.B.)

  3. U.S. Nonproliferation Policies and the Future of Nuclear Cooperation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Byoung Jo; Lee, Sang Hyun

    2008-12-01

    In order for Korea to enhance nuclear cooperation with the U.S., the most urgent thing is to prove its nonproliferation commitment to international community, and legislate solid nonproliferation policies. To achieve these goals, Korean government need to consider to create Nonproliferation Task Force in the government and focus on proving Korea's firm commitment for nonproliferation. Along with it, as a civilian counterpart, Nonproliferation Research Center must be created as soon as possible to research, plan, and publicize Korea's nonproliferation policies and measures. At the same time, the government must set up a control tower that will coordinate Korea's nuclear diplomacy and guide proper division of labor among governmental and nongovernmental agencies in nonproliferation area. Finally, to raise general public's awareness about the danger of nuclear proliferation, government must invest on to develop educational programs and public relationship programs to educate the Korean public

  4. Joint DOE-PNC research on the use of transparency in support of nuclear nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mochiji, Toshiro; Keeney, R.; Tazaki, Makiko; Nakhleh, C.; Puckett, J.; Stanbro, W.

    1999-01-01

    PNC and LANL collaborated in research on the concept of transparency in nuclear nonproliferation. The research was based on the Action Sheet No. 21, which was signed in February 1996, ''The Joint Research on Transparency in Nuclear Nonproliferation'' under the ''Agreement between the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation of Japan (PNC) and the US Department of Energy (DOE) for Cooperation in Research and Development Concerning Nuclear Material Control and Accounting Measures for Safeguards and Nonproliferation''. The purpose of Action Sheet 21 is to provide a fundamental study on Transparency to clarify the means to improve worldwide acceptability for the nuclear energy from the nuclear nonproliferation point of view. This project consists of independent research and then joint discussion at workshops that address a series of topics and issues in transparency. The activities covered in Action Sheet 21 took place over a period of 18 months. Three workshops were held; the first and the third hosted by PNC in Tokyo, Japan and the second hosted by LANL in Los Alamos, New Mexico, US. The following is a summary of the three workshops. The first workshop addressed the policy environment of transparency. Each side presented its perspective on the following issues: (1) a definition of transparency, (2) reasons for transparency, (3) detailed goals of transparency and (4) obstacles to transparency. The topic of the second workshop was ''Development of Transparency Options.'' The activities accomplished were (1) identify type of facilities where transparency might be applied, (2) define criteria for applying transparency, and (3) delineate applicable transparency options. The goal of the third workshop, ''Technical Options for Transparency,'' was to (1) identify conceptual options for transparency system design; (2) identify instrumentation, measurement, data collection and data processing options; (3) identify data display options; and (4) identify technical

  5. The international nuclear non-proliferation system: Challenges and choices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simpson, J.; McGrew, A.G.

    1984-01-01

    When a topic has been under discussion for almost 40 years there is a danger that the literature will become excessively esoteric and that, as Philip Grummett suggests, '...a new scholasticism will arise' (p.79). Originating in a November l982 seminar co-sponsored by the British International Studies Association and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, this volume is a refreshing, well conceived, and well written antidote to that trend. It is also well timed for the 1985 NPT Review Conference. The eight chapters of the volume are divided into three sections. Following an introduction by Anthony McGrew that touches on all the major themes of the volume, the first section deals with the existing non-proliferation system. In three chapters the historical, institutional and policy-making elements of the present system are outlined. There is a vignette on the Nuclear Suppliers Group in Wilmshurst's chapter one (pp. 28-33). Fischer's informative chapter on the IAEA is followed by Gummett's examination of policy options, including, for example, the linking of conventional weapons transfer to non-proliferation policies. The second section, also of three chapters, examines current issues: the state of the international nuclear industry, and the non-proliferation policies of the United States and Britain. Walker's chapter focuses chiefly on change in the industry-from monopoly to pluralism in suppliers, the effect of the economic recession, and the combined effect of these two factors on international politics. Devine's American non-proliferation chapter is a statement of the State Department view, whilst Keohane's chapter on Britain attempts to put the Trident procurement into a proliferation context. The British chapter is present because of ethnocentric considerations

  6. The international nuclear non-proliferation system: Challenges and choices

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Simpson, J.; McGrew, A.G.

    1984-01-01

    When a topic has been under discussion for almost 40 years there is a danger that the literature will become excessively esoteric and that, as Philip Grummett suggests, '...a new scholasticism will arise' (p.79). Originating in a November l982 seminar co-sponsored by the British International Studies Association and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, this volume is a refreshing, well conceived, and well written antidote to that trend. It is also well timed for the 1985 NPT Review Conference. The eight chapters of the volume are divided into three sections. Following an introduction by Anthony McGrew that touches on all the major themes of the volume, the first section deals with the existing non-proliferation system. In three chapters the historical, institutional and policy-making elements of the present system are outlined. There is a vignette on the Nuclear Suppliers Group in Wilmshurst's chapter one (pp. 28-33). Fischer's informative chapter on the IAEA is followed by Gummett's examination of policy options, including, for example, the linking of conventional weapons transfer to non-proliferation policies. The second section, also of three chapters, examines current issues: the state of the international nuclear industry, and the non-proliferation policies of the United States and Britain. Walker's chapter focuses chiefly on change in the industry-from monopoly to pluralism in suppliers, the effect of the economic recession, and the combined effect of these two factors on international politics. Devine's American non-proliferation chapter is a statement of the State Department view, whilst Keohane's chapter on Britain attempts to put the Trident procurement into a proliferation context. The British chapter is present because of ethnocentric considerations.

  7. Non-proliferation and advances in nuclear science

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Iyengar, P.K.

    1995-01-01

    So far, the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) has concentrated on safeguard regimes based on technologies relating to the production of uranium and plutonium in nuclear reactors, and on their potential diversion for use in nuclear weapons. As nuclear science advances, however, nuclear technology both peaceful and for weapons will change, and for the NPT to remain relevant, it must reflect these changes. At this juncture, when the NPT is coming up for review in a year's time, it is important for physicists to take a fresh look at recent advances in nuclear science, and inform the policy-makers and the public at large about their potential for impacting nuclear technology in the future. In this article a few such advances are highlighted and their implications for the NPT are considered. (author). 4 refs

  8. Security Guarantees and Nuclear Non-Proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bruno Tertrais

    2011-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to discuss the value of 'security guarantees', that is, positive security assurances that include a formal or informal defense commitment, in preventing nuclear proliferation. It demonstrates that such guarantees have proven to be a very effective instrument in preventing States from going nuclear. It would thus seem logical to reinforce or extend them. However, this path is fraught with obstacles and dilemmas

  9. Security Guarantees and Nuclear Non-Proliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bruno Tertrais

    2011-07-01

    The purpose of this paper is to discuss the value of 'security guarantees', that is, positive security assurances that include a formal or informal defense commitment, in preventing nuclear proliferation. It demonstrates that such guarantees have proven to be a very effective instrument in preventing States from going nuclear. It would thus seem logical to reinforce or extend them. However, this path is fraught with obstacles and dilemmas

  10. Naval nuclear propulsion and the international nonproliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Guimaraes, Leonam dos Santos

    2005-01-01

    Nuclear powered attack submarine (SSN) acquisition by Non-Proliferation Treaty No- Nuclear Weapon State (NPT-NNWS) Navies does not imply nuclear weapon proliferation risks higher than those related to stationary research and power reactors. It must then be recognized that stringent restraints on supplies and political pressures on governments, both exercised very effectively by No-Proliferation Treaty - Nuclear Weapon State (NPT-NWS) against NPT-NNWS indigenous development of SSN and associated fuel cycle facilities, are fundamentally based on geopolitical and military strategic objectives. This practice is far from being related exclusively to the NPT spirit: in fact, it is a matter of freedom at seas and not of nuclear proliferation. (author)

  11. Nuclear Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Counterterrorism: Impacts on Public Health

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pregenzer, Arian

    2014-01-01

    Reducing the risks of nuclear war, limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, and reducing global nuclear weapons stockpiles are key national and international security goals. They are pursued through a variety of international arms control, nonproliferation, and counterterrorism treaties and agreements. These legally binding and political commitments, together with the institutional infrastructure that supports them, work to establish global norms of behavior and have limited the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Beyond the primary security objectives, reducing the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons, preventing environmental releases of radioactive material, increasing the availability of safe and secure nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and providing scientific data relevant to predicting and managing the consequences of natural or human-caused disasters worldwide provide significant benefits to global public health. PMID:24524501

  12. Swedish support programme on nuclear non-proliferation in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ek, P.; Andersson, Sarmite [Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, Stockholm (Sweden); Wredberg, L. [ILG Consultant Ltd., Vienna (Austria)

    2000-06-15

    At the request of the Swedish Government, the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate has established a support and co-operation programme in the area of nuclear non-proliferation with Russia and several of the republics of the former Soviet Union. The Programme was initiated in 1991 and an overall goal is to accomplish national means and measures for control and protection of nuclear material and facilities, in order to minimise the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons and illicit trafficking of nuclear material and equipment. The objective of the Swedish Support Programme is to help each, so called, recipient State to be able to, independently and without help from outside, take the full responsibility for operating a national non-proliferation system and thereby fulfil the requirements imposed through the international legal instruments. This would include both the development and implementation of a modern nuclear legislation system, and the establishment of the components making up a national system for combating illicit trafficking. The support and co-operation projects are organised in five Project Groups (i.e. nuclear legislation, nuclear material control, physical protection, export/import control, and combating of illicit trafficking), which together cover the entire non-proliferation area. Up till June 2000, support and co-operation projects, completed and on-going, have been carried out in ten States, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. Furthermore, programmes have been initiated during the first part of 2000 with Estonia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In addition, assistance has been given to Poland on a specific nuclear material accountancy topic. All projects are done on request by and in co-operation with these States. The total number of projects initiated during the period 1991 to June 2000 is 109, thereof 77 have been completed and 32 are currently on-going. It is the

  13. Swedish support programme on nuclear non-proliferation in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ek, P.; Andersson, Sarmite; Wredberg, L.

    2000-06-01

    At the request of the Swedish Government, the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate has established a support and co-operation programme in the area of nuclear non-proliferation with Russia and several of the republics of the former Soviet Union. The Programme was initiated in 1991 and an overall goal is to accomplish national means and measures for control and protection of nuclear material and facilities, in order to minimise the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons and illicit trafficking of nuclear material and equipment. The objective of the Swedish Support Programme is to help each, so called, recipient State to be able to, independently and without help from outside, take the full responsibility for operating a national non-proliferation system and thereby fulfil the requirements imposed through the international legal instruments. This would include both the development and implementation of a modern nuclear legislation system, and the establishment of the components making up a national system for combating illicit trafficking. The support and co-operation projects are organised in five Project Groups (i.e. nuclear legislation, nuclear material control, physical protection, export/import control, and combating of illicit trafficking), which together cover the entire non-proliferation area. Up till June 2000, support and co-operation projects, completed and on-going, have been carried out in ten States, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. Furthermore, programmes have been initiated during the first part of 2000 with Estonia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In addition, assistance has been given to Poland on a specific nuclear material accountancy topic. All projects are done on request by and in co-operation with these States. The total number of projects initiated during the period 1991 to June 2000 is 109, thereof 77 have been completed and 32 are currently on-going. It is the

  14. 1995 review and extension conference of the parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    On 19 July 1995, the Director General received a letter, addressed to him by the Alternate Resident Representative of Canada to the International Atomic Energy Agency, concerning 1995 review and extension conference of the parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

  15. The Nuclear Progress And The Non-Proliferation Policies

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Popa-Simil, Liviu [Los Alamos, NM 87544 (United States)

    2009-06-15

    The 2008 fall crisis showed the limits of globalization under the actual rules and de-regulations promoted by few developed countries. It also showed the weakness of the planetary economy induced by strong economic connections that makes the propagation of crises faster than the spread of welfare. The increase in severe weather and natural disasters showed how fast the civilization can be spoiled while the competition for oil resources made the interstate tensions grow. For almost all states, the development of the nuclear power becomes a prime option, even oil producers started to show interest in nuclear technology and also, policies that in particular are clearly oriented towards national development policies. The fact that anybody mastering nuclear technologies and uses for power production is capable in a reasonable time to produce weapons is a well-known fact. Therefore, in order to reduce the proliferation risk it is necessary to contain the nuclear science development. An alternative is to shift the weight in promoting renewable energies, as potential future energy alternative. Considering rigorously the future climate change effects, it becomes obvious that any delay in nuclear development will turn very costly for any nation ignoring all these facts and, the complexity of the real nonproliferation is growing. This new trend raises serious challenges in front of all states regarding the non-proliferation and, in order to keep control and stimulate a sound nuclear development, some of the actual non-proliferation concepts and policies have to be reformulated and enhanced. This has to be done in parallel with a more intensive implication of the international organisms in the real development of the nuclear power at national level. The large diversity of nuclear applications with huge collateral implication in every national economy makes the role of the international organisms orders of magnitude more important. The new challenges posed in front of the

  16. 1995 - a pivotal year for nuclear nonproliferation. German nonproliferation policy in the runup to the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Preisinger, J.

    1994-01-01

    The paper describes the non-proliferation as a task of preventive security policy, the non-proliferation instruments, the content of an extended non-proliferation system, and tasks of German non-proliferation policy. (DG)

  17. Nuclear power and the non-proliferation issue

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-12-01

    This leaflet, issued by the British Nuclear Forum on behalf of the industry, seeks first to place the problem of reconciling the need for nuclear power with its possible weapon uses in a historical perspective. Secondly, it describes the technical and political measures which are now taken, and others which could be introduced in order to ensure that nuclear power, which offers the cheapest and safest large-scale energy source for the future, can be made available without contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Headings are: introduction; the early years; the IAEA; uranium enrichment; plutonium; secrecy has failed; the Non-Proliferation Treaty; the London Suppliers Group; the situation today; the British position; conclusions. (U.K.)

  18. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons - crisis of a concept

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eisenbart, C.; Ehrenstein, D. von

    1990-01-01

    The Working Group of FEST (Protestant Study Community) and VDW (Association of German Scientists) presents twelve theses on the policy of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and deduces recommendations, in particular for the Federal Government. The WG thinks that scope and significance of international nuclear policy has not been sufficiently perceived neither by the German public nor by politicians. The theses are supplemented and explained in more detail by special contributions of the WG's members. The contributions deal with the historical background, with the instruments of NP policy, with international law, with risks and limiting these risks, with economic aspects, with nuclear policy in the Third World, with the chances of nuclear disarmament, and with Federal NP policy. The 'twelve theses' as well as the 22 contributions are individual records. (HSCH) [de

  19. U.S.-Russian cooperation in nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Podvig, Pavel

    2010-02-01

    The United States and Russia, the two largest nuclear powers, have a special obligation to provide leadership in nuclear disarmament and in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In the past year the two countries made an effort to restart the arms control process by concluding a new treaty that would bring their legal disarmament obligations in line with the realities of their post-cold war relationships. The process of negotiating deeper nuclear reductions in the new environment turned out to be rather difficult, since the approaches that the countries used in the past are not well suited to dealing with issues like conversion of strategic nuclear delivery systems to conventional missions, tactical nuclear weapons, or dismantlement of nuclear warheads. This presentation considers the recent progress in U.S.-Russian arms control process and outlines the key issues at the negotiations. It also considers prospects for further progress in bilateral nuclear disarmament and issues that will be encountered at later stages of the process. The author argues that success of the arms reductions will depend on whether the United States and Russia will be able to build an institutional framework for cooperation on a range of issues - from traditional arms control to securing nuclear materials and from missile defense to strengthening the international nuclear safeguards. )

  20. Report of the international forum on nuclear energy, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. Measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security for the back end of nuclear fuel cycle and regional cooperation in Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tazaki, Makiko; Yamamura, Tsukasa; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Kuno, Yusuke; Mochiji, Toshiro

    2013-03-01

    The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) held 'International Forum on Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security - Measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security for the back end of nuclear fuel cycle and regional cooperation in Asia-' on 12 and 13 December 2012, co-hosted by the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo. In the forum, keynote speakers from Japan, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the U.S., France and Republic of Korea (ROK), respectively explained their efforts regarding peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation. In two panel discussions, entitled 'Measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security of nuclear fuel cycle back end' and 'Measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security for nuclear energy use in the Asian region and a multilateral cooperative framework', active discussions were made among panelists from Japan, IAEA, the U.S., France, ROK, Russia and Kazakhstan. This report includes abstracts of keynote speeches, summaries of two panel discussions and materials of the presentations in the forum. The editors take full responsibility for the wording and content of this report except presentation materials. (author)

  1. Review and comment on the advanced spent fuel management process (1): Technical aspects and non-proliferation concerns

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Song, Yo Taik

    2001-01-01

    Efforts are made to analyze the project, the Advanced Spent Fuel Management Technology (ASFMT), which is currently carried out at Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, on the technical feasibility and validity as well as on the nuclear non-proliferation concerns. The project is a part of a program under the 'Long and Midterm Nuclear Development Program'. On the technical analysis, reviewed the papers presented at the national and international meetings on the subject by KAERI staffs, and also participated to various technical discussions on the 'Mock-up Test', currently in progress. On the non-proliferation concerns, the ASFMT project was reviewed and analyzed in reference to various programs currently in progress or in a formulation stages in US, such as the DOE TOPS and ATW. Further reviewed the past JASNEC process and programs for possible application of the ASFMT project for JASNEC project. Provided a few thoughts for effectively carrying out the ASFMT project, and a plan for the next phase is presented

  2. Review and comment on the advanced spent fuel management process (1): Technical aspects and non-proliferation concerns

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Song, Yo Taik

    2001-01-01

    Efforts are made to analyze the project, the Advanced Spent Fuel Management Technology (ASFMT), which is currently carried out at Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, on the technical feasibility and validity as well as on the nuclear non-proliferation concerns. The project is a part of a program under the 'Long and Midterm Nuclear Development Program'. On the technical analysis, reviewed the papers presented at the national and international meetings on the subject by KAERI staffs, and also participated to various technical discussions on the 'Mock-up Test', currently in progress. On the non-proliferation concerns, the ASFMT project was reviewed and analyzed in reference to various programs currently in progress or in a formulation stages in US, such as the DOE TOPS and ATW. Further reviewed the past JASNEC process and programs for possible application of the ASFMT project for JASNEC project. Provided a few thoughts for effectively carrying out the ASFMT project, and a plan for the next phase is presented.

  3. Non-Proliferation, the IAEA Safeguards System, and the importance of nuclear material measurements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Stevens, Rebecca S. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2017-09-18

    The objective of this project is to explain the contribution of nuclear material measurements to the system of international verification of State declarations and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

  4. Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Nuclear Program of the DPRK

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    - Park Sang Hoon

    2012-09-01

    Full Text Available The article analyzes the contemporary aspects of the nuclear weapon nonproliferation issue as exemplified by the international approaches to the DPRK nuclear weapons program, as well as the international community efforts to resolve it, in particular via the Six-Party Talks.

  5. Miscalculated Ambiguity: The Effects of US Nuclear Declaratory Policy on Deterrence and Nonproliferation

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-06-01

    Use. (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1995) 7. 5 Sagan , Scott. "The Case for No First Use." Survival 51, no. 3 (2009): 163-182. 6 The Stanley Foundation...America’s Nuclear Posture. (Cambridge, MA: Union of Concerned Scientists Global Security Program, 2010) 1. 60 Sagan , Scott. "The Case for No First...Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Building for Peace. S.l.: s.n., 1971. Nonproliferation--60 Years Later. DVD. Directed by Carla Robbins. Washington D.C

  6. Institutional overviews. Overview of the JAEA and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Science and Technology Center

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Senzaki, Masao

    2006-01-01

    The Nuclear Nonproliferation Science and Technology Center (NPSTC) was formed within the new Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) to carry out safeguards and material control duties for the JAEA. Development of technologies and procedures for safeguards is an important duty. In addition, the new NPSTC will assume a 'think tank' role in support of the nonproliferation regime, help train nonproliferation experts, and cooperate with academic, government and non-governmental organizations on nonproliferation issues. This report briefly summarizes the formation of the JAEA and describes the duties and structure of the NPSTC in detail. (author)

  7. Development of Computer-Aided Learning Programs on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Hyun Chul

    2011-01-01

    The fulfillment of international norms for nuclear nonproliferation is indispensable to the promotion of nuclear energy. The education and training for personnel and mangers related to the nuclear material are one of crucial factors to avoid unintended non-compliance to international norms. Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) has been providing education and training on nuclear control as its legal duty. One of the legally mandatory educations is 'nuclear control education' performed since 2006 for the observation of the international norms on nuclear nonproliferation and the spread of the nuclear control culture. The other is 'physical protection education' performed since 2010 for maintaining the national physical protection regime effectively and the spread of the nuclear security culture. The 2010 Nuclear Security Summit was held in Washington, DC to enhance international cooperation to prevent nuclear terrorism. During the Summit, the South Korea was chosen to host the second Nuclear Summit in 2012. South Korean President announced that South Korea would share its expertise and support the Summit's mission by setting up an international education and training center on nuclear security in 2014. KINAC is making a full effort to set up the center successfully. An important function of the center is education and training in the subjects of nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear safeguards, nuclear security, and nuclear export/import control. With increasing importance of education and training education on nuclear nonproliferation and control, KINAC has been developing computer-aided learning programs on nuclear nonproliferation and control to overcome the weaknesses in classroom educations. This paper shows two learning programs. One is an e-learning system on the nuclear nonproliferation and control and the other is a virtual reality program for training nuclear material accountancy inspection of light water reactor power plants

  8. Development of Computer-Aided Learning Programs on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Hyun Chul [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2011-10-15

    The fulfillment of international norms for nuclear nonproliferation is indispensable to the promotion of nuclear energy. The education and training for personnel and mangers related to the nuclear material are one of crucial factors to avoid unintended non-compliance to international norms. Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) has been providing education and training on nuclear control as its legal duty. One of the legally mandatory educations is 'nuclear control education' performed since 2006 for the observation of the international norms on nuclear nonproliferation and the spread of the nuclear control culture. The other is 'physical protection education' performed since 2010 for maintaining the national physical protection regime effectively and the spread of the nuclear security culture. The 2010 Nuclear Security Summit was held in Washington, DC to enhance international cooperation to prevent nuclear terrorism. During the Summit, the South Korea was chosen to host the second Nuclear Summit in 2012. South Korean President announced that South Korea would share its expertise and support the Summit's mission by setting up an international education and training center on nuclear security in 2014. KINAC is making a full effort to set up the center successfully. An important function of the center is education and training in the subjects of nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear safeguards, nuclear security, and nuclear export/import control. With increasing importance of education and training education on nuclear nonproliferation and control, KINAC has been developing computer-aided learning programs on nuclear nonproliferation and control to overcome the weaknesses in classroom educations. This paper shows two learning programs. One is an e-learning system on the nuclear nonproliferation and control and the other is a virtual reality program for training nuclear material accountancy inspection of light water

  9. Establishment of Japan Atomic Energy Agency and strategy for nuclear non-proliferation studies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Senzaki, Masao; Kurasaki, Takaaki; Inoue, Naoko

    2005-01-01

    Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) was established on October 1, 2005, after the merger of Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute and Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute. JAEA is the only governmental nuclear research and development institute in Japan. It will engage in research activities ranging from basic research to practical applications in the nuclear field and will operate research laboratories, reactors, a reprocessing plant and a fuel fabrication plant. At the same time, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Science and Technology Center (NPSTC) was also established inside of JAEA to conduct the studies on the strategy for nuclear nonproliferation studies. Five roles that JAEA should play for nuclear nonproliferation were identified and four offices were established in the center to carry out those five roles effectively. To conduct the research and development for nuclear nonproliferation efficiently, the center aims to be a 'Research Hub' based on Partnership' with other organizations. (author)

  10. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in Northeast Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Han Yong-Sup

    1995-01-01

    This paper attempted to find out ways to facilitate bilateral and regional arms control regarding nuclear issues in Northeast Asia. This is done in order to reduce uncertainties regarding nuclear policy and capabilities of those countries, and thus to enhance transparency and confidence in the region. In order to bring them into the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation process in an effective way, we revisited the issues that contributed to the acceleration of the arms race. The review provided insights into the future course of China, the two Koreas and Japan regarding their nuclear policy and capabilities. The findings of this study indicate a general likelihood of resistance to outside request for arms control and disarmament in the countries in Northeast Asia. Besides their continuation with the conventional arms race, countries in Northeast Asia are reluctant to go ahead with the programmes to enhance transparency, build confidence in the region, and to forgo intentions to go nuclear. China is slowly but steadily increasing its nuclear arsenals. Its nuclear arms control policy is not well integrated with nuclear policy and strategy, and it is subject to the overarching goal of nuclear policy and strategy to advance China's status and national security interests in the international community. Thus, it will be very difficult for other countries to bring China to the arms control process for the time being. North Korea has intended to develop nuclear weapons in order to hedge against uncertainties. This poses a threat to the NPT regime and the peace and security of Northeast Asia. Clearly, North Korea has shown its reluctance to disclose the entirety of its nuclear programme under the IAEA inspections. Although South Korea has taken a bold initiative to forgo uranium enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, it has still not fully paid off. Japan adds the problem of plutonium surplus to the uncertain security environments surrounding Northeast Asia

  11. IAEA Director General calls for rededication to nuclear non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    Speaking at the opening session of the Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in New York on April 24, 2000, the Director General of the IAEA urged all nations to commit themselves unequivocally to the basic tenets of the non-proliferation regime

  12. Asia nuclear-test-ban network for nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shinohara, Nobuo; Kokaji, Lisa; Ichimasa, Sukeyuki

    2010-01-01

    In Global Center of Excellence Program of The University of Tokyo, Non- Proliferation Study Committee by the members of nuclear industries, electricity utilities, nuclear energy institutes and universities has initiated on October 2008 from the viewpoints of investigating a package of measures for nuclear non-proliferation and bringing up young people who will support the near-future nuclear energy system. One of the non-proliferation issues in the Committee is the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Objective of this treaty is to cease all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosion. This purpose should be contributed effectively to the political stability of the Asian region by continuous efforts to eliminate the nuclear weapons. In the Committee, by extracting several issues related to the CTBT, conception of 'Asia nuclear-test-ban network for nuclear non-proliferation' has been discussed with the aim of the nuclear-weapon security in Asian region, where environmental nuclear-test monitoring data is mainly treated and utilized. In this paper, the conception of the 'network' is presented in detail. (author)

  13. Comments on fuel cycle concepts and impacts on nonproliferation and safeguards concerns

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persiani, P.J.

    1997-01-01

    Fuel cycle technologies have inherently differing levels of proliferation risk profiles. Institutional and/or multi-national arrangements have been effective in reducing the proliferation risk concerns. The implementation of international safeguards further reduces the proliferation risk concerns by the timely detection of a possible physical diversion of SNM from fuel cycle facilities. Fuel cycles are safeguardable, but the proliferation risk characteristics of fuel cycles concepts differ significantly with consequent impacts on the international level of technical safeguards measures. The paper comments on proliferation characteristics of some of the fuel cycle concepts for the purpose of exploring development of advanced nonproliferation and safeguards measures

  14. Passive measurements of mixed-oxide fuel for nuclear nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dolan, Jennifer L.; Flaska, Marek; Pozzi, Sara A.; Chichester, David L.

    2013-01-01

    We present new results on passive measurements and simulations of mixed-oxide fuel-pin assemblies. Potential tools for mixed-oxide fuel pin characterization are discussed for future nuclear-nonproliferation applications. Four EJ-309 liquid scintillation detectors coupled with an accurate pulse timing and digital, offline and optimized pulse-shape discrimination method were used. Measurement analysis included pulse-height distributions to distinguish between purely fission neutron sources and alpha-n plus fission neutrons sources. Time-dependent cross-correlation functions were analyzed to measure the fission neutron contribution to the measured sample's neutron source. The use of Monte Carlo particle transport code MCNPX-PoliMi is discussed in conjunction with the measurements

  15. First annual report on nuclear non-proliferation: supplement to annual report to Congress

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    Section 602 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) requires that DOE's Annual Report include views and recommendations regarding non-proliferation policies and actions for which the Department is responsible. The Act also requires a detailed analysis of the proliferation implications of advanced enrichment and reprocessing techniques, advanced reactors, and alternative fuel cycles, including an unclassified summary and a comprehensive version containing relevant classified information. The goals of United States non-proliferation policy are to minimize the spread of nuclear weapons and to create a stable international environment for the peaceful use of nuclear energy

  16. The nuclear non-proliferation international system before the TNP revision conference (1995)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Biad, A.

    1996-01-01

    This document described the international cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation. It consists of different agreements which aim at a pacific use of nuclear energy. However it is shown that many difficulties occurred during the non-proliferation treaty. Questions on equilibrium between control and cooperation, on the link between nuclear weapons reduction and countries equipped with the weapon, on the security for non-equipped countries are separately discussed. (TEC)

  17. Need for Strengthening Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards Education to Prepare the Next Generation of Experts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Janssens, W.A.M.; Peerani, P.; ); Gariazzo, C.; Ward, S.; Crete, J.-M.; Braunegger-Guelich, A.

    2015-01-01

    Although nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards are a continuous concern of the international community and discussed frequently at international fora and conferences, the academic world is not really on board with these topics. What we mean by this is that nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards is only very seldom part of a university curriculum. In the few cases where it does appear in the curriculum, whether in a nuclear engineering course or a political sciences master programme, it is typically covered only partially. Nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards are multidisciplinary and embrace, inter alia, historical, legal, technical, and political aspects. This is perhaps the reason why it is challenging for a single professor or university to develop and implement a comprehensive academic course or programme in this area. Professional organizations in this field, like the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) and the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management (INMM), have made first steps to address this issue by implementing specific educational activities. However, much more needs to be done. Therefore, ESARDA, INMM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are in the process of joining efforts to identify key elements and priorities to support universities in establishing appropriate and effective academic programmes in this area. This paper will share best practices, achievements and lessons learned by ESARDA, INMM and the IAEA in providing education and training to develop and maintain the expertise of nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards professionals. In addition, it will suggest potential ways on how to assist universities to get prepared for building-up the next generation of experts able to meet any future challenges in the area of non-proliferation and safeguards. (author)

  18. Draft environmental impact statement on a proposed nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy concerning foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel: Volume 2, Appendix E, Evaluation of human health effects of overland transportation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-03-01

    This Appendix provides an overview of the approach used to assess the human health risks that may result from the overland transportation of foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel. The Appendix includes discussion of the scope of the assessment, analytical methods used for the risk assessment (i.e., computer models), important assessment assumptions, determination of potential transportation routes, and presents the results of the assessment. In addition, to aid in the understanding and interpretation of the results, specific arm of uncertainty are described, with an emphasis an how the uncertainties may affect comparisons of the alternatives. he approach used in this Appendix is modeled after that used in the Programmatic Spent Nuclear Fuel Management and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Draft Environmental Impact Statement (SNF ampersand INEL Draft EIS) (DOE, 1994b). The SNF ampersand INEL Draft EIS did not perform as detailed an analysis on the specific actions taken for foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel because of the breadth necessary to analyze the entire spent fuel management program. However, the fundamental assumptions used in this analysis are consistent with those used in the SNF ampersand INEL Draft EIS (DOE, 1994b), and the same computer codes and generic release and accident data are used. The risk assessment results are presented in this Appendix in terms of ''Per-shipment'' risk factors, as well as for the total risks associated with each alternative. Per-shipment risk factors provide an estimate of the risk from a single spent nuclear fuel shipment between a specific origin and destination. They are calculated for all possible origin and destination pairs for each spent nuclear fuel type. The total risks for a given alternative are found by multiplying the expected number of shipments by the appropriate per-shipment risk factors. This approach provides maximum flexibility for determining the risks for a large number of potential

  19. Suggested non-proliferation criteria for commercial nuclear fuel cycles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laney, R.V.; Heubotter, P.R.

    1978-01-01

    Based on the Administration's policy to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation through diversion of fuel from commercial reactor fuel cycles, a ''benchmark'' set of nonproliferation criteria was prepared for the commercial nuclear fuel cycle. These criteria should eliminate incremental risks of proliferation beyond those inherent in the present generation of low-enriched-uranium-fueled reactors operating in a once-through mode, with internationally safeguarded storage of spent fuel. They focus on the balanced application of technical constraints consistent with the state of the technology, with minimal requirements for institutional constraints, to provide a basis for assessing the proliferation resistance of proposed fission power systems. The paper contains: (1) our perception of the nuclear energy policy and of the baseline proliferation risk accepted under this policy; (2) objectives for a reactor and fuel cycle strategy which address the technical, political, and institutional aspects of diversion and proliferation and, at the same time, satisfy the Nation's needs for efficient, timely, and economical utilization of nuclear fuel resources; (3) criteria which are responsive to these objectives and can therefore be used to screen proposed reactor and fuel cycle strategies; and (4) a rationale for these criteria

  20. The history of Finnish nuclear non-proliferation policy during the cold war. What did the Finns know about nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ahosniemi, A.

    2004-03-01

    This article is a summary of the Finnish historical survey during the Cold War. In the article, I try to show how the Finnish Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy during the Cold War is linked to the broader context of the Finnish foreign and security policy. In the research report I have focused on several questions. One of the most important is the following: What did the Finns know about nuclear weapons during the Cold War? And in this context scientific knowledge is meant by knowing something about nuclear weapons. Basically, the Finnish national based survey of nuclear non-proliferation policy attempted to investigate issues like the kind of research concerning Nuclear Technology in general, Nuclear weapons, and Nuclear weapon policies of super powers in Finland during the Cold War era. (author)

  1. The nonproliferation treaty and peaceful uses of nuclear explosives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ehrlich, Thomas

    1970-01-01

    In the past, nuclear arms control and peaceful uses of nuclear explosives were seen by many proponents of each as competing - if not opposing - interests. At one extreme, some viewed peaceful uses as an annoying irritant on the way to general and complete disarmament. At the other extreme, some considered arms-control arrangements - particularly those limiting nuclear testing - as bothersome barriers to realizing the full benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions. Most people found themselves somewhere between those extremes. But most also felt a continuing tension between essentially opposing forces. This polarity has been significantly altered by the 1968 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is believed that the future use of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes will depend in large measure on the international arrangements worked out under the treaty. I also believe that the success of the treaty in checking proliferation of nuclear weapons is contingent, in substantial part, on those peaceful-uses arrangements. In the areas covered by the treaty, therefore, one could view an active development of peaceful uses for nuclear explosives as complementing rather than conflicting with nuclear arms control. The treaty is primarily a security agreement. It is aimed at reducing the risk of nuclear war by establishing permanency in the current separation of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon nations. By its terms, each nuclear-weapon state agrees not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices to any recipient, and each non-nuclear-weapon state agrees not to receive such weapons or devices. The non-nuclear- weapon parties are also obligated to negotiate safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency covering peaceful-uses activities. And all signatories agree not to transfer fissionable material to those parties unless they are subject to such agreements. These provisions are all part of a scheme to limit the

  2. The nonproliferation treaty and peaceful uses of nuclear explosives

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ehrlich, Thomas [School of Law, Stanford University, CA (United States)

    1970-05-01

    In the past, nuclear arms control and peaceful uses of nuclear explosives were seen by many proponents of each as competing - if not opposing - interests. At one extreme, some viewed peaceful uses as an annoying irritant on the way to general and complete disarmament. At the other extreme, some considered arms-control arrangements - particularly those limiting nuclear testing - as bothersome barriers to realizing the full benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions. Most people found themselves somewhere between those extremes. But most also felt a continuing tension between essentially opposing forces. This polarity has been significantly altered by the 1968 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is believed that the future use of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes will depend in large measure on the international arrangements worked out under the treaty. I also believe that the success of the treaty in checking proliferation of nuclear weapons is contingent, in substantial part, on those peaceful-uses arrangements. In the areas covered by the treaty, therefore, one could view an active development of peaceful uses for nuclear explosives as complementing rather than conflicting with nuclear arms control. The treaty is primarily a security agreement. It is aimed at reducing the risk of nuclear war by establishing permanency in the current separation of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon nations. By its terms, each nuclear-weapon state agrees not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices to any recipient, and each non-nuclear-weapon state agrees not to receive such weapons or devices. The non-nuclear- weapon parties are also obligated to negotiate safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency covering peaceful-uses activities. And all signatories agree not to transfer fissionable material to those parties unless they are subject to such agreements. These provisions are all part of a scheme to limit the

  3. Review of international forum on peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shimizu, Ryo; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Sakurai, Satoshi; Tamai, Hiroshi; Yamamura, Tsukasa; Kuno, Yusuke

    2012-02-01

    International forum on peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation was held at Gakushi-kaikan, Tokyo on February 2-3, 2011 in cooperation with The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and The University of Tokyo Global COE. In our International Forum, we would like to encourage active discussion of international challenges to and solutions for compatibility between peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation, and international cooperation for emerging nuclear energy states. It was successfully carried out with as many as 310 participants and a lot of discussions. This report includes abstracts of keynote speeches, summary of panel discussions and materials of the presentations in the forum. (author)

  4. Utilization of atomic energy in Asia and nuclear nonproliferation system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ishii, Makoto

    1995-01-01

    The economical growth in East Asia is conspicuous as it was called East Asian Miracle, and also the demand of energy increased rapidly. The end of Cold War created the condition for the further development in this district. Many countries advanced positively the plan of atomic energy utilization, and it can be said that the smooth progress of atomic energy utilization is the key for the continuous growth in this district in view of the restriction of petroleum resources and its price rise in future and the deterioration of global environment. The nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) has accomplished large role, but also its limitation became clear. At present, there is not the local security system in Asia, but in order that the various countries in Asia make the utilization of atomic energy and the security compatible, it is useful to jointly develop safety technology, execute security measures and form the nuclear fuel cycle as Asia. Energy and environmental problems in Asia are reported. Threat is essentially intention and capability, and the regulation only by capability regardless of intention brings about unrealistic result. The limitation of the NPT is discussed. The international relation of interdependence deepends after Cold War, and the security in Asia after Cold War is considered. As the mechanism of forming the nuclear fuel cycle for whole Asia, it is desirable to realize ASIATOM by accumulating the results of possible cooperation. (K.I.)

  5. Canada and international safeguards. Verifying nuclear non-proliferation. Verification brochure no. 5

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1990-01-01

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970 and now has about 140 signatory nations. By creating legal barriers against proliferation and by promoting an international non-proliferation ethic, the NPT has promoted international peace and security. A key ingredient has been the confidence generated through verification by IAEA safeguards. By the end of 1988 IAEA safeguards agreements had been concluded with about 100 countries, including Canada. Over 500 nuclear facilities worldwide are under safeguards or contain safeguarded nuclear material. The existence of this credible and effective safeguards system makes international trade in nuclear equipment and materials possible, monitoring the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries as well as between industrial countries. Canada is committed to non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards. Canadian non-proliferation policy is among the strictest in the world, even though opportunities have been lost to sell Canadian technology abroad as a result.

  6. Second annual report on nuclear non-proliferation: supplement to Secretary's Annual Report to Congress

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    This document covers: goals of US nonproliferation policy, agreements for cooperation, technical exchange, US as a reliable supplier of nuclear fuels, IAEA Expert Group on International Plutonium Storage, implementation of US nonproliferation policy, classification, cooperation in strengthening international safeguards and physical security, the US-IAEA voluntary offer safeguards agreement, US spent fuel storage policy, development of proliferation-resistant fuel cycle technologies, and the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation

  7. Evolution and resilience of the nuclear nonproliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pregenzer, Arian L.

    2014-01-01

    This paper introduces the concept of systems resilience as a new framework for thinking about the future of the nonproliferation regime. Resilience refers to the ability of a system to maintain its vital functions in the face of continuous and unpredictable change. First, I make the case that the nonproliferation regime can be viewed as a complex system. Next, I discuss key themes from the literature on systems resilience and apply them to the nonproliferation system: the difference between resilience and stability; the need for evolution to maintain function; the importance of functional diversity; and the concept of the adaptive cycle. I show that most existing nonproliferation strategies are aimed at stability rather than resilience and that the current nonproliferation system may be over-constrained by the cumulative evolution of strategies. According to the literature on systems resilience, this increases its vulnerability to collapse. I argue that the resilience of the nonproliferation system can be enhanced by increasing international participation in setting the nonproliferation agenda, developing general international response capabilities, focusing on non-coercive approaches to decreasing demand, and applying systems thinking more rigorously to nonproliferation

  8. Evolution and resilience of the nuclear nonproliferation regime

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pregenzer, Arian L. [Senior Scientist, Retired, Sandia National Laboratories, 13013 Arroyo de Vista NE, Albuquerque, NM 87111 (United States)

    2014-05-09

    This paper introduces the concept of systems resilience as a new framework for thinking about the future of the nonproliferation regime. Resilience refers to the ability of a system to maintain its vital functions in the face of continuous and unpredictable change. First, I make the case that the nonproliferation regime can be viewed as a complex system. Next, I discuss key themes from the literature on systems resilience and apply them to the nonproliferation system: the difference between resilience and stability; the need for evolution to maintain function; the importance of functional diversity; and the concept of the adaptive cycle. I show that most existing nonproliferation strategies are aimed at stability rather than resilience and that the current nonproliferation system may be over-constrained by the cumulative evolution of strategies. According to the literature on systems resilience, this increases its vulnerability to collapse. I argue that the resilience of the nonproliferation system can be enhanced by increasing international participation in setting the nonproliferation agenda, developing general international response capabilities, focusing on non-coercive approaches to decreasing demand, and applying systems thinking more rigorously to nonproliferation.

  9. Plutonium: key issue in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yoshisaki, M.B.

    1993-01-01

    The technical report is a 1993 update on weapons-grade plutonium, a key issue in nuclear disarmament. Its vital significance would again be discussed during the fifth and the last Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for Nuclear Weapons which would end in 1995. Member States shall decide whether an indefinite or conditional extension of NPT is necessary for world peace and international security. Two Non-NPT States, Russia and U.S.A. are in the forefront working for the reduction of nuclear weapons through nuclear disarmament. Their major effort is focused on the implementation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I and II or START I and II for world peace. The eventual implementation of START I and II would lead to the dismantling of plutonium from nuclear warheads proposed to be eliminated by both countries. This report gives three technical options to be derived from nuclear disarmament issues for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: (a) indefinite storage - there is no guarantee that these will not be used in the future (b) disposal as wastes - possible only in principle, because of lack of experience in mixing plutonium with high level wastes, and (c) source of energy - best option in managing stored weapons materials, because it satisfies non-proliferation objectives. It means fuel for energy in Light Water Reactors (LWR) or Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR). (author). 8 refs

  10. An analysis for formats to the cooperative nuclear nonproliferation agreements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shin, Sung Tack

    1998-01-01

    A country's nuclear program can be designed to support nuclear research, the production of energy, and the production of nuclear materials for medical and industrial applications or for use in nuclear weapons, or any combination of these objectives. One significant concern is the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful nuclear activities to convert weapons programs. Other concerns include the accidental release and transport of radionuclides. The framework for cooperative monitoring consists of context, agreement, parameters and monitoring options. Nuclear material and energy production activities provide nuclear materials for medical and industrial applications, produce electrical power or heat for general use, and possibly support the production of nuclear materials for weapons. All types of nuclear agreements could increase transparency and/or reduce tensions in a regional setting. This article explains about nuclear agreements of South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone, Korean Peace Zone, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. (Yi, J. H.)

  11. Integration of facility modeling capabilities for nuclear nonproliferation analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Burr, Tom; Gorensek, M.B.; Krebs, John; Kress, Reid L.; Lamberti, Vincent; Schoenwald, David; Ward, Richard C.

    2012-01-01

    Developing automated methods for data collection and analysis that can facilitate nuclearnonproliferation assessment is an important research area with significant consequences for the effective global deployment of nuclear energy. Facilitymodeling that can integrate and interpret observations collected from monitored facilities in order to ascertain their functional details will be a critical element of these methods. Although improvements are continually sought, existing facilitymodeling tools can characterize all aspects of reactor operations and the majority of nuclear fuel cycle processing steps, and include algorithms for data processing and interpretation. Assessing nonproliferation status is challenging because observations can come from many sources, including local and remote sensors that monitor facility operations, as well as open sources that provide specific business information about the monitored facilities, and can be of many different types. Although many current facility models are capable of analyzing large amounts of information, they have not been integrated in an analyst-friendly manner. This paper addresses some of these facilitymodelingcapabilities and illustrates how they could be integrated and utilized for nonproliferationanalysis. The inverse problem of inferring facility conditions based on collected observations is described, along with a proposed architecture and computer framework for utilizing facilitymodeling tools. After considering a representative sampling of key facilitymodelingcapabilities, the proposed integration framework is illustrated with several examples.

  12. Definition of Nuclear Material in Aspects of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jeon, Ji Hye; Lee, Chan Suh [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-10-15

    Nuclear safety accidents directly affect human health but nuclear security incidents indirectly influence human, which demonstrates the reason why security receives less attention. However, it is acknowledged that nuclear terrorism is indeed one of the most dreadful threat humanity faces. As part of strengthening nuclear security as well as nonproliferation to response to the threat, we need a better understanding of the nuclear material which needs to be safe under the objective of nuclear security. In reality, practitioners implement safeguards and physical protection in compliance with the regulation text in domestic legislation. Thus, it is important to specify nuclear material clearly in law for effective implementation. Therefore, the definition of terminology related to nuclear material is explored herein, within the highest-level legislation on the safeguards and physical protection. First the definition in Korean legislation is analyzed. Then, so as to suggest some improvements, other international efforts are examined and some case studies are conducted on other states which have similar level of nuclear technology and industry to Korea. Finally, a draft of definition on nuclear material in perspective of nuclear nonproliferation and security is suggested based on the analysis below. The recommendation showed the draft nuclear material definition in nuclear control. The text will facilitate the understanding of nuclear material in the context of nuclear nonproliferation and security. It might provide appropriate provision for future legislation related to nuclear nonproliferation and security. For effective safeguards and physical protection measures, nuclear material should be presented with in a consistent manner as shown in the case of United Kingdom. It will be much more helpful if further material engineering studies on each nuclear material are produced. Multi-dimensional approach is required for the studies on the degree of efforts to divert

  13. Definition of Nuclear Material in Aspects of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jeon, Ji Hye; Lee, Chan Suh

    2014-01-01

    Nuclear safety accidents directly affect human health but nuclear security incidents indirectly influence human, which demonstrates the reason why security receives less attention. However, it is acknowledged that nuclear terrorism is indeed one of the most dreadful threat humanity faces. As part of strengthening nuclear security as well as nonproliferation to response to the threat, we need a better understanding of the nuclear material which needs to be safe under the objective of nuclear security. In reality, practitioners implement safeguards and physical protection in compliance with the regulation text in domestic legislation. Thus, it is important to specify nuclear material clearly in law for effective implementation. Therefore, the definition of terminology related to nuclear material is explored herein, within the highest-level legislation on the safeguards and physical protection. First the definition in Korean legislation is analyzed. Then, so as to suggest some improvements, other international efforts are examined and some case studies are conducted on other states which have similar level of nuclear technology and industry to Korea. Finally, a draft of definition on nuclear material in perspective of nuclear nonproliferation and security is suggested based on the analysis below. The recommendation showed the draft nuclear material definition in nuclear control. The text will facilitate the understanding of nuclear material in the context of nuclear nonproliferation and security. It might provide appropriate provision for future legislation related to nuclear nonproliferation and security. For effective safeguards and physical protection measures, nuclear material should be presented with in a consistent manner as shown in the case of United Kingdom. It will be much more helpful if further material engineering studies on each nuclear material are produced. Multi-dimensional approach is required for the studies on the degree of efforts to divert

  14. Argentina’s nuclear development and the non-proliferation regime

    OpenAIRE

    Sandra Colombo; Cristian Guglielminotti; María Nevia Vera

    2017-01-01

    The development and transfer of nuclear technology have been put under strict control due to its possible military use, leading to the creation of international non-proliferation regimes. One of the latest proposals was the creation of multilateral banks of low enriched uranium (leu). The article states that, under the goal of non-proliferation, this initiative can contribute to accentuate the asymmetry in the distribution of world economic and political power, damaging the endogenous develop...

  15. American alliances and nuclear non-proliferation. The end of nuclear weapon activities of US allies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schneider, Jonas

    2016-01-01

    Jonas Schneider tackles a question that is of great interest both to scholars of nuclear proliferation and to practitioners of nonproliferation diplomacy: Why do some political leaders of U.S. allies agree to abandon their nation's nuclear weapons activities, while others - who are often members of the same allied government and sometimes even of the same political party - steadfastly reject such a course reversal? Our existing stock of theories does not fare well in accounting for this important variation in leaders' attitudes. To solve this puzzle, Schneider develops an innovative theory that draws on the individual status conceptions of allied political leaders. Subsequently, the author undertakes to test his theory using four thoroughly researched case studies, and he derives important lessons for international nonproliferation diplomacy toward the Middle East and Northeast Asia.

  16. Fukushima Daiichi: implications for carbon-free energy, nuclear nonproliferation, and community resilience.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hall, Howard L

    2011-07-01

    Implications of the nuclear power plant accidents at Fukushima Daiichi are explored in this commentary. In addition to questions of nuclear reactor regulatory standards, broader implications on noncarbon-emitting energy production, nuclear nonproliferation objectives, and community resilience and emergency response against catastrophic events are explored. Copyright © 2011 SETAC.

  17. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION: U.S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    2002-01-01

    ...) information about efforts to combat nuclear smuggling at U.S. borders. My statement today is based on the results of our May 16, 2002, report on this subject1 and information we obtained from the U.S...

  18. Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Export Control in the Republic of Croatia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Valcic, I.; Prah, M.; Mikec, N.

    2006-01-01

    In accordance with its internationally accepted obligations, the Republic of Croatia is actively implementing principles of non-proliferation and export control of nuclear materials and/or equipment. The article deals with treaties, conventions, agreements and other international arrangements that are creating certain obligation for Republic of Croatia related to nuclear non-proliferation. The most important are the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards with Protocol, the Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, the NSG Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology and NSG Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software and Related Technology. In addition the article describes a national regulative framework, the basis for conducting activities in nuclear material control, export control of dual-use items as well as non-proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction. Details are given about the Nuclear Safety Act, the Act on Liability for Nuclear Damage, the Act on Export of Dual-Use Items, the Decree on the List of Dual-Use Items, the Law on Production, Repair and Trade in Arms and Military Equipment and the Decree specifying goods subject to export and import licenses. (author)

  19. The nuclear non-proliferation regime: What it is and how it has evolved

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Priest, J.

    1999-01-01

    The nuclear non-proliferation regime commonly denotes the legal norms, voluntary undertakings and policies which the international community has developed to deal with the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation. The word 'regime' suggests a legally binding order. Some components of the non-proliferation regime are indeed legally binding. Others represent essentially political rather than legal commitments. This lecture describes the various independent but mutually reinforcing components of the non-proliferation regime. It thus touches on and highlights the particular importance of political incentives - or disincentives - to the acquisition of nuclear weapons; legal undertakings in which non-proliferation commitments are anchored; verification (specifically the IAEA Safeguards System); compliance and enforcement; export controls; physical protection measures; regional nuclear non-proliferation initiatives; and measures taken to curb proliferation in general and to strive for arms control and nuclear disarmament. The purpose of the lecture is to provide an over-arching, tour d'horizon for the more specific and detailed lectures which follow. (author)

  20. Between Shadow and Light: The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Forty Years On

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Abdelwahab, Biad

    2010-01-01

    The NPT was negotiated during the Cold War period to prevent the emergence of new nuclear players by distinguishing between 'nuclear-weapon states' (NWS) which had carried out nuclear testing before 1 January 1967, that is the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China, and 'non-nuclear-weapon states' (NNWS). Under the NPT, the two groups of states commit to comply with a series of commitments formulated around 'three pillars': 1 - Non-proliferation: the NWSs undertake under Article I not to transfer nuclear weapons or control over such weapons and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any NNWS to acquire them, while the NNWSs are bound under Article II to neither develop or acquire nuclear weapons or 'other nuclear explosive devices' nor to receive any assistance in that connection. 2 - Peaceful use of nuclear energy: Article IV guarantees the 'inalienable right' to 'develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination'. 3 - Nuclear disarmament: each state party to the treaty undertakes under Article VI 'to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament'. The treaty entered in force in March 1970 and has since become universal, with 189 states parties in May 2010. At five-year intervals, parties to the treaty convene review conferences in order to review the operation of the treaty, Article VIII(3). The 1975, 1985 and 2000 review conferences culminated in the adoption of a final declaration and the 1995 review conference decided to extend the treaty indefinitely. The preparatory committee (PrepCom) for the 2010 review conference, which met from April 2007 to May 2009, did not adopt any recommendations, in absence of a consensus on essential issues concerning the operation of the treaty. Hence the importance of this 8. review conference of the parties held in New York from 3 to 28 May 2010 in a

  1. Cooperation in Nuclear Waste Management, Radiation Protection, Emergency Preparedness, Reactor Safety and Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Eastern Europe

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dassen, Lars van; Delalic, Zlatan; Ekblad, Christer; Keyser, Peter; Turner, Roland; Rosengaard, Ulf; German, Olga; Grapengiesser, Sten; Andersson, Sarmite; Sandberg, Viviana; Olsson, Kjell; Stenberg, Tor

    2009-10-01

    Global Partnership and the UNSC Resolution 1540. However, this is only partially true as there is a growing realisation that radiation protection as well as emergency preparedness is part and parcel of the objectives that the international community is striving towards. Some of the projects have a genuinely humanitarian or civilian nature in the sense that they aim at alleviating for instance natural radiation such as from radon. But on the other hand, certain activities that concern radiation protection in terms of reducing the emissions of radiation from radioactive materials also become a security component with regard to the physical protection measures that in most cases will have to be in place. The projects in this field are implemented in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. There are a total of 22 projects in the field of radiation protection and emergency preparedness. In the field of nuclear non-proliferation and security, the geographical scope of SSM's activities is broad and stretching beyond the nearest parts of Russia and other neighbouring states. This has to do with the fact that the spread of nuclear weapons, materials and technologies relies on human will and therefore an amount of irradiated nuclear fuel in Siberia may be just as dangerous as a similar or smaller amount much closer to Sweden. It all depends on the people involved and their intentions. Sweden cooperates with Russia, Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia in this particular field. The projects include the installation of physical protection at facilities with nuclear and radioactive materials; the application of safeguards or nuclear materials accountancy on nuclear materials; assistance to the improvement of national export control systems as well as education in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. SSM participates in a number of projects that are financed by the EU. The projects were initiated in the framework of TACIS and soon to be formulated in the framework of INSC. TACIS focussed on the

  2. U.S.-China commercial nuclear commerce: Nonproliferation and trade issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    The report concludes that the United States should not be denied access to the Chinese nuclear energy program. To the contrary, the report finds that--provided China meets the requisite nonproliferation criteria--it is strongly in the US national interest to engage in peaceful nuclear, cooperation with China, from security, environmental, safety, and economic perspectives

  3. Nuclear energy and non-proliferation in Latin America: the constitution of Tlatelolco system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Armanet, P.

    1982-01-01

    The nuclear energy as alternative energy resource and its military use are analysed. Then the main characteristics of the Tratelolco treaty and non-proliferation in Latin America are discussed. Finally the importance of the nuclear-weapons-free zone in Latin America is shown. (A.B.T.) [pt

  4. Fuel cycle of nuclear power plants and safeguards system of nuclear weapon nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Malek, Z.

    1980-10-01

    The international safeguard system of nuclear weapon nonproliferation and the IAEA safeguard system are briefly described. In Czechoslovakia, a decree was issued in 1977 governing the accounting for and control of nuclear materials. The contents of the decree are presented. Described are computer processing of accounting data, technical criteria for the safeguard system application, containment and inspection in the IAEA safeguard system. The method is shown of the control of and accounting for nuclear materials in nuclear power plants and in fuel manufacturing, reprocessing and enrichment plants. Nondestructive and destructive methods of nuclear materials analysis are discussed. Nondestructive methods used include gamma spectrometry, neutron techniques, X-ray fluores--cence techniques. (J.P.)

  5. Scientists for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Transactions of international seminar

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    This publication presents the results of the Second International Seminar 'Scientists for Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons'. The Seminar took place from 11 to 14 October 1994 in Nakhabino Country Club near Moscow. More than 60 specialists from Russia, USA, France, Belgium as well as IAEA and CEU took part in the seminar. Problems of cooperation in the field of nuclear materials accounting, control and safeguards, physical protection of nuclear materials, nuclear export regulations and disarmament control are discussed at the seminar

  6. Nuclear disarmament and evolution of the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bragin, V.; Carlson, J.; Bardsley, J.; Hill, J.

    1999-01-01

    The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference reaffirmed 'the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control' and endorsed 'universal application of safeguards once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved'. Hence strengthening the international non-proliferation regime and incremental broadening of its coverage towards the universal application of international safeguards in all States is a high priority albeit for the medium to long term. A tentative attempt is made in this paper to anticipate how the elements of verification under the NPT, FMCT and other conventions and arrangements related to nuclear non-proliferation will evolve against the background of the disarmament process, with the goal of achieving at some future stage an ultimate convergence of verification regimes under a complete nuclear disarmament. We think, however, that most of the new initiatives in the area of disarmament/non-proliferation should be realised during the current disarmament phase. We do not wish our model to be perceived as a rigid time-bound scheme. New initiatives should be implemented in parallel and as soon as practicable. This paper reflects the personal views of the authors and should not be taken to represent Australian Government policy. (author)

  7. Activities of the study group of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and non-proliferation policy. FY Heisei 11

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kurosawa, Mitsuru; Oi, Noboru

    2000-01-01

    The Study Group on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation Policy (Chairman: Prof. Kurosawa) was established in FY1999 with the funding from the Science and Technology Agency. The aim of the Study Group is to clearly understand nuclear proliferation issues and to lead international opinion. Nuclear non-proliferation is a matter of rather scanty interest compared to nuclear safety while both of them are important in promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy in Japan. In FY2000, the Study Group held International Symposium 'Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation: A Challenge of 21st Century' and in conjunction with this Symposium, dispatched 'The Statement on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation, Action Plan towards 21st Century'. The Statement consists of five propositions: 1) Strengthening the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and making it universally applicable, 2) Negative legacy of cold war: rapid solution of problems, 3) Civil (non-military) plutonium, 4) Development of technology to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime internationally, and 5) Strengthening Japanese initiative on nuclear non-proliferation policy. In this report, these activities will be explained in detail. (author)

  8. Report of a workshop on nuclear forces and nonproliferation Woodrow Wilson international center for scholars, Washington, DC October 28, 2010

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pilat, Joseph F [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-12-08

    A workshop sponsored by the Los Alamos National Laboratory in cooperation with the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars was held at the Wilson Center in Washington, DC, on October 28, 2010. The workshop addressed evolving nuclear forces and their impacts on nonproliferation in the context of the new strategic environment, the Obama Administration's Nuclear Posture Review and the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The discussions reflected the importance of the NPR for defining the role of US nuclear forces in dealing with 21st century threats and providing guidance for National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and Department of Defense (DoD) programs and, for many but not all participants, highlighted its role in the successful outcome of the NPT RevCon. There was widespread support for the NPR and its role in developing the foundations for a sustainable nuclear-weapon program that addresses nuclear weapons, infrastructure and expertise in the broader nonproliferation, disarmament and international security contexts. However, some participants raised concerns about its implementation and its long-term effectiveness and sustainability.

  9. How to strengthen the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eklund, S.

    1975-01-01

    besides involving the participants in expenditures which even the richest can hardly bear. Thus a decision not to enter into the nuclear arms race should in no way be considered a sacrifice on the part of the country concerned, but only reflects sound sense. Equally, the first beneficiaries of a termination of the nuclear arms race would be the nuclear weapon states themselves, although the whole world would breathe a sigh of relief. (author)

  10. Verifying compliance with nuclear non-proliferation undertakings: IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-06-01

    This report provides background information on safeguards and explains procedures for States to conclude Additional Protocols to comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA. Since the IAEA was founded in 1957, its safeguards system has been an indispensable component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and has facilitated peaceful nuclear cooperation. In recognition of this, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) makes it mandatory for all non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) party to the Treaty to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and thus allow for the application of safeguards to all their nuclear material. Under Article III of the NPT, all NNWS undertake to accept safeguards, as set forth in agreements to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the States' obligations under the NPT. In May 1997, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the Model Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements (reproduced in INFCIRC/540(Corr.)) which provided for an additional legal authority. In States that have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force, the IAEA is able to optimize the implementation of all safeguards measures available. In order to simplify certain procedures under comprehensive safeguards agreements for States with little or no nuclear material and no nuclear material in a facility, the IAEA began making available, in 1971, a 'small quantities protocol' (SQP), which held in abeyance the implementation of most of the detailed provisions of comprehensive safeguards agreements for so long as the State concerned satisfied these criteria. The safeguards system aims at detecting and deterring the diversion of nuclear material. Such material includes enriched uranium, plutonium and uranium-233, which could be used directly in nuclear weapons. It also includes natural uranium and depleted uranium, the latter of which is

  11. Verifying compliance with nuclear non-proliferation undertakings: IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-04-01

    This report provides background information on safeguards and explains procedures for States to conclude Additional Protocols to comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA. Since the IAEA was founded in 1957, its safeguards system has been an indispensable component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and has facilitated peaceful nuclear cooperation. In recognition of this, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) makes it mandatory for all non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) party to the Treaty to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and thus allow for the application of safeguards to all their nuclear material. Under Article III of the NPT, all NNWS undertake to accept safeguards, as set forth in agreements to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the States' obligations under the NPT. In May 1997, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the Model Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements (reproduced in INFCIRC/540(Corr.)) which provided for an additional legal authority. In States that have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force, the IAEA is able to optimize the implementation of all safeguards measures available. In order to simplify certain procedures under comprehensive safeguards agreements for States with little or no nuclear material and no nuclear material in a facility, the IAEA began making available, in 1971, a 'small quantities protocol' (SQP), which held in abeyance the implementation of most of the detailed provisions of comprehensive safeguards agreements for so long as the State concerned satisfied these criteria. The safeguards system aims at detecting and deterring the diversion of nuclear material. Such material includes enriched uranium, plutonium and uranium-233, which could be used directly in nuclear weapons. It also includes natural uranium and depleted uranium, the latter of which is

  12. The year 2000 examination conference of the non-proliferation treaty and the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grand, C.

    2001-01-01

    The nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty (NPT), signed on July 1, 1968 and enforced on March 5, 1970, has been progressively considered as the headstone of the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime. The sixth NPT examination conference took place at New York (USA) in the year 2000, 5 years after the previous conference but also after the first nuclear weapon tests of India and Pakistan. This article recalls up the main non-proliferation events that took place between the 1995 and 2000 conferences and presents the progresses and results of the New York conference. Finally, it wonders about the ambiguities in the conclusions of this last conference. (J.S.)

  13. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: The road ahead. London, 15 January 2001

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2001-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the conference given by the Director General of the IAEA at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, 15 January 2001. The Director General points out that for over five decades since the summer of 1945, strategies of national and international security have been intertwined with the concept of nuclear weapons as a strategic deterrent. In his view, the achievement of a nuclear weapon free world will crucially depend on a fundamental change in that concept of 'security'. Besides the historical perspectives the paper focuses on the non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament strategies. The Director General also states that to achieve the main goal of universal non-proliferation and disarmament it is indispensable to re-evaluate nuclear weapon states status; challenge the doctrine of nuclear deterrence; develop alternatives to nuclear deterrence; and engage in constructive dialogue. In conclusion it is re-emphasized that there remain both the difficulties and the opportunities of the road towards nuclear disarmament. It is pointed out that construction of a non-proliferation regime with near-universal participation has been successful and some progress towards nuclear disarmament has been achieved, but several goals must be pursued to maintain and build upon achievements

  14. Nuclear weapon-free zone, non-proliferation treaty and South Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jayaramu, P.S.

    1980-01-01

    Emergence of and the motivations behind the concept of nuclear weapon free zone, the conceptual linkage between the nuclear weapon free zone and the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the problems involved in the implementation of nuclear weapon free zone proposals put forward from time to time are discussed. Pakistan's proposal for a nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia, motivations behind the proposal, and India's response to it are examined. It is pointed out that both the NPT and nuclear weapon free zone indirectly grant a certain amount of legitimacy to the use of nuclear weapons. (M.G.B.)

  15. Crisis as opportunity. Implications of the nuclear conflict with Iran for the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meier, Oliver

    2014-01-01

    The conflict over the Iranian nuclear programme represents the greatest challenge for international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. For decades Iran has been violating obligations contained in its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to become nuclear weapons capable. But what impact does the conflict over Tehran's nuclear programme have on the nuclear non-proliferation regime? In three areas there is significant overlap between efforts to find a solution with Iran and broader discussions about strengthening non-proliferation norms, rules and procedures: verification of civilian nuclear programmes, limiting the ability to produce weapons-grade fissile materials, and nuclear fuel supply guarantees. The nuclear dispute with Tehran is likely to have specific effects in each of these fields on the non-proliferation regime's norms, rules and procedures. The ninth NPT review conference, which will take place from 27 April to 22 May 2015, offers an opportunity to draw lessons from the nuclear conflict and discuss ideas for further strengthening the regime. Germany is the only non-nuclear-weapon state within the E3+3 group and the strongest proponent of nuclear disarmament. As a supporter of effective multilateralism, Berlin also bears a special responsibility for ensuring that steps to strengthen nuclear verification and control efforts in the talks with Iran also reflect the non-nuclear-weapon states' interest in disarmament and transparency on the part of the nuclear-weapons states.

  16. Crisis as opportunity. Implications of the nuclear conflict with Iran for the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Meier, Oliver

    2014-11-15

    The conflict over the Iranian nuclear programme represents the greatest challenge for international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. For decades Iran has been violating obligations contained in its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to become nuclear weapons capable. But what impact does the conflict over Tehran's nuclear programme have on the nuclear non-proliferation regime? In three areas there is significant overlap between efforts to find a solution with Iran and broader discussions about strengthening non-proliferation norms, rules and procedures: verification of civilian nuclear programmes, limiting the ability to produce weapons-grade fissile materials, and nuclear fuel supply guarantees. The nuclear dispute with Tehran is likely to have specific effects in each of these fields on the non-proliferation regime's norms, rules and procedures. The ninth NPT review conference, which will take place from 27 April to 22 May 2015, offers an opportunity to draw lessons from the nuclear conflict and discuss ideas for further strengthening the regime. Germany is the only non-nuclear-weapon state within the E3+3 group and the strongest proponent of nuclear disarmament. As a supporter of effective multilateralism, Berlin also bears a special responsibility for ensuring that steps to strengthen nuclear verification and control efforts in the talks with Iran also reflect the non-nuclear-weapon states' interest in disarmament and transparency on the part of the nuclear-weapons states.

  17. Report of “the 2013 international forum on peaceful use of nuclear energy, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. Ensuring nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security of nuclear fuel cycle options in consideration of the accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station”

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yamamura, Tsukasa; Suda, Kazunori; Tomikawa, Hirofumi; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Kuno, Yusuke; Mochiji, Toshiro

    2014-03-01

    The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) held “International Forum on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security – Ensuring Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Options in consideration of the Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station –” on 3 and 4 December 2013, with the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo, as co-hosts. In the Forum, officials from Japan, the United States, France and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) explained their efforts regarding peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation. Discussion was made in two panels, entitled “Nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security measures of nuclear fuel cycle options in consideration of the Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station” and “Roles of safeguards and technical measures for ensuring nuclear non-proliferation for nuclear fuel cycle options”. In the first panel based on the implications of the Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station on the domestic and global nuclear energy use and increased interest in the back end of nuclear fuel cycle, discussion was made on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security challenges on both fuel cycle options from the policy and institutional viewpoints whereas in the second panel the roles of safeguards and proliferation resistant nuclear technology including plutonium burning technology in ensuring nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security in the back end of nuclear fuel cycle were discussed. Officials and experts from Japan, IAEA, the United States, France and Republic of Korea participated in the panel and made contributions to active discussion. This report includes abstracts of keynote speeches, summaries of two panel discussions and materials of the presentations in the forum. The editors take full responsibility for the wording

  18. Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament: A long-term perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haeckel, E.

    1990-01-01

    International nuclear policy has been determined for a long time by the exigencies of the status quo. The non-proliferation regime draws its legitimacy from the continuation of extant patterns of power in world politics. Such a static policy cannot succeed forever. Overcoming the threat of nuclear proliferation will require innovative strategy that reaches beyond the status quo. It calls for structural change in the international system to be accomodated instead of resisted. If the Non-Proliferation Treaty is to hold, nuclear weapon states will finally have to forgo their privileged status. This cannot, however, be accomplished simply through the abolition or renunciation of nuclear weapons since nuclear weapons themselves continue to be instrumental for war prevention and international stability. Rather, what is needed is a new approach to the management of the nuclear world system under international responsibility. Nonproliferation and disarmament objectives together call for a concept of global security in which multilateral institutions assume an increasingly important role of nuclear diplomacy. (orig.) [de

  19. The Non-Proliferation Treaty and the peaceful use of nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilmshurst, M.J.

    1983-01-01

    The author discusses the reasons of criticism and even rejection of the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, dealing in particular with the alledged discriminating nature of the Treaty and with the statement that the Treaty is not apt to prevent proliferation on a vertical plane. He further discusses the motives behind the efforts of potential nuclear weapons states to get nuclear weapons. The system of worldwide and bilateral safeguards and controls covering the transfer of nuclear technologies is explained. In conclusion the author suggests to pay more attention to article IV, sub-section (2) of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as this might offer a suitable approach to restricting the dissemination of nuclear explosives. (HP) [de

  20. Problems of the nuclear non-proliferation policy. Contributions to the international discussion

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blix, H.; Butler, P. von; Fischer, W.; Caccia Dominioni, F.; Frick, H.; Gmelin, W.; Haeckel, E.; Lauppe, W.D.; Mueller, H.; Richter, B.; Stein, G.

    1994-01-01

    The volume assembles a number of essays wherein basic problems of nonproliferation are identified and discussed in view of recent developments and future policy requirements. What is the role of multilateral institutions in the containment of nuclear proliferation? How are Western Europe's security needs to be reconciled with the tenets of the global nonproliferation regime? How can international safeguards be upgraded so as to increase confidence among states? What kinds of disciplinary instruments are needed for the international community to prevent an unco-operative state from gaining access to nuclear weapons? What kinds of obstacles stand in the way of smooth co-operation between the European Union and the United States in the nuclear field? How does the demise of global bipolarity impinge on the need to pursue an international nuclear order? The essays in this volume seek to combine structural analysis of conceptual issues with substantive policy recommendations. (orig./HP) [de

  1. Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power. Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume VII. International perspectives

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1980-06-01

    The purpose of this volume is to assess the proliferation vulnerabilities of the present deployment of civilian nuclear-power systems within the current nonproliferation regime and, in light of their prospective deployment, to consider technical and institutional measures and alternatives which may contribute to an improved regime in which nuclear power could play a significant part. An assessment of these measures must include consideration of their nonproliferation effectiveness as well as their bearing upon energy security, and their operational, economic, and political implications. The nature of these considerations can provide some measure of their likely acceptability to various nations.

  2. Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power. Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume VII. International perspectives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-06-01

    The purpose of this volume is to assess the proliferation vulnerabilities of the present deployment of civilian nuclear-power systems within the current nonproliferation regime and, in light of their prospective deployment, to consider technical and institutional measures and alternatives which may contribute to an improved regime in which nuclear power could play a significant part. An assessment of these measures must include consideration of their nonproliferation effectiveness as well as their bearing upon energy security, and their operational, economic, and political implications. The nature of these considerations can provide some measure of their likely acceptability to various nations

  3. Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Education at Texas A&M University

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gariazzo, C.; Charlton, W.

    2015-01-01

    The MS degree in Nuclear Engineering - Non-proliferation at Texas A&M University is administered by the Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute (NSSPI). The oldest and largest of its kind in the US, 45 M.S. and 15 Ph.D. students conducted technical research in relevant areas: safeguards, nuclear security, non-proliferation, and arms control. In addition to focusing on graduate education with a wide combination of internationally-recognized talent, NSSPI faculty lead research and service activities in safeguarding of nuclear materials and reducing nuclear threats. Texas A&M Nuclear Engineering students take relevant nonproliferation and safeguards courses (within the College of Engineering and the Texas A&M Bush School of Government) as well as conduct their research under competent experts. The complete educational experience here is unique because of the strong research and educational support NSSPI provides. This paper will detail these endeavors and convey contributions from NSSPI for developing next-generation safeguards experts via practical experiences and strong affiliations with real-world practitioners. The safeguards and non-proliferation education programme blends historical, legal, technical and policy aspects that is unique for a technical university such as Texas A&M. Beyond classroom lectures, NSSPI provides opportunities for students ranging from asynchronous learning modules to practical experiences. Publicly-available self-paced, online course modules in basic and advanced safeguards education have been developed by NSSPI as supplemental nuclear education for students and professionals. By leveraging NSSPI's contacts, students participate in exchange programmes with international institutions as well as partake in experiences like engaging safeguards practitioners at nuclear fuel cycle facilities around the world, conducting experiments at internationally-renowned laboratories, and representing their communities at workshops worldwide

  4. Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament: A status report. Vienna, 14 March 2001

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2001-01-01

    For more than half a century, strategies of national and international security have been intertwined with the concept of nuclear weapons as a strategic deterrent. Further meaningful progress towards a nuclear weapon free world will demand that we re-examine our fundamental concept of what security means and how it can best be achieved. The following specific areas where our attention should be focused are discussed briefly: the historical perspective, current strategies for non-proliferation and disarmament, and the future prospects

  5. Nuclear export policy and regulation for non-proliferation: Federal Republic of Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boulanger, Werner.

    1978-01-01

    The nuclear export policy of the Federal Republic of Germany complies with the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Already in 1967 the Federal Government stated in a Peace Note that no export was authorised to countries (outside Euratom) which did not comply with the IAEA Safeguards. In the bilateral agreement the Federal Republic signed with Brasil in 1975, emphasis was put on international safeguards and the control exercised on exported materials to avoid any diversion for military purposes. (NEA) [fr

  6. Putting teeth in the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. 25 March 2006, Karlsruhe, Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2006-01-01

    The factors, contributing to the world's changes in respect to peace, security and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons are presented in the document. Five necessary and urgent measures are proposed in order to meet the current challenges: 1)tighten control for assess to nuclear fuel cycle technology; 2)accelerate global efforts tp protect nuclear material; 3)support effective nuclear verification; 4) reinvigorate disarmament efforts; 5) increase the effectiveness of the UN Security Council. The importance and necessity to place nuclear operations under multinational control is outlined

  7. Report on the 8. ESARDA course on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grape, S.; Jonter, T.

    2013-01-01

    The 8. ESARDA course on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation took place in Uppsala, Sweden, on September 12-16, 2011. 44 participants from 15 countries followed the one week long course, comprising four days of lectures, one group exercise and one full day visit to the Swedish final repository (SFR) for short-lived radioactive waste. The lectures covered political and technical aspects related to the general background of safeguards legislation and treaties, the nuclear fuel cycle, destructive and non-destructive safeguards techniques, physical protection, verification technologies such as nuclear material accountancy and control, safeguards inspections, remote monitoring, containment and surveillance, export control, illicit trafficking and nuclear forensics. The course also contained a group exercise, whereby the participants learnt about different nonproliferation treaties on/or related to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as well as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). The task of the group exercise was to discuss and compare the treaties with respect to obligations and rights of state parties, verification of compliance, membership, terrorism, similarities/differences, successes and failures. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  8. JAEA's actions and contributions to the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Suda, Kazunori; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Michiji, Toshiro

    2012-06-01

    Japan, a non-nuclear weapons state, has established a commercial nuclear fuel cycle including LWRs, and now is developing a fast neutron reactor fuel cycle as part of the next generation nuclear energy system, with commercial operation targeted for 2050. Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) is the independent administrative agency for conducting comprehensive nuclear R&D in Japan after the merger of Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) and Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC). JAEA and its predecessors have extensive experience in R&D, facility operations, and safeguards development and implementation for new types of nuclear facilities for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. As the operator of various nuclear fuel cycle facilities and numerous nuclear materials, JAEA makes international contributions to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation. This paper provides an overview of JAEA's development of nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards technologies, including remote monitoring of nuclear facilities, environmental sample analysis methods and new efforts since the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.

  9. Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power: report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume VII. International perspectives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-12-01

    The purpose of this volume is to assess the proliferation vulnerabilities of the present deployment of civilian nuclear-power systems within the current nonproliferation regime and, in light of their prospective deployment, to consider technical and institutional measures and alternatives which may contribute to an improved regime in which nuclear power could play a significant part. An assessment of these measures must include consideration of their nonproliferation effectiveness as well as their bearing upon energy security, and their operational, economic, and political implications. The nature of these considerations can provide some measure of their likely acceptability to various nations. While any final assessment of such measures and alternatives would have to examine the circumstances particular to each nation, it is hoped that the more generic assessments conducted here will be useful in suggesting guidelines for developing an improved nonproliferation regime which also helps to meet nuclear-energy needs. One chapter outlines the existing nonproliferation regime, including the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, bilateral and multilateral requirements for agreements of cooperation and transfers of technology, and existing provisons for sanctions for violation of nonproliferation commitments. The chapter then proceeds to an assessment of various alternatives for providing assurance of fuel supply in light of this current regime. Another chapter examines a set of technical and institutional measures and alternatives for various components of once-through and closed fuel cycles. The components of the once-through fuel cycle assessed are enrichment services and spent-fuel management; the components of closed fuel cycles assessed are reprocessing and plutonium management and fast-breeder reactor (FBR) deployment

  10. Argentina’s nuclear development and the non-proliferation regime

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Sandra Colombo

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available The development and transfer of nuclear technology have been put under strict control due to its possible military use, leading to the creation of international non-proliferation regimes. One of the latest proposals was the creation of multilateral banks of low enriched uranium (leu. The article states that, under the goal of non-proliferation, this initiative can contribute to accentuate the asymmetry in the distribution of world economic and political power, damaging the endogenous development of this technology in emerging countries. Against this, the article investigates the existence of margins to maneuver in the international system from the case of study of Argentina, one of the few developing countries that have managed to export nuclear technology, and has declared the development of independent nuclear activity as a State policy

  11. US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy: impact on exports and nuclear industry could not be determined

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Staats, E.B.

    1980-01-01

    The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 established new measures to prevent the diversion to weapons use of peaceful nuclear exports. It also created a policy to confirm US reliability as a nuclear supplier. GAO did not identify any export sales lost as a result of the Act, but did find indications that nonprofileration policies can influence export sales. Based on avavailable data, GAO could not determine the impact of the Act on the competitiveness of US nuclear exports. However, US companies are at some disadvantage because importers perceive that implementation of the Act may result in delayed export licenses. The United States dominated the nuclear export market through the early 1970s. However, foreign competitors, some aided by US technology transfers, emerged to monopolize home markets and complete for third-country business. Further, the market has been depressed since 1974 and prospects for US nuclear power plant exports have dimmed greatly. However, US companies continue to view exports as important to sustain production capacity

  12. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the relationship

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Graham, Thomas Jr. [7609 Glenbrook Rd., Bethesda, MD 20814 (United States)

    2014-05-09

    The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the most important international security arrangement that we have that is protecting the world community and this has been true for many years. But it did not happen by accident, it is a strategic bargain in which 184 states gave up the right forever to acquire the most powerful weapon ever created in exchange for a commitment from the five states allowed to keep nuclear weapons under the NPT (U.S., U.K., Russia, France and China), to share peaceful nuclear technology and to engage in disarmament negotiations aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear stockpiles. The most important part of this is the comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTBT); the thinking by the 184 NPT non-nuclear weapon states was and is that they understand that the elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles is a long way off, but at least the NPT nuclear weapon states could stop testing the weapons. The CTBT has been ratified by 161 states but by its terms it can only come into force if 44 nuclear potential states ratify; 36 have of the 44 have ratified it, the remaining eight include the United States and seven others, most of whom are in effect waiting for the United States. No state has tested a nuclear weapon-except for complete outlier North Korea-in 15 years. There appears to be no chance that the U.S. Senate will approve the CTBT for ratification in the foreseeable future, but the NPT may not survive without it. Perhaps it is time to consider an interim measure, for the UN Security Council to declare that any future nuclear weapon test any time, anywhere is a 'threat to peace and security', in effect a violation of international law, which in today's world it clearly would be.

  13. The non-proliferation policies of non-nuclear-weapon states

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marwah, Onkar

    1987-01-01

    Eight countries are considered to be capable of producing nuclear weapons and highly suspect in their intentions to actually produce them. These are Argentina, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan. The policies of these suspect Non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) are considered in this paper. The first part assesses the non-proliferation (or proliferation) policies of the eight suspect NNWS, the second part evaluates their differences in approach from the policies urged upon them by the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and the third and final part attempts to understand the future evolution of NNWS policies in the nuclear military field. (U.K.)

  14. Nuclear non-proliferation and security culture within EDF nuclear fleet

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Debes, M.

    2013-01-01

    This document describes the nuclear non-proliferation strategy and the safety culture of EDF. The author lists all the mandatory rules and regulations at international and national levels EDF has to comply with. All these requirements are applied in EDF nuclear facilities through adequate procedures that assure a nuclear material accountancy, a follow-up of any item containing nuclear material in the facility, and internal controls. External independent controls are also performed. The EDF security policy goal is to protect human, material and knowledge assets, and to preserve operational capacity, competitiveness and public confidence, within national regulatory framework and regulation on 'vital importance facilities'. The treatment of events or incident (detection, analysis, lessons drawn, experience feedback) is a tool to progress, along with reporting, internal control process and audits. The security requirements cover the different related domains important to EDF industrial assets: security of employees against assaults; security of data according to their sensibility level; security of the information system and telecom; awareness and training of employees; relations with external suppliers or contractors; business premises; security of staff and projects abroad. For industrial facilities and grids (facilities of 'vital importance'...), the defense in depth principles are applied against the different threat scenarios. Security measures are studied at the design stage in a consistent way with nuclear safety measures, while taking into account the protective means deployed by public authorities. These risk analysis are periodically reassessed. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (A.C.)

  15. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING RELIABLE NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICE APPROACHES: ECONOMIC AND NON-PROLIFERATION MERITS OF NUCLEAR FUEL LEASING

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kreyling, Sean J.; Brothers, Alan J.; Short, Steven M.; Phillips, Jon R.; Weimar, Mark R.

    2010-01-01

    The goal of international nuclear policy since the dawn of nuclear power has been the peaceful expansion of nuclear energy while controlling the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology. Numerous initiatives undertaken in the intervening decades to develop international agreements on providing nuclear fuel supply assurances, or reliable nuclear fuel services (RNFS) attempted to control the spread of sensitive nuclear materials and technology. In order to inform the international debate and the development of government policy, PNNL has been developing an analytical framework to holistically evaluate the economics and non-proliferation merits of alternative approaches to managing the nuclear fuel cycle (i.e., cradle-to-grave). This paper provides an overview of the analytical framework and discusses preliminary results of an economic assessment of one RNFS approach: full-service nuclear fuel leasing. The specific focus of this paper is the metrics under development to systematically evaluate the non-proliferation merits of fuel-cycle management alternatives. Also discussed is the utility of an integrated assessment of the economics and non-proliferation merits of nuclear fuel leasing.

  16. Preparation for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Extension Conference in 1995

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chrzanowski, P.L.

    1993-01-01

    About 30 specialists in non-proliferation participated in a workshop to explore ideas for US Government preparatory steps leading to the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Extension Conference. To that end, workshop sessions were devoted to reviewing the lessons learned from previous Review Conferences, discussing the threats to the non-proliferation regime together with ways of preserving and strengthening it, and examining the management of international nuclear commerce. A fundamental premise shared by workshop participants was that extension of the NPT is immensely important to international security. The importance of stemming proliferation and, more specifically, extending the Treaty, is growing as a result of the significant changes in the world. If the conferees of the Extension Conference decide on no extension or extension for a short limited duration, some technically advanced states that have foregone development of nuclear weapons may begin to rethink their options. Also, other arms control measures, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, could start to unravel. The US must provide strong international leadership to ensure that the Extension Conference is a success, resulting in Treaty extension, perhaps through successive terms, into the indefinite future. Workshop participants were struck by the urgent need for the US to take organizational steps so that it is highly effective in its advance preparations for the Extension Conference. Moreover, the Extension Conference provides both a challenge and an opportunity to mold a cohesive set of US policy actions to define the future role of nuclear weapons and combat their proliferation

  17. Proceedings of the review conference of the parties to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Geneva, 5-30 May 1975

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1976-01-01

    The proceedings of the 1975 Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons review the different Articles of the Treaty and their implementation following a report on the preparations for the Conference. The Annexes contain the text of the Treaty, as well as addresses by various Delegates concerning their countries' positions together with the final declaration and a series of draft resolutions. (NEA) [fr

  18. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1970-04-22

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970.

  19. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1970-01-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970

  20. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1970-01-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970 [fr

  1. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1970-01-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depositary Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970 [ru

  2. Prospects for regional cooperation. Regional cooperation in remote monitoring for nuclear nonproliferation and transparency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Olsen, John

    2006-01-01

    The JAEA and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) have cooperated for a decade in development and testing of remote monitoring technologies in support of international safeguards. With this technology approaching maturity, the JAEA/SNL partnership now envisions regional cooperation to use these technologies to advance nuclear transparency and strengthen nonproliferation, as well. This presentation summarizes the technical evolution and notes the opportunity for regional cooperation to include institutions in the ROK, as well as Japan and the US. (author)

  3. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-10-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970

  4. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1970-01-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970 [es

  5. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1970-04-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970

  6. IAEA Director General welcomes Cuba's intention to join the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    Full text: IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei welcomed Cuba's announcement to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean. He expressed the hope that Cuba will conclude soon a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency, as required under Article III of the NPT. 'With Cuba's intention to become party to the NPT, we have come a step closer to a universal nuclear non-proliferation regime,' Mr. ElBaradei said. Only three countries worldwide with significant nuclear activities now remain outside the NPT. With 188 countries party to the Treaty, the NPT is the most adhered to international agreement after the United Nations Charter and the most widely adhered to multilateral arms control treaty. The NPT makes it mandatory that all non-nuclear-weapon States conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and thus put all of their nuclear material under IAEA safeguards. The Director General also welcomed Cuba's ratification of the Tlatelolco Treaty, which completes the process of having all countries in the region of Latin America and the Caribbean as members of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region. Mr. ElBaradei said that, 'the Tlatelolco Treaty provides a good model for other regional nuclear-weapon-free zones to follow'. He added that 'universal adherence of all countries in regions having nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangements is important to further strengthen the non-proliferation regime'. (IAEA)

  7. Nuclear non-proliferation: The security context, 5 October 2007, University of Florence, Florence, Italy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2007-01-01

    Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, stated that nuclear threats have become more dangerous and more complex. We have witnessed the emergence of illicit trade in nuclear technology. Countries have managed to develop clandestine nuclear programmes. Sophisticated extremist groups have shown keen interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. n parallel, nuclear material and nuclear material production have become more difficult to control. Energy security concerns and fears of climate change are prompting many countries to revisit the nuclear power option. And to ensure a supply of reactor fuel, more countries have shown interest in mastering the nuclear fuel cycle - a step that brings them quite close to nuclear weapons capability. Add to this the 27 000 nuclear warheads that already exist in the arsenals of nine countries, and the hair trigger alert deployment level of some of these weapons. And as if these stockpiles and their deployment were not threat enough, most of these countries continue to repeat two inherently contradictory mantras: first, that it is important for them to continue to rely on nuclear weapons for their security; and second, that no one else should have them. 'Do as I say, not as I do'. Against this backdrop, there are four critical aspects of the nuclear non-proliferation regime that we must strengthen - addressing both symptoms and root causes - if we are to avoid a cascade of nuclear proliferation, and our ultimate self-destruction. First, we must develop a more effective approach for dealing with proliferation threats. Second, we must secure existing nuclear material stockpiles and tighten controls over the transfer and production of nuclear material. Third, we must strengthen the verification authority and capability of the IAEA. Fourth, we urgently need to find a way for disarmament to be given the prominence and priority it deserves. In conclusion, it is clear that a security strategy rooted in 'Us

  8. Working Group 3: Broader Perspectives on Non-proliferation and Nuclear Verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dreicer, M.; Pregenzer, A.; Stein, G.

    2013-01-01

    This working group (WG) focused on the technical topics related to international security and stability in global nonproliferation and arms control regimes and asked how nonproliferation tools and culture might facilitate verification of future nuclear treaties. The review of existing and future nonproliferation and disarmament regimes (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty - CTBT, UNSC Resolution 1540, UK/Norway/VERTIC exercise, Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty - FMCT) offered a view on challenges, possibilities, and limitations for future initiatives. The concepts that the WG considered, with potential use in implementing future nuclear verification treaties, are: Triple S Culture (Safety, Security, Safeguards), State-Level Approach, Safeguards-by-Design, risk-based approaches, managed access, inspections, and protection of sensitive information. Under these concepts, many existing tools, considered by the WG could be used for nuclear verification. Export control works to control sensitive technology and expertise. Global implementation is complicated and multi-faceted and would benefit from greater consistency and efficiency. In most cases, international cooperation and development international capability would supplement efforts. This document is composed of the slides and the paper of the presentation. (A.C.)

  9. Nuclear Non-proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 - No 8 of 1987

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    This Act aims at giving domestic legislative effect to Australia's international non-proliferation obligations and establishes controls over the possession and transport of nuclear materials and equipment by a system of permits. These obligations arise inter alia under the NPT Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The Act provides that its provisions shall apply to nuclear material (as defined in Article XX of the IAEA Statute) and associated items which include associated material, equipment or technology. These are clearly defined in the Act. (NEA) [fr

  10. Cooperation in Nuclear Waste Management, Radiation Protection, Emergency Preparedness, Reactor Safety and Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Eastern Europe

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dassen, Lars van; Delalic, Zlatan; Ekblad, Christer; Keyser, Peter; Turner, Roland; Rosengaard, Ulf; German, Olga; Grapengiesser, Sten; Andersson, Sarmite; Sandberg, Viviana; Olsson, Kjell; Stenberg, Tor

    2009-10-15

    foreseen by for instance the Global Partnership and the UNSC Resolution 1540. However, this is only partially true as there is a growing realisation that radiation protection as well as emergency preparedness is part and parcel of the objectives that the international community is striving towards. Some of the projects have a genuinely humanitarian or civilian nature in the sense that they aim at alleviating for instance natural radiation such as from radon. But on the other hand, certain activities that concern radiation protection in terms of reducing the emissions of radiation from radioactive materials also become a security component with regard to the physical protection measures that in most cases will have to be in place. The projects in this field are implemented in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. There are a total of 22 projects in the field of radiation protection and emergency preparedness. In the field of nuclear non-proliferation and security, the geographical scope of SSM's activities is broad and stretching beyond the nearest parts of Russia and other neighbouring states. This has to do with the fact that the spread of nuclear weapons, materials and technologies relies on human will and therefore an amount of irradiated nuclear fuel in Siberia may be just as dangerous as a similar or smaller amount much closer to Sweden. It all depends on the people involved and their intentions. Sweden cooperates with Russia, Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia in this particular field. The projects include the installation of physical protection at facilities with nuclear and radioactive materials; the application of safeguards or nuclear materials accountancy on nuclear materials; assistance to the improvement of national export control systems as well as education in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. SSM participates in a number of projects that are financed by the EU. The projects were initiated in the framework of TACIS and soon to be formulated in the framework of

  11. Sweden and the making of nuclear non-proliferation: from indecision to assertiveness

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dassen, L. van

    1998-03-01

    Swedish research on nuclear weapons started at a modest scale in 1945 but was soon expanded. By the early 1950s the research programme started to face some of the problems that were going to accompany it for the rest of its life: different priorities and cost-estimates were made by the sectors that wanted to develop nuclear energy and those working on the bomb. Moreover, an introduction of nuclear weapons would lead to a major redistribution of resources to the disadvantage of the navy and army. The public and political debates intensified during the 1950s and culminated in 1960. At first, pro-nuclear voices had been strongest but were soon challenged by interest groups, unions and peace movements. 1960, a committee within the government had established a compromise: Nuclear weapons research for production of weapons would be terminated, while research on the consequences of nuclear weapons would continue. It was a cosmetic decision that could cover for a continued research on weapons design. Nevertheless, there are some general qualities from the debates that indicate why the outcome was that Sweden signed the NPT in 1968. First, the number of interested persons, groups movements and party politicians engaged in the issue increased every time the issue came up. Secondly, the segments of society that supported the nuclear option remained roughly the same. No strong movements rallied to the defence of this position. On the other hand, the anti-nuclear wing received more and more followers. Third, there was a marked tendency by virtually all actors (except the military) to include every sign of progress in international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts as arguments against Swedish proliferation. Since 1968, the non-proliferation choice has ben manifested through Sweden''s adherence to the NPT and this has been accompanied by a strong commitment to other non-proliferation initiatives

  12. Sweden and the making of nuclear non-proliferation: from indecision to assertiveness

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dassen, L. van [Uppsala Univ. (Sweden). Dept. of Peace and Conflict Research

    1998-03-01

    Swedish research on nuclear weapons started at a modest scale in 1945 but was soon expanded. By the early 1950s the research programme started to face some of the problems that were going to accompany it for the rest of its life: different priorities and cost-estimates were made by the sectors that wanted to develop nuclear energy and those working on the bomb. Moreover, an introduction of nuclear weapons would lead to a major redistribution of resources to the disadvantage of the navy and army. The public and political debates intensified during the 1950s and culminated in 1960. At first, pro-nuclear voices had been strongest but were soon challenged by interest groups, unions and peace movements. 1960, a committee within the government had established a compromise: Nuclear weapons research for production of weapons would be terminated, while research on the consequences of nuclear weapons would continue. It was a cosmetic decision that could cover for a continued research on weapons design. Nevertheless, there are some general qualities from the debates that indicate why the outcome was that Sweden signed the NPT in 1968. First, the number of interested persons, groups movements and party politicians engaged in the issue increased every time the issue came up. Secondly, the segments of society that supported the nuclear option remained roughly the same. No strong movements rallied to the defence of this position. On the other hand, the anti-nuclear wing received more and more followers. Third, there was a marked tendency by virtually all actors (except the military) to include every sign of progress in international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts as arguments against Swedish proliferation. Since 1968, the non-proliferation choice has ben manifested through Sweden``s adherence to the NPT and this has been accompanied by a strong commitment to other non-proliferation initiatives. Refs.

  13. Evaluation of the Administration's proposed nuclear non-proliferation strategy. Report to the Congress

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    Dwindling supplies of fossil fuels are causing countries to turn increasingly to nuclear power as a major source of energy. Although nuclear power holds out the promise of energy independence, it has a formidable drawback--it can also lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In April, the President announced a new policy designed to curb nuclear proliferation and the executive branch proposed legislation entitled 'The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1977.' The strategy outlined in these documents calls for stricter export controls and safeguards as well as actions affecting uranium enrichment services, reprocessing, storing of spent fuel, and disposing of radioactive nuclear wastes. GAO analyzed this non-proliferation strategy as it relates to: Improving nuclear export controls; Strengthening international nuclear safeguards; Maintaining U.S. reliability as a supplier of uranium enrichment services; Deferring U.S. reprocessing of spent fuel as an example for others; Reducing risk of proliferation by controlling spent reactor fuel. In general, GAO concluded that the administration's strategy is constructive but noted some weaknesses which should be addressed. Some of the problems noted in this report may already have been addressed by congressional committees in their markup of the legislation

  14. Non-proliferation aspects of long term assurance of supply

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    The meetings in this section deal with the non-proliferation aspects of long-term assurance of supply of the nuclear fuel cycle. A list of 12 fundamental questions concerning the observation and application of the non-proliferation regulations is followed by the comments made by representatives of 10 countries

  15. Free-field ground motions for the nonproliferation experiment: Preliminary comparisons with nearby nuclear events

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Olsen, K.H.; Peratt, A.L.

    1994-01-01

    Since 1987, we have installed fixed arrays of tri-axial accelerometers in the fire-field near the shot horizons for low-yield (≤ 20 kt) nuclear events in the N-tunnel complex beneath Rainier Mesa. For the Nonproliferation Experiment (NPE) we augmented the array to achieve 23 free-field stations. Goals are: (a) to examine robustness and stability of various free-field source function estimates -- e.g., reduced displacement potentials (RDP) and spectra; (b) to compare close-in with regional estimates to test whether detailed close-in free-field and/or surface ground motion data can improve predictability of regional-teleseismic source functions; (c) to provide experimental data for checking two-dimensional numerical simulations. We report preliminary comparisons between experimental free-field data for NPE (1993) and three nearby nuclear events (MISTY ECHO, 1988; MINERAL QUARRY, 1990; HUNTERS TROPHY, 1992). All four working points are within 1 km of each other in the same wet tuff bed, thus reducing concerns about possible large differences in material properties between widely separated shots. Initial comparison of acceleration and velocity seismograms for the four events reveals: (1) There is a large departure from the spherical symmetry commonly assumed in analytic treatments of source theory; both vertical and tangential components are surprisingly large. (2) All shots show similar first-peak particle-velocity amplitude decay rates suggesting significant attenuation even in the supposedly purely elastic region. (3) Sharp (>20 Hz) arrivals are not observed at tunnel level from near-surface pP reflections or spall-closure sources -- but broadened peaks are seen that suggest more diffuse reflected energy from the surface and from the Paleozoic limestone basement below tunnel level

  16. Accountability and non-proliferation nuclear regime: a review of the mutual surveillance Brazilian-Argentine model for nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Xavier, Roberto Salles

    2014-01-01

    The regimes of accountability, the organizations of global governance and institutional arrangements of global governance of nuclear non-proliferation and of Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine of Nuclear Safeguards are the subject of research. The starting point is the importance of the institutional model of global governance for the effective control of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this context, the research investigates how to structure the current arrangements of the international nuclear non-proliferation and what is the performance of model Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine of Nuclear Safeguards in relation to accountability regimes of global governance. For that, was searched the current literature of three theoretical dimensions: accountability, global governance and global governance organizations. In relation to the research method was used the case study and the treatment technique of data the analysis of content. The results allowed: to establish an evaluation model based on accountability mechanisms; to assess how behaves the model Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine Nuclear Safeguards front of the proposed accountability regime; and to measure the degree to which regional arrangements that work with systems of global governance can strengthen these international systems. (author)

  17. Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland. Regulatory control, international cooperation and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Annual report 2011

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Okko, O [ed.

    2012-07-01

    The regulatory control of nuclear materials (i.e. nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. Safeguards are required for Finland to comply with international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation - mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2011 continued to demonstrate that the Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders' declarations.

  18. Historical survey of nuclear non-proliferation in Estonia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maalmann, I.

    2004-01-01

    The presentation gives an overview about the project initiated in co-operation between the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) and the Estonian Radiation Protection Centre (ERPC) to carry out a historical survey of the nuclear activities taken place in the territory of Estonia after the World War II. The main purpose of the project was to create transparency in the State's nuclear related past and to submit the results of the conducted historical survey as a volunteer supplement to the Additional Protocol declaration. (author)

  19. Nuclear power the challenges of non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    2010-01-01

    The revival of the civil nuclear power industry rekindles the debate on proliferation, in other words, on the increase in the number of States likely to achieve nuclear weapon capability. The history of the past thirty years shows that none of the known attempts at proliferation has occurred within the scope of civil nuclear program development. No country that has decided to 'proliferate' has done so by diverting materials or installations governed by the commitment to peaceful utilization and under IAEA control. The only borderline case is India, which did not sign the NPT, and which in 1974 cleverly played on the clauses imposed on it by Canada without violating them in the strictest sense of the word. The exporters of civil nuclear technologies subsequently got organized to control the export of sensitive materials by creating the Club of London, since renamed the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Another crisis occurred in 1991 following the first Gulf war, with the discovery of an extensive covert nuclear program in Iraq (an NPT signatory country); this caused a shock similar to that of 1974 and resulted in the strengthening of the IAEA's powers and inspection resources. India subsequently carried out several nuclear tests in 1998, at least one of which was a thermonuclear device. Pakistan, India's rival since the 1948 partition, crossed the 'nuclear threshold' in 1999. Proliferation also made headlines in 2003. First of all with Libya which, having decided to sign the NPT, revealed the existence of what is called the 'Nuke AQ Khan Bazaar'. In the presumed ignorance of his government, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan had stolen an uranium enrichment technology, becoming the 'father' of the Pakistani bomb, and had organized the traffic of military nuclear technologies, namely with Libya, North Korea and Iran. Again in 2003, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT. This retreat raises the question of what will become of the possible transfers of nuclear technologies that

  20. Twelve theses on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1990-01-01

    NP is not only a scientific-technical but in particular a political task. For the Federal Republic of Germany this means a special responsibility, and thus the theses were formulated and recommendations derived thereof. The theses deal with the following subjects: The responsibility of the FRG - historical, geostrategic, infrastructural; prolongation of the NPT; international safeguards for civil nuclear technology, the role of the IAEA; regional NP policy; nuclear exports; economic aspects of nuclear energy; plutonium and highly-enriched uranium; research policy; radiological risks; nuclear criminal law; disarmament. There are dissenting votes on some theses. Sweeping political developments let some of the theses adopted by the Working Group in March 1990 become obsolete already. (HSCH) [de

  1. How to Make Historical Surveys of Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jonter, Thomas [Stockholm Univ. (Sweden). Dept. of Economic History

    2003-05-01

    In 1998 SKI initiated a project in order to make a historical survey of the Swedish nuclear weapons research during the period 1945-2000. The survey is now fulfilled and contains of three reports. IAEA became interested in the project and accepted it in 2000 as a support program to increase transparency and to support the implementation of the Additional Protocol in Sweden. In the eyes of IAEA, the most important aim is to create knowledge and refine tools to enhance the means to strengthen the Safeguard System within the Additional Protocol. Other countries have now showed interest to follow the Swedish example and to make their own reviews of the nuclear energy and nuclear weapons research of their pasts. A co-operation between Sweden, Estonia, Finland, Lithuania and Latvia has now been initiated in order to make such historical reviews. The Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate is the initiator and financial supporter of the project. The cooperation project has three comprehensive goals: a. to create transparency in the nuclear energy field of the past. The intention is that the results of the conducted studies could be attached to the State Declaration according to the Additional Protocol in order to enhance transparency b. to account for the nuclear material traffic of the past and; c. to develop the competence in nuclear energy matters in general, and in particular, to extend the knowledge regarding each participating State's nuclear experience in the past. The first purpose of this paper is to describe the project and its aims. The second purpose is to present a general model of how a historical review of a State's nuclear related activities and nuclear weapons research can be designed. The model has been created in order to serve as a guide for other countries strengthening of their safeguards systems in the framework of the Additional Protocol. The third purpose is to present the pedagogy that has been used as a teaching method in order to train

  2. Changing Perspectives on Nonproliferation and Nuclear Fuel Cycles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, J; Isaacs, TH

    2005-01-01

    The concepts of international control over technologies and materials in the proliferation sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, specifically those related to enrichment and reprocessing, have been the subject of many studies and initiatives over the years. For examples: the International Fissionable Material Storage proposal in President Eisenhower's Speech on Atoms for Peace, and in the Charter of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) when the organization was formed in 1957; the regional nuclear fuel cycle center centers proposed by INFCE in the 80's; and most recently and notably, proposals by Dr. ElBaradei, the Director General of IAEA to limit production and processing of nuclear weapons usable materials to facilities under multinational control; and by U.S. President George W. Bush, to limit enrichment and reprocessing to States that have already full scale, functioning plants. There are other recent proposals on this subject as well. In this paper, the similarities and differences, as well as the effectiveness and challenges in proliferation prevention of these proposals and concepts will be discussed. The intent is to articulate a ''new nuclear regime'' and to develop concrete steps to implement such regime for future nuclear energy and deployment

  3. Strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime: An international priority. Tokyo, 10 December 2002

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2002-01-01

    The efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapons has witnessed steady progress and a number of important milestones. Progress, however, is still required on this and many other fronts, including: the need to work energetically to ensure the universal adherence to safeguards agreements and additional protocols by all the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT and other non-proliferation agreements; the need for reducing existing nuclear weapon arsenals and adopting concrete steps that move us further towards nuclear disarmament; the need to draw in those States that remain outside the NPT regime; and the need to develop alternative approaches to regional and international security that are functional and inclusive, and that do not incorporate nuclear deterrence as a feature

  4. Economic and Nonproliferation Analysis Framework for Assessing Reliable Nuclear Fuel Service Arrangements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Phillips, Jon R.; Kreyling, Sean J.; Short, Steven M.; Weimar, Mark R.

    2010-01-01

    Nuclear power is now broadly recognized as an essential technology in national strategies to provide energy security while meeting carbon management goals. Yet a long standing conundrum remains: how to enable rapid growth in the global nuclear power infrastructure while controlling the spread of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies that lie at the heart of nuclear fuel supply and nuclear weapons programs. Reducing the latent proliferation risk posed by a broader horizontal spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology has been a primary goal of national nuclear supplier policies since the beginning of the nuclear power age. Attempts to control the spread of sensitive nuclear technology have been the subject of numerous initiatives in the intervening decades sometimes taking the form of calls to develop fuel supply and service assurances to reduce market pull to increase the number of states with fuel cycle capabilities. A clear understanding of what characteristics of specific reliable nuclear fuel service (RNFS) and supply arrangements qualify them as 'attractive offers' is critical to the success of current and future efforts. At a minimum, RNFS arrangements should provide economic value to all participants and help reduce latent proliferation risks posed by the global expansion of nuclear power. In order to inform the technical debate and the development of policy, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory has been developing an analytical framework to evaluate the economics and nonproliferation merits of alternative approaches to RNFS arrangements. This paper provides a brief overview of the economic analysis framework developed and applied to a model problem of current interest: full-service nuclear fuel leasing arrangements. Furthermore, this paper presents an extended outline of a proposed analysis approach to evaluate the non-proliferation merits of various RNFS alternatives.

  5. Finland and nuclear non-proliferation: The evolution and cultivation of a norm

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dassen, L. van [Uppsala Univ. (Sweden). Dept. of Peace and Conflict Research

    1998-03-01

    Finland``s entrance on the non-proliferation scene was in 1963 when President Kekkonen suggested a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ). This started a debate in and among the Nordic countries and it created a Finnish profile towards the Soviet Union. In most cases, the Soviets tried to bring Finland into a much closer relationship with the USSR. The mere prospect and debate on a Nordic NWFZ reduced the incentive for the Soviets to undermine Finnish neutrality or their desire to suggest consultations according to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance on military assistance in the case of a threat to Soviet and/or Finnish security. During the negotiations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1965-1968, Finland played a very active role as a bridge-builder, first between the superpowers and later between the developed and the developing world. This activity gave Finland a name in the UN, strengthened its neutrality and established good relations with the West as well. In 1978, Kekkonen brought up the Nordic NWFZ once more, this time under influence of certain strategic challenges to Finland and general East-West developments. In this Kekkonen had much backing by the public in Finland whereas other states reacted very reluctantly. Politics in Finland has to a large extent been marked by the relations with Russia and later the Soviet Union. However, nuclear non-proliferation was used to ease the weight of this imposing neighbour; a strategy that certainly must be regarded as successful. While achieving this, it was also possible to increase contacts with western states and remain accepted as a neutral state. For Finland, non-proliferation policy was initially a suitable issue to solve other problems than those related exclusively to proliferation. But it was also a policy with a high degree of persistence, pragmatism and willingness to work with concrete issues that maybe do not reach the international limelight in the short run but that work in

  6. Finland and nuclear non-proliferation: The evolution and cultivation of a norm

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dassen, L. van

    1998-03-01

    Finland''s entrance on the non-proliferation scene was in 1963 when President Kekkonen suggested a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ). This started a debate in and among the Nordic countries and it created a Finnish profile towards the Soviet Union. In most cases, the Soviets tried to bring Finland into a much closer relationship with the USSR. The mere prospect and debate on a Nordic NWFZ reduced the incentive for the Soviets to undermine Finnish neutrality or their desire to suggest consultations according to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance on military assistance in the case of a threat to Soviet and/or Finnish security. During the negotiations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1965-1968, Finland played a very active role as a bridge-builder, first between the superpowers and later between the developed and the developing world. This activity gave Finland a name in the UN, strengthened its neutrality and established good relations with the West as well. In 1978, Kekkonen brought up the Nordic NWFZ once more, this time under influence of certain strategic challenges to Finland and general East-West developments. In this Kekkonen had much backing by the public in Finland whereas other states reacted very reluctantly. Politics in Finland has to a large extent been marked by the relations with Russia and later the Soviet Union. However, nuclear non-proliferation was used to ease the weight of this imposing neighbour; a strategy that certainly must be regarded as successful. While achieving this, it was also possible to increase contacts with western states and remain accepted as a neutral state. For Finland, non-proliferation policy was initially a suitable issue to solve other problems than those related exclusively to proliferation. But it was also a policy with a high degree of persistence, pragmatism and willingness to work with concrete issues that maybe do not reach the international limelight in the short run but that work in

  7. Public concern for nuclear power

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bibb, W.R.

    1975-01-01

    Three principles that the U.S. must follow in order to maintain its present way of life are stated: practice of energy conservation; substitution of the more plentiful fuels for the scarce; and development of synthetic fuels and unconventional energy sources. After describing the organizing of the energy agencies and reviewing the history of the nuclear power program in the U.S., the author then discusses the public's concern for nuclear energy which includes radioactive discharges, reactor safety, high-level wastes, and shipment of radioactive materials. He refers to the study by Dr. Norman C. Rasmussen released in 1974, which indicates that the likelihood of a person living in the general vicinity of a reactor being injured in any one year in a reactor accident is one chance in 150 million as compared to his chance of being injured in an automobile accident in that same year as one in 130. On a broader societal viewpoint, if there were 100 reactors operating in the U.S., one individual of the 15 million inhabitants living in the vicinity of these reactors might be killed and two individuals might be injured every 25 years as compared to 1.5 million injuries and 55,000 fatalities in 1974 due to automobile accidents. The author concludes that public acceptance of nuclear power will depend on whether these plants, after a reasonable maturing period, deliver the reliable, economic, and safe power that has been proclaimed

  8. Nuclear power, nuclear exports and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hildenbrand, G.

    1977-01-01

    Developed and developing countries alike unfortunately have no other options in replacing oil in electricity generation than to use coal or nuclear energy. As far as the supplier countries are concerned, there is no doubt that nobody is interested in adding to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the future electricity requirement in the developing countries, especially the need for nuclear power plants, represents a considerable market in the medium and long term which the supplier countries cannot simply ignore because they must seek to secure their export shares in order to protect jobs at home. For the receiver countries it is a matter of principle to achieve the highest possible degree of independence in energy generation so as to be able to guarantee continuity of supply. The interest in building up national fuel cycle activities is also closely linked with the creation of jobs in the receiver countries and with the efforts of these countries to straighten out their balance of payments situation. (orig.) [de

  9. JAEA's efforts for regional transparency in the area of nuclear nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hoffheins, Barbara; Kawakubo, Yoko; Inoue, Naoko

    2014-03-01

    The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) has undertaken a joint R and D project with the US Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) for the purposes of developing an Information Sharing Framework (ISF) for regional nonproliferation cooperation since July 2011. This project builds on nearly twenty years of technical cooperation between JAEA, its predecessor organizations and the DOE including the activities to define, develop and test transparency technologies and other multilateral efforts. The objective of current project is to design a viable information sharing process to support the goals of building confidence in the peaceful nature of regional nuclear programs. At the end of a two-year-effort, project partners, JAEA and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), have defined the comprehensive requirements for an ISF that will ensure nonproliferation transparency success and sustainability. In October 2011, a parallel project with the similar title and objective was launched under the arrangement between the US DOE/NNSA and the Republic of Korea Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEST). Since then, JAEA, SNL, the Korea Institute for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) and Korea Atomic Energy Institute (KAERI) have jointly carried out the project in a form of informal, multilateral cooperation. The project partners have identified needs and audience for ISF, and initiated the discussion to develop requirements for ISF through workshops, meetings, regular telephone conferences, etc. The activities include conducting a survey to identify stakeholders' needs and requirements for an ISF, launching a website to practice information sharing concepts, and presenting papers. This paper provides the historical context of the current project to establish ISF, and reports the progress to date and speculates on future directions. (author)

  10. Predicting linear and nonlinear time series with applications in nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Burr, T.L.

    1994-04-01

    This report is a primer on the analysis of both linear and nonlinear time series with applications in nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation. We analyze eight simulated and two real time series using both linear and nonlinear modeling techniques. The theoretical treatment is brief but references to pertinent theory are provided. Forecasting is our main goal. However, because our most common approach is to fit models to the data, we also emphasize checking model adequacy by analyzing forecast errors for serial correlation or nonconstant variance

  11. Statements commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-08-01

    The document reproduces the following statements commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Statement by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, statements on behalf of the depository Governments and statements on behalf of other Governments (Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Western Samoa and Nordic Countries - Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden)

  12. Supporting the President's Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agenda: Transparency and Verification for Nuclear Arms Reductions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Doyle, James E.; Meek, Elizabeth

    2009-01-01

    The President's arms control and nonproliferation agenda is still evolving and the details of initiatives supporting it remain undefined. This means that DOE, NNSA, NA-20, NA-24 and the national laboratories can help define the agenda, and the policies and the initiatives to support it. This will require effective internal and interagency coordination. The arms control and nonproliferation agenda is broad and includes the path-breaking goal of creating conditions for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Responsibility for various elements of the agenda will be widely scattered across the interagency. Therefore an interagency mapping exercise should be performed to identify the key points of engagement within NNSA and other agencies for creating effective policy coordination mechanisms. These can include informal networks, working groups, coordinating committees, interagency task forces, etc. It will be important for NA-20 and NA-24 to get a seat at the table and a functional role in many of these coordinating bodies. The arms control and nonproliferation agenda comprises both mature and developing policy initiatives. The more mature elements such as CTBT ratification and a follow-on strategic nuclear arms treaty with Russia have defined milestones. However, recent press reports indicate that even the START follow-on strategic arms pact that is planned to be complete by the end of 2009 may take significantly longer and be more expansive in scope. The Russians called for proposals to count non-deployed as well as deployed warheads. Other elements of the agenda such as FMCT, future bilateral nuclear arms reductions following a START follow-on treaty, nuclear posture changes, preparations for an international nuclear security summit, strengthened international safeguards and multilateral verification are in much earlier stages of development. For this reason any survey of arms control capabilities within the USG should be structured to address potential needs across the

  13. Key Issues on Nuclear Energy Non-proliferation in East Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hwang, Yong Soo; Whang, Joo Ho; Lee, Un Chul

    2005-01-01

    Energy demand in East Asia casts a significant challenge to sustainable economy development and socio-political stability in the region which has experienced tensions throughout the history. The energy demand in this region has been dramatically increased since the start of reform in PRC. DPRK is another challenge. The current electricity consumption in DPRK is around 10% of that in ROK. If the economy of PRC continuously grows to the level of neighboring states and if the living standard of DPRK reaches that of ROK, the energy and electricity demand in the region will certainly be out of control unless the proper measures are taken into actions from today. The only feasible energy option is the nuclear one. PRC already proclaimed its ambitious plan to deploy more than 30 reactors in the near future. In addition, a couple of the South Eastern Asian states expressed their willingness to introduce nuclear power plants in the future. The increase in the use of nuclear energy is expected to bring up the nuclear renaissance in the region. However, without the proper mechanisms to supply fresh fuels and to manage spent nuclear fuels with full compliance of nuclear energy nonproliferation, the new development will inevitably cause the instability in the region. So far many interesting proposals on nuclear cooperation in East Asia were announced. Unfortunately, none of them works out properly yet, partly because the old proposals were too political. To restart the engine of the nuclear cooperation and nonproliferation in the region, it is necessary to find out what would be the common interests of the region not so much related to politics. In this paper, some key technical issues are addressed for future regional joint studies

  14. Remarks on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, United Nations Security Council, 24 September 2009, New York, USA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2009-01-01

    IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) limited his speech to a few key issues. First he stated that the global nuclear non-proliferation regime is fragile and has many shortcomings because the IAEA's legal authority is severely limited in some countries and the IAEA verification mandate is centred on nuclear material and not on weaponization activities. Secondly there is a growing number of states that have mastered uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing. Any one of these states could develop nuclear weapons in a short span of time, if, for example, it decided to withdraw from the NPT. There is a need to move from national to multinational control of the nuclear fuel cycle. Thirdly the highest level of protection for nuclear and radioactive material has to be provided. A fourth issue is the need to strengthen the IAEA. A fifth issue is that the IAEA cannot do its work in isolation but depends on a supportive political process, with the Security Council at its core. A sixth issue is that the Security Council must put more emphasis on addressing the insecurities that lie behind many cases of proliferation, such as endemic conflicts, security imbalances and lack of trust. Finally, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei is gratified to see nuclear disarmament back at the top of the international agenda, as well as recognition of the intrinsic link between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

  15. Analysis of nuclear export control system and implementing international nonproliferation regime in China

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, J. S.; Lee, J. S.; Ahn, J. S.; Kim, B. G.; Min, K. S.

    2000-01-01

    China's exporting behaviour of nuclear items had been disconnected from the international non-proliferation regime such as IAEA safeguards and export control related with peaceful use of nuclear energy since 1970s. Especially, China had been one of principle suppliers of nuclear facility and technologies to Pakistan and Iran which had developed nuclear weapon programs. On the other hand, according to the rapid growth of economic scale after China began to open to the world, an active program for nuclear power plant as an electricity source had established. This means that China have surfaced as a big market to Korean nuclear industries. Regarding this, the paper dealt with the nuclear export control matters, i.e. the history of nuclear export control system and analyzed on background of enforcement of U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement that had been apolitical issue between U.S. and China. Prospects toward conforming its nuclear export policies, laws and regulations to international standards also analyzed in results

  16. Nuclear safety. Concerns about the nuclear power reactors in Cuba

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wells, Jim; Aloise, Gene; Flaherty, Thomas J.; Fitzgerald, Duane; Zavala, Mario; Hayward, Mary Alice

    1992-09-01

    the atmosphere, contains defective welds. Another said that reactor operator trainees have received training on inadequate reactor simulators. In contrast, a representative of the Cuban government told us that Cuba wants to build its reactor in accordance with safety standards. Also, according to information provided to us by a representative of the Russian government, Cuba's reactor has been constructed according to safety rules that take into account, among other things, the possible impacts of an earthquake. State Department, NRC, and DOE officials have expressed a number of concerns about the construction and operation of Cuba's nuclear power reactors. According to State Department officials, the United States maintains a comprehensive embargo on any U.S. transactions with Cuba and discourages other countries from providing assistance, except for safety purposes, to Cuba's nuclear power program. The United States would prefer that the construction of the reactors never be completed and wants Cuba to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Treaty of Tlatelolco, both of which bind signatories to blanket nonproliferation commitments for their entire nuclear program, before the United States considers reversing its policy of discouraging other countries from assisting Cuba with the construction of the reactors. The United States has asked Russia to cease providing any nuclear assistance until Cuba has signed either treaty. NRC officials are aware of, but could not verify, the Cuban emigres' allegations of safety deficiencies because available information was limited. They said, however, that if the allegations were true, the cited deficiencies could affect the safety of the reactors operation. In addition, they expressed concern about the ability of Cuba's industrial infrastructure to support the nuclear power reactors, the lack of a regulatory structure, the adequacy of training for reactor operators, the quality of the civil construction, and the design of the

  17. 'For good and for bad': the relations between universal obligations and particular efforts in the field of nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dassen Van, L.

    2005-01-01

    Full text: The world has 'nuclear non-proliferation' on its lips. Presidents, politicians, journalists and others refer to it as the number one peril in our times. This may be right or wrong but irrespective of the real salience of 'nuclear dangers' it has a grip on our minds and wallets. A long range of states now make active investments in the improvement of nuclear security; not only at home as they used to do, but even abroad in other places and countries where there is concern with regard to how safe nuclear and materials are kept and stored. This development is surely an expression of a shared broadening of our sense of responsibility beyond the narrow confines of statehood and borders, and therefore this development should please us. On the other hand, the truly universal measures and instruments of the NPT and the regime round it are in trouble. It is being stated in some quarters that the NPT is inadequate in a new era with new threats from sub-state actors. Nevertheless, the NPT is the only legal instrument that is a framework that either by itself or as a starting-point can serve as a tool box for long-term storage of the proliferation risks. The reason for this is that the NPT is an expression of fairness in terms of rights and balances for all states committed to non-proliferation. And its foundations are those of international law. To the extent the NPT is being questioned will there also be a risk that non-proliferation efforts in the framework of cooperative threat reduction and for instance global partnership will lose legitimacy; simply for the reason that only a small number of the non-proliferation concerns are given attention. This relationship between cooperative threat reduction efforts on the one hand and universal legal instruments for non-proliferation on the other is a double-edged sword. While the two can reinvigorate and strengthen each other, there is also a risk that the one - cooperative threat reduction - when given preference over

  18. Nuclear non-proliferation: Revisiting the basics. Carnegie international non-proliferation conference 2002. Washington, D.C., 14 November 2002

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2002-01-01

    The 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), with 188 States party, represents the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament effort - and despite recent challenges, it has never been more relevant than it is today. But the international community has to move forward, it is essential that a number of the basic assumptions should be revisited, and a number of new approaches reconsidered. A key assumption at the core of the NPT was that the asymmetry between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States would gradually disappear. The nuclear non-proliferation regime has overall been successful - but with some shortcomings. Efforts to end nuclear weapons development achieved an important milestone with the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in September 1996, but the pace of progress has been sluggish among the 44 countries whose ratification is required for the treaty to enter into force - and the rejection of the CTBT by the US Senate in 1999 was a distinct setback. Negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) continues to languish in Geneva, more than seven years after agreement was reached on a mandate. The 2000 NPT Review Conference, building on the package of decisions and resolutions that led to the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, resulted in a number of encouraging commitments, not least the 'unequivocal undertaking' by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. But a scant two years later, we have moved sharply away from those commitments, with a number of the '13 steps' toward nuclear disarmament - such as 'irreversibility,' 'START II, START III and the ABM Treaty,' further 'unilateral' reductions in nuclear arsenals, 'increased transparency,' 'further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons,' and 'regular reports' on the implementation of Article VI of the NPT - left without concrete follow-up actions and in

  19. Nonproliferation impacts assessment for the management of the Savannah River Site aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-12-01

    On May 13, 1996, the US established a new, 10-year policy to accept and manage foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel containing uranium enriched in the US. The goal of this policy is to reduce civilian commerce in weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU), thereby reducing the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation. Two key disposition options under consideration for managing this fuel include conventional reprocessing and new treatment and packaging technologies. The Record of Decision specified that, while evaluating the reprocessing option, ''DOE will commission or conduct an independent study of the nonproliferation and other (e.g., cost and timing) implications of chemical separation of spent nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors.'' DOE's Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation conducted this study consistent with the aforementioned Record of Decision. This report addresses the nonproliferation implications of the technologies under consideration for managing aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel at the Savannah River Site. Because the same technology options are being considered for the foreign research reactor and the other aluminum-based spent nuclear fuels discussed in Section ES.1, this report addresses the nonproliferation implications of managing all the Savannah River Site aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel, not just the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel. The combination of the environmental impact information contained in the draft EIS, public comment in response to the draft EIS, and the nonproliferation information contained in this report will enable the Department to make a sound decision regarding how to manage all aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel at the Savannah River Site

  20. Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. 2005 review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2 May 2005, United Nations, New York, USA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2005-01-01

    The core of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons can be summed up in two words: 'Security' and 'Development'. While the States Party to this Treaty hold differing priorities and views, I trust that all share these two goals: development for all through advanced technology; and security for all by reducing - and ultimately eliminating - the nuclear threat. These shared goals were the foundation on which the international community, in 1970, built this landmark Treaty. They agreed to work towards a world free of nuclear weapons. They agreed, while working towards this goal, to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional States. And they agreed to make the peaceful applications of nuclear energy available to all. Folded together, these agreements, these commitments, are mutually reinforcing. They are as valid today as when they were first made - and even more urgent. What should be all too evident is that, if we cannot work together, each acknowledging the development priorities and security concerns of the other, then the result of this Conference will be inaction. In five years, since the 2000 NPT Review Conference the world has changed. Our fears of a deadly nuclear detonation, whatever the cause, have been reawakened. These realities have heightened the awareness of vulnerabilities in the NPT regime. The Treaty has served us well for 35 years. But unless we regard it as part of a living, dynamic regime - capable of evolving to match changing realities, it will fade into irrelevance and leave us vulnerable and unprotected. The expectations from this Conference are to: re-affirm the goals established in 1970; strengthen the IAEA's verification authority; control over proliferation sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle (activities that involve uranium enrichment and plutonium separation); secure and control nuclear material; show the world that our commitment to nuclear disarmament is firm; back the verification efforts by an

  1. Future non-proliferation challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yelchenko, Volodymyr

    2008-01-01

    Having chaired the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee Mr. Volodymyr Yelchenko noted that the NPT States parties reaffirmed the important role of the Treaty as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime. They stressed that non-compliance with the Treaty provisions by States parties undermined non-proliferation and placed emphasis on the mutually reinforcing nature of disarmament and non-proliferation, and due respect for the right of States parties to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in conformity with the treaty. They reaffirmed the importance of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and international nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes in ways consistent with the non-proliferation goal of the Treaty. The universality aspect was brought to the front with the lack of progress in this area. States parties called upon India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapons states, promptly and without conditions and to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with Additional Protocols, for ensuring non-proliferation. There is concern that non-States actors could gain access to weapons of mass destruction. One of the underlying themes at the Second Prepcom was the total elimination of nuclear weapons as the only absolute guarantee against their proliferation. Negative consequences to nuclear non-proliferation were also mentioned in the context of the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the development of missile defense systems, with the risk of a new arms race on Earth and in outer space. The importance of the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference of Disarmament on a treaty concerning fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and the urgent conclusion of such a treaty as a beneficial step towards non-proliferation was stressed. The NPT states parties reaffirmed the role of the IAEA as the sole competent authority responsible for

  2. Non-proliferation through effective international control, with particular reference to peaceful uses of nuclear material as a result of nuclear disarmament and international control of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Imai, Ryukichi

    1993-01-01

    The role of nuclear factors in the international political situation has changed. The emphasis is now on the new circumstance of the post cold-war world. Non-proliferation is dealt with through effective international control, with particular reference to peaceful uses of nuclear material as a result of nuclear weapons dismantling and international control of plutonium

  3. Present status of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Netchaev, B.

    1976-01-01

    The Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons plays an important role in enhancing the security of all States. It is essential to maintain in the implementation of the Treaty an acceptable balance of the mutual responsibilities and obligations of all the countries Party to the Treaty wether or not nuclear weapon States. These questions were discussed during the Conference on the operation of the Treaty held in Geneva in May 1975. It was emphasized at the Conference that the first five years of application of the Treaty had shown a consistent increase in the number of ratifications and in the safeguards agreements concluded on the basis of the Agreement. (N.E.A.) [fr

  4. The crisis bears the chance. The nuclear conflict with Iran and the impact on the nuclear non-proliferation regime; In der Krise liegt die Chance. Der Atomkonflikt mit Iran und seine Auswirkungen auf das nukleare Nichtverbreitungsregime

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Meier, Oliver

    2014-10-15

    The contribution on the nuclear conflict with Iran and the impact on the nuclear non-proliferation regime covers the following topics: Iran and the verification of non-nuclear -weapon states, the system of nuclear safeguards, the application of new verification instruments, verification of possible military research and development activities, the limitation of proliferation relevant activities, delivery guarantees as mean for non-proliferation, Iran and the handling of contract violations, graded reactions, political issues, problems of harmonization, capacity and process deficiencies, before the ninth non-proliferation verification conference, approaches for strengthening the non-proliferation regime, recommendation to the German politics.

  5. Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power. Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume IV. Commercial potential

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1980-06-01

    This volume of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program (NASAP) report provides time and cost estimates for positioning new nuclear power systems for commercial deployment. The assessment also estimates the rates at which the new systems might penetrate the domestic market, assuming the continuing viability of the massive light-water reactor network that now exists worldwide. This assessment does not recommend specific, detailed program plans and budgets for individual systems; however, it is clear from this analysis that any of the systems investigated could be deployed if dictated by national interest.

  6. Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power. Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume IV. Commercial potential

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-06-01

    This volume of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program (NASAP) report provides time and cost estimates for positioning new nuclear power systems for commercial deployment. The assessment also estimates the rates at which the new systems might penetrate the domestic market, assuming the continuing viability of the massive light-water reactor network that now exists worldwide. This assessment does not recommend specific, detailed program plans and budgets for individual systems; however, it is clear from this analysis that any of the systems investigated could be deployed if dictated by national interest

  7. The nonproliferation predicament

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pilat, J.F.

    1985-01-01

    This book presents papers on the non-proliferation policy being advocated by the U.S. Topics considered include political aspects, proliferation, national security, government policies, NATO, arms control, nuclear disarmament, the balance of power, U.S. foreign policy, dealing with the problem countries, international cooperation, the nuclear marketplace, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, legislation, congressional interest and input, ethical aspects, military strategy, public opinion, and terrorist groups

  8. National Nuclear Security Administration Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Annual Report in Brief: October 2007 - May 2008

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Berkman, Clarissa O.; Fankhauser, Jana G.; Sandusky, Jessica A.

    2009-05-01

    This abbreviated Annual Report covers program activities of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP) from October 2007 through May 2008--the timeframe between the last Annual Report (which covered activities through September 2007) and the next report (which will begin with June 2008 activities). In that timeframe, the NGFP continued building a solid foundation as the program began reaping the benefits of recently implemented changes. This report is organized by Fellowship class and the pertinent program activities for each, including: October 2007 Recruiting events and final applications (Class of 2008) Winter 2007 Selection and hiring (Class of 2008) Spring 2008 Career development roundtables (Class of 2007) Orientation planning (Class of 2008) Recruitment planning and university outreach (Class of 2009) May 2008 Closing ceremony (Class of 2007)

  9. Good practices in provision of nuclear safeguards and security training courses at the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Kobayashi Naoki

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available More than five years have passed since the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security (ISCN was established under the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA in December 2010 and started its activities, in response to the commitment of Japan at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.. The ISCN has been vigorously involved in capacity building assistance on nuclear nonproliferation (safeguards and nuclear security, mainly in the Asian region. It has provided 105 training courses to 2901 participants in total as of August 2016. The ISCN plays a major role in strengthening nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear security in the region, and this can be considered one of the great results of the Nuclear Security Summit process. The ISCN has cooperated with the US Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL to establish a base of instructors, particularly for the Center's flagship two-week courses, the Regional Training Course on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Facilities (RTC on PP and the Regional Training Course on State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (RTC on SSAC. Furthermore, the ISCN has provided training courses for experts in Japan, making the best use of the Center's knowledge and experience of organizing international courses. The ISCN has also started joint synchronized training with the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission (EC JRC on nuclear safeguards. This paper describes the good practices at the ISCN through its five years of activities, focusing on its progress in nuclear safeguards and nuclear security training.

  10. Civil liability concerning nuclear accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    2013-01-01

    France and the USA wish to cooperate in order to promote an international regime of civil liability in order to give a fair compensation to victims of nuclear accidents as it is recommended by IAEA. On the other hand the European Commission has launched a consultation to see the necessity or not to harmonize all the civil liability regimes valid throughout Europe. According to the Commission the potential victims of nuclear accidents would not receive equal treatment at the European scale in terms of insurance cover and compensation which might distort competition in the nuclear sector. (A.C.)

  11. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1977. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Energy Research and Development of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, Ninety-Fifth Congress, First Session, June 10, September 13, 14, 1977

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1978-01-01

    Senator Frank Church presented the opening statement on the June 10, 1977 hearing concerning the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1977, S.1432. S.1432 is designed to establish a nonproliferation framework with specific objectives established for the ERDA nuclear energy programs. The ERDA authorization bill is the budgetary vehicle to implement these objectives. The Committee on Energy and Natural Resources obtained joint referral of certain portions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act to insure that nonproliferation policy is implemented in a manner consistent with the policy of having sufficent energy for this country and foreign countries in the future. Additionally, the Subcommittee on Energy Research and Development must examine the cost and the consequences of various initiatives before they are implemented. For example, the proposal to guarantee uranium enrichment services for foreign nations poses specific requirements on ERDA to expand considerably our enrichment capacity by the year 2000. Without reprocessing, it is expected that spent fuel rods from abroad will be returned to this country for storage with attendant costs and siting decisions. Also, international fuel cycle evaluation programs must be carefully examined to insure that all options, including regional fuel cycle centers with international controls and inspection, are considered in seeking international approaches to the nonproliferation objectives. It is these and related questions to which the subcommittee seeks answers. The hearings on September 13 and 14 focused on S.897, a bill to strengthen U.S. policies on nonproliferation and to reorganize certain export functions of the Federal government to promote more efficient administration of such functions. Statements were presented by experts in government, private firms, and industrial sectors

  12. Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland. Regulatory control, international cooperation and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Annual report 2011

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Okko, O. (ed.)

    2012-07-01

    The regulatory control of nuclear materials (i.e. nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. Safeguards are required for Finland to comply with international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation - mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2011 continued to demonstrate that the Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders' declarations.

  13. The roles of Euratom and the IAEA in nuclear non-proliferation - a Euratom view

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Szymanski, P.

    2013-01-01

    The IAEA safeguards conclusion that all nuclear material has remained in peaceful activities in a State is based on the finding that there are no indications of diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful activities and no indications of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State as a whole. The state-level concept that has been introduced by the IAEA in this respect allows and obliges the IAEA to take into account state specific factors to determine the set of safeguards activities to be applied in a State. The effectiveness of the EURATOM regional safeguards systems, its cooperation with the IAEA and its independence from States and operators are among the factors which the IAEA needs to consider in order to apply safeguards in an effective and efficient way. Socio-economic and political factors like the support to international non-proliferation should also be factors in this concept. The intended evolution of the state-level concept by the IAEA then should result in making better use of the activities of EURATOM safeguards. This is possible by the IAEA relying more on the EURATOM activities for the verification of declared nuclear material and the IAEA concentrating on getting assurance on the absence of undeclared materials and activities. Developing a regional-level concept that supplements the state-level concept can contribute to determine the extent to which the IAEA can make better use of EURATOM safeguards in the future. (author)

  14. Inter-relations between regional and global approaches to nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simpson, J.

    1995-01-01

    It is now becoming evident that the end of the East-West conflict has had a significant effect upon both global and regional security structures. From a situation where regional arrangements were, in the main, determined and driven by pressures arising from the bipolar division which permeated all aspects of the global political system, they increasingly have an independent existence. This has enabled such arrangements to be tailored to local circumstances in a manner which is not possible with global agreements. In particular, it has become apparent that enhanced constraints on peaceful nuclear activities and much more intrusive inspection and monitoring procedures, can more easily be negotiated on a regional basis than a global one. It also appears that nuclear weapon states are prepared to make unconditional commitments about nuclear weapon use on a regional basis, whereas they may not be prepared to do so on a global one. In short, regional approaches enable fine-tuning of the international non-proliferation regime to occur, and for measures to be taken on a regional level that would be politically unacceptable on the global level, due to their discriminatory nature. In the years ahead additional Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) agreements may be negotiated, covering more of the land area of the globe. In parallel, regional nuclear cooperation and safeguarding agreements might also be expected to develop along the lines of EURATOM and ABACC. This in turn may move the states which remain outside of the NPT to a similar position to Argentina and Brazil at the moment: to an acceptance that whatever their opposition in principle to the NPT and the system of supplier export guidelines, the commitments they have already accepted on a regional level are more intrusive and constraining than those they would incur if they were to have acceded to the Treaty. In these circumstances, accession to the NPT becomes a distinct possibility, and thus the regional approach to non-proliferation

  15. Public concerns and alternative nuclear power systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mayo, L.H.

    1980-02-01

    The basic task undertaken in this study was to assess the relative public acceptability of three general types of nuclear power systems as alternatives to the existing Light Water Reactor (LWR) system. Concerns registered toward nuclear power constituted the basic data for this assessment. The primary measure adopted for determining the significance of concerns was the degree of difficulty posed by the concern to the nuclear power decisional structure in the establishment and maintenance of norms to control risks or to advance intended energy objectives. Alleviations or exacerbations of concern resulting from particular attributes of alternative systems were measured from an LWR baseline

  16. Nordic projects concerning nuclear safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Soerensen, H.C.

    1988-11-01

    The report describes the nature of the work done in the first half of 1988 within the field of nuclear safety (1985-89) under the Nordic program for 1985-89. Five programmes and their documentation, are described and complete lists of addresses and of persons involved is given. (AB)

  17. The Text of the Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1974-01-01

    The text of the agreement between Iran and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  18. The Text of the Agreement between Romania and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between Romania and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  19. The Text of the Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1974-12-13

    The text of the agreement between Iran and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  20. The Text of the Agreement between Poland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-04-17

    The text of the Agreement between Poland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  1. The Text of the Agreement between Bulgaria and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-04-13

    The text of the Agreement between Bulgaria and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  2. The Text of the Agreement between Romania and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-04-19

    The text of the Agreement between Romania and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  3. The Text of the Agreement between Iraq and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-02-22

    The text of the Agreement between Iraq and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  4. The text of the Agreement between Turkey and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-02-01

    The full text of the agreement between Turkey and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is presented

  5. The Text of the Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1974-01-01

    The text of the agreement between Iran and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members [es

  6. The Text of the Agreement between Bulgaria and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between Bulgaria and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  7. The Text of the Agreement between Poland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between Poland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  8. Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: Review conference of the States Parties Geneva 1985

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-01-01

    The Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1985 with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are being realized. The Treaty, commonly referred to as the non-proliferation Treaty, is the fundamental instrument to avert the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons and is, perhaps, the most important multilateral arms regulation agreement of our time. It was negotiated in the 1960s in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and in the United Nations General Assembly. The Treaty was opened for signature in London, Moscow and Washington on July 1, 1968. On that date, it was signed by the three Depositary Governments - the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States - and by 58 other States. As of December 31, 1983 the number of States parties to the Treaty had risen to 119

  9. The European dimension in non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krause, J.

    1996-01-01

    Europe was for decades the focal point of efforts to prevent or constrain nuclear proliferation and the first region in which non-proliferation efforts failed. Paper deals with current proliferation problems in Europe, namely, diversion of weapons, diversion from dismantling, production over-capacity, security concerns. Legal instruments against proliferation in Europe described here include development of international norms; instruments of security assurance and cooperation; disarmament assistance; fissile material management; assistance in creating export control systems; improving and harmonizing export controls for dual-purpose items. Problems in implementing non-proliferation instruments are described separately

  10. Germany and the nuclear non-proliferation; Current situation and prospects; Deutschland und die nukleare Nichtverbreitung; Zwischenbilanz und Ausblick

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Preisinger, J.

    1993-07-01

    A summary is given of the consequences, both positive and negative, of international non-proliferation policy. The numerous, complex branches and connections of national measures and inter-stake agreements for the peaceful, controlled uses of nuclear technology and related military technologies are expertly described, and assessed on their effectiveness. Weak aspects of the nuclear non-proliferation regime are pointed out and past reforms are illustrated and assessed in the light of recent developments. The interests of the German Federal Republic from the centre of this analysis. The author shows that, after a certain hesitary, German diplomacy has now become active in the establishment of an international non-proliferation regime. He concludes that Germany should take a strong initiative role in maintaining a peaceful international nuclear order. (orig.) [Deutsch] Es wird ein Resuemee der bisherigen Erfolge und Misserfolge internationaler Nichtverbreitungspolitik gezogen. Die komplexen, vielfach veraestelten und verschachtelten nationalen Massnahmen und zwischenstaatlichen Vereinbarungen zur Ueberwachung und friedlichen Zweckbindung von Nukleartechnologie und militaerisch relevanten Anschlusstechnologien werden sachkundig erlaeutert und auf ihre Wirksamkeit ueberprueft. Schwachstellen des nuklearen Nichtverbreitungsregimes werden offengelegt, Reformschritte der vergangenen Jahre werden dargestellt und im Lichte der juengsten Entwicklungen bewertet. Dabei steht die Interessenlage der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Zentrum der Analyse. Der Autor zeigt, dass die deutsche Diplomatie sich nach einer gewissen Zurueckhaltung schliesslich aktiv in die Gestaltung des internationalen Nichtverbreitungsregimes eingeschaltet hat. Er plaediert fuer eine kraftvolle Initiativrolle Deutschlands zur Erhaltung einer friedlichen internationalen Nuklearordnung. (orig.)

  11. Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power: report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume 1. Program summary

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1979-12-01

    This report summarizes the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program (NASAP): its background, its studies, and its results. This introductory chapter traces the growth of the issue of nuclear weapons proliferation and the organization and objectives of NASAP. Chapter 2 summarizes the program's assessments, findings and recommendations. Each of Volumes II-VII reports on an individual assessment (Volume II: Proliferation Resistance; Volume III: Resources and Fuel Cycle Facilities; Volume IV: Commercial Potential; Volume V: Economics and Systems Analysis; Volume VI: Safety and Environmental Considerations for Licensing; Volume VII: International Perspectives). Volume VIII (Advanced Concepts) presents a combined assessment of several less fully developed concepts, and Volume IX (Reactor and Fuel Cycle Descriptions) provides detailed descriptions of the reactor and fuel-cycle systems studied by NASAP.

  12. Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power: report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume 1. Program summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-12-01

    This report summarizes the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program (NASAP): its background, its studies, and its results. This introductory chapter traces the growth of the issue of nuclear weapons proliferation and the organization and objectives of NASAP. Chapter 2 summarizes the program's assessments, findings and recommendations. Each of Volumes II-VII reports on an individual assessment (Volume II: Proliferation Resistance; Volume III: Resources and Fuel Cycle Facilities; Volume IV: Commercial Potential; Volume V: Economics and Systems Analysis; Volume VI: Safety and Environmental Considerations for Licensing; Volume VII: International Perspectives). Volume VIII (Advanced Concepts) presents a combined assessment of several less fully developed concepts, and Volume IX (Reactor and Fuel Cycle Descriptions) provides detailed descriptions of the reactor and fuel-cycle systems studied by NASAP

  13. Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power. Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume I. Program summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-06-01

    This report summarizes the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program (NASAP): its background, its studies, and its results. The introductory chapter traces the growth of the issue of nuclear weapons proliferation and the organization and objectives of NASAP. Chapter 2 summarizes the program's assessments, findings, and recommendations. Each of Volumes II-VII reports on an individual assessment (Volumn II: Proliferation Resistance; Volume III: Resources and Fuel Cycle Facilities; Volume IV: Commercial Potential; Volume V: Economics and Systems Analysis; Volume VI: Safety and Environmental Considerations for Licensing; Volume VII: International Perspectives). Volume VIII (Advanced Concepts) presents a combined assessment of several less fully developed concepts, and Volume IX (Reactor and Fuel Cycle Descriptions) provides detailed descriptions of the reactor and fuel-cycle systems studied by NASAP

  14. Legal problems concerning the export of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pierer, Heinrich von.

    1977-01-01

    The legal problems raised by the export of nuclear power plants may be divided into three main categories: nuclear operator's liability for nuclear damage, the consequences for the supplier of the licensing requirements in the national laws of the buyer country and finally, the constraints of applying non-proliferation safeguards on export of nuclear equipment. As regards the third party liability regime in particular, the difficulties lie essentially in the insufficiency of the definition of the nuclear operator and the lack of harmonization in, or even the absence of national laws in this field. (NEA) [fr

  15. Nuclear education and training: cause for concern?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    Mankind now enjoys many benefits from nuclear-related technologies. There is, however, growing concern in many OECD countries that nuclear education and training is decreasing, perhaps to problematic levels. This booklet, a summary of the full report, conveys the results of a pioneering survey on nuclear education and training in almost 200 organisations in 16 countries. The current situation is presented and causes for concern are examined. Recommendations are made as to the actions governments, academia and industry must take in order to assure that crucial present requirements are met and future options are not precluded. (authors)

  16. Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland. Regulatory control, international cooperation and the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Annual report 2007

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haemaelaeinen, M.; Karhu, P.

    2008-04-01

    Regulatory control of nuclear materials (nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. In order to uphold our part of the international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation - mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). Nuclear safeguards are applied to all materials and activities that can lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or sensitive nuclear technology. These safeguards include nuclear materials accountancy, control, security and reporting. The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2007 continued to demonstrate that Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders' declarations. STUK remarked on the nuclear safeguards systems of two licence holders in 2007, setting required actions for them to correct their reporting and to update the descriptions of their procedures. Neither the IAEA nor the European Commission made any remarks nor did they present any required actions based on their inspections. By their nuclear materials accountancy and control systems, all licence holders enabled STUK to fulfil its own obligations under the international agreements relevant to nuclear safeguards

  17. The law concerning indemnification of nuclear damage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    This Law aims at determining the basic system concerning indemnification for nuclear damage caused by the operation of reactors, fabrication, reprocessing and use of nuclear fuel materials as well as the transportation, storing or disposal of such materials or those contaminated by such materials (including fission products) accompanying these operations in view of protecting the sufferers and contributing to the wholesome development of atomic energy enterprises. The ''nuclear damage'' referred to in this Law is the damages caused by the action during the process of fission of nuclear fuel materials or the action of radiation or the poisonous action of said nuclear fuel materials or matters contaminated by said materials (those causing poisoning or deuteropathy in human bodies by taking in or inhaling such materials). Upon giving nuclear damage by the operation of reactors and others, the atomic energy entrepreneurs concerned are responsible for indemnifying the damage. Atomic energy entrepreneurs should not operate reactors without first taking the measures for indemnifying nuclear damages. Said measures are conclusion of nuclear damage indemnification responsibility insurance contract and nuclear damage indemnification contract or deposit, by which 6,000 million yen may be earmarked for such indemnification per factory, place of business or nuclear ship

  18. Safety studies concerning nuclear power reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bailly, Jean; Pelce, Jacques

    1980-01-01

    The safety of nuclear installations poses different technical problems, whether concerning pressurized water reactors or fast reactors. But investigating methods are closely related and concern, on the one hand, the behavior of shields placed between fuel and outside and, on the other, analysis of accidents. The article is therefore in two parts based on the same plan. Concerning light water reactors, the programme of studies undertaken in France accounts for the research carried out in countries where collaboration agreements exist. Concerning fast reactors, France has the initiative of their studies owing to her technical advance, which explains the great importance of the programmes under way [fr

  19. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear security. Overview of safeguards requirements for States with limited nuclear material and activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lodding, J.; Ribeiro, B.

    2006-06-01

    This booklet provides an overview of safeguards obligations that apply to States which are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that have no nuclear facilities and only limited quantities of nuclear material. Most State parties to the NPT have no nuclear facilities and only limited quantities of nuclear material. For such States, safeguards implementation is expected to be simple and straightforward. This booklet provides an overview of the safeguards obligations that apply to such States. It is hoped that a better understanding of these requirements will facilitate the conclusion and implementation of safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and thereby contribute to the strengthening of the IAEA?s safeguards system and of collective security

  20. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear security. Overview of Safeguards requirements for States with limited nuclear material and activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lodding, J.; Ribeiro, B.

    2006-06-01

    This booklet provides an overview of safeguards obligations that apply to States which are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that have no nuclear facilities and only limited quantities of nuclear material. Most State parties to the NPT have no nuclear facilities and only limited quantities of nuclear material. For such States, safeguards implementation is expected to be simple and straightforward. This booklet provides an overview of the safeguards obligations that apply to such States. It is hoped that a better understanding of these requirements will facilitate the conclusion and implementation of safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and thereby contribute to the strengthening of the IAEA?s safeguards system and of collective security

  1. Nuclear Forensics: A Methodology Applicable to Nuclear Security and to Non-Proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mayer, K; Wallenius, M; Luetzenkirchen, K; Galy, J; Varga, Z; Erdmann, N; Buda, R; Kratz, J-V; Trautmann, N; Fifield, K

    2011-01-01

    Nuclear Security aims at the prevention and detection of and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material. Nuclear Forensics is a key element of nuclear security. Nuclear Forensics is defined as a methodology that aims at re-establishing the history of nuclear material of unknown origin. It is based on indicators that arise from known relationships between material characteristics and process history. Thus, nuclear forensics analysis includes the characterization of the material and correlation with production history. To this end, we can make use of parameters such as the isotopic composition of the nuclear material and accompanying elements, chemical impurities, macroscopic appearance and microstructure of the material. In the present paper, we discuss the opportunities for attribution of nuclear material offered by nuclear forensics as well as its limitations. Particular attention will be given to the role of nuclear reactions. Such reactions include the radioactive decay of the nuclear material, but also reactions with neutrons. When uranium (of natural composition) is exposed to neutrons, plutonium is formed, as well as 236 U. We will illustrate the methodology using the example of a piece of uranium metal that dates back to the German nuclear program in the 1940's. A combination of different analytical techniques and model calculations enables a nuclear forensics interpretation, thus correlating the material characteristics with the production history.

  2. Nuclear Forensics: A Methodology Applicable to Nuclear Security and to Non-Proliferation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mayer, K.; Wallenius, M.; Lützenkirchen, K.; Galy, J.; Varga, Z.; Erdmann, N.; Buda, R.; Kratz, J.-V.; Trautmann, N.; Fifield, K.

    2011-09-01

    Nuclear Security aims at the prevention and detection of and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material. Nuclear Forensics is a key element of nuclear security. Nuclear Forensics is defined as a methodology that aims at re-establishing the history of nuclear material of unknown origin. It is based on indicators that arise from known relationships between material characteristics and process history. Thus, nuclear forensics analysis includes the characterization of the material and correlation with production history. To this end, we can make use of parameters such as the isotopic composition of the nuclear material and accompanying elements, chemical impurities, macroscopic appearance and microstructure of the material. In the present paper, we discuss the opportunities for attribution of nuclear material offered by nuclear forensics as well as its limitations. Particular attention will be given to the role of nuclear reactions. Such reactions include the radioactive decay of the nuclear material, but also reactions with neutrons. When uranium (of natural composition) is exposed to neutrons, plutonium is formed, as well as 236U. We will illustrate the methodology using the example of a piece of uranium metal that dates back to the German nuclear program in the 1940's. A combination of different analytical techniques and model calculations enables a nuclear forensics interpretation, thus correlating the material characteristics with the production history.

  3. Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power. Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume II. Proliferation resistance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-06-01

    The purpose of this volume is limited to an assessment of the relative effects that particular choices of nuclear-power systems, for whatever reasons, may have on the possible spread of nuclear-weapons capabilities. This volume addresses the concern that non-nuclear-weapons states may be able to initiate efforts to acquire or to improve nuclear-weapons capabilities through civilian nuclear-power programs; it also addresses the concern that subnational groups may obtain and abuse the nuclear materials or facilities of such programs, whether in nuclear-weapons states (NWS's) or nonnuclear-weapons states (NNW's). Accordingly, this volume emphasizes one important factor in such decisions, the resistance of nuclear-power systems to the proliferation of nuclear-weapons capabilities

  4. Evaluation of selected features of US nuclear non-proliferation law and policy. Report to the Congress

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    Because other nations now have uranium enrichment facilities, no nation can use nuclear fuel services to dictate actions to others. The United States, therefore, should avoid undue reliance on its uranium enrichment capability as a tool to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The 1978 nuclear non-proliferation law requires the United States to ensure the availability of US enrichment services to meet foreign demand, but it is not apparent that a new enrichment plant authorized in 1975 is needed to meet this demand. The 1978 law has proven to be administratively workable as a means of exercising control over nuclear exports, but more needs to be done to make Government reviews of nuclear exports predictable and timely. A comprehensive interagency reassessment is needed of the controls the Department of Energy administers over foreign activities of US firms and individuals

  5. A study on strengthening measures of non-proliferation regime through the export control system of sensitive materials, equipment and technology related to nuclear activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kikuchi, Masahiro; Kurosawa, Mitsuru; Komizo, Yasuyoshi

    2004-01-01

    The strengthened safeguards caused from safeguards experiences to Iraq and DPRK leads to the expansion of the IAEA's activities for verification of all nuclear activities as well as verification of nuclear material in the States. The purpose of the activities, of course, includes detection of undeclared exports and imports of specified equipment and non-nuclear material. The Additional Protocol to the agreements between States and the IAEA for the application of safeguards requires to the States to declare the exports and imports information regarding specified equipment and non-nuclear material corresponding to the export control list that is established by the nuclear suppliers group. The Additional Protocol also insists the IAEA's right to access to the location identified by the State to resolve a question related to the declarations. Recently, the IAEA detected the black market group of the sensitive materials, equipment and technologies relevant to the nuclear proliferation through the safeguards activities to Iran and Libya. International community stated deeply concerns to the indecent facts. This paper would discuss and propose the supplemental strengthening measures of non-proliferation regime by effective combination of the safeguards activities under additional protocol and the export control regime. (author)

  6. TOWARDS FULFILLMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    s. Bagheri

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT is an international treaty that should be implemented during both peace and wartime. However, the obligations included in the treaty are dependent upon states' attitudes regarding other issues. Non-use of nuclear weapons is directly related to negotiations done for the purpose of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, non-production or accumulation by other means and disarmament. In our day, prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been one of the issues of international law.The present study is of crucial significance due to its endeavor to clarify the general principles of Humanitarian Law in a relationship to the threat of nuclear weapons' up to now, a special norm; significantly limiting or completely prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, has not been accepted in international law. However, customary international humanitarian law regarding the use of nuclear weapons holds great value because of its purpose in eliminating nuclear weapons as a means of war through ascertaining their non-use and also appeasing the importance of nuclear ascendancy. In this respect, the NPT regime and its relationship with international humanitarian law will be discussed. Firstly, the NPT background, formation, main objectives and principles will be analyzed. In order to evaluate the relationship between the NPT and humanitarian law, the humanitarian obligations in general, humanitarian obligations in the context of the NPT and fulfillmen t of these obligations under the NPT should be studied. One of the main parts of the study is nuclear disarmament obligation included in the NPT. In this section, nuclear disarmament obligation in the context of the NPT and the legal framework of possible, general and comprehensive disarmament will be examined.

  7. Seven law concepts on nuclear non-proliferation suggested by the International Group of Legal Experts (ILG)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Steen, G.; Wredberg, L.

    2001-03-01

    The ILG has worked as an independent group under the Swedish Support Programme on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The ILG's mission is concluded with this report. When developing the seven Law Concepts on national nuclear legislation that are presented in this report, the ILG has applied certain basic principles, which are firmly established in modern Western legislation. A summary of these principles is made here. They are essential cornerstones in laws and regulations that apply both to the nuclear industry and to other high technology areas, characterised by advanced safety and security requirements. Of essential importance is that the Operator alone is responsible for the fulfilment of requirements stipulated in laws and authority directives. The technical complexity of the nuclear industry and the far-reaching requirements on safety and security necessitate a qualified and complete national system of legislation and regulations. As all legislation in general, the nuclear legislation should be clear, easy to understand and give little room for misunderstandings and loopholes. It should also present the legally established requirements on safety and security in a form that facilitates the application and implementation by both state authorities, facility operators and individuals. The investigations of the causes of the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents brought into focus the impact on nuclear safety from human failure. As a consequence, increased emphasis has since then been put on the development of an overall high safety culture in the nuclear field. It is recognised that a good safety culture also promotes the non-proliferation systems and safeguards measures and helps to reduce the risk of illicit trafficking. In a high safety culture environment, each individual facility employee has to be motivated and encouraged to carry out the assigned duties and responsibilities in accordance with rules and regulations

  8. The year 2000 examination conference of the non-proliferation treaty and the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime; La conference d'examen 2000 du TNP et l'avenir du regime de non-proliferation nucleaire

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Grand, C. [Institut d' Etudes Politiques de Paris, 75 (France); Ecole Speciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr-Coetquidan (France)

    2001-07-01

    The nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty (NPT), signed on July 1, 1968 and enforced on March 5, 1970, has been progressively considered as the headstone of the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime. The sixth NPT examination conference took place at New York (USA) in the year 2000, 5 years after the previous conference but also after the first nuclear weapon tests of India and Pakistan. This article recalls up the main non-proliferation events that took place between the 1995 and 2000 conferences and presents the progresses and results of the New York conference. Finally, it wonders about the ambiguities in the conclusions of this last conference. (J.S.)

  9. Use of open source information and commercial satellite imagery for nuclear nonproliferation regime compliance verification by a community of academics

    Science.gov (United States)

    Solodov, Alexander

    The proliferation of nuclear weapons is a great threat to world peace and stability. The question of strengthening the nonproliferation regime has been open for a long period of time. In 1997 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors (BOG) adopted the Additional Safeguards Protocol. The purpose of the protocol is to enhance the IAEA's ability to detect undeclared production of fissile materials in member states. However, the IAEA does not always have sufficient human and financial resources to accomplish this task. Developed here is a concept for making use of human and technical resources available in academia that could be used to enhance the IAEA's mission. The objective of this research was to study the feasibility of an academic community using commercially or publicly available sources of information and products for the purpose of detecting covert facilities and activities intended for the unlawful acquisition of fissile materials or production of nuclear weapons. In this study, the availability and use of commercial satellite imagery systems, commercial computer codes for satellite imagery analysis, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) verification International Monitoring System (IMS), publicly available information sources such as watchdog groups and press reports, and Customs Services information were explored. A system for integrating these data sources to form conclusions was also developed. The results proved that publicly and commercially available sources of information and data analysis can be a powerful tool in tracking violations in the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and a framework for implementing these tools in academic community was developed. As a result of this study a formation of an International Nonproliferation Monitoring Academic Community (INMAC) is proposed. This would be an independent organization consisting of academics (faculty, staff and students) from both nuclear weapon states (NWS) and

  10. Seven law concepts on nuclear non-proliferation suggested by the International Group of Legal Experts (ILG)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Steen, G. [Djursholm (Sweden); Wredberg, L. [ILG Consultant LTD, Vienna (Austria)

    2001-03-01

    The ILG has worked as an independent group under the Swedish Support Programme on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The ILG's mission is concluded with this report. When developing the seven Law Concepts on national nuclear legislation that are presented in this report, the ILG has applied certain basic principles, which are firmly established in modern Western legislation. A summary of these principles is made here. They are essential cornerstones in laws and regulations that apply both to the nuclear industry and to other high technology areas, characterised by advanced safety and security requirements. Of essential importance is that the Operator alone is responsible for the fulfilment of requirements stipulated in laws and authority directives. The technical complexity of the nuclear industry and the far-reaching requirements on safety and security necessitate a qualified and complete national system of legislation and regulations. As all legislation in general, the nuclear legislation should be clear, easy to understand and give little room for misunderstandings and loopholes. It should also present the legally established requirements on safety and security in a form that facilitates the application and implementation by both state authorities, facility operators and individuals. The investigations of the causes of the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents brought into focus the impact on nuclear safety from human failure. As a consequence, increased emphasis has since then been put on the development of an overall high safety culture in the nuclear field. It is recognised that a good safety culture also promotes the non-proliferation systems and safeguards measures and helps to reduce the risk of illicit trafficking. In a high safety culture environment, each individual facility employee has to be motivated and encouraged to carry out the assigned duties and responsibilities in accordance with rules and

  11. Non-proliferation and safeguards aspects of alternative fuel cycle concepts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persiani, P.J.

    1997-01-01

    Timely visibility on the development, evaluation and optimization of fuel cycle concepts with respect to nonproliferation characteristics should be emphasized in the early stage of planning a civilian nuclear power program, by fuel cycle developers, reviewers and decision makers. Fuel cycle technologies have inherently differing levels of nonproliferation characteristic profiles. Institutional and/or multi-national arrangements have been effective in reducing the nonproliferation concerns. The implementation of international safeguards further reduces these concerns by the timely detection of a possible physical diversion of SNM from fuel cycle facilities. Fuel cycles are safeguardable, but the nonproliferation characteristics of fuel cycle concepts differ significantly with consequent impacts on the international level of technical safeguards measures. The paper comments on characteristics of some of the fuel cycle concepts for the purpose of exploring the need to develop advanced nonproliferation and safeguards measures. (author)

  12. The law concerning indemnification of nuclear damage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    The law defines the basic system of indemnification of nuclear damage by the operation of reactors to protect sufferers and help the sound development of atomic energy business. The operation of reactors means hereunder the operation of reactors, processing, reprocessing and the uses of nuclear fuel materials as well as transport, storage and disposal of nuclear fuel materials or things contaminated by them, which accompany with those procedures. The nuclear damage signifies injuries due to functions of fission of nuclear fuel materials or radiation or poisonous functions of things contaminated by them. When nuclear damage happens by the operation of reactors, the atomic energy enterpriser concerned shall indemnify the damage. Atomic energy undertakers shall not operate reactors without taking measures for compensation. The measures shall be the conclusion of nuclear damage compensation insurance contracts and indemnification contracts or the deposit. The amount of less than yen 10 milliards specified by the order and acknowledged by the Director General of Science and Technology Agency shall be allotted to the compensation by these measures for each works, enterprise or nuclear ship. The government shall assist atomic energy enterprisers to indemnify, when such compensation surpasses the amount assigned and the support is considered necessary. (Okada, K.)

  13. Report of 'the 2014 international forum on peaceful use of nuclear energy, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. Future direction toward promoting non-proliferation and the ideal method of developing human resources using Centers of Excellence (COEs) following the new strategic energy plan'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yamaga, Chikanobu; Tomikawa, Hirofumi; Kobayashi, Naoki; Naoi, Yosuke; Oda, Tetsuzo; Mochiji, Toshiro

    2015-10-01

    The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) held 'International Forum on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security – Future direction toward promoting non-proliferation and the ideal method of developing human resources using Centers of Excellence (COEs) following the New Strategic Energy Plan -' on 3 December 2014, with the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo, and International Nuclear Research Center, Tokyo Institute of Technology as co-hosts. In the Forum, officials and experts from Japan, the United States explained their efforts regarding peaceful use of nuclear energy, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. Discussion was made in two panels, entitled 'Effective and efficient measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation based on domestic and foreign issues and the direction and role of technology development' and 'Roles of nuclear security COEs and future expectations'. In Panel Discussion 1, as the nuclear non-proliferation regime is facing various problems and challenges under current international circumstances, how to implement effective and efficient safeguards was discussed. In Panel Discussion 2, panelists discussed the following three points: 1. Current status of Nuclear Security Training and Support Centers and COEs, and Good Practice; 2. What these centers can do to enhance nuclear security (New role for COEs); 3. Regional cooperation in the Nuclear Security Training and Support Center (NSSC) and COEs in states, which the IAEA recommends establishing, and international cooperation and partnerships with international initiatives (New Role). Officials and experts from Japan, IAEA, the United States, France, Republic of Korea, and Indonesia participated in the panel and made contributions to active discussion. This report includes abstracts of keynote speeches, summaries of two panel discussions and materials of the

  14. The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1972-06-15

    The Board of Governors has requested the Director General to use the material reproduced in this booklet as the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements between the Agency and non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

  15. The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1972-06-01

    The Board of Governors has requested the Director General to use the material reproduced in this booklet as the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements between the Agency and non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

  16. The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1971-05-01

    The Board of Governors has requested the Director General to use the material reproduced in this booklet as the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements between the Agency and non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [es

  17. The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1975-04-01

    The Board of Governors has requested the Director General to use the material reproduced in this booklet as the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements between the Agency and non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [ru

  18. The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Board of Governors has requested the Director General to use the material reproduced in this booklet as the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements between the Agency and non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

  19. A study for collaborative management for nuclear spent fuel control. Seeking for nuclear non-proliferation in East Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-03-01

    Because of the rapid increase of power generation with nuclear fuel in East Asia area, the management and control of nuclear spent fuel from nuclear reactors has become an essential and urgent issue in this area. This study focused on the possibility of forming an intergovernmental collaborative management system for nuclear spent fuel with an emphasize on nuclear non-proliferation among East Asian countries, i.e. China, Korea, Taiwan and Japan who own and operate nuclear power plants. First, we studied the present situation for nuclear spent fuel, including the storage measures, the future fore- cast on the accumulation and the government measures to deal with these spent fuel. Then, based upon first step studies, we examined the pros and cons when the collaborative management is realized particularly from the viewpoint of prevention of nuclear proliferation. Further, we estimated possible means for management and control of nuclear spent fuel, including its system size and cost. Finally, we extracted some technological tasks to be solved and political issues to be discussed. Our findings are as follows. 1. The total amount of the power generation in three East Asian counties (China, Korea and Taiwan) is about 17 million KW presently. This will be tripled to 51 million KW by the year 2010. When Japan's ability is added it is 62 million KW currently and 121 million by 2010. 2. The nuclear spent fuel in Taiwan and Korea will be saturated for their storage capacity. On the other hand, Japan will start to operate her reprocessing plant in Aomori prefecture in 2003 and her new storage capability is completed in 1999. Also in China, a reprocessing pilot plant is under construction and its operation is scheduled in 2001. 3. As their national policy, China and Japan does reprocess from spent fuel but Korea and Taiwan don't. Instead, they take non-reprocessing and direct geological disposal. 4. If the collaborative management of nuclear wastes is realized Multi

  20. Outlook to nonproliferation activities in the world and cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy among turkish speaking countries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Birsen, N.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: Nuclear technology is being widely used in protecting the environment, manufacturing industry, medicine, agriculture, food industry and electricity production. In the world, 438 Nuclear Power Plants are in operation, and 31 are under construction. Nuclear share of total electricity generation have reached to 17 percent. However, 2053 nuclear tests from 1945 to 1999 and 2 atom bombs to Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 have initiated nonproliferation activities aiming to halt the spread of nuclear weapons and to create a climate where cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy can be fostered. In addition to international efforts for non proliferation of nuclear weapons, great affords were made for disarmament and banning the nuclear tests which damage the environment. Following the 1st Geneva Conference in 1955 for expanding peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Turkey was one of the first countries to start activities in the nuclear field. Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK) was established in 1956 and Turkey became a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency established in 1957 by the United Nations for spreading the use of nuclear energy to contribute peace, health and prosperity throughout the world, in same year. Turkey is a candidate state to join the European Union and has already signed Custom Union Agreement, also part of the Eurasia Region. So, there are significant developments in the cultural, social, technical, economical and trade relations owing to our common historical and cultural values with the countries in the region and Central Asia. TAEK was established to support, co-ordinate and perform the activities in peaceful uses of nuclear energy and act as a regulatory body and establish cooperation with countries and international organizations. In the late 1990's, TAEK, besides the co operations with various countries, has involved in cooperating with nuclear institutes of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and

  1. Leveraging U.S. nuclear weapons policy to advance U.S. nonproliferation goals : implications of major theories of international relations.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Walter, Andrew

    2009-06-01

    National policymakers are currently considering a dilemma of critical importance to the continued security of the United States: how can U.S. nuclear weapons policies be leveraged to benefit U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals in the near-term, without sacrificing U.S. national security? In its role supporting U.S. nuclear weapons policy, Sandia National Laboratories has a responsibility to provide objective technical advice to support policy deliberations on this question. However, to best fulfill this duty Sandia must have a broader understanding of the context of the problem. To help develop this understanding, this paper analyzes the two predominant analytical perspectives of international relations theory to explore their prescriptions for how nuclear weapons and nonproliferation policies interact. As lenses with which to view and make sense of the world, theories of international relations must play a crucial role in framing the trade-offs at the intersection of the nuclear weapons and nonproliferation policy domains. An analysis of what these theories suggest as courses of action to leverage nuclear weapons policies to benefit nonproliferation goals is then offered, with particular emphasis on where the policy prescriptions resulting from the respective theories align to offer near-term policy changes with broad theoretical support. These policy prescriptions are then compared to the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review to understand what the theories indicate policymakers may have gotten right in their dealing with the nuclear dilemma, and where they may have gone wrong. Finally, a brief international relations research agenda is proposed to help address the dilemma between nuclear deterrence and nuclear nonproliferation policies, with particular emphasis on how such an agenda can best support the needs of the policy community and a potential 'all things nuclear' policy deliberation and decision-support framework.

  2. Nuclear non-proliferation and arms control: Are we making progress? 7 November 2005, Washington, DC, Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2005-01-01

    ) establish a framework for multilateral management and control of the 'back end' of the fuel cycle (i.e. spent fuel reprocessing and waste disposal); and 4) create a similar framework for multilateral management and control of the 'front end' of the fuel cycle (i.e. enrichment and fuel production). Regarding the protection of nuclear material it is reported that multiple international and regional initiatives are underway to help countries to improve the physical protection of such material. The International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was adopted by the UN General Assembly in April 2005. Many governments have also responded to UN Security Council resolution 1540, adopted in April 2004. Both the Convention and resolution 1540 call on countries to criminalize the illicit possession and use of radioactive material, and aim to enhance efforts to detect and combat illicit trafficking. And in July, parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material agreed on major changes that would make it legally binding for countries to protect nuclear facilities and material in domestic use, storage and transport. With strong support from the IAEA, Russia and the US, multiple countries are also taking steps to convert their research reactors from HEU to LEU fuel, and to return the HEU to the country of origin. For nuclear non-proliferation commitments to be effective, they must be backed by credible mechanisms to deal with cases of compliance. The potential for being referred to the UN Security Council has clearly acted as an inducement for compliance in some cases; however, we should recall that the referral of North Korea to the Council, in 1992 and again in 2003, resulted in little to no action. To be effective, the UN Security Council must be ready at all times to engage, in order to cope with emerging threats to international peace and security. On the nuclear disarmament front, no mechanism exists to monitor compliance with

  3. The Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the insertion of the Brazilian State in its regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silva, Marcos Valle Machado da

    2010-01-01

    The issue of nuclear weapons continues to appear as a focal point of International Relations. The efforts and concrete actions on disarmament, non-proliferation, and nuclear arms control are still issues that generate recurring tensions between States. However, in Brazil, there is little analysis of an academic nature about these issues and, with respect to current and prospective position of the Brazilian State in the Nuclear Weapons Non- Proliferation Regime, studies and analysis are even more scarce, or incipient. The present dissertation has as its object of study to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Regime arisen from NPT, and the Brazilian State insertion process in this Regime. Therefore our research work is structured in three areas: the first one is about the role of nuclear weapons in States security perception, the second is about NPT and its Regime, the third runs over the insertion of the Brazilian state in this regime. So, in summary, the research performed included the reasons that make a State to develop nuclear weapons, the NPT genesis and evolution of the perception of the meaning of that Treaty by the States, and the process and the degree of insertion of Brazil in the Nuclear Weapons Non- Proliferation Regime. The inquiry sought to place this object of study in the broader debate on Foreign Relations, based on the approaches of the discipline devoted to the question of managing the security of States, id est, the two approaches that constitute the mainstream of the discipline: the perspective theoretical liberal (and neoliberal variants) and realistic thinking (and neo-realist). Thus, we have used different theoretical lenses, which we think necessary for understanding the specific parts and causal connections between these parts of a complex issue. (author)

  4. IAEA safeguards: Stemming the spread of nuclear weapons. As the world's nuclear inspectorate, the IAEA performs an indispensable role in furthering nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    Following the completion of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968, the IAEA has become the instrument with which to verify that the peaceful use commitments made under the NPT or similar agreements are kept through performing what is known as its safeguards role. Under the NPT, governments around the world have committed to three common objectives: preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons; pursuing nuclear disarmament; and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The NPT has made it obligatory for all its non-nuclear weapon State parties to submit all nuclear material in nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards, and to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency. With all but a handful of the world community as State parties, the NPT is by far the most widely adhered to legal agreement in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. The IAEA takes account of all source and special fissionable material in countries under safeguards. Monitoring and verification activities focus on those types of nuclear material that are the most crucial and relevant to nuclear weapons manufacturing. This includes plutonium-239, uranium-233 and -235 and any material containing one or more of these. Safeguards activities are applied routinely at over 900 facilities in 71 countries. In 2001 alone, more than 21,000 calendar days in the field were devoted to verifying hundreds of tons of special fissionable material by more than IAEA 250 inspectors

  5. Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power. Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume VI. Safety and environmental considerations for licensing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-06-01

    This volume of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program report addresses safety and environmental considerations in licensing the principal alternative nuclear reactors and fuel cycles in the United States for large-scale commercial nuclear power plants. In addition, this volume examines the safety and environmental considerations for licensing fuel service centers. These centers, which have been proposed for controlling sensitive fuel-cycle facilities and special nuclear materials, would contain a combination of such facilities as reprocessing plants, fabrication plants, and reactors. For this analysis, two fuel service center concepts were selected - one with power - generating capability and one without

  6. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear security. IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lodding, Jan; Kinley, David III

    2002-09-01

    One of the most urgent challenges facing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system for verification in order to increase the likelihood of detecting any clandestine nuclear weapons programme in breach of international obligations. The IAEA should be able to provide credible assurance not only about declared nuclear material in a State but also about the absence of undeclared material and activities. Realising the full potential of the strengthened system will require that all States bring into force their relevant safeguards agreements, as well as additional protocols thereto. Today, 45 years after the Agency's foundation, its verification mission is as relevant as ever. This is illustrated by the special challenges encountered with regard to verification in Iraq and North Korea in the past decade. Moreover, the horrifying events of 11 September 2001 demonstrated all too well the urgent need to strengthen worldwide control of nuclear and other radioactive material. The IAEA will continue to assist States in their efforts to counter the spread of nuclear weapons and to prevent, detect and respond to illegal uses of nuclear and radioactive material. Adherence by as many States as possible to the strengthened safeguards system is a crucial component in this endeavour

  7. Nuclear education and training: cause for concern?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yamagata, Hiroshi

    2000-01-01

    Nuclear power plants have played an important role in electricity generation in the OECD member countries, contributing an average 24% over the past few years. One major criterion for the success of this technology has always been the education and training of competent personnel in all sectors of nuclear development and application. The high level of competence and know-how reached must be maintained in the future. Qualified personnel is required for running existing plants, building new nuclear power plants - at present especially in Japan and Korea - and for all activities associated with supply and waste management, decommissioning, and for all applications of nuclear technology above and beyond energy generation. The number of university graduates in the OECD countries is decreasing alarmingly, among other reasons because of the diminished attractiveness of these courses as a consequence of the reduced number of nuclear engineering courses offered in curricula. A broad-based program of disseminating basic information in nuclear technology in university curricula is urgently required. In industry, internal advanced and in-career training measures and programs are offered to ensure broad-based qualification as well as specialization in nuclear subjects of the staff, as demands are rising and flexibility is required of all staff members. This development implies that governments in particular are called upon to ensure, by long-term planning, that nuclear competence is preserved in science and research, in industry and applications, as part of their areas of responsibility and competence. Note: The full text of the study on which this contribution is based has been published under the title of 'Nuclear Education and Training: Cause for Concern?' by OECD-NEA, Paris, 2000, 124 pages. (orig.) [de

  8. Actions concerning nuclear power plant life evaluation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chocron, M.; Fabbri, S.; Mizrahi, R.; Savino, E.J.; Versaci, R.A.

    1998-01-01

    One of the main activities to be undertaken by CNEA will be to provide technological assistance to NASA in problems concerning NPP operation. Works on life extensions of NPP are included in these activities. To fulfill these requirements the Atomic Energy National Commission (CNEA) has constituted a technical committee for Nuclear Power Plants Support (CAPCEN). CAPCEN should be the knowledge reservoir of those issues concerning the performance, safety and life extension of Nuclear Power Plants. One of CAPCEN's most important activities is to promote research work connected with such issues. The main technical areas are: Pressure Vessel and Piping, Heat Exchanges and Fuel Channels and Reactor Inner Components. Efforts are focused on the identification of the main components susceptible of ageing, the study of their ageing mechanisms, the follow-up of their behaviour during operation, and the measures taken to extend their life. (author)

  9. International Education and Training Centre (Nuclear security and Nonproliferation) and Ideas for Educational Test Facilities in the centre

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Seo, Hyung Min [Korea Institute of Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2010-10-15

    With respect to the nuclear security-related multilateral agreements, many states and international societies recognize the importance of evaluating and improving their physical protection systems to ensure that they are capable of achieving the objectives set out in relevant IAEA Nuclear Security Series documents. Under this circumstance, finally, on April 12-13, 2010, US President Obama hosted a Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC, to enhance international cooperation to prevent nuclear terrorism, an issue which he has identified as the most immediate and extreme threat to global security. The goals of the Nuclear Security Summit were to come to a common understanding of the threat posed by nuclear terrorism, to agree to effective measures to secure nuclear material, and to prevent nuclear smuggling and terrorism. The Summit focused on the security of nuclear materials, nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful nuclear energy. At the summit, the Republic of Korea was chosen as the host of the next Summit in 2012. After President Barack Obama declared the opening of the Summit and explained the purpose of the meeting, he designated Korea as the host of the Second Nuclear Security Summit, which was unanimously approved by the participating leaders. During the Summit, President Lee introduced Korea's measures for the physical protection of nuclear materials and laid out what contributions Korea would make to the international community. He also stated that the North Korean leader would be welcomed at the next summit only if his country made substantial pledges toward nuclear disarmament during the Six-Party Talks and announced that Seoul would host the general assembly of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in 2011 and would share its expertise and support the Summit's mission by setting up an education and training center on nuclear security in 2014

  10. International Education and Training Centre (Nuclear security and Nonproliferation) and Ideas for Educational Test Facilities in the centre

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seo, Hyung Min

    2010-01-01

    With respect to the nuclear security-related multilateral agreements, many states and international societies recognize the importance of evaluating and improving their physical protection systems to ensure that they are capable of achieving the objectives set out in relevant IAEA Nuclear Security Series documents. Under this circumstance, finally, on April 12-13, 2010, US President Obama hosted a Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC, to enhance international cooperation to prevent nuclear terrorism, an issue which he has identified as the most immediate and extreme threat to global security. The goals of the Nuclear Security Summit were to come to a common understanding of the threat posed by nuclear terrorism, to agree to effective measures to secure nuclear material, and to prevent nuclear smuggling and terrorism. The Summit focused on the security of nuclear materials, nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful nuclear energy. At the summit, the Republic of Korea was chosen as the host of the next Summit in 2012. After President Barack Obama declared the opening of the Summit and explained the purpose of the meeting, he designated Korea as the host of the Second Nuclear Security Summit, which was unanimously approved by the participating leaders. During the Summit, President Lee introduced Korea's measures for the physical protection of nuclear materials and laid out what contributions Korea would make to the international community. He also stated that the North Korean leader would be welcomed at the next summit only if his country made substantial pledges toward nuclear disarmament during the Six-Party Talks and announced that Seoul would host the general assembly of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in 2011 and would share its expertise and support the Summit's mission by setting up an education and training center on nuclear security in 2014

  11. After fifty years of the nuclear age: Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or elimination of them?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sugie, Ei-Ichi

    1997-01-01

    Ever since the first test of the atomic bomb and the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, mankind lived with nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons were inevitably connected with the Cold War, with its end new opportunity has come concerning prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Steps are to be undertaken in order to eliminate the nuclear weapons. First, would be the prohibition of the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons. By excluding the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons, the world could be closer to nuclear disarmament than ever. The prohibition of the use of some type of weapons could be a breakthrough towards the elimination of such weapons. While the negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons would be difficult, as were those to ban chemical weapons, a ban on the use of nuclear weapons would eventually lead to their elimination. During the Cold War, the imminent goal of disarmament was to stop the nuclear arms race between the two superpowers. But in the post-Cold War era an opportunity has developed for further steps towards nuclear disarmament, the elimination of nuclear weapons

  12. Nuclear non-proliferation: Global security in a rapidly changing world. Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, 21 June 2004, Washington, DC, USA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2004-01-01

    This statement outlines what the IAEA and the international community has learned, what are the problems faced and the nature of the required reforms in the field of non-proliferation, security, safeguards inspection. The proposals are mostly fucued on international/collective cooperation in arms control, improvements of security and effectiveness of safeguards

  13. Nuclear non-proliferation: Global security in a rapidly changing world. Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, 21 June 2004, Washington, DC, USA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    ElBaradei, M

    2004-06-21

    This statement outlines what the IAEA and the international community has learned, what are the problems faced and the nature of the required reforms in the field of non-proliferation, security, safeguards inspection. The proposals are mostly fucued on international/collective cooperation in arms control, improvements of security and effectiveness of safeguards.

  14. U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy: impact on exports and nuclear industry could not be determined. Report to the Congress

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 established new measures to prevent the diversion to weapons use of peaceful nuclear exports. It also created a policy to confirm U.S. reliability as a nuclear supplier. GAO did not identify any export sales lost as a result of the Act, but did find indications that nonproliferation policies can influence export sales. Based on available data, GAO could not determine the impact of the Act on the competitiveness of U.S. nuclear exports. However, U.S. companies are at some disadvantage because importers perceive that implementation of the Act may result in delayed export licenses. The United States dominated the nuclear export market through the early 1970s. However, foreign competitors, some aided by U.S. technology transfers, emerged to monopolize home markets and compete for third-country business. Further, the market has been depressed since 1974 and prospects for U.S. nuclear power plant exports have dimmed greatly. However, U.S. companies continue to view exports as important to sustain production capacity

  15. The fight against international terrorism and changes in the U.S. nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament strategy

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Inmaculada Marrero Rocha

    2003-12-01

    Full Text Available This article examines how the the fight against international terrorism, as a new organising principle in U.S. foreign policy and security policy, has conditioned and modified the American conception of and strategy for combatting nuclear arms proliferation. On the one hand, it analyses the concepts of “axis of evil” or “rogue states” as instruments of automatic and forced connection between international terrorism and nuclear armsproliferating states. On the other hand, it also deals with the changes in American nonproliferation and disarmament strategy, characterised by a distrust towards international cooperation and a clear preference for using means of a unilateral nature, which challenge, and even scorn, international institutions and the rules of international law in this area.

  16. International Cooperation for Enhancing Nuclear Safety, Security, Safeguards and Non-proliferation : 60 Years of IAEA and EURATOM

    CERN Document Server

    Abousahl, Said; Plastino, Wolfango

    2018-01-01

    This open access book examines key aspects of international cooperation to enhance nuclear safety, security, safeguards, and non-proliferation, thereby assisting in development and maintenance of the verification regime and fostering progress toward a nuclear weapon-free world. The book opens by addressing important political, institutional, and legal dimensions. Current challenges are discussed and attempts made to identify possible solutions and future improvements. Subsequent sections consider scientific developments that have the potential to increase the effectiveness of implementation of international regimes, particularly in critical areas, technology foresight, and the ongoing evaluation of current capabilities. The closing sections examine scientific and technical challenges and discuss the role of international cooperation and actions of the scientific community in leading the world toward peace and security. The book – which celebrates 60 years of IAEA Atoms for Peace and Development and the EURA...

  17. Nuclear non-proliferation: the U.S. obligation to accept spent fuel from foreign research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shapar, Howard K.; Egan, Joseph R.

    1995-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) had a 35-year program for the sale and receipt (for reprocessing) of high-enriched research reactor fuel for foreign research reactors, executed pursuant to bilateral agreements with nuclear trading partners. In 1988, DOE abruptly let this program lapse, citing environmental obstacles. DOE promised to renew the program upon completion of an environmental review which was to take approximately six months. After three and a half years, an environmental assessment was finally produced.Over a year and half elapsed since publication of the assessment before DOE finally took action to renew the program. The paper sets forth the nuclear non-proliferation and related foreign policy considerations which support renewal of the program. It also summarized the contractual and other commitments made to foreign research reactors and foreign governments and aspects of U.S. environmental law as they apply to continuation of the program. (author)

  18. The next generation(s) of Europeans facing nuclear weapons: forgetful, indifferent but supportive? EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, Non-Proliferation Papers No. 56 March 2017

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pelopidas, Benoit

    2017-04-01

    The post-cold war generation of citizens is forgetting nuclear weapon-related dangers and becoming indifferent to the issue. At the same time, the absence of mass grassroots, anti-nuclear protest suggests tacit support for current nuclear weapon policies. These three common diagnoses are potentially contradictory and, more importantly, are only assumptions. This paper is the first systematic attempt at assessing the attitude of the under 30's generation of European Union (EU) citizens with regard to nuclear weapons. It is based on a poll of over 10 000 citizens across the 28 EU member countries. The paper finds that none of these assumptions holds. Except for the cases of near nuclear use, the lack of knowledge about nuclear danger is not that widespread; it only increases slowly and not uniformly. Similarly, the lack of popular engagement in the nuclear weapon debate does not mean support for existing policies. In this paper, the sentiment of support is assessed with a set of three criteria: the feeling of safety attained from nuclear weapons; satisfaction with policies taken in one's name; and acceptance of vulnerabilities arising from the possession of nuclear weapons. This paper finds that overall support in these areas is below 30 per cent in every country for which there was a representative sample of respondents. Neither do the youth express a lack of concern, but rather a strong feeling of inability to affect the outcome. This suggests the need for both a research agenda and a reform of EU educational policies aimed at this generation on nuclear weapons

  19. Accountability and non-proliferation nuclear regime: a review of the mutual surveillance Brazilian-Argentine model for nuclear safeguards; Accountability e regime de nao proliferacao nuclear: uma avaliacao do modelo de vigilancia mutua brasileiro-argentina de salvaguardas nucleares

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Xavier, Roberto Salles

    2014-08-01

    The regimes of accountability, the organizations of global governance and institutional arrangements of global governance of nuclear non-proliferation and of Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine of Nuclear Safeguards are the subject of research. The starting point is the importance of the institutional model of global governance for the effective control of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this context, the research investigates how to structure the current arrangements of the international nuclear non-proliferation and what is the performance of model Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine of Nuclear Safeguards in relation to accountability regimes of global governance. For that, was searched the current literature of three theoretical dimensions: accountability, global governance and global governance organizations. In relation to the research method was used the case study and the treatment technique of data the analysis of content. The results allowed: to establish an evaluation model based on accountability mechanisms; to assess how behaves the model Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine Nuclear Safeguards front of the proposed accountability regime; and to measure the degree to which regional arrangements that work with systems of global governance can strengthen these international systems. (author)

  20. Order concerning a nuclear reactor shutdown

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1991-01-01

    Judgment of the State Administrative Court of Baden Wuerttemberg in head notes including: The authority of the Minister-President to give general guidelines includes the right to issue single directives; in matters of prime political significance he can take measures to realize such aims. - It is no extraneous consideration for the supervisory board under atomic energy law to point out in an order concerning a nuclear reactor shutdown that the disallowed operation of a nuclear plant conflicts with the obligation of the state to provide protection and constitutes a penal offence. Further a discourse on the assignment of discretionary powers under Paragraph 19 Section 3 Clause 2 No. 3 of the Atomic Energy Law. (HSCH) [de

  1. Robust Indicators of Nonproliferation Performance

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cowan, Mara R. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Kurzrok, Andrew J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

    2014-02-13

    Understanding how the nuclear industry may benefit from self-regulation is closely linked with understanding how to report compliance activities for nonproliferation and export control objectives, as well as how to distinguish high and low compliance performance. Drawing on the corporate sustainability reporting model, nuclear and dual-use commodities industries can frame socially responsible self-regulatory activities to distinguish themselves as good nonproliferators.

  2. The Text of the Agreement between Greece and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1972-11-17

    The text of the Agreement between the Kingdom of Greece and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  3. The Text of the Agreement between Cyprus and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Cyprus and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  4. The Text of the Agreement between Greece and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1972-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Kingdom of Greece and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  5. The Text of the Agreement between Uruguay and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1972-01-01

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Eastern Republic of Uruguay and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  6. The Text of the Agreement between Denmark and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-04-09

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Denmark and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  7. The Text of the Agreement between Malaysia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-05-18

    The text of the Agreement. and of the Protocol thereto, between Malaysia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  8. The Text of the Agreement between Cyprus and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-07-03

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Cyprus and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  9. The Text of the Agreement between Ireland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-06-01

    The text of the Agreement and of the two Protocols thereto, between Ireland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  10. The Text of the Agreement between Norway and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-04-11

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Norway and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  11. The Text of the Agreement between Nepal and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-06-29

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Nepal and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  12. The Text of the Agreement between Yugoslavia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1974-06-10

    The text of the Agreement between Yugoslavia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 28 December 1973, pursuant to Article 25.

  13. The Text of the Agreement between Australia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1974-12-13

    The text of the Agreement between Australia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 10 July 1974, pursuant to Article 26.

  14. The Text of the Agreement between Mongolia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-06-22

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Mongolia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  15. The Text of the Agreement between Uruguay and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1972-03-24

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Eastern Republic of Uruguay and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  16. The Text of the Agreement between Lebanon and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-07-10

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Lebanon and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  17. The Text of the Agreement between Yugoslavia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1974-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between Yugoslavia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 28 December 1973, pursuant to Article 25.

  18. The Text of the Agreement between Australia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1974-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between Australia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 10 July 1974, pursuant to Article 26.

  19. The Text of the Agreement between Ireland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement and of the two Protocols thereto, between Ireland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  20. The Text of the Agreement between Lebanon and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Lebanon and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  1. The Text of the Agreement between Mongolia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Mongolia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  2. The Text of the Agreement between Norway and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Norway and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  3. The Text of the Agreement between Nepal and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Nepal and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  4. The Text of the Agreement between Denmark and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Denmark and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  5. The Text of the Agreement between Malaysia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement. and of the Protocol thereto, between Malaysia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  6. To make a national based historical survey of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: Experiences from the example of Sweden

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jonter, T.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: This project was initiated by the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate and approved by the Agency as a Support Programme Task to increase transparency and support the implementation of the Additional Protocol in Sweden. A general model of how such a historical survey can be conducted has been worked out in order to serve as help for other countries evaluating their nuclear and nuclear related activities in the framework of the Additional Protocol. The model consists of the following parts: 1. A State's nuclear activities profile since the mid-forties. In this part the task is to analyse the State's civil and military nuclear plans in broad terms, as well as to investigate how these ambitions were carried out in practice. A central ingredient is to map-out how the nuclear energy projects were organised over time; i. e. to pin-point the government authorities, organisations, private companies, universities and research institutions who were involved in the activities and who had the authoritative power at different times since 1945. 2. A description and analysis of the State's role and interactions in the area of international non-proliferation. This part of the model includes a list of the national laws that have regulated the use of nuclear materials since 1945. Are there exceptions in the national jurisdictions that obstruct the international/national inspections to be carried out in practical terms? How have the import and export regulations been designed since 1945? Who are allowed to use sensitive nuclear materials and on what conditions? Another part of the analysis of the State's international policy of non-proliferation includes a description of the international and bilateral agreements that were signed and ratified over the span of the period under consideration. The experiences from the work with the survey of the Swedish nuclear activities show that not all co-operation necessarily went through bilateral (government controlled) agreements

  7. The third review conference of the parties to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    The Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was held in Geneva from 27 August to 21 September 1985, with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty were being realized. The Conference ended with the adoption by consensus of a Final Declaration, by which the States parties, among other things, solemnly declared their conviction that the Treaty was essential to international peace and security and expressed their support for its objectives. This Fact Sheet provides information on the preparations for the Conference, developments at the Conference and the main features of the Final Declaration. Te text of the Treaty is reproduced in Disarmament Fact Sheet No. 33, and its historical background is contained in Fact Sheet No. 41

  8. The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the process for its enhanced review on the eve of the 2000 review conference

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pinel, C.

    2000-01-01

    This article sets out the principle and essentials of the process for reviewing the operation of the non-proliferation treaty (NPT). The NPT was opened for signature on 1 July 1968 and came into force on 5 March 1970. In 1995 the NPT was extended. The 2000 review conference is of considerable importance for the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, particularly in the light of the fact that after the indefinite and unconditional extension of the treaty, the non-nuclear-weapon states urged the nuclear-weapon states to take new steps towards nuclear disarmament. This article presents a review of the 30 year period of the application of NPT

  9. A comparison of the additional protocols of the five nuclear weapon states and the ensuing safeguards benefits to international nonproliferation efforts

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Uribe, Eva C [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sandoval, M Analisa [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sandoval, Marisa N [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Boyer, Brian D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Leitch, Rosalyn M [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01

    With the 6 January 2009 entry into force of the Additional Protocol by the United States of America, all five declared Nuclear Weapon States that are part of the Nonproliferation Treaty have signed, ratified, and put into force the Additional Protocol. This paper makes a comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the five Additional Protocols in force by the five Nuclear Weapon States with respect to the benefits to international nonproliferation aims. This paper also documents the added safeguards burden to the five declared Nuclear Weapon States that these Additional Protocols put on the states with respect to access to their civilian nuclear programs and the hosting of complementary access activities as part of the Additional Protocol.

  10. Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power: report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume VI. Safety and environmental considerations for licensing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-12-01

    Volume 6 of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program report addresses safety and environmental considerations in licensing the principal alternative nuclear reactors and fuel cycles in the United States for large-scale commercial nuclear power plants. In addition, this volume examines the safety and environmental considerations for licensing fuel service centers. These centers, which have been proposed for controlling sensitive fuel-cycle facilities and special nuclear materials, would contain a combination of such facilities as reprocessing plants, fabrication plants, and reactors. For this analysis, two fuel service center concepts were selected - one with power-generating capability and one without. This volume also provides estimates of the time required for development of large-scale commercial reactor systems to reach the construction permit application stage and for fuel-cycle facilities to reach the operating license application stage, which is a measure of the relative technical status of alternative nuclear systems

  11. THE ROLE AND RATIONALE OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Tom COPPEN

    2012-12-01

    Full Text Available Much has been written about perceived weaknesses of the NPT and the challenges it has been facing over the last decades. Analysing the most important provisions of the NPT, this article demonstrates how the treaty has managed to maintain its central role in the non-proliferation regime since its conclusion, and how it retains enough flexibility within its review mechanism and its managerial approach to supervision to keep this position for the decades to come. The theoretical framework of the article is formed by theory of arms control law, relevant features of which are: a large influence of politics and national interests of states on the rule of law; its flexible yet treaty-based nature; and the distinctive role of supervision in order to ensure compliance with primary rules. The article analyses key NPT provisions. Based on Article VIII, the NPT Review Conferences have both an important political and legal function. They are the NPT’s mechanism for review, implementation and supervision; in legal terms, they enable the evolution of the NPT based on subsequent agreement and practice. The NPT articles on non-proliferation and disarmament illustrate how the NPT has evolved to close off loopholes (Articles I and II and retains its flexibility whilst providing a global platform for negotiations on nuclear disarmament (Article VI. Article III evolved and must be understood to oblige NPT states to sign an Additional Protocol (AP with the IAEA. Article IV sets the parameters for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but leaves room for negotiation and conflict. The supervision of the NPT, illustrated by the case of Iran, is a complicated process involving international organisations such as the IAEA and the UNSC; while these may play important roles, however, the enforcement of the NPT is ultimately left to the NPT states themselves.

  12. Synergies between nonproliferation regimes: A pragmatic approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Findlay, Trevor; Meier, Oliver

    2001-01-01

    Full text: With the recent progress in establishing international nonproliferation regimes, the question of synergies between different verification and monitoring regimes is becoming more acute. Three multilateral and universal nonproliferation organisations covering safeguards on civil nuclear materials, nuclear testing, and chemical weapons are up and running. A regime on biological weapons is under negotiation. Several regional organisations concerned with monitoring nonproliferation commitments in the nuclear field are in place; others are being established. Past discussions on synergies between these regimes have suffered from being too far-reaching. These discussions often have not reflected adequately the political difficulties of cooperation between regimes with different membership, scope and institutional set-up. This paper takes a pragmatic look at exploiting synergies and identifies some potential and real overlaps in the work between different verification regimes. It argues for a bottom-up approach and identifies building blocks for collaboration between verification regimes. By realising such, more limited potential for cooperation, the ground could be prepared for exploiting other synergies between these regimes. (author)

  13. The self-consistent energy system with an enhanced non-proliferated core concept for global nuclear energy utilization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kawashima, Masatoshi; Arie, Kazuo; Araki, Yoshio; Sato, Mitsuyoshi; Mori, Kenji; Nakayama, Yoshiyuki; Nakazono, Ryuichi; Kuroda, Yuji; Ishiguma, Kazuo; Fujii-e, Yoichi

    2008-01-01

    A sustainable nuclear energy system was developed based on the concept of Self-Consistent Nuclear Energy System (SCNES). Our study that trans-uranium (TRU) metallic fuel fast reactor cycle coupled with recycling of five long-lived fission products (LLFP) as well as actinides is the most promising system for the sustainable nuclear utilization. Efficient utilization of uranium-238 through the SCNES concept opens the doors to prolong the lifetime of nuclear energy systems towards several tens of thousand years. Recent evolution of the concept revealed compatibility of fuel sustainability, minor actinide (MA) minimization and non-proliferation aspects for peaceful use of nuclear energy systems through the discussion. As for those TRU compositions stabilized under fast neutron spectra, plutonium isotope fractions are remained in the range of reactor grade classification with high fraction of Pu240 isotope. Recent evolution of the SCNES concept has revealed that TRU recycling can cope with enhancing non-proliferation efforts in peaceful use with the 'no-blanket and multi-zoning core' concept. Therefore, the realization of SCNES is most important. In addition, along the process to the goals, a three-step approach is proposed to solve concurrent problems raised in the LWR systems. We discussed possible roles and contribution to the near future demand along worldwide expansion of LWR capacities by applying the 1st generation SCNES. MA fractions in TRU are more than 10% from LWR discharged fuels and even higher up to 20% in fuels from long interim storages. TRU recycling in the 1st generation SCNES system can reduce the MA fractions down to 4-5% in a few decades. This capability significantly releases 'MA' pressures in down-stream of LWR systems. Current efforts for enhancing capabilities for energy generation by LWR systems are efficient against the global warming crisis. In parallel to those movements, early realization of the SCNES concept can be the most viable decision

  14. On the structure of nonproliferation measures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kano, Takashi

    1994-01-01

    The author proposed a new analysis method of nonproliferation measures depending on full perception of common threat of nuclear proliferation to entire human being. Nuclear nonproliferation policies of the US and Japan were analysed by this method and it revealed the following results: 1) There is a large discrepancy between the nuclear nonproliferation policies of the US and Japan mainly because of the different standpoints of both nations and partly because of the difference of understanding on the definition of nonproliferation, and the object of nonproliferation measures. 2) The total structure of nuclear nonproliferation measures becomes more visible through categorization of nonproliferation measures, depending on implementater, target for implementation, characteristics of the measures (soft-liner, legal, or hard-liner) and risk factor for reduction of the total risk of nuclear weapon use. 3) The total structure of nonproliferation measures is multi-barrier structure on the process to reach the actual nuclear weapon use, and each barrier is composed of multi-defense in depth structure including various soft-liner, legal, and hard-linear measures. 4) Various nonproliferation measures can be stored in a data base, based on the proposed structural analysis, which enables further comprehensive analysis for specific purposes efficiently. (author)

  15. Romania non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Biro, Lucian; Grama, Viviana

    2001-01-01

    respect to non-proliferation policy, Romania ratified bilateral Agreements with USA and Canada concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Romania controls the import export activities through CNCAN and Ministry of Foreign Affairs - National Agency for Control of Strategic Exports and Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. CNCAN authorizes all import and export activities concerning materials, devices, equipment and information pertinent for the proliferation of nuclear weapons or of other explosive nuclear devices referred in the Law on the safe deployment of nuclear activities, no. 111/1996, republished. CNCAN has an active role in preventing and combating the illicit trafficking as a national responsible and to control all nuclear material and nuclear activities. (author)

  16. Interviews concerning topical questions in nuclear technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Segatz, U.; Schatz, A.; Stephany, M.; Michaelis, H.

    1978-01-01

    On the occasion of the Nuclex meeting, October 3-7, 1978, Basle/Switzerland, the editorial department of 'Atom und Strom' questioned some leading scientists in nuclear technology on particularly relevant topics. The following subjects were discussed: - How long can we do without nuclear energy, - Modern technology for nuclear power plants, - Nuclear fuel cycle and environment, - Nuclear energy and European Communities, - Nuclear energy and its risks (reflections on incidents). (orig./UA) [de

  17. The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members [es

  18. The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-12-13

    The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 14 September 1973 pursuant to Article 25.

  19. The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  20. Guidelines for the International Observation by the Agency of Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes under the Provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or Analogous Provisions in Other International Agreements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    On 21 June 1972 the Board of Governors approved guidelines for the international observation by the Agency of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or analogous provisions in other international agreements. These guidelines are now reproduced herein for the information of all Members

  1. The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  2. The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 14 September 1973 pursuant to Article 25.

  3. The text of the Agreement of 14 July 1980 between Indonesia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-09-01

    The full text of the agreement between Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is presented

  4. The text of the Agreement of 14 January 1980 between Senegal and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-04-01

    The full text of the agreement between Senegal and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is presented

  5. The Text of the Agreement between the German Democratic Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-04-27

    The text of the Agreement between the German Democratic Republic and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  6. Lawsuits concerning nuclear power generation in FRG

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Saito, Osamu

    1980-01-01

    The confirmation of the courts of justice is required for the permission of power stations. This proposition is not in the laws in FRG, but in view of the recent judicatory regulation, it seems to be the norm established experimentally. From the character of German nation, more than 40 specialists and the committees independent of administration take part in the procedure of administrative permission, but considering the temporary procedure, the processes of five classes of courts join in these. Based on the background of such situation, the author outlined the traditional practice in the legislation and administration in the field of nuclear power generation, then investigated into the decisions of Freiburg and Wuerzburg courts of administrative litigation in 1977 and the decision of the federal constitutional court in 1978. Confronting the same technology of light water reactors, the Freiburg court said that the device protecting from the burst of a pressure vessel is necessary, but the Wuerzburg court did not demand it. The confrontations similar to it were seen in the requirements for the utilization of radioactive substances and the final storage of them. The recent decision of the federal constitutional court is concerned with FBRs, and the court discussed the problem of ''residual risks''. The studies on the German decisions are useful for Japan. (Kako, I.)

  7. Nuclear commerce and non-proliferation in the 1980's: some thoughst

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, G.

    1982-01-01

    The spread of nuclear technology and the possibility of nuclear proliferation were discussed. The United States foreign policies on these topics, and their effects on the nuclear power industry, were also included

  8. U.S. nonproliferation policy in the decade of the eighties: Past dilemmas and prospects for the future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marshall, H.R. Jr.

    1986-01-01

    No single event had more effect on the policies concerning nuclear importation and exportation activities than the 1974 detonation of a nuclear explosive device in India. This led eventually to the enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) in 1978. The author describes the difficult negotiations of the U.S. administration with Euratom, Japan, China, and Latin America. (CW) [de

  9. Development of international law concerning nuclear liability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ifflaender, G.; Kantner, G.

    1979-01-01

    A short overview is given of the most important international conventions relating to civil liability for damage to, or loss of, life of persons or property, caused by nuclear incidents during the operation of stationary and non-stationary nuclear installations or transport of nuclear material. In accord with the international provisions, in the German Democratic Republic too, nuclear operators are exclusively liable for such damage unless it has been caused intentionally by the injury party. (author)

  10. Reagan outlines nonproliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Walsh, J.

    1981-01-01

    The Reagan Administration wants to shift from efforts to impose direct control over the fuel cycle and nuclear technology to a framework based on cooperation and initiatives for greater political stability. A nuclear-free zone for the Middle East is one area to explore. Congress responded to this announced plan with a counter move to tighten non-proliferation strategies. Reagan's policy will be to restore the US as an aggressive, but reliable nuclear trading partner operating under adequate safeguards. Critics find this approach dangerous and contradictory. The policy is still too general to answer specific questions about bilateral arrangements, generic permits, plutonium recycling, and other matters

  11. Gamma-ray imaging. Applications in nuclear non-proliferation and homeland security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vetter, Kai; Mihailescu, Lucian

    2010-01-01

    This paper provides the motivation and describes implementations of gamma-ray imaging for homeland security applications and more general for national and international nuclear security. As in nuclear medicine and astrophysics, the goal of gamma-ray imaging is the detection and localization of nuclear materials, however, here in a terrestrial environment with distances between nuclear medicine and astrophysics, i.e. in the range of 1-100 meters. Due to the recently increased threat of nuclear terrorism, the detection of illicit nuclear materials and the prevention of nuclear proliferation through the development of advanced gamma-ray imaging concepts and technologies has become and active research field. (author)

  12. The law concerning liability for nuclear damage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kinouchi, Kazuo

    1978-01-01

    This treatise outlines the Law on Compensation for Nuclear Damage (Law No. 147, June 17, 1961) and the Law on Indemnity Agreement for Compensation of Nuclear Damage (Law, No. 148, June 17, 1961) which are both came into effect in March, 1962, and describes how these laws will be executed if an accident occurs actually in nuclear facilities. The first law which prescribes various provisions for compensation of nuclear damage is characterised as having the principle of no-fault liability and hence making a nuclear enterpriser responsible for securing adequate financial resources to indemnify general public for their damages from nuclear accidents. Thus, in compliance with the law a nuclear enterpriser should effect both the contract of the indemnity responsible insurance and the indemnity agreement for compensation of nuclear damage. The second law deals with the indemnity agreement which is concluded by a nuclear enterpriser with the government and constitutes a full measure for compensation of nuclear damage supplementing the indemnity responsible insurance. The indemnity agreement is to insure compensation liabilities for nuclear damages which the indemnity responsible insurance can not cover-that is, damages caused by earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, and also damages from normal operations of nuclear facilities and those occurs after 10 years of an accident. Then, the author describes in detail how these laws apply in a nuclear accident to damages to third parties and those to facilities of related nuclear enterpriser himself and to his employees. Finally, the author refers to the legal systems for compensation of nuclear damage in the United States, Britain, France and West Germany. (Matsushima, A.)

  13. Nuclear techniques to address HAB concerns

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vu Nhu Ngoc; Phan Son; Nguyen Ngoc Lam and Chu Van Thuoc

    2004-01-01

    In December, 1998, The Project Formulation meeting on application of Nuclear Techniques to address red tide (Harmful Algal Bloom concerns) was held in Manila Philippines. This is an IAEA/RCA project with the participation of Australia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, The Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. The main objectives of this project (RAS/8/076) included: - Conduct of segmentation studies to gain information on the natural histories of sediments and to correlated these with Red Tide occurrences. - Development of descriptive and predictive of the behaviour of Algal Bloom as affected by the interplay of the causative organism with the environment parameters in the water column and sediments. - Development and field testing of a rapid assay technique based on tritium - labeled saxitoxin for toxin determination. The first phase has been completed in 2002 and the second phase will be completed in 2004. In the two years of 2001 - 2002 Ted Tide occurred in very larger area in Vietnam, for example, in the coast of Binh Thuan Province with the density of 39.10 9 cells/litre. The Ministry of science - technology environment of Vietnam has support 5.000 USD each years for sediment and algal sampling in Cam Ranh Bay (Nha Trang, 11 o 45N and 10 o 15E) and Ha Long Bay in the North - East of Vietnam (21 o 15 and 107 o 3E) and in 2003 in Tuy Phong Bay (Binh Thuan province) (10 o 15N, 108 o 45E). Three sediment core has been taken from Cam Ranh Bay, Ha Long Bay and Tuy Phong Bay. The volume of sediment core is Φ = 8 cm and h = 60 cm. The algal samples have been collected by Bongo nets in Cam Ranh, Ha Long Bay and Tuy Phong Bay. (author)

  14. The Text of the Agreement between Madagascar and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1974-01-01

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Madagascar and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 14 June 1973 pursuant to Article 24. Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

  15. The Text of the Agreement between Mauritius and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Mauritius and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 31 January 1973, pursuant to Article 24. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

  16. The Text of the Agreement between Mauritius and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-06-12

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Mauritius and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 31 January 1973, pursuant to Article 24. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

  17. The Text of the Agreement between Madagascar and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1974-02-19

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Madagascar and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 14 June 1973 pursuant to Article 24. Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

  18. The Text of the Agreement between Finland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1971-10-27

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Republic of Finland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. Members will be informed of the entry into force of the Agreement pursuant to Article 25 thereof by an addendum to this document.

  19. The Text of the Agreement between Austria and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1971-01-01

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Republic of Austria and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. Members will be informed of the entry into force of the Agreement pursuant to Article 25 thereof by an addendum to this document

  20. The Text of the Agreement between Finland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1971-01-01

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Republic of Finland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. Members will be informed of the entry into force of the Agreement pursuant to Article 25 thereof by an addendum to this document.

  1. The Text of the Agreement between Austria and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1971-11-19

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Republic of Austria and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. Members will be informed of the entry into force of the Agreement pursuant to Article 25 thereof by an addendum to this document.

  2. Losing nuclear expertise - A safety concern

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ziakova, M.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: Since the mid of eighties several important changes in human beings behaviour, which influence nuclear field, can be observed - the loss of interest in studying technical disciplines (namely nuclear), strong pressure of environmental movements, stagnation of electricity consumption and deregulation of electric markets. All these factors create conditions which are leading to the decrease of job positions related to the nuclear field connected particularly with research, design and engineering. Loss of interest in studying nuclear disciplines together with the decrease of number of job positions has led to the declining of university enrolments, closing of university departments and research reactors. In this manner just a very small number of appropriately educated new experts are brought In the same moment the additional internal factor - the relative ageing of the human workforce on both sites operators of nuclear facilities and research and engineering organisations can be observed. All these factors, if not addressed properly, could lead to the loss of nuclear expertise and the loss of nuclear expertise represents the direct thread to the nuclear safety. The latest studies have shown that at present NPPs cannot be replaced by other kinds of electric sources and in no case by renewable ones in an efficient manner. Therefore it is necessary to carefully manage knowledge gathered in the nuclear field during the years and to keep on the nuclear safety research, education and training to ensure and upgrade safe and reliable operation of existing and future nuclear facilities. This is responsibility of both the governments of the states using nuclear applications and owners of nuclear facilities. (author)

  3. IAEA safeguards and non-proliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Harry, R J.S.

    1995-02-01

    An overview is given of efforts to contain the nuclear weapons proliferation during half a century of man-controlled nuclear fission. An initial policy of denial did not work, a following period of cooperation needed a gradual strengthening of international assurances on the peaceful character of the flourishing use of nuclear techniques for power generation and of other applications. The focus of the nuclear weapon proliferation concern changed from the highly developed states to developing states. The Non-Proliferation Treaty laid the basis for a unique system of voluntarily accepted international inspections to verify the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA got the task to implement this `Full Scope Safeguards` on all nuclear material and all nuclear activities in the non-nuclear weapon states. Thanks to the structure of the IAEA, in which both proponent and states with a critical attitude take part in the decision making process on the IAEA execution of its tasks, a balanced, and widely acceptable system emerged. International developments necessitated additional improvements of the non-proliferation system. The increase of strength of sub-national groups triggered international cooperation on physical protection, about a quarter of a century ago. More recently, it appeared that NPT states with assumed nuclear weapon ambitions operated in the margins between the interpretation of IAEA safeguards and the spirit and purpose of NPT. Improvements of the IAEA safeguards and a stronger cooperation between states, including the constraints which exporting states have imposed on nuclear supplies, strengthen the safeguards system. The important reductions in the two largest nuclear weapon arsenals lead, together with the delay in the fast breeder implementation, to large stockpiles of nuclear weapon usable materials. Also in this areas new internationally credible assurances have to be obtained, that these materials will never return to nuclear weapon applications.

  4. IAEA safeguards and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harry, R.J.S.

    1995-02-01

    An overview is given of the efforts to contain the nuclear weapons proliferation during half a century of man-controlled nuclear fission. An initial policy of denial did not work, a following period of cooperation needed a gradual strengthening of international assurances on the exclusively peaceful character of the flourishing use of nuclear techniques for power generation and of other applications. The focus of the nuclear weapon proliferation concern changed from the highly developed states to developing states. The Non-Proliferation Treaty laid the basis for a unique system of voluntarily accepted international inspections to verify the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA got the task to implement this 'Full Scope Safeguards' on all nuclear material and all nuclear activities in the non-nuclear weapon states. Thanks to the structure of the IAEA, in which both proponent and states with a critical attitude take part in the decision making process on the IAEA execution of its tasks, a balanced, and widely acceptable system emerged. International developments necessitated additional improvements of the non-proliferation system. The increase of strength of sub-national groups triggered international cooperation on physical protection, about a quarter of a century ago. More recently, it appeared that NPT states with assumed nuclear weapon ambitions operated in the margins between the interpretation of IAEA safeguards and the spirit and purpose of NPT. Improvements of the IAEA safeguards and a stronger cooperation between states, including the constraints which exporting states have imposed on nuclear supplies, strengthen the safeguards system. The important reductions in the two largest nuclear weapon arsenals lead, together with the delay in the fast breeder implementation, to large stockpiles of nuclear weapon usable materials. Also in this areas new internationally credible assurances have to be obtained, that these materials will never return to nuclear

  5. Heavy water and nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miller, M.M.

    1980-05-01

    This report begins with a historical sketch of heavy water. The report next assesses the nonproliferation implications of the use of heavy water-moderated power reactors; several different reactor types are discussed, but the focus is on the natural uranium, on-power fueled, pressure tube reactor CANDU. The need for and development of on-power fueling safeguards is discussed. Also considered is the use of heavy water in plutonium production reactors as well as the broader issue of the relative nuclear leverage that suppliers can bring to bear on countries with natural uranium-fueled reactors as compared to those using enriched designs. The final chapter reviews heavy water production methods and analyzes the difficulties involved in implementing these on both a large and a small scale. It concludes with an overview of proprietary and nonproliferation constraints on heavy water technology transfer

  6. Nuclear and radiation studies and environmental concerns

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McEwan, A.C.

    1998-01-01

    Over the three days 22-24 September 1998 a Science Forum was convened under the general heading of 'Nuclear technology in relation to water resources and the aquatic environment' at the International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna. Some points of interest, or points of more particular relevance to radiation protection, are noted from the five sessions of the Forum: Session 1: water resources; Session 2: sea transport of radioactive and nuclear materials; Session 3: monitoring radioactivity in the aquatic environment; Session 4: nuclear technology in relation to waste resources and the aquatic environment, Session 5: impact assessment. (author)

  7. Non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Manley, I.T.

    1981-01-01

    Proliferation is a problem that can only be solved when the political problems which lead countries to contemplate, the possession of nuclear weapons are solved; in the meantime it can only be managed. Non-proliferation policy has to deal both with the political and the technical aspects of proliferation. It must seek to buy time by addressing the reasons why nations feel the political need to construct nuclear weapons, as well as delaying the moment when such nations feel capable of doing so. The subject is examined and proposals made. (author)

  8. Nuclear education and training: cause for concern?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yamagata, H.

    2000-01-01

    Many diverse technologies, currently serving nations worldwide, would be adversely affected if there was an inadequate number of nuclear scientists and engineers in the future with appropriate scientific and technical backgrounds and university curricula. (author)

  9. Report concerning Zarnowiec nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Albinowski, S.; Dakowski, M.; Downarowicz, M.

    1990-01-01

    Report of the Team of the President of the National Atomic Energy Agency regarding Zarnowiec nuclear power plant contains the analysis of situation in Poland in June 1990, the assessment of public opinion, as well as the description of ecological, technical and economical problems. The team's conclusions are given together with the general conclusion to stop the construction of Zarnowiec nuclear power plant. 5 appendixes, 6 enclosures, 1 documents list, 1 tab. (A.S.)

  10. A Study on the Nuclear Foreign Policy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Byung Wook; Lee, H. M.; Ko, H. S.; Ryu, J. S.; Oh, K. B.; Yang, M. H.; Lee, K. S

    2007-12-15

    This study approaches the international trends related to nuclear non-proliferation in four aspects. First, this study analyzes the trend of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, which includes the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the international nuclear export control regime and proposals for assurance of nuclear fuel supply. Second, this study analyzes the trend of international nuclear organizations, which includes the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a central body of development of nuclear technology and international nuclear diplomacy, and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development/Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA), a intergovernmental organization to consist of a group of nuclear advanced countries. Third, this study analyzes the trends of the U.S.'s nuclear foreign policies, particularly nuclear non-proliferation. Fourth, this study analyzes the nuclear issues of North Korea and Iran as they cause serious concerns to a international society.

  11. A Study on the Nuclear Foreign Policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Byung Wook; Lee, H. M.; Ko, H. S.; Ryu, J. S.; Oh, K. B.; Yang, M. H.; Lee, K. S.

    2007-12-01

    This study approaches the international trends related to nuclear non-proliferation in four aspects. First, this study analyzes the trend of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, which includes the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the international nuclear export control regime and proposals for assurance of nuclear fuel supply. Second, this study analyzes the trend of international nuclear organizations, which includes the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a central body of development of nuclear technology and international nuclear diplomacy, and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development/Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA), a intergovernmental organization to consist of a group of nuclear advanced countries. Third, this study analyzes the trends of the U.S.'s nuclear foreign policies, particularly nuclear non-proliferation. Fourth, this study analyzes the nuclear issues of North Korea and Iran as they cause serious concerns to a international society

  12. Taking the Lead: Russia, the United States, and Nuclear Nonproliferation after Bush

    Science.gov (United States)

    2008-12-01

    2002), especially chap. 5; Henry D. Sokolski, ed., Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Worries beyond War ( Carl - isle: SSI, January 2008); Henry Sokolski and...Two sides of this issue are argued in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: W. W. Norton, 995

  13. Nonproliferation and safeguards aspects of the DUPIC fuel cycle concept

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Persiani, P K [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States)

    1997-07-01

    The purpose of the study is to comment on the proliferation characteristic profiles of some of the proposed fuel cycle alternatives to help ensure that nonproliferation concerns are introduced into the early stages of a fuel cycle concept development program, and to perhaps aid in the more effective implementation of the international nonproliferation regime initiative and safeguards systems. Alternative recycle concepts proposed by several countries involve the recycle of spent fuel without the separation of plutonium from uranium and fission products. The concepts are alternatives to either the direct long-term storage deposition of or the purex reprocessing of the spent fuels. The alternate fuel cycle concepts reviewed include: the dry-recycle processes such as the direct use of reconfigured PWR spent fuel assemblies into CANDU reactors(DUPIC); low-decontamination, single-cycle co-extraction of fast reactor fuels in a wet-purex type of reprocessing; and on a limited scale the thorium-uranium fuel cycle. The nonproliferation advantages usually associated with the above non-separation processes are: the highly radioactive spent fuel presents a barrier to the physical diversion of the nuclear material; avoid the need to dissolve and chemically separate the plutonium from the uranium and fission products; and that the spent fuel isotopic quality of the plutonium vector is further degraded. Although the radiation levels and the need for reprocessing may be perceived as barriers to the terrorist or the subnational level of safeguards, the international level of nonproliferation concerns is addressed primarily by material accountancy and verification activities. On the international level of nonproliferation concerns, the non-separation fuel cycle concepts involved have to be evaluated on the bases of the impact the processes may have on nuclear materials accountancy. (author).

  14. The nuclear non-proliferation: The validity of the rule in Latin America

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cubillos Meza, Adela

    2005-01-01

    The position of Latin American countries within the framework of the Non Nuclear Proliferation Treaty NPT is analyzed in this article. This treaty which entered into force in 1968, has been ratified by a significant number of countries. The nuclear- weapon states, the United States and the former USSR gave origin to the NPT in order to control nuclear proliferation. This treaty has been subject to criticism since it discriminates between the countries which have nuclear weapons and the ones that do not. Thus, the former are allowed to manufacture atomic devices, but it has been forbidden for the latter. Even nuclear- weapon states such as France and China did not support the treaty immediately because they consider it as highly discriminatory. Countries that do not have nuclear weapons have criticized the NPT and did not joined immediately. Among these parties, we can mention three Latin American countries, Argentina, Brazil and Chile. The first two only signed the NPT when they were fully capable and autonomous in nuclear power. The Chilean position of not joining immediately depended upon the Argentinian and Brazilian decision [es

  15. The Asian countries and the non-proliferation treaty prorogation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hoffmann, N.

    1995-01-01

    This work deals with the non-proliferation treaty prorogation of Asia. The position of the asian countries under the old non-proliferation treaty is given. It includes the 1968 non-proliferation treaty signatories, the calling in question again and the criticisms revealed by the asian countries. The positions and the open forecasts expressed on the non-proliferation treaty prorogation and the article on the elimination of the nuclear weapons are also given. (O.L.)

  16. Outlook on non-proliferation activities in the world and cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy among Turkish speaking countries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Birsen, N.

    2002-01-01

    Nuclear technology is being widely used in protecting the environment, manufacturing industry, medicine, agriculture, food industry and electricity production. In the world, 438 nuclear power plants are in operation, and 31 are under construction. Nuclear share of total electricity generation have reached to 17 percent. However, 2053 nuclear tests from 1945 to 1999 and 2 atom bombs to Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 have initiated nonproliferation activities aiming to halt the spread of nuclear weapons and to create a climate where cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy can be fostered. In addition to international efforts for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, great efforts were made for disarmament and banning the nuclear tests which damage the environment. Following the first Geneva Conference in 1955 for expanding peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Turkey was one of the first countries to start activities in the nuclear field. Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK) was established in 1956 and Turkey became a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency established in 1957 by the United Nations for spreading the use of nuclear energy to contribute peace, health and prosperity throughout the world in same year. Turkey is a candidate state to join to European Union and has already signed Custom Union Agreement, also part of the Eurasian Region. So, there are significant developments in cultural, social, technical, economical and trade relations owning to our common historical and cultural values with the countries in the region and Central Asia. TAEK was established to support, co-ordinate and perform the activities in peaceful uses of nuclear energy and act as a regulatory body and establish cooperation with countries and international organizations. In the late 1990's TAEK, besides the cooperation with various countries, has involved to cooperating with nuclear institutes of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan for

  17. The future of non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gere, F.

    2000-01-01

    This paper comprises two parts. The first part makes a status of the non-proliferation policy: problems of ratification of Start 2 and CTBT treaties, nuclear tests in India and Pakistan in May 1998 etc. The second part makes a prospective reflexion on the evolution of the position of nuclearized countries at the 2015-2030 vista: role of Asia, nuclear perception, evolution of the US perception of non-proliferation, military strategy and European unification. (J.S.)

  18. Nonproliferation analysis of the reduction of excess separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persiani, P.J.

    1995-01-01

    The purpose of this preliminary investigation is to explore alternatives and strategies aimed at the gradual reduction of the excess inventories of separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium (HEU) in the civilian nuclear power industry. The study attempts to establish a technical and economic basis to assist in the formation of alternative approaches consistent with nonproliferation and safeguards concerns. The analysis addresses several options in reducing the excess separated plutonium and HEU, and the consequences on nonproliferation and safeguards policy assessments resulting from the interacting synergistic effects between fuel cycle processes and isotopic signatures of nuclear materials

  19. International auspices for the storage of spent nuclear fuel as a nonproliferation measure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    O'Brien, J.N.

    1981-01-01

    The maintenance of spent nuclear fuel from power reactors will pose problems regardless of how or when the debate over reprocessing is resolved. At present, many reactor sites contain significant buildups of spent fuel stored in holding pools, and no measure short of shutting down reactors with no remaining storage capacity will alleviate the need for away-from-reactor storage. Although the federal government has committed itself to dealing with the spent fuel problem, no solution has been reached, largely because of a debate over differing projections of storage capacity requirements. Proliferation of weapons grade nuclear material in many nations presents another pressing issue. If nations with small nuclear programs are forced to deal with their own spent fuel accumulations, they will either have to reprocess it indigenously or contract to have it reprocessed in a foreign reprocessing plant. In either case, these nations may eventually possess sufficient resources to assemble a nuclear weapon. The problem of spent fuel management demands real global solutions, and further delay in solving the problem of spent nuclear fuel accumulation, both nationally and globally, can benefit only a small class of elected officials in the short term and may inflict substantial costs on the American public, and possibly the world

  20. Institutional effectiveness in international regimes. An analysis of the effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime coping with the political malignity in the case of Iran

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Oezden, Tugba

    2015-07-01

    Among the international security regimes, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime has a prominent ranking due to the destructive power of the nuclear weapons over regional and global peace and stability. The NPT Regime has come across with two major challenges in the recent decade: North Korea and Iran. Contrary to North Korea, Iran is determined to stay as a state party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Regime still did not confirm the character and extent of Iranian nuclear program. The question of this study is ''why the processes of the NPT Regime cannot specify the nature and scope of Irans nuclear program?'' The three main the processes of the regime, which are the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the multilateral negotiations, are examined to determine the weaknesses of the regime. This study argues that the regime is modulated to cope with operational challenges and it remains relatively incompetent when a political challenge arises.

  1. Historical Survey of Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Estonia, 1946-1995

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maremaee, Ello; Tankler, Hain; Putnik, Henno; Maalmann, Iige

    2003-12-01

    The report presents a historical survey on two of the nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards in Estonia - Sillamaee Uranium Extraction Factory and the Paldiski Submarine Training Centre. These facilities were a Soviet legacy and shall be decommissioned and it is only through a close international co-operation and technical assistance that it would be possible to solve all the problems arising at these facilities. The historical survey represents the best available information the authors were able to give on the nuclear facilities, which have functioned on the territory of Estonia. The historical survey was a joint co-operation initiative by the Estonian Radiation Protection Centre and the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate. The historical survey will be presented to the IAEA as a volunteer supplement to the State Declaration according to the Additional Protocol (author)

  2. Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament: the President Obama's Prague speech

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hautecouverture, B.

    2010-01-01

    The author comments the content and the consequences of President Obama's speech on the future of nuclear weapons in the 21. century. After a recall of the political context, the author shows how this declaration sounded with a real new tone, defined a new direction and introduced a new method, but may reach its objectives only on a long term. Then, he comments how these objectives are challenged by the present context and events, and outlines how the US Nuclear Posture Review will be important

  3. Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament: speech of the president Obama at Prague

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hautecouverture, B.

    2009-01-01

    Introduced by the Prague speech of april 7 2009, the Obama President program towards the non proliferation and the nuclear disarmament was pointed out by its optimism ambition and determination. But a more detailed lecture shows concurrent positions. The author analyzes the political aspects of the President speech. (A.L.B.)

  4. Nuclear Analytical Techniques and Nonproliferation Studies at the University of Texas at Austin

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Landsberger, S.; Biegalski, S.; Schneider, E.; Foltz-Biegalski, K.

    2014-01-01

    The faculty members in the Nuclear and Radiation Engineering Program have made significant contributions to the placing of PhD and MS students in various programs at the national laboratories and US government. The success and foundation of the program is based on a strong collaboration with staff members at these various laboratories, per-reviewed publications, and continued financial support

  5. Agreement of 12 July 1973 between Costa Rica and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

  6. Agreement between the Kingdom of Cambodia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Kingdom of Cambodia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 November 1999, signed in Vienna on 17 December 1999, and entered into force on the same date

  7. IAEA safeguards related to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons- T.N.P. and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America-Tlatelolco

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodrigues, M.D.F.

    1978-04-01

    The application of safeguards, focusing mainly the causes that gave origin to this type of control, is studied. The safeguard procedures used by the IAEA are also given, relative to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America - Tlatelolco, the Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons - T.N.P. and the Euratom safeguards. Some consideration is given to the organizations related to safeguards application such as IAEA, OPANAL and Euratom, their functions and aims. (F.E.) [pt

  8. Cooperation in Nuclear Waste Management, Radiation Protection, Emergency Preparedness, Reactor Safety and Nuclear Non-Proliferation with the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia and Belarus

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dassen, Lars van; Andersson, Sarmite; Bejarano, Gabriela; Delalic, Zlatan; Ekblad, Christer; German, Olga; Grapengiesser, Sten; Karlberg, Olof; Olsson, Kjell; Sandberg, Viviana; Stenberg, Tor; Turner, Roland; Zinger, Irene

    2010-06-01

    The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) is trusted with the task of implementing Sweden's bilateral cooperation with Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus and Armenia in the fields of reactor safety, nuclear waste management, nuclear non-proliferation as well as radiation protection and emergency preparedness. In these fields, SSM also participates in a number of projects financed by the European Union. This report gives an overview of the cooperation projects in 2009 as well as the framework in which they are performed. Summaries of each project are given in an Appendix. The project managers in the Section for Cooperation and Development in the Department of International Affairs are responsible for the cooperation projects and the implementation of the bilateral programmes. But the positive outcome of the projects is also dependent on a large number of experts at SSM who work with the regulatory functions in the nuclear and radiation protection fields in a Swedish context as well as on external consultants. Together, their experience is invaluable for the implementation of the projects. But the projects also give experience of relevance for the SSM staff.

  9. Cooperation in Nuclear Waste Management, Radiation Protection, Emergency Preparedness, Reactor Safety and Nuclear Non-Proliferation with the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia and Belarus.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dassen, Lars van; Andersson, Sarmite; Bejarano, Gabriela; Delalic, Zlatan; Ekblad, Christer; German, Olga; Grapengiesser, Sten; Karlberg, Olof; Olsson, Kjell; Sandberg, Viviana; Stenberg, Tor; Turner, Roland; Zinger, Irene

    2010-06-15

    The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) is trusted with the task of implementing Sweden's bilateral cooperation with Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus and Armenia in the fields of reactor safety, nuclear waste management, nuclear non-proliferation as well as radiation protection and emergency preparedness. In these fields, SSM also participates in a number of projects financed by the European Union. This report gives an overview of the cooperation projects in 2009 as well as the framework in which they are performed. Summaries of each project are given in an Appendix. The project managers in the Section for Cooperation and Development in the Department of International Affairs are responsible for the cooperation projects and the implementation of the bilateral programmes. But the positive outcome of the projects is also dependent on a large number of experts at SSM who work with the regulatory functions in the nuclear and radiation protection fields in a Swedish context as well as on external consultants. Together, their experience is invaluable for the implementation of the projects. But the projects also give experience of relevance for the SSM staff.

  10. Uzbekistan - nonproliferation and continuous activities on countering nuclear materials and other radioactive sources illicit trafficking

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Petrenko, V.D.; Yuldashev, B.S.; Shipilov, N.N.; Karimov, Yu.N.; Fazilov, M.I.

    2006-01-01

    Full text: Countering illicit trafficking of nuclear weapon and its components is an important task in the modern world. For this reason, at the borders and customs points the control of transportation is to be conducted in order to determine radioactive and fissile materials in them. This report presents the results of works performed in the period of 2001 - 2005 years on the program for development of radiation monitors and equipping the Uzbekistan border customs points with them, in order to fight the smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials. The Republic of Uzbekistan is located on the transit transportation crossroad, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Western Europe - to the North, and Iran, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and others - to the South. Therefore, this program is important for saving peace in the world and fighting any attempts to create nuclear weapon in the region. The radiation monitoring equipment is installed at the border customs points through which the transportation enters the Uzbekistan and at the Tashkent International Airport where passengers arrive by air. Also, the customs points are equipped through which the transportation quits for South and international passenger depart. The radiation portal monitors are designed by CIS Aspect (Dubna, Moscow region), however, we develop our own portal monitoring system which can be produced after certification. The Institute of Nuclear Physics provides the technical expertise that includes installation, calibration, maintenance, and secondary alarm response; mobile response units are being developed to rapidly and accurately identify seized material and recommend handling procedures. At present we are accumulating information on the alarm from the Yantar - type radiation monitor at the customs check-points and examining characteristics of the system to improve the results of our research

  11. New Non-Intrusive Inspection Technologies for Nuclear Security and Nonproliferation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ledoux, Robert J.

    2015-10-01

    Comprehensive monitoring of the supply chain for nuclear materials has historically been hampered by non-intrusive inspection systems that have such large false alarm rates that they are impractical in the flow of commerce. Passport Systems, Inc. (Passport) has developed an active interrogation system which detects fissionable material, high Z material, and other contraband in land, sea and air cargo. Passport's design utilizes several detection modalities including high resolution imaging, passive radiation detection, effective-Z (EZ-3D™) anomaly detection, Prompt Neutrons from Photofission (PNPF), and Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence (NRF) isotopic identification. These technologies combine to: detect fissionable, high-Z, radioactive and contraband materials, differentiate fissionable materials from high-Z shielding materials, and isotopically identify actinides, Special Nuclear Materials (SNM), and other contraband (e.g. explosives, drugs, nerve agents). Passport's system generates a 3-D image of the scanned object which contains information such as effective-Z and density, as well as a 2-D image and isotopic and fissionable information for regions of interest.

  12. Common sense and nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kennedy, R.T.

    1985-01-01

    Since the dawn of the nuclear age nearly four decades ago, the United States has been firmly commited to the objective of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. That principle is embodied in the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), support for which has been a basic tenet of US foreign policy and a basic security interest of the world at large ever since. The Reagan administration remains firmly committed to the goal of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Such proliferation could trigger new and grave dangers for America's security and well-being and indeed for that of all the world's peoples. Desperate leaders in future high-stakes conflicts might not shrink from nuclear blackmail or even from the use of nuclear weapons if they were available. A conventional clash between nuclear-armed states in a conflict-prone region might escalate by accident or miscalculation to a local nuclear exchange. It cannot be discounted that such a nuclear clash might threaten to involve the superpowers themselves. With proliferation, also, terrorist groups could more easily acquire nuclear weapons to extort concessions. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, then, is not solely of interest to the superpowers: it is vital to all countries and regions. The security of the countries in those regions to which nuclear weapons might spread would be most immediately and seriously affected. By their adherence to the NPT, more than 100 countries have recognized this fact

  13. Some major challenges: Nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear arms control and nuclear terrorism. Vienna, 29 October 2001. Statement to the symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2001-01-01

    The main topics dealt with the ensuring of an effective, universal and adequately financed system for the verification of nuclear non-proliferation, namely as follows: Effectiveness of the system; Participation in the system ; Financing of the system; Making Progress in Nuclear Arms Control; Protection Against Nuclear Terrorism. In the Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) for 2000, the Agency was able to conclude that for all 140 states with safeguards agreements in place the nuclear material and other items placed under safeguards remained in peaceful nuclear activities or were otherwise adequately accounted for. The Agency currently safeguards over 900 facilities in 70 countries on a regular safeguards budget of approximately US $80 million per year. Turning to the major recent challenge, protection against nuclear terrorism, the IAEA has long been active in encouraging States to make security an integral part of the management of their nuclear programmes. The recent attacks in the United States were, however, a wake-up call to all that more can and must be done. In the week immediately following the tragedy, the IAEA General Conference adopted a resolution which requested a thorough review of Agency activities and programmes relevant to preventing acts of nuclear terrorism

  14. Nuclear non proliferation and disarmament; Non-proliferation nucleaire et desarmement

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-07-01

    In the framework of the publication of a document on the ''weapons mastership, disarmament and non proliferation: the french action'', by the ministry of Foreign Affairs and the ministry of Defense, the French Documentation organization presents a whole document. This document describes and details the following topics: the conference on the treaty of non proliferation of nuclear weapons, the France, Usa and Non Governmental Organizations position, the threats of the proliferation, the french actions towards the disarmament, the disarmament in the world, a chronology and some bibliographic resources. (A.L.B.)

  15. Fast reactors and nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Orlov, V.V.

    1997-01-01

    1.Three aspects of nonproliferation relevant to nuclear power are: Pu buildup in NPP spent fuel cooling ponds (∼ 104 t in case of consumption of ∼ 107 t cheap uranium). Danger of illegal radiochemical extraction of Pu for weapons production; Pu extraction from NPP fuel at the plants available in nuclear countries, its burning along with weapon-grade Pu in NPP reactors or in special-purpose burners; increased hazard of nuclear weapons sprawl with breeders and closed fuel cycle technology spreading all over the world. 2.The latter is one of major obstacles to creation of large-scale nuclear power. 3.Nuclear power of the first stage using 235 U will be able to meet the demands of certain fuel-deficient countries and regions, replacing ∼ 5-10% of conventional fuels in the global consumption for a number of decades. 4.Fast reactors of the first generation and the currently employed fuel technology are far from exhausting their potential for solving economic problems and meeting the challenges of safety, radioactive waste and nonproliferation. Development of large-scale nuclear power will become an option accepted by society for solving energy problems in the following century, provided a breeder technology is elaborated and demonstrated in the next 15-20 years, which would comply with the totality of the following requirement: full internal Pu breeding deterministic elimination of severe accidents involving fuel damage and high radioactivity releases: fast runaway, loss of coolant, fires, steam and hydrogen explosions, etc.; reaching a balance between radioactive wastes disposed of and uranium mined in terms of radiation hazard; technology of closed fuel cycle preventing its use for Pu extraction and permitting physical protection from fuel thefts;economic competitiveness of nuclear power for most of countries and regions, i.e. primarily the cost of NPPs with fat reactors is to be below the cost of modern LWR plants, etc

  16. Scientists of Russian Federal Nuclear Centre - ARSRITP and arms control and nuclear weapons non-proliferation problems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Avrorin, E.N.; Andrusenko, B.A.; Voznyuk, R.I.; Voloshin, N.P.

    1994-01-01

    The activity of scientists of Russian Federal Nuclear Centre (RFNC) -ARSRITP in the field of nuclear disarmament control for the period of 1974 -1993 is discussed. RFNC - ARSRITP scientists in collaboration with american specialists have developed and employed in practice the techniques and equipment to control the bilateral Treaty on the limitation of Nuclear -Weapon Test. Experience of control over nuclear tests of threshold power and realization of new RFNC - ARSRITP scientific and technical projects have made a basis for development of measures and means of possible control methods to observe complete nuclear test ban

  17. Some possible applications of measurements on mu mesons to nuclear safeguards, nonproliferation, and arms control activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kane, W.R.; Vanier, P.E.

    1997-01-01

    In the nuclear safeguards and arms control areas, well-developed methodologies exist for determining the properties of nuclear materials via measurements of the gamma rays and neutrons emitted from these materials, or in the arms control area, by the use of radiography. In certain favorable instances, it may by feasible to perform comparable measurements with the use of a ubiquitous, naturally-occurring radiation--cosmic ray mu mesons (muons). At the earth's surface these charged particles have a broad energy distribution peaking at about 500 MeV with a flux of approximately 10 -2 /cm 2 -sec-steradian. In traversing matter, muons lose energy at a rate of approximately 2 MeV/gram almost independent of atomic number. Muons can readily be detected by either plastic scintillators or wire planes. While the flux is small, a scintillator of one meter area, for example, will register about 20,000 events/min. these particles should have utility in the detection and imaging of objects with sectional densities of a few hundred grams/cm 2 . The degree of intrusiveness of the imaging can be controlled through the detector configuration. Some possible applications include: (1) mass measurements on large UF 6 cylinders, (2) determination of the size of treaty-limited objects, e.g., missiles, in rail cars or other containment; (3) verification of single or multiple warheads or components; (4) the detection of concealed, underground cavities. Examples will be presented

  18. Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament: the President Obama's Prague speech; Non-proliferation et desarmement nucleaires: discours de Prague du president Obama

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hautecouverture, B. [Centre d' Etudes de Securite Internationale et de Maitrise des Armements (CESIM), 75 - Paris (France)

    2010-07-15

    The author comments the content and the consequences of President Obama's speech on the future of nuclear weapons in the 21. century. After a recall of the political context, the author shows how this declaration sounded with a real new tone, defined a new direction and introduced a new method, but may reach its objectives only on a long term. Then, he comments how these objectives are challenged by the present context and events, and outlines how the US Nuclear Posture Review will be important

  19. Terminating Safeguards on Excess Special Nuclear Material: Defense TRU Waste Clean-up and Nonproliferation - 12426

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hayes, Timothy [Los Alamos National Laboratory, Carlsbad Operations Group (United States); Nelson, Roger [Department Of Energy, Carlsbad Operations Office (United States)

    2012-07-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) manages defense nuclear material that has been determined to be excess to programmatic needs and declared waste. When these wastes contain plutonium, they almost always meet the definition of defense transuranic (TRU) waste and are thus eligible for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The DOE operates the WIPP in a manner that physical protections for attractiveness level D or higher special nuclear material (SNM) are not the normal operating condition. Therefore, there is currently a requirement to terminate safeguards before disposal of these wastes at the WIPP. Presented are the processes used to terminate safeguards, lessons learned during the termination process, and how these approaches might be useful for future defense TRU waste needing safeguards termination prior to shipment and disposal at the WIPP. Also described is a new criticality control container, which will increase the amount of fissile material that can be loaded per container, and how it will save significant taxpayer dollars. Retrieval, compliant packaging and shipment of retrievably stored legacy TRU waste has dominated disposal operations at WIPP since it began operations 12 years ago. But because most of this legacy waste has successfully been emplaced in WIPP, the TRU waste clean-up focus is turning to newly-generated TRU materials. A major component will be transuranic SNM, currently managed in safeguards-protected vaults around the weapons complex. As DOE and NNSA continue to consolidate and shrink the weapons complex footprint, it is expected that significant quantities of transuranic SNM will be declared surplus to the nation's needs. Safeguards termination of SNM varies due to the wide range of attractiveness level of the potential material that may be directly discarded as waste. To enhance the efficiency of shipping waste with high TRU fissile content to WIPP, DOE designed an

  20. Management Principles for Nonproliferation Organizations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Hund, Gretchen

    2012-01-01

    This paper identifies business models and six management principles that can be applied by a nonproliferation organization to maximize the value and effectiveness of its products. The organizations responsible for reducing the nuclear proliferation threat have experienced a substantial growth in responsibility and visibility since the September 11 attacks. Since then, the international community has witnessed revelations of clandestine nuclear facilities, nuclear black markets, periodic nuclear tests, and a resurgence of interest by countries worldwide in developing nuclear capabilities. The security environment will likely continue to evolve in unexpected ways since most of the proliferation threats with which the world will be forced to contend remain unforeseen. To better prepare for and respond to this evolving security environment, many nonproliferation organizations are interested in finding new or better ways to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of their operations. Of course, all organizations, whether they are market driven or non-profit, must operate effectively and efficiently if they are to succeed. Indeed, as this study demonstrates, many of the management principles that this study recommends can help all organizations succeed. However, this study pays particular attention to nonproliferation organizations because of the mission they are responsible for fulfilling. Nonproliferation organizations, including nonproliferation programs that operate within a larger national security organization, are responsible for reducing the threat of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. These organizations have an enduring mandate from the public and the international community not to fail in the completion of their mission for failure could have detrimental impacts on international security, public health and the environment. Moreover, the public expects nonproliferation organizations and programs to fulfill their mission, even when resources are limited

  1. Management Principles for Nonproliferation Organizations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Hund, Gretchen

    2012-03-06

    This paper identifies business models and six management principles that can be applied by a nonproliferation organization to maximize the value and effectiveness of its products. The organizations responsible for reducing the nuclear proliferation threat have experienced a substantial growth in responsibility and visibility since the September 11 attacks. Since then, the international community has witnessed revelations of clandestine nuclear facilities, nuclear black markets, periodic nuclear tests, and a resurgence of interest by countries worldwide in developing nuclear capabilities. The security environment will likely continue to evolve in unexpected ways since most of the proliferation threats with which the world will be forced to contend remain unforeseen. To better prepare for and respond to this evolving security environment, many nonproliferation organizations are interested in finding new or better ways to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of their operations. Of course, all organizations, whether they are market driven or non-profit, must operate effectively and efficiently if they are to succeed. Indeed, as this study demonstrates, many of the management principles that this study recommends can help all organizations succeed. However, this study pays particular attention to nonproliferation organizations because of the mission they are responsible for fulfilling. Nonproliferation organizations, including nonproliferation programs that operate within a larger national security organization, are responsible for reducing the threat of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. These organizations have an enduring mandate from the public and the international community not to fail in the completion of their mission for failure could have detrimental impacts on international security, public health and the environment. Moreover, the public expects nonproliferation organizations and programs to fulfill their mission, even when resources are limited

  2. Transparency and nonproliferation in the Asia-Pacific region. Enhancing transparency, strengthening the nonproliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hamada, Kazuko

    2008-01-01

    Driven by the prospect of rapid economic growth and the perceived need for energy security, the Asia-Pacific region is destined to increase its nuclear energy use in the coming decades. This projected increase, however, will bring with it nuclear proliferation concerns, fueling fears about the security of nuclear material and creating suspicions about its use. The increasing use of nuclear energy inevitably necessitates supplementary efforts, designed to ensure nuclear security and a legitimate use of nuclear energy, other than the obligation to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Nuclear transparency measures could be useful tools for building confidence that the increasing nuclear energy use does not contribute to nuclear proliferation. These measures could also foster a cooperative tradition that can address rising concerns over nuclear trafficking and terrorism, which require regional coordination to combat. However, moderate progress in implementing transparency measures suggests a lack of political appreciation of this concept. Thus, this paper describes various forms of potential transparency measures to expand the possibilities of the transparency concept and explore areas in which this concept might be applicable. This paper also clarifies some challenges involving transparency projects, and suggests possible ways to address these challenges. (author)

  3. Nuclear denotation: a topic for global public health concern

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wiwanitkit, Viroj

    2011-01-01

    In mid of March 2011, a big Tsunami attacked Japan and caused serious destruction. In addition to the destroyed infrastructure, disruption of the nuclear plants occurred and this is the origin of the big problem of nuclear denotation which is of present concern. Nuclear denotation is an actually interesting new problem that affects a large group of world population. This situation is new and requires our attention in a global level. In this article, the author summarizes and discusses this important topic

  4. Salience of the Nuclear Threat: Operationalization through Spontaneous Concern.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mayton, Daniel M., II

    An indirect/nonreactive technique of assessing spontaneous concern should be used to examine the salience of the threat of nuclear war. Direct/reactive techniques may produce inconsistent results and inadvertently enhance a false consensus. The procedures for the administration, scoring, and interpretation of a spontaneous concern measure along…

  5. United States non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scheinman, L.

    1978-01-01

    U.S. non-proliferation policy is aimed at slowing the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities, managing the destabilizing effects of nuclear technology for energy purposes, and fostering international standards and institutions to deal responsibly with global nuclear development. These goals assume that nuclear technology has not already precluded social control and recognize the social benefits offered by peaceful uses of atomic energy. Non-proliferation policies recognize that the motivation for possessing nuclear weapons is a more-difficult problem than technical ability and will concentrate on reducing those incentives through international agreements and safeguards and by maintaining the separation of commercial nuclear fuel cycles and military uses

  6. Ordinance concerning the filing of transport of nuclear fuel materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    This Order provides provisions concerning nuclear fuel substances requiring notification (nuclear fuel substance, material contaminated with nuclear fuel substances, fissionable substances, etc.), procedure for notification (to prefectural public safety commission), certificate of transpot (issued via public safety commission), instructions (speed of vehicle for transporting nuclear fuel substances, parking of vehicle, place for loading and unloading of nuclear fuel substances, method for loading and unloading, report to police, measures for disaster prevention during transport, etc.), communication among members of public safety commission (for smooth transport), notification of alteration of data in transport certificate (application to be submitted to public safety commission), application of reissue of transport certificate, return of transport certificate, inspection concerning transport (to be performed by police), submission of report (to be submitted by refining facilities manager, processing facilities manager, nuclear reactor manager, master of foreign nuclear powered ship, reprocessing facilities manager, waste disposal facilities manager; concerning stolen or missing nuclear fuel substances, traffic accident, unusual leakage of nuclear fuel substances, etc.). (Nogami, K.)

  7. Statement to 2010 Review Conference of Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 3 May 2010, New York, USA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Amano, Y.

    2010-01-01

    The IAEA works to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and technical cooperation. The IAEA also has a role to play in verifying nuclear disarmament. As all of these activities are relevant to the work of the NPT Review Conference, I would like to provide you with a brief overview of recent developments. As you know, reliable supplies of energy are vital to ensure continued prosperity and sustained development. Nuclear power is enjoying growing acceptance as a stable and clean source of energy that can help to mitigate the impact of climate change. More than 60 countries are considering introducing nuclear power to generate electricity. It is expected that between 10 and 25 new countries will bring their first nuclear power plants online by 2030. Certainly, it is for each sovereign State to decide whether or not to use nuclear power, but the IAEA assists interested countries in establishing a reliable nuclear infrastructure. Nuclear power must be accessible not only for developed countries but also for developing countries. Nuclear power needs to be efficient, sustainable and profitable. Any expansion in its use must be done safely and securely, and without increasing the proliferation risk.A successful NPT Review Conference is indispensable because it will enhance confidence in the non-proliferation regime, which in turn will provide the Agency with a stronger basis for our work in all areas

  8. Nuclear education and training: from concern to capability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) first published in 2000 Nuclear Education and Training: Cause for Concern?, which highlighted significant issues in the availability of human resources for the nuclear industry. Ten years on, Nuclear Education and Training: From Concern to Capability considers what has changed in that time and finds that, while some countries have taken positive actions, in a number of others human resources could soon be facing serious challenges in coping with existing and potential new nuclear facilities. This is exacerbated by the increasing rate of retirement as the workforce ages. This report provides a qualitative characterisation of human resource needs and appraises instruments and programmes in nuclear education and training initiated by various stakeholders in different countries. In this context, it also examines the current and future uses of nuclear research facilities for education and training purposes. Regarding the nuclear training component of workforce competence, it outlines a job taxonomy which could be a basis for addressing the needs of workers across this sector. It presents the taxonomy as a way of enhancing mutual recognition and increasing consistency of education and training for both developed and developing countries. Contents: 1 - A decade of change: Background; The evolving environment; A key resource - a competent workforce; 2 - Review of nuclear education and associated facilities: Introduction; Education and training - progress over the last decade; Present use of research infrastructure for education and training in NEA member countries; 3 - Towards a blueprint for workforce development: The benefits of a competent nuclear workforce; Classifying competence; Analysis ; 4 - Ensuring capability - the recommendations: Nuclear human resource features and requirements; Ten years on - the developments; Approach to developing a common job taxonomy; 5 - Appendices: Recommendations from Nuclear Education and Training

  9. Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power. Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume V. Economics and systems analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-06-01

    This NASAP assessment considers the economics of alternative nuclear reactor and fuel-cycle systems in the light of possible patterns of uranium supply and energy demand, as well as the economic implications of improvng the proliferation resistance of the various systems. The assessment focuses on the costs of alternative nuclear technologies and the possible timing of their implementation, based on their economic attractiveness

  10. Addressing employee concerns about welding in a nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Danko, J.C.; Hansen, D.D.; O'Leary, P.D.

    1988-01-01

    A leading utility contracted with EG and G Idaho to perform a comprehensive, independent evaluation of the utility's welding program with respect to the safety-related welds made at one of its nuclear power plants. The purpose of this paper is to review a number of the employee concerns and the technical basis for the disposition of these concerns. In addition, recommendations are presented that may help to prevent the recurrence of employee concerns in future nuclear power plant construction, and thereby costly delays may be avoided and welding productivity and quality improved

  11. American alliances and nuclear non-proliferation. The end of nuclear weapon activities of US allies; Amerikanische Allianzen und nukleare Nichtverbreitung. Die Beendigung von Kernwaffenaktivitaeten bei Verbuendeten der USA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Schneider, Jonas

    2016-07-01

    Jonas Schneider tackles a question that is of great interest both to scholars of nuclear proliferation and to practitioners of nonproliferation diplomacy: Why do some political leaders of U.S. allies agree to abandon their nation's nuclear weapons activities, while others - who are often members of the same allied government and sometimes even of the same political party - steadfastly reject such a course reversal? Our existing stock of theories does not fare well in accounting for this important variation in leaders' attitudes. To solve this puzzle, Schneider develops an innovative theory that draws on the individual status conceptions of allied political leaders. Subsequently, the author undertakes to test his theory using four thoroughly researched case studies, and he derives important lessons for international nonproliferation diplomacy toward the Middle East and Northeast Asia.

  12. Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Annual Report: Class of 2011

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McMakin, Andrea H.

    2012-08-20

    Annual report for the Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP), which PNNL administers for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Features the Class of 2011. The NGFP is a NNSA program with a mission to cultivate future technical and policy leaders in nonproliferation and international security. Through the NGFP, outstanding graduate students with career interests in nonproliferation are appointed to program offices within the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN). During their one-year assignment, Fellows participate in programs designed to detect, prevent, and reverse the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

  13. Positive steps toward non-proliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Greenhalgh, G.

    1979-08-30

    Russel W. Fox and Mason Willrich in their paper, International Custody of Plutonium Stocks: A First Step Toward an International Regime for Sensitive Nuclear Energy Activities, advocate placing excess plutonium in an international custodial facility; critical criteria governing releases are outlined so that, on one hand the owners can have high confidence that their plutonium will be returned promptly, under appropriate circumstances, and on the other hand, all the other participating and concerned countries can have confidence in the assurance that plutonium will be released only for immediate use in a defined and approved civil purpose. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in the 1978 issue of its Year Book, recognizes a move towards a more positive approach to the problem of nuclear proliferation. It is noted that the non-proliferation strategies of the main supply countries have largely concentrated on a two-pronged approach of technology denials with tightening of safeguards. But already, enrichment, reprocessing, and breeder reactor programs extend far beyond the five nuclear weapon states. History testifies to the limitations of a policy of technical denials. SIPRI recognizes that another way to dissuade non-nuclear weapon states from creating their own enrichment or reprocessing plants would be to establish an open market for these services, a market characterized by diversity and competition. So far, there has been no case where a country has developed nuclear explosives by diverting material from a civil power station. Development of nuclear weapons by various countries is briefly noted and areas where strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is needed are noted. (MCW)

  14. Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power: report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume IX. Reactor and fuel cycle descriptions

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1979-12-01

    The Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program (NASAP) has characterized and assessed various reactor/fuel-cycle systems. Volume IX provides, in summary form, the technical descriptions of the reactor/fuel-cycle systems studied. This includes the status of the system technology, as well as a discussion of the safety, environmental, and licensing needs from a technical perspective. This information was then used in developing the research, development, and demonstration (RD and D) program, including its cost and time frame, to advance the existing technology to the level needed for commercial use. Wherever possible, the cost data are given as ranges to reflect the uncertainties in the estimates. Volume IX is divided into three sections: Chapter 1, Reactor Systems; Chapter 2, Fuel-Cycle Systems; and the Appendixes. Chapter 1 contains the characterizations of the following 12 reactor types: light-water reactor; heavy-water reactor; water-cooled breeder reactor; high-temperature gas-cooled reactor; gas-cooled fast reactor; liquid-metal fast breeder reactor; spectral-shift-controlled reactor; accelerator-driven reactor; molten-salt reactor; gaseous-core reactor; tokamak fusion-fisson hybrid reactor; and fast mixed-spectrum reactor. Chapter 2 contains similar information developed for fuel-cycle facilities in the following categories: mining and milling; conversion and enrichment; fuel fabrication; spent fuel reprocessing; waste handling and disposal; and transportation of nuclear materials.

  15. Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power: report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume IX. Reactor and fuel cycle descriptions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-12-01

    The Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program (NASAP) has characterized and assessed various reactor/fuel-cycle systems. Volume IX provides, in summary form, the technical descriptions of the reactor/fuel-cycle systems studied. This includes the status of the system technology, as well as a discussion of the safety, environmental, and licensing needs from a technical perspective. This information was then used in developing the research, development, and demonstration (RD and D) program, including its cost and time frame, to advance the existing technology to the level needed for commercial use. Wherever possible, the cost data are given as ranges to reflect the uncertainties in the estimates. Volume IX is divided into three sections: Chapter 1, Reactor Systems; Chapter 2, Fuel-Cycle Systems; and the Appendixes. Chapter 1 contains the characterizations of the following 12 reactor types: light-water reactor; heavy-water reactor; water-cooled breeder reactor; high-temperature gas-cooled reactor; gas-cooled fast reactor; liquid-metal fast breeder reactor; spectral-shift-controlled reactor; accelerator-driven reactor; molten-salt reactor; gaseous-core reactor; tokamak fusion-fisson hybrid reactor; and fast mixed-spectrum reactor. Chapter 2 contains similar information developed for fuel-cycle facilities in the following categories: mining and milling; conversion and enrichment; fuel fabrication; spent fuel reprocessing; waste handling and disposal; and transportation of nuclear materials

  16. Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power: report of the nonproliferation alternative systems assessment program. Volume V. Economics and systems analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-12-01

    This NASAP assessment considers the economics of alternative nuclear reactor and fuel-cycle systems in the light of possible patterns of uranium supply and energy demand, as well as the economic implications of improving the proliferation resistance of the various systems. The assessment focuses on the costs of alternative nuclear technologies and the possible timing of their implementation, based on their economic attractiveness. The objectives of this assessment are to identify when economic incentives to deploy advanced nuclear power systems might exist, to estimate the costs of using technologies that would reduce the risk of proliferation, to assess the impact of major economic uncertainties on the transition to new technologies, and to compare the investments required for alternative systems

  17. Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power: report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume V. Economics and systems analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-12-01

    This assessment considers the economics of alternative nuclear reactor and fuel-cycle systems in the light of possible patterns of uranium supply and energy demand, as well as the economic implications of improving the proliferation resistance of the various systems. The assessment focuses on the costs of alternative nuclear technologies and the possible timing of their implementation, based on their economic attractiveness. The objectives of this assessment are to identify when economic incentives to deploy advanced nuclear power systems might exist, to estimate the costs of using technologies that would reduce the risk of proliferation, to assess the impact of major economic uncertainties on the transition to new technologies, and to compare the investments required for alternative systems. This information can then be used to assess the potential economic benefits of alternative research, development, and demonstration programs and the timing of those programs

  18. Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power: report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume V. Economics and systems analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    None

    1979-12-01

    This assessment considers the economics of alternative nuclear reactor and fuel-cycle systems in the light of possible patterns of uranium supply and energy demand, as well as the economic implications of improving the proliferation resistance of the various systems. The assessment focuses on the costs of alternative nuclear technologies and the possible timing of their implementation, based on their economic attractiveness. The objectives of this assessment are to identify when economic incentives to deploy advanced nuclear power systems might exist, to estimate the costs of using technologies that would reduce the risk of proliferation, to assess the impact of major economic uncertainties on the transition to new technologies, and to compare the investments required for alternative systems. This information can then be used to assess the potential economic benefits of alternative research, development, and demonstration programs and the timing of those programs.

  19. A Digest of Nonproliferation Literature.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Duggan, Ruth A

    2006-04-01

    In preparation for the 2005 US/Russian Weapons Laboratories Directors Meeting, the six laboratories participating in the meeting endeavored to develop a strategy for nonproliferation technology research and development. A literature review was conducted to identify possible areas of technical collaboration and technology opportunities associated with improving nonproliferation associated with the civilian nuclear fuel cycle. The issue of multinationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle was also researched. This digest is the compilation of one-page summaries used by management of the three US nuclear weapons laboratories in preparation for strategy development. Where possible, the Web site address of the complete paper is referenced.3 AcknowledgementsThe author wishes to thank Jessica Ruyle, Nancy Orlando-Gay, and Barbara Dry for their research assistance and contributions.4

  20. Assessment of nuclear fuel cycles with respect to assurance of energy supply; economic aspects; environmental aspects; non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    This paper, which was presented to all INFCE Working Groups gives a broad qualitative assessment in tabular form of the following five fuel cycles: LWR once-through, LWR with thermal recycle, HWR once-through, HTR with uranium recycle, fast breeder reactor. The assessment is given of the assurance of supply aspects, the macro- and micro-economic aspects, the environmental aspects, and the non-proliferation, including safeguards, aspects of each fuel cycle

  1. The regulations concerning the uses of nuclear source materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1981-01-01

    This rule is established under the provisions of the law concerning the regulation of nuclear raw materials, nuclear fuel materials and nuclear reactors and the ordinance for the execution of this law, and to enforce them. Basic terms are defined, such as exposure radiation dose, cumulative dose, control area, surrounding monitoring area, worker and radioactive waste. Nuclear raw materials shall be used at the facilities for using them, and control areas and surrounding monitoring areas shall be set up. Cumulative dose and exposure radiation dose of workers shall not exceed the permissible quantities defined by the General Director of the Science and Technology Agency. Records shall be made in each works or enterprise on the accept, delivery and stock of each kind of nuclear raw materials, radiation control and the accidents in the facilities of using nuclear raw materials, and kept for specified periods, respectively. The users of nuclear raw materials shall present reports in each works or enterprise on the stock of these materials on July 30 and December 31, every year. They shall submit reports immediately to the Director General on the particular accidents concerning nuclear raw materials and their facilities and on the circumstances and the measures taken against such accidents within ten days. These reports shall be presented on internationally regulated raw materials too. (Okada, K.)

  2. Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power: report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume IV. Commercial potential

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-12-01

    Volume IV provides time and cost estimates for positioning new nuclear power systems for commercial deployment. The assessment also estimates the rates at which the new systems might penetrate the domestic market, assuming the continuing viability of the massive light-water reactor network that now exists worldwide. This assessment does not recommend specific, detailed program plans and budgets for individual systems; however, it is clear from this analysis that any of the systems investigated could be deployed if dictated by national interest

  3. Twenty years of the Non-proliferation Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldblat, Jozef.

    1990-01-01

    The report assesses the achievements of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and discusses ways in which the non-proliferation regime could be strenghtened. It recommends a series of measures to be taken by the parties of the Treaty, both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states, with a view to reinforcing the Treaty and achieving its universality. 198 refs

  4. The regulations concerning the uses of nuclear fuel materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    The Regulations are established on the basis of ''The law for the regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors'' and the ''Provisions concerning the usage of nuclear fuel materials'' in the Enforcement Ordinance of the Law, to enforce such provisions. Terms are explained, such as exposure radiation dose, cumulative dose, control area, surrounding inspection area, persons engaging in works, area for incoming and outgoing of materials, batch, real stocks, effective value and main measuring points. In the applications for the permission to use nuclear fuel materials, the expected period and quantity of usage of each kind of such materials and the other party and the method of selling, lending and returning spent fuel or the process of disposal of such fuel must be written. Explanations concerning the technical ability required for the usage of nuclear fuel materials shall be attached to the applications. Applications shall be filed for the inspection of facilities for use, in which the name and the address of the applicant, the name and the address of the factory or the establishment, the range of the facilities for use, the maximum quantity of nuclear fuel materials to be used or stocked, and the date, the place and the kind of the expected inspection are written. Prescriptions cover the records to be held, safety regulations, the technical standards for usage, the disposal, transport and storage of nuclear fuel materials and the reports to be filed. (Okada, K.)

  5. Ordinance concerning the filing of transport of nuclear fuel materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    The ordinance is defined under the law for the regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors and the order for execution of the law. Any person who reports the transport of nuclear fuel materials shall file four copies of a notification according to the form attached to the public safety commission of the prefecture in charge of the dispatching place. When the transportation extends over the area in charge of another public safety commission, the commission which has received the notice shall report without delay date and route of the transport, kind and quantity of nuclear fuel materials and other necessary matters to the commission concerned and hear from the latter opinions on the items informed. The designation by the ordinance includes speed of the vehicle loaded with nuclear fuel materials, disposition of an accompanying car, arrangement of the line of the loaded vehicle and accompanying and other escorting cars, location of the parking, place of unloading and temporary storage, etc. Reports concerning troubles and measures taken shall be filed in ten days to the public safety commission which has received the notification, when accidents occur on the way, such as: theft or loss of nuclear fuel materials; traffic accident; irregular leaking of nuclear fuel materials and personal trouble by the transport. (Okada, K.)

  6. Nuclear orientation experiments concerning odd-A gold isotopes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ligthart, H.J.

    1982-01-01

    This thesis describes nuclear spectroscopy aspects of nuclear orientation in the odd-A gold isotopes 191 Au, 193 Au, 195 Au and 197 Au. These isotopes lie in a transitional region between the spherical nuclei in the lead region and the strongly deformed rare earth isotopes. Following a general introduction to nuclear orientation, the experimental arrangement is described. A new technique is presented that applies in-beam recoil implantation inside the refrigerator itself and this was applied to the case of 191 Au. The three other gold isotopes were oriented using a conventional dilution refrigerator. The nuclear orientation experiments concerning 11/2 - isomers of the isotopes are described. The long-lived isomeric states were oriented using the large hyperfine field of gold in iron. Higher lying levels were studied by nuclear orientation of the Hg parent states. (Auth./C.F.)

  7. The Text of the Agreement between New Zealand and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between New Zealand and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  8. The Text of the Agreement between the Philippines and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1974-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Philippines and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 16 October 1974, pursuant to Article 25.

  9. Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (I) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the Protocol Additional thereto, entered into force for the Republic of Slovenia on 1 September 2006 [es

  10. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Estonia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (I) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons came into force for the Republic of Estonia on 1 December 2005 [es

  11. Agreement between the Czech Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (I) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the Protocol Additional thereto, entered into force for the Czech Republic on 1 October 2009 [es

  12. The Text of the Agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (I) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force for the Slovak Republic on 1 December 2005 [es

  13. The Text of the Agreement between the Philippines and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1974-12-13

    The text of the Agreement between the Philippines and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 16 October 1974, pursuant to Article 25.

  14. The Text of the Agreement of 16 May 1974 between Thailand and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1976-11-19

    The text of the Agreement of 16 May 1974 between Thailand and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 16 May 1974, pursuant to Article 25 thereof.

  15. The Text of the Agreement between Viet-Nam and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1975-01-24

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Viet-Nam and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 9 January 1974, pursuant to Article 25.

  16. The Text of the Agreement between New Zealand and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-06-08

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between New Zealand and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  17. The Text of the Agreement of 31 October 1975 between the Republic of Korea and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1976-06-16

    The text of the Agreement of 31 October 1975 between the Republic of Korea and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  18. The Text of the Agreement between the Holy See and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-06-06

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between the Holy See and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  19. The Text of the Agreement between the Republic of Zaire and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-05-14

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Zaire and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  20. The Text of the Agreement of 23 August 1973 between Ghana and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1975-12-16

    The text of the Agreement of 23 August 1973, and of the Protocol thereto, between Ghana and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  1. The Text of the Agreement of 4 March 1977 between Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1978-03-15

    The text of the Agreement of 4 March 1977, and of the Protocol which is an integral part thereof, between Japan and the Agency in implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced for the information of all Members.

  2. Statement issued on 30 January 1995 by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union in connection with the accession of Algeria to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    The statement was issued on 30 January 1995 by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union in connection with Algeria's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Statement was received from the Resident Representative of France to the International Atomic Energy Agency and is being circulated for the information of all Member States

  3. The Text of the Agreement between the Republic of Zaire and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Zaire and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  4. The Text of the Agreement of 4 March 1977 between Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-03-01

    The text of the Agreement of 4 March 1977, and of the Protocol which is an integral part thereof, between Japan and the Agency in implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced for the information of all Members

  5. Statement issued on 28 February 1995 by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on accession of Argentina to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    The statement was issued on 28 February 1995 by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on accession of Argentina to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Statement was received from the Resident Representative of France to the International Atomic Energy Agency and is being circulated for the information of all Member States

  6. The Text of the Agreement between the Holy See and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between the Holy See and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  7. Text of the agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-07-01

    The document informs that the Czech Republic succeeded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 1 January 1993 and to the agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the above treaty

  8. Text of the agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-07-01

    The document informs that the Slovak Republic succeeded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 1 January 1993 and to the agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the above treaty

  9. The text of the agreement of 5 December 1974 between Jordan and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1978-04-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Agreement of 5 December 1974, and the Protocol thereto, between Jordan and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Agreement entered into force on 21 February 1978

  10. The Text of the Agreement between Viet-Nam and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1975-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Viet-Nam and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 9 January 1974, pursuant to Article 25.

  11. The Text of the Agreement of 31 October 1975 between the Republic of Korea and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1976-01-01

    The text of the Agreement of 31 October 1975 between the Republic of Korea and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  12. The Text of the Agreement of 7 August 1978 between Portugal and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-11-01

    The text of the Agreement of 7 August 1978 between Portugal and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 25, on 14 June 1979.

  13. The Text of the Agreement of 23 August 1973 between Ghana and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1975-01-01

    The text of the Agreement of 23 August 1973, and of the Protocol thereto, between Ghana and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  14. Implementation of nuclear reduction agreements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scheinman, L.

    1994-01-01

    The collapse of the Soviet Union not only created a new political environment conductive to arms control and disarmament. It also raised unique and unprecedent non-proliferation problems which bear on the implementation of Start I and even on the Non-proliferation treaty insofar as a failure to rein in Ukraine would create a case of instant proliferation and raise questions about whether somehow Russia as a successor of the Soviet Union failed to meet its Non-proliferation Treaty obligation not to 'assist' any other state in acquiring nuclear weapons. The significance of implementing the agreements concerned with non-proliferation, production of highly enriched uranium outside IAEA safeguards, transparency relevance to the international arena, particularly to nuclear issues are discussed as crucial to progress towards a more stable and secure world order. The importance of the Non-proliferation Treaty extension Conference is underlined

  15. The National Ignition Facility (NIF) and the issue of nonproliferation. Final study

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-12-19

    NIF, the next step proposed by DOE in a progression of Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) facilities, is expected to reach the goal of ICF capsule ignition in the laboratory. This report is in response to a request of a Congressman that DOE resolve the question of whether NIF will aid or hinder U.S. nonproliferation efforts. Both technical and policy aspects are addressed, and public participation was part of the decision process. Since the technical proliferation concerns at NIF are manageable and can be made acceptable, and NIF can contribute positively to U.S. arms control and nonproliferation policy goals, it is concluded that NIF supports the nuclear nonproliferation objectives of the United States.

  16. The National Ignition Facility (NIF) and the issue of nonproliferation. Final study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    NIF, the next step proposed by DOE in a progression of Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) facilities, is expected to reach the goal of ICF capsule ignition in the laboratory. This report is in response to a request of a Congressman that DOE resolve the question of whether NIF will aid or hinder U.S. nonproliferation efforts. Both technical and policy aspects are addressed, and public participation was part of the decision process. Since the technical proliferation concerns at NIF are manageable and can be made acceptable, and NIF can contribute positively to U.S. arms control and nonproliferation policy goals, it is concluded that NIF supports the nuclear nonproliferation objectives of the United States

  17. Nonproliferation characteristics of advanced fuel cycle concepts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persiani, P.J.

    1998-01-01

    The purpose of this study is to comment on the proliferation characteristic profiles of some of the proposed fuel cycle alternatives to help ensure that nonproliferation concerns are introduced into the early stages of a fuel cycle concept development program, and to perhaps aid in the more effective implementation of the international nonproliferation regime initiatives and safeguards methods and systems. Alternative cycle concepts proposed by several countries involve the recycle of spent fuel without the separation of plutonium from uranium and fission products

  18. Prediction of future dispute concerning nuclear power generation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1981-04-01

    This investigation is the third research on the public acceptance of nuclear power generation by the National Congress on Social Economics. In this study, how the energy dispute including that concerning nuclear power generation will develop in 1980s and 1990s, how the form of dispute and the point of controversy will change, were predicted. Though the maintenance of the concord of groups strongly regulates the behavior of people, recently they have become to exercise individual rights frequently. The transition to the society of dispute is the natural result of the modernization of society and the increase of richness. The proper prediction of social problems and the planning and execution of proper countermeasures are very important. The background, objective, basic viewpoint, range and procedure of this investigation, the change of social dispute, the history of the dispute concerning nuclear power generation, the basic viewpoint in the prediction of the dispute concerning nuclear power generation, the social situation in 1980s, the prediction and avoidance of the dispute in view of social and energy situations, and the fundamental strategy for seeking a clue to the solution in 1980s and 1990s are described. The establishment of neutral mediation organs and the flexible technologies of nuclear reactors are necessary. (Kako, I.)

  19. United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    Science and technology transformed the world in the twentieth century. Living standards improved but warfare was rendered more deadly. Weapons of mass destruction - biological, chemical and nuclear - and their means of delivery were developed, as ever more sophisticated conventional armaments were produced and disseminated. The horrors and destruction of armed conflict persist. The need for disarmament and non-proliferation education and training has never been greater. Indeed, changing concepts and perceptions of security and threat magnify the urgency for new thinking to pursue disarmament and non-proliferation goals. More than a decade after the end of the cold war and at the start of the twenty- first century, there is a pressing need to combat ignorance, complacency and a culture of violence. These can be countered through long-term programmes of education and training, especially those related to disarmament and non- proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, with a view to their reduction and complete elimination. At the same time, concern has heightened over the global threat of the excessive and destabilizing proliferation of conventional weapons, especially small arms and light weapons, rendering more acute the need to combat such proliferation in a sustained way through disarmament and non-proliferation education and training. Additionally there is a need to raise awareness of new challenges to international security and the process of disarmament. Among them, terrorism, with the possibility of the use of weapons of mass destruction, is a source of particular concern. Other challenges, such as organized crime, poverty, human rights abuses and environmental concerns must also be taken into account. Education and training remain important but under utilized tools for promoting peace, disarmament and non-proliferation. The present report addresses that issue and proposes ideas for action

  20. Reflections on the problems concerning the acceptance of nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coenen, R.; Frederichs, G.; Loeben, M.

    1977-01-01

    The public's increasingly sceptical attitude towards nuclear energy and the massive opposition against the settlement of nuclear facilities have resulted in an unofficial moratorium and present a danger for the further introduction of nuclear energy. While prevailing attempts to explain the opposition see the behaviour of nuclear opponents mainly as an emotional reaction, thus only giving an insufficient explanation of the outbreak and the course of the conflict, the political dimension of the acceptance problems is dealt with here, and the inadequate efficiency of those mechanisms are analyzed which traditionally take care of political decisions being accepted by the public. The coming into being of a protest movement directed against the utilization of nuclear energy is the result of the integration of risks and problems specific to nuclear energy into a general discontent, widespread amongst the population, concerning the aftereffects of uncontrolled economic growth and coping with the problems by the political-administrative system. The protest movement gains in stability and effectiveness by the interplay of public discussion and protest potential which develops its own dynamic. Furthermore, decisions concerning sites constantly bring the acceptance problems to the fore again. (orig./HP) [de

  1. Nuclear law. January 2011 - July 2012

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bringuier, Pierre; Di Costanzo, Laura

    2012-01-01

    This paper gives a synthesis of legal aspects concerning nuclear power in France. The following main points are reviewed: institutional aspects (notably the independence of the Nuclear Safety Authority - ASN); transparency and public information; nuclear safety and radiation protection; nuclear materials, their control and security aspects; transports; trade and non-proliferation agreements; radioactive wastes; radiation accidents; liabilities and insurance; nuclear arms

  2. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1977. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Energy Research and Development of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, Ninety-Fifth Congress, First Session on S. 897 and S. 1432

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1978-01-01

    On April 7, 1977, President Carter announced his nuclear power policy. The policy statement set forth seven specific objectives for the future use of nuclear energy in this country and the rest of the world. The two proposed instruments for implementing this policy are the revised fiscal year 1978 ERDA authorization draft bill and S. 1432, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1977. These legislative proposals are linked in that S. 1432 is designed to establish a non-proliferation framework with specific objectives established for the ERDA nuclear energy programs. The ERDA authorization bill is the budgetary vehicle to implement those objectives. The Committee on Energy and Natural Resources obtained joint referral of certain portions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act to insure that non-proliferation policy is implemented in a manner consistent with the policy of having sufficient energy for this country and foreign countries in the future. The Subcommittee on Energy Research and Development must examine the costs and the consequences of various initiatives before they are implemented. F or example, the proposal to guarantee uranium enrichment services for foreign nations poses specific requirements on ERDA to expand considerably our enrichment capacity by the year 2000. Without reprocessing, it is expected that spent fuel rods from abroad will be returned to this country for storage with attendant costs and siting decisions. Also, international fuel-cycle evaluation programs must be carefully examined to insure that all options, including regional fuel cycle centers with international controls and inspection, are considered in seeking international approaches to the non-proliferation objectives. At the June 10 hearing, the subcommittee received testimony on S. 1432, the bill prepared by the administration. The hearings on September 13 and 14 focused on S. 897. Statements by many witnesses are included

  3. Regulations concerning the fabricating business of nuclear fuel materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    In the Law for the Regulations of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors, the regulations have all been revised on the fabrication business of nuclear fuel materials. The revised regulations are given : application for permission of the fabrication business, application for permission of the alteration, application for approval of the design and the construction methods, application for approval of the alteration, application for the facilities inspection, facilities inspection, recordings, entry limitations etc. for controlled areas, measures concerning exposure radiation doses etc., operation of the fabrication facilities, transport within the site of the business, storage, disposal within the site of the business, security regulations, designation etc. of the licensed engineer of nuclear fuels, collection of reports, etc. (Mori, K.)

  4. Regulations concerning the fabricating business of nuclear fuel materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    The Regulation is revised on the basis of ''The law for the regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors'' and the ''Provisions concerning the enterprises processing nuclear fuel materials'' in the Enforcement Ordinance for the Law, to enforce such provisions. This is the complete revision of the regulation of the same name in 1957. Terms are explained, such as exposure radiation dose, cumulative dose, control area, surrounding inspection area, persons engaged in works, radioactive wastes, area for incoming and outgoing of materials, fluctuation of stocks, batch, real stocks, effective value and main measuring points. For the applications for the permission of the enterprises processing nuclear fuel materials, the location of an enterprise, the construction of buildings and the construction of and the equipments for facilities of chemical processing, forming, coating, assembling, storage of nuclear fuel materials, disposal of radioactive wastes and radiation control must be written. Records shall be made and maintained for the periods specified on the inspection of processing facilities, nuclear fuel materials, radiation control, operation, maintainance, accidents of processing facilities and weather. Limit to entrance into the control area, measures for exposure radiation dose, patrol and inspection, operation of processing facilities, transport of materials, disposal of radioactive wastes, safety regulations are provided for. Reports to be filed by the persons engaging in the enterprises processing nuclear fuel materials are prescribed. (Okada, K.)

  5. Research on design of dialogue session concerning nuclear technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Karikawa, Daisuke; Takahashi, Makoto; Yagi, Ekou; Toba, Tae; Kitamura, Masaharu

    2010-01-01

    Toward resolving nuclear conflict, deep dialogue sessions among stakeholders having different opinions concerning nuclear technology are strongly required. In order to realize a fair and constructive dialogue session, it is necessary to pay attention to the design of the dialogue session, e.g., participant selection, agenda setting, facilitation, and rules of dialogue. The basic requirements for a dialogue session have been proposed in this study based on theoretical and empirical analyses of previous dialogue sessions on nuclear issues. The theoretical analysis has been performed based on various aspects concerning defects in nuclear communication mentioned in science and technology studies. The empirical analysis has been performed by analyzing participants' responses and by systematizing practical findings of previous dialogues. The proposed requirements for a dialogue session were utilized for the design and operation of a preliminary attempt of a dialogue session named 'Open Forum for Nuclear Communication.' Through the analysis of data, such as minutes and recorded conversations collected after the session, it has been confirmed that the prespecified requirements have been satisfied. In addition, the participants' responses have shown a high acceptance for an open forum. According to these results, the basic validity and effectiveness of the proposed requirements in the design of a dialogue session have been successfully demonstrated. (author)

  6. Technology standards for structure, etc. concerning nuclear power generating facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    Based on the Ordinance for the Technology Standards concerning Nuclear Power Generating Facilities, the technology standards are established for the vessels of class 1 to 4 (including reactor pressure vessels, reactor containment vessels, etc.), the pipes of class 1 to 3, safety valves, pressure test and monitoring test specimens. Those specified are materials, nondestructive tests, structures, shapes, shells, flanges, etc. for the vessels and the pipes, and so on. (Mori, K.)

  7. Historical survey of nonproliferation policies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldschmidt, B.

    1977-01-01

    This paper briefly surveys the successive nonproliferation policies and their influence on international commerce and the reaction of the countries where they were applied: the war policy, secrecy policy, liberal policy, safeguarded assistance policy, nonproliferation treaty policy, suppliers' policy, French policy, and the no weapon-usable material policy. It is emphasized that any new solution of the problem must not appear to delay or limit in any way a nation's access to nuclear energy, nor to make any countries dependent on others to meet their energy requirements. Therefore, in the choice of a future policy, political considerations are more important than technical or legal ones. The greatest catalyst of proliferation is the spread of national autarchic programs, and these can only be avoided within a general climate of international trust. The escalation of mistrust between the countries possessing the technological information and those desiring it must be dispelled. Such a policy will have to be clear and stable

  8. Review of GAO report on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Seventh Congress, First Session, May 21, 1981

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1981-01-01

    Three witnesses from the General Accounting Office (GAO) testified at a May 21, 1981 hearing on the results of a three-year review of the impact and implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) of 1978. A total of 115 countries have ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT), and some have urged a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Latin America. The GAO proposed recommendations for improving NNPA administration and developing a more coherent long-term policy. The GAO questions the need for additional enrichment capacity, and suggests a closer look at the need to complete the centrifuge facility. It notes only limited progress in multinational fuel-supply assurances and the establishment of international spent-fuel repositories. It urges the US to take a more-active role in these areas and in the international control system. A listing of US exports of highly enriched uranium from 1954 to 1981 follows the testimony

  9. The regulations concerning the uses of nuclear fuel materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    The regulations are defined under the law for the regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors and provisions concerning the uses of nuclear fuel materials in the order for execution of the law. Basic concepts and terms are explained, such as: exposure dose; accumulative dose; controlled area; inspected surrounding area and employee. The application for permission shall state the expected period and amount of the uses for each kind of nuclear fuel materials. Persons to whom spent fuels shall be sold, lent or returned and the method of disposal of such fuels shall be also indicated. Records shall be made and kept for particular periods for each works and enterprise on inspection of facilities, control of dose, maintenance and accident of facilities in use. The application for permission of the safeguard regulations shall report rules for each works and enterprise on the faculty and organization of controllers of facilities in use, safeguard education of employees, operation of apparatus which needs special control for prevention of disaster, establishment of controlled and inspected surrounding areas, entrance limitation, inspection of exposure dose, etc. Technical standards of the uses of nuclear fuel materials, disposal and transportation in the works and the enterprise and storage are stipulated in detail. Reports on exposure dose of employees and other specified matters shall be submitted every year to the Director General of Science and Technology Agency according to the forms attached. (Okada, K.)

  10. Regulations concerning the fabricating business of nuclear fuel materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    Regulations specified here cover application for such matters as permission for an undertaking of processing, alteration (of location, structure, arrangements, processing method, etc.), approval of design and construction plan, approval of alteration (of design and construction plan of processing facilities), and inspection of the facilities. The regulations also cover execution of facilities inspection, certificate of facilities inspection, processing facilities subject to welding inspection, application for welding inspection, execution of welding inspection, facilities not subject to welding inspection, approval of welding method, welding inspection for imported equipment, certificate of welding inspection, application for approval of joint management, notice of alteration, etc., cancellation of permission, record keeping, restriction on access to areas under management measures concerning exposure to radioactive rays, patrol and checking in processing facilities, operation of processing equipment, transportation within plant or operation premises, storage, waste disposal within plant or operation premises, safety rules, public notification concerning examination and successful applicants, procedure for application for examination, reissue of certificate for nuclear fuel handling expert, return of certificate for nuclear fuel handling expert, submission of report, measures for emergency, notice of abolition of business, measures concerning cancellation of permission, identification card, etc. (Nogami, K.)

  11. Internationalization: an alternative to nuclear proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meller, E.

    1980-01-01

    Leading personalities in the field of nuclear energy worldwide assess possible improvements to the present nonproliferation regime and explore the possibilities for the internationalization of sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. Their studies address past and current nonproliferation policies, the current controversy between the United States and its European allies on the development of fast breeder reactors and plutonium recycling, implications of the recent US Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 upon US/Euratom relations, industrial government relationships, safety concerns, and the special needs of developing countries. Their conclusions stress the recognition of complex factors such as military security, technical competition, the spread of nuclear technology, and politics that will limit any mechanism to govern nonproliferation. They urge greater effort in educating the public to the political and economic complexities of nuclear power and recommend strengthening international agreements and other arrangements, including controls and safeguards, and the general rules for the international trade of nuclear fuel. 11 figures, 7 tables

  12. Perception of the People Concerning Nuclear Power Plant for Electricity

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suroyo, A.M. Djuliati

    2003-01-01

    Preliminary research on the perception and resistance of the people concerning government's plan to build a nuclear power plant for electricity at Muria peninsula, in Jepara, has that some people refused, some were ready to accept, and some just hesitated. In general the beaurocrats accepted the plan, although some felt doubtful since they are in change of environment conservation. Parliament members and religious leaders have the tendency to be doubtful in response of the government's plan on nuclear power plant. Those NGO members, especially these under young activist leaders have refused the plan, while other religious leaders and some rural leaders tend to accept it. The various perception and attitudes which exist in the society are mostly caused by conditions such as one's position, his group's perception in which he attached to, and factors either socio-cultural, socio-political, or socio-economics. Especially those with negative perception were actually influenced by the feeling of distrust to the government. At this time the government is trying to rebuild people's confidence by planning some development programs with bottom-up approach, but since it has a bad reputation in the post, that different attitudes have emerged toward state's projects, since in the past many persons have corrupted the project they carried-out for their own benefit. The various attitudes of the people toward the government have their impact on the government plan to build nuclear plant in Jepara. In this situation it will be more who reject the plan. To this moment is seems that the government has not successfully changed its image to have public trust, due to their prejudice to government projects, more over for its nuclear power plant. Input of information, especially about nuclear. They select information about nuclear mostly from the negative side only, although there should be also positive side

  13. COGEMA's national advertising campaign concerning nuclear fuel recycling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gallot, Christine

    1999-01-01

    Goals of COGEMA's advertising campaign concerning nuclear fuel recycling are to: speak out in an area where COGEMA has legitimacy and is expected; and to take part in the discussion to support and defend an activity that is important for COGEMA. Targets are: back up opinion relays by reaching the general public; and back COGEMA personnel. The advertising strategy can be defined as follows: what is recommended for other industries (sorting and then recycling) is COGEMA's practice for spent fuel, with very significant advantages for the community in terms of economy and ecology

  14. The regulations concerning the uses of nuclear fuel materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    Regulations specified here cover application for permission for use of nuclear fuel substances, application for alteration (of method for spent fuel disposal, etc.), application for inspection of facilities, execution of inspection of facilities, (airtight properties test, watertight properties test, corrosion resistance test, chemical analytical test, non-destructive test, mechanical test, pressure resistance test, leakage test), issue of certificate, technical standards concerning construction (geometry, resistance to earthquake, airtight performance, shielding wall, alarm system, waste disposal capacity, emergency power source, etc.), facilities subject to welding inspection, application for welding inspection, execution of welding inspection, facilities not subject to welding inspection, certificate of welding method, resord keeping, safety rules, technical standards for operation, technical standards for waste disposal within plant or for operation premises, transportation within plant or operation premises, technical standards for storage, submission of report, measures for emergency, notice of abolition of business operation, notice of disorganization, measures concerning cancellation of permission, identification card, etc. (Nogami, K.)

  15. New evolution of safeguards and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seyama, K.; Kurihara, H.

    1999-01-01

    Since the end of the Cold War, circumstances concerning international safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation have changed drastically. At this stage, early introduction of a strengthened and streamlined new safeguards system and broad implementation of the verification activities regarding nuclear material from dismantled nuclear weapons are expected, and in the near future, the international community is expected to establish a verification regime under the Cut Off Treaty. From now on, the roles of the IAEA will become more important in these new areas. At the same time the efficiency of the activities is essential from a financial and human resources aspect in order to introduce those measures smoothly. On the other hand, the Member States should cooperate with the IAEA to improve the transparency of its nuclear policy and activities. Taking account of such circumstances, first, the authors will explain the non-proliferation policy of Japan. Second, the authors will introduce the present status of Japan's safeguards system and activities. Finally, the authors will present several tasks which are important for the IAEA and Japanese safeguards for coming several years. (author)

  16. Israel's position on non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marom, R.

    1986-01-01

    Israel maintained that the complex international system and worldwide political tension created a situation in which comprehensive plans of disarmament could not produce any positive result. The deadlock in the field of general and complete disarmament has brought Israel to the realization that one possible way to alleviate the stalemate could be progress by stages through partial measures of disarmament. Israel's position on non-proliferation indicates that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone (NWFZ), as it relates to the Middle-East, could serve as a credible alternative to the unilateral adherence to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon (NPT) and an effective measure of non-proliferation in the region. (Author)

  17. The Signing of the U.S.-India Agreement Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jörn Müller

    2009-02-01

    Definitions */ @page {mso-footnote-separator:url("file:///C:/DOKUME~1/mlippold/LOKALE~1/Temp/msohtml1/01/clip_header.htm" fs; mso-footnote-continuation-separator:url("file:///C:/DOKUME~1/mlippold/LOKALE~1/Temp/msohtml1/01/clip_header.htm" fcs; mso-endnote-separator:url("file:///C:/DOKUME~1/mlippold/LOKALE~1/Temp/msohtml1/01/clip_header.htm" es; mso-endnote-continuation-separator:url("file:///C:/DOKUME~1/mlippold/LOKALE~1/Temp/msohtml1/01/clip_header.htm" ecs;} @page Section1 {size:612.0pt 792.0pt; margin:70.85pt 70.85pt 2.0cm 70.85pt; mso-header-margin:36.0pt; mso-footer-margin:36.0pt; mso-paper-source:0;} div.Section1 {page:Section1;} -->

    On 10 October 2008, the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the Indian Minister of External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee signed the “Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy” (hereafter: US-India Agreement.[1]

    The text of the US-India Agreement had been agreed upon in summer 2007; the text was released on 3 August 2007. Preliminary assessments were mixed: Some scholars were highly critical, going so far as dubbing it a “debilitating blow to

  18. The regulations concerning refining business of nuclear source material and nuclear fuel materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1981-01-01

    This rule is established under the provisions concerning refining business in the law concerning the regulation of nuclear raw materials, nuclear fuel materials and nuclear reactors and the ordinance for the execution of this law, and to enforce them. Basic terms are defined, such as: exposure radiation dose, cumulative dose, control area, surrounding monitoring area and worker. The application for the designation for refining business under the law shall be classified into the facilities for crushing and leaching-filtration, thikening, and refining, the storage facilities for nuclear raw materials and nuclear fuel materials, and the disposal facilities for radioactive wastes, etc. To the application, shall be attached business plans, the explanations concerning the technical abilities of applicants and the prevention of hazards by nuclear raw materials and nuclear fuel materials regarding refining facilities, etc. Records shall be made on the accept, delivery and stock of each kind of nuclear raw materials and nuclear fuel materials, radiation control, the maintenance of and accidents in refining facilities, and kept for specified periods, respectively. Security regulations shall be enacted for each works or enterprise on the functions and organizations of persons engaged in the control of refining facilities, the operation of the apparatuses which must be controlled for the prevention of accidents, and the establishment of control area and surrounding monitoring area, etc. The report on the usage of internationally regulated goods and the measures taken at the time of danger are defined particularly. (Okada, K.)

  19. Perspectives and benefits of the non-proliferating fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Parker, F.

    2012-01-01

    The world community has faced the issues of nuclear non-proliferation for decades. Frank Parker, Emeritus Distinguished Professor at Vanderbilt University, has proposed a non-proliferating fuel cycle, which greatly reduces the risk of use of nuclear materials for military purpose. A simplified fuel cycle with reduced opportunities for proliferation of nuclear weapons and permanent disposal of radioactive wastes as well as a reference sub-seabed HLW disposal system are described [ru

  20. The text of the Agreement of 22 February 1978 between Paraguay and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-08-01

    The full text of the agreement between Paraguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America is presented

  1. Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Dominican Republic to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Dominican Republic to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

  2. The text of the agreement of 11 June 1971 between Finland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons came into force for Finland on 1 October 1995. As a result of the coming into force of the aforesaid Agreement for Finland, the application of safeguards under the Agreement of 11 June 1971, which entered into force on 9 February 1972, between Finland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has been suspended

  3. Public concerns and choices regarding nuclear-waste repositories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rankin, W.L.; Nealey, S.M.

    1981-06-01

    Survey research on nuclear power issues conducted in the late 1970's has determined that nuclear waste management is now considered to be one of the most important nuclear power issues both by the US public and by key leadership groups. The purpose of this research was to determine the importance placed on specific issues associated with high-level waste disposal. In addition, policy option choices were asked regarding the siting of both low-level and high-level nuclear waste repositories. A purposive sampling strategy was used to select six groups of respondents. Averaged across the six respondent groups, the leakage of liquid wastes from storage tanks was seen as the most important high-level waste issue. There was also general agreement that the issue regarding water entering the final repository and carrying radioactive wastes away was second in importance. Overall, the third most important issue was the corrosion of the metal containers used in the high-level waste repository. There was general agreement among groups that the fourth most important issue was reducing safety to cut costs. The fifth most important issue was radioactive waste transportation accidents. Overall, the issues ranked sixth and seventh were, respectively, workers' safety and earthquakes damaging the repository and releasing radioactivity. The eighth most important issue, overall, was regarding explosions in the repository from too much radioactivity, which is something that is not possible. There was general agreement across all six respondent groups that the two least important issues involved people accidentally digging into the site and the issue that the repository might cost too much and would therefore raise electricity bills. These data indicate that the concerns of nuclear waste technologists and other public groups do not always overlap

  4. International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament - A possible international regime to cover radiological materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hautecouverture, Benjamin

    2009-10-01

    as radioactivity cannot be eliminated but only transferred from one place to another. Although it is difficult to give any precise figure, costs could in this case soar to trillions of dollars. The international community has begun concerning itself with nuclear and radiological terrorism officially since 9/11. In a rather unusual way in the field of international security, implementation of instruments to combat radiological terrorism anticipated the materialization of the risk. It is legitimate to ask oneself today if we have at our disposal an in-depth defence strategy, in which the many existing layers of action are integrated effectively. In the negative, it could be that a sense of false security proves more worrying and damageable than the threat itself. It is important to keep in mind that the international struggle against radiological terrorism necessitates long term efforts. IAEA, as an institution, appears to be, at least officially, the cornerstone of radiological safety and security. Although the initiatives of the Agency are based on the good will of Member States (action plans, code of conduct, recommendations, guides, partnerships, etc.), the inklings of an international regime on the issue have emerged, through iterated cooperation within the Agency. In this context, the risk of the emergence of a two-tier system, in which the bottom tier would be composed of comprehensive but ineffective mechanisms (multilateral awareness and non-binding or unverifiable tools), and the upper tier of fragmented and unbalanced ones ('coalition of like-minded' approach), is real. The project to move towards a more integrated regime to cover radiological materials thus seems a timely one. On a political level, five main issues at least must be addressed in order to establish a more comprehensive and effective international architecture for radiological and nuclear security: - integration and increased coherence necessitates financing and institutional authority (who

  5. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998 [fr

  6. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Canada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between Canada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998 [fr

  7. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 June 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 18 September 2003 [fr

  8. The Text of the Agreement of 2 October 1977 between Maldives and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    The text of the Agreement of 2 October 1977, and of the Protocol thereto, between Maldives and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 2 October 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

  9. Text of the Agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Succession by the Czech Republic

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-07-01

    In a communication received on 24 March 1993, the Government of the Czech Republic informed the Director General, inter alia, that by virtue of succession to the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, it was a Party, with effect from 1 January 1993, to the Agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [es

  10. The Text of the Agreement of 24 April 1977 between Afghanistan and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-04-01

    The text of the Agreement of 24 April 1977, and of the Protocol thereto, between Afghanistan and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 20 February 1978. The Protocol entered into force on the same date pursuant to Article II thereof.

  11. The Text of the Agreement of 30 January 1973 between Morocco and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1976-01-01

    The text of the Agreement of 30 January 1973, and of the Protocol thereto, between Morocco and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 18 February 1975, pursuant to Article 25. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

  12. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 24 September 2008. It was signed on 22 April 2010 in Berlin, Germany, and on 26 April 2010 in Vienna, Austria [es

  13. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 June 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 18 September 2003 [es

  14. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 September 1997. It was signed in Vienna on 30 September 1997 [es

  15. Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 30 January 1973 between Morocco and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 30 January 1973 between the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2004. It was signed on 22 September 2004 in Vienna, Austria [es

  16. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Turkey and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 7 June 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 6 July 2000

  17. The Text of the Agreement of 2 October 1977 between Maldives and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1977-11-29

    The text of the Agreement of 2 October 1977, and of the Protocol thereto, between Maldives and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 2 October 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

  18. The Text of the Agreement of 26 February 1975 between Sudan and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1977-06-10

    The text of the Agreement of 26 February 1975 and of the Protocol thereto, between Sudan and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 7 January 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

  19. The Text of the Agreement of 28 July 1975 between Swaziland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1975-12-18

    The text of the Agreement of 28 July 1975, and of the Protocol thereto, between Swaziland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 28 July 1975, pursuant to Article 24 thereof. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

  20. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 26 November 1998, and entered into force on 22 August 2000